Although O PA entitles its m otion a “Motion for Judgment on the Pleading s, or, in the 1 Alternative, for Summary J udg ment,” the Court tre ats OPA’s motion solely as a motion for judgme nt under F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure ( “Rule”) 56—and not for judg ment on the pleading s under Rule 12(c ). OPA has, f or example, submitted with it s motion t he De clar ation of Helen M. B ollwerk (“ First B ollwerk De cl.”) , which it relies upon throughout its m otion. As Rule 12(d) make s clea

r, “[i] f, on a motion under Rule [] 12(c), matters outside the ple ading s are prese nted to and not excluded by the cour t, the motion mus t be treated as one for summary judgme nt under Rule 56.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). GE OR GE L ARDN ER, Plaintiff,
v. DEPARTMENT OF J USTI CE, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 08-1398 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Jul y 31, 2009) Plaintiff, Georg e L ardne r, filed the a bove-c aptioned ac tion ag ainst Defe ndant Off ice of the Pard on

Attor ne y (“ OPA ” ), a

c omp on e nt o f t

he De pa rtme nt o f Jus tic e (“ DO J”) , p ur su ant t o the Fr eedom of

Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552, seekingdisclosure of the identities of pardon a pplicants and c ommutation applicants whose applica tions had been de nied during former President Geor g e W. Bush’s ter m in office. Curr ently

pendingbefor e the Court ar e the pa rt ie s’ c ro ss- mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Af

te r t ho ro ug hly

re vie wi ngthe pa

rt ie s’ 1 submissi ons, including the attachme nts thereto, applica ble ca se law, statutory

authority , and the
rec ord of the c ase a s a whole, the Court shall GRANT I N PART and DENYI

N PART Plainti ff’ s [9] Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt a

nd sh a ll G RA

NT I N PA RT a

nd DENYI N PA RTAs a pre liminary matter, Court strictly

adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h)(1) 2 and “a ssumes that fac ts identified by the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are admitted, unless such a f

act is controve rted in the stateme nt of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” L CvR 7(h)(1). Ac cording ly , the Court shall either r efe r to Plaintiff’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“Pl.’s Stmt.”) or De fenda nt’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“D ef.’ s Stm t.”), un le ss a pa rt y dis pute s a

pr of fe re d f a c t and cites to contra

ry evidenc e in the re cord. The Court sh a ll a lso c ite to e vid e nc e in t he re c or d ( inc lud ingthe de c laratio ns su bmi tte d b y

the pa rt ie s) wher e appr opriate, to provide information not cover ed by the par ties’ statements of material fa c ts. Th e Court

fi nd s th at th e re is n o g e nu ine dis pute ov e r t he fa c tua l is su e s th at are mate ri a l to resolution of this case
. 2 Def endant’ s [10] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment. Specifica lly , the Court DENI ES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defe ndant’s motion with respec t to the issues of collater al estoppel and se g reg abilty , but GRANTS Plainti ff’ s motion and DENI ES Defe ndant’s motion with respec t to the propriety of withholding the reque sted information under Ex emptions 6 and 7(C). OPA is there fore require d to disclose to Plainti ff the r esponsive lists of pardon a nd
c omm utatio ns a pp lic ants wh os e a

pp lic atio ns we re de nie d b y Pr e sid e nt B us h d

ur inghis te rm

in office
. I. BACKG ROUND A. OP

A a nd theCle me nc

yProc ess Th e fa c ts o f t

his c a se are str a ig htf

or wa rd . O PA i s th e c omp on e nt w ith in D OJ th at is assig ned to ca

rry out the function of a ssisti ngthe President in the exerc ise of his cleme ncy power s. SeeDe c laratio n o f H e le n M . B oll we rk , D e puty Pard on Attor ne y (h e re ina ft e r “ F ir st Bollwe rk De cl.”) , submitt ed in support of De fenda nt’s Motion for Summary J udg ment, ¶ 3. 2 OPA rec eives pe titions addre ssed to the President for all forms of e x ecutive c lemency (including pardon, c ommutation of sentence , remission of fine, a nd repr ieve) for f

eder al cr iminal offense s and conduc ts the appropr iate investig ations on the merits of those pe titions
. Id. OPA then uses3

the information collec ted to prepa re r eports (“ letters of a dvice” ) advisingthe President about the
rec ommended disposition of indivi dual ca ses. Id. ¶ 3. As Ms. B ollwerk e x plains, the letters of advice “conta in[ ] a frank a nd candid a

naly sis of the offe nse, the a pplicant’s re habilitation and suitabilit y for c lemency , and the likely impact of a

g rant of c lemency .” Id. ¶ 4. Pursuant to Article I I , Section 2 of the Constituti on, the President has the exclusive authority to make fina l decisions in clemenc y case s. Id. ¶ 6 . A c c or din g ly , th e Pr e sid e nt i s f re e to disreg ard O PA’s rec ommendation or to ac t without any involvement from the OPA wha tsoever. Id. OPA , h ow e ve r, c on c e de s th at “ the Pr e sid e nt h a s tr a dit ion a lly re lie d h e avil y

on the [OPA ’s ] advice in clemenc y

case s to inform his decision-making .” Id. ¶ 6. On c e the Pr e sid e nt m ake s h is f ina l de c isi on

wh e the r t o g ra

nt o r d e ny

a c le me nc y

re qu e st, OPA is then char g ed with implementing that decision. See id. ¶¶ 15- 17. I f the Preside nt decides to gran t clemenc y , OPA is notified of that dec ision and is then responsible for prepa ringand executing the appropr iate cle mency war rant. Id. ¶ 15. In addition, OPA is responsible for providing DOJ’s Office of Public Affa irs with a memora ndum advising it of the Pre sident’s decision to g rant c lemency as we ll as the date of

the President’s f

avora ble ac tion, the name of the clemenc y rec ipient, the city

and state of

his residenc e, the of

fense for whic h clemenc y was g ra nte d, the date and

dis tr ic t of

c onvic tio n, the se nte nc e imp os e d, and the name a s w e ll a s c ity and state of

residenc e of the applicant’ s attorney , if the applica nt was re prese nted. Id. ¶ 1 7. Th is information is also rea dily available to the g ener al public for r eview on D OJ ’s website. See http:// www.usdoj.g ov/pardon/re cipients.htm (last visited J uly 30, 2009). I f the Preside nt decides, how ever , to deny clemenc y , the Off

ice of the Counsel to the President provides OPA with wr itten notification that the reque st for cle mency has bee n denied.4

Id. ¶ 15. This written notification serve s as the off icial re cord of

the President’s a ction on the clemenc y reque sts of those applicants, a nd is retained by

OPA, which plac es a c opy of the notification in the individual applicant’s c lemency file and a lso recor ds the information in OPA’s automated database . Second B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 5. As is par ticularly rele vant to the instant action, OPA admits that it m aintains lists of clemency applicants whose applications have been de nied. Plaintiff’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“Pl.’s Stmt.”), ¶ 17; Def endant’ s Response ¶ 17. OPA is also responsible for notifying e ach a

pplicant in writing of the Preside nt’s decision to deny the applica

nt’s clemenc y

reque st. First Bollwe rk De cl. ¶ 15. Althoug h, in contrast to a g rant of c lemency , OPA does not ty pically notify the Off ice of Public Affair s when the Pre sident denies a reque st for cle mency , id. ¶ 17, OPA re serve s the rig ht to do so in “cases of substantial public interest,” D ef.’ s MSJ , Ex . E (Privac y Act stateme nt). Moreove r, as a matter of g ener al prac tice, the OPA f

ree ly discloses identifying inf

ormation about unsucc essful cle mency applicants to any

member of

the public upon a r equest for information about a pa

rticular pe rson. Id. ¶¶ 19- 20. OPA provides for mal notice of its pra ctice of disclosure in the F eder al Reg ister as well as in its Privacy

Act stateme nt, which is included in and made a par t of eve ry clemenc y application. Id. ¶ 20. Specific ally , the Fe dera l Reg ister notice a dvices intere sted parties that OPA will publicly

disclose the followinginformation to “[a] member of the public who ha s reque sted information conc erninga spec ific, name d person:” whether a clemency

application has be en filed, a nd if so, the date on which it was filed, the ty

pe of c lemency

soug ht, the offe nse(s) for which clemenc y is sought, the date and c ourt of c onvic tio n, the se nte nc e imp os e d, the de c isi on of the Pr e sid e nt t o g rant or de ny

clemenc y

and the date of that de cision, the admini strative closure of a clemenc y reque st and the date of such c losure. 67 Fe d. Reg . 66417, 66417-18. Simil arly , OPA’s Privacy Act stateme nt advises cleme ncyInf i l i n gth e i n s t an ta c t i o n , P l a i n t i f f a l s o c h a l l e n g e d

O P A ’ s r e s p o n s e t o a

s e c o n d F O IA 3 reque st he had submitted to OPA on Febr uary 11, 2008, in which he soug ht copies of OPA’ s annual a nd quarte rly

status reports. See Compl. ¶¶ 10-13. As set for th in the parties’ Stipulation fi le d w iththi s Co ur

t on Oc tob e r 1 6, 20 08 , th e pa rt ie s h ave mut

ua lly re so lve d a ll i ssu e s r e late d to the Fe bruar

y 11, 2008 FOIA re quest, and Plaintiff has a g ree d to voluntary dismiss those portions of his Complaint based on his request for copies of O PA’s annual a nd quarte rly

status reports. See Stipul ation, Docke t No. [8]
. 5 applicants that OPA will advise a third-par ty , “[u] pon specific reque st,” “whe ther a named pe rs on ha s b e e n g ra

nte d o r d e nie d c le me nc y ,” F ir st. B oll we rk De c l. ¶ 20 , a nd that th e OPA “may” pre pare a “public a ffa irs notice . . . desc ribing . . . a denia l of cleme ncy in case s of substantial public interest,” De f.’s MSJ , Ex . E (Privac y Act stateme nt). As of Nove mber 3, 2008, President B ush had g rante d 157 pardons a nd six commutations of sentenc e, and ha d denied 1,535 pardon r equests and 6,290 c ommutation requests duringhis administration. Id. B. Plain tif

f’ s F OI A R e qu est By letter dated April 10, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA re quest to OPA seekingthe identities of all those denied pa rdons and, se parately , all those denied c ommutations by President Bush dur ing his ter

m in office. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Defenda nt’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“D ef.’ s Stmt .” ), ¶ 1 . O PA d e c lin e d to pr od uc e any of the lis ts o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants reta ined by

OPA or any

other potentially

responsive doc uments, citing F OIA Exempti ons 6 and 7(C) as the ba sis for withholding a ll responsive re cords. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 3 & Ex. B (May 22, 2008 L etter f rom OPA to Plainti ff) ; Defe ndant’s Response Stateme nt (“De f.’s Resp.” ), ¶ 3. Plaintiff appea led the denia l of his FOIA re quest by letter dated J une 9, 2008. Pl.’s Stmt . ¶ 4 & Ex . C (June 9, 2008 L etter f

rom Plaintiff to OPA); Def.’ s Resp. ¶ 4. On August, 12, 2008, having
rec eived no r esponse to his appe al, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the above- captioned matter. SeePl.’s St mt. ¶ 5; Def.’ s Resp. ¶ 5; Compl., Docket No. [1]
. There afte r, by letter dated 3On Novembe r 13, 2008, the pa rties advised the Court that they had re solved disputes 4 relating to a third F OIA re quest, which wa s submitt ed on Nove mber 13, 2008 by Plaintiff to the OPA seeking , inte r a lia , specific information as to ea ch par don applicant a nd commutation applicant whose application wa s denied by President B ush. See Stipul ation, Docke t No. [11] , ¶ 1
. S p e c i f i c a l l y , P l a i n t i f

f s o u g h t th e f o l l o w i n gi n f

o r m at i o ni nth e N o v e mb e r

1 1 , 2 0 0 8 F O IA reque st as to eac h pardon a nd commutation applicant whose application had be en denie d by President B ush: (a) the nature of the a pplicant’s off

ense; (b) the sentenc e imposed upon him; (c) the date of

sentenc ing; ( d) the date of the Pre sident’s dec ision denying c lemency ; (e) the date ( or at least the year) whe n the application was filed; and ( f) whe ther the a pplicant soug ht pardon or commutation. See id. Th e pa rt ie s h ave sin c e a dv ise d th e Court that O PA h a s a g re e d to dis c los e the re quested infor

mation—but without t he name that corr esponds to eac h applicant’ s data. Id. ¶ 3. In return f

or disclosure of

this information, Pl aintiff agree d to withdraw a ll other aspec ts of the No ve mbe r 1 3, 20 08 F OIA r e qu e st a nd “ no t to re qu e st a

ny fe e s o r c os ts i n c onne c tio n w ith briefingthe issue of segreg ability raised in the f

ilings in this action.” Id. ¶¶ 4- 5. Th e pa

rt ie s, h o w e v e r , d i s a g r e e a s t o w h e th e r th e i n f o r m at i o nr e qu e s t e d

i nth e N o v e mb e r

1 3 , 2 0 0 8 F O IA re qu e st i s a lso pr op e rl y

e nc omp a sse d b y

Pla int if f’ s Apr il 1 0, 20 08 F OIA r e qu e st at is su e in t his lawsuit. Id. ¶ 2. None theless, as Plaintiff’s c oncer ns with respec t to that information have now been r esolved by

stipulation, t he par

ties ag ree that the sole “issue r emainingin this action and that must be resolved by

the Court is whether the defe ndant must disclose the names of pardon a p p li c an ts an d

c o mm u tati o na p p li c an ts w h o s e a

p p li c ati o n s w e r e d e n ie d

b y Pr e s id e n t G e o r g e W. Bush.” Id. ¶ 7. 6 September 5, 2008, Plaintiff wa s advised that the DO J was c losing his appe al file, in lig ht of the fi lin gof the ins tant l aws uit . Pl .’ s Stmt. ¶ 5 & Ex. D (S e pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 8 L e tte r f ro m D OJ to Plaintiff); Def.’ s Resp. ¶ 5. As stipulated by

the par ties, the sole issue now bef ore the Court is whether OPA may proper ly withhold the names of pa rdon and c ommutation applicants (collec tively , “cle mency
a pp lic ants ” ) who se a

pp lic atio ns we re de nie d b y Pr e sid e nt B us h. Th e pa rt ie s h ave fi le d th e ir 4 respe ctive cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. SeePl. ’s Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt, Docke t No. [9] , (“Pl.’s MSJ ”); De f.’s Motion for Judgment on the Plea dings or , in the Alternative, for Summary J udg ment, Docke t No. [10] , (“D ef.’ s MJ S”). Eac h party has also filed their re spective oppositions, see Plaintiff’s Opposition to Def.’s MSJ , Docke t No. [13] , (“Pl.’s Opp’n” ); Def

endant’ s Opposition to P laintiff’s MSJ , Docke t No. [14] , (“D ef.’ s Opp’n”) , and7

replies, seePlaintiff’s Reply , Docke t No. [15] , (“Pl.’s Reply”); De fenda nt’s Reply , Docke t No. [16] , (“D ef.’ s Reply ”). B riefingis theref ore c omplete, and the pa

rties’ c ross-motions are now ripe for the Court’s re view and r esolution. II. LEGAL STANDARD In revie winga motion for summary judgme nt under F OIA, the Court must conduct a de
novo revie w of the r ecor d. See5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ). In the FO I A context, “ de novo revie w require s the Court to ‘asce rtain whe ther the a g ency has sustained its burden of demonstratingthat the documents re quested . . . a re e x empt from disclosure under [] FOIA.’” Assassinati on Arc hiv es &Re

se arc h Ct r. v. Cent. Intelligenc e Age ncy , 334 F.3d 55, 57 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (qu o t i n g Summers v . Dep’ t of Justice , 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 ( D.C. Cir. 1998)). Summary judgme nt is proper whe n “the plea dings, the discovery [i f any] and disclosure mater ials on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Un de r F OIA, a ll und e rl yingfa c ts a nd inf e re nc e s a re ana ly zed in t he light m os t f

avo ra ble to the FOIA re quester; a s such, only afte r an a g ency

seekingsummary

judgme nt proves that it has fully discharg ed its FOIA obligations is s ummary judgme nt appropriate. Mo or e v . A sp in , 9 16 F. S u p p 3 2 , 3 5 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)). In opposing a

motion for summary

judgme nt, a par

ty must offer mor e than c onclusory statements. See B roaddrick v. E xec . Office of President , 139 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D .C. 2001) (c i t i n g Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)). Indeed, a plaintiff pursuingan ac tion under F OIA must establish that the ag ency has improper ly

claimed a

n exemption as a matter of la w or that the a g ency

has fa iled to seg reg ate a

nd disclose all non-8

exempt information in the requested doc uments. Se e Pe rry -T orre s v . D e p’ t of Sta te , 4 04 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D.D.C. 2005). Congr ess ena cted F OIA for the purpose of introducingtranspar ency to gove rnment activities. See Ste rn v. Fed. B ureau of Inve stigati on , 7 37 F .2 d 8 4, 88 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 4) . Co ng re ss
rema ined sensitive, howeve r, to the nee d to achieve balanc e betwe en this objective a nd the
vu lne ra bil ity of “ le g iti mate g ov e rnme nta l and pr ivate int e re sts [that] c ou ld b e ha rm e d b y re le a se of ce rtain ty

pes of infor

mation.” Criti cal Mass Energy Project v. Nuc lear Regulatory Comm’n , 97 5 F .2 d 8 71 , 8 72 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 2) ; see also Summe rs v. DOJ , 140 F.3d 1077, 1079 ( D.C. Cir. 19 98 ). Ac c or din g ly , F OIA p ro vid e s n ine e xemp tio ns purs ua nt t o whic h a

n a g e nc y may wi thh old reque sted information. See5 U .S. C. § § 5 52 (a )( 4) (B ), (b )( 1) -( 9) . T he a g e nc y mus t de mon str ate the validity

of any exemption t hat it asserts. See id. ; Bec k v. D OJ , 9 97 F .2 d 1 48 9, 14 91 (D .C. Cir. 1993) (“[c]onsistent with t he purpose of the Ac t, the burden is on the a g ency to justi fy wi thh old ingre qu e ste d d oc ume nts ” ). In a dd iti on , s umm ary jud g me nt m ay

be g ra nte d o n th e ba sis of the a g ency ’s ac company ing a ffidavits or de clar ations if they descr ibe “the justifications for
no nd isc los ur e wi th r e a so na bly sp e c if ic de ta il, de mon str ate that th e inf or matio n w ithhe ld l og ic a lly falls within the claimed e x emption, and ar e not controve rted by either c ontrary

evidenc e in the
rec ord nor e vidence of ag ency bad fa ith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). These aff idavits may

be submitted by

an off icial who coor dinated the se arc h, and nee d not be from e ach individual who pa rticipated in the se arc h. See Safe Card Servs. v. Se c. &Exc h. Comm’n , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). An ag ency

also has the bur den of de tailing what proportion of the infor mation in a document is non-exempt and how that mater ial is dispersed throug hout the document. Mead9

Data Cent. Inc. v . U.S. Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 ( D.C. Cir. 1977). Any non-exempt information that is rea sonably seg reg able f

rom the re quested re cords must be disclosed. Ogelsby v. U.S. De p’t of Army , 79 F.3d 1172, 1178 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition, district courts are
re qu ir e d to c on sid e r s e g re g a bil ity iss ue s su a s

po ntee ve n whe n th e pa

rt ie s h ave no t sp e c if

ic a lly raised suc h claims. Trans-Pac. Policing Agree ment v. U .S. Customs Serv. , 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999). III . D ISC USS ION As discussed above , OPA has withheld the re quested infor mation pursuant to Ex emptions 6 and 7(C). Plaintiff initially contends that OPA is collater ally estopped fr om assertingthat the
name s o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants may

be wi thh e ld u

nd e r E xemp tio n 6 . Pl a int if f a lso contends that e ven if the Court we re to re ach the merits of OPA’s withholding under Exemption 6, the balanc e of the private a nd public interests implicated by disclosure in this instance mandates that OPA relea se the names of the unsuc cessf ul clemenc y

applicants. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the doc uments at issue are not “law e nforc ement re cords” for pur poses of FOIA, and ther efor e OPA is not entitled to withhold t he identities of the unsuc cessf ul clemenc y applicants pursua

nt to Ex emption 7(C) either. T he Court first addr esses the que stion of collatera l estoppel bef

ore the n turning to the merits of the pa rties’ a rguments reg ardingthe proprie ty of OPA’s withholdings unde r Exemptions 6 and 7(C). F inally , the Court examines the question of
s e g r e g a b i l i ty. A. Collat eral Estoppel Does Not Prec lude OPA from Litigati ng the Propriety of W ithholding t he Information Reque sted Pursuant to Exemption 6 As explained above, O PA has ref used to disclose re sponsive materia l list ing the names of
c l e m e n c y a p p l i c an t s w h o s e a

p p l i c at i o n s w e r e d e n i e d

b y P r e s i d e n tB u s hb a s e d , i np art , o nF O IA10

Ex emption 6. Plainti ff initially argues that OPA is barr ed by collater al estoppel fr om withholding the r equeste d information. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, the pa rties litigate d this iss ue to a final judg ment in an ea

rlier a ction, Lardner v. DOJ , Civ. Act. No. 03-180, 2005 WL758267 (D.D.C. Mar . 31, 2005) (he reina fter “ Lar dn e r I ”). O PA disag ree s, arguing that collatera l estoppel is not appropriate. For the re asons set for

th below, the Court agree s with OPA that Plaintiff has failed to show that collatera l estoppel applies in this instance. “Collatera l estoppel, or issue pre clusion, provides that ‘onc e a c ourt has dec ided an issue of fa ct or lawnece ssary

to its j udg ment, that decision may prec lude re litigation of the issue in a suit on a differ ent ca

use of a ction involving a pa rty to the first ca se.’” Sto ne hil l v. Inte rnal Rev enue Se rv. , 5 3 4 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Al le n v . M c Cur ry , 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)) , aff’d

558 F.3d 534 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). The doc trine re quires thre e ele ments: “‘(1) the same issue now be ing r aised must have be en conte sted by the par ties and submitted for judicial deter mination in the prior case ; (2) the issue must have been a ctually and nec essar ily

deter mined by a c ourt of c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n in that pr ior c a se ; and (3 ) p re c lus ion

in t he se c on d c a se mus t not work a ba sic unfair

ness to the par

ty bound by the first dete rmination.’” Martin v. DOJ , 488 F. 3 d 4 4 6 , 4 5 4 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Y amaha Corp. of Am. v. United States , 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The party invoking c ollatera l estoppel “be ars the bur den of e stablishing that the conditions for its application have been satisfied.” In re Subpoe na Duce s Tecum Issue d to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n , 439 F.3d 470, 743 ( D.C. Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has failed to show that the first eleme nt is satisfied— i.e. , that the issue now beingraised is the sa

me issue that was pr eviously contested by

the par ties and submitted for de te rm inatio n in

the pr ior c a se . Rathe r, the Court

c on c lud e s th at th e iss ue s in the tw o a c tio ns ,As Judg e B ate s n ote d, Exe mpt ion 6 w a s th e “ on ly

e xemp tio n c la ime d in

[that] c a se to 5 preve nt disclosure of the na mes of unsucc essful applica nts.” Lar dn e r I , 2 00 5 WL

75 82 67 , at * 18 . E xemp tio n 7 (C ), the oth e r e xemp tio n c la ime d in thi s c a se , w a s th e re fo re no t at is su e in Lar dn e r I
. 11 a lth ou g h a dmi tte dly

sim ila r, are su ff ic ie ntl y dif fe re nt t hat a pp lic atio n o f t

he do c tr ine is inappropriate. The e arlier action involved a pr evious FO I A re quest by Plaintiff to OPA seeking production of two c ateg ories of doc uments: (1) “a ll ‘letters of a dvice’ (the re ports from the Attorney Gene ral or his de signe e to the President a dvising whe ther to g rant or de ny reque sts for pardons) g ener ated f

rom 1960 to 1989,” and ( 2) “the complete f iles of the par don applications of twenty -five pr ominent individuals.” Lar dn e r I , 2005 WL758267, at *1. The materials at issue in that action dated f

rom the administration of for mer Preside nt Ronald Reag an or e arlier
. Id. at * 18. OPA provided Plaintiff with thousands of pag es of doc uments, but—as is releva nt he re—in the c ours e of

pr ov idi ngPla int if

f w ithc op ie s o f t

he re qu e ste d 2 5 p ard on

a pp lic atio ns , re da c te d th e name s o f 1 41 un su c c e ssf ul p ard on a pp lic ants wh os e name s h a pp e ne d to a

pp e ar i n those pardon r ecor ds. Id. at *1, 16. J udg e John D. Bates he ld that “it was improper for the De pa rtme nt t o w ithho ld o n p e rs on a l pr iva c y g ro un ds [ i.e. , pursuant to FO I A Exempti on 6] t he identity of unsucc essful par don applicants . . . fr om the disclosed par don documents in which they appea r.” Id. at * 1. 5 By contra st, the dispute now befor e the Court stems from a more re cent F OIA re quest by Plaintiff seekingdisclosure of r esponsive mater ials listi ngthe identities of all cleme ncy applicants whose applications we re de nied duringformer President B ush’s term in offic e. The F OIA r e qu e st at is su e he re , a nd the mate ri a ls r e sp on siv e to t hat r e qu e st, thu s d if

fe r m ate ri a lly from the F OIA re quest and re sponsive materia ls at issue in the prior ac tion. Unlike in Lar dn e r I ,12

in whic h Pl a int if

f’ s r e qu e st f

or dis c los ur e of

the ide nti tie s o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants
was c abined to only

those 141 names that ha

ppened to a

ppear in a selec t number of pa

rdon files specific ally

reque sted by

Plaintiff and datingfrom President Rea g an’s a dminist ration or e arlier , Plaintiff’s curr ent re quest seeks disclosure of lists retained by OPA identifying the more than 7,000 applicants who w ere rec ently denied c lemency

by President B ush. Th e fa c t th at th e F OIA r e qu e sts in t he tw o a c tio ns , a s w e ll a s th e mate ri a ls r e sp on siv e to those reque sts, differ c onsiderably counsels ag ainst application of c ollatera l estoppel. Cf. Ma rti n , 488 F.3d at 301 (collater al estoppel a pplicable in F OIA ac tion where same 1991 Repor t
wa s at is su e in b oth

a c tio ns ); Nat’l Tr easury Em ployee s Union v. Internal Re venueServ. , 765 F.2d 1174, 1177 ( D.C. Cir. 1985) (collate ral e stoppel applied whe re “ the FO I A re quests in the tw o a c tio ns are ide nti c a l e xce pt f or the y e ar i nv olv e d” ); Sto ne hil l , 534 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7 (collate ral e stoppel applicable in FOIA ac tion where the withheld documents at issue in the p r e v i o u s l i t i g at i o nw e r e th e “ s am e d o c u m e n t s th atar e i ni s s u e i n[ th e i n s t a n t ] p r o c e e d i n g ” )
. In particula r, althoug h both actions broadly confr ont the propriety

of withholding the identities of
unsucce ssful clemenc y

applicants, the c ircumstance s in which the withholdings we re ma de var y
su bs tanti a lly

be tw e e n th e tw o matte rs . M or e ov e r, Pla int if f s e e ks to a

pp ly the do c tr ine to litigation of a

leg al issue, not a fa ctual one, a nd in such circ umstances, the D .C. Circuit has counsele d that there is “more r oom for a se cond look when the issue is one of law tha n when a fac t question is at stake.” Nat ’l Tre as ur y , 765 F.2d at 1177. I n light of this observa tion and the dif fe re nc e s b e tw e e n th e tw o a c tio ns , th e Court is p e rs ua de d th at it

is a pp ro pr iate to p e rm it O PA the opportunity

to demonstrate why

the leg al issue should be re solved diffe rently in this case, g ive n th e dif

fe re nc e s b e tw e e n th e a c tio ns , r athe r t ha n p re c lud ingOPAfr om l iti g atin gthe me ri ts13

of the ne w situation. Accor dingly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and GRANT D efe ndant’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, with respec t to the qu e sti on of c oll ate ra l e sto pp e l. B. OP

A M ay Not W ith ho ld t heNam es o

f U ns uc c essf ul C le me nc yAp pli c an ts Pu rsu an t to FO

IA Ex e mp tio ns 6 a nd

7( C) The Court turns next to t he mer its of OPA’s withholdings. As explained above , the pa rt ie s’ re ma ini ngdis pute s o n s umm ary jud g me nt f

oc us on OPA ’s de c isi on

to w ithho ld responsive materials listing the na mes of cle mency

applicants that have bee n denied c lemency by Pr e sid e nt B us h p ur su ant t o b oth Exe mpt ion

6 a nd Exe mpt ion

7( C) . T he Court

sh a ll f ir st examine the propriety

of withholding the reque sted information under Ex emption 6 before than examining the mer its of withholding such infor mation under Exemption 7(C). 1. Ex emption 6 F OIA E xemp tio n 6 pe rm its an a g e nc y to w ithho ld i nf

or matio n c on ta ine d w ith in

“ pe rs onne l and

me dic a l f

ile s and sim ila r f ile s th e dis c los ur e of

wh ic h w ou ld c on sti tut e a c le arl y
unwar rante d invasion of per sonal privac y .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)
. Se e als o Na t’ l A rc hiv es & Re c or ds Ad mi n. v . F av ish , 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004); DOJ v . Reporters Comm. for Free dom of thePr ess , 489 U.S. 749, 773-74 (1989). The term “similar files” is broadly interpre ted, such that Exe mpt ion

6 p ro te c ts f

ro m di sc los ur e a ll i nf

or matio n th at “ a

pp lie s to a

pa rt ic ula r i nd ivi du a l” in the abse nce of

a public intere st in disclosure. State Dep’ t v. W ashington Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 60 2 ( 19 82 ) ( “ In s um, we do no t th ink that Co ng re ss m e ant t o li mit Exe mpt ion

6 to a na rr owc la ss of files c ontaining only

a discre te kind of per sonal information. Rather , the exemption was intended to cove r deta iled Gover nment rec ords on an individual which c an be ide ntified as applying to that individual.”) (interna l quotation and citation omitted). Acc ording ly , it is notthe14

nature of the files in whic h the information is containe d, but rather the balanc e of public a

nd private inter ests that deter mines the exemption’s scope. W as hingto n P os t , 456 U.S. at 599-600. Ex emption 6 “tilt[ s] t he bala nce ( of disclosure inter ests ag ainst privacy interests) in fa

vor of disclosure,” and cr eate s a “he avy burden” for a

n ag ency invoking Exemption 6. Morley v

. Cent. IntelligenceAgenc

y , 508 F.3d 1108, 1128 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). Thus, in consideringwhether Ex emption 6 applies, the Court must “first deter mine whether

disclosure of the [i nformation at issue] ‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to demi nim is , privac y interest.’” Multi Ag Me dia LLC v . D e

p’ t of Ag ric ultur e , 5 1 5 F. 3 d

1 2 2 4 , 1 2 3 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Em

ployee s v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 874 ( D.C. Cir. 1989)). F or this purpose, “[a] substantial privacy

interest is any

thing greater than a demi nim is privac y interest.” Id. at 1230- 31 . In a dd iti on , f

or purp os e s o f b a lanc ing , it is s ig nif ic ant t hat “ [t]he pu

bli c ’s int e re st i n disclosure of pe rsonnel files de rives fr om the purpose of the [FOIA] – the preser

vation of ‘the citizens’ rig ht to be informed a bout what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Bec k, 997 F.2d a t 1492-93 (qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773 (interna l quotation marks omitted)). While FOIA’s purpose “ is furthere d by

disclosure of of

ficial infor

mation that ‘sheds lig ht on an ag ency ’s perf ormanc e of its statutory

duties,’” “ [i ]nformation that “reve als littl e or nothingabout an
a g e nc y ’s own c on du c t’ do e s n ot f ur the r t he statut or

y purp os e ; thus the pu

bli c ha s n o c og niza

ble interest in the re lease of such infor mation.” Id. at1 4 9 3 (qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773). Neither

party disputes that the information re quested by Plaintiff constitutes a “per sonnel and medica l file[] [or] simil ar f ile[] ,” such that it meets the threshold requir ement for protec tion under Exemption 6. Accor dingly , the Court turns direc tly to consideration of the privac y and15

public interests implicated by disclosure. i. An unsucc essful cle mency applicant’ s privacy

interest in disclosure of the re quested infor

mation is of a limited and minimal nature. As stated above , the Court must “first deter mine whether

disclosure of the [i nformation at issue] ‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to demi nim is , privac y interest.’” Multi Ag Me dia LLC , 5 1 5 F. 3 d

at1 2 3 0 (qu o t i n g Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employ ees , 879 F.2d at 874). OPAc on te nd s th at di sc los ur e of an in div idu a l’ s n ame a s p art of a lis t of ind ivi du a ls who se applications for

clemenc y

have be en denie d would eff ect a “double stig ma” on the unsuc cessf ul clemenc y applicant, publicly

reve aling“both the fa ct of a n individual’s fede ral c riminal
c o n v i c t i o n ” an d

“ th e f a c tth atth e i n d i v i d

u a l a p p l i e d f o r c l e m e n c y and was deeme d unworthy of cleme ncy .” De f.’s MSJ at 7-8 (e mphasis in origina l). Plaintiff counters that denial of a clemenc y application is not so rare as to stigmatize an unsuc cessf ul applicant and that, reg ardle ss, the applicants have no re asonable expectation that the exist ence of their a pplication for c lemency

and the eve ntual decision by

the President on that applica tion will not be publicly

disclosed. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-11. The Court ultimately finds an unsucc essful cle mency applicant’ s privacy interest—althoug h not zero, as Plaintiff contends—is nonethele ss of a minimal and limited nature g iven the cir cumstance s of disclosure in this case
. First, the Court does not a g ree that disclosure e ffe cts a “ double stigma ,” as O PA urg es. Plaintiff’s FOIA re quest seeks disclosure only of the fa ct that an individual has a pplied for a

nd be e n d e nie d c le me nc y . T hat is , Pl a int if f d oe s no t seek disclosure of any substantive, persona l information locate d in the actua l clemenc y files. Althoug h disclosure of the fac t that an individual has applied for clemenc y

inhere ntly

reve als that the individual has pre viously been convicted of

a fe dera l crime, the Court e mphasizes that Pl aintiff does not see k the details of theAlthough the Court held above that J udg e B ates’ de cision in Lar dn e r I does not bar 6 OPA from litigating the le g al question at hand, that finding doe s not, of course , mean that the Court ne e d igno re Judg e B ate s’ pe rs ua siv e and we ll- re a so ne d d e c isi on

to t he e xtent it

is d ir e c tly rele vant to the issues now bef ore the Court. 16 individual applicant’s cr iminal hist ory or fe dera l conviction. Moreove r, as is cle ar f rom the statis tic s p ro vid e d b y

OPA , o nly

a ve ry sma ll m ino ri ty

of c le me nc y

a pp lic atio ns are a c tua lly g rante d; by

far , the majority

are denied. SeeFirst B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 15 (a s of Novembe r 3, 2008, President B ush had g rante d 157 pardons a nd six commutations of sentenc e, but denied 1,535 pardon r equest a

nd 6,290 commutation reque sts). Rejection is theref ore not “ ‘so ra

re a n
occur renc e as to stig matize the [ reje cted] applicant.’” Lar dn e r I , 2005 WL758267, at * 17 (qu o t i n g Kur

zo n v . D e p’ t of He alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 6 49 F .2 d 6 5, 69 (1 st C ir . 1 98 1) ). Thus , 6 althoug h public disclosure of the President’s dec ision to gra nt clemenc y

arguably has a positive impact on an individual applica nt, the Court is not persuaded that the conver se is true— i.e. , that public disclosure of the President’s dec ision to deny clemenc y

will “ref lect poorly

upon [an individual applicant’s] curre nt level of re habilitation and g ood char acte r.” F irst Bollwer k Dec l. ¶ 27. Se c on d, c le me nc y a pp lic ants have no re a so na ble e xpe c tatio n th at O PA w ill no t pu bli c ly disclose either

the exist ence of their c lemency application or the President’s eve ntual decision whether to gr ant or de ny

clemenc y . OPA acknow ledg es, as it must, that applicants ar e advise d that OPA will revea l such information upon re quest. As explained above, it has be en OPA’s long- standing prac tice to fre ely disclose to any

member of

the public both that an individual has
a pp lie d f or c le me nc y

and that th e Pr e sid e nt h a s d e nie d th e re qu e st f or c le me nc y

wh e ne ve r i t
rec eives a n inquiry about an individual by

name. See supra at pp. 4-5. OPA’s Privac y17

State me nt, wh ic h is pa

rt of the c le me nc y

a pp lic atio n f

or m pr ov ide d to and

fi lle d o ut b y

a ll clemenc y applicants, spec ifically

informs potential applica nts that “[u] pon specific reque st, we advise a ny one who a sks whether

a name d person ha s been grante d or denie d clemenc y .” Id. Ind e e d, purs ua

nt t o th e OPA ’s c ur

re nt d isc los ur e po lic y , O PA w ill , u po n r e qu e st, pu

bli c ly disclose not only

whether a cle mency

application has be en filed a nd the dec ision of the President to gr ant or de ny

clemenc y

and the date of that de cision, but also the date the c lemency application wa s filed; the ty pe of c lemency

soug ht; the offense (s) for which cle mency

was soug ht; the date and c ourt conviction; the sentenc e imposed; and the a dminist rative c losure of a cl em en cy re qu es tan d

th e d at e o f s u ch cl o s ure . Fi rs tBo l l we rkDe cl
. ¶ 2 0 (qu o t i n g 6 7 Fe d
. R eg. 66 41 7, 66 41 8) . In a dd iti on , a s p re vio us ly dis c us se d, OPAa dv ise s c le me nc y a pp lic ants that it
may , in its dis c re tio n, pr e pa

re a “ pu bli c a ff a ir s n oti c e . . . d e sc ri bin g. . . a de nia l of c le me nc y ” in
case s in which it has deter mined a “substantial public inter est” e x ists. Def.’s MSJ , Ex . E (Privacy Act stateme nt). A cle mency applicant “ could har dly

rea d this [ ] as a firm promise of anony mity .” Lar

dn e r I , 2005 WL758267, at * 16. Ms. Bollwer

k’s dec larations serve only to highlig ht that clemenc y applicants ha

ve no
re a so na ble e xpe c tatio n th at th e e xiste nc e of the ir a pp lic atio n a

nd the e ve ntu a l outc ome of

the ir
re qu e st f or c le me nc y

wi ll b e ke pt c on fi de nti a l. A lth ou g h M s. B oll we rk e xpla ins that so me
a pp lic ants , a

nd in p art ic ula

r p ard on a pp lic ants , v oic e “ dis c omf or t w iththe po ssi bil ity

that th e ir convictions may

come to public notice a s a re sult of their seekingclemenc y ,” nonethe less she confirms that “ most pardon applica nts who express privacy

conce rns dec ide to continue with the pa rd on pr oc e ss. ” F ir st B oll we rk De c l. ¶ 24 . T he a

pp lic ants are thu s a dv ise d th at th e ir application for

clemenc y

and the Pre sident’s dec ision whether to g rant or de ny clemenc y

may be18

publicly disclosed, y et the applica nts voluntarily

choose to proc eed w ith the application proc ess. As J udg e B ates a

ptly observe d in Lar

dn e r I: “The a

pplicant is petitioning the g overnme nt for the pe rf or manc e of a pu bli c a c t; this is n ot a

sit uatio n whe re he is a

thi rd -p art

y wh o f ind s h ims e lf

in g overnme nt rec ords throug h no action of his own.” Id. In an ef fort to distinguish this case f rom the situation in Lar

dn e r I , OPA argues that the
rec ent nature of the c lemency denials and the sheer

number of a

pplicants cove red by

Plaintiff’s
re qu e st i n th is c a se c re ate a g re ate r p ri va c y

int e re st t ha n w a s h e ld t o e xist b y

Judg e B ate s in Lar dn e r I
. SeeDe f. ’s Op p’ n at 7. Th e Court is n ot s o p e rs ua de d. Withre sp e c t to the fi rs t po int , OPA claims that the re cords at issue in Lar dn e r I —unli ke the re c or ds at is su e he re—“ we re so date d th at th e pr iva c y

int e re sts in what ha

pp e ne d d e c a de s e arl ie r w e re no t r e g ard e d a s p art ic ula rl y signific ant.” De f.’s Opp’ n at 7. Refe renc e to Lar dn e r I , h o we v er , d em o n s tra t es th atJ u d ge Bates’ discussion of an unsuc cessf ul applicant’s pr ivacy

interests did not mention, let alone depend upon, the relative ag e of the files in which the a pplicant’s name was located. See2005 W L 7 5 8 2 6 7 , at* 1 7
. OP A’ s s u p p o s i t i o nth atth e a ge o f t h e r ec o rd s “p o s s i b l y ” a ff ec t edJ u d ge Bates’ dec ision, see Def

.’s Opp’n at 7, is thus wholl y unsupported by

the ac tual text of that decision. See id. Moreove r, OPA make s no eff ort to expl ain how the f

act that a n applicant wa s denied c lemency

within the past 10 y ear s substantially alters the pr ivacy

interests at stake , pa rt ic ula rl y g ive n th e Court ’s re

je c tio n a bo ve that a

pp lic ants are “ sti g matize d” by pu bli c disclosure of the mere fac t that they applied for

and we re de nied cleme ncy . Wit h respe ct to the
se c on d p oint, a lth ou g h O PA i s c or re c t th at th e ins tant F OIA r e qu e st e nc omp a sse s a su bs tanti a lly g reater number

of applica

nts than those at issue in Lar dn e r I , OPA does not explain how this factThe Court notes that this case is theref ore unlike the situation in Reporters Committee , 7 wher e the Supre me Court held that the compilation of other wise har d-to-obtain information about a pa

rticular individual does, in fa ct, alter the privac y

interest implicated by

disclosure of that information. 489 U.S. at 764. The Supre me Court there fore found a “ distinction, i n terms of persona l privacy , betwee n scatter ed disclosure of the bits of information contained in a r ap shee t and the r evelation of the rap she et as a whole.” Id. Her e, by

contra st, the information soug ht by Plaintiff— i.e. , li sts of

the ide nti tie s o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants —c on so lid ate s a sin g le fac t about multipl e individuals into one list. I t theref ore doe s not gather scattered infor mation about one individual into one location, as w as the c ase in Reporters Committee , but rather compiles one discr ete f

act a bout many

individuals int o one location. 19 aff ects a n ind iv idu al applicant’ s privacy interest. Contrary

to OPA’s appar ent contention, an 7 individual applicant’s priva cy interest is not somehow mag nified simply beca use other individual
a pp lic ant’ s p ri va c y

int e re st m ay

be imp lic ate d a s w e ll. Finally , the Court notes that, in discussing Exemption 6, OPA has relied he avily on two de c isi on s in

pa rt ic ula r: DO J v . R e po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th ePr ess , 489 U.S. 749 (1989), and Judicial W

atch, Inc . v. DOJ

, 3 65 F .3 d 1 00 8 ( D. C. C ir 20 04 ). OPA ’s re lia

nc e on the se c a se s, howeve r, is misplaced. In Reporters Committee , the Supreme Court he ld that rap shee ts—which contain ce rtain desc riptive information about a n individual, such as date of birth and phy sical char acte ristics, as well as the individual’s history of ar rests, cha rg es, convic tions, and inc arc e ratio ns —a

re e xemp t f

ro m di sc los ur e un de r E xemp tio n 7 (C ). 48 9 U .S. at 75 1, 78 0. In s o de c idi ng , th e Sup re me Court re je c te d th e argume nt t

hat an in div idu a l ha s n o p ri va c y int e re st i n his criminal history

simply beca use it contains information that wa s public, holding that “ the fa ct that‘an e vent is not wholly ‘private ’ does not mea

n that an individual has no intere st in li miting disclosure or dissemination of the information.” Id. at 770. Signific antly , howeve r, Re po rte rs Committee differ s from this case in three important wa y s. F ir st, the do c ume nts at is su e in t hat c a se —c ri min a l r a

p s he e ts— c on ta in s ig nif

ic ant,20

detailed pe rsonal information. Id. at 751. B y contra st, Pl aintiff see ks only disclosure of the applicant’ s name a

nd the fa ct that he a

pplied for a

nd was de nied cleme ncy , a fa r cr y from the ty pe of e x tensive and pe rsonal information contained in the ra p sheets at issue in Re

po rte rs Committee . Second, public disclosure of the ra p sheets wa s car efully

regulated and c ontrolled by a “w eb of f

eder al statutory

and re g ulatory

provisions” that preve nted g ener al disclosure to the public. See id. at 764-65. As the Supre me Court emphasized, “[t] his care ful and limited pattern
o f au th o ri z edrap s h ee td i s cl o s ure s fi t s th e d i ct i o n ary d ef i n i t i o no f p ri v ac y

as i n v o l v i n g a restric tion of information ‘to the use of a par ticular pe rson or g roup or c lass of per sons.’” Id. at 765. By contra st, the information soug ht in this case is available to a ny member of

the g ener al public upon specific reque st and may be re lease d by

the OPA if it determines the re is “substantial pu bli c int e re st” in t

he c a se , f a c ts o f whic h th e a

pp lic ants are ma de awa

re pr ior to f ili ngthe ir applications for

clemenc y . Third and f

inally , the ra

p sheets in Reporters Committeehad bee n
acc umulated by

the Gover

nment in a ce ntral data

base f or its own rec ord-ke epingpurposes. Id. at 770-71. B y

contra st, the information soug ht in this case is in OPA’s custody solely as a r esult of the applica

nt’s own voluntary

decision to petition the Governme nt for cle mency , which is itself a public act. Thus, a lthough Reporters Committeeteac hes that the public nature of a n applicant’ s
un de rl yingc onvic tio n a

nd su bs e qu e nt c le me nc y

re qu e st d oe s n ot pe r sene g ate any pr ivate int e re st the ind ivi du a l a

pp lic ant m ay

have in p ub lic dis c los ur e of that in fo rm atio n, the Court is
no ne the le ss p e rs ua de d th at th e pr iva c y int e re st i mpl ic ate d b y

the re qu e st at is su e he re is signif ic antl y dif fe re nt— and

signif ic antl y we ake r—

tha n w a s th e pr iva c y

int e re st at is su e in Reporters Committee
. OPA also cites extensively from the D.C. Circuit’s de cision in Judicial W atch , g oin gso21

fa r a s to de dic ate mor e tha

n tw o p a g e s o f i ts 1 3 p a g e mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt t o duplicatinga sing le block quote f rom that opinion. SeeDef .’s MSJ at 5-7. OPA’s r eliance on Judicial W

atch , howeve r, is misplaced, a nd the leng thy

block quote—cited w ithout any leg al
ana ly sis or

dis c us sio n— do e s n oth ingto s up po rt OPA ’s po sit ion

tha t di sc los ur e in t

his c a se is
unwar rante d. In Judicial W

atch , the plaintiff soug ht, inte r a lia , “‘[a]ny and/or a ll pardon applications’ c onsidered by former President Clinton.” 365 F.3d at 1110. Thus, unlike he re, the plaintiff in Judicial W

atch soug ht the actua l substance of the cleme ncy

applications, which contain “non- public, persona l information reg ardingthe par don applicants, their f amilies, and the crimes they

committed.” Id. at 1125-26. The D.C. Circuit held that disclosure of the clemenc y applications themselves w as exempt under Exemption 6, and in so doing, emphasized the “ broad
ra ng e of de ta ile d a

nd highly pe rs on a l in fo rm atio n a

bo ut a pa rd on a pp lic ant” that w a s c on ta ine d in th e r equ es t edap p l i ca t i o n s , i n cl u d i n g: identifying inf

ormation such as na

me, ho m e addre ss, social secur ity number, citizenship, and phy sical cha rac teristics, . . . a de tailed account of his or her criminal history , substance a

buse, occ upational licensingh i s t o ry , and such pe rsonal bio g ra ph ic a l matte rs a s f

amil y his tor y , ma ri ta l st atus , a

nd the name s, bir

th d ate s, c u s t o dy, an d l o c at i o n o f th e a p p l i c an t ’ s c h i l dr e n . . . r e s i d e n c e s , e mp l o ym e n th i s t o r y, milit ary rec ord, financ ial status, and medica l history
. . . a desc ription of their lives since c onviction, their mental and phy sic al well-be ing, a nd emotional pleas for pa rd on s, inc lud ingle tte rs fr om fr ie nd s, fa mil y me mbe rs , e mpl oye rs , a

nd atto rn e y s. Id. at 1125. By

contra st, Pl aintiff in this case doe s not seek disclosure of the substanc e of the applicants’ c lemency

applications, but only

the fa ct that the applica

nts filed a petition for clemenc y , which wa s subsequently denied. As Judge s Bates observe d in Lar dn e r I , “[a]t no point [ ] di d the cour

t [ in Judicial W

atch ] even sug g est that disclosure of the fact that an individual filed a petition for a pardon, instea d of the c on te nts of the pe tition i tself, amounts to an
unwa rr ante d inva sio n o f t

he pr iva c y

of the a pp lic ant. ” 20 05 WL75 82 67 , at * 1 6 ( e mph a sis22

included in orig inal). OPA’s re liance on the se ca ses is theref ore misplace d. The Court conc ludes that an a pplicant’s priva cy

interest in the mer e fa ct that he a pplied for a nd was de nied cleme ncy , althoug h not zero, is neverthe less of a limited and minimal nature.

ii. Di sc los ur e of

the re qu e ste d in fo rm atio n s e rv e s th e pu bli c ’s int e re st in knowing what their Gove rnment is up to. Turningthen to the public intere st in disclosure, the Court finds that disclosure of the names of unsuc cessf

ul clemenc y

applicants dire ctly

serve s the main “purpose of the [FOIA] – the prese rvation of ‘ the citizens’ rig ht to be informed a bout what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Bec k, 9 9 7 F. 2 d at1 4 9 2 -9 3 (qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773 (interna l quotation marks omi tte d) ). F un dame nta lly , d isc los ur e of the re qu e ste d in fo rm atio n s hin e s a light o n th e mos t basic infor

mation about the executive’s e x erc ise of his pardon pow er—who is and who is not g rante d clemenc y

by the President. “T his is the paradig matic ca se for disclosure, in that the inf or matio n w ou ld s e rv e dir e c tly to o pe n th e Go ve rnme nt’ s a c tiv iti e s ‘ to t he sh arp e y e of

pu bli c scrutiny .’” Lar

dn e r I , 2 0 0 5 W l 7 5 8 2 6 7 , at* 1 7 (qu o t i n g Reports Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773). Indeed, it is rea dily

appar ent that the public has a n interest in laying ope n the executive’s e x erc ise of his clemenc y

power to public scrutiny
. In line with that public interest, the President’ s decision to gran t c le me nc y is p ub lic ly disclosed as a

matter of g ener al pra ctice. F irst Bollwer k Dec l. ¶ 17. As discussed a bove, whe n the President g rants a c lemency reque st, the Governme nt publishes the date of the President’s favor able a ction, the name of the cleme ncy

rec ipient, the city

and state of

his residenc e, the offe nse for

which cle mency

was g rante d, the date a

nd district of conviction, the sente nce imposed, and the name as we ll as city and state of

residenc e of the applicant’ s attorney , if the applicant wa s repr esente d. Id. Th is i nf or matio n is no t on ly

pu bli c ly dis c los e d, but ma de re a dil y23

available to the g ener al public for r eview on D OJ ’s website. Seehttp:// www.usdoj.g ov/pardon/
rec ipients.htm (last visi ted J uly 20, 2009). This prac tice of publicly disclosing the Pre sident’s de c isi on s to g ra

nt c le me nc y

c on fi rm s th e pu

bli c ’s int e re st i n o pe nin gup the c le me nc y pr oc e ss and in ensuringthat the exercise of the executive’s c lemency power is not veiled in a cloak of
secr ecy . Surely , then, just as disclosure of the names of suc cessf ul clemenc y

applicants fur

thers the public’s intere st in understandingthe func tioning of the clemenc y proce ss, so too does dis c los ur e of

the ide nti tie s o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants “ le t c iti zen s k

no w ‘ wh at th e ir g overnme nt is up to.’” Dep’ t of Defense v . Fede ral Labor Relati ons Auth. , 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773)). More over, disclosure of the identities of
unsucce ssful applicants is not only useful for

reve alingto whom the President has de nied clemenc y , but it also increase s the value of the information alr eady

in the public domain— i.e. , the name s o f t

ho se to who m th e Pr e sid e nt h a s g ra nte d c le me nc y . A s Judg e B ate s o bs e rv e d in Lar dn e r I , “ [a] c omp ari so n o f t

he su c c e ssf

ul a nd un su c c e ssf

ul a pp lic ants wo uld illumi nate—indee d, a cla im could be made that it is essential to an unde rstandingof—the circ umstances in which the executive choose s to gr ant or de ny a par don and the f

actor s that bear on that decision.” 2005 WL758267, at *17. Sig nif ic antl y , O PA a lr e a dy

a c kn ow le dg e s th at th e pu bli c ha s a n inte re st i n k

no wi ngthi s inf or matio n, g ive n it s c ur

re nt p oli c y

of re le a sin gsu c h in fo rm atio n to a me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c upon specific reque st. OPA, however , in seekingto minim ize the importance of its curre nt disclosure policy , makes much of the fa ct that applica

nts “have [n] ever

had any rea son to believe that their name s would be publicly disclosed as pa

rt of a listing of all those denie d executive24

clemenc y by a g iven President.” F irst Bollwer k Dec l. ¶ 25. OPA thus focuses on the manner of public disclosure— i.e. , d i s cl o s ure v i a al i s tv er s u s d i s cl o s ure o nan i n d i v i d u al b as i s . Al th o u gh OPA does not specif

ically explain why

it believes that the manne r of public disclosure aff ects a n
a pp lic ant’ s p ri va c y

int e re st, the ob vio us imp or t of OPA ’s argume nt i s th at di sc los ur e via a lis t incre ases the r isk of broade r public disclosure. F or example, OPA opines that a membe r of the public who re quests information about a spe cific, na med cleme ncy

applicant is likely

to use the information for mor e limited, personal pur poses. See id. ¶ 1 9 ( ob se rv ing that “ the va st m a

jor ity of third-pa

rty reque sts for such infor

mation are made by

family members or

close fr iends of the
c le me nc y a pp lic ant, wh o . . . wi she ith e r t o s up po rt fo r f avo ra ble a c tio n b y

the Pr e sid e nt o r t o inq uir e a bo ut t he status of

the pe tit ion ). B y

c on tr a st, OPAimp lie s th at a me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c wh o r e qu e sts inf

or matio n a bo ut a ll uns uc c e ssf

ul c le me nc y

a pp lic atio ns duri nga

c e rt a in t ime period is likely

to use the information for a br oader , more public purpose
. See id. (sug g esting th atp e r m i t t i n gd i s c l o s ur e w o u l d

p e r m i t“ a m e d i a r e qu e s tf o r i n f o r m at i o n ” th ati s “ s i mp l y a fishing e x pedition”). The Supreme Court, howe ver, ha s made it abunda ntly clea r that “whether an invasion of pr ivacy

is warr anted c annot turn on the purpose s for whic h the re quest for information is made.” Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 771 (empha sis in original re moved).

“ Con g re ss ‘ c le arl y

int e nd e d’ the F OIA ‘ to g ive any me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c a s mu c h r ig ht t o disclosure a s one with a spec ial interest [in a particular document].’” Id. (qu o t i n g Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roe buck & Co. , 4 21 U. S. 1 32 , 1 49 (1 97 5) ). OPA ’s fo c us on the ide nti ty of the third-pa

rty reque ster and the manner of disclosure is ther efor e misplace d. OPA further

argues that “the re is little, if any thing, to be g ained f

rom the re lease of [the reque sted] information, as the names a lone offe r no insight into the ac tions of the ag ency , wher e25

the re sults of the investigations int o post-conviction ac tiviti es ar e incor porate d into letters of advice that are protec ted from disclosure .” De f.’s Opp’ n at 12. Admittedly , disclosure of the identities of unsucce ssful clemenc y applicants would not re veal the a ctual substance of OPA’s
rec ommendations reg ardingtheir applications to t he President. The Court, however , does not ag ree that disclosure of the reque sted materia l can ne ver pr ovide insight into the proc ess by which OPA investig ates a nd issues its recommendation to the President. By OPA’s own admission, “the President has tra ditionally relied he avily

on the Depa

rtment’s advic e in cleme ncy
case s to inform his decision-making .” F irst Bollwer k Dec l. ¶ 6. Arguably , then, disclosure of the President’s de cision may reve al insight into the OPA’s re commendation proc ess as we ll. Ind e e d, OPAha s c on c e de d th at th e a c tua l su bs tanc e of

its re c omm e nd atio n is no t ne c e ssa ry to g ain insight into the cle mency proce ss, openly

acknow ledg ing that “[c]ons ideration of such fa c tor s a s th e natur e of

an a pp lic ant’ s o ff

e ns e , th e se nte nc e imp os e d u po n h im, the date of

his
s e n t e n c i n g , an d

th e d at e o f

th e P r e s i d e n t ’ s d e c i s i o nd e n yi n gc l e m e n c y [ ] c o u l d p r o v i d e a F O IA reque ster with a substantive ba sis upon which to draw some c onclusions about the func tioning of the cleme ncy

proce ss during a g iven pre sidential administration.” Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 28. I f such information is helpful to understandinghow the cle mency proce ss functions, logic counsels that the names of

the unsucc essful cle mency applications is of equa l assistance. Reg ardle ss, even if the Court were to acc ept OPA’s conte ntion that the reque sted inf or matio n p ro vid e s n o in sight i nto OPA ’s ro le in t he c le me nc y

pr oc e ss, the pu

bli c int e re st i n this case c annot be de fined so nar rowly . As found above , disclosure of the identities of the individuals to whom t he President ha s denied c lemency serve s the public’s intere st in laying ope n the executive’s e x erc ise of the pa rdon proc ess for public sc rutiny —and the mer e fa ct that26

dis c los ur e may

no t als o sh e d li g ht o n th e su bs tanc e of

the OPA ’s re c omm e nd atio n a nd its investigative proce ss does not neg ate the public inter est in disclosure. As the Supre me Court has state d, the purp os e be hin d F OIA i s f os te re d whe re “ dis c los ur e of the inf or matio n s ou g ht w ou ld ‘she[d] l ight on a

n ag ency ’s per formanc e of its statutory duties’ or

otherwise le t citiz ens know ‘what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Dep’ t of Defense v . Fede ral Labor Relati ons Auth. , 5 10 U. S. 4 8 7 , 4 9 7 (1 9 9 4 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773)). Finally , the Court emphasizes that Plaintiff in this case seeks “ officia l information” do c ume nti ngthe Go ve rnme nt’ s a c tio ns
— i.e. , the denial by the President of a

petition for
c le me nc y . A s e xpla ine d a bo ve , whe n th e Pr e sid e nt d e nie s c le me nc y , th e Of fi c e of the Couns e l to the President informs OPA in writingthat the re quests of the de signated applica nts have be en denied. SeeFirst B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 15. That notification serve s as the off icial re cord of

the President’s ac tion on the clemenc y reque sts of those applicants a nd become s part of the clemenc y file of the a

pplicant and is re corde d in OPA’s automated database . Second B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 6. The re quested infor

mation, then, is not sim ply information “that the G overnme nt happens to be storing.” Reporters Comm ., 489 U.S. at 780. Rather, the inf ormation reque sted is drawn f rom
re po rt s o f a

nd re fl e c ts the of

fi c ia l a c tio ns of

a Go ve rnme nt o ff

ic ia l—t hat is , th e e xec uti ve and

his exercise of

the cleme ncy

power . This information serve s as “a rec ord of ‘ what the Gove rnment is up to,’” id. at 78 0, and

thu s f a lls sq ua re ly wi thi n F OIA’ s st atut or

y purp os e . It is no t th e c a se that the information at issue wa s simply acc umulated by

the OPA but reve als littl e or nothing about the Gove rnment’s a ctions. Id. at 773. Acc ording ly , OPA’s re liance on Re po rte rs Committee is mispl ace d. SeeDef .’s Opp’n at 13. Given the substantial public intere st and the minimal privacy interest that exists here, the27

Court concludes that the reque sted information may not be prope rly

withheld under Exemption 6. As e xpla ine d a

bo ve , a n a g e nc y may wi thh old inf or matio n p ur su ant t o th is E xemp tio n o nly if it i s evident that disclosure “would constitute a c lear ly unwar rante d invasion of per sonal privac y .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 thus “til t[ s] t he bala nce ( of disclosure inter ests ag ainst privacy interests) in fa

vor of disclosure ,” and c reates a “ heavy burden” for a

n ag ency invoking Ex emption 6. Morley , 508 F.3d at 1128. Havingdeter mined that disclosure of the identities of
unsucce ssful clemenc y

applicants fur

thers the public inter est behind F OIA and that the
a pp lic ant’ s p ri va c y

int e re st i n th is c a se is m ini ma l, t he Court c on c lud e s th at O PA h a s n ot m e t it s he avy burd e n a nd it m ay no t w ithho ld t

he name s o f u

ns uc c e ssf ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants purs ua

nt t o Ex emption 6. Accor dingly , the Court shall GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and DEN Y Def

endant’ s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, with respec t to the propriety of withholding the r equeste d information pursuant to Exemption 6.

2. Ex emption 7 Ex emption 7(C) protec ts from disclosure “ rec ords or infor mation compiled for law
e nf or c e me nt p ur

po se s, ” but on ly

to t he e xtent th at di sc los ur e of su c h r e c or ds “ c ou ld r e a so na bly be expected to c onstitut e an unw arr anted invasion of pe rsonal priva cy .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
. To proper ly

asser t Ex emption 7(C), OPA must first establish that the rec ords at issue we re
c omp ile d f

or law e nf or c e me nt p ur

po se s. I f t

his sh ow ingis m a de , O PA m us t th e n d e mon str ate that disclosure of the rec ords could re asonably be expected to c onstitut e an unw arr anted invasion of privac y . See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. DO J , 331 F.3d 918, 926 ( D.C. Cir. 2003). For the
rea sons set forth below, the Court finds that the rec ords at issue ar e not, in fac t, law enf orce ment
rec ords, and OPA ther efor e may not withhold the recor ds pursuant to Exempti on 7(C).28

At the outse t th e Court

no te s th at w he re an a g e nc y “ sp e c ia lize s in

law e nf or c e me nt, its decision to invoke exemption 7 is entit led to defe renc e.” Cam pb e ll v. DOJ

, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Pratt v. W ebster , 673 F.2d 408, 419 ( D.C. Cir. 1982)). Ne verthe less, the “def ere ntial” standar d of re view that the Court applies to this deter mination is not“vac uous.” Id. Instead, the a g ency ’s dec larations “must establish a rational ‘ne x us betwee n the investig ation and one of the ag ency ’s law e nforc ement duties,’ a nd a conne ction betwee n an ‘individual or incide nt and possible sec urity

risk or violation of fe dera l law.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420-21). As the D.C. Circuit explained in Cam pb e ll , “ [t]he fa c t th at in fo rm atio n is sto re d in a [doc ume nt] wi th a n o ff ic ia l- so un din gla

be l is ins uf

fi c ie nt s tand inga lon e to u ph old no nd isc los ur e ;” “ [a]t a minimum , the [ag ency] m ust demonstrate the r elationship betwee n a re cord a nd its label and betwee n the label a

nd a law e nforc ement purpose .” Id. I f t he a g e nc y ’s de c lara

tio ns “ ‘f a il t o supply fac ts’ in sufficient de tail to apply the Pratt rational ne x us test, then a cour t may not gr ant summary judgme nt for the a g ency .” Id. (c i t i n g Quinon v. Fe deral Bureau of Inv estigation , 86 F.3d 1222, 1229 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)). As an initial matter, it is unclear whether OPA intended to ar g ue that it is a criminal law enfor ceme nt ag ency

specia liz ing in law

enfor ceme nt, such that its decision to invoke Ex emption 7 is entitled to defer ence . See Cam pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32. The only ref ere nce to this issue by OPA is contained in a lone footnote in its moti on for summary judgme nt, in which OPA states the undisputed proposition that “criminal law e nforc ement ag encie s need only show that the
re c or ds at is su e are re late d to the e nf or c e me nt o f f

e de ra l la ws and that th e e nf

or c e me nt a c tiv ity

is within the law enf

orce ment duty

of the a g ency .” De f.’s MSJ at 8, n. 3. OPA, howeve r, provides
no fu rt he r e la bo ratio n o n th is p oint and do e s n ot a c tua lly

argue , in e ith e r i ts o wn

mot ion or itsAlthough it is well established that DOJ is an ag ency specia liz ing in law

enfor ceme nt 8 for pur poses of Exemption 7, see Ctr. for Nat’l Security Studies , 3 31 F .3 d at 92 6, c ourt s r outin e ly loo k to the sp e c if

ic a g e nc y or un it w ith in D OJ th at ha s c us tod y ov e r t he re sp on siv e mate ri a ls i n deter mining whe ther de fer ence is due to the dec ision that the recor ds at issue are “law enfor ceme nt rec ords” f

or purpose s of FO I A. See, e .g., Cam pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32 (focusingon wh e the r t he F B I , r athe r t

ha n th e DO J in g e ne ra l, s pe c ia lize s in law e nf or c e me nt s uc h th at it s de c isi on to i nv ok e Exe mpt ion

7 is e nti tle d to de fe re nc e ); Ba rn ar d v . D e p’ t of Ho me lan d S

e c ur ity , 598 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D .C. 2009) (foc using on whether the United States Customs and Borde r Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforc ement, rather than the Depa rtment of Homela

nd Security in ge nera l, perfor

m law enf

orce ment activities for pur poses of Exemption 7). Ac c or din g ly , w ith out f

ur the r e la bo ratio n f ro m O PA a s to the ba se s f or su c h a c on c lus ion

that it is a law e nforc ement ag ency , the fa ct that DOJ—and not OPA—is clearly a law e nforc ement ag ency is insufficient to establish that the Court owes de fer ence to OPA’s conclusion that the re qu e ste d d oc ume nts are law e nf or c e me nt r e c or ds
.

29 opposition t o Plaintiff’s motion, that OPA is , in fac t, a law e nforc ement ag ency . See De f. ’s MSJ at 8-9; De f.’s Opp’ n 9-12. The Court ther efor e does not unde rstand OPA to be makingthe specific argument that it is a law enfor ceme nt ag ency whose de cision on the law e nforc ement nature of the re cords at issue is entitl ed to def ere nce. 8 Re g arl de ss, e ve n if

the Court we re to f ind that O PA i s a

law e nf or c e me nt a g e nc y

and its decision to invoke Exemption 7(C) is entit led to defe renc e, the Court would nonethe less find that OPAha s n ot s ho wn

that th e re c or ds at is su e are law e nf or c e me nt r e c or ds . F ir st, OPAbr oa dly
asser ts that “cleme ncy

rec ords” a

re la w enf orce ment rec ords under

FOIA. See Def

.’s MSJ at 8-9; De f. ’s Op p’ n at 9- 12 . T he D. C. C ir c uit ha s ma de c le ar, ho we ve r, that an a g e nc y ’s br oa d c la im that it s f ile s are law e nf

or c e me nt f

ile s— wi tho ut a dd

re ssi ngthe pa

rt ic ula r d oc ume nts at is su e —is insufficient to establish that the spec ific docume nts in disput e within those files ar e law enfor ceme nt rec ords under FOIA. Se e Cam

pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32 (claim by ag ency that “any thing in [ a law e nforc ement ag ency ’s] file pertains to an e x empt law enf orce ment purpose” has bee n “longreje cted” ). Second, O PA’s asser tion that “clemenc y

rec ords ar e [] considere d law30

enfor ceme nt rec ords under the FO I A”—e ven if true —misses the point entirely . Def .’s Opp’n at 9. In both its own mot ion and its oppositi on to Plainti ff’ s motion, as well as in Ms. Bollwer k’s supporting de clar ations, OPA descr ibes at g reat leng th both the nature of OPA’s investig ation into the merits of cleme ncy applications and the possible contents of an a pplicant’s cle mency application—ostensibly

to demonstrate that the inf ormation compiled in OPA’s cle mency
rec ords as pa

rt of its investigation into t he applica nt is information compiled for lawenfor ceme nt purposes. See Def

.’s MSJ at 8-9; De f.’s Opp’ n at 9-12; F irst Bollwer k Dec l. ¶ 26; Second B oll we rk De c l. ¶ ¶ 1 -5 . Si g nif

ic antl y , h ow e ve r, that is not the question now bef

ore the Court. Rathe r, Pla int if

f s e e ks on ly

dis c los ur e of

re sp on siv e mate ri a l li sti ngthe name s o f t ho se
c le me nc y a pp lic ants wh os e re qu e sts fo r c le me nc y we re de nie d b y

Pr e sid e nt B us h. Th is information “e x ists independently of the c lemency

file on any

applicant,” Pl.’s MS J at 9, a f act that OPA does not dispute in its opposi tion, and has there fore conce ded, see Def .’s Opp’n at 9- 12. See F ranklin v. Potter , 600 F.Supp.2d 38, 60 (D.D .C. 2009) (treating de fenda nt’s argument in motion for summary

judgme nt as conc eded where plaintiff fa iled to addre ss in his response); Ho pk ins v . W om e n’ s D iv ., Ge ne ra l B d. of G lob al M ini str ie s, 28 4 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 5, 25 (D .D .C. 2003) (“ I t is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositi ve motion and addr esses only cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded.” ), aff’d 98 Fe d. Appx. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As is appa rent then, Plaintiff doe s not seek copie s of the applica nts’ actua l clemenc y petitions or any

substantive information compiled by the OPA and include d in the files of the unsucc essful applica nts. Accor dingly , the fa ct that such substantive infor mation mayFor this reason, Binion v. DOJ , 695 F.2d 1189 ( 9th Cir. 1983) and Associated Press v

. 9 DOJ , 549 F.3d 62 ( 2d Cir. 2008) are inapposite. Def .’s Opp’n at 9. I n Binion , th e Ni nth Cir c uit held that “infor

mation compiled by

the FB Iin a par don applicant investig ation satisfies the rational ne x us test” under Ex emption 7. 695 F.2d at 1194. Similarly , in As so c iate d Pre ss , the Second Circuit addr essed a FOIA re quest for a

copy of the c ommutation petiti on filed by J ohn Walker L indh. 549 F.3d at 65. Those decisions thus involved reque sts for substantive re cords included in an a

pplicant’s cle mency

file, an issue not implicated in the c ase at hand.

31 qualify as law e nforc ement re cords f or purpose s of FO I A is irrele vant to the issue at hand. 9 OPA argues that its list s of the unsucc essful applica nts’ names a

re none theless law
e nf or c e me nt r e c or ds be c a

us e : ( 1) “ the c omp ute r d ata ba se re c or ds c on ta ini ngthe a pp lic ants ’
names a re pa rt of the same sy stem of re cords a s the pape r [clemency] files;” and (2) suc h rec ords “ar e cr eate d using the very clemenc y

reque sts that start the investigation into whether a pa rdon or
c omm utatio n is wa

rr ante d f or the c ri me and

a pp lic ant i nv olv e d. ” De f. ’s Re ply at 3. Th e se arguments are wholly

without merit. The first asse rtion is lega lly irrele vant; as discussed a bove,
even a ssuming that cle mency rec ords in g ener al ar e law e nforc ement re cords, the f act that the lis ts o f d e nie d a

pp lic ants “ are pa

rt of the same sy ste m of

re c or ds ” do e s not

me an th at th e lis ts themselves ar e law e nforc ement re cords f or purpose s of FO I A. Se e Cam pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32. The sec ond asser

tion is unsupported by

the re cord. A s OPA acknow ledg es, whe n the President denies c lemency —whether

of one individual or se vera l individuals—t he Of fice of the Counsel to the President informs OPA in writing that the reque sts have bee n denied. SeeF ir st Bollwe rk De cl. ¶ 15; Second B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 5; L ardne r De cl., Ex. 7 (redac ted copy of
no tif ic atio n li st p ro du c e d to Pla int if f i n c onne c tio n w itha

se pa ra te F OIA r e qu e st) . “ Th is notification from the White House Counsel’s Of fice serve s as the off

icial re cord of

the President’s ac tion on the clemenc y reque sts of those applicants.” Second B ollwerk De cl. ¶ 5. To the extent OPA retains those notifications, or c reates computer r ecor ds based on the inf ormationAlthough O PA has admitted that it maintains lis ts of clemenc y applications that have 10 been de nied, it is undisput ed that OPA possesses r esponsive docume nts, seePl.’s St mt. ¶ 17; De f. ’s Re sp . ¶

17 ; L ard ne r D e c l., Ex. F , O PA n on e the le ss a sse rt s th at Pla int if f’ s F OIA r e qu e st would require it to “ext rac t information” fr om the substantive clemenc y applicants, see F ir st Bollwe rk De cl. ¶ 26. Give n OPA’s admission that it already maintains responsive r ecor ds, any argument that Plaintiff’s reque st require s OPA to create new doc uments from the substantive c l e m e n c y r e c o r d s i s un s u

p p o rt e d b y th e r e c o r d
. Ina d d i t i o n , th e C o urte mp h a s i z e s th atF O IA “does not oblig ate a g encie s to crea te or re tain documents; it only obligates them to provide acc ess to those which it in fac t has cre ated or reta ined.” Kissi nger v. Re porters Comm. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980). Thus, to the extent OPA sugg ests that Plaintiff’s FOIA re quest somehow oblig ates it to “extract the infor mation sought by

Plaintiff” from cle mency

assessments or other

rec ords, Plaintiff is both factually and leg ally

incorre ct. The Court notes that Plaintiff cites e x tensively to Abramson v. FBI

, 658 F.3d 806, 813 11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for

the proposition that—even if the information soug ht in this case was take n from the a

pplicant’s individual clemenc y files—OPA must stil l demonstrate that the “ new document [] qualif[ies] independe ntly for a ny exemptions from disclosure under F OIA.” Pl.’s MSJ at 6; Pl.’s Reply

at 7-8. Plaintiff, howe ver, is flatly wrongas a le g al matter, ignoringthe fac t that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abramson w a s s u b s e qu e n t l y reve rsed by

the United States Supreme Court. See FBI v . Abramson , 4 56 U. S. 6 15 , 6 31 (1 98 2) . In s o d oin g , th e Sup re me Court made cle ar that “information initially contained in a

rec ord made by

law enf orce ment purposes c ontinues to meet the threshold re quirements of Exemption 7 where that rec orded information is repr oduced or summarized in a new doc ument prepa red f or a non- lawenfor ceme nt purpose.” See FBI v . Abramson , 456 U.S. 615, 631 (1982). Plaintiff’s continued relianc e on the D.C. Circuit’s de cision in Abramson , without acknowledg ing its subseque nt reve rsal, is inappropr iate, to say the least. None theless, g iven the Court’s findingabove that OPA’s lists of unsuccessf ul clemenc y

applicants a

re not “ cre ated usingthe [] clemenc y reque sts,” but r athe r u sin gthe no tif

ic atio ns se nt b y

the Whit e Ho us e to t

he OPA , Pl a int if

f’ s e rr or is irrele vant to the Court’s holding in this ca se. 32 provided in the notifications, such documents are not “cr eate d using the [] clemenc y reque sts,” but rather using the notifications sent by the White House to the OPA, which a re the officia l
re c or d o f t

he Pr e sid e nt’ s d e c isi on

to d e ny c le me nc y

to t ho se a pp lic ants . Thus , c on tr ary to 10 OPA’s cha

rac terization, it i s evident that the re cords we re not c ompiled by OPA in the course of “conduc ting investig ations into the clemenc y reque sts of all applicants over the past eig ht y ear s.” Def .’s MSJ at 9. 11 F ina lly , th e Court

e mph a size s o nc e a g a in t

hat O PA, a s a

matte r o f g e ne ra l po lic y , p ub lic ly33

dis c los e s th e re qu e ste d in fo rm atio n to any me mbe r o f t

he pu bli c up on sp e c if ic re qu e st a

nd a lso
rese rves the r ight to disclose the inf ormation to the public at larg e upon its own deter mination that there is “substantial public interest” in the c ase. The fac t that OPA free ly rele ases the na

mes of un su c c e ssf

ul c le me nc y

a pp lic ants to t

he g e ne ra l pu

bli c in c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s c a sts signific ant doubt on OPA’s claim that its rec ords re flec ting this information should be tre ated a s confide ntial law enf

orce ment rec ords that must be protec ted in order to “pre vent pre mature disclosure of inve stigatory materia ls.” See A bramson , 456 U.S. at 621. As OPA has not provided a ny meritorious rea son why

the ac tua l re c or ds at is su e in t his litigation— i.e. , lists or databases that are compiled or re tained by OPA to rec ord the Preside nt’s of fi c ia l de c isi on

to d e ny c le me nc y

re qu e sts a s tr ans mitte d to OPAby the Of fi c e of the Couns e l to the President—should be c onsidered la w enf orce ment rec ords for pur

poses of F OIA, the Court conclude s that the materia ls are not law enfor ceme nt rec ords as re quired unde r Exemption 7. Acc ording ly , OPA may

not properly

withhold the documents under E x emption 7(C) and the Court theref

ore sha ll GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and DEN Y Def endant’ s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, with respec t to the propriety of withholding the reque sted information pursuant to Exemption 7. In conclusion, then, the Court finds that OPA may not properly

withhold the names of those applica

nts whose applications for cleme ncy wer e denie d by

President B ush duringhis term in office pursuant to either Ex emption 6 or Exempti on 7(C). As these are the only exemptions
c la ime d in

the ins tant a c tio n, OPAis h e re by re qu ir e d to dis c los e the re qu e ste d in fo rm atio n to Plaintiff.34

C. Se gr e ga bil ity F ina lly , a s e xpla ine d a

bo ve , und e r D .C. Cir c uit

pr e c e de nt, dis tr ic t c ourt s a re re qu ir e d to
c on sid e r s e g re g a

bil ity iss ue s su a s

po nteeven when the pa

rties have not specifica lly raised suc h claims. Trans-Pac. Policing Agree ment , 177 F.3d at 1028. Although Plaintiff initially argued that OPA had not re lease d all seg reg able por tions of the withheld rec ords, seePl.’s MS J at 18, Plaintiff’s conce rns wer e subseque ntly resolved by

the par ties’ Stipulation fil ed with this Court on November

20, 2008. SeeStipul ation, Docke t No. [11] . Moreove r, as the only question at issue in this case is whethe r OPA may proper ly withhold the responsive mate rials listing the identities of the applica

nts whose cleme ncy

applications we re de nied by President B ush during his term in office under Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and a s the Court has now answ ere d that question in the neg ative, all re quested non-e x empt information must be disclosed to the Plaintiff. Acc ording ly , the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and GRANT Def endant’ s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, with respec t to issues of seg reg ability , as Plaintiff’s conce rns ar e now moot in light of the parties’ November 20, 2008 Stipul ation and the Court finds that no other segreg ability conce rns ar e at issue in this case g iven its conclusion above that the reque sted information must be disclosed in full. IV . C ON CL USI ON F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , th e Court

sh a ll G RA

NT I N PA RT a

nd DENYI N PA RT Plaintiff’s [9] Motion for Summary J udg ment and shall GRANT I N PART and DENYI

N PART Def endant’ s [10] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment. Specifica lly , the Court DENI ES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defe ndant’s motion with respec t to the issues of collater al estoppel and se g reg abilty , but Court GRANTS Pl aintiff’s motion and DEN I ES Defe ndant’s35

motion with respect to the propr iety of withholding the reque sted information under Ex emptions 6 and 7(C). O PA is therefor e re quired to disclose to Plaintiff the name s of those par don and
c omm utatio n a pp lic ants wh os e a

pp lic atio ns we re de nie d b y Pr e sid e nt B us h d

ur inghis te rm

in office . An appr opriate or der a ccompa nies this memorandum opinion. Date: July

31, 2009 /s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge