### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00242- CV

Ronda Floyd, Appellan t

v. 21st Mor tgage C orporation, Appellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 1 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, NO. C-1 -CV- 13- 0105 81, H ONO RAB LE DAVID J. P HI LLIP S, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n this forc ible-deta iner action, appellant Ronda Floy d appea ls from the trial court’s judgme nt g ranting possession of cer tain rea l proper

ty to appellee 21st Mortg age C orpora tion.
See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002 (statutory reme dy of forc ible detainer ). On October 16, 2 0 1 4 , 2 1 s t M o r tg a g e f il e d a mo ti o n to d is mi s s th is a p p e a l f o r la c k o f ju r is d ic ti o n
. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , 2 1 s t M o r

tg a g e
arg ues that this appea l has become moot beca use Floy d failed to superse de enfor ceme nt of the judgme nt, the trial court issued a writ of possession, and upon execution of the writ, 21st Mortg ag e obtained possession of the pr operty

.

The only issue in a forc ible-det ai n er action is the rig ht to actua l possession of the premises. Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e) ; see also Marshall v. Housing Auth. of the City of San Antonio , 198 S.W .3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). Under the Texas Property Code, a judgme nt in a forc ible-deta iner action “may not under any circ umstances be stay ed pending appea l unles s , wi t h i n ten day s of thesigning of the judgme nt, the appella n t files a superse deas bond in an amount set by the county

court.” Tex. Prop. Code § 24.007. An appellant’ s failure to superse de a forc ible-deta iner judgme nt will not divest an appellant of her rig ht to appea l, bu t d o es s u b j ec t the judgme nt to enfor ceme nt, including the issuance of a writ of possession. Marshall , 198 S.W .3d at 786-87. When the appellant

cea ses to have actua l possession of the proper ty , an appea l of a judgme nt in a forc ible-deta iner action become s moot unless the appellant holds and asser ts “a potentially meritorious claim of rig ht to

curr ent, ac tual possession.” Id . at 787.

Her e, the rec ord establish es t hat the trial court signe d the judgme nt of possession

on Marc h 24, 2014; Floy d di d n o t s u perse de the judgme nt, and 21st Mortg ag e subsequently obtained possession of the proper ty by execution of a writ of possession. Floy d has not responde d 1

to 21st Mortg ag e’s asser

tion that this appea l is moot, but conce des in her brief that she is no longe r in posse ssion of the proper ty

. I n addition, the substance of Floyd’s appellate arg uments is tha t the underly ing deed of trust and fore closure, throug h which 21st Mortg ag e obtained title to the
proper ty , wer e wr ong ful and invalid. These challeng es, even if meritorious, cannot be resolved in this forc ible-deta iner action and cannot form the b as i s of a “potentially meritorious claim of rig ht

The rec ord shows that the judgme nt of possession did not set an amount for superse deas. 1 Although Floyd filed a motion to set bond, it was not filed until April 16, 2014, well afte r the 10-day statutory deadline for filing a superse deas bo n d had passed. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.007. Fur thermore , Floy d does not dispute that she i s no longe r i n actua l possession of t he property and any complaint she may have reg arding the trial co u rt ’s fa i l ure to set an amount for superse deas bond cannot provide “a potential basis for a claim” that she is “entitled to curr ent, actua l possession.” See W ilhelm v. Fede ral Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n , 349 S.W .3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Pec k v. Fede ral Home Loan Mortg. Corp ., No. 03-13-00362- CV, 2013 WL 6805665, at *2 (Te x . App.—Austin Dec

. 18, 2013, no pet.) (me m. op.) (conc luding that a ppellant failed to pr ovide potential basis for claim of entitlement to c urre nt, a ctual possession w here issues on appea l were limit ed to trial cour t’s failure to set amount for super sedea s bond).

2to curr ent, actua l possession.” See W ilhelm v. Fede ral Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n , 349 S.W .3d 766, 768-69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (conc luding that pending suit for wr o ng ful fore closure did n o t p ro vide a “potential basis for a claim” that appellant was “entitled to curr ent,
actua l possession ”) ; R es endez v. FV REO I, LLC , No. 03-13-00201- CV, 2014 WL 411720, at *2 ( T e x. A p p
. — Au s ti n Ja n
. 3 1 , 2 0 1 4 , n o p e t. ) ( me m. o p
. ) ( c o n c lu d in g th a t c la im o f w r o n g f

u l f o r e c lo s u r e could not be resolved in forc ible-deta iner action and could not provide basis for “poten tially meritorious claim of rig ht to curr ent, actua l possession” beca use claim was i n d ep en d en t of issue of rig ht to imm ediate posse ssion).

Be cause Floy d i s n o l o n ger in possession of the proper ty and has not asser

ted a potentially meritorious claim of rig ht to cu rr en t , ac tual possession, Floy d’s appea l is moot. See Marshall , 198 S.W .3d at 787. Acco rd i n gly , we g rant appellee ’s motion and dismiss the appea l
as moot.

__________________________________________ Scott K. Field, Just ice
Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Field Dismissed on Appellee’ s Motion Filed: January

30, 2015

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