Filed 8/31/21 In re M.B. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

IN RE M.B., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.B.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Juv. No. B307531

(Super. Ct. No. FJ56779)

(Los Angeles County)

“I’m going to bring a Glock 9 . . . to school tomorrow . . . and 

shoot you in the head.”

M.B. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a 

wardship petition charging him with making a criminal threat in 

violation of Penal Code section 422 (hereinafter section 422). 
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(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The court declared the offense a 

misdemeanor, placed appellant on six months’ probation without 

wardship, and ordered him released to a parent. Appellant 

contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that 

he made a criminal threat. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 5, 2019, appellant and E.M. were students 

at Burbank Community Day School. Appellant was 14 years old 

and E.M. was in the 11th or 12th grade. E.M. was acquainted 

with appellant, who told her he had been expelled from his 

previous school for bullying behavior. 

During a break period that morning, E.M. sat at a table 

with a group of her friends. Appellant was sitting at the same 

table across from her. E.M. said hello to appellant and tried to 

give him a “high-five,” but he said “no” and pushed her hand 

away. Appellant mentioned a fellow student named Valerie, then 

laughed and told E.M. in a monotone voice that “[i]f I was going 

to shoot up the school, she would be first, and then it would be 

you, and then everybody else.” 

No one at the table laughed at the statement. E.M. was 

scared, nervous, and confused. She told appellant that she was 

not sure if he was joking, that he was making her nervous, and 

that she “would not like him to say things like that because they 

can be a real dangerous threat.” Appellant responded by 

repeating the statement in a more serious tone with his fists 

clenched. E.M. told appellant: “If you say anything like that

again, I will tell the school, and you’ve scared me, and I’m going 

to leave this table.” 

E.M. left the table, walked to her next class about 40 feet 

away, and waited outside the front door for the bell to ring. A 
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few minutes later, appellant walked up to E.M., clenched his 

fists, and angrily said, “I’m going to bring a Glock 9 . . . to school 

tomorrow . . . and shoot you in the head.” E.M. was “terrified” 

and immediately went to the principal’s office and reported the 

incident. She did not attend school the next day because she was 

afraid and anxious. 

About a week after the incident, appellant approached E.M. 

at school and said “I was kidding, it was a joke.” E.M. replied 

that she did not think appellant was joking but told him it was 

“okay” because she “didn’t want to agitate him more.” At one 

point E.M. sent appellant an Instagram message stating that she 

would write a letter on his behalf because she “didn’t want to 

make his life harder than it had to be,” but subsequently

“regretted sending it.” 

Burbank Police Officer Dustin Rodriguez was assigned as a 

School Resource Officer at Burbank Community Day School. 

Officer Rodriguez interviewed E.M. and appellant and was 

present when the principal spoke to appellant. Appellant said his 

remarks to E.M. were made during a discussion with his friends 

about firearms and knives. He admitting telling E.M. that he 

would shoot her, but claimed he was merely “joking.” 

Appellant testified in his own defense. He claimed that his 

remarks were made during a discussion with his friends about 

school shootings. E.M., who was “not friends with” appellant and 

his friends and had never sat with them before, came to their 

table “in the middle of the conversation.” While E.M. was sitting 

at the table, appellant jokingly told her he was going to bring a 

Glock 9 to school and shoot her in the head. Everyone laughed 

and he only made the statement once. After E.M. left and walked 
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to her next class, appellant “went up to her [and] told her [he] 

was kidding[] and . . . not to trip about it.” 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support 

the finding that he made a criminal threat in violation of section 

422. We disagree. 

“‘The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of 

[the] evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile case: we 

review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the 

conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re A.G. (2020) 

58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653 (A.G.).) “‘“We resolve neither credibility 

issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. 

[Citation.]” [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence “is 

unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’” the 

[judge’s] verdict.’” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 

87.) 

To prove that a criminal threat was made in violation of 

section 422, the prosecution must establish “‘(1) that the 

defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will 

result in death or great bodily injury to another person,” (2) that 

the defendant made the threat “with the specific intent that the 

statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent 

of actually carrying it out,” (3) that the threat—which may be

“made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic

communication device”—was “on its face and under the

circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person 
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threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of 

execution of the threat,” (4) that the threat actually caused the 

person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or her own 

safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,” and (5) that 

the threatened person’s fear was “reasonabl[e]” under the 

circumstances.’ [Citations.]” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

620, 630.) 

Appellant does not dispute that he told E.M. he was going 

to bring a Glock 9 to school the next day and shoot her in the 

head, that the threat conveyed to E.M. a gravity of purpose and 

an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, that E.M. was 

in sustained fear as a result of the threat, and that her fear was 

reasonable under the circumstances. He nevertheless contends 

that the evidence is insufficient to establish the second element of 

the crime, i.e., that he made the threat with the specific intent 

that it be taken as a threat. According to appellant, “the juvenile 

court found true an allegation that a fourteen-year-old boy made 

a criminal threat against a classmate on testimony that he made 

an extremely unfunny joke for which he apologized.” 

The juvenile court, however, expressly found that appellant 

was not joking when he made the threat and rejected appellant’s 

testimony to the contrary as not credible. “We defer, as we must, 

to the trial [court’s] credibility determinations. [Citation.] And 

we note there is nothing funny about threatening to take a gun to 

school in any event.” (A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 650.) 

Moreover, “even if [appellant] made the [threat] as a joke, a 

reasonable trier of fact could conclude the joke was made with the 

intent that it be understood by [E.M.] as a threat.” (Id. at p. 655.) 

Contrary to appellant’s claim, it is irrelevant that he 

subsequently apologized to E.M. for threatening to bring a gun to 
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school and shoot her. Although he notes that “[o]ne may, in 

private, curse one’s enemies . . . safe from section 422 sanction” 

(People v. Teal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281, italics added), 

appellant’s threats were made directly to E.M.

Appellant also misplaces his reliance on In re Ricky T.

(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132. The minor in that case—a 16-yearold student who told a teacher “I’m going to get you” after the 

teacher inadvertently hit him with a door—conceded that the 

evidence was sufficient to establish the first two elements of 

section 422, i.e., that he willfully threatened the teacher and did 

so with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat. The Court

of Appeal agreed with the minor, however, that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish the third and fourth elements of the 

crime, i.e., that the nature of the threat and the circumstances in 

which it was made conveyed a gravity of purpose and an 

immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and that the threat 

actually placed with teacher in sustained fear for his safety. (Id. 

at pp. 1137-1141.) In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned 

among other things that “[a]ppellant’s intemperate, rude, and 

insolent remarks hardly suggest any gravity of purpose” and that 

“[a]ppellant’s statement was an emotional response to an 

accident rather than a death threat that induced sustained fear.” 

(Id. at pp. 1138, 1141.) 

Here, appellant did not merely make intemperate, rude, 

and insolent remarks. He made a clear, unambiguous, and

unequivocal death threat that plainly induced sustained fear in 

the victim. He first told E.M. that “[i]f I was going to shoot up 

the school, [Valerie] would be first, and then it would be you, and 

then everybody else.” After E.M. conveyed that she did not think 

the remark was funny, appellant repeated it in a more serious 
7

tone. After E.M. left the the table, appellant followed her, 

clenched his fists, and angrily told her he was going to bring a 

Glock 9 to school the next day and shoot her in the head. This

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, is plainly sufficient to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that appellant made the threat with the specific intent 

that it be taken as a threat. Appellant’s claim of insufficient 

evidence thus fails.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

TANGEMAN, J.
Kevin Brown, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 

Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, and

Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.