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EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS:

FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL COORDINATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 12, 2006

Serial No. 109–73

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington, Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Dave Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science, and Technology ...................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science, and Technology ............................................................. 3

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

Mr. Steven Bailey, Director, Pierce County Department of Emergency 

Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20

The Honorable George Foresman, Under Secretary of Preparedness, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9

Mr. William ‘‘Bill’’ Mitzel, MS, ARM, ALCM, Risk Control Specialist, Home 

Office Commercial Lines, Unigard Insurance Group 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26

Mr James Mullen, Director, Washington Military Department, Emergency 

Management Division: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Mr. Mario H. Trevin ̃ o, Fire Chief, Bellevue Fire Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23

PANEL II 

Mr. Michael Loehr, Director, Preparedness, Public Health—Seattle and King 

County: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50

Sheriff Paul A. Pastor, Jr., Pierce County Sheriff’s Office ................................... 42

Mr. William ‘‘Bill’’ Pugh, Director, Public Works/Assistant City Manager, 

City of Tacoma ..................................................................................................... 51

Mr. Roger C. Serra, Director, Security and Emergency Management, Seattle 

City Light: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 53

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 55 

Mr. A.D. Vickery, Assistant Chief, City of Seattle Fire Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 44

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46

(1)

EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS: 

FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 

COORDINATION 

Wednesday, April 12, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m. at the 

Orting Multi-Purpose Center, 202 Washington Avenue South, 

Orting, Washington, Hon. Dave Reichert [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members Present: Representatives Reichert and Pascrell. 

Mr. REICHERT. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology 

will come to order. The Subcommittee will hear testimony today on 

Federal, State and local coordination for emergency planning and 

preparedness. 

I would like to thank every one of the witnesses here today and 

the public for attending this morning’s important hearing. 

Before we proceed any further this morning, as chairman, I need 

to take care of some housekeeping duties. Because this is an official 

Congressional hearing as opposed to a town hall meeting, we must 

abide by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security as 

well as the House of Representatives. Therefore, I kindly ask that 

there be no applause at any time or any kind of demonstration 

with regard to the testimony. It is important that we respect the 

decorum and rules of the Committee and the House. Thank you in 

advance for your understanding. 

Before we begin the testimony today, I must first welcome my 

distinguished colleague, the ranking member of our Subcommittee, 

Mr. Pascrell. The Subcommittee’s ranking member and New Jersey’s finest is welcome to the State of Washington and Washington’s 8th Congressional District. 

Although Bill and I hail from opposite coasts and belong to different political parties, we nonetheless share a common vision for 

a safer America. 

I’m just going to pause here and go off the script just a little bit. 

Bill and I have had the opportunity to work together as partners, 

I think, for about the six months or so that I’ve had this position. 

And I must say that I think that we have become an example, not 

only for other subcommittees under the Homeland Security um-
2

brella, but also for other committees and subcommittees within the 

House of Representatives as to how we work together to address 

the Nation’s needs, especially when it comes to keeping our communities safe from all hazards; not just national hazards, but all 

hazards that we might face in the changing world that we all now 

live in. 

So I’ll go back to the script to say that there are few members 

of Congress as passionate as Bill on issues related to first responders to Homeland Security. And to be honest, there are few in Congress as knowledgeable and with as much expertise on the needs 

and concerns of first responders as Bill. 

So thank you, Bill, for taking part in this hearing. It’s time away 

from the family. He’s come a long way, all the way from New Jersey. I don’t pronounce it the same way as he does, I’m sure. But 

this is a long trip. It’s a five and a half to six-hour trip from New 

Jersey to the Seattle area, the Northwest here, and Bill is on a 

flight home this evening already with his staff, and also the staff 

of the Homeland Security Committee. 

So I just want to take this moment to thank all the staff from 

both sides of the aisle and the staff from the Homeland Security 

Department. Amy especially has been very helpful in helping bring 

this hearing here today. We have a very busy schedule after this 

meeting this afternoon shortly after this hearing. So thank you so 

much, Bill, for taking time to be here. 

Thank you, George Foresman and the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Under Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security—he’s the Under Secretary of Preparedness—for his graciousness in appearing before us today. Mr. Under Secretary, I’m sure 

that Bill shares my high regard for you and my sincerest wishes 

for your success in a very challenging job. 

Bill, please correct me if I’m wrong or just simply exaggerating, 

but I believe our Subcommittee to be one of the most bipartisan in 

all of Congress. Although we have some policy differences on occasion, Bill and I and our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, our 

goal is enhancing our nation’s ability to prevent and therefore mitigate against, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters and emergencies. 

There is a public perception that bipartisanship, if it isn’t dead 

yet, is on life support. But as long as I have anything to say or do 

about it, bipartisanship on this Subcommittee will remain strong. 

After all, homeland security is a bipartisan issue. Neither party 

has a monopoly on national security or the caring for the wellbeing 

of our 

Nation and its citizens. That is precisely why Bill and I will 

within the next month or so jointly introduce legislation to fix two 

of the most serious deficiencies within our National Disaster Response System as made evident by the government’s response after 

Hurricane Katrina. 

The first bill on public safety emergency communications will, 

among other things, establish an office of emergency communications in the preparedness directives, consolidate the national communications system, SAVCOM, program, the integrated network 

project, the interoperable communications technical assistance pro-
3

gram within this new office, and transfer the Department of Commerce’s new $1 billion interoperability grant program to DHS. 

The second bill, which is on preparedness and response, will instead of restoring FEMA to its previous status as an independent 

agency, better integrate FEMA into the department, restore the 

nexus between preparedness and response, and implement many 

important Katrina-related reforms such as creating an Office of 

Public and Community Preparedness. 

The purpose of this hearing is to help us gain a more thorough 

understanding of what Congress can do to better assist the Seattle 

region’s efforts to enhance all hazard preparedness. Specifically we 

will examine the state of the region’s coordination, cooperation and 

planning for the state of the region’s catastrophic events, whether 

manmade or natural, and how well the Department of Homeland 

Security is working with our State and local governments. 

There are few metropolitan regions in the country as vulnerable 

as ours. Those of us who live in the Pacific Northwest unfortunately are all too familiar with nature’s fury. In fact, I’m pressed 

to think of any other region that faces the same number of natural 

hazards such as volcanic eruptions, lahars, earthquakes, tsunamis, 

wildfires and floods, just to name a few. Given our region’s wealth 

of critical infrastructures such as the Port of Seattle, our military 

bases, and our proximity to Canada, the Seattle region is increasingly a potential target for those seeking to undermine our way of 

life. Because we reside in an area so prone to catastrophic natural 

disasters and at such high risk for acts of terrorism, it is absolutely 

imperative that all those forms of governments, Federal, State and 

local, work in an integrated seamless manner. 

Unfortunately, as the response to Hurricane Katrina so dramatically exposed, we as a nation have a long way to go in that regard. 

We really should expect better from our government. It’s for these 

reasons that the Subcommittee is holding today’s field hearing. We 

are indeed fortunate in the Seattle region to have the opportunity 

to hear from so many hardworking, dedicated expert public servants on our state of preparedness. Your appearance is vitally important to the work of the Subcommittee and no doubt to the Department. 

A little more than six months ago, Peter King, Chairman of the 

full Committee on Homeland Security, personally asked me to 

chair this Subcommittee. As one of the only six freshman in the 

history of Congress to be afforded the privilege and honor of 

chairing the Subcommittee, I am pleased and happy to host my 

first field hearing in the 8th Congressional District. 

Again, I would like to thank the witnesses and the audience for 

being with us. I now yield to the ranking member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, for holding the 

first of two hearings dedicated to examining emergency planning 

and preparedness among Federal, State and local officials. And 

when I look at the basic topics that we’re going to get into today, 

what are our strengths and what are our weaknesses, and what is 

the relationship between the different levels of government, we’re 

trying to spend a lot of time on that, because we think it’s critical. 
4

We know of the lack of communication at 9/11, and we want to 

see how far we’ve come since then. Are we working together in the 

first place? A lot of things pass for working together when you look 

at it and scratch the surface to find out the folks on the local level 

don’t have any idea because we haven’t really shared with them. 

Dave and I believe in the same philosophy on this. We believe 

in a bottom-up approach to protecting our kids and our families 

and our neighborhoods. It’s been an honor for me. And David 

knows that I can be as partisan as the next person, but David 

knows I care for this guy. He’s been a great chairman. You have 

a great congressman here. He works very, very hard for all the people. And he knows, if I didn’t mean it, I wouldn’t say it. I don’t care 

where I would be. 

Mr. REICHERT. That’s true. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So this is a serious concern for both of us. If and 

when terrorists or natural disaster strike our homeland, it would 

be those on the local level that are most affected. We forget that 

many times when we get caught up in the aura of the dome. 

Homeland Security consequently must begin at home, in our 

communities and our cities. It is imperative that the men and 

women on the frontlines are fully coordinated with State and Federal officials, that robust communication, cooperation and integration throughout the various spheres of our security apparatus exists. Lives, as you know, will depend on it. 

We live in a vast nation, so whether I’m talking about Mr. Dave 

in Washington State or Mr. Dave for New Jersey, which I represent, there may be many miles, 2,300, that separate us, but we 

both really want the same thing for America. We want to contribute to that and get out of the business of simply pointing fingers. Because of the sheer size of the Nation, we have an abundance of risks and vulnerabilities right here in Washington State. 

It’s home to the potential of a variety of natural disasters, earthquakes volcanic eruptions, tsunamis. 

In additional, two large container ports and a close proximity to 

the northern border, the area is considered to be a potential terrorist target. Dave and I both agree that, whatever dollars are 

spent by the Federal Government, the more we can base it on risk 

to the communities, the better off we will all be. It will work more 

efficiently and more effectively. 

In New Jersey, which we’ll be visiting for a second hearing down 

the road, we have a number of challenges. It’s close to New York 

City, and that presents its own share of risks. It has a complex 

array of infrastructures throughout the region. 

Both of our congressional districts have many things in common. 

First and foremost is the dedication of our first responders, the police, fire, EMTs, State and local officials who want to help protect 

our citizens. That’s why we’re here today, to help ensure that the 

Department of Homeland Security is effectively working with State 

and local agencies in addressing the challenges of developing and 

implementing their emergency preparedness and their response 

plans and their interoperable communication networks. We have 

spent vast hearing hours in debate and discussion on how we can 

improve communications in this country. And if one was to look objectively and stand back, we haven’t come very far in four years. 
5

We have our own inability to get the agencies to reach out to one 

another. We have our own turf wars that exist on a Federal level. 

We’re trying to overcome them, trying to bring people together. 

At the same time, we want the Federal Communications Commission to understand their responsibility in providing a spectrum 

so that we can elaborate upon communications. 

We’re very fortunate today to have these folks that have come a 

long way. We have the Under Secretary, George Foresman, very 

well respected in emergency management. I really believe that. 

And we have some disagreements when we come to meetings, of 

course, because he represents the administration’s standpoint. But 

he goes beyond that, and I want to commend him for the work that 

he’s done and the patience that he’s had with me, because I can 

ask too many questions at times. He doesn’t know whether to 

laugh or smile. We all have faith in you, George, Mr. Secretary, not 

only your competence but in your passion for the responsibilities. 

You are well prepared for this job, and one of the few areas of 

Homeland Security which I feel comfortable with, even though 

we’re a long ways from doing what I think should be done, and I 

mean that sincerely. 

I’m looking forward to an appearance or an array of emergency 

management and first responder officials, and I’m interested to 

learn what they believe are the greatest impediments to this. 

My local firefighters in New Jersey, my local police officers and EMTs back in New Jersey are concerned about more than the $600 

million that is being cut from preparedness directives within the 

Department of Homeland Security. They worry about the elimination of the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, the 

Metropolitan Medical Response System, and the safer firefighter 

grant program, which will affect local readiness. They have real 

concerns about the dramatic cuts in the fire grant programs which 

help all Americans, small towns and large towns, the Emergency 

Management Performance Grant Program and the various training 

programs within the department. 

Today while we discuss the need for interoperability, let’s not forget that the administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget also proposes 

to eliminate funding for the COPS Interoperability Grant Program 

on the grounds that the program is redundant with the efforts of 

the Department of Homeland Security. 

We’re not here to discuss the COPS program, because you 

wouldn’t be able to shut me up. But we are here to talk about, legitimately I think, interoperability programs within that. The Department of Homeland Security does not have a dedicated Interoperability Grant Program, so I look forward to hearing how the 

witnesses are using their limited resources to address a major priority discussing how we can help improve the directives. Dave and 

I want to be helpful to you. And I think, please believe us in our 

actions. 

I welcome hearing from today’s witness, a group of dedicated 

public servants who are addressing critical challenges. I salute 

them and look forward to a lively discussion about issues of enormous national importance. 

And in conclusion, we know that every time we act in the Congress of the United States, there is a ripple effect. There are con-
6

sequences to what we do. I take that extremely seriously, and I 

know David does, and I’m honored to work with him. And thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for convening here. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. I want to just mention 

first, before we get into witness testimony, that this kind of gives 

everyone a little bit of a flavor of how hearings are held if you 

haven’t had the opportunity to be in Washington, D.C. and be 

present at a hearing. 

Usually there’s a number of other members around the table and 

some witnesses all anxious and eager and ready to answer questions. They can’t wait for the friendly exchange that usually occurs. 

I am eliciting a smile here from Mr. Foresman as he focuses on his 

notes. 

I think there’s going to be—it’s interesting. You know, I want to 

make this a very comfortable and relaxed atmosphere. We’re in 

Orting, Washington, the 8th District. And both Bill and I, and I 

know George, the Under Secretary and all the witnesses here, are 

pleased to be here. But I want to just emphasize how important 

this hearing is. We aren’t going through the motions here to gather 

some news coverage. We are here today because we’re going to 

gather some facts, listen to some people who know their business. 

And we are crafting legislation, as Bill said, that will change the 

way you all in this room do business, how you do your jobs, how 

we as American citizens depend upon you who are our first responders and who are working with first responders in emergencies 

to protect our community. This is important stuff, and I just want 

to reemphasize that. Sometimes we lose focus here. This is really 

important. So thank you again, Mr. Pascrell, for taking the time to 

be here. 

And first, we’ll introduce a panel. The first witness that will 

speak today is the Honorable George Foresman, Under Secretary 

of Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security. We also 

have with us Mr. Jim Mullen, Director of the Emergency Management Division of Washington Military Department; Mr. Steven Bailey, Director of the Pierce County Department of Emergency Management; Chief Mario Trevin ̃ o, Chief of the Bellevue Fire Department; and Mr. William Mitzel, Risk Control Specialist, Home Office 

Commercial Lines, the Unigard Insurance Group. 

The Chair now recognizes the Honorable George Foresman to 

testify. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE FORESMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF 

PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FORESMAN. Good morning, Chairman Reichert and Congressman Pascrell. 

I very much want to acknowledge my appreciation for your kind 

remarks. And the one thing I will offer is, the Committee and both 

of you as leaders on the committee continue to provide good guidance, counsel, and appropriate oversight to us in the Department 

of Homeland Security, and I appreciate that. Thank you both for 

the opportunity to appear today before the Subcommittee to discuss 

the important national preparedness initiatives in the Department 

of Homeland Security. I’m indebted to you to be here today, and 

I’m humbled by the fact I’ve been able to join the local and State 
7

officials who are on the frontline of making America safer and more 

secure. 

I’m particularly appreciative of this field hearing. It allows us 

time with our local, State and private partners in their communities and on their turf. This type of exposure is critical toward 

constantly strengthening and improving our national approach to 

preparedness. A national approach, not Federal but national, requires the integration of levels and functions of government, the 

public and the private sector and the American people. I would just 

offer that this provides a parallel opportunity; the more questions 

that you ask them, the more that I will learn to be able to take 

back to Washington. 

As I have mentioned in the previous testimony before the Committee, over the past 20 years, our Nation has not had a comprehensive national approach to preparedness that was dynamic 

and flexible enough to react to changes in risk. 

The Department of Homeland Security was created as an all-hazards department with a mission to guide the development of a 

model to steer a national preparedness effort to link all the things 

that we do to deter, prevent, protect, respond, recover and mitigate 

against a wide range of hazards. It is important to recognize that 

this model is a shift from previous practices in which preparedness 

efforts were narrowly focused on either terrorism and natural disaster preparedness, but not both and not in an integrated fashion. 

Our difference in comprehensive approach requires a change in 

the way that we think about preparedness. It is not simply a step 

in the continuum what we do to manage the risks to the homeland 

or the function of readiness. Rather it is the umbrella over the continuum. 

Simply put, preparedness is how we will bring together the independent efforts to build one national preparedness system. It is 

how we make the independent interdependent. 

It is essential to understand that, under our current evolving 

risk management principles, preparedness is not just an administrative function within the Department of Homeland Security. Our 

direction and mission applies to each office and component within 

DHS across the Federal areas and communities, and most importantly with our State, local and private sector partners and the 

most critical element, the American people. Our job is to increase 

synchronization and integration within and among all of these elements. It is a shared national mission, not simply a Federal activity. To strengthen our national preparedness, we must focus more 

acutely on connecting the unconnected to achieve unity of effort. In 

order to achieve a broader and truly national preparedness effort, 

the Department must coalesce to lessen the many disparate issues 

at all levels of government and in the private sector while preserving critical missions, cultures and identities of individual organizations. 

Central to our efforts is the establishment of National Preparedness Integration Program, or NPIP, which includes a $50 million 

initiative in our DHS fiscal year 2007 budget request. The NPIP 

will support our national and departmental efforts by providing a 

centralized mechanism for promoting the alignments of preparedness efforts across all levels of government, the public and private 
8

sectors. Failure to do so will lessen our ability to support the men 

and women working every day in our communities to keep American safe and secure. 

By developing a common doctrine and approach to planning and 

training exercises, risk management and assessments, we will 

unite and integrate currently independent activities across all levels of government. Three examples: When an earthquake or lahar, 

as you mentioned earlier, or a terrorist attack could impact the 

people and infrastructure in this region, we must be sure that how 

we respond, how the Federal Government supports safety in communities is clear, coordinated and consistent irrespective of the 

hazard that threatens to cause the damage and destruction. At the 

end of the day, the local public safety officials charged with preventing a mitigation and response of the recovery wants one format 

process for getting Federal help. Imagine if we as citizens had to 

call different numbers and follow different procedures if we were 

dealing with all auto accidents or fire versus a crime versus a medical emergency. This kind of standardization will allow us to better 

measure performance so that we can individually and collectively 

assess our progress as a community and state and as a nation. It 

will allow us to evaluate preparedness from state to state and city 

to city as well as nationally. 

The creation of the NPIP will enable us to build the national preparedness system that was envisioned when Congress created 

DHS. Critically it will draw on all responsible parties’ plans and 

budgets for preparedness. Without such a system, it will be impossible to answer the question of how much better prepared are we 

today and how much do we continue to be. How better prepared 

should we be, and how far do we have to go? Most critically we 

need to have an integrated approach nationally. The NPIP will provide for this integrated approach. 

I would also note that our national catastrophic planning project 

is currently not as integrated as it should be. Hurricane Katrina 

was a vivid reminder of this. We trust that existing plans across 

all levels of government are adequate and feasible, but we do not 

have a systematic way to ensure that they are fully synchronized 

on a day-to-day or region-to-region or a jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction 

basis. This results in a fragmented response to disasters, particularly catastrophic events. 

Additionally, the core principle of the national response plan may 

not be fully operationalized which is needed quickly at the Federal, 

State or local level. We need a national planning system that will 

provide the means to achieve synchronization both vertically and 

horizontally to ensure that the Nation’s planning at the local, State 

and Federal levels are organized and well resourced to be able to 

effectively respond to a wide variety of threats that we face on a 

day-to-day basis. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Pascrell, the President and Congress have consistently identified the need for specific 

and measurable goals for preparedness, national cooperation, the 

application of the systems where the need and risk is the greatest, 

determination of the central capability of community need, and advanced planning processes that ensure plans are adequate and 
9

achieve the required synchronization to ensure goals interoperability. 

The National Preparedness Integration Program and the work of 

the preparedness directives will allow the Department to meet each 

of these challenges and will ensure a safer and more secure America; and most importantly, will ensure more prepared communities. 

Thank you once again for providing me the opportunity to speak 

with you all today and for your continued support and valued 

input. I look forward to answering any questions that you may 

have. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Forseman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. FORESMAN

Introduction 

Good morning Chairman Reichert and Congressman Pascrell. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee to discuss important preparedness 

initiatives within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

As you may have observed, over the past 20 years America’s approach to preparedness has not been sufficiently comprehensive or dynamic and flexible enough 

to react to changes in a continuum of risk. National preparedness efforts have too 

often focused on either terrorism planning and prevention or natural disaster preparedness and response. 

In the initial years of the newly created Department, significant emphasis was 

placed on terrorism-related threats, in recognition of the post-9/11 environment. 

However, as very evident today, it also had acquired the all-hazards legacy elements 

associated with many of the components assigned to the Department and the preparedness linkages and responsibilities associated with our State, local, and private 

sector partners. Thus, we must take a comprehensive approach in our national preparedness planning efforts. 

Therefore, I would like to share with you my vision and goals for strengthening 

America’s preparedness and how these initiatives will allow us to meet these goals 

in support of the overall mission of the Department. 

Last July, the Preparedness Directorate was created as a result of Secretary 

Chertoff’s Second Stage Review. This newly formed Directorate was given the distinct mission to coordinate the full range of our national capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terror or other disasters. 

For the reasons above, my vision and goals for national preparedness require a 

change in the way we think about preparedness. I see it more as a transformation 

of ‘‘how’’ we prepare as being essential to ensuring the safety and security of our 

citizens in the 21st Century. 

This change in thought dictates that preparedness should be understood not simply as a step in the continuum of what we do to manage risks to the homeland or 

the function of a single entity. Rather, it is the umbrella over the continuum. Simply 

put, preparedness is how we will bring together independent efforts to build one national preparedness system. 

In addition, it is essential to understand that under our current evolving risk 

management principles, Preparedness is not just an administrative function within 

the Department of Homeland Security. Our mission applies to each office and component within DHS, across the federal interagency community as well as our State, 

local, territorial, tribal and private sector partners, and the most critical element—

the American people. Our job is to achieve integration and synchronization within 

all of these elements. It is a shared national mission, not simply a Federal activity.

Preparedness Directorate Mission 

The mission of the Preparedness Directorate is to define, strengthen and measure 

preparedness capabilities of the Nation to prevent, protect against, respond to and 

recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. 

I believe that to achieve a broader and truly national preparedness, the Department and our State, tribal, local, and private sector partners must coalesce, integrate, and synchronize many disparate initiatives while preserving critical missions, 

cultures, and identities of individual organizations. Therefore, integration, synchronization, and communication become the foundations to our national preparedness 

efforts. 

Additionally, the Directorate will develop, foster, and instill a national preparedness culture—an imperative established by the White House and the Congress, and 
10

an expectation of the American citizens. This will require extensive leveraging of existing DHS Headquarters and field component resources and program activities. It 

will also require the dedicated encouragement and leveraging of other Federal interagency, State, local, tribal, and private sector resources to facilitate seamless national preparedness and effective cooperative partnerships.

National Preparedness Integration Program 

Central to preparedness integration and synchronization is the establishment of 

the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP), which is included as a $50 

million initiative in the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Budget Request. 

The purpose of the NPIP is to improve the Nation’s preparedness posture—a national safety and security imperative. The basic premise of the NPIP is that effective 

national preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized approach among 

Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector partners to share information and to 

plan, train, and exercise consistently. The current federal level approach to information sharing, planning, training and exercising is inconsistent across departments 

and agencies, leading to non-integrated preparedness. 

As the preparedness enabling element of the Office of the Under Secretary for 

Preparedness, the NPIP will oversee the national integrated preparedness efforts to 

ensure coordinated strategic partnering and development of standard preparedness 

doctrine. This reflects the vision outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive Eight, released on December 17, 2003. 

The Department requires a lead preparedness integrator such as the NPIP to support national preparedness transformation. This function will be accomplished at 

the Preparedness Directorate level and adequately resourced to ensure synchronization and integration of national preparedness initiatives and requirements. 

NPIP will link requirements with emerging technology, doctrine, and operational 

requirements, techniques, and procedures to ensure the integration, interoperability, 

and operational effectiveness of homeland security capabilities. NPIP staff will work 

closely with the Homeland Security Institute and DHS Centers for Excellence to ensure preparedness integration projects and requirements are studied through experiments, and tested through combined training and exercise events conducted by 

the Directorate. 

Preparedness standardization also allows us to better measure performance so we 

can individually and collectively assess our progress, allowing us to evaluate preparedness nationally, from region to region, state to state, and city to city. 

Therefore, through the NPIP, we can better develop regional and local resilience 

to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.

Building a National Preparedness System 

By establishment of the NPIP, we will enhance our national preparedness system, 

which allow us to better answer the question, ‘‘What risks should we prepare for 

and how well must we prepare?’’ Given the range of roles and responsibilities of 

DHS, it has proved difficult to ensure homeland security capabilities are internally 

coherent and collectively competent. These currently bifurcated relationships must 

be organized within a fully integrated and adaptable national preparedness system.

A fully integrated national preparedness system will result in: 

• Strategic and operational flexibility that accommodates risk and uncertainty; 

• A capabilities-based framework that organizes the nation to act in concert, and 

with the speed and operational effectiveness required for effective prevention and 

response; and 

• The means to measure readiness by an individual entity or in aggregate. 

This national preparedness system will improve the nation’s homeland security 

and fully leverage the domestic all-hazards emergency response system for natural 

hazards and other emergencies. 

State, local, tribal and private sector partners are not an adjunct to national preparedness system development. Instead, they are integral to development of a functional and successful system—bringing partnership commitment and participation 

to sustain and achieve sufficient preparedness capacity to ensure the Nation can effectively deal with catastrophic events.

Some of the critical initiatives supporting this system are: 

• Finalizing a single national and regional risk assessment methodology to identify the types and magnitudes of risks we face. 

• Encouraging capability-based planning that supports synchronization both 

vertically (across levels of government) and horizontally (across agencies at each 

level of government). 
11

• Provide risk-based allocation of Federal assistance to state and local governments and other funding recipients and targeted towards building adaptable and 

interchangeable target capabilities, including capabilities that strengthen citizen resilience. • Finalize a system of preparedness measures to assess national, regional, and 

local preparedness. 

Several of these initiatives are already underway in DHS and other Federal agencies. The NPIP will help ensure unity of effort and consistency.

Nationwide Plan Review 

The NPIP will also support follow-on efforts for the Nationwide Plan Review mandated by President Bush following Hurricane Katrina. 

DHS was directed by the President to conduct an immediate review of emergency 

plans for the nation’s major cities. Congress subsequently tasked DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to review plans for all States and territories and 

75 of the nation’s largest urban areas, with particular emphasis on evacuation planning. DHS launched a two-phase review process in cooperation with DOT. 

The overall objective of this two-phase review is to assess the adequacy and feasibility of the nation’s emergency plans to deal with catastrophic disasters, whether 

natural or manmade. 

The first phase involved a self-assessment of plans by States, territories and 

urban areas/major cities using guidance and criteria provided by DHS. The Department, through Preparedness Information Bulletin Number 197 issued November 23, 

2005, provided comprehensive guidance to the participating jurisdictions on the 

types of information required for the self-assessment. The Information Bulletin 

posed a number of questions designed to determine the status of emergency planning efforts within the participating jurisdictions. It should be noted that participation in the Nationwide Plan Review is a prerequisite for receipt of Fiscal Year 2006 

DHS Homeland Security grant funds.

The Department received responses from 98% of the participants. DHS provided 

a report summarizing Phase I results to Congress on February 10, 2006. The report 

included the following summary of findings: • States’ and urban areas’ plan components are generally consistent with existing Federal planning guidance such as SLG 101 (State & Local Guidance 101) 

and voluntary standards such as NFPA 1600; 

• For States and urban areas, having plans that are consistent with existing 

Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards does not translate into confidence in those plans to manage catastrophic events; 

• The majority of States and urban areas have exercised their plan components 

within the past two years, though updates to plan components have not been 

as consistent; 

• Plan components that have been updated recently are more likely to be consistent with existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards; 

• Plan components that have been updated recently are more likely to be considered adequate for managing catastrophic events; and 

• More populous States tend to have plan components that are consistent with 

existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards. 

The Phase I results suggest the need for more common planning assumptions and 

methods; stronger integration of grant funding with operational needs; and a common framework for assessing and reporting on plans’ effectiveness.

The second phase of the Nationwide Plan Review is currently underway and 

based on the Phase I findings, four areas were identified as requiring special emphasis in Phase II. These are customarily the most resource-intensive components 

of emergency plans and include the planning elements of: 

1. Mass Evacuation 

2. Mass Care 

3. Resource Management 

4. Health and Medical. 

During phase II, Peer Review Teams comprised of former state and local emergency management and homeland security officials will visit 131 States, Territories, 

and urban areas to jointly validate self-assessments, determine requirements for 

planning assistance, collect best practices, and recommend corrective actions. The 

Peer Review Teams will work to jointly validate the self-assessments and determine 

requirements for planning assistance, and recommend corrective actions for those 

plans that are determined to require some level of change. 

Perhaps just as important, these teams will collect best practices to disseminate 

to our State and local partners. Through the sharing of best practices we hope to 

achieve additional progress in the effort to improve catastrophic emergency planning 
12

processes. The results of the site visits and specific recommendations to strengthen 

catastrophic planning will be provided in a final report to the President and Congress by May 31, 2006. 

There’s no doubt that our national catastrophic planning process is disjointed and 

unsystematic. We have had to trust that existing plans across all levels of government are adequate and feasible, but we do not have a systematic way to ensure they 

are, or that they are synchronized. When I use the word ‘‘synchronized,’’ I mean 

both a process and an effect—that plans are related in purpose, place and time, and 

that together, our combined plans and pooled capabilities achieve the effect we 

want: ‘‘the city is evacuated’’ or ‘‘the terrorists are eliminated.’’ 

The existing Federal, State, and local preparedness and operational plans are not 

sufficiently coordinated, resulting in a fragmented response to disasters, particularly 

catastrophic events. Additionally, the core principles of the National Response Plan 

(NRP) have not been fully operationalized and de-conflicted at the Federal, State, 

or local levels. 

The Department hopes to address the needs identified by States and localities 

during the course of the Nationwide Plan Review, in part, through the establishment of the NPIP.

Close 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the President and Congress have consistently identified 

the need for specific and measurable goals for preparedness, national cooperation, 

application of assistance where the need is greatest, determination of essential capabilities that communities need, and advanced planning processes that ensure plans 

are adequate and feasible and achieve required synchronization. 

HSPD–8 ‘‘National Preparedness,’’ Hurricane Katrina lessons learned, and the 

strategic requirements of the war on terrorism require transformation of national 

preparedness—a process that shapes the changing nature of homeland security preparedness through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organization that exploit the Nation’s advantages and protect against our vulnerabilities by 

building and sustaining national resilience. 

The benefits of transforming national preparedness include: synchronization with 

national policy; a strategic approach to national preparedness transformation; and, 

achievement of the Directorate’s vision of creating, through NPIP, a fully integrated 

national preparedness system. 

And lastly, this approach ensures that national preparedness transformation will 

not be jeopardized and the credibility of the Directorate and Department will not 

be undermined; that the ambitious shaping of homeland security preparedness will 

not be impeded; and that we do not miss the historic opportunity to act and correct 

the shortcomings in the Katrina emergency response as well as in the protection 

and defense of the United States from terrorism. 

Thank you once again for providing me the opportunity to speak with you today 

and for your continued support to the Department. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Under Secretary. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES MULLEN, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON 

MILITARY DEPARTMENT, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION 

Mr. MULLEN. Thank you, Chairman Reichert and Congress 

Pascrell, for allowing me to speak to the Committee as part of the 

national discussion about the state of our preparedness. 

Washington State’s all-hazards management system predates 9/

11 by several decades, including the statewide homeland security 

stratagem that predates 9/11 by two full years. Our system incorporates broad public and private representation. It is this system 

that develops and tracks the all-hazards State Homeland Security 

Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan is the foundation of Team Washington’s enterprise approach to disaster preparedness. 

We have excellent working relationships with our local colleagues 

within the State. This is not to say that we agree with each other 

on everything, but we have mutual respect. We interact honestly 

in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect to the challenges 
13

each of us faces. In emergency situations, as well as during difficult 

day-to-day issues, that bond is held. With our regional and Federal 

colleagues, I can say that we have an excellent relationship as well, 

but miss the days when they were our link to the Federal decisionmaking process. We trust them, they know us, but they are often 

cut out of the dialogue by their own command chain. 

I’ve seen some positive signs of that due to the excellent leadership that Region 10 gets at FEMA, but while my remarks may—

as we proceed may seem a little pointed, I must stipulate that the 

regional leadership must be given as much respect in DC as we 

give it here. We have a great respect for them. 

Interoperability is one of the most recurrent themes nationally, 

and properly so. The State of Washington has a State Interoperability Executive Committee established by the legislature to address this issue. Long-term solutions are complex and potentially 

very costly. Although technological and administrative challenges 

and long-term financing issues for statewide interoperability are 

very real, our emphasis remains on interoperability between first 

responders. Interoperability, like I say, is as much a management 

as a technological term. There must be willingness at all levels to 

coordinate, collaborate and cooperate. 

Emergency Management Performance Grants, EMPG, are the 

Federal match for State and local investments in emergency mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Although EMPG is 

based on a 50/50 match—50 percent Federal, and 50 percent State 

and local—the reality is that State and local governments are carrying these burdens at an 80/20 ratio. It is a cruel myth that States 

and locals are simply waiting for Federal dollars before initiating 

their own efforts. 

Ironically, EMPG is the only DHS grant program that requires 

any match at all of States and locals, and yet instead of leveraging 

the local-State investment, the DHS strategy has been to inflict 

death by a thousand cuts on the one program that provides the 

best chance to prepare communities to respond in any type of disaster. This flies in the face of any reasonable assessment of what 

must be done to assure that local and State planning and coordination is enhanced. 

DHS still lacks emergency management expertise. Decisions are 

made daily by DHS about deadlines and program application requirements that impose an unnecessary burden on an already overwhelmed local and State emergency management infrastructure. 

And DHS still has difficulty in meeting its own deadlines for providing information so grant applications can be completed. 

I cannot be certain that Federal disaster assistance will be provided in a timely manner, nor that the Federal assistance will provide what I need when I need it. I can’t be certain that my Region 

10 Federal counterpart, in whom I have great confidence, will be 

kept in the loop of information, even when he serves as the Federal 

Coordinating Officer. In our next disaster, I may be devoting time 

to damage control from the effects of the Federal effort rather than 

focus on victims, which would be my preference. 

Post Katrina, States must be prepared to work to preserve Federal commitments to assist victims. There exists the distinct possi-
14

bility that DHS may renege on commitments and parse the words 

of written assurances. 

The Katrina experience, I might say, was merely another milestone in the continuing degradation of the Nation’s capacity to 

mitigate, prepare, respond and recover with respect to disasters. 

We’ve seen this happening over the years. FEMA isn’t FEMA anymore. 

Our Katrina is most likely a major earthquake. That’s why mitigation and preparedness efforts have taken hold in our State. Since 

we won’t have four days to observe our disaster approaching, those 

things that we do to offset consequences and ready our citizens are 

of critical importance. 

In one version of the Katrina-style event, a subduction zone 

quake could create a tsunami threat within 25 minutes of our 

coastal communities. We are implementing a coordinated warning 

system for coastal communities for tsunamis. This will include public education workshops, training and exercises. We do have evacuation plans to support moving people quickly away from an approaching lahar or a tsunami. We in this State must improve our 

ability to care for a sizable number of citizens when they must 

move away from a dangerous environment. 

A major quake along the Seattle Fault could trigger significant 

injuries or loss of life. We would see significant damage to the 

transportation and commerce networks in our State. No part of our 

economy will be unscathed. 

A great deal of cooperative work has positioned Washington 

State to respond effectively, but clearly the momentum and collaboration needs to continue. We need to continue to build on our partnerships with local government and the private sector, because for 

a considerable time after our earthquake, we will be on our own. 

A major commitment of EMPGs beyond the annual levels we have 

seen would be an extremely helpful development if it were to be administered by emergency management professionals minus the constraining influences that characterizes the Homeland Security 

Grant Program requirements. 

We will be stronger if and when DHS and FEMA rights itself, 

but even if that happens some day, we know that we have our own 

work to do out here. With increased planning exercise and training 

support, we can make great strides to improve the overall capacity 

of local and State government. We will carry our share of that burden. 

We also need to continue to reach out to DHS and FEMA. And 

when they extend a hand, as they have been doing recently, we 

need to grab it. We should not just complain. We must keep offering our participation and our advice to help fix the problems we’ve 

identified. Mere consultation isn’t sufficient. True partnership allows debate, discussion and the merging of expertise before deadlines are established and before policies and requirements become 

etched in stone. We look forward to any such exchange with DHS. 

None of these issues are unique to my State. However, because 

I think of some earlier failures in leadership and the demolition of 

existing national emergency management structure with little 

analysis or consultation, we will need time to restore a national 

program managed by professionals and possessing the necessary 
15

authority and expertise to not only improve the situation but recognize those positive contributions the DHS model has brought, including the State and local cooperation. But at the same time, we 

need to restore and enhance what was the FEMA mission until recently. It can be done, but it will have to be done by the professional emergency management community and the public safety 

sector. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Mullen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF JAMES M. MULLEN

Introduction 

Thank you, Chairman Reichert, and Ranking Member Pascrell for allowing me to 

provide you with a statement for the record on Emergency Planning and Preparedness: Federal, State and Local Coordination. I’ll try to highlight key issues that I 

believe need to be raised as part of the national discussion about the state of our 

preparedness. 

Washington State’s all-hazards management system predates 9/11 by several decades, including a statewide Homeland Security stratagem that predates 9/11 by 2 

full years. Our system incorporates a broad public/private representation on a statutorily created Emergency Management Council and a statewide Homeland Security 

Committee (each of which meets every 60 days. These groups liaise with the Governor’s Domestic Security Executive Group (comprised mostly of senior cabinet level 

public safety officials) which meets on a weekly basis, advising the Governor on the 

state’s disaster readiness and on state wide disaster issues ranging from tsunami 

preparedness to homeland security grant programs involving local, state and private 

sector participants. It is this system that develops and tracks the State’s Homeland 

Security Strategic Plan, which is truly an all hazards document. The Strategic Plan 

is the foundation of Team Washington’s enterprise approach to disaster preparedness.

Status of intergovernmental collaboration 

We have excellent working relationships with our local colleagues within the 

state. That is not to claim we concur in all things, nor is it to suggest interactions 

are smooth all of the time. Interactions are unfailingly honest, and this has been 

helpful during emergency situations, as well as in resolving difficult day to day 

issues. We have taken the time to develop mutual respect for the professional capabilities and challenges each government level encounters. With our regional federal 

colleagues, I can say that we have an excellent relationship as well, but miss the 

days when they were our link to the federal decision making process. We trust 

them, they know us, but they are often cut out of the dialogue by their own command chain.

Interoperability 

Interoperability is one of the most recurrent themes in any credible analysis of 

an effective and robust emergency management system. The State of Washington 

has a State Interoperability Executive Committee established by the Legislature, to 

address this issue. Although technological and administrative challenges, and long 

term financing issues for state wide interoperability, are very real, it remains our 

primary focus to support first responders, assuring that a deputy sheriff from one 

county can communicate at an incident effectively with a fire commander from the 

neighboring county without missing a beat. Interoperability is as much a management as a technological term—there must be willingness at all levels to coordinate, 

collaborate and cooperate. 

We are also enhancing our logistical capability, first coordinating more effectively 

within the Military Department between the resources of the Emergency Management Division and the National Guard, and branching out this past year to work 

with local logistics planners to devise a seamless exchange of information about 

available resources.7

State and Local Planning and Coordination Capability 

Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) are the federal ‘‘match’’ for 

state and local investments in emergency mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Although EMPG is based on a 50/50 match (50% federal to 50% state/local), 

the reality is that state and local governments are carrying these burdens at an 80/

20 ratio. It is a cruel myth that states and locals are simply waiting for federal dollars before initiating their own efforts. 
16

Ironically, EMPG is the only DHS grant program that requires any match at all 

of states and locals, and yet instead of leveraging the local—state investment, the 

DHS strategy has been to inflict death by ‘‘1000 cuts’’ on the one program that provides the best chance to prepare communities to respond in any type of disaster. 

This flies in the face of any reasonable assessment of what must be done to assure 

that local and state planning and coordination is enhanced.

Impediments to Disaster Response in a Presidential Declaration of Emergency 

DHS still lacks emergency management expertise. The federal performance we 

have seen in exercises and real time events and the policies we must endure suggests that the next major emergency response may be aggravated rather than alleviated by DHS. 

On a daily basis, decisions are made by DHS about deadlines and program application requirements that impose an unnecessary burden on an already overwhelmed 

local and state emergency management infrastructure. And, DHS has difficulty in 

meeting its own deadlines for providing information so grant applications can be 

completed. 

During a disaster, I cannot be certain that federal disaster assistance will be provided in a timely manner, nor that the federal assistance DHS/FEMA provides will 

be what I need, when I need it. I can’t be certain that my Region 10 federal counterpart, in whom I have great confidence, will be kept in the loop of information, even 

when he serves as the Federal Coordinating Officer. This means that in our next 

disaster I may be devoting time to damage control from the effects of the federal 

‘‘effort’’ rather than focus on victims, which would be my preference. 

Post Katrina, states must be prepared to work to preserve federal commitments 

to assist victims. There exists the distinct possibility that DHS may renege on commitments, and parse the words of written assurances. 

The Katrina experience was merely another milestone in the continuing degradation of the nation’s capacity to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover with respect 

to disasters. We in emergency management have seen this condition unfold over the 

past several years. FEMA isn’t FEMA any more.

Our Katrina 

Our ‘‘Katrina’’ is most likely a major earthquake. That’s why mitigation and preparedness efforts have taken hold in our state: since we won’t have four days to observe our disaster approaching, those things that we do to offset consequences and 

ready our citizens are of critical importance.

Coastal Communities 

In one version of a Katrina style event, a subduction zone quake could create a 

tsunami threat within 25 minutes for our coastal communities. 

We are implementing a coordinated warning system for coastal communities for 

tsunami. This will include public education workshops, training and exercises.

Evacuation 

We do have evacuation plans to support moving people quickly away from an approaching lahar or a tsunami. We in this state must improve our ability to care for 

a sizable number of citizens when they must move away from a dangerous environment.

Seattle Fault 

A major quake along the Seattle Fault could trigger significant injuries or loss of 

life. We would see significant damage to the transportation and commerce networks 

in our state. No part of our economy will be unscathed.

Immediate Future 

None of these vulnerabilities is a surprise. A great deal of cooperative work has 

positioned Washington State to respond effectively, but clearly the momentum and 

the collaboration needs to continue. We need to continue to build on our partnerships with local government and the private sector, because for a considerable time 

after our earthquake we can expect to be on our own. A major commitment of 

EMPG beyond the annual levels we have seen would be an extremely hopeful development, if it were to be administered by emergency management professionals, 

minus the constraining influence that characterizes the Homeland Security Grant 

Program. 

We will be stronger if/when DHS/FEMA rights itself, but even if that happens 

some day, we know that we have our own work to do here. With increased planning 

exercise and training support, we can make great strides to improve the overall capacity of local and state government. We will carry our share of the burden. 
17

We also need to continue to reach out to DHS and FEMA. We should not just 

complain—we must keep offering our participation and our advice to help fix the 

problems we have identified. Mere consultation will not be sufficient: a true partnership allows debate, discussion and the merging of expertise before deadlines are established, and before policies become etched in stone. We look forward to any such 

exchange. 

None of these issues are unique to my state. However, because of the demolition 

of the existing national emergency management structure with little analysis or consultation, we will need in time to restore a national program, managed by professionals, and possessing the necessary authority and expertise to recognize those 

positive contributions the DHS model has made, while restoring and enhancing 

what has been the FEMA mission until recently. It can be done, but it must be done 

by the professional emergency management community and its public safety partners. 

Thank you. 

Note: while the issues below were not covered specifically in my oral presentation, I am prepared to discuss these with the Committee at any time.

Some Additional Thoughts 

• EMAC: Nationally, we need to continue to foster the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC) which in a state to state exchange sent more than 

65000 civilian and National Guard personnel to the Gulf States. This system proved 

adaptable and flexible, and after action efforts will make the program even stronger 

in its next deployment mission. 

• Federalization: Any attempt by any Administration to ‘‘federalize’’ a disaster 

response should be met with opposition from all quarters. This is a constitutional 

issue and it is uniquely American to insist that the state’s governors control efforts 

within their own states. 

• Public Education: People in our state in earthquake hazard areas must be 

trained to drop, cover and hold, and to move to higher ground as soon as they can 

in tsunami prone areas. Similarly, given the frequency and history of disasters in 

various parts of Washington State, the particular emphasis on a hazard, and thus 

the protective measures the public must be schooled in, may differ. Fires, floods, 

lahars each have characteristics and protective or defensive measures to be conveyed. The emergency management community is uniquely qualified to present public 

education for all hazards disaster preparedness, and this is delivered best by local 

officials at the local government level, anywhere in the country, for any type of hazard that a community may face. 

• State and federal assistance and support is important, but it cannot be a controlling form of support. Washington State is developing a state wide public education strategy that can be tailored to any jurisdiction in the state, and will provide 

materials and technical assistance to communities. The State will work within the 

state government family to convey appropriate messaging that will enhance the 

prospects of key state personnel to be able to respond quickly with a high level of 

assurance that their own families are protected. 

• Exercises: A collaborative effort is underway, coordinated by State EMD, but 

with the indispensable participation of our local colleagues, to try to establish a rational exercise regime for the state of Washington. Exercises, to be effective, must 

be designed carefully, implemented appropriately, critiqued thoroughly and unflinchingly, and followed up resolutely to correct any gaps or deficiencies. If the 

TOPOFF 2 exercise in 2003 achieved anything at all in our state, it solidified relationships and built trust among a variety of disciplines that is invaluable in these 

times. The exercise protocols will enable us to develop capability within the State, 

and will ultimately facilitate expansion to inter state exercises, and even across our 

international border with Canada as the 2010 Olympics approaches.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Mullen. The Chairman recognizes 

Mr. Bailey. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN BAILEY, DIRECTOR, PIERCE COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Pascrell. Thank 

you for inviting me here. As a resident of the 8th Congressional 

District, I want to welcome the Chairman home. It’s good to see 

him. You’ll have to pardon me if in this very formal process I fail 

to address him properly, because for those of us in the 8th Congres-
18

sional District, he’s just Dave. And so I’ll try to say ‘‘Mr. Chairman’’ today, but it’s good to see you. 

Shortly after 9/11, within three months, Pierce County executive, 

John Ladenberg, formed the Terrorism Early Warning Task Force 

with public safety leaders throughout our county. That work has 

been working since that day to address the preparedness and response issues in Pierce County, and we have made great strides. 

And I think it’s important, when we get in this debate of the Department of Homeland Security and the FEMA issues and a lot of 

the negative press that we see, we have made great strides in this 

county in terms of public safety. And I certainly want to thank the 

Congress for the support they have given us. It has made specific 

and drastic improvements in public safety in our community. 

We have great leadership. Jeff Jensen, the Director of the Emergency Management for the City of Tacoma is here; Sheriff Paul 

Pastor, the Sheriff of Pierce County, is here, and they are all actively involved. 

We’ve had a couple of events recently that have demonstrated 

that. We had an active shooter incident in the Tacoma Mall several 

months ago. I believe we had fifteen different jurisdictions respond 

to that in support of the Tacoma Fire and Police Department who 

did an excellent job resolving that situation. But I think it did demonstrate some of the improvements we’ve made in public safety in 

this community. 

Then just last week we had a two-day drill—health drill, biological attack involving the CDC and the State Department of Health 

and Emergency Management and our local community. And once 

again, we demonstrated clearly that we have made important 

strides in preparedness and operations at the community level. It’s 

the only way we will survive as a community is to continue to work 

together. We simply don’t have the resources to deal with these incidents on our own. 

And of course, another important issue is interoperability communication. There again, we have made some strides with new 

technology. Under a grant, one of the Federal grants, we were able 

to purchase a new communications vehicle for this county. It’s got 

technology in it that allows us to commonize the radio frequencies. 

We used that at the Tacoma Mall incident so that all of the fifteen 

responding jurisdictions could talk to one another. It works. It isn’t 

seamless. It would cost this county a great deal of money to become 

seamless, money that we do not have. And of course, as you’ve said, 

the frequencies aren’t available even if we had the money. So those 

are issues that we are really concerned about. 

The real issue that I really want to stress here—and it’s really 

following up on some things that Mr. Pascrell said—is about community involvement. One of the things, because I’ve been in this 

business a long time and people assume I may know something, is 

I get a lot questions about, what are the ten lessons of Hurricane 

Katrina? Probably, at my age, I can’t remember ten things anymore, so I have to boil it down to one. And that one lesson for me 

out of Katrina is the expectation of the public for us to meet their 

needs. It’s almost like they think we will be there 20 minutes after 

the event with a hot plate of food, a warm blanket and a check for 

$500. If you went to the major 911 center here in Tacoma today, 
19

you would see flashing on the dispatch screen 911 calls that are 

waiting for law enforcement officers to clear from another event so 

that they can respond to the new call. We simply are not meeting 

the daily law enforcement, fire and EMS demand in our community; and that is the reality. And it creates this huge gap of expectation of the public and our ability to respond. Here in Orting we 

do not have a warehouse with a hundred firefighters and a hundred police officers sitting waiting for the next disaster. 

So one of the steps we’ve taken here in Pierce County is a community program called Pierce County Neighbor Emergency Teams, 

PC–NET. It is training and equipping neighborhoods and individuals to take care of themselves and their community. It started 

with a small Federal grant that got us off the ground. We’re now 

up to 250 neighborhoods throughout the county with over 3,000 citizen trained volunteers. This is the future for us in terms of our 

people being able to take care of themselves. 

The problem is, of course, the Federal grant has gone away, and 

we are now left with a great program with no funding underpinning it allowing us to continue to increase. We have 50 neighborhoods waiting for staff to become available to equip them under 

this program. 

I believe community preparedness needs to be a priority if we are 

going to effectively respond to major disasters anywhere in this 

country, and certainly here in Pierce County. 

I appreciate Congressman Reichert’s assistance last year in trying to assist us in getting some Federal funding to continue the 

program. We’re looking and hoping once again that this will rise 

to a level that will enable us to continue to fund and support this 

effort. 

The unique thing about our program, although it’s based on the 

Federal CERT program for the disaster preparedness piece, we 

have also under the leadership of Sheriff Pastor included a crime 

prevention piece. And the reason we’ve done that is, preparing people for disasters, sometimes the disaster doesn’t come along for 

quite a while, and they can become disinterested as volunteers. But 

when you bring the crime piece in, that’s a day-to-day interest 

issue for them. And we have seen on average in our PC–NET 

neighborhoods a 27 percent decrease in personal property crime. So 

we’re very excited by this two-pronged work and attack that we’re 

doing in our communities. 

So I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the ability to 

speak. We certainly appreciate the hard work that you’re providing 

for us in Washington. Again, I would like to supplement Mr. 

Mullen’s comments on the grant process. At the local level, the people who need to do the planning and the responding are the same 

people that have to do the grant process; and every year since 9/

11, the grant process at the Federal level has changed significantly. 

The most significant change is this year. And the due dates are 

down to yesterday, not months from now or even weeks from now. 

It’s you need to have it in by yesterday. It is hamstringing us to 

implement the programs that we need to implement. 

So my plea would be, if we could stay with a process for a couple 

years and not change it and let us catch our breath, that would be 

most helpful. 
20

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Bailey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVE C. BAILEY

September 11, the Indonesian tsunami and Hurricanes Katrina/Rita have, to 

some, caused a paradigm shift in the world of emergency management—from single 

level collaboration to new innovative partnerships and cooperation on a multi-faceted level. For many of us, this approach was always the current practice but it is 

now mandated nation wide. The key to effective mitigation, preparation, response 

and recovery is coordination and collaboration at the regional level. 

Pierce County has made great strides in this arena by creating the Terrorism 

Early Warning and Response task force, as well as participating in the Seattle/King 

County Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Citizens, municipalities, county 

agencies, local jurisdictions and regional, state and military partners work together 

on a daily basis to address all hazards facing our communities. In Pierce County, 

this most recently became evident during a shooting at the Tacoma Mall. Hundreds 

of public safety personnel from multiple agencies and jurisdictions responded to that 

incident because of the strong relationships that have been developed. Had we not 

all trained, planned and exercised together, the outcome may have been very different. 

Interoperable communications is the current hot topic in emergency response. The 

Tacoma Mall incident is yet another example of why interoperability is so important. Many of the responding agencies utilized different frequencies, but because of 

recent improvements, all agencies were able to talk with on another. More specifically, Pierce County Emergency Management purchased a state-of-the-art Mobile 

Operational Command Center (MOCC) with homeland security funds that is utilized 

on a weekly basis. On that unit is a piece of equipment called the ACU 1000 which 

commonizes radio frequencies at the flip of a switch. Our public safety dispatch centers are equipped with the same technology so this version of interoperability is 

available countywide, not just when our MOCC is deployed. 

Many operate under the misconception that the answer to interoperability is 800 

megahertz radios, but there simply aren’t enough channels available for public safety and it is cost prohibitive. We estimate it will cost $50+ million for Pierce County 

to move to the 800 megahertz system and that does not include the cost for infrastructure (towers, etc.). As mentioned above, Pierce County has made great, cost effective improvements, but it still isn’t seamless. 

Probably the biggest lesson, even above interoperability, is citizen and community 

preparedness. After years and years of telling the public they need to have a plan 

and enough supplies to be self sufficient for at least three days, Hurricane Katrina 

showed us that people just aren’t following through on the message. We discovered 

an enormous gap between what people expect and what government is able to provide. It appears that citizens expect government to appear on their doorstep within 

30 minutes of a disaster with a hot plate of food, a bottle of water, blanket and a 

check for $500. When emergency response disciplines can’t meet 9–1–1 call demands 

on a daily basis, what makes people the response should be any different in a disaster? We do not have the resources. 

So what is the answer? The key is individual and community preparedness, for 

all hazards. During the hurricanes, individuals and neighbors were not prepared 

and didn’t follow the direction of local officials. They fell into what we call normalization, a thought process that makes one think the situation just can’t be that bad, 

or it can’t happen to them. Here in Pierce County, we have found something that 

works. 

Pierce County Emergency Management has a national award-winning program 

called Pierce County Neighborhood Emergency Teams (PC–NET) that is incrementally closing the aforementioned gap in our area. PC–NET is a neighborhood-oriented approach to emergency preparedness and homeland security. It is based on 

the belief that a cooperative effort between a county and its citizens is the only sure 

way to protect a neighborhood and to prepare for a major disaster. 

If individuals and their neighborhoods are prepared to mutually assist each other, 

lives can be saved, property can be spared, and emergency services can be freed to 

respond to the most devastated areas. This is accomplished by organizing block 

groups into a variety of disaster response teams, each of which has a simple onepage list that clearly outlines necessary tasks. In addition, we have partnered with 

the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department to provide a crime prevention program that, 

to date, has resulted in a 27 percent average drop in property crimes for PC–NET 

neighborhoods (up to 50% in some areas). 
21

PC–NET goes beyond conventional community preparedness and crime prevention 

efforts of simply raising awareness—PC–NET means taking action. People and 

neighborhoods that are prepared will know what to expect during times of disaster, 

what to do, and how to come together in an organized, timely response. 

The problem is that funding for this program and others like it is virtually nonexistent. Pierce County Emergency Management enjoyed a three-year federal grant 

that got the program started, but the funding was exhausted at the end of 2005. 

Federal CERT funding only provides $25–65 thousand, depending on the fiscal year, 

for a two year grant. This does not cover the salary for even one staff member to 

run a program for our 750,000 residents. Recent attempts to work the funding 

through congressional representatives have also been unsuccessful. Educating our 

citizens on how to prepare and training them to respond and be self sufficient for 

at least one week will have a great impact on all phases of emergency management. 

As mentioned in the beginning of this testimony, collaboration is critical, not just 

with those in professional emergency response roles but also with the citizens we 

serve.

Testimony Outline: 

I. Introduction 

II. Regional coordination/collaboration 

a. TEW 

b. UASI 

III. Interoperable communications 

a. MOCC 

b. ACU 1000

c. Made great improvements, but not seamless 

IV. Emergency Preparedness 

a. Biggest lesson out of hurricanes 

b. PC–NET 

c. Lack of funding

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Steve. The Chair recognizes Chief 

Trevin ̃ o. 

STATEMENT OF MARIO H. TREVIN ̃ O, FIRE CHIEF, BELLEVUE 

FIRE DEPARTMENT 

Chief TREVIN ̃ O. Good morning, Chairman Reichert and Congressman Pascrell. 

As a point of reference, the City of Bellevue is located approximately ten miles east of Seattle. The Bellevue Fire Department 

also provides fire and rescue medical services to five other townships, serving a total population of 135,000 people. We’re also part 

of the well-known King County Medic One Program and have the 

further responsibility of providing Advanced Life Support services 

to a 300 square mile area and a total population of 250,000 people. 

To our visitors, let me also convey my welcome to Washington, 

and thank you all for the opportunity to speak with you today 

about regional planning and preparedness, particularly as related 

to our area of focus, which is how we work together to identify and 

prioritize Homeland Security allocations. 

We’re all concerned about homeland security from a national perspective. I hope my background will be helpful in these discussions. 

In the regional arena, I’m the Chairman of the King County Zone 

1 Fire Chiefs, and my national involvement includes serving as 

Vice-Chairman of the Emergency Response Technology Group of 

the National Technology Transfer Center, and member and former 

chairman of the Metropolitan Fire Chiefs. 

The Puget Sound urban area has a strong history of regional collaboration and mutual support in the emergency planning, management and response arenas. This experience level, combined with 

effective and working relationships, provide a basis which has 
22

served as a cornerstone for our process and upon which we have 

added sharp focus in recent years on homeland security issues. 

Some examples of this collaboration process include the development of emergency management systems within King County and 

the subsequent networking to address regional and national issues; 

also the development of effective hazardous materials training and 

response capabilities, the City of Bellevue is a member of the 

Eastside Hazardous Materials Consortium which provides protection for much of Eastern King County; the enhancement of emergency responder safety through training and procurement of PPE’s, 

which stands for personal protective equipment, detection and disposal equipment for explosive devices and hazardous materials; 

planning for chemical, biological, radiological and explosive response, detection and recovery; joint training initiatives such as Incident Management Team, or IMT, training, which is multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional; also joint training partnerships 

such as our Seattle-Bellevue exercises recently in rescue systems 

which respond to structural collapse, high-rise firefighting, weapons of mass destruction scenarios, mass transportation scenarios, 

and improvised explosive devices, or IED, scenarios; and lastly our 

pandemic influenza planning. 

In February of 2004, the Seattle-King County urban area developed an urban-area strategy. That strategy was developed by the 

principal jurisdictions involved in the Seattle-King County Core 

Group, which makes core decisions. Those include Seattle, King 

County, Pierce County, Snohomish County and the Washington 

State Military Department. It also featured input from other governmental organizations that fall within the boundaries of that 

urban area. The City of Bellevue was added to the Seattle-King 

County Urban Area Core Group as a result of their Urban Areas 

Security Initiative or USAI 2006 grant. 

The urban strategy is closely integrated with the Region 6 Homeland Strategic Plan, which was also developed in 2004 for the allocation of the State Homeland Security Grant Program, or SHSP, 

funding applied to geographic King County. There’s substantial 

multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional representation among the 

various groups that develop and implement these plans, which 

helps reinforce the need and benefit of broad involvement with the 

emergency responders. With these plans in place, our urban area 

is poised to deal with the challenges ahead for all hazards and 

homeland security planning and response. 

Some of our recent challenges, however, have come in the area 

of trying to integrate our established process with shifting Federal 

processes and priorities. For example, the timelines were condensed during the 2006 grant cycle, making it very difficult to develop a comprehensive, inclusive and thoughtful grant strategy. It 

is important for Congress to be specific in providing direction to the 

Department of Homeland Security so that grant processes allow 

time for sufficient regional collaboration. 

Also, grant processes change anyway. They’re not reported out in 

a timely manner which forces changes in our regional processes. 

Regional partnerships involve difficult and time-consuming work, 

and dramatic changes to regional processes require significant rebalancing at the State and local level. This results in frustration 
23

and lost time. Ultimately, this means that we spend more time developing the process and less time focused on prioritizing and implementing of projects. 

Increased flexibility in grant funding remains a need so that 

urban areas can target funds to their areas of greatest need. These 

include coordinated planning efforts to assure critical infrastructure protection needs are prioritized including but not limited to information technology, water systems and facility hardening; equipment procurement and evaluation to ensure interoperability and 

responder preparedness; training and exercise development, implementation and evaluation to prepare responders, city leaders and 

elected officials for a major response; and finally, the development 

and implementation of planning documents which may include 

State and local governance and continuity of government. 

Jurisdictions within our urban area are participating in the current review of the National Response Plan that is occurring in the 

wake of Hurricane Katrina. Catastrophic events require community-to-community, urban area to urban area, and state-to-state 

planning. It’s important that Federal policy encourage continued 

and further collaboration that spans beyond the borders of our community. 

Some of the next steps that I see for our urban area include continuing to build and streamline our partnerships at the regional 

level; to build our response capabilities further leveraging our existing resources and our existing mutual aid commitments; to 

streamline and improve the efficiency of our intelligence capabilities; to refine and develop our regional plans; and finally to train 

across—continue to train across jurisdictional borders. 

That concludes my prepared remarks, and I will take any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Chief Trevin ̃ o follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARIO H. TREVIN ̃ O

Chairman Reichert, members of the Committee, my name is Mario Trevin ̃ o, and 

I am Chief of the Bellevue, Washington, Fire Department. For your reference, the 

City of Bellevue is located approximately 10 miles East of Seattle. We also provide 

fire and Emergency Medical Services to five other townships, serving a total population of approximately 135,000 people. We are part of the renowned King County 

Medic One Program, and have the further responsibility of providing Advanced Life 

Support to a 300 square mile area with a total population of 250,000 people. 

To the visiting members of the Committee, welcome to Washington, and thank 

you all for the opportunity to speak to you about regional planning and preparedness, particularly as related to our area of focus—how we work together to identify 

and prioritize Homeland Security allocations. We are all concerned about Homeland 

Security from a national perspective, and I should point my background should be 

helpful in these discussions. In the regional arena, I am the Chairman of the King 

County Zone 1 Fire Chiefs. My national involvement includes serving as Vice-Chairman of the Emergency Response Technology Group of the National Technology 

Transfer Center, and being a member and past Chair of the Metropolitan Fire 

Chiefs. 

The Puget Sound urban area has a strong history of regional collaboration and 

mutual support in the emergency planning, management, and response arenas. This 

experience level, combined with effective working-relationships provide a basis 

which has served as a cornerstone for our process, upon which we have added sharp 

focus in recent years on homeland security issues.

Some examples of this collaborative process include: 

1. The development of emergency management systems in King County, and the 

subsequent networking to address regional and national issues. 
24

2. The development of effective Hazardous Materials training and response capabilities. The City of Bellevue is a member of the Eastside Hazardous Materials Consortium which provides protection for much of Eastern King County. 

3. The enhancement of emergency responder safety through training and the 

procurement of equipment such as personal protective equipment (PPE), detection and disposal equipment for explosive devices, and Hazardous Materials 

equipment. 

4. Planning for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Explosive response, detection and recovery. 

5. Joint training initiatives, such as Incident Management Team (IMT) training, 

which is multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional. 

6. Joint training partnerships, such as the Seattle/Bellevue exercises in: Rescue 

Systems (structural collapse); High-rise Firefighting; Weapons of Mass Destruction scenarios; Mass-transportation scenarios; and Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IAD) scenarios. 

7. Pandemic Influenza planning. 

In February, 2004, the Seattle-King County Urban area developed an urban area 

strategy. The strategy was developed by the principal jurisdictions involved in the 

Seattle-King County Core Group, which makes core decisions: Seattle; King County; 

Pierce County; Snohomish County; and the Washington State Military Department. 

It also featured input from other governmental organizations that fall within the 

boundaries of the urban area. The City of Bellevue was added to the Seattle-King 

County Urban Area Core Group as a result of the Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) in 2006. 

The urban strategy is closely integrated with the Region 6 Homeland Strategic 

Plan, which was also developed in 2004 for the allocation of State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP) funding applied to geographic King County. There is 

substantial multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional representation among the 

various groups that develop and implement these plans, which helps reinforce the 

need and benefit of broad involvement from emergency responders. With these plans 

in place, our urban area is poised to deal with the challenges ahead for all hazards 

and homeland security planning and response.

Some of our recent challenges have come in the area of trying to integrate our 

established process with shifting federal processes and priorities. For example: 

1. Timelines were condensed during the 2006 grant cycle, making it very difficult to develop a comprehensive, inclusive, and thoughtful grant strategy. It 

is important for Congress to be specific in providing direction to the Department 

of Homeland Security so that grant processes allow time for sufficient regional 

collaboration 

2. Grant processes change annually, and are not reported out in a timely manner, forcing changes in regional processes. Regional partnerships involve difficult and time-consuming work, and dramatic changes to regional processes requires significant re-balancing at the State and local level, which results in 

frustration and lost time. Ultimately, this means we spend more time developing the process and less time focused on prioritizing and implementing 

projects. 

3. Increased flexibility in grant funding remains a need so that urban areas can 

target grant funds to their areas of greatest need such as: 

a. Coordinated planning efforts to assure critical infrastructure protection 

needs are prioritized, including but not limited to: information technology; 

water systems; and facility hardening. 

b. Equipment procurement and evaluation to ensure interoperability and 

responder preparedness 

c. Training and Exercise development, implementation and evaluation to 

prepare responders, city leaders, and elected officials for a major response. 

d. Development and implementation of planning documents which may include state and local governance and continuity of government. 

Jurisdictions within our urban area are participating in the current review of the 

National Response Plan that is occurring in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Catastrophic events require community-to-community, urban area to urban area, and 

state-to-state planning. It is important that federal policy encourage continued and 

further collaboration that spans beyond the borders of our communities.

Some of the next steps I see for our urban area include continuing to: 

1. Build and streamline our partnerships on a regional level, 

2. Further build our response capabilities leveraging existing resources and existing mutual aid commitments, 

3. Streamline and improve the efficiency of our intelligence capabilities, 
25

4. Refine and develop our regional plans, 

5. And train across jurisdictional borders. 

That concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you Chairman Reichert and members of the Committee for allowing me to participate in this hearing today.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Chief. The Chair recognizes Mr. 

Mitzel. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ‘‘BILL’’ MITZEL, MS, ARM, ALCM, 

RISK CONTROL SPECIALIST, HOME OFFICE COMMERCIAL 

LINES, UNIGARD INSURANCE GROUP 

Mr. MITZEL. Good morning, Chairman Reichert and Ranking 

Member Pascrell. It is a pleasure to represent private industry preparedness programs and to provide you with information regarding 

Unigard’s program. 

Originating with the request from three employees that were 

also volunteer firefighters to participate in a disaster preparedness 

training program sponsored by Pierce County in 1987, Unigard’s 

Emergency Preparedness and Response Program was formed. Over 

a period of several years that included numerous team drills and 

direction from JoAnn Jordan of the Bellevue Fire Department’s 

Preparedness Division, with thanks to Chief Trevin ̃ o’s staff, the 

Unigard Emergency Response Team has evolved into seven specialized teams. You have been provided with an organizational chart 

of our emergency management structure as Appendix A on the 

written submittal. 

Currently 54 employee volunteers make up Unigard’s Emergency 

Response Team. They and supportive senior management, including our president and CEO, Peter Christen, are key to the success 

of our program. 

The December 8, 1990 snowstorm, or 1993 Inaugural Day windstorm, the Nisqually quake in February of 2001 and 9/11 all resulted in further enhancement of our program. 

Moving from the history of the program to how it operates, 

Unigard’s Emergency Response Team and Business Continuity program are components of our Risk Management process, which you 

are copied on in Appendix B. 

Training of each of our specialized teams is based on the widely 

used Community Emergency Response Team, or CERT, model with 

some additional training for Unigard’s specific operations. The 

training procedures in our program are, however, somewhat different from the traditional CERT Program. For instance, only a 

segment of the full 20 to 25-hour CERT training is needed to be 

completed in order for employees to be on any specific Unigard 

Emergency Response Team. This specialized approach takes employees away from their jobs for only four to five hours, it supports 

their specialized competency, and it’s much more accommodating 

for employees and their supervisors than taking the full CERT 

training. The required baseline emergency training for all employees and Emergency Response Team members is noted in an article 

that is provided in Exhibit C.*

I cannot overemphasize how critical the support from Bellevue 

Fire Department, Medic First Aid, WPS and Applied Technology 

Council instructors are to our program’s success. Officer Michael 

Chu, Public Information Officer of the Bellevue Police Department, 
26

*See, committee file. 

has also been instrumental in developing the Workplace Violence 

Prevention Program—portion of our program. 

Still another noteworthy element in our program is Crisis Communications Training. The Reverend Mike Ryan, Chaplain for the 

Bellevue Police Department, has provided this training, which is 

designed to assist our Humanitarian Assistance Team, primarily 

made up of human resources staff, in understanding and preparing 

for various behavioral scenarios in an emergency. 

Our program’s primary focus is life safety, in addition to expediting the initial building damage assessment. The main concern 

from a life safety and preparedness standpoint for Unigard, and 

most in emergency management would agree for the entire Northeast coast of the United States, is a mega-thrust earthquake, as I 

look at how high the boxes are stacked behind your chair. 

We are well into the average cycle for such a catastrophic event. 

Therefore, appropriate readiness should not be an option. 

Going forward, we are planning on providing advanced emergency preparedness and business continuity consultation to our 

commercial lines insureds and the independent agents that we sell 

our products through. We will use proven elements of our program 

as a template in association with proven and easy-to-use features 

of other programs such as the American Red Cross, the National 

Safety Council and FEMA, for example, to deliver a best practices 

product to our insureds. For businesses with advanced preparedness and continuity programs, offering them a reduction in their 

business interruption insurance premiums is also under consideration. 

Regarding Federal incentives to private industry for investing in 

business continuity and emergency preparedness, and in applying 

the philosophy of ‘‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,’’ 

in looking at IRS Form 3800 provided as Exhibit D,* although 

there is credit for employers affected by Hurricane Katrina, Rita or 

Wilma, and credit for several other investments, there is no credit 

for investing in business continuity or emergency preparedness 

which, particularly when teamed with potential property insurance 

rate credits, could serve to move most businesses from being reactive on the preparedness pendulum to being proactive. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 

[The statement of Mr. Mitzel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL MITZEL

Good morning Chairman Reichert and Ranking Member Pascrell. It is a pleasure 

to represent private industry preparedness programs and to provide you with information on Unigard’s program. 

In 1987, the idea of improving Unigard’s in-house emergency preparedness program was presented to our CEO by 3 volunteer firefighters that were employees at 

Unigard. They were from Mason County, Bainbridge Island and the City of 

Kirkland. Two of these three were also EMT’s. 

These employee/volunteer firefighters attended a one-week disaster preparedness 

course sponsored by Pierce County and came back with recommendations to establish Basic Search and Rescue, Fire and Emergency Medical Teams at Unigard and 

to purchase a 20 foot surplus truck cargo container for the teams equipment. Over 

a period of several years that included numerous team drills and advise from JoAnn 

Jordan of the Bellevue Fire Department’s Preparedness Division, Unigard’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) evolved into 7 specialized teams that each had specific 
27

training and protocols that are now in line with NFPA 1600 and the Bellevue Fire 

Department’s recommendations. You have been provided with an organizational 

chart of our emergency management structure as Exhibit A.

Currently 54-employee volunteers make-up Unigard’s ERT. They and supportive 

senior management, including our President and CEO Peter Christen are key to the 

success of Unigard’s Emergency Preparedness and Response program. 

In the early days of our program, as well as improving our program based on lessons learned from drills and from local experts, there were several advances closely 

related to regional or local events. For instance, on December 18, 1990 when over 

a foot of snow dropped in the Bellevue/Seattle area, interest in the ERT was boosted, resulting in the purchase of additional equipment and more training regarding 

improving building damage assessment skills. 

In the summer of 1992, an open house of our ERT was held with representatives 

from Bellevue and neighboring Redmond and Kirkland Fire Departments in attendance. As a result of follow-up conversations, the cities of Bellevue and Kirkland incorporated remotely located truck cargo containers into their Cities Emergency 

Plans. 

In 1993, the Inaugural Day windstorm brought hurricane force winds to western 

Oregon and Washington. Unigard’s Bellevue/Home Office campus was without 

power for three days. After this storm, we purchased our Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC) container and installed two Cummins generators, which until recently 

provided about 30 hours of back-up power. To-date, the generators can provide backup power for three days without refueling. 

In 1996, Unigard purchased satellite phones from Mobile Satellite Ventures and 

added twenty-five Motorola MTX handheld radios to improve ERT on-site communications during our drills and actual events. 

On February 28th, 2001 we experienced the Nisqually earthquake. Although damage in the Bellevue area was minimal, our telecommunications and employee transportation was disrupted for several hours. The quake led to increased support from 

senior executives, fine-tuning our team structure/training, and ERT oversight. This 

included moving ERT under Risk Management rather than Information Technology. 

After 9/11/01, as was the case for most of corporate America, the rules changed. 

As a result, Winterthur, our Swiss parent company, now requires all of its companies to meet higher minimum business continuity, security and emergency preparedness standards. Due to previous activities in these areas, Unigard already met 
28

or exceeded most of these directives when they were put in place. We continue to 

improve our ERT and business continuity programs and processes. 

Moving from the History of the program to how the program operates, our ERT 

and Business Continuity program are components of Unigard’s Corporate Risk Management structure and our enterprise risk management process, which you are copied on as Exhibit B.

Two full-evacuation drills are completed annually by the ERT. Training for each 

of our specialized teams is based on the Community Emergency Response Team 

(CERT) program with some additional training for Unigard?s specific operations. 

Unigard’s ERT program has several unique differences from traditional CERT 

programs. Only a segment of the full 20–25-hour CERT training is required to be 

completed in order for an employee to serve on a specific Unigard ERT such as Fire/

Utility Shut-off or Search and Rescue team. Additionally, over 15 percent of our 

ERT members are cross-trained on 2 or more teams with a few trained to serve on 

all teams. 

This specialized approach, takes most employees away from their jobs for only 4–

5 hours, supports their specialized competency and is much more accommodating for 

employees and their supervisors than taking the full 20–25 hour CERT training. 

After initial team training is completed, they spend about 4 to7 hours per year participating in drills, refresher training as needed and related pre or post-drill meetings. 

We are able to keep ERT turnover well under 10 percent annually by following 

drills with meetings that encourage new approaches and ideas, providing lunch for 

team members after the drills; and communicating the valued comments and suggestions from drill observers, which include local authorities. Active members also 

receive copies of letters of appreciation sent annually by senior management to their 

supervisors. These are timed to arrive just prior to the employee’s annual performance reviews. 

Baseline Emergency Training For all Employees and ERT Members is noted in 

the article you have been copied on as Exhibit C. I cannot over-emphasize how critical it is to get support from Bellevue Fire, Medic First Aid, WPS and the Applied 

Technology Council for important elements of our training. Officer Michael Chiu, 

PIO of Bellevue PD has also been instrumental in reviewing the Workplace Violence 

Prevention component of our program. 

Another noteworthy element of our program is Crisis Communications training. 

The Reverend Mike Ryan, Chaplain for the Bellevue Police Department, has provided this training. His training addresses human behavior during and immediately 
29

after a disaster and assists our Humanitarian Assistance Team members in understanding and preparing for various emergency/disaster behavioral scenarios. 

On-campus training provided by the Bellevue Fire Department and the Applied 

Technology Council on assessing building damage after an earthquake is open to 

neighboring businesses if the classes are not full. 

Unigard has a contingency plan with our neighboring Longs Drug Store. This arrangement gives the Humanitarian Assistance Team and the Incident Commander 

an option in obtaining food and other supplies during a possible prolonged ERT operation. This also provides a method for re-supplying the Medical Team. 

Our Program’s primary focus is life safety and expediting the initial assessment 

of building damage. Two Initial Assessment Teams (Red and Blue) made up of damage assessment trained Fire and Search & Rescue Team personnel are dispatched. 

These teams are typically equipped, organized and dispatched within 12 minutes of 

the start of a drill. 

The main concern from a preparedness and life safety standpoint for Unigard and 

essentially the Northwest coast of the United States is a mega-thrust earthquake. 

The Northwest is well into the average cycle for such a catastrophic event, therefore, appropriate readiness should not be optional. A possible worst-case H5N1 pandemic may be the next closest event from a level of a severity standpoint. A lesser, 

however, still catastrophic event such as a rupture of the nearby Seattle fault, located four miles south of Unigard’s Home Office in Bellevue requires the same degree of preparedness. 

Lesser events than major earthquakes, to encompass all reasonably foreseeable 

hazards (a slight adjustment to an ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach) are also addressed in 

Unigard’s program based on periodic vulnerability assessments. 

Outside of the Bellevue branch office (located in the same facility as Unigard’s 

home office), there are six other branch offices ranging in size from seven to 25 employees. Emergency Procedure training is also provided at these offices. Procedures 

are customized for each office based on size, environment and cooperative efforts 

with landlords. 

Going forward, we are planning on providing advanced emergency preparedness/

business continuity consultation to our commercial lines insureds and the independent agents that we sell our product through. We will use proven elements of 

the Unigard program as a template (adjustable based on business size) in association with proven and easy-to-use features of other packaged programs (American 

Red Cross, National Safety Council, FEMA, etc.) to deliver our insureds a Best Practices product. For businesses with advanced and active preparedness/continuity programs, offering them a reduction in business interruption insurance premium (a 

component of fire/property coverage) is under consideration. We look forward to continuing to improve our program. We subsequently will share our experience with 

our community, our insureds, and our independent agents. 

Regarding direct federal support to enhance investment in business continuity 

and emergency preparedness in the private sector and applying the philosophy of 

‘‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’’, in looking at IRS Form 3800, 

provided as Exhibit D, although there is credit for employers ‘‘affected by’’ Hurricane Katrina, Rita or Wilma, credit for increasing research activities and credit for 

providing child-care facilities at a place of employment, there is no credit related 

to investing in business continuity or emergency preparedness which, particularly 

if teamed with potential property insurance rate credits, could serve to move many 

businesses from being reactive to being proactive on the preparedness pendulum.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Mitzel. I should mention that 

Unigard Insurance Group was the recipient of an award in this 

area. That’s why Unigard is represented here today. They are, I 

think, far ahead of the curve nationwide in their leadership in how 

private companies can be involved in protecting our communities. 

Unigard was the recipient of an award for Business Emergency 

Planning and Preparedness. It was presented by the International 

Emergency Management Association. So congratulations to 

Unigard. 

Mr. MITZEL. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. I happened to be at the presentation of that 

award, so I participated in that. 

Thank you all for your testimony. And Mr. Pascrell and I will 

have questions here for the next several minutes. 
30

I’d like to start, first of all, with the Under Secretary. Let’s get 

this question out of the way immediately. What is your view of 

some of the efforts to move FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security? Where do you think FEMA should be and why? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, thank you for the question, and 

I’ll just be very direct. 

I think it’s a horrible idea. I’ve been in this business my entire 

professional life. And I say that as an individual who has spent 

time as a frontline responder, as a State emergency management 

official, and now at the Federal level in the Department of Homeland Security. We—and frankly, over the course of the past three 

months since I was sworn in, I’ve been somewhat surprised with 

some of the challenges that FEMA is confronting in terms of its internal operations, and they are less about organization and structure in terms of the department and very much about management 

and leadership. And I think there’s a clear lesson that we’ve 

learned out of the Katrina events, and that is that we’ve got to 

make sure that—and Mr. Mullen highlighted this—that we have 

good quality professionals in these key positions, whether it be in 

FEMA, the Coast Guard, Secret Service, whomever it might be, 

that you’ve got to have good quality, well-educated, well-trained 

professionals who have been doing this and understand the roles 

and responsibilities. 

The other point that I would offer is, as we look across our readiness for the upcoming hurricane season which we use as a benchmark, which we all know we can have an earthquake today or a 

terrorist attack in any area of the country, so while June 1st is the 

target date, we’d like to have it all done sooner rather than later. 

When we talk about preparedness, FEMA is not the only element 

in preparedness. It’s a critical element in terms of our national preparedness efforts. But one of the debates that I participated in as 

a State official with the Congress is how do we do a better job of 

prevention in terms of protection, response, recovery and mitigation. And part of that debate was—the result of that was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. So I think that we 

are making significant progress in terms of strengthening FEMA. 

We’ve got a new team that’s been nominated by the President. 

We’ve got new people onboard in the Department and in FEMA. 

And we meet with them on a weekly basis. And I’ve seen literally 

dramatic progress over just the past 30 days with the logistical system in place, strengthening the communication systems. 

I think, frankly, the big issue was, there was an apparent resistance to integration with the broader Department of Homeland Security as a common entity. Those issues have been resolved, and 

Chief Paulison and the rest of his team are working hand-in-hand 

in cooperation with the information analysis folks. And we’re seeing greater integration each and every day. Frankly we’re going 

into this hurricane season in a much stronger Federal posture because the work that we’re doing at FEMA is part of positioning as 

a critical element in the Department of Homeland Security. We’re 

providing a lot of assistance at the Department level that FEMA 

didn’t have available to them in the event of a major disaster. And 

I for one having dealt with the issue over the years, that’s absolutely critical. 
31

I’ll just close with one other issue. I’ve dealt with a the lot of 

presidential disaster declarations from State officials. The headlines of FEMA at Katrina are the same headlines that came out 

of Andrew, and they’re the same headlines that came out of the 

Northwest floods. These are not new issues. But the one thing with 

this new approach to preparedness in the Department is this gives 

us a first opportunity, a clear opportunity, to make sure that we 

don’t simply document the lessons learned, but that we challenge 

them, turn them into an implementation plan and make fundamental changes to what we’re doing to ready America at the local, 

State and Federal levels. 

Mr. REICHERT. So I can clarify, in my mind, you’re against that 

FEMA move from the Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Absolutely. I think it would cause—any further 

movement of the boxes would further interrupt the momentum that 

we’re beginning to build. Beyond the grant program, just in basic 

coordination, no one said putting this Department together was 

going to be easy. We’re going through the natural evolution and the 

maturity process. And it’s beginning to take hold. Just literally in 

the past three months, I’ve seen significant progress. And I think 

we need to get a time and assess where we are and where we’re 

going. This is not an organizational issue; this is a management 

issue. 

Mr. REICHERT. You say you have Dave Paulison there and his assistant, Admiral Johnson. And certainly your experience and expertise in this area is well known. So the fact that we have people in 

place that do have experience and are looked to for their experience 

and leadership in this arena, do you see—you talked about not seeing any organizational structure issues. So you don’t see anything 

organizationally that needs to be done at all? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Well, I think that Chief Paulison—and frankly 

I’m spending more time with Chief Paulison than I am with my 

own family these days. But I would offer to you that I think Chief 

Paulison needs to have the flexibility to make some tweaks within 

the FEMA organizational structure that he has that oversight over. 

But in terms of the macro-organizational structure of the Department in terms of FEMA’s relationship, no, I think we’re in pretty 

good shape. There may be some other tweaks. 

But at the end of the day—Dave and I have had a lot of conversations. We were down on the Gulf Coast two weeks ago, and 

we talked about, what are those things that the department needs 

to do at the macro level to make FEMA a success and to make our 

National Emergency Management System a success, and we understand that. And his desires are shared by the other component 

leaders. We need the other component leadership folks on a dayto-day basis; Ted Allen of the Coast Guard and others. Everybody 

is stepping up to the plate and doing things to support the Department’s mission and have made improvements in the strategy. 

And I would just offer that we’re going through growth pain. Nobody will deny that. But we don’t stop growing. We simply need to 

make sure that we continue to strengthen ourselves. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. I would follow up very quickly with 

Mr. Mullen. 
32

Your testimony described a little difficulty in your relationship 

with FEMA since it’s changed and now under the umbrella of the 

Department of Homeland Security compared with past experience 

before they were under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security. And you mentioned that there was no emergency 

management expertise, you thought that was a factor that created 

some difficulty for your communication. The grant applications 

were not completed in a timely fashion. Commitments were not 

met. Let’s see what else we have. Well, those are just some of the 

things that you mentioned as kind of main things. 

How do you see the relationship now with FEMA and the preparedness you’re doing in your daily work? 

Mr. MULLEN. Thank you for asking that. I’ve been on the edge 

of my chair since Secretary Foresman was speaking. 

I thought that the initial creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a precipitous decision taken with almost no analysis or discussion with professionals in the situation. I think that 

if we reverse it now, it would be the same kind of mistake. I think 

we’ve got it; it’s there. We need to work with it. Before we make 

any major overhaul of that system—and I think some of my colleagues in emergency management would agree with me—before 

we go back and try to reconstruct this thing totally, I think we 

ought to take a couple years, wait for a new administration, whichever party prevails, and that proposal from the professional communities to whichever transition team is going to have to hunker 

down after November and figure out how we will run this country 

and protect it. That’s the group that should be looking at the longterm reorganization. 

Now we are six years in. We need to spend the next two years 

seeing if this can actually work. It’s like picking up a good novel. 

Let’s work with each other to try to fix that problem and that problem and that problem. There is a better team in place. There’s a 

more sensitive team in place. They seem to be listening. And I 

don’t want to interrupt that. We get a little frustrated every six 

months when we have a sit-down with DHS and find out half the 

people there are moving. I would like to see some continuity there 

for a while. I would like you to be there the next time we talk. 

Mr. FORESMAN. So would my wife. 

Mr. MULLEN. I can understand that. I think that one of the 

things that I hope that FEMA will do and the DHS will do is work 

with the Federal family to try to coordinate them. They have spent 

a lot of time affecting State and local lives and work programs, but 

I haven’t seen a lot of evidence that there’s been coordination at 

that level. That was really what the DHS system was supposed to 

do was to pull all those Federal entities together. In fact, with one 

hand they have, I think, done a good job of telling us to get together and work together. We have done a lot of that. But at the 

same time obstacles have been thrown into place that affect our 

ability to work together, that makes Steve Bailey or one of his 

other colleagues go back to a bunch of people and say this isn’t 

what we’ve been told before, there’s been a change, the application—the deadlines are tighter, we need all this information, we 

need it today. That kind of thing drives people at the local level 
33

crazy, and it isn’t easy on the folks at the State level to pass that 

burden on. 

And so I think that if we can get some stability within FEMA 

for a year or so in the systems and processes so we have some predictability, I could actually tell my emergency management council 

and Committee on Homeland Security colleagues what to expect in 

November when the grant guidelines come out so we can get ready 

for them. That’s the problem right now. We’re moving so fast that 

no one can either catch their breath or remember what the last 

commitment was. If we can get this under control for the next couple of years and give a fair chance for this program to work, I think 

that we might make real progress, even if we end up ultimately 

changing it, reconstituting it. The first thing to do is try to make 

this work, because we don’t have time for another reorganization. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. What usually happens is we all get 

five minutes on the panel. Since there’s only two of us and we’re 

a little bit more relaxed, I took a little bit longer. I’m sure Mr. 

Pascrell was ready for his questions, so I’ll yield my time to the 

ranking member. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Secretary Chertoff announced that, because of the debacle of Katrina, that there would 

be some changes. 

And I go back to what Director Mullen spoke about in his testimony in response to the question from the Chairman. Yesterday 

Chertoff announced that there would be some changes. And I hope 

that these are not simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. That’s what we’re concerned about. 

I wouldn’t be too quick to change—see, whether FEMA is in 

Homeland Security or not is secondary. Whether it’s functional, 

that’s the most important thing. And whether there is a seat at the 

table in the Oval Office, that’s critical. We’re not only talking about 

human tragedy, national tragedy; we’re talking about terrorism. 

In the recommendations that the Secretary presented yesterday, 

he mentioned that he assumed a greater role for the military. What 

does that mean, and where did this come from? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, I was not with the Secretary when 

he made those remarks at the press conference, but let me address 

first the issue of the Oval Office. 

Secretary Rumsfeld would not go to the White House without the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I think reasonable expectation is that Secretary Chertoff is not going to go without the 

FEMA Director to discuss what’s going on with the disaster. And 

the Secretary is committed to making sure that Chief Paulison has 

the appropriate access to the key decisionmakers. That is an opportunity that is fully embraced when they’ve got the chance. 

To the second piece of the question, as you know, a number of 

reports have recommended a more robust role for the military. And 

I think that part of what we’re working through with our colleagues at the Department of Defense is to make sure that we’re 

not simply substituting the military for good preparedness at the 

local and State level. And these are recommendations in the reports. We’re evaluating those recommendations. But first and foremost, we see that, with respect particularly to the comments made 

here today, that our grant programs, that our activities are tar-
34

geting enhancement in the local and State level. We’ve got nearly 

15 million State and local government employees that are potential 

responders. That is a far greater number than we have in uniform. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I asked the question because I think there were 

five or six recommendations. But I asked the question because it 

illustrates what we need to do in terms of the boots on ground 

here. We need to develop systems from the bottom up. The very 

people who—those 15 thousand people you’re talking about, those 

local people, we need to ask them what works best rather than we 

think either in the committee or the Department what we—we 

think we know what’s best for you. That doesn’t work, and I would 

question that. 

In the area of funding, you mentioned the question of funding. 

You worked in the State of Virginia. 

Mr. FORESMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You did a great job down there. You were a member of Secretary Ridge’s special task force established to find out 

where Federal funding was, and why local governments were concerned they were not receiving funding. I don’t care where we go 

throughout the United States, we hear the same thing. You hear 

it in Washington. We hear it in Washington also. 

The task force released a report in June of 2004, and it recommended that the Department of Homeland Security in coordination with State, county, municipal and tribal governments develop 

an automated grant-tracking system that would allow for the realtime tracking of the distribution and the use of Homeland Securityrelated funds. In the Congress, we felt this was a big deal, and I 

believe it is. 

Tell us if this new grant-tracking system has been deployed; and 

second, what were the findings of the department with regard to 

Homeland Security funds? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, with respect to the first part of the 

question, no, we have not deployed the new system. And one thing, 

your familiarity with the Firefighters Assistance Grant Program, 

some of the tracking tools that we’re using today that’s proven to 

be a very successful and timely program, we’re looking at adapting 

and adopting those rather than trying to create something new and 

give our local and State partners a little bit of consistency, which 

you’ve seen and you’ve heard here today. We have not made sufficient progress on that. It is among the top priorities that I have 

in the preparedness directive, and I ask our folks in the training 

office we need to be able to give you real-time timely data, and the 

State and local people need to have that. 

Second, with regard to the grant programs, one of the issues that 

I have identified, and again I’ve seen today, we sometimes get focused on the product at the expense of the processes. And I think 

that clearly what we need to do is to find cleaner processes that 

are unified across the multiplicity of extremes that we have out 

there, so that if you’re a local official or a State official, if you’re 

dealing with targeting infrastructure, protecting lives, if you’re 

dealing with fire-ready rates, if you’re dealing with Homeland Security Grant Programs, HSGPs, that you’ve got a consolidated consistent process rather than differing grant processes. 
35

Part of this that is different is the fact that Congress is providing 

different levels of guidance for grant programs including the deadlines. But I think the take-away is, we need to bring our State and 

local partners in, take a deep breath, as Mr. Mullen said, in terms 

of where we’re at right now, look at these grant processes and 

make sure we’ve got them as streamlined as possible, because at 

the end of the day, we want to get the dollars out. We want to 

spend them in a wise fashion. 

But at the same time, you’re going to ask us this time next year, 

how much better prepared are we, and I need to be able to assure 

you that we’ve spent the dollars wisely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have concluded that, while there is criticism 

that must be directed at local efforts to secure funds for needed 

materials and procedures, most of the blame is not the local police 

officers or firemen or EMTs or coordinating agencies within the 

State. When we hear about money in the—what’s the saying—

money gets stuck in the pipeline, that’s why I asked the question 

in the first place. 

Notice, I’m not going to get into the cuts that have been recommended by the administration today. They’re bizarre. And if you 

listen to the first responders here, the guys and the gals that are 

on the frontline, I think that there’s a lot of explanation that has 

to be done. But I realize that we won’t talk about that today. Isn’t 

that good? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Mullen, does the Washington Homeland Security Committee include tribal government representation in its 

emergency planning and preparedness? 

Mr. MULLEN. Tribal governments are able to participate on the 

Committee of Homeland Security, but they are not on the routine 

council. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Why not? 

Mr. MULLEN. Because there’s a statutory membership created. 

That would be something that would have to be adjusted. That’s 

something that we should approach again and take another look at. 

Mr. PASCRELL. If it’s from the bottom up, we shouldn’t exclude 

anybody, and we should find ways to deal with that. 

And it would seem to me—and former—I’d like your reaction to 

this. Former FEMA Director, Michael Brown, remember him? 

Mr. MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. He complained that—it’s nothing earth-shattering, but he complained that the Department of Homeland Security’s emphasis on risk has hampered the all-hazards preparedness 

function of FEMA. What specific metrics or methodology does the 

statewide committee employ to ensure that all hazardous preparedness, all hazardous preparedness, is also applicable to a terrorist 

or a risk-based scenario? 

Mr. MULLEN. Many of the measures, many of the programs that 

have been funded, programs that have applicability, whatever the 

disaster might be, we have employed a risk factor in our designation of where the money should go on our prioritization. And that’s 

been somewhat controversial because risk models are an imprecise 

science. Some of the information is classified, and I don’t have access to some of it. 
36

But as we have worked on this, we have tried to strike a balance 

between population, population density and a factor of risk to try 

to be respectful of the Federal till for risk as well as the Washington area and the State, and that has been more heightened in 

terms of focusing on what is perceived to be the greatest risk that 

we have. 

So it’s in there. I believe as we try to assess our critical infrastructure and wade through both issues of disclosure and other 

things that are going on, we’re making progress without having 

true risk factors to put in. In the meantime, what I have tried to 

have my focus look at is, what is the kind of impact that an event 

would have on us, and what would make Washington State less 

Washington State. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And when you’ve established priorities, somebody 

is of lesser priority. I mean we have that problem on the Federal 

level when we try to deal with funding based on risk. Some States 

felt that what we were trying to do is exclude them, and that 

wasn’t the purpose. However, it would seem to me that, with limited resources, they need the directive to where the greatest vulnerability is. 

Mr. Chairman, can I just ask a quick question? 

Mr. REICHERT. Sure. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Bailey, what are the standards relied upon to 

ensure that the equipment purchased in advancing the goals of 

interoperability, what are the standards derived from? Where do 

you think they should be derived from? 

Mr. BAILEY. Well, that’s a debate that has raged. 

Mr. PASCRELL. That’s why I asked your opinion. 

Mr. BAILEY. Thank you. One of the things we’ve tried to do in 

this State—and I think we’ve done it pretty well—and here’s why 

it is has worked, is because the State was smart enough to establish work groups that involved the local people. And Jeff Jensen, 

the Tacoma Emergency Manager, has been critically involved in 

the planning process on the equipment from the very beginning 

along with Chief Vickery who is here from Seattle. So we’ve had 

that kind of inclusive planning process that has helped us a great 

deal. 

However, the State of Washington, as Congressman Reichert will 

tell you, is a very diverse State. We have a mountain range that 

literally almost creates two different worlds. So to totally standardize equipment is probably not fully attainable, but certainly 

what we have done is through that work of regional people working 

at the State level, all equipment purchases are vetted to ensure as 

much interoperability as possible. And I think thanks to that committee, and the people here today that represent that, we’ve done 

a pretty good job of trying to get to those kinds of attainments. 

Federal standards, I think, in theory are somewhat probably a 

good idea. The practicality due to local changing conditions, I’m not 

sure they’re totally attainable either. We have a lot of requirements 

from the Federal Government already, and I would hate to see further flexibility taken away from the local level personally. So that’s 

how I would address your question. 

I would also just like to add that, on our Homeland Regional Coordination Council here in Pierce County that makes the decisions 
37

for all of our homeland security grant spending, we do have a representative from the Seattle Tribe of Indians who is very active in 

that process. And I think you would find at the local level throughout the State, that the tribes are very well represented. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you very much. Chief Trevin ̃ o, very briefly, 

your testimony focused on the frustration you have with DHS’s 

constant revision of the grant guidelines, how that hampers planning, et cetera, et cetera. 

Have the new guidelines had the effect of improving the statewide planning process? 

Chief TREVIN ̃ O. The new guidelines, once again, are changed, and 

so we’re having to react to those changes just as everyone else is. 

Mr. Bailey commented earlier about encouraging DHS to maintain continuity in the guidelines, so that all of us as players and 

participants in the process could catch up with it, and I’d like to 

echo that thought. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And Mr. Mitzel, how does your company balance 

your private sector concerns and emergency preparedness? 

Mr. MITZEL. Our private sector concerns? Okay. We are a commercial insurance company. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Right. 

Mr. MITZEL. So what we do, we help our commercial lines insureds with their own emergency preparedness and continuity programs, which vary highly based on the environment that they’re located in, the type of business, et cetera. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So those folks wouldn’t be hesitant to detail their 

emergency plans because of profit? 

Mr. MITZEL. Generally speaking, but they are very open with us 

as their insured to come in and assist them, so we generally help 

them with their continuity. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We talked about the idea, which you brought up, 

about credit to those companies who would come forth and put 

something into effect, therefore reducing risk and vulnerability, 

methods and processes within the companies to overcome—and to 

prepare as well as to overcome if something disastrous occurred. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. Mitzel, are you familiar with the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Community Emergency Response Team? 

Mr. MITZEL. The CERT program, yes. 

Mr. REICHERT. How does that differ from the Unigard emergency 

response? 

Mr. MITZEL. I would refer to another company that’s done an excellent program in our jurisdiction, in Chief Trevin ̃ o’s jurisdiction, 

and they, in fact, won the same award we did the year before, and 

that is T-Mobile. And they do train their employees to the full 

CERT program. They are able to get employees away for that 20 

to 24-hour block of time. They have a very successful program, too. 

We wanted to specialize our employees a little bit more on just 

becoming a search and rescue team member or a medic—medical 

team member versus training them to do a little search and research, a little damage assessment, a little bit of everything, because we felt that the number of drills we were doing, two or three, 
38

we wanted to keep the competency at a higher level than being 

trained to do everything. 

So we took the model, revised it somewhat with the local fire department’s approval, and customized the program to what we 

thought was a better fit with our organization. So there’s a wide 

range of flexibility depending on how much time the senior management is able to give us the employees to participate in training 

and drills. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. We had a little discussion about interoperability. That’s one of the things we’ve been working hard on. 

We’ve held a number of hearings. I think Washington State is way 

ahead of the curve across the Nation in our ability to communicate 

first intraoperatively and interoperatively with other departments. 

How does interoperability play with the partnership between the 

Bellevue Police Department and the Bellevue Fire Department and 

Unigard? 

Chief TREVIN ̃ O. Well, we’re fortunate in the City of Bellevue in 

that the police department and the fire department share a communications center. Our communications are completely seamless, 

I’m happy to say, and we’re able to speak on each others’ radio 

channels on a regular basis. 

The same thing applies with Unigard Insurance. We have very 

good communication with them. In fact, part of their process is 

working with our volunteer ham radio operators and preparing for 

the eventuality that our communication systems could go down in 

the event of a disaster. Every disaster that I’ve seen going back to 

our response when I was in the search and rescue team to the 

earthquake in Los Angeles, the communication systems went down, 

the cellphones went down, just about everything goes down. So we 

rely on ham radios as kind of a last tier of backup in our process 

with them. And we’re very involved with them, and I think we’re 

very effective. 

Mr. REICHERT. So it’s more private sector organizations are involved in the separate emergency preparedness. There is a plan in 

Bellevue to include them in some sort of communication systems to 

use the expertise that they have passed on? 

Chief TREVIN ̃ O. Yes. And I should also comment that the combined communications center not only provides services to the 

Bellevue Police Department and the Bellevue Fire Department, but 

a total of fourteen team fire departments and two police departments. So it really takes on kind of a regional aspect, and the participants and the private agencies within the regional area all benefit from that process. 

Mr. REICHERT. Chief, you also mentioned that jurisdictions within our UASI and you participate in that review. Who’s leading that 

UASI review? 

Chief TREVIN ̃ O. The way I understand it, you have to remember 

that Bellevue is a recent participant in the UASI process, and a lot 

of the planning into the proposals made was already done before 

Bellevue was named as a participant, so we came onto the process 

very late. And at our very first entry level, most of the planning 

had been done. 

The next level of review is done at the State and from the State 

proposal, which comes back to the Federal Government. We’re 
39

waiting for the response back at which point further review will be 

done. 

Mr. REICHERT. Anyone else have anything to add to that? 

Mr. MULLEN. I chaired a UASI program. And as a voting member, I’ve had the opportunity to work with it. It was a very exhaustive process. And given the very limited time and the change of 

guidelines, it was very challenging for everybody involved. 

Mr. Bailey was in that group, the Snohomish County emergency 

manager, Seattle, Bellevue, and the King County Deputy Director. 

So we had a group of five or six, but working with us are a number 

of working groups that have fed into the information that is pretty 

broadly representative. While Bellevue has now joined our core 

group as a voting member, Bellevue was represented by King 

County Fire & Rescue prior to that. It’s been a pretty collaborative 

process. 

Now, again, I can’t say there was great joy about the decisions, 

but in the end, I think, given the parameters we had, the limited 

knowledge and the time frame, I thought we made some outstanding decisions, and people really stepped up and put the regional requirements ahead of the major jurisdictional desires. That 

happens when choices have to be made, and I think the spirit that 

this group had was very strong. 

And it wasn’t without its bumps, but we worked through that, 

and I think we’re stronger for it. And we’re waiting for the next 

run we’ll have when we find out what we’ll divide up and what the 

methodology of deciding is. Steve was also here. 

Mr. REICHERT. Go ahead. 

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, I think there’s one very good example of what we’ve been able to do in the UASI work group. 

The Seattle-King County metropolitan area is the largest populated metropolitan area in America without a public safety aviation 

program. And that is one high priority we have put in our UASI 

proposals. We’ve worked with your staff to seek additional resource 

funding to help us deal with really what is a huge public safety 

tool. Given our geography, our limited transportation system, interoperability issues in a disaster, the aviation piece is huge, and we 

have lagged behind in this region for years. And part of UASI has 

worked with aviation. Ted Summers has been involved in that, and 

we’ve made progress. The solution is funding, and that’s the thing 

we’re trying to pursue in that UASI program. 

Mr. REICHERT. I know there’s been a tri-county effort in the air 

support area, and we are still working with Pierce County, King 

County and Snohomish County trying to acquire some funding. 

I was sheriff not too long ago. And part of that frustrating process is UASI. But I think it’s grown into a great partnership. 

I want to mention just quickly before I move back to Mr. Pascrell 

for some follow-up questions that I had the opportunity to interact 

with Mr. Michael Jackson also in hearings, but Mr. Pascrell mentioned in the paper today the Secretary saying that the military 

may play a greater role when it comes to these emergencies. There 

are other things out there. I know that the Secretary is very much 

presenting as new ideas, new directions, and one of those—I want 

to mention some of those besides the involvement what role does 

the Department have to play in these emergencies. One, I know 
40

that you really want to take a look at the contractual element, the 

logistics-related tools, who is moving where and why, what the contracts are, better customer service to handle mass dispersion, 

preidentifying shelters for people who are homeless, enhancing situational awareness, people deploying quickly to areas. These are 

just some of the things that Secretary Jackson mentioned. Debris 

removal was a big issue at Katrina. And it seemed like they used 

the most expensive engineers and contractors and the Corps of Engineers, not local contractors. 

Again, the stronger DOD role was mentioned. Reaching out to 

the locals, which I was glad to see on the list of things that DHS 

is looking at, how can we work together closely. This is a great 

start, having a hearing here. Last but not least is financial accountability, cost control, and better management, so all of those 

things. 

Do you have a comment on any of those? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, if I may go back to the question 

about DOD, I think that part of what the Secretary may have been 

also talking about—again, I was not in the room when he made the 

comments—but in retrospect, as a result of the briefings he and I 

both did on Monday, update briefings, one of the things that we’ve 

been able to do is to make sure that the mission assignments that 

the Department of Defense may need to do in the context of supporting hurricane response or even an earthquake scenario, there 

are lots of things we’re going to need; heavy-lift helicopters, medium-lift helicopters. We’re going to need air transportation. We’re 

going to need aerial reconnaissance using some of the technology 

of our intelligence community to do some of that, all of these types 

of things. 

We know that we’re writing the mission assignment today. And 

I think a large part of what I would offer to you is, this is basic 

Core 101; do as much as you can before the disaster strikes. And 

we’re working very aggressively with Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary McHale, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and others to make sure that we get as much of the likely DOD missions 

that are historic missions. They have dealt with them for 20, 30 

years, make sure it’s prescripted so it’s the State of Washington or 

any local community depending on the State of Washington. If we 

have to turn to the Federal family of DOD, we’re ready to do whatever it takes to make it happen. 

So I’ll go back and talk to the Secretary, Congressman. I’ll provide you all with a written follow-up in terms of what his comments were in relation to the article. Sometimes the information in 

the statement may not be exactly correct. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I just have one final question, Mr. Secretary. 

When Secretary Chertoff said yesterday that he desired to upgrade the National Alert System, what exactly can we look forward 

to with that regard? 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, thank you for that question. That 

actually goes to a large part of what my colleagues have been talking about today. One of FEMA’s critical elements is the ability to 

notify the general populace at large that we have a variety of situations that have occurred, earthquakes, hurricane, whatever it 

might be. 
41

The Emergency Alert System, formerly known as the Emergency 

Broadcast System, has not undergone the transformation to the degree that it was intended when they made some changes in the 

1990’s. We need to make some policy changes. There are a lot of 

things upon the broadcast media, text messaging, reverse 911, a lot 

of technologies that are available today. Don’t forget our core principles of the broadcast media. But we need to make sure that, from 

a policy standpoint, it reflects the 21st Century technology and how 

we communicate with the population at large. 

The other issue is to identify the number of occasions where the 

Emergency Alert System simply has not worked. The broadcasters 

are voluntary participants in that program. Some broadcasters in 

some States have very robust radio and television support for those 

activities; other States do not. We need to ensure the strength of 

that system, so we’re taking a very systematic look to make sure 

that the conversion from analog to digital has moved as it should 

have, that the primary and secondary relay points are up and operating, that the States have in place a good quality plan, and that 

we’re using all the available technology. 

Again, at the end of the day, government can be as prepared as 

we want to be. The private sector can be as prepared as they want 

to be. But if fellow citizens have problems, then all that preparedness is not going to pay off. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Mullen, do you have a comment on that question? 

Mr. MULLEN. No. I think the point that the EAS is voluntary 

needs to be taken very seriously. It isn’t necessarily something that 

is guaranteed. The warning will go off precisely in the time frame 

and the manner that we wish. 

I actually was reacting a little bit to the discussion about the 

greater DOD role just for a moment. I think where we get very concerned is, when it sounds like the suggestion is made in the Federal line, we feel very strongly in that, if the troops came in, they 

should be under the command of the adjunct general working for 

the government. Building work to support States has helped in the 

requirement to support the local people. 

When we’re talking about a National Alert System or any pronouncement coming out of DHS headquarters, we welcome that, 

but we also welcome the opportunity to and the connection to the 

local and State officials who actually are responsible for delivering 

that message to be sure it’s done properly. I go back to the 

Nisqually earthquake when the Nisqually operation was under the 

Federal level. I campaigned in the boiler room for each jurisdiction 

getting press release without any consultation from the State and 

local. Those are the kinds of things that we need to get away from 

so we’re sure that we’re all working together. If we’re going to be 

a team, we’ve got to get our signals straight. 

Mr. FORESMAN. Chairman and Congressman, if I might, that’s 

why dialogue is absolutely important. Let me be very clear. 

What we’re doing with the Emergency Alert System is designed 

to empower local officials and State officials to be able to use a system that works. The Federal Government is responsible for making 
42

sure there’s an Emergency Alert System. We depend on our local 

and State partners to implement that system and make it work. 

In regard to the DOD, I think that the acknowledgement here is 

that emergency disasters are local events or State events. The role 

of the Federal Government is to provide support. Nothing in my remarks should be construed to say that we’re talking about federalizing emergencies and disasters in the community. What we’re 

talking about is making sure the Federal support is robust and in 

force. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Let’s go back to what you just said. It’s all right 

for us to conclude that we want the locals—I mean the extended 

definition of that—the locals ought to respond to national catastrophes, be it whatever, and that the Federal Government should 

be called on as a later resource. 

That only works if the locals are involved in the process in the 

first place. That has not happened. You can’t expect the locals to 

be able to respond accordingly when these disasters get out of hand 

as Katrina did or as a manmade disaster, a terrorist attack, unless 

those folks are in at the planning in the very beginning and not 

look just to respond. I think I can’t emphasize that enough, Mr. 

Chairman. If there’s anything we keep on hearing over and over 

again, we expect the locals to take on this huge responsibility and 

undertaking. Many times locals don’t—can’t appreciate—they’re 

not in a position to appreciate what’s the extent of the resources 

that will be needed to fight this particular—to respond to the situation. And that is why the Federal Government has a responsibility 

early on before anything even happens to help us prepare for 

what—our citizens demand that. Our citizens demand that. And 

this is the angst, this is the anxiety that’s being grated out there, 

I think, more than in any other area. 

The questions about FEMA, how can you separate preparedness 

from response? I don’t know how you do that. I don’t think you 

should do that. That’s my point. Thanks. 

Mr. FORESMAN. Congressman, you know, I agree. We just need 

to meet our short-term planning proposals. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you to the panel for their testimony, and 

I appreciate you asking questions and answering questions. 

This Committee has been very focused on three things that we 

recognize as key components in this process; that’s planning, training and communication. I think everyone on the panel will agree, 

those three are key to our success in keeping our communities safe. 

The most important part in having any of those three critical areas 

succeed is the piece that Mr. Pascrell just touched upon, and that 

is the relationship between the Federal, the State and the local entities. And all have to come together to address this issue, and 

today I think we have a good start. I think that, as we move forward with friendships and the names that we shared today help 

build those relationships and make the planning and training and 

communication piece work. 

So thank you all for being here. And at this time, before calling 

the second panel, we’ll take a brief recess. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. REICHERT. I’d like to call the Subcommittee hearing to order. 

I’ll now call the second panel. 
43

The witnesses on the second panel are Sheriff Pastor, Sheriff of 

Pierce County; Assistant Chief Vickery, City of Seattle Fire Department; Michael Loehr, Director of Preparedness for Public Health—

Seattle and King County; and Mr. William Pugh, Director of Public 

Works and Assistant City Manager for the City of Tacoma; and Mr. 

Roger Serra, Director of Security and Emergency Management for 

Seattle City Light. 

The Chair recognizes Sheriff Pastor. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL A. PASTOR, SHERIFF, PIERCE COUNTY, 

WASHINGTON 

Mr. PASTOR. First of all, gentlemen, thank you very kindly for 

coming here and listening to us. Welcome to Pierce County. It is 

especially good to see Chairman Reichert who give assurance to me 

that there is life after being sheriff, and possibly even more exalted 

life. I always thought that being sheriff is the ultimate but—

Mr. REICHERT. It is. 

Mr. PASTOR. There are a number of things that we commented 

on that you’ve heard about already in Washington State and in 

Pierce County, things which allow us to apply technology to work 

and support of one another to prepare for and respond to natural 

disasters and terrorist attacks. We don’t just want to brag though 

because, if you wear your—if you rest on your laurels, you’re probably wearing them in the wrong place, so there is much more that 

needs to be done. 

One thing that we do not have in Pierce County that I will address briefly is interoperable communications. We have kind of a 

patched commonality to our emergency management, but we need 

to do more, and we can get there. Getting there is consistent with 

the goals we have taken with our approach to disaster preparedness and emergency preparedness countywide. And I speak countywide from the standpoint of having the privilege of serving as the 

sheriff of Pierce County, a county for over 750,000 people with all 

sorts of territory in 1800 square miles and the mountain that you 

could see if you could see it in the distance over there. That is our 

mountain in Pierce County. 

Our approach, as you’ve heard already, to disaster preparedness 

and terrorist preparedness is an all-hazard approach. That’s our 

doctrine. That’s the way we approach this. As you’re well aware, 

most of the preparedness for natural disaster planning, equipment 

partnership is applicable in the area of responding to terrorist incidents as well, in fact, probably over 75 percent. So we’ve taken 

steps, we’ve made plans, we’ve equipped, we’ve drilled, we’ve 

trained with the all-hazards/all partners doctrine in mind. We’ve 

tried to include people from the public sector and throughout the 

public sector, local, State and Federal, as well as people from the 

private sector, private businesses as well. In collaboration with our 

municipal partners in the county and in even closer collaboration 

with our colleagues in the Pierce County Department of Emergency 

Management, we have placed the people in this county, I think, in 

a strong position with regard with readiness. 

And you can pick off the things. You’ve heard some of them already. Our State is involved with the PC–NET program; computer 

mapping of schools and critical infrastructures has begun here in 
44

Pierce County; establishing temporary radio frequencies to patch 

our radio frequencies together; our Terrorist Early Warning Group, 

which Chairman Bailey has talked about. But we have more to do 

to improve our position. And we have a complication of, like many 

parts of the United States, we value local control. We have 19 law 

enforcement agencies, 23 fire districts, eight Public Safety Answering Points—and God bless us for our dedication to local control of 

it. But sometimes and in some challenges, that can be an impediment to what we need. Some challenges, terrorism, whether it’s 

international or home-grown—it’s important that we recognize that 

we have both, and we have had experience with both in this county. Large scale disasters and mass civil disturbance events are 

three examples of challenges which don’t always lend themselves 

to purely local approaches. 

For that reason, in Washington State, our State Sheriffs and 

Chiefs Association has developed a statewide Law Enforcement 

Emergency Mobilization Plan, so that we can as seamlessly as possible work to support one another if any kind of disaster or mass 

civil disturbance or whatever breaks down. 

One of the things that we need to do—I need—is establish a 

stronger, more permanent interoperable communication system. 

And in Pierce County, this week an RFP will go out for a study 

on that. And the study will cost about $60,000. We are working to 

use Federal moneys to find out what we should do and how to 

wisely use resources. The study is intended to provide direction to 

the most cost effective approach to achieving interoperability. We 

want to be sure we get the best possible performance. And we really appreciate the Federal government’s interest in this area as we 

carry it further. 

So I described the doctrine. I talked about some of our needs, our 

accomplishments. The question is, what is the proper role of the 

Federal Government from here on out. And the proper role starts 

with the idea that, as has already been said, no disaster or terrorist attack takes place at the Federal level. If you remember back 

to 9/11, even the Pentagon, when the plane crashed into the Pentagon, if you review the videotapes, you’ll see Fairfax County Police, you’ll see Alexandria Police. Even at the epicenter of what is 

Federal power, you see locals responding. 

In light of this, in light of the co-responsibilities we share, we 

don’t intend to passively ask the Federal Government to solve our 

problems. But we do intend to ask the Federal Government to partner with us. And I’ve asked our Federal partners to consider a 

number of issues. One of them, is this really a good time to cut 

back on law enforcement technology funding? Mr. Pascrell talked 

about that. Planning, procuring and deploying interoperative communications is essential for what we need to do. Cutbacks on that 

may not be the right signal to send at this time. 

I would ask that we have the ability to hire personnel to deal 

with disasters and terrorism issues. 

Mr. Chairman, you’ve heard me say that we have a circuit of gas 

masks to respond to real events. To prevent events, you need 

human beings, not just equipment. If it is true that, in the international scene, we are in the midst of something that might be 

called World War IV. World War IV requires sacrifice on 
45

everybody’s part, sacrifice on the part of local officials, on the part 

of the Federal Government, and especially on the part of citizens 

to step forward and confront challenges. So we at the local level believe we have a responsibility to step forward. We believe it when 

the President and the Congress tell us that we’re on the frontline 

of terrorism. 

In February we had a major county sheriffs, inner city chiefs 

meeting in Washington. We heard praise for our effort, and I’m 

sure that praise was very sincere and heartfelt. But we also heard 

an inconsistent message, that is cutbacks in the COPS Programs 

and personnel, cutbacks in technology. 

I would ask the gentlemen that you take back to Washington 

that we’re willing to do our part, and we’re willing to step forward. 

We’re not interested in just passively holding up our hands. We’re 

interested in rolling up our sleeves and doing the work. We would 

ask that you join us in that, especially when it comes to resources. 

We believe that public safety is not a spectator sport. We say 

that to our citizens, and we ask that our Federal partners not just 

cheer us along, but also stay in the game and help us out in the 

field. We ask that you help simplify the preparedness grants, that 

you help us prioritize, and that you help us and help the citizens 

of the United States. Those of us at the point of the spear are the 

reason actually that the spear exists. And the point of the spear 

are the local first responders. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Paul. Assistant Chief Vickery. 

STATEMENT OF A.D. VICKERY, ASSISTANT CHIEF, CITY OF 

SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. VICKERY. Chairman Reichert, Congressman Pascrell, thank 

you. 

Just a little background, I have been in fire service 40 years, and 

I was able to respond to the Oklahoma City bombing, the 9/11 terrorist attack, the FEMA-sponsored Urban Search and Rescue. I’m 

really unique in that I was also trained as a police officer when I 

headed the fire investigation unit. 

This is a great opportunity. Never before, 25 years ago when I 

was sitting on a panel with a sheriff on one side and public health 

official on another. I think it shows we’ve come a long way in a 

very short amount of time. 

I’d like to emphasize some areas where I think significant 

progress is made from those of us down here in the trenches. I’ve 

also lived in the trench, in the bottom of the trench. And never in 

my 40 years of service have I ever seen the level of cooperation and 

mutual respect law enforcement and the fire service have for each 

other as we do now. It’s truly a realization that we’ve been covering 

each other’s back. 

Secondly, I think there have been some big strides. Previous to 

the National Incident Management System, when the sheriff stood 

up and pointed and said ‘‘fire,’’ I ducked; and when I stood up and 

said ‘‘fire,’’ he grabbed the hoses. Now what we have is a system 

of language called the National Incident Management System, so 

that when we do communicate, even though we don’t have the relationships face-to-face, that we’re talking the same language. This 

is a huge step forward. 
46

That language ties in with the National Response Plan. If we 

would all read it and practice it at the Federal and State and local 

level, it gives us a strategy as well as a language that we can use 

from all facets of the first response community. 

Risk-based funding, and it sounds good, but in practice this is 

going to be a challenge, because all of America is faced with risk. 

I do think that focusing our limited resources on areas where we 

have identified and shared that risk, it’s very difficult for us to get 

information from the Federal Government on where the risk really 

exists. I think the sheriff and I and the public health feel the risk, 

but we’re not getting a lot of help in qualifying that. 

I don’t know what the terrorists are going to do next, but I do 

know what they have done; they’ve killed people. And where you 

have large concentrations of people, we have a greater risk simply 

because of the density of the population. 

So from that standpoint, we need to look at focusing where there 

are large concentrations of people whether they are transient or 

that’s where they live. 

A new Director for FEMA, I think we all need to fully support 

the confirmation of Chief David Paulison as the new Director of 

FEMA. He’s got 30 years of response experience. Let’s let him use 

it for the next disaster. 

The focus on terrorism response is not at counter purposes to responding to a naturally-occurring event. If I can respond to a terror 

event, I should be able to respond to a naturally-occurring event. 

The communication systems, the interoperability of the equipment are applicable. But the difference with a terror event is my 

partnership with law enforcement becomes significantly more important. To bring those to justice who have committed the crime, 

to protect the evidence, but we also focus on one thing—saving 

lives. And the tools we learn to respond to terrorism are effective 

at saving lives in a non-terrorist event. 

I believe truly here that the risks that we have—and each time 

I get closer to Mount Rainier, I get a little more sensitive. I look 

behind my back to see if the mud flow is coming towards me right 

now. 

So when it comes to responding, in my experience, I do believe 

that there is such a thing as a perfect storm. I’ve never seen a perfect response in 40 years. We can always improve our capability to 

respond. 

What areas do I feel that we need enhancement? Communications continue to hamper our ability to appropriately respond to 

and provide for the safety of the first response community. I applaud the fact that we have patches in technological, but right now 

I can’t talk to a firefighter in a building that’s 30 feet away from 

me. The radio doesn’t go through the building. I don’t know where 

it is in the building, nor do I know where those police officers or 

assistants, where they are in the building. So if something happens, can I protect them? 

I’ve got 1,000 members on the Seattle Fire Department and 600 

radios. That means that when there is an emergency of a significant magnitude, I don’t have enough radios for all the firefighters 

who could be called to the scene. 
47

The United States military utilizes satellites in their communication systems, and it really doesn’t matter if a hurricane wipes everything off the map, they bounce the signals off the satellites. I 

can go to Mexico for vacation and get satellite TV. They beam signals all over the world. Why can’t we have a federally-funded public safety communications system similar to the military but not 

compromising the military’s need for secrecy. 

People are our most valuable asset. I agree with the sheriff. I’ve 

got 100 gas masks and 25 fire engines, but if we don’t put people 

on them, we just don’t have the capacity to respond. 

Right now in the City of Seattle today, there are about a million 

people. There are 300—a little over 300 police and fire on duty. 

When that bell hits or that patrol car gets the call to respond, 300 

people is a challenge when you’ve got a million potential people 

that you’re going to deal with. Staffing will continue to be a significant issue, and I think that we need to continue to look at Federal 

support for staffing both law enforcement, fire and EMS. 

I can’t help but look at the port. And I see these enormous cranes 

that just came in on a ship here a couple weeks ago. I see a port 

in both Tacoma and Seattle that is surrounded by a city unique in 

many areas; a port that 22 illegal immigrants came in, and from 

the grace of God they were not hostile. They were actually friendly 

and looking to get a job in this country. And the security guard, 

first they were identified by a crane operator, and then the security 

guard was nice enough to talk to them, smile, and put them in a 

van. I’m glad their intentions were not hostile. They could have put 

us at great risk. 

So I think we need to continue to emphasize that port security 

is a critical issue, not only in the prevention of interdiction but in 

the capability to respond if an incident does occur, and to get our 

ports back operating if an attack did occur, either an accident or 

an intention. 

Mr. REICHERT. Chief, if I can interrupt just for a second, Mr. 

Pascrell has to catch an airplane. If we can keep our comments to 

five minutes for the rest of the panel. Thank you. 

Mr. VICKERY. I urge that we fully fund FEMA and populate the 

agency with professional responders. Without adequate funding for 

FEMA, it doesn’t matter who’s at FEMA. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Vickery follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF A.D. VICKERY

Welcome, I’m A.D. Vickery, Assistant Chief of the Seattle Fire Department. I entered the Fire Service in 1966 and, over the past 40 years, have responded to thousands of emergencies. I responded to the Oklahoma City Bombing, the 9/11 Terrorist 

Attack on New York City, and Hurricanes as a member of our FEMA sponsored 

Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Team. As head of the Seattle Fire Investigation 

Unit I completed basic Law Enforcement training and held a Police commission. I’ve 

worked as a firefighter/paramedic for 12 years in Seattle. 

Preparedness and response to emergencies must build on local capability. The emphasis in government needs to focus on funding and supporting local capability. 

I would like to address areas where significant progress is being made, and then 

areas where enhancements are needed related to local fire, hazmat, and field emergency medical services.

Areas of Significant Progress 

• Never in my 40 years of service have I seen this high a level of cooperation 

and mutual respect exist between the Fire Service and Law Enforcement. Terrorism has taught us that we are mutually dependent. This realization has al-
48

lowed us to integrate resources and command structures, reduce duplication of 

effort and standardize equipment. 

• Emergency responders now have a common ‘‘language’’ and game plan which 

integrates local, state, federal and military resources. The common language is 

the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Previously, when the Sheriff points and yells ‘‘fire’’ it didn’t mean the same thing as the Fire Chief yelling 

‘‘fire’’. NIMS provides the baseline for emergency response operations and communication.

The National Response Plan (NRP) provides the structure for how local, state, 

federal and military assets interact and support each other. We all have to read 

it and remember it. 

• Risk based funding. All of America is at risk, from nature and terrorists. Certain areas are at a higher risk. I don’t purport to know what a terrorist is going 

to do next, but I do know what they have done. They kill people, and they kill 

people in large numbers. 

• A new Director for FEMA. We need to fully support the confirmation of Chief 

David Paulison as the new Director of FEMA! Chief Paulison has over 30 years 

of response experience. Let’s let him use it. 

• The focus on terrorism response is not at counter purposes to responding to 

natural disasters. If you can respond to a terrorist incident, you can respond 

to a natural disaster. I do believe that there is such a thing as the ‘‘perfect 

storm,’’ I’ve never seen a ‘‘perfect response’’. We do, however, need to balance 

our exercises and training to include natural disasters as a component of our 

overall preparedness.

Areas which Need Enhancement 

• Communications continue to hamper our ability to respond effectively and efficiently. We need hardware and redundant systems. In Seattle, the Fire Department has 1,000 members but we only have 600 radios. In a disaster, 400 

of our firefighters will not have radios.

There continues to be significant gaps in police, fire, EMS and Emergency Management communication interoperability. The United States military utilizes 

satellites for ground communications, why can’t the government put up communication satellites for Public Safety? We get satellite TV all over the United 

States, why not provide redundancy for first responders using similar technology? 

• People are our most valuable asset. We need to provide federal staffing support for local fire and law enforcement agencies. In Seattle we have approximately 350 police and firefighters on-duty for a daytime population of 1 million 

people compressed into 90 square miles. We simply do not have adequate staffing to deal with emergencies out of the ordinary. 

• We need to significantly increase funding to improve Port security and response. Our major ports are critical assets and there aren’t a lot of them, and 

they are soft targets. Unlike many major ports, the Cities of Seattle and Tacoma surround their ports. This puts residents at risk. We need to fund prevention, response and recovery planning and resources. 

• As a responder, when a disaster occurs, I need equipment to continue the response when my local supplies are consumed. We need to fully fund the 

Prepositioned Equipment Packages which were recently utilized in Hurricane 

Katrina to reconstitute local public safety agencies. This program has been 

transferred to FEMA without adequate funding. It absolutely needs to be supported. 

• Fully fund FEMA and populate the agency with professional responders. 

Without adequate funding it doesn’t matter who FEMA reports to. 

• Increase funding to high risk cities and urban areas. Both natural disasters 

and terrorists will likely kill and injure more people in densely populated areas. 

• Improve our ability to respond to multiple casualty incidents. We have a local 

capacity to deal with dozens of injured victims, we need the capacity to deal 

with hundreds. It doesn’t currently exist. We need mass casualty field surge capability. 

• We need to provide the public with a continuing stream of factual information 

which will allow them to be self-sufficient for days instead of hours. Never underestimate the ability of the American public to weed out fact from fiction. 

In summary, we are making progress in our efforts to improve Homeland Security 

for prevention, response and recovery from natural and manmade disasters. Success 

will depend on commitment and a combination of local resources and sustained federal supplemental funding. 

Thank you.
49

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Chief. 

Mr. LOEHR.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LOEHR, DIRECTOR OF 

PREPAREDNESS, PUBLIC HEALTH, SEATTLE AND KING 

COUNTY 

Mr. LOEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Pascrell, for the opportunity to speak with you this morning on a 

subject that is critical to the continued health and safety of our region’s residents. 

Local health departments have always had a role in disaster preparedness and response. Since 9/11, we’ve seen significant changes 

in the threats we face and the level of preparedness we need to 

achieve. In just a short time frame, we’ve seen a wave of disasters 

around the world with significant public health consequences including the anthrax attacks of February of 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2003, tsunamis, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Madrid 

and London bombings, and now avian flu and the threat of pandemic influenza. 

All of these events have focused a spotlight on the Nation’s public health infrastructure and its ability to manage the health consequences of emergencies. 

In order to meet these new challenges, we have forged relationships with our health care system partners, our first responders, 

community-based organizations and emergency managers, and are 

much better integrated into each other’s plans. I echo the Chief’s 

comment that, four years ago, we were not in any means together, 

and now I cannot get away from him. It’s a very good thing. 

The results of these partnerships can be seen in newly developed 

response capabilities such as the isolation and quarantine of infectious patients and the ability to dispense large amounts of antibiotics to a large number of people in a very short time. 

We have also developed a countywide disease surveillance system 

in concert with such varied partners as hospitals, 911 dispatch centers and schools, but we cannot afford to stop here. I’d like to offer 

some specific examples of how we can improve coordination across 

all levels of government and response systems through better integration of planning, response and resources. 

First, we need to improve the way the Federal funding is provided for preparedness so that integration, not fragmentation, is 

supported. 

Over the past four years, public health and hospitals in King 

County have become fully integrated into homeland security planning, strategic development and exercise. The TOPOFF 2 exercise 

in 2003, and our bioterrorism planning efforts demonstrate close 

coordination across disciplines. We have established a Health Care 

Coalition with over 25 partner organizations that is developing new 

protocols for making critical, system-wide decisions, managing information and allocating resources. This will foster a unified command approach to health and medical response countywide, something that’s totally new in our county, and I think it’s actually revolutionary nationwide. 

However, Federal funding priorities for public health and hospitals are focused on specific response tasks, specific hazards and 
50

equipment. This fails to recognize that a systemic approach to 

health care preparedness is needed. Hospitals, public health, clinics, medical practices, and pharmacies all rely on each other during 

disasters. Planning, training, exercising and responding as an integrated system should be fully supported, if not required, by funding 

programs. 

Just now, we’re beginning to see this change. The latest guidance 

for hospital grants from Health Services and Resources Administration, HRSA, begins to take a systems approach to preparedness 

for hospitals. This should be incorporated throughout all Federal 

grant programs. There is no strategy for total health care preparedness at the national level, and there hasn’t been for four years. 

That is probably the greatest tragedy in public health preparedness 

that we’ve seen; there’s simply no organized set of priorities, no incorporation of local priorities. As Congressman Pascrell mentioned, 

it is not a top-down system. It shouldn’t be. Locals should be communicating what the priorities are and have a say in how the resources should be allocated. 

Secondly, the ability to share real-time data with response partners needs to be expanded beyond voice capabilities and beyond 

traditional first responders. We have over 7,000 medical professionals in King County that we rely upon as the eyes and ears of 

our health care system. As public health threats emerge, paramedics and hospital staff will be on the frontlines responding to the 

threat. They are the ones who will likely detect the first signs for 

bioterrorism or potentially threatening diseases in our community. 

Yet, there is no reliable system in place to share critical data between public health and medical professionals. Today it’s the fax 

machine. The hardware and software necessary to track and communicate critical health data between public health and medical 

professionals is lacking across the county. 

Public health response measures including isolation and quarantine of infected patients, and mass dispensing of medications require robust data-tracking systems to monitor in real-time the patients, their status, and the care they have received, wherever they 

may be located. These are critical infrastructure needs nationwide. 

Third, training resources must become a Federal priority and 

must be appropriate for public health responders. Federal grant requirements for public health have focused primarily on developing 

response plans; and for hospitals the focus has been primarily on 

acquiring equipment. Yet training personnel to implement an effective response is essential. 

Training resources provided by the Department of Homeland Security simply aren’t relevant to the needs and responsibilities of 

health system responders. Specialized training necessary to carry 

out specific health-related plans for mass dispensing of antibiotics 

or isolating large numbers of infectious patients is not eligible 

under Homeland Security grants and not resourced under CDC or 

HRSA grants, so we’re left basically either not training or eating 

the cost. 

In addition, training resources should be more flexible and accommodate the needs of health care organizations. 

In summary, partnerships are the cornerstone of emergency response. We’ve seen the benefits when they’ve worked well and wit-
51

nessed the disastrous consequences when they have not. Federal 

policies and practices can make a tremendous difference in determining whether the preparations of responding agencies and institutions will be in concert or at odds when the next disaster comes. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you. 

[The statement of Mr. Loehr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL LOEHR

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning on a subject critical to the 

continued health and safety of our region’s residents. 

Local health departments have always had a role in disaster preparedness and 

response, but since 9/11 we have seen significant changes in the threats we face and 

the level of preparedness we need to achieve. 

In just a short time span, we’ve seen a wave of disasters around the world with 

significant Public Health consequences, including anthrax attacks, SARS, tsunamis, 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Madrid and London bombings, and now avian flu and 

the potential for a pandemic flu. 

All these events have focused a spotlight on the nation’s Public Health infrastructure and its ability to manage the health consequences of emergencies. 

In order to meet these new challenges, we have forged relationships with our 

health care system partners, first responders, community based organizations and 

emergency managers, and are much better integrated into each others plans. The 

results of these partnerships can be seen in newly developed response capabilities 

addressing isolation and quarantine of infectious patients and mass dispensing of 

medications. 

We have also developed a county-wide disease surveillance system in concert with 

such varied partners as hospitals, 911 dispatch centers, and schools. 

But we can’t afford to stop here. 

I’d like to offer some specific examples of how we can improve coordination across 

all response disciplines, through better integration of planning, response and resources. First, we need to improve the way that federal funding is provided for preparedness so that integration, not fragmentation, is supported. 

Over the past four years, public health and hospitals in King County have become 

fully integrated into homeland security planning, strategy development, and exercises. The TOPOFF 2 exercise in 2003, and our bioterrorism planning efforts demonstrate close coordination across disciplines. We have established a Health Care 

Coalition with over 25 partner organizations that is developing new protocols for 

making critical, system-wide decisions, managing information and allocating resources. This will foster a unified command approach to health and medical response will occur countywide. 

However, federal funding priorities for public health and hospitals have focused 

on specific response tasks, hazards and equipment. This fails to recognize that a 

systemic approach to health care preparedness is needed. Hospitals, public health, 

clinics, medical practices, and pharmacies all rely on each other during disasters. 

Planning, training, exercising and responding as an integrated system should be 

fully supported, if not required, by funding programs. 

Just now, we are seeing this beginning to change. The latest guidance for hospital 

grants from Health Services and Resource Administration (HRSA) begins to take a 

systems approach to preparedness for hospitals. This should be incorporated 

throughout all federal grant programs. 

Second, the ability to share real-time data with response partners needs to be 

expanded beyond voice capabilities, and beyond traditional first responders. We 

have over 7,000 medical professionals in King County that we rely upon as the eyes 

and ears of our health care system. As public health threats emerge, paramedics 

and hospital staff will be on the front lines responding to the threat. They are the 

ones who will likely detect the first signs for bioterrorism or potentially threatening 

diseases in our community. 

Yet, there is no reliable system in place to share critical data between public 

health and medical professionals. The hardware and software necessary to track 

and communicate critical health data between public health and medical professionals is lacking across the country. 

Public health response measures including isolation and quarantine of infected 

patients, and mass dispensing of medications require robust data tracking systems 

to monitor in real time the patients, their status, and the care they have received, 

wherever they may be located. These are critical infrastructure needs nationwide. 
52

The capability to rapidly communicate and track data with health care providers 

is as important to us as it is for fire and police to communicate with their colleagues 

in the field. We believe the federal government can play a critical role in supporting 

this need. 

Third, training resources must become a federal priority and must be appropriate 

for public health responders. 

Federal grant requirements for public health have focused primarily on developing response plans; for hospitals the focus has been on acquiring equipment. Yet 

training personnel to implement an effective response is essential. 

Training resources provided by the Department of Homeland Security aren’t relevant to the needs or responsibilities of health system responders. Specialized training necessary to carry out plans for mass dispensing of antibiotics or isolating large 

numbers of infectious patients is not eligible under Homeland Security grants and 

not resourced under CDC or HRSA grants. 

In addition, training resources should be more flexible and accommodate the 

needs of health care organizations. For many health care organizations, including 

our department, a large number of staff that will be relied upon for emergency response support generate patient revenues as part of their daily responsibilities. 

Removing them from their regular work creates a double impact in cost—not only 

for the hours spent for training itself, but for the revenue lost in not seeing patients. 

Especially in the current state of health care economics, it makes it very difficult 

for health care organizations to train at the level that’s needed. 

Partnerships are the cornerstone of emergency response. We’ve seen the benefits 

when they have worked well, and witnessed the disastrous consequences when they 

haven’t. Federal policies and practices can make a tremendous difference in determining whether the preparations of responding agencies and institutions will be in 

concert or at odds when the next disaster comes. 

We appreciate your time and interest today, and we stand ready to work with you 

to further improve our collective preparedness efforts.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Loehr. 

Mr. PUGH.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ‘‘BILL’’ PUGH, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC 

WORKS/ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER, CITY OF TACOMA 

Mr. PUGH. Good morning, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member 

Pascrell. My name is Bill Pugh. I’m the Assistant City Manager 

and Public Works Director for the City of Tacoma. I have to confess, I’m a little different from the prior people who have spoken. 

I’m an engineer, a little bit of an anomaly in this crowd. 

I’m here today on behalf of American Public Works Association’s 

27,000 members and nearly 2,000 public agency members. Public 

Works officials are first responders. We clear transportation routes, 

we assess government and primary public buildings, we work 

alongside police, fire and emergency service professionals to ensure 

that water is flowing through fire hoses, traffic lights are operating 

and traffic is moving, barricades are up, debris is removed, and the 

public is safe. We are often the last to leave the scene as we manage the lengthy cleanup and restoration of any disaster site. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about emergency 

and planning preparedness and the indispensable role it plays in 

securing the safety of our communities. APWA has been and will 

continue to be an advocate for the development of emergency plans 

which coordinate emergency response across all levels of government in a way that saves lives, property and restores critical lifelines. 

One of the most important components when planning for catastrophe is effective coordination between all of the response players. 

While the primary focus of such preparation has usually been centered on first-responders, it is crucial not to overlook the significant 
53

preparedness roles that are played by all levels of government, and 

not just the local community in which the disaster is taking place. 

For example, during Hurricane Katrina, there was a total breakdown in communications between the Federal, State and local governments. As a result, response plans were left unimplemented, 

and valuable time was lost trying to restore basic order to the disaster zone. This could easily have been avoided. Had many Gulf 

communities practiced their preparedness plans or coordinated 

with other levels of government before this hurricane season, hopefully a lot of this could have been avoided. However, even the best 

plans can fail when faced with an unexpected catastrophe. This is 

why the APWA feels it is even more important to communicate 

with the government at all levels before an emergency and become 

familiar with the preparedness plans of others. This way, we can 

identify where there are bottlenecks, weak spots, and other inconsistencies and then to work together to develop the most efficient 

recovery and response plan possible. 

I’d like to give you two local examples of where I think communications have worked well and not so well. First, during the 

Katrina aftermath, local agencies within the Puget Sound area met 

to plan for the possible evacuees. All of those agencies attended, 

and the State agencies were conferenced in by phone. The groups 

soon discovered that they were working on very similar planning 

and preparedness issues, and agreed to meet together to strengthen and consolidate their efforts. Although invited, no one from 

FEMA attended either of these meetings. 

Second, the military bases, McChord Air Force Base and Fort 

Lewis, have a major presence in the south Sound region. As such, 

they have the potential to offer significant resources in a major disaster. Pierce County local government has an excellent relationship 

with the command staff of both of these bases and has entered into 

a mutual aid agreement with McChord and Fort Lewis. If disaster 

strikes and the military forces are available, help from them will 

be also. 

And at this point, I’d like to give credit to one of your panelists 

up here before, Steve Bailey. Through that partnership, they’re 

able to develop that interagency agreement, which I think is the 

first one in the Nation. 

Disasters are inherently local by their nature. They involve men 

and women providing critical services to preserve public health and 

protect life and public property. How well they do their job depends 

on how well we support them. How well we support them depends 

on how well we communicate. How well we communicate depends 

on the strength of the relationship. If the relationship falls apart 

at the top, the men and women providing the critical services will 

be impacted, and our citizens will suffer the consequences. 

The role of the Federal Government is to assist local agencies 

when disaster strikes by providing the necessary support and resources to mitigate the disaster. We look forward to and rely on 

that help. The Federal Government, in turn, needs to rely on the 

local leadership to prioritize and deploy those resources. This can 

only be done well only if we work well together. 

Now that we’ve developed our local, State and Federal emergency 

response plans, let’s develop the relationships so they can be suc-
54

cessfully implemented. Get to know your local emergency management professional. Develop that relationship and that partnership. 

Do it soon before the next disaster strikes. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Pascrell, on behalf of the 

APWA, I’d like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify 

this morning. As has been mentioned a couple three times so far, 

Deputy Chief Jeff Jensen of the Tacoma Fire Department, who is 

with me is also one of our critical partners in Pierce County. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pugh. 

Mr. SERRA.

STATEMENT OF ROGER C. SERRA, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY 

AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, SEATTLE CITY LIGHT 

Mr. SERRA. Chairman Reichert and Mr. Pascrell, thank you for 

this opportunity to share my observations and comments regarding 

the efforts now being taken for the protection our critical infrastructures, specifically in the energy sector. 

As introduced, I am the current Director of Security and Emergency Management for the Seattle City Light. Prior to this position, I was Director of Emergency Management for Snohomish 

County, and also have served as the police chief. 

I also have the distinction to have served in the United States 

Army where my last assignment was as the Department of Defense 

liaison for Military Support for Civil Authorities for the entire 

FEMA Region 10. I have been involved in State, local and Federal 

activities, and I actively have served on the State committee of 

Homeland Security and chaired the government subcommittee that 

produced the Washington general analytical center and the regional intelligence centers that has become a model across the 

United States for intelligence issues. 

I make reference to these career experiences basically to reflect 

that my diverse career has given me the rare opportunity to approach emergency management from different perspectives that 

clearly illustrate the interdependency of all the disciplines to plan 

collaboratively. 

Seattle City Light, a department of the City of Seattle, is one of 

the Nation’s largest municipally-owned utilities in terms of the 

number of customers it serves. Seattle City Light has a service 

area of 131 square miles and serves more than 340,000 customers 

and a population exceeding 680,000. 

Seattle City Light provides the primary power for the city and 

the government offices and operations. Its criticality for the region 

relies on electricity to maintain continuity of government functions 

and the syntax with the major corporations located in the Greater 

Puget Sound cannot be overstated. Much of our efforts to date have 

been to install security enhancement features and reevaluation of 

accessibility to the public that previously were accessible but now 

are restricted. 

Regional collaboration with the other public utilities in the area 

is imperative and one which has been cited as a best practice initiative in managing emergencies by the American Public Power Association study of how leading companies have implemented effec-
55

tive and comprehensive emergency planning. This was all self initiated without the funding from the Federal Government. 

Also cited in the best practices initiative was that the excellent 

relations shift in former regionally liaison established in the northwest utilities are the foundation for successful emergency response 

and provide valuable insight for other utilities to emulate. The utilities rely on cooperation among multiple functions to handle emergencies and communicate with all involved parties. 

Critical infrastructure protection is listed as one of the Department of Homeland Security’s national priorities, and as such it deserves priority for appropriate funding, to design, improve and enhance the physical security information technology and communication systems. Unfortunately, critical infrastructure does not have 

the same attention as first responders would get when it comes to 

the funding mechanism. 

Programs such as the Buffer Zone Protection Planning have been 

beneficial but one that still needs Federal emphasis that provides 

assistance for conducting effective risk and vulnerability assessments and funds to implement the recommendations made in the 

assessments. Energy generation facilities such as dams, power 

lines, substations are highly visible facilities that have great exposure to threats of attack. Partnering with law enforcement measures employed by—employed in the Conservation of Environmental 

Design Program, CEDP, are now being utilized and implemented 

in how to protect our own facilities. Mutual cooperation among law 

enforcement agencies at the local, county, State and Federal levels 

is crucial for the protection of critical infrastructure such as Seattle 

City Light boundary dam located in Pend Oreille County, which is 

contiguous with the Canadian border. This underscores the need 

for interoperable communications among law enforcement as well 

as those people who have to protect our critical infrastructures. 

There is now a greater focus for hiring dedicated and professional 

security staff to handle the responsibilities of security and emergency management in the power industry that previously were defined as additional duties to individuals in the organization with 

excellent operational knowledge but limited security experience. 

This professionalism is a reflection of the industry’s commitment to 

making sure that things are done properly and consistently with 

industry standards. Emphasis for continuity of population planning 

is necessary to ensuring that essential functions are performed and 

priorities established for the restoration of power to those sectors 

considered vital to the protection of life and property. 

The power industry also recognizes that it must do a better job 

of communicating to other infrastructure providers when service 

will be restored and utilize technology that provides the capability 

to alert its employees and customers during a disaster. Equally important is the need to develop an effective early warning system 

that partners with law enforcement, with public and private enterprises, and ensuring that appropriate intelligence is shared on a 

timely basis. 

National organizations such as the North American Electric Reliability Council, the large public council, and the Western Electric 

Coordinating Council serve to network the growing number of utility security emergency management practitioners. 
56

Issues for your consideration is provide directly funds for agencies operating critical infrastructures for the purpose of conducting 

risk and vulnerability assessment, development of operations 

plans, conducting exercises and for the purchase and installation of 

voice and data communication systems, state of the art IT systems 

and equipment necessary to enhance physical security; expand the 

list of facilities to qualify for Buffer Zone Protection planning and 

increase the amount of implementing effective protective systems. 

The National Infrastructure Database is out of date; establish regional Department of Homeland Security offices that improve coordination and interaction with its regional partners. 

The opportunity to share our concerns, strengths and initiatives 

with your committee is appreciated, and I’m prepared to answer 

any questions you may have regarding that subject. 

[The statement of Mr. Serra follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER SERRA

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Committee on Homeland Security?s 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, thank you for 

this opportunity to share my observations and comments regarding the efforts now 

being taken in the protection of our critical infrastructures—specifically in the energy sector. 

My name is Roger Serra. I am the Director of Security and Emergency Management for the Seattle City Light. Prior to this position I was the Director of the Snohomish County Department of Emergency Management and before that I was the 

Chief of Police for the University of Washington. It is also my distinct honor to have 

served in the United States Army where I retired as a Colonel with my last assignment as the Principal Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer for FEMA 

Region X serving as the DOD Liaison for Military Support to Civil Authorities. I 

have been involved at the local, state and federal level in the areas of emergency 

management and homeland security. I served on the State’s Committee on Homeland Security representing local emergency managers and chaired the committee?s 

Intelligence Sub-committee where we developed the concept of the Washington State 

Joint Analytical Joint Center and the Regional Intelligence Centers. It was also my 

privilege to serve as the President of the Washington State Emergency Management 

Association. 

Seattle City Light, a department of the City of Seattle, is one of the nation’s largest municipally owned utilities in terms of the number of customers served. Seattle 

City Light has a service area of 131.3 square miles and serves more than 345,000 

customers and a population exceeding 680,000. Seattle City Light provides the primary power for the cities and county’s governmental offices and operations. It’s criticality to the region’s reliance on electricity to maintain continuity of governmental 

functions and its impact to the major corporations located in the Greater Puget 

Sound Area cannot be overstated. Regional collaboration with the other public utilities in the area is imperative and one which has been cited as a Best Practice Initiative in Managing Emergencies by the American Public Power Association 

study of how leading companies have implemented effective and comprehensive 

emergency planning. 

Also cited in the Best Practices Initiative was that the excellent relationships and 

formal regional liaisons established in the Northwest utilities are the foundation for 

successful emergency response and provide valuable insights for other utilities to 

emulate. Utilities rely on cooperation among multiple functions to handle emergencies and communicate with all involved parties. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection is listed as one of the DHS National Priorities 

and as such deserves priority for appropriate funding designed to improve and enhance its physical, information technology and communications systems. Programs 

such as the Buffer Zone Protection Planning have been beneficial, but one that still 

needs federal emphasis that provides assistance for conducting effective risks and 

vulnerability assessments and funds to implement the recommendations made in 

the assessments. Energy generation facilities such as dams, power-lines and substations are highly visible facilities that have greater exposure to threats and attacks. Mitigation efforts such as utilizing the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) measures to reduce vulnerabilities is one initiative, when 
57

applied, has proven effective. Mutual cooperation among law enforcement agencies 

at the local, county, state and federal levels is crucial for the protection of critical 

infrastructure such as the Seattle City Light Boundary Dam located in Pend Oreille 

County and the Canadian border. 

There is now a greater focus for hiring dedicated staff to handle the responsibilities of security and emergency management in the power industry that previously 

were assigned as ‘‘additional duties’’ to non-qualified individuals in the organization. 

This professionalism is a reflection of the industry’s commitment to making sure 

that things are done properly and consistent with industry standards. 

Emphasis for Continuity of Operations planning is necessary in ensuring that essential functions are performed and priorities established for the restoration of 

power to those sectors considered vital to the protection of life and property. The 

power industry also recognizes that it must do a better job of communicating to 

other infrastructure providers when service will be restored and utilize technology 

that provides the capability to alert its employees and customers during a disaster. 

Equally important is the need to develop an effective Threat Early Warning System 

(TEW) that partners law enforcement with both public and private in ensuring that 

appropriate intelligence is shared on a timely basis. 

National organizations such as the Large Public Power Council (LPPC) and the 

Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) serve to network the growing number of utility security and emergency management practitioners.

Issues for your consideration: 

Provide direct grant funds for agencies operating critical infrastructures for the 

purpose of conducting risk and vulnerability assessments, development of Continuity of Operations Plans, conducting exercise and for the purchase and installation of voice/data communications systems, state of the arts Information Technology 

systems and equipment necessary to enhance physical security. 

Expand list of facilities to qualify for Buffer Zone Protection planning and increase amounts for implementing effective protective systems.Establish Regional 

DHS offices to improve coordination and interaction with regional partners. 

The opportunity to share our concerns, strengths and initiatives with your committee is appreciated. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have regarding my roles and responsibilities.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Serra. I have a few questions, 

and then I’ll move to Mr. Pascrell. He’ll have several questions 

also. 

Mr. Serra, are there critical infrastructure services of power, 

water, transportation, are they integrated into the UASI preparation plan? 

Mr. SERRA. They are a component in the overall discussion on 

how the funds will be distributed. There is a group that meets to 

decide how those things are going to be. 

There is a preference for critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, 

we only have one representative that represents all the utilities in 

the UASI program, and that process is something that I’m just now 

beginning to better understand having just come to Seattle recently. But there is a role, and there is a position that we have in 

the overall discussion. And certainly with the new grant guidelines 

for the fiscal year 06 grants for investment justification, critical infrastructure was one of the areas that rose to the top as one that 

required some immediate attention. 

Mr. REICHERT. So it may play a greater role? 

Mr. SERRA. We are hoping it will play a greater role in this area. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pugh, is there an evacuation plan for the City 

of Tacoma? 

Mr. PUGH. Yes, there is. As to exactly what it is, I don’t know. 

I’d have to yield to Chief Jensen. 

Mr. REICHERT. The next question was, does the Department of 

Public Works have a part in that plan? 
58

Mr. PUGH. We have had a part in that plan. And I’ll tell you 

frankly, we haven’t in the recent years had the involvement that 

we need to. And I don’t think that’s through any fault of really the 

fire department or anybody else. I think that involvement becomes 

with leadership from the top. There hasn’t been leadership, at least 

from a management standpoint, within the City of Tacoma. And I 

recognize strongly that we need to get together and do our job better. 

Mr. REICHERT. Any discussions taking place hopefully includes 

Public Works. 

Mr. PUGH. Yes. I think the partnership we’ve had over the last 

two or three years with Public Works and both police and fire has 

been stronger than it’s probably been in the last fifteen. 

Mr. REICHERT. So are there training opportunities and exercises 

for Public Works people to participate in in conjunction with the 

fire department and police department? 

Mr. PUGH. Yes, totally. 

Mr. REICHERT. So that’s happened? 

Mr. PUGH. Yes, it has. 

Mr. REICHERT. What about the City of Seattle? 

Mr. VICKERY. The Public Works is integrated into our Disaster 

Response Plans. In fact, we provided the equipment and training 

for all public employees and a select group of Public Works employees who would be engaged in the response. Public Works also includes the Department of Transportation. We can’t move people or 

materials. You can get a front-end loader and push the street open, 

but how do you control the traffic. There’s a very close line between 

law enforcement and the Department of Transportation. They are 

integrated into our plans. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Loehr, in the event of a pandemic, what in 

King County leads the way in that? Who is your primary Federal 

partner? 

Mr. LOEHR. That’s an excellent question. The health and medical 

response, as I mentioned, public health, particularly the local 

health officer, would direct the health and medical response. But 

we are changing significantly how we look at our health system 

and incorporating, as I mentioned, more of a unified command approach. The reason is hospitals simply don’t have the capacity to 

operate facility by facility. Public health simply doesn’t have the resources to operate independent and in competition with other 

health care entities. Again, this is revolutionary in the country. We 

are really operating as a single organism, a single entity, with a 

single person in charge, if necessary. And there are some tough decisions that we need to make, changing standards of care. People 

aren’t going to recognize the health care system during a pandemic. 

They really won’t. Making the decision to cancel elective surgery, 

it will be on the shoulders of the hospital CEO. There’s going to 

be a health officer saying in every hospital, we’re going to a red 

plan, or whatever you want to call it. Now is the time to implement 

it. So we feel very good at how our health care coalition is pulling 

hospital partners together. 

When it comes to other consequences in a pandemic, we will become a new government and pull society together. We do have a 

regional disaster plan in King County which even given that is a 
59

home rule state and a home rule county, somebody has to be in 

charge. But we recognize that we’re going to have to make decisions in a cooperative manner, we’re going to have to share some 

resources. Through our regional staffing plan, these organizations 

are going to have to work together. 

But when it comes to coordinating the Federal partners, I don’t 

believe we have one for planning for a pandemic response. It has 

not been demonstrated to me at all that there is any strategy prepared at the Federal level for public health, and I certainly haven’t 

seen any indication of Federal support for health and emergency 

management that I would consider reasonable or reliable. 

Mr. REICHERT. Are you familiar with the position of the chief 

medical officer that has been implemented? 

Mr. LOEHR. I have heard that that has occurred, and I’m curious 

as to how that person relates to other Federal health organizations, 

the CDC. 

Mr. REICHERT. Hopefully we’ll get that together. 

Mr. LOEHR. Thank you. 

Mr. REICHERT. One of the things that this Subcommittee will be 

focused on here in the future, once we’ve at least attempted to 

solve the interoperatively issue, is the health care preparedness 

issue. We understand, at least in our initial investigative questioning, that there is a concern—big concern about a service capacity. Can you explain that? 

Mr. LOEHR. Yes, I can. The ability for any health organization to 

essentially create additional capacity, whether it’s space or personnel, doesn’t exist in this country. The health care system is a 

for-profit industry. Just like any other business, the idea is cost. 

And costs have been cut so drastically that there simply is no extra 

left in the system where we have an emergency. For example, for 

half of the hospitals in this country today, the situation is very 

similar to what was described after 9/11. They are operated overcapacity. You’re seeing medicine performed in the hallways. And 

that exists in King County, and it exists in half of the hospitals in 

the country. There is no extra capacity. 

So the health care system are another issue that we certainly 

can’t solve through any Federal preparedness grant. But with the 

cards we’ve been dealt, how do we use the system that we have 

most efficiently. It is not by funding specific response capabilities 

or specific pieces of equipment for hospitals; it’s by looking at this 

system, as underresourced as it is, and overcapacity as a single entity where we can move resources around, at least within our own 

jurisdiction. And that has not happened in four years. It is beginning to happen, but a certain capacity is going to have to happen. 

We’re talking about adding hospital beds. It’s not going to be in the 

UASI hospitals; it’s going to be a building like this where we’re 

going to need cots, we’re going to need medical supplies. We’re 

going to have to use our own staffing. We’re going to have to find 

our own facilities. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Loehr. Chief Vickery, in tailoring 

responses to this specific region, what recommendations do you 

have to provide for early warning to the public? 

Mr. VICKERY. I think it starts with an ability to share information with the response community, particularly in a terrorist event. 
60

I think what Pierce County has done with the sheriff down there 

with terrorism early warning center gives you an ability to scrub 

the material. 

As a firefighter, I do not need to know the ethnicity or the name 

of a perpetrator. I do need to know the threat. And the ability of 

a terrorism center to share that information with people who may 

not have a security clearance or who don’t have the need to know—

I hate to use that word—is very important. Then that information 

needs to be transmitted to the public in a way that doesn’t create 

panic. And I don’t think we’re there yet. 

The fact that we’re a red in the Nation doesn’t really mean much 

to me. I love the color red on the planet right now. I love the color 

red. I’m all for it, but it doesn’t mean much; what degree, what 

shade of red. Well, I think there’s a necessity to change the alert 

system where it can be localized. And certainly even within our 

own region, the threat that you would have in Tacoma may not be 

at the same level as it is in Seattle based upon your population 

density and the nature of the threat. A threat that is the release 

of a substance, what’s the weather, what are the weather conditions, what’s the staffing. So we do not allow the local community 

the ability to just assimilate that information. It needs to be a 

graded threat system rather than red, yellow, green. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you very much, and thank you for your 

forthright answers so far. And Chief, thank you for pointing out the 

lack of Federal funding, the COPS Interoperatively Program. That 

would be eliminated under the present budget or present proposed 

as redisposed, and we’ll see what happens when we get going here. 

Chief Vickery, you know, we now have a FEMA Director. He’s no 

longer active. He came up through the fire ranks, as you well 

know, the first fireman, first fire responder. That’s the first, second 

or third level management in the entire Homeland Security. So we 

know the nature of the problem. We know the nature of the problem. 

And what we’re trying to do is put some beef into the words. We 

need this to be a bottom-up situation. I think that is important, 

and you will feel better about each of your tasks, I think, if we do 

implement that. 

There have been suggestions that, in looking at FEMA—and as 

I said before, simply not rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, there will be some real change. 

Of the following, I would like to know what you think of each of 

these suggestions about FEMA in your experience. We need to have 

a fully-staffed FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Do you agree with that? 

Mr. VICKERY. Professionally staffed. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Do we have a fully-staffed FEMA right now? 

Mr. VICKERY. To the best of my knowledge, no. They’re still at 

somewhere 30 percent the positions have not been filled. 

Mr. PASCRELL. That’s correct. Second, preparedness and response 

be recombined at FEMA, we’ve talked about that in the first panel. 

I would probably think they would agree with that. Do you? 

Mr. VICKERY. When you say ‘‘recombine,’’ sir—
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Mr. PASCRELL. Right now they’re two separate divisions. Preparedness and response are no longer together in FEMA. 

Mr. VICKERY. They need to be integrated. We can’t prepare and 

respond separately. 

Mr. PASCRELL. We now have an experienced emergency person at 

the top which we didn’t have before. That’s a good sign, correct? 

Mr. VICKERY. It is, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And the Director of FEMA has direct contact with 

the President during incidents of national significance. Wouldn’t 

you agree? 

Mr. VICKERY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Here’s my question. Do you think that these steps 

would take FEMA in the right direction that you want to go? 

Mr. VICKERY. The answer is yes. And my empathy and support 

is of Chief Paulison for this reason: He stepped into a situation 

where the city is already half on fire. So I’m glad you appointed 

me fire chief of a city while it’s burning. 

Mr. PASCRELL. He’s got to deal with the hand that he’s dealt. 

He’s a big enough person to do it. I am confident that he will do 

it. But just enough—the Director has to have direct access to the 

President of the United States. We cannot have to go through the 

Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Mr. Chertoff. In fact, 

in the testimony that came out, he said why bother, you know, 

what the heck is going down from? 

And Mr. Loehr, am I pronouncing that correctly? 

Mr. LOEHR. Loehr. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Loehr, I’m sorry. Do you sense urgency in any of 

the things—on a Federal level on any of the things that you 

brought up—

Mr. LOEHR. Well—

Mr. PASCRELL. —on the Federal—in the Federal Government. 

Mr. LOEHR. I think there is urgency in the sense of certain programs that have been initiated for control for preparedness. There’s 

an urgency in getting funding out and imposing requirements on 

local health departments to accomplish certain risks. There has 

been no urgency in actually developing the strategic approach, and 

I think one of the glaring deficiencies that I would see from the absence of a strategy is pandemic flu. Still no local jurisdiction in this 

country has received any funding for that yet. We’re waiting for 

that. It’s now on our doorstep, and we’ve been preparing for over 

two years. 

Mr. PASCRELL. As you watch the spread of avian flu, if we chronicled this over the last two or three years, something is happening 

out there. Is it not? 

Mr. LOEHR. Yeah. Half the world is now infected with avian flu. 

And it’s estimated that within the next six months, it will come 

from Alaska, Canada into North America. And we’re still waiting 

as a country to have some resources to fight that. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You’re waiting for the signal. 

Mr. LOEHR. Right. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Are the public hospitals in this county able to 

communicate with each other during emergencies? 

Mr. LOEHR. Yes. I’m actually very happy to say we’ve been integrated with our response partners, police and fire, for a long time. 
62

They’re experts when it comes to this type of communication. We’ve 

been integrated into their radio system. We have backup radio systems. We have an interactive website for sharing information about 

possible bed capacities; very crude, but it is effective. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You talked about that there is such an environment when that happens. You talked about where the beds would 

be and how the hospitals might operate. 

Have you reached out to the HMOs, for instance, as to what their 

role would be in such an emergency situation? 

Mr. LOEHR. Great question; absolutely. As part of the Health 

Care Coalition, we realized it’s not just hospitals. There’s a couple 

jurisdictions in the county that have looked at the hospitals as a 

single unit that we share our resources with. We have to go way 

beyond that. The health plans, large medical practices, they’re got 

physicians, they’ve got nurses. And with the staffing shortage of 

100,000 nurses in this country right now, we can’t afford not to use 

everybody we can get our hands on. So they are directly part of our 

health care coalition just to make sure we prioritize our resources 

whether it’s where do we find beds to where do we find staff. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Serra, we’ve had many discussions in Washington about various infrastructures, let’s say. How do you protect 

the chemical industry? New Jersey’s big problem is a stretch along 

the New Jersey Turnpike that encompasses a tremendous part of 

the chemical industry in this country. 

The question is, who has that responsibility? Should we impose 

on the chemical companies, or should the Federal Government take 

charge? Is there a sense of urgency about that issue? My question 

to you is, how do you protect the utilities in your mind, and are 

we going in the right direction? 

Mr. SERRA. I think there is a direction that we’re going. I think 

it’s a slow process. One of the things that I had evaluated in the 

last few years is that we’re unable to determine what type of security enhancements need to be done or response before—until such 

time as we can do a risk and vulnerability assessment. To me the 

risk and vulnerability assessment is the first step in doing what we 

need to do in the future. There is no fund or a limited amount of 

funding, especially for—well, in the public sector to be able to conduct the assessments needed to do that and—

Mr. PASCRELL. Are you telling us that—we’re waiting here, we’re 

in the waiting room. You’re not telling us that the utilities themselves have put a plan together to protect the infrastructure within 

that particular utility? 

Mr. SERRA. No. I’m just saying—

Mr. PASCRELL. You’re not saying that? 

Mr. SERRA. No. We are doing—

Mr. PASCRELL. What are you saying? 

Mr. SERRA. We are continuing to do the steps that we need to 

do in order to protect our present infrastructure. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What does that mean? What are you doing? I 

want to ask you a specific question. Have you hired more people 

to protect the infrastructure of the utilities which provides energy, 

electricity, to folks in this area? 

Mr. SERRA. The answer to that is no, we have not done that. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How do you protect the industry then? 
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Mr. SERRA. The way we’re doing it right now is to contract security to come in and do the security functions for those critical infrastructures. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Would you repeat that, please? 

Mr. SERRA. Contracting with private security firms to—

Mr. PASCRELL. Who are these private security firms? 

Mr. SERRA. These are private security firms that are hired in the 

public and private sector that are private security agencies, not 

full-time—

Mr. PASCRELL. You’re still not answering me, because as you saw 

with the airline industry, when they did it before 9/11, they hired 

rent-a-cops. It didn’t work out, besides a lot of other things, and 

that’s one of the reasons why they’re being sued by some of the victims’ families of 9/11. And we certainly wouldn’t want that to happen in the energy area, would we? 

Mr. SERRA. I share exactly your feelings. Coming into this field 

is that, you know, I think we need to have some full-time individuals that are specifically charged with the security of the critical 

infrastructures. As I mentioned in my comments is that, it’s just 

recently that critical facilities like energy have begun to hire fulltime security and emergency managers that understand what 

they’re supposed to do. This is a function that had always been an 

additional duty for other people within the industry, and so it 

didn’t have a priority that it probably should have had. 

I don’t disagree with you that there should be full-time employees dedicated to the protection of those critical infrastructures, not 

hiring it out to other people to take care of those infrastructures. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What I’m hearing from you, Mr. Serra, with all 

due respect is what I get from the chemical industry, and it is not 

acceptable. The public has a right to know that the very resources 

that they depend on day in and day out are, to the best of 

everybody’s ability, realizing there’s no such thing as a seamless, 

perfect system—you’re certainly not going to get it from Washington—that is not acceptable to me. I can only speak for myself. 

It’s like we’re waiting for something to happen. What is the industry doing on its own to try to make it happen so that you can then, 

if you take it at least through some point, and you look at the Federal Government to assist you to complete the activity, that’s one 

thing. I don’t hear that. Nor do I hear a sense of urgency on your 

part. 

Energy is critical. I don’t have to tell you; you can tell me. I don’t 

feel that we have that sense of energy with regard to the utilities 

of this country. 

I might add, Mr. Chairman, I don’t think it’s any different here 

than it is throughout the United States of American. These are 

major, major activities that people depend upon, that the police will 

depend upon, and fire will depend upon. And if those activities are 

not able to sustain themselves, there is something wrong. You can’t 

expect the sheriff’s department to hire more people so that they can 

look after that utility, unless we give them more resources to do 

that. These things aren’t going to happen, my friend, like they just 

fall out of the sky. It doesn’t work that way. It does not work that 

way. 
64

So here we’re talking about two major areas—I can talk to you 

about them—two major areas. I brought the subject of chemical industry up—and the utilities, energy; that we need to take a very 

serious look at yesterday in order to protect them, God forbid, if 

there is a terrorist attack or some kind of natural calamity. 

I have no further questions or comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. Just a follow-up, Mr. 

Serra. The infrastructure organizations, are they looking at technology in assisting them in protecting our infrastructures? 

Mr. SERRA. I think you have to have a balance of the technology 

with which to protect the facilities and actual individuals to actively be doing the job they’re required to do. Perhaps the urgency 

has not been there because it has not been a priority for the industry to do that as far as funding available to hire these individuals, 

but I do have the sense that it is coming around. I think through 

the networking among the professionals that are now in place is 

that there is a push to have that kind of resource by the utilities. 

Mr. REICHERT. Do the contracts also with the local law enforcement hire sheriff departments and/or police officers in addition to 

the security personnel? 

Mr. SERRA. In certain areas like in the remote areas where we 

have Skagit and the boundary, we have contracts with the sheriff’s 

department. But unfortunately that results in just one deputy that 

is then hired to provide 24/7. 

Mr. REICHERT. I think the point that Mr. Pascrell was trying to 

make, is there an effort by the community you represent to hire 

dedicated staff; and if there is an effort to hire dedicated staff, are 

you finding difficulty in finding that staff to do the job? 

Mr. PASCRELL. There is an effort to do exactly that, is to hire 

these people full-time. There’s a matter of convincing upper management that this is really important to put that much money 

aside to say we need to have on-staff security. 

Mr. REICHERT. When you say there’s an effort, is that from the 

bottom up? 

Mr. PASCRELL. It is from the bottom up. And perhaps much of 

that is just an educational process with regards to the importance 

of having security in place. 

Mr. REICHERT. Is there a place that you represented on UWAGA? 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am still involved with UWAGA, but not in the 

role that I used to play. 

Mr. REICHERT. So that critical intelligence information as far as 

risk of threat assessment gets to the community it represents, 

there is an understanding by the people in the upper echelon that 

there is a need for security, tighter, security? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Right. And unfortunately, with regards to the intelligence sector and the UWAGA and the regional intelligence 

group is we have not taken the next step in how we transmit or 

share the information that is gathered with the intelligence groups 

or other agencies that are not law enforcement. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I want to add something here. 

You say in your testimony—Mr. Serra, you said the critical infrastructure protection is listed as one of DHS’s national priorities, 

and as such deserves priority for appropriate funding designed to 
65

improve and enhance its physical information technology and communication system. Programs such as the Buffer Zone Protection 

Plan have been beneficial but one that still needs Federal emphasis. 

Let me tell you how I read it. I wouldn’t read the rest. You can 

read the rest of it. This is how I read it. Okay? What you’re waiting 

for in my estimation is a Federal bailout. You haven’t started the 

process really, because what can be said about energy in most of 

the States of the union can be said about water and the protection 

of our water supply. I don’t have to tell you how critical water is 

in any time of a tough situation or a catastrophic situation, be it 

manmade, terrorism, or be it nature. That’s not acceptable to me. 

I’m sorry. 

So what I would do is go back and tell your superiors that the 

committee or certain members of the committee don’t find it acceptable that you’re waiting for the government to protect your infrastructure. You haven’t really started down the path. And we could 

say this across the United States of America, Mr. Chairman. I 

mean this is a partnership, or it isn’t a partnership. And if you’re 

waiting for the Federal Government to come forward, because 

there’s parts of the Federal Government that do not see the urgency either; and if they do, don’t want to come up with the money. 

And if they do want to come up with the money and place other 

priorities in the path of coming up with that money, we are not 

going to do this. We are not going to accomplish it. Let’s not fool 

the American people either. Let’s not fool them. They have been 

fooled enough. 

So private industries in priority areas—water is pretty much of 

a priority. Energy is another priority. So you’re waiting. 

The airlines took that same position. And if they had taken some 

real precautions, those murderers would have never been able to 

do what they did on 9/11. That’s my contention. We blame the CIA 

and the AIC and the FBI and the IBF. That’s all baloney. We have 

a mixed audience. And the point of the matter—

Mr. REICHERT. And we’re not in New Jersey. 

Mr. PASCRELL. And we’re not in New Jersey, that’s true. But you 

understand what I’m saying? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Don’t take anything I’m saying personally. I have 

heard it before. I just wanted you to know that I heard it. I was 

listening. 

Mr. SERRA. I appreciate that, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. Gentlemen, I want to follow up on the theme that 

Mr. Pascrell has been asking questions in follow-up, and that’s 

really on the priorities and the frustrated part of funding and the 

Federal Government. 

My background is in King County government as a police officer 

and as sheriff. And if you experience some frustration in the Federal government’s inability to recognize partnerships, there’s a couple examples I could give where the Federal Government has come 

to the sheriff’s office and said, we’re from the Federal Government, 

and we’re here to help. And the first thing everybody says is run 

for cover. 
66

And in this post-September 11th world that we live in, we see 

the same sort of offer. And I think that there has been a lot of improvement, but there are those areas where we see some gaps or 

some inability to comprehend and understand really what happens 

when we take the position of saying, we want you to help us, we’re 

not going to help you. That’s frustrating experience with your local 

law enforcement, your local firefighters, local people trying to get 

the job done. 

So I want to go to the sheriff and ask a question about the COPS 

funding and the Department of Homeland Security grant funding, 

because I know that, my first year in Congress, last year, I got into 

a little battle with the cardinals of the party that I represent over 

the COPS funding process. And when you give a $600 million increase to a Federal agency, and then you cut $80 million from a 

local effort, that’s not a partnership. And that was the point I tried 

to make. 

So my question to you, Sheriff, is, as you’ve been operating now 

under this umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security and 

the grant process and seeing the COPS grants slowly dwindle, have 

you seen the—has the Homeland Security grant really been a help 

to you over what COPS used to be, or is there a balance there, or 

are you on the negative side? 

MR. PASTOR: Two things. There’s been no question that there 

has been a benefit, so one would appear to be inordinately ungrateful if one were to suggest that there hasn’t been a benefit. There 

has been a benefit. So shading it all one way is just not accurate. 

That’s number one. 

Number two, there has also been frustration that’s coming forth, 

as we have discussed before, with the issue that we are a people 

of intensive enterprise. No matter how much technology you adopt, 

ultimately there are people who need to carry out things. You can 

put in surveillance technology, but there has to be a person to respond to it. There has to be a person to react to it. Only human 

beings, properly trained, properly deployed, can prevent a terrorist 

attack. That was my gas mask analogy; yes, you can put on a gas 

mask afterwards, but a man or woman, whether they have this 

kind of badge or a fire badge, whether they’re involved in public 

health or other kinds of responder roles, are the people who are 

going to be able to get ahead of the curve to do this. 

The issue of resources relates to what I said about sacrifice. Citizenship involves sacrifice. It becomes a focus like a laser in time 

of war; and we are at war. And for some reason we don’t dig inside 

ourselves and say at war we must sacrifice. We treat citizenship as 

if it is consumerism, as if we can gather as many goodies to ourselves as possible. Citizenship isn’t about that. It’s about obligation, 

it’s about duty, it’s about something bigger than that. 

And so when we ask people with badges on and a military uniform on to sacrifice, we also want to ask citizens to sacrifice. We 

want Federal Government leaders and local government leaders to 

lead citizens toward the path of sacrifice in order to preserve the 

country, preserve our freedoms, preserve our liberties. 

Mr. REICHERT. You should run for Congress. Mr. Pascrell, do you 

have any additional comment? 
67

Mr. PASCRELL. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank the panel. 

Great job. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, panel. And thank all of you for being 

here today. It’s been a valuable experience, I think, for all of us. 

Members of the committee may have some additional questions for 

the witnesses, and we will ask that you respond to those in writing. 

The hearing record will be open for ten days without objection. 

Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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