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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Diplomacy of the Jaguar

French Airpower in 

Postcolonial African Conflicts

Geraud J. Laborie

Lieutenant Colonel, French Air Force

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 39

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2009
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
In memory of Sgt Gilles Polin (French Army, 1st RPIMa 

[Naval Infantry Paratrooper Regiment]), killed in action at 

the Chadian-Sudanese border on 3 March 2008.



Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research projects from the prior academic year. The 

ACSC research program encourages our students to move 

beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing air and space power.” 

The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at 

the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright 

Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of 

these studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. 

Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies 

available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate 

further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

vii

Abstract

The legacy of its former status as a colonial power has 

left France with a strong commitment in Africa. To secure 

its interests and aspire to a great foreign policy, France has 

used the cooperation agreements with its former colonies to 

maintain its influence on the continent, leading the French 

military to intervene in multiple African crises since decolonization in 1960. 

This paper addresses the use of airpower during the French 

military operations in Africa since 1960. Using case study 

methodology, it emphasizes the operational level of war and 

analyzes the use of the different French army, air force, and 

naval aviation operational roles; the adaptation of equipment to conditions in Africa; and the changes in the FrenchAfrican policy that have influenced the use of airpower.

The study argues that successes in Mauritania and Chad 

in the 1970s and 1980s convinced the French military to 

increase its reliance on airpower. The change in policy following the Rwandan crisis in 1994 did not alter this trend. 

On the contrary, the synergy between French airpower and 

special forces was critical in securing France’s objectives 

during operations in the former Zaire in 2003 and the Central African Republic in 2007. However, the ongoing intervention in the Ivory Coast proved that a lack of airpower 

integration planning can lead to numerous challenges for 

the French military. To address that issue, the French air 

force needs to develop an operational doctrine that the joint 

force commanders can rely on to better integrate the use of 

airpower with the early stages of joint planning and get the 

full benefit of its flexibility, responsiveness, and firepower 

during the operation.

ix

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to two individuals at 

the Air Command and Staff College who were instrumental 

in the completion of this study. Lt Col Robert Munson provided the initial momentum and guided the first steps of my 

research. Dr. William Dean supported me with his professional guidance and his knowledge of French military affairs that challenged my French-centric view of the topic.



Introduction

To be tolerable, any use of force in Africa must 

have an indisputable motive and be strictly limited 

in time and space, that is, brief and punctual.

—French prime minister Pierre Messmer (1972–74)

Since the end of its colonial empire in the 1960s, France 

has intervened in many crises in Africa and has maintained 

a steady number of deployed troops in the countries of its 

former empire. Public opinion in France and abroad has 

often identified the French operations with three key and 

highly publicized figures: the paratrooper from marine infantry or Foreign Legion regiments, the enduring C-160 

Transall transport aircraft, and the Jaguar fighter-bomber. 

These three actors have traditionally drawn most of the media coverage of the operations. The last two are FAF assets 

and seem to confirm the strong involvement of French airpower in Africa. However, the reality may not be as clearcut. To support the French-African policy, the military has 

used airpower in different roles and at different levels of 

commitment throughout the history of French postcolonial 

intervention on the continent.

This research paper precisely analyzes how the French 

military has used airpower during its operations in postcolonial Africa, concentrating on the operational level of 

war. Drawing from the history of early interventions from 

the late 1960s to the crisis in Chad in the 1980s and the 

recent operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 

the Ivory Coast, the study examines the role of airpower in 

these conflicts. Was airpower a preferred option or did it 

have only a marginal role? Was its employment successful? 

What were the challenges it faced? Did the use of airpower 

help France achieve its strategic goals?

Building on the legacy of successes in Chad in the 1980s 

and the Congo in 2003, this study argues that French airpower in a joint fight has proven to have a flexible, responsive, and efficient capability to address African crises. Until 

the recent conflict in the Ivory Coast, the French military 

had increased its reliance on airpower to reduce its mark 

on the continent and to act as a force multiplier to support 
African military forces. While success in Africa cannot rely 

solely on airpower, the conflict in the Ivory Coast has shown 

the necessity of better airpower integration in all its roles to 

face the unrelenting military challenges on the continent.

This study begins by recalling the historical basis of the 

French involvement in Africa and the different policies and 

military strategies that formed airpower employment. It proceeds to address the different French interventions in postcolonial Africa and how airpower rose from a limited role to 

the preferred option in the showdown with Libya in Chad in 

the 1980s. The study continues with a discussion about 

the change in the French-African policy after the Rwandan 

crisis that led to the successful use of a French equivalent 

of the Afghan Model. It ends with the challenges faced in 

the ongoing operation in the Ivory Coast and also with lessons learned and recommendations.

France in Africa: 

An Aspiration to Grandeur

Stemming from the legacy of its former colonial empire 

(see appendix A), French involvement in Africa has played a 

leading role in France’s foreign policy since the end of the 

decolonization in the early 1960s. The special status of the 

French-African policy is twofold. There is the need to protect French economic interests in its former colonies. While 

highly preponderant in the early years of the postcolonial 

era, this motivation has lost most of its importance today.1

The other motivation has not lost any relevance. France has 

maintained a strong influence in Africa to secure its status 

as a medium power with an important role in the international community. This aspiration to grandeur (greatness) 

is key to understanding the French-African policy. As John 

Chipman points out, “The fact that Africa provides a ‘field of 

action’ for French power is fundamental to French military 

and therefore political confidence.”2

To keep its influence in Africa, France has relied on the 

agreements secured by Gen Charles de Gaulle when France 

granted the colonies their independence in 1960.3 Regarding military affairs, the agreements involve two different 

kinds of relationship with the former colonial power. The 

defense agreements give African states the possibility to call 
on France for direct security assistance, which, for all countries except Togo and Benin, includes the protection of France 

against internal and external threat. Twelve African states 

signed them in 1960 and 1961: the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Gabon, Senegal, Madagascar, the 

Ivory Coast, Benin, Niger, Mauritania, Togo, and Cameroon. 

The military cooperation agreements involve instructing 

and training the African military. These agreements comprise 

“one of the most efficient ways of guaranteeing the maintenance of [French] influence in the new armies.”4 Under 

these agreements, France provides the newly formed African 

states’ military with free equipment, advising, and training. 

All former colonies signed them except for Guinea.5

French-African Policy: 

From Direct Interventionism to 

Renforcement des Capacités Africaines 

de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP)

Having secured guarantees regarding its interests and 

strong ties with the newborn African states, France started 

its military withdrawal from the continent as early as 1961. 

By 1970 the number of troops on the continent had decreased 

from 58,500 to 6,400.6 Until 1974 this disengagement was 

only interrupted by a few spectacular interventions, as in 

1964 to support the Gabonese president Leon M’ba against 

an uprising led by the leader of the opposition party and in 

1968 to suppress a revolt in northern Chad. Several revisions 

of the defense agreements further reduced the size of the 

French military presence, with the withdrawal of French 

forces from Madagascar.7 When Pres. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 

took office in 1974, he changed French-African policy to 

a more interventionist policy targeting a perceived growth 

in Soviet influence in Africa.8 An era of renewed French military interventionism began and remained with some adjustments when François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party 

came to power in 1981. France kept honoring its defense 

agreements but put self-imposed restraints regarding military intervention destined to solve purely internal disputes. 

Still, difficulties started to arise at the beginning of the 

1990s regarding such a policy. These difficulties assumed 
three aspects: the need to maintain large permanent bases 

in Africa in a shrinking defense budget environment at the 

end of the Cold War, the lukewarm support of national public opinion concerning the government’s stance on crises in 

Africa, and the lack of an efficient response to the genocide 

in Rwanda in 1994. These issues came at a time when African states grew increasingly eager to handle security problems by themselves and caused a major shift in focus of the 

French military cooperation in Africa. The new French policy 

that was presented in 1998 during the Africa-France summit at the Louvre in Paris established the Renforcement des 

Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) program.9 This program centers defense cooperation on reinforcing the African states’ peacekeeping capacity. Instead of 

direct interventionism, France would promote regional solutions through such multinational organizations as the United 

Nations, the African Union, and the European Union (EU) by 

providing training and support for African nations willing to 

participate in peacekeeping operations. The ongoing operation in Darfur offers an aspect of this risk-sharing policy.

The Three Pillars of the 

French Military Strategy

To support the French-African policy, the French military strategy in Africa has evolved around three pillars. Depending on the policy of the time and the state of its relationships with various key African states, the preponderance 

of each pillar has varied accordingly. 

The first pillar of the French strategy supports the military of its African partners. The initial defense of an African 

state rests on its own military, equipped, developed, and 

trained by France. A modified version of this pillar has preeminence today with the RECAMP concept that favors an 

African response to an African regional crisis. French airpower has adapted to the new policy by supporting African 

forces with airlift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and combat aircraft in conjunction with special 

forces on the ground. Operation in the CAR in spring 2007 

provides a good example of this evolution: Special forces 

provided targeting information for Mirage F-1s flying from 

N’Djamena to support CAR forces trying to repel Chadian 
rebel columns. Throughout the operation, Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft from the French Navy provided ISR.

The second pillar of the French strategy supports French 

military forces stationed in Africa. These Forces d’Outre-Mer

(French overseas forces) initially came from the seven principal bases secured by the defense agreements (Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville, N’Djamena, Bangui, Djibouti, and Diego 

Suarez). Their purpose is to provide a permanent French 

military presence that can deter and serve as a crisis monitor and a rapid-reaction capability. Renegotiations of the 

defense agreements, financial cost, and political issues 

have led to a constant reduction of the number of overseas 

bases and permanently deployed troops. Today, only Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville, and Djibouti remain. The French 

strategy rested heavily on this pillar during the first decade 

following decolonization, when French overseas forces and 

bases in Africa were still numerous. Since that time this 

pillar has been more and more buttressed by the third pillar, which has borne the brunt of major operations from the 

1970s onward. 

This third pillar is the French-based, quick-reaction force 

that would reinforce pre-positioned forces in case of a serious crisis. Created in 1961, the 23,000-personnel Force 

d’Intervention Interarmées (Joint Intervention Force [JIF]) 

had a dual purpose. It could provide an effective and deterrent force to face the instability on the continent while allowing the downsizing of French forces permanently stationed 

there to make them more acceptable to public opinion both 

at home and abroad. A reorganization of the French military in 1983 led to the creation of the Force d’Action Rapide, 

a quick-reaction unit that absorbed the Force d’Intervention 

Interarmées in a far more lethal force twice its size and capable of action both in central Europe in support of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or in Africa. 

Airpower in the Background: 

The Early Years of French 

Involvement, 1960–75

In the years after decolonization, France implemented its 

military strategy in Africa by relying principally on its 
ground forces stationed in France and overseas. The role of 

the French Air Force (FAF) was modest, consisting primarily 

of supporting the JIF using intertheater airlift to deploy it 

from France and intratheater airlift to resupply it from 

French overseas bases. Reconnaissance, air defense, and 

close air support (CAS) had a far lower priority because the 

French military did not expect a high level of threat.10

The capacity to project troops was critical to successfully 

achieve the French strategy. Unfortunately, the FAF airlift 

capability proved to be limited. Qualitatively, its most capable asset was the Nord N-2501 Noratlas medium transport aircraft, similar to the United States’ C-119. Unpressurized and powered by two piston-driven engines, it lacked 

the payload and the range to quickly and effectively deploy 

the JIF. Quantitatively, the Air Staff acknowledged that the 

entire airlift fleet could deploy no more than 400 tons in 48 

hours to support an operation 5,000 kilometers (km) from 

France. Exercise Alligator III in September 1967 proved the 

point: The deployment of the JIF exercise in the Ivory Coast 

had to rely heavily on sealift for combat and support equipment due to airlift limitations.11 The acquisition of 50 C-160 

Transalls to replace the N-2501s that began in 1968, supplemented by three long-range DC-8Fs, significantly boosted 

the FAF airlift capability, but it still fell short of its requirement to project the JIF.

The FAF implemented the French military strategy using 

both forward-deployed assets in the French overseas bases 

and French-based units dedicated to supporting the JIF 

when it deployed. The number and type of FAF combat aircraft based in Africa reflected the assessment of the threat. 

The FAF initially deployed two squadrons of seven to eight 

AD-4 Skyraiders previously used for counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations during the Algerian conflict (1954–62). 

The force shrank to only one attack squadron that was 

based in Djibouti in 1975 and received North American F-

100D/F Super Sabres in replacement for its aging AD-4s. 

At the same time, the FAF designated only two Frenchbased squadrons to support the JIF, each equipped with 

aging Sud-Ouest Vautour II medium bombers.12

Operations during that period confirmed the threat assessment made by the Air Staff. Relying heavily on ground 

troops and encountering only guerilla units, the French mili-
tary seldom used its few attack assets. In fact, most of these 

operations were typical of the early days of independence. 

They called for a limited show of force and police action 

against civilian riots or small guerilla groups. An example is 

the rescue of the Gabonese president M’ba in 1962. Mutineers from the Gabonese army had taken him prisoner, and 

the FAF airlifted French paratroopers from Brazzaville and 

Dakar to Libreville to free the president and squash the rebellion.13 The only notable exception was the operation 

against the Front de Libération Nationale (FROLINAT) in 

Chad from 1968 to 1975. The 2,600-strong French land 

component faced highly mobile and better armed rebels. 

Using lightly armored columns and helicopters to search 

and destroy the enemy, the French joint task force (JTF) 

also relied on four Skyraiders detached to N’Djamena in 

1968 to support its COIN operations. Still, despite some 

bouts of heavy fighting, the JFC did not call for a stronger 

air component, and the FAF only had a secondary role in a 

mostly land-centric operation.14

The Rise of the Jaguar: 

Giscard d’Estaing, Mauritania, 

and Chad, 1975–81

President Giscard d’Estaing’s interventionist policy came 

when the French military faced a growing threat in Africa. 

Soviet-backed Libya, Somalia, and Angola had access to 

Soviet armaments and built strong conventional forces 

equipped with the latest ground-to-air missiles and combat 

aircraft. They provided guerilla formations with modern 

weaponry that threatened FAF assets. For example, in April 

1978 FROLINAT launched a major offensive against the 

Chadian government and destroyed a French-piloted AD-4 

Skyraider with an SA-7 missile.15 At the same time, the 

shortfalls of strategic and tactical airlift became more and 

more apparent. Without the capability to quickly deploy 

troops, the French military strategy that relied mainly on 

ground forces became unrealistic. Only airpower through 

the use of modern, air-refueled fighter-bombers could provide the survivability, flexibility, and rapid-response capability to counter the growing threats.
Airlift limitations plagued the ambitious French operation during the crisis affecting the Shaba province of Zaire 

in the spring of 1978. On 12 May 4,000 rebels coming from 

Angola captured the mining center of Kolwezi (Zaire), where 

2,500 Europeans (mostly French and Belgian) resided, and 

started to massacre them. The rebels also threatened Zairian president Joseph-Desire Mobutu, a key ally against the 

Soviet influence in the region. It was necessary to act quickly 

and forcefully; so, on 17 May President Giscard d’Estaing 

authorized Operation Léopard to retake the city. Unfortunately, the FAF had already committed its airlift assets in 

Mauritania and Chad in support of ongoing operations. To 

deploy troops to Zaire, the FAF had to rely on five longrange French commercial transport aircraft (four DC-8s 

and one B-707) under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

program to fly the 2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment 

(2d REP) to Kinshasa. Simultaneously, USAF C-5As and C-

141s provided the necessary logistics support, with 31 sorties that transported 931 tons of cargo and 124 passengers. 

On 19 May three French C-160s, followed by four Zairian C-

130s, dropped 400 paratroopers from the 2d REP for the 

first large French airborne assault since the Suez crisis in 

1956. The French legionnaires secured the city and its airport at a cost of four killed and 14 wounded.

Even if the operation had been a tactical success, it 

showed how limited the FAF airlift capabilities had been. In 

any crisis involving more than a few hundred enemy rebels, 

it became unlikely that France could project the necessary 

quantity of ground troops to help its pre-positioned forces 

defeat them. Besides, the solution to enlarge French presence overseas was impossible financially and politically. 

Airpower could then provide an alternative answer by using 

modern combat aircraft based in France and quickly deployable to overseas bases in time of conflict.

The FAF had already started to acquire the right tool to 

implement the new strategy: the Jaguar fighter-bomber. 

Developed with the British, the French version of the aircraft had incorporated modifications to tailor it to overseas 

operations. A simple and rugged navigation system had replaced the much more complex avionics of the Royal Air 

Force Jaguars designed for operations in Europe. The aircraft also featured an air-to-air refueling (AAR) capability 
and could operate in an austere environment. To support 

President Giscard d’Estaing’s interventionist policy, the 

FAF dedicated the entire 11th Wing to rapid overseas deployment, with a strong emphasis on overseas training and 

at least one squadron on permanent alert. Other Jaguar 

squadrons of the 7th Wing focused on suppression of enemy 

air defense (SEAD) and nuclear strike but trained for overseas deployment as a secondary mission.16

In conjunction with the Jaguar, the FAF modernized its interceptor fleet with an air-to-air capability to face the threat 

posed by the modern Soviet fighters available to some African 

countries. By the end of the 1970s, the 5th and 30th Wings 

had received the AAR-capable Mirage F-1C-200 interceptors 

and were ready to deploy with the 11th and 7th Wings. The 11

C-135F aerial tankers that were initially dedicated to the 

support of strategic operations would provide the necessary 

aerial refueling. Despite budget limitations, the Giscard 

d’Estaing administration also tried to ease the airlift shortage 

by acquiring two additional DC-8Fs and 29 new AAR-capable 

C-160NGs (new generation).17 All the Transall NGs could accommodate a kit that converted them into aerial tankers, capable of refueling both the Mirage F-1C-200s and the Jaguars. 

Finally, the FAF tried to develop its early warning and command and control (C2) capability of overseas operations. Without any E-3s—France did not participate in the NATO E-3A 

program—the FAF had to rely on the French Navy Atlantic, a 

maritime patrol aircraft designed for antisubmarine warfare 

but that could also act as an airborne C2 and electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform and communications relay station. 

Eventually, in 1977 a modernized version of the Atlantic 

(called the Atlantic 2) brought a significant improvement in 

ELINT and surface targets detection in conjunction with a 

limited aerial early warning capability.

The first test for the modernized FAF happened in Mauritania. Since 1973 the Algerian- and Libya-backed Polisario Front had been fighting for the self-determination of the 

Western Sahara province against the Mauritanian government. Its primary targets were Mauritanian and French interests in the region. Using guerilla tactics, the Polisario 

had even launched a raid against the Mauritanian capital, 

Nouakchott, which had prompted the government to sign 

new military agreements with France in 1976. Shortly there-
10

after, the abduction of eight French technicians during a 

Polisario raid on the ore mining center of Zouérat started 

Operation Lamentin. Besides rescuing the hostages, the 

operation significantly reduced the Polisario’s ability to conduct large raids against economic targets. It was a combined effort with the Mauritanian and Moroccan military, 

with France playing a supporting role. For that reason, 

France did not base any fighters on Mauritanian soil but 

provided guidance for Moroccan companies to expand the 

airfields at Nouakchott and Atar so the Moroccan Air Force 

could deploy its Northrop F-5s and Mirage F-1s there.

For the FAF, it was the first operational test for the Jaguars and the first air-centric joint operation commanded by 

an FAF two-star general.18 Ten Jaguars deployed in Dakar 

and Cape Verte in Senegal, supported by two C-135Fs, would 

provide the firepower against Polisario columns. Command 

and control involved French Navy Atlantic maritime patrol 

aircraft and the set up of relay stations inside Mauritania, 

all linked to the French embassy in Nouakchott that would 

act as a rudimentary combined air operations center.19

Initially, the Jaguars and the Atlantics conducted reconnaissance missions and were aided by Mirage 4-A strategic 

bombers conducting high-altitude reconnaissance missions. 

They provided intelligence and targeting information that 

proved critical in the success of the air raids that started in 

December 1977. The destruction of a 200-vehicle Polisario 

column between 10 and 12 December 1977 is a typical example of the joint and combined modus operandi. On 10 

December 1977, two Atlantics from the French navy 21F 

Flotille detected the column heading towards the ZouératNouadhibou rail line. Two days later, they guided a first raid 

of Moroccan F-5s and T-6s, followed by Jaguars flying from 

Dakar and striking the rebels with their two 30-millimeter 

(mm) cannons and rockets. The Jaguars attacked again on 

13 December, and the column was totally annihilated, without any loss on the French side.20 The FAF would repeat this 

kind of mission on 18 December 1977 and on 3 May 1978, 

when six Jaguars flying from Senegal engaged an enemy’s 

column in the open desert and systematically destroyed it. 

Unable to achieve military success, the Polisario decided to 

negotiate with the Mauritanian government. After both par-
11

ties started discussions at the end of 1978, FAF operations 

in Mauritania ended.21

While diplomats took over in Mauritania in 1978, another 

crisis erupted in Chad. The FROLINAT had taken the offensive again—this time with modern Soviet weaponry supplied by Libya—and scored numerous victories against the 

Armée Nationale du Tchad (ANT). As the situation further 

deteriorated in April 1978, the Giscard d’Estaing administration ordered the deployment of a 1,700-man joint task 

force composed of Foreign Legion troops to block the rebel 

advance towards the capital. Still, because of the concurrent crisis in Kolwezi, the French military had to divert 

much of its airlift and the 2d REP from Chad to Zaire. Drawing from the lessons of the conflict in Mauritania, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to compensate for the loss in 

combat capabilities in Chad by using offensive airpower to 

stop the FROLINAT.

Deploying from France and the French base in Abidjan 

(the Ivory Coast), 12 Jaguars arrived in N’Djamena in May 

1978, supported by two C-135Fs and one Atlantic.22 Their 

mere presence on Chadian territory was designed to deter 

further FROLINAT offensives. This did not succeed, partly 

because the FROLINAT assumed France would be too busy 

in Zaire to effectively support the ANT. The FROLINAT 

launched its main offensive against the ANT defensive lines 

on 18 May, with N’Djamena as the ultimate target. In two 

decisive engagements in late May and early June around 

the key positions of Ati and Djadda in Central Chad, Foreign Legion cavalry and marine infantry supported by light 

helicopters and Jaguars defeated the rebels. The firepower 

of the Jaguars was a key factor: in one single attack near 

Djadda, the fighter-bombers killed more than 200 rebels.23

The seven years of the Giscard d’Estaing presidency 

(1974–81) provided the foundations for the use of airpower in 

Africa. To implement its policy of increased interventionism, 

the Giscard administration shifted from the previous reliance 

on ground troops to a much heavier use of airpower. The move 

was the only effective way to address the limitations in airlift 

that continued to plague the French military. Operations in 

Mauritania and Chad were the landmark cases that proved 

that modern and robust fighter-bombers like the Jaguars 

could be effective in desert warfare against irregular troops. 
12

From then on, the FAF would be one of the key components of 

any joint task force sent to address an African crisis.

Operation Manta (1983–84): 

New Challenges for French Airpower

In May 1981 Giscard d’Estaing lost the presidential election to the French Socialist Party (PSF) leader François Mitterrand. The PSF had been a strong critic of the previous 

administration’s interventionist policy, arguing that it behaved like a “pyromaniac fireman” in Africa.24 As part of its 

preelection program, the new socialist government decided 

to favor negotiations over military intervention, the latter 

taking place only “at the express desire of an African leader 

and preferably only in conjunction with African forces.”25 It 

was with this mind-set that the Mitterrand administration 

faced its first serious crisis in Chad. This time the FAF 

would face the bulk of the modern Libyan air force (LAF) 

supporting Chadian rebels. Due to President Mitterrand’s 

emphasis on a diplomatic solution, the French military 

would commit its assets in Chad on a strict defensive mission to try to separate warring parties. Rules of engagement 

(ROE) became restrictive: unless for self-defense, the use of 

firepower required approval by the highest political authorities in Paris. With all these limitations, Operation Manta

succeeded only in reaching a politically and economically 

costly stalemate, which forced the Mitterrand administration to reconsider its African policy.

When civil war broke out again in 1980, the opponents to 

Chadian president Hissene Habre, led by Goukouni Oueddei 

and his Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), sought the help 

of Libya, which intervened in force to back its allies. From 

1980 to 1983, heavy armored forces of the Libyan regular 

army, equipped with T-54s and artillery and protected by 

mobile air defense systems (ZSU-23/4, SA-9), supported 

the rebels each time they suffered setbacks at the hands of 

the renamed Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT). 

The LAF provided effective firepower and spearheaded attacks against major objectives like Faya-Largeau, launching 

15 raids in three days in July 1983 using MiG-23s, Su-22s, 

and Mirage 5s.26 This prompted President Habre to ask for 

direct French military assistance against Libyan airpower.
13

President Mitterrand reluctantly agreed to the Chadian 

demand but requested from the French JCS a course of action that would avoid a direct confrontation between French 

and Libyan forces. The purpose was to deploy ground troops 

north of N’Djamena to act as a peacekeeping force between 

both parties. Operation Manta started on 11 August 1983, 

with strict ROEs: French forces could open fire only if directly threatened.27

Two issues quickly arose. The first one was the recurrent 

problem of a lack of airlift capabilities, this time further 

emphasized by the concurrent deployment of 2,000 troops 

in Lebanon as part of the Beirut Multinational Force. Because of the urgency of the situation in Chad, air was the 

fastest way to reinforce the small contingent of French 

ground troops that had deployed by land from the CAR. Difficulties arose when Algeria denied overflight rights, which 

forced FAF crews to fly either west via Casablanca, Dakar, 

and Abidjan or east via Tunis and Khartoum. The new AARcapable Transalls and the FAF DC-8s could not fully address the issue, so the FAF had to lease 30 Boeing B-747s 

and DC-10s under the CRAF program. This development 

created other problems as well, since the heavy airlifters 

could not land in N’Djamena due to the short runway. The 

airlifters had to fly first to Bangui in the CAR, where multiple Transall rotations would carry men and equipment to 

the Chadian capital. There, a shortage of aviation fuel forced 

the C-160s to depart from Bangui with enough fuel for the 

round-trip, which severely decreased their maximum payload 

capability: it took an average of eight to 10 Transall rotations to fly an entire DC-8 load (30 tons) to N’Djamena. By 

the end of the first week of the operation, the FAF had been 

able to project to Chad only 900 troops equipped with a few 

AML-90 wheeled armored vehicles and 120 mm mortars.28

The second major issue facing the French military was 

the threat posed by the LAF during the deployment of the 

French forces. Air strikes targeting the N’Djamena airport 

and French units were most likely to occur. The FAF alone 

could not work this issue, and France requested the help of 

the United States. At the start of the operation, the US Air 

Force deployed two E-3A (airborne warning and control system) and eight F-15s with two KC-10s to Khartoum, while the 

US Navy Sixth Fleet intensified its operations in the Gulf of 
14

Sirte.29 This show of force was enough to deter the LAF and 

to guarantee the safe deployment of French troops.

By the end of August, 1,750 French troops, supported by 

SA-341 Gazelle antitank helicopters, had built three key 

defensive positions in Moussoro, Abéché/Biltine, and Ati to 

protect N’Djamena. During that time, the FAF had started 

to reduce its dependency on American air superiority and 

to deploy its own fighters. Due to the same shortage of aviation fuel that plagued the airlift effort, any attempt to use 

N’Djamena as a forward operating base was initially out of 

the question. The FAF already had four Jaguars based in 

Libreville (Gabon) and deployed four others and three C-

135Fs in Bangui, where the French navy provided two Atlantics. These aircraft provided a detection of ground targets and airborne radio relays. The FAF also worked the 

fuel issue. It created a petroleum, oils, and lubricants supply chain using between 350 and 400 tanker trucks leased 

by French oil companies that followed a 1,000-mile route 

from western Africa through Cameroon and Nigeria. It also 

contracted commercial airlines to fly some fuel to N’Djamena. 

This logistics effort provided enough fuel to deploy four Jaguars, four Mirage F-1C-200s, and one C-135F to N’Djamena 

on 21 August. 

The Mirages were critical to address the threat posed by 

the LAF. They reinforced the air defense assets already in 

the theater (one Crotale battery). Also, the FAF installed 

several surveillance radars along the defensive line protecting the capital to detect any intrusion at medium or high 

altitude. Still, the radar coverage provided only a 15-minute 

warning against a strike targeting the N’Djamena airport 

and its high concentration of aircraft, further increased by 

the lack of parking space. Throughout the operation, the 

Mirages flew at a high tempo, providing combat air patrol 

for the Jaguars and escorting the Atlantics during ELINT 

missions.

After a welcome lull in the summer, major combat operations resumed in September, with an ALN offensive towards 

Oum-Chalouba. By that time it was obvious to the rebels 

that the French would not use their airpower in offensive 

operations as they had in 1978. Still, the French presence 

had achieved a certain level of deterrence, and the Libyans 

did not back the attack with their own air force. Also, mul-
15

tiple overflights of rebel columns were sometimes enough to 

intimidate them, as happened during the attempted attack 

against Koro-Toro on 11 September.30 However, the strict 

ROEs quickly showed their limitations and were a contributory cause to the loss of a Jaguar and its pilot. The French 

fighters could use only cannon fire against the enemy, and 

several times during the operation, they had taken too much 

time to get the authorization to open fire.31 History repeated 

itself on 24 January 1984. In the morning, Jaguars and 

Mirages detected an ALN column protected by ZSU-23s, 

which had previously attacked a FANT position and taken 

two Belgian doctors as hostages. The column fired at the 

aircraft using SA-7s, and the Jaguars returned cannon fire. 

They kept following the column until 1700 (military time), 

when they finally got permission to launch a full-scale attack. Two Jaguars supported by two Mirage F-1Cs strafed 

the rebels, who were ready for them. ZSU-23s badly damaged one of the Mirages and shot down one Jaguar, killing 

its pilot.32

The loss provoked a strong reaction from the French government. It sent additional troops and Mirages to Chad, 

boosting the force to 3,500 men, and created a free-fire zone 

along the 16th parallel. Still, Operation Manta was draining 

French financial resources, and France appeared increasingly bogged down in Chad. President Mitterrand was eager 

to negotiate a settlement and started negotiations with Col 

Mu’ammar Gadhafi, despite the strong opposition of the 

Chadian government. In September 1984 negotiating parties reached an agreement, and both the French and the 

Libyan governments agreed to withdraw their troops. On 7 

November Operation Manta was over.

The operation revealed numerous lessons. At the strategic 

level, it had drained a lot of financial resources but had solved 

nothing. The Chadian government quickly pointed out the 

evidence of Libyan activities in northern Chad, contrary to the 

negotiated agreement with France. In fact, the LAF was even 

building a large airfield in Ouadi Doum and had deployed five 

Mirage F-1s (purchased from France during the 1970s) and 

nine Su-22s in Aouzou. These violations of the agreement became embarrassing for the French government.33

At the operational level, the government had imposed 

considerable restraint on the use of military force, which 
16

had prevented the FAF from mounting an effective airinterdiction campaign against the ALN and had contributed 

to strengthening Libyan military capabilities in Chad. Also, 

the ineffective airlift bridge had shown the considerable difficulties in projecting a large number of ground forces.34

This convinced the French JCS that relying primarily on 

airpower was the only way to project power in Africa. It also 

meant that to be effective, future air operations had to be 

more massive and, in the case of Chad, had to address the 

threat posed by the LAF through a robust offensive counterair campaign.35 Finally, the lack of adequate radar coverage 

forced the FAF to rely on USAF E-3s to provide a better 

warning about an impending LAF attack.36

One of the few positive aspects of Operation Manta was 

the renovation of the N’Djamena airport. France had upgraded the runway so that it could accommodate large 

cargo aircraft and more parking spaces.37 This would be 

necessary for future developments of the Chadian crisis.

Operation Epervier (1986–87): 

Jaguars and Mirages against 

the Libyan Air Force

On 10 February 1986, the ALN broke the truce with the 

Chadian government and took the offensive south. Libya 

provided troops from its Islamic Legion as well as armor 

and artillery. France found itself in a situation similar to 

1983, except that this time the forward operating bases the 

LAF had built in Faya-Largeau and Ouadi Doum posed a 

more serious threat to any French airlift effort in support of 

the Chadian government. Still, France could not ignore the 

flagrant violation of the 1984 agreement and decided to intervene. Learning from the lessons of Operation Manta, the 

French government approved a much more air-centric military intervention, which would target the LAF in northern 

Chad through an aggressive offensive counterair campaign. 

Operation Epervier (Sparrowhawk), as it would be named, 

contributed to the complete stoppage of the Libyan infiltration in the Chadian civil war.

After the first week of combat, the FANT had been able to 

hold its ground against the ALN and the Libyans, but the 
17

probability of renewed offensives asked for a French intervention to stabilize the situation in Chad. The strategic objective was to compel Libya to stop its present involvement 

in the internal political situation in Chad and to deter it 

from further implication. At the operational level of war, the 

French military decided to limit French ground forces’ involvement to providing training and logistics support for 

the Chadians.38 The bulk of the combat operations would 

rely on the FAF with a clear mission: to stop LAF operations 

in northern Chad and protect the N’Djamena airport. The 

command of the JTF reflected the air-centric aspect of the 

operation, with an FAF officer acting as the JFC.

Operation Epervier started on 16 February 1986, with a 

strike against the LAF facilities at Ouadi Doum. To maintain an element of surprise, the FAF used its assets already 

deployed in Africa. Twelve Jaguars, four Mirage F-1s, three 

C-135Fs, six C-160s, and two Atlantics, most of them based 

in Bangui, constituted the air component of the JTF.39

Armed with BAP-100 antirunway bombs and supported by 

the C-135Fs for the five-hour, 2,400-nautical-mile roundtrip from Bangui, the strike package included 10 Jaguars. 

Mirage F-1s provided air cover, while the Atlantics supported the raid with their ISR and communications relay 

capability. The surprise raid was a success. Concentrating 

on the runway, the strike scored several direct hits that 

rendered it temporarily unusable.

Unable to deploy its fighters to its main forward operating 

base, the LAF could not stop the massive FAF airlift bridge 

that started right after the raid from Bangui to N’Djamena 

and flew badly needed supplies to the FANT. Still, the Libyans attempted a strike at the N’Djamena airport on 17 February with a single Tu-22 that scored a hit on the runway 

but did not prevent the airlift bridge from proceeding as 

planned. The strike came undetected from southern Libya, 

confirming the weakness of the FAF radar coverage and the 

need to boost air defenses around the Chadian capital.40 In 

early March, USAF C-5s flew in a French Army Hawk longrange battery. The radar coverage and early warning capability also received a boost with the deployment of a radar 

station in Moussoro, 200 km northeast of the capital, and 

the arrival of one DC-8 Sarigue ELINT platform and one C-

160 Gabriel signals intelligence platform in the theater.41
18

The raid on Ouadi Doum succeeded in deterring Tripoli 

from further deployment of the LAF in Chad. The situation 

on the ground reached a stalemate that lasted for six 

months. France tried to use that time to find a settlement 

with all parties involved and did not take part in direct combat operations as long as the Libyans did not operate south 

of the 16th parallel.42 However, when the FANT launched a 

successful offensive against the enemy at the end of 1986, 

the retreating Libyan military retaliated by sending the LAF 

on a raid south of the 16th parallel, thus directly challenging France. Responding to the Libyan aggression, the FAF 

came back at Ouadi Doum on 7 January 1987, this time on 

a SEAD mission targeting the Libyan SA-6 radars. Striking 

the airfield had become far more dangerous than in February 1986. The Libyans had built a strong air defense around 

the base, with five SA-6 batteries and numerous antiaircraft 

artillery. For the raid, two Mirage F-1CRs acted as baits for 

the SA-6 radars, while eight Mirage F-1Cs supported two 

Jaguars armed with AS-37 Martel antiradiation missiles. 

The raid successfully destroyed the main observation radar 

of an SA-6 battery.43

The Libyan ground forces kept suffering numerous defeats at the hands of the FANT throughout the spring of 

1987, which included a daring surprise attack against a 

LAF air base in southern Libya. Blaming the French, Gadhafi used two Tu-22s to launch another attempted strike at 

the N’Djamena airport on 8 September 1987. To avoid detection, the bombers flew along the western border of the 

country and tried to mix with civilian air traffic. Still, this 

time the French air defense system worked, and the Hawk 

battery destroyed a Tu-22, while the other turned back.44

This would be the last encounter between the LAF and 

the French military. On 11 September 1987 Libya and Chad 

agreed on a cease-fire, and at the next Organization of African Unity summit, Libya agreed to settle the dispute by 

going to the International Court of Justice.45 Subsequently, 

France dramatically reduced its military posture in Chad 

but never terminated Operation Epervier. Since 1986 the 

FAF has maintained a strong presence in Chad to protect 

Chad against any external aggression. This has enabled the 

French government to maintain some control over the tumultuous Chadian internal politics.
19

Compared to Operation Manta, Operation Epervier proved 

far more successful. When used with determination, French 

airpower stopped the LAF from expanding its facilities in 

northern Chad and successfully deterred any escalation of 

the Libyan involvement. At the same time, French ISR assets provided critical information for the FANT to mount a 

series of inspired offensives that repelled Gadhafi’s forces 

back to Libya. For the French, the success came at a far 

lesser human and financial cost than Operation Manta. It 

also relied on a successful partnership with the FANT and 

its leader, Idriss Déby, who proved to be a gifted commander. 

Still, the operation highlighted some limitations of the 

FAF and involved a high level of risk. When conducting the 

raid on Ouadi Doum, the French hoped to send a clear message to Gadhafi but at the same time tried to prevent an 

open conflict with Libya. They were successful in reading 

the Libyan leader’s mind correctly. However, if Tripoli had 

ordered the LAF to react more forcefully in the first weeks 

of the operation, it is likely that it would have been able to 

stop the French airlift effort. At that time the FAF did not 

have the capability to establish air superiority over southern Chad. To establish it, the FAF had to rely on USAF airlift to fly the Hawk batteries and the surveillance radars 

that proved critical during the 8 September 1987 raid. Also, 

the AS-37 Martel antiradiation missiles used on 7 January 

1987 against SA-6s did not prove very reliable.46 Without 

an effective SEAD capability, any escalation of the conflict 

with Libya would have become problematic for an FAF unable to strike Libya’s forward air bases.

French Airpower in the Post–Cold War 

Environment: From One NEO to the Other

In Africa, the end of the Cold War sent a wave of destabilization that triggered numerous conflicts into the 1990s. 

Countries that had received financial and military support 

from one superpower or the other suddenly found themselves abandoned by their patron. In the case of Zaire, the 

corrupt and authoritarian regime of President Mobutu 

stopped being the West’s best ally in central Africa and became one of the more embarrassing.47 Its demise had mul-
20

tiple ripple effects that caused civil wars in Zaire, Congo, 

Rwanda, Burundi, and the CAR.

Facing this uncertain environment, the French military 

had to conduct numerous noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in the 1990s. These NEOs shared several common characteristics. They all involved an initial deployment 

of French overseas forces using the pre-positioned airlift 

assets of the FAF. C-160s or C-130s stationed in Libreville, 

Bangui, or N’Djamena, together with French army troops, 

formed a quick-reaction force deemed to be critical to the 

success of the operation, as exemplified by the NEO in Zaire 

in 1991.

48 By contrast, without any forward basing of its C-

130s, the Belgian Air Force suffered delays and had to rely 

on USAF airlift support to fly troops from Europe during the 

1993 NEO in Zaire.49 Also, these operations were conducted 

amid a raging civil war where the different factions did not 

target French assets and personnel directly. Consequently, 

the level of threat remained acceptable for the employment 

of tactical transport aircraft, and the FAF did not need to 

deploy combat aircraft to provide a deterrent presence or to 

conduct supporting combat operations. These operations 

used an intermediate staging base (ISB) from which the 

FAF would operate and fly the evacuees. In all cases the ISB 

was the French base where the transport aircraft were stationed, which further stressed the importance of forward 

basing for the FAF.

Operations after the Rwandan Trauma: 

RECAMP, Special Forces, and Airpower

The year 1994 marked a watershed in French involvement 

in Africa. Two distinct events occurred during that year. 

The first one was the publication of the 1994 white paper 

on defense that paved the way for France’s defense policy in 

the post–Cold War environment. The white paper would 

have a strong impact on the French military and led to a 

reduction in format and the end of conscription. The second one was the genocide in Rwanda and the French controversial intervention there, called Operation Turquoise. 

Operation Turquoise did not involve a significant use of 

airpower apart from the traditional reliance on FAF C-160s 

and C-130s to deploy ground forces and perform some hu-
21

manitarian airdrops in May 1994. However, at the strategic 

level, Rwanda marked the end of France’s direct intervention policy. Critics accused the operation of being ineffective in preventing the genocide of the Tutsi population while 

having facilitated the escape of key Rwandan personalities 

involved in the genocide.50 The French government also 

faced a parliamentary inquiry that stressed the lack of 

transparency and coherence of the African policy.

The RECAMP policy that followed has emphasized multilateralism and African states’ military capabilities so that 

they can take the matter of regional instability and peacekeeping operations into their own hands. The French military has adapted to the new policy by shifting from a traditional reliance on the third pillar to the first one, the African 

states’ military, supplemented by the use of French Special 

Forces and airpower to boost maneuverability and firepower.51 This French version of the Afghan model has found 

its place in the FAF doctrine regarding combat airpower related to special operations.52 This document defines two 

concepts of use: intelligence support and fire support.53 The 

first one uses such traditional ISR assets as the Atlantic 2 

or the Mirage F-1CR (reconaissance version) and also such 

combat aircraft as the Mirage 2000D with its targeting pod 

in a nontraditional ISR role. The second one emphasizes 

the synergy between the combat aircraft and the joint tactical air controller, which allows CAS to be the most effective. 

The FAF 10th Air Commando Group has specialized in laser designation of targets for the combat aircraft and has 

received considerable combat experience working with Mirage 2000Ds armed with GBU-12 laser-guided bombs (LGB) 

in Afghanistan.54

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 

(DRC) in 2003 typifies the implementation of the new French 

policy in Africa and the key role played by French Special 

Forces and airpower. To support the United Nations Mission (MONUC) in the DRC and to protect populations fleeing the ethnic strife in the Ituri province of northeastern 

DRC, the new foreign policy branch of the EU launched the 

operation under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484. France provided most of the troops (1,785 out of 

2,200), as well as the command and control structure. 

Uganda agreed to host the force in Entebbe, and its deploy-
22

ment began on 7 June 2003, with strategic airlift provided 

by chartered AN-124s. To achieve its objectives, the JFC 

tasked the air component to provide a day-and-night deterrent presence over the Ituri province, an ISR capability, and 

ultimately CAS, if needed. These tasks posed+ significant 

challenges for the air component commander. At this time 

of the year, low ceilings and moisture negatively affect the 

Ituri province, which compelled the FAF to deploy allweather-capable assets. On 5 June five Mirage 2000Ds 

equipped with terrain-following radars, LGBs, and targeting pods deployed from France to N’Djamena to provide 

that all-weather capability. Later in June the FAF relocated 

its five Mirage F-1CTs and CRs already in Chad to Entebbe. 

Also, due to the long distance from the Ituri province, two 

C-135FRs flew to Libreville to reinforce the air-to-air refueling capability provided by the lone C-135FR already in 

N’Djamena. The FAF then put two Mirage 2000Ds on a 3.5-

hour alert notice (5.5-hour at night). A typical mission 

would involve multiple air refuelings and last up to seven 

hours, with two hours on station over Ituri. Another challenge was the setting up of an adequate combat search and 

rescue capability. The two SA-330 Puma helicopters deployed 

in Entebbe could provide a quick extraction of a downed 

crew in Ituri. However, the long transit from N’Djamena to 

the theater over Chad, the CAR, and the DRC meant that 

any rescue operation over these remote and sometimes 

hostile areas would involve significant time and complexity. 

The FAF came up with a plan that used French army Cougar helicopters based in Gabon and Cameroon and several 

pre-positioned stocks of fuel in the DRC. Still, providing an 

adequate response to any flight emergency remained an important issue for the air component commander.

On 6 June 2003, C-160s and C-130s infiltrated special 

forces into Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province, to secure the airport and start the deployment of the main 

force. Mirage F-1s protected the safe infiltration of these 

forces. The next day 2000Ds flew their first CAS mission 

using LGBs. The effect on the aggressiveness of enemy militias was significant. Later in the month, high-speed, lowlevel passes by the Mirage 2000Ds using their all-weather, 

terrain-following capability proved sufficient to deter further attacks on European forces. The JTF completed its 
23

mission by the end of August, and the transfer of authority 

between the European force and the MONUC became effective on 1 September 2003. At that time the FAF combat 

assets had flown 730 hours in 220 missions supported by 

115 air refueling sorties.55

Operation Artemis provided satisfaction for the FAF. The 

synergy between its tactical transport aircraft and special 

forces had proved decisive in securing the airport in Bunia. 

Also, airpower had demonstrated the multiple options it 

brought to the JFC because of the progressive use of force 

it could provide. What could start as a dedicated ISR sortie 

could evolve into a show of force using such nonkinetic 

means as a high-speed pass and possibly culminate in a 

strike ranging from gun strafing to using LGBs. This flexibility derived from the partnership between special forces 

and the FAF that had started in 2000 and proved its operational soundness in Afghanistan. The French version of the 

Afghan model had demonstrated that its force-multiplying 

effects could apply to several situations, from increasing 

the firepower of African forces like in the CAR in 2007 to 

supporting endangered peacekeeping forces like in the DRC 

in 2003.56 It could provide these effects at the cost of a small 

footprint on the ground and little collateral damage.

The Ivory Coast: 

Back to a Ground-Centric Strategy?

Despite the growing success of the partnership between 

airpower and special forces, the French military responded 

to the crisis that erupted in the Ivory Coast in October 2002 

with a predominately land-centric operation.57 When Pres. 

Laurent Koudou Gbagbo requested French support against 

rebels that had seized the northern part of the country and 

attempted to march to Abidjan, France decided to launch a 

dual-purpose military intervention called Operation Licorne 

(Unicorn).58 Its primary mission was to protect French nationals against the growing violence. The second part of the 

mission was far more challenging. Its objective was to force 

a military status quo between the rebels and the Forces 

Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) that would compel both parties to negotiate and avoid a definitive partition 

of the country.
24

Operation Licorne started as a heavy land-centric intervention that relied on the marine infantry battalion in Abidjan, 

reinforced by the paratroop companies stationed in Gabon 

and elements of the French Foreign Legion flown from 

France. The FAF used its tactical airlift to support the operation but initially did not deploy any combat aircraft. The 

only offensive airpower capability in the theater was provided by four Gazelle light-attack helicopters from the 

French army. French forces succeeded in stopping the rebel 

advance on the capital in October 2002, and it seemed at 

first glance that they had achieved their mission of forcing 

both parties to negotiate during the Marcoussis peace talks 

held from 15 to 23 January 2003. In fact both the rebels 

and the FANCI were using the cease-fire to strengthen their 

military capabilities. By late 2002 and early 2003, the FANCI 

acquired four Mi-24 attack helicopters and two MiG-23MLDs 

from Bulgaria, four Su-25s from Belarus, and Israeli-made 

unmanned air vehicles. Mercenaries from South Africa and 

Eastern Europe provided the crews.

At the same time, relations between Paris and Abidjan 

became tenser because President Gbagbo’s partisans accused France of not providing the necessary support to totally defeat the rebels. In December 2003 anti-French riots 

started in the Ivorian capital. These riots would continue 

during the spring of 2004, as the FANCI were preparing for 

a major offensive against the rebels. Breaking the cease-fire 

on 4 November 2004, the FANCI launched an air strike 

against rebel positions using two Su-25s. The FAF decided 

to deploy three Mirage F-1CTs with air-to-air armament to 

the theater, but political constraints prevented their basing 

in Abidjan. Stationed in Libreville, they could not provide the 

visible presence that could deter an escalation of the conflict. On 6 November 2004 two Su-25s using 57 mm rockets 

deliberately targeted a French forward base in Bouake, killing nine French soldiers and an American citizen. The 

French reaction was forceful. Using antitank missiles, 

French forces destroyed all FANCI offensive air assets on 

the ground, while they were refueling after the attack.59 The 

widespread anti-European violence that followed in Abidjan 

forced France to conduct an NEO on 7 November 2004. 

Gazelle helicopters protected the evacuation by keeping vital 

lines of communication open to French columns targeted 
25

by rioters and elements of the FANCI. Also French troops 

had to secure the Abidjan airport after an FAF C-160 suffered damage on the ground from an RPG-7 rocket.60

Despite this outburst of violence, both France and the 

Ivorian president were eager to avoid an escalation of the 

conflict. The latter was afraid that France would punish 

him by withdrawing the Licorne forces from the cease-fire 

line and letting the rebels capture the capital.61 By January 

2005 all the parties involved were back to the negotiating 

table and agreed to respect the terms of the Marcoussis 

treaty.62 Since 2005 France has maintained a 3,000-man 

strong military presence in the Ivory Coast that provides a 

quick-reaction capability to the United Nations Operation 

in the Côte d’Ivoire set up to monitor the cease-fire. 

Operation Licorne is still France’s largest and most controversial military intervention in Africa.63 At the operational 

level, the most striking aspect of the crisis, compared to 

other French operations in Africa, was the absence of any 

FAF combat aircraft deployed in the theater. Three main 

factors explain the lack of a stronger FAF presence. Initially, the availability of a robust French army force was 

deemed sufficient to address the crisis. However, 2002 and 

2003 saw periods of heavy fighting with determined and 

well-armed rebels. A preliminary French army assessment 

of the operation published in July 2004 stressed the need 

to provide the Licorne forces with more firepower and the 

need to address the threat posed by the combat aircraft 

acquired by the FANCI, which were already operating 

against rebel positions in violation of the cease-fire agreements.64 If airpower had been integrated in the planning of 

Licorne from the start of the operation, it would have addressed the French army concerns and provided the firepower and deterrent effect it had during Artemis. That it 

was not has enabled Mi-24s and Su-25s to violate the ceasefire in total impunity and ultimately attack French troops. 

In fact, in 2004 it was probably too late to deploy Mirage F‐1s 

to Abidjan. Due to the growing anti-French feeling in the 

city and within the Ivorian government, the French JTF was 

not able to rely on Abidjan as a secure forward-operating 

base. The rocket strike against an FAF C-160 is a case in 

point. This forced the FAF to base its airlift assets in Togo 

and deploy Mirage F-1s in Gabon, too far from the Ivory 
26

Coast to provide any deterrent effect during the November 

2004 crisis. The third factor concerns the French strategy 

and the political constraints it faced. After the Marcoussis 

treaty in January 2003, French authorities emphasized the 

peacekeeping status of Operation Licorne. It was hardly 

time to deploy highly visible combat aircraft even in Togo, 

despite the growing tension between France and the Ivorian 

government and the threat posed by the Ivorian air force.65

Conclusion

French airpower in postcolonial Africa has evolved from 

a limited supporting role in the early postcolonial era to bearing the brunt of the fight in Chad in 1986–87. Its flexibility 

has permitted its adaptation to the RECAMP policy favored 

by the French political authorities after the Rwandan conflict in 1994, through the effective partnership with special 

forces. At the operational level, the French military has 

learned four principal lessons from its involvement in Africa. 

The first lesson learned is that the availability of secure 

forward operating bases is essential. Without them, deploying forces is a long and painstaking process involving negotiations with potential host nations—hardly the ideal solution when the crisis calls for a rapid response. This lesson 

tends to be forgotten by the political authorities, due to the 

cost associated with maintaining permanent bases in Africa. 

Accordingly, since 1960 their number has declined steadily. 

Still, as former Licorne JFC, French army general Emmanuel Beth pointed out, “The cost to effectiveness ratio is in 

reality in favor of pre-positioning. When all is well, one considers it is expensive.”66

The second lesson learned concerns airlift support. The 

lack of a strategic airlift capability has plagued French operations since 1960. The situation is even worse today, with 

the gradual phasing out of the C-160 and the delays in its 

replacement program, the Airbus A-400M.67 The French air 

force has never truly addressed the issue, and French operations have strongly relied on external support, either 

from allies or through contracting with private air cargo 

companies. 

A third lesson learned that has never been contradicted 

is the need for a robust ISR capability. In this domain 
27

French airpower has fared better. Mirage F-1CRs and Atlantics have earned a well-deserved reputation as effective 

and complementary ISR platforms. They were instrumental 

in detecting enemy offensives in Mauritania and Chad.

The fourth lesson taught by the French operations highlights a need to systematically integrate airpower into the 

planning of an operation. So far, successes and failures in 

this domain have alternated: Operation Artemis showed the 

efficiency of a truly joint planning process, whereas Licorne 

failed to include airpower in the initial planning when it 

was probably still possible to deploy fighters in the Ivory 

Coast. With the growing level of threat faced by French 

forces in Africa, it is all the more important for JFCs to systematically include airpower in the joint campaign planning. To effectively do so, they need a French airpower doctrine at the operational level of war, a document that the 

FAF has not produced. Recent studies have pointed out the 

lack of doctrinal thinking other than at the tactical level in 

the FAF. The time has come to deliberate in a country where 

the administration budgetary process has recently converted to a “no concept, no money” approach!68

Notes

1. Initially, the reason for France’s involvement in its former colonies 

was economic because France wanted to protect its economic interests in 

young and potentially unstable countries. As part of the cooperation 

agreements signed in the 1960s, France secured a monopoly on the 

procurement of such African agricultural products as bananas, peanuts, 

palm oil, and cocoa and of such strategic minerals as uranium. In the 

1980s uranium needed for the vast network of French nuclear reactors 

producing most of its electricity came almost exclusively from Africa (Niger, 

Gabon, and South Africa). French companies and large corporations 

maintained a strong presence in the former colonies, concentrated mostly 

in four countries: Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon. In 

these countries, French nationals managed plantations, oil extraction, 

and forest exploitation. In 1989 French expatriates in Gabon numbered 

27,000, which was the highest proportion of whites in any African country 

except South Africa. Still, the economic importance of former French 

colonies has gradually diminished since the 1960s. The rise of the 

European Economic Community (EEC), promoting open markets, forced 

France to review its closed-market policy in Africa during the Yaounde and 

Lome conventions from 1981 to 1985. As more and more competitors 

gained access to Africa’s markets, France lost its monopolistic position, 

and its large corporations started diverting their investments to other 

continents. In 2007 trade with all African countries accounted for only 16 
28

percent of French exports and 12 percent of its imports. When detailed per 

country, the level of trade with sub-Saharan Francophone countries has 

remained low compared to other parts of Africa. In 1999 the total amount 

of exports to the four main economic partners of France in sub-Saharan 

Africa—Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon—totaled 12.1

billion French francs, the same amount as the exports to Algeria alone. 

These figures show that the economic impact of Franco-African relations 

cannot explain the amount of French political and military involvement 

anymore. Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’industrie, “Aperçu 

du commerce extérieur de la France en 2007,” http://lekiosque.finances

.gouv.fr/APPCHIFFRE/Etudes/tableaux/apercu.pdf.

2. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 2.

3. Facing an ongoing colonial war in Algeria, Charles de Gaulle attempted 

to satisfy the calls for independence of the other French colonies in a more 

peaceful manner. His first step was the creation of the French community 

by the ordinance of 7 January 1959. The aim was to provide the colonies 

with a certain degree of autonomy while preserving their unity under the 

French state, which would manage defense, security, and economic affairs 

on behalf of the community. The attempt was a failure due to the colonies’ 

stronger aspiration for independence. Fearing that further delays in the 

decolonization process would increase tensions, France granted 

independence to the colonies of the Afrique Occidentale Française and 

Afrique Equatoriale Française in 1960. Pierre Bezbakh, Petit Larousse de 

l’Histoire de France, 731.

4. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 7.

5. These two types of agreements guarantee France’s monopoly on 

military matters in its former colonies. For example, Article 2 of the second 

annex of the defense agreement between France and Gabon states that 

“the Gabonese Republic, in consideration of the help granted by the French 

Republic, and in order to secure the standardization of armaments, 

contracts to call exclusively on the French Republic for the maintenance 

and renewal of its materials.” Chipman, French Military Policy and African 

Security, 6.

6. Ibid., 7.

7. Ibid., 11.

8. With Angola, Mozambique, Libya, and Somalia getting military 

support from the Soviet Union, France was facing better-armed guerilla 

movements and states equipped with modern conventional forces that 

included combat aircraft. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 12.

9. Publication Interarmées Instruction 03.121, Concept de renforcement 

des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix.

10. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 7.

11. Ibid., 10.

12. Each squadron belonged to the 92d Bomber Wing of the 2d Tactical 

Air Command (2 CATAC: Commandement Aérien Tactique) that would form 

the air component of the Joint Intervention Force. Lorell, Airpower in 

Peripheral Conflict, 9.

13. McNamara, France in Black Africa, 165.

14. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 67.

15. Ibid., 34.
29

16. Ibid., 16.

17. Ibid., 19.

18. Facon et al., Abrégé d’histoire de l’aéronautique militaire et de l’Armée 

de l’air, 51.

19. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 30.

20. Ibid.

21. Facon et al., Abrégé d’histoire de l’aéronautique militaire et de l’Armée 

de l’air, 51.

22. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 34.

23. Ibid., 35.

24. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 14.

25. Ibid.

26. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 41.

27. Ibid., 43.

28. Ibid., 45.

29. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, 1980–1989.”

30. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 46.

31. The process was cumbersome: if a fighter aircraft requested 

permission to open fire, it had first to contact the Atlantic on patrol, which 

would forward the request to the French JTF headquarters (HQ) in 

N’Djamena. The JFC had then to contact the French JCS HQ in Paris, 

which would forward the request to the highest political level. The pilot on 

station would get an answer through the same channel. For example when 

the ALN closed down on French positions on 6 September 1983, the French 

JFC launched two Jaguars and requested permission from Paris to open 

fire. It took more than one hour for the request to be processed, and by the 

time the JFC received an answer, the Jaguars had already turned back. 

Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 46.

32. Ibid., 48.

33. Ibid., 49.

34. Martel, Histoire Militaire de la France, 563.

35. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 50.

36. Martel, Histoire Militaire de la France, 563.

37. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, 19.

38. The main reason was France’s unwillingness to provide direct 

combat support to the FANT in its fight against the ALN, perceived as a 

purely internal conflict. The FANT would have to address the threat posed 

by the ALN on its own. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 56.

39. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, 160.

40. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 55.

41. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, 160.

42. Lorell, Airpower in Peripheral Conflict, 57.

43. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, 1980–1989.” 

44. Dessornes, “The Chadian Affair: A French Hawk Battery Engaged a 

Tupolev 22 Bomber.”

45. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, 162.

46. Cooper, “Libyan Wars, 1980–1989.”

47. Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires, 348.

48. Ibid., 346.

49. Ibid., 352.
30

50. Hansen, “The French Military in Africa.”

51. The French Special Operations Command (SOC) is one of the 

youngest major commands of the French military. Created in 1992 as a 

result of lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm, it is a joint 

organization whose air component includes an FAF transport squadron 

equipped with both C-160s and C-130s and an FAF helicopter squadron 

with the new long-range EC-725 Caracal. The FAF also provides the 10th 

Air Commando Group for the land component.

52. Andres, Willis, and Griffith, Jr., “Winning with Allies.” 

53. Publication Armée de l’air 03.110, Coopération équipages-forces 

spéciales dans le cadre des missions d’appui aérien. Concept d’emploi air.

54. Le Saint, “Coopération équipages–forces spéciales dans le cadre 

des missions d’appui aérien–concept d’emploi air.”

55. Wodka-Gallien, “The Tricolor Aloft: French Air Force Operations in 

2003,” 58.

56. In the Central African Republic (CAR) in the spring of 2007, French 

special forces provided targeting information to Mirage F-1s flying from 

N’Djamena to support CAR forces trying to repel rebel columns at the 

Chadian border.

57. From its independence until the death of its first president, Felix 

Houphouët-Boigny, in 1995, the Ivory Coast served as a model of 

development and economic growth for African countries. France maintained 

a strong economic presence in the country where 25,000 French nationals 

were living in 2002, coupled with a permanent military base in Abidjan 

hosting a marine infantry battalion and two FAF light helicopters. After the 

death of its emblematic ruler, the Ivory Coast experienced a slow process 

of economic recession and political destabilization, which culminated in 

the 2002 coup against Pres. Laurent Gbagbo. The rebels failed to oust the 

ruling president but succeeded in conquering the north part of the country 

where they had widespread support. From there, they attempted to launch 

an offensive against the capital. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 

L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, 11–12.

58. Initially President Gbagbo called for the implementation of the 

defense agreement with France in case of a foreign aggression. The French 

government refused because the crisis was an internal issue that involved 

no foreign aggressor. Indeed, more than 90 percent of the rebels were 

Ivorian, the rest being immigrants from neighboring countries that came 

into the Ivory Coast when its economy was booming. Fondation pour la 

Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, 23.

59. French forces also arrested the Eastern European mercenaries 

who had formed the bulk of the FANCI air arm and turned them over to 

their respective countries’ ambassadors.

60. Cooper and Mladenov, “Cote d’Ivoire, since 2002.”

61. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne 

d’une crise à l’autre, 16.

62. Ibid., 14.

63. A French observer even called it “France’s little Iraq.” See Hansen, 

“The French Military in Africa.” Still, proponents of the French intervention 

have stressed its success in preventing large-scale massacres like those in 
31

neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia. Fondation pour la Recherche 

Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre, 17.

64. Division Recherche et Retour d’Expérience, Enseignements de 

l’opération LICORNE (Septembre 2002–Juillet 2004).

65. Ibid., 42.

66. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, L’Afrique subsaharienne 

d’une crise à l’autre, 27.

67. “Long-term Consequences,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 

November 2007, 52–53.

68. Verstappen, “Regards croises sur les stratégies aériennes américaine, 

britannique et française.”

33

Appendix A

Background on the History of the French 

Colonial Empire in Africa

Except Algeria, where the French presence began in 1830, 

most of the French colonial empire in Africa is a legacy of 

the Third Republic and such visionaries as Jules Ferry and 

Leon Gambetta, who started an aggressive expansion policy 

in the 1880s. On the eve of the First World War, France had 

established its colonial administration over most of western 

Africa. Its possessions further expanded when it took control of German colonies—Togo and Cameroon in 1918, and 

the administration remained unchanged until decolonization started in 1960.

The French administration assumed three different forms 

in Africa. Algeria received special treatment due to the Europeans who had settled there and accounted for a third of 

the population in 1960. No longer considered a colony, it 

became an integral part of France in 1848. Still, the native 

population had almost no political rights and thus no influence on the local political life, which was entirely in the 

hands of the Europeans. Tunisia and Morocco were protectorates; that is, the French ruled by controlling the local 

monarchy. Finally, the administration of the vast expanses 

of sub-Saharan Africa in western and central Africa and in 

Madagascar relied entirely on French colonial agency officials assigned there on a dual-purpose mission: first dealing with economics and the exploitation of Africa’s raw material resources and agricultural products and also fulfilling 

a moral obligation to bring the benefits of civilization to the 

natives. This mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) spread 

the French culture and language to make assimilation possible. As Francis Terry McNamara points out, “French linguistic and cultural proselytizing has been coupled with a 

willingness to accept as equals people who have acquired a 

good knowledge of French. This missionary zeal has had a 

subtle but substantial influence on wider French national 

influence and power.”1 This point would have a strong impact on the decolonization process. By having promoted a 

francophone elite, France was able to achieve a peaceful 
34

transfer of power to new heads of state who were friendly to 

the French cause and in most cases were eager to keep 

strong ties with their former colonial power. These ties 

would assume the form of cooperation agreements with important defense-related clauses. In these countries that had 

composed the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF: French 

Occidental Africa) and the Afrique Equatoriale Française 

(AEF: French Equatorial Africa) France would exert the 

strongest postcolonial political and military influence. 

Note

1. McNamara, France in Black Africa, 127.
35

Abbreviations

AAR	 air-to-air refueling

ACSC	 Air Command and Staff College

ALN	 Armée de Libération Nationale

ANT	 Armée Nationale du Tchad

C2 	 command and control

CAR	 Central African Republic

CAS 	 close air support

COIN	 counterinsurgency

CRAF	 Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DCA	 defensive counterair

DRC	 Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOWAS	 Economic Community of Western African

States

EEC	 European Economic Community

ELINT	 electronic intelligence

EU	 European Union

FAF	 French Air Force

FANCI	 Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire

FANT	 Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes

FROLINAT	 Front de Libération Nationale

GUNT	 Gouvernement d’Unité Nationale de Transition

HQ	 headquarters

ISB	 intermediate staging base

ISR	 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCS	 Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIF	 Joint Intervention Force

JFC	 joint force commander

JTF	 joint task force

KM	 kilometer

LAF	 Libyan air force

LGB	 laser-guided bomb

MM	 millimeter

MONUC	 United Nations Mission in DRC

NATO	 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO	 noncombatant evacuation operation

OCA	 offensive counterair

OEF	 Operation Enduring Freedom

PSF	 French Socialist Party
36

RECAMP	 Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de

Maintien de la Paix

REP	 Régiment Etranger Parachutiste

ROE	 rules of engagement

RPIMA	 Régiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine

SEAD	 suppression of enemy air defense

SOC	 Special Operations Command
37

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