FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J UL Y 18, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1491 2 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00023 -CR- 5-MCR UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us KEIDRIC COOK, a. k. a. K iki , D ef en da nt- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 18 , 200 5)
Be fo re A N D E RS O N , BA RKE T T a nd F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: K ei dr ic Co ok a

ppe al s hi s 15 1- m onth se nte nc e fo r co nspi ra cy to dis tr ibu te a nd2

t o p o s s e s s w i t h i n t e n tt o d i s t r i b u t e 5 0 g r a ms o r mo r e o f c o c a i n e b a s e , a n d5 0 0 g r a ms
or m ore of coca ine powder, i n v iolation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 84 1(a)( 1), ( b)(1)(A )(iii), (b )( 1) (B )( ii) , a nd 8 46. C ook ar gue s onappe al tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt
com m itted reversible error in sentencing him under the then-m andatory United State s Sentencing Guidelines (“ feder al g u i delines”), and based on fac ts that neither wer e ch ar ge d inhis ind ic tm en t, nor a dm itt ed by him , in lig ht of

Bl ak el y v. W as hin gto n, 542 U.S . ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. Ed. 2d 40 3 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S . ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 , 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). For the re asons set forth m ore fu lly be low , w e va ca te a nd r em an d. A f ed er al gr an d j ur

y r et ur ne d ase al ed

ind ic tm en t aga ins t Cook an d th re e co co nspi ra tor s, Ro be rt John Co ok, A nth ony Ch ar le s H ill s, Jr
. , a nd L av ar Ram ar o H ill s, ch ar gin g a ll of

the c o- co nspi ra tor s w iththe above -r ef er en ce d c onsp ir ac y

a nd l ist ing ite m s f or f or fe iture . O the r than r ef eren cing the se sta tut or

y dr ug am ount s, thi s indictm ent did no t include either sp ec i fi c d rug am ount s, or that a firearm wa s po ss es se d a s p art of t he co ns pi racy. Cook su bsequent ly entered in to a written plea agreem ent, whereby he agreed to ple ad gui lty to this co nspi ra cy ch ar ge , in exc ha nge fo r the gove rn m en t agr ee ing not to f ile a ny r el at ed c ri m ina l c ha rg es a ga ins t hi m , a nd to inf orm the c ourt of

his
co ope ra tio n, if ap pli ca

ble
. Co ok a lso a gr ee d th at he ( 1) ha d am an da tor

y m ini m um3

statutory sentence o f ten y ears’ im prisonm ent; (2) was respo nsibl e for the statutory drug am ount s charged in his ind ictm ent; (3) w as wa iving his righ t t o have a j ury

“ m ak e a de te rm ina ti on, und er ar ea sona

ble doubt s tandard , of

tha t e le m en t of

the crim e char ging the we ight or am ount of t he controlled sub stances in the consp iracy

. . . f or w hic h he [ w as ] he ld a cc ount ab le f or se nte nc ing pur

pose s” ; an d (4 ) unde rs too d that the court would determ ine “ the am ount of the w eight of the controlled s ubstances at tri bu ta bl e to hi m at se nt en ci ng un de r th e p rep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce s ta nd ard .”

Furthe rm or e, the pa rt ie s st ipu la te d a s to the f oll ow ing f

ac ts: ( 1) Co ok an d hi s
co -conspi ra tor s w er e inv olv ed in a co nspi ra cy

to poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te
co ca ine ba se a nd p ow der in the P an am a Ci ty , F lor ida , a re a ; ( 2) a s part of thi s
co nspi ra cy , c onf

ide nti al inf

orm an ts ( “ CI s” ) pur ch as ed c oc ai ne pow de r fr om

Co ok o n August 18 and 29, 2003; (3) on October 1 , 2 0 03, lawenforce m ent officials seized fr om Co ok’ s pe rs on an d his re sid en ce ap pr oxi m at el y tw o- an d- a- ha lf ounc es of
co ca ine powder , $70 0 inU
. S. Curr en cy , dr ug p ar ap he rn al iaa nd i te m s f or c ooki ng cocaine base, and firearm s; (4) in January 2004 , law e nforcem ent officials seized fr om the re sid en ce oc cu

pie d by c o- co nspi ra tor s A nth ony a nd L av ar

H ill s e le ctro nic
sc al es w ithc oc ai ne r es idu e, m at er ia l us ed f or c ooki ng c oc ai ne ba se , 9 6.6 g ram s of cocain e b ase, and approxim ately $2,400 in U.S . C urrency ; and (5) num erous CIs4

could testify that they purchased cocaine powder from Cook and both cocaine powder
an d ba se f

ro m his c o- co nspirat or s du ri ng the ti m e pe ri od o f the c onsp ir ac y , w itha tot al w ei ght

w el l i n exc es s of

50 g ram s of

c oc ai ne ba se a nd 5 00 g ram s of c oc ai ne po wde r. During Cook’ s plea colloqu y , he agreed th at t he governm ent could sh ow that he w as r es pons ibl e fo r 50 g ram s or m or e of co ca ine ba se an d 50 0 gr am s or m or e of
co ca ine pow de r. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso spe ci fi ca lly inf orm ed Co ok a s f

oll ow s: If y ou e nte r a gui lty

ple a, the jury

w oul d no t m ak e tha t de te rm ina tio n, an d tha t de te rm ina tio n w oul d be le ft to the Co urt to m ak e as to dr ug am ount
. A nd tha t de te rm inat io n w oul d be m ad e by m e at y our se nte nc ing , but

it w ill be ba se d on a le sse r standard of pr oof
. I t w ill not be ba s ed o n a standard of bey ond a reasonable doub t, such as the j ury w oul d be he ld t o, but

it w oul d be ba se d onapr ep onderanc e of the ev ide nc e standard
. Cook confirm ed that he understo o d t his waiver. Cook also agreed that the fac tual pr of fe r co nta ine d inhis ple a ag re em en t w as c or re ct , a lon g w itha ddi ng tha t hi s r ole in the c onsp ir ac y

w as ( 1) to dis tr ibu te sm al l am ount s of co ca ine pow de r, an d (2 ) to pur ch as e co ca ine pow de r, put it int o $20 an d $40 ba gs, an d dis tr ibu te it in cl ubs an d oth er a re as . T he c ourt ul ti m at el y a cc ep te d C ook’ s pl ea , ba se d onit s de te rm ina tio n th atit was fr ee an d v ol un ta ry . Pr ior to se nte nc ing , apr oba tio n of fi cer p rep ar ed

apr es en te nc e inv es tig at ion rep or t ( “PS I ” ) , set ti ng Co ok ’s bas e o ffen se lev el at 3 4, p ur su an t t o U.S.S.G.5

§ 2D 1. 1( c) (4 ), ba se d onit s de te rm in at iontha t C ook w as r es pons ibl e fo r the equiv al en t of

21. 16 k ilo gr am s of

c oc ai ne pow de r. T he pr oba tio n o ffi cer also
reco m m en de d: (1) a two
- l e v e l u pwa rdad jus tm en t, p ur su an t t o U.S.S.G. § 2D 1. 1( b) (1 ), be ca

use ada nge ro us w ea

pon tha t Cook pr ovi de d to ac o- co nspi ra tor
w as pos se sse d by

the c o- co nspi ra tor

in the pr oxi m ity

of dr ugs re la tin g to the
co nspi ra cy ; and ( 2) athr ee -l ev el dow nw ar d a dj ust m en t, pur suant t o U
. S. S. G
. § 3 E 1
. 1, fo r ac ce ptanc e of

r es pons ibi lity . I n c al cu la tin g C ook’ s c ri m inal-h is to ry poi nts , the of fi ce r de te rm ine d th at , a lth ough Co ok o nly ha d on e cr im ina l- his tor

y poi nt b as ed

on
a sta te c onvi ct ionf

or dr ivi ng unde r the inf

lue nc e (“ D U I” ), tw o a ddi tio na l c ri m ina lhisto ry point s wer e warranted, p ursuant to U. S. S. G. § 4A1.1(d), because Cook wa s on probatio n for this DU I offe nse while the instant consp iracy occurre d. W ith an ad j ust ed of fe nse le ve l of

33, a nd a c ri m ina l hi sto ry

c at eg or y of I I, Co ok’ s r es ult ing gui de lin e range w as 151 to 181 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t. C ook ra ise d no obj ec tio ns to th is PSI p rio r to sen te nc in g. A t sent en ci ng, how ev er , Co ok obj ec te d to the PS I’ s incl usi on i n c al cu la tin g hi s
cr im ina l hi sto ry

c at eg or y of tw o cr im ina l- his tor

y poi nts fr om

his be ing on p ro ba tio n during th e comm i s s i o n of the instant offense. C ook argued th at, althoug h he was
ar re ste d onthe D U I of

fe nse on Au gust 29, 2003 , he w as not se nte nc ed a nd p la ce d on pr oba tio n f

or the D U I of

fe nse unt il Octo be r 8, 200 3, a ft er his a rr es t f

or the ins tantTh e re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in a wr itt e n r e sp on se by

the g ov e rnme nt t o Co ok ’s B lake ly 1 objection, pre sumably

beca use Cook did not file this objection until one day befor e sente ncing was sche duled to rec ommence. 6 offense. The court continu ed this sentencin g hearing to allow the parties additional ti m e to bri ef t hi s i ss ue . Co ok s ubse que ntl y

f ile d a n a ddi tiona l obj ec tio n to the P SI , a rg uin g th at , in light of the Suprem e Court’ s dec i sion in Blakely , the district court should sen tence him only to his m andatory

m inim um statutory sentence, without regard to the feder al gui de lin es . C ook spe ci fi ca lly co nte nde d tha t his ind ic tm en t di d no t sp ec if y aquanti ty of dr ugs be y ond the sta tut or

y a m ount s of

50 g ram s of

c oc ai ne ba se a nd 500 gr am s of cocaine powder. 1 On Septem

ber 1, 2004 , w hen sentencing rec omm enced, the court overruled Cook’s obj ection to the ca lculation o f his crim inal histo ry category , c onclud ing th at Co ok h ad f ai le d to sho w tha t he too k so m e af fi rm at ive ac t or ste p to co m m uni ca te to his co-consp irators his intent to withdraw from the conspiracy
. Cook also renewed his Blakely objec tion, which th e cou rt overruled. In doing so , the c ourt explained th at it did not be lie ve tha t the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in Bl ak el y w as ap pli ca

ble to the federa l guid elines. T he court, how ever, clarif ied that (1) th is Blakely

objec tion was pr es er ve d, a nd ( 2) if

the S upr em e Co urt rea ch ed ac ontrary

c onc lus ionin the npendin g cases, such a determ ination “ would definitely aff ect [C ook’s] sentence. ”7

Co ok the n m ove d fo r a se nte nc e at the low en d of his gui de lin e range , a rg uin g tha t ( 1) he ha d c oope ra te d w iththe gov er nm en t, a lbe it not

e noug h fo r the gov er

nm en t to file a m o t i o n fo r a dow nwar d departure; and (2) his guidelin e range was disprop ortionately

high b ecause part of the conspiracy offense occurred while he w as on p ro ba tio n f

or the D U I of

fe nse . The go vern m en t r es pond ed tha t, a lth oughCo ok had attem pted to coop erate , and wa s still cooperating, this cooperation had not b een sufficient for a departure based on substantial a ssistance. Cook also personally stated tha t ( 1) he ha d th re e m ino r chil dr en , a nd ( 2) he did not ha ve c ont ac t w ithhis c oco ns pi rat or s fo ll owi ng hi s ar res t fo r th e in st an t o ffen se . The c ourt inform ed the part i es t hat, a lthou gh it was “ boun d by ” the fe deral gui de lin es , it

did not ha ve a pr obl em

in im posi ng a se nte nc e w ith in C ook’ s gu ide lin e
range , ba se d one vid en ce of the ex te nt of

his inv olv em en t i n th e co nspi ra cy . T he
co urt a lso e xpl ai ne d th at

“ the f ed er al co nspi ra cy law s ar e ha rs h. T he y a re tou gh, but they are intended to be,” and that it wa s adoptin g the finding s of the PSI
. The c ourt ultim ately

sentenced Cook to 151 m onth s’ im prisonm ent, 5 y ears’ supervised release, and a $100 s pecial assessm ent fe e. In doing so, the court stated that it had (1 ) co nsi de re d th e fa ct or s se t ou t i n 18 U
. S. C. § 35 53( a) , inc lud ing the appl ic ab le fe de ra l gu ide lin es ; ( 2) f

ound tha t this se nte nc e m et the ge ne ra l go al s of

pun ish m en t; and (3) im

posed a sentence at the low e nd of Cook’s guideline range because he had8

at te m pt edto co op erat e wit h t he go ve rn m en t. Co ok spe ci fi ca lly ar gue s on ap pe al tha t B la ke ly /B ooke r er

ro r oc cu rr ed

in his case beca use the district court (1) sentenced him unde r t h e t h en -m andatory feder al gui de lin es ; and ( 2) r el ie d onf ac ts and c ri m ina l c ondu ct tha t ne ith er

w er e charg ed

in Co ok’ s indic tm en t, nor

a dm itt ed by him dur ing his ple a co llo quy . C ook al so
co nte nds tha t r es en te nc ing is w ar rante d be ca

use , a t r es en te nc ing , the c ourt c oul d (1 ) co nsi de r th e fu ll e xte nt o f his c oope ra tio n, de spi te tha t the gov er nm en t ha d no t filed a m otion for a downwar d departure; and (2) redeter m ine his cr im i n al h i s t o ry cat eg or y . A s a prel im inary

m at te r, a lth oughne ith er pa rty ha s a ddr es se d th e iss ue of
w ai ve r , C o o k a r g u ab l y i s f o r e c l o s e d f

r o m a r g u i n g e rr o r b a s e d o n B o o k e r w he n he ag re ed a s part of his ple a ag re em en t t o w ai ve his r igh t t o have aj ur y de te rm ine dr

ug
am ount be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. W e revi ew

the va lid ity

of a n a ppe al w ai ve r de
no vo . Uni te d S ta te s v . We a v e r , 27 5 F .3d 13 20 , 13 33 n.2 1 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 1) . A
s e n t e n c e - ap p e a l wa i v e r

i s v a l i da n de n f

o r c e ab l e i f mad e kn o w i n g l y a n dv o l u n t a r i l y. Id. a t 1333 (citing United States v. Bushert, 997 F. 2d 13 43, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993 ))
. A w ai ve r w ill be e nf or ce d if the gov er

nm en t de m onstra te s e ith er : “ (1 ) the district court specifically

question ed the defendant about the waiver during the plea
co llo quy , or (2 ) the re co rd cl earl y show s th at the de fe ndant o the rw ise und er sto od the9

fu ll sig nif ic an ce of the w ai ve r. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ce sa l, 391 F
. 3d 1 172, 118 2 ( 11th Cir. 2004 ) (quoting United States v. Benitez-Z apata, 131 F. 3d 1444 , 1446 (11th Cir. 19 97 )), p et it io n fo r cer t. fi le d, No . 04 -9 86 5 (U.S. Ap ril 21 , 20 05 ). Furthe rm or e, w e ha ve c onc lud ed tha t “ [t ] he ri ght to a

ppe al ase nte nc e ba se d on Appr en di/ Bo oke r gr ou nd s can b e w ai ve d inaple a ag re em en t. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Ru b b o , 3 9 6 F. 3 d1 3 3 0 , 1 3 3 5 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( re je ct i n g ar g u m en t

t h at d ef en d an t ’s Book er chal le nge f

el l w ith in an e xc ep tio n to the appe al w ai ve r tha t a llo w ed he r to ch al le ng e an y se nt en ce th at ex ceed ed th e st at ut or y m ax im um ). Fo ll owi ng Rubb o, we also rej ected a def

endant’ s argum ent that his Booker challenge that the district court ap pli ed the gui de lin es in an unc onst itu tio na l m an ne r fe ll w ith in an e xc ep tio n to his appeal wa iver, that is, that the defendant could appeal a “ violatio n of the law apart fr om th e gui de lin es . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. G ri na rd -H en ry , 399 F
. 3d 1 294, 129 7 ( 11th Cir. ), cert. denied, No. 04 -9566 (U .S . May 16, 2005); see also United States v. Fry e, 402 F. 3d 1 123, 112 9 ( 11th C ir
. 200 5) ( co nc lud ing tha t de fen dant’ s a ppe al of his
se nte nc e w as ba rr ed

by his kno w ing a nd v olu ntary appe al w ai ve r, a s c ont ai ne d inhis pl ea ag reem en t). Inthe ins tant c as e, unl ike the f ac ts i n R ubbo , G ri na rd -H en ry , a nd F ry e, Co ok did not a gr ee to w ai ve a ll ar gum en ts r el at ing to the appl ic at ion of the se nte nc ing gu i d el ines. N evertheless, Cook acknowledged in h is plea agreem ent that he wasTh e Sup re me Court a lso ha s in str

uc te d th a t “ [w]he n a

de fe nd ant p le a ds g uil ty , th e State 2 is free to seek judicial sente nce e nhance ments so long a s the defe ndant either stipulates to the rele vant fa cts or conse nts to judi cial fa ctfinding .” See B lakely , 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct . at 2541. 10 w ai vin g hi s r igh t t o aj ur

y de te rm ina tio n of dr

ug am ount

be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. In de ed , Co ok e xpr es sly

a gr ee d inhis ple a ag re em en t tha t the co urt wo uld de te rm ine the “ am oun t of the w eight of the controlled s ubstances attribut able to him at sentencing u nder the preponderance of the e vidence standard.” Cook also con ceded during h is plea colloqu y that he understoo d that, if he e ntered a guilty plea, the court
w oul d de ci de dr

ug am ount , a nd tha t this de te rm ina tion wou ld b e ba se d ona pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce standard , ins te ad of be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. Mor eo ve r, Co ok h as not a rg ue d onappea l th at this w ai ve r w as not kno w ing a nd vol unt ar y . T hus, to the e xte nt C ook’ s S ixth A m en dm en t c ha lle ng e is ba se d onthe
co urt’ s de te rm ina tio n of

dr ug am ount , no e rr or

oc cu rr ed
. 2 Co o k , h o we v er , a l s o i s ch al l en g i n g h i s s en t en c e b a s e do n t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s
use o f the then-m andatory feder al guidelin es, and based on its reliance on other j udi ci al ly de te rm ine d f

ac ts i n c al cu lati ng C ook’ s se nte nc e. B ec au se Co ok t im el y
ra ise d a Bla ke ly obj ec tio n in the dis tr ic t cour t, w e re vie w his Bl ak el y

/B ooke r cl ai m
on ap pe al de novo , but re ve rs e onl y fo r ha rm fu l er ro r, se e U nit ed St at es v. P az , 405 F. 3d 9 46, 948 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). “ T o f ind ha rm le ss e rr or , w e m

ust11

de te rm ine tha t the e rr or

did not af

fe ct the subs tanti al ri ght s of the pa rt ie s. ” P az , 405 F. 3d a t 94 8 ( quot at ionom itt ed ). Mo re ove r, und er ha rm le ss- er

ro r re vie w , the gove rn m en t c ar

ri es the bur de n of

pr oof
. I d. In Appr en di v. N ew Je rs ey , 530 U
. S. 224, 120 S.Ct
. 2348 , 147 L
. E d. 2d 4 35 (2 000) , the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t “ [o ] the r than the fa ct of a pr ior c onvi ct ion , a ny fa ct tha t i nc re as es the pe na lty f or ac ri m e be y ond the pr es cr ibe d st at uto ry m ax im um
m u s t be subm itted to a jury , and proved bey ond a reasonable doub t.” Id., 530 U.S
. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362 -63. Before Cook’s sentencing hearing, the S uprem e Court
re vis ite d th at

r ule in Bl ak el y , in the c ont ex t of W as hin gto n st at e’ s se nte nc ing guid eline schem e, and clarifie d that “ the ‘ statutory m axim um ’ for Apprendi pu rposes is the m axim

um sentence a j udge m ay

im pose sol ely

on the basis o f the fa cts ref lected i n t h e j u ry v e r d i c t o r a d m i t t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t
. . . . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the r el ev an t

‘ sta tut or y m ax im um ’ is not the m ax im

um se nte nc e a j udge m ay

im pose a ft er f ind ing ad di ti on al fact s, b ut th e m ax im um he m ay im po se wit ho ut an y

ad di ti on al fin di ng s.” Bl ak el y , 54 2 U.S. at __

_, 1 24 S.Ct . at 2 53 7 (e m

ph as is in ori gi na l). Ap p l yin g t h es e p ri n ci p l es , t h e S up re m e C o u rt h e l d t h at Bl ak el y’ s
se nt en ce—

w hic h w as e nhanc ed

und er the sta te gui de lin es ba se d onthe se nte nc ing court’ s additio nal finding by a p reponderance of the e vidence that Blakely com m itted his kidnapin g of

fe nse w ithde lib er at e cr

ue lty —vi ola te d th e Si xthA m en dm en t. I d.12

at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2534-38
. In a footnot e, however, the Court explicitly rem arked th at“ [t]he Fed eral Gui de li ne s ar e n ot be fo re u s, an d we e xp res s n o o pi ni on on th em .” Id
. a t __ _ n. 9, 124 S
. Ct
. a t 25 38 n
. 9. Whil e the ins tant c as e w as pe ndi ng o n a ppe al , the S upr em e Cour t is sue d it s de ci sio n inBo oke r, f

ind ing “ no d ist inc tio n of co nst itu tio na l sig nif ic an ce be tw ee n th e F e d e r a l S e n t e n c i n g G u i d e l i n e s a n d t h e Wa s h i n g t o n p r o c e du r e s a t i s s u e ” i n B l a k e l y. Booker, 543 U. S. at ___, 125 S.C t. a t 749. Resolving the constitu tional questio n left open in Blakely , the S uprem e Co u rt h eld that the m andatory nature of the f

ederal gui de lin es r en de re d the m inc om pa tib le w ith the Si xth A m en dm en t’ s guarante e to the ri ght t o a j u ry t r i a l
. I d
. a t

_ _ _ , 1 2 5 S
. C t
. a t 7 4 9
- 5 1
. I n e x t e n d i n g i t s h o l d i ng i n Bl ak el y to the G uid el ine s, the Co urt e xpl ic itl y r ea ff irm ed it s r at ion al e in Appr en di tha t “ [a]ny

f ac t ( oth er than apr ior

c onvi ct ion ) w hic h is ne ce ssary to supp ort a
se nte nc e ex ce ed in g th e m ax im um auth or iz ed

by the f ac ts e sta bli she d by

aple a of gui lty or a j ur y ve rd ic t m

ust be adm itt ed

by the de fe ndant o r pr ove d to aj ur y be y ond
a re as ona ble doubt. ” I d. a t __

_, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 75 6. Inase co nd and sep ar at e m aj or ity opi nio n, the Co urt i n B ooke r co nc lud ed tha t, to b es t pr es er

ve Co ngr es s’ s in te nt i n e na ct ing the Se nte nc ing Re fo rm A ct of 1984 , the ap pr opr ia te r em edy

w as to “ ex ci se ” tw o sp ecifi c se ct ion s—1 8 U
. S. C. § 35 53( b) (1 ) (requiring a sentence w ithin the guidelin e range, absent a departure) and 18 U. S. C.These othe r re levant fa ctors in § 3553(a ) include: “ (1) the nature a nd circ umstances of 3 the offe nse and the history and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt; (2) the nee d for the se ntence imp os e d– (A ) t o r e fl e c t th e se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe ns e , to pr omo te re sp e c t f or the law, and

to pr ov ide jus t pu

nis hme nt f

or the of fe ns e ; ( B ) t o a ff

or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e to c ri min a l c on du c t; (C) to protec t the public from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt; and (D) to pr ovide the def endant wi th n e e de d e du c a tio na l or vo c a tio na l tr a ini ng , me dic a l c are , o r o the r c or re c tio na l tr e a tme nt i n the most effe ctive manne r; (3) the kinds of sentenc es ava ilable; (4) the kinds of se ntence and the sentenc ing r ang e esta

blished for . . . (A ) the a

pplicable c ateg ory

of off ense c ommitt ed by

the applicable cate g ory

of def endant a s set forth in the guidelines . . .; (5) a ny pertinent policy state me nt []; ( 6) the ne e d to avo id u nw arr ante d s e nte nc e dis pa ri tie s amon g de fe nd ants wi th simil ar r ecor ds who have been f ound g uilty

of similar conduc t; and (7) the ne ed to provide restitution to any

victims of the offe nse.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -(7)
. 13 § 37 42( e) (e sta

bli shi ng standard s of

r ev ie w on a

ppe al , inc lud ing de nov o r ev ie w of de pa rt ur es f ro m the appl ic ab le gui de lin e range) —t he re by e ff ec tiv el y r en de ri ng the Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s advis or y onl y . Id
. at ___, 125 S. Ct
. at 76 4. Th us , th e gui de lin es r an ge is nowa dvi sor y ; i t no lon ge r dic ta te s th e fi na l sent en ci ng re sul t bu t instead is a n i m

po rt a nt s e nt e nc i ng f

a c t or t ha tt he s e nt e nc i ng c ourti s t o c on si de r, al ong w iththe f

ac tor s cont ai ne d in 18 U. S. C. § 3553( a)
. I d. a t __ _, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 76 4- 3 65
. Followin g the Suprem e Court’ s decision in Booker, we exam ined in Paz a Bl ak el y/B o o k er

ch al l en g e t o a g u i d el i n e e n h an ce m en tb as ed o n t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa ct ua l f ind ing on an am ount of los s. Pa z, 405 F. 3d at 947. W e de te rm ine d tha t the defendant’ s sentence w as err oneous because (1) it was based on j udicially determ ined facts that w ere not adm itted by th e d ef en d an t, and (2) it was e nhanced und er a
m an da tor y gu id el ine s sy ste m . I d. a t 94 8. Mo re ove r, w e co nc lud ed tha t the14

gove rn m en t coul d not show tha t the se e rr or s w er e ha rm le ss b ec au se the se nte nc ing transcript clear ly

showed that, had the district court trea ted the federa l guid elines as advis or y , the de fe ndant’ s te rm

of im pr iso nm en t wo uld ha ve be en shor te r. Id
. a t 94 8- 49. W e, the re fo re , va ca te d and re m an de d Pa z’ s sent en ce f or r es en te nc ing c onsi ste nt
w ithBo oke r. I d. a t 94 9. He re, the court applied a two-level e nhancem ent, pursuan t t o § 2D1. 1(b)(1), because a dangerous we apon that Cook provided to a co-conspirator wa s poss essed in the pr oxi m ity

of dr ugs re la tin g to the co nspi ra cy . N ev er the le ss, Co ok a dm itt ed

the fa ct s un de rl y ing thi s e nhanc em en t at se nte nc ing by not dis put ing his P SI ’ s in cl usi on of the m . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. S he lto n, 400 F
. 3d 1 325, 133 0 ( 11th C ir
. 200 5) (concluding that sentence enhancem ent based on drug quantitydid no t v i ola te Booker
w he re the de fe ndant d id not dis put e the f ac ts i n th e PS I) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. Burg e, N o. 04- 1346 8, sli p op . a t 20 88- 89 ( 11th C ir
. May 2, 200 5) ( re

j ec tin g B ooke r ch al le nge unde r pla in- er

ro r re vie w be ca

use the de fe ndant adm itt ed fa ct s re la tin g to his r el ev an t
co nduc t by ab an doni ng at se nte nc ing his obj ec tio ns to var iou s f ac tua l st at em en ts i n the P SI ). T hus, thi s § 2 D 1. 1 e nh an cem ent di d no t r es ult in a Si xthA m en dm en t vi ol at io n u nd er Bo ok er. T o th e ex te nt C ook al so i s c ha lle ngi ng the c ourt’ s c al cu la tio n of his c ri m ina lhisto ry point s, this ar gum ent sim ilarly fails. T he Suprem e Court held in Alm endarez-15

Torr es v. U nited States, 523 U. S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L .E d.2d 350 (199 8), that the gov er nm en t ne ed not pr ove be y ond a re as ona ble doub t tha t a de fe ndant h ad pr ior
co nvi ct ion s f

or adis tr ic t c ourt t o us e tho se pr ior c onvi ct ion s f

or pur pose s of
en ha nc em en t. I d. , 523 U
. S. a t 24 7, 118 S
. Ct
. a t 12 33 ; se e al so U nit ed S ta te s v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249 , 1257 (11th Cir.) (discus s ing th e A lm endarez- Torr es hol din g) , c er

t. de nie d, 125 S. Ct
. 637 (2 004)
. Mo re ove r, w e ha ve de te rm ine d th at the Su pr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n inA lm en da re z- T or re s w as “ le ft

und ist ur be d by Appr en di, Bl ak el y , a nd B ooke r, ” suc h th at “ a distr ic t c ourt do es not e rr by r el y ing on p ri or convictio ns to enhance a defendant’ s sentence.” See Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1329; see also Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2005 ) (B ooker is not im plicated when a defendant’ s sentence i s enhanced based on a prior convictio n); United States v. Cam acho-Ibarquen, 404 F.3d 1283 , 1290 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (sam e); United St at es v. G al le gos- A gue ro , N o. 04- 1424 2, m anusc ri pt op. at 3- 4 ( 11th C ir
. May

18, 2005 ) (s am e)
. T hus, Co ok h as not sho w n th at

the c ourt vi ol at ed his S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts i n li ght of Bo oke r. S ee Bo oke r, 543 U
. S. a t __ _, 125 S
. Ct
. a t 75 6. On the other hand, as Cook asserts, w hen the court sentenced him , the c ourt
w as ope ra tin g un de r a be lie f tha t the f ed er al gui de li ne s w er e m an da tor y , ins te ad of advis or y . A non -c onst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r, the re fo re , oc cu rr ed
. Se e Sh el ton , 400 F. 3d at 133 0-31 (concludin g that a statutory err or occurs w hen the district courtPhr a sin g thi s te st c onve rs e ly , w e a lso have e xpla ine d th a t no n- c on sti tut ion a l e rr or is 4 harmless unless it “re sulted in actual pre judice bec ause it had substantial a nd injurious effe ct or inf lue nc e in d e te rm ini ngthe [re su lt]. ” Se e Ga lle g os -A g ue ro , N o. 04 -1 42 42 , ma nu sc ri pt o p. a t 4 (quoting United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999)) ; see a lso United States v. Petho, No. 04-15412, manuscr ipt op. at 3 (11th Cir. May 18, 2005) (same). 16 sentences a defendant “ under a m andatory [g] uidelin es schem e, even in the absence of a Si xt h Am en dm en t en ha nc em en t v io la ti on ”). W e have determ ined that there are two harm less error standards for Booker
er ro rs, dependent on whether the err or is constitu tional or statut ory . See United St at es v . M at h en i a, No . 0 4 -1 5 2 5 0 , m an u s cr i p t o p . at 5 (1 1 t h Ci r. Ma y 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 ). We
ex pla ine d inP az—an a

ppe al inv olv ing a co nst itu tio na l Bo oke r er ro r— tha t, w he n a constitu tional Book er e rror occ urs, the governm ent onlym ay establish th at it wa s ha rm le ss b y

sho w ing , und er

ahe igh tene d stand ar d, tha t “ it is c le ar be y ond a reasonable doubt that the error com plained of did not contribu t e t o t h e sentence obtained.” Paz, 405 F. 3d at 9 48 (internal q uotatio n and m arks om itted). O n the other hand, in Mathenia, w e determ ined that
non- co nst itu tio na l e rr or

is ha rm le ss i f, vie w ing the pr oc ee din gs i n th ei r en tir ety , ac ourt de te rm ine s th at the e rr or did not af fe ct the se nte nc e, or had bu t ve ry

sli ght e ff ec t. I f one c ansay

w ithf ai r as sur an ce tha t the se nte nc e w as not subs tanti al ly sw ay ed by the er ro r, the se nte nc e is d

ue to be affir m ed even thoug h there w as err or. Ma the nia , N o. 04- 1525 0, m anusc ri pt o p. a t 5- 6 ( int er nal qu ot ation s and m ar

ks
om itted). 4In rea chingthis conclusion in Mathenia, we cited to our de cision in United States v. 5 Robles, No. 04-13598, manuscr ipt op at 8-10 (11th Cir. May 10, 2005), in which we conclude d—under the more string ent har mless error

test for c onstitut ional Booke r er ror—that the err or wa s harmless whe re the court une quivocally stated that its sentence would be the same eve n if the fe dera l guide lines only wer e advisory . See Mathe nia, No. 04-15250, ma nuscript op. at 7-8. 17 W e furthe r ex pla ine d in Ma the nia tha t “ [t ] he non -c onst itu tio na l harm le ss e rr or standard is not e as y f or the gov er nm en t t o m ee t. It is as dif fi cu lt fo r the gov er

nm en t to m eet that stand ard as it is for a defendant to m eet the third-prong prej udice standard f or pla in e rr or

rev ie w.” I d. a t 6. N ev er the le ss, w e co nc lud ed

tha t the gove rn m en t ha d m et

thi s bu rd enby ci tin g to a sta te m en t by the dis tr ic t co urt tha t, if the Sup re m e Co urt determ ined that the federal guidelines were unconst itutio nal as
m andatorily

applied, the district c ourt “ noneth eless [w ould ] consider the guid elines
as —f or the ir pe rs ua siv e va lue or as a dvi sor y , a nd the se nte nc e [the c ourt] w oul d im pose w oul d be the sa m e. ” Id
. at 7. W e, the re fo re , co nc lud ed in M athe nia tha t the gove rn m en t “ de m onstra te d w ithf ai r as sur an ce tha t the dis tr ic t co ur t’s er ro r of ap ply ing the gui de lin es in a m anda to ry f as hio n di d no t a ff

ec t, or ha d bu t a

sli ght af fe ct , on [ the de fe ndant’ s] ult im at e se nte nc e. ” I d. a t 8. 5 Be ca use this c as e inv olv es onl y anon -c onst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r, w e m ust ap ply the te st d isc uss ed

in Ma the nia , ins te ad of the “ be y ond a re as ona ble doubt” te st dis cu sse d inP az . T he c ourt i n th e ins tant c as e inf orm ed the pa rt ie s that it “ did

not ha ve apr obl em

in im posi ng a sen te nc e w ith in C ook’ s gu ide lin e range , ba se d on18

evidence of the extent of his invo lvem ent in the consp iracy .” It noted, a s well, that (1) the federa l conspiracy laws are intended to be harsh, ( 2) the court had considered the factors set out in § 3553(a), and (3) it had determ ined that Cook’ s sentence m et th e g en eral go al s o f pu ni sh m en t. How ever, unlik e the fa cts in Mathenia, the court he re al s o noted that it was “b o u n d b y” t h e g u i d e l i n e s , a n d t h a ti tb e l i e v e dt h a tac o n t r a ry r u l i n g b y t h e S up r e me Court in Booker “ would definitely aff ect [Cook’s] sentence. ” Moreover , the c ourt sta te d that it w as im

posi ng a se nte nc e at

the lowe nd o f the gui de lin es be ca use Co ok ha d a tte m pte d to c oope ra te w iththe gov er nm en t. B ec au se the se s ta te m en ts d o no t show“ w ithf

ai r as sur an ce tha t the se nte nc e w as not sub stanti ally swa y ed

by the
er ro r, ” the gov er

nm en t ha s no t shown th at Co ok’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts w er e not violated, and, thus, it has not proven th at the Booker er ro r w as harm less. S ee Ma the nia , N o. 04- 1525 0, m anusc ri pt o p. a t 5- 6; see al so U nit ed S ta te s v. D av is, N o. 04- 1458 5, m anusc ri pt o p. a t 5- 6 ( 11th C ir
. May 4, 200 5) (c onc lud ing tha t, de spi te the
co urt’ s gr an t of

am oti on f

or adow nw ar d de pa rt

ur e fo r subs tant ia l a ssi stanc e, the governm ent could not show that the court’ s m andatory application of the gu idelines in sentencing t h e d ef

en dant was harm less, beca use the m otion only

gave the court li m it eddi sc ret io n i n c on si de rin g t he de fen da nt ’s ass is ta nc e). A cc or d i n g l y , w e c o n c lud e tha t, be ca use Co ok f

re el y a nd v olu ntari ly

w ai ve d hi sIn fac t, the g overnme nt has conc eded suc h and agree d that this case should be r emande d 6 fo r r e se nte nc ing . We are g rate fu l f or the c and or

of g ov e rnme nt c ouns e l. 19 ri ght to a j ur y de te rm ina tio n of dru g am ount , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm ina tio n of thi s
am ount by the pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce w as not

e rr one ous. I n ad di ti on, the
co urt di d no t vi ola te Co ok’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts i n se nte nc ing him by re ly ing on his prior conv ictions and on facts to which he adm itt ed. The c ourt, however , c o mm i t t e dan o n - c o n s t i tu t i o n a l e rr o r i n t r e a t i n g t h e f

e d e r a l g u i d e l i n e s a s man d a t o ry. Furtherm ore, the gov er n m en t has failed to show that this preserved err or wa s ha rm le ss. W e, the re fo re , va ca te a nd re m an d f or r es en te nc ing c onsi ste nt w iththe 6 Supr em e Co ur t’s d eci si on in Bo ok er. VACATED AND REMANDED.