The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 

Richard Weitz

September 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War 

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies

Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-634-4
v

FOREWORD

Since the Cold War era, when the United States 

began heavily investing in Turkey’s military and defense operations, the United States and Turkey have 

enjoyed a fruitful and mutually beneficial relationship. Because of Turkey’s geographic location, political stability, and recent economic success, the country 

has served as a strategic ally in U.S. foreign policy. 

The Arab uprisings in particular have challenged the 

Turkish-U.S. partnership. For a country that was already struggling to balance its position as a regional 

power with the imperative of maintaining good relations with its Western allies, the increasing instability 

in the region has forced Ankara to rely more on the 

United States than it would prefer. Although the Syrian conflict has underscored to Turkey the value of its 

security ties with the United States, the war has also 

exposed deep differences between the two countries 

on fundamental issues. While presently partially buried, these differences could easily rise to the surface in 

coming years.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD WEITZ is Senior Fellow and Director of 

the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional 

security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, 

and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense 

policies. Dr. Weitz is also an expert at Wikistrat and 

a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New 

American Security (CNAS). Before joining Hudson in 

2005, Weitz worked for the Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defense Science Board, DFI International, Inc., 

Center for Strategic Studies, Harvard University’s 

Kennedy School of Government, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Dr. Weitz has authored or edited 

several books and monographs, including Rebuilding 

American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century 

Strategy (2013); Global Security Watch-China (2013); two 

volumes of National Security Case Studies (2012 and 

2008); War and Governance: International Security in a 

Changing World Order (2011); The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow (2010); Global Security Watch-Russia

(2009); China-Russia Security Relations (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis

(2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative 

Analysis (2007); and Revitalising U.S.–Russian Security 

Cooperation: Practical Measures (2005). Dr. Weitz holds 

a B.A. with Highest Honors in government from Harvard College, an M.Sc. in international relations from 

the London School of Economics, an M.Phil. in politics 

from the Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in political 

science from Harvard University.

ix

SUMMARY

Until a few years ago, the relationship between 

Washington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perennially troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks strongly 

opposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have subsequently complained that the Pentagon was allowing 

Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorating security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagreements over how to respond to Iran’s nuclear program, 

U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey’s outreach efforts 

to Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Palestinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties and 

contributed to further anti-Americanism in Turkey. 

Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local challenges by moving closer to the West, leading to the 

advent of a “Golden Era” in Turkish-U.S. relations. 

Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship 

a “model partnership” and Turkey “a critical ally.” 

Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties have 

improved during the last few years. The U.S. military 

withdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tension 

and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with 

Washington to influence developments in Iraq. Furthermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries to 

partner in support of the positive agenda of promoting 

democracy and security in the Middle East. Americans 

and Turks both want to see democratic secular governments in the region rather than religiously sanctioned 

authoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey’s reconciliation 

efforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankara 

to realize that having good relations with the United 

States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle East 

and beyond. Even though Turkey’s role as a provider 

of security and stability in the region is weakened as 
x

a result of the recent developments in Syria and the 

ensuing negative consequences in its relations to other 

countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and resume its position. Partnering with the United States is 

not always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuaded 

Turkey’s leaders that they need to backstop their new 

economic strength and cultural attractiveness with the 

kind of hard power that is most readily available to 

the United States. For a partnership between Turkey 

and the United States to endure, however, Turkey 

must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspective, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and 

resolve a domestic democratic deficit. At the same 

time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting 

Turkey’s security concerns regarding the European 

Union, while the United States should adopt a more 

proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of 

tensions between Ankara and Washington that could 

significantly worsen at any time.
1

TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 

INTRODUCTION

During its past decade under the ruling Justice 

and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

or AKP), Turkey became a much more prominent 

global actor due to its dynamic diplomacy, strengthening economy, and the security vacuum in its turbulent neighborhood, which created a demand for 

the greater foreign policy activism Ankara was now 

able to provide. The “zero problems with neighbors” 

policy, which has been the cornerstone of the Turkish AKP party’s foreign policy under Prime Minister 

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet 

Davutoğlu, aims at resolving all Turkey’s problems 

with neighbors, or at least minimizing them as much 

as possible. Guided by the philosophy of Davutoğlu, 

the dominant strategic thinker of the AKP even before he became foreign minister, Turkey has sought to 

improve its political relations with its key neighbors 

by strengthening mutual economic links and by moving its position on prominent issues, such as Israel 

and Iran’s nuclear program, closer to the mainstream 

international view even if that differed from the position favored by the United States and most North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) governments. 

The goal has been to strengthen Turkey’s economy, 

achieve greater regional stability, and thereby raise 

Ankara’s global influence. The Turkish leadership 

recognized that regional conflict and competition 

would persist, but hoped the parties would keep these 

negative elements constrained to enjoy the positive 

benefits of improved economic relations and a more 
2

secure region, which would provide Turkey with the 

“strategic depth” Ankara needed to become a great 

power. Turkey’s rapid economic growth is facilitating the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces 

(TSK) and the country’s domestic defense industry. 

Its large, predominately moderate Muslim population provides Ankara with one of the largest and most 

readily deployable armies in Europe. Turkey’s location astride multiple global hotspots—the Balkans, the 

Caucasus, the Middle East, etc.—widens NATO’s geographic perspective. Turkish strategic thinkers have 

traditionally seen their country as surrounded by unstable, potentially hostile geographic regions. Turkish 

foreign and defense policy has sought to reduce this 

instability—and ideally transform Turkey’s pivotal 

geopolitical position from that of a liability into an 

advantage—by partnering with the United States and 

other NATO countries. Being more flexible, however, 

recent Turkish foreign policy has also become less predictable, which complicates Ankara’s relations with 

Washington and other traditional partners. Within 

Turkey, newly empowered societal actors such as ethnic lobbies, business associations, influential civilian 

politicians, and a resurgent religious establishment 

have pushed for changes in long-established foreign 

and defense policies. Conversely, the Turkish military, previously the dominant security actor, has lost 

influence, weakening a traditional force favoring close 

ties with the United States. The AKP has managed to 

exploit Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union 

(EU) to justify stripping the TSK of political powers.
3

EUROPEAN SECURITY 

Turkey has presented both a challenge and an opportunity to NATO and the EU as they restructure 

their roles, missions, and capabilities to address Europe’s 21st-century security challenges. Since NATO’s 

foundation in 1949, the Alliance has played a crucial 

role in Turkey’s security strategy and contributed to 

its integration with both Europe and the United States. 

During the Cold War, the Turkish government relied 

on its NATO membership and its bilateral alliance 

with the United States to backstop Turkey’s security. 

The pro-Western elite that dominated the country’s 

foreign and defense policies viewed Turkey’s affiliation with NATO and ties to the United States as defining and ensuring its status as a core member of the 

Western camp. 

NATO simultaneously defended Turkey against 

the Warsaw Pact and benefited from Ankara’s efforts 

to deter Soviet adventurism. Though confrontations 

occurred between Turkey and fellow Alliance member Greece over Cyprus and other issues, these conflicts actually highlighted NATO’s additional value in 

moderating differences between Athens and Ankara. 

Turkey has not only benefitted from NATO’s support, 

but has also contributed heavily to the Alliance’s effort 

to promote security in the Euro-Atlantic region and 

beyond. Turkey serves as the organization’s vital eastern anchor, controlling the straits between the Black 

Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and sharing a border 

with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Although the Cold War is 

over, NATO’s importance for Turkey remains. With 

much of Europe paralyzed due to the Euro crisis and 

with U.S. attention drifting eastward, Turkey has the 

opportunity to emerge as one of NATO’s new leaders, 
4

providing Ankara adopts more of a collective transatlantic perspective and stops trying to import its bilateral disputes with Israel and the EU into the Alliance’s 

multinational deliberations. Having been a member 

of NATO since 1952, an aspirant for EU membership 

for over a decade, and disposing of one of Europe’s 

most powerful military forces, Turkey must perforce 

be a key component of any effective European security architecture. Yet, finding an appropriate place for 

Ankara in the evolving EU-NATO balance has proven 

exceptionally difficult given the country’s continued 

exclusion from the EU and dispute with the government of Cyprus. 

Turkish officials have waged a protracted battle to 

influence EU security decisions and compel Greek Cypriots to reach a political settlement with their Turkish 

minority. In pursuit of these ends, they have proved 

willing to block EU-NATO cooperation on important 

security issues. A recurring problem is that Turkey is 

a member of NATO but not the EU, whereas Cyprus 

belongs to the EU but not NATO. The two countries 

have used the consensus rules of each organization 

to prevent one organization from cooperating with 

the other on important security issues. In particular, 

Turkish objections to the possible leaking of sensitive 

NATO military information to Cyprus have limited 

ties between the EU and NATO since Cyprus joined 

the Union in 2004. With no security arrangement in 

place, EU officers on the training mission for Afghan 

police are forced to improvise on the ground for their 

own protection with local International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders. 

These mutual antagonisms have constrained 

NATO-EU cooperation in general, and disrupted the 

joint NATO-EU security missions in Afghanistan, 
5

Kosovo, and in the Gulf of Aden in particular. For 

example, there is no comprehensive EU-NATO agreement on the provision by ISAF of security for the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) 

staff and no possibility to exchange classified and 

often critical information. Consequently, EUPOL has 

had to conclude individual agreements with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations and has even 

been obliged to hire a private company to guarantee 

its security and to maintain an extremely tight security policy. Moreover, Turkey and the United States 

did not conclude bilateral agreements with EUPOL. 

All this has slowed down EUPOL’s deployment 

and hampered its effectiveness.1 The AKP’s dominant 

form of security discourse, with frequent references to 

multilateralism, soft power, and critical dialogue, resembles more closely that used by EU rather than U.S. 

officials, who try to “keep all options on the table,” 

including the use of military force. But Turkey has always relied on the United States as well as NATO to 

provide such power when it is needed. For example, 

Turkey insisted on giving NATO control of the 2011 

Libyan intervention.2 Having NATO, rather than an ad 

hoc coalition or one led by the EU or United States, will 

likely remain Ankara’s preference as long as Turkey is 

excluded from the EU.3

NATO

When NATO was formed in April 1949, Turkey 

was not initially invited to join. Washington was reluctant to commit to defend distant Turkey, and had 

also rejected Turkish proposals for a bilateral alliance 

or a unilateral U.S. security guarantee. NATO’s West 

European members did not want to risk diluting the 
6

U.S. economic and other assistance they were receiving. Although some Turkish leaders wanted to pursue a more neutral foreign policy following NATO’s 

snub, Turkish policymakers continued to pursue 

NATO membership, believing the Alliance offered 

Turkey the optimal Western anchor. Turkey’s key 

contribution to the U.S.-United Nations (UN) Korean 

War effort augmented Ankara’s renewed membership 

campaign. In September 1951, NATO invited Turkey, 

along with Greece, to join the Alliance. The United 

States was hesitant to extend its involvement in the 

Middle East due to its commitments in Europe and 

Asia.4 Yet, with the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia, 

the decline of British influence in the Middle East, and 

the threat of Soviet aggression in the Mediterranean, 

the United States began to not only see the importance 

of the Middle East but also the importance of Turkey 

as a potential ally. At the time, several factors impeded 

Turkey’s admission into NATO. Influential European 

leaders considered Turkey as part of the Middle East 

and did not want to extend the Marshall Plan to Turkey.5

 Nonetheless, London, United Kingdom (UK), 

and Washington pushed for Turkey’s admission into 

NATO, primarily because of its “guardianship” of the 

Dardanelles and Bosporus. Under the Montreux Convention, Turkey could close these straits to the Soviet 

Navy in wartime.6

Turkey has since made major contributions to 

Western security. During the Cold War, Turkey 

helped constrain the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, provided one of the largest armies in Europe, 

and hosted key NATO military facilities. NATO 

planners were concerned with strategic weaknesses 

that could be exploited by the Soviet Union if war 

were to erupt between the Alliance and the Union of 
7

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). NATO’s boundaries 

stretched from the North Cape in Norway to Mount 

Agri in eastern Turkey, and while central Europe was 

the primary focus of NATO’s defense, its northern 

and southern flanks were dangerously exposed. Not 

only did NATO have to contend with Soviet ambitions in the Mediterranean, but it also had to deal with 

the deterioration of British influence in the Middle 

East and the disunity between the Arab states. The 

Middle East and the Mediterranean are also important 

because of vital transportation and communications 

lines and the raw materials located in the region.7 In 

addition, Turkey not only played an important role 

in intelligence gathering, early warning, forward basing, logistics, and training, but also served as a valuable link between the Middle East and the West. This 

was demonstrated during the U.S. landings in Lebanon in 1958 and the Jordanian civil war in 1970. Until its military intervention in the Cyprus crisis, Turkey was “a strong element of stability in the eastern 

Mediterranean.”8

The end of the Cold War, however, changed this 

relationship.9 Turkey cooperated with the United 

States in the 1991 Gulf War and contributed to NATObacked missions in the former Yugoslavia and Libya. 

But as the 1990s unfolded, Turkey suffered escalating 

terrorist violence in the southeast region, a major economic crisis, increased political polarization, a security vacuum in neighboring northern Iraq (which the 

PKK exploited), and perceived diminished Western 

interest and support.10 The September 2001 (9/11) attack on the World Trade Center marked a new era in 

NATO’s history, but it also led to a change of Turkey ́s 

role within the Alliance’s structure. The more diverse 

security environment in the post-9/11 world has led 
8

to NATO engagements far beyond the Euro-Atlantic 

area, and provided new importance to Turkey, given 

its geographical and cultural position in contemporary “out of area” missions.11 There are three main developments that gave Turkey a more significant role 

in the organization. First, NATO’s attention expanded 

to include a wider geographical focus, reaching countries with a strategic distance away from the Euro-Atlantic geography. This included a specific focus on the 

Middle East and countries located in Turkey’s neighborhood. Second, the allies reached a consensus to include terrorism in NATO’s agenda, creating a need for 

new means and strategies, which largely depended on 

local knowledge that Turkey could contribute regarding its region. Third, Turkey has close physical and 

other connections with Afghanistan.12

Turkey brings other important assets to the NATO 

Alliance. It is the only predominantly Muslim member 

of NATO and boasts one of the world’s most dynamic 

economies. The country’s rapid growth is allowing 

the country to enhance its military forces through both 

foreign purchases and an improving domestic defense 

industry. Thanks to its large population and the geographically broad perspective of its national security 

community, Turkey has one of the largest and most 

readily deployable armies in Europe. With a force of 

over 600,000 personnel and a military budget of close 

to $19 billion, Turkey has the second largest military 

in NATO.13 Turkey borders three security hotspots of 

concern for the Alliance: the Balkans, the Caucasus, 

and the Middle East. Turkey has contributed heavily 

to the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan, commanding 

ISAF on multiple occasions and stationing more than 

1,700 troops in Kabul. Turkey has made substantial 

contributions to the reconstruction of the country. 
9

One such example is the Vardak Provincial Construction Team, which was established in November 2006. 

Under its auspices, Turkey had provided $200 million worth of aid by 2008.14 At the same time, Turkey 

has deployed soldiers to Afghanistan to train Afghan 

soldiers and police belonging to the Afghan National 

Security Forces. Turkey’s training mission, its economic assistance, and its regional diplomatic initiatives aimed at reconciling Afghanistan and Pakistan 

are essential to promoting Afghanistan’s security and 

post-conflict reconstruction. President Abdullah Gül 

has said that, “As stakeholders in the region, we cannot expect that the United States and other Western 

powers solve the problems by themselves. We should 

shoulder our responsibilities.”15 In addition, by constructing roads, Turkish firms are building stronger 

economic relations and diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and other countries.16 With its involvement 

in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Turkey can not 

only take a stand against Taliban extremism, but also 

provide NATO with leverage against Iran.17

Turkey’s influence in the Balkans, another area of 

concern for NATO, remains strong, especially since 

Ankara has improved relations with Serbia. Turkey 

has made contributions to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), 

the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(SFOR), and the follow-on mission led by the European Union Force Althea.18 For years, Turkish warships 

have been helping patrol the Black Sea and eastern 

Mediterranean against terrorists and other threats to 

these vital lifelines. Ankara has supported expanding 

NATO’s roster of members and partners since the Alliance’s enlargement promotes stability in neighboring regions. Current Turkish efforts focus on assisting 

Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
10

Herzegovina in their efforts to join NATO at some 

point. In terms of NATO’s “new missions,” Turkey 

is playing a vital role in promoting NATO’s energy 

security by serving as a vital conduit for oil and gas 

reaching Europe from Eurasia, especially the Caspian 

basin and Russia. Turkey’s energy partnership and 

overall good relations with Russia, despite differences 

over the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 

(CFE) and Syria, have helped buffer Russia-NATO 

tensions on many issues. In the future, Turkish diplomats could help resolve the protracted conflicts in the 

former Soviet Union involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia. 

Ankara has also played a critical role in the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which 

is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian 

short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. 

assets, personnel, and allies in Europe.19 When the 

Obama administration announced the EPAA, it was 

in Turkey’s interest to integrate the U.S. program into 

NATO to present a transatlantic missile defense project as a NATO rather than a U.S. plan to its neighbors. 

In September 2011, Turkey agreed to host in Malatya 

a forward deployed AN/TPY-2 early warning radar 

system, operational since January 2012, as part of the 

EPAA ballistic missile defense program. Turkey has 

also played an important role in advancing NATO’s 

security in the Middle East. From August 2004 to June 

2013, Turkey hosted NATO’s Allied Air Command 

Headquarters. This Air Command, located in Izmir, 

was part of Allied Joint Force Command Naples and 

safeguarded almost three million square miles of airspace across NATO’s southern region. The Air Command in Turkey played an important role in Operation 

UNIFIED PROTECTOR against Libya.20 Turkey today 
11

hosts NATO’s Land Command headquarters, which 

is also located in Izmir, in addition to one of NATO’s 

six “Rapid Deployable Corps,” which are high readiness headquarters that can be quickly removed to lead 

NATO troops on missions within or beyond NATO 

territory.21 As part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, Turkey is reported to host U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.22 Turkey 

and NATO have been aligning their policies toward 

Syria throughout the crisis there. Turkey is playing 

a crucial role in promoting NATO’s energy security 

by serving as a vital conduit for oil and gas reaching 

Europe from Eurasia, especially the Caspian basin 

and Russia.

From Washington’s perspective, Turkey has an 

exemplary nuclear nonproliferation record. Neither 

the collapse of the Eastern bloc, nor the wars involving neighboring Iraq, which under Saddam Hussein 

sought nuclear weapons and used chemical ones, nor 

Iran’s nuclear ambiguous ambitions have prompted 

Turkey to pursue nuclear weapons. Of particular importance to Turkey’s foreign policy are arms control 

and disarmament treaties. Turkey became a party to 

the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 

2000. Turkey also joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 and the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the founding 

member of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding 

export controls of conventional weapons and dualuse equipment and technologies. Turkey joined the 

Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

in 2000, and the Australia Group that seeks to ensure 

that exports do not contribute to the development of 
12

chemical or biological weapons that same year. Turkey supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 

which was launched by President George W. Bush 

during a speech in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003. 

Turkey joined, as initial partner state, the “Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (GICNT), 

launched by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Bush, following a joint statement in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 

July 2006. Turkey hosted the Initiative’s second meeting in Ankara in February 2007. Turkey became a signatory to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 

Missile Proliferation (HCOC) at the conference held 

in The Hague, the Netherlands, in November 2002. 

Furthermore, Turkey joined the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons” (CCW) and its three Protocols 

(Protocol I, Amended Protocol II, and Protocol IV) in 

2005. Under the provisions of the Convention, Turkey 

is obligated to destroy its stockpiled anti-personnel 

land mines by 2008 and to clear mined areas by 2014. 

In order to destroy the stockpiled anti-personnel land 

mines, the “Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility” was built and has been operational since 

November 2007. 

Turkey’s nonproliferation bona fides were highlighted by the March 26-27 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Korea. Turkey’s delegation reported 

progress in adopting international treaties against 

nuclear terrorism, supporting UN and International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts in these areas, 

holding training courses for its customs and nuclear 

workers on nuclear security issues, participating in 

anti-nuclear smuggling initiatives, shipping dangerous highly enriched uranium spent reactor fuel to the 

United States for more secure storage, and upgrading 
13

the safety and security regulations for its emerging civilian nuclear energy program, especially the Akkuyu 

Nuclear Power Plant project.

Nonetheless, several developments could move the 

environment in a more adverse direction. Most obviously, unambiguous evidence could arise that Iran is 

pursuing nuclear weapons, which would compel Turkey to reassess its nuclear weapons policies. Turkey’s 

plans to expand its domestic nuclear energy program 

would, for the first time, provide its government with 

the scientific, technical, and industrial foundations to 

pursue genuine nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s 

own development of the capacity to make nuclear 

weapons has demonstrated to Ankara and others. But 

Turkey’s leaders might still decide that, even if Iran 

developed a small nuclear arsenal, they would be better off continuing to rely on NATO and Washington 

as well as Turkey’s powerful conventional military, 

bolstered by national and multinational missile defenses, rather than pursue an independent Turkish 

nuclear force as a means of deterring even a nucleararmed Iran.

EUROPEAN UNION

Turkey has been bidding to join the EU since 1959, 

only 2 years after the organization’s inception. Ankara achieved this goal on September 12, 1963, with 

the signing of the Agreement creating an association 

between the Republic of Turkey and the European 

Economic Community (EEC). This agreement aimed 

to move Turkey toward entry into a customs union 

with the EEC, both as an achievement in itself and as 

a means to facilitate Turkey’s accession into the EEC 

as a full member.23 This was accomplished with the 

1963 Ankara Accession Agreement and its Additional 
14

Protocol, which envisaged eventual EU membership; 

in 1995, Turkey joined the EU Customs Union. Turkey gained the right to export its goods duty free to 

EU countries though the freedom of movement was 

restricted to goods; Turks wishing to enter the EU still 

require an entry visa.

Negotiations toward Turkey’s accession to the EU 

officially began on October 3, 2005. This process requires that the parties negotiate and close all 33 chapters of the EU acquis communautaire (the corpus of EU 

laws and policies). The opening and closing of individual chapters is subject to unanimity among the 27 

EU member states, as is the final decision to conclude 

an Accession Treaty, making the whole process vulnerable to national vetoes and blackmail. All 27 EU 

governments must vote to open and close each chapter as well as to admit each new member.24 As of now, 

only 13 chapters have been opened to Turkey; the 

European Council suspended eight chapters in December 2006. Austria, Cyprus, France, and Germany 

have blocked another nine chapters.25 Turkey started 

accession negotiations with the EU at the same time 

as Croatia, which will soon join the EU. Fifteen other 

countries have joined the EU since 1987, when Turkey 

applied for full membership. Not only has Turkey’s 

membership drive stalled while the EU has grown 

from 12 to 27 countries, but the EU has declined other 

Turkish priorities, such as being extended the visafree entry privileges offered by all EU members to one 

another’s citizens under the Schengen Treaty. Egemen 

Bagis, Turkey’s Minister for EU Relations, has called 

these travel restrictions “not fair” since “Turkey is the 

only EU candidate country, whose citizens are still 

subject to visas.”26
15

Since coming to power more than a decade ago, 

the ruling AKP has used the EU entry requirements 

as a justification and catalyst to promote economic 

and political reforms at home that have also served 

to strengthen the Turkish economy and to curtail the 

power of the Turkish military. Public opinion polls 

show that Turkey’s EU membership drive continues 

to enjoy strong support among the country’s elite 

despite falling popular support for membership. In 

a January 2013 opinion survey, 87 percent of experts 

still favored joining the EU, while only 33 percent of 

the public were in favor of persisting.27 The other main 

political parties still officially support Turkey’s quest 

for EU accession. 

Yet, the question of Turkish accession has been 

problematic for many years. Many Europeans have 

been concerned about Turkey’s poor human rights 

record, restrictions on media freedoms, potential miscarriages of justice, constraints on Kurdish rights, and 

nonrecognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Disputes 

with EU countries over various Turkish domestic 

and foreign policies have led Turkish leaders to lose 

faith that Ankara will soon be invited to join as a full 

member. EU members have become preoccupied with 

organizational reform, economic restructuring, and 

integrating recent members. Efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) distinct 

from NATO have presented challenges for Turkey 

due to its limited influence on EU decisionmaking. In 

addition, many Europeans characterize the accession 

negotiations that formally began in October 2005 as a 

decades-long process that might not lead to full membership even if Turkey completes them successfully. 

Numerous domestic and external issues have negatively affected the negotiation process. Supporters of 
16

EU membership for Turkey argue that the AKP has 

managed to stabilize the economy and suppress the 

scope for military coups since it came to power in 2002. 

It has built good ties with international donor organizations and can count on the support of the European 

Commission in its dispute with the Constitutional 

Court in regards to its legitimacy.28 Critics argue that 

Turkey is mostly located in Asia. Also, the proximity to security areas such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria does 

not appeal to some EU leaders. They argue that EU’s 

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not ready to 

shoulder more responsibility in the Middle East, and 

that Turkey’s membership would link the otherwise 

fairly peaceful and quiet EU more strongly to a very 

volatile region in security terms. As for Turkey’s new 

political stability, critics argue that the AKP achieved 

this through suppression of government critics. The 

recent mass protests against the Erdoğan government 

have reinforced these concerns. 

 Public opinion in several EU countries, such as 

Austria and France, has opposed Turkey’s membership. This fact became significant when both governments announced they would hold referendums on 

Turkey’s accession. In addition, the 2004 entry into 

the EU of the Republic of Cyprus, not recognized by 

Turkey, further complicated matters since, once having joined, Cyprus could veto Turkey’s entry. The Cypriot government has blocked six chapters of Turkish 

accession negotiations, arguing that Ankara needs to 

normalize relations with them before being considered as a potential EU member.29 When Cyprus held 

the rotating EU presidency during the last 6 months 

of 2012, Turkey–EU relations froze solid with no progress in their negotiations and minimal official contact 

between Turkey and the EU. Leading EU countries, 
17

such as France and Germany, openly expressed their 

unease regarding Turkey’s joining the EU and instead 

proposed establishing a “privileged partnership” 

for Turkey short of membership, which Ankara has 

rejected. As a result, talks between Ankara and Brussels became rather quiet, stale, and unproductive 

throughout the following years and leading up to the 

present. Turks have become frustrated by these negotiations, which have been stalled for years. The EU’s

protracted crises have also considerably decreased 

Turkish interest in the organization.

The official reason given for suspending the accession negotiations with Turkey was Ankara’s refusal to 

apply the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey to the Republic of Cyprus.30 Vessels flying Cypriot 

flags are barred from entering Turkish ports.31 On July 

20, 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied a third of the 

island after a Greek initiated coup attempted to secure 

power and annex the island to Greece.32 The Turkish 

government seized for its citizens the northern section 

of the island, which they then self-declared to be the 

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The rest of the 

island, besides the small segment that is currently being occupied by UN Peacekeeping forces, is known 

as the Republic of Cyprus. The problem is that the 

Turkish government refuses to recognize the Republic 

of Cyprus because of their dispute over the rightful 

possession and subsequent governance of the island 

as well as the Northern Cyprus blockade currently in 

place. The Republic of Cyprus has been a member of 

the EU since 2004 and, as a result, many EU countries 

have banded together in support of that entity. The 

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized 

by the international community, including the EU, as 

an “occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus.”33 Tur-
18

key does not recognize the ethnically Greek Republic 

of Cyprus. EU nations such as France and Germany 

have unequivocally said to the Turkish government 

that they need to treat Cyprus the same as any other 

EU member state, starting with recognizing them as a 

sovereign nation. However, leadership from Ankara 

is standing its ground firmly in refusing to make such 

acknowledgments, even if it means possibly terminating their chance at joining the EU.34

France has played a lead role in impeding Turkey’s 

accession in recent years. The French government led 

the effort in 2006 to suspend the negotiations after 

Turkey refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. 

France vetoed 11 out of the 35 chapters, which caused 

the accession talks to virtually halt (only eight remain 

suspended as of early-2013).35 Relations rapidly deteriorated when the French Senate approved a bill that 

would punish those who deny internationally recognized genocides. Turks saw this legislative measure 

as an explicit reference to their denial of the Armenian 

genocide in 1915.36 Many Turkish officials argued that 

the bill was a campaign strategy by then French President Nicholas Sarkozy aimed at recruiting votes from 

the Armenian population in France.37 

In retaliation to the proposed bill, Turkey imposed 

immediate political, military, and economic sanctions. For example, Turkey did not renew permission 

for French military planes to use Turkish airspace.38

These sanctions were quickly lifted and a French court 

eventually negated the bill, but relations between the 

two countries remained cold throughout the Sarkozy 

presidency.39 However, since Sarkozy left office in 

2012, France has had a revamped policy regarding 

Turkish accession. President Hollande has openly 

stated his support for Turkey’s becoming an EU mem-
19

ber at some point.40 Following his election in 2012, his 

administration advocated opening some of the eight 

chapters of the accession talks that were closed.41 In 

February 2013, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told 

his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoğlu of his willingness to open Chapter 22 of the acquis regarding “Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments.”42 According to the European Commission, this 

chapter consists: 

mostly of framework and implementing regulations, 

which do not require transposition into national legislation. They define the rules for drawing up, approving and implementing Structural Funds or Cohesion 

Fund programs reflecting each country’s territorial 

organization. . . . Member States must have an institutional framework in place and adequate administrative capacity to ensure programming, implementing, 

monitoring and evaluation in a sound and cost-effective manner from the point of view of management 

and financial control.43

This was followed by Angela Merkel’s trip to Ankara in late-February 2013, where she not only supported the opening of Chapter 22, but also suggested 

potentially opening other chapters to advance the 

accession talks.44

Germany’s backing of France in welcoming the resumption of accession talks between Turkey and the 

EU was a major shift for Berlin. Germany has long 

been an opponent of Turkish accession despite having 

one of the largest Turkish populations outside of the 

native country. Chancellor Merkel was the first to propose a “privileged partnership” between Turkey and 

the EU as an alternative to full membership. Many 

Germans have long held a position of not wanting 
20

Turkey to become a member state, despite its booming economy and critical geographic location. Other 

EU officials have expressed concerns about the EU 

needing Turkey more than vice versa due to Turkey’s 

more dynamic economy and increased foreign policy 

options. German officials have also adopted a more 

positive attitude toward Turkey’s accession drive. In 

2012, German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, 

said that: 

We, the Europeans, should open chapters to negotiations with Turkey in the first half of 2013. Otherwise, 

in the upcoming term, our interest in Turkey may be 

greater than Turkey’s interest in us.45

Gunther Oettinger, Germany’s EU commissioner, said 

that the EU could eventually “crawl to Ankara on its 

knees to beg the Turks to join the EU.”46

Meanwhile, Turkish officials are maneuvering, 

such as by threatening to abandon the EU and seek 

membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to give Ankara more leverage in the accession negotiations. On October 12, 2011, the EU Commission released a “Positive Agenda” document that 

listed and rated progress being made between Turkey 

and the EU. It offered favorable conclusions regarding Turkey’s political reforms in key areas. The new 

EU approach is seen as a complement rather than a 

substitute for EU membership, since it could impart 

new momentum to the accession process as well as 

prepare Turkey better for it. The positive agenda includes eight areas of joint interest: political reforms 

in Turkey, visas, the EU acquis, migration, energy, 

trade, foreign policy dialogue, counterterrorism, and 

further participation of Turkey in EU programs. Joint 
21

EU-Turkish Working Groups have been formed to see 

how progress can be made regarding these issues. The 

newly created EU External Action Service has established a special Turkey team to support this process.

Turkey’s excellent economic performance during 

the past decade, contrasted with the overall economic 

weakness within the EU, has made Ankara a more attractive partner for the Union. In fact, former Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış has expressed the 

opinion of many Turks when he argued that Turkey 

should delay negotiating with the EU over accession 

since Turkey’s bargaining position will improve as the 

Turkish economy continues to perform much better 

than the EU average. Turkey’s economy is projected 

to grow for the next decade at an average rate of 6.7 

percent per year.47 It would already rank as the sixth 

largest among EU members. Turkey’s geography also 

makes it a natural conduit for EU trade and investment 

flowing eastward to Eurasia and the Middle East, and 

oil and gas from the Caspian Basin entering the EU.48

As a partial EU member, Turkey offers a large 

market for European goods and simultaneously acts 

as a gateway to markets in the Middle East and North 

Africa.49 For Berlin, this is especially crucial, given 

that Germany sustains its economy through exports.50

Conversely, Ankara’s continued interest in joining 

the EU results in part from Turkey’s economy still 

being oriented toward Europe. Although the percentage of Turkish trade involving the EU has continued 

to decline over time, some 38 percent of its imports 

originated from the EU in 2011, whereas 46 percent 

of Turkey’s exports go to EU members.51 Those shares 

amounted to $85 billion and $58 billion, respectively.52

These trade volumes have kept increasing despite 

the current Euro crisis and the more rapid growth of 
22

Turkey’s economic links with Russia and many other 

countries. Turkey’s imports from the EU increased by 

35.1 percent and 19.8 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively, while exports grew 18.4 percent and 12.7 percent in those same years. Approximately two-thirds 

of Turkey’s foreign direct investment still comes from 

the EU.53

But one might wonder how long Germany will 

hold this more flexible position. Merkel’s encouraging 

approach toward Turkish accession was partly due to 

the forthcoming German national elections in 2014. 

In the 2009 election, the Christian Democratic Party 

(CDP) eased its anti-Turkish position in order to appeal to the 690,000 Turkish voters54 and 3 million residents of Turkish origin living in Germany.55 The CDP 

might be preparing for a similar electoral gambit on 

this occasion. In addition, although Germany has now 

come out in favor of opening of a new chapter in negotiations, the German government has conditioned 

expanding the renewed EU-Turkey talks to cover 

additional chapters to Turkey’s applying its Ankara 

Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus.56 By enunciating this condition, the Merkel government has indicated its willingness to engage more with Turkey in 

the field of European integration, but stands firm on 

the matter of its accession to the EU. Indeed, the chapter opened is relatively minor and not subject to much 

controversy, unlike the chapters concerning human 

rights or Cyprus. Hence, Merkel’s change of position 

is more symbolic than significant.

Many other EU leaders naturally want to focus on 

addressing the EU’s internal problems before seriously discussing Turkish accession.57 Germany’s reaction 

to the recent thaw between France and Turkey is further complicated by the differing views among parties 
23

within Germany. Merkel’s CDP is much less favorably 

disposed to accession than the Free Democratic Party 

and the Social Democratic Party, which both officially 

favor full Turkish accession into the EU.58 The CDP 

prefers granting Turkey only partial membership in 

order to maintain good relations with one of Germany’s biggest economic partners.59 Even though Merkel 

reassured Turkey about the accession process, she did 

not promise full accession.60 Finally, despite the political pivots made by Germany and France, Turkey 

still faces many hurdles in the accession process. For 

example, France is still blocking four Chapters, while 

Cyprus is blocking another six, making full accession 

improbable in the near future. 61

TROUBLED TRIANGLE: NATO, THE EU,

AND TURKEY

Despite the difficulties with making progress in the 

EU admission process, European leaders are aware 

that Europe’s security cannot be separated from Mediterranean security, and there have been various attempts to establish a sustainable relationship between 

EU and Turkey. The task of redefining a security relationship between EU and Turkey has proved difficult, 

mostly because of EU’s internal problems with defining the limits of integration and responsibility within 

defense and security policy. As a result, it will most 

likely continue to be in Turkey’s interest to maintain 

NATO as the most powerful institution for defense 

and security in Europe even while Turkey continues 

to participate in military and civilian ESDP missions. 

Indeed, Turkey has been the most active participant 

in ESDP missions among countries outside of the EU, 

and more active than many EU-states as well.62
24

In 1992, Turkey was granted associate status in 

the Western European Union (WEU) as a means to 

allow for an EU-Turkey security partnership to develop even without granting Turkey full membership 

in the EU. Turkey was directly involved in planning 

and preparing WEU operations in which NATO assets 

and capabilities were to be used, thanks to Ankara’s 

status as one of the six “associate members” (Turkey, 

Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and the Czech 

Republic) that had membership in NATO and the 

WEU. Turkey could attend its bi-weekly ambassadorlevel meetings, send officers to the WEU defense planning cell, and have Turkish parliamentarians attend 

the sessions of the WEU Assembly. Turkey also had 

the right to participate fully in WEU decisions when 

they involved collective NATO assets.63 But Ankara 

lost this favorable situation when the EU decided to 

end the WEU’s role in the ESDI and develop the ESDP 

wholly within the EU instead. Turkey subsequently 

found itself marginalized in the European security 

system and feared that the EU could potentially operate in its areas of interest without Ankara’s having any 

input to the decision.64

NATO and the EU have sought to cooperate more 

effectively to address European security challenges. 

This collaboration has included sharing high-value 

but scarce assets, developing mutually profitable divisions of labor, and conducting joint operations, as 

in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and against Somali pirates. 

A priority is to avoid the creation of gaps, needless 

redundancies, institutional rivalries, or tensions between countries belonging to one but not the other—

such as Turkey and the United States. After decades 

of informal talks between their officials and member 

governments, NATO and the EU established formal 
25

institutionalized relations in 2001 in response to the 

EU’s expanding range of security and defense activities, as manifested in its ESDP. (Technically, it is the 

ESDP rather than the EU per se that has institutional 

ties with NATO).65 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty had 

designated the WEU as the EU’s defense component. 

Its main responsibility was to undertake the “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian missions, search and rescue operations, crisis management, peacekeeping, 

peace enforcement, and environmental protection). 

Maastricht also established an intergovernmental 

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). NATO 

and the WEU had developed extensive cooperation 

over the preceding decades. Welcoming potential EU 

contributions for the Petersberg tasks despite NATO’s 

also performing the same types of missions, NATO 

governments agreed in 1994 that the WEU could use 

NATO collective assets, following the approval of the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC), for Petersberg-type 

missions under the EU Common Foreign and Security 

Policy. The Alliance likewise approved the concept of 

Combined Joint Task Forces, whose “separable but 

not separate” deployable headquarters could be used 

for EU- as well as NATO-led operations. In June 1996, 

the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin sought 

to promote an ESDI within the Alliance in an effort 

to encourage European members to assume more of 

NATO’s roles and responsibilities by strengthening 

their defense capabilities. Under what became known 

as the “Berlin Plus” agreement, the ministers further 

agreed to make NATO assets available for WEU-led 

crisis management operations. 

Meanwhile, European governments also took 

steps to strengthen the EU’s security and defense role 

independent of NATO. At their December 1998 sum-
26

mit in St. Malo, France, the British and French governments issued a joint statement that affirmed the goal 

of establishing an ESDP within the EU. The following 

December, however, the European Council meeting in 

Helsinki, Finland, transferred the EU crisis management role from the WEU to the EU. At the November 

2002 Prague Summit, the NATO members consented 

in principle to making NATO assets and capabilities 

available for EU-led operations in which the Alliance 

was not militarily engaged. The EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP issued in December 2002 defined the political principles that would govern their relationship: 

effective mutual consultation; equality; institutional 

decisionmaking autonomy; respect for member states’ 

interests; and the coherent, transparent, and mutually reinforcing development of their military capabilities.66 The declaration affirms NATO’s continued 

role in crisis management and conflict prevention (as 

well as collective defense), while stating that the EU’s 

growing activities in the first two areas will contribute 

to their common goals. 

In March 2003, NATO and the EU finalized adoption of the Berlin Plus agreements that allows the 

EU to use NATO’s collective assets and capabilities 

for EU-led crisis management operations, including 

NATO’s command arrangements, logistics assistance, 

and assistance in operational planning, when NATO 

as an institution is not involved in the operation. Only 

EU members that are either also NATO members or 

that have joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

Program, and thereby established a bilateral security 

arrangement with NATO, are eligible to use these 

NATO assets.67 At the end of that month, the EU began its first Berlin Plus operation when its Operation 

CONCORDIA replaced the NATO-led Operation ALLIED HARMONY in the former Yugoslav Republic 
27

of Macedonia. After the transition, some NATO assets supported the EU-led follow-on operation.68 Another Berlin Plus operation began in late-2004, when 

the EU’s Operation ALTHEA replaced the NATO-led 

Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.69

As originally formulated, the Berlin Plus agreement Arrangement between NATO and the EU meant 

that the non-EU European NATO allies could contribute to EU-led operations without participating in the 

decisionmaking process regarding these operations. 

Consequently, Turkey decided to use its decisionmaking powers in NATO to stall implementation of Berlin Plus agreements to force the EU to accept a more 

favorable arrangement from Ankara’s perspective. In 

December 2001, Turkey, the UK, and the United States 

signed the Ankara Document, which guaranteed that 

NATO members not in the EU could participate in 

ESDP decisions when contributing to them. The EU 

heads of state and government adopted the document 

during their Brussels Summit in October 2002 as the 

“ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the 

Involvement of the non-EU European Allies.” This 

Nice Implementation Document served as the basis 

of the December 2002 NATO-EU Joint Declaration 

that was adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 

December 13, 2002, and the decision of the December 

2002 European Council session in Copenhagen, Denmark, that the Berlin Plus agreements would apply 

only to EU members that also belonged to NATO or 

had joined its PfP Program. The Copenhagen Summit 

also agreed that Turkey could participate in EU-led 

operations in its geographic vicinity if Ankara wanted 

to do so.70

Turkey has since become the largest contributor to 

ESDP missions of any non-EU country and has even 
28

contributed more than some EU members. According 

to many Turkish officials, however, the EU failed to 

live up to this commitment, resulting in Turkey being 

asked to contribute to ESDP operations that Ankara 

had little input in planning or initiating. In December 

2002, the EU issued a declaration of intent to establish nine 2,000-troop battle groups by 2007 as rapid 

reaction units for foreign crises. The EU has had two 

battle groups on permanent standby since 2007, but 

the failure of EU member governments to agree regarding how, when, and where to employ them has 

prevented them from ever being used.71 In November 

2004, the Turkish government declared its intent to 

contribute forces and capabilities to the battle groups, 

but in June 2007, Ankara withdrew its air and naval 

contributions due to its exclusion from ESDP decisionmaking structures.72 Further use of the Berlin Plus 

agreements has been limited due to their inapplicability to the short time frames intended for many EU 

crisis-response operations as well as their political and 

structural complexity.73 By contrast, in the ground operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in the 

maritime counterpiracy mission off Somalia, when 

EU and NATO missions have overlapped, the EU and 

NATO have established various ad hoc command 

and communications arrangements for these parallel 

operations.74

Since 2007, NATO and the EU have had some two 

dozen common member countries. But since both 

institutions decide many important security and defense issues by consensus, countries that have membership in one organization but not the other can exert 

substantial negative influence on the level of cooperation between the institutions. At present, NATO 

members Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the 
29

United States are not EU members, while the traditionally neutral or nonaligned EU members Austria, 

Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not 

NATO members, though four of the five (Malta since 

April 2008 but still not Cyprus) have joined NATO’s 

PfP, which allows for institutionalized cooperation 

between members and partners in support of NATO 

goals. All these countries participate in official NATOEU meetings. With Malta’s entry into PfP in 2008 and 

France’s re-entry into NATO’s Integrated Military 

Command in 2009, Cyprus has become the main outlier within the NATO-EU partnership. Cyprus is not a 

PfP member and, partly due to a Turkish veto, does not 

have a security agreement with NATO for exchanging 

classified documents. As a result, it uniquely cannot 

participate in official NATO-EU meetings, though informal meetings including Cyprus do occur. The row 

has led Greece and Cyprus to object to any Turkish 

participation in the development of the ESDP while 

Turkey has blocked the Greek Cypriots from joining 

EU-NATO meetings and from taking part in ESDP 

missions using NATO intelligence and resources. 

Turkish objections to sharing sensitive NATO 

military information with the government of Cyprus, 

which joined the EU in May 2004 despite its failure to adopt a UN-backed political settlement with 

the island’s Turkish minority, has limited formal 

NATO-EU intelligence sharing since then.75 The Cyprus government, sometimes assisted by Greece and 

other EU members, has retaliated by blocking Turkey’s participation in certain EU defense activities, 

such as the work of the European Defense Agency. A 

recurring justification is that Turkey has not complied 

with its obligations under its accession negotiations to 

open its ports and airports to Cypriot-registered ships 
30

and aircraft.76 The dispute has impeded a range of possible EU-NATO cooperation. The various EU-NATO 

institutional arrangements and meetings in Europe 

have been constrained by an inability to hold formal 

sessions with an agreed agenda or the authority to 

reach substantive decisions.77 These mutual antagonisms have also disrupted the joint NATO-EU security missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and in the Gulf 

of Aden off Somalia. Thanks to its full membership 

in NATO, Turkey has the ability in principle to deny 

the use of any NATO collective assets for any future 

EU-led mission.

When the December 2000 EU Summit in Nice, 

France, decided to exclude non-EU-NATO members 

from the EU’s security and defense decisionmaking 

mechanisms, Ankara’s national security community 

worried that it could have little impact on EU policies 

that could affect Turkey’s security. It also anticipated 

that the EU would therefore pay less attention to Turkish concerns than would the WEU and NATO. More 

generally, Turkish policymakers were concerned about 

the EU’s lack of will and ability to defend Turkey. In 

addition to the often grudging support for Ankara 

against the PKK terrorists and periodic denunciations 

of an “Armenian genocide” that many Turks deny 

ever occurred, many West European governments 

proved reluctant to render Turkey military assistance 

during the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. Due to 

its persistent capabilities-expectations gap, moreover, 

the EU did not (and still does not) look like it would 

soon develop more robust military assets comparable 

to those available to NATO, thanks largely to its U.S. 

membership. Conversely, there was the theoretical 

possibility that, in a confrontation between Turkey 

and Greece, the WEU would be obliged to side with 

Athens simply due to its EU membership.78 Finally, 
31

some Turkish policymakers resented that, due to the 

barriers placed on Turkey’s desired accession to the 

EU, the former Soviet bloc countries that would soon 

join the EU would have more influence on the organization’s European security policies than Turkey, a 

long-standing Western ally within NATO.79

Turkey aspires to a leadership role in the Alliance, 

but Turkey’s contributions risk being overshadowed 

by its petty efforts to limit NATO’s ties with Israel and 

the EU. Turkey’s love-hate relationship with the EU 

is a major complicating factor for Turkey’s NATO relationship. Even setting aside its frustrated EU membership ambitions, Turkey’s security relationship with 

the EU remains so problematic as to threaten its ties 

with NATO. The most immediate problem is the paralyzing effects of the Turkey-Cyprus dispute on institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU. The 

dispute with the EU, along with those with France and 

the United States in recent years, helps explain why 

opinion polls show that popular support for NATO 

is lower in Turkey than in any other member country. 

Turkish diplomats initially refused to allow EU leaders to attend NATO’s May 2012 heads-of-state summit 

in Chicago on the grounds that the EU was making 

no greater contribution to NATO than the 56-member Organization of Islamic Conference, then led by 

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish national, and other 

international organizations. In the end, the EU leaders were allowed to attend some NATO sessions but 

not others. 

Turkey’s relations with NATO have also suffered 

from various other problems, including de facto Turkish-Russian collusion to limit NATO’s presence in 

the Black Sea, diverging threat perceptions regarding 

Iran, and Ankara’s opposition to the appointment of 
32

Rasmussen as NATO’s Secretary General due to his 

stance, when head of the Danish government, on the 

Danish cartoon portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Nonetheless, Turkish policymakers definitely preferred having a transatlantic institution of which Ankara was a core member dominate European security 

than having EU structures potentially displace it. 

THE MIDDLE EAST

Turkey’s geostrategic position between Europe 

and the Middle East has made the country an important NATO ally and an essential partner for both the 

United States and European countries. With its secular 

values, it has been important for Turkey to preserve 

its Western ties. Although Turkey has never ignored 

its proximity to the Middle East, Ankara tended to collaborate the most with Iran, Israel, or other non-Arab 

states. But during the past decade, Turkey broke with 

Israel and reengaged in the Arab world after years of 

estrangement.80 In Washington and Ankara, expectations were high that Erdoğan’s successful “Turkish 

Model”—a moderate Sunni government with a dynamic economy tied to the United States--could be 

exported.81

The Obama administration assigned Turkey 

an important role in advancing U.S. interests in the 

Middle East while allowing Washington to stay in 

the background in a component of a “lead from behind” foreign-policy strategy.82 For both Turkey and 

Washington, trying to manage the difficult political 

transitions in the Middle East has become the primary 

issue in the Ankara-Washington relationship.83 This 

partnership has seen both progress and setbacks. With 

fresh self-confidence, the government in Ankara tried 
33

to meet these expectations using the soft power of its 

model along with skillful diplomacy. Of course, given 

the situation in the region today, the “zero problems” 

phrase has become something of a joke for Ankara. 

Following some transient improvements, Turkey’s relations with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and other 

Middle Eastern governments have regressed to their 

troubled mean and sometimes even worse. Ankara 

is the only government not to have an ambassador 

in Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv simultaneously. 

At the cost of some popularity, Erdoğan is seen as 

the champion of radical Sunni policies in the Middle 

East rather than a renewed Ottoman leader. Turkey’s 

troubles with its neighbors have helped drive Ankara 

back toward the United States, which has the hard 

power even if it chooses not to use it, but Turkish-U.S. 

differences regarding many Middle Eastern issues 

are acute. 

Syria.

Since the Syrian crisis began, Turkey and the 

United States have been effectively coordinating their 

policies. They first sought to induce Bashar al-Assad, 

whom Washington was trying to wean away from 

Iran, to introduce reforms demanded by the moderate protesters. But after Assad only made fig-leaf reforms designed to divide the opposition and reduce 

foreign resistance, Washington and Ankara demanded a change of regime in Damascus. They have since 

imposed various sanctions on the Syrian government, 

but these measures have been challenged by China, 

Iran, and Russia. Although Turkey and the United 

States have followed similar paths regarding Syria, 

the journey has proven far costlier to Turkey. Bilateral 
34

trade between Turkey and Syria reached $2.5 billion 

in 2010, making Turkey Syria’s largest trading partner, but has since collapsed, as have various Turkish visions of establishing a free trade agreement, a 

customs union, or other region-wide economic structures. In addition, Turkey has accepted more than 

600,000 refugees from its neighbor in accordance with 

Ankara’s “open door” policy to those fleeing the civil 

war.84 Additionally, both the Syrian National Council 

and the Free Syrian Army have used Turkey as a base 

for organizing their resistance against Assad’s forces. 

Turkey has also supported the war against Assad by 

quietly allowing the passage through its territory of 

volunteers from Muslim countries to fight in Syria. 

In addition, some sources claim that the Syrian rebels have received weapons and other military support 

transported through Turkey and funded by Qatar and 

Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government has denied 

this claim on several occasions.85 Even so, the confrontation with Syria has contributed to negating Turkey’s 

“zero-problems” policy toward its neighbors. In contrast, the United States had few economic or diplomatic ties with Assad’s regime, so lost little in calling for 

his removal and imposing sanctions on his country. 

It is easy to forget that the relationship between 

Turkey and Syria significantly improved after the 

AKP came to power in November 2002. When Prime 

Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu began their intense effort to improve the relations with 

the country’s neighbors, Syria became one of the most 

important targets. The Turkish effort to strengthen 

relations with Syria resulted in frequent meetings between Erdoğan and Assad bolstered by growing diplomatic and commercial ties between the two countries. On December 22, 2004, Turkey and Syria signed 
35

a free trade agreement (the Association Agreement) in 

Damascus, which entered into force in January 2007.86

In many ways, Syria became a showcase symbol of 

Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy of zero problems 

with neighbors. But Erdoğan misjudged when he 

believed he could persuade Assad to accept needed 

reforms.87 As the situation in Syria became worse during the summer of 2011, Davutoğlu went to Damascus 

to encourage Assad in person to end his repressive 

policies. The mission failed. Following Assad’s continuing use of violence against his own people, Turkey drastically changed its policy toward Syria. Both 

countries withdrew their diplomatic representatives 

and suspended the Association Agreement.88 Erdoğan 

became one of the first leaders to call for Assad to 

leave power.89

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and Turkey’s willingness to harbor Syrian rebels and refugees, 

Turkey has been subjected to a series of cross-border 

attacks. In an April 2012 incident, Syrian soldiers 

opened fire on Syrian rebels and refugees in the Turkish town of Kilis, killing two Syrian refugees and 

wounding some two dozen people.90 The downing of 

a Turkish fighter plane over Syrian air space in June 

2012 was but the most prominent of several incidents 

of the deteriorating security situation between the 

two countries.91 Following the incident, the Turkish 

government decided, with Washington’s encouragement, to request assistance only under Article 4 of the 

North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for urgent consultations if a NATO member considers its security 

interests threatened. 

Turkey did not seek Article 5 protection, which 

calls for collective defensive actions to counter threats, 

because few NATO members want to employ military 
36

force against Syria. The Alliance justified deploying 

Patriot air defense missiles in southern Turkey as a 

purely defensive “precautionary measure” to counter 

any threat emanating from Syria.92 NATO’s Patriot 

Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Interceptor 

Batteries are some of the most sophisticated air and 

missile defense systems in Western inventories. Combined with the high accuracy of their radar sensors 

and targeting systems, the Patriots can intercept foreign warplanes and short-range ballistic missiles as 

far as 100 kilometers (km) away, allowing them to 

command an area well beyond the Turkish-Syrian 

border—all of northern Syria to include the embattled 

towns of Aleppo and Homs.93

While the earlier 1990 and 2003 Turkish requests 

for Patriots from NATO provoked major intra-Alliance divisions, on this occasion the NATO decisionmaking process went more smoothly. Davutoğlu 

and other Turkish diplomats engaged in lengthy and 

comprehensive consultations with the other NATO 

governments even though only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States have the PAC-3s.94 NATO 

largely has remained aloof from the Syrian crisis, 

but with the Patriot systems have come hundreds of 

NATO troops to operate, maintain, and protect the Patriot interceptors, their radars, and their other support 

elements. In effect, the NATO personnel have become 

a “trip wire” that makes NATO military intervention 

more likely following future Syrian-Turkish border 

clashes. This tactic has seemingly worked. Since the 

missiles arrived, there have not been any further major airstrikes against Turkish territory. The Syrian military has likely been more cautious in its operations 

near the Turkish border. Even so, NATO has not tried 

to use its Patriots to establish a no-fly zone over Syr-
37

ian airspace, which the systems have the capacity to 

do. Such a step would make it easier for the guerrillas 

to establish camps and troop concentration across the 

border in Syrian territory. 

Some Turkish officials and commentators have 

called for Turkish military intervention to protect Syria’s civilians or Ankara’s economic and security interest.95 The Turkish government has reinforced its border and authorized more flexible rules of engagement 

for the TSK to respond to potential threats from Syrian 

forces approaching the Turkish border. Turkey has 

experienced numerous cross-border attacks by Syrian 

government forces, terrorist attacks by groups linked 

to the Assad regime, and a surging number of Syrian 

refugees taking up residence in Turkey—whose numbers have exceeded by several orders of magnitude 

the burden Turkish leaders said at the beginning of 

the war they could tolerate. If Turkey does intervene 

militarily, the Obama administration would likely 

again follow its “lead from behind” strategy and, as in 

Libya, provide primarily low-profile intelligence and 

logistics support for the Turkish military. Washington has been concerned that the failure to uphold its 

perceived “red lines” in Syria will decrease U.S. credibility and encourage Iran, North Korea, and other 

countries to challenge other declared U.S. red lines. 

But although Ankara and Washington have had their 

opportunities to intervene more directly in the Syrian conflict, they repeatedly have declined to exploit 

possible pretexts for employing their armed forces to 

remove Assad.

Neither Turkey nor the United States wants to 

intervene militarily in the Syrian war. Ankara has 

declined to exploit several opportunities that would 

have served as pretexts, including cross-border shoot-
38

ings and shelling against refugees fleeing into Turkey. 

On paper, the TSK should be able to defeat the divided and weakened Syrian military, but the Turkish 

military has fought only irregular PKK guerrillas for 

the past few decades and lacks experience in invading 

and occupying a foreign country. An invading Turkish military might be welcomed as liberators by Syrian 

Sunnis, but the country’s Kurds and Alawites would 

more likely respond negatively to a Turkish occupation force and perhaps even respond with an antioccupation insurgency such as those that harassed the 

U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps the main 

Turkish concern is that, once Turkish forces occupy 

Syria, they will become bogged down trying to suppress the fighting among the various factions. 

The Syrian regime is not without means to retaliate 

for whatever measures Turkey and the United States 

adopt in support of Assad’s opponents. In partnership with Iran, the Syrian government could resume 

its pre-1998 practice of providing extensive support 

for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Many PKK 

operatives were born or based in Syria. The recent 

upsurge in PKK attacks against Turkish targets may 

be a Syrian-Iranian warning to Ankara to moderate 

its pressure on Assad. Even excluding the PKK factor, 

a Turkish decision to intervene on behalf of Assad’s 

opponents risks labeling Turkey as a regional champion of Sunni Arabs, despite Turkish efforts to define 

the Syrian crisis as a humanitarian issue rather than a 

sectarian one. Although Turkey and the United States 

have called for Assad’s removal, the incumbent president is not the center of gravity, in Clausewitzian 

terms, of the war, as Maummar Qaddafi was in Libya. 

Whereas Qaddafi’s death ended his unique regime, 

in Syria the regime’s power resides with the security, 
39

business, and political elites. This system of collective 

rule, which has a sectarian orientation due to the large 

numbers of minority Alawites among the elite, could 

easily result in a continuation of Assad’s policies even 

if the incumbent president leaves office. 

The Turkish authorities have allowed members of 

the opposition Syrian National Council and the Free 

Syrian Army to organize on Turkish territory, but the 

disunity of the Syrian opposition factions remains a 

problem. Even many Syrians are reluctant to embrace 

these opposition bodies for fear that they will become 

dominated by Sunni extremists. Although Turkish 

and U.S. officials have sought to purge al-Qaeda operatives from their ranks, the Turkish authorities have 

proven less sensitive to the concerns of Syria’s nonSunni ethnic and sectarian groups. Turkish and U.S. 

officials have long been considering the option of establishing a border buffer zone or safe areas deeper 

inside Syrian territory, where refugees could find safe 

shelter without entering Turkish territory. But the experience in the Balkans in the 1990s made clear that, 

unless backed by air strikes and robust ground forces, 

the adversary will not respect these safe havens.

Both governments would like to avert further 

civil strife and achieve a rapid transition to a stable 

and prosperous Syria under a new government. They 

also want to prevent extremist groups from exploiting 

the chaotic situation to break Syria apart or transform 

the country into a terrorist safe haven. U.S. officials 

share Turkish worries about the adverse regional repercussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assad 

is overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, then 

the Iraqi government and state might soon follow, 

creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurds 

in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. Turkish 
40

leaders note that a continuation of the Syrian fighting, 

which has already spread to parts of Lebanon, risks 

provoking a wider sectarian war that will hurt Turkey even if its troops refrain from directly intervening 

in Syria. Meanwhile, the Kurds in Syria are gaining 

the kind of autonomy enjoyed until now only by the 

Kurds of northern Iraq. In order to concentrate Syrian 

forces elsewhere, the regime has withdrawn its troops 

from Kurdish-dominated towns in northern Syria and 

allowed a major Syrian Kurdish movement, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to take charge of municipal 

administration to prevent the Syrian Free Army from 

seizing the region.96 Turkish officials suspect the PYD 

of having links with the PKK. Erdoğan warned that, 

“We will not allow the terrorist organization to pose 

a threat to Turkey in Syria; it is impossible for us to 

tolerate the PKK’s cooperation with the PYD.”97 U.S. 

officials are also worried about the adverse regional 

repercussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assad 

is overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, then 

the Iraqi government and state might soon follow, 

creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurds in 

Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. U.S. officials 

join Turks in asserting that: 

we are equally clear that we don’t see for the future 

of Syria an autonomous Kurdish area or territory; we 

want to see a Syria that remains united . . . any movement towards autonomy or separatism . . . would be a 

slippery slope.98

Given the reluctance to employ direct military 

force against Syria, the Turkish and U.S. governments 

favor less costly options that nonetheless go beyond 

the current sanctions. The United States and several 

European governments have been providing com-
41

munications equipment, training, and other forms 

of nonlethal assistance to the guerrillas. Some Gulf 

countries reportedly are supplying weapons as well 

as fighters and trainers. As a result, the Assad regime 

has remained in power thanks to even greater support 

from Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, whose 

decision last year to send large numbers of armed 

fighters to Syria saved Assad at a critical time in the 

war. The Syrian regime has skillfully polarized the 

conflict to exploit popular fears that an insurgent victory would result in Sunni extremists dominating the 

new regime, which would suppress Syria’s non-Sunni 

minorities and transform the country into a Talibanstyle regime and an al-Qaeda bridgehead.99 The opposition has been divided into feuding political leaders 

and indeed depends on al-Qaeda-affiliated groups for 

its best fighters. Since neither Turkey nor the United 

States is prepared to send large numbers of ground 

forces to Syria to attain these goals, they are increasing 

the likelihood of post-Assad civil strife in Syria, with 

adverse consequences for neighboring countries.

The Syrian conflict has had an ambiguous impact 

on Turkish-U.S. relations. It has directed their policymakers to focus on strategic issues at a time when 

both sides are eager to diversify the partnership. Since 

the Syrian Civil War, Ankara and Washington have 

been preoccupied with harmonizing their Middle 

East and Syria policies. The conflict presents both 

countries with the prospect of relying on a weak, divided, and increasingly extremist guerrilla force, or 

using their own forces directly in Syria, which would 

entail a difficult post-conflict stabilization and probable state-building missions. For the past few years, 

Turkey and the United States have undertaken many 

limited measures designed to remove the Assad gov-
42

ernment, but none have succeeded. They have pursued the relatively low-cost policy option of seeking 

to induce Assad to give up voluntarily in some form 

of managed political transition to a broader and more 

representative regime. Yet their efforts to organize a 

credible Syrian government-in-exile have been frustrated by divisions and jealousies among Assad’s opponents. With extensive Turkish backing, the military 

opposition has grown stronger, but has proved unable 

to achieve decisive victories. If anything, the military 

balance has shifted in favor of the Syrian government, 

though Assad’s forces lack the strength to win the 

war quickly. 

Neither the Turkish nor the U.S. governments have 

considered Assad’s removal a sufficiently vital national interest as to warrant the use of their own troops 

in Syria. Turkey would like the Pentagon to do it, but 

U.S. policy has focused on keeping the conflict largely 

contained within Syria, which has succeeded thus far, 

and more recently securing the elimination of all its 

chemical weapons. U.S. policymakers have increasingly recognized the dangers of repeating past policy 

failures in Syria. As in 1979, the United States risks 

replacing an odious dictator who nonetheless has not 

threatened core U.S. national security interests with 

an extremist religious regime whose members would 

be ideologically prone to attack the United States and 

its regional allies in Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. As in 

the 1980s when Washington inadvertently allowed alQaeda to exploit the war against the Soviet occupation 

of Afghanistan to develop a powerful regional base 

and network, in Syria the United States risks the transformation of a popular uprising against an unfriendly 

regime into a Sunni-defined jihad that could easily extend against American and other Western targets. 
43

At worst, a Taliban-like regime will take power 

in Damascus and encourage the new al-Qaeda linked 

network of Syrian fighters and their foreign supporters to extend their guerrilla campaign to neighboring 

countries. Removing Assad is also not a critical vital 

interest for the United States. Washington has lived 

with the Assad dynasty for decades and can probably continue to do so. Assad’s removal could weaken 

Tehran’s influence in the Middle East, but would neither prevent Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons nor 

necessarily facilitate an Arab-Israel peace agreement. 

The Assad regime may miscalculate and finally force 

Ankara’s or Washington’s hands, but the most likely 

scenario for the next few years is a continuation of 

the current crisis, with the possibility of a renewed 

Ankara-Washington rift. 

Turkish leaders would have liked to see more vigorous actions by the Obama administration against 

the Assad government. In an interview with The Washington Post, President Abdullah Gül stated that he did 

not see the U.S.-Russia framework agreement on eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons as leading to a comprehensive solution to the crisis. He also implied that 

dealing with Assad to secure their elimination was 

immoral, given Assad’s crimes; only his overthrow 

would bring an enduring solution to the country’s 

security threats.100 That the United States and Russia 

reached the Syrian agreement without Turkey’s participation, let alone consent, likely reinforced Turkish 

animosity to the agreement. In a reversal of the Iraq 

situation a decade ago, the beleaguered Turkish government has increasingly pressed the United States to 

adopt a more assertive stance in a neighboring Arab 

country. Turkish officials have called for arming the 

rebels, establishing no-fly zones to negate the devas-
44

tating effects of Syrian air power, and making a greater effort to deny foreign arms shipments to the Syrian 

government. 

In contrast, Washington remains uncomfortable 

regarding the skills and ideological inclinations of the 

Syrian insurgents, and tensions have grown between 

Washington and Ankara over how to handle the extremist element of the Syrian resistance. Although 

opposed to al-Qaeda, whose affiliates have conducted 

terrorist attacks inside Turkey against Western and 

other targets, the Turkish government has allowed 

Sunni militants a free hand in using its territory to train 

and equip fighters for the Syrian campaign. Ankara 

has also permitted Qatar and Saudi Arabia to provide 

lavish funding for the most extremist factions within 

the resistance. The narrative advanced by these Gulf 

monarchies—that what is occurring in Syria is an oppressed Sunni population finally overthrowing an oppressive Iranian-back regime—resonates well among 

the Sunnis of Syria, Iraq, and even many Turks. Sunni 

militants in Syria are some of the most effective as 

well as dogmatic opposition fighters. Iraq’s own Sunni militants are obtaining weapons and combat training that they will likely later use against the Baghdad 

government. Their hope is that, if Assad falls and a 

Sunni-led regime takes charge in Damascus, then the 

Iraqi Sunnis will receive even more assistance since 

they could benefit from the direct support of the new 

Syrian government as well as the assistance of many 

returning Syrian veterans and renewed enthusiasm 

for Sunni-based insurgencies. 

Turkish officials continuously have denied the 

claim that they have supported radical groups like 

Jabhat al-Nusra, but, until recently, the government in 

Ankara has turned a blind eye to the issue. An affiliate 
45

of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra is a Sunni jihadist faction 

that fights alongside the more moderate Free Syrian 

Army against the Assad regime. Many of its members are foreigners who are primarily from Middle 

Eastern countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.101 However, international pressure 

combined with fears of domestic blowback has led the 

government to adjust its strategy toward Syria’s extremist groups. For example, the arrests of suspected 

al-Nusra members in Turkey were followed by deadly 

car-bombings in Reyhanli.102 Gül has since stated that 

these radical groups threatened Turkey’s security.103

Ankara is especially concerned with the growing 

presence near its borders of Jabhat al-Nusra and other 

fighters connected with the al-Qaeda linked Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).104 A related concern 

is that the radicals will gain the military upper hand 

in Syria and attack the moderate opposition, weakening its international support and legitimacy.105 Turkey 

has now begun a stricter border control and a more 

sensitive evaluation of which opposition groups to 

support. The authorities have been taking measures 

to prevent Turkish youth from joining radical Islamist 

groups.106 The United States should continue to support these efforts, presumably with low-profile Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence assets.

U.S. officials have parried Turkish proposals to 

consider the option of establishing a border buffer zone or safe areas deeper inside Syrian territory, 

where refugees could find safe shelter without entering Turkish territory. Turkey created a similar zone 

in northern Iraq in 1991, which allowed more than a 

million Iraqi Kurds to escape Saddam Hussein’s expected retribution for their failed 1991 uprising after 

the Kuwait war. Ankara and Washington could also 
46

apply the model used in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and create no-fly zones, safe havens, 

and humanitarian corridors to protect Syrian civilians 

and accelerate the disintegration of the Syrian army 

by enticing more military defectors, who could flee to 

the zone with their families. At one point, Davutoğlu 

reportedly expressed interest in establishing such 

a corridor that would extend from the sea, perhaps 

even to Cyprus, rather than near the Turkish border. 

But the lesson of the 1990s is that, unless backed by 

air strikes and robust ground forces, the adversary 

will not respect these safe havens. Assad’s military is 

considerably stronger than Qaddafi’s, so any no-fly 

zone would need to be robustly enforced. It would 

need to begin with a preemptive strike against the 

Syrian military to destroy its planes and helicopters, 

degrade its ground forces and command and control 

networks, and weaken the morale of the Syrian forces. 

Then it would resemble the no-fly zone established 

over northern and southern Iraq after 1991 by the 

United States and other NATO governments, which 

required repeated strikes against Iraqi targets (such 

as air defense units) to prevent Saddam’s forces from 

re-grouping. It is doubtful that Chinese and Russian 

governments would provide UN authorization for 

any such enforcement measures, so the Turkish and 

U.S. governments would need to justify the measures 

on the basis of self-defense. U.S. officials point to 

significant differences between the Libyan and Syrian situations, notably the lack of an authorizing UN 

resolution as well as greater divisions within the Arab 

League and NATO about the wisdom of intervening. 

In the absence of more universal regional support or 

a more sold backing in international law, U.S. officials 

are more reluctant to employ force in Syria. 
47

Iraq.

Turkey has several core interests in Iraq: cultivating ties with the various Iraqi factions; preventing the 

PKK from using northern Iraq as a base of operations; 

balancing the influence of Iran; securing access to 

Iraqi oil and other economic opportunities; and generally seeking to promote stability in a key neighboring 

region. In particular, a mixture of defensive and offensive motives has been driving Turkish policy toward Iraq. The defensive consideration is the conviction among Turkish leaders that Prime Minister Nouri 

al-Maliki’s divisive policies, designed to weaken his 

rivals for power and rally Shiite partisans behind him, 

are leading Iraq back toward sectarian civil war. They 

fear that renewed confrontation could undermine 

Turkey’s economic interests in Iraq, present Ankara 

with yet another humanitarian crisis on its border, 

and undermine Turkey’s carefully crafted policy of 

containing Kurdish nationalism in Iraq within tightly 

constrained limits. Another defensive goal of Turkey 

is to keep Iranian influence in Iraq limited. Although 

Ankara has sought to develop better ties with Iraq’s 

Shiite majority, Turkey generally has sought to balance Tehran’s use of some Iraqi Shiites as its main local proxies by supporting various Sunni and Kurdish 

leaders in Iraq. Ankara does not want to wage a proxy 

battle with Iran on Iraqi soil, but it wants to ensure 

that a coalition government in which Turkish interests are represented rules Baghdad. Turkish leaders 

also aim to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan is governed by 

leaders that will take Ankara’s economic and especially security interests into account. Al-Maliki naturally 

resents what he sees as Turkish efforts to contain his 

power and divide and rule parts of Iraq. The Turkish 
48

government has employed several tools in pursuit of 

these goals in Iraq—diplomatic initiatives, economic 

ties, and, when necessary, military power.

Turkey suffered security and economic problems 

as a result of the 2003 Iraq War, but the conflict did 

enhance Ankara’s regional influence by deepening 

the power vacuum that had emerged after the 1991 

Persian Gulf War. The AKP government has filled this 

vacuum by extending its influence in many neighboring countries in what some observers describe as a 

“neo-Ottoman” policy, a label rejected by AKP leaders. Turkey’s influence in Iraq has grown considerably 

in recent years as Turkish policymakers have adopted 

more inclusive policies and as economic and cultural 

intercourse between Iraqis and Turks has grown. But 

sources of tension do exist in the relationship. The 

Turkish military regularly violates Iraqi sovereignty 

by attacking PKK targets in northern Iraq, sometimes 

through large cross-border ground invasions. Some 

Iraqis still suspect that Turkey would like to establish 

de facto control over northern Iraq, which used to belong to the Ottoman Empire. If the situation in Syria 

stabilizes, then that country rather than Turkey could 

provide the main oil pipeline conveying Iraqi crude 

to European markets. Turkey and Iraq have regularly disputed access to water and the management 

of shared waterways, with Iraqis objecting in the past 

to various Turkish dam projects that could reduce the 

flow of water to downstream countries like Iraq and 

Syria. Should Iraq ever come under the control of a 

government hostile to Turkey, Ankara could use the 

KRG as a buffer to shield Turkey from Baghdad as 

well as a means to exert pressure on Iraqi policies. But 

Turkish officials have been careful to refrain from discussing such an option for fear of exacerbating wor-
49

ries that Ankara’s real objective is to recover northern 

Iraq, the former Ottoman vilayet of Mosul.

The United States and some Arab governments 

have generally encouraged Turkey to expand its presence in Iraq. Not only does Turkey help dilute Iranian 

influence, but Turkish business activities also generate 

economic growth and jobs in Iraq, helping the country 

recover from decades of war and civil strife. Furthermore, many U.S. leaders still see Turkey’s Islamicinfluenced, but essentially secular, political system as 

a model of the type of political and social system that 

could work well in Iraq, with its large Sunni minority 

and secular tradition, or at least as offering a superior 

alternative to that of an Iranian-style Shiite autocracy. 

Even religious Turks such as AKP leaders espouse a 

moderate form of Sunni Islam that exudes tolerance 

toward Shiites and other Islamic minorities. This trend 

is likely to continue as U.S. influence in Iraq declines 

further in coming years with the withdrawal of U.S. 

troops and the natural deeper integration of Iraq into 

mainstream Middle East politics. By helping keep Iraq 

out of Tehran’s orbit and linking Baghdad to the West, 

Ankara increases its own regional influence and enhances its value as a strategic partner of Washington 

and Persian Gulf governments.

The nadir of Turkish influence in Iraq occurred 

after the Anglo-American invasion of March 2003. 

Despite the offer of billions of dollars of U.S. aid, the 

Turkish parliament voted against a reluctant proposal 

by the new AKP government to allow the U.S. military to attack Iraq through Turkey’s southeast border 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Instead, 

the Pentagon had to spend considerable time repositioning its troops to enter Iraq through its southern 

border. The George W. Bush administration partly 
50

blamed the Turkish parliament’s decision for the subsequent emergence of the anti-Western insurgency 

in Iraq. In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that, “If we had been able to get the 4th 

infantry Division in from the north through Turkey

. . . the insurgency would have been less.”107 By then, 

Turkish public opinion had turned solidly against 

Washington’s Iraq policies. Turks perceived the U.S. 

promotion of an autonomous Kurdish quasi-state in 

northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government, 

as inspiring Kurdish separatism in Turkey and providing a de facto sanctuary for PKK terrorist attacks 

on Turkish civilians, which escalated following the 

Anglo-American invasion. Another source of concern 

was how Turkey’s exclusion from the occupying coalition combined with the tensions between Ankara 

and Washington had minimized Turkish influence in 

post-Saddam Iraq.

Since 2007, the Turkish and U.S. Governments have 

cooperated more effectively with the Turkish military 

to counter PKK activities in northern Iraq. Before then, 

Ankara had complained repeatedly that Washington 

was paying insufficient attention to Turkey’s security 

interests in northern Iraq, especially PKK activities in 

the KRG. But the deaths of 13 Turkish soldiers in a 

border clash in October 2007 led the United States to 

provide intelligence and other assistance to the Turkish military, which conducted air and ground attacks 

against PKK targets in northern Iraq. The more precise 

Turkish attacks minimized Kurdish civilian casualties 

and therefore KRG complaints.108

Since then, in line with the AKP’s “zero problems” with neighbors policy, Erdoğan, Gül, and other 

Turkish policymakers have sought to balance unilateral military action with the application of soft power 
51

means of influence in Iraq, primarily by deepening cultural, education, and business ties with Iraqis. In July 

2008, Turkey and Iraq signed a joint political declaration that established a high-level strategic cooperation 

council aimed at establishing a “long-term strategic 

partnership.” The agreement also calls for joint efforts 

to prevent terrorists and illegal arms from moving 

across their border. The council has since served as 

a discussion forum for the prime ministers and other high-level government officials of both countries. 

They have met several times a year to improve cooperation regarding energy, security, diplomatic, and 

economic issues. 

The reorientation in Turkey’s policy toward Iraq 

culminated in Gül’s March 23-24, 2009, trip to Iraq, the 

first official presidential-level visit to the country in 33 

years. The trip also resulted from a sustained Turkish campaign to improve ties with the KRG. In 2009, 

Turkey opened consulates in Erbil (the KRG capital), 

Basra, and Mosul—major regional centers of Kurdish, 

Shiite, and Sunni influence, respectively—in a tangible 

display of support for a unified Iraq.109 Within Iraq, 

Turkish leaders first developed extensive ties with 

Iraq’s Sunni minority, which until Saddam Hussein’s 

overthrow in 2003 ruled over Iraq’s other minorities 

as well as its Shiite majority. Turkey then improved 

relations with the leaders of Iraq’s Kurdish minority, 

who prudently distanced themselves from the PKK 

and embraced the economic opportunities offered by 

the Kurds. 

In addition to reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni and 

Kurdish minorities, the AKP has also attempted to 

develop ties with Iraqi Shiites, including reaching out 

to populist Shiite cleric, Moktada al-Sadr, by training 

lawmakers belonging to al-Sadr’s party in parliamen-
52

tary protocol. In addition, a Turkish consortium participated in an $11 billion renovation project in Sadr 

City, Baghdad’s largest Shiite neighborhood. In October 2009, Turkey opened a consulate in Basra, a Shiitedominated southern port city and Iraq’s only large 

seaport in a major oil-producing region. To further 

signal his government’s desire to reach out to Iraqi 

Shiites, Erdoğan became the first modern Turkish 

leader to attend the Shiite commemoration of Ashura 

(in December 2010) and visit Imam Ali’s tomb in Najaf 

(in March 2011), one of the most important Shiite sites 

in Iraq. 

During Iraq’s March 2010 national elections, Turks 

generally supported the more secular Iraqi National 

Movement bloc led by Ayad Allawi rather than the 

Shiite-dominated State of Law Coalition led by alMaliki. Turkish officials view al-Maliki less as an Iranian puppet than as an ambitious strongman who has 

exploited the post-war weakness of competing Iraqi 

political and social institutions to accrue and exercise 

near dictatorial powers. Turkish policymakers are also 

concerned that the new Iraqi government and military 

are too weak to govern the fissiparous Iraqi state effectively. Turkish policymakers want an Iraqi regime 

that can keep “peace at home, peace in the world,” 

and not fall under the control of another foreign government, in this case Iran. 

The governments of Saudi Arabia and the other 

conservative Persian Gulf minorities consider Turkey 

a useful ally for promoting moderate Sunni causes in 

Iraq against either Sunni extremists belonging to alQaeda or Shiite militants backed by Iran. Turkey’s 

relations with many Arab governments have improved in recent years as Turkey has moved toward 

mainstream Arab positions regarding Israel and other 
53

issues. Al-Maliki and his allies naturally disliked Ankara’s interference in their domestic affairs, though 

Turkey’s financial and other support to al-Maliki’s 

opponents was considerably less than that provided 

by some Persian Gulf monarchies. 

Pressure from Turkey, the United States, and other 

foreign governments during the coalition formation 

talks did succeed in inducing the Iraqi rivals to form 

what looked to be a nominally multiparty government 

in which power is divided between al-Maliki, Allawi, 

and other Iraqi leaders. But al-Maliki exposed the fractures within the Iraqi government and shattered the 

facade of unity by trying to arrest Vice President Tariq 

al-Hashimi, the highest-ranking Sunni official in the 

Iraqi government, on charges of running a terrorist 

death squad. Al-Maliki then threatened Kurdish leaders after they provided al-Hashemi, who enjoys good 

ties with Turkey, with sanctuary in the KRG on the 

grounds that he would not receive a fair trial in Baghdad.110 Alarmed by the prospects of renewed civil war 

and Iraq’s possible break up, Erdoğan called al-Maliki 

by phone on January 10 and urged him to reconcile 

with his colleagues in order to avoid the “irreversible 

chaos” that would result from renewed ethnic and religious wars among Iraqis, which could engulf other 

Muslim countries. In response, al-Maliki told the U.S.-

sponsored al-Hurra Television network on January 13 

that, “Turkey is playing a big role that might bring 

disaster and civil war to the region, and Turkey will 

suffer because it has different sects and ethnicities.” 

The two governments summoned each other’s 

ambassadors to complain about their respective country’s behaviors.111 Later several rockets were fired at 

the Turkish embassy in Baghdad.112 No one was hurt, 

and no one claimed responsibility, but the Turks natu-
54

rally suspect the incident was a warning orchestrated 

by al-Maliki’s forces. Relations worsened after Turkey 

gave refuge to Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, 

who arrived on April 9 and has taken up indefinite 

residence in a luxury apartment in Istanbul, where he 

continues to denounce al-Maliki while undergoing 

medical treatment and enjoying round-the-clock police protection and elite patronage.113

Al-Maliki’s harsh rhetoric regarding Turkey was 

partly motivated by his suspicions that Turkey was 

colluding with his enemies in the United States and 

various Arab governments against him. His rhetoric 

about Turkey sharply escalated after Davutoğlu and 

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed their unease at the situation in Iraq in a February 13, 2012, joint press conference. Clinton stressed 

that it was important “that the Iraqi Government be 

an inclusive one in which all Iraqis believe that they 

have a stake in the future of a united Iraq.” She went 

on to add that: 

the foreign minister and I had a good discussion about 

Iraq and how we can work together to strengthen their 

democracy, help to settle political differences between 

various factions.

Clinton pointedly added that: 

We encourage Turkey to continue to play an important role in trying to reach out to Baghdad, to many 

different personalities within the political system, and 

we’ve encouraged other nations in the region to do the 

same. We think Turkey’s played a very constructive 

role. But we share the concern about the need to demonstrate unequivocally a commitment to an inclusive 

Iraqi Government that represents all Iraqis.
55

Davutoğlu replied that: 

Iraq is the backbone of the stability in our region. If 

there is no stability in Iraq, there cannot be stability in 

our region. We have been always saying Iraq is like a 

small Middle East. We have all sectarian, ethnic communities, religious communities in the Middle East we 

have in Iraq.

But Davutoğlu went on to insist that: 

The welfare of all Iraqis, regardless of their ethnic 

or sectarian background, that is the only demand of 

Turkey. . . . We see all Iraqis as our eternal neighbors, 

brothers and sisters. Their welfare is our welfare. 

If they have any problem, any pain, it is us, we feel 

the pain.

Davutoğlu added that the Iraqi constitution requires power sharing among its communities, and that 

Turkey considers that principle essential for the “success of the Iraqi democracy,” adding that, “If there is a 

successful Iraqi democracy, that will be a good model 

for other countries as well.”114

The PKK issue has also contributed to the general 

deterioration in relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Turkish leaders have complained that security 

along the Iraq-Turkish border has declined and that 

the PKK has been exploiting this opening to intensify 

attacks against Turkey. Dozens of Turkish security 

personnel died in the summer of 2011. On October 29, 

2011, the PKK launched its most successful attack to 

date, killing 24 Turkish soldiers and wounding many 

more, in an ambush in Hakkari province. In response, 

around 10,000 Turkish security personnel, including 

elite special forces units in addition to regular conscripts, engaged in a major military operation in the 
56

border region against the PKK. Although most Turkish forces stayed inside Turkish territory, some 2,000 

Turkish troops crossed into northern Iraq to search 

for and destroy PKK units and facilities. Gül told visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on December 16, 2011, that Turkey feared its border security situation would worsen now that all U.S. troops 

were leaving Iraq.115 Ankara has sought to minimize 

its costs and rely on Iraqi forces to deal with the PKK 

fighters inside Iraq. The leaders of both the Iraqi central government and the KRG in northern Iraq have 

denounced the PKK attacks and not resisted Turkish 

military operations on their territory, but they lack the 

means to eliminate the PKK forces in Iraq themselves. 

Meanwhile, the Turkish government has encouraged the expansion of Turkish-Iraqi economic ties. 

In addition to commercial considerations, Turkish 

officials have sought to make Iraq’s economic health 

depend more on its sustaining good relations with 

Turkey, which increases Ankara’s leverage over Baghdad’s policies. Most of Iraqi Kurdistan’s trade and 

foreign investment involves Turkish firms, but even 

Iraqis located elsewhere understand that Turkey is the 

most prosperous and industrialized of Iraq’s neighbors, offers routes to and from Western markets, and 

provides an exit to the Mediterranean Sea for Iraqi hydrocarbons.116 Furthermore, economic exchanges with 

Iraq especially benefit southeastern Turkey, where 

Turkey’s discontented Kurdish population lives. One 

means of reducing their dissatisfaction is to improve 

their standard of living. 

Between 2003 and 2011, overall yearly bilateral 

trade between Iraq and Turkey increased from $940 

million to $11 billion.117 Iraq has become Turkey’s 

second largest trading partner, after Germany. More 
57

than half of Turkey’s trade with Iraq involves the 

KRG.118 Turkey’s main exports to Iraq include materials, machinery, and construction products, basic 

food and cleaning materials, and electrical and electronic products. In contrast, about the only items that 

Turkey imports from Iraq are hydrocarbon products 

such as crude and fuel oil. In 2009, Turkey began importing oil directly from the KRG after Iraq’s central 

government could not agree on a new oil law due to 

disputes over revenue sharing and other issues. On 

August 7, 2007, Turkey and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding that Iraqi natural gas would be 

supplied to Turkey and via Turkey to Europe.119 After 

Baghdad, politicians failed to agree on a new oil law, 

Turkey began importing oil directly from the KRG in 

2009. The oil pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in Iraq 

to Ceyhan in Turkey transports one-fourth of Iraq’s 

crude oil exports. The flow assures the authorities in 

both Kurdistan and beyond considerable revenue, 

while helping secure Turkey’s position as a major 

energy bridge between the Middle East and Europe. 

Meanwhile, Turkey is helping Iraq meet its own energy demands. Turkish firms have invested in oil and 

gas exploration and production projects throughout 

Iraq. Even excluding the oil sector, Turkey has become 

Iraq’s largest commercial investor. Turkish firms have 

invested in hotels, housing, and the energy sector in 

Iraq. These companies provide manufactured goods 

and other products. By early-2012, 740 Turkish firms 

had negotiated $2.5 billion in construction contracts in 

the KRG alone.120 Altogether, more than 1,000 Turkish companies had invested in Iraq, concentrated in

the construction, irrigation, solid waste management, 

pharmaceutical, agriculture, and tourism sectors.121

Turkish firms had undertaken more than $11 billion 
58

worth of construction projects in Iraq since 2003.122

Hundreds of Turkish contractors in Iraq are working 

on approximately $16 billion worth of projects.123

Turkey has sought to exert influence in Iraq by 

means other than force, economics, and energy. Turkey has been utilizing “soft power” and projecting an 

image of pop culture over its border.124 In addition, 

Turkey helped double the number of out-of-country 

training opportunities that NATO could offer Iraqis 

in 2010 for internal security training.125 In December 2005, Turkey encouraged efforts in Iraq to bring 

together the Sunni Arab Party representatives and 

U.S. ambassador in Istanbul, in an effort to head off 

the burgeoning Sunni-led insurgency.126 Turkey also 

hosted programs to train hundreds of Iraqi politicians in democratization for all of Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian political parties.127 In August 2009, 

Davutoğlu unsuccessfully sought to mediate between 

Iraq and Syria after Iraqi officials blamed the Syrian 

government for helping several massive bombings 

in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Nonetheless, the recurring 

Turkish military interventions in northern Iraq underscore that Turkey still relies on military power as its 

ultimate security guarantee in northern Iraq. 

Kurdish Connections.

In their conflicts with Baghdad, Turkish policymakers have had what a few years earlier would have 

been a surprising ally: Iraq’s Kurds. Turkey enjoys 

considerable support and influence in northern Iraq 

due to its deep cultural, education, and especially 

business presence there. Previously Ankara refused 

to deal with the KRG, but now Turkish officials strive 

to cooperate with it. One senior Turkish Foreign 

Ministry official argued that: 
59

Turkey has no problems with Iraq and Syria, but has 

problems with al-Maliki and al-Assad’s policies. Our 

relations with the rest of the region and with many 

partners are in their best state for years.128

Although Turkey’s outreach effort has failed to 

make much progress with respect to Iraq’s Sunnis, 

Ankara has become the dominant actor in northern 

Iraq. The year 2009 saw a major change in Turkey’s 

approach to the KRG. Before then, Turkey had eschewed official contact with the KRG based in Ebril 

and sought to constrain its autonomy and regional 

influence. Ankara feared that the KRG’s emergence as 

a quasi-independent state would encourage separatist tendencies among Turkey’s own Kurdish minority, 

estimated to number as much as 20 percent of the population. Instead, the Turkish authorities pursued their 

interests within Iraq primarily by engaging with the 

occupying powers and, as it gained more influence, 

Iraq’s central government in Baghdad. This latter approach was similar to how Ankara worked in the past 

with Iraq to contain Kurdish influence. But this strategy, while yielding gains in the 1960s and 1970s, has 

proved less effective since the 1991 establishment of a 

Kurdish autonomous region and especially since 2003 

due to the decentralized nature of political authority 

in post-Saddam Iraq. 

Attempts to use the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC), 

established in 1995 to consolidate several smaller political parties and therefore strengthen the influence of 

Iraq’s Turkmen minority, as a local proxy also failed 

to yield major benefits. Ankara has backed Turkmen 

objections to the incorporation of the city or region of 

Kirkuk into the KRG since having control of the area’s 
60

oil resources would bolster the KRG’s wealth and autonomy, and perhaps embolden its leaders to declare 

independence.129 Although the local Turkmen are eager to partner with Ankara, Baghdad, and Iran (many 

are Shiites) to contest Kurdish influence in Kirkuk 

and other areas, they lack much political strength and 

have been able to elect only a couple of members to the 

Iraqi national parliament in each election. As a result, 

Ankara found itself with little influence in northern 

Iraq despite that border region’s vital importance to 

Turkey’s security. 

In 2009, the Turkish government reversed course 

and adopted a more flexible and embracing policy 

toward the KRG as well as its own Kurdish minority. After having for years avoided direct contact with 

the KRG, whose existence Turkish nationalists feared 

would encourage separatist sentiments among their 

own Kurds, Turkey now engages directly with the 

KRG, which still enjoys considerable autonomy but 

whose leaders have committed to remaining part of a 

unified Iraqi state and to suppressing PKK operations 

in their area of control. KRG pressure reportedly contributed to the PKK’s decision to declare a ceasefire in 

August 2011.130

For their part, Turkish officials currently prefer a 

strong KRG that has the power to control its border 

and internal security, promote economic development that provides opportunities for Turkish traders 

and investors, and provides Kurds with an alternative 

successful model to that of supporting the PKK. Many 

Kurds in Turkey as well as Iraq support the KRG as 

their best means of achieving limited autonomy in a 

situation in which Kurds cannot establish an independent country. Turkey’s 2010 opening of a consulate in 

Erbil signified Turkey’s new approach by recognizing 
61

the KRG as a core constituent element within the federal state of Iraq. Turkish officials have also developed 

ties with moderate Kurdish leaders such as Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and KRG President Massoud Barzani, who regularly visit Ankara as honored guests. 

Ankara’s elevated role in the KRG has also enhanced 

Turkey’s influence in Baghdad since Turkey has become the most powerful foreign actor in a region of 

vital importance to the Iraqi government.131

Although Turkey’s overall economic exchanges 

with Iraq have increased considerably in recent years, 

its economic presence has become particularly prominent in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially its trade, energy, 

and construction sectors. In the KRG, 80 percent of 

goods sold are imported from Turkey.132 The border 

between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan has never been 

more open, as 1,500 trucks daily pass through the 26-

lane main border crossing of Ibrahim Khalil. A few 

years ago, the main Turkish presence in northern Iraq 

was military. Although some Turkish troops now 

quietly remain in northern Iraq, Turkey’s most visible presence is its pop culture, especially cinema, and 

Turkish goods. Turkish clothes, furniture, toys, building materials, and other products flood the malls and 

shops throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. 

Turkish investment is also flourishing, with more 

than half the registered foreign firms operating in 

Iraqi Kurdistan—almost 800 of the 1,500 registered 

foreign companies—being Turkish.133 Many Turkish 

business leaders see Iraqi Kurdistan as both an area 

of economic opportunity in itself as well as a transit 

zone for increasing Turkish trade with more distant 

regions in the Middle East. If the KRG were a separate 

country, then it would rank among Turkey’s top 10 

trading partners. 
62

Turkish political leaders want to strengthen their 

border security by working with Iraqi Kurdish authorities against the PKK. They also hope that the 

increased economic exchanges across the border will 

bring greater prosperity to the traditionally economic 

backward regions where many of Turkey’s Kurds, 

which constitute one-fifth of Turkey’s population, 

reside. Iraqi Kurds appreciate that their economic 

development depends heavily on attracting Turkish 

investment, as well as being able to trade with Turkey 

and beyond, by means by transiting Turkish territory. 

The KRG is landlocked, and Turkey offers the optimal 

connecting route to European markets. During a June 

2010 trip to Turkey, Barzani observed that, “Turkey 

is a gateway for us to Europe as we are a gateway for 

Turkey to Iraq and the Gulf countries.”134 Kurds attribute several Turkish advantages, including lower 

prices and more flexible contract terms than other 

foreign sellers.135

Ironically, Kurdish nationalism now has also been 

encouraging Kurdish-Turkish reconciliation. Iraqi 

Kurds appreciate that, under current conditions, they 

can best deepen ties with Turkey’s Kurds by having 

good relations with Turkey. At least for the time being, the possibility of establishing a unified Kurdish 

political entity is excluded, so keeping the borders as 

porous as possible is their best option. However, as 

long as the PKK insurgency persists, it will remain an 

impediment to deeper cross-border economic and political ties among Kurds and with their neighbors.

Turkey’s counterinsurgency operation on both 

sides of its border with Iraq highlights the recurring 

problem confronting Turkish governments and military in their fight against Kurdish terrorists: the insurgents’ area of operations, like the Kurdish population 
63

itself, straddles across Turkey’s borders with other 

countries—namely Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The governments of all four countries share an interest in suppressing Kurdish separatism and violence, but they 

have also found Kurdish terrorism useful tools to 

pressure the other countries. These transnational ties 

mean that, despite their large scale, Turkish military 

operations cannot suppress the insurgency for long. 

Its vigorous nature might at best deter further foreign 

backing for actions by the PKK against Turkey as well 

as provide the maneuvering room the Turkish government needs to make the concessions required in the 

new constitution to address Kurdish grievances—but 

it remains unclear whether the ruling AKP will so use 

this opportunity.

Iran.

The relationship between Turkey and Iran is 

fraught with baffling contradictions. One might expect the inherent religiosity of both the AKP and Iran, 

despite Sunni-Shite theological differences, to sustain 

good ties, but the contrasts between the Islamic Republican and the “Turkish Model” have resulted in 

an acute rivalry during the Arab uprisings, as both 

have held themselves out as a paradigm of Islamic democracy. At first, the presence of two overtly Islamist 

parties in charge of Ankara and Tehran encouraged a 

Turkish-Iranian reconciliation, but then their religious 

orientations became a source of their divisions. Turkey’s secular political parties and national security establishment, which dominated Turkey’s foreign policy until a decade ago, generally perceived Turkey’s 

Islamic neighbors, Iran and Syria, as potential threats, 

and sought to develop security ties with Israel, the 

other important non-Muslim state in the Middle East. 
64

The Islamic orientation of the ruling AKP has 

meant that current Turkish and Iranian leaders now 

share a common devotion to Islam and animus toward Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. However, 

the religious element, which had previously buoyed 

the relations between the two, became a source of division as Erdoğan began to displace President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other prominent Iranians 

as the most popular Muslim leader among the Arab 

masses due to the AKP’s public attacks on Israel and 

their support for various pro-Palestinian initiatives 

such as the controversial “freedom flotillas” seeking 

to defy Israel’s blockade of Gaza.136 During his triumphant tour to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September 

2011 and at other times, Erdoğan recommended that 

the new regimes in the Arab world follow Turkey’s 

secular democratic model, whereas Iranian government representatives have told them to establish an Islamic Republic, as in Iran.137 Since then, their religious 

devotion has become an even more direct source of 

tensions as Turkish leaders have backed Sunni opponents of Shiite governments (as in Iraq and Syria) and 

Sunni governments facing mass Shiite opposition supported by Iran (as in Bahrain).138

The AKP deviated from Washington’s policy regarding Iran’s nuclear program, though its approach 

has corresponded to the mainstream international 

view. While Turkish officials do not want the Islamic 

Republic to obtain nuclear weapons—members of 

Turkey’s still influential military establishment have 

suggested that Turkey would rapidly follow Iran in 

acquiring nuclear weapons for reasons of security and 

prestige—Turkish officials do not object to Iran’s pursuit of limited nuclear energy activities under appropriate international monitoring. The current Turkish 
65

government insists that any country should have the 

right to engage in all civilian nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment and the other phases of the 

cycle needed to produce nuclear fuel, provided it applies traditional IAEA safeguards and complies with 

other nonproliferation norms.139

In contrast, most of Turkey’s NATO allies remain 

adamant that Iran must cease enriching uranium or 

engaging in other sensitive nuclear activities until 

Tehran convinces the international community that 

its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Turkish leaders have sought to mediate the nuclear dispute 

between Tehran and the West. In 2010, they worked 

with Brazil to achieve a confidence-building exchange 

of enriched uranium between the parties. Months of 

diplomatic efforts by Erdoğan and President Lula Inacio da Silva of Brazil to mediate the Iranian nuclear 

dispute appeared to achieve results when they announced an agreement in Tehran on May 17. In their 

trilateral statement, the three governments declared 

that Iran was prepared to “deposit” 1,200 kilograms 

(kg) of its low-enriched uranium in Turkey in return 

for the delivery within 1 year of 120-kg of uranium 

enriched to the higher level needed for Tehran’s medical research reactor.140 After the West rejected that proposal, Turkey’s initial reaction was to stand behind the 

Tehran accord. Turkish officials claimed that Obama 

and other U.S. officials had earlier supported their initiative, though in retrospect they may have failed to 

give it proper attention due to an expectation that it 

had little chance of success.141

In the months of recriminations that followed, 

Turkish officials denounced what they described as 

the hypocrisy of Western governments in approaching nonproliferation issues. They said that these coun-
66

tries repeatedly have sought to sanction Iran despite 

its government’s signing the Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) and the absence of any concrete proof that Iranians are seeking nuclear weapons.142 In addition, they 

have made special deals with India despite the Indian 

government’s refusal to adhere to the NPT. Erdoğan 

was especially incensed by what he saw as the West’s 

deliberately overlooking Israel’s nuclear weapons 

program. Turkey wants to prevent other countries, 

such as Israel, from employing—or threatening to 

employ—force against Iran to attack its nuclear facilities. Turkish officials consider counterproductive the 

“dual-track” approach adopted by Western countries 

toward Iran—combining offers of cooperation with 

threats of attack and sanctions. Instead, they argue 

that the best way to prevent Iran from seeking nuclear 

weapons is to address the underlying sources of insecurity that might induce Tehran to seek them. Rather 

than rely on threats and sanctions, they want to offer 

Iran security pledges in return for reciprocal Iranian 

guarantees that Tehran will not use its nuclear activities for military purposes. 

Accordingly, Turkish officials have generally opposed sanctioning Iran.143 First, Iran is Turkey’s second 

largest supplier of natural gas.144 Turkey is not blessed 

with sufficient energy resources to meet its needs and 

cannot afford to cut trade ties with one of its most 

significant energy partners. Turkish policymakers 

have felt obliged to accept the mandatory sanctions 

imposed by the UN Security Council, but they have 

tried to resist applying the supplementary sanctions 

adopted by Western governments, which include not 

purchasing Iranian energy or selling Iran precious 

metals.145 Turkey currently imports about 25 million 

cubic meters of natural gas per day from Iran through 
67

a direct pipeline.146 This flow amounts to almost onethird of Turkey’s total annual gas consumption and 

helps balance Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia, 

which provides Turkey with most of its gas, some oil, 

and is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. 

Second, the people of Turkey and Iran have a broad 

cultural and historical relationship. One-third of Iranians are Azeri Turks, and Tehran is the second-largest 

Turkish-speaking city in the world. Turks are therefore reluctant to support sanctions that harm the Iranian people.147 In the absence of convincing evidence to 

the contrary, Turkish officials had reservations about 

imposing economic and other sanctions against Iran 

by the UN Security Council or by individual countries, which severely hurts Iran’s neighbors and key 

economic partners, including Turkey. Rather than rely 

on threats and sanctions, Turks urge the United States 

and its allies to offer Iran security pledges in return 

for reciprocal Iranian guarantees that Tehran will not 

use its nuclear activities for military purposes. These 

Turkish-U.S. differences, currently overshadowed by 

Turkish-Iranian divergences over Iraq and especially 

Syria, could become more serious in the future. Turkey might also change its benign nuclear weapons 

policies in coming years. Most obviously, unambiguous evidence could arise that Iran is pursuing nuclear 

weapons, which some Turks have said would require 

Turkey, refusing to accept military inferiority regarding Iran, to do likewise. Turkey’s plans to expand its 

domestic nuclear energy program would, for the first 

time, provide its government with the scientific, technical, and industrial foundations to pursue genuine 

nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s own development 

of the capacity to make nuclear weapons has demonstrated to Ankara and others. 
68

In September 2011, Turkey committed to host a 

U.S. AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile defense (BMD) early 

warning radar at Malatya as part of NATO’s defense 

against Iran’s growing missile capabilities. Turkey 

made the controversial decision to reinforce Ankara’s 

security ties with the West despite Iranian objections. 

The decision was both presented and facilitated by the 

restructuring of the U.S. missile defense architecture 

in Europe by the Obama administration, which relocated the initial U.S. deployments out of East Central 

Europe and toward the Balkans, Black Sea, and eastern 

Mediterranean regions. The new structure, with the 

interceptor missiles based in Romania and on nearby 

U.S. warships, offers Turkey greater BMD coverage as 

well as the opportunity, though publicly unsought, to 

play a major role in that architecture. Despite Turkish lobbying not to identify Iran as the main target of 

the NATO BMD network, Iranian leaders and media 

clearly consider the decision to host the radar in the 

face of Iranian and Russian opposition an unfriendly 

act.148 But the decision has proven useful in silencing 

Western critics of the AKP’s Eastern orientation and 

has been overshadowed by the more serious differences between Ankara and Tehran regarding Syria. 

The same pattern of initial reconciliation followed 

by renewed divisions has occurred with respect to 

other regional security issues. In addition to renouncing security ties with Israel, the AKP pleased Iran by 

seeking to reconcile with its Syrian ally, President 

Bashar al-Assad. In the process, the new leaders in 

Turkey managed to dampen Syrian support for the 

PKK, a policy that Tehran soon followed. Turkey and 

Iran each have large Kurdish minorities (some 14 million Kurds live in Turkey and approximately 5 million 

live in Iran) whose members sometimes are so dissat-
69

isfied with the policies of their central governments 

that they engage in anti-regime terrorism. Turkey and 

Iran each face major Kurdish terrorist groups based in 

Iraq. Besides the anti-Ankara PKK, the Free Life Party 

of Kurdistan (PJAK) has attacked Iranian targets from 

its strongholds in Iraq’s Qandil mountain range. 

A few years ago, Turkish and Iranian authorities 

began exchanging counterterrorist intelligence and 

coordinating military strikes against Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq.149 But more recently, the AKP 

has supported Assad’s opponents, irritating Tehran 

in the process.150 Although a few years ago the AKP 

was able to overcome decades of confrontation and 

develop good ties with the Syrian government, the regime’s brutal killing of thousands of protesters has led 

the AKP officials to support Syrian opposition forces 

seeking to change the current regime.151 Iranian leaders have complained about Turkey’s becoming the 

main regional backer of the armed opposition seeking to overthrow Assad. Iranians consider preserving 

a friendly regime in Damascus a vital national interest 

for Iran.152

A more recent dispute has been Turkey’s successful appeal in November 2012 that NATO deploy 

Patriot air defense systems on Turkish soil to defend 

Turkish territory against Syrian air and missile strikes. 

Iranian analysts fear the Patriots could serve as the basis of a no-fly zone that would deprive the Assad regime of one of its few advantages over the insurgents. 

Ahmadinejad canceled a planned visit to Turkey that 

December, which the Iranian media said was in protest to the deployments.153 Turkey has also declined to 

send high-level officials to events in Iran, such as the 

2012 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran. 
70

Furthermore, it seems that some Iranian support 

has resumed to the PKK, which also receives help from 

Assad’s regime. PKK military leader Cemil Bayik, who 

has close ties to Iranian hardliners, has been one of the 

most vocal opponents of peace talks with the Turkish 

government. He has pledged to defend Iran and Syria 

from alleged Turkish plots to change their regimes. 

Earlier media reports claimed that Iranian authorities 

had briefly “detained” PKK leader, Murat Karayilan, 

when Iranian officials learned of impending Turkish 

air strikes against his PKK camps. The Iranians supposedly then released Karayilan when the bombing 

ended rather than remand him to Turkish custody. 

Turks speculated that Iranian authorities wanted 

to keep Karayilan and the PKK active as a potential 

source of leverage or a bargaining chip with Turkey.154

Turkish-Iranian differences regarding Iraq have 

also become a major source of bilateral tension. Most 

Turkish officials do not want Iran to dominate Iraq. 

They fear that Iranian leaders seek a weak and divided 

Iraq that is unable to contest Tehran’s drive for regional primacy. They also perceive Iran as wanting a subservient Shiite coalition to rule Baghdad that would 

not resist Iranian political and economic control over 

Iraq. In contrast, Turkey favors a strong but democratic Iraqi state ruled by a coalition of political forces 

that can maintain domestic stability as well as contribute to regional security.155 These conditions would be 

favorable for reviving Iraq’s hydrocarbon production, 

which would benefit Turkey as a key transit state for 

Iraqi oil and gas, and restoring Iraqi economic growth, 

which would support Turkish investors and traders. 

These different strategic visions have seen Turkish and Iranian groups often back opposing political 

forces in Iraq. Even the nuclear issue has lost its ability 
71

to sustain good Turkey-Iran ties. Ankara gained some 

credit in Tehran in 2010, when it sought to galvanize 

a confidence-building agreement between Iran and 

the West over its nuclear mediation. Turks have since 

expressed irritation at Iranian ingratitude for their efforts to mediate between Tehran and the West. Iranian 

carping often includes threats as well as criticisms.156

Erdoğan has since stopped accepting at face value 

Iranian pledges never to develop nuclear weapons, 

telling an American journal that Turkey would feel 

compelled to seek nuclear weapons, too, if Iran ever 

acquired them. Iran subsequently proposed Kazakhstan and other countries as suitable hosts for holding 

future rounds of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, 

excluding Turkey.157

The economic ties between the two are deep, even 

though Iran has proven to be an unreliable partner and 

a graveyard of Turkish investment capital. Trade between the two is large—Turkey-Iran trade rose above 

$10 billion in 2011 and now exceeds $15 billion.158 The 

two parties even have agreed to start using their own 

currencies in their bilateral commerce to help achieve 

their goal of tripling Iran-Turkey trade to $30 billion 

within a few years.159 But trade with Iran is frustrating for Turkish entrepreneurs. Many deals announced 

with great fanfare never pan out—a pattern one sees 

in Iran’s relations with many other countries. As such, 

Turkey is making progress in having Azerbaijan, Iraq, 

and eventually Turkmenistan replace Iran as major 

suppliers of gas and oil.160

Iran’s role in the Turkish economy looks set to decline further as Turks deepen their ties with the more 

dynamic economies in Asia and elsewhere. Turkish 

and Iranian officials have discussed arrangements 

whereby natural gas from Iran and Turkmenistan 
72

could flow to European markets via Turkey.161 But U.S. 

officials have criticized Turkey’s energy and economic 

ties with Iran, which Washington has been seeking to 

isolate. UN, U.S., and European sanctions forced the 

Turkish Petroleum International Co. to abandon a $7 

billion deal to develop a part of Iran’s enormous South 

Pars field.162

Although Turkey consistently has voiced opposition to sanctions against Tehran, the country has 

at times benefited from those sanctions, which have 

eliminated competition from other foreign firms that 

Turkish businesses would have to contend with in a 

sanctions-free environment. Furthermore, UN sanctions prohibit countries from paying for Iranian goods 

in dollars or euros, which forces Iran to use any earnings to buy local goods such as food and medicine 

rather than purchase nuclear-related equipment with 

hard currency. But the Turkish authorities have tolerated a “gas-for-gold” sanctions-circumventing scheme 

whereby Iran has used Turkish lira to purchase gold 

that Iranians can sell elsewhere in exchange for Western currency. The corruption scandal that came to light 

in December 2013 revealed the Turkish government 

allowed the state-owned Halkbank to circumvent the 

sanctions by exploiting the loophole that permitted 

Turkey to pay for Iranian energy imports with gold.163

The renewed Turkish-Iranian tensions of recent 

years mark a regression to the historic pattern for 

their relationship. Clashes between the imperial ambitions of the Turkish-centered Ottoman Empire and 

the Safavid Persian dynasties shaped regional politics 

for centuries. Relations between Ankara and Tehran 

were strained even during the 1990s. Turkey’s strongly secular leaders accused Iranians of seeking to promote religious fundamentalism in Turkey and other 
73

countries; Iranians criticized Turkey’s strict rules 

against religious expression, such as the banning of 

headscarves in public institutions. Turks opposed the 

Iranian practice of rule by clerics while Iranians criticized military rule in Turkey. Both governments suspected the other of promoting terrorist and separatist 

movements against them. Turkey and Iran also have 

diverging interests in Central Asia. Both would like to 

increase their influence in a region where they were 

the dominant players in previous centuries. Ankara is 

particularly drawn to the Turkic nations, whereas Iran 

feels closest to Tajikistan. It has only been in the last 

decade that Turkey, under AKP rule, has improved its 

relations with the Iranian government, and some early 

gains have more recently been reversed.

Iranian leaders have resisted breaking entirely with 

Turkey. They already have enough potential adversaries and lack any genuine allies, so having a powerful 

neighbor that opposes using force against Iran is still 

a great advantage. Turkey and Iran have not fought a 

war since the 17th century, and the popular mood in 

both counties is against another bilateral armed conflict any time soon. In public, influential Iranians have 

been attributing some of their tensions with Turkey to 

U.S. machinations and Western plots. Iranians want 

Turkey to continue to refrain from sending their own 

military forces into Syria. Without them, the Assad regime might survive for years in a stalemated civil war, 

with the opportunity growing over time that a new 

Turkish government might come to power. 

Meanwhile, Turkey and Iran are establishing a 

joint university, a joint economic commission, and 

more transit and border terminals.164 Even beyond 

economic ties, Turkish leaders fear that isolating and 

threatening Tehran could further radicalize Iranian 
74

foreign policy, which, at least in regards to Turkey, 

has been rather pragmatic. An alienated Iranian government might deepen its ties with terrorist organizations, intervene more deeply in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and take other actions designed to retaliate against 

the United States and its allies, like Turkey. A war between Iran and the West would prove disastrous since 

Turkey’s regional interests would severely suffer, as 

they did during the confrontation between the West 

and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.165 Turkey suffered heavy 

economic losses during the years in which the UN 

Security Council imposed sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s government and then as a result of the Western 

invasion of the country. The losses from a war today 

involving Iran would be even greater. 

Nonetheless, the Turkey-Iran relationship is 

primed for problems due to their differing geopolitical and sectarian interests. They have already resumed their historic pattern of eschewing direct wars 

by competing against one another by proxy in Iraq, 

Syria, and Azerbaijan. After decades in which one 

or the other country was clearly dominant, we now 

have a dangerous equipoise in which both these 

non-Arab regimes consider themselves rising powers that deserve preeminent say in the region. But 

by definition, at most only one of them can gain 

that primacy. 

EURASIA

Although many earlier successes of the AKP’s zero 

problems policy have failed to endure, Turkey’s relations with Russia, Central Asia, China, and even Afghanistan are still better than a decade ago. Turkey’s 

relations with Russia are generally good despite dif-
75

ferences over Syria, the South Caucasus, Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy, Moscow’s noncompliance with the CFE Treaty, and other issues. Thanks to 

their ties with NATO and the United States, Turkish 

policymakers have been able to accept these differences with general nonchalance. Moscow has not become 

overly irritated by Turkey’s confrontations with Syria, 

Moscow’s main client in the Middle East, or Turkey’s 

support for NATO’s missile defense architecture 

in Europe. Turkey has likewise accepted Moscow’s 

moves to establish a Eurasian economic bloc with surprising nonchalance. Yet, differences over Syria, and 

now the Crimea, confront Turkey’s Russia policy with 

its most serious challenge in decades. For now, the 

improved relationship with Russia has also enabled 

Turkey to better support U.S. goals in Central Asia. 

Russia no longer fears Ankara’s influence in Central 

Asia and might even welcome a Turkish presence to 

help counterbalance China’s growing presence in the 

region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey has 

strived to carve out a space for itself in the Central 

Asian region, among its Turkic brother-nations. Turkish involvement in the region increased tremendously 

with the War in Afghanistan, which Turkey has supported and participated in with vigor and enthusiasm. 

Turkey has spearheaded mediation efforts in the region, particularly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Through the 1990s, Russia countered Ankara’s efforts 

to exert influence in the region, and only in recent 

years has Turkey been able to expand its cooperation 

with former Soviet Central Asian nations beyond a 

strictly cultural context. Turkish firms have begun to 

dominate in the region in many sectors, from banking, 

to telecommunications, food processing, and textiles. 

Erdoğan, having failed to overcome the impasse that 
76

currently hinders EU membership, has courted closer 

relations with the SCO as a means of exercising influence in Central Asia. Turkey has recently attained the 

status of “dialogue partner,” but there are significant 

obstacles to fuller membership, and major doubts as 

to the degree to which the SCO, with its limited economic and security capabilities, could replace the EU 

and NATO.

RUSSIA

The AKP has pursued better Russian-Turkish relations. The two countries have developed a sustained 

economic and security partnership, centered on growing tourism, energy flows, and overlapping security 

concerns in their shared neighborhoods of Central 

Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. 

Several factors explain the mild Turkish response, 

limited to declarations of principles and feared consequences. Turkey now receives more than half its natural gas from Russia, as well as large deliveries of oil 

and support for its planned nuclear energy program. 

Annual trade now amounts to some $40 billion. Mutual investment has also grown, with Turkish firms 

helping construct the Sochi Olympics complex in 

Russia.166

During the past decade under the AKP, Turkish and Russian interests converged more than they 

differed. Both countries have sought to reduce terrorism, increase oil and gas transit through Turkey, 

and limit disruptive political upheavals in Central 

Asia and neighboring regions, given the risks of such 

chaos spilling across their borders. Neither government wants Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, but both 

Ankara and Moscow do not object to Iran’s pursuit 
77

of limited nuclear activities under appropriate international monitoring. In addition, Turkey and Russia 

want to prevent other countries from employing force 

against Iran to attack its nuclear facilities.

Russian officials no longer evince concern about 

Turkey’s growing economic and cultural presence in 

Central Asia and, as evidenced by Moscow’s low key 

response to Turkey’s decision to host a NATO missile defense radar, no longer consider Turkey a major military threat. Turkey and Russia largely have 

set aside their Cold War adversarial mindsets in the 

former Soviet space. The Kremlin, protective against 

U.S. and West European intrusions, no longer evinces 

much concern about Turkey’s growing economic and 

cultural presence in the Turkic nations of the South 

Caucasus and Central Asia. Russians may even welcome Turkey’s growing economic presence in Central 

Asia as a means of diluting China’s growing economic 

prowess there. Despite Moscow favoring Armenia 

and Ankara siding with Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey have managed to keep their differences over the 

Nagorno-Karabakh dispute under control. Even in 

the case of Georgia, Turkey has managed to maintain 

good relations with Tbilisi without antagonizing Moscow, though Turkish efforts to lessen Russia-Georgia 

antagonisms have largely failed. 

The independent policies Ankara pursued toward 

regional security issues presumably lessened Moscow’s concerns about Turkey serving as an anti-Russian stalking-horse for Western interests in the region. 

Policymakers in both countries have shared the belief 

that other NATO countries, particularly the United 

States, have paid insufficient attention to their concerns in these regions. A few years ago, analysts even 

spoke of an “Axis of the Excluded” between them.167
78

Although Turkey has since strengthened its ties with 

NATO and the United States, Russian analysts still 

cultivate Turkey as a rising power. It has a dynamic 

economy, newly flexible foreign policy, and shares 

with Russia the experience of being physically part of 

Europe but practically treated as a peripheral country 

not suitable for membership in core European clubs 

such as the EU.168

The Black Sea region has represented another geographic region of overlapping mutual concern to both 

Turkey and Russia. In recent years, Russian-Turkish 

security cooperation in this area has been sufficiently 

extensive and exclusionary as to worry the West about 

the two countries establishing a de facto condominium in the region, which represents the main route 

through which Caspian oil and gas reaches Europe. 

For example, Moscow and Ankara have worked to 

limit the presence of Western navies in the Black Sea. 

In particular, they have resisted Alliance proposals 

to enlarge the scope of NATO’s Operation ACTIVE 

ENDEAVOUR, currently active in the Mediterranean, 

into Black Sea waters. Russian policymakers do not 

want NATO to establish a major military presence in 

another region neighboring the Russian Federation, 

while Turkish officials also oppose any steps that 

might lead to a review of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which grants Turkey special privileges as possessor of the Bosporus Straits, including the power to 

limit the size of warships from nonlittoral states that 

enter the Black Sea. 

Since 2006, Russian warships have been participating in Black Sea Harmony, a Turkey-led multinational 

initiative launched in 2004 designed to counter terrorism, narco-trafficking, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation in the south Black Sea 
79

region by tracking suspicious vessels and conducting 

security checks on ports.169 The two navies track vessels and exchange data about possible illegal activities. Russian and Turkish government representatives 

maintain that Black Sea Harmony and other RussianTurkish maritime security cooperation, such as the annual exercises of the Black Sea Naval Force involving 

the riparian states since April 2001, obviate the need 

to bring NATO’s ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR or any other 

NATO naval presence into the Black Sea region. As 

Gül put it during his joint February 2009 news conference with then Russian President Dmitrey Medvedev 

in Moscow: 

Russia and Turkey are the two most important countries in the region, which are called upon to make a 

weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, security and cooperation across the region.170

Frictions do exist between Ankara and Moscow. 

Turkey has criticized Russia’s decision to suspend 

implementation of the CFE, whose provisions limit 

the number of Russian military forces that can be deployed near Turkey and also promote military transparency and restraint throughout the South Caucasus, 

the scene of one recent war (involving Georgia in 2008) 

and potentially another (between Armenia and Azerbaijan). Turkish policymakers have sought to maintain “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia 

in general and in the South Caucasus in particular.171

Preserving “pluralism” involves strengthening the 

political sovereignty of these countries, countering the 

growth of Russian influence in the Caucasus (though 

in a covert rather than overt way), and promoting 

closer ties between these countries and Euro-Atlantic 

organizations such as NATO.172
80

In line with its strategy of “making friends” with 

previously alienated countries, generating opportunities for greater east-west commerce through Turkey, 

and attempting to avert further instability in the South 

Caucuses following the Georgia War, the AKP government signed a set of protocols with Armenia in 

October 2009 that would establish mutual diplomatic 

relations and reopen their joint border. Pressure from 

Azerbaijan and its Turkish supporters has generated 

opposition within the Turkish legislature to ratifying 

the protocols before Armenia resolves the NagornoKarabakh dispute, which the Turkish government 

cited in 1993 as the original reason for closing the border. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev threatened to 

stop subsidizing the sale of natural gas to Turkey and 

seek alternative energy export routes should Turkey 

adopt the protocols while Armenian forces continued 

to occupy Azerbaijani territory.173 The Turkish government rapidly backtracked and resumed insisting 

on a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue before 

the protocols could enter into effect. 

The government of Armenia, which set aside previous demands for Turkey to recognize the 1915 massacres as genocide during the signing ceremony, has 

been unwilling to make further concessions simply to 

reestablish relations and reopen its border with Turkey. Turkish diplomats have hoped that Russia, an 

historical ally of Armenia as well as member of the 

OSCE Minsk Group, would help promote a reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. When he met with 

Putin in January 2010, Erdoğan called on Moscow 

to play a more active role in resolving the NagornoKarabakh issue.174 Yet, Putin declined to commit to 

exerting any pressure on Armenia, whose parliament 

must also ratify the protocols, to make concessions 
81

regarding Nagorno-Karabakh in order to secure Turkish parliamentary ratification. When asked about the 

issue at their joint news conference on January 13, Putin argued that linking the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would 

simply delay progress on both. He stated:

Both the Karabakh and Turkish-Armenian problems 

are extremely complicated in their own right, and I 

don’t think they should be joined together in a package. Each problem is hard to resolve even taken on 

its own, and if we lump them together, any hope of 

their resolution automatically recedes into the distant 

future.175

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made 

similar remarks the following day when he visited Yerevan.176 Skeptics might suspect that Russian officials 

are not eager to see a reconciliation between Turkey 

and Armenia since, while offering the possibility of 

drawing Azerbaijan and Turkey closer to Russia, the 

protocols’ adoption could reduce Moscow’s influence 

in Armenia and promote the development of new 

east-west energy and commercial routes through Turkey that circumvent Russian territory. Armenia suspended the parliamentary ratification process for the 

protocols a few months later.

Russia’s decision to use overwhelming force to 

defeat Georgia in its August 2008 war shocked Turkish policymakers into realizing that their margin for 

maneuver in Russia’s backyard might be smaller than 

anticipated due to Moscow’s new assertiveness.177 To 

prevent further regional disorders, Ankara sought to 

advance a multilateral regional security framework 

that would both constrain Russia’s assertive impulses as well as revitalize efforts to solve the regional 
82

conflicts that might lead to new flareups and further 

destabilization.178 Although Turkish leaders traditionally had strongly supported Georgia’s territorial 

integrity and developed strong economic ties with 

Georgia, Turkish officials restrained their criticism of 

Moscow’s intervention and subsequent dismemberment of Georgia. Turkish representatives instead focused on averting future conflicts by promoting the 

creation of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) that would include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, as well as Turkey. The CSCP 

would have supplemented the contributions made by 

other regional security institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), whose Minsk Group has sought to address 

the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet republics, 

and the SCO, with which Turkey is also seeking to 

develop closer ties. The CSCP also sought to exploit 

the interests Russia shared with Turkey in promoting sufficient regional stability to allow for a mutually 

profitable energy corridor between Eurasian energy 

suppliers and European energy consumers.179

In addition to hoping to enlarge Turkey’s margin 

to maneuver in the South Caucasus, Ankara wanted 

to avoid further conflicts that placed Turkey uneasily 

between Russia and the Western democracies. Turkey had found it difficult to manage the intense pressure placed on Ankara during the war. In the early 

days of the conflict, Turkey turned down American 

requests to send ships through the Turkish Straits into 

the Black Sea.180 After Ankara eventually agreed to allow three U.S. ships, as well as some other NATO vessels, the Russian government complained that Turkey 

was violating the 1936 Montreux Convention, which 

regulates passage of ships from non-Black Sea states 
83

through the Turkish Straits.181 More generally, Turkish leaders traditionally have sought to dampen tensions between their neighbors, including those in the 

Middle East, to avoid disputes that could harm the 

Turkish economy or otherwise negatively redound on 

Turkish interests. Russian officials endorsed the proposed platform in principle since, by excluding nonregional actors, it would give Moscow and Ankara 

a leading role in addressing local security problems. 

But Western and Georgian disinterest led to the initiative’s demise.

Another source of Turkey-Russian tension has been 

the large and persistent trade imbalance in Russia’s favor, despite recurring pledges by both governments to 

work to change the balance and composition of their 

trade. The imbalance, which does not characterize 

Turkey’s trade with other major economic partners, 

results from Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russian 

oil and gas, which accounts for almost three-fourths 

of Turkey’s imports from Russia. Turkey has become 

one of the largest Russian gas importers and natural 

gas accounts for the largest proportion of Turkey’s 

annual trade turnover with Russia. Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy is a cause of concern among 

officials in Ankara, leading Ankara to seek to diversify 

its sources of energy to include suppliers in Central 

Asia, the South Caucasus, and at times Iran (though 

international sanctions and U.S. pressure have made 

this difficult). Turkey is also planning to develop civilian nuclear power, though Turkey has partnered 

with Russia, which offered the best deal, to develop 

its first nuclear power plant, which will use a thirdgeneration Russian-made reactor. Russia has agreed 

to pay most of the costs of this construction and accept 

repayment out of the revenue from the electricity the 

plant will generate. 
84

In recent years, Syria has become a major sore point 

between Ankara and Moscow. While Ankara has been 

demanding that Assad resign, Moscow continues to 

support his regime. Turkey’s leading role in organizing the anti-Assad resistance, Syria’s cross-border attacks against Turkish territory and Ankara’s decision 

to force a Syrian plane wrongly suspected of carrying 

weapons to land for inspection in Turkey after it had 

left Russia, have strained ties. However, neither government has been willing to break ties over the issue 

because the two countries still have strong overlapping interests in other areas. Turkey and Russia have 

been able to compartmentalize their differences over 

Syria so that they can continue to pursue other dimensions of their improving relationship.182

More recently, the March 2014 Crimea crisis has 

confronted Turkey with the most serious challenge to 

its Russian policy since the Cold War. Until losing the 

Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, the Ottoman Empire 

held sovereignty over the Crimea, then dominated 

by a population of Muslim, Turkic-speaking Crimean 

Tatars who looked to Istanbul for spiritual and other 

leadership. Joseph Stalin forcefully changed this ethnic balance by accusing the Tatars of collaborating 

with the German occupation and sending them into 

exile. It was not until the last days of the Soviet Union 

that the authorities allowed many Tatars to return. 

Today, the peninsula’s 300,000 Crimean Tatars 

represent some 12 percent of the population. Turkey 

has provided them with special aid programs, and 

Turkish officials have affirmed that they will protect 

the Tatars during the present crisis.183 The Tartars 

have opposed the Crimean independence referendum 

and fear that, as part of Putin’s Russia, their rights will 

again be infringed. Representatives of the millions of 
85

Turks of Tartar origin have demanded that Ankara 

take a strong stand against the illegal territorial transfer.184 Moscow’s proclaimed right to use military force 

to protect ethnic Russians resembles the pretext Moscow used in more than a dozen wars against the Ottoman Empire, justified by the need to defend Orthodox 

Christians against Muslim oppressors. 

Despite having closer ties with the Crimea than any 

NATO country, championing the cause of threatened 

Muslims elsewhere, and being key neighbors and energy partners of both Russia and Ukraine, Turkish officials adopted a surprising low-key response to Moscow’s moves against the Crimea. Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, 

and other Turkish officials have simply called for upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, 

and political unity without taking any concrete measures to compel observance of these principles other 

than call for a coalition government in Ukraine that 

maintained a foreign policy balanced between Russia and the West. Likewise, though Davutoğlu has 

warned that Moscow’s actions could open a “Pandora’s Box” by unfreezing other “frozen conflicts” in the 

Black Sea region—an allusion to the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh—Ankara has 

not launched a new initiative to avert that outcome, as 

it did after the 2008 Georgia War. 

Although the Turkish government has said that it 

will not recognize the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum, in which the peninsula’s residents reportedly 

overwhelmingly voted to join Russia, Ankara has not 

followed the United States and the EU in imposing 

sanctions on Russian officials for backing this maneuver. Davutoğlu has even insisted that Turkey will 

not let “another power”—perhaps an allusion to the 

EU or Washington—create a Russia-Turkey conflict 
86

over Crimea, which he insisted was a global crisis that 

should concern all countries. Searching for ways to 

de-escalate the crisis, the Foreign Minister has also argued that the West should avoid trying to isolate Moscow and instead should, along with Ukraine, negotiate a mutually acceptable compromise that respected 

Russian interests.185

Diverging domestic considerations have also been 

paralyzing Ankara’s response in the current crisis. The 

AKP’s declining popularity should encourage the government to take a firmer stance toward Moscow to gain 

popularity among Turkey’s nationalists, ethnic Tatars, 

and Russian-haters. But if Russia retaliated by disrupting gas deliveries and other economic intercourse with 

Turkey, voters’ standard of living would decline at a 

time when Turkey faces several crucial ballots. In addition, Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders may have 

viewed the popular revolution in neighboring Ukraine 

with some unease, given how Turkey has also faced 

months of unprecedented protests. Putin thus far has 

been playing Turkey well, keeping Ankara quiet in 

both the Georgian and Crimean crises, but if he continues to grab former Soviet territories, he may finally 

drive Turkey to return to its traditional anti-Russian 

stance, especially in the Black Sea region, just as Ankara has reversed many of the AKP’s initially new foreign 

policies in recent years.

CENTRAL ASIA

Turkey has striven to deepen ties with Central Asia 

since these formerly Soviet republics became independent countries. Several Central Asian republics have 

majority populations of ethnic Turkic origin, and all 

have long engaged in trade and other relations with 
87

Turkey. Since these countries gained independence 

in 1991, the Turkish government has sought to train 

and educate their people and provide technical, linguistic, and other assistance to their institutions, from 

their militaries and governments to their businesses 

and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

Turkish officials also see one of their missions as representing Central Asian interests and views within 

major international institutions such as the G-20.186

They therefore encourage Central Asians to convey 

messages to these institutions’ members via Turkey. 

To diversify its sources of energy imports further, 

Turkish officials have been seeking to develop options 

to transship, and possibly purchase for domestic use, 

natural gas from Kazakhstan and other Caspian Basin 

countries. Turkey is interested in serving as a “natural energy bridge” between the supplier countries to 

Turkey’s east and international energy markets to 

Turkey’s north, west, and south. The Central Asian 

states, desiring to decrease their reliance on Russiancontrolled pipelines, have supported this effort. Indeed, Central Asian governments welcome Turkey’s 

growing ties in the region as these times help pursue 

multivector foreign policies with Western directions, 

even as other NATO countries reduce their presence 

in their region.

Turkish analysts and government officials are of 

two minds regarding future political developments in 

Central Asia. One group believes that Central Asia is 

ripe for deep political change through its own version 

of the Arab Spring. They see the region as the last bastion of one-party authoritarian rule and consider the 

prospects for its near-term democratization to be high. 

This group would also welcome a phenomenon like 

the Arab Spring in the region since they consider the 
88

absence of functioning democracies in most Central 

Asian countries as a significant problem for Turkish 

entities. For example, they note that, since all major 

policies in a dictatorship are determined by a single 

individual or group, authoritarian governments are 

prone to make radical changes in policy overnight. In 

addition, the constraints on most individuals’ ability 

to access information in authoritarian regimes, as well 

as the legal arbitrariness common in nondemocracies, 

present major obstacles to domestic and foreign entrepreneurs seeking to run profitable businesses in these 

countries. 

But another group of Turkish experts consider the 

prospects for Central Asia’s near-term democratization to be low because they were more optimistic about 

these regimes’ ability to withstand the kind of political 

chaos sweeping through the Arab world. They argued 

that it would take decades for these countries, whose 

leaders still consist of people who have overwhelmingly developed their political views during the Soviet period, to abandon their Soviet mentality and adopt 

Western liberal values. 

In the view of these Turkish analysts and officials, 

another constraint on political change in Central Asia 

was the geographic isolation of these states from other 

democratic countries as well as their history of authoritarian rule. They argued that Central Asia’s democratization would entail a lengthy process requiring 

the further political and economic evolution of these 

countries. For example, they believed that these nations’ economic development would expand the size 

of their middle class. In time, these stronger middle 

classes could provide a foundation for these states’ 

evolution into more democratic regimes, since people 

having some property want to exert some influence on 
89

government policies that could affect these interests. 

Conversely, this second group of Turkish officials 

feared that efforts to rush Central Asia’s democratization could easily backfire and lead their rulers to adopt 

even more repressive domestic politics. Instead, they 

advocated that, for the time being, Western governments focus on promoting the rule of law and human 

rights in Central Asia, while hoping that economic 

development and other modernization trends would 

eventually lead to more democratic governments in 

the region. 

At present, this second group of Turkish officials 

seems to have the greater influence on Turkey’s policies toward Central Asia. But the onset of revolutionary upheavals in this region could easily shift the balance of influence in favor of the first group more eager 

and optimistic about the prospects for Central Asian 

democratization. Despite these differences, both 

groups of Turkish officials maintained that their country could play some role in Central Asia. Neither has 

thought Turkey sufficiently powerful to compete with 

Russia directly for regional influence. Turkish officials 

recognize Russia’s political, military, and economic 

primacy in the region. They also perceive China as a 

growing economic power in the region. These officials 

see Turkey’s role in Central Asia mainly in cultural 

terms, encouraging these Turkic people to learn Turkish and acknowledge their historical affinity with the 

commonwealth of Turkish nations. They also want 

Turkish businesses to trade and invest in the region. 

In practice, the few Turkish companies having a major 

presence in Central Asia concentrate their activities in 

certain economic sectors such as construction. 

Turkey has also been developing ties with the 

SCO. The SCO has rapidly become one of Eurasia’s 
90

most influential multinational institutions despite its 

short history. It is also one of the largest (in terms of 

geographic size and population) regional organizations, with a most comprehensive agenda. When they 

established the SCO on June 15, 2001, the six founding states (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) adopted a “Declaration 

on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization” that emphasized their adherence to a “Shanghai 

Spirit” based on “mutual respect for multicivilizations” and other values. The issue of Turkey’s acquiring some kind of formal affiliation with the SCO, the 

dominant multinational institution in Eurasia, has 

been under discussion for years, but it was not until 

2012 that the SCO governments finally decided to offer Turkey some kind of formal affiliation after Ankara had assured them that Turkey would not be a 

stalking-horse for NATO in Eurasia. 

The June 2012 annual meeting of the SCO heads 

of state in Beijing, China, designated Turkey a formal 

“dialogue partner” of the organization. The SCO uses 

the category for countries that are neither full members nor formal observers (like India, Iran, Pakistan, 

Mongolia, and now Afghanistan). The 2009 Yekaterinburg summit in Russia granted Belarus and Sri Lanka 

“dialogue partner” status. These partners cannot sign 

SCO documents or participate in SCO decisions; they 

can only offer advice in those areas of cooperation 

specified in a memorandum negotiated between the 

SCO and the partner. Designating Turkey a dialogue 

partner makes imminent sense given Turkey’s longstanding interest in Central Asia, economic influence 

in that region, and powerful regional military force. 

Turkish academies and trainers have been working 

with the Central Asian armed forces since these coun-
91

tries became independent. Turkey’s location astride 

multiple global hotspots—the Balkans, the Caucasus, 

the Middle East, etc.—gives it significant geopolitical 

weight. In addition, allowing a NATO member to affiliate with the SCO helps reduce the concerns of some 

outsiders that the SCO is seeking to construct an alliance of anti-Western autocracies in the heart of Asia. 

By making Turkey a dialogue partner and Afghanistan a formal SCO observer, the SCO now has 

the most comprehensive set of members to address 

Afghanistan’s regional security and economic integration. Turkey has played a major role in enhancing Afghanistan’s security and development. Turkey 

could also help the SCO realize its aspirations to have 

greater economic impact. Turkey has considerable assets in such sectors as finance, transportation, energy, 

telecommunications, and construction. Although not 

yet in the same class as China, India, and Russia, Turkey’s booming economy has already propelled Turkey 

to the ranks of the G-20. Turkey already has some $11 

billion in combined trade and investment in Central 

Asia, as well as approximately $1 billion in Eximbank 

loans and some $30 billion in contracts to almost 2,000 

Turkish firms. 

In a January 2013 TV interview, Erdoğan said 

that he had told Putin that Turkey, after decades of 

thwarted efforts to join the EU would join the SCO 

instead if Putin could arrange it. Explaining his opinion, Erdoğan called the SCO “better and more powerful, and we have common values with them,” which 

include Muslim and Turkic ties with these nations.187

Erdoğan’s remark should not really be seen as a great 

surprise. The Prime Minister has earlier cited supposed Western hostility toward his country and religion. For example, when in Egypt in November 2013, 
92

Erdoğan warned his listeners that “all the West wants 

is to tear the Islamic world to pieces.”188

Political calculations might also be at work. Polls 

show that Turks have become increasingly frustrated 

with the EU, and Erdoğan presumably saw no harm 

in bashing this unpopular target.189 Although most 

Turkish commentators also saw the remarks as a gambit to strengthen Ankara’s negotiating leverage with 

Brussels, a few noted that they resonate well with 

Turkey’s’ flexible foreign policy which, under the 

AKP, has moved Ankara away from its previously 

strongly Western orientation. The comments also reflect Erdoğan’s sense that Turkey belonged to a different “Islamic civilization” rather than an exclusively 

Christian one.190

Last October, Erdoğan’s chief adviser, İbrahim 

Kalın, complained of a growing gap between Islamic 

and Western values and concluded that “the European model of secular democracy, politics, and pluralism seems to have little traction in the Arab and 

larger Muslim world,” in which he included Turkey.191 Although many Turks agree that the EU is simply unwilling to accept such a large Muslim-majority 

country, Erdoğan’s critics, including heads of leading 

opposition parties, complained that Erdoğan was using the religion issue to avoid uncomfortable questions 

about EU attacks against his government’s authoritarian tendencies at home.192 In addition to reflecting a 

genuine concern about Turkey’s mistreatment by the 

EU and an effort to gain easy popularity by attacking 

an unpopular target, Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders see cooperating more with the SCO as an enticing 

option. Like everyone else, Erdoğan has noticed that, 

“The economic powers of the world are shifting from 

west to east.”193
93

In addition to Afghanistan, the main security preoccupation of the SCO thus far has been the “three evils” 

of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—all 

priorities of Turkey’s national security establishment. 

A strengthening of Islamist radicalism in Central Asia 

could easily redound negatively in Turkey, while 

Turkish authorities want to delegitimize Kurdish aspirations for a separate state. Turkey’s border security is constantly challenged by narcotics and human 

trafficking from Central Asia since Turkish territory 

provides the most direct land route to rich European 

markets. The SCO’s preoccupation with fighting Islamist terrorism and ethnic separatism would help the 

AKP justify its repressive domestic policies, which are 

claimed to help counter Kurdish terrorism and separatism. Unlike EU governments, SCO members would 

support whatever repressive means the Turkish authorities deemed necessary.194

The SCO provides another means for Turkey to 

deepen its still modest political engagement with 

Central Asia, and in a framework acceptable to Russia 

and other countries that remain wary of neo-Ottoman 

aspirations regarding the Turkic nations of Central 

Asia. The Turkish Council, Parliamentary Assembly 

of Turkic-speaking Countries (TÜRKPA), the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), 

the Turkish Academy and Turkey’s numerous student 

scholarships have never yielded Ankara much influence in these states. The impact of the Central Asian 

projects sponsored by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) has been 

weakened by the decision to expand its aid recipients 

to dozens of countries rather than retain its original 

focus on the newly independent Turkic republics. The 

educational and cultural outreach efforts sponsored 
94

by the Turkish government and various Turkish 

NGOs have had limited impact building on the shared 

ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other bonds between 

Turkey and these nations. Furthermore, Turkey’s new 

status offers Ankara the prospect of participating in 

SCO-led diplomatic initiatives regarding Afghanistan 

or Central Asia and the organization’s socioeconomic 

initiatives, which might extend to the energy realm. If 

the SCO forms an oil and gas club, then Turkey wants 

to be one of its members.195

Meanwhile, Turkey’s leverage with Europe, the 

United States, and elsewhere might also rise through a 

deeper affiliation with the SCO. Closer ties would also 

help counter criticism that the AKP’s ambitious policy 

of zero problems with neighbors has failed to attain 

enduring results. Although Turkey’s ties with Syria, 

Iraq, and Europe have worsened in recent years, the 

improvements in Ankara’s relations with the SCO 

members have largely persisted. Deepening ties with 

the SCO could prove useful for Ankara in promoting 

its security goals in Afghanistan and Central Asia. And 

Turkey is now eligible to become a formal observer or 

full member of the SCO, with enhanced privileges, in 

the future. Turkish officials have affirmed interest in 

moving up the membership ladder and becoming a 

formal observer state of the SCO, though this might 

not yield any tangible gains in Turkey’s involvement 

in SCO activities given the marginal differences in the 

rights and privileges of the two categories.196

Turkish and SCO officials have since indicated that 

Turkey could join both the SCO and the EU since they 

were not exclusive organizations. Nonetheless, joining 

the SCO would prove easier since there are far fewer 

parties to convince to grant membership (only the six 

existing full SCO members); no SCO government has 
95

publicly opposed Turkey’s accession as a full member, 

while France, Austria, and Cyprus openly have opposed Turkey’s joining the EU; joining the SCO does 

not require extensive negotiations on specific chapters 

like the EU admission process; and public opinion 

within Europe to Turkey’s joining the EU is generally 

unfavorable, while in the SCO, the governments can 

make decisions without taking their public opinion 

into account.

But Turkey also will find it harder to avoid the 

contradictions that permeate the SCO. Turkish diplomacy has already fallen afoul of the confrontation between SCO observers India and Pakistan, with media 

commentators in both governments accusing Turkish 

leaders of not paying sufficient heed to their security 

interests in Afghanistan. Although currently camouflaged by Turkey’s relying on NATO to bolster its security regarding Syria, some NATO officials remain 

uneasy about the implications of Turkey’s eastward 

drift for Alliance cohesion. Turkey might seek to use 

its SCO ties as leverage in NATO debates. Turkey will 

also find it hard to avoid the differences between Beijing and Moscow regarding the SCO’s proper role and 

development. Whereas China would like the SCO to 

establish a free-trade zone, Russia has sought to sustain barriers that help preserve the privileged status 

many Russian businesses inherited from the Soviet 

era. This is especially true in the energy sector, where 

China is eager to expand its access to Central Asian 

oil and gas resources traditionally under Russia’s control. The differences between China and Russia have 

contributed to the SCO’s not admitting any new full 

members to its ranks since its founding in 2001. 
96

Afghanistan.

One reason Turkey wants to deepen its ties with 

the SCO is to expand its diplomatic toolkit regarding 

Afghanistan, which became a formal SCO observer in 

2012. Turkey has undertaken major military, economic, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore Turkey’s 

important role in Afghanistan, which may increase as 

more NATO troops withdraw from that country.

Turkey’s military contributions to Afghanistan 

have been channeled through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created by the December 

2001 Bonn (Germany) Agreement as a means to provide security while the new post-Taliban government 

rebuilt Afghanistan’s military and police forces.197

NATO took charge of ISAF in subsequent years and 

expanded its area of operations in stages until it officially covered all of Afghanistan. An independent 

U.S.-only command focusing on counterterrorist operations has also operated in Afghanistan. Turkey has 

twice led ISAF: first between June 2002 and February 2003, and then between February and November 

2005.198 Turkey has also played a major role in various ISAF regional commands and has led the Force’s 

Regional Command Capital in the Kabul region.199

Turkey extended its command of the ISAF’s Kabul 

region for another year on November 1, 2011.200 Turkey initially deployed 276 troops into Afghanistan in 

late-2001 during the post-9/11 coalition military operations in that country, but this figure rose to 1,300 in 

June 2002, when Turkey assumed command of ISAF 

and was charged with providing security in Kabul 

and running the city’s international airport. At one 

point, Turkey had almost 2,000 troops in Afghanistan 

assigned to various noncombat missions.201
97

While the Turkish government has refused to 

deploy its troops on explicit counterinsurgency or 

counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan, its military forces within ISAF have helped train members of 

the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National 

Police in these tactics. In this regard, Turkish instructors can draw on the experience the Turkish military 

has gained in its many years of conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations against the 

PKK, al-Qaeda, and other militant groups.202 Turkish 

troops serve primarily in the Kabul region, but also 

in several Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) 

across Afghanistan. In Kabul, Turkish troops trained 

hundreds of Afghan soldiers and assisted in reconstruction projects. They also patrolled the city to reassure citizens about their security. Turkey also collaborated with other NATO members such as France and 

Italy in a joint Kabul headquarters to promote security 

in the capital area. In November 2006, moreover, Turkey established a PRT in Wardak, located 40-km west 

of Kabul. Its mixed contingent of civilian and military 

personnel trained the Afghan Police, improved judicial administration, developed public infrastructure, 

and supported projects aimed at raising the quality of 

life of the local population.203

During Erdoğan’s visit to the White House in Washington, DC, on December 7, 2009, President Obama 

requested that the Turkish government deploy combat troops to Afghanistan. In declining the proposal, 

Erdoğan and other Turkish officials explained that 

they wanted to focus Turkey’s military contributions 

on training Afghan security forces, undertaking economic reconstruction projects, and supporting other 

noncombat missions. Alluding to Turkey’s value as 

a potential mediator between the Afghan govern-
98

ment and its adversaries, Gül argued that, “If Turkey 

sends combat forces to Afghanistan, the power that 

everybody respects—including [the] Taliban—will 

disappear.”204 The Obama administration eventually 

accepted this logic. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates subsequently stressed to the media that the 

Obama administration was “extremely pleased with 

Turkey’s contributions in Afghanistan” because U.S. 

officials “pay high importance to personnel that can 

train [Afghan] individuals in the areas of military and 

security.”205

The Turkish government and Turkish NGOs have 

supported many humanitarian and economic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. These have included education, health, housing, and infrastructure 

improvement projects. The Turkish government, with 

funds from TİKA, has constructed dozens of schools, 

helping fill a major socioeconomic gap in Afghanistan. 

TIKA has also helped dig wells to provide citizens 

with safe drinking water. Turkey’s Greater Anatolian 

Project (GAP) has supported projects to improve irrigation in the Afghan city of Jalalabad.206 Turkey has 

donated much food to Afghanistan through the UN 

Food and Agricultural Organization and other means. 

Turks have constructed or rebuilt seven medical clinics in Afghanistan and have supported other health 

initiatives in that country.207 Economic considerations 

have sustained Turkish interest in ending the Afghan 

conflict. The continued fighting has prevented Afghanistan from joining with Turkey and other countries in providing a Eurasian east-west land route for 

Central Asian exports to European markets. Turkey 

aims to become a major transit country for trade between Asia and Europe, but regional insecurity has 

discouraged foreign investment in east-west railroad, 

highway, and pipeline projects. 
99

Turkey has complemented its long-standing military and economic contributions to Afghanistan with 

diplomatic initiatives aimed at creating a favorable 

environment for an Afghan-led peace process. This 

focus has dovetailed well with the Obama administration’s Afghan-Pak war strategy, which tries to pursue 

three mutually reinforcing tracks: “fight, talk, and 

build,” signifying the need for a favorable regional 

diplomatic framework for ending the conflict, along 

with increased military and economic support for 

Afghanistan. The administration’s “New Silk Road” 

policy aims to increase economic ties between Afghanistan and its neighbors in the expectations that 

the economic gains would reduce economic incentives 

to join regional terrorist and insurgent groups, reduce 

Afghanistan’s dependence on foreign assistance, and 

promote greater regional cooperation in other areas. 

Turkey’s three contributions also coincide well with 

the Obama administration’s “3-D” (defense, development, and diplomacy) approach toward foreign 

policy.208

Many of Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives have concentrated on improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan—or at least keeping their lines of 

communication open during their frequent bilateral 

disputes. Like the Obama administration, and other 

NATO governments, Turkish officials argue that any 

enduring solution to the conflict will require better relations between the governments of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. In particular, Pakistani support is needed 

for inducing the Afghan Taliban to end its insurgency 

since the insurgents use Pakistani territory as a base 

of operations. Turkish officials and experts argue 

that their country has distinct advantages in this mediation role, including historically good relations with 
100

both countries, a shared Islamic faith, a lack of local 

proxies or other means, and no incentives to interfere 

in their internal affairs.209 Turkey has long-established 

ties with Pakistan dating from their common alignment with the Western camp during the Cold War 

and their shared moderate Muslim governments. 

Their military-to-military exchanges, which include 

a diverse range of bilateral and multilateral exercises, 

have continued to this day. In turn, Pakistan may have 

helped Turkey improve its relations with China and 

discouraged its Afghan Taliban allies from attacking 

Turkish troops in ISAF.210

Since April 2007, Turkey has hosted six TurkeyAfghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Forum meetings involving senior Turkish, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials. These sessions began as presidential 

summits but have since expanded to include senior 

foreign, intelligence, interior, and other civilian and 

military officials. Similarly, while their initial focus 

was on promoting regional security and counterterrorism collaboration among the three governments, 

they have since broadened to include economic and 

other forms of nonmilitary cooperation.211 For example, at the January 25, 2010, trilateral summit, the three 

governments endorsed initiatives to promote the reconciliation and reintegration of Taliban members who 

agreed to cease fighting and engage in solely nonviolent activities.212 They also discussed cooperating on 

health, education, and other socioeconomic projects.213

Turkey has sought to move beyond mere declarations and have the parties establish concrete 

confidence-building measures among the parties. As 

part of this trilateral process, in early-2011 Turkey 

organized the first joint military exercise (on urban 

warfare) involving all three armies.214 A trilateral di-
101

rect video-telephone conference line among the three 

presidents has been established. There is also a Trilateral Minds Platform whose members include academics and members of the media and think tanks. In 

addition, Turkey has started an Istanbul Forum that 

brings together representatives of the chambers of 

commerce in each of the three countries, which helps 

promote cooperation among their national business 

leaders and other private sector actors to complement 

the government-to-government meetings.215

In November 2011, Istanbul hosted two vital multinational meetings designed to support international 

peace efforts regarding Afghanistan. The first gathering was a tripartite presidential summit with Hamid 

Karzai of Afghanistan, Asif Zardari of Pakistan, and 

Gül of Turkey. The second, the Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia conference, involved officials 

from these three countries, as well as from many other 

neighboring and supporting countries seeking to establish a benign regional security environment for 

ending the war. Representatives from Afghanistan, 

China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates 

attended the event as full participants and wrote the 

collective conference communique. These self-designated “Heart of Asia” countries were joined by senior 

officials from other supporting countries and international institutions. The latter included Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, 

Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States, as well as the UN, Economic Cooperation Organization, OSCE, NATO, SCO, South Asian 

Association for Regional Cooperation, Organization 

for Islamic Cooperation, the EU, and the Conference 
102

on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in 

Asia. 

In its mediation efforts, Turkey has encountered 

many of the same challenges that have bedeviled 

similar U.S. and other third-party facilitators. These 

obstacles include the region’s porous borders, which 

facilitate the flow of fighters and drugs; poor governance; transnational organized criminal groups 

that have an interest in sustaining the conflict; weak 

national governments and security forces that have 

faced major Islamist insurgents; and limited and declining commitments by external powers to support 

regionally driven peace programs. In addition, the 

Afghan-Pakistan conflict has elements of a civil war 

in which the Taliban enjoys some support among the 

large Pashtun community that straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. For this reason, regionally based 

peace efforts invariably will prove of limited effectiveness unless accompanied by complementary developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan such as more effective governance, better counterinsurgency operations, 

and a greater desire on the part of the insurgents to lay 

down their arms and reenter their civilian societies. 

The Istanbul conference communique, like other international gatherings, stressed that any peace efforts 

must be led by the Afghan conflict parties. Regional 

rivalries have also impeded Turkey’s peace efforts. 

While Russia, China, and the West now generally support the same goals, Turkey has found it just as difficult as other countries to manage the India-Pakistan 

rivalry. The Indians complained when they were not 

invited to the trilateral summits between Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Turkey, as well as other Turkey-hosted 

gatherings on Afghanistan. Indians interpreted their 

exclusion, as well as Turkish diplomats’ seeming pre-
103

occupation with improving bilateral economic ties 

between Turkey and India, as a sign that Turkey does 

not respect India’s legitimate national security interest 

in Afghanistan.216 Meanwhile, the main Turkish opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), 

has attacked the Turkish government for seeking to 

cooperate with the Taliban, which they denounce as a 

terrorist group, by considering establishing a Taliban 

representation bureau on Turkish territory.217

Whatever limitations on its role as a potential mediator in Afghanistan, Turkey has been a natural partner 

with NATO, the EU, and the United States in Afghanistan. The EU’s special representative to Afghanistan, 

Vygaudas Usackas, has praised Turkey’s support for 

regional peace efforts and termed EU-Turkish cooperation “most exemplary.”218 This bond has helped 

sustain close ties between Turkey and the West even 

when its government pursues policies toward Iran or 

Israel unwelcome in many Western capitals. Even if 

Turkey’s diplomatic efforts regarding Afghanistan 

fail, Ankara could well receive credit for trying. 

In addition to sharing the general Western goals 

in Afghanistan and contributing troops to the NATOled ISAF, Turkey has unique cultural and geographic 

assets regarding Afghanistan that are welcome in the 

West as well as the region. Turkey is the only NATO 

country with a Muslim-majority population, a valuable attribute for a Western-led military operation in 

a Muslim-majority country (Afghanistan) and region 

(Central Asia). Turkey’s location is also pivotal since 

Afghanistan, unlike the former Yugoslavia, is very 

much “out-of-area” for an Alliance whose military 

operations have focused primarily on Europe, North 

America, and the ocean between them. Incirlik Air 

Base and other facilities in Turkey have served as important transit centers for helping transport NATO 
104

troops and other items to Afghanistan.219 Turkey, 

which has the second highest number of troops of any 

NATO member after the United States, accrues certain 

advantages within the Alliance from its prominent 

role in Afghanistan. The other allies acknowledge 

Turkey’s unique assets and contributions. From 2003 

to 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin served as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative 

in Afghanistan. 

At the same time, several factors have constrained 

Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan. These include a 

concern about becoming bogged down in an unwinnable war, alienation from U.S. policies in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, and fears of antagonizing fellow Muslims by 

appearing to join a Western (Christian) crusade. These 

concerns, manifested in low popular support within 

Turkey for Turkey’s limited involvement in the war, 

have made the Turkish government cautious about 

its level of involvement, especially in the military 

realm. Public opposition to the AKP’s foreign policy 

might grow now that the AKP’s “zero problems with 

neighbor” policy is in tatters with Turkey’s relations 

with Syria, Iran, Armenia, Israel, and other countries 

deteriorating in recent years. 

CHINA

The relationship with China is, on the whole, quite 

positive. The Chinese see Turkey as a potentially valuable partner, now that its economy has shown itself 

to be both dynamic and resilient, and now that it is 

demonstrating a policy independence that it has not 

shown since ties between the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) and Turkey were established in 1971. 

Beijing has been cultivating Turkey on many levels, 
105

and Sino-Turkish economic and more recently security relations have become increasingly important. Chinese scholars have expressed admiration for Turkey’s 

strong economic performance while PRC policymakers are content that Ankara is not going to champion 

Uighur or other Turkic separatism in China or other 

countries. 

The rise of Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s has 

done much to change Ankara’s perspective regarding 

Beijing’s policies toward the Uighur Turks in Xinjiang 

(East Turkestan) province: like Beijing, Ankara now 

champions the principles of territorial integrity and 

national sovereignty, and opposes separatism. Beijing, in return, has adopted a neutral line regarding 

the Cyprus issue. Trade between the two has grown 

by leaps and bounds, though the deficit remains in the 

PRC’s favor. Turkish officials have sought to entice 

Chinese investment in various infrastructure projects 

as a means of reducing the trade imbalance. Turkey is 

even considering a Chinese air defense system despite 

Washington’s objections. The AKP government’s desire for new partnerships and Turkey’s eagerness to 

join other states in benefitting from the strength of 

the Chinese economy has contributed to this flourishing relationship with Beijing. Their growing mutual 

attraction has led them to overlook their diverging 

policies regarding some regional issues, such as Syria 

and the status of ethnic Turks in China, and instead 

concentrate on cultivating mutual economic and strategic ties. Both Chinese and Turkish analysts describe 

their countries as two rising great powers that, located 

on opposite ends of Eurasia, could through their strategic partnership have a major impact on the nations 

between. The two countries referred to increasingly 

deepening relations between the two nations as “stra-
106

tegic cooperation” in 2010 and celebrated the 40th anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties between the 

two countries.

Several factors are driving Turkey to improve ties 

with China. First, Turks want to develop economic 

ties, especially to sell goods to China and attract PRC 

investment. Second, Ankara is exploring developing further military ties with the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA). Third, China is a leading world power. 

For example, its status as a permanent member of the 

UN Security Council gives Beijing considerable say 

over issues of concern to Ankara, including Cyprus, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East peace 

process. Fourth, China’s economic and political influence is growing in Central Asia, an important region 

for Turkey. Fifth, unlike Europeans and Americans, 

PRC officials do not attack Ankara’s policies toward 

the Kurds, talk about an Armenian genocide, criticize 

Turkey’s repression of media freedoms, or otherwise 

seek to interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs. Finally, 

strengthening ties with China helps Ankara gain leverage in its relations with other important countries, 

such as Russia, Europe, and the United States.

Chinese analysts consider Turkey an increasingly 

important country for China due to its growing economy, increasingly independent and influential diplomacy, and pivotal geopolitical location between Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. With respect to the 

latter, Chinese analysts note that Turkey is a Turkicspeaking nation closely linked with Central Asia, a 

Middle Eastern country whose regional influence has 

been rising, and a member of both NATO (formally) 

and the EU (in terms of some economic conditions that 

interest the Chinese). Beijing has strived to improve 

relations with the Turkish peoples, including in Xinji-
107

ang, considers the Middle East and especially Central 

Asia as two regions important for China’s development and security, and is aiming to improve ties with 

both NATO and the EU. Turkey can serve as a conduit 

for China to exert both direct and indirect influence in 

these other regions. 

In addition, Chinese analysts view Turkey as one 

variant of the rising number of overly Islamic oriented 

governments arising in Eurasia and the Middle East. 

They also perceive Turkey as the best of these variants, contrasting Turkey’s moderate, stable and secular political system with the less stable regimes in their 

client state of Pakistan and the aggressively extremist 

form of Islamic government seen in Iran. They prefer that the Arab Spring yield more governments like 

Turkey rather than more regimes like Pakistan and 

Iran. China’s Turkey specialists express grudging admiration for the ruling AKP despite suspicions of its 

overtly religious ties. They note that Turkey’s AKPled government has pursued a more independent foreign policy than its predecessors that has seen Turkey 

distance itself from the United States and especially 

Israel. More recently, the AKP has deftly developed 

good ties with the governments of Libya and Syria 

and then abandoned them when these regimes have 

fallen into trouble. 

Through much of the 20th century, relations between Turkey and China were either peripheral, 

conflict-prone, or both. During the first half of the 

century, the two nations were preoccupied with their 

internal affairs, trying to modernize their antiquated 

political and economic institutions. In 1950, Turkey 

and the newly created PRC came into direct contact 

in highly unpropitious circumstances. Seeking to gain 

entry into NATO, which occurred in 1952, Turkey vol-
108

untarily sent thousands of troops to fight alongside 

American and other Western soldiers in the Korean 

War. A few months later, the PRC also sent soldiers 

into the Korean battlefield, leading to bloody battles 

between Chinese and Turkish troops. Ankara continued to recognize the Chinese government in Taipei, 

while PRC propagandists labeled Turkey a “runningdog of the U.S. imperialism” and supported Turkey’s 

leftist movements. 

Trade and cultural ties developed during the 1960s 

and after a pause due to China’s chaotic Cultural Revolution, Ankara and Beijing established formal diplomatic relations in 1971, continuing only trade and 

other economic connections with Taiwan. The concurrent improvement in ties between Beijing and Washington facilitated this reconciliation, as did a mutual 

Chinese and Turkish concern about the growth of the 

military power of the Soviet Union, their common 

neighbor. They signed several bilateral accords, including a China-Turkey Trade Agreement, a Mutual 

Protection of Investments Agreement, an Agreement 

on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention 

of Tax Evasion, and a Fraud and Marine Shipment 

Agreement. Nonetheless, even after Turkey and the 

PRC established diplomatic relations in 1971, their 

political engagement with one another remained marginal. It was not until 1982 that Turkish head of state 

President Kenan Evren visited China. PRC President 

Li Xiannian conducted a reciprocal visit to Turkey 2 

years later. Economic and political ties grew slowly 

during the next 2 decades but were not major priorities for either government. Their status as developing countries with little mutual cooperation meant 

that, in 1985, two-way trade amounted to only some 

$100 million.
109

A major source of tension in PRC-Turkish relations 

is Beijing’s treatment of its ethnic Uighur minority in 

Xinjiang. The Uighurs are a Turkic-speaking Muslim 

minority who have lived for centuries in western China in what they historically have called “East Turkestan.” They share ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, 

historical, and other ties with the other Turkic people 

of Central Asia, as well as Turkey itself. In the view 

of Chinese analysts, the close cultural and historical 

affinity between the PRC’s Uighurs and other Turks 

should enable them to serve as a bridge between 

China and Turkey, as well as Central Asia. 

Although the PRC’s trade with the Turkic nations remains low in relative terms, and dwarfed by 

China’s enormous commerce with other regions like 

East Asia, Western Europe, and North America, trade 

with Turkey and Central Asia is important for Xinjiang. Its peripheral location has limited Xinjiang’s 

trade ties with China’s larger markets. Chinese plans 

to import more Caspian Basin oil and natural gas will 

fortify Xinjiang’s westward orientation. In fact, Central Asian countries are important to China due to 

their proximity and the growing Chinese investment 

in Central Asia, whose governments are more inviting 

to Chinese businesses than those of the Middle East, 

where Chinese companies most often engage in projects under contract. In fact, the Chinese worry that the 

new Arab regimes will not respect China’s commercial interests due to their collusion with Western governments to constrain Chinese business opportunities 

in these countries. Another concern is that the Middle 

Eastern disorders, which Chinese experts believe will 

last for months, if not years, will help keep world oil 

and other commodity prices unnaturally elevated.
110

China expresses suspicions about the AKP’s sympathies for their fellow Muslims in Xinjiang and fears 

that religious and other ties could serve as a transmission belt for importing Middle Eastern chaos into the 

Muslim-majority nations of Central Asia and potentially Xinjiang, with its large Muslim Uighur minority. Beijing has established tight control over Xinjiang 

to ensure possession of its valuable natural resources 

and pivotal geographic position as the PRC’s gateway 

to Central Asia and beyond. Beijing fears that relaxing 

control over the region would encourage separatist 

sentiments in Tibet and other regions of China. 

PRC policies such as restricting the use of the 

Uighur language in schools, curbing their religious 

freedoms, and encouraging Han Chinese migration 

into Xinjiang have exacerbated ethnic tensions and 

led many Uighurs to flee to Turkey. Many Turks 

have sympathized with the Uighurs as victims of 

Chinese communist persecution. When the Turkish nations of Central Asia gained independence in 

the early-1990s, many Turks hoped those in Xinjiang would soon follow suit. For decades, successive 

Turkish governments offered asylum to these waves 

of Uighur migrants, some of whom established associations advocating independence for what they 

called the state of East Turkistan. These included the 

Eastern Turkistan Cultural Association, the Eastern 

Turkistan Women Association, the Eastern Turkistan 

Youth Union, the Eastern Turkistan Refugee Committee, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, and the 

Eastern Turkistan National Center. Some Uighurs—

the numbers are constantly in dispute—have joined 

militant groups and fought back against Beijing and 

ethnic Hans.
111

The rise of Kurdish militarism later in the 1990s 

helped win over the Turkish political establishment 

to the Chinese position that Beijing’s difficulties in 

Xinjiang resembled Ankara’s problems with Kurdish separatists. By the end of the decade, Turkish officials ended their practice of giving Uighurs leaving 

the PRC automatic Turkish citizenship, stopped using the name “East Turkistan” rather than Xinjiang, 

and recognized that province as an inalienable part 

of China. This forced many independence-advocating 

East Turkistan groups to close or leave Turkey, often 

to Germany or the United States. 

In December 1998, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz 

banned Turkish officials from participating in antiBeijing activities relating to East Turkistan.220 They 

eventually joined the PRC in prioritizing the values 

of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and the 

fight against what PRC officials denounce as the 

three evil forces. Beijing rewarded Turkey’s new Uighur policies, as well as its restrained response to the 

June 1989 Tiananmen Square killings, by not criticizing the Turkish government’s use of military force in 

Kurdish areas. 

The PRC also adopted a neutral stance toward the 

Cyprus issue. The suppression of the 2009 ethnic rioting between Han Chinese and Uighurs—which began 

in Urumqi, the regional capital, and then spread to 

other regions—by the PLA in 2009 only temporarily 

disrupted this process of distancing Turkish government policy from Uighur nationalism. At the time, 

Erdoğan called the results “almost genocide,” while 

other Turkish leaders used similar language.221 Whatever their personal sentiments, Turkish officials felt 

compelled to express concern over the July 2013 riots 

in Xinjiang due to the strong, if short-lived, pressure 

for action by important segments of Turkish society. 
112

Media commentators, political agitators, and others 

condemned the killings.222 The riots embarrassingly 

also came just days after Gül had visited China and 

had prioritized developing bilateral economic ties over 

human rights or other issues. During a stop in Urumqi, 

Gül commented that the region’s Uighur population 

represented a bridge between Turkey and China.223

PRC analysts accept that Erdoğan’s harsh comments 

following the riots were made for domestic political 

reasons—to resonate with the popular sentiment in 

Turkey against Beijing’s crackdown. They note that 

Erdoğan quietly sent his special envoy, State Minister 

Zafer Çağlayan, the following month to Beijing, where 

he expressed understanding for the PRC policies and 

hope that the incident would not undermine bilateral ties. They further noted that Erdoğan refrained 

from denouncing China’s Uighur policies when PRC 

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Turkey in October 

2010. The Chinese and Turkish governments agreed 

to establish a strategic partnership, again manifesting Erdoğan’s policy of forgetting about the Uighurs 

in order to develop bilateral state-to-state ties with 

the PRC.

Since the riots, Turkish and PRC officials have 

again prioritized the values of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and fighting the three evil forces. 

The end of their common Soviet threat and the independent national economic reform processes in the 

two counties, which aimed to integrate them more 

into international markets, also led both governments 

to focus more on developing bilateral economic connections even as new political issues emerged that 

led to more joint discussions: the newly independent 

Central Asian countries, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the war on terror. 

However, the deaths of some two dozen people in re-
113

newed Xinjiang clashes in late-February 2012 made it 

harder to ignore the Uighur issue during Xi’s visit. In 

his Sabah newspaper interview, President Xi stressed 

how the PRC had sought to promote Xinjiang’s development to raise the living standards of all the ethnic 

groups living there, including the Uighur. He encouraged Turkish entrepreneurs to invest in the region and 

attend the second China-Eurasia Expo in Urumqi in 

September. Despite his remarks, Uighur activists protested outside Xi’s hotel in Ankara against Beijing’s 

repression of its Uighur minority. Carrying a flag of 

East Turkestan, the demonstrators burned a poster of 

Xi and PRC flags before police dispersed them. According to China’s Xinhua News Agency, when meeting with Erdoğan at his Istanbul home on February 22, 

Xi said that:

China hopes that Turkey will continue to take effective 

measures to oppose and prevent anti-China separatist 

activities by ‘East Turkistan’ forces on its territory so 

as to ensure the healthy and steady growth of ChinaTurkey ties.224

Xinhua also reports that: 

Erdogan reaffirmed that Turkey has consistently adhered to the one-China policy, recognized the People’s 

Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative 

of the whole Chinese people, and never allowed any 

activity on its territory that aims to undermine China’s 

independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.225

Turkey may become more important for the rest 

of China since the two countries’ national economies 

are expanding much faster than the global average, 

and have sustained exceptionally high gross domestic 
114

product (GDP) growth rates despite the global recession, elevating their global economic importance. The 

PRC has become Turkey’s third largest trading partner 

(after Germany and Russia) and the leading source of 

Turkey’s imports. According to the PRC Ministry of 

Commerce, two-way trade has grown from approximately $1 billion in 2001 to almost $18.7 billion in 

2011, an 18-fold increase during that decade.226 Turkish government statistics indicate that bilateral trade 

amounted to $24.1 billion in 2011.227 During the 2001-

11 period, Chinese investment in Turkey reached 

$10 billion, with projects worth $4 billion already 

finalized.228

PRC firms are very active in Turkey’s infrastructure, construction, mining, and telecommunications 

sectors.229 Both Ankara and Beijing have an interest in 

helping Turkey realize its ambition to become a multidirectional energy corridor that would help direct 

some Eurasian oil and gas eastward as well as toward 

Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.230 Turkey and 

China, with two of the world’s largest and most dynamic economies, are especially eager to revive their 

traditional Silk Road links though Central Asia and 

other Eurasian countries. The PRC leadership appreciates Turkey’s potential gateway status for sales in 

Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. Huawei Technologies Ltd. has chosen İstanbul as its headquarters 

for managing its businesses in Central Asia.231 When 

Premier Wen Jiabao visited Turkey in 2010, the two 

countries signed eight deals in areas including trade, 

energy facilities, and railway networks that would 

help connect Istanbul to Beijing through a “modern 

silk road.”232 Wen’s visit to Turkey was the first conducted by a PRC Prime Minister in 8 years.233 He and 

Erdoğan announced they would establish a strategic 
115

cooperation relationship that would include increased 

economic, political, energy, security, cultural, and 

other ties.234 Wen said that China would: 

take active measures to promote trade with Turkey” 

and would encourage investment by Chinese enterprises in Turkey and facilitate cooperation in various 

economic fields, such as power projects, bridge construction and the financial sector.235

The two leaders pledged to increase their bilateral 

trade, which then amounted to less than $20 billion 

each year, to $50 billion annually within the next 5 

years. The agreements signed during Wen’s visit suggest that Turkey and China are eager to expand their 

economic ties. China is already Turkey’s largest trade 

partner in the Far East.236

There are some economic difficulties in the Turkey-China relationship. The two countries sometimes 

compete for sales as well as access to regional energy 

supplies. Another source of economic tension is their 

bilateral trade imbalance. Approximately 60 percent 

of China’s imports from Turkey consist of mined raw 

materials, with chemicals also ranking high on the 

list.237 Meanwhile, more than three-fourths of Turkey’s imports from China are intermediate goods.238

The Turkish authorities want PRC companies to process more of these mining products inside Turkey.239

Trade between Turkey and China has flourished 

in recent years, but almost all of this has been due to 

Turks’ growing appetite for Chinese goods. Turkey’s 

trade with China is currently dominated by imports 

from China, which totaled $21 billion in 2011, with 

only $3 billion in exports. Like other countries, Turks 

have found penetrating the Chinese market difficult. 

The lower costs of Chinese labor and other PRC ad-
116

vantages have resulted in Sino-Turkish trade being 

very imbalanced.240 The PRC Ambassador to Turkey, 

Gong Xiaosheng, insists that China does not want 

such an enormous trade surplus. He claimed the PRC 

government was encouraging Chinese enterprises to 

import more from Turkey as well as increase their direct investment in Turkey.241 In addition to setting the 

goal of increasing their two-way trade, the two governments said they would rely more on national currencies in their bilateral commerce, which could help 

equalize both countries mutual imports and exports. 

In any case, Turkish policymakers seem less interested in rectifying the bilateral trade imbalance than in 

enticing more PRC investment in Turkish infrastructure. Turkish officials are eager to take advantage of 

Chinese capital and technology to help develop their 

energy and transportation sectors. High-speed railroads are a special area of interest given China’s leading expertise in this area and Turkish desires to build 

a network of fast east-west trains to enhance Turkey’s role as a conduit for commerce between Europe 

and Asia. 

The focus on deepening and rectifying mutual economic ties was evident in then-Vice President Xi Jinping’s 3-day February 2012 visit, made at the invitation of Gül.242 In Ankara, Xi met with Gül and Turkish 

Parliament Speaker Cicek. He then flew to Istanbul to 

talk with Erdoğan and attended a China-Turkey business forum. When Xi met Gül, the two governments 

signed seven bilateral economic agreements.243 These 

included a f﻿inancial cooperation agreement between 

the Treasury Undersecretariat and the China Development Bank, a memorandum of understanding between 

Turkish public broadcaster-TRT and Chinese Central 

Television (CCTV), and a currency swap agreement 
117

between the two national banks. Furthermore, Deputy 

Prime Minister Ali Babacan encouraged Turkish banks 

to open branches in China and PRC financial institutions to enter Turkey.244 Xi and Erdoğan said that the 

two sides should enhance their economic cooperation 

in finance, energy, infrastructure construction, and 

high-technology sectors such as aviation, aerospace, 

nuclear energy, and high-speed rail transportation.245

In his February 22 address to the China-Turkey 

Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Istanbul, 

attended by hundreds of Chinese and Turkish business leaders, Xi praised the attendees as “participants 

and promoters of the win-win and mutually-beneficial economic and trade cooperation between the two 

countries.”246 Xi urged the two countries to grasp the 

opportunities for their emerging market economies to 

“upgrade and push forward the win-win and mutually-beneficial economic and trade cooperation.” He 

specifically called for increasing cooperation on global 

and international hotspot issues; broadening cooperation into more sectors such as transportation and 

infrastructure development; jointly resisting trade 

protectionism including by mitigating trade imbalances; and increasing cultural exchange and peopleto-people ties.247

To this end, Turkey designated 2012 as a Chinese 

Cultural Year and China hosted a Turkish Cultural 

Year in 2013. The number of Chinese tourists visiting 

Turkey has grown significantly in recent years, soaring from only a few thousand in 2008 to more than 

100,000 in 2011. Even so, this figure is considerably 

less than the millions of Russians and Europeans who 

vacation every year in Turkey.248

For his part, Turkish Economy Minister Zafer 

Çağlayan told the Forum attendees that, besides China’s purchasing more Turkish products, additional 
118

Chinese investments in Turkey were needed to help 

remedy the trade imbalance.249 Murat Sungurlu, the 

head of the Turkish-Chinese Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜÇSİAD), told Today’s Zaman

that only 43 of the 29,144 foreign-owned companies 

in Turkey were from China.250 Çağlayan called for 

the holding of more of these mutual business forums 

and trade fairs so that Chinese companies would better understand business opportunities in Turkey.251

Babacan said Turkish and Chinese firms could establish partnerships and undertake joint projects in third 

countries.252 Xi denied China “deliberately” sought a 

trade surplus with any other state. “With respect to the 

trade deficit in the trade between Turkey and China,” 

he explained, “China is willing to maintain communication and cooperation with Turkey and take comprehensive mitigation measures.”253 Xi said the PRC 

would continue to give incentives for Chinese firms 

to invest in Turkey, though he encouraged Turkish officials to ensure an attractive investment climate for 

PRC investors.254

Sino-Turkish military cooperation began in the 

1990s after Ankara turned to China following failed 

negotiations with the U.S. Government to produce, 

with technology transfer, the M-270 Multiple Launch 

Rocket System (MLRS). In the late-1990s, Turkey manufactured under license the Chinese WS-1 302mm and 

TR-3000 rockets, as well as the B-611 short-range surface-to-surface missile.255 In the late-1990s, the United 

States rejected Turkey’s request to purchase the MLRS 

on the grounds that Turkey had used U.S.-provided 

arms to attack Kurdish anti-government militias. 

Therefore, Turkey turned to China to acquire rockets, 

missiles, and relevant technologies. Still, the value of 

the Chinese arms transfers to Ankara has remained 
119

small compared to what Turkey was acquiring from 

its NATO partners, and Turkish military exchanges 

with China were very infrequent compared with the 

robust exchange program between Turkey and the 

United States, Europe, and Israel. In recent years, military cooperation between China and Turkey has taken 

an upward trend. 

In October 2010, China’s fighters arrived in Turkey (via air passageways provided by Pakistan and 

Iran) at the invitation of Turkey to join in its air force 

drill code-named Anatolian Eagle, in China’s first 

ever bilateral military exercise with Turkey, which 

also marked the PRC’s first military exercise based on 

the territory of a NATO member. In past years, the 

annual Anatolian Eagle air drills in the central Anatolian province of Konya involved warplanes from the 

United States, other NATO countries, and Israel. But 

in 2009 and 2010, the Turkish government decided not 

to invite Israel to participate, which may have contributed to the U.S. decision to skip the drills as well. 

Seeing an opportunity for mutual benefit, the Turkish and Chinese air forces decided to conduct their 

own maneuvers. Presumably at the government’s direction, the Turkish media gave much less coverage 

to the drills as compared with previous years. Still, 

the Pentagon spokeswoman felt compelled to stress 

that Turkey remained committed to NATO and that 

Turkish representatives had pledged to protect U.S. 

and NATO military secrets.256 The decision of the 

Turkish air force to use its older F-4Es rather than its 

more advanced F-16s during the exercises with the 

Chinese may have resulted from Pentagon pressure 

since the initial media reports had indicated the F-16s 

would participate.257 Notwithstanding this apparent 

concession to U.S. concerns that the exercises would 
120

enhance Chinese understanding of NATO tactics and 

technologies, which presumably make it easier for the 

PLA to develop countermeasures, several American 

commentators cited the exercises as a reason to be 

cautious about transferring further advanced military 

technology to Turkey, including the new F-35 joint 

strike fighter.258 Despite these concerns, Turkish-PRC 

military cooperation looks set to continue. The TSK 

are eagerly trying to develop contacts with non-Western militaries, while the PLA Air Force has been expanding its range of operations during the past year, 

including by simulating long-distance bombing runs 

in Kazakhstan earlier in September 2013 during the 

SCO’s annual exercise. 

The more interesting matter is Beijing’s ambitions 

to expand its hitherto intermittent presence in the 

Turkish defense market. While the Turkish military 

has strong ties to the U.S. military industry and continues to seek advanced military equipment from the 

United States and participate in joint defense industry projects, Erdoğan recently announced the decision 

to enter into negotiations with China to purchase the 

Chinese FD-2000 air defense system. Ankara’s opting 

for the PRC’s system, based on the HQ-9 missile, represents a tremendous achievement for China’s arms 

sales industry and a major break with tradition for 

the Turkish national security community, which still 

prefers to purchase major weapons systems from the 

West if Turkey’s own developing defense industry 

cannot produce them. Although its reported range 

and effectiveness is less than that of the competing 

systems, and the FD-2000 is not battle tested like the 

Patriots, China’s bid was reportedly $1 billion less 

than the competitors. Most importantly, China has 

offered to co-produce the entire systems in Turkey, 
121

transferring much defense technology in the process 

and meeting Turkey’s long-standing preference to 

improve the capacity of its national defense industry. 

But the state-owned Chinese company, China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation, is under 

sanctions for violating the Iran, North Korea, and 

Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006, enacted by the 

United States, to prevent proliferation of WMD and 

ballistic missile technology to the named countries. It 

is not clear if Turkish policymakers knew or understood this problem, and recent media reports suggest 

Turkish defense firms are lobbying Ankara to reverse 

course and buy another system.259

The China-Turkey relationship looks set to become 

even more important in coming years due to the two 

countries’ status as rising global powers and their current governments’ inclination to embrace new partnerships and opportunities. They are also rising world 

powers eager to remake at least some features of the 

international system, whose foundations were laid 

after World War II, when Ankara and Beijing were 

too weak to have much influence. Turks are eager 

to draw on Chinese capital and technologies as they 

develop their own economy, while the PRC is looking to deepen ties with important regional actors such 

as Turkey. Nonetheless, their bilateral relationship is 

unlikely to become as important as, for example, the 

broad and deep ties each has developed in recent years 

with Russia. 

Turkey and China could easily become commercial rivals in third markets, especially in the textile 

and construction sectors, since they both rely on their 

low labor costs as a main source of their comparative 

advantage in world trade. U.S. pressure will probably 

also constrain Turkey’s potential interest in develop-
122

ing close defense ties with the PRC. Turkey and China 

might also compete again for influence and resources in Central Asia even if they continue to overlook 

China’s Uighur minority.

TURKEY’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Turkey has built one of the most impressive defense industrial bases among the newly industrialized 

states in the Middle East. The country’s total military 

expenditure for 2014 was almost $11 billion.260 The 

TSK are the 14th largest in the world and the largest in 

Europe (if Russia is excluded), with more than 500,000 

active duty personnel across all the services, 2,500 

main battle tanks, 350 fighter and fighter/ground 

attack jets, 40 attack helicopters, and about 24 submarines and major surface warships.261 According to 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 

Turkey accounted for 3 percent of worldwide imports 

of conventional weapons for the 2009-13 period.262

Yet, over time, Ankara has reduced the percentage of 

these weapons that it has purchased from U.S. sources, while raising the share of arms imported from 

non-U.S. companies and the proportion of weapons 

manufactured in Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkish defense 

companies have been expanding their own exports. 

The United States traditionally has been the largest supplier of defense systems to Turkey due to the 

two countries’ strategic ties, joint military exercises, 

common NATO membership, the TSK’s long familiarity with U.S. weaponry, and interoperability considerations. Initially, Turkey lacked a major defense 

industrial sector, and buying weapons from the United States was seen as a natural means of reinforcing 

the bilateral alliance. Since the mid-1990s, Turkey has 
123

strived to modernize its armed forces and develop 

its defense industry. In the 1990s, Turkey launched a 

campaign to modernize its military that will cost an 

estimated $150 billion by 2026. The motives for this 

indigenous defense industrialization were not only 

military, but also economic and political. Turkey consciously pursued a parallel strategy of security and 

development, building its heavy industry and hightechnology sectors while striving for greater self-sufficiency in arms production. Turkey has also pursued 

an advanced arms production capability to enhance 

its international status and influence. 

Furthermore, U.S. policies have shaped Ankara’s 

behavior. Turkey’s 1974 military intervention in Cyprus led the U.S. Congress to curtail defense assistance to Turkey and impose an embargo on weapons 

sales, which led Ankara to seek alternative arms suppliers.263 Congress lifted the arms embargo in 1978. In 

1980, Turkey and the United States signed a Defense 

and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) that 

provided for additional weapons transfers and for 

U.S. bases in Turkey. The DECA has been renewed 

several times.264

Nonetheless, Turkey has continued to seek nonU.S. arms suppliers. Turkey bought some weapons 

from Russia in the 1990s. While Russia was more relaxed about how Turkey could use these weapons, the 

TSK complained about the inferior quality of some 

Russian weapons, the lack of Russian after-sale services, and Russia’s inability to provide sufficient spare 

parts. Russia further irked Ankara when it announced 

its intention to sell S-300 air defense missile systems 

to the Greek-governed portion of Cyprus.265 Israel also 

became a major arms supplier to Turkey, beginning 

with a 1996 defense and military pact between the two 

countries.266
124

In the ensuing years, Israeli firms upgraded ageing 

Turkish weapons systems and sold its newer defense 

systems to Turkey. Israeli Military Industries Ltd., for 

example, upgraded 170 of Turkey’s tanks, while Israel 

Aerospace Industries (IAI) sold Ankara unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) and upgraded several dozen 

Turkish F-4 fighter jets.267 But defense cooperation between the two countries ceased following the Israeli 

raid on a Turkish-organized flotilla that was trying 

to break the Israeli blockade on the Hams-controlled 

Gaza Strip. Signs of a thaw emerged only in 2013, 

when the IAI delivered $100 million worth of electronic systems for the airborne early warning and control 

aircraft that Boeing is manufacturing for Turkey’s air 

force.268 However, the IAI had committed to the deal 

in 2002.269

The frayed Israel-Turkey relationship has affected Turkey’s nascent defense industry in other ways. 

In 2005, Turkey contracted with IAI to purchase 10 

Heron UAVs, which were to be delivered in 2007. The 

delivery date was continually postponed, with the 

Israeli producers blaming the delays on the need to 

adopt the Heron to accommodate Turkish electronic 

systems. After Israel began delivery of the UAVs in 

2009, Turkey complained about their sub-par performance. Turkey tried to acquire U.S.-made Predator 

UAVs, but the U.S. Government resisted, given the 

rift between Tel Aviv and Ankara as well as Turkey’s 

then-relatively warm ties with Syria and Iran.270

Turkey has cooperated with new defense industrial partners in recent years. For example, Turkey has 

become the second largest buyer of defense equipment from South Korea, after the United States. In 

2001, Seoul and Ankara inked a deal worth $1 billion 

for modified versions of South Korea’s K9 Thunder 
125

self-propelled howitzer, produced by Samsung Techwin. In 2007, Turkey agreed to purchase 40 singleengine turboprop training KT-1 aircraft, with much 

technology transfer. Turkish Aerospace Industries 

will produce 35 of the aircraft under a license.271 From 

Turkey’s perspective, this deal is ideal in that it provides Turkey with “good enough” defense systems at 

a lower price than the most advanced systems, while 

augmenting the capacity of its own defense industry.

While considering a wider range of foreign suppliers, the Turkish government has sought to raise the 

share of items and services purchased from the country’s own defense industries. Nearly 2 decades ago, 

the Turkish Parliament adopted Law No. 3238, which 

mandated the development of a “modern defence industry . . . to achieve the modernization of the Turkish 

Armed Forces.” Turkey’s defense industry has grown 

since then. In 2008, Turkey had more than 200 defense 

companies and 1,000 subcontractors dealing in $3 to 

$4 billion worth of business. That year, Turkey was 

the world’s 28th largest arms exporter.272 Between 

2004 and 2010, the ratio of domestically sourced armaments rose from 15 percent to 54 percent, though 

the percentages for the more critical and advanced 

defense technologies is likely higher.273

As Turkey has developed its defense industry, more 

U.S. companies have lost sales to firms from countries 

with less restrictive export rules and more generous 

technology transfer policies.274 Turkey sees producing 

its own tanks, helicopters, UAVs, and fighter jets as 

high-priority national projects. Even so, Turkey will 

likely need foreign technical expertise and financial 

resources, at least for some critical sub-systems.275 U.S. 

defense sales to Turkey reached an all-time high in 

the 1990s. Although the U.S. share has since declined, 
126

for the 2009-13 period, Turkey was the world’s 11th 

largest importer of arms.276 In 2012, Turkey was the 

world’s fourth largest importer of arms, behind India, 

China, and the United States, respectively.277

Turkish officials want to increase their country’s 

weapons exports. The government sees foreign arms 

sales as another means to give other countries a stake 

in Turkey’s security, as well as an opportunity to create more high-tech jobs and lower unit costs for the 

TSK through larger production runs. The same factors 

that have enabled Turkey’s industry to substitute for 

previously imported defense items have made them 

better able to compete for foreign sales: the growing 

sophistication and size of Turkey’s civilian economy, 

the companies’ improving human capital and productivity, mandatory technology transfers and offsets, 

and extensive Turkish government support for the industry in the form of domestic military contracts and 

state-supported research and development efforts. 

In 2012, Turkey exported defense products to 60 

countries.278 That year, Turkish arms exports reached 

$1.3 billion, a 43 percent increase over the previous 

year, making Turkey the world’s 24th largest arms exporter.279 The United States was Turkey’s chief defense 

export market, buying $490 million of Turkish military products in 2012. These purchases were primarily related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, for 

which Turkish firms produce components. Following 

the United States, Turkey sold $101 million worth of 

weapons to the United Arab Emirates and $99 million 

to Saudi Arabia.280

Ankara aspires to raise its arms exports to $2 billion 

by 2016 (while spending $8 billion on acquiring defense systems from other countries).281 Turkey hopes, 

for example, to sell its Altay main battle tank, referred 
127

to as the “national tank,” to Saudi Arabia, which has 

plenty of cash to invest in its defense capabilities and 

has an inventory of ageing tanks. A sale would boost 

political and military ties between the two Sunni 

countries and help to cement security ties useful for 

managing any Iranian-led Shia bloc in the region.282

It is important not to exaggerate the extent of these 

changes. Despite its maturing defense industry, Murad Bayar, Turkey’s Undersecretary for Defense Industries, has stated that Turkey lacks a cohesive defense armaments export policy.283 The U.S. grip on the 

international arms market is declining, while Turkish 

defense firms are experiencing growth, but the United States still remains the largest international arms 

dealer, with a 30 percent share of total arms exports in 

2012, worth more than $200 billion.284 Furthermore, the 

United States is the world’s largest supplier of combat 

aircraft (62 percent of total exports), which happens 

to be one of Turkey’s major military imports.285 As of 

2010, the United States was involved in roughly 80 

percent of the defense-related activities in Turkey. 

Although unable to match the quality of some U.S. 

defense exports, Turkish companies can often win 

contracts based on their lower costs and greater ability to transfer military technology to potential buyers. 

Obviously, there are buyers, like the Arab monarchies, 

who can afford to pay the highest prices for the best 

quality weapons, and also hope their purchases generate influence in Washington. But many other countries will find Turkish weapons systems of sufficient 

quality for their needs, and also gain from Turkey’s 

less restrictive technology transfer policies. However, 

in these respects, Turkish firms are joined by Russian 

and increasingly Chinese defense companies, which 

can capture defense markets where the buyer is seek-
128

ing good enough weapons at substantially lower costs 

than their U.S. competitors and with more generous 

technology transfer provisions. 

The solution for this greater foreign competition in 

third-party defense markets is to make U.S. defense 

exports more competitive in general rather than just 

against Turkey. In addition to ensuring a level playing 

field by denying foreign competitors access to unfair 

subsidies, proprietary information, or proliferation 

loopholes, U.S. defense corporations must lower their 

costs, increase their reliability, and work with the 

Obama administration and Congress to reform U.S. 

defense export laws and regulations to make it easier 

for U.S. firms to transfer widely available military 

technologies to foreign buyers while still protecting 

U.S. defense secrets.

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Turkish government’s 2009 policy reversal 

toward the Kurds applied within Turkey as well as 

in northern Iraq. Today, there are nearly 15 million 

Kurds in Turkey, comprising one-fifth of the country’s population.286 They are Turkey’s largest minority 

group, as well as one of the country’s poorest populations due to the discrimination against them by the 

Turkish state. 287 Many Kurds reside in Turkey’s southeast, which traditionally has been their home region, 

but there are many others who also live in Turkey’s 

urban areas.288 Besides the several million Kurds living in Turkey, there are also Kurdish populations in 

the neighboring states of Iraq, Syria, and Iran, making 

a total of around 30 million Kurds worldwide.289

Within Turkey, the conflict between the Kurds

and the Turkish government has produced more 
129

than 40,000 casualties in 30 years and cost Turkey 

billions of dollars.290 In 1978, the Kurd leader, Abdullah Öcalan, founded the PKK, which has sought to win 

Kurdish independence from Turkey through armed 

conflict.291 Turkey, the United States, and the EU have 

since designated the PKK a terrorist organization. Its 

first attack against Turkish forces occurred in 1984 in 

the district of Semdinli,292 located in the largely Kurdish southeast, and many more attacks have occurred 

since then. Originally, the goal of the attacks was 

the establishment of Kurdistan, which would be an 

independent entity made up of the Kurdish regions 

of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.293 During the 1990s, 

however, the PKK gave up this separatist idea and instead called for more autonomy for the Kurds living 

in Turkey.294

Finally, in 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya 

and imprisoned for treason on the Turkish prison 

island of Imrali, located in the Sea of Marmara.295 Despite this, he is still considered to be the de facto leader 

of the PKK and serves as its spokesperson. In recent 

years, the PKK’s demands have changed; it no longer 

holds the aspiration to establish Kurdistan. Instead, 

the PKK has shifted to demanding more autonomy 

and democratic rights. It also seeks greater constitutional rights for Kurds, more freedom to use the Kurdish language, and the lessening of state pressure on 

Kurdish activists.296

Following years of pro-reform rhetoric as well as 

open and secret talks with Kurdish nationalists (including between the director of national intelligence 

and imprisoned PKK leader Öcalan), the AKP-led 

Turkish government made a major policy reversal 

in 2009 and adopted a more flexible and embracing 

policy toward its Kurdish minority as well as the KRG 
130

in northern Iraq. The Kurdish opening within Turkey 

saw the government give Kurds more cultural rights, 

including the right to use the Kurdish language in 

public (responding to claims of linguistic genocide). 

For example, it launched a 24-hour state-run Kurdish 

language television channel (TRT6, widely available 

through terrestrial transmission) in January 2009. Furthermore, AKP leaders apologized for past Turkish 

repression of Kurdish rights and pledged to address 

earlier wrongs. Some Kurdish leaders hoped that, once 

Turks understood that Kurds simply want to achieve 

equal rights within a common country, more Turks 

would appreciate and support their concern. Kurdish nationalists proposed a peace plan whose components include a ceasefire, establishing a Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission with amnesty for ex-PKK 

fighters, deploying a multinational force to assist with 

the demobilization of PKK insurgents and their eventual entry into the peaceful political process, releasing PKK prisoners, enhancing Kurds’ constitutional 

and legal rights, and eventually the release of Öcalan 

from prison. 

The newly declared policy of moderation initially 

received substantial popular support due to widespread war weariness among Turks, Kurds, and others. Turk-Kurdish violence had persisted for decades, 

so many individuals on both sides were willing to try 

to achieve a political resolution of their differences. 

Moreover, the AKP worked to improve the economic 

situation in the poor Kurdish southeast by supporting 

local businesses, developing agriculture, and promoting the construction of private hospitals. These actions 

have led many Kurds to see the party in a favorable 

light and to vote for it in elections.297 But Turkish nationalist parties soon began to make political gains by 
131

accusing the AKP of making too many concessions 

with little effect. 

The AKP responded by moving more cautiously, 

which led to dampening enthusiasm among Kurds for 

the opening and renewed PKK violence. In effect, the 

hardliners on both sides were empowering each other. 

In addition, impatient Kurdish activists, only some of 

whom defend or even sympathize the PKK and its 

violent methods, complain that they have seen few 

changes on the ground in southeast Turkey despite 

the progressive rhetoric they hear in Ankara. The slow 

and half-hearted pace of the AKP “Democratic Opening” also led some Turkish Kurds to question the government’s sincerity. For example, the government’s 

amnesty proved very limited and conditional, with 

many ex-PKK and even nonviolent Kurdish nationalists finding themselves re-arrested and imprisoned. 

Restrictions on Kurdish political activities continue to constrain opportunities for a peaceful resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish crisis. The requirement that 

any political party must receive at least 10 percent in 

a general parliamentary election to gain seats in the 

national legislature is twice as high a hurdle as that in 

most European countries that have proportional representation voting systems. Kurdish nationalists often 

must run as independent candidates, which deprives 

them of access to public television and radio political 

protests or votes from Turkey’s large diaspora, whose 

members must vote for one of the parties on the ballot. 

In September 2011, the International Crisis Group 

(ICG) released a report entitled, “Turkey: Ending 

the PKK Insurgency,” which offered sensible advice 

regarding how to make progress resolving Turkey’s 

Kurdish issue. The thrust of their recommendations 

was to move the struggle for Kurdish rights from the 
132

field of battle to field of parliament. The group called 

for an end to the fighting, major legal reforms, an amnesty and Turkish Kurd acceptance to work within 

the legal Turkish system. The ICG authors endorsed 

the Democratic Opening toward the Kurds adopted 

by the ruling AKP, which has sought to deemphasize 

ethnic tensions by making some concessions to Kurds, 

as well as stressing the common Muslim identity of 

Turks and Kurds rather than their ethnic differences. 

But the ICG wants to see the Turkish government 

implement its reforms more consistently and effectively. They also advocate that the authorities release 

imprisoned nonviolent Kurdish politicians and allow 

even those Kurds sympathetic to the PKK, which is 

the leading anti-Ankara terrorist government, to take 

their elected seats in parliament. Meanwhile, they 

call on both sides to avoid tit-for-tat escalatory moves 

and instead resume the government-PKK ceasefire 

declared last year—there have been many such ceasefires, but they soon collapse due to lack of followup and other problems—as well as disarmament 

negotiations.

Inside Turkey, the declining influence of the Turkish military may have weakened U.S. influence in 

Turkey. Before the advent of the AKP government 

in 2002, the military effectively dominated Turkish 

politics and enforced a secular and Western-oriented 

country. The Turkish General Staff exercised power 

largely informally but also through successive coups 

in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. 

Under the AKP, the Turkish parliament has established powers of surveillance and control over major 

institutions, such as the National Security Council, 

that used to facilitate the military’s control of civil 

society.298 Publicized criminal investigations like the 
133

Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, looking into the 

military’s role in suspected plots to overthrow the 

government in the early-2000s, have also undermined 

the Turkish military’s power. Some Turkish citizens 

fear that the AKP’s policies have overcorrected for the 

earlier military threat, and that these policies threaten 

to impose an excessively powerful civilian executive 

branch. Turkey has recently experienced some of its 

most serious corruption scandals and mass protests 

in years. Concerns regarding the AKP government 

have been reflected in the demonstrations that started 

in late-May 2013 in Taksim Square, which rapidly 

expanded in scope. The protesters have denounced 

what they saw as the country’s growing authoritarianism, mistreatment of minorities, and repression of 

civil rights and media freedoms.

The Istanbul street protests began when a group 

of environmentalists staged a peaceful demonstration 

at Taksim’s Gezi Park to challenge the government’s 

plans to demolish the park to establish a shopping 

mall and other buildings.299 On May 30, the opposition CHP announced that they would side with the 

protestors, thereby elevating the political stakes at issue. As the number of protestors grew, Erdoğan, the 

main proponent of the demolition plan, refused to 

back down or offer a compromise, such as agreeing 

to establish a commission to study the issue or to hold 

a referendum. With his approval, the Turkish police 

tried to disperse the protesters with tear gas and by 

burning several of their tents.300 The police violence 

backfired, encouraging many others to join the protests, which spread throughout Istanbul and many 

other parts of Turkey.301

By June 1, Interior Minister Muammer Guler 

claimed that almost 1,000 people had been arrest-
134

ed at nearly 100 demonstrations nationwide, with 

over 1,000 people injured in Istanbul and Ankara.302

Erdoğan said that he would investigate the issue of 

excessive police violence but insisted that he would 

stand by plans to develop Gezi Park.303 Clashes between anti-government demonstrators and the Turkish police became a regular occurrence. The protest 

movement has adopted a broader agenda and gained 

a wider following, including several strata of Turkish 

society that have not engaged in such direct action before, such as some professionals and other members 

of the middle class. The demonstrators have a lengthy 

list of grievances against the Turkish government and 

the ruling AKP.304 Their most prominent concerns include objections to Erdoğan’s leadership style, seen as 

authoritarian and insensitive to the concerns of nonAKP supporters. The protesters also worry about the 

AKP’s Islam-inspired policies, such as its weakening 

secularization, limiting free speech, and recent efforts 

to limit the sale of alcohol.

Erdoğan has blamed the Hizmet movement, Jews, 

and foreign countries for the most recent scandals, 

whose reach has extended to the security services. 

The corruption, protests, and crackdown have severely harmed Erdoğan’s international standing, especially in the West. EU membership, always a long 

shot despite the AKP’s initial reform drive, has faded 

even further away. Erdoğan’s January 21, 2014, trip to 

Brussels, Belgium, provided EU leaders with an opportunity to criticize him in person. In a joint press 

conference with the Turkish prime minister, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy pointedly stated that, “It is important not to backtrack on 

achievements and to ensure that the judiciary is able 

to function without discrimination or preference.”305
135

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso added that, in the view of the EU, “Whatever the 

problems are, we believe that the solution for those 

problems should respect the principles of rule of law 

and separation of powers.”306

Influential U.S. opinion leaders have also expressed 

concerns regarding Turkey’s secular political democracy and foreign-policy orientation. In a public address in Washington, Senator John McCain called the 

public demonstrations “a rebellion against Erdoğan’s 

push of the Turkish people toward Islam” as well as 

popular unease that “Erdoğan . . . is becoming more 

like a dictator than a prime minister or a president.”307

A bipartisan network of dozens of foreign-policy 

opinion makers, including former senior Democratic 

and Republican officials in recent U.S. administrations, have circulated a letter urging Obama to adopt 

a more critical line with Erdoğan. 

Some analysts worry that the United States is repeating its familiar approach in the greater Middle 

East of downplaying human rights and democracy 

concerns in favor of short-term security needs and 

other priorities, despite the risk of alienating the 

partner’s population and accepting policies that risk 

weakening the country’s liberal democratic potential 

over the long term. Furthermore, many commentaries expressed concern that Erdoğan’s actions were 

discrediting the model partnership image found in 

U.S. official discourse on Turkey since Obama’s first 

trip there a few months after he assumed office in 

January 2009. 

Since Turkey is one of the largest electoral democracies with a Muslim majority, the United States 

is looking to Turkey as a democratic model for Muslims and to present an alternative to Islamic extrem-
136

ism. Turkey’s value of a force against radical Islamist 

movements has been devalued by the Turkish government’s lax attitude toward secularism and ties with 

Sunni militants in Syria and elsewhere. Citizens and 

governments in Central Asia who previously saw 

Erdoğan and the AKP as role models of a moderate 

Islamist movement now see Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan 

as having as strong economies as Turkey but also being more secular and stable, if less democratic. The 

Arab Spring analogy was sometimes referenced in the 

U.S. media, with the cozy ties between Washington 

and Cairo when Hosni Mubarak still held autocratic 

power over Egypt cited as a common example. 

In recent months, a group of experts assembled by 

the Washington-based Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) 

have launched the most comprehensive and sustained 

campaign calling for changing U.S. policies toward 

Erdoğan. Under its auspices, U.S. Ambassadors to 

Turkey Morton Abramowitz and Eric Edelman, along 

with BPC project leader Blaise Misztal, have been 

releasing a number of op-eds and other publications 

calling on the Obama administration to take a much 

harder public stand with Erdoğan.308 In their view, 

Erdoğan’s policies risk undermining Turkey’s value 

as a U.S. partner through actions that weaken its 

democratic political institutions, foreign investor confidence, and other sources of Turkey’s international 

power. While acknowledging the risk that outside 

heckling can backfire given the Turkish public’s antipathy toward the U.S. government, they argue that 

the prime minister and other Turkish elites do care 

about Obama’s views and have moderated their policies regarding Israel and other issues to address U.S. 

concerns.309
137

However, Obama’s cautious policy does have 

some supporters in the U.S. media and think tank 

community. For example, Doug Bandow of the CATO 

Institute, while acknowledging that Erdoğan is not 

an ideal democratic leader, writes that Erdoğan was 

legitimately elected and a better alternative than the 

previous military dictatorship, where hundreds were 

jailed, tortured, and executed. In addition, Bandow 

maintains that Turkey’s current government, while led 

by an Islamist party, is not a dictatorship like the former governments of Tunisia, Egypt, or Syria; Bandow 

also considers the AKP-run government considerably 

more stable than the others.310 These recent criticisms 

followed earlier criticism in the United States about 

how Turkey was drifting away from its Western orientation toward Iran, Russia, and other Eastern partners.

Until now, fears of damaging the U.S.-Turkey partnership generally has made Obama administration officials reluctant to attack Erdoğan’s domestic policies. 

Even during the June protests and resulting police 

crackdown, Obama never directly criticized Erdoğan 

publicly.311 When asked about the domestic events in 

Turkey, the standard White House response has been 

to describe them as important but insist that that the 

United States does not interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs. For example, in late-January 2014, White 

House Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 

Communications Ben Rhodes told the foreign media 

that the administration has confidence that Turkey, 

as a strong democracy and important NATO ally, can 

resolve its problems on its own and that Washington 

would continue to cooperate with the Erdoğan government on foreign policy.312 At the State Department, 

Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf likewise insisted 

that, “The United States is not and will not become 

involved in Turkey’s domestic politics.”313
138

One reason for the divergence between the EU 

and the U.S. response is that Obama does not want 

to worsen further his personal ties with Erdoğan. In 

place of their constant dialogue a few years ago, now 

months go by without Erdoğan and Obama talking 

even by phone. Another difference is that the EU has 

more leverage over Turkey due to Brussels’ ability 

to deny Ankara various economic rewards. U.S. economic aid to Turkey is much less, while U.S. military 

financial assistance, previously the dominant form of 

financial aid, has dwindled to almost nothing. 

Conversely, the United States needs Turkey more 

than the EU due to Turkey’s status as an almost 

unique platform for projecting U.S. hard and soft 

power in Iraq, Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries.314 But Erdoğan escalated matters by blaming the 

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Francis J. Ricciardone, 

for plotting his removal. A story that simultaneously 

appeared in four pro-AKP newspapers describes Ricciardone as telling his EU ambassadorial colleagues 

in Ankara over dinner on December 17, 2013, when 

the latest arrests became public, that the scandal 

would precipitate the “collapse of an empire,” an alleged reference to Erdoğan’s government. Erdoğan’s 

partisans described Ricciardone as participating in 

a Jewish-Hizmet conspiracy to bring down the AKP 

government and replace it with one more pliable to 

Washington and Tel Aviv. The conspiracy theorists 

point to a coincidence of alleged facts to justify their 

suspicions—Ricciardone had warned Turkey’s Halkbank earlier that it would be punished for helping Iran 

evade sanctions, he met with CHP opposition leaders 

on December 17, and one of the people arrested that 

day was the son of Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan, 

who had announced that Turkey would renew its 
139

controversial gold-for-gas trade with Iran now that 

Tehran had reached a sanctions-relief deal with the 

international community.315

Erdoğan has voiced disapproval of the presence of 

Fetullah Gulen in Pennsylvania, accusing the religious 

leader of organizing a campaign to infiltrate Turkey’s 

security forces, create a state within a state, and seek 

Erdoğan’s overthrow from his safe haven in Pennsylvania.316 U.S. and EU officials have denied that Ricciardone made the alleged statement against Erdoğan. 

The U.S. embassy in Ankara released a statement 

stating: 

Allegations targeting US Embassy employees published in some media organs do not reflect the truth . . . 

to repeat once again: No one should endanger TurkeyUS relations through such intentional slander.317

Nonetheless, Erdoğan publicly implied that he 

would seek Ricciardone’s withdrawal from Turkey 

over his supposed plotting against him.318 Obama responded with his first public rebuke of Erdoğan, warning that such statements and actions could endanger 

the U.S.-Turkey relationship.319 Regarding the larger 

protests and scandals, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, insisted that, “We’ve expressed our concerns about some of the events that are happening on 

the ground directly, publicly and privately, and we’ll 

continue to do that.”320 During a media briefing in 

December, she added that, “We would reiterate that 

we expect Turkey to meet the highest standards for 

transparency, timeliness, and fairness in its judicial 

system.”321

Nonetheless, at a January 14, 2014, meeting between Davutoğlu and Secretary of State John Kerry, 
140

the two leaders glossed over these issues and instead 

spoke about Turkey-U.S. cooperation regarding Syria, 

the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and the Iranian 

nuclear dispute.322 Moreover, the administration has 

declined to punish Turkey for its circumvention of the 

sanctions through its gas-for-gold scheme.323

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Every few years, the U.S. National Intelligence 

Council (NIC) publishes studies of how the world 

might evolve over the next 2 decades. The authors 

of Global Trends 2025, which appeared in 2008, highlight several factors that they believe warrant focusing much attention on Turkey’s evolving role in the 

international system. According to Global Trends 2025, 

a future Turkey most likely will blend Islamic and 

nationalist strains, which could serve as a model for 

other rapidly modernizing countries in the Middle 

East. Conflict and armed engagements between Israel, Iran, and Turkey contribute to instability in the 

region, which remains unstable as most populations 

in the Middle East live in poverty. 

Turkey could play a prominent role in modernizing 

and reforming the region’s militaries. Previous Turkish governments developed a strong, positive relationship with Israel and any future government could 

reverse the friction now existing between the AKP and 

Israel. Turkey’s future leaders might also pursue far 

less conciliatory policies with religious regimes such 

as Iran, especially if Iran developed nuclear weapons 

or pursued destabilizing policies in Iraq, Central Asia, 

or the South Caucasus. An already important member 

of NATO’s missile defense system, Turkey could play 

an even greater role in this architecture in the future. 
141

A more recent study, Global Trends 2030, predicts 

that by that year, the diffusion of power among countries will see Asia surpass Europe and North America 

in terms of aggregate GDP, population size, military 

spending, and technological investment. In this vision, 

a regional power such as Turkey will become especially important to the global economy as Europe, Japan, 

and Russia continue to slowly decline. However, this 

study views Turkey not as a single entity, but rather as 

a collective with countries such as Columbia, Egypt, 

Iran, Mexico, and South Africa. Termed the “Next 

Eleven” by Goldman Sachs, they will surpass Europe, 

Japan, and Russia in terms of global power by 2030. 

Turkey especially has a major opportunity to secure a strong footing in the future global economy. 

Aging is the key structural change underlying the 

negative economic outlook for Europe, Japan, and 

the United States. Turkey’s youthful population will 

only decline slightly by 2030, and an influx of young 

migrants should help maintain a stable workforce. Africa’s demographic youth bulge could reinforce Turkey’s economic growth–a reality that other emerging 

regional and global powers, including China, India, 

Brazil, and Turkey have already begun to seize. 

Turkey has invested heavily in several North Africa countries. As of late-2011, Turkish investments 

in Africa had reached more than $5 billion. Assuming continued growth, Turkey and other members of 

the Next Eleven will play a very important role in the 

future of Africa as well. 

However, one area of concern in Global Trends 2030 

is Turkey’s youthful, ethnic Kurdish population. In 

general, the amount of armed conflict over the past 

40 years has decreased; even when armed conflict has 

occurred, the amount of violence toward citizens has 
142

been limited as well. However, during this same time 

period, there has been an uptick in intrastate violence 

in countries where a population contains a politically 

dissonant, youthful ethnic minority. More than 80 

percent of all armed ethnic and civil conflicts have occurred in such countries. The ethnic Kurds in Turkey 

have a pattern of actively participating in intrastate 

conflict. Kurdish fertility in southeastern Turkey is at 

four children per woman. This high rate of fertility, 

combined with the overall decline in fertility of other 

Turks, will result in Turkey seeing a higher percentage of ethnic Kurds than ever before. 

It is only natural that the U.S. intelligence community ponders the impact of Turkey’s growing significance in global affairs. Turkey will exercise considerable influence over global and regional power 

dynamics during the next 20 years. The legitimacy, 

stability, and alignment of Turkey will have a major 

impact on the balance of power in Southeast Europe, 

the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Turkey can either be a valuable source of stability in these regions or a dangerous 

contributor to their problems. If Turkey becomes too 

bogged down in its international agenda and ignores 

its own demographic situation involving the youthful Kurdish population, or engages the Iran Nuclear 

problem unilaterally, Turkey’s likely bright future 

could become considerably dimmer. 

The NIC studies many other countries, so Turkey 

was by no means singled out in its reviews. Prudent 

policymakers, in both Turkey and the United States, 

should consider what future contingencies they might 

encounter so as to perhaps anticipate and avert them. 

Some of these studies and seminars may have had an 

impact on U.S. policies toward Turkey, though this is 
143

uncertain. Often policymakers are moved exclusively 

by the spirit of the moment—and we suffer as a result.

Turkish policymakers must adopt more of a collective, transatlantic perspective of a NATO stakeholder seeking the greater good of the West rather 

than that of a frustrated nationalist engaged in petty 

squabbles with NATO policymakers. Above all, they 

need to keep its bilateral disputes with Israel and the 

EU out of NATO’s multinational security agenda. For 

example, much of the Western media coverage of Turkey’s activities before the May 2012 NATO Summit 

focused, not on Turkey’s admirable contributions to 

NATO’s defense capabilities and in Afghanistan but 

on how the Turkish government sought to deny Israel 

access to any information from the U.S. BMD radar on 

its territory and deny Israelis from having an official 

presence at the Chicago summit.

 Turkish diplomats also initially refused to allow 

EU leaders to attend the summit on the grounds that 

the EU was making no more contribution to NATO 

than the 56-member Organization of Islamic Conference, then led by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish national, and other international organizations that were 

not invited to Chicago. Turkish officials need to adopt 

more of the perspective of a collective NATO stakeholder seeking the greater good of the West. Turkey 

should avoid strategic surprises such as agreeing to 

host military exercises with China without consulting 

NATO allies. Without Turkey’s full support, neither 

the EU nor NATO can achieve its important security 

goals in the Arab world. The solution for many EUNATO problems involving Turkey is to address their 

root causes rather than merely their symptoms. 

Expanding Turkey’s role in EU security and defense decisionmaking would ease many of the anxi-
144

eties in Ankara about the Union’s growing security 

roles. If Turkey is not to soon gain EU membership, 

then it should receive at least as much influence in 

ESDP decisionmaking structures as Ankara had previously enjoyed as a WEU associate member—a status that was evidently pledged at NATO’s April 1999 

Washington Summit. Alternately, undertaking a more 

genuine effort to bring Turkey into the EU would 

make Turkish policy makers more tolerant of exclusionary ESDP practices since they would know that 

this discrimination was a temporary phase pending 

Ankara’s membership accession. Fortunately, Cyprus’ 

EU presidency did not cause a further EU-Turkey rift, 

due to the parties’ preoccupation with other issues, 

but the negotiations regarding the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership could further 

isolate Turkey from its traditional Western economic 

partners unless Brussels and Washington make a great 

effort to ensure that Turkey’s interests are addressed, 

including keeping open the ultimate prize of possible 

EU membership. The EU’s long-term potential will 

be degraded if its members cannot draw on Turkey’s 

economic, military, and other assets. 

With respect to the Middle East, Turkey and the 

United States need plans for what might happen 

should the government in Syria or other Middle Eastern countries retaliate against Turkey or abruptly collapse. If the Assad regime falls, fighting among the elements of the winning Syrian coalition over the spoils 

is entirely possible, with other neighboring countries 

having strong incentives to support local proxies. 

Until then, Turkey and the United States need to do 

a better job at unifying the disparate Syrian opposition factions around a moderate platform. Their lack 

of unity is a major reason why the Assad regime still 

enjoys much support among Syrians who prefer the 
145

devil they know. Turkish authorities need to promote 

better integration among the insurgents as well as 

mechanisms to exclude Islamist extremists. 

Furthermore, Turkey’s strained ties with Israel 

will constrain its partnership with the United States, 

especially in the U.S. Congress. Although economic 

relations between Turkey and Israel remain strong, 

the two countries are maneuvering to punish one 

another diplomatically. Turkey is seeking to exclude 

Israel from international meetings, while Israel is trying to show it has other diplomatic options by pursuing better ties with Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and 

Romania. Despite efforts at reconciliation, supported 

by the United States in general and Obama in particular, and supported by their still strong economic links 

and mutual concerns regarding Syria, deep sources of 

tension between Turkey and Israel exist. For instance, 

both sides are seeking different goals in their reconciliation efforts. Israel wants to resume close strategic 

ties, whereas Turkey seeks an amicable divorce. In addition, Israel does not fit into the new AKP worldview, 

which deemphasizes state-to-state relations based on 

realpolitik and instead adheres to a mixture of Turkish and Sunni Islam bolstered by appeals to popular 

democracy and other transnational values. 

Popular animosity in each country toward the 

other remains strong. A contributing factor to the 

poor relationship is Turkey’s support for Hamas. At 

one level, this connection is useful for helping moderate Hamas policies and providing a channel through 

which Hamas and Western interlocutors can communicate. But in addition to providing much aid to Hamas 

that helps sustain its control over the Gaza Strip, there 

is evidence that Turkey’s lax financial procedures are 

allowing Hamas to receive illegal finds for terrorist 
146

activities.324 The United States and other governments 

must increase their pressure on Ankara to strengthen 

its measures against terrorist financing and to crack 

down on the provocative actions of Turkish extremists 

against Israel and other targets. 

The United States and other pro-Western governments should welcome Turkey’s keeping Iranian influence within limited bounds in Iraq, but Washington would also be wise to keep any support to Ankara 

low key. Turkey can best advance Western (and Iraqi) 

interests if it is not seen as a U.S. proxy or a Sunni 

Muslim patron seeking to marginalize Iraq’s long repressed Shiite majority. Although Ankara has sought 

to cultivate ties with Iraqi Shiites, and more recently 

Iraqi Kurds, the strong Turkish support for the Sunnisecular Iraqiyya bloc in the 2010 elections against the 

Shiite-centered block of incumbent al-Maliki aroused 

fears in Iran and Iraq that Turkey was playing such 

a role. Turkish officials appreciate that an explicitly 

sectarian approach would be counterproductive since 

most Iraqi Shiite and Iranian animosity is focused on 

Saudi Arabia and other patrons of Sunni extremism. 

At worst, Turkey could find itself leading a block of 

West-leaning Sunni states against Iran and its Shiitedominated proxies. Such an Islamic cold war would 

still promote further divisions among Middle Eastern 

Muslims as their governments gravitate toward one 

pole or the other. 

Turkey could change its own, thus far benign nuclear weapons policies in coming years, if, for example, unambiguous evidence arose that Iran is seeking 

to militarize its nuclear program. Turkey’s plans to 

expand its domestic nuclear energy program would, 

for the first time, provide its government with the scientific, technical, and industrial foundations to pursue 
147

genuine nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s own development of the capacity to make nuclear weapons 

has demonstrated to Ankara and others. But Turkey’s 

leaders might still decide that, even if Iran developed 

a small nuclear arsenal, they would be better off continuing to rely on NATO and Washington as well as 

Turkey’s powerful conventional military, bolstered 

by national and multinational missile defenses, rather 

than pursue an independent Turkish nuclear force as 

a means of deterring even a nuclear-armed Iran. In 

this context, U.S. aspirations to eliminate NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons may become a source of tension 

with Turkey. 

From Ankara’s perspective, the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that have reportedly been stationed in 

Turkey for decades under NATO’s nuclear-sharing 

arrangement help bind the U.S.-NATO security dimensions together. At times, some Turkish officials 

implied that having physical access to the U.S.-NATO 

nuclear weapons was a form of compensation for Turkey’s not developing its own national nuclear arsenal. 

The weapons are a symbolic manifestation of Turkey’s 

security links to Brussels and Washington that could 

be replaced by something else such as integration 

within EU defense structures or the emerging U.S.-

NATO missile defense architecture. 

If Iran developed a small nuclear arsenal, Turkey’s 

leaders might still decide that they could continue to 

rely on NATO and Washington as well as Turkey’s 

powerful conventional military, bolstered by national 

and multinational missile defenses, rather than pursue an independent Turkish nuclear force as a means 

of deterring even a nuclear-armed Iran. Even so, 

Washington and Brussels need to fully consider Turkish security concerns as they proceed to formulate 
148

and pursue arms reductions policies with Russia. This 

is also true in the domain of non-nuclear weapons, 

given Turkey’s interest in restoring the CFE and other 

mechanisms of preventing destabilizing arms races or 

conventional force imbalances around its periphery. 

Human rights and economic issues complicate relations with the United States and other Western countries. Foreign critics complain about the Turkish government’s repression of media freedoms, stalemated 

efforts to solve the problem of Turkey’s Kurdish minority, and the lack of strong oppositional parties in 

Turkey. U.S. leaders will continue to be torn between 

seeking to sustain the advantages they receive from 

maintaining close ties with Turkey as an ally—vital 

security support in a critical geographic location—and 

disapproving of the prickly Erdoğan’s authoritarian 

behavior and human rights violations. 

Future developments could tip the balance in favor 

of a more critical approach to Erdoğan. The U.S. and 

NATO military withdrawal from Afghanistan could 

reduce the need for Turkey’s direct and logistical support for the coalition military campaign there. The 

U.S.-Iran reconciliation, if it continues, will decrease 

Washington’s concern with keeping Turkey in alignment with U.S. policies regarding nonproliferation, 

missile defense, sanctions, and balancing Tehran’s influence in Iraq. A continued decline in the fortune of 

the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world is reducing Ankara’s value as a partner with Washington in 

Egypt and other countries. The diminishing U.S. role 

in the Middle East is making Turkey’s reduced ability 

to promote pro-U.S. policies in that region. Turkey’s 

economic slowdown, partly due to how the disorders 

in Turkey are scaring off foreign investors, will also 

lower Ankara’s influence in Washington—something 

U.S. diplomats should point out. 
149

One can imagine converse scenarios in which Ankara’s value in Washington rebounds, but the main 

wild card is how the scandals, protests, and economic problems will affect Turkey’s upcoming elections. A new government in Ankara, either under a 

weakened Erdoğan (less able to implement a Kurdish reconciliation) or a new political leader (who may 

not prove any more committed to the rule of law and 

political democracy than Erdoğan), will likely generate more mutual frustrations and further reduce the 

reluctance of U.S. leaders to challenge objectionable 

Turkish policies. 

Another constraint on the Turkish-U.S. relationship is the decreasing U.S. share of Turkey’s trade and 

investment, which now is oriented more toward the 

EU and the Middle East. Both governments need to 

make it easier for Turkish and American businesses to 

trade and invest in each other’s countries. Initiatives 

are needed to reduce the level of popular hostility in 

Turkey toward the United States, which limits the 

depth and breadth of the relationship. Turkish-U.S. 

ties are still focused on government-to-government 

relations. The relationship needs to encompass civil 

society and private sector actors more.

More generally, the United States should adopt 

a more proactive policy toward potential sources of 

tensions between Ankara and Washington that, unresolved, could abort the recent upturn in Turkish-U.S. 

relations. For example, the United States could launch 

sustained initiatives to resolve differences between 

Turkey and other U.S. partners such as Armenia, Israel, Iraq, and the EU. It is understandable that Washington wants to limit Turkey’s imports of Iranian natural 
150

gas, but then the United States must be more open to 

allowing Turkey to obtain energy from the KRG even 

if Baghdad opposes it.

The Obama administration should continue its 

welcome efforts to reconcile Turkey and Israel. U.S. 

and Turkish policymakers have proved skilled at compartmentalizing their differences over Israel, but an 

Israeli attack on Iran, a popular uprising in Palestine, 

and other not improbable events could easily escalate 

Turkey-Israeli tensions, which invariably would spill 

over to adversely affect the Washington-Ankara axis. 

Less often cited, the Armenia-Turkey relationship has 

the same explosively destructive potential. After the 

failed reconciliation effort of a few years ago, neither 

country has made major exertions to overcome their 

current deadlock. But 2015 will mark the centenary of 

what many call the “Armenian genocide.” Unless Ankara, quietly backed by Washington, renews its reconciliation efforts, the Armenia issue risks inflicting 

a blow to bilateral relations. Otherwise, Washington 

could find itself constantly torn between key allies. 

Regime changes in other Middle Eastern countries could also have implications for U.S. military 

bases and deployments in Turkey’s region, requiring further adjustments in the U.S. military presence 

in Turkey and other regional partners. It would be 

best if Ankara and Washington developed plans for 

such scenarios in advance to improve the prospects 

of a harmonious response to such contingencies. In 

addition to the substance of any policies, improving 

communications between Ankara and Washington is 

essential for avoiding further misunderstandings between these pivotal partners, regardless of who is in 

power in either country. 
151

As the Western world continues to be concerned 

about what is seen as evidence of a Turkey reaching out 

to the East, it is vital for Turkey to reassure its Western 

allies of its support. On the other side, Western scholars and politicians should have more understanding 

of the fact that Turkey is not an island, and that the 

country must take the necessary means to create a 

sustainable environment for itself. A long-term objective should be renewing cultural ties among Turks 

and Americans. There is still much popular hostility 

in Turkey toward the United States, which limits the 

depth and breadth of the relationship. Bilateral relations still excessively focus on government-to-government ties. The Turkey-U.S. relationship must extend 

to encompass civil society and private sector actors. 

Turks and Americans still hold surprisingly negative 

misperceptions about one another. Encouraging more 

Foreign Area Officers to learn Turkish would pay 

dividends even beyond Turkey given renewed interest in the Turkish language in Central Asia and the 

Middle East.

ENDNOTES

1. John Greenway, “Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy: An 

Asset for Europe,” Alliance Geostrategique, March 31, 2010, available from www.alliancegeostrategique.org/2010/03/31/turkey-johngreenway-aweu/.

2. Sinan Ülgen, The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, pp. 97-109. 

3. Gülnur Aybet, “Turkey’s Security Challenges and NATO, 

2012,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2012, pp. 1-5, available from carnegieendowment.Org/Files/

Aybet_Brief.pdf.
152

4. Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics 

and Influence In The Early Cold War Era, London, UK: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008, pp. 138-139. 

5. Ihsan Gurkin, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern 

Perspective, New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 

1980, p. 30; and Bilgin, 166. 

6. Gurkin, pp. 30-31.

7. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

8. Ibid., p. 31. 

9. Güneş Ünüvar, “Turkey-NATO Relations: Past, Present 

And Future,” Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Vub, Brussels, Belgium: 

Institute For European Studies International And European Law, 

Ll.M. Programme, 2011-12, March 7, 2014, available from https://

www.academia.edu/1472745/turkey_-_nato_relations_past_present_

and_future.

10. Richard Outzen, “From Crisis To Cooperation Turkey’s 

Relations With Washington and NATO,” Washington, DC: The 

Washington Institute For Near East Policy, June 2012, p. 4, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/

PolicyNote12.pdf.

11. Sofia Hafdell, “Turkey–Nato Relations at the 60th Anniversary,” Policy Update No. 2, March 2012, Istanbul, Turkey: Istanbul Kültür University, Global Political Trends Center, March 

7, 2014, available from www.Gpotcenter.Org/Dosyalar/Pu2_Nato_

Hafdell_Mar2012.pdf.

12. Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Transformation of NATO and Turkey’s Position,” Perceptions, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 

7-17, available from sam.gov.tr/Transformation-Of-Nato-AndTurkeys-Position/.

13. Selcan Hacaoglu, “NATO Member Turkey Turns to Sanctioned Chinese Co. for Missiles,” Bloomberg, September 27, 2013, 

available from www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-27/nato-memberturkey-turns-to-sanctioned-chinese-co-for-missiles.html.
153

14. Muharrem Eski, “Turkey’s Increasing Role in Afghanistan,” Journal of Global Analysis Vol. 1, No. 2, 2012, p. 145.

15. Daren Butler, “Karzai Seeks Closer Trade Ties with Muslim Nations,” Reuters, November 9, 2009.

16. Eski, pp. 147-149.

17. Ibid., p. 143.

18. Aybet, pp. 1-5.

19. Tom Z. Collina, “The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 

May 2013, available from www.armscontrol.org/Factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach.

20. NATO, “NATO Deactivates Allied Air Command Izmir 

Headquarters, Turkey,” Brussels, Belgium: NATO, May 22, 

2013, available from www.aco.nato.int/Nato-Deactivates-Allied-AirCommand-Izmir-Headquarters--Turkey.Aspx.

21. NATO, “The Rapid Deployable Corps,” Brussels, Belgium: NATO, November 26, 2012, available from www.nato.int/

cps/en/natolive/topics_50088.htm.

22. “Overview, Turkey,” Washington, DC: The Nuclear 

Threat Initiative, Official Web Page, July 2013, available from 

www.nti.org/country-profiles/turkey/.

23. “Turkey-EU Relations,” Istanbul, Turkey: Republic of 

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from www.mfa.gov.

tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa.

24. “Turkey: EU Political Benchmarks ‘Were Never Given 

to US’,” Eurasia Review, February 7, 2013, available from www.

Eurasiareview.com/07022013-Turkey-Eu-Political-Benchmarks-WereNever-Given-To-Us.

25. Kemal Kirisci, “Shanghai Blues, the European Union, and 

John Kerry’s Turkey,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institu-
154

tion, February 27, 2013, available from www.brookings.edu/blogs/

up-front/posts/2013/02/27-eu-kerry-turkey-kirisci.

26. Egemen Bagis, “For A Visa-Free Europe,” New Europe, January 27, 2013, available from www.neurope.eu/blog/visa-free-europe.

27. “Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 

2013/1,” Istanbul, Turkey: Edam Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, available from edam.org.tr/Eng/Document/

Edam%20poll%202013-1.pdf.

28. Grace Annan, “Turkey Marks Half Century Of Unsuccessful Bids To Join EU,” Global Insight, August 3, 2009.

29. “Fule Urges Turkey To Implement Additional Protocol,” 

Famagusta Gazette, available from famagusta-gazette.com/FuleUrges-Turkey-To-Implement-Additional-Protocol-P18332-69.htm.

30. “Relance Des Négociations D’adhésion De La Turquie A L’union Européenne?” Toute L’europe, February 26, 

2013, available from www.touteleurope.eu/Fr/Actions/Construction-Europeenne/Elargissement/Actualite/Actualites-Vue-Detaillee/

Afficher/Fiche/6267/T/44207/From/2247/Breve/Relance-DesNegociations-Dadhesion-De-La-Turquie-A-Lunion-Europeenne.

html?Chash=806abe3562.

31. Ibid.

32. “1974: Turkey Invades Cyprus,” BBC News, available 

from news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_38660

00/3866521.stm.

33. “Resolution 550,” New York: United Nations Security 

Council, May 11, 1984, available from www.un.org/en/ga/search/

view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984).

34. “Turkey Says It Won’t Recognize Cyprus as EU President,” Thejakartapost.Com, June 8, 2012, available from www.

thejakartapost.com/News/2012/06/08/Turkey-Says-Wont-RecognizeCyprus-Eu-President.html.

35. “Turkey-EU Relations.”
155

36. Scott Sayare and Sebnem Arsu, “Genocide Bill Angers 

Turks as It Passes in France,” The New York Times, January 23, 

2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/europe/

french-senate-passes-genocide-bill-angering-turks.html?_r=0.

37. Quentin Peel and Daniel Dombey, “Merkel Backs New 

EU Talks For Turkey,” The Financial Times, February 24, 2012, 

available from www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f853063e-7e99-11e2-a792-

00144feabdc0.html.

38. Scott Sayare, “French Council Strikes Down Bill on Armenian Genocide Denial,” The New York Times, February 28, 2012, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/world/europe/frenchbill-on-armenian-genocide-is-struck-down.html.

39. “Turkey Has Lifted All Sanctions Against France,” The 

Journal of Turkish Weekly, July 6, 2012, available from www.Turkishweekly.Net/News/137913/Turkey-Lifts-All-Sanctions-AgainstFrance.html.

40. Andreas Rinke and Gulsen Solaker, “Cyprus Remains 

Stumbling Block In Turkey’s EU Ambition: Merkel,” Reuters, February 25, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/

us-germany-turkey-eu-idUSBRE91O10L20130225.

41. Ibid.

42. “France To Assist Turkey in Opening EU Chapter,” 

Hurryet Daily News, February 12, 2013, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com/france-to-assist-turkey-in-opening-eu-chapter-.

aspx?pageID=238&nID=40984&NewsCatID=351.

43. “Chapters of the Acquis,” Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, available from ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/

conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm.

44. Yavuz Baydar, “Merkel’s Visit Marks a Turn,” Today’s 

Zaman, February 26, 2012, available from www.todayszaman.com/

columnists/yavuz-baydar_308224-merkels-visit-marks-a-turn.html.
156

45. “EU May Chase Turkey Soon: German FM,” Hurryietdailynews.Com, December 22, 2012, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-may-chase-turkey-soon-german-fm.aspx?pageID=238&n

ID=37410&NewsCatID=338.

46. Andrew Rettman, “Germany Ready to Re-Start EU-Turkey Talks,” EU Observer, February 25, 2013, available from euobserver.com/enlargement/119178.

47. Natasha Gural, “Investing in Europe’s Fastest-Growing 

Economy,” CNBC, August 15, 2012, available from www.cnbc.com/

Id/48552347/Investing_In_Europe039s_Fastestgrowing_Economy.

48. Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, “Turkey-EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,” 

Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, available from trade.

ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf.

49. Ksneia Krauer-Pacheco, “Turkey as a Transit Country and Energy Hub: The Link to Its Foreign Policy Aims,” 

Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, December, 2011, available from www.

forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf.

50. David Rising, “German Economy Shrank in Q4 as Exports 

Slump,” Time World, February 14, 2013, available from bigstory.

ap.org/article/german-economic-growth-drops-4q-2012.

51. “Turkey-EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” 

52. Ibid.

53. Roman Muzalevsky, “Turkey Looks Forward, Talks 

SCO,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 13, 2013, available from 

www.1913intel.com/2013/02/14/turkey-looks-forward-talks-sco-thejamestown-foundation/.

54. Judy Dempsey, “Merkel’s Party Eases Anti-Turkish 

Stance,” The New York Times, June 6, 2009, available from query.

nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E5D9143AF931A35755C0A

96F9C8B63.

55. Peel and Dombey.
157

56. Rinke and Solaker.

57. Kristen Allen, “The World from Berlin: Turkish Accession Is ‘of Minor Importance’ to EU,” Spiegel, November 1, 2012, 

available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-presscriticize-erdogan-eu-accession-ultimatum-a-864734.html.

58. Peel and Dombey.

59. “Turkey Deserves More from Merkel if Their Future in 

the EU Is to Be Taken Seriously,” European Green Party, February 

26, 2012, available from europeangreens.eu/News/Turkey-DeservesMore-Merkel-If-Their-Future-Eu-Be-Taken-Seriously.

60. Hanne Bursch, “Stall in Turkey’s EU Accession Talks 

Calls for Alternative Approach,” Washington, DC: United States 

Institute Of Peace, February 26, 2012, available from www.usip.

org/olivebranch/stall-in-turkey-s-eu-accession-talks-calls-alternativeapproach.

61. Peel and Dombey.

62. Ülgen, The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship.

63. Suhnaz Yilmaz, “Turkey and the European Union: A 

Security Perspective,” Giovanni Gasparini, ed., Turkey and 

European Security, Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 

2006, pp. 58-59.

64. Miguel Medina Abellan, “Competing Visions of European Foreign and Security Policy Making. Turkey, the European 

Union and Nato,” April 24-26, 2008, p. 5, available from www.ies.

be/node/440.

65. Jolyon Howorth, “NATO and ESDP: Institutional Complexities and Political Realities,” Politique Étrangère L 4:2009 English Ed., April 2009, p. 95. 

66. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership,” New York: NATO, 

April 26, 2010, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/EN/

NATO-EU-strategic-partnership.htm.
158

67. “The Presidency Conclusions,” Copenhagen, Denmark: 

Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002, Annex IiI, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/Uedocs/Cms_Data/Docs/

Pressdata/En/Ec/73842.pdf. 

68. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership.”

69. Howorth, p. 96.

70. “The Presidency Conclusions.”

71. Paul Ames, “ESDP: Presidency: Closer EU-NATO Ties 

Key To Success Of Missions,” Europolitics Monthly, September 

21, 2009.

72. “NATO’s Chief to Convince Turkey Not to Block NATOEU Ties,” Turkish Daily News, June 11, 2007.

73. Simon Duke, “The Future Of EU-NATO Relations: A Case 

Of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?” European Integration, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2008, p. 34.

74. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership.” 

75. Ames.

76. Howorth, p. 97.

77. Duke, p. 33.

78. Petros Vamvakas, “NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and 

Central Asia: Possibilities and Blind Spots,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 

10, No. 1, March 2009, p. 65.

79. Yilmaz, pp. 59-61.

80. Piotr Zalewski, ”How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ 

To Zero Friends,” Foreign Affairs, August 22, 2013, available from 

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/21/how_turkey_foreign_

policy_went_from_zero_problems_to_zero_friends.
159

81. Peter Kenyon, “The Turkish Model: Can It Be Replaced?” 

National Public Radio News, January 6, 2012, available from www.

Npr.Org/2012/01/06/144751851/The-Turkish-Model-Can-It-BeReplicated.

82. David Ignatius, “U.S. and Turkey Find A Relationship 

That Works,” The Washington Post, December 7, 2011, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-and-turkey-find-arelationship-that-works/2011/12/06/gIQAh5UcdO_story.html.

83. Bulent Aliriza, “The Escalating Syrian Crisis and US-Turkey Relations,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, available from www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/

haber/1347972429-2.Bulent_Ali_Riza_Escalating_Syrian_Crisis_and_

US_Turkey_Relations.pdf.

84. Humeyra Pamuk, “Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey Exceeds 600,000: Turkish Official,” Reuters, October 21, 2013, 

available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-syria-crisisturkey-refugees-idUSBRE99K04O20131021.

85. Aliriza.

86. “Turkey-Syria Association Agreement,” Istanbul, Turkey: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, Official Web Page, 

available from www.economy.gov.tr/Index.Cfm?Sayfa=Tradeagreeme

nts&Bolum=Fta&Country=Sy&Region=0.

87. Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey’s Syria Calculus Must Change 

Again,” The National Interest, September 23, 2013, available from 

nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkeys-syria-calculus-must-changeagain-9104.

88. Ibid.

89.Lally Weymouth, “Turkish President Abdullah Gül: Assad 

Must Go,” The Washington Post, September 23, 2013, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/turkish-president-abdullahgul-assad-must-go/2013/09/23/ffc45d7a-246e-11e3-b75d5b7f66349852_story.html.
160

90. Neil Macfarquhar and Sebnem Arsu, “Syrian Troops 

Fire into Turkey in Clash Near Refugee Camp,” The New York 

Times, April 9, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/

world/middleeast/turkey-accuses-syria-of-firing-across-border.

html?pagewanted=all.

91. Aliriza.

92. Jerome Rivet, “NATO Expected To Give Go-Ahead To Patriot Deployment In Turkey,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), December 2, 2012. 

93. “US-Led NATO Intervention Begins in Syria War: Patriots in Turkey,” Debkafile, November 27, 2012, available from www.

debka.com/article/22566/US-led-NATO-intervention-begins-in-Syriawar-Patriots-in-Turkey.

94. “NATO Agrees To Augment Turkey’s Air-Defence Capabilities,” December 4, 2012, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/

natolive/news_92861.htm.

95. Kirisci.

96. Jonathon Burch, “Turkish Minister Plays Down Syria Link 

To Turkey Attacks,” Reuters, August 25, 2012, available from mobile.reuters.com/article/BMW/idUSBRE87O05M20120825.

97. David Pollock, “Syria’s Kurds Unite Against Assad, But 

Not With Opposition,” The Washington Institute, July 31, 2012, 

available from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/

view/syrias-kurds-unite-against-assad-but-not-with-opposition.

98. Philip H. Gordon, “International Press Roundtable,” 

Washington, DC: Department of State, July 30, 2012, available 

from www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/195910.htm.

99. Soner Cagaptay, “‘Testing Turkey’—Why War in Syria 

Could Bring Ankara and Washington Closer Together,” Foreign Affairs, May 28, 2013, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/

Articles/139409/Soner-Cagaptay/Testing-Turkey. 

100. Weymouth.
161

101. Ruth Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat Al-Nusra—The Most 

Extreme Wing of Syria’s Struggle,” The Telegraph, December 2, 

2012, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle

east/syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-the-most-extreme-wing-ofSyrias-struggle.html.

102. Jonathon Burch, “Turkey Arrests 12 in Raids on ‘Terrorist’ Organization,” Reuters, May 30, 2013, available from www.

reuters.com/article/2013/05/30/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSBRE94T0YO20130530.

103.Weymouth.

104. Sami Kohen, (Milliyet), “Turkey Readjusts North Syria 

Strategy,” Timur Goksel, trans., Al-Monitor, October 20, 2013, 

available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/10/turkeynorth-syria-strategy-firing-isis.html.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “Rocky U.S.-Turkey Relations 

Persist Since Iraq War,” Fox News, April 7, 2005.

108. Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan,” Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace, May 2010, p. 5, available from carnegieendowment.org/

files/USIP_SR_Turkey_Iraq.pdf.

109. Gonul Tol, “Turkey and Iran Find Common Ground in 

Iraq,” Frontline’s Tehran Bureau, January 19, 2012.

110. Sahar Issa, “Attack on Turkish Embassy in Iraq Highlights Rift,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 20, 2012. 

111. “Turkish Embassy in Baghdad Attacked Amid Rising 

Tensions,” Today’s Zaman, January 18, 2012, available from www.

todayszaman.com/news-268888-turkish-embassy-in-baghdad-attackedamid-rising-tension.html.
162

112. “Press Release Regarding the Rocket Attack Launched 

against the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad,” Istanbul, Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2012, available from trove.nla.

gov.au/work/161237539?versionId=175770144.

113. Saban Kardas, “Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 3, 2012, available from www.refworld.org/

docid/4fa7a28d2.html.

114. Davutoğlu and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed their unease at the situation in Iraq in a February 13, 2012, 

joint press conference.

115. Serkan Demirtas, “Gul Warns Panettao on Terror in PostUS Iraq,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 17, 2011.

116. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.”

117. “Turkey’s Trade Volume with Iraq up 41 Percent,” World 

Bulletin, May 2, 2012, available from www.worldbulletin.net/?aType

=haber&ArticleID=89305.

118. Jon Hemming, “Turkey Does Not Want Return To Iraq 

Chaos: Minister,” January 18, 2012, available from www.reuters.

com/article/2012/01/18/us-iraq-turkey-idUSTRE80H18M20120118.

119. Hasan Turunc, “Turkey and Iraq,” London, UK: The 

London School of Economics, available from www2.lse.ac.uk/ideas/

publications/reports/pdf/sr007/iraq.pdf.

120. “Turkey Aims to Double Iraq Trade in 2012: Minister,” 

AFP,available from www.iraqdirectory.com/en/print.aspx?sid=18080.

121. “Turkish Minister Likens Turkey, Iraq to Adjacent 

Stores,” Journal of Turkish Weekly, May 3, 2012, available from 

www.turkishweekly.net/news/135454/turkish-minister-likens-turkeyiraq-to-adjacent-stores.html.

122. Turkey’s Trade Volume with Iraq up 41 Percent,” World 

Bulletin, May 2, 2012, available from www.worldbulletin.net/?aType

=haber&ArticleID=89305.
163

123. “Ankara, Arbil Likeminded on Iraq’s Future,” Hürriyet 

Daily News, January 19, 2012, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-arbil-likeminded-on-iraqs-future--.aspx?pageID=238

&nID=11799&NewsCatID=344.

124. Anthony Shadid, “Resurgent Turkey Flexes Its Muscles 

around Iraq,” The New York Times, January 4, 2011, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/world/middleeast/05turkey.html?_

r=1&pagewanted=all.

125. Michael D. Barbero, “Turkey, NATO, and Iraq: 2011 and 

Beyond,” October 12-13, 2010, available from www.aco.nato.int/

page12822541.aspx.

126. Turunc.

127. Ibid.

128. “What Went Wrong with Iraq and Syria?” Hurriyet Daily 

News, January 19, 2012, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.

com/what-went-wrong-with-iraq-and-syria.aspx?pageID=238&nID=

11811&NewsCatID=409.

129. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.”

130. Mohammed A. Salih, “Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan: From 

Cold War to Warm Peace,” World Politics Review, March 4, 2011, 

available from www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8088/turkeyand-iraqi-kurdistan-from-cold-war-to-warm-peace.

131. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.”

132. Turunc.

133. Salih.

134. Ibid.

135. Salih.
164

136. Tony Karon, “Even as He Clashes With Israel, Turkey’s 

Erdoğan is Displacing Iran’s Influence,” Time World, September 

14, 2011, available from world.time.com/2011/09/14/even-as-heclashes-with-israel-turkeys-erdogan-is-displacing-irans-influence/; and 

Soner Cagaptay, “Gaza Crisis: Turkey’s New Role,” Newsweek, 

June 3, 2010, available from www.newsweek.com/gaza-crisis-turkeysnew-role-73091.

137. Mark Levine, “Is Turkey the Best Model for Arab Democracy?” Al Jazeera, September 19, 2011, available from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201191684356995273.html; Ariel Ben Solomon, “Iran FM says his country is model of democracy 

for region,” The Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2014, available from 

www.jpost.com/International/Iran-FM-says-his-country-is-model-ofdemocracy-for-region-337222.

138. Semih İdiz, “Turkey-Iran Ties Strained by Iraq, Syria,” 

Al-Monitor, February 19, 2013, available from www.al-monitor.com/

pulse/originals/2013/02/turkey-iran-tensions-rise-syria.html#.

139. “Turkish FM says Ankara supports Iran nuclear rights,” 

Press TV, February 27, 2013, available from www.presstv.com/

detail/2013/02/27/291139/turkey-supports-iran-nuclear-rights/.

140. “Iran signs nuclear fuel-swap deal with Turkey,” 

BBC News, May 17, 2010, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

8685846.stm. 

141. Thomas Erdbrink, “Brazil and Turkey Seek Iranian 

Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, May 16, 2010, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/

AR2010051503508.html. 

142. “Turkey: World Is Turning a Blind Eye to Israel’s Nuclear Weapon,” Haaretz, April 11, 2010, available from www.haaretz.

com/news/turkey-world-is-turning-a-blind-eye-to-israel-s-nuclearweapons-1.284046. 

143. Mary Beth Sheridan, “Turkish Foreign Minister Opposes U.N. Sanctions on Iran,” The Washington Post, April 14, 

2010, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2010/04/14/AR2010041403818.html. 
165

144. Stephen J. Flanagan, Bulent Aliriza, and Andrew Kuchins, 

“The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

March 2013, p. 9, available from csis.org/files/publication/130318_

Flanagan_TurkeyRussiaIran_web.pdf.

145. Tulay Karadeniz and Ibon Villelabeitia, “U.S. Presses 

Turkey to Enforce Sanctions on Iran,” Reuters, October 21, 2010, 

available from www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/us-iran-turkeyusa-idUSTRE69K46920101021. 

146. “Turkey’s Gas Imports from Iran Unaffected by Deals 

with Iraq: Minister,” Press TV, May 23, 2012, available from www.

presstv.com/detail/2012/05/23/242621/turkish-gas-imports-from-iranunaffected/. 

147. Ben Katcher, “Turkey Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Washington Note, April 15, 2010, 

available from www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/04/davutolgu_expla/. 

148. Thom Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile 

Shield,” The New York Times, September 15, 2011, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missileradar-for-nato-defense-against-iran.html. 

149. Patrick Markey, “Iraqi Kurds Flee Iranian and Turkish Bombardment,” Reuters, August 24, 2011, available from 

www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/oukwd-uk-iraq-turkey-id

AFTRE77N2IO20110824.

150. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Turkey & Iran: Islamic

Brotherhood or Regional Rivalry?” Al Jazeera Center for Studies,

June 4, 2013, available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/

05/20135139554264452.htm.

151. Sinan Ülgen, “Turkey’s Syria Connundrum,” The National Interest, August 24, 2012, available from nationalinterest.org/

commentary/turkeys-syria-conundrum-7385.

152. Alex Vatanka and Soner Cagaptay, “How Turkey and 

Iran See Each Other,” Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 
166

April 13, 2012, available from www.mei.edu/content/how-turkeyand-iran-see-each-other.

153. Kadri Gursel, “Iran-Turkey Rivalry Worsens over Patriot 

Deployment,” Al Monitor, January 4, 2013, available from www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/turkey-patriot-missiles-iran.html.

154 . Henri J. Barkey, “Back to Bloodshed,” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2011, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2011/10/21/back_to_bloodshed.

155. Sean Kane, “The Coming Turkish-Iranian Competition 

in Iraq,” Special Report No 276, Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace, June 2011, available from www.usip.org/sites/

default/files/Turkish_Iranian_Competition.pdf.

156. Suat Kiniklioglu, “Turkey’s Iran Issue: The End of Turkish Romanticism,” Today’s Zaman, April 6, 2012, available from 

www.todayszaman.com/columnists/suat-kiniklioglu_276605-turkeysiran-issue-the-end-of-turkish-romanticism.html. 

157. “Kazakhstan Will Host Iran-P5+1 Talks Due to Neutrality: MP,” Press TV, February 11, 2013, available from www.presstv.

com/detail/2013/02/11/288472/kazakhstan-neutral-on-iranp51-talks/.

158. “Turkey-Iran Economic and Trade Relations,” Istanbul, 

Turkey: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 

available from www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economicrelations-with-iran.en.mfa.

159. “Turkey, Iran to Trade in Local Currencies to Replace 

Greenback,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 20, 2012, available from 

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-iran-to-trade-in-local-currenciesto-replace-greenback.aspx?pageID=238&nid=23588.

160. Robert M. Cutler, “Turkey Strengthens Iraqi Energy 

Ties,” Asia Times, March 26, 2010, available from atimes.com/atimes/

Central_Asia/LC26Ag01.html.

161. Simone Tagliapietra, “Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas 

Hub: Myth or Reality?” Natural Gas Europe, January 27, 2014, 

available from www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-regional-naturalgas-hub.
167

162. Thomas Erdbrink, “In Iran, Elite Unit Expands Oil Role,” 

Washington Post, May 5, 2010, p. 12.

163. Gary Clark, Rachel Ziemba, and Mark Dubowitz, “Iran’s 

Golden Loophole,” Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense

of Democracies, May 13, 2013, available from defenddemocracy.

org/content/uploads/documents/FDD_RGE_Iran_Gol_Report__

May_2013_FINAL_2.pdf and Jonathan Schanzer and Mark 

Dubowitz, “Iran’s Turkish Gold Rush,” Foreign Policy, December 

26, 2013, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/26/

irans_turkish_gold_rush. 

164 . “Iran, Turkey Set to Establish Joint University,” 

Press TV, February 3, 2013, available from www.presstv.com/detail/2013/02/03/287038/iran-turkey-to-launch-joint-university/; “Tehran, Ankara to Set Up Joint Economic Commission,” FARS News 

Agency, January 30, 2013, available from english.farsnews.com/

newstext.aspx?nn=13921110000790; “Deputy Minister: Iran, Turkey to Set Up Joint Economic Commission Soon,” Iran Chamber 

of Commerce, Industries, Mines & Agriculture, February 11, 2013, 

available from en.iccima.ir/news/iccima-news-bulletin/iran-economybulletin/item/6470-deputy-minister-iran-turkey-to-set-up-joint-economiccommission-soon.html.

165. “Turkey’s Erdogan: Israeli Strike on Iran Would Devastate Mideast,” Haaretz, April 1, 2012, available from www.haaretz.

com/news/diplomacy-defense/turkey-s-erdogan-israeli-strike-on-iranwould-devastate-mideast-1.421934.

166. Lamiya Adilgizi, “Old Rivals or Regional Partners: Russia, Turkey, and Crimea,” Al-Jazeera, March 16, 2014, available 

from www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/old-rivals-regionalpartners-r-2014315144016585481.html. 

167. Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, “Turkey and Russia: 

Axis of the Excluded?” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 

81–92, available from www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/

articles/2006/3/spring%20turkey%20hill/2006_survival.pdf. 

168. Fedor Lukyanov, “Russian-Turkish Gambit,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta, October 17, 2012. 
168

169. “Russia Agrees to Join Turkish Security Operation in 

Black Sea,” RIA Novosti, Global Security.Org, June 29, 2006, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/06/mil060629-rianovosti01.htm. 

170. “Press Statements Following the Russian-Turkish 

Talks,” President of Russia Website, February 13, 2009, available 

from www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/13/2131_type82914

type82915_212893.shtml.

171. Igor Torbakov, “The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey 

Relations,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, 

p. 9, available from www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Georgia

CrisisTorbakov.pdf. 

172. Ibid. 

173. Roman Muzalevsky, “The Armenia-Turkey Protocols: 

Tactical Cooperation in the Shadow of Eurasian Strategic Competition,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, November 11, 2009, 

available from old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5214. 

174. E. Tariverdiyeva, “Russia-Turkey Cooperation Will Contribute to Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution, but in the Long 

Term: Experts,” Trend News Agency, January 14, 2010, available 

from en.trend.az/news/karabakh/1618377.html. 

175. “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Address a News Conference on the Outcome of 

Their Negotiations,” Prime Minister of Russia Website, January 13, 

2010, available from archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/8965/. 

176. “Russian FM Urges Progress on Turkey, Armenia 

Rapprochment,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 14, 

2010, available from www.speroforum.com/a/25566/Russian-FMUrges-Progress-On-Turkey-Armenia-Rapprochment.

177. Torbakov, p. 5. 

178. Ibid., p. 30.
169

179. Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, “Thinking about the Caucasus as a Land Bridge between Turkey and Russia,” Ankara, Turkey: Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, January 

2009, p. 4.

180. “US Warship Sails Through Straits, Russia Suspicious,” 

Today’s Zaman, August 23, 2008, available from www.todayszaman.

com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=0CACCAB85DD413

2AD2A1EE8C3013F9EC?newsId=151006.

181. Alexander Murinson, “Russia Accuses Turkey of Violating Montreux Convention,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 

October 15, 2008, available from old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4960. 

182. Jacob Resneck, “New Energy Between Cold War Foes 

Turkey, Russia,” The Washington Times, September 3, 2012, 

available from www.Washingtontimes.Com/News/2012/Sep/3/NewEnergy-Between-Cold-War-Foes-Turkey-Russia/?Page=All. 

183. Fulya Ozerkan, “Turkey Fears for Tatar Minority in 

Ukraine,” AFP, March 13, 2014, available from https://sg.news.

yahoo.com/turkey-fears-tatar-minority-ukraine-174324104.html.

184. Vitaly Naumkin, “Russia manages Turkey, Crimean Tatars in Ukraine,” Almonitor, March 11, 2014, available from www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/russia-crimea-ukraine-turkeytartars.html#. 

185. “FM Davutoğlu Rules Out Turkish-Russian Crisis Over 

Crimea,” Today’s Zaman, March 3, 2014, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-341063-fm-davutoglu-rules-out-turkish-russiancrisis-over-crimea.html; and “Turkey’s priority safety of Crimean 

Tatars,” World Bulletin, March 16, 2014, available from www.

worldbulletin.net/todays-news/131201/turkeys-priority-safety-ofcrimean-tatars. 

186. G-20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 

China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic 

of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, 

United Kingdom, United States—the EU, with Spain participating as a “permanent guest,” and further short-term guests named 

annually by the group’s rotating chairperson.
170

187. Roman Muzalevsky, “Turkey Looks Forward, Talks 

SCO,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10, February 13, 2013, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_

news%5d=40454&tx_ttnews%5bbackpid%5d=381&chash=3fe3eda58

624dbac0cea0755b9460435. 

188. Burak Bekdil, “The Shanghai Seven?” Hürriyet Daily 

News, February 8, 2013 available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/

the-shanghai-seven.aspx?pageid=238&nid=40689&newscatid=398. 

189. “Prospects for a Future Role for Erdogan,” Al-Jazeera, 

October 14, 2012, available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2012/10/2012101182616142155.htm. 

190. Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s Quest for a Eurasian Union,” 

Todays Zaman, January 27, 2013; and Erman Akilli, “Turkey’s Illusions of Neo-Eurasianism and Interest in Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Today’s Zaman, February 26, 2013, available 

from www.todayszaman.com/news-308231-turkeys-illusions-ofneo-eurasianism-and-interest-in-shanghai-cooperation-organizationbyerman-akilli-.html.

191. Bekdil. 

192. “Idea of Shanghai Membership Inconsistent, Says 

Main Opposition Party Leader,” Anatolia News Agency, February 5, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/idea-ofshanghai-membership-inconsistent-says-main-opposition-party-leader.

aspx?pageID=238&nID=40529&NewsCatID=338.

193. Brett Daniel Shehadey, “Turkey: Reuniting the Ottoman 

Empire—Analysis,” Eurasia Review, February 28, 2013, available 

from www.eurasiareview.com/28022013-turkey-reuniting-the-ottoman-empire-analysis/. 

194. Doga Ulas Eralp, “Turkey—Can the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be an Alternative to the EU?” Transconflict, 

February 6, 2013, available from www.transconflict.com/2013/02/

can-shanghai-cooperation-organization-be-an-alternative-to-europeanunion-for-turkey-062/. 
171

195. “Is Turkey Serious About Becoming SCO Member State?” 

Xinhua, China.org.cn, February 9, 2013, available from www.china.

org.cn/opinion/2013-02/09/content_27934748.htm. 

196. Ariel Cohen, “Mr. Erdogan Goes to Shanghai,” National Interest, February 18, 2013, available from nationalinterest.org/

commentary/mr-erdogan-goes-shanghai-8113. 

197. United Nations Security Council Document 1154 Annex 

1—International Security Force, December 2001, p. 9. 

198. “Turkey’s Emerging Role in Afghanistan’s Reconstruction,” Eurasianet.Org, March 22, 2002, available from www.Eurasianet.Org/Departments/Insight/Articles/Pp032302.Shtml. 

199. “Troop Numbers and Contributions,” ISAF Afghanistan, 

February 20, 2014, available from isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-andcontributions/index.php.

200. “Turkey Extends ISAF’s Command One More Year,” 

Hürriyet Daily News, October 4, 2011, available from www.

hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-extendsisaf8217s-command-one-more-year-2011-10-04.

201. Desmond Butler, “Obama Praises Turkey for Help in Afghanistan,” The Jerusalem Post, February 8, 2010, available from 

www.jpost.com/International/Obama-praises-Turkey-for-help-inAfghanistan.

202. Düden Yegenoglu, “The ISAF Mission and Turkey’s Role 

in Rebuilding the Afghan State,” Policy Watch 1052, Washington, 

DC: The Washington Institute, November 18, 2005, available from 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/pdf/the-isaf-missionand-turkeys-role-in-rebuilding-the-afghan-state.

203. “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation,” Istanbul, Turkey: Turkish General Staff, February 3, 2010, 

available from www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm.

204. “Turkey: Ankara’s Strategic Outlook on Afghanistan,” STRATFOR, December 4, 2009, available from 

www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey-ankaras-strategic-outlookafghanistan#axzz3B5QdfL00.
172

205. “U.S. Requests No More Troops from Turkey to Afghanistan—Robert Gates,” Trend News Agency, February 6, 2010, 

available from en.trend.az/regions/world/usa/1634243.html. 

206. John Daly, “Afghanistan: The Turkish Advantage,”

The International Relations and Security Network, April 30,

2007, available from www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/

/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=

en&id=53227. 

207. “Turkey to Restore Afghanistan’s Oldest Hospital,”

Today’s Zaman, September 26, 2011, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-257979-turkey-to-restore-afghanistans-oldesthospital.html. 

208. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Revises Its Strategy for Ending 

the Afghan War,” The Washington Post, October 31, 2011, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-revisesits-strategy-for-ending-the-afghan-war/2011/10/31/gIQAwTbXaM_

story.html.

209. Ceren Kumova, “Turkey Looks to Stabilize Afghanistan, 

Boost Confidence in Af-Pak Region,” Today’s Zaman, October 30, 

2011, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-261311-turkeylooks-to-stabilize-afghanistan-boost-confidence-in-af-pak-region.html. 

210. Saurav Jha, “Turkey-Pakistan Ties: India’s Loss Is China’s Gain,” World Politics Review, January 14, 2011, available from 

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7569/turkey-pakistan-tiesindias-loss-is-chinas-gain. 

211. “Global Insider: Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral 

Forum ,” World Politics Review, April 25, 2011, available from www.

worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8623/global-insider-turkey-afghanistan-pakistan-trilateral-forum. 

212. “Une Main Tendue Aux Talibans Afghans Et Pakistanais À L’étude À Istanbul” (“An outstretched hand to the Afghan 

Taliban and Pakistan in the study to Istanbul”), Le Monde.Fr: Actualités À La Une, January 25, 2010, available from www.lemonde.fr/

asie-pacifique/article/2010/01/25/une-main-tendue-aux-talibansafghans-et-pakistanais-a-l-etude-a-istanbul_1296255_3216.html. 
173

213. “Turkish President Meets Afghan, Pakistani Leaders for Co-Op in Supporting Afghanistan,” Xinhua, January 25, 

2010, available from english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/

6878306.html. 

214. Joint Statement on U.S.-Turkey Consultations on Afghanistan Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, U.S. 

Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, April 7, 2011, available 

from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160178.htm. 

215. “Global Insider: Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral 

Forum.”

216. Jha, and Aditya Kaul, “After an Absence, India Back at 

Turkey Meet on Afghan,” October 30, 2011, available from www.

dnaindia.com/india/report_after-an-absence-india-back-at-turkey-meeton-afghan_1604834. 

217. “An Istanbul Address for the Taliban?” SETimes May 1, 

2011, available from www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/

features/setimes/features/2011/01/05/feature-02.

218. Mahir Zeynalov, “EU Applauds Turkey’s Generous Support To Afghanistan,” Today’s Zaman, November 3, 2011, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-261835-eu-applauds-turkeysgenerous-support-to-afghanistan.html. 

219. Soner Cagaptay, “Incirlikization,” Hurriyet Daily 

News, July 30, 2009, available from www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/

opinion/11975929.asp.

220. Yitzhak Shichor, “Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch 

in Sino-Turkish Relations,” Washington, DC: East-West Center, 

2009, p. 48. 

221. Fatih Furtun, “Turkish-Chinese Relations in the Shadow 

of the Uyghur Problem,” Today’s Zaman, March 29, 2010, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-205744-159-turkish-chineserelations-in-the-shadow-of-the-uyghur-problem.html.
174

222. Mustafa Edib Yilmaz, “Turkish Pressure Mounting 

on China to Stop Killings in Xinjiang,” Today’s Zaman, July 9, 

2009, available from www.todayszaman.com//news-180330-turkishpressure-mounting-on-china-to-stop-killings-in-xinjiang.html.

223. “Tension Runs High as China Cracks Down on Uighur 

Riot,” Today’s Zamam, July 7, 2009, available from www.todays

zaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=180125.

224. Recep Erdoğan, interview with China’s Xinhua News 

Agency, Istanbul, Turkey, February 22, 2012.

225. Ibid.

226. Cheng Guangjin, “Xi Looks to the Future at Journey’s 

End,” China Daily, February 23, 2012, p. 1, available from www.

chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/23/content_14672508.htm. 

227. “Chinese VP Addresses Business Forum in Istanbul,” 

Xinhua, February 22, 2012, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

english/china/2012-02/22/c_131425406_2.htm.

228. Ergin Hava and Zhuying Shi, “Turkey, China set Eyes 

on $100 bln in Mutual Trade,” Sunday’s Zaman, February 22, 

2012, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-272194-turkeychina-set-eyes-on-100-bln-in-mutual-trade.html.

229. “Turkey and China have signed a series of deals,” Balkan 

Business News, February 23, 2012, available from www.balkans.com/

open-news.php?uniquenumber=136741. 

230. “Tension Runs High as China Cracks Down on Uighur 

Riot,” Today’s Zaman, July 7, 2009, available from www.todays

zaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=180125.

231. Hava and Shi. 

232. Zhao Shengnan, “Turkey Looks to Strengthen Ties 

with China’s Vibrant Economy,” China Daily, February 21, 

2012, available from europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-02/21/

content_14654757.htm. 
175

233. B. Raman, “China Engages Turkey to Neutralize Uighur 

Threat,” Rediff News, October 17, 2010, available from news.rediff.

com/column/2010/oct/17/b-raman-china-engages-turkey-to-neutraliseuighur-threat.htm. 

234. “China, Turkey to Establish Strategic Cooperative Relationship,” China Daily, October 8, 2010, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/08/content_11386689.htm. 

235. Raman, “China Engages Turkey to Neutralize Uighur 

Threat.” 

236. Ibid. 

237. Hava and Shi. 

238. “China’s Xi Tells Turkey’s Gul of Regional Stability 

Hopes,” AFP, February 21, 2012, available from sg.news.yahoo.com/

chinese-leader-begins-turkey-talks-amid-uighur-protests-180124657.

html.

239. Hava and Shi. 

240. Barcin Yinanc, “Improving Economic Relations with 

China Is No Easy Endeavor,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 17, 

2010, available from www.hurriyedailynews.com/n.php?n=impro

ving-economic-relations-with-china-is-no-easy-endeavor-2010-10-17. 

241. “Wen’s Visit to Turkey to Boost Bilateral Relations,” 

China.org, September 29, 2010, available from www.china.org.cn/

world/2010-09/29/content_21034081.htm. 

242. “Chinese VP Calls for Efforts in Boosting Trade with Turkey,” China Daily, February 23, 2012, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/23/content_14676867.htm. 

243. Tulay Karadeniz, “Uighur Protests as China’s Xi Visits 

Turkey,” Reuters, February 21, 2012, available from www.reuters.

com/article/2012/02/21/us-turkey-china-idUSTRE81K1X920120221.

244. “Turkish, Chinese Firms to Ink $1.38 Billion Deals: Minister,” AFP, February 22, 2012, available from www.rnw.nl/english/

bulletin/turkish-chinese-firms-ink-138-billion-deals-minister.
176

245. “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Talks about Vice President 

Xi Jinping’s Visits to Ireland and Turkey,” Consulate General of 

China in Los Angeles, February 28, 2012, available from losangeles.

china-consulate.org/eng/topnews/t908882.htm. 

246. “Vice President Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses ChinaTurkey Economic & Trade Cooperation Forum,” Beijing, China: 

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 23, 2012, available 

from www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t908092.htm. 

247. Ibid.

248. Zhao Shengnan, “Turkey Looks to Strengthen Ties 

with China’s Vibrant Economy,” China Daily, February 21, 

2012, available from europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-02/21/

content_14654757.htm. 

249. Hava and Shi. 

250. Ibid. 

251. Ibid. 

252. “Babacan Urges More Chinese Banks in Turkey,” World 

Bulletin, February 22, 2012, available from www.worldbulletin.net/?

aType=haber&ArticleID=86172. 

253 . “Vice President Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses China-Turkey Economic & Trade Cooperation Forum.”

254. “Xi Jinping Receives Written Interview of Turkey’s 

Sabah,” Embassy of China, February 21, 2012, available from 

gr.chineseembassy.org/eng/zgyw/t907757.htm. 

255. Yitzhak Shichor, “Turkey Trot: Military Cooperation 

between Beijing and Ankara,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, April 16, 2009, available from www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34868. 

256. Jim Wolf, “China Mounts Air Exercise with Turkey, U.S. 

Says,” Global Post, October 8, 2010, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2010/10/08/us-china-turkey-usa-idUSTRE6975HC20101008.
177

257. Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, “Turkey, China in 

Exercises,” Defense News, October 17, 2010, available from www.

defensenews.com/story.php?i=4921329. 

258. B. Raman, “Chinese Air Force Planes refuel in Pakistan, 

Iran on way to Turkey,” The Guardian Sri Lanka, October 16, 2010, 

available from www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/10/chinese-air-forceplanes-refuel-in.html. 

259. “Turkey Distancing from Missile Deal with China,” 

Defense Updates, March 11, 2014, available from defense-update.

com/20140311_turkey-distancing-missile-deal-china.html. 

260. “Turkey Increases Defense Spending,” Washington, DC: 

Atlantic Council, available from www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/

natosource/turkey-increases-defense-spending.

261. “Chapter Four: Europe,” The Military Balance, London, 

UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014, pp. 146–149. 

262. “The Top 20 Arms Importers, 2009–2013,” Stockholm, 

Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009–

2013, available from www.sipri.org/googlemaps/2014_of_at_top_20_

imp_map.html.

263. Richard Weitz, “Reducing Its Dependence on Foreign 

Arms Suppliers, Turkey Enhances Its Strategic Autonomy,” 

Turkey Analyst, Vol. 3, No. 14, August 30, 2010.

264. Ibid.

265. Michael R. Gordon, “Greek Cypriots to Get Missiles from 

Russians,” The New York Times, April 29, 1998, sec. World, available from www.nytimes.com/1998/04/29/world/greek-cypriots-to-getmissiles-from-russians.html.

266. “Israeli Defense Industry, with Relations Improving, 

Eyes Turkey Again,” UPI, accessed March 18, 2014, available from 

www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/04/08/Israelidefense-industry-eyes-Turkey-again/UPI-60071365439747/.
178

267. “Israel Defense Systems Firms Court Turkish Military,” 

www.JPost.com, accessed March 18, 2014, available from www.

jpost.com/Defense/Israel-defense-firms-court-Turkish-military-308824.

268. Ibid.

269. “Israeli Defense Industry, with Relations Improving, 

Eyes Turkey Again.”

270. Suzan Fraser, “Turkey: Drones to Be Bought From United States,” Huffington Post, available from www.huffingtonpost.

com/2012/05/22/turkey-drones_n_1535912.html; “U.S. Denies Turkey’s Request for Combat UAVs,” World Tribune, January 6, 2011, 

available from www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/

me_turkey1329_01_06.asp.

271. Tolga Ozbek, “Turkish Air Force to Receive First KT-1 

Trainer,” Flight Global, October 27, 2010, available from www.

flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-turkish-air-force-to-receivefirst-kt-1-trainers-348995/.

272. Andrew Mcgregor, “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: 

Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century,” Washington, DC: 

The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p. 2.

273. “Turkish Defense Market Worth $14 Billion,” UPI, Vol. 

1, accessed March 18, 2014, available from www.upi.com/Business_

News/Security-Industry/2012/08/14/Turkish-defense-market-worth14-billion/UPI-88161344953044/.

274. Richard Weitz, “Whither Turkey-US Arms Sales,” Turkey 

Analyst Vol. 4, No. 11, May 30, 2011, available from www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2011/110530B.html.

275. Robert K. Ackerman. “Turkey’s Defense Industry Matures,” SIGNAL Magazine, September 2010, available from www.

afcea.org/content/?q=node/2387.

276. “The Top 20 Arms Importers, 2009–2013,” Stockholm, 

Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 

2009–13, accessed March 17, 2014, available from www.sipri.org/

googlemaps/2014_of_at_top_20_imp_map.html.
179

277. “Turkey Joins World’s Top Five Weapons Importers,” 

Hürriyet Daily News, April 18, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-joins-worlds-top-five-weapons-importers.

aspx?pageID=238&nid=43160. 

278. “Turkey Seeks Increased Arms Exports,” UPI, August 

28, 2012, available from www.upi.com/Business_News/SecurityIndustry/2012/08/28/Turkey-seeks-increased-arms-exports/UPI50721346186145/.

279. “Turkey Sets High Arms Export Hopes,” Hürriyet Daily 

News, April 18, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/

turkey-sets-high-arms-export-hopes.aspx?PageID=238&NID=44445&

NewsCatID=344.

280. Ibid.

281. “Turkey Seeks Increased Arms Exports.”

282. Burak Bekil, “With Tank Deals, Turkey Focuses on Arms 

Exports,” Defense News, May 25, 2013, available from www.defense

news.com/article/20130525/DEFREG01/305250010/With-Tank-DealsTurkey-Focuses-Arms-Exports.

283. Robert K. Ackerman. “Turkey’s Defense Industry Matures,” SIGNAL Magazine, September 2010, available from www.

afcea.org/content/?q=node/2387.

284. K. K. Sruthijith, “India Remains Top Arms Importer 

While China Becomes Fifth Largest Exporter,” The Economic 

Times, March 18, 2013, available from economictimes.indiatimes.

com//articleshow/19029471.cms.

285. Weitz, “Whither Turkey-US Arms Sales.” 

286. Sebnem Arsu, “Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw From 

Turkey,” The New York Times, April 25, 2013, available from www.

nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from-turkey.html?_r=2&. 

287. Alon Ben-Meir, “The Kurdish Conflict: The Real Challenge to Turkey’s Democracy,” The World Post, December 5, 2011, 
180

available from www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/the-kurdishconflict-the_b_1129359.html. 

288. Ragan Updegraff, “The Kurdish Question,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2012, p. 119, available from https://

muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v023/23.1.updegraff.

html.

289. Ibid.

290. Constanze Letsch, “Kurds Dare to Hope as PKK Fighters’ 

Ceasefire with Turkey Takes Hold,” The Guardian, May 7, 2013, 

available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/07/kurds-pkkturkey-peace-talks. 

291. Aliza Marcus, “The Kurds’ Evolving Strategy: The 

Struggle Goes Political in Turkey,” World Affairs, NovemberDecember 2012, available from www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/

kurds%E2%80%99-evolving-strategy-struggle-goes-political-turkey. 

292. Letsch.

293. Sebnem Arsu, “Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw From 

Turkey,” The New York Times, April 25, 2013, available from www.

nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from-turkey.html?_r=2&.

294. James Reynolds, “Turkey Kurds: PKK Chief Ocalan Calls 

for Ceasefire,” BBC, March 21, 2013, available from www.bbc.com/

news/world-europe-21874427. 

295. Letsch.

296. Reynolds.

297. Updegraff, p. 124.

298. Steven A. Cook, “The Weakening of Turkey’s Military,” 

Council on Foreign Relations, March 1, 2010, available from www.

cfr.org/turkey/weakening-turkeys-military/p21548.
181

299. Duygu Dogan, “Raid on ‘Occupy Taksim Park’ Demonstrators Triggers Outcry” Hurriyet Daily News, May 30, 2013, 

available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/raid-on-occupy-taksimpark-demonstrators-triggers-outcry.aspx?PageID=238&NID=47870&

NewsCatID=341. 

300. Ibid.

301. Can Sezer and Parisa Hafezi, “Turkish PM Erdogan Calls 

For End To Protests As Clashes Flare,” Reuters, June 1, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/01/us-turkey-protestsidUSBRE94U0J920130601. 

302. Ibid.

303. Ibid.

304. Joe Parkinson and Emre Peker, “Violence Spreads In Turkey As Rifts Widen Prime Minister’s Supporters Stage Rally,” The 

Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2013, available from online.wsj.com/

news/articles/SB10001424127887323566804578548931174506930. 

305. Deniz Arslan, “US Avoids Criticizing Turkey To Protect 

Middle East Interests,” Today’s Zaman, February 2, 2014, available 

from www.todayszaman.com/news-338096-us-avoids-criticizing-turkey-to-protect-middle-east-interests.html. 

306. Ibid.

307. “Turkey Protests Mark A Democracy Request, US 

Senator McCain Says,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 7, 2013, 

available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/TurkRadio.aspx?pageID

=238&nID=48395. 

308. “The United States Needs to Tell Turkey to Change 

Course,” The Washington Post, January, 23, 2014, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-needs-to-tellturkey-to-change-course/2014/01/23/3525bf52-7eda-11e3-93c1-

0e888170b723_story.html. 

309. Morton Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman, Co-Chairs, 

“From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing US Turkey Policy,” Wash-
182

ington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, October 2013, available from 

bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/US%20Turkey%20Policy.pdf.

310. Doug Bandow, “Turkey Is Different,” American Spectator 

Online, June 10, 2013, available from www.Cato.Org/Publications/

Commentary/Turkey-Different.

311. Jim Zanotti, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2014, 

p. 7, available from www.Fas.Org/Sgp/Crs/Mideast/R41368.pdf. 

312. Ben Rhodes, “2014 Foreign Policy Priorities for the 

Obama Administration,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, January 29, 2014, available from fpc.state.gov/220909.htm. 

313. Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S Department of State, January 23, 2014, available from 

www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/220560.htm. 

314. Arslan.

315. “US Ambassador Ricciardone Warned Turkey’s Halkbank,” World Bulletin, December 21, 2013, available from www.

Worldbulletin.Net/News/125412/Us-Ambassador-RicciardoneWarned-Turkeys-Halkbank.

316. “White House: No US Interference in Turkish Affairs,” 

Today’s Zaman, January 30, 2014, available from www.todayszaman.

com/news-338032-white-house-no-us-interference-in-turkish-affairs.

html.

317. Jayson Browder, “Erdogan Risks U.S. Ties with Provocations,” Asia Times, January 2014, available from www.atimes.com/

atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-140114.html. 

318. Semih Idiz, “Turkey Will Pay for Erdoğan’s Ambitions,” 

Hurriyet Daily News, December 24, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-will-pay-for-erdogans-ambitions.aspx?Page

ID=238&NID=60032&NewsCatID=416. 
183

319. Tim Arango, “Growing Mistrust between U.S. and Turkey Is Played Out in Public,” The New York Times, December 23, 

2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/europe/

growing-mistrust-between-us-and-turkey-is-played-out-in-public.

html?_r=1&. 

320. Orhan Coskun, “Turkish Graft Scandal Triggers Feud 

over Judicial Independence,” Reuters, January 10, 2014, available from www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/10/us-turkey-corruptionidusbrea090jr20140110. 

321. Jen Psaki, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of 

State, December 20, 2013, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

dpb/2013/12/219043.htm.

322. “Remarks with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu after Their Meeting,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of State, January 12, 2014, available from www.state.gov/secretary/

remarks/2014/01/219569.htm. 

323. Jonathan Schanzer, Mark Dubowitz, “Iran’s Turkish 

Gold Rush,” Foreign Policy, December 26, 2013, available from 

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/26/irans_turkish_gold_rush.

324. Jonathan Schanzer, “The Turkish-American Alliance: 

Opportunities and Challenges,” Washington, DC: Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies, April 12, 2013, available from www.

defenddemocracy.org/events/the-turkish-american-allianceopportunities-and-challenges/.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Richard Weitz

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil