www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 1 

S

pace activity is critical to the American way of war. The commercialization of space has potentially radical implications for U.S. national security 

through its impact on a range of military and intelligence functions and 

on the ability of the nation to effectively project power around the globe.

Historically, U.S. space access has been under government control. In recent years, the increasing congestion of space with the rise of commercial space 

systems has been fundamentally changing the traditional government-centered 

calculus. The reality of modern space activity is that both the commercial and 

civil space sectors are vital for achieving national security objectives and enhancing American spacepower.1

 Burgeoning commercial space activities are leveraging technologies from the information technology sector to enable ultra-lowcost access to space (ULCATS). Air University likens these developments to the 

early history of aviation whereby the improved affordability of access to space 

has the potential for breakthroughs in national security and the space industry 

with global ramifications.2

In 2016–2017, Air University conducted a “Fast Space” study on how this 

evolution will present opportunities and challenges to the security of the United 

States. In support of Air University, National Defense University (NDU) collaborated with Johns Hopkins University, eight think tanks, and multiple subject 

matter experts to analyze the utility of ULCATS for the U.S. military. Each of 

these organizations contributed one or more reports for the Fast Space study.

For this study, the authors have adopted the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) definition of cost of access to space as the cost of placing 

and maintaining capabilities in space. This definition encompasses launch costs 

Low-Cost Access to Space: 

Military Opportunities and 

Challenges

by Philip Stockdale, Scott Aughenbaugh, and Nickolas 

Boensch

DEFENSE HORIZONS

National Defense University

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

About the Authors

Philip Stockdale is a Senior Research 

Fellow at the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies (INSS) at the 

National Defense University. Scott 

Aughenbaugh is a Research Fellow at 

INSS. Nickolas Boensch is a Research 

Intern at INSS.

Key Points

◆ In support of the Air University 

“Fast Space” study, the National 

Defense University collaborated 

with Johns Hopkins University, 

eight think tanks, and subject matter experts to analyze the utility 

of ultra-low-cost access to space 

(ULCATS) for the U.S. military.

◆ Contributors identified disruptors that could achieve ULCATS 

and Fast Space as well as space 

architectures and capabilities that 

could reduce the cost of access to 

space. They also offered recommendations for legal, policy, regulatory, authority, and oversight 

adjustments that could facilitate 

cost reductions.

◆ The combination of a greater 

number of innovative commercial 

space actors, industry advocacy 

for licensing reform, and optimism 

regarding reusable launch vehicles 

will eventually change the ways 

the United States operates in 

space.

◆ As the economic landscape of 

space activities evolves, some 

missions in low earth orbit may be 

turned over to commercial sector operation, but the next 3 to 

5 years might not be revolutionary for government use of space 

capabilities.

February 2018
2 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

as well as the costs associated with “launch infrastructure, 

launch operations, and the size and number of payloads 

required to operate a capability in space.” On this basis, CSIS defined ULCATS as a reduction by an order 

of magnitude (factor of 10 or more) in the total cost per 

pound delivered to orbit.3

ULCATS is a subset of the term Fast Space, which 

Air University defines as:

an ecosystem of concepts, capabilities, and industrial 

partnerships that makes speed the defining 

attribute of advantage in space. In this approach, 

speed describes both the supply and demand sides 

of the space market. On the supply side, Fast Space 

envisions sortie-on-demand launch capability, 

made possible through economically viable business 

cases, high launch rates, sustainably lower costs, 

rapid turn-around, and higher reliability from 

emerging approaches that industry is experimenting 

with. On the demand side, Fast Space enables users 

of all levels of conflict, from tactical to strategic, 

to harvest new advantages in and through space. 

These advantages include persistent command and 

control, ubiquitous communications, on-demand 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR), and new axes for kinetic effects.4

The goals of this paper—using reports from the Fast 

Space study and a concurrent report by Air University—are to identify disruptors that could achieve ULCATS and Fast Space; explore new space architectures 

and capabilities that could be undertaken due to an 

order of magnitude reduction in cost of access to space; 

and make recommendations for legal, policy, regulatory, 

authority, and oversight adjustments that need to be 

addressed to encourage innovation in the commercial 

space sector and to facilitate reductions in the cost of 

access to space and Fast Space.

The following is a list of the think tanks that 

participated in the Fast Space study and contributed 

reports:

◆ Center for Strategic and International Studies5

◆ Center for a New American Security6

◆ Wikistrat, Inc.7

◆ Telemus Group8

◆ Special Aerospace Services9

◆ BMNT Partners LLC10

◆ Interstellar Technologies LLC and Onyx Aerospace Incorporated.11

Air University envisions a three-phase maturation 

process in forging a Fast Space environment. The first 

phase—industry—is already present and is changing the 

U.S. Government-centered calculus on space. In this initial phase of 1 to 3 years, industry will lay the crucial 

groundwork for Fast Space by developing large constellations of small satellites. In the second phase of 3 to 10 

years, Fast Space will emerge, providing the U.S. military 

with greater command and control; ISR; and positioning, 

navigation, and timing capabilities. It will also provide 

a “civil reserve space fleet” due to commercial reusable 

launch vehicles bringing threefold reductions in cost of 

access to space. In the final phase of more than 10 years, 

Fast Space will be fully obtained as a result of achieving 

ULCATS.12 Aviation-like sortie access to space, reusable 

launch vehicles, resilient communications and ISR systems, tailored space applications, and rapidly deployable 

launch-on-demand systems will shape a new ULCATSenabled, Fast Space environment.

Reducing Cost of Access to Space

Several contributors to the Fast Space study sought 

to identify and assess the viability of disruptive breakthroughs that have the potential to significantly reduce 

the cost of access to space. These potential disruptors include economies of scale and learning efficiencies, fixed 

and variable costs, future technologies, reusable launch 

vehicles, and virtuous cycles.

Economies of Scale, Learning Efficiencies, and Fixed 

and Variable Costs. Building more launch vehicles would 
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 3 

enable economies of scale and learning efficiencies that 

could reduce manufacturing costs. A higher launch vehicle production rate could enable changes in the manufacturing process and procurement of inputs, such as the 

adoption of automated processes and assembly systems, 

that could drive down unit costs. Learning efficiencies 

could occur in parallel with economies of scale and repetition of the same process, reducing required labor.13

More launch vehicles, particularly reusable ones with a 

higher launch frequency, could increase labor efficiencies 

and the rate of lessons learned.14

An increased frequency of launches from a given site 

has multiple advantages. One is a decrease in fixed cost 

per launch. With increased launch frequency, fixed costs 

such as upkeep and maintenance of launch infrastructure 

could be spread out. Additionally, variable launch costs 

would be affected. Those costs associated with the integration of payloads with their respective launcher and 

the operation of pads during launch could be reduced as 

personnel grow more efficient with practice.

Procedural changes would also evolve with increased 

launch frequency. For example, alterations to preflight 

testing regimes and payload integration processes could 

lead to more substantial reductions in the cost of launch 

operations, as follows. Before being fueled and encapsulated within the payload faring, satellites arrive a month 

or more in advance of launch and undergo expensive preflight checks in costly cleanroom environments. This is 

followed by additional tests on the pad before launch. 

One study notes that advanced reusable vehicles could 

eventually lead to tests being reduced to something like a 

walk-around inspection on the pad and that payload integration in an open-air environment could significantly 

reduce the duration and cost of launch operations. According to the study, this would begin to fit an aircraft 

model of reusability.15

It is not likely that economies of scale and learning efficiencies alone could result in ULCATS. Achieving economies of scale in launch activities and systems 

is unlikely without much higher levels of demand. Furthermore, achieving the necessary demand requires substantial reductions in launch costs, which is also unlikely 

at this time. Even if yearly launches quadrupled from 

their present numbers, launch operations costs could not 

achieve an order of magnitude reduction.

Future Technologies. Several new technologies—

such as novel propulsion systems, on-orbit servicing, and 

on-orbit mining and manufacturing—were considered 

for their potential in generating ULCATS. On-orbit 

servicing could be used to reposition satellites so they 

would no longer need to expend their own propellant for 

station-keeping maneuvers, upgrade satellites in orbit by 

replacing sensors with new ones, and repair mechanical 

issues in situ. These disruptors would extend the life of 

satellites, as well as reducing launch costs because less 

mass would be launched. On-orbit mining and manufacturing would similarly reduce the mass needed to be 

launched, although not by the magnitude associated with 

ULCATS. As of 2017, no novel propulsion technologies 

are poised to provide a breakthrough that would lower 

launch costs in the foreseeable future.16 NASA’s renewed 

interest in nuclear thermal propulsion is focused on increasing speed, not necessarily reducing costs.

Reusability. Reusable launch vehicles are perhaps 

the most promising means of reducing launch costs. 

While companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin have 

demonstrated competencies in this area with their reusable first-stage boosters, maturation of reusability is 

a core requirement in Air University’s Fast Space ecosystem. With continuing reductions in cost a result of 

reusable features, current and future national security 

payloads could be launched more economically and more 

frequently, enabling greater operational agility.17 While 

the U.S. Government is currently dependent on costly 

and infrequent launches with long lead times, these qualities could assure the U.S. military’s access to space.

Primary barriers to developing reusable launch vehicles include commercial business cases. Current market 

demand is not sufficient to justify the high-risk private 

investment. SpaceX has invested $1 billion or more in research and development costs on the Falcon 9 reusable 

first stage. European government and industry officials 
4 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

claim that to close the business case for reusable launch 

vehicles, ensure a return on investment, and make reusable launch vehicles economically feasible, flight rates of 

at least 35–40 per vehicle per year are needed.18 Reliability and the associated risk of launch systems following 

repeated launches and refurbishment are concerns for 

both investors and customers.19 Additionally, reusability 

without market competition could result in negligible 

cost reductions as the launch provider would only pass 

on significant cost reductions if forced by competition.20

If reusability is to play a role in supporting ULCATS and bolstering Fast Space, iterative refurbishment 

time and associated cost will need to be minimized. If 

each launch requires lengthy inspections, followed by repairs to damage suffered on the previous launch, then 

the process would not be consistent with the aircraft-like 

reusability model needed for routine, reliable access to 

space. SpaceX spends months evaluating, refurbishing, 

and testing the first stage of their Falcon 9 launch vehicles prior to reuse. They intend to reduce this timeframe to the same day and reuse other components such 

as second-stage rockets. If this could be achieved, launch 

cycles could begin to fit an aircraft-like reusability model.

While some claim that expendable launch vehicles 

could be developed to achieve higher frequency of 

launch and similarly achieve ULCATS, the Air University study does not agree. The authors argue that, based 

on this logic, expendable airplanes, flown once and then 

thrown away, would be employed.21 While they note 

that launch vehicles—like airplanes—are complex systems, not mass-manufactured commodities, airplanes do 

not undergo the stresses of atmospheric re-entry with 

each flight. The proposed cost reductions are enticing, 

but it has yet to be proved that launch vehicles could 

routinely return and rapidly relaunch with minimal risk 

and without costly refurbishment. Operational costs 

for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle Program turned out to 

be 20 times higher than projected, and never achieved 

the anticipated 160-hour turnaround time or launch 

frequency.22

The Virtuous Cycle of Launch Frequency. Many of 

the contributing studies recognized that launch frequency is crucial in achieving reduced cost of access to 

space. Figure 1 illustrates launch cost per kilogram (kg) 

of payload given flight rate per year.While launch costs 

can vary dramatically, the graph nominally shows that 

increasing the flight rate per year by nine times would 

result in a threefold reduction in cost per kg of payload. 

Furthermore, a tenfold reduction in cost per kg of payload would require an almost fiftyfold increase in the 

number of launches. This observation raises the question 

of what comes first: ULCATS that would enable a robust space market, or a thriving market that requires ULCATS. One study referred to this question as a chickenand-egg problem and remarked that it remains unclear 

which will initially need to occur to produce a Fast Space 

environment.23

Air University proposed that if some of the disrupters discussed above succeed in reducing initial costs of 

access to space, then a virtuous cycle could be jumpstarted, eventually leading to tenfold cost reductions in 

access to space. Figure 2 depicts the reinforcing cycle of 

costs declining, leading to increased investment and innovation that enables more efficient and frequent space 

activity, resulting in costs iteratively declining.24 The 

virtuous cycle of new markets, higher flight rates, and 

more investment (leading to development of advanced 

technologies) would lead to reductions in labor intensity. 

In turn, this could enable achievement of ULCATS.25

The space industry assumes a cyclical nature where an 

increased customer base fuels a larger, innovative launch 

industry. Industry could charge less per launch, encouraging the development and expansion of more satellite 

companies. This cycle could create wealth for the United 

States and deliver additional space-based capabilities for 

the military.26

Space Architectures and Military 

Capabilities

From space-based missile defense to persistent ISR 

capabilities, contributors contemplated the viability of 
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 5 

technologies and architectures that could be supported 

in a fast space environment by ULCATS, as follows.

Launch Cost vs. Total Cost. Recognizing how ULCATS and, specifically, reduced launch costs impact a 

mission’s total cost is vital to understanding which missions could be considered in a Fast Space environment. 

Variables include the size and weight of a payload, 

altitude and inclination of planned orbit, type of launch 

vehicle used, utilization of vessel capacity, and urgency 

of placing a payload into orbit. Costs vary widely according to these variables. One study tested how various 

sized payloads, with different total system acquisition, 

development, and procurement costs, would be affected 

by ULCATS.27

For existing types of military satellite systems, the 

systems themselves are so expensive that even a tenfold 

reduction in launch costs due to ULCATS would have 

a negligible effect on the overall costs of the projects. 

Space-Based Infrared System Early Warning satellites 

have a unit acquisition (development plus procurement) 

cost of $3.1 billion and a unit procurement cost of $1.5 

billion.28 The new Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

Commercial satellites and the Mobile User Objective 

System both have similar high acquisition costs. For 

payloads with very high acquisition costs, launch costs 

are a much smaller percentage of total costs. ULCATS 

would contribute a negligible improvement to the cost 

effectiveness of these systems.

Navigation satellite systems are likely to benefit from 

ULCATS. NAVSTAR GPS and GPS III have relatively 

low unit acquisition and procurement costs, resulting in a 

larger proportion of total lifecycle costs being attributed 

to launch costs. Nonetheless, unit acquisition and unit 

procurement costs are still far in excess of launch costs.29

Unless future capabilities can be developed and procured 

Figure 1. Launch Cost per Kilogram

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

 0

$/KILOGRAM OF PAYLOAD

FLIGHT RATE PER YEAR

NOMINAL SCENARIO

TODAY

3X REDUCTION

10X REDUCTION

3

6

12

24

40

60

80

100

120

150

185

225

260

300

365

450

550

670

820

1,000

1,500

2,200

3,200

4,600

6,800

10,000

17,000

29,000

50,000

Propellant

Insurance

Operations & Maintenance

Hardware

Facilities

Development
6 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

at less expense than launch costs, ULCATS would likely 

have a modest or negligible impact on lifecycle costs.

Space-Based Weapons and Orbiting Ballistic Missile 

Interceptors. Space-based weapons for kinetic ground attack were considered for their viability in a Fast Space environment. One study noted how 48 weapons, each with 

a mass of 750 kg, would need to be placed in 16 orbital 

planes to provide the continuous ability to strike within 

45 minutes. Using this capability, hardened or buried targets could be penetrated. Sixteen launches, each carrying three weapons, would be used to reach all 16 orbital 

planes.Even if not used, the capability would need to be 

replaced every 10 years due to orbital decay and degradation of components within the satellite. Over 30 years, 

this would require 48 launches and 144 weapons. With a 

unit cost of $10 million, and $50 million per launch vehicle, over 30 years the total procurement cost would be 

$3.8 billion (not taking into account development costs). 

If ULCATS could be achieved, procurement cost could 

drop by half. However, a decision to place weapons in 

orbit would have extraordinary policy implications and 

would be much more expensive than a terrestrial capability.30 The impact of ULCATS may not be significant 

enough to make such a mission more cost effective than 

terrestrial alternatives.31

A space-based missile defense system could be enabled by ULCATS. In Wikistrat’s crowdsourced simulation, the majority of experts recognized such a capability 

occurring 10-plus years after achieving ULCATS. An 

orbiting missile defense capability could deter adversaries by denying them the confidence of a ballistic missile 

attack. In a Fast Space environment, costs of deploying 

a system could be reduced and greater operational flexibility could be achieved, relieving pressure on theater 

missile and ground-based midcourse defense systems. 

An orbiting missile defense capability would engage 

inbound threats early in their trajectories and reduce the 

effectiveness of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, decoys, and countermeasures. Finally, an 

orbiting system could reduce the political and logistical 

issues of forward-basing missile defense technologies.32

A space-based missile defense architecture would 

have low unit acquisition costs but a large mass. This 

combination means that launch costs could represent a 

Figure 2. Virtuous Cycle

VIRTUOUS

CYCLE

Reusable Launch Vehicles

or ULCATS Systems

Become Operational 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Space Systems Are in a Reinforcing

Cycle of Continuously Lower Costs

Lower Launch Prices and

Increased Availability

More Business Cases

(Large LEO Constellations

and Personal Human

Spaceight) Close in New

Markets

More Launches Create 

Higher Flight Rates

Ammortized Fixed

Costs Enable Even

Lower Launch Costs

Lowering End User Costs for

Space Products and Services

Increases Demand for

Space-Based Assets and

Solutions

More Investment Capital Accelerates

Development of New Innovation Space

Capabilities (On-Orbit Assembly, Orbital

Propellent Storage/Transfer, Space Solar

Power, and Space Mining)

Demonstrated Innovations

Increase Utility and Value of

Space Services

Diusion of New

Innovations Further

Increases Flight Rates

Lowering Launch

Costs Further

Investors Fund Next Generation of

RLVs to Increase Reusability,

Operability, and Reliability
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 7 

considerable portion of total costs. A 2004 Congressional Budget Office study contemplated a constellation of 

156 to 368 space-based interceptors in low Earth orbit. 

Production costs for each interceptor would be around 

$35 million, with each having a mass of 442–847 kg and 

an operational lifetime of 7 years. Launch costs would 

amount to approximately 40 percent of a system’s lifecycle costs. With this high proportion of launch costs relative to lifecycle costs, a reduction in launch costs could 

improve the cost effectiveness of such a system. While 

a space-based missile defense system could benefit from 

ULCATS, such a system could remain impractical or 

inferior to terrestrial-based alternatives.33 Similar to deploying space-based weapons, an orbiting missile defense 

capability would have dramatic policy consequences. It 

would be viewed as reversing decades of American space 

policy, likely normalizing the placement of weapons in 

orbit, and would be unlikely to gain the acceptance of 

commercial space actors who would view it as a destabilizing threat to the space industry.

Small Satellites. The U.S. military’s current space 

architecture is defined by small constellations of highly 

aggregated, expensive satellites. High launch costs have 

influenced these architectural choices. A majority of 

Wikistrat’s expert analysts expect that within 5 years of 

ULCATS, space architectures could change to large constellations of small satellites.34 The current situation of a 

small number of launch vehicles with individual flights 

taking weeks to prepare is feasible in peacetime but will 

be a vulnerability in times of conflict as reconstitution 

of assets in space could take years.35 Currently and historically, access to space has been expensive, incentivizing 

highly complex payloads for few launch opportunities. 

ULCATS could enable the fielding of smaller, less costly 

satellites.36

An alternative architecture consisting of a large 

number of small satellites with disaggregated functions, 

reserve satellites for replenishment, and a launch infrastructure capable of repopulating constellations could 

better serve the U.S. military in situations where conflicts 

could extend into space. Lower cost and shorter on-orbit 

life expectancy of small satellites could allow for more 

consistent replacement and replenishment, allowing 

technology to be refreshed more frequently and reducing the need to incorporate the latest expensive and often risky technology.37 A constellation of small satellites 

would increase the redundancy, modularity, and dispersion of space assets,38 thereby increasing the resiliency of 

American satellite constellations. It would enhance deterrence by eroding an adversary’s confidence in its ability to gain a first-strike advantage through a critical blow 

against the United States’ on-orbit space infrastructure.

For small satellites, launch costs represent a much 

higher percentage of system lifecycle expense. OneWeb, 

a company planning to provide global internet broadband through a large constellation of small satellites, 

aims to manufacture 840 small spacecraft for $500,000 

each with 32–36 spacecraft launching on a Russian Soyuz

launch vehicle. Under the assumption of a $50 million 

cost per launch, each spacecraft would cost roughly $1.5 

million per launch, and subsequently the ratio of launch 

costs to production costs would be 3 to 1.39

OneWeb and other small satellite producers could 

benefit from ULCATS, but the cost reductions would 

only occur because OneWeb’s planned constellation is 

large enough and will deploy many satellites with similar orbital characteristics, allowing it to take advantage 

of medium-launch vehicles. Small satellite operators 

planning on launching smaller constellations using satellites with differing orbital characteristics would not 

be suitable for launching large batches on mediumlaunch vehicles. BlackSky Global, a startup satellite 

imaging service, plans to operate a 60-satellite constellation that will become operational in phases and will 

therefore be unable to launch in large batches. Small 

satellite operators like BlackSky currently rideshare as 

secondary payloads, incurring indirect costs that could 

inhibit the greater adoption of small satellites. Further, 

small satellite operators have limited control over the 

timing of launch or the precise orbital parameters.40

Small satellites within the constellations would need to 

be replenished much more frequently than those in the 
8 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

current architecture, but they would not be able to take 

advantage of launching in large batches like OneWeb’s 

planned initial deployment.

Replenishment missions, and missions needing to 

deploy fewer small satellites relative to OneWeb, would 

require the use of a small-launch vehicle. The current 

U.S. domestic launch base will be unable to handle any 

future demand for launching small satellites.41 Current 

small-launch vehicles are inefficient and expensive. The 

Minotaur IV small-launch vehicle has a cost of $29,000 

per kg of payload, compared to SpaceX’s Falcon 9 medium-launch vehicle that costs $6,000 per kg of payload.42

If ULCATS could enable the production of efficient 

small-launch vehicles capable of launching on demand, 

small satellite constellations could be utilized and reconstituted in civil, commercial, and military applications.

ULCATS-enabled small-launch vehicles capable of 

launching on demand and low-cost small satellites could 

enable a new architecture of reserve satellites that are 

“ready to launch” to reconstitute national security capabilities. Such a capability would improve the resiliency 

of U.S. space-based assets. If adversaries calculated that 

American satellites could be reconstituted quickly, then a 

shift to a ready-to-launch architecture could reduce the 

incentive for a preemptive attack. However, a movement 

toward low-cost satellites, stockpiled and ready to launch 

on demand, would require major changes in the space 

industrial base.43

A Fast Space architecture of large constellations of 

small satellites could enable persistent ISR. By fielding large constellations of remote-sensing satellites, the 

United States could, among many other applications, 

increase situational awareness, expand maritime domain 

awareness, reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, and 

illuminate the credibility of threats. Large constellations of ISR satellites could increase warning times and 

enhance transparency in an adversary’s military actions 

while allowing for replenishment of degraded assets.44

In strategic terms, it is unclear whether persistent 

ISR based on constellations of small satellites will be effective in future conflicts. Adversaries are aware of U.S. 

reliance on informational advantage and understand that 

future conflicts will have a great emphasis on information dominance. Adversaries are developing more robust, 

asymmetric antisatellite technologies to thwart the many 

benefits the United States could derive from large constellations of ISR satellites. Other more cost-effective 

intelligence resources, such as the exploitation of the Internet of Things, could be fielded, rendering investments 

in large constellations of satellites impractical, even in an 

ULCATS scenario.45

One contributing study contemplated the ULCATS-enabled capacity for combatant commanders to 

have dedicated satellite communications and ISR constellations to deploy in support of mission requirements. 

Command, control, communications, and ISR capabilities could be disaggregated, allowing for more responsiveness to the needs of the specific mission at hand. 

However, if implemented, the space operating environment would be made much more complex. Furthermore, 

the recruitment and training of so many personnel to 

operate these satellite communications and ISR assets 

could be impractical.46

Some challenges arise in the shift toward a new 

architecture of large constellations of small satellites. It 

would generate a significantly greater number of objects 

requiring management, operation, tracking, and monitoring. Orbital debris could become a greater issue, especially if new space actors neglect to deorbit their assets 

within the 25-year international guideline. Large numbers of satellites could overwhelm situational awareness 

of the space domain. Confusion could arise regarding the 

escalatory steps of targeting and destroying a small satellite. While a physical attack on one of the highly aggregated satellites currently in orbit would likely be an indicator of hostile intent, the destruction of a redundant, 

disaggregated small satellite would be more opaque and 

could allow adversaries to act nefariously without being 

held accountable.47 Even with the development of ULCATS, it is not assured that a space launch infrastructure 

allowing for the on-demand deployment of small satellites into orbit would be developed.48
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 9 

Finally, such an architecture would not be possible 

for all U.S. missions. While the Department of Defense 

(DOD) would appreciate the higher revisit rates provided by small satellites, the Intelligence Community would 

need the higher resolution provided by large, expensive 

assets like those currently in orbit.49 Space-based radars 

require high levels of power while observation systems require large apertures for high resolution and/or sensitivity. 

The technology to distribute these functions across a large 

constellation of satellites is not currently available.50

A “Megasatellite” Architecture. Along with disaggregation, some studies envisioned the aggregation of 

capabilities into massive satellites. Through ULCATS 

and the development of on-orbit servicing, military and 

commercial firms could develop large space station-sized 

modular satellite busses that would aggregate many payloads together.51 Instead of maximizing performance per 

pound, features could be optimized without regard for 

minimizing their mass.52 These megasatellites could be 

built to host a wide variety of interchangeable payloads. 

Although megasatellites would be enticing targets for 

adversaries, they could also aid in creating “red lines” in 

space, potentially dissuading adversaries from targeting 

American space assets.53

Strategic Deterrence, Conventional Deterrence, and 

Management of the Strategic Environment. The adoption of some of the architectural changes and capabilities 

mentioned in this paper, and others changes, would allow 

the United States to derive advantages from the space 

environment. Air University noted that the benefits derived from a highly reliable launch infrastructure with 

high sortie rates, industry participation, entrepreneurial 

ventures, and new sources of commerce and economic 

growth would advance strategic stability by improving 

strategic deterrence, conventional deterrence, and management of the strategic environment.54

In a Fast Space scenario, strategic warning assets 

could be disaggregated from tactical and operational capabilities, further enabled by the ability to reconstitute 

such assets. These capabilities would strengthen the nation’s nuclear deterrent by establishing clear red lines for 

U.S. strategic assets. As adversaries field greater antiaccess/area-denial capabilities, American conventional 

military power and deterrence have declined in relative 

terms. Fast Space capabilities could provide a new paradigm for power projection, allowing the United States 

to reduce its reliance on forward bases while fielding a 

renewed command and control construct and allowing 

for highly synchronized multi-domain operations and 

multi-axis approaches. The United States could shape 

the strategic environment through its global role in military, commercial, and civil space, all enabled by a Fast 

Space architecture and a strong industrial base.55

The Government Role in 

Commercial Space

Governments are key contributors to the commercial space industry through investments in technologies 

that do not have an immediate market but can evolve 

into beneficial capabilities. In this way, government 

programs can create new opportunities for commercial 

technologies by reducing the risk for early commercial 

entrants.

Government demand for space-based capabilities 

serves to enlarge the market for many commercial capabilities and applications. Better coordination and cooperation in this area will deliver mutual benefit. For example, geospatial data overlap between the commercial 

development community and the national security community is successful and constantly improving. Similarly, 

to prevent famine and mitigate food insecurity, programs 

like the Famine Early Warning Systems Network depend on NASA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Agriculture, and 

U.S. Geological Survey to provide decision-makers with 

accurate, credible, timely, and actionable information.56

Commercial enterprises such as Planet and SpaceX augment their commercial client base by providing a range 

of services to defense, intelligence, and interagency organizations, thus creating economies of scale.
10 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

Recommendations

Many laws, policies, and regulations could be revisited to encourage innovation and development in the 

commercial space sector. Areas for consideration include 

increased use of commercial space launch contracts, 

more flexible approaches to risk mitigation and mission assurance, increased development of common design standards, investment in dual-use technologies and 

launch infrastructure, sophisticated implementation of 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and 

streamlined Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

launch licensing.

To achieve the benefits of ULCATS and Fast 

Space, the United States will need to adjust its policies, 

organization, and organizational culture so it can leverage and respond to disruptive technologies, enable innovation, and advance American interests.57 By not actively encouraging innovation and partnering with the 

commercial sector, industry could develop systems that 

have less than optimal value to the warfighter. As a result, revolutionary systems could take longer to develop, 

and other countries could benefit from engaging with 

their respective industries, surpassing some American 

capabilities.58

The following recommendations have been selected 

from the contributing studies.

Following current trends such as NASA’s Commercial Crew and Cargo Program and the Air Force’s 

steadily increasing use of SpaceX Falcon 9 launches—to 

include a future launch of the X-37B space plane—CSIS 

recommends the Air Force and other U.S. Government 

agencies should use commercial space launch contracts 

for regularly scheduled launches to the maximum extent 

possible in order to build the government’s expertise in 

buying these services.59

CSIS recommends the U.S. Government should be 

an early investor in cutting-edge space technology that 

is likely to have future applications in both military and 

commercial space, such as the development of systems 

and software for the exploitation of large satellite constellations.60

Addressing government influence in supporting the 

commercial space market, CSIS recommends the government should leverage its purchasing power to create 

a baseload demand for emerging services.61 This could 

help commercial actors to close their business cases and 

would enable commercial space actors to overcome cost 

barriers to entry by granting reliable long-term revenue 

streams and helping foster a commercial environment 

capable of producing transformative technologies.62

To engage with the private sector, Air University 

recommends the use of Other Transaction Authorities 

(OTA) as a proven, effective vehicle for public-private 

partnership capable of reducing costs. Companies are 

investing their own capital into innovative ways to reduce launch costs. By partnering with government investments via an OTA, industry would gain access to 

unburdened capital, technical expertise, and unique 

infrastructure while government could leverage private 

business models and innovative cultures where failure is 

more accepted. Air University asserts that OTAs could 

be fundamental to initiating a virtuous cycle.63

Existing technology transfer programs are beneficial 

to several of the large successful members of the commercial space industry. Such transfers are critical to the 

commercialization of high-risk, high-value concepts. 

BMNT recommends government agencies should provide frameworks for the adoption and transition of commercial systems, derived from technology transfer, to 

incentivize companies to consider government-use cases 

from the start.64

To encourage shifts in current U.S. space architectures away from small constellations of aggregated 

satellites, the Telemus Group recommends government 

support for the development of small satellites. The 

group proposes the DOD and Air Force should consider funding for small satellites as these constellations 

could prove more survivable and reconstitutable, even 

if this change results in reduced funding for traditional 

satellite programs. Further, the government should support the development of efficient small-launch vehicles 

to launch thousands of small satellites. Perhaps the best 
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 11 

way to encourage the development of efficient smalllaunch vehicles is for the U.S. military to begin developing, producing, and deploying more small satellites.65

Currently, American launch providers conduct missions from 10 active and approved launch sites within 

the United States. With the current launch cadence, this 

number of sites is appropriate, but a much larger number 

of launch sites and launch pads will be needed if launch 

frequency increases to the levels predicted by Air University. CSIS recommends the government should invest in 

improving current launch infrastructure and be willing to 

collaborate with industry and state and local governments 

on future designs that could be capable of higher operational tempos.66

The Telemus Group notes a need to rapidly reconstitute critical satellite constellations in a Fast Space 

environment and recommends the U.S. military should 

encourage development of launch vehicles deployable in 

sufficient numbers to enable an effective reconstitution 

capability.67

One of the most important actions for the United 

States to enable a future ULCATS environment is to assume a leading role in establishing norms and guidelines 

for actors’ behavior in space.68 CSIS recommends the 

United States should establish national space governance 

procedures and advance approaches for the development 

of similar international standards.69 Setting the framework for conduct of actors in space would provide clarity 

as new opportunities and services in space unfold.70

Recommendations for Federal 

Policy and Regulation Reform

Clear policy guidance and standards for commercial space activities are needed for a thriving commercial space industry.71 Guidance currently provided by 

the U.S. Government inhibits commercial space activity 

through a lack of transparency, clarity, and predictability.72 Specifically, industry lacks appropriate Federal 

regulations and licensing that could bring confidence to 

the market. Regulatory systems are failing to keep up 

with rapid expansion and innovation from the commercial space industry, and this will be exacerbated by 

ULCATS.73

Regulations for space-related missions are spread 

across several agencies, making licensing processes 

overly complicated and unintuitive. Firms dealing with 

emerging technologies face regulatory processes that are 

not comprehensive and, at times, nonexistent. Without 

proper regulations and licensing processes, commercial 

companies find it difficult to receive adequate investments and insurance.74 The following are recommendations for Federal policy and regulation reform.

CSIS recommends that mechanisms be developed 

and personnel should be put in place at various levels in 

government to review space-related licensure. Agencies 

such as NOAA, the Federal Communications Commission, and the FAA should cooperate to enhance the 

capacity for licensing new and existing commercial space 

actors and activities. Further, licensing agencies should 

clearly communicate with industry on issues likely 

to lead to license denial, perhaps by granting security 

clearances to a limited number of company personnel in 

order to discuss reasons behind license denial.75

Unclear regulatory structures and dispersed responsibility within the regulatory environment inhibit the 

growth of the commercial space sector. BMNT recommends that if the United States seeks to maintain its leadership in space technology development, it must pursue a 

more efficient and centralized method of regulating space 

activities. BMNT cautioned against enforcing regulations 

that stifle innovation.76

Several contributors commented on the government’s 

expensive test requirements and high mission assurance 

costs. Air Force mission assurance is 30 to 50 percent of 

launch costs.77 High mission assurance standards are driven by the high acquisition costs of U.S. military satellites 

and the extent to which the military is dependent on a 

small number of assets in orbit for most of its missions.78

Some contributors suggested that if the Air Force could 

increase its tolerance of risk and mission failure, it could 

achieve lower launch costs and higher launch rates, possibly contributing to the virtuous cycle. CSIS recommends 
12 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

that the Air Force continue to review ways the launch certification process could be simplified so that launch services could be purchased in the same way as commercial 

customers purchase them.79 Air University recommends 

replacing this system with a one-time testing process to 

verify reliability before fielding operational service.80 CSIS 

notes a transition to a system of regulating payloads by 

exception—with only specific items unable to launch until 

criteria are met—may be necessary, especially if ULCATS 

was to enable a launch frequency of over 100 per year.81

There are a greater number of actors in the space domain than ever before and this trend will continue, especially if ULCATS is achieved. Concerns have arisen 

about whether existing sources of space situational awareness data and analytical tools are sufficient to handle the 

proliferation of access to space. Both space situational 

awareness and space traffic control will be vital with the 

numerous capabilities, missions, and markets that will 

be enabled by ULCATS.82 CSIS recommends creating a 

clear set of standards and processes to check orbits for 

collision risks, ensuring that there are plans for debris 

mitigation and safe re-entry disposal and implementing an effective, but minimally burdensome, space traffic 

management system.83

Strict ITAR rulings have been criticized by commercial actors for stifling the U.S. commercial space industry. 

Such restrictions are necessary for national security, but 

ITAR’s stringent export controls have made some companies decide to avoid exporting space-related products 

because of the complexity of the regulations and the fear 

of penalties. These regulations have caused some foreign 

organizations to produce “ITAR Free” space products to 

ease acquisition. While President Barack Obama initiated an Export Control Reform initiative, many in the 

industry hope for greater clarification and relaxation in 

the export control of space products. CSIS recommends 

that the United States approach export controls with the 

understanding that American spacepower grows when its 

firms are industry leaders in the global space market.84

Public vs. Private Sector

While the above policy and regulation reform recommendations seek to bolster the commercial space industry, encourage ULCATS, and anticipate a Fast Space 

environment, they do not seek an unconditional switch 

to assets provided exclusively by the private sector. Such 

a recommendation is made by Robert Zimmerman from 

the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He 

recommends that a complete shift in power and regulatory authority be made away from the Federal Government 

to commercial industry and that commercial entities be 

given unprecedented freedom to act in response to the 

demands of the market.85 His study includes comparisons 

between launch and development costs of various spacecraft associated with the private sector and those associated with the government.86 It supposes a binary relationship between the public and private sector, leading to the 

conclusion that free enterprise should be the victor.87

Zimmerman claims that commercial markets exist 

for public goods. He does not consider the absence of 

a commercial market, where governments must provide 

public goods that make no commercial sense like science, 

exploration, and security.88 Specifically, he compares costs 

between the U.S. Government’s Space Launch System 

(SLS) and commercial launch providers like SpaceX and 

Orbital ATK. He notes commercial satellite companies 

cannot afford a launch on the SLS, but he does not mention that SLS is a vehicle designed for deep space exploration. It was not developed by the government to perform 

a service provided by private-sector actors.89 In an ULCATS scenario, the Federal Government will purchase 

many launch capabilities, data, information, and space assets from the private sector. At the same time, it will need 

to provide public goods that cannot be addressed through 

the market. The recommendations in the previous section, 

unlike Zimmerman’s recommendations, do not consider 

the movement toward greater partnering with the private 

sector as a zero sum choice toward free enterprise.

In purely financial terms, Zimmerman is correct. More 

than $15 billion has been spent on SLS development and 
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 13 

it has still not been launched. The SLS will cost about $1 

billion per launch. Falcon Heavy is now a proven launch 

system, priced at about $90 million per launch, with potential to support science, exploration, and security missions.

Déjà Vu?

The assertion that ULCATS and Fast Space bring 

the promise of cost-reducing reusable launch vehicles 

causes many in the space industry to recall previous hopes 

and plans. The Dyna-Soar/X-20, Space Shuttle, National Aerospace Plane, Military Spaceplane, and X-33/

Venturestar were programs that failed to achieve routine 

access to space and expected cost reductions. Other ambitious plans from the commercial space industry in the 

1990s never materialized, leading to numerous bankruptcies. Although many predictions for the development of 

commercial space have been premature, the push toward 

commercial space is a constant trend.90

According to Air University’s study, several hurdles 

prevented past attempts at achieving ULCATS. The study 

identifies the perceived lack of a compelling military need, 

high costs of development and acquisition, technical infeasibility of reusable launch vehicles, and a requirementsdriven acquisition process that was not structured for 

paradigm-breaking capabilities, all inhibited reusability 

and ULCATS from succeeding. It asserts that emerging 

national security threats, advancements in technology capable of delivering the benefits of reusable launch vehicles, 

wealthy entrepreneurs willing to invest their own capital 

into space assets, increasing engagement with the private 

sector, and the benefits of OTA agreements in creating 

partnerships with commercial firms all make reusability, 

ULCATS, and Fast Space an attractive possibility.91

Congress is ready and willing to aid in the formation of a prosperous space sector, and it is aware of the 

regulatory gaps and struggles that exist for commercial 

space actors. With the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 

Competitiveness Act of 2015, Congress recognized the 

need for a regulatory regime to provide stability for the 

commercial space industry, particularly to actors interested in harvesting resources in space. The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology approved the 

American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, which 

seeks to establish “a legal and policy environment intended to unleash American free enterprise and business, 

assure conformity with Outer Space Treaty obligations, 

and ensure that the United States will lead the world in 

commercial space activities throughout the 21st century.”92

Notably, the bill reforms the licensing system for commercial remote-sensing satellites, which has come under 

fire from industry representatives for impeding growth. In 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2018, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 

adopted an amendment instructing the Secretary of Defense to brief the HASC on the DOD “plan to evaluate the risks, benefits, costs, and potential cost-savings of 

the use of reusable launch vehicles” for national security 

missions.93 This amendment encourages the Air Force to 

rethink its policies regarding reusable launch vehicles. 

As Congress increasingly addresses matters affecting the 

commercial space industry, it could play a vital role in facilitating ULCATS.

Conclusion

The ongoing commercialization of space activities is 

enabling increased privatization of government tasks.94

Government remains the critical player and anchor customer in the industry. Only when there is a large influx 

of non-government customers into the market, so that 

fixed costs can be spread over a larger number of players, 

can access to space become a viable commercial enterprise. SpaceX’s introduction of greater price competition 

into the international launch market has not yet resulted 

in new demand for launch services, but it has caused a 

reallocation of market share among international launch 

providers. The Air University study anticipates a virtuous cycle leading to even greater ULCATS, aligning with 

past studies that predicted new sources of demand when 

launch prices are below $1,000 per pound.95

There is no guarantee that ULCATS will occur. If it 

does, it could play out differently than recent scholarship 

has envisioned. Trends and technological advances in a 
14 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

number of areas suggest that ULCATS is a possibility.96

The growing number of commercial space actors advocating for licensing and regulation reform could succeed 

in lowering the cost of access to space for U.S. entities. 

Cost reductions from commercial reusable launch vehicles, even if not achieving ULCATS or Fast Space, will 

change the ways the United States operates in space.

The emergence of low-cost access to space is prompting debate on the challenges and opportunities presented 

by “old space vs. new space” and “government vs. commercial” space-related activities. As the economic landscape of 

space activities evolves and business cases become viable, 

it may be logical for some missions in low Earth orbit to 

eventually be turned over to commercial sector operation. 

But the next 3 to 5 years of technological development 

might not be revolutionary as the industry adjusts to new 

risk factors.97

Many of the studies encouraged the U.S. military 

to enable—and capitalize on—developments within the 

private sector. The military may not be moving quite as 

fast as these studies would prefer. General John Raymond 

of the U. S. Space Command noted that the Air Force 

is monitoring commercial launch developments but that 

the Service’s goals of gaining assured access to space, 

competition, and ending reliance on the Russian RD-180 

engine would take priority.98 Air Force Major General 

Roger Teague, when speaking on Air Force acquisition, 

mentioned that the Air Force would continue to follow 

the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle strategy, viewing reusability as a feature, not a requirement.99 Congress 

and the National Space Council could serve a vital role in 

directing and implementing the reforms and recommendations outlined by the contributing studies.

The Trump administration’s early emphasis on job 

creation and expansion of domestic industry appears to 

make Fast Space a strong candidate for investment opportunities. A flourishing commercial space industry has 

the potential to create high-paying and stable jobs in 

engineering, manufacturing, communications, and other 

fields. NASA and Air Force centers that contribute to 

space operations are located in most regions of the country, and the commercial space industry has potential for 

creating jobs across the nation. However, this growth in 

opportunity does not come without cost. Expansion of 

the commercial space industry and the evolution of Fast 

Space will require an increased supply of space-related 

professionals and significant investment by government 

in required human capital.

Several contributors to this study note that ULCATS would not be just an American phenomenon. If 

the United States achieves ULCATS, the ability to attain reductions in cost of access to space would spread 

to other state and nonstate actors. CSIS notes how ULCATS could enable proliferation of long-range missiles 

as well as adoption of space-based anti-satellite systems. 

Wikistrat notes how American supremacy in ISR could 

be threatened.100 CNAS mentions how adversaries could 

end reliance on the U.S. Global Positioning Satellites and 

exploit their own global navigation satellite systems for 

precision strike capabilities.101

Spacepower is proliferating among a variety of state 

and nonstate actors. Understanding how the U.S. military 

can achieve ULCATS and operate in a ULCATS environment is fundamental to national security.
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 83 15 

Notes 1 Scott Pace, “Merchant and Guardian Challenges in the Exercise 

of Spacepower,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, ed. 

Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 

2011).

2 Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra-Low Cost Space Access for 21st

Century Challenges (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 2017), 1, 5, available at <www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/

Research/documents/Space/Fast%20Space_Public_2017.pdf?v

er=2017-03-10-113507-743>.

3 Todd Harrison et al., Implications of Ultra-Low-Cost Access to 

Space (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 1.

4 Fast Space, 1.

5 Harrison et al.

6 Robert Zimmerman, Capitalism in Space: Private Enterprise and 

Competition Reshape the Global Aerospace Launch Industry (Washington, 

DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017), available at <www.

behindtheblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CNAS-ReportCapitalismInSpace-Final-1PUBLISHED.pdf>; Jerry Hendrix and 

Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, From Blue Seas to Black Space: Applying 

Mahan and Corbett to the Final Frontier, undated, accessible via Air 

University; Eldridge Colby, The Implications of the Commercialization 

of Space and ULCATS for a U.S. Limited War Defense and Deterrence 

Strategy for Space, 2016, accessible via Air University.

7 Wikistrat, Inc., Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 2016, accessible 

via Air University.

8 The Telemus Group, The Implications of Low-Cost Access to 

Space for Air Force Programs, Missions and Strategies: An Analytic Cost 

Study, 2017, accessible via Air University. Future Space Workshop Series: 

Workshop 1: Low Cost Access to Space, 19 October 2016 Event Summary; 

Workshop 2: Future Space Payloads, 20 October 2016 Event Summary;

Workshop 3: Future Space Architectures, 7 November 2016 Event Summary, all accessible via Air University.

9 Wayne Hale, Space Vehicle Reusability as a Contributor to UltraLow Cost Access to Space: A Retrospective on Reusability Lessons Learned 

from the Space Shuttle Regarding the Paper: “Fast Space: Leveraging 

Ultra-Low Cost Access for 21st Century Challenges,” Special Aerospace Services LLC for Johns Hopkins University, December 29, 2016.

10 BMNT Partners LLC, Critical Considerations for Future Space 

Accessibility, undated, accessible via Air University.

11 Interstellar Technologies LLC and Onyx Aerospace Inc, 

Observations of Assessments for Fast Space: Collaboration of Johns Hopkins 

University ( JHU ERG), National Defense University (NDU), and Air 

University (AU), undated, accessible via Air University.

12 Fast Space, 13–16. 

13 Harrison et al., 3.

14 Fast Space, 22.

15 Harrison et al., 7.

16 Ibid, 4, 7–8.

17 Eric Berger, “Air Force Budget Reveals How Much SpaceX 

Undercuts Launch Prices,” Arstechnica, June 15, 2017, available at 

<www.arstechnica.com/science/2017/06/air-force-budget-revealshow-much-spacex-undercuts-launch-prices/>.

18 Peter B. de Selding, “SpaceX’s Reusability Effort Faces One 

More Big Challenge,” Space Intel Report, March 31, 2017, available at 

<www.spaceintelreport.com/spacexs-reusability-effort-faces-one-morebig-challenge/>.

19 Cenan Al-Ekabi, Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2015–2016 

(Vienna, Austria: European Space Policy Institute, 2016), 47.

20 Fast Space, 23.

21 Ibid., 24.

22 Harrison et al., 5–6; Hale, 1–2.

23 Fast Space, 11.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 21, 24.

26 Zimmerman, 21.

27 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 11.

28 Ibid., 18–19.

29 Ibid., 18.

30 Harrison et al., 34–35.

31 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 22.

32 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 16.

33 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 21.

34 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 11.

35 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 39.

36 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 23.

37 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 29, 35.

38 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 11.

39 Fast Space, A-1.

40 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 29.

41 Peter B. de Selding, “Spaceflight Ends Its Silence, Asks U.S. 

Government to Permit Smallsat Use of Indian Rockets,” Space Intel 

Report, March 2, 2017, available at <www.spaceintelreport.com/

spaceflight-ends-its-silence-asks-us-government-to-permit-smallsatuse-of-indian-rockets/>.

42 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 12–13.

43 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 15, 16.

44 Ibid., 13, 23.

45 Ibid., 23.

46 Ibid., 43–44.

47 Ibid., 11–12.

48 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 45.

49 Future Space Workshop Series.

50 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 12.

51 Harrison et al., 42.

52 Fast Space, 23.

53 Harrison et al., 42.

54 Fast Space, 1.

55 Ibid., 8–9.

56 Kimberly Flowers, Scott Aughenbaugh, and Kristen Hajduk, 

The Sky’s the Limit: Geospatial Data, Global Food Security and Political 

Stability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2017), 15.

57 Harrison et al., 10.

58 Fast Space, 17–18.

59 Harrison et al., 16.

60 Ibid., 18.

61 Ibid.

62 Critical Considerations for Future Space Accessibility, 11.

63 Fast Space, 10, 12.

64 Critical Considerations for Future Space Accessibility, 11.

65 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 47–48.

66 Harrison et al., 25, 18.

67 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 49.

68 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 34.
16 DH No. 83 www.ndu.edu/inss

69 Harrison et al., 21.

70 Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 34.

71 Harrison et al., 29.

72 Harrison et al., 19.

73 Jeff Foust, “Commercial Remote Sensing Companies Seek 

Streamlined Regulations,” Spacenews, March 17, 2017, available at 

<www.spacenews.com/commercial-remote-sensing-companies-seekstreamlined-regulations/>.

74 Ibid., 22.

75 Ibid., 22, 24.

76 Critical Considerations for Future Space Accessibility, 7–10.

77 Future Space Workshop Series.

78 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 12.

79 Harrison et al., 16–17.

80 Fast Space, 22–23.

81 Harrison et al., 24.

82 Ultra-Low Access to Space, 27.

83 Harrison et al., 25.

84 Ibid., 27.

85 Zimmerman, 29.

86 Ibid., 4.

87 Scott Pace, “Wishful Thinking Collides with Policy, Economic 

Realities in ‘Capitalism in Space,’” Spacenews, April 4, 2017, available at 

<www.spacenews.com/op-ed-wishful-thinking-collides-with-policyeconomic-realities-in-capitalism-in-space/>.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Harrison et al., 14.

91 Fast Space, 9, A-1–A-2.

92 Marcia S. Smith, “New Commercial Space Bill Clears House 

Committee,” Space Policy Online, June 9, 2017, available at <www.

spacepolicyonline.com/news/new-commercial-space-bill-clears-housecommittee>.

93 Marcia S. Smith, “Rogers Warns Air Force Not to Resist Space 

Corps Proposal,” Space Policy Online, June 22 2017, available at <www.

spacepolicyonline.com/news/rogers-warns-air-force-not-to-resistspace-corps-proposal>.

94 Pace, “Wishful Thinking.”

95 Ibid.

96 The Implications of Low-Cost Access to Space, 47.

97 Critical Considerations for Future Space Accessibility, 3.

98 Phillip Swarts, “Delta 4 Replacement Ready by 2023, Top 

General Says,” Spacenews, May 22, 2017, available at <www.spacenews.

com/delta-4-replacement-ready-by-2023-top-general-says/>.

99 Jeff Foust, “Is ‘Fast Space’ Fast Enough?” The Space Review, 

May 22, 2017, available at <www.thespacereview.com/article/3246/1>.

100 Harrison et al., 43–44; Ultra-Low Cost Access to Space, 14.

101 Elbridge Colby, The Implications of the Commercialization of 

Space and ULCATS for a U.S. Limited War Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 

November 2016), 4.

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