[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12331

____________________

ANDREW R. ALLRED, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-00560-PGB-LHP

____________________

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Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Florida death-row prisoner Andrew Allred appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. This appeal concerns his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to ensure that he underwent a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for use 

during the penalty phase of his criminal trial. After a thorough review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm 

the district court’s denial of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.

I. BACKGROUND

Allred pled guilty before a Florida court to two counts of 

first-degree murder as well as armed burglary, aggravated battery 

with a firearm, and criminal mischief. Because under Florida law 

his convictions made him eligible for the death penalty, he was entitled to a penalty-phase trial to determine his sentence. See Fla. 

Stat. § 921.141(1). He waived his right to a jury during the penalty 

phase. Thus, a judge was tasked with weighing aggravating and 

mitigating factors to decide whether to sentence Allred to death or 

life imprisonment. See id. § 921.141(3)(b). The trial court sentenced 

Allred to death for both murders. After his death sentence was upheld on direct appeal, Allred pursued postconviction relief in the 

Florida state courts and then in federal court. Below we describe

the evidence presented at Allred’s penalty-phase trial, his 

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sentencing, hisstate postconviction proceedings, and his federal habeas proceedings.

A. The Penalty Phase

After Allred pled guilty, his case proceeded directly to a penalty-phase bench trial. During the penalty phase, the State introduced evidence of the following facts.

Allred had a romantic relationship with one of the two victims in this case, Tiffany Barwick. Before her murder, Allred and 

Barwick were living together at Allred’s parents’ home. They 

ended their relationship with a fight on August 25, 2007. The fight 

and breakup happened at the Allred home during Allred’s 21st 

birthday party, which was attended by 50 guests. In attendance was 

Michael Ruschak, the other murder victim, who was Allred’s closest male friend at the time.

Unable to cope with the breakup, Allred began harassing 

Barwick. Days after the breakup, he purchased a handgun. Immediately after obtaining the weapon, he used pictures of Barwick for 

target practice. He emailed her a photo of the bullet-riddled pictures, which hung on the wall of his room.

After the breakup, Allred learned that Barwick and Ruschak 

had begun a sexual relationship. The day before the murders, he

messaged his friend Michael Siler, “I pretty much just need to start 

killing people.” Allred v. State (Allred I), 55 So. 3d 1267, 1272 (Fla. 

2010). Siler replied, “[Y]ou’re just depressed.” 

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The next day, Allred sent threatening messages to and about 

Barwick and Ruschak. In Allred’s direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court summarized the messages as follows:

In an instant message chat with Siler in the morning, 

Allred stated, “I’m pretty much gonna kill him . . . Ruschak . . . and her.” In an electronic conversation with 

victim Ruschak on that same day, Allred told him, “If 

[I] see you again, [I] will kill you, and yes that is a 

threat.” Finally, Allred and Barwick engaged in a 

heated and lengthy computer exchange on the day of 

the murder. Allred informed Barwick that he had 

hacked into her computer, changed the passwords,

deleted files, and sent emails to people on her contacts 

list. He also transferred all of the funds in her bank 

account to pay her credit card debt. Calling her a 

“whore” because of her relationship with Ruschak, 

Allred said he could not forgive her for that and 

threatened, “[I]f [] I ever see [Ruschak] again I will kill 

him.”

Allred I, 55 So. 3d at 1272–73 (alterations in original).

That evening, Allred told Ruschak that he was coming over 

to Ruschak’s house. Allred took his handgun and drove to the 

home of Eric Roberts, where Ruschak lived and Barwick lived temporarily. Allred expected to find both Barwick and Ruschak at the 

house. Several guests who were acquainted with Allred were also 

at the house. Ruschak warned them of Allred’s impending arrival. 

According to one guest, Kathryn Cochran, when Barwick learned 

that Allred was coming over, she went into “panic mode.”

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A few minutes after Ruschak’s announcement, Allred pulled 

up to the house. He repeatedly rammed his truck into Barwick’s 

car, which was parked outside. Guests inside the house heard the 

collisions. Cochran described hearing a noise like a mortar blast.

Allred exited his truck and attempted to enter the home, but 

he was unable to enter because Ruschak had locked the front door 

in anticipation of his arrival. Allred banged loudly on the front 

door, yelling “[l]et me in,” but no one opened it. Allred I, 55 So. 3d 

at 1273. 

Allred then walked to back of the house and banged on a

sliding glass door that opened to the living room, where some of 

the guests had gathered. Barwick ran away to hide. When no one 

let him in, Allred shot through the door. He walked through the 

broken glass into the house, gun in hand. The occupants scattered.

Allred noticed Ruschak peering from the kitchen and pursued him, shooting him four times. Ruschak was killed instantly. 

Allred continued to the bathroom, where he found Barwick hiding

in the bathtub. He shot her six times. She, too, died instantly. As

Allred moved through the house, Roberts grabbed him, trying to 

stop him. Allred shot Roberts in the leg and escaped his grasp.

Allred left the crime scene and drove home. He called 911 

and reported that he had killed two people. He threatened to commit suicide. When law enforcement officers arrived at Allred’s 

home, he was standing at the end of the driveway with a handgun 

on the ground next to him. He told his arresting officer, “I’m the 

guy you’re looking for.” Id. at 1274. After he was secured, Allred

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asked “if the people were dead,” and in the patrol car he said, “I 

knew I killed someone, I shot fourteen times.” Id.

After his arrest, detectives interviewed Allred about the 

murders. In the interview, he demanded to know “what happened 

to . . . the people that got shot” before confessing to shooting Ruschak and Barwick. He confessed to the events of the shooting substantially as described above.1 He also confessed to using Barwick’s 

pictures for target practice. He told detectives that he killed Ruschak because Ruschak was an “asshole” who sided with Barwick 

in the couple’s breakup. Id. at 1275. But Allred denied planning the 

murders, buying the gun to facilitate the murders, and going to 

Roberts’s house that night with the intent to shoot Barwick and 

Ruschak. He said that he drove to the scene only to ram Barwick’s 

car. 

Contrary to Allred’s denials, the State’s evidence indicated

that the murders were premeditated. The State pointed to digital 

evidence of the threats he sent to and about Ruschak and Barwick

leading up to the murders. Cochran, who had a conversation with 

Barwick about the threats at Roberts’s gathering, testified that Barwick was so “freaked out” about Allred’s communications that she 

called the police when she heard Allred was coming to the house. 

1 Although Allred described the events of the shooting in the police interview, 

in postconviction proceedings, his mental health expert, Dr. Glenn Caddy, 

opined that Allred’s reporting of the murders was imperfect or “fragmented.” 

We discuss Caddy’s opinion in more detail in Section B below. 

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The eyewitnesses who had been at Roberts’s home testified 

about Allred’s deliberate pursuit of Ruschak at the scene. They described Allred as singularly focused when, after shooting his way 

through the door, he silently moved past the guests in the living 

room to shoot Ruschak in the kitchen. Roberts testified to Allred’s 

cool affect during the murders, characterizing Allred’s tone of voice 

during their struggle as “somewhat calm” or “louder than calm.”

Corroborating the eyewitness accounts, Allred confessed to detectives that he was “specifically looking for Michael” when he walked 

into Roberts’s kitchen. 

To prove that Barwick’s murder was especially heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel, an aggravating factor under state law, the State 

played the 911 call that Barwick made while hiding from Allred in 

the bathroom to illustrate the fear she experienced immediately before her death. On the call, she screamed as she heard the gunshots

that killed Ruschak and continued screaming as she was fatally shot

moments later. 

For the defense in the penalty phase, Allred’s trial counsel, 

Timothy Caudill, called seven witnesses in mitigation, mostly

Allred’s family members and former teachers. Caudill had difficulty 

organizing a mitigation case because Allred was sometimes uncooperative and generally reluctant to participate in mitigation efforts. Allred waived his right to be present and did not attend his 

penalty-phase trial. 

Caudill presented evidence that Allred was socially and emotionally developmentally delayed and that his family life was 

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difficult. He argued that Allred’s developmental delays meant that 

he should be considered younger than 21 for sentencing purposes.

The evidence about Allred’s developmental delays included 

testimony from his mother, Tora Allred, about his childhood. She 

noticed changes in Allred’s behavior beginning around the age of 

five or six, when he suddenly became hyper and emotional. Concerned about his behavior, Tora took him to a pediatrician who 

attributed his behavior to possible sexual abuse and referred him to 

a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist instead diagnosed Allred with a 

“well-defined tic disorder” (Allred licked his hand and rubbed his 

eye repetitively) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 

(“ADHD”). Id. The psychiatrist prescribed Allred medication to 

treat the ADHD. 

The pediatrician’s suggestion of sexual abuse was never substantiated. Although there was alleged sexual abuse in Allred’s family—Allred’s older cousin filed a report that their grandfather and 

great uncle had sexually abused him—Allred never claimed to have 

been sexually abused. Allred’s grandfather testified that he and his 

grandson had a good relationship and that Allred had a good childhood. 

But other testimony suggested that, in many ways, Allred 

had a troubled childhood, at school and home. Caudill argued that 

Allred’s developmental difficulties impacted his education and social growth. To illustrate, Allred’s teachers testified that he did not

interact with his peers or participate in class. His third-grade 

teacher testified that he was “withdrawn and ‘standoffish.’” Id. at

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1276. Tora testified that around third grade, school progress reports suggested that her son might have a learning disability. Yet

subsequent school testing revealed that Allred had a high IQ. As a 

result, he enrolled in gifted education classes in middle school. He 

did not adjust well to the program, however. Both Allred’s middle 

school teacher and Tora testified that he became even less social—

more of a “loner”—throughout his middle school years. He eventually stopped taking gifted classes. 

About Allred’s home life, his parents testified that he was exposed to alcohol abuse and domestic violence throughout childhood. Allred’s father, David, and Tora agreed that David had an 

alcohol problem. They testified that they were physically violent 

toward each other. They described one violent incident involving

Allred. One evening, David picked up a shotgun—Tora said he 

threatened to shoot himself; David said he was shooting at a tree 

to blow off steam—and assaulted Tora as she tried to take the 

weapon away. Allred, who was about 12 at the time, witnessed the 

assault and called the police. David was arrested. There was no testimony that Allred himself was abused. 

Despite Allred’s difficult childhood and developmental deficits, Tora admitted on cross-examination that by the time of the 

murders, her son was self-sufficient. Although he dropped out of 

high school in eleventh grade, he later earned his diploma and a 

two-year associate’s degree in accounting. Until the day of the murders, when his employment was terminated, he worked full time,

teaching the use of software. He lived independently in a large 

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room, an addition to the family home that only he could access.

For three or four months, Barwick lived there too, and, according 

to Tora, the couple was happy. 

Because of Allred’s emotional difficulty handling his 

breakup with Barwick, Caudill argued that Allred was suffering 

from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murders. In 

support, he presented Tora’s testimony that Allred became even 

more withdrawn after Barwick moved out. David testified that he 

was worried his son was suicidal after the breakup.

Caudill’s arguments in the penalty phase about mitigating 

circumstances focused on Allred’s social and emotional developmental delays, difficult childhood, and emotional distress, yet he 

called no mental health expert to testify. Before trial, Caudill had 

identified Dr. Deborah Day, a psychologist, as a testifying expert.

But Caudill decided not to call Day as a witness.2

After the penalty-phase trial concluded, the trial court sentenced Allred to death. The court found three statutory aggravating factors for each murder. For Ruschak’s murder, the court concluded that (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated;

(2) the murder was committed while Allred was engaged in a burglary; and (3) Allred had a prior capital conviction for Barwick’s 

contemporaneous murder. For Barwick’s murder, the court 

2 During postconviction proceedings, Caudill testified about his decision not 

to call Day. We discuss his testimony in Section B below. 

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concluded that (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 

cruel; (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; and 

(3) Allred had a prior capital conviction for Ruschak’s contemporaneous murder. The court assigned great weight to all these aggravators except the contemporaneous burglary. 

The court found no statutory mitigating factors and four 

nonstatutory mitigating factors, all of which it assigned little or 

moderate weight. As nonstatutory mitigation, the court weighed

the facts that Allred: (1) accepted responsibility by entering guilty 

pleas; (2) cooperated with law enforcement; (3) suffered from an 

emotional disturbance after his breakup with Barwick; and (4) had 

developmental problems at a young age that impacted his educational and social development, but not his later education.3

3 The court considered and rejected several other mitigating factors. It determined that Allred’s emotional and developmental age at the time of the crime

corresponded to his chronological age of 21 and therefore declined to weigh a 

younger emotional age as a mitigating circumstance. See Fla. Stat. 

§ 921.141(7)(g) (identifying as a mitigating factor “the age of the defendant at 

the time of the crime”). And although the court recognized that Allred suffered from an emotional disturbance after the breakup, it did not apply the 

statutory mitigator for extreme emotional disturbance. See id. § 921.141(7)(b) 

(identifying as a mitigating factor that “[t]he capital felony was committed 

while the defendant was under the influence of extreme . . . emotional disturbance”). The court found that the “careful thought and planning of the murders” negated such application. The court also stated that it was “not convinced that [Allred] was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.” See id. § 921.141(7)(f) (identifying as a mitigating factor that 

“[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her 

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Weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 

court found that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the 

mitigating circumstances. The court sentenced Allred to death for 

the murders of both Ruschak and Barwick. 

B. State Postconviction Proceedings

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Allred’s death sentence 

on direct appeal. See Allred I, 55 So. 3d at 1284. Allred then initiated 

state postconviction proceedings, in which, as relevant here, he 

claimed that Caudill, his penalty-phase trial counsel, rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to ensure that he received a reasonably competent mental health evaluation.4 Allred alleged that Caudill performed deficiently in three respects. First, he alleged that 

Caudill unreasonably relied on the opinion of Day, the mental 

health expert Caudill retained. Allred alleged that Caudill mistakenly believed Day would testify that Allred had antisocial personality disorder, sociopathy, or psychopathy and relied on this understanding in deciding to withdraw her testimony in the penalty 

phase. Second, Allred alleged that Caudill failed to conduct an adequate background investigation and therefore failed to adequately 

prepare Day. Third, Allred alleged that Caudill failed to present the 

conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”).

4 In postconviction proceedings, Allred raised other challenges to his convictions and sentence. We limit our discussion to Allred’s ineffective assistance 

claim regarding the mental health evaluation, the only claim in this appeal.

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testimony of a mental health expert as mitigation in the penalty 

phase. Allred alleged that Caudill was obligated to pursue other experts, specifically those that were “tailored to the needs of the case” 

and had expertise with Allred’s developmental issues. 

This deficient performance, Allred alleged, prejudiced his 

case such that had counsel performed effectively, there was a reasonable probability that he would not have received a death sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (explaining that, to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant “must show that 

counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”). 

1. The Postconviction Evidentiary Hearing

The postconviction trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on several of Allred’s claims, including the claim relevant 

here: that Caudill rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that Allred underwent a reasonably competent mental health 

evaluation for use in the penalty phase. At the hearing, Allred’s 

postconviction counsel introduced two types of mental health evidence that Allred contended supported his theories of deficient performance. First, counsel introduced evidence of possibly mitigating 

mental health conditions—dissociation and autism spectrum disorder—that Allred argued Caudill should have developed. Second, 

counsel introduced evidence to undermine Day’s purported diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, a potentially aggravating 

mental health condition. 

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Allred’s counsel called two licensed psychologists. Both evaluated Allred in preparation for the evidentiary hearing. The first 

psychologist, Dr. Glenn Caddy, testified that Allred was in a dissociative state during the murders. This meant that Allred was “disconnect[ed] from a clear understanding” of his actions. Caddy 

opined that the dissociative state was triggered by Allred’s profound “ego disintegration”—his sense of degradation and emotional distress—following his public breakup with Barwick and the 

discovery that she was involved with Ruschak. Caddy opined that, 

because of the dissociation and Allred’s deteriorating emotional 

state, Allred satisfied a statutory mitigator: he had diminished capacity at the time of the crime. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(f) (listing 

as a mitigating factor that “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her 

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired”).

Caddy testified that Allred’s postconviction reporting of the 

murders showed a fragmented memory of what happened inside 

Roberts’s house. In Caddy’s opinion, Allred’s postarrest interview 

indicated fragmentation. To Caddy, the disconnect between 

Allred’s behavior and his inability to explain it indicated dissociation. But Caddy conceded on cross-examination that a fragmented 

memory could also have been Allred’s response to the trauma of 

the shootings. He agreed it was possible that Allred’s memory fragmented under the stress of the violence he inflicted rather than because of dissociation before the shootings. Thus, Caddy could not 

say whether the symptoms of dissociation he observed actually 

“set[] the stage” for the shooting.

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Allred’s postconviction counsel also called Dr. Gary Geffken, an autism specialist, who opined that Allred had a high-functioning form of autism spectrum disorder or “at the very least[,] 

pervasive developmental disorder.” Geffken based his opinion on 

social and emotional deficiencies he observed upon meeting Allred

and assessing his background. Geffken opined that Allred was emotionally underdeveloped: he lacked sympathy, empathy, and the 

ability to discuss emotions like jealousy or embarrassment. Geffken 

also opined that Allred was socially underdeveloped. When Geffken met with Allred, he found him to be intentionally solitary,

cutting himself off from human interaction. Records established 

that Allred had also been this way in childhood and had difficulties

interacting with peers. In Geffken’s opinion, Allred also exhibited 

other characteristics of autism spectrum disorder: Allred adapted 

poorly to change and had exhibited unusual repetitive behaviors 

and tics in childhood. 

Geffken concluded that Allred’s autism was a plausible explanation for why he murdered Ruschak and Barwick. Geffken posited that when Allred and Barwick broke up, Allred was unable to 

cope with the loss because he did not have the social and emotional 

skills of a normal adult his age. Allred’s actions stemmed from this 

inability to process his emotions. Geffken opined that the formation of intense, consuming attachments—and an inability to 

cope with their loss—was characteristic of behavior across the autism spectrum. But Geffken acknowledged on cross-examination 

that the type of violence Allred carried out was “clearly” atypical of 

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those on the autism spectrum. Geffken unequivocally stated that 

Allred was not remorseful and that his actions had been deliberate.

But Caddy thought that Allred had recently demonstrated 

an “intellectual” remorse for what he had done. Anticipating the 

testimony of the State’s witnesses, including withdrawn penaltyphase mental health expert Day, Caddy unequivocally opined that 

Allred did not have antisocial personality disorder. Allred did not 

meet the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder because he had no history of a childhood conduct disorder. And

Caddy observed that Allred showed no history of failing to correspond to social norms and noted that before the murders he had 

no history of getting into significant trouble. Caddy concluded that 

Allred displayed empathy that was contraindicative of antisocial 

personality disorder.

Postconviction counsel then called Allred’s trial counsel, 

Caudill, attempting to show that Caudill unreasonably relied on 

this contraindicated diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder to 

justify his decision to not present a mental health expert in the penalty phase. Caudill’s reliance on Day’s purported antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, postconviction counsel argued, prevented 

him from adequately investigating more favorable mental health 

diagnoses like dissociation and autism spectrum disorder. 

Caudill testified to his understanding of Day’s evaluation of 

Allred, their conversations about her potential testimony as to antisocial personality disorder and other aggravators, and his decision 

not to call Day or another mental health expert. He testified that 

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he retained Day as a mental health expert before the penalty phase. 

After Day evaluated Allred, in the time leading up to the trial, Caudill had multiple conversations with her about her evaluation. During one of these conversations, Day relayed that she had nothing

to offer in mitigation in Allred’s case. Caudill understood from the 

conversation that if Day testified and had to offer a diagnosis, the 

only diagnosis she could offer would be antisocial personality disorder—or worse, that Allred was a psychopath or sociopath. Put 

differently, her findings were consistent with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.5 And though Caudill understood that an 

antisocial personality disorder diagnosis must be premised on a 

childhood conduct disorder, he believed there was evidence of 

such a disorder in Allred’s past, such that an antisocial personality 

disorder diagnosis was not contraindicated. 

According to Caudill, in his experience, antisocial personality disorder, sociopathy, and psychopathy were not mitigating. He

further believed that calling Day, or any mental health expert, 

would elicit damaging testimony on Allred’s reporting of the murders. Caudill viewed Allred’s explanation for the murders—that the 

victims were deserving—as aggravating. He also thought that mental health expert testimony as to Allred’s animosity toward the 

5 A contemporaneous memo written by Caudill’s cocounsel stated that Day 

had “concluded that Mr. Allred is a sociopath or psychopath.” This statement 

was not accurate, however. Day never diagnosed Allred. Both the postconviction trial court and the Florida Supreme Court determined that despite the 

memo’s overstatement of Day’s conclusion, Caudill did not misunderstand 

her evaluation. The record does not contradict this finding of fact.

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victims, expressed in Allred’s own words, would be more impactful 

than the State’s comparable evidence. For all these reasons, he decided to withdraw Day as a testifying witness. 

Caudill testified that he never had cause to question Day’s 

conclusions, nor did he consider seeking a second opinion or expert. He did not believe that another expert would have come to a 

different conclusion or been able to provide mental health mitigation. He was also concerned about delaying the penalty phase to 

pursue other experts, given Allred’s hostility toward developing a 

mitigation case.

The State called Day at the postconviction hearing. Through 

Day, the State aimed to establish that Caudill had correctly concluded that Day’s expert testimony would have been more aggravating than mitigating. Therefore, the State argued, Caudill made 

a reasonable strategic decision to forgo the presentation of mental 

health evidence in the penalty phase.

Day testified that, at Caudill’s behest she, along with two 

psychologists in her employ, had conducted a comprehensive evaluation of Allred before his penalty-phase trial. Based on her evaluation, Day opined at the postconviction hearing that Allred had 

“features” of antisocial personality disorder: he met some, but not 

all, of the criteria for the disorder described in the Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. She determined that Allred 

displayed an inability to have empathy, had interpersonal difficulties, had difficulties obeying societal norms, and evidenced a reckless disregard for others. But she also concluded that he did not 

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have a childhood or adolescent conduct disorder; she saw evidence 

of antisocial traits emerging only past the age of 15. Because such a 

conduct disorder is a required criterion for a diagnosis of antisocial 

personality disorder, Day could not formally diagnose him. 

According to Day, Allred demonstrated features of psychopathy, which she described as a “descriptor[] of behavior” rather 

than a separate diagnosis. She opined that many of Allred’s antisocial traits—deceptiveness, irresponsibility, poor behavioral control, 

lack of empathy, and disregard for others—were also characteristic 

of psychopathy. Allred’s clinically elevated scores on the psychopathic deviate scale of a personality test she administered, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (“MMPI-2”), were consistent with her impressions.6

Day testified consistently with Caudill’s impressions of her 

conclusions. If she had testified at the penalty phase, she said, her 

testimony would have been aggravating rather than mitigating. 

She could offer little in the way of statutory mitigation, and her 

opinions would have supported aggravators, including that the 

murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated. She opined that 

Allred’s behavior leading up to the murders evidenced premeditation and observed that he displayed a lack of remorse.

6 Day also testified that Allred had clinically elevated scores for depression and

trauma. She did not explain how those scores related to her impressions of 

Allred’s traits, background, or behavior, though she did report that Allred experienced situational depression in jail.

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The State called a second mental health expert, psychiatrist 

Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, who evaluated Allred and reviewed the other 

experts’ conclusions.7 Danziger refuted Caddy’s diagnosis of dissociation and Geffken’s diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder.

Like Caddy, Danziger opined that Allred did not have antisocial personality disorder. Aside from the murders and the surrounding events, Danziger found that Allred lacked traits that 

would support an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis. But he 

“agree[d] wholeheartedly” with Day’s evaluation and postconviction testimony and opined that, accounting for the murders, Allred 

displayed features of the disorder. Danziger also agreed with Caddy 

and Day that Allred would not meet the criteria for a “full-scale

diagnosis” of antisocial personality disorder, in part because he had 

no conduct disorder before the age of 15. Danziger saw no pervasive pattern of criminal conduct in Allred’s behavior. He opined

that Allred was not a sociopath or a psychopath.

Danziger disagreed entirely with Caddy’s finding that Allred 

was in a dissociative emotional state during the murders. He

opined that the evidence of Allred’s actions surrounding the murders suggested premeditation rather than confusion, disorientation, or a lack of control. He characterized Allred’s imperfect 

7 Danziger had met previously with Allred, at Caudill’s request, shortly after 

Allred’s arrest in 2007. There was conflicting testimony as to whether this pretrial evaluation was intended to evaluate Allred’s competency only or also to 

assess the possibility of an insanity defense. Danziger met with Allred again in 

2013 to evaluate him at the State’s behest. 

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memory as “a very thin reading to base a diagnosis of dissociative 

disorder on.”

Danziger also disagreed with Geffken’s diagnosis of autism 

spectrum disorder. Although Danziger believed that Allred had social deficits, he explained that to be diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, a person must have a restrictive repetitive pattern 

of behavior, interest, or activities. He did not find that Allred presented such a pattern, though he failed to consider Allred’s childhood tic disorder when making this conclusion. Danziger further 

opined that an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis would not be 

mitigating even if correct. If Allred were autistic, he still would 

have been able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and

conform his conduct to law. And Danziger saw no evidence that 

Allred was experiencing extreme emotional distress.

Danziger summarized that had he testified at trial, he could 

not have offered any testimony in mitigation other than the evidence that had been offered in the penalty phase. He noted the evidence of Allred’s exposure to domestic violence and his historic 

diagnoses of ADHD and tic disorder, but the court had acknowledged those facts at sentencing.

2. The State Postconviction Trial Court’s Order

The postconviction trial court denied Allred’s claim that trial 

counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to 

ensure that Allred received a reasonably competent mental health 

evaluation. It concluded that Allred failed to show that Caudill 

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performed deficiently or that any deficiency prejudiced him. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

The postconviction trial court assessed Caudill’s performance as to each of the three deficiencies Allred alleged: that Caudill unreasonably relied on Day’s antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, that Caudill failed to conduct an adequate background investigation, and that Caudill failed to seek out additional mental 

health experts to testify in the penalty phase. 

First, the court concluded that Caudill reasonably relied on 

his understanding of Day’s opinion. Caudill correctly understood 

that “Day had not diagnosed the Defendant with anti-social personality disorder, but rather, she indicated that if she was forced to 

give a diagnosis the only diagnosis she could offer was anti-social 

personality disorder.” State v. Allred, No. 07-4890, 2013 WL 

12450438, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013). 

Second, the court concluded Allred offered no evidence that 

Caudill conducted an inadequate background investigation or inadequately prepared Day. Allred’s argument to the contrary had 

no support. 

Consequently, Caudill was entitled to rely on Day’s opinion. 

Given Day’s opinion that Allred had antisocial traits and her indication that she could not provide helpful testimony, the court concluded that Caudill’s choice not to present Day’s testimony was a 

“reasonable strategic decision” rather than deficient performance. 

Id. at *4. It was also a “successful” decision in that it precluded the 

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introduction of additional damaging evidence as to Allred’s premeditation and lack of remorse. Id. 

Because the court concluded that Caudill’s reliance on Day’s 

opinion was reasonable, it followed that he “was not required to 

continue searching for an expert who would give a more favorable 

assessment of [Allred’s] mental status.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The court therefore rejected Allred’s third argument, that Caudill was obligated to seek another mental health expert to testify at the penalty phase, concluding that Caudill’s failure 

to do so did not amount to deficient performance. 

Despite finding no deficient performance, the postconviction trial court proceeded to analyze whether Caudill’s failure to 

present a mental health expert prejudiced Allred. The court looked 

to whether the new mental health evidence adduced in postconviction—the diagnoses provided by Caddy and Geffken—would have 

altered the sentencing outcome. The court found the testimony of 

both experts not credible.

It found that Caddy’s diagnosis of dissociation at the time of 

the murders was unsupported, in part, because the diagnosis relied

on Allred’s “alleged fragmented memory” of the murders, yet 

Caddy “acknowledged that the Defendant’s fragmented memory 

could be the result of a physiological reaction to the trauma of the 

shooting.” Id. at *5. And the court credited Danziger’s contrary 

opinion that there was no evidence of Allred’s having been in a dissociative state.

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The court also found not credible Geffken’s testimony that 

Allred had autism spectrum disorder. It credited Danziger’s testimony that, to be diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, one 

must display a restrictive repetitive pattern of behavior. It found a 

“lack of evidence” that Allred had restrictive repetitive behavior 

patterns. Id.

Because it found Caddy’s and Geffken’s testimony not credible and credited Danziger’s, the court concluded that Allred failed 

to establish that he was in a dissociative state at the time of the 

murders or that he had autism spectrum disorder. But even if 

Allred had credibly demonstrated those diagnoses, the court found, 

their introduction would not have impacted the penalty phase’s

outcome because his experts’ testimony failed to show that Allred’s 

capacity was, in fact, diminished, and that he lacked premeditated 

intent. 

3. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction 

trial court’s denial of Allred’s ineffective assistance claim. Allred v. 

State (Allred II), 186 So. 3d 530, 539 (Fla. 2016). It ruled that Allred 

“demonstrated neither deficiency nor prejudice” as to Caudill’s failure to obtain a competent mental health evaluation during the penalty phase. Id. at 539. 

Like the postconviction trial court, the Florida Supreme 

Court evaluated Caudill’s performance as to each of the three deficiencies that Allred alleged. First, the court concluded that Caudill 

reasonably relied on Day’s opinion. Id. at 536–37. It held that Day 

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had “clearly indicated,” and Caudill correctly understood, “that her 

testimony would be more aggravating than mitigating.” Id. at 537. 

Although Day “did not reach the [antisocial personality disorder] 

diagnosis, her testimony that Allred met all but one of the factors 

essential to the diagnosis would not have been mitigating in nature. 

Neither would her testimony that he had some of the traits of a 

sociopath and a psychopath.” Id. Further, by withdrawing Day’s 

testimony, “Caudill kept out testimony about Allred’s lack of empathy or remorse.” Id. His reliance on her “professional assessment” was not unreasonable, and his decision to withdraw her testimony was a reasonable strategic choice. Id.

Second, the court concluded that Caudill’s background investigation was not deficient. Id. at 537–38. It determined that Caudill conducted an adequate background investigation to prepare his

mitigation case in the penalty phase; the court cited his efforts to 

track down records, witnesses, and evidence that Allred was possibly sexually abused by his grandfather. Id. at 538.

Third, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Caudill’s 

decision not to call Day “did not require the continued search for a 

more favorable mental health opinion.” Id. Caudill’s failure to find 

and present a favorable mental health expert in the penalty phase 

did not constitute deficient performance. Id. In addition, Caddy and 

Geffken were not credible, and the evidence presented at the postconviction hearing “established neither that [Allred] was in a dissociative state nor that he suffered from an autism spectrum disorder.” Id. at 538–39. Thus, Allred failed to present evidence of a 

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favorable opinion. But even if he had, the court stated that “securing a more favorable expert opinion” would not “undermine the 

sufficiency” of Day’s opinion, on which Caudill was entitled to rely. 

Id. at 539.

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

Allred then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising several claims, including a claim that trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a reasonably competent mental health evaluation. The district court denied Allred relief and then denied him a certificate of appealability. 

We granted Allred a certificate of appealability on his claim that 

trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in two ways, for failing 

to (1) conduct a sufficient background investigation and (2) ensure 

a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for Allred’s penalty phase. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“When reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of habeas 

relief, we review questions of law and mixed questions of law and 

fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error.” Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. 

Dep’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 886, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim “presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Pope 

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 752 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs our review of federal habeas petitions. 

“AEDPA prescribes a highly deferential framework for evaluating 

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issues previously decided in state court.” Sears v. Warden GDCP, 

73 F.4th 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2023). AEDPA bars federal courts 

from granting habeas relief to a petitioner on a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate court” unless the decision (1) “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law 

if the court “applie[d] a rule that contradicts the governing law” set 

forth by the Supreme Court or the state court confronted facts that 

were “materially indistinguishable” from Supreme Court precedent but arrived at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 405–06 (2000). To meet the “unreasonable application” standard, “a prisoner must show far more than that the state court’s decision was merely wrong or even clear error.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 

U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the 

decision must be “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any 

possibility for fair minded disagreement.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). This standard is “difficult to meet and . . . demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 996 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

A federal habeas court must defer to a state court’s determination of the facts unless the state court decision “was based on an 

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28 Opinion of the Court 22-12331

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

We are required to give state courts “substantial deference” under 

§ 2254(d)(2). Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). “We may 

not characterize . . . state-court factual determinations as unreasonable merely because we would have reached a different conclusion

in the first instance.” Id. at 313–14 (alteration adopted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We presume a state court’s factual determinations are correct absent clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. See Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 

1035 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

On each claimed basis for relief, we review “the last statecourt adjudication on the merits.” See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 

40 (2011). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court 

and the state court has denied relief,” we presume “the state court 

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Allred’s relevant ineffective assistance claim was adjudicated on the merits, and thus we review it 

under AEDPA’s standards. 

III. DISCUSSION

In this appeal, Allred argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to ensure a reasonably competent 

mental health evaluation during the penalty phase, as he did in 

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state postconviction proceedings.8 He argues that Caudill’s failure

to present mental health evidence was deficient in two ways.

First, Allred argues that Caudill unreasonably relied on a 

misunderstanding of Day’s evaluation of Allred’s mental state without adequate investigation into her opinion. This led Caudill to 

provide ineffective assistance of counsel by deciding not to call 

Day, or another mental health expert, in the penalty phase. Allred 

contends that Caudill erroneously understood Day’s opinion to be 

that if “she had to diagnose Mr. Allred, she would state that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), sociopathy, or 

psychopathy.” Appellant’s Br. 9. According to Allred, Caudill was 

required to second-guess this opinion and investigate the supposed 

diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder further. Had he done so, 

Allred contends, Day would have continued her work and offered

the “firm conclusion” that Allred did not have antisocial personality 

disorder due to his lack of adolescent conduct disorder. Reply Br. 

8 As noted above, we granted a certificate of appealability on two aspects of

Allred’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim: that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) conduct a sufficient background investigation and (2) ensure a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for the penalty phase. 

Allred’s argument on appeal, however, addresses only (2), counsel’s failure to 

ensure a reasonably competent mental health evaluation. He does not argue 

that Caudill performed a deficient background investigation; instead, he now 

argues that Caudill failed to investigate the basis of Day’s evaluation and opinion, which is simply another way of saying that Caudill unreasonably relied 

on Day’s opinion in deciding not to call her as a witness. We therefore discuss 

only the claim that Caudill was ineffective in failing to ensure Allred underwent a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for the penalty phase. 

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4–6. Because Caudill did not question Day’s evaluation, Allred argues, his decision to withdraw her testimony was based on insufficient investigation and thus constituted deficient performance.

Second, Allred argues that Caudill performed deficiently by

failing to seek out and present the testimony of additional mental 

health professionals, like Caddy and Geffken, whose testimony 

would have supported statutory mental health mitigators in the 

penalty phase. Had the trial court heard the testimony of a mental 

health expert, Allred says, there is a reasonable probability that it 

would have weighed the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in his favor and sentenced him to life imprisonment

instead of death. 

Counsel provides ineffective assistance, warranting vacatur 

of a conviction or sentence, when his performance falls “below an 

objective standard of reasonableness,” taking into account prevailing professional norms, and “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. To determine whether this reasonable probability exists, “we consider the totality of the available 

mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence 

adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When applying AEDPA to this prejudice standard, “we must decide whether 

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the state court’s conclusion that [counsel’s] performance . . . didn’t 

prejudice [the petitioner]—that there was no substantial likelihood 

of a different result—was so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Pye, 50 F.4th at 

1041–42 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that Allred was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to present the testimony of a mental health expert during the penalty 

phase was not unreasonable, and thus its decision is entitled to deference under AEDPA.9 Because Allred failed to establish prejudice 

under the Strickland-AEDPA framework, we affirm the federal district court’s denial of habeas relief. In so ruling, we need not address 

whether the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusions as to trial counsel’s deficient performance were reasonable. “Because a petitioner 

must prove both deficient performance and prejudice, a court need 

not address one element if it determines that the petitioner has 

failed to prove the other.” Mashburn v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 

80 F.4th 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

9 The Florida Supreme Court said little regarding the prejudice prong of 

Allred’s claim. Nonetheless, it concluded that Allred “failed to establish either 

prong of Strickland” as to each of his ineffective assistance claims and, more 

particularly, ruled that Allred “demonstrated neither deficiency nor prejudice” 

as to the claim that Caudill rendered ineffective assistance in failing to ensure 

that Allred underwent a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for 

the penalty phase. Allred II, 186 So. 3d at 535, 539. 

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Allred resists our conclusion. In arguing that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance, he relies on the testimony of 

Caddy and Geffken. He argues that his experts’ opinions on two 

diagnoses—dissociation and autism spectrum disorder—show that 

the statutory “mental health” mitigators applied to him. Appellant’s Br. 20; see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(7)(b), (h). Therefore, he argues, 

his experts would have shifted the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors and created a reasonable probability of a life sentence. But at the postconviction hearing the parties introduced conflicting evidence as to whether Allred experienced dissociation and 

whether he met the criteria to be diagnosed with autism spectrum 

disorder. The State’s expert, Danziger, refuted Caddy’s and Geffken’s diagnoses. The state postconviction trial court resolved the

factual disputes by crediting Danziger’s opinion over the opinions 

of Allred’s experts, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that 

finding.

We first consider whether the credibility finding—a determination of fact, Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1315 

(11th Cir. 2016)—was unreasonable. See Pye, 50 F.4th at 1035–36 

(stating that we cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s 

“ultimate decision” was “based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Allred argues that 

the court made “an unreasonable interpretation of the facts [and]

the testimony” on its way to concluding that “neither Dr. Caddy’s 

nor Dr. Geffken’s testimony would have changed the outcome” of 

his penalty phase, because “[b]oth experts were able to show that 

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the mental health statutory mitigator applied.” Appellant’s Br. 19–

20. Thus, Allred asks us to evaluate the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim based on the testimony of his experts and 

“not based on which expert the courts found more convincing.” Id. 

at 23. In so arguing, Allred asks us to reject the finding that Caddy 

and Geffken were not credible and to credit their opinions over the 

contrary opinion of the State’s expert, Danziger. We cannot do so. 

We have held that it is not unreasonable for a state habeas court to 

discount the testimony of one expert in favor of another’s when 

the experts’ testimony conflicts, so long as crediting the opposing 

expert’s testimony is itself not unreasonable. See Ferguson v. Sec’y, 

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 1315, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2013); Jones, 834 

F.3d at 1316–17; Pye, 50 F.4th at 1050. Allred does not argue that

crediting Danziger’s testimony was unreasonable. So we cannot 

say that it was unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to affirm the state postconviction trial court’s finding that Allred’s experts were not credible. 

We next consider the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that 

Allred failed to establish the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The prejudice ruling is a legal conclusion 

that we review under § 2254(d)(1). We conclude that the court’s 

determination was neither “contrary to,” nor “an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” under the statute. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In deciding whether the ruling was unreasonable, we reweigh the evidence in mitigation against the evidence in 

aggravation. Porter, 558 U.S. at 41. And so we turn back to the evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing. 

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Without Caddy’s and Geffken’s opinions, the mental health 

evidence adduced at the hearing yielded little in mitigation. The

only other testimony indicating that Allred had significant mental 

health conditions came from Day, who testified that Allred had features of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy. In a case 

where a habeas petitioner presented with “antisocial tendencies,”

this Court said that evidence of antisocial personality disorder is 

“not mitigating, but damaging.” Suggs v. McNeil, 609 F.3d 1218, 

1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). More recently, we have observed that high psychopathic deviate scores on 

the MMPI-2 and testimony to behavior consistent with that score 

are damaging rather than mitigating. Puiatti v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t. of 

Corr., 732 F.3d 1255, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2019). And so, here, as in 

Suggs, Day’s testimony “would have come at a steep price.” Suggs, 

609 F.3d at 1231.

We acknowledge that at the hearing experts on both sides 

noted social and familial difficulties in Allred’s background, as well 

as his childhood mental health diagnoses of ADHD and tic disorder. But these facts were presented during the penalty-phase trial

and considered at sentencing. In addition, at sentencing the trial 

court weighed Allred’s emotional distress following his breakup 

with Barwick. Thus, Geffken’s and Caddy’s testimony on the emotional trauma they believed Allred suffered post-breakup—even divorced from these experts’ discredited diagnoses—was of little additional mitigating value. Because the evidence presented in state 

habeas proceedings was “by no means clearly mitigating” or otherwise “largely duplicated” mitigation evidence at trial, we cannot 

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say that it was unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to conclude that Allred had failed to show a substantial likelihood of a 

different sentence. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 200–01

(2011).

Our conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court’s no-prejudice determination was based a reasonable application of Strickland

is bolstered by the strength of the aggravating circumstances the 

sentencing court identified. Where there is “substantial evidence of 

aggravating circumstances,” it is more difficult for a petitioner to 

establish prejudice under Strickland. Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). So, too, when the 

mitigating evidence is scant. The new mitigating evidence in this 

case—that Allred had antisocial traits—would likely have been 

damaging. Even considering the mitigating evidence presented at 

trial—that Allred had social difficulties, a troubled family life, and 

childhood developmental disorders but was a self-sufficient young 

adult with no prior history of violence—we cannot conclude that 

the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably found no prejudice, given 

the aggravating circumstances. 

And “[t]his is not a case where the weight of the aggravating 

circumstances or the evidence supporting them was weak.” Sochor 

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 685 F.3d 1016, 1030 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The trial court found that both Ruschak’s and Barwick’s murders were cold, calculated, and 

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premeditated and that Barwick’s murder was heinous, atrocious, 

or cruel.10

For the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator, the 

evidence of premeditation in the penalty-phase case was strong. 

The trial court cited the timing of Allred’s purchase of the murder 

weapon, his threatening messages to and about the victims, and his 

warning to Ruschak about his arrival at the scene as evidence that 

the murders were preplanned. If Caddy’s testimony had been credited, it is possible that his opinion of Allred’s diminished capacity 

might have mitigated the impact of this premeditation evidence. 

But Caddy’s testimony was not credited. And Allred introduced no 

other evidence at the evidentiary hearing to undercut the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator. To the contrary, the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing tended to show that the 

testimony of a mental health expert would have supported the 

cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator. Based on her evaluation of Allred, Day opined that his behavior leading up to the 

10 As we previously noted, the court found additional aggravating factors as 

to each murder. As to Ruschak’s murder, the court found aggravating that 

Allred committed the murder while engaged in a burglary, and he was previously convicted of another capital felony (Barwick’s contemporaneous murder). As to Barwick’s murder, the court found aggravating that Allred was previously convicted of another capital felony (Ruschak’s contemporaneous murder). Because the cold, calculated, and premeditated and heinous, atrocious, 

or cruel findings are sufficient to support our conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court’s prejudice determination was not unreasonable, we do not discuss the court’s findings as to the other aggravators. 

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murders suggested premeditation. Caddy testified that Allred had 

a preconceived fantasy of killing Ruschak and Barwick. 

To support the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, the 

trial court adduced from the 911 call Barwick made while hiding 

from Allred that she was terror-stricken, anticipating her own 

death, in the minutes before Allred shot and killed her. It described 

the 911 call “as the most horrific piece of evidence this court has 

heard in a homicide case in nearly twenty-three years as a trial 

judge.” And the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator “pertains 

more to the nature of the killing and the surrounding circumstances” than the petitioner’s mental state. Hardwick v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 541, 561 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, postconviction testimony about Allred’s 

mental state was unlikely to undermine the heinous, atrocious, or

cruel aggravator.

We have said that the cold, calculated, premeditated and 

heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravators are “among the most serious aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 559. It is improbable that the 

evidence adduced at Allred’s postconviction evidentiary hearing 

would have reduced the impact of these powerful aggravators sufficiently to introduce the reasonable probability of a different outcome for Allred. See Pye, 50 F.4th at 1049 (“We’ve repeatedly held 

that even extensive mitigating evidence wouldn’t have been reasonably likely to change the outcome of sentencing in light of a 

particularly heinous crime and significant aggravating factors.”).

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For these reasons, the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that Allred could not show prejudice from his trial counsel’s 

performance withstands our highly deferential review under 

AEDPA. The court’s ruling that there was no substantial likelihood 

of a life sentence in Allred’s case was not “so obviously wrong that 

its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” 

so it is entitled to deference. See id. at 1041–42 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Our reweighing of the totality of the evidence in 

mitigation against the evidence in aggravation shows that Allred 

was unable to shift the balance of the sentencing factors. Although 

Allred argues that evidence of his mental state should have been 

presented at trial, the mental health evidence adduced at the postconviction hearing—notwithstanding the testimony found not 

credible—would have been of little value. The mental health expert testimony presented was either supportive of existing aggravating factors like premeditation, supportive of new and potentially aggravating mental health diagnoses like antisocial personality disorder, or cumulative of mitigating evidence the sentencing 

court considered. We therefore cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court’s prejudice ruling was “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1). The court’s decision withstands our highly deferential 

review under AEDPA, and we affirm the denial of relief on Allred’s

penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of Allred’s petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

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