U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–816PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

THE DAYTON LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF

BOSNIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2018

Serial No. 115–148

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Matthew Palmer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 4

Sasha Toperich, Ph.D., senior fellow and director of the Mediterranean Basin, 

Middle East, and Gulf Initiative, Center for Transatlantic Relations, The 

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University ..................................................................................................... 19

Mr. Philippe Leroux-Martin, director, Rule of Law, Justice, and Security, 

U.S. Institute of Peace ......................................................................................... 26

Mrs. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, Balkan Affairs adviser, Albanian American 

Civic League ......................................................................................................... 36

Mr. Kurt Bassuener, co-founder and senior associate, Democratization Policy 

Council .................................................................................................................. 43

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Matthew Palmer: Prepared statement ........................................................... 6

Sasha Toperich, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 21

Mr. Philippe Leroux-Martin: Prepared statement ................................................ 28

Mrs. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Prepared statement ........................................... 39

Mr. Kurt Bassuener: Prepared statement ............................................................. 45

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats: 

‘‘Don’t wait for the western Balkans to blow up again. The U.S. and the 

E.U. must act,’’ by Wesley K. Clark ................................................................ 68

Statement by Dr. Edward S. Yambrusic ............................................................ 71

Letter from Amnesty International, April 18, 2018 .......................................... 74

Mrs. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Macedonia-Albanian Platform .......................... 80

Mr. Kurt Bassuener: 

Letter to House of Lords International Relations Committee, September 

15, 2017 ............................................................................................................. 83

‘‘A Feature, Not a Bug,’’ Bosnia Daily, December 5, 2017 ................................ 90

Internet link and list of additional documents submitted for the record ........... 92

The Honorable Robin L. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois: Question for Mr. Matthew Palmer submitted for the record ......... 93

(1)

THE DAYTON LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF 

BOSNIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I hereby call this hearing to order. Good 

afternoon and welcome to this hearing on the legacy of the Dayton 

Agreement and political situation in Bosnia and what portends to 

be for the Western Balkans. I suspect today’s topic may be new to 

some of my younger colleagues. The horrific conflict of the 1990s 

and its underlying causes is something many of us hope had been 

resolved a long time ago, but here we are. 

The issue at hand stems from the fundamental compromise within the 1995 Dayton Agreement. To end 3 years of war and genocide, Bosnia’s democratic development and territorial integrity was 

balanced against the need to accommodate ethnic interests. For 

peace, this trade-off made sense. The time has come, however, not 

just for stability but for political reform as well, political reform 

that allows Bosnia to have a fully functional government, one that 

meets democratic standards. 

Based on the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia is divided into two political entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in and of 

itself has been divided into ten cantons, and the Republic of 

Srpska—okay. I want to make sure I am pronouncing it Srpska. 

The three major ethnic communities, Bosniak, Serb, and Croats 

share power. Bosnia-Herzegovina is headed at the state level, for 

example, by a tripartite presidency, one for each of the ethnic communities. It is a complex and overlapping system where positions 

are allowed and allotted by affiliation of one of the three ethnic 

groups, sometimes through the exclusion of citizens who do not belong to any of the ethnic groups. 

While this system secured in the group rights of one warring 

party for two decades of democratic change has resulted in a situation, however, where equal representation of an individual citizen 

is viewed as a threat to protecting the political equality between 

the ethnic groups, Bosniaks in the Federation, for example, may 

now make up 70 percent of that population. The electoral law set 

2

up a scenario, however, where a representative of one community 

may be duly elected, but an ethnicity other than his own. 

So the Constitutional Court of Bosnia found that this violated 

the equality between the ethnic communities set forth in the constitution and undercut key provisions of the electoral law. Because 

the political parties were unable to find a compromise solution to 

this within the required time frame, Bosnia is approaching a general election this October without election law in place. This has 

created a potential for a political crisis and hopefully that for the 

loss of life and conflict. 

The current set of ethnocentric political parties and entrenched 

elites have regrettably been unable or unwilling to find a solution 

for the good of the country and its people. Given our country’s history in involvement in the region and particularly our central role 

in brokering the Dayton Agreement, the United States has an ongoing responsibility to help Bosnians find a mutually agreeable and 

lasting solution. We cannot, however, just sit on the sidelines and 

except the Europeans and the European Union to solve this. That 

is something we should have learned by now. Experience has 

shown us Europe often lacks the political resolve to lead, and active 

engagement now will lessen the likelihood of more challenging 

intervention later on. 

We have two panels for today’s hearing and first we will hear 

from our State Department and then a panel of private witnesses. 

So I thank all of you for appearing today and now I turn to my 

ranking member, Mr. Meeks, for his opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, for calling this 

hearing and continuing to focus our subcommittee’s attentions on 

the Balkans. I am particularly excited about shining a helpful light 

on Bosnia where we are witnessing a country amble toward a constitutional crisis barring a solution. Additionally, I am grateful to 

have a veteran of our State Department here to testify. I always 

salute those in the State Department and the great work that they 

do for our country and they think sometimes it goes unrecognized, 

but I want to thank you for what you do. 

I look forward to hearing about your recent trip to the region and 

key takeaways on the broader issues. It was an understanding by 

many here in Congress that the region was moving steadily toward 

the West and closer to the institutions that are markers for our 

democratic principles, NATO and the EU. In fact, just yesterday, 

the Commission backed EU accession talks for Albania and Macedonia. This is a very encouraging announcement, but the followthrough is what is tough. 

Whereas, there was and is momentum in this direction, the 

progress has slowed and leaders are looking at playing the West 

off of Russia. Populations aren’t as convinced of the benefits of 

NATO or EU membership as they once was and outside actors, 

namely Turkey and Russia, are increasingly interested and willing 

to insert themselves in a detrimental manner, thereby jeopardizing 

the investments that the United States has made toward the democratic peace. 

The United States who helped broker that peace is nervously 

turning inwards, unfortunately, and the leaders in the region, however, underestimate the extent to which the United States’ instituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Aug 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\041818\29816 SHIRL
3

tions and people are committed to the goals of individual rights, democracy, and peace. By focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You got it. 

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. Electoral framework and constitutions, 

Congress can help avert a crisis and keep perhaps and even use 

this opportunity to reinvigorate the push to a rules-based political 

system in Bosnia. The way it stands now and without sufficient attention from the West, the Bosnian elite are allowed to continue to 

drift toward this crisis. Worse, a haphazard fix to the legal gap can 

be used to cement the divide between the political economic elites 

and the constituent peoples. 

The conundrum needs to be addressed. However, the malign actors outside of Bosnia and in the neighborhood are hardly waiting 

until the October elections to act. In the United States we sometimes want simple answers to very complex situations. We start 

afresh, move to new cities, go bankrupt, and try again. We sometimes misunderstand the role of history in much older cultures 

than ours. In Bosnia, it is impossible to separate the past from the 

present and the future. 

The brave people, all constituent peoples, understand what risk 

there is to this political game of chicken. There are the seeds that 

need to be tended to and that need to be the vital force of the political solution. I believe there is a role for the United States here, 

first and foremost, in taking up responsibility for the consequences 

of Dayton and for our strategic interest in the region. We must 

honestly rethink the strictures of the Accords and how an immediate fix can lead to better governance in the region. And we can 

only be successful here, indeed, the region can only be successful 

if we do this in concert with our allies. 

The EU and even some of its larger member states, significantly 

the U.K., have shown renewed interest in the region. As the cochair of the EU Caucus and Ranking Member on the European 

Subcommittee, I want to harness that positive energy and use it to 

advance our common interests starting in Bosnia and spreading it 

throughout the region. 

And again I thank all who are going to testify and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

Our first witness of the day is Matt Palmer, a senior Foreign 

Service Officer and currently Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Central Europe and the Western Balkans. He has completed tours in Serbia, Cyprus, and has worked for the National Security Council at the White House. 

Let me just note I am deeply concerned along with a lot of other 

people that we just have acting deputy assistant secretaries of 

State rather than this administration having appointed permanent 

people to those positions, but we are very happy to have you with 

us. We know you are a pro. 

So go right ahead. You have about 5 minutes and then we will 

open it to questions. 

4

STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW PALMER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. PALMER. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, 

and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the challenges that we see in Bosnia and Herzegovina and our strategy for addressing them. I would 

like to express my sincere gratitude to the House of Representatives and this committee for your interest in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

I recently returned from a trip to the region and I can tell that 

the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina share our desire to see their 

country integrated with the West. We have a long history of good 

relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat Isis, a solid partner on counterterrorism and 

a proactive counterpart in efforts to limit the spread of violent extremism. 

The country is, however, facing its most serious challenges since 

the 1990s, which left unchecked could have serious consequences 

for Western Balkans, Europe, and the United States. There is a 

real risk that national elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina this fall 

could fail to produce a government unless political leaders can 

reach agreement on reforms to the country’s electoral law. Without 

a government, the country could face a prolonged post-election crisis during which progress would stall on pressing objectives such 

as tackling corruption, strengthening rule of law, countering violent extremism, and furthering the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Basic governmental responsibilities such as passing a budget 

would become impossible. Most importantly, such internal problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina open the door to malign actors 

such as Russia which is intent on sowing chaos in the region and 

thwarting Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic future. 

To ensure that election results can be implemented, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina’s political leaders must find compromises that balance 

the collective rights of the country’s three constituent peoples, 

Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, with the individual rights of all citizens both of which are enshrined in the constitution. The tension 

between these principals has been reflected in a number of cases 

filed with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

the European Court of Human Rights. Current electoral reform efforts are aimed at finding balanced solutions consistent with the 

decisions of these courts. 

The most pressing reform issue concerns elections to the upper 

chamber of Parliament known as the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 2016, the Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral mechanism to establish 

the House of Peoples was inconsistent with the constitution and 

gave the state Parliament 6 months to fix the election law. When 

Parliament failed to do so, the Court invalidated these sections of 

the law and in doing so effectively eliminated the legal basis for establishing the House of Peoples. Without a fully constituted House 

of Peoples, it will be impossible to form either the Federation government or the state level House of Peoples, the upper House of the 

Parliamentary Assembly. 

5

The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights have also ruled in numerous cases 

that constitutional provisions governing elections to the presidency 

are discriminatory. Under the current setup, anyone who is not 

from one of the three major ethnic groups is ineligible to run for 

President. Fixing this would require amending the state constitution, a time-consuming task that will require significant political 

will. We have seen no proposal that satisfactorily addresses this 

issue. Because of time constraints, we are urging the political parties to prioritize reforms related to the House of Peoples and hold 

off further consideration of the presidency until after the October 

elections. 

The State Department is engaged at all levels in support of efforts to reform the electoral process. Over the last year, we have 

met regularly with the leaders of key political parties to encourage 

them to work together toward consensus. Ambassador Maureen 

Cormack and her staff at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo have led 

an electoral reform facilitation process since last October, bringing 

parties together to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. I had 

the opportunity to meet with all three members of the presidency 

while in Sarajevo earlier this month as well as with other leaders 

from across the political spectrum. 

We have also engaged international partners who support Bosnia 

and Herzegovina’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions to discuss how to best 

advance electoral reform and promote rule of law. In addition to 

helping political leaders agree on electoral reforms, we are taking 

steps to shore up rule of law and stamp out corruption by pressing 

the government to accelerate reforms and providing targeted assistance. We are also urging political leaders and criminal justice institutions to demonstrate the political will and courage necessary to 

investigate, prosecute, and punish corrupt actors and the organized 

crime groups they protect far more aggressively. 

We are working to spur economic growth by improving the business climate. A stable, prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina that is 

integrated within the Western community of nations and is a 

strong partner on counterterrorism helps make America safer, is a 

better place for U.S. business, and will bolster peace, stability, and 

prosperity in the region. These goals are ambitious but we are committed to seeing a democratic, prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina 

closely partnered with the United States in advancing our common 

interests. 

Thank you very much and I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]

6


29816a-1.eps

Testimony by Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Palmer 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

"The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia and the Western Balkans" 

April18, 2018 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and Members of the Committee, thank you for 

inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the challenges that we see in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and our strategy for addressing them. I would like to express my sincere gratitude 

to the House of Representatives and this Committee for your interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

I recently returned from a trip to the region, and I can tell you that the people of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina share our desire to see their country integrated with the West. 

We have a long history of good relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a member of the 

Global Coalition to Defeat lSlS, a solid partner on counter-terrorism, and a proactive counterpart 

in efforts to limit the spread of violent extremism. The country is, however, facing its most 

serious challenges since the 1990s, which, left unchecked, could have serious consequences for 

the Western Balkans, Europe, and the United States. 

Electoral Reform 

There is a real risk that national elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) this fall could fail to 

produce a government unless political leaders can reach agreement on refonns to the country's 

electoral law. Without a government, the country could face a prolonged post-election crisis, 

during which progress would stall on pressing objectives such as tackling corruption, 

strengthening rule of law, countering violent extremism, and furthering the country's EuroAtlantic integration. There is considerable risk that corrupt actors would use the opportunity to 

underrnine state institutions and further weaken the the rule of law. Basic governmental 

responsibilities such as passing a budget would become impossible. Most importantly, such 

internal problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina open the door to malign actors such as Russia, 

which is intent on sowing chaos in the region and thwarting Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic future. 

To ensure that election results can be implemented, Bosnia and Herzegovina's political 

establishment must find compromises that balance the collective rights of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina's three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) with the individual rights 

of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of which are enshrined in the constitution .. The 

tension between these often opposing political systems principles has been reflected in a number 

of cases filed with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court 

of Human Rights. Current electoral refonn efforts will need to be aimed at finding balanced 

solutions that are consistent with the decisions of these courts. 

The most pressing reform issue concerns elections to the upper chamber of Parliament, known as 

the House of Peoples, of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 2016, the 

Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral mechanism to establish the Federation House of 

Peoples was inconsistent with the constitution and gave the state Parliament six months to fix the 
7


29816a-2.eps

election law. When Parliament failed to do so, the court invalidated these sections of the law, 

and in doing so etTectively eliminated the legal basis for establishing the House of Peoples. 

Without a fully constituted House of Peoples, it will be impossible to fonn either the Federation 

Government or the state-level House of Peoples, the upper house of the Parliamentary Assembly. 

In consequence, neither the Federation nor the state-level government would be able to adopt 

legislation. 

The multi ethnic town ofMostar poses a similar problem on a more localized scale. The state 

parliament failed to amend sections of the electoral law that the Constitutional Court had 

declared unconstitutional, so the court struck them down. As a result, Mostar has not held local 

elections since 2008. 

The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights 

have also ruled in numerous cases that constitutional provisions governing elections to the 

Presidency are discriminatory. Under the current setup, anyone who is not from one of the three 

major ethnic groups is ineligible to run for president. Fixing this would require amending the 

state constitution, a time-consuming task that will require significant political will. We have 

seen no proposal that satisfactorily addresses this issue. Because of the length of time needed to 

accomplish this, we are urging the political parties to prioritize reforms related to the House of 

Peoples and hold off further consideration of the Presidency until after the October elections. 

The State Department has engaged at all levels in support of efforts to reform electoral processes. 

Over the past year, we have met regularly with the leaders of key political parties to encourage 

them to work toward consensus. Ambassador Maureen Connack and her staff at the U.S. 

Embassy in Sarajevo have led an electoral reform facilitation process since last October, bringing 

parties together to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. I had the opportunity to meet with all 

three members of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Presidency while in Sarajevo April 3-4, as well as 

with other leaders from across the political spectrum. We have also engaged international 

partners who support Bosnia and Herzegovina's Euro-Atlantic ambitions to discuss how to best 

advance electoral refonn and promote rule oflaw in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Addressing Challenges 

These challenges are formidable, but we are and must remain active in helping Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to confront them. In addition to helping political leaders agree on electoral reforms, 

we are taking steps to shore up rule of law and stamp out corruption by pressing the government 

to accelerate reforms and providing targeted assistance. We are also urging political leaders and 

criminal justice institutions to demonstrate the political will and courage necessary to investigate, 

prosecute, and punish corrupt actors and the organized crime groups they protect far more 

aggressively. Additionally, we are working to spur economic growth by improving the business 

climate. 

2 
8


29816a-3.eps

Conclusion 

A stable, prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina that is integrated within the Western Community 

of Nations and is a strong partner on counter-terrorism helps make America safer, is a better 

place for U.S. business, and will bolster peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Political 

leaders must commit themselves to the deep reforms needed to make the country a success. We 

need to help them to make these necessary refonns and push back against Russian malign 

influence and other external threats. These goals are ambitious, but we are committed to seeing a 

democratic, prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina, closely partnered with the United States in 

advancing our common interests. 

3 
9

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much for that testimony today. What are the chances, where do you have us, are we 

going to avert a major crisis or is it a coin flip? Is it 50/50? Is it 

hey, we have it all straightened out, we are just now doing things 

underneath the radar screen? 

Mr. PALMER. I don’t want to underestimate the challenge, Mr. 

Chairman. This is a difficult set of negotiations that are ongoing 

between and amongst the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am 

reluctant to put a number on it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me put it this way. If you are over 

50 percent you are optimistic, right? If you are under 50 percent 

you are pessimistic? 

Mr. PALMER. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What are you? 

Mr. PALMER. For me, Mr. Chairman, I am committed to working 

as hard as we can to help these guys get across the finish line. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, that is a good answer there. That is political——

Mr. PALMER. In that case, sir, I am going to stop right there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Do you really think that it is possible for them to give up this sort of ethnic organizational structure 

that we brought in, everybody brought in as part of the way to end 

the actual killing that was going on? Can we now drift away from 

that and is that possible? 

Mr. PALMER. Chairman, I don’t think that they need to give it 

up as such and I don’t think that is what anybody is looking for 

out of this process or, really, what anybody thinks is realistic. The 

goal is to adjust and amend the electoral law in such a way to ensure that the balance between the collective rights of the constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, and the rights of individual citizens of Bosnia, not all of whom belong to one of these 

three ethnic groups——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Mr. PALMER [continuing]. That that balance is struck appropriately in a manner that is consistent with the Bosnian Constitution, consistent with international norms, and with European law. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you know, something that has to be 

fine-tuned that much, it seems to me that it is very hard for us to 

fine tune things overseas. America is usually coming with a sledgehammer which is what we did during the Balkan War last time. 

We came in with a sledgehammer. We were bombing Belgrade for 

Pete’s sakes. And I think that our heavy hand in that region 

helped end that mass of killing and I think we can be proud that 

we stood with our allies in Western Europe and accomplished that 

in saving a lot of lives. I don’t know from what you are saying that 

what we are looking at right now whether or not we came up with 

a solution or just a stopgap proposal that people are trying to implement until the fighting starts again. 

Let me ask you this. If fighting does break out in Bosnia, let’s 

say, for example, would that spill over into the rest of the Balkans 

or would you think that would be able to be contained right in Bosnia? 

Mr. PALMER. That is a complex hypothetical question, Mr. Chairman, and I am——

10

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Of course it is. 

Mr. PALMER [continuing]. Reluctant to engage in hypotheticals. 

And at this point we see no immediate risk of violence in Bosnia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. PALMER. But I mean certainly our experience in the past has 

been that violence in any place in the Balkans has an immediate 

and negative effect on stability within its neighbors across the region. It would be a profound concern. Were that to be the case in 

Bosnia, I think that the risk of spillover of that violence into undermining overall regional stability would be significant. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, sure. Yes, eventually what you have is, 

you know, your Croatians, you have your Serbians, and you have 

of course your Albanians there, and these people have, they are different religions. They have a huge history of conflict over centuries 

and I think that it would be naive to think that is going to be easy 

for us to just sort of hold hands and come up with a compromise 

that will prevent them to not kill each other. But we will see. 

Could you tell me—and by the way, again I think we need to, 

as Congressman Meeks mentioned, we need to be proud of you 

folks who have been doing the bidding of the United States of 

America to try to be a peacekeeper in that area. There is nothing, 

I think, more honorable than being peacekeepers and peacemakers. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But there is the yin and the yang. Are there 

negative forces? What about that we have the Chinese are now recognizable players in the area. We have the Turks and the Turks 

seem to be going in exactly the wrong direction. And now we have 

the Russians, okay. If you could like go into it very quickly, are 

these players being a positive influence or is this a drag? What is 

your analysis of these various things? 

But also, by the way, we have to recognize that, you know, radical Islam is still around and that is something people are worried 

about. So what about those outside factors? 

Mr. PALMER. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, it is something we watch 

very closely. The outside actor who is of particular concern to us 

at this point in time is the Russian Federation and their goals. Not 

just in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but across the region are fundamentally at odds with our goals. We are working to help the 

countries of the Western Balkans integrate into European and 

Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Russians are working assiduously 

to sow distrust and discord. This is of concern to us. 

It is a concern to us what it is that is happening at the state to 

state level and it is also of concern to us in terms of what is happening in terms of Russian disinformation, Russian support for 

groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are working to tear apart 

the social fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you think they are being, the Russians are 

playing a role of provocateur? 

Mr. PALMER. I think that is a perfectly reasonable description, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Shocking, shocking. We will go back to 

maybe a second round with this witness. 

And, Mr. Meeks? 

11

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I am going to drop the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary. Let me ask this question. 

Mr. PALMER. It is a mouthful. 

Mr. MEEKS. There are certain Bosnian Croat political leaders, 

particularly those from the HDZ political party, who claim to speak 

on behalf of the entire Bosnian Croat community. Is that community really united in its views? I mean they are saying it, but is 

it really united in its views and do those living in Central Bosnia 

share the aims and the goals of those living in—I can’t get this out 

of mouth——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Herzegovina. 

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. Herzegovina? 

Mr. PALMER. That is a complex question, Ranking Member 

Meeks. I would say that, you know, there is no group anywhere in 

the Balkans that is entirely homogenous in terms of their goals 

and aspirations, their political orientation, their understanding of 

their own self-interests so all of these communities are complex. 

We speak in shorthand and the shorthand mantra that we have for 

Bosnia is one country, two entities, three constituent peoples. I had 

that tattooed somewhere on the back of my hand so I don’t forget. 

But within those constituent communities you will find a wide 

spectrum of opinions. However, we do have duly elected leaders 

from these communities. We have political parties that through a 

competitive political process have come to the fore to represent the 

interests of their communities. And what we are trying to do at 

this point is to work together with these representatives of the constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina to try and find a path 

forward toward mutual agreement and that is our goal. We don’t 

support any particular resolution, any particular set of electoral reforms. We do want to see electoral reforms that are robust, that are 

durable, that are consistent with Bosnia’s constitutions and international norms and the rulings of the European courts given Bosnia’s aspirations to eventually become a member of the European 

Union. 

Mr. MEEKS. And let me ask this question which is particularly 

sensitive and enlightening to me. Given the history of us here even 

in the United States in trying to, when you have people of different 

ethnicities trying to live together living in the same communities—

I am one of the product where one way we tried to overcome that 

and we are still trying to do it to a degree in the United States is 

integrate schools so that people are going to school together. They 

go in, they learn about one another, they understand that, you 

know, they have different ethnicities but they still have the same 

kind of blood and organs and everything, they are human beings. 

What are we doing? Are we doing anything to try to help along 

to end segregation among students on ethnic lines and having them 

going to school together and things of that nature? 

Mr. PALMER. Yes, Mr. Meeks. We are working through a variety 

of programs and assistance efforts and activities to promote tolerance, to create opportunities in particular for young people to interact, to ensure that the curriculums of the schools are to the extent 

possible stripped of the kinds of heated rhetoric that can pit neighbor against neighbor, something that we saw on too regular of a 

basis in the Balkans in the 1990s. 

12

This is a challenging environment for this. The traditions in the 

Balkans, the political traditions are different than they are in the 

United States. We have a tradition of prioritizing the rights of the 

individual. In the Balkans the rights of individuals are also significant, but they also do have a degree of comfort and experience with 

collective rights, group rights that are a little bit alien to American 

political culture. And so what we are trying to help them do is to 

find a balance between this concept of collective rights, the rights 

of a community, the rights of a constituent people which are enshrined in the Dayton constitution, the Constitution of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, to balance those collective rights against the rights of 

the individual and find a way for the society to work and function 

as smoothly and effectively as it can. It is a different tradition than 

the American tradition, but it is one that we feel can be entirely 

consistent with a democratic future for Bosnia. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I know he says we are going to another 

round so, all right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Perry? 

Mr. PERRY. First, Mr. Chairman, thank you and Ranking Member Meeks for allowing me unanimous consent to come in and sit 

in on the meeting. Secretary, good to see you. Last month I sent 

a letter to the Assistant Secretary Mitchell. Oh, and dobar dan to 

anybody in the crowd here. 

Regarding the issue, the United States has significant investment and it has been 25, 26 years on now, and I think this is systematic of the Dayton Accord, which in my mind wasn’t really supposed to last, you know, more than 20 years. I mean it was up to 

the country to come up with changes that more suited their circumstances and let the people and those citizens decide that. And 

I did get a response to my inquiry from Ms. Waters, and I suppose 

she was as descriptive as she could be, but it is pretty broad ranging and so a couple specific questions. 

If the three parties can’t come together with some agreement 

what are the range of options? Can it be delayed? Is that realistic? 

Can you put a—and I understand you are not making these decisions, but you must be hearing the discussions and things are 

looming and, you know, you just run out of time to implement some 

of this stuff. And as I recall, I mean when I was there we had an 

election and 2,500 parties, right, individual political parties or 

something along that line. If you imagine how unpleasant these 

elections here in the United States, imagine that there. 

So, I am wondering what the other options are. I am also wondering about capabilities. Since, you know, a lot of the weapons 

were taken out of the country and so on and so forth, what are the 

capabilities of the different factions, you know, other than sowing 

discord, et cetera, or Russia and Turkey providing anything hard, 

so to speak, that could be used or, you know, is that available? 

And then, finally, are there significant dates surrounding the 

election? Because I can’t remember all this stuff, but it seems as 

I recall that in this country they seem to memorialize certain dates 

that are associated with infractions going to the past. And so if 

there are certain dates that come up around election time where 

certain infractions of the past occurred that might be an opportunity, unfortunately, to reignite tensions or sore feelings. 

13

And so I just—and what is—I know I am giving you a laundry 

list here. Where does this issue fall on the State Department’s priority list for Bosnia, because as Mr. Meeks talked about one school, 

two different, or two schools under one roof, I mean I am sure that 

is a priority, corruption remains a priority. There is a lot of priorities. But I am wondering where this falls in the priority for State 

as far as you know. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you for those questions, Mr. Perry. Let’s 

begin at the top, I suppose, with this issue of what the alternatives 

are. And I would put to you, sir, that there is really no point where 

we stop working these issues. That at no point are we going to 

wash our hands of Bosnia and Herzegovina or are we going to say 

that this problem is simply too hard and we surrender. 

Mr. PERRY. I am not implying that, but I am wondering if at 

some point where this is always an ongoing issue of constitutional 

provisions and the governance and so on and so forth but this I 

think at some point reaches crisis level. And I don’t know at what 

point State Department considers it such, but I sent a letter last 

month so obviously I am already there. 

Mr. PALMER. The crisis point that we are looking at, Mr. Perry, 

is the elections in the fall in October and the risk that these elections fail in the baseline responsibility of an election which is to 

produce a government. And if Bosnia doesn’t have a government, 

you know, they can stumble along for some time with people in acting capacities with technical mandates. There is experience with 

this in that part of the world, but there comes a point where the 

failure to adopt a budget means that they don’t have the money 

available to make the necessary expenditures and when basic services, and when you stop paying war veterans, when you stop providing pensions, when you stop collecting the trash, that is when 

people go out in the streets and that produces instability that is 

visible and dangerous to all. 

So we would like to avoid getting to that point and the negotiations that we are supporting in facilitating in Sarajevo right now 

are aimed at helping the parties reach an agreement that will prevent that crisis. I can’t tell you exactly when that will happen. 

Mr. PERRY. I mean I appreciate that, but yet I haven’t heard any 

other option other than we hope they get to a consensus which is—

look, we are all hoping. I think everybody in the room is interested 

in that. But if they don’t, what is the reality here? 

Mr. PALMER. Sure. I think the answer to that, Mr. Perry, would 

be if they don’t and they get to October and there is no government 

and you have this incipient crisis that you try again, right, and you 

try again with the pressures of the budget breathing down your 

neck. And when there is pressure on the political leaders to avert 

the kind of crisis, the kind of civil unrest——

Mr. PERRY. I know I have asked you a lot of questions and I am 

way over. So we will just continue the conversation, I hope. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

I am looking at this political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I can’t 

make heads or tails of it. It looks like the NCAA tournament bracketing. 

Mr. PALMER. Yes, it is pretty complicated, sir. 

14

Mr. SIRES. I mean, but can you tell me if the Dayton Accord 

needs to be reformed? 

Mr. PALMER. Well, I think that what we are talking about here, 

Mr. Sires, is in fact reforming the Dayton Accords at the micro 

level. We are trying to make adjustments to the system that Dayton established to help the Bosnian political system fit more 

smoothly into the international system to accommodate international and European norms. 

One of the big things that needs to get fixed in Bosnia is the 

method of selecting the presidency. The problem with that I think 

is pretty clear. If you are not a Serb and you are not a Croat or 

you are not a Bosniak, you cannot run for the presidency of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. There is something fundamentally wrong with 

that and that shortcoming has been recognized in a number of decisions by the European courts fixing that, amending that. Finding 

a way to resolve that conundrum will require changing the constitution that is changing Dayton because the constitution is part 

of Dayton. 

So yes, there will need to be changes. I would not argue that it 

is necessary at this point to consider wholesale changes. I wouldn’t 

throw the whole thing out and start over again, but to work in 

making the immediate amendments and fixes and reforms that are 

necessary to make that spaghetti-gram more functional. 

Mr. SIRES. And what are the prospects of joining the EU? 

Mr. PALMER. Long term? Long term there is a process. It is going 

to take time. Bosnia has a lot of reforms that it needs to implement, reforms related to governance, reforms related to rule of law, 

reforms related to transparency, accountability, functionality; so it 

is our hope and expectation that the process of aspiring to be a 

member of the European Union, opening the negotiations, opening 

and closing the various chapters that are part of that accession 

process that that will help Bosnia make the reforms necessary to 

be more functional, to be more effective, to be more viable as a unitary state. 

Mr. SIRES. In looking at this chart, the Central Bank, would that 

be the Treasury comparable to ours? 

Mr. PALMER. No, there is a Central Bank separate from the Ministry of Finance. So I think it is probably closer to the Federal Reserve. 

Mr. SIRES. Tough to make this out here. 

Mr. PALMER. Bigger type helps. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will have time for a couple minutes more 

from each of the members. Let me just note that if this doesn’t 

come about any faster than what we have seen in the last 25 years 

in terms of reaching compromises, it seems that your goal, that the 

goal you are outlining is that we are going to get everybody ready 

and we are going to put them into the EU and they are going to 

be in the EU. I don’t think the EU is going to be around that long. 

So, I mean I hate to tell you this, but I will give you the honest 

assessment from here. I think the EU is on the way out. 

And, however, I do think that it is possible that a new type of 

coalition is forming in Europe that will include, could go all the 

way down into the Balkans from what we consider Central and 

15

what, Eastern Europe now with Poland and Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, maybe Romania and Bulgaria, maybe Serbia, et 

cetera. That may be what you end up with when all is said and 

done. I don’t know. 

Do these people—let me ask you this. I am not an expert, although I have been there thanks to Joe and Shirley actually took 

me there once, but do Serbs and Croatians and the Albanians and 

like with the Kosovo, do they speak different languages? Can they 

talk to one another? 

Mr. PALMER. The issue of language is intensely political in the 

Balkans, so Croats will tell you they speak Croatian. Bosniaks will 

tell you they speak Bosnian. Serbs speak Serbian. I understand 

them all. So they can speak to each other. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. PALMER. There is different words, there is different accents, 

but they are mutually intelligible for sure. Albanians are a different language all together. So it is not a Slavic language, it is unrelated to any of the other languages. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what percentage of the Bosnian population speaks that language? 

Mr. PALMER. Of the Bosnian population that speaks Albanian? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, do they? 

Mr. PALMER. It would be under one, I am pretty sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So that is small. 

Mr. PALMER. Very small minority. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many speak Croatian and is that different than Serbian? 

Mr. PALMER. They are mutually intelligible, Mr. Chairman, so I 

don’t know that we have a language count. I think if you were to 

do a census, and again the issue with the census is pretty politicized too, but the numbers who identify as Croat could be taken as 

a placeholder for the numbers who speak Croatian. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there an ethnic divide here as well, meaning can someone see someone walking down the street and say ahha that is a Serbian or ah-ha that is a Bosnian or whatever? 

Mr. PALMER. Almost certainly not, Mr. Chairman. There might 

be some differences of dress particularly for religious Bosniaks that 

would be identifiable, but in general, no. You can’t just look at 

somebody and know what they are. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It sounds like a hell of a project to try to get 

them to work together, seeing that if we can’t see the differences 

but they feel it so strongly and that is fascinating. Well, thank you 

for the insights you have given us today. We of course wish you 

success. 

And Mr. Meeks, do you have any other questions? 

Mr. MEEKS. Well, I will just kind of ask one quick one. Do Serbia——

[Audio malfunction in hearing room.] 

Mr. PALMER. Absolutely, Ranking Member Meeks, they do. I 

have spoken about this issue at length with senior decision makers 

in both Zagreb and Belgrade and both governments understand 

that they would stand to lose significantly from instability in Bosnia. That the challenges that Bosnia poses are not specific to Bosnia, they are region wide. And so there is considerable interest on 

16

the part of the governments in Zagreb and the government in Belgrade in partnering with us, working together trying to help us 

move Bosnia closer toward a stable, prosperous——

Mr. MEEKS. Actually doing something to advance——

Mr. PALMER. They are working with us. I think there is more 

that we can expect from them and we have made that case in both 

Zagreb and Belgrade. Certainly Zagreb has a lot of influence over 

the leadership of the Bosnian and Croat community as Belgrade 

has a lot of influence over the Bosnian and Serb community and 

the Bosnian and Serb leadership, and we have encouraged them to 

use that influence constructively in pursuit of peace and stability. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MEEKS. No, I just forgot because I just needed to say one 

thing, because, you know, the chairman is my good friend, et 

cetera, but there are times that we disagree on certain things. And 

I just want to say that whatever our disagreement is it will not be 

in the best interest of the United States if we don’t have a strong 

EU. And I would hope that the EU will continue to be moving and 

thriving and folks are looking and pushing and going that direction. And I think that the EU nations are looking to work together 

to make sure because we didn’t know how bad things were postWorld War II. We have been much, it has been much safer and 

much better with a united Europe and we have to continue to focus 

and make sure that happens. So I just had to get that in there for 

the record. 

Mr. PALMER. I share that hope and expectation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Successful. You can have an independent 

bank that dominates your economic system. Wonder who—we 

don’t—anyway that is a whole other issue about who controls 

money supply and whether or not they—that that is something 

that should be done by people who are elected by the people of the 

country or whether that can just be independent. But that is a 

whole other issue that we will talk about in another hearing. There 

you go. 

Again, thank you. Let me ask you one thing. So are the Serbs 

playing a positive role now in what you are talking about today in 

trying to find this peace or are they playing a negative role? 

Mr. PALMER. I think that the government in Belgrade has the 

same goals and objectives that we have for Bosnia which is an integral, stable, prosperous country that functions. Do I think there is 

more that Belgrade can do to help us secure that goal? Yes, sir, I 

do. And we have been in discussions with President Vucic, Prime 

Minister Brnabic and others as to what it is that we would hope 

Belgrade would contribute to that effort. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

And Mr. Perry, do you have a couple minutes that you would like 

to——

Mr. PERRY. Of course, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. PERRY. So getting back, Mr. Secretary, capabilities, if you 

will. Are there capabilities that exist that we need to be aware of 

from a military standpoint, from a police standpoint, or is it just 

going to be harsh language if there is discord? 

17

Mr. PALMER. At this point, sir, we would not anticipate that this 

political challenge becomes a military challenge. This is not, Bosnia 

is not on the brink of war. 

Mr. PERRY. That is good to know, but what are the capabilities? 

Mr. PALMER. If you are thinking about just in terms of raw capabilities, there is certainly plenty of weapons that are sloshing 

around the Western Balkans and there have been for a long time. 

There is an army that is a unitary army. Bosnia only has one 

army. One of the great accomplishments post-Dayton was negotiating the reunification of the Bosnian army. In terms of——

Mr. PERRY. Does the Bosnian army include heavy weapons like 

tanks, army personnel carriers, air force? 

Mr. PALMER. They do have some heavy weapons, artillery tanks, 

APCs. I think the air force is such, maybe a few helicopters. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Mr. PALMER. You know, there is also the police forces in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina which there are a myriad, and police forces in 

that part of the world are more heavily armed than police in the 

United States. So that is another issue to be aware of, to watch out 

for. The Ministry of Interior forces in Republika Srpska recently 

purchased several thousand automatic weapons, assault rifles. 

Mr. PERRY. Where did they purchase those? 

Mr. PALMER. They purchased from Serbia. 

Mr. PERRY. From Serbia, and it is in accordance with the Dayton 

Accord, correct? 

Mr. PALMER. It is not inconsistent with the Dayton Accords, but 

it is something that raised some eyebrows in Bosnia. 

Mr. PERRY. Because it is not in the military but it is in the police 

force, but it——

Mr. PALMER. Police force, and people do remember from back in 

the ’90s that the police fought. 

Mr. PERRY. Right, which is the reason I asked the question. 

Okay, what about any significant dates surrounding the election 

that might be of import knowing that they memorialize atrocities 

and infractions time after time? 

Mr. PALMER. There are an awful lot of those dates, Mr. Perry, 

and I can’t off the top of my head think of any that would surround 

the dates of the elections in October, but they haven’t announced 

those dates yet. 

Mr. PERRY. Is that something the State Department considers to 

be mindful of, the dates, locations, et cetera, in this whole discussion? Or if not, and maybe it is just in my mind, but it just seems 

to me it was an important part of the culture in reinforcing some 

of these mindsets. 

Mr. PALMER. That is certainly true, sir. And I think in terms of 

looking at when the Central Election Commission might actually 

set the date for the elections in October, no one is going to be more 

sensitive to those dates than the Bosnians. 

Mr. PERRY. Right, right. 

Mr. PALMER. So I think that we would work with the parties to 

ensure that the electoral process is not only held under conditions 

that are agreed by all, but that the process of moving ahead with 

the balloting is also as smooth and trouble-free as could possibly 

be. So we will be working with them closely on the ground. Our 

18

Embassy is very sensitive to the nuances of Bosnian politics and 

pays very careful attention to things like significant dates. 

Mr. PERRY. All right, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many people are in your Embassy? 

Mr. PALMER. How many Americans? Mr. Chairman, I can’t give 

you an actual number. I am going to have to get back to you with 

that. I will do a little bit of research and I will get you a hard number. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As our panel is sitting down I would like to 

thank Representative Laughlin that is and make sure I pronounce 

Joe DioGuardi as well for their help in making sure that we had 

a well-rounded group of witnesses. And I appreciate that very 

much to our two former members, Representative Laughlin of 

Texas and DioGuardi from New York. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, we can hear it there. We have four 

witnesses to join us now for our second panel. First witness is Dr. 

Sasha Toperich, okay, a Senior Fellow and Director of Mediterranean Basin and Middle East and Gulf Initiative at Johns Hopkins 

University. He serves as the chairman of the organizing committee 

for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Vision 2020 project at the University 

Center for Transatlantic Relations. 

We have—now you are going to have to correct me if I am 

wrong—Philippe Leroux——

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Leroux. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Leroux. Philippe Leroux-Martin, okay. He is 

the Director for the Rule of Law, Justice, and Security at the 

United States Institute of Peace. Prior to this he headed the Legal 

Department at the International Civilian Office in Kosovo and led 

the public law unit in the Office of High Representative in Sarajevo. He is the author of Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lessons 

from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Then we have with us Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi who is my dear 

friend, but I am mispronouncing your last name I am sure. I have 

done that for years, okay. You have got it—and Joe, her husband 

Joe who served with us in the United States Congress from New 

York. And I say Congressman Laughlin, are you here? He was here 

a moment ago. Oh, way in the back. Thank both of you for your 

help in organizing this hearing. 

Shirley is a Balkan Affairs Adviser to the Albanian American 

Civic League. She is a returning witness to this subcommittee. She 

has a long record of writing and speaking out on political developments in the region, particularly on the topic of how to bring a lasting peace to Kosovo. And I have appreciated their input and guidance over the years. 

And then Kurt Bassuener. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Bassuener. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Say it again. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Bassuener. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Bassuener, okay, is the co-founder of the Democratization Policy Council, a global initiative for accountability 

and democracy promotion. He co-authored a recent report entitled, 

19

Are we there yet? International impatience vs. a long-term strategy 

for a viable Bosnia. 

So are we there yet? Okay, we are going to find out. He too has 

worked for the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, the 

Balkan Action Council as well the Balkan Institute. 

So we welcome our witnesses. We ask that you try to keep your 

testimony down to 5 minutes. You can put whatever else into the 

congressional record, and then we will have some dialogue. 

So, Doctor, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF SASHA TOPERICH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN, MIDDLE 

EAST, AND GULF INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC 

RELATIONS, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. TOPERICH Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, members of the committee, 

thank you very much for inviting me today to testify. I will keep 

my remarks brief and I ask that my full testimony be entered into 

the record. 

Today’s hearing, Legacy of Dayton, Future of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

and the Western Balkans, could not come at a more critical time. 

In just 20 days, Bosnia-Herzegovina will pass a deadline by which 

it has to pass legislation to comply with the Constitutional Court 

to reform electoral law. There is no compromise political agreement 

in sight. Parliament and the Bosnian political leaders should be 

pressed by allies at home and abroad to pass the electoral law 

change before the October elections. The alternative to carry out 

the elections in October without the passing of the electoral law reform could bring Bosnia-Herzegovina into a constitutional and political chaos. 

Also, for 8 years Bosnian political leaders failed to implement 

Sejdic-Finci, European Court of Human Rights verdict that would 

allow minorities such as Jews to be elected President. These 

changes are prerequisite for Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the European Union. Other citizens such as Ms. Zornic also won the lawsuits against Bosnia-Herzegovina as she was being found ineligible 

to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the presidency as 

she refused to declare affiliation with any constituent people, 

namely Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, but simply wanted to run for the 

office as a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Due to the political stalemate, citizens of city of Mostar have 

been deprived of voting rights for both 2012 and 2016 elections. 

This simply should not be case in 2018. The leaders in BosniaHerzegovina have developed a bad habit of ignoring court rulings 

they dislike and to attend to important issues at the very last moment and that often only when pressured by the European Union 

and the United States. Bosnia-Herzegovina must develop a new 

habit of respecting court judgments even if politically unpopular. 

Parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina need to reform the electoral law or 

we could face a crisis in the country and instability in the region. 

Simultaneously, they need to work on finding solution to all courts’ 

verdicts in order to enable basic rights for all of its citizens. 

20

Inactivity can lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into danger of political 

instability that will inevitably lead to regional instability which 

will only play into Russia to further pursue her agenda. Milorad 

Dodik, President of Republika Srpska, one of the two sub-entities 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina who is sanctioned by the United States, continues to deny genocide over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim in Srebrenica. 

Close to Putin, his continued separatist rhetoric remains to be the 

highest threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina and regional stability. 

Given this, I would like to present the committee with three recommendations. Congress and the Trump administration should 

take a leadership role in finding a solution and strongly support 

our Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina effort that work closely with 

European Union in mediating positive solution to election law. It 

is encouraging that Wess Mitchell, our Assistant Secretary for European, Eurasian Affairs is now more engaged in the Balkans. The 

U.S. should reach out to our European partners and request them 

to follow U.S. sanctions on Milorad Dodik with a set of their own, 

as Dodik’s separatist rhetoric continues to represent a serious 

threat to regional stability. 

To counter Russia influence, the United States should work with 

its NATO partners to reach political decision and activate a NATO 

Membership Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina as early as 

this July at the NATO’s next summit in Brussels. This would also 

be an opportunity for Turkey to play a constructive role in advancing security and stability in the Western Balkans through NATO’s 

institutions by helping bringing Bosnia-Herzegovina a step closer 

to the full NATO membership. 

Activation of the MAP of Bosnia-Herzegovina would help reduce 

widespread corruption and would send a strong signal to political 

elites to stop interfering in justice system currently under their 

heavy influence and would reduce their elevated ethnic rhetoric 

with which they manipulate the masses time over again. Improving 

independence of judiciary system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is key to 

stopping political elites in using their mechanisms of power to prosecute business community leaders who hold different political 

views, often being racketeered by the politicians for not bowing to 

their pressures. 

In closing, a strong democratic, multiethnic and Euro-Atlantic 

Bosnia-Herzegovina is in the United States’ interest. American 

leaders should do all they can to help make this happen. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toperich follows:]

21


29816b-1.eps

WRITTEN SUBMISSION 

Sasha 'l'opcrich 

Senior fellmv dlld Director of the ~'[ed.iterunean Basin, .i\'Iiddle East dlld Gulf Init1ative at the Center for 

'l'ransatbntic Rel-ations, Paul/f. ~it:.-:e School of \elY-anced International Studies at johns llopkins Llni\'ersity 

Testimony Defore the 

House Committee on Foreign \tlairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

\pn\18, 2018 

Resolving Bosnia's Electoral Crisis 

On 1 December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 1\cnegm-ina (Gil I) mlcd in the I ,jubic Case 

that the BiH election la\\' violated the constitu.tional rights of the const1tuent peoples (the Serbs, Croats, and 

Bosni-aks) gu-aranteed by the Dayton Accords. 'lhc court declared that each constituent people should be able 

to elect its own representatiyes to the Federation TTouse of the People in free and hir elections. Tn the current 

situation, tnetnhers of one constih1ent people can elect the representatiYes of another constih1ent people (i.e., 

Bosniaks could elect Serb representatives to the Federation TTouse of Peoples). The court also found that the 

same pritKiple applies to the election of the members of the three-member Presidency and delegates to the 

country-level House of Peoples. 

This case follo\\'S from a Constitutional court n1ling fron~ 2000 that dechtred that the eqlulity of the three 

Constituent Peoples is the central and O\rer;;rrching principle of the Dayton Constitution. 

'1 'he court ordered the Bill Parliament to pass election lmv reforms "\vi thin six months. Parliament failed to 

comply w1th the court n1ling. If Parliament does not act by MJy 8 to replace the struck-out text of the 

election Lt\Y, the October 2018 general election risks being nullified, potenti~1lly thro"\ving the country into 

political and gm'ernance chaos. TToweyer, parliament can still amend the b\v tight up until the election, but 

that is a Lbmgerous precedent that Hies in the face of democrahc nonns. 

The consequences of nullification include there being no tUlly functioning government and Parliament at 

both the country and fedention (state) level, as well as the impact this will have, including: poss1hle cotnplete 

parJl.lysis of the political system, intenul constitutional cris1s, blocking any future rcfonn efforts, and a high 

risk for regional inst~tb1lrty and outside interference, n~~wipulat10n cwd destabilization by those \vho oppose 

the United States and European L'nion, especially Russia. 

In parallel to this issue, the Europe~m Court of Humrtn Rtghts has ruled n~ultiple times that the BiH 

constitutional provisions regarding \vho can stand for, and be elected to, the state presidency, are 

incompAtible \vith the EuropeAn Convention on Hun~an Rights. Specifically, the Sqdic-Fmci judgment held 

that the ethnicity reqlllretnent for the office of president- that individuals tnust he either Serb, Croat or 

Bosniak- discriminates against citi:,..:ens of BiTT \vho do not identify thetnse]yes as a metnber of one of the 

three constituent peoples, such as Jc\vs, Roma, or others that tnake up minority groups that arc not part of 
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29816b-2.eps

the Constituent Peoples. The ECllR required .Gill to amend the constitution to remoye this discriminatory 

element 111 2009, but several years later no progress has been made. 

'1 'he European L:nion h·as al\vays stated repe·atedly that implementing the S ejdir-Fitui ruling is ·a prerequisite for 

B1H making progress tO\vards becoming a candidate for EC membership. These ECHR n1lings should be 

irnplemented immediately after Bosnia and 1/erzegoviru receiyes the Fll candidacy status, and within the 

framework of the Dayton Peace A.ccord and the constituent rights of the three constituent peoples. 

Other citizens, such as T'vfs. Zornil~, also \:von a b\v suit against BiTT, for being ineligible to stand for election 

to the House of Peoples (second chamber of the State parliament) and to the collective Head of State (the 

Presidency). as she refused to declare affiliation \vith any of the constituent people (namely Bosniaks, Croats 

and Serbs) but sHnpl)' \Vanted to nm as a citl:o;en ofBiH. 

J..lso due to political stalemate, citizens of city of \'los tar have been deprived of ~,-oting rights both in 2012 and 

2016 election. This must not be the case for 2018. 

Simply put: Bosnia and Tlenegovina goven1ment must respect the Dayton Peace :\ccord and the Courts 

mlings. The right; of the Constituent Peoples and the rights of cihzens and minorities must be protected as 

required by the law. 

The ftlilure by the parhament in Bosnia and Herzegm.-ina to address itnportant constitutlonal court n1lings 

poses significant concern for the future democratic trajector)' of the country and its commitment to the n1le 

of Lnv. Th1s also puts Bos111a ~md Herzegovina's EC and NATO aspirations ~tt nsk. 

This isn't just about tixmg a problen~ to deliver one election. Solving this problen~ \Vill make Bosnia and 

1/erzego\-ina a stronger, more representative democracy that represents all of its citizens. 

Current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding Electoral Law 

~\s of today, there is no electoral reform proposal under consider(ltion 111 the D1H Parli(lmentary (lSSetnbly. 

There has been one proposal drafted hy the Croat ptrrties \\Thich p(lssed the House of Peoples 111 July 2017, 

but it\:vas struck dmvn by Bosniak delegates, \\:ho have a majority in the House ofReprese11tath·es. 011e 

I3osmak party mtroduccd a proposal trround the beginning of 201B, hut this \Vas also struck do\\;"11 on the 

same day :1s the Croat propos:1l. As :1 result, there arc no proposals under consider:1tion. 

International Response 

The international community, particularly the EC ~md US, have attempted to bring the various parties 

together to reach a compromise, but so far with little effect. 

The Prc:->idcncy :o rhc legal rcqmren1cnt tCJ cn:->Lirc that 1) c;tch nf rhrcc member:-> nfTio:-ni:t's 

ptesidency legitirnately :~11d dis1inctly represent one of the three ditferent consticuFnt peoples (from tl1e T ,jub1C 

a~d other GJ~c:-;); cm~l2) the po~it:iPn can be held by anY ctizcc of .u-:.y cthr";ic1ty (from rlw ScjdiC-Finci ::md 

other Ef:llR cases). ln shnrt: 
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a. lmplen~enting the tL'{ required by the Lju biC ctse h~ts been dem~wded by the CroJ.t and Serb 

leadership and can implement hy legishtion 0nly. 

b. lmplen~enting the fLx required by the Sejdi(>IIinc case is a prerequisite for EL t~LL·ession. The 

changes here ~eqLrire J constituti::111;1l -;;_mendrne~H. 

\\'ithout grearcr politicallc~Jder:>hip, tbcrc 1:-> a srrcmg chamx th1s curn_·nt n!~gntiating process could r<1pidly 

disintegnte to the henefi: of e>-.lern-al pmJ>.·ers, namely Russia" The Russians ate alret1dy prep,1ring 1o ::ei;..;e on 

thts and :we pushing cnrt anti-U.~:. pr~-·pagan,~]a around the t~1llure to re:Kh J. sc lution. 

Consequence of Failure to Reform the Election Law 

If the lmv is not amendment before the election, Bill '\vould face the follmv--ing consequences: 

1. '111e October 2018 election will occur, but many of the results \'1-·il\ be invalid. 

2. T11e countr)T\Yill only have a partial government~ "\vith no ability to pass la\Ys, including ala\\T to fix this 

crisis. The BTTT federation (one of the t\vo sub-state entities that make up the country) \viii have no 

goYert1met1t or parliament. 

3. Republika Srpska (the other sub-state entity) \vill haYe a full government. Its leader, \'filorad Dodik is a 

close ally of\7ladimir Putin, Ius been sanctioned by the Cnited States, and hJ.s regularly called for 

Repuhlika Srpska to succeed frmn the rest of I3ill- this crisis tnay g-ive him that excuse. 

-l. ·!he path to 1\. '.·ro and the b~L· will be closed to Gil I for the foreseeable future. 

5. Neighboring Cro~1ti~1 ~md Serbia will likely he dra\vn into this crisis, hurting regionrtl st~1hility and Serbirt's 

chances of joining the FC. 

6. Russia \Vlll be able to take advantage of this instability to push thc1r mvn agendas. 

7. Instability could also mcrcasc the nsk that lshmic extremists '\vill usc I3iH as a transit route and base of 

operahons. 

Path Forward 

'1 'here seems be consensus that it is possible to implement the reforms to the electoral b\v rel-ated to the 

H01~se of the People by legislation. However, in~plementing the SejdiC-Pinci tUld other EC.HR rulins-s cannot 

be duac at tbis time \vithout a cn!lstitl;tiona] atnendmenr and there i~ not cmm3h support in the p:rrliamcnt tq 

p<lSS Jn amendmert. Changes tCJ tb_~ elcctotal la\v related to the presidency that implement the LjubiC case, 

hut not the JiCHR rulings, c--111 be ach1eved by lcgislahon only, but, 1deally, all changes to the presidency 

should he made at one time. 
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The political parties ~tll ~tgree that retOrnling the House of the Peoples' election la"\V n~ust happen, but there 1s 

not agrectncnt on how to do this and no parties arc offering nc\v proposals. ScYeral parties' red line is that 

election code for the Presidency must be reformed as part of this process, ideally to be in line \vith both the 

LjubiC case, ZorniC and SejdiL:-Ginc1. 

This result \vill create a goyernment that has true legitimacy to the people it is supposed to represent. Such a 

govenlment\vcJUld therefore also have the legitimacy to make changes to the constih1tion to not only 

irnplement long-ignored FCTTR ruling-s, but also make more fundamental and necessary changes to how the 

countr)' 1s organized and govemed. 

1) ResolYing the election issue is a key indicator of Y>.rhether the nlle of la\\' ~md ci true functioning 

democracy exists in Bosnia and llcnegov-ina. 

a. J ,e·adcrs in Bosnia and 1/cr;,-:egoYina h·aye deY eloped :J bad habit of ignoring court rulings they 

don't agree \Vith and to attend to important issues at a very last minute, often only if pressured. 

b. Bosnian leaders must respect the Dayton Peace Accords, the BiTT Constitutional Court, and the 

European Court ofHumatl Rights or they have no hope for NATO or EU membership. 

c. Bosnia and Herzegovina must develop a new habit of respecting court judgments eYen if 

politically unpopular. 

,\band aid, lulf me,tsure approach will not sufllce. Both ECHR ruling 111 2009, <U1d the Constitutional 

Court's n1lings in 2016 and 2017 striking dmvn the unconstitutional prmrisions of the election law 

is Yery clear: cmy election retOrn~ n~ust respect the rights of the Constituent People enshrined in 

the Dayton -.:\greement ~md n~ust ~u1dress fixes to the election la\.\' for both the House of the 

Peoples and the Presidency and to include implementation of"Sejdic-Finci" ruling. 

Clearly, \vith the ..\-Lly H deadlme loommg, there is little time and lack of political \viii to address SejdicPinci and the Presidency, and in this light, fixing the House of Peoples and Yoting in the city of 

1\losttrr, a city that has been depnvcd of \-oting rights both m 2012 and 201(J elections, due to 

failure of politiGll parties to implement the decision of the country's Constitutional Court, arc 

essential. 

(her 8 years no\v, political leaders in Bosni:J ·and 1/cnegovina failed to implement ECIIR ruling. Youth 

of the country is leavmg. Br~1in drain m Bosnia and HerzegoYina 1s alarmmg. People feel hopeless 

and discouraged with lack of progress. The LlS should make it clear to political leaders \vho 

obstruct ~md procrastinate BiH tr~msatbntic integrations that there ·will be serious consequences 

and the US should be ready to act tmd lead th1s reform as soon as Dosnia and Herzcgcn-uu 

receh·es the F.U candidacy status. 
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Recommendations for the Committee: 

(;iyen this, I \vould like to present the comn1ittee with 3 recotnmendat10ns. 

2) Congress and the Tnm1p ~\.dministration should take a leadership role in finding a solution and 

strongly support our En1bassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EC representcttives in their jomt 

effort to rncdiate a positive solution to the electoral bw and other court verdicts. It is encouraging 

dut \\7ess :~vlitchell, our .;\ssistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian -''\ffairs 1s no\V n1ore 

engaged in the Balkans. 

3) The C.S. should reach out to our European partners and request thctn to follmv U.S. sanctions on 

\'filorad Dodik, with the set of their mvn, as Dodik's separatist rhetoric continues to represent a 

serious threat to regional stability. 

4) To counter Russia int1uence the CS should work w1th its :\JATO partners to reach political decision 

and activate ::\L\ TO _i\Iembership .;\ct1on PLm (-i\L\P) for Bosnia and Herzegovma, ciS early ~ts this 

July. at the N ,'\.HYs summit in Bn1ssels. 

This "\Yould be also an opportunity for Turkey to pby a constn1ctive role in rtdvtmcing security rtnd 

stability in the \\restern Balk-ans, through ~A TO's institutions, by help bringing Bosnia -and 

Herzegovina step closer to full :\J_L\TO metnbership. 

ActiYation of i\fAP for Bosnia and Heri':egoYina \\i()uld help reduce \vide spread corruption and \vould 

send a strong signal to political elites to stop interfering 111 justice systetn, currently under their hcttvy 

intluence, and \VOuld reduce their elevated ethnic rhetoric \Vith which the; manipulate masses times 

and over ag:Un. 

Improving independence of judiciary systen1 in BosnLL ~md Herzegovina 1s key to stopping political 

elites in using their mechanisms of pmver to prosecute business community leaders who hold 

different political views, often being racketeered by the politicians for not bowing to their pressures. 

J..merica must deYote its energy -and intluence to help Bosni-a -and 1/eri':egoYina refonn the \vay its presidents 

rtnd representati>.res ~1re elected. 

J.. strong, democratic, multiethnic, and Euro-Atlantic Bosnia and Her:,.:egovina is in the CS interest. A.merican 

lertders should do ~1ll they can to help n1ake this h~1ppen. 
26

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Leroux-Martin? 

STATEMENT OF MR. PHILIPPE LEROUX-MARTIN, DIRECTOR, 

RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY, U.S. INSTITUTE OF 

PEACE 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. My testimony will cover the following three questions: First, how Bosnia has arrived at the current electoral impasse; second, what solutions have been——

[Off-microphone comment.] 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Of course. How Bosnia has arrived at the 

current electoral impasse; second, what solutions have been put 

forward; and third, what can we learn about the continued efficacy 

of the Dayton Agreement? 

As far as the first question is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I think 

a useful way to understand the dynamic of the current electoral 

impasses in Bosnia today is to think of a complex, interconnected 

power grid in which a critical node is about to lose its energy supply. If we are unable to fix the supply of energy to this critical node 

in the next 6 months, other key components of the grid will be affected. 

The current electoral impasse in Bosnia originates from one of 

Bosnia’s two Federal entities and that is the Federation of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. The Federation entity government has legislative 

branch composed of a House of Representatives and a House of 

Peoples. In December 2016, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia declared certain provisions of Bosnia’s election law that were regulating the election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation to be unconstitutional. The Parliamentary Assembly has to 

date failed to enact new provisions. This has led to a legal vacuum, 

and this legal vacuum is at the very center of the electoral impasse 

we are facing today. 

Absent a solution, several components of Bosnia’s governance 

structure could be paralyzed given that the House of Peoples plays 

a critical role in the formation of governments both at the entity 

Federation level but also at the state central level. Going back to 

my analogy, the Federation’s House of Peoples is a critical node in 

Bosnia’s systems of governance. 

Moving on to my second point about the solutions that I put forward, Mr. Chairman, the Constitutional Court’s decision reignited 

an intense competition between political parties in the Federation 

and has reopened the issue of the representation of Bosnian Croats 

in its governing structures. This competition has taken the form of 

a dispute over various gerrymandering proposals. Political parties 

have proposed amendments through discussions led by the European Union and the United States. The proposals have so far all 

failed as none have sought a genuine compromise. 

Looking forward, I think the United States and EU should obviously remain very flexible vis-a-vis any potential solution, but I 

think an agreement on a solution should meet the following principles, and there are five of them. First, it should comply. Any solution should comply with the constitutional framework of Bosnia. 

27

Second, it should have the political support necessary to engage, to 

ensure passage before the relevant legislatures. Third, it should not 

further undermine Bosnia’s capacity to ensure that its electoral 

system complies with the European Convention for Human Rights. 

Fourth, it should ensure that the right to vote and the right to be 

a candidate for a seat in the Federation House of Peoples is guaranteed for all cantonal delegates belonging to a constituent people. 

And, finally, it should not further undermine Bosnia’s governance 

structure. 

Moving on to the last question about Dayton’s efficacy, Mr. 

Chairman, it is clear that the current electoral impasse is another 

illustration of the deficiencies faced by the complex governance 

structure established at Dayton. It is true that the Dayton constitution is not perfect. It is worth remembering, however, that the 

Dayton Agreement is a peace agreement that was supported by the 

United States, the European Union, and Russia, to stop a brutal 

war. It reestablished freedom of movement throughout the country. 

It allowed more than one million persons who had been displaced 

by the war to exercise their right to return to their homes under 

the peace agreement. 

Although progressing slowly and painfully, Bosnia is nevertheless progressing toward EU and NATO membership today. When 

compared to other recent peace processes, Dayton has been a clear 

success. Many voices have been suggesting a complete overhaul of 

Dayton over the last few years. I would caution that attempts to 

overhaul Dayton may be very hard to implement in reality. I think 

a more effective strategy would be to reform Dayton through a series of incremental agreements and in order to avoid any further 

weakening of the central state, the United States and the EU 

should state that only a united Bosnia with a stronger central level 

of government would be able to join the EU and NATO. 

And, finally, to be successful I think the United States and the 

EU will need to ensure that both Serbia and Croatia play a positive 

role throughout this process. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leroux-Martin follows:]

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United States Institute of Peace 

"The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia 

and the Western Balkans" 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Philippe Leroux-Martin 

Director Rule of Law, Justice and Security 

lJnited States Institute of Peace 

April18, 2018 
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Introduction 

Subcommittee Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the "Dayton Legacy and the Future of 

Bosnia and the Western Balkans." Your attention to this issue is appreciated. 

I testify before you today as the Director for Rule of Law, Justice and Security at the United 

States Institute of Peace, although the views expressed here are my own. USIP was established 

by Congress over 30 years ago as an independent, national institute to prevent and resolve 

violent conflicts abroad, in accordance with US. national interests and values. 

I worked, earlier in my career, as the Head of the Public Law Unit of the Legal Department of 

the Otlice of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) in Sarajevo. I also 

headed the Legal Department of the International Civilian Otlice (ICO) in Kosovo. My 

testimony is informed by this specific experience and perspective. 

I have been asked by the Subcommittee to comment on the electoral impasse engendered by the 

decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to declare certain provisions of 

the current electoral law regulating the election of delegates to the Federation House of Peoples 

unconstitutional. My testimony will cover the following specific questions: ( 1) How Bosnia has 

arrived at the current electoral impasse? (2) What solutions have been put forward? and (3) What 

can we learn about the continued etlicacy of the Dayton framework? 

1. How Bosnia has Arrived at the Current Electoral Impasse? 

Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of a central state government (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 

and two Entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska). Its 

constitutional structure also includes the District of Brcko. 

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's two Entities, is 

itself structured into a federal arrangement with a federal level of government and ten cantons. 

The federal level of government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Entity includes an 

executive, legislative and judicial branch of government. The legislative branch is a bicameral 

body composed of a (1) House of Representatives and a (2) House of Peoples. The House of 

Peoples co-decides all legislation and protects the vital national interest of constituent peoples. 

The current electoral impasse in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerns one of Bosnia's two Entities 

-namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The impasse relates to legal provisions 

regulating the election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

The election of delegates to the Federation House of Peoples is regulated by two main legal 

sources: 

The Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina: a law from the central state government 

adopted by Bosnia and Herzegovina's Parliamentary Assembly. 
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• The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Entity legislation 

providing for the organization of the Entity. 

Elections are scheduled to take place across all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

in October 2018. 

The current impasse stems from decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina in relation to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 2016, the 

Court declared that certain provisions of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulating 

the election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation were unconstitutional (Ljubic 

case). 

The Court requested the central state Parliamentary Assembly to amend the provisions of the 

Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parliamentary Assembly has, to date, failed to do 

so. The Court issued a non-enforcement ruling by which it repealed the disputed provisions of 

the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has led to a legal vacuum. This legal vacuum 

is at the center of the current electoral impasse. 

Impacts ojiegal Vacuum 

The current legal vacuum has at least two major impacts: 

1. Potential paralysis of state and entity governments: The House of Peoples has, in 

addition to its legislative responsibilities, a role to play vis-a-vis the formation of the 

government and legislature of both the Entity and the central state. It must, for example, 

approve the President of the Federation and the cabinet of the Federation. It is also 

responsible to select delegates to the House of Peoples of the central Parliamentary 

Assembly. Its delegates can also block a decision of the Presidency of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. Absent a solution to this legal vacuum, several components of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina's governance structure could therefore be either paralyzed after October 

2018. 

2. Political competition between political parties: the Ljubic decision reignited an intense 

competition between political parties in the Federation and has reopened the issue of the 

representation of Bosnian Croats in its governing structures. 

Political Competition 

Political camps in the Federation Entity are seeking to redesign electoral rules and constituencies 

in ways that would benefit them. This gerrymandering competition can be summarized as a 

competition between tv1ro broad options: 

High Constituency Concentration: The Croatian Democratic Union party of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) dominates the Bosnian Croat political scene in the Federation 

Entity. Its proposals for new election rules have sought to limit the power to elect Croat 

delegates to the Federation House of Peoples to cantons where Bosnian Croats form a 

2 
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majority of the cantonal population. Such proposals have sought to significantly restrictor exclude- the rights of Bosnian Croat delegates from cantons where Bosnian Croats 

are not in the majority of the cantonal population. HDZ BiH is opposed to electoral 

arrangements allowing, according to its perspective, an overrepresentation of Bosnian 

Croat delegates from cantons where they form a small fraction of the cantonal population. 

The Bosnian Croats are in the majority in four of the ten cantons in the Federation Entity 

(Posavina Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, West Herzegovina Canton and Canton 

1 0). All four cantons share a border with neighboring Croatia. 

• Low Constituency Concentration: On the other hand, Sarajevo based parties [Party for 

Democratic Action (SDA), Alliance for a Better Future (SBB), Social Democratic Party 

(SDP), Democratic Front (DF)] oppose the demands of the HDZ BiH. They claim that the 

HDZ proposals seek to disenfranchise Bosnian Croat voters living in cantons where they 

are not in the majority. Those parties largely advocate for maintaining the status-quo. 

Some of them also fear that concentrating voting power in cantons contiguous to 

neighboring Croatia represents the first step of a broader strategy to establish a new Croat 

majority federal unit that could, akin to Republika Srpska, threaten to declare 

independence. 

Some of them insist on the capacity of all cantons to participate in the election of Croat 

delegates to the House of Peoples. Some of the Sarajevo based parties also insist on using 

the prewar census of 1991 to calculate the number of delegates for each canton. The 6 

cantons where Bosnian Croats are currently not in the majority had larger Bosnian Croat 

populations before the war. Using the 1991 census as a basis to elect delegates gives them 

a greater say in the election of Bosnian Croat delegates to the House of Peoples. 

The lvio camps have not yet agreed on a solution. Most political parties tend to rely on rigid 

maximalist positions. Given that elections are scheduled for October 2018, it is harder for parties 

to consider and consent to difficult compromises at this point. 

2. What Solutions have been put forward? 

Several political parties have proposed various amendments. The proposals have all failed as 

none sought a genuine compromise. Certain proposals have been mostly examined in discussions 

led by the European Union and the United States. The range of proposals can be grouped into 

two broad categories: 

• Maximalist solutions: By maximalist solutions, I mean solutions designed to serve the 

exclusive interests of a given political party. Examples ofmaximalist solutions include 

those seeking to concentrate voting power into the four majority Bosnian Croat cantons, 

or solutions suggesting to transform the House of Peoples in the Federation into a body 

vested with less power. 

• Compromise solutions: By compromise solutions, I mean solutions based on common 

ground that do not encroach upon core interests of a given political actor. Examples of 

3 
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compromise solutions include those seeking to add delegates to the House of Peoples to 

address claims of overrepresentation or proposals to qualify the capacity of cantons with 

small Bosnian Croat population to elect Croat delegates. 

The international community should remain flexible vis-a-vis a potential solution. An agreement 

on a solution should meet the following principles: 

I. The solution should comply with the constitutional framework of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

2. It should enjoy the political support necessary to ensure passage before the relevant 

legislatures. 

3. It should not further undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina's capacity to ensure that its 

electoral system complies with the European Court for Human Rights. 

4. It should ensure that the right to vote and to be candidate for a seat in the Federation 

House of Peoples is guaranteed for all cantonal delegates belonging to a constituent 

people. 

5. It should not further undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina's governance structure. 

Failure to reach agreement 

Should the parties fail to reach agreement before the October elections, additional avenues could 

be considered to enact a solution. 

Some have art,>ued that the Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina could step in. The 

Commission is mandated by law to determine, for the upcoming elections, new numbers of 

delegates for the Federation House of Peoples on the basis of the 2013 census. While the 

Commission could play a role in solving the impasse, there are significant risks attached to this 

solution. The legal basis for the Commission to impose a comprehensive compromise in line 

with Bosnia's constitutional framework is tragile. A solution imposed by the Election 

Commission is likely to face new legal challenges. It would also politicize a critical domestic 

institution. 

Some have also suggested that the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina enact a 

solution on the basis of his powers under the Dayton peace agreement and relevant resolutions of 

the United Nations Security Council. There are risks attached to this course of action as well. 

Parties will likely challenge the legality of the measure enacted. It will also send a signal to the 

European Union that Bosnia's representatives are unable to organize their own elections. 

This may be, nevertheless, the best course of action. It will prevent a dangerous politicization of 

the Election Commission. The potential impact on Bosnia's EU membership aspirations must be 

measured against the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet a candidate country and that, 

according to the European Commission's newly released strategy for the Western Balkans, its 

membership perspectives would materialize only after 2025. 

Any solution enacted by the High Representative would need to meet the principles suggested 

above for a negotiated solution. It should also be made clear that the solution would be etl'ecti ve 

4 
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until parties enact a permanent solution. It should also be strongly supported by the members of 

the Peace Implementation Council, including the United States and the European Union. 

3. What can be learned about the efficacy of the Dayton Framework? 

The current electoral impasse illustrates some of the dysfunctionalities generated by the 

particularly complex constitutional architecture agreed upon at Dayton. While most democracies 

must contend with intense political competition and temporary dysfunctions, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina is different. 

Its difference lies in the fact that while political parties fight over resources, economic growth, 

and electoral tactics just like in any other country, some parties also use political, administrative 

and legal means to pursue wartime objectives that directly challenge the very foundation of the 

democratic space established by the Dayton agreement. 

Calls by ultranationalist factions for Republika Srspka to secede from Bosnia as well as calls for 

majority Bosnian Croat cantons to control the Federation and the central level of government 

through a constellation of constitutional and electoral t,>uarantees are highly destabilizing for 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

The Dayton agreement has been criticized since its entry into force. Such criticisms must be 

measured against the fact that the Dayton agreement is a peace agreement that was supported by 

the United States, the European Union and Russia to stop a brutal war in a country inhabited by a 

majority Muslim population. It imposes obligations upon Serbia and Croatia to respect the 

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia- a country they actively sought to annex just two 

decades ago. The agreement allowed for peace and stability to return to Bosnia. It reestablished 

freedom of movement throughout the country. Tt allowed more than 1 million persons who had 

been displaced by the war to exercise their right to return under the peace agreement. The World 

Bank expects Bosnia's GOP to grow at a rate of3.2% in 2018. Although progressing slowly and 

painfully, Bosnia is nevertheless progressing toward EU and NATO membership. 

If we compare the Dayton agreement to other peace processes, there is little doubt that Dayton is 

a success. 

Calls for a comprehensive overhaul of Dayton have become common through the years. While 

pointing to serious problems in the design of Dayton, such calls must be measured against 

difficult realities: 

Any change to the Constitution established at Dayton needs to meet the requirements 

of the amendment procedure set by the Constitution. These changes must be 

supported by a wide spectrum of interests. If parties find it difficult to agree to legal 

provisions governing the election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the 

Federation Entity, they are likely, at the very least, to face similar difficulties while 

assessing a comprehensive overhaul of the Dayton constitutional framework. 

2. There is currently no defined alternative constitutional structure that would be 

supported by all parties. 

5 
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29816c-7.eps

3. The incentives for change are currently weak. The prospect ofEU membership has 

been, on its own, unable to bring parties to agree to significant reforms over the last 

decade. 

As other regional powers are exercising increasing levels of int1uence in the region, there is still 

a chance for the EU and the United States to unite forces to help Bosnia and Herzegovina 

address some of the more problematic aspects of the Dayton constitutional structure. A common 

strategy would need to achieve the following: 

Clear objectives: Key EU and NATO members states should clearly define that only a united 

Bosnia will be eligible to enter into the EU and NATO. Moreover, in order to meet the 

obligations of EU membership, Bosnia and Herzegovina should have an efficient state level 

government which, in addition to its current responsibilities, will be vested with additional 

responsibilities necessary to effectively and efficiently implement the European acquis 

con1munautaire. 

Neighboring countries: Serbia's access to Euro Atlantic organizations must be contingent upon 

it playing a positive role in Bosnia. Croatia's standing and int1uence within the European Union 

and NATO must be contingent upon the same. 

Reform by incremental agreements: Refonning Dayton is possible through incremental 

agreements. In the past, assertive international support has led to agreements to amend the 

Constitution to recognize the existence ofBrcko District International involvement has also led 

to agreements between the Entities to transfer responsibilities to the central state in the tield of 

defense, taxation or justice. These agreements must include groups of Bosnian citizens that do 

not belong to the current political parties. 

Maintaining stability: The EU and the United States must prevent a return to instability. They 

can do so by continuing to support the mandates of the High Representative and the international 

military presences in Bosnia. The EU integration process has proven to be destabilizing for 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The accession process demands signit!cant changes in the current 

allocation of power in a country that is particularly sensitive to such demands. International 

mandates to maintain stability in Bosnia are an essential insurance policy to accompany Bosnia 

until it secures its place firmly in Europe and NATO. The current international military 

presences should also be encouraged to base some of their operations in the Brcko District to 

contain the secessionist aspirations ofRepublika Srpska president Mil orad Dodik. 

Recommendations 

lc1 address current electoral impasse: 

Support the joint EU and United States efforts to facilitate a political settlement 

Call upon the governments of Serbia and Croatia to actively support a solution in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. 

6 
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29816c-8.eps

Encourage active U.S. diplomatic and congressional pressure to the heads of the political 

parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina by expressing support for an agreement based on the 

following principles 

The solution should comply with the constitutional framework of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

It should enjoy the political support necessary to ensure passage before the relevant 

legislatures. 

It should not ±urther undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina's capacity to ensure that 

its electoral system complies with the European Court for Human Rights. 

It should ensure that the right to vote and to be candidate for a seat in the Federation 

House ofPeoples is guaranteed for all cantonal delegates belonging to a constituent 

people. 

It should not turther undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina's governance structure. 

Support the enactment of a solution by the High Representative should the parties fail to 

reach agreement on time. 

1(1 address concerns about/he efficacy of the Dayton agreement: 

Invite the U.S. government to design and implement a common strategy with key 

members of the European Union and NATO member states. 

Invite the U.S. government and key EU member states to set the conditions under which 

Bosnia and Herzegovina will be allowed to join NATO and the EU. 

Support the establishment of an incremental constitutional reform process shepherded by 

the EU and the United States. 

Invite authorities responsible to manage the international military presences in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina to base some of their operations in Brcko District. 

Continue to support the authorities of the High Representative until Bosnia and 

Herzegovina has secured its membership in the European Union and NATO. 

Thank you for your continued focus and attention to this critical issue. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

The view expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

7 
36

STATEMENT OF MRS. SHIRLEY CLOYES DIOGUARDI, BALKAN 

AFFAIRS ADVISER, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my remarks for the record and make a summary now and I 

would also like to submit two pieces for the congressional record. 

One, a piece on ethnic politics in the Western Balkans focusing on 

Bosnia and Macedonia, by my colleague Roland Gjoni, expert in 

international law and a senior fellow in political science at the University College Dublin, and then the Albanian platform in Macedonia which I will refer to later. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Those items will be included in the record, 

without objection, as will the extension of remarks will also be included. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

While the Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, it 

did not resolve the Balkan conflict. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs made a very serious effort to reveal the realities of 

Slobodan Milosevic’s 10-year occupation of Kosovo and genocidal 

march across the Balkans which ultimately claimed at least somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 lives and displaced four million during the Bosnian War. Under pressure from your committee, 

the Clinton administration finally initiated NATO airstrikes 

against Serbia in March 1999 as we know to bring an end to the 

war in Kosovo begun in 1998 as a continuation of the Balkan Wars 

of the 1990s. 

Nevertheless, the roots of the Balkan conflict remain unresolved 

to this day and the crux of the problem lies in the signing of the 

Dayton Accords. Why? Because U.S. Balkan Envoy Richard 

Holbrooke, then chief U.S. negotiator at Dayton, cast Serbian dictator and later indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic into the 

role of the peacemaker. And instead of a peace agreement that 

would have outlined the steps to restore Bosnia-Herzegovina to its 

pre-war reality as a society of multiethnic and multireligious harmony among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, Dayton divided BosniaHerzegovina, as we have heard, into two entities with a weak Federal Government. And, incredibly, Milosevic was rewarded with the 

recognition of a previously nonexistent political entity called 

Republika Srpska, and it has left Bosnia-Herzegovina on the brink 

of being ungovernable ever since because Srpska blocks the Federal 

Government from functioning for the benefit of all Bosnian citizens. 

The second reason why the roots of the Balkan conflict were not 

resolved at Dayton is rarely acknowledged by Western governments and foreign policy experts, namely that Milosevic agreed to 

arrive at the negotiations only if two conditions were met: That Albanians would not be allowed at the table and that Kosovo would 

not be part of the agenda. This set the stage for Milosevic’s military attack on Kosovo in 1998. 

And by the way he had always intended to carry out ethnic 

cleansing there before his troops invaded Bosnia in 1992, but it 

was actually former Congressman Joe DioGuardi, who I did not 

know at that time, and members of the Albanian American Civic 

League who were able to educate the U.S. Congress about 

Milosevic’s plans, thereby placing the spotlight on Milosevic that 

led to his temporary exit from Kosovo. 

37

Dayton’s neglect of the Albanian issue is still a very live legacy 

and the West’s historical appeasement of Serbia is the principal 

problem. Belgrade has resorted to provoking violence in Northern 

Kosovo, the area that it has controlled and manipulated financially 

and politically ever since Kosovo came under U.N. protection at 

war’s end in the summer of 1999. Unless the United States stops 

taking a backseat to Europe and the Balkans, Serbia will be admitted to the European Union while simultaneously achieving what 

has always been its primary goal: The denial of Kosovo’s sovereignty and the acquisition of Northern Kosovo and Republika 

Srpska. 

The legacy of Dayton also includes the lack of reciprocity for Albanians in the Presevo Valley where they are second- and thirdclass citizens of Serbia while the Kosovo Serbs have the highest 

level of human and civil rights of any minority group, I would add, 

in Europe. And the legacy of Dayton also resulted in the constitutional and systemic oppression and discrimination of Albanians in 

Macedonia. It is Macedonia that I believe the U.S. Government 

must now focus on. 

It is frequently forgotten that when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, the Republic of Macedonia emerged as an independent 

state without violence in 1991 based on the cooperation of ethnic 

Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. Macedonia is the only country 

in the Western Balkans where no one ethnic group has a true majority. But the subsequent failure to bring equal human and civil 

rights to all ethnic groups in Macedonia led to armed conflict in 

2001. To end the conflict, as we know, the EU and the U.S. Government entered into negotiations with the ethnic Macedonian and 

ethnic Albanian political leaders that resulted in the signing of the 

Ohrid Framework Agreement, which was supposed to achieve the 

equitable representation of all national groups in the state’s institutions as well as the equitable distribution of resources. Seventeen 

years later, Ohrid implementation has stagnated in relation to the 

judiciary, law enforcement, military, intelligence, and fiscal decentralization, and ethnic Macedonian domination is constitutionally 

entrenched and yet to be addressed. 

The current political crisis in Macedonia cannot be resolved short 

of grappling with the key Albanian grievances. Macedonia will 

never become a functioning democracy if it discriminates against 

30 to 40 percent of its population—Albanians and other non-Slavs. 

But again, achieving ethnic equality now is at risk once more in 

Macedonia. In January 2018, the Macedonian Parliament twice 

passed the law making Albanian the country’s second official language, which was mandated in an agreement between Zoran Zaev’s 

SDSM party and the ethnic Albanian parties called the Albanian 

Platform and used it to form the new government. 

Even so, as we speak, Macedonian President Ivanov, starting in 

January, twice vetoed it claiming that a second official language 

would threaten Macedonia’s unity and territorial integrity. The 

Macedonian Constitution requires the passage of this law after two 

votes in favor, but this is yet to happen because Ivanov has declined constitutionally to sign the law, and he is now stoking ethnic 

tensions that may have domestic and regional implications. Ending 

discrimination against ethnic Albanians by providing equal opporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Aug 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\041818\29816 SHIRL
38

tunity for economical and social growth in areas where Albanians 

are ethnic majorities can dramatically reduce the possibility of future armed conflict. 

The question remains whether the United States and the European Union will step forward to negotiate a timeline to achieve full 

equality of the Macedonian and Albanian communities before the 

country’s admission to NATO. Especially in Macedonia, we witnessed a foreign policy approach in the U.S. Government for the 

past 20 years that focused on stability at all costs—as you have 

often pointed out, Mr. Chairman—instead of making conflict prevention and human rights the center of our engagement with the 

region. Hence, post-Dayton, the Balkan conflict is still unresolved. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Cloyes DioGuardi follows:]

39


29816d-1.eps

Testimony 

Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi 

Balkan Affairs Adviser, Albanian American Civic League 

Honse Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

April IS, 2018 

"The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia and the Western Balkans" 

While the Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, it did not resolve the Balkan 

conflict. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs made a serious etl'ort to explore and reveal 

the realities on the ground in Southeast Europe during Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic's 

ten-year occupation of Kosova and genocidal march across the Balkans, which ultimately 

claimed more than 200,000 lives and left four million citizens displaced. Under pressure from 

your committee, the Clinton Administration finally initiated NATO airstrikes against Serbia in 

March 1999 to bring an end to the war in Kosova, which began in 1998 as a continuation of the 

Balkan wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the roots of the Balkan cont1ict remain unresolved to 

this day, and the crux of the problem lies in the signing of the Dayton Accords on November 1, 

1995. 

Why? Because US Balkan Envoy Richard Holbrooke, who was then chief US. negotiator at 

Dayton, cast Serbian dictator, and later indicted war criminal, Slobodan Milosevic into the role 

of the peacemaker. And instead of a peace agreement that would have outlined the steps to 

restore Bosnia-Herzegovina to its pre-war reality as a society ofmultiethnic and multi-religious 

harmony among Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs (at a level that many Western countries 

have yet to achieve), Dayton divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities, with a weak federal 

government in an economically depressed nation. Incredibly, Slobodan Milosevic was rewarded 

with the recognition of a previously non-existent political entity called Republika Srpska. An 

entity created through Milosevic's genocidal campaign in Bosnia, in effect normalized at Dayton 

the use of violence for political goals. And it has left Bosnia-Herzegovina on the brink of being 

ungovernable ever since, because Srpska blocks the federal government from functioning for the 

benetit of all of Bosnia's citizens. This is the first reason why the United States and the 

European Union-if they do not want to see future armed conflict-need to revisit Dayton and 

create a new plan that will bring lasting peace, interethnic harmony, and political and economic 

sustainability to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

The second reason why the roots of the Balkan cont1ict were not resolved at Dayton is rarely 

acknowledged by Western governments and foreign policy experts. Namely, that Slobodan 

Milosevic agreed to arrive at the negotiations only if two conditions were met: that Albanians 

(the third largest ethnic group in the Western Balkans) would not be allowed at the table and that 

Kosova, forcibly occupied by Serbia since 1989, would not be part of the agenda. This set the 

stage for Milosevic's military attack on Kosova in 1998. (Milosevic had always intended to 

carry out ethnic cleansing and genocide in Kosova even before his paramilitary and military 

troops invaded Bosnia in 1992, but fonner Congressman Joe DioGuardi and his Albanian 
40


29816d-2.eps

-2-

Americans supporters were able to educate the US Congress about Milosevic's plans, thereby 

placing the spotlight on Milosevic that led to his temporary exit from Kosova. 

In the more than two decades since the Dayton Accords were signed, the unresolved roots of the 

Balkan contlict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova (and also in Macedonia) have converged. 

Dayton has created an unsustainable peace where states and ethnic groups are waiting for the 

next big geopolitical shift to continue their contlict. This can be seen most vividly in Serbia's 

double game of playing up to the West but continuing the arms race with Russian support in the 

hope of some new power constellation that would allow Serbia to carve out Srpska Republika 

and return to Kosova. (A canary in the mine signal was sent to the West in January 2017, when a 

Serbian train painted with Serbian flags, religious Christian Orthodox scenes, and the words 

"Kosovo is Serbian" in 20 languages departed Belgrade and headed for northern Kosova until it 

was stopped before it could arrive.) 

Dayton and its aftermath were built on the premise that Belgrade is the center of the region 

which is the source of the historic Western appeasement policy towards Serbia. This has led the 

United States and the European Union to spend enonnous energy for the past twenty years on 

democratizing Serbia, when in fact Belgrade is still run by authoritarian Milosevic leftovers that 

are paying lip service to the West and otherwise working for Russian interests in the region. 

Among other things, Serbia has established with Russia a so-called humanitarian center in Nish, 

close to the Kosova border, which the US State Department has identified as "a subtly disguised 

military base set up by the Krelim to spy on US interests in the Balkans." 

Dayton's neglect of the Albanian issue is still a very live legacy, and the West's historical 

appeasement of Serbia is the principal problem. Instead offulfilling Serbia's expansionist 

appetite, the international community should have required Serbia to recognize the independence 

of Kosova and accepted it into the European Union. Because it did not, and because five 

members of the European Union still do not recognize Kosova's independence, which became a 

reality in 2008, Belgrade has resorted to provoking violence in the northern part of Kosova, the 

area that it has controlled and manipulated financially and politically ever since Kosova came 

under UN protection at war's end in the summer of 1999. 

While the international community pushed for the implementation of the "Ahtisaari plan," which 

made all state institutions in Kosova multi ethnic, integrating the Kosova Serbs into the 

legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Kosova government, no one ever tested 

Ahtisaari in Northern Kosova, and this has enabled Serbia to consolidate its control there. In the 

end and unless the United States stops taking a back seat to Europe in the Balkans, Serbia will be 

admitted to the European Union through a false demonstration of"neighborly relations" with 

Kosova (a requirement for admission to the EU), while simultaneously achieving what has 

always been its primary goal: the denial ofKosova's sovereignty and the acquisition of northern 

Kosova. 1n short, lasting peace and stability in the region will remain elusive. Dayton failed to 

accomplish what Croatian scholar Branka Magas foresaw in 1999, "Unless the process of the 

dissolution of Yugoslavia is allowed to be completed and the former Republic of Yugoslavia is 

dissolved into its component parts, thus setting Kosovo on a path to independence, it will be 

impossible to build a peaceful and democratic state system in Southeastern Europe." (Bosnia 
41


29816d-3.eps

-3-

Report 1999). 

The legacy of Dayton also includes the lack of reciprocity for Albanians in the Presheva Valley, 

where they are second and third-class citizens of Serbia, while the Kosovo Serbs have the highest 

level of human and civil rights of any minority group in Europe today. The legacy of Dayton 

also resulted in the constitutional and systemic oppression and discrimination of Albanians in 

Macedonia. 

It is Macedonia that I believe the US government now must focus on. It is frequently forgotten 

that, when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, the Republic of Macedonia emerged as an 

independent nation without violence in 1991 based the cooperation of ethnic Albanians and 

ethnic Macedonians. Macedonia is the only country in the Western Balkans where no one ethnic 

group has a true majority But the subsequent failure to bring equal human and civil rights to all 

ethnic groups in Macedonia led to armed cont1ict in 2001. To end the cont1ict, the European 

Union and the US government entered into negotiations with the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic 

Albanian political leaders that resulted in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The 

Ohrid Agreement was supposed to achieve the equitable representation of all national groups in 

the state's institutions, as well as the equitable distribution of resources. Seventeen years later, 

the provisions related to the judiciary, law enforcement, military, and intelligence, along with 

t!scal decentralization, have yet to be implemented. 

Time will not allow me to go into the details of the interethnic crisis that ensued. But suffice it 

to say that the political crisis in Macedonia cannot be resolved short of grappling with the key 

Albanian grievances (along with the grievances of other non-Slavs). This requires that 

Macedonia adhere to the agreement, known as the Albanian platform (which I am submitting for 

the record), that the leaders of three Albanian political parties and ethnic Macedonian Social 

Democrat leader Zoran Zaev used to form the new government in 2017. The Albanian Platform 

contains many of the fifteen provisions that were part of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 

Once more, achieving ethnic equality is at risk in Macedonia. In January 2018, the Macedonian 

parliament tvv·ice passed the law making Albanian the country's second officiallant,>uage, which 

was mandated in the agreement between Zoran Zaev's SDSM party and ethnic Albanian parties. 

Even so, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov twice vetoed it, claiming that a second official 

language would threaten Macedonia's "unity sovereignty, and territorial integrity." The 

Macedonian constitution requires the passage of this law after two votes in favor by the 

Parliament, but it has yet to happen. 

The second most important component of the Albanian Platform is the decentralization of the 

federal budget. Ending discrimination against ethnic Albanians by providing equal opportunity 

for economic and social growth in areas where Albanians are ethnic majorities can dramatically 

impact reduce the possibility offuture armed cont1ict. The question remains whether the United 

States and the European Union will step forward to negotiate a timeline to achieve full equality 

of the Macedonian and Albanian communities in Macedonia before the country's admission into 

NATO. Especially in Macedonia, we have witnessed a foreign policy approach in the US 
42


29816d-4.eps

-4-

government for the past twenty years that focused on stability at all costs, instead of making 

conflict prevention and human rights the center of our engagement with the region. Hence, postDayton, the Balkan conflict is unresolved. 

As long as Albanians are denied the recognition that every other ethnic majority in the Former 

Yugoslavia has been granted, and as long as there is no change in the status quo of Western 

foreign policy, the Balkan contlict will not be resolved. The way forward should entail making 

human rights, anti-racism, and rule of law the linchpin of US and EU involvement in Southeast 

Europe. And so the time has come to ask the US government and the European Union what they 

really want. Do they want a whole, undivided, peacetul, democratic, and prosperous European 

Union, or a periphery offailed, aid-dependent societies that saddle it with economic and law 

enforcement responsibilities? To prevent a costly and potentially deadly conflict going forward, 

the West will have to rethink its diplomatic strategy and foreign policy in the Balkans, hopetully 

one that emphasizes conflict prevention and human rights, not stability at all costs. 
43

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. KURT BASSUENER, CO-FOUNDER AND 

SENIOR ASSOCIATE, DEMOCRATIZATION POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. BASSUENER. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of this committee. I welcome this timely hearing which 

will draw overdue attention to a more than decade of negative trajectory in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reasons for that. This an 

area in which the United States and the West have been deeply engaged for over two decades. And where we have a wide array of incentives and mandates that could be of utility, we need to understand why we got here to discuss this wider manner. 

Essentially, the United States started to take a backseat and 

downshift its engagement in the region as a whole and particularly 

in Bosnia’s case in about 2006 because there was an understanding 

that the carrots of EU and NATO membership were going to impel 

forward movement. So the only question at that point was in the 

common understanding was to question the velocity of forward 

movement. I think the events since 2006 demonstrate that is not 

the case. 

So at its root the issue at hand is not a question of Croat rights 

and constituent peoples, rather, it is one of deeper incumbency burrowing and self-protection of entrenched elites and this is a manifestation of a far wider, broader, and deeper problem, longer running problem. Bluntly put, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political elite constitutes a political business, organized crime, media nexus across 

the ethnic spectrum. I am not picking on any particular group. But 

nothing—their primary incentives are can they keep what they 

stole, can they remain positioned to keep stealing, and can they remain unaccountable both politically and legally? This system allows them to do that. Nothing the EU can offer them is better than 

that which is why there hasn’t been forward movement. 

So while there is no shortage of culpability to go around across 

the full spectrum of Bosnia’s political elites, the fact remains that 

the alliance between Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik 

and HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina leader Dragan Covic has steadily 

eroded the progress achieved in the first decade since the war, at 

great taxpayer cost by the way, with the aim of effectively carving 

out secure ethnic fiefdoms of absolute control. This will ultimately 

lead to state collapse if it is not resisted, so it demands resistance. 

The escalating challenge to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s sovereignty 

that we have witnessed over the past decade has brought out the 

worst in Serbia and Croatia. They are both involved in Bosnia’s internal politics to a degree that was not permitted for the first decade since after the war. In fact, all the nationalist agendas that 

were prevalent in the 1990s are operating without restraint because we are not restraining them anymore. We were the enforcer 

of the Dayton order. We have ceased to be the enforcer of the Dayton order. There are no rules because they are not being enforced. 

All the ingredients for organized violence or escalation of a violent 

inter-ethnic incident are there in terms of weapons. I could come 

back to that in the Q&A. 

So there is a deep popular hunger for a rules-based political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is fully compatible with collective 

44

protections and direct political representation which you don’t 

have. Bosnians can’t write their congressman because they don’t 

vote for them on a territorial basis, they vote on a party list. So 

there is no accountability above the municipal level for anybody in 

Bosnia’s political system. 

So the strategic goal for the United States, EU, and our other 

Western allies on the Peace Implementation Council which enforces 

the Dayton Peace Agreement needs to be arriving at a governance 

system that allows for functional democratic representation, accountability, and good governance. This needs to be the post-election focal point of American foreign policy for which we need to be 

preparing now. So in very brief terms, what is to be done? One, the 

United States needs to fill the deterrent gap in Bosnia. There is no 

deterrent to violence right now. Not legally, because we don’t have 

a foothold for it, but practically, the EU-operated deterrent force, 

which NATO used to do under our command up until 2004, is not 

suited to task. There needs to be American participation in a reinforced Chapter 7 deterrent for which we have the mandate—we 

don’t need to ask anybody’s permission—including troops in Brcko 

and Mostar prior to the October elections. 

Second, we need to replace the moribund leadership of the Office 

of the High Representative and reinvigorate the international civilian enforcement of Dayton Peace Agreement with an American 

high representative. There is nothing in the Dayton Agreement or 

anything else that prevents that. That is a lack of political will. If 

there is Western unity it can happen. Second, on this particular 

issue of the Ljubic case and the Constitutional Court ruling, there 

needs to be an effort to try to arrive at a compromise prior to the 

elections, but recognition that might not happen. And by getting in 

on the security end at the front end we reduce the potential downside of not arriving in that compromise. 

And third, we need to focus on the fundamental problem of why 

Bosnia is the laggard of the region which is a lack of accountable 

representative, democratic governance and this was the reason that 

there was popular unrest in 2014 and it may reemerge. Thank you 

very much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bassuener follows:]

45


29816e-1.eps

Written Statement for the Congressional Record 

Kurt W. Bassuener, Co-Founder and Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council 

House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing: "The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia and the 

Western Balkans" 

Wednesday, April18, 2018, 14:00hrs 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking member, members of this Subcommittee, I welcome this timely hearing, 

which I hope will draw overdue attention to the more than decade of negative trajectory in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. The fact that Bosnia, in which the West has been so deeply engaged for over two 

decades, and where we have a wide array of mandates and incentives, is going in the wrong 

direction at an accelerating pace demands an understanding of what- and the policies which- have 

brought the situation to this simmering crisis stage. 

It is apropos that this hearing makes Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the focal point for a look at "The 

Future of the Western Balkans." The three-and-a-half-year war there was by far the most bloody of 

the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, drawing in two predatory neighbors, first Serbia, then Croatia. 

Western deterrence of further violence and challenges to Bosnian statehood, under American 

leadership or with strong U.S. backing, were conducive to the democratic transformations which 

followed in Croatia, then in Serbia, almost two decades ago. For a decade following the war, BiH 

was widely assessed- for good reason- as a (relative) success story. That internationally catalyzed, 

but popularly perceived, success helped foster a complacency that progress toward membership in 

the European Union and NATO was guaranteed- only the velocity was in question. That assumption 

has been demonstrated to be false ever more since 2.006. 

BiH's constitutional and electoral framework has been ruled deficient by reason of restricting equal 

rights to run and vote for office repeatedly by the European Court of Human Rights, to which BiH is 

bound in the Sejdic-Finci, Pilav, and Zornic cases, as well as assessed as an impediment to 

functionality and democratic development by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission. None of 

these have been respected by the HDZ or its political ally, the SNSD, or were weaponized into a 

political hostage situation as has the Ljubic case. At its root, the issue at hand is not a question of 

"Croat rights" or "constituent peoples" representation, but rather one deeper incumbency 

burrowing and self-protection of entrenched elites; a manifestation of a far broader, deeper, and 

longer-running problem. The politicization of the three international judges on the BiH 

Constitutional Court is a new and dangerous precedent. 

This needs to be seen in tandem with the sustained assault on BiH constitutional, judicial, and state 

structure which has been mounted by the leadership of the Republika Srpska, one of the country's 

two "entities." The US rightly sanctioned RS President Milorad Dodik over a year ago for his 

referendum in defiance of a Constitutional Court ruling; unfortunately, our European allies did not 

follow suit- but still could. While there is no shortage of culpability among the full spectrum of BiH 

political elites, the fact remains that the alliance between Dodik and HDZ BiH leader Dragan Covic 

has steadily subverted all the progress achieved in the first decade after the war (at massive 

taxpayer cost) with the aim of effectively carving out more secure feudal fiefdoms of absolute 

control, ultimately leading to state collapse- which could not be peaceful under any foreseeable 

circumstances. This demands resistance. 

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The escalating challenge to BiH's sovereignty and integrity that we have witnessed over the past 

decade or so has brought out the worst in both Belgrade and Zagreb, which both are involved in 

Bosnia's internal politics to a degree not seen since the war. In fact, all the nationalist agendas 

unfulfilled during the war, foreign and domestic, are being pursued without restraint. BiH is nowand has been for over a decade- a rules-free environment. BiH and the wider region are suffering a 

from deterrence failure; a bill we have yet to pay for, but one that will come due, should our policy 

and posture not soon change. For Bosnia and Herzegovina's current incarnation and configuration 

have a "made in America" label on them; our interest in maintaining U.S. credibility and European 

security remain as valid as they were nearly a quarter century ago. Failure in BiH will rightly be seen 

as an American failure, despite other contributing factors. 

The deeper encroachment into the Western Balkans of malign, illiberal powers such as Russia, 

Turkey, the Gulf States, and China which many have highlighted in the past months, are symptoms of 

a more fundamental problem. Simply put, the widely held presumption of a decade and a half agothat the "carrots" of potential EU and NATO membership would induce reforms which would yield 

self-sustaining representative and accountable democratic governance in the Western Balkans have 

proven insufficient to that task. Bosnia- but not just Bosnia- demonstrates that such positive 

inducement alone is not enough. The leadership class that emerged from the Balkan wars- and in 

Bosnia's case, co-designed their own political ecosystem in the Dayton Peace Accords- have clearly 

determined that their interests are better served by not sincerely engaging in the difficult reforms 

required to join the EU and NATO. The question is why. 

I think there are really two basic potential explanations. The first is that these leaders simply do not 

understand the potential upside- that this is a political education problem. The second is that they 

do grasp the benefits on offer to their countries, but they have done a cost-benefit analysis and have 

determined that their own interests are best served- and their perquisites of power preserved- in 

another fashion. I believe the latter is far more convincing. 

Bluntly put, Bosnia and Herzegovina's political elite constitutes a political-business-organized crimemedia nexus which can currently a) keep what they stole, b) remain positioned to keep stealing, and 

c) remain unaccountable politically and legally. Nothing that the European Union can offer the 

country is better-for them and their business model- than that. It's just rotten luck for the 

country's overwhelming majority. While the ethnic political elites may compete for relative 

territorial and economic dominance, configuration of the state, or whether there should even be a 

state at all, they can all agree on those basic elements of BiH's political operating system. As they 

have demonstrated for almost three decades, political leaders of all stripes are unconcerned with 

popular suffering, unless it poses a direct threat to them, as it briefly did in February 2014. Coercing 

popular resignation and acquiescence is sufficient to maintain control, with all its benefits. 

One might ask "how does this work?" Why would voters continue to elect leaders who so blatantly 

abuse the public trust and limit their own horizons? Political powerbrokers in BiH (and not just 

there, but regionwide- and beyond) have two main tools at their disposal: patronage and fear. 

These form a potent cocktail, given the size of the public sector relative to the overall economy, the 

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absence of a functional social safety net, and the ambient but palpable threats of destitution, 

dispossession, or worse. 

To give one relatively prosaic example of the real-life mechanics, if Uncle Jovan, (or Josip, or Jusuf) 

works for the government in any capacity- even in maintenance- he is the sole breadwinner for his 

family, and one is unconvinced one's vote is secret (as is the case), would one really vote against the 

powers-that-be? One might stay home wishing a pox on all options on the menu, as roughly half the 

electorate does, but it is unlikely that family would take that risk. And, generally, they do not. That 

is hardly the spirit of "consent of the governed," despite the superficial respect for its forms. 

Understanding this dynamic is the key to squaring the almost universal popular disdain expressed by 

BiH's citizenry (and documented in polling) across the board toward political elites and the 

remarkable durability of the country's political class since the war, job security that- outside of 

Belarus- is unrivalled in Europe. 

The ugly truth is that the incentive structure of the Dayton constitutional/political system is an 

evolutionary dead-end; a perfect environment for the apex predators who were present at its 

creation (or their political successors). Absent the external enforcement, pressure, and deterrence 

that attended its first decade with American focus and muscle, it defaults to precisely what we see 

today: slow but inexorable and accelerating dissolution of the state, attended with ever more open 

and shameless corruption, abuse of power, and generation of fear. Fear is potent, because the 

potential for significant violence is recognizably real to Bosnia and Herzegovina's citizens. All the 

ingredients for organized violence, or escalation of a violent interethnic incident into organized 

violence, are present. The fact that such bloodshed could not rise to the levels seen from 1992-1995 

should not engender complacency. 

Even uglier is the reality that EU-Ied Western policy, to which the U.S. has subscribed, has enabled 

such malign behavior, effectively rewarding it through appeasement: cutting corners on standards, 

bankrolling political irresponsibility in the hope of buying stability and security. In fact, we have only 

been renting quiet- for now. The reality is that we have been operating in a very similar fashion to 

BiH's own citizens: enablers, for fear of the alternative. But as the party that holds the greatest 

leverage, our failure to confront this challenge is unjustified and all the more culpable. 

Regarding NATO, which ensured the peace in BiH since the war, progress toward membership with a 

Membership Action Plan has been stalled because of Republika Srpska's unwillingness to allow 

registration of military property at the state-level. No longer should such intransigence be allowed 

to impede this process. But the reality is that BiH will not be able to convince NATO members to 

accept it as a viable ally without a fundamental reconstruction of its governance structure and 

decisionmaking mechanisms. 

Bosnians and Herzegovinians of all self-identifications (and there are many more than the 

"constituent peoples" straitjacket allows to bloom) are far more reasonable than we, and they 

themselves, give them credit for. Given the amount of bloodshed, displacement, and trauma 

experienced in 1992-1995, one would think more acts of vengeance would have occurred. It's not 

for lack of means- BiH is a country with an average of one firearm per household, many of which 

would be illegal even under American law. Not for lack of motive- most of the violence in the war 

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was up close and personal. People generally know who did what to whom. And there is no lack of 

opportunity- people can travel freely should they want to exact vengeance. So why is such violence 

so infrequent as to be almost unheard of? As someone fortunate enough not to have lived through 

a war, I can only venture an educated guess: people saw the social fabric unravel once, and it was 

bad enough the first time- they don't want to go back there. One can scarcely imagine a more 

restrained, reasonable mindset given the circumstances. We Americans kill each other for much 

less. 

Furthermore, there are few illusions left among BiH citizens about the nature of the war and its 

political aftermath, despite understandably different perspectives owing to their personal 

experiences. BiH citizens across ethnic lines recognize now that they lostthe war. The political elites 

in their ubiquitous black Audis were the sole winners. People are reminded of this fact daily, in the 

most humiliating fashion. 

Like a broken leg poorly set in triage, Dayton's constitutional political incentive structure was an 

achievement that saved the patient but leaves her permanently hobbled. Dayton's wobbly 

framework must be broken to be fixed. Paradoxical as it might sound, reinvigoration of the Dayton 

enforcement tools makes moving beyond that flawed system possible by reducing the political 

leadership's ability to leverage fear. We have to enforce the bad old rules until there can be broad 

popular agreement on new ones. Only then can application of firm financial conditionality, never 

fully employed, have the desired effect- reducing the leverage of patronage on the body politic. 

Even though violence has not yet erupted, the reality is that it could at any time, with the attendant 

dangers of malign actors (Russia and other foreign powers, radicallslamists, irredentist neighbors, 

etc.) supporting it, capitalizing upon it, or even instigating it for their own interests. The upcoming 

October general elections will raise tensions even higher. We must not remain anesthetized by 

complacency. 

Nor should we continue the futile and self-destructive policy of addressing potential security risks 

with economic leverage alone, more deeply entrenching the protection racket which currently 

prevails. The time to act to deter and prevent such violence and further regression- and enable 

bottom-up progress- is now. 

So much for diagnosis, what is to be done? 

1) Arresting the downward spiral by re-invigorating Dayton's enforcement tools- a potent 

military deterrent force and a credible international High Representative. The U.S. could 

readily assemble pan-Western support for such a policy, if we are willing to lead. In terms of 

force requirements, it is hard to gainsay the last such assessment by former Deputy Supreme 

Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (DSACEUR) Gen. John McColl at the beginning of this 

decade- a brigade, upwards of 3,000 troops, is necessary to fulfill the safe and secure 

environment mission legally required in Dayton. The current force is under ZO percent of 

that size. The U.S. should not be the sole provider of forces. Demonstrated will to commit a 

significant proportion of the force in the most strategic areas and likely flash points- Brcko 

and Mostar- prior to the October elections would challenge our closest allies to provide the 

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remainder. There is also no reason that the next High Representative cannot be an 

American. 

The civilian enforcement mechanism for Dayton- the international High Representative- is equally 

important, and equally moribund at present. Maintaining the Office of the High Representative only 

as a legal placeholder, rather than a vital and potent element of the country's constitutional 

architecture, pending a self-sustaining solution, as we have for the past decade has been a major 

accelerant to the ongoing downward spiral. Nominating and promoting an American High 

Representative as part of an overarching strategy is essential. A person capable of restoring the 

credibility of Dayton's civilian enforcement mechanism, would possess political gravitas, respect 

among our European, Canadian, and Japanese allies, and the will to take a hands-on approach 

toward creating the conditions under which the need for an international High Representative would 

be obviated. 

Neither of these elements alone is sufficient to restabilize the situation. They only work in concert. 

Nor alone do they constitute a strategy- but they are essential elements of a potentially successful 

one. 

2) That highly controversial Constitutional Court ruling in the Ljubic case demands a one-time 

only compromise regulation, undertaken to respect the narrow ruling (e.g., the House of 

Peoples alone). so as to allow the election and government formation to go forward. The 

U.S. should lead a transatlantic effort to press hard, including naming and shaming, to get 

the situation resolved in this fashion- and be prepared to accept the reality that such a 

solution may not be achieved. 

But the time is long since due to address the broader structural impediments to accountable 

democracy entailed in the Dayton constitutional and electoral system. A commitment to begin this 

process must be part and parcel of any stopgap arrangement on the House of Peoples- or a failure 

to achieve one. 

3) The strategic goal for the US, EU and other Western allies on the Peace Implementation 

Council needs to be arriving at a governance system that allows for functional democratic 

representation, accountability, and good governance. This needs to be the post-election 

focal point of American policy, for which we need to begin preparing, now. 

While the shape of such a system must emerge from BiH citizens and gain supermajority support of 

each self-defined group, the initiative for catalyzing this necessary societal discussion and the 

fostering of a constituency for an organic, popularly legitimate system to replace the deficient 

Dayton structures can and must be undertaken by the country which brokered Dayton and drove its 

implementation for a decade: the United States of America. In my own view, this fundamental 

change should lead to directly elected legislators onto whom citizens could project their own 

concerns and to whom they could make their displeasure felt. At present, beyond the municipal 

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level, there is no such accountability. That level of governance, therefore, ought to be the elemental 

building block for representative governance in a citizen/voter-centered BiH. 

There is a deep popular hunger for a rules-based political system and society in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina; this is fully compatible with publicly accountable collective protections, and with direct 

electoral representation. Our current posture makes it nearly impossible for those citizens who 

already clearly want- or could be convinced to support- something better to mobilize and get 

traction. These are America's true friends in BiH, across the country. 

While external actors like the U.S. cannot fix Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can create far better 

conditions for a democratic and accountable Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop and emerge. Only a 

country so governed will be saleable to current NATO and EU members as a potential contributing 

ally and fellow member. It is in our interest- and that of our European allies- we finally do so. 

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29816e-7.eps

Brief Explanation to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Political Dynamic Charts 

Through January 2006 

February 2:006 to Date 

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29816e-8.eps

Chart 1 illustrates the political dynamic between 1996 and Z006. While BiH ethno-political elites had 

leverage over "their" people through application of patronage and fear (and therefore never really 

had to earn consent, as it was coerced), they also had to look up to a powerful international 

community which could- under the terms of the Dayton Accords- annul, amend, or impose laws, 

even remove officials or ban them from political life for violating the terms of the peace agreement. 

Since politics is a for-profit enterprise in BiH, that was bad for business. Furthermore, the leverage 

of fear was blunted by a presumption that the West- with American muscle paramount- would 

deter any resumption of hostilities or attempts to dissolve the state. 

Chart Z illustrates the political dynamic in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Z006 to date. The leverage 

of political elites over citizens of fear is amplified, since the countervailing force of committed 

Western enforcement of the Dayton Accords, in their civilian and military aspects is lacking- hence 

dotted lines in both directions. BiH's political elites have never been as empowered. Effectively, 

they operate without political or legal constraint. Furthermore, they benefit from international 

financial largesse, with which they rent popular consent, as a sort of tribute. The West, including the 

US, is effectively renting quiet from these warlords-in-waiting, who exact tribute. Our policies are 

built around what they will and will not accept. They are not uniquely evil, but uniquely empowered 

-and they take full advantage. 

Chart 3 illustrates the way forward. Pressure from both above- the US-mobilized West limiting 

their ability to generate insecurity by disarming them of their ability to generate fear and dispense 

patronage, combined with pressure from below- popular demand for political accountability, 

representation, and a rules-based society, would force BiH's political elites to respond and accept 

the need for structural change. BiH's political elites have had ample opportunity to do the right 

thing for the right reasons, but have refused due to their own personal interests. They must instead 

They must instead be compelled to do the right thing by making all other options more painful. 

compelled to do the right thing by making all other options more painful. 

8 
53

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony to 

all the witnesses. We are joined by Brad Sherman of California and 

we are going to pay him the courtesy of having the first shot at 

the witnesses today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Yugoslavia shows a clash of the two 

great principles of diplomacy and international law, self-determination and territorial integrity. And it is not surprising that the 

United States is schizophrenic on the clash of these two principles 

since only two great wars have been fought on our territory. Leaving Dolly Madison and 1812 aside, the first launched in 1776 was 

a great war for self-determination and in 1861 we fought hard to 

preserve our territorial integrity. 

There seems to be some illogic into how we applied these two 

principles. We were for self-determination of the individual republics of the former Yugoslavia. Then we were for the territorial integrity of those republics. When sections of the republics tried to 

assert their self-determination we accept with regard to Kosovo. So 

we did not support the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia; we did support the territorial integrity of Croatia and saw the 

ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Krajina. 

We support the territorial integrity of Bosnia. We now support 

the territorial integrity of Kosovo when Northern Kosovo wants to 

secede. So it was okay for Kosovo to secede from Serbia but not 

Northern Kosovo to secede from Kosovo. One would think that this 

is all illogic and has no pattern, but there is a clear pattern. We 

are anti-Russian and therefore anti-Serbian and we are re-fighting 

the Cold War over again. 

And I will point out that Russia has been equally illogical and 

has been pro-Orthodox Slav and anti-the other groups in the area 

in its behavior. How many Serbs were ethnically cleansed from 

Krajina? Does anyone know? 

Mr. BASSUENER. I believe the figure that is most commonly 

talked about is 250,000. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And has the West urged them to be compensated 

in any way or is there any chance they will get their land back? 

Mr. BASSUENER. The West has definitely encouraged refugee return——

Mr. SHERMAN. Encouraged, but——

Mr. BASSUENER. Facilitated but, you know, the numbers are 

small. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean has Croatia been excluded from international organizations until they make good? 

Mr. BASSUENER. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Because the West is lining up against Slavic Orthodox instinctively as an anti-Russian approach. I am going to 

shift to a different area. That is, Muslims in this world have been 

faced with genocide twice, Kosovo and Bosnia. It was the United 

States that bombed a Christian country twice in order to protect 

Muslims. Has enough been done to educate the Muslim world that 

the United States, hardly the oppressor of Muslims, was the decisive country, the only country to come in from, just about the only 

country to come in from the outside and kill people by the score, 

Christians I might add, in order to protect Muslims? Does the average person in Jakarta or Rabat know this? 

54

I realize you folks focus on the former Yugoslavia, but what has 

been done by the Governments of Bosnia and Kosovo to send people out to buy advertising time to deal with Muslim organizations 

and to make sure that every mullah in the world knows that it was 

America that bombed Christians to save Muslims when no one else 

would? Does anyone know whether they—and what portion of their 

budget do they devote to this effort? 

Yes? 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. I would first like to, if you don’t mind, 

Congressman Sherman, make a statement that I think is very, 

very——

Mr. SHERMAN. You know, I have 27 seconds more. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. No, I will be very quick, but you are 

talking about Kosovo as a Muslim nation. It is just not the case. 

All Albanians are——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is Kosovo a majority Muslim nation? 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. It is majority secular Muslims living 

side by side and in harmony with Orthodox Christians, Roman 

Catholics, and Jews. So I just want to——

Mr. SHERMAN. You have dealt with me on the committee long 

enough to know that there is separate tradition for Sherman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Special rule for you for minutes of dialogue 

after you are done. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, yes. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. I just wanted to clarify that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Obviously throughout Europe there is a decline of 

religious participation, but. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. I just want to say the U.S. wasn’t, you 

know, attacking a Christian nation. 

[Off-microphone comment.] 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Oh, I thought it was, but I did push 

it. But the U.S. was not perceiving this, in my understanding, as 

an attack on Muslim nations, an attack against Christians in order 

to save Muslims. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No, we bombed Serbs in order to save Kosovars 

and probably did the right thing. But it just so happens that 

Kosovo is part of the greater Muslim majority world whether or regardless of where people are on Friday at noon. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Right, except the Albanians are Albanians first, people of faith second. 

Yes, okay, just thought that——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. But does anybody have a comment? Has 

the Government of Kosovo or the Government of BosniaHerzegovina devoted any substantial part of its worldwide efforts 

to helping the United States with this problem we have in the 

Muslim world? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, was that a question? 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is a question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s go. We have one, two, three, four——

Mr. SHERMAN. And I don’t know is an acceptable answer. 

Mr. TOPERICH Mr. Congressman, I think digging out a ghost of 

the past 20 years ago and beyond doesn’t help anyone in today’s 

hearing, but I would say all the countries of the Western Balkans 

opted to join the European Union. Serbia and President Vucic, he 

55

is a positive leader of Serbia now. He was at SAIS. He was here 

with the Vice President Biden. He was coming well-received in 

Washington, DC, very often in Brussels. Serbia has made a commitment to join European Union and everybody recognizes special 

relationship with Russia. 

In respect to all the countries, whether with the Muslim populations and Serbia has a Muslim population, Bosnia has a Muslim 

populations, all of these countries——

Mr. SHERMAN. Doctor, this is time to answer the question, but 

the question is what do the Governments of Kosovo and Bosnia do 

to help educate people from Rabat to Jakarta about the heroic efforts of the United States? That is the question. 

Mr. TOPERICH I think these efforts, Mr. Congressman, is our role 

in history everywhere. Everybody talks about, everybody are grateful to the United States that they stopped the war in BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And so everybody in Jakarta and Rabat knows, 

okay. 

Mr. TOPERICH I believe so. 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of 

each government and namely the Government of Kosovo or Bosnia 

on the diplomatic steps or other steps they are taking. What I can 

tell you for having worked in the region is that it is absolutely 

clear when you walk in the streets of Pristina or even if you walk 

in Bosnia that the population is very grateful for the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Very what? 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Very grateful for the role that the U.S. has 

played. Very often if you walk in Pristina you will recognize that 

statues or streets or even coffee shops are named after prominent 

Americans who have played a very positive role. And I would imagine if you look at the track record, the diplomatic track record of 

Bosnia or Kosovo that both have been very helpful in helping the 

U.S. in pursuing its interests on all sorts of fronts. But I cannot 

speak on behalf of the specific campaigns or the resources that 

have been invested by these governments to promote the role that 

the U.S. has played. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Congressman Sherman, I can tell you 

about Kosovo. Because Albanians are so pro-American, as soon as 

740 Kosovar Albanians ended up going to fight with ISIS this created enormous alarm. And the NGOs and the Kosovo Government 

and our Embassy and USAID in Kosovo immediately came together 

and began a very, very effective and dramatic program to make 

sure that no one else returned and to demonstrate the fact that 

Kosovar and Albanians in other parts of the Western Balkans 

would be committed to preventing ISIS from moving into Western 

Europe and then certainly into their own societies. It has been well 

established. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Congressman Sherman, I think since Ms. Cloyes 

DioGuardi spoke about Kosovo I can speak about Bosnia. The governance system in Bosnia-Herzegovina would impede such a campaign actually being adopted because there would be difference of 

opinion over the American intervention. So I think that is a reflection of what we have been discussing earlier today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

56

Mr. Perry? 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Well, I think if nothing else, 

Mr. Sherman has—let’s face it. I mean how far do you want to go 

back? And I think the seventh century or so might be as about the 

right time frame and the infractions are—well, I mean that is 

about where this stuff starts, right? And maybe it is not important 

to Americans, but is certainly important to the people that live in 

these places and I think it is important for us as Americans to acknowledge that it is part of the situation, right. 

So, but we are where we are, right, so maybe let’s talk about 

some tangible things. I missed something, Mr. Leroux, if I am pronouncing that correctly, in your opening statement about the electric grid. Can you elaborate what were you talking about specifically there? 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Sure, Congressman, and I apologize if the 

analogy was not too clear. What I was trying to get at is to highlight the importance of the House of Peoples in the Federation for 

the entire governance structure of Bosnia. The delegates in the 

House of Peoples have a role to play, a crucial role to play in the 

formation of the government at the entity level in the Federation 

entity. So they are responsible to approve the president and the 

vice president of the Federation. They also have the responsibility 

to approve the cabinet, but they also have a role to play vis-a-vis 

the House of Peoples in the state level Parliamentary Assembly in 

that they are responsible to elect delegates to the House of Peoples 

at the state level. 

And moreover, as Kurt was mentioning earlier, the presidency of 

Bosnia can rely, based on the constitution, on a mechanism which 

is called a vital entity interest mechanism which is a veto mechanism. So any member of the presidency can refer to a caucus in the 

House of Peoples at the Federation a decision and then block that 

decision to that. So the House of People, that is what I was trying 

to get at. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. They are a critical node that can block——

Mr. PERRY. Yes, and I want to make sure I understand that correctly. And I think Mr. Bassuener has—am I pronouncing that——

Mr. BASSUENER. Bassuener. 

Mr. PERRY. Bassuener has kind of codified it easily for Western 

people, right, what is the problem here. And as much as from my 

standpoint I don’t think America wants to decide, like we want the 

people of Bosnia to decide, but I think you codified it correctly. 

They have little impetus, the people in the position, to decide to 

make any changes because it suits their interest to keep it exactly 

the way it is. We don’t want to be heavy handed. I mean I think 

America unduly gets characterized and we get called imperialist 

enough as it is, right? We are just trying to help people get along 

and solve problems and stop the killing and so on and so forth. 

So let me talk to you about a couple things. Filling the deterrent 

gap, let’s be real specific. You are talking about troops on the 

ground as an impetus and would this be another NATO mission or 

you are saying that it is Americans? 

Mr. BASSUENER. I am saying as part, certainly not a majority of 

such a force. Right now, just to be clear, presently, and this flows 

57

back to the Dayton Agreement Annex 1-A, NATO was the military 

element of the enforcement mechanism. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. BASSUENER. So that was handed over to the European Union 

as of the end of 2004. It is still NATO forces, effectively, under a 

different flag. That force is now 600 troops. They couldn’t defend 

themselves if challenged. The theory is that they would be reinforced from without by air. That might take time and by then you 

are not deterring you are reacting. So as I said, all the elements 

for potential violence are there. 

In terms of weapons it is roughly one per household in terms of 

average firearms ownership or possession and this is stuff that 

would be illegal under American law to put it clearly. It doesn’t get 

used, which it speaks to the forbearance of your average Bosnian 

of every flavor and stripe, but it could be. So yes, the deterrent 

number the DSACEUR, Deputy NATO chair, had put forward was 

a brigade which is roughly 3,000 to 4,000 troops, to actually fulfill 

that role. I think a battalion of American troops as a challenge to 

our other NATO allies to fill that gap would be important particularly in Brcko and Mostar which are the most likely ethnic 

flashpoints and we don’t need a new mandate for that. We have it. 

Mr. PERRY. And that is why you picked Brcko and Mostar just 

because of the specific——

Mr. BASSUENER. That is where, it could kick off in a lot of other 

places. Brcko is the hinge which is the circuit breaker of any attempt at secession by the Republika Srpska because it is not territorially contiguous if that is not possessed. And that is why in RS 

Government maps it is part of the RS. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. It is part of it, right. 

Mr. BASSUENER. And Mostar because of the ethnic divide there. 

Mr. PERRY. So this is kind of, there will be I think a long answer 

to a short question, you know, responsible governance where the 

citizens are tied to the person that they elect and more importantly 

the elected official is tied to the citizen, you seem to have a lot of 

answers or least a lot of thoughts about answers. How do they get 

to that point? 

Mr. BASSUENER. Well, you mean how do we get from the blockage of the political elites to getting to a system that is actually responsible to citizen——

Mr. PERRY. How do they change the system? You keep on saying 

‘‘we,’’ right. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Yes, yes. No, that is fair. I mean——

Mr. PERRY. I don’t know if we want to be involved if we don’t 

have to be, right? 

Mr. BASSUENER. Well, we—our best value added, let’s be intellectually honest, we can’t fix Bosnia. What we can do is create more 

conducive conditions for Bosnians who do want to fix Bosnia to get 

traction. Right now, the Daytonist system is an initiative-destroying machine and the two tools of patronage and fear are heavily 

amplified in the hands of the political elites and they work as a 

package deal. That is why the public sector is so important because 

you are not going to vote against the powers that be if you are 

afraid of losing your job and you are not sure you voted secret. It 

is very integrated. By taking fear out of that equation or at least 

58

radically reducing it by making clear to everybody violence is off 

the table, right now that is not the case. Everybody’s worst fear 

now is feasible in a way that it was not in 2006. 

So simply doing that and making clear we are going to enforce 

the bad old rules until there are new rules and try to catalyze that 

is, it would be an enormous help to moving forward. I think there 

is a potential constituency for a very different sort of BosniaHerzegovina, to be honest, which needs to involve a critical mass, 

a supermajority of each self-defined group which, as the chairman 

noted, is more than three. 

So that would be the mechanics of it by declaring we are going 

to enforce Dayton, we are not going to allow violence, and you need 

to move toward something better to ever be able to be functional 

or a member of our clubs. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, all right. We have been marking time, 

a little time for Mr. Meeks to come back, but I will just move forward and hope that they get back in time for his input. 

First of all, let me just note, and again with the first witness we 

had a good interaction there. I do believe that the long-term idea 

that I think is dominating our abilities to function is the idea that 

all of these people are going to be in the EU and we are going to 

be able to walk away. They just, this whole—and I, as I say, my 

vision of what is going on in Europe is that the EU is disintegrating and it will not be there to provide this kind of solution. So 

maybe we can try to focus on and as we have done here, what we 

can do to make these groups who live in proximity to each other 

not activate themselves into killing each other. And we have, I 

mean the Bosniaks then are basically Muslim people like in Albania but they are not Albanian; is that correct? Do they speak Albanian, the Bosniaks? What language do the Bosniaks speak? 

Mr. BASSUENER. Serbo-Croatian. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Serbo-Croatian, okay. And the Serbs speak 

Serbo-Croatian and the Croatians speak just Croatian. No? Okay. 

Well, they all speak the same language; is that right? And they 

kind of look alike too, don’t they? Okay. They look alike and they 

speak alike, hmm, okay. It seems to me that we should be able, 

maybe it is sort of like going next door down the street because 

they hear there is a ruckus down the street, but maybe you don’t 

have the solution when you tell these guys you really shouldn’t be 

fighting with your wife like that because you are making so much 

noise when, you know, that perhaps they have got to settle it for 

themselves. I would hope that we can come up with trying to be 

an honest broker. 

And, you know, when I was a kid, I was like 20 years old I was 

driving down this road near the harbor in Los Angeles and there 

was this big gang of people and right in the middle of them were 

these guys who were fighting. I mean they were like, and it was 

really bloody. I mean they were sort of big thug guys and they were 

just beating on each other. And one guy was really, I mean he was 

getting covered with blood. The biggest guy was the one who was 

getting covered with blood. And I walked up there and I said, you 

know, isn’t there some way we can solve this? And they punched 

me in the face. I remember that forever. 

59

Luckily we did not get punched in the face and we did have some 

positive role when all this killing was going on back in the 1990s. 

I actually think the United States played a very positive role there. 

And the fact that they haven’t been killing people and that that 

carnage has been at least halted, that is something that I think 

America can be proud of. And I do think that it probably took us 

an ability for, in order to accomplish that I think we probably did 

have to exercise the bombing of Belgrade and we did. And I think 

after that it stopped. 

Now with that said, I will say that in the years since I have 

found at this point in time, after all this time has passed the Serbs 

seem to be open-minded toward working to some solutions. They 

haven’t recognized Kosovo yet, but the Serbs are very willing to try 

to have this alteration of the border so that this area where 90 percent of the people are Serbs then become part of Serbia and another area that is about 80 percent Kosovar becomes part of 

Kosovo, they are willing to make that kind of an agreement and 

I think we should praise them for that. The Kosovars aren’t, and 

I think the Kosovars aren’t because, sorry, because our people 

think that getting all these people into the EU is the ultimate solution and the EU will not put up with any changes in boundaries. 

So I think that maybe we should be operating independent of 

that kind of concept because I don’t think it is going to work. One 

thing we are, and as we are discussing here, we are discussing 

whether or not a protecting individual rights and human rights in 

a country and then having at the same protecting group rights is 

going to work. Now what we have, we heard about what was going 

on in Macedonia. The Macedonians speak a different language. 

They have two languages there. That doesn’t seem to be the problem in Bosnia. And, however, in Macedonia one of the big things 

that is causing an upheaval is that they won’t let people speak that 

second language. 

Let’s note that and say, okay, are the Macedonians going to be 

able to get along and are they going to be able to succeed with that 

concept? Because the—and correct me if I am wrong, Shirley, and 

that is that the Macedonians while they have their language, the 

Albanians have this separate language and the Albanians would 

like to have their—if they do not have it, do the Albanians in Macedonia consider speaking Albanian to be their individual right, is 

my question to you, Shirley. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Again Albanians—thank you. Albanians, in general, in Macedonia actually speak both languages, but 

I go back to the fact again that this is the one clearly multiethnic 

state in the Western Balkans and you can’t have a 30 to 40 percent 

of the population being discriminated against and expect to 

have——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. In their language. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. It is not just the language. The way the 

language law works is for areas that are predominately Albanian 

would have the right to speak Albanian and use Albanian in state 

institutions and right now they do not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And they consider that to be their individual 

right like you would have it in—I am trying to relate this to BosVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Aug 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\041818\29816 SHIRL
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nia, when in Bosnia they at least don’t have this language division, 

which I think is——

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Right. But also, Chairman Rohrabacher, it is not just an issue of language rights. The Dayton Accords, the Ohrid Agreement, I should say, in 2001 that was negotiated by both the U.S. and the EU with both ethnic Albanians and 

ethnic Macedonians brought the conflict of 2001, the armed conflict, to an end, but it also set forth a program, a plan. It is not 

that different, actually, from the initial idea behind the Dayton Accords for Bosnia to begin to bring about true equality and fairness 

in the region. That has not happened. 

So we have had, you know, 18 years go by and that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Quality and fairness, to be fair, is a nebulous 

term and what we have in, I am trying to bring some lessons here 

from one part of the Balkans to the other part of the Balkans. 

That, you know, here, as I say, you have people in Bosnia who have 

basically the same language and they really go back a long way. 

They are basically part of the same cultural unit in the world even 

though they have different religions. 

By the way when I went through the Balkans many years ago 

I went to a, in Croatia I went into this really burned out Catholic 

church. And the first thing I said, I go wow, the Muslims really 

came in here and destroyed this church, didn’t they? Oh no, this 

was burned by the Serbs because they are Orthodox and these are 

Roman Catholics. And, you know, I will have to say that to Americans this all sounds so, how do you put it, it is almost other worldish. I mean this is not something that we recognize at all as where 

Catholics will be killing one another even though because one is 

Orthodox and one is not. But if we are going to be the force, if we 

are going to be the force for bringing about a peaceful world in this 

area, I think we, I guess we have got to understand that. 

Okay, Shirley, go ahead and then I am going to let other people 

comment. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. But Chairman, just one thing, wouldn’t 

the United States, though, recognize that we don’t want discrimination against ethnic groups? And when you have a majority who 

is not, a huge majority that is not Slav, not ethnic Macedonian, you 

have that group, you have the predominance of one ethnic group 

making the groups, not just Albanians alone, in a second- and 

third-class position in their country. And I think that is something 

that our democratic situation would, you know, fundamentally oppose. In other words it is not just a question of people getting an 

individual right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it is people being discriminated against, 

et cetera. 

So, yes, sir? 

Mr. LEROUX-MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, regarding the role 

of Serbia and Kosovo I wanted to bring to your attention as well 

that from the perspective of Kosovo, Kosovo is an independent 

state that has been recognized by more than a hundred countries 

including the United States and most countries in the EU. So for 

Serbia to talk about an exchange of territory, what Serbia or Belgrade is doing is they are openly talking about carving up and infringing upon the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of an 

61

independent state. I think what is also important to understand is 

that Serbia and Belgrade have been involved in acts of provocation. 

They have sent trains with a lot of religious symbols down to 

Kosovo to create disruption. 

So to categorize the role of Serbia I think as a helpful, reasonable 

contributor, my sense is that we need to take into account these 

actions that Belgrade has contemplated recently. And Kosovo has 

been involved with Belgrade in a number of conversations and discussions that were facilitated by the European Union trying to get 

to a number of arrangements to facilitate—not to facilitate, but to 

normalize their relationships. So from my perspective, Kosovo has 

been playing a very mature, transparent, and constructive role in 

trying to engage with Serbia on normalizing their relationships. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I haven’t found them very cooperative. I have 

been having conversations with the Serbs and Kosovars over the 

years and I certainly supported Kosovo in their efforts to be independent. Since then, personally I can just testify that I have found 

the Kosovars to be much less likely to want to cooperate. Now the 

Serbs on the other hand won’t officially recognize anything, but 

they will discuss issues and try to come to compromises. At least 

that is my experience with them. 

Let me offer Brad 2 more minutes, and 2 more minutes, and then 

if Mr. Meeks has not arrived—by the way you wanted to jump in, 

I could tell. 

Mr. TOPERICH Well, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And give people a chance, 2 minute, or what 

would you like to say? 

Mr. TOPERICH Well, I think in respect to the European Union I 

share your concerns, but, however, European Union is a strong 

partner for the Western Balkans at this point in time. And regardless what the hypothetical future of Europe may look like, I think 

it is important for us to talk to our European allies and have their 

strong action together with ours in fixing the Western Balkans as 

an unfinished business as soon as possible because enhancing the 

rule of law, enhancing the European standards of democracy to the 

Western Balkans, it’s not to give geographical background, but that 

your Balkans are the part of Europe. You can fly 45 minutes from 

Sarajevo to Vienna. 

It is an immediate European interest of security and this is our 

allies, our security and national interest that we push and Europeans to work with us stronger to put those things right in the 

Western Balkans. That is what I wanted to say. And another one 

if I may on Macedonia, I think we should strongly support Zaev 

government with all being said today, but they are working very 

seriously with Greek counterparts to address the name issue problem that Greece blocked for their joining NATO and joining European Union. 

We finally have pro-European, pro-Euro-Atlantic government in 

Macedonia that also I think you will be pleased to hear thanks to 

our former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Yee who directly intervened with the President Ivanov and other to unblock 

the stalemate there and give a legitimately elected government a 

mandate. So they are really working and finally we have some good 

news from Macedonia. I think we should keep the eye on getting 

62

this issue with the name of Greece sold so that they can move toward the EU and NATO. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You deserved to get that in the record. 

Yes, sir, go right ahead. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Two quick points to follow up, first, on the European Union, I definitely think that catalyzing a common Western 

position because we have been atomized. There has been a transatlantic divide in our posture and our posture and approach toward 

the region which not just malign actors from the outside, but mischievous actors within the Western Balkans have taken full advantage of. Catalyzing that position is going to take American leadership, I think it will be welcome in many corners. 

Second, very quickly on Macedonia that is the only relatively 

good news story in the region, in my view, for the past year is the 

transition last year. There is a lot left to do. Sasha has mentioned 

the name issue regarding NATO and the EU. I would add one 

other element, resolution of the unresolved cases of inter-ethnic violence that happened during the Gruevski regime, uncovering them 

in independent investigations which the government to its credit 

has said it wants to do, but there has been scant international enthusiasm for that. I think that is going to be essential to developing a democratic system where there can be nobody who corners 

the market like Nikola Gruevski had. So I just wanted to add that 

to the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. I would give my 

colleagues a couple minutes to make closing remarks. 

Brad, you have 2 minutes for closing. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One very quick question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go for it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is the Government of Kosovo sending troops to Afghanistan or Iraq? How many? 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Yes, they have. I don’t have the current 

number, Congressman. I am sorry about that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Any idea? 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. But Albania has and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So has Albania. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I know Albania has and Albania has accepted the 

MEK which took—but then there were over 700 individuals from 

Kosovo that joined ISIS? 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Yes. But there are more people who 

joined ISIS from England and other Western countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, England is an enormously much larger 

country. 

Mrs. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. I just wanted to point out what happened, what the response was. It was a very effective response and 

I think our State Department would concur, although that is not 

my personal——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I would simply make the point our State Department asks for way too little from those who have benefited 

from American action. We have not asked the community of Muslims in Bosnia to send representatives from one end of the Muslim 

world to the other. We have not insisted that the Kosovo Government do the same. And when people look back and say why did 

America fail to engage in the world, the fault will not just be on 

63

those who argued against engagement, but those who have argued 

for engagement and then didn’t push our allies and beneficiaries 

for reciprocity. And the idea that asking for reciprocity is anti-engagement I think is shortsighted. 

So I would hope, I don’t blame Kosovo and the Muslims of Bosnia 

for doing less than I would like to see them do to help us. I blame 

a State Department that hasn’t explained that whether we are 

dealing with a Japan that has lived under our protection in great 

wealth for 70 years and didn’t have a single soldier on the ground 

in Afghanistan or whether it is Kosovo which does not have a 

major outreach to the Muslim community on our behalf from Rabat 

to Jakarta, those who ask little from our allies are setting us up 

for less involvement from the American people. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. PERRY. I return to Mr. Bassuener. So I am sure you must, 

you are a smart guy. Troops on the ground in Bosnia seems, I don’t 

know, a little politically untenable at the moment maybe. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Unpalatable, for sure. 

Mr. PERRY. So if that is the case, let’s just say it is for the conversation’s sake, things keep on moving toward the inevitable date 

without any resolution, who is going to fill the void if we don’t and 

how will that be filled? 

Mr. BASSUENER. Well, right now on the docket for reinforcement 

for the current force is a British reserve battalion. I definitely 

think they would have to be part of an on the ground in situ reinforcement. 

Mr. PERRY. But that will be after the fact? 

Mr. BASSUENER. That will be after the fact. That will not, I mean 

they could get it ahead of the curve too. There would need to be 

European Union unanimity on that which is not being catalyzed at 

present. So right now we are skating on very thin ice to be, if we 

are intellectually honest about it. 

Mr. PERRY. So that is the friendly actor. I guess I was looking 

for more of the other side of the coin, if you will. 

Mr. BASSUENER. Ah. I see where you are going. Look, I would not 

put it past other malign actors to fill voids, particularly Russia, 

particularly in Republika Srpska. However, again I mean if there 

is any place on planet Earth where you a united West, which is not 

united right now, has more leverage, potential leverage than the 

Western Balkans including Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically with 

the mandates that flow from the Dayton Agreement, I don’t know 

where it is. So if that void is being filled, if that is a vacuum, that 

is on us. 

Mr. PERRY. And I don’t disagree. Describe for me if you will, if 

you can, what the filling of the void, whether it is Russian 

Republika Srpska or Turkey elsewhere, et cetera, what does it look 

like physically? 

Mr. BASSUENER. Well, physically it could take many forms. Obviously there are things, there is Russian training of the Republika 

Srpska Ministry of Interior special forces going on about to open 

a new training center outside Banja Luka. We have seen, I mean 

this is purely speculative, but, you know, we are in speculative territory here. We have seen Vladimir Putin take bold moves to put 

64

us on the back foot. That is what happened in Syria as a result of 

being in the doghouse for Ukraine. 

Would I put it past him flying in paratroopers into Banja Luka? 

No, I wouldn’t. Do I think it is imminent? No. Could it happen? 

Yes. We are not controlling the airspace the way we did immediately after the war. It is open season. This is a territory that we 

could secure not to predetermine a solution, but to prevent really 

negative solutions or degradation of the situation. We are not. That 

is something that could be dealt with in the immediate term and 

certainly should be before October as tensions rise. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chair. I yield. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. We will just close up with this, a 

couple of observations on my part. And when we talk about what 

is going on there now, we realize at one point when I first became 

a Member of Congress there were people who were slaughtering 

one another. You had Serbs going down into Kosovo and just saying we don’t care if you want to be independent or not, you raise 

your head up and we are going to cut it off. And it became so intense that finally the West, the Western Europe, the United States 

acted. And again there are all kinds of mistakes that have been 

made, but I think that we can be, we should understand just the 

fact that we have been able to play that role in stopping that bloodshed and keeping it from reigniting all these years is a great accomplishment and it speaks well of our motives. 

We have been warned that there are people who don’t have those 

motives. They are provocateurs, the Russians and the Turks. That 

they maybe do not have the same motive that has motivated us 

and our European allies to try to get and try to calm the situation 

down. Maybe they aren’t trying to calm the situation down, I don’t 

know. One thing I do know that we have a horrible, if the Muslims 

of that part of the world right there in the Balkans, if they become 

a radical element on this planet, if they are radicalized into the 

radical Islamic movement it will be a disaster for the cause of 

peace, a disaster for Europe, a disaster for the United States. 

And so we have to make sure, whether it is Albania or whether 

it is Kosovo or, you know, or whatever country we are talking 

about, Macedonia or whatever that those Islamic people do not feel 

that they are getting, that they are so unfairly treated and the situation is so bad for them that they will be susceptible to this radical Islamization that will lead them to become terrorists and killers. As we know, that type of dynamic exists in this world today. 

Now I hope that we have learned a lot. And it is interesting that 

Bosnia is the place where we can take a look at all of this as sort 

of in a laboratory almost to see how we can work with people, and 

in Bosnia working with people at close proximity who have all of 

these traits where Serbs and Croatians, and yes, and Muslims. 

And so with that said I think we have learned a lot today. I 

think it has been good to have Brad. Thank you for stopping in, 

you know, and we thank you for stopping in as well, Mr. Perry. 

And I thank our witnesses. I am Congressman Dana Rohrabacher 

and I am the chairman of this subcommittee and it is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

Apri116, 2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You nrc respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held by the 

Subconunittcc on Europe, Eurasia. and Emerging Threats in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available 

live on the Committee "\'fcbsitc at h:tlQ./hnY'\V.f~prcigrr.Affuirs.lm1J~:..:.tr~)_!J: 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. Aprill8, 2018 

2:00p.m 

The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia and the Western Balkans 

.Mr. Matthcvy Palmer 

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Panel IT 

Saslm Topcrich. Ph.D 

Senior Fcllo·w and Director of the Mcclitcrrancan Basin .Middle East. and Gulf Initiative 

Center for Tnmsatlantic Relations 

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 

The Jolms Hopkins University 

Mr. Phlllppe Leroux-Martin 

Director 

Rule of Lm;v. Justice. and Security 

U.S. Institute of Peace 

Mrs. Shirley Cloycs DioGuardi 

Balkan Affairs Adviser 

Albani;m American Civic League 

:Mr. Kurt Bassuener 

Co-Founder and Senior Associate 

Dcmocrati/atlon Policy Connell 

By Direction of the Chainnan 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ___ E_o_u_ro_:p_e_,_E_'_"_·a_s_i<_l,_a_"_d_E_m_e_''l<:c''_."_cg_T._l_•_re_a_t,_,. ---HEARING 

Day Wetlnesdny Date ___ A""'p_r_il_l_8_c,_2_0_1_8 __ Room_-=-22=-0'-0'-=-R"-a"-J'cch~u~n~l __ 

Starting Time 2:00 pm Ending Time 4:09pm 

Recesses I_Q__i ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L___to __ ) L___to __ )( __ lo __ )( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Rep. Ro!trabacher 

Check all ~l thefollowillg that apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive {<:l<Jsed) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record!&..( taped) 0 

Stenographic Record ~ 

The Dayton Legacy ami the Future of Bosnia ami the Western Ballams 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Meeks, Rep. Sherman, Rep. Sires, Rep. Rooney 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if' they are not members of:titll committee.) 

Rep.Peny 

IillARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list belo-w and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Us! any statements suhmllledfor the record.) 

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS


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Meanwhile, Turkey and the Gulf states are also investing heavily in the western Balkans. Turkey 

is the third-largest investor in Bosnia, and the leader of Bosnia's main Muslim political party 

travels to Istanbul regularly for photo ops with the increasingly authoritarian Turkish President 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

Saudi Arabia and its neighbors in the Gulf have focused their contributions on supporting 

religious organizations, building new mosques and offering religious instruction to local imams. 

The strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that is often the basis of such training bears little 

relation to the moderate tradition that has been practiced in the Balkans for centuries, and has 

been tied to rising fundamentalism in the region. 

An estimated 1,000 foreign fighters (primarily from Kosovo and Bosnia) have fought with the 

Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Although the number offoreign fighters from the Balkans is 

trending downward, the environments in which these individuals became radicalized, and the 

vulnerabilities to recruitment among disatiected segments of the population, continue to be a 

concern. The problem of reintegrating returned foreign fighters poses an even more vexing 

challenge. 

Finally, China is also seeking to augment its influence in the region. Under its "One Belt, One 

Road" initiative, Beijing is poised to provide the massive capital investment needed to undertake 

badly needed infrastructure projects in the Balkans. But as we've seen in Africa, such investment 

almost always comes with strings attached. 

Clearly, the United States and Europe must remain committed to the western Balkans- with a 

particular emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions so that governments can address the 

needs of their citizens. 

A western Balkans free-trade zone recently proposed by the region's leaders could be a step in 

the right direction. But such an initiative should not be viewed as a substitute for the potential 

guarantees to be provided by NATO and the E.U A serious road map for E.U accession would 

provide countries in the region with the incentives to make necessary political and economic 

reforms, increase their cooperation and address rising inter-ethnic tensions. 

Of course, such efforts would need to secure popular support in order to go forward- a 

challenge in a region where the population remains sharply divided in attitudes toward 

institutions like NATO. 

Yet according to one recent poll, although Bosnians of Serb, Croat and Muslim backgrounds are 

divided on many issues, they are united in their opposition to the Islamic State and their desire to 

tackle economic problems. NATO membership would be easier to sell to the region's ethnic 

Serbs (who tend to be pro-Russian and anti-NATO) if membership were pitched as helping to 

foster greater regional stability. 
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We can ensure that the billions in taxpayer dollars invested in this region were not wasted by 

supporting the work of democracy development implementers such as the National Democratic 

Institute and the International Republican Institute. We've seen the continued importance of this 

kind of work with initiatives such as the newly established Task Force on Counter-Extremism, 

which is helping lawmakers in Bosnia adapt to the ever-shifting challenge of violent extremism. 

We have many tools at our disposal to avert the creeping destabilization in the western Balkans. 

Let us ensure that we do not squander the tremendous investment we have made in this troubled 

region, and renew our commitment to helping these fledgling democracies to achieve their full 

potential 
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The Bos~aks, on the other hand, to satisfy their territorial ambitions, 

ethnically cleansed the Croats in Central Bosnia, and, as a majority and a 

recognized entity, reduced the Croats to a minority with a subsidiary role in 

the "Federation". Indeed, Bosnian Croats are in a dire, precarious 

circumstance, facing a continuous political marginalization, threatened by 

two, equally dangerous ideologies- the ideology of a Great Serbia, and the 

ideology of Moslem Fundamentalism. The former has been the fundamental 

term of reference ofthe Serbian hegemonic politics ever since Garasinovo 

"Nacertanije" of 1843. Under the motto "All, and Everywhere Serbs" (Srbi 

Svi i Svuda), the ideology expressed itself in different modalities, depending 

on political circumstances, including the most recent infamous SANU 

Memorandum (Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art). 

The latter was propagated by the late president Izetbegovic in his 

"Declaration': which envisions an Islamic State in the Balkans. 

Today, the Bosnian Croats face a clear and present danger. Unfortunately, 

these are some of the consequences of the Dayton Accords. What to do 

now? In my view, we must proceed with the premise" that no one wants to 

be a minority in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Republic of Croatia clearly 

has an important role to play in the solution, both from the standpoint of a 

national interest, and the constitutional obligation to protect its people in 

Bosnia and Hercegovina. It should work with the United States and the 

European Union to find a solution that will preserve the territorial integrity 

of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and equally protect the three constitutionally 

recognized peoples: Croats, Serbs, and Bosnjaks. 

There are a number of proposals on the table. I am going to mention a few, 

so you'll get a sense of what might be a realistic solution. 

A Croatian historian, Janko Bekic, proposed the establishment of a third 

entity as the best solution for the protection of Croats in Bosnia and 

Hercegovina and their national interest. 

A left oriented politician, Tony Picula, disagreed. He proposed a Swiss 

model of "cantonization", that is, the cantonization of the whole Bosnia and 

Hercegovina. 

Milorad Dodik, President of "Republika Srpska" proposed a division of the 

territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina into three separate sovereign states: 

Herceg Bosna, Republika Sepska, and Bosnia, united in a corifederate 

arrangement. 
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The key question is: Will the Bosnjaks agree to any of the above proposals? 

Bakir Izetbegovic, Moslem member of the Bosnia and Hercegovina 

Presidency cautions that Bosnjaks would not permit union of the cantons on 

the ethnic basis, emphasizing that current number of cantons in the 

Federation must remain the same, that is, ten. Even more sensitive question 

is: Why would Bosnian Serbs accept an arrangement which would result in 

termination, and, at the most, in division of its republic? 

A proposal by a Croatian journalist, Jozo Pavkovic,(Vecernji List, February 

18, 2018) appears to be acceptable to the greatest number ofBosnjaks, 

Serbs, and Croats. The crux of his proposal is the notion that Bosnia and 

Hercegovina can be a functional viable state only on the formula 1 + 3. This 

would mean termination ofthe Federation and 10 cantons (zupanija) .. The 

Government, that is, the governance would consist of one state and three 

entities. In his view, the national ethnic entity would strengthen the multiethnic state. 

According to Pavkovic, the Croatian entity, which would include Bosnian 

Posavina, and other Croatian counties ( opcine) would provide a connecting 

bridge for a unified state. 

Respectfully submitted, 

International Lawyer, Consultant 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS


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understanding of survivors' search for justice as previously detailed l.n numerous 

investigations and statements by Amnesty. 

In 1992, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia 

and conflict broke out between its Muslim Bosniak, Catholic Croat, and Orthodox Serb 

communities. The resulting war lasted three years and was marked by gross human 

rights violations by all sides. The use of rape and other forms of sexual violence during 

the war was widespread. Rape was committed on a large scale by all parties to the 

conflict, although the majority of victims were Bosnian Muslims. In total, more than 

20,000 women suffered rape and other forms of sexual violence at the hands of 

military and paramilitary forces. Many were imprisoned in so-called "rape camps," 

where they were enslaved, tortured, and forcibly impregnated as part of a campaign of 

violence and ethnic cleansing. 

Our research found that, nearly two decades after the end of the conflict, BiH 

authorities have failed to provide support and redress to women survivors of conflictrelated sexual violence. Under international law, the Bi H state is responsible for 

guaranteeing victims' rights to justice, truth and reparation. This obligation includes 

equal and effective access to justice; and adequate, effective and prompt reparation 

for the harm suffered, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction 

and guarantees of non-repetition. 

The government's stated commitment to reconstructing Bosnian society and rebuilding 

civic trust is not seen as credible by survivors of rape. While some few women have 

secured appropriate redress, many more have been denied the justice and recompense 

to which they are entitled. Their frustrated attempts to seek compensation are due to 

the labyrinthine and dysfunctional constitutional, judicial, and administrative structure 

of BiH and the country's ongoing political paralysis. 

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to the violence and implemented a 

complicated power sharing agreement, dividing BiH into two semi-autonomous entities: 

the Federation of BiH ("FBiH"), predominantly populated by Bosnian Muslims 

("Bosniaks") and Croats, and the Republika Srpska ("RS"), with a Serb majority. Brcko 

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District in Northern Bosnia was granted a special status and the FBiH was eventually 

further decentralized into ten separate cantons. Collectively, these entities are referred 

to as political subdivisions of BiH. 

This political arrangement yielded a highly decentralized and byzantine system of 

justice. As a result, authorities across the country have been unable to agree to an 

equal standard of rights and protections for survivors of sexual violence. In BiH, the 

prosecution of war crimes, including the cases of conflict-related sexual violence, can 

take place at the state level or at the level of the state's political subdivisions. In total, 

15 different courts (10 cantonal FBiH courts and 5 RS courts) operating under 

different criminal legislation are empowered to investigate and prosecute an accusation 

of war-time sexual violence. 

I. Complicated Legal Processes Have Denied Justice to Survivors of Sexual 

Violence 

Bosnia's fragmented system of governance has repeatedly resulted in the denial of 

justice for survivors of sexual violence. With no standardized procedure, survivors must 

take it upon themselves to research and navigate the byzantine legal regimen. Survivors 

of sexual violence interviewed by Amnesty did not know how to obtain the status of 

civilian victim of war, secure administrative compensation, or get psychological 

support. 

According to the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Bosnia and Hel1:§Rovina, the 

state prosecution faces over 550 unresolved war crimes cases with over 4,500 

identified perpetrators and an almost equal number of anonymous perpetrators 

remaining at large. A reallocation process designed to redistribute cases from the Court 

of BiH to lower level courts has been partially successful in clearing caseloads. 

However, this has been stymied by the political subdivisions' limited judicial capacity 

and experience with witness protection. As described by one woman interviewed by 

Amnesty, "'Justice is too slow, or it never happens. After the war, I reported the 

crimes. All the men who did this to me were members of the local police ... These 

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courts won't prosecute them. It seems that there will be no judgment for them in this 

world" 

II. Limited Witness Protection Capacity Dissuades Women from Seeking 

Justice 

The provision of witness protection and witness support in BiH has been significantly 

strengthened over the past years. Improvements to witness protection processes have 

enabled all 15 courts to facilitate witness anonymity through audio and video distortion 

during testimonies. Approximately two-thirds of the courts employ dedicated witness 

protection officers for witnesses during the course of their testimonies and offer 

separate facilities to ensure they are not forced to wait in the same room as their 

abuser. Despite these improvements, witness support is limited to the duration of the 

trial only. Witnesses who face harassment before or after testifying are often left to 

navigate the threats without external support 

Witness protection departments in courts and prosecutors' offices rely heavily on 

funding from the EU and the U.S. to recruit and retain staff and finance training. 

When BiH failed to adopt a new judicial sector reform strategy, the European Union 

withheld two years worth of funds provided through its Instrument for Pre-accession 

(I PA) mechanism. According to an OSCE report, the reduced resources resulted in the 

termination of many investigators and other support staff, including witness protection 

officers in some courts, leaving some of the core positions vacant for an extended 

period of time 

Ill. Survivors Are Wrongfully Denied Compensation and Rehabilitation 

Under international law, all victims of war crimes, including survivors of sexual 

violence, have a right to remedy and reparation from the state. 

While different political subdivisions maintain their own policies on redress for civilian 

victims of war, Bi H lacks a comprehensive statewide framework for redress. Despite 

several efforts to do so, the authorities failed to adopt key pol icy and legal documents 

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that sought to put in place a system to address the rights of this group in a manner 

consistent with international standards. In 2012 and again in 2013, the BiH Ministry 

of Human Rights and Refugees and the BiH Ministry of Justice sought to implement 

several strategies and policies that, taken together, would allow Bosnians subjected to 

torture and ill-treatment during the war to obtain special status and enjoy specific 

rights regardless of their residency in BiH. Both attempts failed to garner the political 

support necessary to become law. As a result, different political subdivisions of BiH 

take different approaches to recognizing survivors and offer different forms of 

reparations. Some offer none whatsoever. 

Survivors also have difficulty securing compensation from the perpetrators. As of 

September 2017, courts in BiH have ordered perpetrators to pay compensation to 

survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in only eight cases. Over 20 years after 

being sexually assaulted, not one of the eight survivors has actually received 

compensation. Most often, the perpetrators lacked funds and were unable to pay. BiH 

does not have a solidarity fund or an alternative mechanism to provide compensation to 

survivors in instances where the perpetrators are unable to do so. Many of the survivors 

interviewed by Amnesty stated that the courts did not inform them of their right to seek 

compensation. 

IV. Recommendations to Congress 

ill Continue providing financial and other support to strengthen institutional 

capacities of the judiciary in BiH to prosecute crimes under international law: 

The U.S. should continue to provide significant assistance to BiH by helping 

the country reform its judicial sector. USAID's "Justice Project in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina" project helps build courts' capacity, train prosecutors, facilitate 

enforcement of judgments, and build public trust in the judicial system. The 

program is slated to conclude in 2019, and Congress should allocate funding 

for additional judicial sector reform and technical assistance in FY2020. 

ill Encourage BiH authorities to remove obstacles that prevent survivors from 

seeking redress: BiH is obligated to adopt a unified pathway for survivors of 

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sexual violence in wartime to seek justice and compensation under the UN 

Convention against Torture. Such policies should define criteria for how a 

survivor can obtain the status of "civilian victim of war," ensure the inclusion of 

survivors of conflict-related sexual violence under that status, and enumerate 

specific rights guaranteed to survivors throughout all political subdivisions of 

BiH. Congress should press the U.S. Department of State to assist and 

encourage BiH to reform its legal system in order to provide much-needed and 

much-overdue justice for survivors of sexual violence. 

For more information, please contact me at dbalson@aiusa.org or (202) 509-8132. 

Sincerely, 

Daniel Balson 

Advocacy Director for Europe and Central Asia 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MRS. SHIRLEY CLOYES DIOGUARDI, 

BALKAN AFFAIRS ADVISER, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE


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2. Achievement of economic equality and societal wellbeing, especially through the 

equitable regional development 

• Establishment of a new mechanism, in the form of a State Committee on Financing of 

Municipalities, for a more just decision-making with regard to government grants for 

municipalities' benefit. 

• Creation of a Ministry for Political System and Relations among Communities, as a body 

responsible for the respect for the rights of the communities and to incentivize economic and 

societal development in disfavored areas. 

• Realization of equitable representation in the security bodies, the military, intelligence 

[agencies], and the judiciary. 

• Realization of equitable representation at all levels of central governance, as well as public 

agencies, or public shareholder enterprises. 

3. Strengthening of the Rule of Law, as a prerequisite for the advancement of the EuroAtlantic integration process 

• hnplementation of the Reform Plan, in accordance with the Skopje Agreement [Przino], the 

Priebe Recommendations, the Urgent Reform Priorities of the European Commission, as well as 

the recommendations from the High-Level Accession Dialogue with the EU. 

• Support for the impartial work of the Special Prosecution [Office], without ethnic or political 

prejudice. 

• Shedding full light on the issues and court cases of"Sopot," "Bradee," "Monster," and 

"Kumanovo," though an investigative committee, or an independent international body. 

4. Creation of a spirit of trust in the function of good interethnic relations, as a crucial 

element to the political stability of the country 

• Aflirmative measures to ensure the tinancing of Albanian cultural institutions at the local and 

national level. 

• Creation of a central institution for the advancement of the languages of the communities, 

which shall ensure tbe training of translators, editors and lectors. 

5. Resolution of the name issue, in conformity with European values and the principles of 

international law 
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• Adoption of a Joint Binding Resolution in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia which 

shall oblige the Government of Macedonia to commit to actively work toward a solution to the 

name dispute. 

• Inclusion of Albanians in the working group for direct negotiations with Greece. 

6. Good Relations With the Neighbors 

• Inclusion of Albanians in the working group for direct negotiations with Bulgaria. 

• Cooperation with Kosovo and Albania for the integrated border management. 

• Opening of new border crossings. 

7. Quick integration in NATO and the EU 

Accomplishing the above points shall unblock Macedonia's path toward full integration in 

NATO and open negotiations for membership in the European Union. 

The accomplishment of these objectives will be supervised through the establishment of a 

Roundtable of Albanian Parliamentary Parties. 

The Roundtable of Albanian Parliamentary Parties shall function according to the principle of 

rotation and shall serve as a platfonn for the harmonization of political actions and transparent 

communication with Macedonia's international partners, while seeking in particular the support 

of the European Union and international institutions. 

The Roundtable shall determine the deadlines for the accomplishment of the above-mentioned 

objectives, in accordance with the laws and the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 
83

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. KURT BASSUENER, CO-FOUNDER AND

SENIOR ASSOCIATE, DEMOCRATIZATION POLICY COUNCIL


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reflected in a host of independently assessed comparative indicators.' The essential error was 

the presumption that Euro-Atlantic enlargement alone would impel organic and durable 

reform in the states of the region, based on the "big bang" enlargement in Central and Eastern 

Europe in 2004. Even in retrospect, with the retreat from liberal democracy most visible in 

Hungary and Poland, that enlargement was a success 2 However, that process was an 

experiment which succeeded for a number of reasons, both on the demand side and on the 

part of the EU and NATO. The countries of the former Yugoslavia, in which political leaders 

had benefitted personally from the conflicts of 1991-2001, posed a much greater challenge, 

requiring a broader set of tools and different incentive structure. 

On top of this error, shared on both sides of the Atlantic, an additional element to the EU' s 

vaunting of its "transformative" and "soft power" served to limit its field of vision and 

leverage. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and attendant ructions within NATO and the EU led 

the leading continental powers and the EU institutions to append a connotation to "soft 

power" that Joseph Nye had not intended. Put cheekily, this could be summed up as "we 

don't need to employ coercion and violence like our simpler Anglo-American friends- we 

have soft power." However, what regional leaders rightly heard was "we no longer have the 

will to apply strong leverage or deter your worst practices." They have acted accordinglyand have been indulged in their malpractice through undeserved declarations of progress and 

effective sidestepping of standards in the name of stability. The loss of Western credibility in 

the region has been considerable. And the stability achieved is not actual, durable, or in 

conformity with Britain's professed liberal democratic values. 

The winners of a string of five wars (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 

Macedonia- the middle three of which collectively yielded a death toll of at least 130,000) 

are the political elites, which through accumulation by war now form durable political, 

business, organized crime, and media complexes in each country. The overwhelming 

majority of their citizens, including many who fought, very clearly recognize that they lost. 

But the West's approach has been predicated on the delusion that they share the same 

interests- and that the winners actually represent the losers. They are our "partners," 

according the enlargement model, after all.. The clearest indicator of popular sentiment 

regarding the future is the accelerating brain drain from the region. Even those with decent 

and secure employment are choosing to emigrate for the sake of their children. A more 

1 For example, on Gini coefficients, see Zsoka Kocsan, "Being Poor, Feeling Poorer: Inequality, 

Poverty, and Poverty Perceptions in the Western Balkans," IMF Working Paper, February 2016. 

Available at: b_ltp5_1/www,iminrillllxt<>maJlpuhsLfiLwRL~QJ!'lJ~QJll_31Jldf See also "Populists and 

Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy- Freedom in the World 2017," Freedom House, 

available at: b![l!i:/Lf[~ftclo_a1llou_s_<UJITJL~ite5ld~flJ1!ltLfUgs/FI::I_ElW 2Q1LR!lJJJJILEi!:Hll.Q\1f Regarding 

corruption, the countries ofthe region ranked as follows in 2016: Slovenia (31), Croatia (55), 

Montenegro (64), Serbia (72), Bosnia and Herzegovina (83), Albania (83), Macedonia (90), and 

Kosovo (95). 

2 The EU and NATO's leverage to effect change of applicants ends upon their entry. The 

unwillingness to demand Croatia end territorial disputes with Bosnia and Herzegovina was therefore a 

missed opportunity for NATO and the EU. Since entering the EU, Zagreb has involved itself ever more deeply- and detrimentally- in BiH's internal affairs. See Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener, 

"Lost in Transition? Croatia's Policy Toward Bosnia and Herzegovina," DPC Policy Note, November 

2015. Available at: biip~//wl"'w.il_emru;ralizatiPJJJ)DJic~.Q_rg/_pdfiDJ'C_%2_QE_oJis;iL%2_0_t.lole 

%2012%20Croatia%27s%20BiH%20Policy .pdf 

2 
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damning indictment of localleaderships, economies, and by implication our policies, can 

scarcely be imagined. The hollowness of democracy and capitalism in the eyes of large 

swathes of the local populations owes to applying the terms to blatantly self-serving behavior 

by leaders. This cynicism provides a wellspring for populism, nationalism, and other forms 

of radicalization. The trend toward authoritarian rule has been manifest not only in Serbia 

and Macedonia, as well at the sub-state entity ofRepublika Srpska in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, but also within the club, in Croatia. 

The vacuum which opened over the past decade because of the West's bureaucratic autopilot 

-in which Britain (often with some discomfort) participated- has allowed the increased 

regional leverage of external actors. Russia is the most obvious and immediately threatening 

of these. Up until the invasion of Crimea and launching of its war in eastern Ukraine, Russia 

could play opportunistic spoiler in the Western Balkans, abetted by Western disunity and 

differentiation in threat perceptions. This was most pronounced in Bosnia. But it was 

manifest throughout the region. Following Crimea, Moscow shifted into a much higher gear 

to being an active disruptor: first encouraging separatist adventurism by Republika Srpska 

President Mil orad Dodik in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then moving to support the increasingly 

nationalist and authoritarian regime ofNikola Gruevski in Macedonia, and most spectacularly 

in the attempted coup in Montenegro a year ago. Tn all these cases, Moscow has aligned its 

talking points and policies with Belgrade, creating a visible alignment of political players 

opposed to (in word and/or deed) to NATO and EU enlargement. From 2014 on, Russian 

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that it sees Euro-Atlantic integration- not just 

NATO- as a "provocation.''3 Serbia's government, despite claiming ambitions to join the 

EU and being a candidate for membership, refuses to align with the Union on sanctions 

against Russia- and appears implicated along with Moscow in the October 2016 coup 

attempt in Montenegro. It also seems, most worryingly, to be collaborating closely with 

Moscow in efforts to subvert Macedonia's new, fragile coalition government led by Prime 

Minister Zoran Zaev. 

Turkey, ever more deeply authoritarian and under the unchecked paranoid and abrasive 

leadership ofRecep Tayyip Erdogan, has also amplified its regional ambitions and footprint, 

backing retrograde political, social, and religious elements in Western Balkan societies. The 

deepening frictions which result from Ankara's policies may well amplify these efiorts. 

China sees the Western Balkans as a vital economic conduit into the EU. So while unlike 

Moscow, it does not oppose EU or NATO enlargement (quite the contrary as for the EU), it 

does- as in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and throughout Asia- offer alternatives to 

leaders who wish to avoid the stipulations of international financial institutions, adhere to 

democratic and human rights standards, and so on. Balkan leaders have all warmed to their 

ministrations. 

3 See Kurt Bassuener, "EUFOR: The West's Potemkin Deterrent in Bosnia and Herzegovina," AIDPC Security Risk Analysis, Policy Note #3, November 2015, page 12-13. 

btllli'LIL¥W.'I'ILd_emQJ::rB1ization.Q.o.licy,QrgLndfLAI-DF'C_%.2J16iH%20. S.e~uritl'%2Q..8.is.ls Lo2.0AnalJLs1s 

%20Paper%20Series%203%20EUFOR%20%20The%20Wests%20%20Potemkin%20De!errent.pdf 

3 
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Finally, Persian Gulf autocracies have developed a far larger footprint in the Western Balkans 

over the past tive years. This can be seen through state-directed investments, private 

investment (often in large property purchases and construction of exclusive resorts for Arab 

visitors), cultural and humanitarian investments (often with a religious angle), and a large 

influx of people- most numerous being new arrivals to the lower-middle class. What is 

unnerving is not so much the influx of people per se, but the confluence of interests driving 

the process: opaque investment in collusion with local political actors (with attendant 

corruption) and an alien influence on local and organic Islamic practice. These factors have 

generated considerable resentment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in particular- and 

mainline into standing anti-Muslim narratives and prejudices propagated by Serb, Croat, and 

ethnic Macedonian nationalists. 

It is hard to conceive of a region on Earth where the West had developed a wider portfolio of 

policy levers and influence over more than two decades- and at great cost. The decline in 

Western leverage and credibility is overwhelmingly its own fault. While the challenge of the 

region's organic democratization and development is in many ways greater than it was a 

decade ago, it can be sunnounted. But only with a clear-eyed view of the actual dynamics, 

the stakes, and active development of a popular constituency for these processes is this 

feasible. A desire for "stability," as reflected in the Committee's request for evidence, is 

understandable 4 But it is illusory. The Western Balkans are, despite the recent positives of 

Montenegro's joining NATO and Macedonia's genuine, though reversible, forward 

movement, regressing in the aggregate. A Western policy posture which, as with the entire 

Mediterranean littoral, is focused on pacification and containment, not only undercuts Britain 

and the West's real friends in these countries, to the benefit of its kleptocrats. It is also 

doomed to fail. It can only be maintained as a protection racket, etl'ectively allying us with 

kleptocrats against their citizens. Maintenance of the current policy is politically and 

bureaucratically the easiest course. But it cannot succeed. Tts threadbare character, together 

with the zero gravity environment which followed the Brexit vote and the Trump presidency, 5 

has encouraged all those with unfultilled agendas to amplify and accelerate them. It has also 

resurrected dangerous fantasies of redrawing borders6 - a policy which would guarantee both 

violent conflict (in a far more geopolitically volatile environment than 20 years ago) and 

embroilment of theW est- including Great Britain. 

Britain's bilateral policy, along with the US, has maintained greater credibility than the 

"international community" as a collective as a result of demonstrating that it understands it is 

4 See the author quoted in Judy Dempsey, "Judy Asks: Is the EU Sleeping on the Western Balkans?," 

Carnegie Europe, May 13,2015. Available at: b1!p:f/_carn.lli@J~1U'PJ2e.ewl,'ili:BlSJ.Qiillll!fQPilD'ta_=l'l.QOJ?.\l. 

5 See Kurt Bassuener and Valery Perry, "Erratic Ambiguity: The Impact of Trump's Unpredictable 

Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans," DPC Policy Paper, June 2017. Available at: 

b1tQ:/JifY1!iY'L.r:J (l.ITlQITilliz.<JtiQOJJQJlc~Qfl_QE_C_E'oli.Qy_E'ane_U~rmtig_A_rn!JiQ.YltL.IrHmJJLE.Qr.<iiillLI'!l.l 

iJ;y_in~W_S.ll.l~allll-PdJ 

6 See former British diplomat Timothy Less advocating this dangerous course in "Multi-ethnic States 

Have Failed in the Balkans," 8/RN, 16 January 2017. Available at: 

http://www balkaninsight.com/en/article/mul!i-e!hnic-slates-have-failed-in-the-balkans-01-16--2017 

4 
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willing to operate with a broader set of policy tools, including hard power deterrence. The 

UK's deployment of troops to Bosnia four years ago and continuing backup of the anemic 

EUFOR demonstrate this. 

Great Britain's diplomatic credibility in the region remains potent; the Ambassador in 

Macedonia has been widely praised by civic activists as being direct and sincere. But Brexit 

has reduced the UK's leverage already in intra-EU fora, and therefore in other ad hoc 

coordination efforts as well. Efforts must be redoubled to compensate for this unfortunate 

retreat. NATO is one obvious avenue through which to pursue this. Efforts to more deeply 

engage with solid non-EU Atlantic partners Canada and Norway, particularly in light of the 

mixed signals from Washington, are essential. Canada's closing of several diplomatic posts 

in the region a decade ago, including in Sarajevo, where it is represented in the Peace 

Implementation Council, often makes them an afterthought. This is a mistake and dissipates 

the relative strength of like-minded capitals (which usually include Tokyo as well). 

Despite Brexit, the UK has deep sunk costs and long-tenn interests in a democratic, open, and 

prosperous Western Balkan region whose states can integrate -under their own steam- into 

NATO and the EU Britain's security obligations in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, do not 

disappear with Brexit, as they are reflected both through NATO and bilaterally. 

While the timelines and modalities- even certainty- ofBrexit remain open questions, this 

need not, and must not, impede Britain's assertive engagement and collaboration with its 

democratic and developed allies and partners on both sides of the Atlantic in the Western 

Balkans. The lJK's less doctrinaire and more practical posture, reflected across party lines 

for two decades regarding the region, is more vital than ever before. For all these countries 

desperately need - and had citizens actively calling for- rules-based societies and actual 

representation. Britain has a great deal to offer. 

Following the German election, in which Chancellor Angela Merkel seems poised to be the 

victor, a wholesale reassessment of EU' s operating system and policy portfolio is necessary -

catalyzed by last year's Brexit referendum. There is widespread and vocal recognition that 

strong cooperation between the UK and the EU on security, defense, and rule of law is 

necessary, regardless ofBrexit's functional arrangements. The Western Balkans provide an 

ideal venue and platform for this this cooperation. Furthermore, London can act as a catalyst 

for the long-overdue reassessment of the West's stale, unimaginative, and unconvincing 

policy posture, both through its continuing membership of the EU and NATO. Such an 

initiative, 1 am confident, would be welcomed by Ottawa and Oslo as a joint endeavorjointly proposing such a wholesale reassessment to NATO and EU allies. This ought to be 

launched in Autumn 2017. 

The West cannot tlx the Western Balkans on its own; the best it can do is use its still-massive 

leverage and to create an environment in which those citizens of these countries who do want 

rules-based societies and systems can gain traction toward that end. While the full panoply of 

policies and assets to be employed is perhaps a subject for another memo (DPC has proposed 

5 
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a consistent and full portfolio through its decade of analysis and advocacy), the basic 

elements include the following: 

Amelioration of the existential fear which forms the central pillar of the political life 

support system for the durable elites forged during the wars. The West once provided 

this through security guarantees in Bosnia, for example; absolving itself from that 

responsibility fueled the ongoing regression Without the credibility of the threat of 

renewed conflict, political elites would have to deliver to citizens or suffer the 

consequences- electorally, legally, or extra-legally. Providing direct bilateral 

security guarantees to the Western Balkan states in their current borders against 

external and internal threat would a! so reduce the room for maneuver of adversari a! 

geopolitical actors, particularly RussiaT Even NATO membership, for example, 

cannot replace the Chapter 7 UN Security Council guarantee of a "safe and secure 

environment" that tirst NATO, now the EU are obligated to provide under the Dayton 

Agreement's Annex 1 A. 

Assertively and consistently advocating rule of law, democratic standards, and the full 

set of obligations attendant with OSCE and Council of Europe, as well as NATO and 

EU membership aspirations. For too long, local elites have been graded on the curve, 

in the vain hope that through positive discrimination, they would be encouraged to 

redouble their reform etiorts. This approach has had precisely the opposite etiect 

Britain and its Western partners must demonstrate solidarity with those who do 

espouse and adhere to our standards and values- in terms of publicly visible/audible 

policy support, as well as material assistance. At present, the beneficiaries of our 

support are, in the aggregate, the adversaries ofrefonn and democratic accountability. 

This would include vigorous support to special prosecutors and courts to pursue abuse 

of power, corruption, and organized crime. -and where possible through existing 

mandates (as in Bosnia), executive personnel to directly assist 

Finally, once the utility of ambient fear has been reduced through credible security 

guarantees, the West's leverage through financial support- as provided through IFls, 

the EU, and blilaterally -leaps in potency. At present, the West effectively buys 

social peace for fear of violent instability in the Western Balkans. By deterring 

violence unilaterally, this regressive relationship, which forestalls reform and political 

accountability, can end. Once their room to maneuver is limited, political elites 

should face much tougher conditionality from the West The leverage of their citizens 

over them will correspondingly grow. 

ln short, while the direction of travel in the Western Balkans has been largely negative over 

the past decade, these countries can develop genuine and resilient liberal democracies, and 

7 See Kurt Bassuener, "Filling in the Blanks: Prospects for NATO Enlargement in the Western 

Balkans," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Sudosteuropa Dialog, July 2017. Available at: 

http:!llibrary. fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/12902/2017 -06-07 .pdf 

6 
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therefore pursue credible membership applications for NATO and the EU. Tn fact, the only 

way they will achieve entry, given justifiable skepticism in Western publics, is to 

demonstrate the support for values and obligations of membership in these clubs is sincere, 

deep, and broad. Despite the ructions ofBrexit, Britain can play a catalytic and leadership 

role in righting a policy posture with which it has rightly, but inconsistently and to date 

ineffectually, demonstrated misgivings. The time to act is now. 

7 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. KURT BASSUENER, CO-FOUNDER AND

SENIOR ASSOCIATE, DEMOCRATIZATION POLICY COUNCIL


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the truth. He also noted that it's very 

important to enable democracy inside 

these collectivisms, without national 

leaders instructing the people on how 

to think. 

"Without personal freedoms and personal confrontations with the truth, we 

can't make a civilizational step forward. 

If we want to become a healthy society 

and a democratic country, we will have 

to finish what The Hague started", noted 

Friar Babic. 

When thinking about extremism in this 

21st century, the first thing that comes to 

mind is religious and ethnic fundamentalism, which at its core is an unholy 

union of doctrine married to political 

agenda. Over the past couple weeks in 

this country, I am reminded that this is 

everywhere, in three different, yet fundamentally similar, forms. We listen to 

experts talk about extremism at conferences, we read about it, we observe it 

and we're constantly trying to identify 

the drivers of it, as if the drivers are hidden or obscured, when in reality they 

have been lurking in plain sight for over 

a generation 

The Consequences 

This leads me to conclude that we 

have to go back to the basics, to the 

system itself. This system, corrupt and 

extreme at its core, not only enables 

the main political players to use inflammatory language and nationalistic 

rhetoric, but rewards them for it. And 

they are able to do so without fearing 

any consequences, either from a public captured by patronage and neutralized by marginalization and fear, or 

from an "International Community" 

which has long remained effectively 

mute on these and similar issues, and 

instead stands on stage with the very 

same individuals who stoke the embers 

of extremism to ensure the state of fear 

and crisis prevents hungry and frustrated people from really challenging this 

reality, as thousands did in 2014, striking fear - if for only a short lime - into 

the political class 

The consequences these players don't 

think about, it seems, are those felt in 

local communities throughout Bosnia 

and Herzegovina by those forgotten by 

their governments, where unemployment is so high that ethnic sentiment is 

the only thing they can hold on to. This 

is a useful tool for manipulation, but I 

wonder if the politicians behind these 

dangerous sentiments think that they 

can indefinitely control the volatile 

emotions and dynamics they continue 

to stoke 

Extremism, but not violent extremism, is 

an everyday occurrence in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. And do I feel safe? No. But 

that is exactly the point. 

How Bosnia Is on the 

Frontline of Europe's 

Landmine Battle 

tending goats near his home in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina when he stepped on 

a landmine. He suffered severe injuries 

and was fortunate not to lose his right 

leg. He's been left disabled. The accident happened near his home in the 

hills around Mostar, which was heavily 

hit during the 1992-95 Bosnian War. 

Karavdic's is one of a dozen people to 

be injured by landmines in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina in the last couple of years. 

Nine people have been killed over the 

same period. 

Experts say Bosnia and Herzegovina is 

one of the most landmine-contaminated countries in Europe following the war 

in the early 1990s 

More than 80,000 mines and unexploded ordnance still exist in the country, 

putting more than half-a-million people 

at direct risk, according to the 

International Committee of the Red 

Cross (ICRC) 

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the 

only countries in Europe where landmine contamination is considered 'massive' because it affects more than 1 00 

square kilometers, according to 

landmine Monitor 2016. Others include 

Croatia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq and 

Angola. ICRC says while progress has 

been made in clearing Bosnia and 

euronews 

Herzegovina's landmines the country 

has put back a deadline to be free of 

them from 2019 to 2025. The country's 

case shows that two decades since 

landmines were banned - a treaty was 

signed on December 3, 1997- they are 

still killing people in Europe. 

Twenty years ago an estimated 20,000 

people, mainly civilians, were being 

killed or maimed by them every year. 

But since the treaty - signed by 162 

states - the numbers have gradually 

decreased to around 6,500 annually. 

Erik Tollefsen, the ICRC's head of 

weapons contamination, said while 

landmine deaths have been 

decreased over the last two decades 

there has been a hike in recent years 

"The big problem today is non-state 

actors," he said. 

"In many of these conflicts that we see 

on the news and in the newspapers 

every day we see that many more 

improvised landmines are being used 

than we are able to clear. 

"Today landmines and other unexploded ordinance such as cluster munitions 

are presenting a huge menace in postconflict scenarios. It's not just a hindrance to human security, but it is also 

preventing life from going back to normality" 
92

NOTE: The following documents submitted for the record may be found at:

https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=108176

• IDPI Proposal on BiH (submitted by Rep. Rohrabacher

• IST-BiH Statement (submitted by Rep. Rohrabacher)

• NFCA Statement on BiH Hearing (submitted by Rep. Rohrabacher)

• CAA Letter on BiH Hearing (submitted by Rep. Rohrabacher)

• Ethnic Politics in the Balkans by Roland Gjoni (submitted by Shirley Cloyes 

DioGuardi)

• K-143s Municipalization Model Primer (submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

• Political Trends & Dynamics in Southeast Europe (submitted by Kurt 

Bassuener)

• Reflections on Efforts to Prevent and Counter Radicalization (submitted by 

Kurt Bassuener)

• Countering the Cultivation of Extremism in BiH (submitted by Kurt 

Bassuener)

• Beyond Enlargement—Why the EU’S Western Balkans Policy Needs a Reset 

(submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

• Croatia’s BiH Policy (submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

• CR After the New EU initiative (submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

• Retreat for Progress in BiH (submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

• The Wests Potemkin Deterrent (submitted by Kurt Bassuener)

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[Note: A response to the previous question was not received prior to printing.]

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29816l.eps

Rep. Robin Kelly QFRs 

EE&ET Subcommittee Hearing: The Dayton regacy and the Future of Bosnia and the Western 

Balkans 

Aprill8, 2018 

Mr. Palmer: 

Tam concerned by the increasing risk that elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, slated to be held 

this October, may not occur as planned. A 2016 Constitutional Court ruling requires the 

country's Parliamentary Assembly to amend the election law by May- next month- to ensure 

that delegates to the House of the Peoples, as well the members of the Presidency, are truly 

legitimate representatives of the Constituent Peoples. Rulings of the European Court of Human 

Rights also require changes to Bosnia and Herzegovina's election code to conform with 

international human rights standards. 

The Parliamentary Assembly has failed to do this despite ample time and the risk of political 

instability on the rise. A resolution of this issue is essential for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move 

closer to EU and possible NATO membership. I fear that Russia may take advantage of this 

crisis to try to destabilize the region, as it is already trying elsewhere in the Balkans. 

What will the State Department do to ensure that the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina acts quickly to pass reforms to the law controlling elections to the House of the 

People and the Presidency as required by multiple court rulings so that the results of its 

upcoming October elections can be fully implemented?