NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0305-13T1

VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, Successor

by Merger to Bergen Commercial

Bank,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J. RONALD MEIER,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

GREGORIA MEIER,

Defendant.

___________________________________________________

Argued September 16, 2014 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher, Nugent and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Atlantic County, 

Docket No. F-063285-09.

Bruce H. Dexter argued the cause for 

appellant (Dexter & Kilcoyne, attorneys; Mr. 

Dexter and Virginia Kilcoyne, on the brief).

David Neeren argued the cause for respondent 

(Udren Law Offices, P.C., attorneys; Mr. 

Neeren, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FISHER, P.J.A.D.

September 26, 2014

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

September 26, 2014

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-0305-13T1

In this appeal, we consider the ramifications for a later 

foreclosure action when, six years earlier, defendant J. Ronald 

Meier, owner with his wife of the foreclosed property, paid off 

the first mortgage loan and, rather than obtain a discharge of 

the mortgage, received an assignment. We agree with the 

Chancery judge that, in these circumstances, the mortgage had no 

further validity.

The critical facts are undisputed. In 1999, defendant and 

his wife purchased the Ventnor property in question with the 

proceeds of a $168,000 loan from Community Bank of Bergen County

the repayment of which was secured by a purchase money mortgage. 

Defendant was the president, chief executive officer and 

chairman of the board of Community Bank, which later merged with 

plaintiff Valley National Bank.

In 2005, defendant and his wife obtained a $100,000 home 

equity loan from Community Bank that was also secured by a

mortgage on the Ventnor property. In 2007, defendant paid the 

entire amount due on the 1999 loan, and, in exchange, Community 

Bank provided defendant with a written assignment, which he 

recorded, of the 1999 mortgage.1 Defendant claimed in the trial 

 

1In opposing the motion that gave rise to the order under review, 

defendant, who was then unrepresented, failed to provide the 

court with any opposing papers; the facts he presented at oral 

(continued)
3 A-0305-13T1

court – no affidavit or certification to this effect was 

provided – that he paid off this debt with "premarital assets."2 

In 2009, plaintiff Valley National Bank filed a complaint 

against defendant and his wife, as well as the holder of a later 

$15,000 mortgage, seeking foreclosure of the 2005 home equity 

loan. The complaint made no mention of the 1999 mortgage 

defendant paid off in 2007. A final judgment by default was 

entered in plaintiff's favor on August 22, 2012, and plaintiff 

purchased the property at a sheriff's sale on January 3, 2013.

On April 1, 2013, approximately three months after the 

sheriff's sale, defendant demanded payment from plaintiff of 

$149,838.06 – the amount paid by defendant to Community Bank in 

2007 – plus $53,019.20, which was asserted to be accrued

interest, presumably since defendant paid the principal amount 

to Community Bank in 2007. After investigating, plaintiff 

 

(continued)

argument regarding his reasons for paying off the 1999 mortgage 

loan, therefore, were not properly supported. Notwithstanding, 

like the Chancery judge, we assume for present purposes that 

defendant's assertions are true. For example, defendant claimed 

he paid off the mortgage because federal banking regulations 

precluded him from having his bank hold more than one mortgage 

on his property. There is no sworn statement or evidential 

material to support that this was his intention.

2We are told defendant and his wife were divorced. The record 

does not disclose when this occurred nor does the record suggest 

how the parties' property, including the Ventnor property in 

question, was distributed.
4 A-0305-13T1

demanded that defendant agree to a discharge of the mortgage. 

When defendant refused, plaintiff moved for a divestiture of the 

assignment of mortgage.

As we have observed, defendant filed no written response to 

plaintiff's motion. On the return date, the Chancery judge 

permitted the unrepresented defendant to argue his position and 

then adjourned the matter to allow additional time for the 

retention of counsel and a response from defendant in accordance 

with court rules. Defendant appeared on the adjourned return 

date without counsel, and the judge ruled in plaintiff's favor.

In his oral decision, the experienced Chancery judge 

concluded that defendant's receipt of an assignment of the 

mortgage in 2007 – when he was a director of the bank – was

"troubling," and that the circumstances "might well support a 

referral of this matter to the Department of Banking and 

Insurance." He concluded that the record demonstrated the 

mortgage had been fully satisfied in 2007, was no longer legally 

viable, and the assignment was consequently unenforceable. By 

order dated August 2, 2013, the judge divested defendant of the 

mortgage and assignment and declared defendant had no further 

interest in or claim to the property.

In appealing, defendant argues, first, that the assignment 

was valid and the mortgage still viable and, second, that 
5 A-0305-13T1

because plaintiff did not question or contest the 1999 

mortgage's viability prior to entry of final judgment, the order 

under review should be barred by the entire controversy 

doctrine, or the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and laches. The 

second argument, which was not posed in the trial court, is so 

devoid of merit as to be unworthy of further discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). It suffices to say that 

the parameters of Rule 4:50 are broad enough to permit plaintiff 

relief in this extraordinary circumstance, and that the 

equitable doctrines upon which defendant relies were designed to 

prevent, not perpetuate, fraud and inequity.

3

As to defendant's first point, we agree with the Chancery 

judge that it would be inequitable to conclude that defendant is 

entitled to payment from plaintiff pursuant to the assigned 

mortgage. Defendant's argument to the contrary is based on a 

misreading of well-established principles of law.

Our analysis must start with the indisputable premise that, 

in the eyes of the law, a mortgage is extinguished by operation 

of law when full payment is made by a mortgagee and accepted by 

 

3Defendant never responded to the complaint or otherwise put 

plaintiff on notice of his claim to rights emanating from the 

assigned mortgage until after entry of the foreclosure judgment 

and after the property was transferred through a sheriff's sale. 

That circumstance speaks for itself as a response to defendant's 

claim that equitable principles preclude the relief plaintiff 

seeks.
6 A-0305-13T1

the mortgagor. See, e.g., 12 Thompson on Real Property § 

101.03(c) at 414 (Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2008). There is no dispute 

that Community Bank was the holder of the mortgage when, in 

2007, defendant tendered all that was due on the debt. 

Normally, in such an instance, the borrower would be entitled to 

a discharge of the mortgage, and have that event recorded so the 

mortgage would no longer encumber the property. Here, defendant 

fully paid off the debt with what he claims were his own 

premarital assets, and Community Bank – of which defendant was 

then president, chairman of the board, and chief executive 

officer – took the unusual step of providing defendant with an 

assignment of the mortgage, which defendant recorded.4

In arguing that the mortgage remained viable because of the 

assignment, defendant chiefly relies upon the proposition

expressed by our Supreme Court that "[a]n assignment of a 

 

4We again observe that the source of the funds used to pay off 

the 1999 loan and defendant's intention in obtaining an 

assignment instead of the mortgage's discharge are not supported 

by any sworn statement. The Chancery judge gave defendant ample 

opportunity to support his arguments in the manner proscribed by 

the rules, but defendant failed to do so. Although it would 

have been appropriate for the judge to have considered the 

motion unopposed, we find no error in the judge's generosity in 

assuming the truth of defendant's allegations, and we will do 

likewise because what defendant argues presents no obstacle to 

our affirmance of the judge's order. But to be clear – since 

defendant's ex-wife has not appeared in the proceedings in this 

court or the trial court – the claim that premarital funds were 

used was never established.
7 A-0305-13T1

mortgage to one of two tenants in common . . . does not 

discharge it." Estate of Colquhoun v. Estate of Colquhoun, 88 

N.J. 558, 565 (1982) (internal citation omitted). He also 

correctly argues that although they held the property by way of 

a joint tenancy, defendant and his wife were – as to each other 

– tenants in common. Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 259 (1976). 

These principles, however, only define whether or to what extent 

defendant was entitled to reimbursement from his wife for his 

having paid off the mortgage with what he alleges to be 

premarital assets. These principles do not rationally support 

the argument that the assigned mortgage continued to burden the 

property in any other respect, let alone recoil upon Community 

Bank or its successors.

To be sure, Estate of Colquhoun suggests that a payment of 

a loan with premarital assets with a concomitant assignment of 

an underlying mortgage may preserve cotenants' rights and 

obligations. We need not, and do not, however, opine on whether 

or to what extent defendant's 2007 payoff of the 1999 mortgage 

reserved in him the right to seek reimbursement from his wife; 

assuming that issue has not already been resolved elsewhere,5 it 

 

5Recognizing that defendant represented to the trial court that 

he and his wife were divorced, it is difficult for us to imagine 

that any claims they may have possessed against each other or 

(continued)
8 A-0305-13T1

is not presented here. Nevertheless, because Estate of 

Colquhoun constitutes the centerpiece of defendant's argument, 

we find it necessary to recount its circumstances to illustrate 

how that case does not govern the disposition of this appeal.

In Estate of Colquhoun, a married couple purchased property 

in part with funds provided by their son, Robert, who took back 

a $51,000 mortgage; $35,000 was due by August 31, 1974, which 

was timely paid, and the $16,000 balance was to be paid to 

Robert in equal monthly installments over the following twentyfive years. 88 N.J. at 560-61. Four years later, Robert

assigned his interest in the mortgage to his father as a gift. 

Id. at 561. The husband died four months after receiving the 

assignment; his will disinherited his wife and their two sons, 

leaving his estate to his brothers and sisters in Scotland. 

Ibid. The wife died seven months after her husband; she left a 

will, which directed that neither her husband nor her son, 

Robert, was to benefit from her estate. Ibid. The wife's 

estate contracted to sell the property but was stymied by the 

existing $16,000 mortgage purportedly held by the husband's 

estate by way of the assignment and that estate's claim for 

payment, ibid., leading to a suit to determine the liability of 

 

(continued)

their respective interests in the Ventnor property have not 

already been finally determined. 
9 A-0305-13T1

the wife's estate, if any, on the mortgage, Estate of Colquhoun 

v. Estate of Colquhoun, 177 N.J. Super. 491, 495 (App. Div. 

1981).

The trial judge granted summary judgment, concluding that 

the wife's estate was liable for the entire $16,000 balance 

together with interest. Estate of Colquhoun, supra, 88 N.J. at 

562. We reversed, finding that "well-settled and long 

established principles of equity compel the extinguishment of 

the mortgage in these circumstances." Estate of Colquhoun, 

supra, 177 N.J. Super. at 496. Specifically, in relying on 

Grober v. Kohn, 47 N.J. 135, 149 (1966), which held that "[c]oowners of property, as such, have a 'confidential relation' with 

respect to certain aspects of their common interests," we held 

that this duty

prohibits a cotenant from acquiring an 

undisclosed adverse interest in the common 

property for his own benefit, and if he has 

acquired such an interest, he will be deemed 

to have done so for the benefit of all 

cotenants, subject only to their obligation 

to make a pro rata contribution to the 

acquisition cost, if any.

[Estate of Colquhoun, supra, 177 N.J. Super.

at 497.]

We found this general principle to have antecedents as old as 

Weller v. Rolason, 17 N.J. Eq. 13, 19 (Ch. 1864) and Rothwell v. 

Dewees, 67 U.S. 613, 618, 17 L. Ed. 309, 311 (1863), which 
10 A-0305-13T1

relied on the rule as having been "very fully laid down" to the 

same effect by Chancellor James Kent, who authored the landmark 

"Commentaries on American Law" in the early nineteenth century. 

See also Breitman v. Jaehnal, 99 N.J. Eq. 243, 245-46 (Ch.

1926), aff’d o.b., 100 N.J. Eq. 559 (E. & A. 1927). Our Supreme 

Court reversed our determination in Estate of Colquhoun, not 

because this ancient rule had lost its vitality, but because the 

Court found the unique circumstances presented should be 

controlled by the parties' intentions. 88 N.J. at 565.

In examining vastly different circumstances, we rely upon 

the well-established principles mentioned above and hold that 

any interest in the property conveyed to defendant by the 

assignment related only to defendant's claim, which he was 

required to assert within a reasonable time, see Estate of 

Colquhoun, supra, 88 N.J. at 566; Breitman, supra, 99 N.J. Eq.

at 245-46, against his wife for reimbursement of her fair share 

of his payment from allegedly non-marital assets. As to all 

others, defendant's satisfaction of the debt underlying the 1999 

mortgage caused a merger of that mortgage with defendant and his 

wife's ownership of the fee. Stated another way, absent the 

assignor and assignee's contrary intention, merger is presumed 

when the greater and lesser interests in property are joined in 

the same person or entity. See Anthony L. Petters Diner, Inc. 
11 A-0305-13T1

v. Stellakis, 202 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 1985); Estate of 

Colquhoun, supra, 177 N.J. Super. at 498; Gimbel v. Venino, 135 

N.J. Eq. 574, 576 (Ch. 1944); Thompson on Real Property, supra,

§ 101.03(e) at 419-20. Here, no contrary intention was 

expressed or is reasonably inferable from the circumstances; the 

1999 mortgage merged in the marital partnership's ownership of 

the Ventnor property. Estate of Colquhoun hardly suggests a 

different approach because the Supreme Court in that case merely 

found the presumption of a merger was overcome by a contrary 

intention. 88 N.J. at 565.

Here, it is enough to observe that defendant failed to show 

that Community Bank intended that the mortgage might be used to 

interfere with its position as the holder of the 2005 home 

equity mortgage, or otherwise. Indeed, it would be difficult to 

characterize defendant's alleged intention in obtaining the 

assignment as anything short of a fraud on Community Bank or its 

shareholders and successors. We therefore conclude that 

defendant's payment in full of the remaining debt on the 1999 

loan extinguished the mortgage insofar as anyone but his wife 

was concerned regardless of the mortgage's assignment to him.6

 

6The same result is compelled when considering that defendant, as 

assignee, only obtained such rights and privileges possessed by 

the assignor. See Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 313 

(App. Div. 2008); Gerrold v. Penn Title Ins. Co., 271 N.J. 

(continued)
12 A-0305-13T1

The order under review is affirmed.

 

(continued)

Super. 50, 54 (App. Div. 1994). Once it received payment in 

full, Community Bank had no further interest in the property; 

accordingly, it conveyed nothing when it assigned the mortgage 

to defendant.