IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0690

Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD CHAPLINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Chris Foy, Judge.

A juvenile criminal defendant appeals his sentence for second-degree 

sexual abuse. SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Seventeen-year-old Chad Chapline pled guilty to second-degree sexual 

abuse after he and a compatriot repeatedly sexually assaulted a teenage girl while 

brandishing a knife. The district court sentenced Chapline to twenty-five years in 

prison with a mandatory minimum of eight years and four months before parole 

eligibility. Among other claims, Chapline contends the sentencing court failed to 

address constitutionally required juvenile-sentencing factors. We agree, vacate 

the sentence imposed, and remand for resentencing. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Three teens—Chapline, N.O., and M.H.—ran away from a residential 

treatment center near Waverly. While hiding out in a treehouse by a football field, 

Chapline “started to touch” N.O., who struggled, screamed, and cried. Chapline 

directed M.H. to “hold her down and cover her mouth” while Chapline sexually 

assaulted her; the two then “switched roles” and M.H. assaulted N.O. During the 

assaults, Chapline and M.H. brandished a pocketknife and screwdriver and—in 

Chapline’s words—told N.O “we didn’t want to use them but would if we had to.” 

Chapline emphasized the sharpness of the pocketknife by cutting the wooden 

boards in the treehouse with it. 

Chapline and M.H. “took turns” sexually assaulting N.O. over two days. 

They penetrated her anus and vagina with their penises and hands, forced her to 

perform oral sex and a “handjob,” and they performed oral sex on her—all against 

her will. Chapline and M.H. estimated they raped N.O. at least five times. 
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The three teens then went to Walmart to use the store’s public Wi-Fi. N.O.

managed to contact her mother and said Chapline and M.H. were holding her 

against her will and threatening her with weapons. 

Police found the three teens in the jewelry department and arrested them. 

They spoke with Chapline, M.H., and N.O. separately. Chapline and M.H. 

eventually confessed, and N.O. disclosed the multi-day assault. Chapline also 

described how he had sexually assaulted other girls before N.O. and used threats 

to keep them from reporting. 

The Bremer County Attorney charged Chapline with two counts of seconddegree sexual abuse, class “B” felonies in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 

and 709.3 (2022), and one count of false imprisonment, a serious misdemeanor in 

violation of Iowa Code section 710.7. As part of a plea agreement, Chapline pled

guilty to one count of second-degree sexual abuse with open sentencing in 

exchange for dismissing the remaining charges. 

Before sentencing, the Department of Correctional Services filed a

presentence investigation (PSI) report that documented communication from

Chapline’s adoptive parents and his time in treatment facilities, shelters, and 

behavioral health units. The PSI also included a psychosexual evaluation that

noted Chapline “denied the offense” during the evaluation and “stated he did not 

[sexually abuse N.O.] and indicated that she is lying.” 

At sentencing, Chapline asked the court to impose no mandatory minimum 

on his term of incarceration before parole eligibility. The State sought a mandatory 

minimum of seventeen-and-a-half years. The district court sentenced him to 
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twenty-five years in prison with a mandatory minimum of eight years and four 

months. Chapline appeals. 

II. Standard of Review

Our review is for abuse of discretion, but “it is not forgiving of a deficiency 

in the constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision based on a proper 

hearing.” State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017). We are required to 

reverse if the district court did not consider one of the five constitutionally-required 

juvenile-sentencing factors before imposing a mandatory minimum. State v. 

Majors, 897 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 2017).

III. Discussion

Chapline seeks relief alleging the district court failed to consider all the 

required juvenile-sentencing factors, while also considering unproven conduct as 

an aggravating factor. We find the juvenile-sentencing-factors issue dispositive.

Under our supreme court’s precedent, a sentencing court must “expressly 

consider the [juvenile-sentencing] factors before imposing any mandatory 

minimum sentence on a juvenile offender.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 172 

(Iowa 2018) (citing State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014)). The five 

factors are:

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful 

behavior, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 

risks and consequences; 

(2) the particular family and home environment that surround 

the youth; 

(3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all 

circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the 

commission of the crime; 

(4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through 

the criminal process; and 

(5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
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State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 841 (Iowa 2018) (edited for readability).

Chapline makes a few substantive challenges regarding the constitutional 

factors, but we focus on his claim the sentencing court did not address the fourth 

factor, concerning the challenges youthful offenders face in navigating the criminal 

process. To give the full picture of the reasons given for sentencing, we reproduce 

the court’s explanation verbatim: 

Mr. Chapline, this is a difficult case for the court. I mean, it’s 

clear your actions caused lots of harm. Lots of damage. Another 

thing that’s challenging for me is the fact that because—for various 

reasons you have been in a lot of different placements where the 

whole purpose of the placement was to try to get you help, address 

needs that you have, whether it’s for mental health purposes, 

emotional purposes or what have you, and it would not appear to the 

court that this treatment or these various programs have had much 

positive impact on you.

You know, . . . the offense that you’ve pled guilty to, where . . . 

you engaged in un-consensual, nonconsensual, forcible sex with 

[N.O.], another person participated. Whether it was necessarily at 

your urging or guidance or not, you were both there, you both knew 

what was happening, you both participated. You used a knife.

You know, my personal belief is that everyone can change, 

everybody’s got something positive to contribute to society. But your 

case challenges that belief, Mr. Chapline.

I mean, I believe that there’s something positive you can 

contribute, but I don’t believe you’re in a position where we can 

safely—or we can leave—that I can leave the door open for you to 

be taken back into the community anytime soon.

You know, the PSI, the psychosexual evaluation, talk about 

different factors that are concerning to me. You know, the fact that 

with the psychosexual evaluator, you were denying even committing 

the offense, that you’d done anything wrong. That causes the court 

concern that . . . a lot needs to happen before we can hope for your 

rehabilitation. And if you’re not acknowledging with the evaluator that 

you did these acts, the court doesn’t have much hope about your 

prospects for successfully going through sex offender treatment 

program.

Because of my concerns of the treatment, the programming 

you’ve already received, and the fact that it doesn’t appear to have 

had much impact, I don’t sense any . . . I don’t sense any remorse 

from you, I don’t sense that you have an appreciation for . . . the 
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impact your actions have had on [N.O.], . . . and I am concerned 

about your likelihood to reoffend, I do think that that’s something 

that’s come through on the psychosexual evaluation.

You know, often with a young person who has committed a 

sex offense, looking at the circumstances, you can ascribe it to sort 

of somebody being impetuous, getting caught up in the heat of the 

moment and making poor choices that way. What you did here . . . 

doesn’t really have any of those what I would consider perhaps 

mitigating factors.

This looks to me like . . . there was a plan in place, you . . . 

enlisted or at least encouraged one other person to participate with 

you. You used a knife. . . . [T]his wasn’t a single act. It was, I 

believe, ongoing act over the course of at least a day. So there’s just 

different things that tell me you thought about this. You planned it. 

You were focused on some type of gratification for you without much 

concern for how it might impact your victim.

So it would be my belief that . . . some period of prison time is 

required before I feel you should even be considered for parole. I 

think the State’s recommendation is probably too harsh. What I’m 

wrestling with right now is the right balance. If you were [thirty] years 

old and committed this crime, I’d have no qualms about the sentence 

that the law requires.

You’re not [thirty] years old. You’re [seventeen], going to be 

[eighteen], and a five-year prison sentence is a, you know, more than 

a quarter of your life to this point. So, you know, my view is every 

year of prison I’m hoping will have more of an impact on you than it 

might have on somebody who is older, more hardened. But I have 

to say, Mr. Chapline, you’ve shown kind of . . . a cold disposition here 

. . . in the proceedings we’ve had. And it would be the court’s opinion 

that you should serve at least one-third of the indeterminate sentence 

before you can be considered for parole. So eight-and-one-third 

years.

Chapline asserts the sentencing court “did not say a word about” the fourth 

factor. The State contends the court implicitly considered this factor when it 

discussed how Chapline was “placed in different programs with opportunities for 

rehabilitation that did not work.” But Chapline’s past failures speak to the fifth factor 

(prospects for rehabilitation), not the fourth factor (challenges navigating the justice

system). See, e.g., Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 647 (Iowa 2019)

(“This [fourth] factor recognizes that juveniles are typically less capable than adults 
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at navigating the legal process.”); Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146 (describing the fourth 

factor as “the legal incompetency associated with youth”). We agree with 

Chapline’s assessment; the fourth factor went unaddressed by the district court—

expressly or otherwise. See Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 171–72 (quoting Lyle, 854 

N.W.2d at 404 n.10).

We vacate the sentence imposed and remand with directions to re-sentence 

Chapline after considering the required juvenile-sentencing factors. See, e.g., id.

at 173. We express no opinion on whether application of the constitutional factors 

will yield the same or a different sentence on remand.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.