Initial Majority Oversight Report 

Chairman Rand Paul, M.D.

Subcommittee on Federal Spending 

Oversight and Emergency Management

May 9, 2018

Afghanistan in Review: Oversight 

of U.S. Spending in Afghanistan
Report of the Majority

Oversight Mission to Afghanistan

April 14-17

Table of Contents

• Introduction

• Oversight in Afghanistan: Boondoggles

o Defense Logistics Agency Disposal Service

o Electricity and the North East Power System

o The Grand Hotel

o The Afghanistan Ministry of Interior

• Security Challenges

o The Natural Gas Filling Station

o The U.S. Consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif

• Building Blocks of Success

o Corruption

o Integrity Watch Afghanistan

• Conclusion
Introduction

“Congressional delegations come [to Afghanistan] all the 

time, about once a week or every 10 days, but this is only 

the second oversight one we have ever had.”

- U.S. Embassy Afghanistan Personnel

The United States’ response to the 9/11 terror attacks — to eliminate the 

terrorists responsible in Afghanistan along with the Taliban that harbored them —

was unquestionably justified. However, in the years since, the task of rebuilding and 

stabilizing Afghanistan has continued, with no end in sight. The United States has 

now been engaged in Afghanistan for nearly 17 years. That makes the war in 

Afghanistan the longest in U.S. history, and there is little evidence to suggest that 

the U.S. will withdraw any time soon. 

At present, the U.S. government spends approximately $45 billion annually in 

Afghanistan.1 Nearly half of that goes to direct support for both U.S. and Afghan 

security forces. Logistical support accounts for most of the rest, while nearly $800 

million goes to economic assistance. Estimates of total U.S. spending in Afghanistan 

vary between $841 billion – a figure Brown University’s Cost of Wars Project says is 

vastly underestimated – to approximately $2 trillion.2 

These costs pale in comparison to the more than 2,300 American men and 

women3 that have given their lives in Afghanistan. This is a debt that can never be 

repaid.

After nearly two decades of war, trillions of dollars spent, and immeasurable 

human cost, the American taxpayer would be justified in demanding significant 

progress in Afghanistan to match their extraordinary investment there.

Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case.

In order to understand the issues confronting the ongoing U.S. effort in 

Afghanistan, the Federal Spending Oversight (FSO) Subcommittee conducted on-theground oversight of U.S. spending in-country from April 14th to 16th, 2018. This 

mission consisted of more than a dozen meetings and four off-site visits over the 

course of two and a half days in Afghanistan. 

The bipartisan FSO team met with Afghans from both the national 

government and a non-governmental organization (NGO); military and State 

 1 Pennington, Matthew, and Associated Press “Pentagon says war in Afghanistan costs taxpayers $45 billion per 

year.” PBS News Hour, February 6, 2018. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/pentagon-says-afghan-war-coststaxpayers-45-billion-per-year. 2 Sahadi, Jeanne, “The financial cost of 16 years in Afghanistan.” CNN, August 22, 2017. 

http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/news/economy/war-costs-afghanistan/index.html. 3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/262894/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/
Department personnel; and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR). The team also visited the Defense Logistics Agency’s 

demilitarization and disposal facility at Bagram Air Base; an incomplete and 

abandoned hotel adjacent to the U.S. Embassy that was financed through the 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation; the Afghanistan Department of the 

Interior; and the offices of Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 

This is an initial majority report of that mission, the team’s findings, and 

observations from on the ground amidst America’s “Forever War.”

Oversight in Afghanistan: Boondoggles

“While seemingly contradictory, we appreciate your 

continued oversight; it helps us to hone our skills and 

think in new diminutions.”

–Robin Fontes, MG, U.S. Army CSTC-A

Defense Logistics Agency- Disposal Service

The FSO team was interested in touring the Defense Logistics AgencyDisposal Service (DLA-DS) facility at Bagram Air Base, specifically because a 

whistleblower had alerted FSO to potential destruction of new equipment. FSO went 

through a long process of asking IGs and GAO to investigate DLA-DS and the 

potential destruction of new equipment. After several dead-ends, FSO almost 

dropped the issue and canceled the DLA-DS visit. Luckily, the visit went on as 

planned. Though told destruction of new goods was rare, FSO found thousands of 

dollars of new (in the packaging) electrical equipment slated for disposal.4

Background

A whistleblower alerted the FSO 

Subcommittee early in 2015 that brandnew equipment (often in its original 

packaging) in Afghanistan was being 

destroyed in industrial shredders. It was 

suggested there was a supply chain 

issue, and that goods were delivered on a 

regular basis, and more were arriving 

 4 The conduit retails for approximately $19.59. The breaker boxes retail for $78.24, and the breakers retail for 

roughly $8. Though prices in bulk are often decreased, shipping costs must be accounted for and included in total 

cost. 

Figure 1: New breaker boxes slated for destruction
than were truly needed. As a result, the surplus goods were simply being destroyed. 

The FSO Majority first requested SIGAR to investigate the destruction of new 

equipment in December 2015. The Inspector General responded on March 4th, 2016,

that, “The allegations raised in your letter merit further review”; however, in 

consultation with the Department of Defense, such allegations were outside of 

SIGAR’s jurisdiction. FSO was encouraged to contact the Defense Criminal 

Investigative Service (DCIS), the investigative component of the Department of 

Defense Inspector General.5 

DCIS took 23 weeks to respond to the inquiry with a 2-page response noting 

that no criminal activity had occurred, and, since the IG’s office had produced 11 audit 

reports of DLS and the drawdown was largely complete by 2014, no further audit 

would occur.6 

In short, the FSO Majority felt that it was being stonewalled and approached 

GAO to look into the matter. GAO had not completed their investigation when the 

FSO team left for Afghanistan. However, they provided a preliminary oral brief on 

what they had found. In that brief, it was determined that roughly a quarter of one 

percent of the goods that DLA disposes of is new, totaling $50 million.7

 5 SIGAR Letter to Chairman Paul, March 4, 2016.

6 DCIS Letter to Chairman Paul, August 16, 2016. 7 The conduit retails for approximately $19.59. The breaker boxes retail for $78.24, and the breakers retail for 

roughly $8. Though prices in bulk are often decreased, shipping costs must be accounted for and included in total 

cost.

Figure 2: Afghan vehicles slated for destruction
On the Ground at DLA-DS in Afghanistan

In light of GAO’s preliminary findings, the FSO team considered canceling the 

scheduled site visit to the DLA-DS facility. While $50 million is no small sum, it does 

represent a small portion of what is decommissioned in Afghanistan. However, given 

the late timing, the DLA-DS visit continued on schedule.

The FSO team found the 

DLA-DS team to be taking their 

job seriously. It was mentioned 

several times that vehicles are 

battle worn and are not able to 

come in under their own power 

when they arrive for destruction 

– as can be seen in Figure 2 of 

vehicles awaiting disposal. 

The FSO team was told 

with regard to the vehicles that 

they came from the Afghan 

Army or Police. FSO was told that at one point the U.S. would meet Afghan requests 

for new equipment without question, but now vehicles needed to be unusable to be 

replaced. This refrain was common throughout the trip - the U.S. used to waste 

money but now was not wasting anything anymore.

DLA-DS also told the FSO team that all efforts were made to find a home for 

discarded goods before they were destroyed. The DLA facility has a white board 

(Figure 3) that contains requests from all over Afghanistan for various goods that 

may turn up at the DLA-DS facility. Further, FSO was told that DLA-DS seeks to 

separate out valuable and usable goods and materials from goods of no value. Figure 

4 shows a worker sorting through cables to find any copper wiring. 

This all seemed to confirm 

GAO’s impression that little in 

the way of new goods are 

destroyed, and that it was more of 

a past problem. The impression 

given was that FSO might have 

missed the mark. In fact, at the 

site visit, it was asked if any new 

goods were ever destroyed, and

the FSO team was told it 

happens, but rarely. This made 

it all the more shocking when 

minutes later, three bins of 

Figure 4: Sorting through wires to determine if there is anything of 

value, such as copper.

Figure 3: A whiteboard showing requests from around Afghanistan 

for goods from the DLA-DS facility
new electrical equipment (Figure 5), much of which was still in its 

manufacturer’s packaging, were discovered.

If so little in the way of new goods are being destroyed and disposed of, then it 

seems like a remarkable coincidence that three bins with thousands of dollars of new 

goods happened to be there the day an oversight team concerned about this problem 

showed up.8

To be clear, DLA-DS is only receiving these goods, and they make an effort to 

redistribute what is usable elsewhere. But questions still remain regarding how new 

goods in their original packaging find their way to DLA-DS’s facility in the first place. 

Need for Further Investigation

Clearly there are more 

questions that need to be answered 

with regard to the supply chain and 

how new and usable goods end up in 

the DLA-DS facility. 

One explanation may be

found with contractors. During the 

facility tour, the term “customers” 

came up repeatedly. It was 

explained that at this point in the 

war, DLA-DS mostly handles goods 

from the Afghan forces or from 

contractors. 

Upon returning from 

Afghanistan, FSO contacted GAO to 

inquire about disposition of goods 

from contractors. Indications are 

that some disposed-of goods have a 

contractor reference number, but 

there is no accounting for the original 

procurer. Moreover, DCIS’ August 

16th, 2016, letter noted that they had 

previously done reports identifying “recurring weaknesses, 

including...ineffective equipment accountability controls ... insufficient 

contract oversight; inaccurate property accountability systems. ...” It could 

 8 The conduit retails for approximately $19.59. The breaker boxes retail for $78.24, and the breakers retail for 

roughly $8. Though prices in bulk are often decreased, shipping costs must be accounted for and included in total 

cost. 

Figure 5: New breakers (top) and conduit body joints w/cover 

(bottom) slated for destruction/disposal
be the case that contractors are over-ordering knowing the U.S. government is 

paying.

This investigation will continue; however, FSO has been told that records are 

aging and incomplete. Another approach may be to acquire requisition requests and 

purchase orders to compare to destruction records. Doing so would shed light on how 

many of a given product was being purchased at the same time that same product, in 

new condition, was being destroyed. 

Electricity and the North East Power System

The FSO team requested a site visit of the North East Power System (NEPS) 

while in Afghanistan. Due to security concerns, this was not possible. Nonetheless,

the FSO team held a joint meeting with personnel from USAID and the Army Corps 

of Engineers to discuss the project. This was of particular interest to the FSO team 

given the recent release of a report from SIGAR documenting numerous problems 

with the $60 million “Phase III” of the project.9

NEPS is part of an overall Power Transmission, Expansion, and Connectivity 

Project aimed at bringing power to the Afghan population. The FSO team was told 

the entire NEPS project is estimated to cost approximately $750 million and be 

completed by 2020. Remarkably, after nearly 17 years of war and rebuilding, only 36 

percent of the population has power. 

Work by Proxy 

With the kinds of security restrictions that exist in Afghanistan, many U.S.-

funded projects cannot be visited by U.S. personnel; NEPS is one such project. 

The NEPS project is run by the Army Corps of Engineers, but the actual 

construction of the project is done by a contractor - Zwakman Nabizai Construction 

Company. While much of this NEPS project (done in four phases) is within 100 miles 

of Kabul or Bagram AFB10, the FSO team was told the Army Corps is/was unable to 

visit the project sites because security could not be assured. SIGAR is likewise unable 

to visit the sites dues to security and must rely on Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an 

Afghan NGO, to perform oversight. 

 9 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Afghanistan’s North East Power System 

Phase III.” SIGAR-18-37-IP, March 30, 2018. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR-18-37-IP.pdf. 10 Distance from Kabul to: Pul-e-Alma (end Phase I and start Phase II) 42.8 miles; to Gardez (end of Phase II and 

start of Phase IV) 79.5 miles. Distance From Bagram AFB: to Charikar (start of Phase III) is 13.6 miles and to Nejrab 

(end point of Phase III) is 26.7 miles.
Certainly a small minority can compromise safety, but it calls into question 

how effective projects such as NEPS are in building goodwill if U.S. personnel would 

be in danger if they did the work themselves. 

Built on Property Without Permission/Purchase 

As SIGAR reported, before construction of the 

NEPS project was to begin, the Afghan government was 

to procure and clear the land it would be built on. That 

simply did not happen, and yet the Army Corps gave the 

contractor the go-ahead to begin the project. 

In a meeting with USAID and the Army Corps, the 

FSO team questioned the wisdom of building on people’s 

land without procuring it first. The answers were 

astonishing. The team was told that most Afghans do not 

have formal title to their land, so it would be impossible 

to determine from whom to purchase the land. Moreover,

it was asserted that if it was known that land was being 

purchased for this project, prices would skyrocket, and 

everyone would claim some piece of land in the 

transmission lines’ path. 

The FSO team found this to be a wholly 

unacceptable answer. As is often the case, the 

government is too focused on the “whats” of 

success and not the “whys.” Certainly electricity is important to the modern 

world, but respect for property rights is one of the most fundamental 

cornerstones of a successful and stable society. 

Afghanistan has not had a sustained period of stable government, so land 

titling is not common. That does not change the fact that the people who live and 

work on such properties believe it to be theirs. In fact, according to the Asia 

Foundation, the most common kind of disputes that come before Afghan courts are 

land disputes. Taken with property disputes (which are broken out separately),

deciding ownership of land and property account for 57 percent of all court cases.11 

Like Americans, Afghans clearly have a deep rooted sense of 

ownership and private property. We should thus be seeking to protect 

Afghan property rights rather than using failings in their law to exploit 

them. Is it any wonder that security would be an issue?

 11 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2017: A Survey of the Afghan People.” The Asia Foundation, November, 

2017. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017_AfghanSurvey_report.pdf. 

Figure 6: A tower for the NEPS 

Phase III system literally built in 

someone's backyard
Phase IV of NEPS is currently underway, and U.S. officials told the FSO team 

that again they had begun construction without procuring the land. 

India’s Frugality Degraded U.S. Quality 

NEPS Phase III is a distribution branch 

coming off of the main transmission line drawing 

power from Uzbekistan. The plan called for Phase 

III to originate at the Charikar substation, which 

was built by the Indian government. Substations 

are to the power grid what breakers are to 

residential homes. As SIGAR reported, NEPS 

Phase III did not connect to Charikar as the plans 

had called for. Instead, Phase III connected 

directly into the transmission line using what is 

called a “T” connection. 

There seems to be some dispute between 

SIGAR and the Army Corps as to whether a “T” 

connection is intended to be temporary or not. The 

Army Corps says this is a permanent and fully 

serviceable connection. However, the FSO team 

pressed the issue and learned that, while it can be 

a permanent connection, it bypasses the Charikar 

substation entirely – the breaker at the head of the 

spur. 

Perhaps the most troubling part of everything related to Charikar is that the

“T” connection was needed because the Indian government wanted to save money. As 

it was described to the FSO team, to make the connection, the substation requires 

what amounts to giant outlets for the high-voltage lines to plug into. Such outlets 

cost millions of dollars, and Charikar was already running over budget. So the Indian 

government deleted the outlets from the substation. FSO asked why no one held 

Indians to deliver Charikar as planned and if American personnel was alerted to the 

deletion? According to the Army Corps and USAID officials with whom FSO, the 

Indians did notify the U.S. of the deletion, and such notification shows the high level 

of coordination on the overall electrification project. 

Culture and Corruption

One of the most troubling aspects of the Afghanistan power system is the role 

the Taliban play. The FSO team was told that once a piece of the transmission system 

is completed, it is handed over to Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), the 

Figure 7: NEPS Phase III towers
Afghan power utility. From that point it is up to them to maintain and repair the 

system. 

While new U.S. funding is no longer at risk, the team was told that the 

infrastructure U.S. taxpayers bought is routinely destroyed as part of an extortion 

scheme by the Taliban. In one part of the country, the Taliban have blown up so 

many towers that DABS has become proficient enough to rebuild the towers in a 

matter of hours. 

But the point is not to frustrate the U.S.’ rebuilding effort. Instead, it is to 

extort a peace payment from DABS. In another part of Afghanistan, the FSO team 

was told that the peace agreement allows the Taliban to bill the a local population for 

electricity in exchange for not wreaking havoc on the broader electric grid. 

Consider this in context: infrastructure is crumbling in the U.S., yet 

we are building new infrastructure in a warzone that combatants are 

destroying or – even worse – using to finance their fight against us.

The Grand Hotel

The FSO team investigated the Grand Hotel 

Project,12 commonly referred to as the Kabul Marriott. 

The idea behind the hotel was to have Five Star 

accommodations and, later, luxury apartments in close 

proximity to the U.S. Embassy and nearby Afghan 

Ministries. The website of the project’s developer 

described the hotel project as, “Grand in every way,” 

adding, “you will be surrounded with its elegance.”13 

SIGAR had previously published a report on the 

project, which was financed through almost $90 

million from the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation (a U.S. Government entity). The hotel 

was never completed and the loans never repaid.14 

What made this project interesting to the FSO 

team is that the failed project sits directly adjacent to 

the U.S. Embassy property. Unlike so many 

unreachable projects in Afghanistan, progress reports 

from the builder could be easily confirmed, security 

 12 There was also an apartment residency that was supposed to adjoin the building. 13 TaherInvest, “Hotels and Resorts: Silk Rotana Kabul.”TaherInvest.” 

http://www.taherinvest.com/en/companies/hotels-resorts/the-grand-hotel-kabul/about-grand-hotel/. 14 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ”Review Letter: Abandonment of OPIC 

Projects in Kabul.” SIGAR-17-13-SP, November 16, 2016. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-17-

13-SP.pdf. 

Figure 8: A hallway in the residential 

portion of the bulding
issues would be known, and corrective action could be taken quickly if needed. 

Unfortunately, by all appearances this did not occur. 

Nowhere Near Complete

According to SIGAR, TAYL Investment Group (who was building the hotel)

stated in their April 25, 2013, progress report to 

OPIC that 95.21 percent of the construction 

loans had been spent, and the project would be 

completed in approximately two months, with a 

soft opening scheduled for July of the same 

year.15 

The FSO team toured the facility and 

found that it was nowhere near complete, 

something that would have been obvious to 

anyone at the adjacent U.S. Embassy 

compound. On 

the whole,

there was no 

aspect of the 

hotel that could 

reasonably be considered “weeks” from completion. 

While the exterior of the building had a near-finished

look, there were still numerous signs it was 

incomplete. 

The interior of the building was clearly more 

than three months away from the hotel being able to

receive its first guests. The FSO team found almost 

the entire interior of the building “roughed out,” and 

it would still need months’ worth of cleaning and 

finishing. 

According to engineers from the State 

Department and SIGAR, the hotel is at best 50 

percent complete; however, many people that spoke 

with the FSO team put the estimate in the mid-tohigh 30 percent range. 

No one at OPIC seemed to be aware of the 

actual progress of the hotel, which allowed the 

 15 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Review Letter: Abandonment of OPIC 

Projects in Kabul.” SIGAR-17-13-SP, November 16, 2016. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-17-

13-SP.pdf.

Figure 9: Residential room supposedly almost 

complete and awaiting furniture.

Figure 10: Actual rooms observed by 

FSO team
builder to keep up the charade that the hotel would be opening soon. In June 2013 

TAYL reported that they had contracted for furniture. The photos in Figure 9 are of 

pictures of rooms that were dummied up and staged to look ready for guests. 

The FSO team was not able to view these specific rooms; however, Figure 10

pictures were taken by FSO personnel. Despite the photos of clean, complete rooms, 

the reality showed bare floors, unpainted walls, and exposed wires.

Had OPIC visited the site or asked one of the thousands of U.S. personnel 

living just yards from it to do so, it would have been clear that this project was not on 

track. 

Security Would Have Been A Problem

One of the most obvious problems with the hotel project is the lack of security. 

Though directly adjacent to the U.S. Embassy, security must have been a concern 

from the beginning. The picture in Figure 11 was taken by FSO personnel and shows 

what would have been the main entrance to the hotel. What is striking is that,

according to State Department officials who accompanied the FSO team, the guard 

shack and razor wire were installed during construction to protect workers – not as 

a security measure after the building was abandoned. 

If it was not possible to construct the hotel without this degree of security 

measures, then how was there any hope this facility would be used as a “five star” 

luxury hotel? 

The FSO team found the security risk the hotel posed to the U.S. Embassy and 

its personnel deeply troubling. Figure 12, a picture taken by FSO personnel, shows 

Figure 11: These security measures were put in place by the hotel builder. This calls into question 

how it was ever assumed this hotel could be a viable business venture.
the hotel from outside the consular building of the embassy – roughly a distance of 

800 feet.16 The hotel looks over the embassy walls and is only 460 feet from the living 

quarters used by embassy personnel and visitors, including members of Congress and

the FSO team. 

From this vantage point, had the hotel been completed, the Taliban or other 

terrorist organizations would have had an amazingly convenient vantage point for an 

attack on U.S. goods and personnel. While we doubt this vulnerability would not 

have been dealt with, it would have cost money. Further, there is nothing to suggest 

this eventuality was contemplated prior to the hotel project receiving funding. 

Nothing suggests that OPIC ever even considered the possible security 

challenges of this project, which is why SIGAR encouraged OPIC to “use more robust 

oversight practices, appropriate to the dynamic nature of Afghanistan’s security 

environment, when funding any future large-scale construction projects in 

Afghanistan.”17

 16 Distance was measured using Google Maps. 17 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Review Letter: Abandonment of OPIC 

Projects in Kabul.” SIGAR-17-13-SP, November 16, 2016. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-17-

13-SP.pdf.

Figure 12: This picture of the Hotel was taken outside the Consular Building of the Embassy, 800 feet 

away.
What is Next for the Hotel?

We know that TAYL received $92 million for the hotel project.18 It is unknown 

how much of that was actually spent pursuing the hotel. Obviously a five-story 

structure was constructed, and at some point it appeared to be a serious effort. But 

perhaps as security deteriorated in Kabul the TAYL felt it was unsafe to continue 

construction and the effort would be fruitless. What we do know is that the U.S. 

Embassy has acquired the rights to the property from OPIC and is now securing the 

site and using it for storage, the building remains incomplete, and TAYL has failed 

to repay the loan. 

Since the hotel has been allowed to sit for nearly four years, unfinished and 

unmaintained, it has begun to deteriorate. Personnel from both the State 

Department and SIGAR told the FSO team that it would be more economical 

to raze the building in its entirety and build something different in its place. 

Many questions remain, and FSO plans to pursue further information, 

including but not limited to the answers to the following questions:

• The project was commonly referred to as the Kabul Marriott, including on 

OPIC documents, but TAYL’s website indicated late in 2013 that Rotana 

Hotels were “selected” to manage the property. Afghan Voice Agency 

reported in May 2013 (the month before the project was to open) that 

Marriott had pulled out of the project due to security.19 What was Marriott 

and then Rotana’s involvement in this project? How close to completion 

were these companies led to believe the hotel was?

• TAYL’s company website remains active, though its last new posting is from

May 2014, ironically with a promotional video of the Grand Hotel. Has 

TAYL shuttered its business? Has OPIC tried to collect on their loan?

• OPIC’s website says their mission is to “help American businesses gain 

foothold in new markets.” TAYL is/was headquartered in Amman, Jordan, 

and according to the company website, it was founded in Kuwait. How did 

this company qualify for OPIC funding?

 18 This figure includes the adjoining apartments. 19 Afghan Voice Agency, Kabul, “Construction of the Marriott Hotel stopped in Kabul.” Afghan Voice Agency, May 9, 

2013. http://www.avapress.com/en/news/64870/construction-of-the-marriott-hotel-stopped-in-kabul. 
Afghan Ministry of Interior

The Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MOI) is responsible for domestic police 

activities in Afghanistan. The FSO team’s understanding was that the MOI building 

was near the city center and, as such, it was at risk of attacks from the Taliban. In 

2011, it was decided that the U.S. would build the Afghans a new MOI 

building/compound within the perimeter of the Kabul airport, which is a more secure 

location.20 Such security concerns seem well-founded given that the suicide bombing 

that killed 95 people this January took place near the old MOI building.21

The new MOI headquarters was opened late in 2015 and cost the U.S. taxpayer 

$210 million.22 The FSO team was interested in visiting the site given that SIGAR 

found numerous deficiencies with the building, including nonfunctioning HVAC and 

uncertified fire doors.23 Just as troubling was a persistent rumor that during 

construction, the Minister believed his office was not as opulent as the Defense 

Minister’s office, and thus change orders were made to add marble and trappings. 

For this reason and others, the building went through an early renovation before even

being occupied. So not only did the building not live up to its $210 million price tag 

in terms of functionality, but the U.S. taxpayer was taken advantage of a second time, 

for cosmetic upgrades. 

While the U.S. contracted for the 

building of the MOI building, the renovation 

project was contracted by NATO, but funded 

by the U.S. In fact, the header of the 

description of work to be done on the 

contract is “MOI HQ Enhancement” for a 

newly constructed building. The 

enhancement project cost taxpayers an

additional $2.6 million.

When the FSO team was ready to 

tour/inspect the building, it was evident 

that the MOI was unprepared, and FSO felt

that we did not get the full perspective. 

 20 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Afghan Ministry of Interior Headquarters 

Project: Phases 1 and 3 Experienced Construction Deficiencies, Poor Oversight, and Increased Costs.” SIGAR-18-

35-IP, March, 2018. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR-18-35-IP.pdf. 21 Politi, Daniel, “Taliban Pack Ambulance with Explosives, Kill at Least 95 in Afghan Capital.” Slate, January 27, 

2018. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/taliban-pack-ambulance-with-explosives-kill-dozens-in-afghancapital.html. 22 Naibkhel, Farhad, “MOI gets new complex.” Afghanistan Times, December 19, 2015. 

http://afghanistantimes.af/moi-gets-new-complex/. 23 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Afghan Ministry of Interior Headquarters 

Project: Phases 1 and 3 Experienced Construction Deficiencies, Poor Oversight, and Increased Costs.” SIGAR-18-

35-IP, March, 2018. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR-18-35-IP.pdf.

Figure 13: Freestanding climate unit next to a vent 

for the central climate system at the Ministry of 

Interior.
Instead of a formal inspection of the building, FSO was haphazardly taken to various 

offices. FSO was able to see the Minister’s office, but even that was brief and only

came after the issue was pressed.

HVAC and Fire Alarms

FSO was able to observe numerous independent climate control units 

throughout the building. According to officials FSO talked with at the MOI, these 

were required because of problems with the reliability of the central HVAC system. 

Based on documents FSO has reviewed, it appears 220 of these units were 

installed as part of the 

renovation, with each having a 

unit cost of $2,220 for a total of 

$488,400.24 In total, HVAC work 

as part of the renovation cost 

$647,692. 

Amazingly, part of the 

renovation included a

“Disconnect Fire Alarm System.” 

This was not billed discretely 

and was part of the $756,000 

cost of labor the contractor billed 

for. 

The FSO team was told by personnel at the MOI that the fire alarm system 

does not work. The MOI staffer simply shrugged his shoulders when asked, “So what 

do you do if there is a fire?”

Marble and the Minister’s Office

FSO was told the main reason for the pre-opening renovation was that the 

Minister at the time wanted a more ornate office, similar to the one the Defense 

Minister had. In particular, it was said that he wanted marble installed. The FSO 

team did not observe marble in the Minister’s office, but the lobby of the MOI was 

floor-to-ceiling marble. However, this work was done over two and a half years ago, 

and the FSO team was rushed through the Minister’s offices and suite.

MOI staff told FSO that the assertion of using marble was untrue, and that 

the ornate woodwork in the halls of the Minister’s suite (see Figure 16) was confused 

for marble. 

 24 NATO Contract #4500321284. September 15, 2015.

Figure 14: Note the Air Duct in the ceiling between the two light 

fixtures, as well as the free units directly ahead and on the left wall.
However, the contractor billed for nearly $40,000 in marble, including “Marble 

Floor Covering” and “Marble Thresholds for Double swing doors.”25 In total, the 

enhancement project was only supposed to take two months, yet in two months’ time, 

variations and changes increased costs by $310,338. Amazingly, $7,000 was billed 

for “Lost time waiting for instructions” and $10,000 for the rental of a car and driver.

Security Challenges

Upon arrival in Afghanistan, it is obvious that security is a major challenge. 

Though the FSO team arrived via commercial airline, they were instructed not to 

enter the airport terminal. Instead, the team was taken down a gangway to a waiting 

car on the tarmac and driven to a U.S. facility elsewhere on the airport grounds. 

From there the FSO team (like all embassy visitors) was helicoptered to the U.S. 

Embassy. 

This experience is foreboding to the overall U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The 

embassy grounds and adjacent NATO military compound are like a prison; the 

perimeter is surrounded by high walls, there are check points, and no one can leave 

except in special cases. Embassy personnel live and work on the compound. In fact,

a brand-new housing facility was just completed, which we were told would include a 

full size grocery store and a gym with a pool. 

However, numerous personnel who had previously been at this post told stories 

of leaving the compound and shopping and eating in restaurants in Kabul. This 

clearly shows the security situation has deteriorated. One explanation is that the 

Afghan National Police have taken on a larger role in providing security, while the 

 25 Ministry of the Interior Enhancement Project Additional Work Cost Breakdown. November 27, 2015.

Figure 15: There did not appear to be marble in the

Minister's office.

Figure 16: MOI staff suggested that reports of marble 

were not true, and that people mistook the wood in the 

hallway in the Minister's suite as marble. However, the 

renovation contractor billed for marble.
U.S. military has a decreased role. While this may be the case, it clearly shows that 

the overall security profile of the country has diminished.

Mazar-e Sharif 

Security concerns have rendered many regions in which the U.S. has 

previously invested significant funds in development and infrastructure projects 

entirely inaccessible to U.S. coalition forces. Notable among these innumerable 

investments are the infamous $43 million natural gas station and the ill-fated U.S. 

Consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif. FSO had requested to visit these sites, but security 

concerns made this impossible.

The Natural Gas Filling Station

The Department of Defense’s botched effort to build a natural gas filling station 

in Sheberghan, Afghanistan, was conceived as a way in which to “demonstrate the 

commercial viability of [compressed natural gas (CNG)] for automobiles in 

Afghanistan as part of a broader effort to take advantage of Afghanistan’s domestic 

natural gas reserves and reduce the country’s reliance on energy imports.”26 In 2006, 

the U.S. Geological Survey found that Northern Afghanistan is home to substantial 

natural gas reserves, liquids, and petroleum. Somehow this relatively 

straightforward, yet seriously ill-advised, effort to build a gas station cost 

$42,718,739 between 2011 and 2014, $30 million of which was devoted to overhead 

costs. SIGAR found that the cost far outstripped other similar efforts DOD 

undertook and “cost 140 times as much as a CNG station in Pakistan.”27

If only the price tag were the only absurd aspect of this project. SIGAR found 

“no evidence DOD ever did a feasibility study before moving forward” with it.28 Had 

they done one, perhaps they would have found, as SIGAR subsequently did in the 

course of its investigation, that Afghanistan lacks the natural gas infrastructure 

necessary to support a market for CNG vehicles. In layman’s terms, regardless of 

the country’s expansive reserves, the country can’t transport natural gas from point 

A to point B. Further, even if there were reliable transportation methods, Afghans 

simply lack the ability to pay for vehicles that run on natural gas. CNG conversion 

costs as much as $800 in a country where the annual average income is about $690, 

which may explain why the U.S. government paid for the conversion of over 120 

Afghan vehicles to CNG so that they could use the filling station.29 All told, the 

station produced “no discernable macroeconomic gains and a discounted net loss of 

$31 million.”30 On its oversight trip, the FSO delegation requested to view the station 

 26 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “DOD’s Compressed Natural Gas Filling 

Station in Afghanistan: An Ill-Conceived $43 Million Project.” SIGAR-16-2-SP, October 22, 2015. 

https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-16-2-SP.pdf. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.
but was told that the U.S. military could not guarantee safety at that location, so it 

is off-limits to Americans and coalition forces.

The U.S. Consulate at Mazar-i-Sharif

Similarly, the delegation requested to visit Mazar-i-Sharif, considered “one of 

Afghanistan’s safest cities,”31 but again, safety concerns made visiting impossible. 

The delegation sought to visit the location of the now-infamous U.S. Consulate there. 

At the end of 2009, the U.S. made the decision to build the consulate in Mazar-iSharif, as it is a major city in the north that could feasibly serve as the U.S.’ 

diplomatic hub in the region. The embassy in Kabul eventually settled on an historic 

hotel in the city. It signed a 10-year lease in 2009 and dumped over $80 million into 

the site – $26 million on renovations alone. 

Without conducting basic site assessments, the State Department plowed 

ahead, “[e]ager to raise an American flag and open a consulate in a bustling 

downtown district. ...”32 These officials “sought [and received] waivers to stringent 

State Department building rules and overlooked significant security problems at the 

site”33 

Had waivers not been issued, officials might have discovered the significant 

flaws with the location. It “shared a wall with local shopkeepers. The space between 

the outer perimeter wall and the buildings inside – a distance known as ‘setback’ in 

war zone construction – was not up to U.S. diplomatic standards set by the State 

Department’s Overseas Security Policy Board. The complex was surrounded by 

several tall buildings from which an attack could be launched.”34 The installation’s 

outer perimeter wall was made of sun-dried mudbricks, straw, and manure, as well 

as untreated timber for roofing.35 The location also lacked the space for a Black 

Hawk helicopter to land, meaning that in a military emergency a response team 

would need between 90 minutes and two hours to reach the site “‘under good 

conditions.’”36 

These concerns eventually came to light in year two of the 10-year lease, and 

upon arrival, Ambassador Ryan Crocker decided to conduct the waived assessments. 

Reviews found the building was subject to “‘catastrophic failure’” in the event of a car 

bomb “‘in light of the local construction techniques and materials.’”37 Further, “[a]

chain of security incidents ... prevented U.S. officials from moving into the facility.” 

 31 Hasrat-Nazimi, Waslat, “Mazar-i-Sharif attack proves no Afghan city is safe.” Deutsche Welle, November 11, 2016. 

http://www.dw.com/en/mazar-i-sharif-attack-proves-no-afghan-city-is-safe/a-36360885. 32 Londoño, Ernesto, “Citing security, U.S. abandons consulate site in Afghanistan.” The Washington Post, May 5, 

2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/citing-security-us-abandons-consulate-site-inafghanistan/2012/05/05/gIQA9ZkD4T_story.html?utm_term=.7631670fce8d. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.
In fact, a “‘sophisticated surveillance operation against the consulate, including 

information about plans to breach the consulate site,’” was unearthed by Afghan 

security forces.38 

By the end of 2011, “embassy officials began exploring alternative short-term 

sites for their diplomatic staff in northern Afghanistan. A Western diplomat familiar

with the situation said the United States has sought, so far in vain, to persuade the 

German and Swedish governments to sublet it,” a concept that both countries found 

“laughable.”39

Building Blocks of Success

Corruption

Over and over again, at virtually every meeting the FSO team had in 

Afghanistan, corruption was pointed to as being the major impediment to the 

country’s success. According to the Asia Foundation’s 2017 survey of the Afghan 

people, 83.7 percent responded that corruption was a major problem affecting the 

country as a whole, and 69.8 percent said it affected their daily lives.

In several meetings, the FSO team was told the U.S. is responsible for a 

significant degree of corruption in Afghanistan. One Afghan said that Americans 

were at least 50 percent responsible for corruption, while others put it at lower but 

still significant percentages. 

Constantly, the FSO team was told the root of this belief is that from the early 

days of the war, the U.S. indiscriminately spent money with little oversight. No one 

disputed that claim during the visit. 

From the numerous meetings the FSO team had, two apparent perceptions of 

how the U.S. fosters corruption became clear:

1. If the U.S. gives corrupt people money and allows those people to steal 

from their own (U.S.) taxpayers, then they are sanctioning corruption 

by Afghan officials against the Afghan people.

2. The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world. If they build 

infrastructure that does not work as intended or at all, or if what was

promised does not get delivered, it is done intentionally. 

These perceptions are supported by data from Integrity Watch Afghanistan,

which, according to their 2016 National Corruption Survey, found that only 19 

 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
percent of respondents believed International Forces worked for the benefit of all 

people, while 22 percent were seen as working for the benefit of some people.40 When 

asked if Afghans thought the international community wants to fight corruption, 46 

percent responded that they did not, and 19 percent were unsure. When people were 

specifically asked if in the previous year they had heard a U.S. official speak against 

corruption, only 22 percent said they had.41

Numerous people the FSO team spoke with placed a certain level of 

responsibility for corruption on the Karzai Government, but even as one individual 

said, that still ultimately points back to the U.S. and U.S. dollars. As they told it, 

Karzai used American money to enrich himself and then prop up a “fake economy” 

based on foreign assistance. 

Integrity Watch Afghanistan

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) is an NGO that seeks to combat waste, 

fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan. Of all the meetings the FSO team had, it was clear 

that IWA is probably the most effective actor in terms of fostering stability in 

Afghanistan.

What makes IAW so effective and unique is that it is one of the few NGOs made 

up of and run by Afghans. That gives IAW a quality no American can have: being 

local on the ground.

Members of the FSO team left the embassy compound to visit IAW at their 

offices in Kabul. FSO was interested in IAW because they do contract work for SIGAR 

- doing oversight where U.S. personnel cannot go (even if U.S. dollars are going there). 

However, IAW turned out to be so much more.

This was one of the last meetings the FSO team had, and it was clear that IAW 

has a completely different philosophy and passion than had been seen among the

Americans that the FSO team had previously met on the trip. IAW works out of 

offices converted from a three-story house. The FSO team was led to a basement 

conference room, where it met with IAW’s Executive Director, Sayed Ikram Afzali, as 

well as two of his deputies.

 40 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “National Corruption Survey 2016: Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of 

Corruption.” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2016. https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NCS__English__forweb.pdf

41 Ibid.
Their leadership is well-educated, including some with advanced degrees from 

western institutions. Most of IAW’s workforce is in their 30s and have returned or 

stayed in Afghanistan in the hopes of making their country succeed. At numerous 

prior meetings, FSO had been told the younger generation was the one that bought 

into the “new” Afghanistan. At IWA, the FSO team saw this generation’s passion in 

action.

Developing a Culture of Accountability 

Perhaps the most striking aspect about IAW was how much this group does to 

improve and stabilize Afghanistan and how little attention they receive. In addition 

to doing contract work for SIGAR, IWA produces reports on everything from 

corruption to mining, does its own audits, provides representatives to various antiFigure 17: Members of the FSO Team (McNeill, front-right; Gor, 2nd front-right) meet with IWA at their Kabul 

headquarters.
corruption and integrity panels, and trains

local Afghans to hold their government 

accountable. It was their training program 

that really caught the attention of the FSO 

team.

IWA spreads out across Afghanistan to 

train volunteers to be integrity watchers. In 

the U.S., it is taken for granted that regular 

citizens attend government meetings or court 

proceedings and can question their elected 

officials; in Afghanistan, there is no tradition 

of this practice whatsoever. Through IWA 

trainings, Afghans learn what to look for: 

how evidence is admitted in court, which

company is getting a municipal contract and 

how it was bid, and what the critical 

questions to ask are.

IWA told the FSO team that these trainings have become very popular, and 

they have started doing corporate trainings, as well. More importantly, IWA said 

they have heard secretly from judges and municipal officials asking IWA to train 

integrity observers in their area. Judges and government officials are expected to be 

corrupt, but if an integrity watcher is in the gallery, then it is that much harder to be 

corrupt. IWA has heard from officials trapped in the corrupt system seeking integrity 

watchers as an excuse to do their job correctly.

Of course, for every honest official who welcomes IWA to their sphere of 

influence, there are countless others who thrive on corruption. FSO was told IWA 

gets threats of violence, both generally as well as personal threats to Mr. Afzali. 

One thing is for certain: corruption is a huge impediment to any country’s 

success, and without an engaged populous committed to fighting it, Afghanistan will 

never be a stable country. 

Remarkably, though, SIGAR seems to be the only U.S. component that has 

significant interaction with IWA. Most U.S. officials have heard of IWA, but when 

asked about them, the standard response was along the lines of, “We have heard of 

them, and they do good work, but we do not have much involvement with them.”

Hopefully, that is changing. IWA told us they were created in 2005. Since 

then, most U.S. ambassadors to Afghanistan have given them little attention, 

perhaps granting one meeting a year. With the arrival of Ambassador Bass, IWA 

told us they feel more appreciated and more looked to for advice and assistance in 

confronting Afghanistan’s problems. 

Figure 18: Map of IWA's 2017 work throughout 

Afghanistan.
Conclusion

After 17 years, it is difficult to see that the U.S. has made much progress. With 

every meeting and every project, the FSO team was told that in the early days, the 

U.S. spent money like water and had little appreciation for its effectiveness. It was 

a “firehose” approach. 

Most U.S. officials assured the FSO team that things are different now, but 

after two and a half days in Afghanistan, that is not the impression the FSO Majority 

came away with. Yes, less money is being spent, and, to that end, some more thought 

is going into how the money is spent. However, over and over again, the signs that 

corners are being cut and eyes turned away to just get projects done were evident. 

Worst of all, often this “just get it done” approach has countervailing effects. 

Giving people electric power is wonderful, but if we steal their land in the process,

surely the net result is negative. What statement is being made to the Afghan 

government when the Interior Ministry has a brand-new building that has an HVAC 

and fire alarm system that does not work and that was renovated before the initial 

opening? 

U.S. personnel must demand the same level of quality for the projects the U.S. 

taxpayer finances for the Afghan people as they would for a project they financed for

their own home. Is progress being made toward a goal at a reasonable pace? After 

17 years it does not appear so. 

When people are spending someone else’s money on someone else, the only way 

to truly foster that kind of appreciation of quality is through rigorous oversight.