Quantifying Antitrust Regimes*

Michael W Nicholson 

Federal Trade Commission**

5 February 2004 

This paper introduces means of quantifying global trend of proliferation in 

antitrust laws, and introduces measures to assess the presence of such laws across a large 

set of countries. In particular, the Antitrust Law Index maps the presence of “laws on the 

book” into a numerical measure of competition regimes by assigning binomial scores for 

the presence of particular laws in a jurisdiction, and then summing the individual 

components to yield a total score. The countries with the highest index values do not 

necessarily represent the strongest antitrust laws. The results do suggest that the impetus 

for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational 

bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union. 

General Field: Law and Economics, International Trade 

JEL Classification: L40, K21, F23 

Key Words: antitrust law, international policy coordination, multinational firms 

 

*

 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 

Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. Roger Boner, Xiaoyang Chen, Mary 

Coleman, Russ Damtoft, Alan Fisher, Russell Hillberry, Daniel Hosken, James Langenfeld, Kristina 

Martin, Morris Morkre, Russ Pittman, David Samuels, Roger Stoner, Chris Taylor, and an anonymous 

referee have provided helpful suggestions. 

** Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20580, 

U.S.A., phone: 1-202-326-3233, fax: 1-202-326-3443, e-mail: mwnicholson2001@yahoo.com. 
1 Introduction 

International antitrust as a policy concern, encompassing domestic competition 

regimes and multinational economic effects, has grown with the size and complexity of

global business activity. Concurrent to the recent merger “wave” has been an increase in 

the number of countries that have antitrust laws, so that the number of mergers requiring 

filing in multiple jurisdictions increased exponentially in the 1990s.1

 Mergers and 

acquisitions between multinational firms have potential global impacts that increase with 

the degree of economic integration among countries. Moreover, anticompetitive activity 

by multinational firms generally has international spillovers, with policies in one country 

being transmitted by international business to consumers in any number of countries. 

A relative dearth of analytical research accompanies this proliferation of antitrust 

laws and the increasing role of transnational governance. Empirical investigations into 

the causes and consequences of international antitrust policy lag behind these global 

trends, in large part suffering from a lack of quantification. Measures of governance have 

been developed in recent years to allow empirical studies of many political or legal 

activities, and I intend to add competition policy to the list.2

 Recent empirical studies 

have used various methods to quantify antitrust laws, employing survey methods or 

binary variables to indicate the presence of a policy. I discuss the value of such tools, 

and introduce some potential measures to assess the presence of antitrust laws across a 

large set of countries. 

 

1

 Rowley and Baker (2001) 2

 The breadth of measures in governance is sufficiently large that Kauffman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 

(1999) compiled several hundred cross-country indicators. These include such subjects as corruption, ruleof-law, and the effectiveness of government. 

1
2 Fundamentals of Quantifying Antitrust Regimes 

Jurisdictions with antitrust regimes have proliferated over the past decade. The 

number of countries with antitrust regimes has expanded from 35 in 1995 to over 100 in 

2003, with many others in the process of drafting laws.3

 Competition agencies have been 

established in each of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, with a 

considerable amount of research focusing specifically on this trend towards market 

institutions in the former communist world.4

 There has also been a trend towards 

institutional reform of antitrust in Latin America and East Asia. The rise in jurisdictions 

that regulate commercial activity has generated a greater demand in the international 

community for a coherent framework to handle the myriad national policies now in 

effect. 

Much of the discussion on continued trends in multi-jurisdictional regulation 

focuses on transnational governance.5

 This has lead to multilateral efforts to improve 

coherence in international competition policy, with institutions such as the World Trade 

Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the European Union engaging in such 

efforts.6

 The International Competition Network (ICN) is a recently established group 

that has arisen to deal specifically with transnational issues in antitrust.7

 Within this 

 

3

 Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation (2003) 4

 See Fingleton, Fox, Neven, and Seabright (1998) and Dutz and Vagiliasindi (2000) as examples within a 

much larger literature. 5

 See Graham and Richardson (1997) and Hoeckman (1997) as examples. 6

 A primary concern of multilateral organizations like the WTO regarding competition policy involves the 

impact on market access. Liberal trade regimes can have procompetitive effects that substitute for antitrust 

enforcement. As trade restrictions are lifted, market power by domestic firms may be dissipated in the 

global economy. To the extent that competition policy relates to the contestability of markets, however, it 

may be at odds with similar traditional aspects of trade liberalization. In particular, Hoeckman (1997) 

notes that trade policy focuses on “competitors” (i.e., the factors of production), not necessarily 

“competition” itself. 7

 See Djelic and Kleiner (2003) or www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 

2
multilateral forum, various working groups seek international consensus on antitrust 

laws. 

Consensus may prove difficult, since the optimal role of competition policy can 

depend on the relative size of countries, as well as their development levels and 

orientation towards market economies.8

 Traditional Western goals of competition policy, 

such as promoting competition between firms, protecting consumers, and enabling 

economic efficiency, may sometimes come in conflict. For example, an antitrust policy 

that allows many mergers, and an associated increase in concentration for various 

industries, may generally be more efficient than one seeking to preserve a large number 

of small firms at all costs. One policy focuses on overall welfare, and the other on 

specific preferences about market structure. This demonstrates complexities in antitrust 

policy, both within and across national borders. 

Antitrust laws in developed countries with consistent goals towards economic 

efficiency may also be quite diverse. As discussed in Jenny (1995), national competition 

laws include value judgments about domestic sociopolitical balance. This often leads to 

politically fragile policies that are sources of legal uncertainty and are economically 

costly to society. Various influences on the regime carry inconsistent goals, with a 

resulting antitrust policy may impose constraints on firms that impede the efficient 

allocation of scarce resources. 

Consequently, one must be careful in keeping competition policy within the 

context of national or regional goals and preferences.9

 In measuring an antitrust regime, 

 

8

 See Gal (2003) 9

 Some may object to a description of “national preferences”. This phrase is often employed by

international economists to describe the vector of influences that determine policy in a particular country. 

It does not suggest or even assume homogeneity of preferences for all individuals subject to that policy. 

3
tradeoffs must be made between general and specific approaches. An analysis of a single 

competition regime, or of policies in a few countries with similar backgrounds, can be 

quite detailed.10 As the analysis shifts outward to include more regimes across different 

regions, the specific details of a regime must be sacrificed to accommodate more 

universal policies. 

The role and effectiveness of a competition regime carries important differences 

across countries that may reflect the business culture of various regions. The goals of 

national policy appear to have great similarities within regions such as North America 

and Latin America but great differences between those regions.11 The situation is more 

complex in Europe, where most Eastern European countries are implementing policies in 

accord with the European Union, and thus in convergence with Western Europe, despite 

potentially conflicting business cultures.12

The rapid adoption of antitrust laws is being performed primarily by countries in a 

transition from state-dominated economies. These decentralizing economies also form

the motivation for much analytical research on international antitrust. In particular, 

liberalizing Latin American countries and formerly communist European countries 

provide an opportunity to study and contrast massive economic transformations. Kovacic 

(2001) points out that decentralizing efforts generally occur in a social and political 

climate dependent on the state, with a business and consumer environment wary of free 

markets. 

 

10 Fingleton, et. al (1998), as discussed below, provide a comprehensive analysis of the four similarlysituated Central European countries. 11 For example, competition policy in Latin American must account for a pervasive regulatory environment, 

which affects the enforcement of many policies. See de Leon (2002). 12 See Pittman (1998) 

4
 The term “Competition Culture” has been coined to describe the social and 

political climate for antitrust policy, which could include political will, regulatory 

expertise, efficient enforcement, control of corruption, and sufficient resources dedicated 

to the task. One study13 suggests that ineffective competition policy regimes could be 

attributed to a domestic culture that lacks certain foundations for a competitive 

environment, not limited to institutions and laws.14

3 Existing Measures of Antitrust 

Various methods have been employed to quantify competition regimes. Survey 

evidence enables a comparison of regimes across countries using the experience of 

individuals working in these countries. More comprehensive analyses have used input 

measures, such as the public funding or level and skill of agency staff, to indicate the 

resources employed in antitrust enforcement. The effectiveness of regimes could be 

studied through observable outputs, such as the number of cases investigated in a 

jurisdiction. Research involving large cross-sections of countries has generally been 

limited to binary measures that indicate the presence or absence of antitrust laws. This 

section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods of 

measurement, as well as some qualitative approaches. The next section develops an input 

measure based on national laws. 

Breadth versus Depth of Surveys 

 

13 See CUTS: The Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation (2003) 14 One must, of course, be careful not to relegate all cross-country differences to “culture”. The best step

forward is to identify which aspects of competition culture carry the greatest weight, and study their 

impacts accordingly. 

5
Existing survey evidence demonstrates the interaction between the general and the 

specific approaches to measurement. Surveys involving a smaller set of countries can 

have greater depth of analysis. However, in order to increase the breadth of the survey 

and facilitate comparisons with a larger group of countries, many specifics must be 

relaxed to accommodate differences across regions.

The most trenchant survey analysis to date is on transition economies in Central 

and Eastern Europe, which was administered by Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) in 

collaboration with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).15 

The survey covers the enforcement, advocacy, and institutional effectiveness of 

competition policy for eighteen countries. These countries share relatively similar 

geography, history, and culture, which enhances the value of comparisons between 

regimes. 

Dutz and Vagliasindi find that the earliest adopters of antitrust laws – including 

Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic countries – have the most effective overall regimes. The 

results of the survey are used to analyze the impact of competition policy on product 

market competition. Using a dataset developed in a separate survey of 3,000 firms in 

twenty of the transition economies, the authors find that more effective policies improve 

the extent that new enterprises can expand in the economy. Institutional Effectiveness 

showed the strongest impact on domestic competition. Dutz and Valiasindi also find that 

pressure from foreign sources and stronger corporate governance are also indicators of

 

15 The survey was conducted in 1999, with the intent to reflect information from Central and Eastern

European data in 1996 and 1997. The survey focuses on competition policy implementation. An overall 

index is developed from three main categories – Law Enforcement, Competition Advocacy, and

Institutional Effectiveness. 

6
product market competition, suggesting that such policies may substitute for competition 

policy. 

 The Global Competition Review publishes a survey, shown in Table 1, relating to 

the effectiveness of antitrust institutions in multiple jurisdictions.16 Respondents to this 

survey are generally consumers of the competition agencies, such as business groups, 

lawyers, consumer organizations, and economists. The questions relate to a variety of 

topics, including the handing of mergers, cartels, technical expertise, procedure, 

autonomy, leadership, and a general ranking. Note that twenty-nine of the thirty-two 

countries covered by the GCR surveys are members of the OECD; none of the countries 

in the EBRD survey is a member.17 This reflects in part the different audiences and goals 

for each. 

A comprehensive set of countries is covered in a survey conducted by the World 

Economic Forum (WEF), but is limited to a relatively subjective and simple valuation of 

the broad characterization of anti-monopoly policy. The WEF surveyed business leaders 

in 2001 to rate the effectiveness of antitrust policy in various countries, asking them to 

rate “antimonopoly” policy from “1=lax and not effective and promoting competition” to 

“7=effectively promotes competition”. The results are published in the Global 

Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, and replicated in Table 2.18 

One must consider the objective in developing cross-country comparisons. 

Development or transition researchers will be interested in focusing on a smaller set of

 

16 Global Competition Review (2000, 2001, 2003) 17 The other three are: Argentina, Israel, and South Africa. The GCR is expanding the coverage of its

survey to include Latin American countries, and a wider range of topics. See Global Competition Review 

(2003). 18 Nicholson (2003) uses the results of this survey in a cross-country analysis of the impact of competition 

policy on foreign direct investment and cross-border licensing. 

7
countries particular to specific issues. The EBRD survey was particularly suited to 

answering questions and concerns specific to transition economies. International 

economists may seek explanations of broad trends, such as the impact of competition

regimes across countries or regions. The WEF survey is a useful means for large crosssectional studies, but lacks scholarly rigor for in-depth analysis. 

Universality of Binary Variables 

Empirical economists have made preliminary steps towards comparing antitrust 

regimes by employing binary variables indicating the presence of particular laws across 

time or type of regime. Such binary variables are coarse measures, but offer great value 

in their universality across countries. Evenett (2002) uses dummy variables to contrast 

the impact of merger review regimes. He finds that regimes that require notification of a 

merger prior to consummation have a negative and statistically significant impact on 

inflows of U.S. mergers and acquisitions. The results suggest that pre-merger 

notification regimes cut such inflows in half. No statistical difference is found between 

post-merger or voluntary regimes, and jurisdictions with no merger review. 

Kee and Hoeckman (2003) investigate the impact of various competition laws on 

price mark-ups, using cross-country regressions that incorporate binary variables for the 

date in which laws were introduced. This measure is useful for measuring trends across 

time, but does not account for heterogeneity in the laws. For example, the law passed in 

the United States in 1890 is considered no different, as anything other than a time 

dummy, from the Pakistani law passed in 1970, the British law passed in 1948, and the 

current U.S. law. The measure does demonstrate the influence that competition laws may 

8
have on domestic markets, specifically through a measure of industry price markups over 

cost. The results suggest that antitrust laws do not have a direct impact on market 

competition, but do affect the market structure of a domestic economy, in particular the 

number of firms. This market structure, in turn, affects the industry markup. 

Input and Output Measures 

Input measures have great potential for empirical work, but trustworthy data is 

difficult to obtain for a large number of countries. Fingleton, Fox, Neven, and Seabright 

(1998) use such measures in a comprehensive examination of competition regimes in the 

four Visegrad countries of Central Europe – Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and 

Poland. They begin with comparisons of employment, output, and productivity across 

sectors for each of the countries, and then look at import penetration and foreign direct 

investment, which are factors that may serve as substitutes for enforcement of

competition laws. They argue that the role of competition policy is exacerbated by the 

transition nature of these economies for three main reasons: factors encouraging 

competition in established market economies, such as free trade and efficient capital 

markets, are relatively inefficient in transition economies; market structures in transition 

economies are more likely to justify antitrust concerns; and that competition policy may 

benefit the transition process itself. 

The quantitative support offered for the discussion covers a wide range of the 

various means by which competition regimes could be assessed. The authors consider 

the input measures, such as the laws themselves and institutional resources 

(budget/staffing). They also consider output measures such as the number of cases 

9
investigated, sources of investigation, cases completed. Included in the assessment are 

appeals against the agency decisions, which could indicate either the efficiency of the 

institutions or the success of the review process in the country. 

The comparisons are in many ways justified because each of the four countries is 

at a similar level of development, both in its levels of GDP as well as its institutions for 

governance. Things are considerably more complicated when making comparisons not 

only across different levels of development, but also across cultural divisions. 

I provide some information on input measures in the appendix. The effectiveness 

of a regime often relates directly to the resources available for its enforcement. One way 

to characterize an effective regime is to examine the resources available to the institutions 

charged with its enforcement. Table 3 shows the extent of resources, in terms of budget 

and staff, for the competition agencies in 38 countries for which the data is available.19 

The resources invested by a country in its competition regime shown in the table 

may simply reflect the size of the economy. The United States, with the largest economy 

in the world, has (by far) the largest national budget for competition policy, with over 

$300 million devoted per year.20 To control for market size, Table 3 also includes 

columns for budget per staff member and the budget as a percentage of national income. 

Although few countries had more than 10% of the financial resources devoted to 

competition policy as compared to the United States when simply considering the overall 

budgeting, a few countries have higher values for budget per staff member, and most 

countries in the sample actually commit more resources as a percentage of their national 

 

19 Note that for some countries, including the United States, the budget and/or staff figures include inputs

for consumer protection. Although this may tend to bias the indicator for these countries, budget/staff 

figures exclusive of consumer protection are not available for a large cross-section of countries. 20 Global Competition Review (2003). The figure includes the budget for both the Federal Trade 

Commission and the Department of Justice. 

10
income. Table 4 lists the values for budget per staff and budget as a percentage of 

national income, indexed to the value for the United States. 

These may give some indication of the commitment by some countries to their 

competition policy. For example, relative to its national income, Latvia six times as 

much on antitrust enforcement as the United States. Latvia also commits a much higher 

value of its budget to the size of its staff relative to other similar countries such as Estonia 

and Lithuania. At the minimum, this intraregional comparison demonstrates that Latvia 

has a relatively larger commitment of budgetary resources to antitrust concerns. 

The figures for budget-per-staff are uncorrelated with GDP, which suggests that 

the measure may prove a strong indicator of antitrust regimes, since wealthier countries 

are not necessarily funneling greater monetary resources into their institutions. However, 

this must be considered a coarse measure of actual policy. If competition policy at the 

national level benefits from economies of scale, then entities within larger national 

markets may exhibit efficiency gains from specialization within the institutions. 

Moreover, the larger Western economies also shoulder, in general, relatively stronger rule 

of law, intellectual property protection, control of corruption, and other indicators of 

institutional maturity, which may positively interact with antitrust regimes.

21

Qualitative Analysis 

Finally, qualitative analysis can be employed for a discussion of national policies. 

Pittman (1998) poses a series of questions relating to the three major parts of competition 

laws – agreements among enterprises, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. He 

applies the questions to a discussion of a number of countries in Central and Eastern 

 

21 See Nicholson (2003) for a description.

11
Europe, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Russia, and 

Romania.22 He finds that not only did the first generation of these laws greatly resemble 

the competition law of the EU, but that amendments since their adoption have increased 

the similarities.23 He notes that important implications arise if: the law does not 

distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements; no clear distinction is made 

between per se and “rule of reason” violations; and that a focus on market share instead 

of market power may lead to too much regulation. 

4 Quantifying Antitrust Laws

A means of quantification of antitrust regimes that has proven useful for other 

forms of governance, including intellectual property rights, is based on an index of 

national laws for that policy. In this section, I introduce an Antitrust Law Index that 

maps the presence of laws on the book into a measure of competition regimes. The 

methodology employed for the Antitrust Law Index follows similar indices that measure 

the relative value of intellectual property rights. 24 The practice involves assigning 

binomial scores for the presence of particular laws in a jurisdiction. I determine a set of 

criteria for laws, and then register the presence of each criterion for a selection of 

countries. Summing the individual components yields a total score. 

Laws on the Book 

 

22 Lapachi (2002) uses this set of questions to discuss Georgia’s competition law. 23 The EU law is found in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, formerly articles 85 and 86. 24 See Rapp and Rozeck (1990) and Ginarte and Park (1997). 

12
The analysis focuses on the determinants of the written law, and less on the actual 

implementation of the law.

25 A quantifiable description of laws is a first step towards 

understanding the impact of those laws. Moreover, the motivation for adoption of the 

laws is an interesting question in itself. Most countries in Latin America passed antitrust 

laws in the early 1960’s, and Venezuela as early as 1919, but did not actively enforce 

those laws until the early 1990’s. What was the push in the 1960’s to adopt the laws? 

Countries are currently drafting antitrust legislation by the score, but very little analytical 

research investigates their effectiveness. What are the conditions currently in place to 

encourage this legislation? This expansion could be due to influence from multilateral 

organizations like the WTO, the pressures of an integrating global economy, regional 

political economy trends, or any number of other explanations. The Antitrust Law Index 

can be applied to discerning these trends.26 

Criteria 

The analysis focuses on the causes of the written law and the legal process, and 

less on the actual implementation of the law. Three broad dimensions of competition 

policy are incorporated – Regime Structure, Merger Policy, and Anticompetitive 

Practices. Each of the dimensions breaks down into multiple subcategories, with each 

subcategory assigned a point value. Some of the subcategories are mutually exclusive,

such as mandatory versus voluntary notification requirements for mergers. Table 5 

displays these criteria and the unit scale. 

 

25 One should note that the analysis is agnostic between countries with common law or civil law traditions. 

Both legal systems are treated the same. 26 One potential avenue for development of this research would be to identify changed in the laws across 

time. Such an index would be useful in analyzing dynamic trends. 

13
The Regime Structure includes the categories of scope, structure, and available 

remedies. This dimension gives an indication of the political and legal capacity for the 

antitrust regime. Merger Policy includes notification, assessment criteria, and rights of 

private enforcement. Dominance and Restrictive Trade Practices include related aspects 

of anticompetitive practices. These categories intend to describe a wide breadth of 

competition policy, with an ensuing index that captures the strength of national laws. 

The first three categories in Table 5 relate to the Regime Structure. The scope 

indicates the breadth to which the laws apply. In particular, this covers whether the laws 

empower coverage for activities by foreign firms with activity that affects consumers in 

the domestic market. The criteria for a threshold for a response may also indicate the 

scope of laws, but currently it appears not to be directly comparable across countries. 

Stronger competition policy could also be indicated by the nature of the remedies or 

sanctions available. Units are awarded for the power to fine, to imprison, and to force 

divestiture. 

Regime Structure also includes an indicator for the role of private enforcement in 

national antitrust laws, which offers a further check towards ensuring competitive 

markets. Third parties with a direct interest in alleged anticompetitive practices have a 

market-based incentive to seek fair outcomes in private litigation, and laws that allow for 

private enforcement suggest a greater role in the economy for competition policy. Thus, I 

include three indicators within the dimension for private enforcement – whether third 

parties can initiate action, can obtain remedies, or can take part in the proceedings of a 

case. 

14
 The second major dimension is Merger Policy. The notification requirements 

capture the regulations concerning two merging firms appraising the competition 

authority to their intentions. The two broad categories indicate whether notification is 

mandatory or voluntary. Some national laws do not mention notification at all, and 

receive zero units. One point is granted for voluntary or mandatory notification, but since 

mandatory regimes must necessarily be pre-merger or post-merger, such regimes always 

score higher. 

The assessment criteria measure the tools used by antitrust authorities to indicate 

the potential impacts of a merger. I use three categories of merger control rules: market 

dominance, substantial lessening of competition, and public interest, as well as one for 

“other” criteria. The latter captures such policies as in Belgium, which, in addition to the 

dominance test, also includes the bargaining power of customers and suppliers and the 

maturity of the market for its substantive test. Efficiency is also included within the 

assessment criteria. 

Particular aspects of anticompetitive practices include single-firm dominance or 

collusive acts that restrict trade. Dominance covers the restrictions on the activities of a 

single firm that include: access limit, abusive acts, price setting, price discrimination, 

resale price maintenance, and obstacles to entry. Restrictive trade practices covers pricefixing, tying, market division, output restraint, market sharing, eliminating competitors,

collusive tendering (or bid-rigging), and supply refusal. Although some areas of 

enforcement may not be associated generally with competitive harm, each indicates the 

extent of adopted legislation. 

15
These two lists overlap in many of the same anticompetitive behaviors, with the 

major distinction drawn between unilateral or collusive actions. Some national laws 

break down the restrictions in a very similar fashion to those suggested above; usually, 

these are countries that have drafted laws within the past decade and likely used the 

model laws as a guide. Most countries have the particular practices covered either in the 

single-firm dominance section of their laws, the restrictive trade practices section, or 

both. Ultimately, the index below registers a point if the law states anywhere that, say, 

“resale price maintenance” is regulated, even if it is not listed directly within the singlefirm dominance articles of the competition law. 

Table 6 in the appendix lists the index for the 52 jurisdictions in the sample, from

highest to lowest. The number of countries is determined by accessibility of the set of 

laws. The most striking aspect of the index is that the top is dominated by transition 

economies in Central and Eastern Europe. As mentioned above, many transition 

economies have simply adopted language from the Treaty of Rome for their domestic 

laws – language which mirrors the “model” laws used for the present selection criteria. 

This index of national laws, a plausible rendition of the legal basis for antitrust, provides 

little information about what is understood to be effective competition policy in various 

countries. Given the existence of these laws, the question is whether they are associated 

with effective policy. 

Determinants of the Antitrust Law Index 

Regarding the association with effective policy, consider the relationship between 

the legal index and the WEF survey value discussed above. The correlation between the 

16
legal index and the WEF survey, for the 43 overlapping countries, is -0.200. Countries 

with more laws are apparently less likely to have policy described as effective. One 

plausible explanation may be the resources that are available for these institutions, and 

the disparities in resources devoted to enforcement, which depends in part on the overall 

wealth of the national economy. Traditionally, indices related to national governance are 

highly correlated with national wealth. Higher-income countries are usually associated 

with stronger IPRs, stronger control of corruption, and stronger rule of law. 

This holds, to a degree, for the legal index. Regressing it against GNP yields: 

(1) ANTITRUST = 13.28 + 0.524*GNP, R2

=0.059 

with statistical significance at 90% confidence. This suggests that there may be some 

influence of national income on the score for the legal index. 

Note that regressing the index against GNP and GNP-squared yields: 

 (2) ANTITRUST = 14.05 – 1.616*GNP + 0.236*GNP2

, R2=0.149 

with statistical significance for both variables at 95% confidence. This suggests a nonlinear relationship between GNP and the legal index, such that very poor and very rich 

countries have more laws on the books, while middle-income countries have fewer 

competition laws. 

Finally, Table 7 lists the mean index for five major regions of the world, along 

with standard deviations from the mean. Note that Africa features some of the highest 

indices, driven by the strength of the laws in Kenya and South Africa. Latin American 

countries apparently have laws that meet relatively fewer of the criteria. 

5 Conclusion 

17
The recent surge in global business activity has increased demand for analytical 

research into the causes and consequences of international antitrust policy. Empirical 

studies have lagged these trends, however, due in large part to difficulties in quantifying 

antitrust regimes. This paper has shown the various advantages of existing measures, and 

offers suggestions for future work. Rigorous quantification of antitrust regimes employs 

a wide variety of methods, including survey data, input and output measures, and binary 

variables. 

I introduce in this paper an Antitrust Law Index to indicate the content and 

complexity of laws on the books. The countries with the highest index values do not 

necessarily represent the strongest antitrust laws. What can be said with some certainty, 

based on this analysis, is that Turkey and various Central and Eastern European countries 

have adopted laws that reflect the laws of certain high income countries. 

The impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines 

of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union. 

Alternatively, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2002) describe the endogenous development 

of political institutions, in which the degree of insulation by the government chief 

executive determines various features of the politico-economic environment. Differences 

in antitrust regimes could reflect a complex interplay among economic fundamentals, 

business culture, and the relative degree of democracy in each country. Competition

regimes are affected by many non-economic factors. 

Graham and Richardson (1997) outline cultural differences in such policy. They 

describe the market system as “socially populated, socially rooted, socially conditioned, 

and socially constructed”, and variances in regulatory practices such as competition 

18
policy may reflect social differences. Understanding the determinants of antitrust 

regimes will prove extremely useful for analyzing domestic market structures and for 

developing coherence in international agreements. Quantifying antitrust regimes can also 

serve to explain the relative value in drafting laws and policies to conform across national 

borders. 

19
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21
Appendix

Table 1: Regime/Institution Score Received in Global Competition Review Survey*

Country 2000 2001 2003 Country 2000 2001 2003

Argentina 2.5 1.5 Korea 3

Australia 3.5 4 Mexico 2.25

Austria 2.5 2.5 Netherlands 3 3 3.75

Belgium 2 New Zealand 4

Brazil 2 2.25 Norway 3

Canada 2 3 3.75 Portugal DG 1 2.5 n/a 

Denmark 2 2.5 3.5 CC 1 n/a

European Union 3 3 4 South Africa Comm 2 2.75

Finland 3.5 3.5 Trib 3.5

France 2 3 3.75 Spain 3 3.5

Germany 5 4 4.25 Sweden 4 3.5 3.75

Greece 2.5 2 Switzerland 4 3 3

Ireland 2 3 3.5 United Kingdom FT 2 3.5 4.25

Israel 2.75 Comm 3 3.5

Italy 4 4 3.75 United States DOJ 4 4.5 4.5

Japan 3 3.75 FTC 3 3.5

*No survey was undertaken in 2002. The 2003 column indicates evaluations for the full regime, rather 

than particular institutions.

Table 2: Results of World Economic Forum Survey Results on Antimonopoly Policy 

Country Rating Country Rating Country Rating

Argentina 3.8 Israel 5.7 Romania 3.7 

Australia 5.7 Italy 5.2 Russia 3.1 

Belgium 5.8 Jamaica 3.9 Slovakia 3.8 

Brazil 4.7 Japan 5.0 Slovenia 4.2 

Canada 5.6 Korea 4.7 South Africa 4.8 

Chile 5.1 Latvia 3.8 Spain 5.2 

Costa Rica 3.7 Lithuania 3.4 Sri Lanka 3.8 

Czech Rep 3.7 Mexico 4.0 Sweden 5.5 

Denmark 5.7 Netherlands 6.2 Switzerland 5.0 

Estonia 4.2 New Zealand 5.5 Taiwan 5.2 

Finland 6.6 Norway 5.3 Thailand 3.9 

France 5.8 Panama 4.0 Turkey 4.1 

Germany 6.2 Peru 3.8 Ukraine 3.3 

Greece 4.1 Phillipines 3.8 United Kingdom 5.8 

Hungary 4.8 Poland 4.6 United States 6.0 

Indonesia 3.6 Portugal 4.5 Venezuela 3.8 

Ireland 5.0 

22
Table 3 Measures of Resource Inputs into Competition Policy, by Country 

Country Agency

Budget

Agency

Staff

Budget/staff Budget/National 

Income*

Argentina 200,000 23 8,696 0.5

Armenia 126,740 22 5,761 12.7

Australia 38,000,000 391 97,187 79.5

Belgium 180,000 20 9,000 0.7

Brazil 5,615,000 167 33,623 4.6

Canada 21,300,000 325 65,538 25.8

Chile 1,950,000 38 51,316 14.3

Czech Rep 2,059,715 120 17,164 14.1

Denmark 8,300,000 65 127,692 54.2

Estonia 711,200 39 18,236 54.7

Finland 807,410 42 19,224 6.5

France 79,501,405 287 277,008 55.8

Germany 13,325,240 150 88,835 6.4

Indonesia 2,800,000 90 31,111 4.7

Ireland 4,260,000 37 115,135 41.0

Israel 4,459,267 82 54,381 35.7

Italy 32,000,000 121 264,463 22.5

Jamaica 596,000 6 99,333 66.2

Japan 51,900,000 607 85,502 16.0

Kenya 320,000 21 15,238 10.7

Korea 22,500,000 416 54,087 31.6

Latvia 3,480,000 25 139,200 193.3

Lithuania 796,600 55 14,484 27.5

Mexico 14,000,000 144 97,222 17.1

Netherlands 34,000,000 158 215,190 77.4

New Zealand 10,000,000 79 126,582 142.9 

Norway 9,000,000 80 112,500 68.2

Panama 900,000 17 52,941 56.3

Poland 5,303,312 237 22,377 14.7

Romania 1,652,709 346 4,777 12.7

Slovakia 1,115,337 59 18,904 17.4

Slovenia 428,578 11 38,962 12.6

South Africa 9,131,863 111 82,269 19.3 

Spain 2,700,000 95 28,421 3.3

Sweden 9,000,000 94 95,745 42.5

United Kingdom 101,682,682 708 143,620 71.1

United States 307,000,000 1378 222,787 31.4 

Uzbekistan 500,000 343 1,458 8.3

Source: Global Competition Review (2003). Some calculations performed by Russ Damtoft. National 

Income measured in PPP GDP values from the World Development Indicators. Note that for some

regimes, the budget and/or staff figures include consumer protection. 

*In order to account for the differences in magnitude between budget dedicated to competition policy and

national income (PPP) measures, the values for Budget/National Income are listed as percentages, 

multiplied by 104

. For example, New Zealand’s value of 142.9 indicates that the budget for competition

policy in New Zealand represents 0.0143% of its national income. 

23
Table 4: Input Measures, as Indexed Relative to the United States 

Budget/staff Budget/NI Budget/staff Budget/NI

Argentina 4 2 Kenya 7 34

Armenia 3 40 Korea 24 101

Australia 44 253 Latvia 62 616

Belgium 4 2 Lithuania 7 88

Brazil 15 15 Mexico 44 54

Canada 29 82 Netherlands 97 247

Chile 23 46 New Zealand 57 455

Czech Rep 8 45 Norway 50 217 

Denmark 57 173 Panama 24 179

Estonia 8 174 Poland 10 47

Finland 9 21 Romania 2 41

France 124 178 Slovakia 8 56

Germany 40 20 Slovenia 17 40

Indonesia 14 15 South Africa 37 62

Ireland 52 131 Spain 13 11

Israel 24 114 Sweden 43 135

Italy 119 72 United Kingdom 64 226

Jamaica 45 211 United States 100 100

Japan 38 51 Uzbekistan 1 27

Source: Global Competition Review (2003) 

Table 5 Criteria and Unit Values for Laws on the Books, per General Category 

Please see the text of the paper for a description of how the criteria are determined. 

General category of antitrust 

policy for the listed criteria in 

the next column. 

Criteria listed within the national laws. If the 

below area is specifically mentioned by the 

national laws, then units are included for the 

legal index. If the criteria are not specifically 

mentioned, no units are awarded. 

Total units 

awarded if 

the criteria 

are 

present. 

Scope Extraterritoriality 1

Remedies Fines 1

Prison sentences 1

Divestitures 1

Private Enforcement Third party initiation 1 

Remedies available to third parties 1 

Third party rights in proceedings 1 

Merger Notification Voluntary 1 

Mandatory 1

Pre-merger 2

Post-merger 1

Merger Assessment Dominance 1 

Restriction of competition 1 

Public interest 1

Other 1

Efficiency 1

24
Dominance Limits access 1 

Abusive acts 1

Price setting 1

Discriminatory pricing 1 

Resale price maintenance 1

Obstacles to entry 1 

Efficiency defense 1 

Restrictive Trade Practices Price-fixing 1 

Tying 1

Market division 1 

Output restraint 1 

Market sharing 1 

Eliminating competitors 1

Collusive tendering/bid-rigging 1

Supply refusal 1

Table 6 Antitrust Law Index (incorporating information for each regime)

The values shown for the index indicate an additive summary of the established laws for 

each country. See the text of the paper for how the summation is performed, as well as a 

specific example. 

Country Index Country Index Country Index

United States 21 Italy 15 Denmark 12 

Ukraine 20 Czech Rep 14 Brazil 11

Turkey 19 Israel 14 Costa Rica 11

Belgium 18 Korea 14 Finland 11

Latvia 18 Slovenia 14 Norway 11

Poland 18 Taiwan 14 Germany 10

Romania 18 Venezuela 14 Jamaica 10

Argentina 17 Zambia 14 New Zealand 10

Lithuania 17 Australia 13 Panama 10

South Africa 17 Canada 13 Sri Lanka 10 

Uzbekistan 17 Indonesia 13 Tunisia 10

France 16 Macedonia 13 Japan 9

Ireland 16 Mexico 13 United Kingdom 9

Kenya 16 Peru 13 Yugoslavia 8

Slovakia 16 Spain 13 Netherlands 7

Sweden 16 Thailand 13 Chile 4

Croatia 15 Armenia 12 Malta 4

Estonia 15

25
Table 7 Regional Means (# countries in parenthesis) 

This table lists the average value of the index, along with the standard deviation, for each 

region. 

Avg. Index St Dev

North America (2) 17.75 3.89 

Africa (4) 15.50 3.87 

Europe (26) 14.85 4.10 

Asia (9) 13.78 2.28 

Australasia (2) 13.00 0.00 

Latin America (9) 11.56 4.07 

26