J-S46015-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.D., MOTHER

No. 3264 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000613-2015

CP-51-DP-0000711-2014

FID: 51-FN-000686-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.D., MOTHER

No. 3264 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order October 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 

CP-51-AP-0000613-2015

CP-51-DP-0000711-2014

FID: 51-FN-000686-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2016

S.D. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered October 21, 2015, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor son, Z.D. (Child), born in 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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December of 2013.1 In addition, Mother appeals from the order entered that 

same day, which changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows. 

On December 20, 2013, [the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS)] received a General Protective Services (GPS) 

report alleging that the mother, [Mother,] and the child, [Child], 

tested positive for marijuana in the hospital. Furthermore, they 

both tested positive for [b]enzodiazepine and opiates. The 

benzodiazepine was administered by the hospital. The child, 

[Child,] was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) 

for low Appearance, Pulse, Grimace, Activity and Respiration 

(APGAR) scores, respiratory distress and problems with feeding. 

Moreover, the mother, [Mother,] did not have the necessary 

supplies for the child, [Child]. Lastly, the mother, [Mother], had 

a mental health diagnosis of depression. The report was 

substantiated. 

On March 12, 2014, [Child] was admitted to St. Christopher’s 

Hospital for Children for complications with breathing and low 

birth weight. Furthermore, the child, [Child], was diagnosed 

with failure to thrive. Moreover, DHS received a Child Protective 

Services (CPS) report alleging that [Mother] was not feeding the 

child properly and was not transporting the child to medical 

appointments. She also was unable to make the formula for the 

child after having been properly instructed. Additionally, 

[Mother] told a hospital worker that she felt like throwing the 

child [out] of a window. [Mother] often became frustrated while 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered separate decrees involuntarily terminating the 

parental rights of Child’s putative father, B.K., as well as the parental rights 

of any unknown Father that Child may have. Neither B.K., nor any other 

alleged father, has filed an appeal from the decree terminating his parental 

rights. 
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feeding the child. The nurses at St. Christopher’s Hospital for 

Children had no problem feeding [Child]. Furthermore, there 

was no medical explanation for the child’s failure to thrive other 

than [M]other not feeding him properly. Moreover, [M]other had 

expressed suicidal and homicidal ideations to her case manager. 

Lastly, the report alleged that [M]other was unable to accurately 

assess the needs of the child. The report was indicated. 

On March 15, 2014, the mother, [Mother], was admitted to 

Hahnemann University Hospital for mental health treatment and 

was released on March 21, 2014[,] with intensive outpatient 

services.

On March 24, 2014, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (OPC) for the child, [Child], who remained at St. 

Christopher’s Hospital for Children.

On March 24, 2014, DHS held a Family Service Plan (FSP) 

meeting. The objectives identified for the mother, [Mother,] 

were to: 1) meet weekly with Family School, 2) properly care for 

[Child], 3) participate in mental health evaluation and comply 

with all treatment recommendations and 5) visit and maintain 

regular contact with the child. 

On March 25, 201[4], [Child] was discharged from St. 

Christopher’s Hospital into the care and custody of DHS and 

placed in a foster home through Children’s Choice . . . . 

A shelter care hearing was held on March 24, 2014[,] before 

Master Lynne M. Summers. Master Summers lifted the OPC and 

ordered the temporary commitment of [Child] to the care and 

custody of DHS.

On April 3, 2014, an adjudicatory hearing was held before the 

Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated [Child] 

dependent and committed him to the care and custody of DHS. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/15/2016, at 1-2 (unnumbered pages). 

On September 15, 2015, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child, as well as a petition to change Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption. A termination and goal change hearing was 
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held on October 21, 2015. Following the hearing, the court entered its 

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, and its order changing Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on 

October 28, 2015, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. 

Mother now raises the following issues for our review.

A. Whether the trial court erred in involuntarily terminating the 

[M]other’s parental rights where it was not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence when [M]other completed a substantial 

portion of her FSP goals?

B. Whether the trial court erred in involuntarily terminating 

[M]other’s parental rights where [M]other had consistently visited 

her child and there was a bond between [M]other and Child and 

the termination of parental rights would have a negative effect on 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs of [C]hild?

Mother’s brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

____________________________________________

2

In her brief, Mother purports to challenge both the termination decree and 

the order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother’s brief at 4, 

8-10, 14. However, Mother did not raise an issue with respect to the goal 

change order in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, 

nor did she include this issue in her statement of questions involved. Thus, 

Mother has waived any claim with respect to the goal change order. See 

Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or 

suggested by an appellate brief's statement of questions involved, and any 

issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is 

deemed waived.”) (citations omitted).
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 
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Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(2) and 

(b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 
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such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted)). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court found that Mother is incapable of parenting 

Child, and that Mother cannot, or will not, remedy her parental incapacity. 

TCO at 3-6 (unnumbered pages). The court reasoned that Mother has failed 

to complete mental health and drug and alcohol treatment, and that Mother 

has continued to test positive for illegal drugs. Id. at 3. The court also 

concluded that Mother is in need of additional parenting instruction. Id. at 

4.

Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating 

her parental rights because she has completed parenting instruction, and 

because she has participated in mental health and drug and alcohol 

treatment. Mother’s brief at 10. Mother also stresses that she has visited 

with Child consistently. Id. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination and goal 
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change hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Turning Points for Children 

case manager, Janay Johnson. Ms. Johnson testified that Mother’s primary 

FSP objectives were to obtain parenting instruction, mental health 

treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment. N.T., 10/21/2015, at 20. 

Concerning Mother’s parenting objective, Ms. Johnson acknowledged 

that Mother participated in parenting classes, and that she has attended her 

visits with Child consistently. Id. at 23, 32. However, Ms. Johnson testified 

that she does not believe that it would be safe to return Child to Mother’s 

care, and that Mother is in need of “another parenting class or two” in order 

to “help her and assist her in redirecting [Child].” Id. at 24, 28. 

With respect to Mother’s mental health and drug and alcohol 

treatment, Ms. Johnson testified that Mother is supposed to be receiving 

treatment for both issues at the Consortium. Id. at 20-21. Ms. Johnson 

explained that she has not been able to confirm whether Mother is compliant 

with treatment. Id. Ms. Johnson has attempted to contact the Consortium, 

but she has not heard back.3 Id. 

Ms. Johnson further testified that Mother recently was ordered to 

complete five drug screens, but that Mother completed only three of the 

____________________________________________

3 During the hearing, DHS presented several Clinical Evaluation Unit 

progress reports. See N.T., 10/21/2015, at 23, 33; DHS Exhibit 5. The 

progress reports indicate that Mother previously attended drug and alcohol 

treatment at Northeast Treatment Center, but that Mother was discharged 

from treatment on April 8, 2015 “due to non-compliance with treatment 

mandates.” DHS Exhibit 5 at 5 (unnumbered pages). 
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requested screens. Id. at 21. Mother completed a drug screen on June 15, 

2015, and tested positive for cocaine. Id. Mother completed a second drug 

screen on July 2, 2015, and tested positive for both cocaine and PCP. Id. 

Mother was asked to complete a drug screen on July 14, 2015, but she 

refused. Id. at 22. On October 6, 2015, Mother completed a third drug 

screen, which came back negative. Id. Finally, Mother was asked to 

complete a drug screen less than a week prior to the termination hearing, on 

October 16, 2015. Id. Ms. Johnson testified that, when asked to come in 

for the screen, Mother’s response was, “basically that she did a screen last 

week and she did not understand why she would have to do another one.” 

Id. Mother then claimed that she could not submit to a drug screen because 

“she had a program that day because I asked for it to be done before her 

supervised visit . . . [T]hen I was informed that she had food poisoning and 

wouldn’t be able to come . . . to the visit either.” Id.

Accordingly, the record supports the finding of the trial court that 

Mother is incapable of parenting Child, and that Mother cannot, or will not, 

remedy her parental incapacity. Mother has continued to test positive for 

illegal drugs as recently as July of 2015, and she failed to comply with a 

requested drug test less than a week prior to the termination hearing. It 

was proper for the trial court to conclude that Child should no longer be 

denied permanence and stability, as it is apparent that Mother is nowhere 

near being able to act as Child’s caretaker. See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 

(“A child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will 
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summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”) (citations 

omitted).

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court found that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would be in Child’s best interest, and that Child will not suffer irreparable 
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emotional harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. TCO at 5-6. The 

court explained that Child is attached to his pre-adoptive foster Mother, and 

that he does not have a parent/child bond with Mother. Id. at 5. Mother 

argues that Child is bonded to her, and will suffer harm if her parental rights 

are terminated. Mother’s brief at 12-13. Mother emphasizes that Child has 

only been in his current foster home for four months, and that Ms. Johnson 

only observed Child with his foster mother on one occasion. Id. at 12. 

Ms. Johnson testified that Child has resided in his pre-adoptive foster 

home since July of 2015. N.T., 10/21/2015, at 25, 27-28. Ms. Johnson 

opined that Child has “a connection” with his foster mother, and that it 

would be detrimental to remove Child from his foster home. Id. at 25. Ms. 

Johnson acknowledged that she only visited Child’s foster home once. Id. at 

29. Ms. Johnson explained, however, that she also reviewed notes from the 

previous case manager, and discussed the issue with “the DHS nurse,” who 

has observed Child with his foster mother. Id. at 30. 

Concerning Child’s relationship with Mother, Ms. Johnson stated, “I 

believe [Child] and [Mother] have a good relationship. I just don’t see that 

parental bond.” Id. at 24. Ms. Johnson noted that Child separates easily 

from Mother at the conclusion of visits. Id. at 24-25. Ms. Johnson opined 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Child, 

and that it would be in Child’s best interest to be adopted by his foster 

mother. Id. at 25-26. 
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Thus, the record confirms that Child’s needs and welfare would best be 

served by terminating Mother’s parental rights, and that Child will not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Child has spent 

nearly his entire life outside of Mother’s care, and Child and Mother do not 

appear to share a parent/child bond. Further, Child resides in a pre-adoptive 

foster home, and has a positive relationship with his foster mother. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, we 

affirm the trial court’s decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

In addition, we affirm the order changing Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption, as Mother has waived any challenge with respect to that order.

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2016