Appendix II 

1453 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
January 2011

January 2011

1454 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1 

 January 27, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Acting Director Melson: 

 It is my understanding that the ATF is continually conducting operations along 

the southwestern United States border to thwart illegal firearm trafficking. I am 

specifically writing you concerning an ATF operation called “Project Gunrunner.” There 

are serious concerns that the ATF may have become careless, if not negligent, in 

implementing the Gunrunner strategy. 

Members of the Judiciary Committee have received numerous allegations that the 

ATF sanctioned the sale of hundreds of assault weapons to suspected straw purchasers, 

who then allegedly transported these weapons throughout the southwestern border area 

and into Mexico. According to the allegations, one of these individuals purchased three 

assault rifles with cash in Glendale, Arizona on January 16, 2010. Two of the weapons 

were then allegedly used in a firefight on December 14, 2010 against Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) agents, killing CBP Agent Brian Terry. These extremely 

serious allegations were accompanied by detailed documentation which appears to lend 

credibility to the claims and partially corroborates them. 

On Tuesday, according to press reports, the ATF arrested 17 suspects in a Project 

Gunrunner bust. William Newell, the Special Agent in Charge of the ATF’s Phoenix 

Field Office was quoted as saying, “We strongly believe we took down the entire 

organization from top to bottom that operated out of the Phoenix area.” However, if the 

17 individuals were merely straw purchasers of whom the ATF had been previously 

aware before Agent Terry’s death, then that raises a host of serious questions that the 

ATF needs to address immediately. 

As you know, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

released a review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner in November of 2010, in which the OIG 

concluded that Project Gunrunner has been unsuccessful, in large part because: 

Project Gunrunner’s investigative focus has largely remained on gun dealer 

inspections and straw purchaser investigations, rather than targeting higherlevel traffickers and smugglers. As a result, ATF has not made full use of the 

1455 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2 

intelligence, technological, and prosecutorial resources that can help ATF’s 

investigations reach into the higher levels of trafficking rings.1

Therefore, in order to gain a more complete understanding of ATF activities in 

Project Gunrunner, I request that you arrange for my staff to be briefed by knowledgeable 

ATF supervisors no later than February 3, 2011. Please contact Jason Foster or Brian 

Downey at (202) 224-5225 to schedule the briefing. All formal correspondence should 

be sent electronically in PDF format to Brian_Downey@judiciary-rep.senate.gov or via 

facsimile to (202) 224-3799. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 

 

1 Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2011-001, November 2010, 

available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf

1456 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1 

 January 31, 2011

Via Electronic Transmission

 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Acting Director Melson: 

 

As you know, I wrote to you on Thursday, January 27, regarding serious 

allegations associated with Project Gunrunner and the death of Customs and Border 

Protection Agent Brian Terry. Although the staff briefing I requested has not yet been 

scheduled, it appears that the ATF is reacting in less productive ways to my request. I 

understand that Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) George Gillette of the ATF’s 

Phoenix office questioned one of the individual agents who answered my staff’s 

questions about Project Gunrunner. ASAC Gillette allegedly accused the agent of 

misconduct related to his contacts with the Senate Judiciary Committee. This is exactly 

the wrong sort of reaction for the ATF. Rather than focusing on retaliating against 

whistleblowers, the ATF’s sole focus should be on finding and disclosing the truth as 

soon as possible. 

 Whistleblowers are some of the most patriotic people I know—men and women 

who labor, often anonymously, to let Congress and the American people know when the 

Government isn’t working so we can fix it. As such, it would be prudent for you to 

remind ATF management about the value of protected disclosures to Congress and/or 

Inspectors General in accordance with the whistleblower protection laws. Absent such a 

clear communication from you, ATF management might be able to intimidate 

whistleblowers to prevent them from providing information to Congress. 

As you may be aware, obstructing a Congressional investigation is a crime.1

 

Additionally, denying or interfering with employees' rights to furnish information to 

 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 1505 states, in pertinent part: 

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication 

influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due 

and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had 

before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of 

the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either 

House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress-- 

 

Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves 

international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more 

than 8 years, or both. 

1457 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2 

Congress is also against the law.2

 Federal officials who deny or interfere with 

employees' rights to furnish information to Congress are not entitled to have their salaries 

paid by taxpayers' dollars.3

 Finally, ATF personnel have Constitutional rights to express 

their concerns to Congress under the First Amendment. 

ATF employees have the right to talk to Congress and to provide Congress with 

information free and clear of agency interference. Further, these employees have the 

right to be free from fear of retaliation or reprisal for doing so. Please ensure that ATF 

employees are aware of their rights and whistleblower protections and that ATF 

managers are accountable for respecting any protected disclosures. 

 If you have any questions please contact my Committee staff, Jason Foster at 

(202) 224-5225. Any formal correspondence should be sent electronically in PDF 

searchable format to Brian_Downey@judiciary-rep.senate.gov. 

 

 Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

cc: The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

 Attorney General of the United States 

 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 7211 states: 

The right of employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to 

furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be 

interfered with or denied. 

3

 P.L. 111 -117 § 714 states: 

No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be available for the payment of the 

salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government, who - 

 

(1) prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, any other officer 

or employee of the Federal Government from having any direct oral or written 

communication or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee of the 

Congress in connection with any matter pertaining to the employment of such other 

officer or employee or pertaining to the department or agency of such other officer or 

employee in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or contact is at the 

initiative of such other officer or employee or in response to the request or inquiry of 

such Member, committee, or subcommittee; or 

 

(2) removes, suspends from duty without pay, demotes, reduces in rank, seniority, stats, 

pay, or performance of efficiency rating, denies promotion to, relocates, reassigns, 

transfers, disciplines, or discriminates in regard to any employment right, entitlement, or 

benefit, or any term or condition of employment of, any other officer or employee of the 

Federal Government, or attempts or threatens to commit any of the foregoing actions with 

respect to such other officer or employee, by reason of any communication or contact of 

such other officer or employee with any Member, committee, or subcommittee of the 

Congress as described in paragraph (1).

1458 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
February 2011

February 2011

1459 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1460 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1461 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence


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1463 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence


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1464 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1 

 February 16, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Attorney General Holder: 

 I appreciate the staff briefing that Department of Justice (DOJ) and Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) officials provided on February 10, 

2011. However, the briefers focused on general issues related to challenges in 

successfully prosecuting gun trafficking cases. They refused to answer specific questions 

about the facts and circumstances that led me to request the briefing. 

Specifically, they refused to say whether the approximately 103 weapons seized 

according to the Jaime Avila indictment were the only seizures related to the nearly 770 

weapons mentioned in the indictment. They refused to say whether the third assault rifle 

purchased by Avila in January 2010—the one not found at the scene of CBP Agent Brian 

Terry’s shooting—has been recovered elsewhere. When asked whether ATF had 

encouraged any gun dealer to proceed with sales to known or suspected traffickers such 

as Avila, the briefers said only that they did not have any “personal knowledge” of that.

Therefore, please provide the following documents to the Committee: 

1) All records relating to communications between the ATF and the Federal 

Firearms Licensee (FFL) who sold the weapons to Avila, including any 

Report of Investigation (ROI) or other records relating to the December 17, 

2009 meeting “to discuss his role as an FFL during this investigation.”

2) All records relating to communications between ATF headquarters and 

Phoenix Special Agent in Charge (SAC) William Newell from December 1, 

2010 to the present, including a memorandum, approximately 30 pages long, 

from SAC Newell to ATF headquarters following the arrest of Jaime Avila 

and the death of CBP Agent Brian Terry. 

3) A copy of the presentation, approximately 200 pages long, that the Group 7 

Supervisor made to officials at ATF Headquarters in the Spring of 2010. 

1465 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2 

4) Copies of all e-mails related to Operation Fast and Furious, the Jaime Avila 

case, or the death of CBP Agent Brian Terry sent to or from SAC Newell, 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) George Gillette, Group 7 

Supervisor, or the Case Agent between November 1, 2009 and January 31, 

2011. 

Please provide documents in batches on a rolling basis as they are identified and located. 

Also, please prioritize your search for documents and produce them in the following 

order: (1) documents in response to requests one through three, (2) documents in 

response to request four dated between December 13, 2010 and January 31, 2011, and (3) 

documents in response to request four dated between November 1, 2009 and December 

13, 2010. 

I look forward to receiving your response. Please provide the first set of 

requested documentation by no later than February 23, 2011. If you have any questions 

please contact Jason Foster or Brian Downey at (202) 224-5225. All formal 

correspondence should be sent electronically in PDF format to 

Brian_Downey@judiciary-rep.senate.gov or via facsimile to (202) 224-3799. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

cc: The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

Chairman 

United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III 

Director 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

The Honorable Alan D. Bersin 

Commissioner 

United States Customs and Border Protection 

1466 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 2011

March 2011

1467 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1468 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1 

 

March 3, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Attorney General Holder and Acting Director Melson: 

 It is has been over a month since I first contacted Acting Director Melson about 

serious whistleblower allegations related to a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF) operation called “Fast and Furious”—part of the broader “Project 

Gunrunner” initiative. Several agents alleged that ATF leadership encouraged 

cooperating gun dealers to engage in sales of multiple assault weapons to individuals 

suspected of illegally purchasing for resale to Mexican cartels. These agents were 

motivated to come forward after federal authorities recovered two of the Operation Fast 

and Furious guns at the scene where a Customs and Border Patrol Agent named Brian 

Terry was killed. 

In response to my letter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied that ATF would 

ever knowingly allow weapons to fall into the hands of criminals, or let firearms “walk” 

in an operation. On February 9, I wrote to DOJ and attached documents that supported 

the whistleblower allegations about the guns found at the scene of Agent Terry’s death.1

My office continues to receive mounting evidence in support of the whistleblower 

allegations. For example, attached are detailed accounts of three specific instances where 

ATF allowed firearms to “walk.”2

 In all three instances, the suspect asks a cooperating 

 

1

 Letter from Senator Grassley to Attorney General Holder. February 9, 2011. Accessed at 

http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/upload/020911GrassleyToHolder-ATF.pdf. 2

 ATF Reports of Investigation (ROIs) detailing ATF Phoenix Field Operations from May 8-June 1, 2010. 

(Attachment 1) 

1469 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2 

defendant to purchase firearms at a gun dealer who was also cooperating with the ATF. 

So, two of the three participants in the transactions were acting in concert with the ATF. 

Yet, the ATF allowed the suspect to take possession of the firearms in each instance. In 

one case the suspect said that he “assumed the only real risk in their trafficking 

arrangement when he [REDACTED] ‘erase(d) the (serial) numbers’ from the firearms 

and ‘take (transports) them...’”3

The whistleblowers did not wait until a federal agent was killed before voicing 

their concerns internally. Several agents in the Phoenix Gun Trafficking Group (Group 

VII) voiced their opposition to the ATF’s handling of the case internally first. Group 

Supervisor David Voth sent an email on March 12, 2010 about the “schism developing 

amongst our group.”4

 His response to dissent within the group was to invite those who 

disagreed with the strategy to find another job: 

Whether you care or not people of rank and authority at HQ are paying 

close attention to this case and they also believe we (Phoenix Group VII) 

are doing what they envisioned the Southwest Border Groups doing. It 

may sound cheesy, but we are “The tip of the ATF spear” [sic] when it 

comes to the Southwest Border Firearms Trafficking. 

We need to resolve our issues at this meeting. I will be damned if this 

case is going to suffer due to petty arguing, rumors, or other adolescent 

behavior. 

... If you don’t think this is fun, you’re in the wrong line of work—

period! This is the pinnacle of domestic U.S. law enforcement 

techniques. After this the toolbox is empty. Maybe the Maricopa County 

Jail is hiring detention officers and you can get paid $30,000 (instead of 

$100,000) to serve lunch to inmates all day.5

 

Two weeks later, on April 2, 2010, Voth sent an email to Assistant U.S. Attorney Emory 

Hurley and Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) George Gillett with the subject, 

“No pressure but perhaps an increased sense of urgency.”6

 In the email, he reiterated 

support for the strategy, but cited increasing levels of violence as a reason to move more 

quickly. Voth wrote: 

Our subjects purchased 359 firearms during the month of March alone, to 

include numerous Barrett .50 caliber rifles. I believe we are righteous in 

our plan to dismantle this entire organization and to rush in to arrest any 

one person without taking in to [sic] account the entire scope of the 

conspiracy would be ill advised to the overall good of the mission. I 

 

3 Id. 4

 Email from Group Supervisor David Voth to Group VII. March 12, 2010. (Attachment 2) 

5 Id. (Emphasis in original.) 6

 Email from Group Supervisor David Voth to Group VII, Emory Hurley (USAAZ), and George Gillett. 

April 2, 2010. (Attachment 3) 

1470 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
3 

acknowledge that we are all in agreement that to do so properly requires 

patience and planning. In the event, however, that there is anything we 

can do to facilitate a timely response or turnaround by others, we should 

communicate our sense of urgency with regard to this matter.7

Voth also acknowledged in a May 3, 2010 email to his group that “April was the second 

most violent month during the Calderon administration with 1,231 executions.”8

 ATF 

personnel in Mexico reportedly noted the increased violence and contacted ATF 

Headquarters to express concern over the Operation Fast and Furious strategy of allowing 

the weapons sales to proceed. 

ATF Headquarters was fully aware of the strategy. A copy the Operation Fast 

and Furious case summary sent to ATF Headquarters states: 

This OCDETF [Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force] case is a 

large scale firearms trafficking case with the firearms being recovered in 

the Republic of Mexico or on/near the US/Mexico border (El Paso, TX, 

Nogales, AZ, Douglas, AZ, etc.) To date over 1,500 firearms have been 

purchased since October 2009 for over one million ($1,000,000.00) cash 

in over-the-counter transactions at various Phoenix area FFLs. 

[REDACTION] There are many facets to this investigation but ATF is 

attempting to not only secure a straw purchase/dealing in firearms without 

a license case against various individuals but more specifically to make 

the bigger connection to the Mexican Cartel/Drug Trafficking 

Organization (DTO) obtaining these firearms for the best possible case 

and the most severe charges when it is time to Indict [sic] this case.9

 

Dismantling the Mexican drug cartels is a worthy goal. However, asking cooperating 

gun dealers to arm cartels and bandits without control of the weapons or knowledge of 

their whereabouts is an extremely risky strategy. ATF leadership did not allow agents to 

interdict the weapons in this case. Instead, agents simply monitored the purchases of 

“suspect guns” and entered them into a database of firearms “suspected to eventually be 

used in criminal activity.”10 Over the course of this investigation, weapons allowed to 

walk were ending up in Mexico and along the Southwestern border. The ATF was well 

aware that this was happening. For example, in November 2009, four 7.62 caliber 

weapons were recovered in Naco, Mexico just two weeks after being purchased by one of 

the ATF’s suspects in Glendale, Arizona.11 Also, in July 2010 a Romanian AK-47 

 

7 Id. 8

 Email from Group Supervisor David Voth to Group VII. May 3, 2010. (Attachment 4) 

9

 Phoenix Group VII, Operation Fast and Furious. (Attachment 5) 

10 Email from Senior Firearms Program Specialist to Group VII Agent. June 17, 2010. (Attachment 6) 

11 Email: Suspect Person Activity Report. March 18, 2010. (Attachment 7) 

1471 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
4 

variant—the same model found at the scene of Agent Terry’s death—was recovered in 

Navojoa, Mexico.12

In light of this evidence, the Justice Department’s denials simply don’t hold 

water. On February 4, 2011, the Department claimed that the ATF did not “knowingly” 

allow the sale of assault weapons to straw purchasers and that “ATF makes every effort 

to interdict weapons that have been purchased illegally and prevent their transportation 

into Mexico.”13 Clearly those statements are not accurate. These documents establish 

that ATF allowed illegal firearm purchases by suspected traffickers in hopes of making a 

larger case against the cartels. ATF was not alone. The U.S. Attorney’s office appears to 

have been fully aware and engaged in endorsing the same strategy. 

 Congress needs to get to the bottom of this. 

 After close of business last night, I received a one-page response to my letters of 

February 9 and 16.14 The response asks that I direct to the Inspector General any 

individuals who believe they have knowledge of misconduct by Department employees. 

You should know that just after Agent Terry died in December, at least one 

whistleblower contacted the Office of Inspector General before contacting my office. 

Despite reporting the allegations multiple times by phone, Internet, and fax, no one 

contacted the whistleblower until after my staff contacted the Acting Inspector General 

directly on February 1. 

I have received no documents in response to my February 16, 2011, request. Last 

night’s DOJ reply cites the Justice Department’s “longstanding policy regarding pending 

matters” as a reason for withholding documents “relating to any ongoing investigation.”15

However, as you know, that policy is merely a policy. It is not mandated by any binding 

legal authority. 

There are many instances where the Justice Department and its components 

choose to provide information about pending investigations to Congress. These examples 

are not always officially documented, but often occur when there are particularly 

egregious allegations of government misconduct or there is an extremely high level of 

public interest in an investigation. Getting to the truth of the ATF whistleblower 

allegations in this case is extremely important to the family of Brian Terry and should be 

important to all Americans. There is no reason to wait the unknown number of years it 

might take for all of the trials and all of the appeals to be exhausted. The time for truth is 

now. 

 

12 Email from ATF Violent Crime Analysis Branch and Group VII Agents, detailing a weapon recovery in 

Mexico. August 6, 2010. (Attachment 8) 

13 Letter from the Department of Justice to Senator Grassley. February 4, 2011. (Attachment 9) 14 Letter from the Department of Justice to Senator Grassley. March 2, 2011. (Attachment 10) 

15 Id. 

1472 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
5 

In addition to providing the documents I previously requested, please explain how 

the denials in the Justice Department’s February 4, 2011 letter to me can be squared with 

the evidence. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 Committee on the Judiciary 

cc: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

Chairman 

United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III 

Director 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

The Honorable Alan D. Bersin 

Commissioner 

United States Customs and Border Protection 

 

1473 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1 

 March 4, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Acting Director Melson: 

Due to my inquiry into the ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious, I am concerned 

that the ATF may have employed the same risky strategy of encouraging weapons 

trafficking that was employed elsewhere by the ATF, beyond the Phoenix Field Office 

and its Operation “Fast and Furious.”

As you know, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent Jaime 

Zapata was murdered in Mexico on February 15. According to a press report based on an 

unnamed source, the weapon used to kill Zapata “was shipped through Laredo with the 

possible knowledge of the ATF,” and “the feds were already investigating the suspects 

when the gun was sent to Mexico.”

1

 According to another report in the Dallas Morning 

News: 

In North Texas . . . ATF agents were conducting another Project 

Gunrunner surveillance operation involving brothers Otilio and Ranferi 

Osorio. ATF and Drug Enforcement Administration officials organized 

the November undercover transfer of about 40 weapons believed to be 

destined for a Mexican drug cartel. When Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Agent Jaime Zapata was gunned down Feb. 15 in Mexico, 

ballistics tests and a partial serial number linked one weapon used in the 

shooting to Otilio Osorio.2

In its March 1 press release announcing the arrest of the Osorio brothers as well as their 

next-door neighbor Kelvin Morrison, the Department of Justice (DOJ) confirmed that all 

three men were being investigated by the ATF as early as last November. Prior to the 40 

weapons referenced above being confiscated in Laredo, the Osorio brothers and Morisson 

provided the guns to an ATF confidential informant in Dallas in a meeting set up by the 

ATF. After the delivery of the illegal weapons, the three men were stopped by local 

police. Why were these traffickers not thereafter arrested in November? 

 

1 Terry Wallace, “ATF: Gun in US agent’s death traced to Texas man,” Associated Press, February 28, 

2011. 

2 “Federal gun-smuggling surveillance program backfires,” Dallas Morning News, March 3, 2011. 

1474 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2 

Naturally, this raises questions about whether the ATF strategy of allowing straw 

purchasers to continue to operate in hopes of making bigger cases may have contributed 

to the shooting of ICE Agent Jaime Zapata. Please provide written answers to the 

following questions: 

(1) Although the gun used in the assault on Agent Zapata that has been traced 

back to the U.S. was purchased on October 10, 2010, how can we know that 

it did not make its way down to Mexico after the November investigation, 

when the arrest of these three criminals might have prevented the gun from 

being trafficked and later used to murder Agent Zapata? 

(2) When did law enforcement first become aware that Morrison purchased the 

gun? 

(3) Given that the likely recipients of any trafficked guns were so close to the 

border, did any ATF personnel raise concerns about the possibility of those 

guns being used against U.S. law enforcement? If so, how did the ATF 

address those concerns? 

(4) Did any ATF personnel raise concerns about the wisdom of allowing 

individuals like the Osorio brothers or Morrison to continue their activities 

after the November weapons transfer? If so, how did the ATF address those 

concerns? 

In addition to answering those questions, please provide all records relating to: 

(5) When law enforcement officials first became aware of the trafficking 

activities of Otilio and Ranferi Osorio and Kelvin Morrison; 

(6) Surveillance that may have been conducted on the Osorio brothers or 

Morrison prior to the November transfer of weapons between the ATF’s 

confidential informant and the Osorio brothers and Morrison; 

(7) The November transfer; and 

(8) Any surveillance that law enforcement continued to conduct on the Osorio 

brothers or Morrison after the November transfer. 

1475 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
3 

Please contact my staff no later than March 7, 2011 to schedule a briefing on this 

matter. Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Tristan 

Leavitt at (202) 224-5225. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

cc: The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

1476 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 4, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

Alan D. Bersin 

Commissioner 

United States Customs and Border Protection 

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20528 

Dear Commissioner Bersin: 

As you know, I am investigating the connection between the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) operation “Fast and Furious” and the firefight on 

December 14, 2010 that claimed the life of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol 

Tactical Unit (BORTAC) Agent Brian Terry. Terry’s attackers were apparently armed with 

assault rifles originally purchased as part of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious. The BORTAC 

unit used thermal binoculars to identify the rifles and demanded that the suspected aliens drop 

their weapons. Yet, according to an affidavit filed by the FBI, even after the aliens refused to 

disarm themselves, the BORTAC unit was under standing orders to first use non-lethal bean bag 

rounds.1

 The aliens responded with gunfire, and Agent Terry was killed in the ensuing 

exchange. 

It’s difficult to understand why CBP would require its agents to use less-than-lethal force 

against people who are clearly armed and dangerous. Further, Agent Brian Terry’s brother, Kent 

Terry, has said that of the four individuals in the BORTAC unit, only two were armed with 

standard firearms at all. Two carried only bean bag guns. These agents did not even have the 

means to defend themselves. 

Please provide copies of all records relating to: 

(1) CBP’s policy on the use of force in circumstances such as those Brian Terry 

reportedly faced, and 

(2) Any change to that policy in the last two years. 

 

1

 Affidavit of FBI Agent Scott Hunter, December 29, 1020, Case No. 10-10251M. (Attachment 1) 

1477 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 

2 

In addition, please contact my staff no later than March 7, 2011 to schedule a briefing on this 

matter. Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Tristan Leavitt at 

(202) 224-5225. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

cc: The Honorable Janet Napolitano 

 Secretary 

 United States Department of Homeland Security 

 301 7th Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20528

1478 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 4, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of State 

Harry S. Truman Building 

2201 C Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20520 

Dear Secretary Clinton: 

 Over the past month I have been investigating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives (ATF) operation called “Fast and Furious”—part of the broader “Project 

Gunrunner initiative. According to several agents, ATF leadership encouraged gun dealers to 

engage in sales of multiple assault weapons to individuals suspected of illegally purchasing for 

resale to Mexican cartels. I am looking into the connection between Operation Fast and Furious 

and the firefight on December 14, 2010 that claimed the life of CBP Agent Brian Terry. 

I understand that Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, his deputy, and other 

officials met in Mexico City in the summer of 2010 to discuss “on-going investigations” related 

to Project Gunrunner with the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. Accordingly, please provide all 

records relating to any such meeting that may have occurred from June through September 2010, 

to include meeting minutes, briefing notes, emails, or cables. 

I would appreciate a response no later than March 11, 2011. If you have any questions 

about this request, please contact Jason Foster at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for your prompt 

attention to this important matter. 

 Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 Committee on the Judiciary 

 

1479 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 8, 2011 

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 

Kevin L. Perkins, Chair 

Integrity Committee 

Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 

935 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 3973 

Washington, DC 20535-0001 

 Re: Whistleblower allegations involving Operation Fast and Furious, a 

Project Gunrunner case at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) 

Dear Mr. Perkins: 

 Agent John Dodson and other whistleblowers have alleged that the ATF 

intentionally allowed thousands of weapons to be illegally trafficked to Mexico.1 ATF 

appears to have acted with the full knowledge and approval of the Justice Department. 

Hundreds of these firearms later turned up at crime scenes on both sides of the border, 

including at the murder scene of Customs and Border Protection Agent Brian Terry. 

 At first, ATF and the Justice Department repeatedly denied the allegations, 

asserting that they were “false.” However, now that I have presented extensive 

documentary evidence supporting the claims, Attorney General Holder has asked the 

Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General (DOJ-OIG) to conduct a review. 

Unfortunately, there are three reasons that the public may be unable to trust that the 

DOJ-OIG is completely disinterested and independent. 

First, the position of Justice Department Inspector General is currently vacant. 

The Acting Inspector General just recently took over for Glenn Fine. Thus, the office is 

without a Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed leader. In my experience, 

acting inspectors general tend to function as caretakers of the office. They are not 

necessarily equipped to take on an entrenched bureaucracy and challenge senior 

officials with the tough questions necessary to get to the bottom of a controversy as 

 

1 John Solomon, David Heath, and Gordon Whitkin, “ATF Let Hundreds of U.S. Weapons Fall into Hands 

of Suspected Mexican Gunrunner,” The Center for Public Integrity (Mar 3, 2011), 

http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/2976. 

1480 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Kevin L. Perkins 

 March 8, 2011 

 Page 2 of 3 

serious and far-reaching as this one. That would be especially true if the acting 

inspector general is seeking the nomination to fill the position on a long-term basis. 

Second, the DOJ-OIG was aware of the allegations long before the Attorney 

General’s request and did nothing. Agent Dodson had already contacted the DOJ-OIG 

in December, just after Agent Terry’s death. He received no reply. After contacting my 

office, Agent Dodson contacted DOJ-OIG again, and still received no reply. No one from 

the office contacted him to gather information about his allegations until after my staff 

contacted the Acting Inspector General directly on February 1, 2011. Given that the 

DOJ-OIG initially failed to follow-up, it might have an incentive to minimize the 

significance of the allegations in order to avoid the appearance that its own inaction 

contributed to the problem in the last few months. 

Third, I understand that ATF officials have cited a DOJ-OIG report critical of 

Project Gunrunner2 as one of the factors that prompted the shift to a riskier strategy of 

letting guns be trafficked rather than arresting straw buyers. DOJ-OIG may be 

sensitive to the appearance that its previous criticism created the conditions under 

which ATF and DOJ felt pressured to take risks in order to make a “big case” against the 

cartels. Again, that could create an incentive to minimize the significance of the 

allegations. 

For these reasons, the DOJ-OIG does not appear to be completely disinterested 

in the outcome of its review. Without a greater level of independence, it will be difficult 

for the public to have faith in the impartiality and integrity of the result. Therefore, I 

request that the Acting Inspector General recuse her office and that a disinterested 

inspector general’s office be selected to conduct the review. 

In addition, I request that the scope of the inquiry be expanded beyond the 

underlying decision to allow guns to “walk.” The investigation should also carefully 

examine the circumstances surrounding false and misleading statements to Senate 

Judiciary Committee staff and to me in response to questions about these allegations 

over the past several weeks. 

 

 

2 Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner, Evaluation and 

Inspections Report I-2011-001 (November 2010), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf. 

(“ATF’s focus remains largely on inspections of gun dealers and investigations of straw purchasers, rather 

than on higher-level traffickers, smugglers, and the ultimate recipients of the trafficked guns.”) 

1481 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Kevin L. Perkins 

 March 8, 2011 

 Page 3 of 3 

Attached for your reference are copies of my correspondence with the ATF and 

the Justice Department, beginning on January 27, 2011. Please provide a written reply 

no later than March 15, 2011. Thank you for your prompt attention to this extremely 

important matter. 

 Sincerely, 

 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 Committee on the Judiciary 

cc: Attorney General Eric Holder 

U.S. Department of Jusice 

 Acting Inspector General Cynthia A. Schnedar 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Acting Director Kenneth Melson 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

Attachments 

1482 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
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1484 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
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1488 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
1

AVERY DOOLEY POST & AVERY, LLP

Attorneys at Law

90 Concord Avenue 

Belmont, MA 02478

Telephone: (617) Fax: (617) 

March 10, 2011

Transmitted Electronically and via Overnight Delivery

Brian_Downey@judiciary-rep.senate.gov

Senator Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Re: George T. Gillett, Jr.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division

Dear Senator Grassley;

By way of introduction, this office represents George T. Gillett, Jr., Assistant 

Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF), Phoenix Field Division. Recently, you sent several correspondences to Kenneth E. 

Melson, Acting Director of ATF, addressing multiple issues emanating from an ATF 

operation known as “Fast and Furious.” 1

 These letters allege that ATF knowingly 

permitted the sale of hundreds of weapons to known gunrunners and/or the Mexican cartel, 

that ATF’s actions resulted in the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent, Brian Terry and that 

the “whistleblowing” agents who brought ATF’s purported wrongdoing to light have been 

subjected to unlawful retaliation at the hands ATF Management. You reference ASAC 

George Gillett, by name, in at least three of these letters. Moreover, you allege that ASAC 

Gillett engaged in some level of misconduct and/or illegal activity in connection with the 

“Fast and Furious”/”Project Gunrunner” initiative.

1 Operation “Fast and Furious” was a component of the overarching, national ATF initiative known 

as “Project Gunrunner.” 

1489 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
2

At the outset of this correspondence, we wish to express our sincere respect and 

appreciation for your work as an advocate of federal whistleblowers. Our office has also 

long fought for the implementation of increased protections for federal whistleblowers. 

We have defended federal employees who have been subjected to retaliation based on their 

protected whistleblowing in a number of cases. Some of the more noteworthy cases in 

which we have served as counsel, at some point, have been: Chambers v. Dept. of the 

Interior, Parikh v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs and MacLean v. Dept. of Homeland Security.

On far too many occasions, we have witnessed, firsthand, the unlawful, retaliatory 

treatment of federal employees who have had the courage to report agency corruption and 

threats to the public safety. In this matter, however, we are concerned that you have 

inaccurately and prematurely judged ASAC Gillett’s actions without giving proper review 

and consideration to all of the relevant facts. 

At all times relevant to this matter, ASAC Gillett’s actions were consistent with 

and in furtherance of the “Fast and Furious”/”Project Gunrunner” initiatives; operations 

that were explicitly approved and consistently overseen by DOJ, ATF, and the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office. Moreover, with respect to the whistleblower on whose behalf you 

wrote, ASAC Gillett’s actions were not motivated by retaliation, but rather out of 

legitimate concern about the release of sensitive grand jury information and were effected 

at the explicit direction of his superiors. These facts notwithstanding, our primary purpose 

in writing is not to address your recently communicated inquiries. Rather, our overarching 

concern relates primarily to ASAC Gillett’s safety and protection.

As you are aware, your letters to ATF are a matter of public record and are easily 

procured by any private citizen with Internet access. In addressing your concerns about 

Project Gunrunner, your letters attributed the alleged impropriety to individually named 

ATF employees. With regard to our client, you pointedly accuse ASAC Gillett of 

engaging in whistleblower retaliation and acting with negligent disregard with respect to 

Project Gunrunner’s implementation and operations. The serious allegations you have 

levied against ASAC Gillett in the court of public opinion have hindered his right to fully 

and properly defend against these allegations and have effectively prematurely indicted a 

federal law enforcement officer with more than 20 years of faithful service. 

1490 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
3

Your inquiries to ATF concerning Project Gunrunner have garnered significant 

public attention. In effect, the media has taken your salacious accusation as a definitive 

finding that ASAC Gillett has committed some level of misconduct resulting in the death 

of a brother federal agent. As you know, a cursory Internet search allows private citizens 

to locate and contact virtually anyone (including federal employees) with unnerving ease.

In the wake of this national media coverage, ASAC Gillett has received various written 

threats from unidentified members of the public. We are concerned that continued airing 

of your concerns that prematurely attribute blame to certain named individuals will result 

in further harm to ASAC Gillett. 

We are absolutely convinced that the allegations against ASAC Gillett will be 

dispelled once all relevant information is aired in the proper forum. However, until that 

time, we respectfully request that you refrain from publicly attributing allegations of 

purported malfeasance to ASAC Gillett in any forthcoming correspondence or in 

communications with the media. This will preserve ASAC Gillett’s right to fully and 

properly defend against any such allegations and simultaneously safeguard his personal 

safety and the safety of his family.

We thank you, in advance, for your anticipated cooperation and ask that you 

contact us with any questions or concerns regarding this matter. 

 Very truly yours,

 AVERY DOOLEY POST & AVERY, LLP

 Peter H. Noone

PHN/caf

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1493 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 15, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable Michele M. Leonhart 

Administrator 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 

U.S. Department of Justice 

700 Army Navy Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202 

Dear Administrator Leonhart: 

 Since January, I have been investigating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF) operation called “Fast and Furious”—part of the broader “Project Gunrunner” 

initiative. According to several agents, ATF leadership encouraged gun dealers to engage in sales of 

multiple weapons to individuals suspected of illegally purchasing for resale to Mexican cartels. 

 I understand from documents and other information provided that Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) Agents were aware of Operation Fast and Furious and possibly deeply involved in 

the operation. Reportedly, DEA funds were used to facilitate operations in ATF’s Operation Fast and 

Furious. 

 Accordingly, in order to get a better understanding of DEA’s involvement with Operation Fast 

and Furious please provide all records relating to communications between supervisors and DEA 

headquarters regarding DEA’s involvement. Additionally, I request that you arrange for knowledgeable 

DEA supervisors to brief members of my staff no later than March 25, 2011. 

I would appreciate a response to this letter no later than March 18, 2011. If you have any 

questions about this request, please contact Brian Downey at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for your prompt 

attention to this important matter. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

cc: The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General, United States Department of Justice 

1494 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 15, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable John T. Morton 

Director 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

500 12th Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20536 

Dear Director Morton: 

 Since January, I have been investigating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF) operation called “Fast and Furious”—part of the broader “Project Gunrunner” 

initiative. According to several agents, ATF leadership encouraged gun dealers to engage in sales of 

multiple assault weapons to individuals suspected of illegally purchasing for resale to Mexican cartels. 

 I understand from documents in my possession that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

Agents were aware of Operation Fast and Furious and possibly deeply involved in the operation. On 

March 9, at an oversight hearing of the Department of Homeland Security, I questioned Secretary 

Napolitano regarding possible ICE participation in Operation Fast and Furious. Secretary Napolitano 

indicated that she was unaware of a specific ICE Agent being part of ATF’s operation. 

 Accordingly, to get a better understanding of ICE’s involvement with Operation Fast and Furious 

please provide all records relating communications between ICE supervisors and ICE headquarters 

regarding ICE’s involvement. Additionally, I request that you arrange for knowledgeable ICE 

supervisors to brief members of my staff no later than March 25, 2011. 

 

I would appreciate a response by no later than March 18, 2011. If you have any questions about 

this request, please contact Brian Downey at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for your prompt attention to this 

important matter. 

 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

cc: The Honorable Janet Napolitano 

Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security

1495 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 16, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

The Honorable Alan D. Bersin 

Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20229 

Dear Commissioner Bersin: 

 Since January, I have been investigating the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF) operation called “Fast and Furious”—part of the broader “Project Gunrunner” 

initiative. According to several agents, ATF leadership encouraged gun dealers to engage in 

sales of multiple weapons to individuals suspected of illegally purchasing them for resale to 

Mexican cartels. Specifically, I am seeking information on whether CBP officials had an 

opportunity to seize weapons from straw purchasers on two specific occasions. 

First, on March 8, 2011, federal authorities indicted 11 defendants, including the Mayor 

and the Police Chief of a small town in New Mexico, for conspiring to smuggle weapons from 

the United States into Mexico.1

 According to the indictment, on January 14, 2010, Blas 

Gutierrez and Miguel Carrillo were pulled over near the border and were found in possession of 

eight weapons, including three AK-47-type pistols. 2 Also according to the indictment, two of 

the weapons were later smuggled to Mexico, where they were found this month, March 2011.3

 I 

understand that CBP may have been the agency that conducted the vehicle stop referenced in the 

indictment and that some of the weapons may have been connected to Operation Fast and 

Furious. However, CBP allegedly let the individuals go, perhaps because it failed to determine 

that the weapons or individuals were connected to ATF operation at the time of the vehicle stop. 

Second, CBP officials allegedly stopped Jaime Avila near the border in the spring or 

summer of 2010. He allegedly had the two WASR-10 rifles in his possession that were later 

found at the scene of Agent Brian Terry’s murder, along with over thirty additional weapons. 

CBP officials contacted ATF or an Assistant United States Attorney who allegedly instructed 

CBP to allow Avila proceed without seizing the weapons. 

 

1

 Indictment, filed March 8, 20l1, United States v. Villalobos, Case 2:11-cr-00487. (Attachment 1) 2 Id. at 3. 3 Id.

1496 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
In order to ascertain the extent to which these accounts are accurate, please ensure that 

CBP officials are prepared to answer questions about these two incidents in addition to questions 

about the use of force policy at the staff briefing scheduled for this Friday. If you have any 

questions about this request, please contact Brian Downey at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for 

your prompt attention to this important matter. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

Attachment 

1497 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
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1508 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 25, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission

Cynthia A. Schnedar 

Acting Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Acting Inspector General Schnedar: 

In several previous letters to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) and your office, I have expressed my concerns over the actions of the ATF 

in Operation “Fast and Furious.” 

On March 3, 2011, ATF Special Agent Jay Dobyns filed a Department of Justice Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) online complaint, a copy of which is attached for your reference. 

Although the complaint is not directly related to Operation Fast and Furious, it alleges 

misconduct on the part of supervisors from ATF’s Phoenix Field Office. Agent Dobyns reported 

serious allegations, which may provide important background and context for the Congressional 

review of Operation Fast and Furious. 

 In his OIG complaint, Agent Dobyns provides an email from one of the supervisors 

saying, “I’ll go out of my way to conceal [significant details],” and “I have enough [Law 

Enforcement] and intelligence community experience to know how to protect myself and my 

subordinates. I can hide the ball with the best of them.” Furthermore, Agent Dobyns advised that 

his allegations have been reported numerous times in the past to ATF management and the 

Department of Justice has been aware of them for at least eighteen months. 

Due to the nature of the claims, please evaluate Agent Dobyns’ claims in an expedited 

manner and provide an updated status of how the OIG intends to investigate the allegations. 

1509 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Department of Justice Inspector General 

 March 25, 2011 

 Page 2 of 2 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I request that your agency provide 

a response no later than April 8, 2011. Should you have any questions regarding this letter, 

please contact Jason Foster at (202) 224-5225. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 

Attachment 

1510 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
March 28, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Acting Director Melson: 

 On March 4, 2011, I wrote you regarding questions surrounding the February 15 murder 

of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agent Jaime Zapata in Mexico. I have yet 

to receive a reply. 

 In my last letter, I referenced the March 1 DOJ press release regarding the Osorio 

brothers and their next-door neighbor Kelvin Morrison. They were arrested on charges related to 

trafficking firearms to a Mexican drug cartel and indicted on March 23. According to the 

release, all three defendants had been suspects in an ATF undercover operation in early 

November 2010. In that operation, the Osorio brothers and Morrison provided 40 firearms to an 

ATF informant. The press release indicates, “The meeting [between the informant and the 

suspected traffickers] was arranged related to an investigation of Los Zetas,” a Mexican drug 

trafficking cartel.1

The DOJ’s press release appears to be the first public acknowledgement that one of the 

firearms used in the murder of Agent Zapata had been traced back to Otilio Osorio. Specifically, 

the press release stated: 

[A]ccording to one affidavit filed in the case, one of the three firearms used in the 

Feb. 15, 2011, deadly assault of ICE Special Agent Jaime Zapata that was seized 

by Mexican officials has been traced by ATF to Otilio Osorio. Otilio Osorio 

allegedly purchased that firearm on Oct. 10, 2010, in the Dallas/Fort Worth 

metroplex, prior to law enforcement’s awareness of the purchase. Ballistic testing 

 

1

 Press Release, Department of Justice, March 1, 2011, available at

http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel11/dl030111.htm. 

1511 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
Acting Director Melson 

 March 28, 2011 

 Page 2 of 3 

conducted by Mexican authorities on this firearm indicated it was one of the three 

firearms used during the deadly assault on Special Agent Zapata’s vehicle.2

The DOJ’s press release gives the impression that law enforcement officials were unaware of 

Osorio’s activities in October 2010 when he allegedly purchased the weapon that was later used 

to kill Agent Zapata. 

The press release leads the reader to believe that law enforcement had no reason to 

suspect Osorio was a straw purchaser until sometime between October 10 and early November, 

when he was the subject of the undercover operation. According to the release: 

The investigation now has also revealed that on Aug. 7, 2010, a Romarm, model 

WASR, 7.62 caliber rifle was discovered by law enforcement officers in LaPryor, 

Texas, near the U.S./Mexico border. Trace results indicated that Morrison 

purchased this firearm on July 30, 2010, from a FFL [federal firearms licensee]. 

According to the affidavit, between July 10, 2010, and Nov. 4, 2010, Morrison 

purchased 24 firearms from FFLs.3

This portion of the DOJ’s press release appears designed to give the impression that the August 7 

discovery by unspecified “law enforcement officers” and subsequent trace results linking the 

weapon to Morrison became known only after the October 10 purchase of the murder weapon. 

 However, I have learned that ATF agents actually observed a cache of weapons being 

loaded into a suspect vehicle on July 29, 2010, but did not maintain surveillance on that vehicle.4

 

The very next day, Morrison purchased the firearm that was later “discovered,” in August.5

 In 

fact, it was actually seized along with 22 other AK-style firearms in the very suspect vehicle that 

ATF agents had witnessed being loaded with weapons on July 29.6

 When the vehicle was 

stopped en route to Eagle Pass, Texas on August 7, the weapon purchased by Morrison on July 

30 was recovered, along with two weapons purchased by Ranferi Osorio.

7

 All of these facts 

were apparently known to federal authorities contemporaneously, and yet none of them are 

included in the Justice Department’s craftily-worded press release. 

 The March 8 letter I received from Department of Justice (DOJ) Assistant Attorney 

General Ronald Weich is not an adequate response to my March 4 letter, which was addressed 

specifically to you. Therefore, please provide your direct response to the questions in my letter, 

along with the documents previously requested. In particular, please prioritize any documents 

responsive to paragraph (5), which called for all records relating to when law enforcement first 

became aware of the trafficking activities of Otilio and Ranferi Osorio and Kelvin Morrison. 

 

2 Id.

3 Id. (Emphasis added.) 4

 ATF Management Log, Case 785096-10-[redacted], Case Title “[redacted] Firearm Traffickers (SWB 

Gunrunner).” (Attachment 1)

5

 ATF Firearms Trace Summary, Sep. 17, 2010. (Attachment 2)

6 Supra note 4. 7

 ATF Firearms Trace Summary, Sep. 15, 2010; ATF Firearms Trace Summary, Sep. 17, 2010. (Attachment 3)

1512 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
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 March 28, 2011 

 Page 3 of 3 

Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Tristan Leavitt at (202) 224-

5225. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Member 

Attachment 

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April 2011

April 2011

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April 8, 2011 

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 

Kenneth E. Melson 

Acting Director 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

99 New York Avenue, NE 

Washington, DC 20226 

Dear Acting Director Melson: 

 Attached is an email released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).1 

It appears to contain proposed guidance to ATF employees about how to respond to 

contacts from my office. The guidance instructs ATF employees that they “are in no way 

obligated to respond” to questions from Congress. It also attempts to prevent direct 

communications with my office by instructing that ATF employees “should refer 

congressional staff who seek information from you to the ATF’s office of congressional 

affairs.” The guidance further attempts to prevent direct communications with my 

office by claiming that ATF employees “are not authorized to disclose non-public 

information.” 

 It is unclear from the email released through FOIA whether this guidance was 

actually communicated to ATF employees. However, it is of grave concern because, as 

you know, such attempts to prevent direct communications with Congress are not a 

lawfully authorized activity of any officer or employee of the United States whose salary 

is paid with appropriated funds.2 Specifically, no officer or employee may attempt to 

prohibit or prevent “any other officer or employee of the Federal Government from 

having direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee, 

or subcommittee of the Congress” about a matter related to his employment or the 

 

1 Attachment 1. 

2 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, § 714 (2010), as continued by §101 

of continuing resolutions P.L. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (2010) and P.L. 112-6, 125 Stat. 23 (2011)—which 

extends the funding levels in the 2010 appropriations bills, as well as “the authority and conditions 

provided in such Acts,” through April 8, 2011. 

1525 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Kenneth E. Melson 

 April 8, 2011 

 Page 2 of 4 

agency “in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or contact is at the 

initiative” of the employee or Congress (emphasis added).3

 I wrote to you on January 31 to ensure you were aware of these provisions and to 

express concerns that without proper guidance, managers might inappropriately 

intimidate employees to discourage them from speaking with Congress and thus 

unlawfully interfere with a Congressional inquiry.4 In order for Congress to exercise its 

oversight authority and act as a check on Executive power, it is crucial that agency 

employees are free to communicate directly with Members and Committee staff. Direct 

contact means contacts that do not necessarily involve Congressional liaison or agency 

management. Without such direct, unfiltered communications, Congress would still be 

unaware of, and unable to inquire about, the serious allegations involving the death of 

Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry and the sales of weapons to known and suspected gun 

traffickers. 

 I have a long experience of witnessing retaliation against whistleblowers. 

Sometimes it is explicit and immediate. Often it is subtle and delayed until after public 

scrutiny has faded. Unfortunately, it is so frequent that employees fear that even 

truthful answers to direct factual questions from Congress will get them in trouble. That 

is why I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of those employees who wish 

to cooperate with a Congressional inquiry or report problems anonymously. Direct 

contact with Congress of the sort protected by the law serves as an extra level of 

protection against retaliation and is obviously essential where an employee seeks 

confidentiality. 

However, in some cases, agency employees choose to disclose their direct 

contacts with Congress, despite the potential consequences. As I explained in my 

January 31 letter, one employee chose to disclose his protected contacts with my staff 

and was immediately questioned about the content of those communications. I was 

concerned about that because forcing an employee to reveal the details of such 

communications would intrude on the integrity of the Congressional inquiry and offend 

the comity between the Branches that flows from the separation of powers under the 

Constitution. 

Now, a second agency employee has chosen to disclose that he has had protected 

contacts with Congress. George Gillett, through and in conjunction with his legal 

counsel, is cooperating with this investigation. Mr. Gillett is the Assistant Special Agent 

in Charge of the ATF’s Phoenix field division, and Committee staff’s direct contacts with 

him are an essential component of our inquiry. He has participated in two preliminary 

meetings jointly with Senate Judiciary Committee staff and House Oversight and 

Government Reform Committee staff. As you know, retaliation for such 

communications is prohibited by law. 

 

3 Id. 

4 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (providing criminal penalties for obstructing or impeding the power of Congressional 

inquiry). 

1526 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Kenneth E. Melson 

 April 8, 2011 

 Page 3 of 4 

On one previous occasion when an agency sought to compel an individual to 

disclose the content of his communications with Congress, I was prepared to introduce a 

resolution authorizing the Senate Legal Counsel to seek legal remedy in the courts. 

Fortunately, in light of that draft resolution, the Executive Branch withdrew its attempt 

to compel discovery of communications between a whistleblower and Congress.5

In this current inquiry, a similar attempt was also abandoned. The first ATF 

agent to disclose that he had direct contacts with Congress was ordered to describe the 

content of his communications in writing. However, shortly after my January 31 letter, I 

was pleased to learn that the order was withdrawn. I appreciate the agency’s willingness 

to respect Congressional prerogatives and avoid interfering with a Congressional 

inquiry. Similarly, the agency should avoid intruding into our investigative process by 

seeking to learn the content of ASAC Gillett’s communications with Congress. 

In light of the attached email, I have renewed concerns that the guidance being 

given to employees may be inconsistent with the law.6 Therefore, please provide 

written answers to the following questions: 

1. Was the attached guidance distributed, either in writing or otherwise, to 

ATF field offices or other ATF personnel? 

2. Was any guidance on contacts with Congress distributed, either in writing 

or otherwise, to ATF field offices or other ATF personnel? If so, please 

provide a copy. 

3. What steps have you taken or do you plan to take to ensure that employees 

are aware of their right to communicate directly with Congress if they so 

choose? 

 

 

5 See S. PRT. 110-28, § VIII.D.2 “Attempt to Compel Disclosure of Confidential Communications with 

Congress,” p. 103, 641, 652 (“Nothing in this agreement shall require [the production of] any 

communications with, or documents that were created for, any Senate Committees (or the staff or 

members thereof”). See also S. HRG. 109-898, at 39-41, 470-471, responses to questions for the record to 

Dec. 5, 2006, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing at 8. 

6 See generally, Government Accountability Office, “Department of Health and Human Services—Chief 

Actuary’s Communications with Congress,” B-302911 (Sep. 7, 2004) (discussing the history and 

background in support of the government-wide prohibition on attempts to prevent direct communications 

with Congress) (Attachment 2). 

1527 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 Kenneth E. Melson 

 April 8, 2011 

 Page 4 of 4 

Please reply no later than April 14, 2011. If you have any questions about this request, 

please contact Jason Foster at (202) 225-5225. Thank you for your cooperation. 

 Sincerely, 

 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

Attachments 

cc: Chairman Patrick Leahy, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

 Chairman Darrell Issa, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

 

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April 13, 2011 

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Attorney General Holder: 

 At approximately 1:30 p.m. yesterday, my staff learned that the Justice 

Department was making four documents available at 2:00 pm for Chairman Darrell 

Issa’s staff to review regarding the controversy over ATF’s Project Gunrunner, Operation 

Fast and Furious, and the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. These documents 

are among those I requested in February of this year. Yet, the Justice Department 

refused to make them available for my staff to review. In fact, the Justice Department 

has produced not one single page of documents in response to my inquiries. 

Thus far, I have not requested that Chairman Leahy join in any document 

requests, consider any subpoenas, or schedule any hearings into this matter in the 

Senate Judiciary Committee. Any such request would be unnecessary and duplicative of 

the process on the House side, so long as any documents provided there are also 

provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee at the same time. 

The Department’s failure to cooperate with my requests is especially troubling in 

light of the February 4, 2011, reply to my initial letter. In that reply, the Justice 

Department took the position that those allegations were “false” and specifically denied 

“that ATF ‘sanctioned’ or otherwise knowingly allowed the sale of assault weapons” to 

straw purchasers. The letter further claimed that “ATF makes every effort to interdict 

weapons that have been purchased illegally and prevent their transportation to Mexico.” 

I already provided evidence contradicting that denial in my February 9 and 

March 3 letters. In addition, attached you will find further documentation undermining 

the Department’s assertion. Specifically, the documents are emails between ATF 

officials and a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) in Arizona. These emails demonstrate 

that ATF instructed gun dealers to engage in suspicious sales despite the dealers’ 

1542 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

 April 13, 2011 

 Page 2 of 4 

concerns. The emails refer to meetings between the FFL and the U.S. Attorney’s office to 

address the concerns being raised by the FFL. ATF supervisor David Voth wrote on 

April 13, 2010: 

I understand that the frequency with which some individuals under 

investigation by our office have been purchasing firearms from your 

business has caused concerns for you. ... However, if it helps put you at 

ease we (ATF) are continually monitoring these suspects using a variety of 

investigative techniques which I cannot go into [in] detail.1

In response, the gun dealer expresses concern about potential future liability and sought 

something in writing to address the issue explicitly: 

For us, we were hoping to put together something like a letter of 

understanding to alleviate concerns of some type of recourse against us 

down the road for selling these items. We just want to make sure we are 

cooperating with ATF and that we are not viewed as selling to bad guys.2

Following this email, the ATF arranged a meeting between the FFL and the U.S. 

Attorney’s office. According to the FFL, the U.S. Attorney’s office scheduled a follow-up 

meeting with the FFL, but asked that the FFL’s attorney not be present.3 

At the meeting on May 13, 2010, the U.S. Attorney’s office declined to provide 

anything in writing but assured the gun dealer in even stronger terms that there were 

safeguards in place to prevent further distribution of the weapons after being purchased 

from his business.4 As we now know, those assurances proved to be untrue. On June 

17, 2010, the gun dealer wrote to the ATF to again express concerns after seeing a report 

on Fox News about firearms and the border: 

The segment, if the information was correct, is disturbing to me. When 

you, [the Assistant U.S. Attorney], and I met on May 13th, I shared my 

concerns with you guys that I wanted to make sure that none of the 

firearms that were sold per our conversation with you and various ATF 

agents could or would ever end up south of the border or in the hands of 

the bad guys. ... I want to help ATF with its investigation but not at the risk 

of agents’ safety because I have some very close friends that are U.S. 

Border Patrol agents in southern AZ[.]5

 

1 Email from ATF Group VII Supervisor David Voth to Cooperating FFL, Apr. 13, 2010 (Attached). 2 Email from Cooperating FFL to ATF Group VII Supervisor David Voth, Apr. 13, 2010 (Attached). 

3 Telephone interview with Cooperating FFL, Apr. 5, 2011. 

4 Id. 5 Email from Cooperating FFL to ATF Group VII Supervisor David Voth, Jun. 17, 2010 (Attached). 

1543 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
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 April 13, 2011 

 Page 3 of 4 

Incredibly, the FFL sent this email six months before guns from the same ATF operation 

were found at the scene of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry’s murder. So, not only were 

the ATF agents who later blew the whistle predicting that this operation would end in 

tragedy, so were the gun dealers—even as ATF urged them to make the sales. 

 Furthermore, according to the FFL, there were “one or two” occasions on which 

his employees actually witnessed and recorded with surveillance cameras an exchange 

of money between the straw purchaser and another individual on the premises.6 

Despite this actual knowledge of a straw purchase, the dealer said ATF officials wanted 

him to proceed with the transaction.7 However, his employees refused to process the 

sale.8

In light of this new evidence, the Justice Department’s claim that the ATF never 

knowingly sanctioned or allowed the sale of assault weapons to straw purchasers is 

simply not credible. As you know, I have multiple document and information requests 

pending with various components of the Justice Department. Unfortunately, however, 

it appears that senior Department officials are not allowing the components to respond 

fully and directly. 

Please provide written answers to the following questions by no later than April 

20, 2011: 

1. Do you stand by the assertion in the Department’s reply that the ATF 

whistleblower allegations are “false” and specifically that ATF did not 

sanction or otherwise knowingly allow the sale of assault weapons to straw 

purchasers? If so, please explain why in light of the mounting evidence to 

the contrary. 

2. Will you commit to providing the Senate Judiciary Committee with 

documents, or access to documents, simultaneously with the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform? If not, please explain 

why not. 

 

 

6 Telephone interview with Cooperating FFL, Apr. 5, 2011. 

7 Id. 8 Id. 

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 April 13, 2011 

 Page 4 of 4 

If you have any questions regarding this request, please have your staff contact Jason 

Foster at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for your prompt attention these important issues. 

 Sincerely, 

 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

Attachment 

cc: Chairman Patrick Leahy 

 U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

 Chairman Darrell Issa 

 U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

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1 

April 22, 2011 

Via Electronic Transmission

Cynthia A. Schnedar 

Acting Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Acting Inspector General Schnedar: 

ATF Special Agent Vincent Cefalu advised my office that he filed a claim with the 

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 2 years ago and has yet to 

receive a formal finding. In May 2010, CNN reported of Cefalu: 

ATF managers turned against him after he reported in 2005 what he said 

was an illegal wiretap plan in a racketeering case. Records show ATF 

disputes his claims of the planned illegal wiretap. But he said that started a 

series of retaliatory measures that ended up in 2007 with him in a desk job. 

His only negative evaluation, he said, was the year after he criticized the 

planned wiretap.1

Since the CNN broadcast, Agent Cefalu claims that he has been effectively idled. He 

advised my staff that he has been assigned “only 89 minutes of definable work since the 

May allegations became public.” I request that your office evaluate Agent Cefalu’s claim 

and provide me with an updated status. 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I request that your agency 

provide a response no later than May 6, 2011. Should you have any questions regarding 

this letter, please contact Jason Foster at (202) 224-5225. 

Sincerely, 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

 

1

 Abbie Boudreau and Scott Zamost, ATF agents describe fear of retaliation, CNN, May 26, 1010, available at 

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-26/politics/atf.whistleblowers_1_atf-wiretap. 

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May 2011

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May 16, 2011 

VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Attorney General Holder: 

 Last week I submitted Questions for the Record (QFRs) following the Judiciary 

Committee hearing on Oversight of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

 Historically, the Justice Department generally takes five to eight months to 

respond to QFRs. However, because of my ongoing investigation into the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), I would appreciate receiving 

responses to questions on this topic much sooner. Attached is a copy of those questions. 

Please provide responses as soon as possible. 

 Additionally, I would like to reiterate the requests that have remained 

unanswered from my previous letters on this matter. 

a) In my letter of February 16, 2011, I requested that you provide: 

1) All records relating to communications between the ATF and the 

Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) who sold the weapons to Avila, including 

any Report of Investigation (ROI) or other records relating to the 

December 17, 2009 meeting “to discuss his role as an FFL during this 

investigation.” 

2) All records relating to communications between ATF headquarters and 

Phoenix Special Agent in Charge (SAC) William Newell from December 1, 

2010 to the present, including a memorandum, approximately 30 pages 

long, from SAC Newell to ATF headquarters following the arrest of Jaime 

Avila and the death of CBP Agent Brian Terry. 

3) A copy of the presentation, approximately 200 pages long, that the 

Group 7 Supervisor made to officials at ATF Headquarters in the Spring of 

2010. 

1577 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

 May 16, 2011 

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4) Copies of all e-mails related to Operation Fast and Furious, the Jaime 

Avila case, or the death of CBP Agent Brian Terry sent to or from SAC 

Newell, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) George Gillette, Group 7 

Supervisor, or the Case Agent between November 1, 2009 and January 31, 

2011. 

I requested that these documents be provided on a rolling basis as they are 

identified and located. I also requested that you please prioritize your search for 

documents and produce them in the following order: (1) documents in response 

to requests one through three, (2) documents in response to request four dated 

between December 13, 2010 and January 31, 2011, and (3) documents in 

response to request four dated between November 1, 2009 and December 13, 

2010. 

b) After ICE Agent Jaime Zapata was brutally murdered in Mexico on February 15, I 

was shocked to learn that, like Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, Agent Zapata had 

been killed with a weapon traced to an individual in the U.S. that the ATF had 

been aware was trafficking firearms. Accordingly, in my March 4, 2011 letter, I 

requested answers to the following questions: 

(1) Although the gun used in the assault on Agent Zapata that has been 

traced back to the U.S. was purchased on October 10, 2010, how can we 

know that it did not make its way down to Mexico after the November 

investigation, when the arrest of these three criminals might have 

prevented the gun from being trafficked and later used to murder Agent 

Zapata? 

(2) When did law enforcement first become aware that Morrison 

purchased the gun? 

(3) Given that the likely recipients of any trafficked guns were so close to 

the border, did any ATF personnel raise concerns about the possibility of 

those guns being used against U.S. law enforcement? If so, how did the 

ATF address those concerns? 

(4) Did any ATF personnel raise concerns about the wisdom of allowing 

individuals like the Osorio brothers or Morrison to continue their activities 

after the November weapons transfer? If so, how did the ATF address 

those concerns? 

In addition to answering those questions, I also requested all records relating to: 

1578 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

 May 16, 2011 

 Page 3 of 4 

(5) When law enforcement officials first became aware of the trafficking 

activities of Otilio and Ranferi Osorio and Kelvin Morrison; 

(6) Surveillance that may have been conducted on the Osorio brothers or 

Morrison prior to the November transfer of weapons between the ATF’s 

confidential informant and the Osorio brothers and Morrison; 

(7) The November transfer; and 

(8) Any surveillance that law enforcement continued to conduct on the 

Osorio brothers or Morrison after the November transfer. 

Finally, I requested a briefing on the Zapata matter. I reiterated these requests in 

my letter of March 28, 2011, and am still awaiting both a response and a briefing. 

c) In my letter of April 8, 2011, I requested written answers to three questions. The 

third read: 

(3) What steps have you taken or do you plan to take to ensure that 

employees are aware of their right to communicate directly with Congress 

if they so choose? 

In response, you provided me with information about the ATF providing its 

agents with information about the Whistleblower Protection Act in order to 

prevent retaliation against whistleblowers. While that is appreciated, it does not 

respond to my question. I asked about making employees aware of the 

appropriations provision that protects their right to communicate directly with 

Congress. As I outlined in that letter: 

[A]ttempts to prevent direct communications with Congress are not a 

lawfully authorized activity of any officer or employee of the United States 

whose salary is paid with appropriated funds.1 Specifically, no officer or 

employee may attempt to prohibit or prevent “any other officer or 

employee of the Federal Government from having direct oral or written 

communication or contact with any Member, committee, or subcommittee 

of the Congress” about a matter related to his employment or the agency 

“in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or contact is at 

the initiative” of the employee or Congress (emphasis added).2

I wrote to you on January 31 to ensure you were aware of these provisions 

and to express concerns that without proper guidance, managers might 

 

1 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, § 714 (2010), as continued by §101 

of continuing resolutions P.L. 111-242, 124 Stat. 2607 (2010) and P.L. 112-6, 125 Stat. 23 (2011)—which 

extends the funding levels in the 2010 appropriations bills, as well as “the authority and conditions 

provided in such Acts,” through April 8, 2011. 

2 Id. 

1579 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix II: Correspondence
 The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

 May 16, 2011 

 Page 4 of 4 

inappropriately intimidate employees to discourage them from speaking 

with Congress and thus unlawfully interfere with a Congressional inquiry.3 

In order for Congress to exercise its oversight authority and act as a check 

on Executive power, it is crucial that agency employees are free to 

communicate directly with Members and Committee staff. Direct contact 

means contacts that do not necessarily involve Congressional liaison or 

agency management. Without such direct, unfiltered communications, 

Congress would still be unaware of, and unable to inquire about, the 

serious allegations involving the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry 

and the sales of weapons to known and suspected gun traffickers. 

 Accordingly, please provide responses to the questions attached, as well as those 

outlined above, by May 30, 2011. If you have any questions regarding this letter, please 

have your staff contact Tristan Leavitt at (202) 224-5225. Thank you for your prompt 

attention these important issues. 

 Sincerely, 

 

 Charles E. Grassley 

 Ranking Member 

Attachment 

 

3 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (providing criminal penalties for obstructing or impeding the power of Congressional 

inquiry). 

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June 2011

June 2011

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PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT, CHAIRMAN

HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, NEW YORK JON KYL, ARIZONA

RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA

AMY KLOBUCHAR, MINNESOTA JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS

AL FRANKEN, MINNESOTA MICHAEL S. LEE, UTAH

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, DELAWARE TOM COBURN, OKLAHOMA

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

KOLAN L. DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director

June 23,2011

The Honorable Eric Holder Jr.

Attorney General of the United States

United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

tinitcd ~tatcs ~cnatc

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

Dear Attorney General Holder:

I write to request that copies of all documents delivered to the Chairmen and Ranking Members

of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee on the

Judiciary in connection with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Project

Gunrunner and Operation Fast and Furious be delivered to the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, to me as its Chairman and Senator Grassley as our Ranking Republican Member. I

also request that any documents made available for inspection by the bipartisan staff of those two

House Committees in this regard likewise be made available for inspection by the bipartisan staff

of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary under the same terms and conditions as made available

to the House Committees. Finally, I request that any witnesses made available for interviews by

the staffs of the House Committees in this regard be made available for interviews by bipartisan

staff of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

Since I have prepared this letter in an effort finally to allow the Senate to vote on the President's

nominations of Jim Cole to be Deputy Attorney General, Lisa Monaco to be Assistant Attorney

General for National Security and Virginia Seitz to be Assistant Attorney General for the Office

of Legal Counsel, my request is not intended to become operative until after the Senate Majority

Leader has proceeded to those nominations, the debates are concluded and the Senate has voted

on each of them.

cc: Hono Ie Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Republican Member

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