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66–577 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–18 

NOMINATION OF STEPHANIE O’SULLIVAN 

TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 3, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 3 

WITNESS 

Stephanie O’Sullivan, Principal Deputy Director of National IntelligenceDesignate .............................................................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 20 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 62 

Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated January 

12, 2011, to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report ....................................................................................................... 74 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF STEPHANIE O’SULLIVAN 

TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Udall 

of Colorado, Chambliss, Burr, Risch, Blunt and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. 

The Committee meets today to consider the President’s nomination of Ms. Stephanie O’Sullivan to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. So, welcome, Ms. O’Sullivan. 

Before turning to the nomination, let me first publicly welcome 

the six new members of the Committee, who aren’t here yet but 

hopefully will be coming along shortly. We are joined on the Committee by Senators Conrad, Udall, and Warner on our side, and 

Senators Coats, Blunt, and Rubio on the Republican side. So we 

have six new members of this Committee, which I think both the 

Vice Chairman and I very much look forward to. 

I note that Senator Coats is returning to the Committee, having 

served here in the 105th Congress. I also want to congratulate Senator Saxby Chambliss on his Vice Chairmanship. We’ve worked together on this Committee since you joined, Senator, in 2002. And 

I look forward to a close, good, positive working relationship, and 

all I can say is so far, very good. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Before turning to the nomination, I would 

also like to note two important matters that are before us this 

month. 

On February 16th, the Committee will be holding its annual 

worldwide threat hearing. That hearing provides the leaders of the 

intelligence community with an opportunity to present to the Committee and the public their assessment of current and projected national security threats to the United States. The Committee will be 

interested in exploring with them their assessments of the vast 

changes sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa. 

2 

On February 28 three important authorities under the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act—the so-called business records, roving wiretap, and lone-wolf provisions—will sunset. That’s three 

weeks from now, essentially, unless the Congress acts to extend 

them. 

The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 

have written to the congressional leadership in support of legislation that I’ve introduced to extend these authorities to December 

31, 2013. The whole PATRIOT Act comes up for review—it sunsets—in 2013. That’s really the time to look at the entire Act and 

make some decisions as to whether there should be reforms, 

changes, amendments, whatever, at that time. 

I’m very concerned that these three sections, which are really 

vital for ongoing operations, essentially default, and I think that 

would place our nation in some increased insecurity. So I am hopeful that this will be Rule Fourteened to the floor and we can have 

a straight up or down vote on a straight three-year extension of 

those three provisions. 

And now to the nomination. Ms. O’Sullivan was nominated to be 

Principal Deputy Director to DNI Clapper on January 5th of this 

year. If confirmed, she will be the second-most senior intelligence 

professional in the government, with the significant responsibility 

to assist DNI Clapper in his management and direction of the entire community. 

Director Clapper has laid out his goal for his office to force a better fusion in the intelligence community between intelligence collection and analysis, and to make the whole greater than the sum 

of its parts. Ms. O’Sullivan has stated that she shares this goal and 

has agreed to take on the challenge to see it accomplished. 

The importance of this mission has been underscored this week 

by the instability and protests in the Middle East. The President, 

the Secretary of State, and the Congress are making policy decisions on Egypt, and those policymakers deserve timely intelligence 

analysis. I have doubts whether the intelligence community lived 

up to its obligations in this area, which is an issue that the Committee will continue to examine as time passes. 

Now, that’s not, thankfully, a question aimed at Ms. O’Sullivan. 

As an Associate Deputy Director of the CIA, her role is akin to that 

of the chief operating officer, ensuring that the agency functions effectively and efficiently. She has served in this role since December 

of 2009, transforming Director Panetta’s objectives into actions. 

Prior to this position, Ms. O’Sullivan headed CIA’s Directorate of 

Science and Technology for four years. In that role she managed 

the CIA’s technical innovation and support to case officer operations. While almost everything in this area is highly classified and 

unfortunately can’t be discussed here, the Committee has taken a 

real interest in several of these programs and found them to be on 

the cutting edge of science and unique assets to the community. 

Ms. O’Sullivan spent over 14 years combined in the Directorate 

of Science and Technology. She was formerly in the Office of Naval 

Intelligence, and before that she worked at TRW, now part of Northrop Grumman. 

As a nominee to be Principal Deputy DNI, Ms. O’Sullivan has 

answered numerous pre-hearing questions and met with Members. 

3 

Her answers to those questions will be posted today on the Committee’s website. 

So I look forward to your statement and answers to Members’ 

questions, and hope that we will be able to get you confirmed 

quickly and painlessly through the Senate. I know that DNI Clapper very much shares in that hope as well. 

I’ll now turn to our distinguished Vice Chairman and then, if you 

will, give you an opportunity to introduce your family and make 

any opening remarks you would care to make. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. First 

of all, let me say that at the hearing the other day when you were 

unable to be with us I made the comment—and I want to make it 

again—about the fact that I appreciate, as a member of this Committee, particularly on the minority side, the way that you have 

conducted yourself as Chairman in both our classified and unclassified hearings, and all other aspects of serving as Chairman. 

You have made sure that every member of the Committee—it 

didn’t make any difference which side of the aisle we were on—had 

total input into whatever the issue was, and I commend you for 

that and want to make sure you know that I feel personally very 

strongly about the fact that we are going to have a very strong 

working relationship. We’ve had the opportunity to work together 

before. And it’s going to be interesting times that we have to deal 

with, but I thank you for your leadership. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Ms. O’Sullivan, I join the Chair in 

congratulating you on your nomination. You have a distinguished 

career and we appreciate your willingness to serve in the numbertwo job in the intelligence community. 

In your responses to the Committee’s questions, you describe the 

many serious threats our nation faces. And as we watch the events 

in the Middle East unfold, we are reminded of how important good 

and timely intelligence is to staying ahead of the rapid changes in 

our world. A big part of your new job will be to make sure that our 

intelligence community collectors and analysts live up to this task. 

As you and I talked yesterday, information sharing is of critical 

importance. It’s important to get the information, but then it’s also 

extremely important to make sure that it gets into the hands of 

those people who are making the decisions, including yourself in 

this position. And I want to make sure that we continue to give the 

due diligence to the sharing of information within the community. 

Of course, we have a major oversight of that, but as the numbertwo person at DNI, you are going to have a major role in that particular issue too. 

As you noted, the ongoing threat from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 

Peninsula, the same group responsible for the failed Christmas Day 

attack, is high on our radar screen. Amplifying this concern is the 

fact that former Guantanamo Bay detainees have joined AQAP. 

How to handle the remaining Gitmo detainees and ensuring that 

4 

host countries actually monitor already-released detainees remain 

critical problems. 

We know the IC plays an important role in this area. Congress, 

too, has its own oversight responsibilities. I expect that in your new 

position you will help make sure this Committee has all the information we have asked for and need to fulfill our responsibilities. 

Today and in the coming months, I look forward to hearing your 

views on other oversight matters, including the ODNI’s reorganization under Director Clapper and how it will improve the IC’s collection and analysis. 

As the budget debate heats up here in Washington, we’ll look for 

your ideas on how the IC can run more efficiently and cost-effectively. The days of bloated government budgets, including for the 

IC, must be behind us. This Committee has a good track record in 

taking firm stances on budget issues, and I expect that trend to 

continue in this Congress. 

These are just a few of the issues facing the IC and the ODNI. 

We look forward to hearing your ideas today, and we look forward 

to a speedy confirmation process and to continue to work with you. 

I thank you. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Ms. O’Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE O’SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Chambliss 

and distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President’s nominee for the position 

of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. 

I also want to thank you for welcoming my family. I am pleased 

that my husband Patrick, my parents Adam and Barbara, and my 

brother-in-law Timothy could join me. Their support and grounding 

have been essential to my ability to serve in public service throughout my career. 

That service encompasses almost 30 years spent in or supporting 

our country’s intelligence community. During that time I have 

served in private industry, the Department of Defense, and the 

Central Intelligence Agency. I have delivered systems and new capabilities in every intelligence discipline. I have worked across the 

intelligence cycle, from research to operations, and I have worked 

across the intelligence community in partnerships that delivered 

more than either of us could have alone. 

I fully comprehend both the challenge and the grave responsibility bestowed upon the Director of National Intelligence and, if 

confirmed, would strive to meet both the challenges and fulfill the 

responsibilities of the office. 

The DNI is charged with protecting our country in a time where 

we are collectively facing a daunting set of threats and challenges. 

In this environment, a strong and effective DNI and its leadership 

has never been more important. If I am confirmed, I look forward 

to supporting Director Clapper’s goals to better integrate the intelligence community and to ensure that the community is efficient in 

both its structure and its operation. 

5 

I also look forward to supporting the DNI and the intelligence 

community’s imperative to keep Congress fully and currently informed. The oversight process is the basis by which the intelligence 

community maintains the trust of the Congress and the people that 

we serve. Moreover, oversight is a valuable contribution to improving the quality of intelligence. If confirmed, I will ensure that the 

intelligence community is meeting its statutory obligations to fully 

and currently inform the congressional oversight Committees of intelligence activities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and for your consideration of my nomination. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. O’Sullivan follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE L. O’SULLIVAN, NOMINEE FOR THE POSITION OF

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Chambliss, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President’s nominee 

for the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI). I also 

want to thank you for your time and consideration of my nomination and of my 

record in public service. 

That service encompasses almost thirty years spent in, or supporting our country’s Intelligence Community. During that time I have served in private industry, 

the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. I have delivered 

systems and new capabilities in every intelligence discipline. I have worked across 

the intelligence cycle from research to operations and learned the value of innovation in each of them. I have worked across the Intelligence Community in partnerships that produced more than either party could have alone and experienced the 

potential that can be found in an integrated enterprise. I fully comprehend both the 

challenge and the grave responsibility bestowed upon the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and if confirmed, would strive to meet the challenges and fulfill the 

responsibilities of the office. 

The DNI is charged with protecting our country through the provision of timely, 

objective, and accurate intelligence to policymakers and the effective management 

and integration of the Intelligence Community. The DNI is also responsible for ensuring that the Intelligence Community, as it fulfills its obligations, complies with 

the direction of the President and with our country’s laws and Constitution. 

In order to implement these responsibilities, the DNI integrates intelligence capabilities and products, sets priorities, and allocates resources. The DNI also leads the 

community in initiatives designed to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. The 

PDDNI assists the DNI in carrying out his or her duties and responsibilities. The 

PDDNI supports the DNI’s policies to include integrating intelligence, leading the 

U.S. Intelligence Community, and protecting U.S. national security. The PDDNI 

also acts and exercises the powers of the DNI upon the absence or disability of the 

DNI. If I am confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director Clapper’s goals to better integrate the Intelligence Community and ensure the Community is efficient in 

both its structure and operations. 

Given the threats and challenges facing the Intelligence Community, it has never 

been more important for the DNI to exercise strong and effective leadership. As a 

nation, we are facing a daunting number of threats ranging from terrorism, to the 

development and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, to cyber security. In 

the face of these competing imperatives, the ability of the DNI to adjudicate and 

set priorities is essential. 

DNI leadership is also needed to address the management challenges faced by the 

Intelligence Community. The DNI’s leadership will be required in defining a path 

forward for information sharing that recognizes, and appropriately balances, the inherent risks without jeopardizing the gains we have achieved through deeper integration. DNI leadership on efficiency and effectiveness initiatives will be key to optimizing the Intelligence Community’s budget and resources in the face of inevitable 

constraints. Finally the DNI has one additional leadership duty, to lead the men 

and women of the Intelligence Community. Working with our Congressional oversight committees, the DNI must both support their efforts to protect our country 

and challenge them to give their best. 

6 

Accomplishing all of this will require that the DNI has a strong and effective leadership team. DNI Clapper has generally defined responsibilities within his leadership team such that the PDDNI will serve as the Chief Operating Officer for the 

Intelligence Community as well as the Office of the DNI (ODNI). Internally the 

PDDNI will be focused on the management and oversight components of the DNI’s 

office, while the Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration (DDNI/II) focuses on the ODNI components responsible for integrating analysis 

and collection. Externally, the DDNI/II is focused on supporting the National Security Staff and policymakers, while the PDDNI will be focused on the Intelligence 

Community components and the DNI’s oversight and reporting responsibilities. If 

confirmed as PDDNI, I would also have full visibility into, and understanding of, 

intelligence matters such that I would be prepared to act for the DNI in his absence. 

I believe that the DNI has assembled a leadership team that builds on the 

strength of our community. I believe that my own background in technology, development and acquisition, and clandestine operations, as well as my experience at CIA 

will complement the DNI’s own experience and that of his leadership team. 

I will close by addressing the Intelligence Community’s imperative to support 

Congressional oversight. I believe in and value the Congressional oversight process, 

and if confirmed as PDDNI, I will fully support the Intelligence Community’s notification and reporting obligations to our oversight committees in Congress. The oversight process is the basis by which the Intelligence Community maintains the trust 

and confidence of Congress and the people we serve. Keeping the congressional oversight committees currently and fully informed of significant intelligence activities, 

anticipated intelligence activities and intelligence failures is fundamental to the system of checks and balances embedded in our government and the only way an intelligence organization can effectively operate within our open society. Moreover, oversight is a valuable contribution to improving the quality of intelligence and the effective, efficient operation of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that the Intelligence Community is meeting its statutory responsibilities to fully and 

currently inform the Congressional oversight committees of intelligence activities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to 

answer your questions. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Ms. O’Sullivan. 

There are several standard questions that I might ask you, so I’m 

just going to go through them very quickly. I think you can answer 

them with one word. 

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other 

venues when invited? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and elsewhere in the intelligence community to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and officials elsewhere in the intelligence community provide such material to the Committee when 

requested? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to 

the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very, very much. And I have a 

couple of questions. 

7 

On August 20, DNI Clapper established the position of Deputy 

Director of National Intelligence as the new third-ranking position 

in the Office of DNI, and he eliminated the four deputy DNI positions that had existed previously. The same day, DNI Clapper also 

announced that Robert Cardillo, former Deputy Director for Analysis at the DIA, would serve as the first Deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration. 

In your written responses to our Committee’s pre-hearing questions, you stated that ‘‘the PDDNI is responsible for ensuring the 

adequate and appropriate resources, policies and process to maximize intelligence integration.’’ But you also wrote, ‘‘The DDNI too 

is responsible for the integration of intelligence across the intelligence community.’’ 

Who is in charge of making sure intelligence information is integrated and shared across the intelligence community? Would it be 

you, if you’re confirmed, or is it Mr. Cardillo? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The Director of National Intelligence has set 

the agenda, and he has the primary responsibility. Both Robert 

Cardillo and I will fully support his objective of doing that. So I 

would feel bound to answer that call, and I would feel that that 

would be a primary responsibility that I carried. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Now I’m confused. You’re saying that he 

has the primary responsibility. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. General Clapper has the primary responsibility, 

and both of us will be supporting him in that role. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, who makes sure that intelligence is 

integrated and shared across the community? Which person? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. That would probably fall into my area of primary responsibility as I understand the structure of the office. Robert Cardillo’s primary role is in integrating collection and analysis 

and identifying intelligence gaps, which are then passed to the rest 

of the community to effect solutions. I would be responsible for 

overseeing the process of the trades and implementation across the 

rest of the community. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Good. Now that’s very clear and on the 

record, so thank you. 

I wanted to ask you a question on contractors, if I can find it 

here. We have been increasingly concerned about the IC’s heavy 

dependence on contractors. The actual numbers are classified at 

the secret level, but past DNIs and agency heads have all generally 

agreed that there’s an over-reliance on contractors that have put 

inherently governmental work in the hands of the private sector. 

As you know, the law is that if the work is inherently governmental, it must be done by a government employee, not a contractor. And contractors have increased costs, roughly 70 percent 

per position. In other words, it is much more expensive to do it that 

way, and it means that the government does not develop and obtain its own expertise. It’s delegated out at 70 percent greater cost. 

Your answers to the Committee’s pre-hearing questions state 

your belief that contractors can help the government meet its 

short-term needs. You wrote, ‘‘If the immediate security of the nation or United States citizens or our interests are threatened, then 

the surge use of contractors is an appropriate consideration.’’ Now, 

this budget is likely to have cuts, as you may guess. Will you make 

8 

reducing the use of contractors within the IC a priority, if confirmed? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Madam Chairman, if confirmed, I would pledge 

to take a very close look at those contractors. The key word in my 

response was ‘‘surge’’ use. That does not mean sustained forever. 

Contractors bring unique and valuable skills and they fill surge 

needs, but we should take a look at it periodically, on an ongoing 

basis, to make sure that they are not just continuing out of inertia. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, as long as you know and take a look 

at the gross numbers, which are astonishing. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I would pledge to do that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And, in fact, the department has pledged 

itself to, I believe to a 5-percent reduction of contractor use a year, 

which, candidly, is rather de minimus. So I would like to ask that 

you look at that, and we will be calling on you in the future to 

question you further on it. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I have experience doing that already. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you. 

Ms. O’Sullivan, the Committee has been reviewing the disposition of Gitmo detainees and the process used to decide whether to 

detain or release these detainees. As the recidivism rate continues 

to rise, we need to make sure that transfer countries really do have 

eyes on any released detainees. The Committee is still waiting for 

some key documents from the administration on this issue. Will 

you commit to working with the Committee to help us get all the 

documents that we have requested? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. If confirmed, I would pledge to make available 

all the information that this Committee needs to the best of my 

ability, including on this issue. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. The ODNI has acknowledged that 

the DNI acted in a policy role in the decisionmaking process for 

transferring detainees. Do you believe that’s an appropriate role for 

the DNI and if so, why? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The process by which we are working the Gitmo 

detainee is a cross-community process. Intelligence officers inform 

that process. They also have a say as to the risk involved. So it’s 

appropriate that the community informs the interagency process as 

to what the risks are and the capabilities of liaison countries. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. So do you think the DNI is an appropriate person to be on that policymaking side? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I think he is appropriate to consult. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Okay. Let me just express a concern 

that has been brought up from time to time since creation of the 

DNI. It’s something you and I talked about a little bit yesterday, 

and that’s the size of the DNI. I don’t want to put you in a position 

of saying the DNI is too big or not big enough but certainly one 

of the problems that we’ve had in the intelligence community is 

sometimes wading through the bureaucracy. 

I would just urge you that in your position as General Clapper’s 

right-hand person that you look at the size and the scope of the 

work being done by the DNI and if we can from the policy side help 

make decisions and work with you with regard to either trimming 

9 

it down or making it more efficient I’d just urge you to think outside the box and let us help you do that. 

Lastly, since the Wikileaks disclosure began the tug between the 

need to know versus the need to share has come under increased 

scrutiny. What are the key factors that you believe should be considered in resolving this tension between need to know and need 

to share? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. To your first question on the size of the DNI, 

I agree with you that it would be difficult for me to make a substantive assessment looking at the DNI’s office from the outside. 

However, if confirmed I would pledge to do what I have always 

done when I’m responsible for leading a group of intelligence community men and women. I would make sure that their efforts are 

not wasted because they are duplicative. 

I would make sure that their efforts had an impact and I would 

make sure that they had the tools and resources needed to do the 

job that you expect of them. I would look at the cadre mix, the 

skills mix across the organization, and that would include looking 

at the size of the organization. I would do this because every single 

person in the intelligence community wants to feel that they are 

making an impact and having a bottom-line addition to the community. They want to feel value added. They deserve that their work 

is value added, and that means taking a careful look at what we’re 

asking them to do. 

On your second question about intelligence sharing, need to 

share and need to know are not and cannot be mutually exclusive 

for the intelligence community. We definitely have intelligence 

sources that must be protected. Lives are indeed at stake. We also 

cannot afford to give up the gains that we have made—the very 

real gains we have made—via deeper integration and sharing that 

we’ve had since 9/11. 

That has been important to keeping our country safe and it has 

really truly meant that we are able to do things that we weren’t 

in the past. There are things that we can do to balance those two 

competing objectives and the way forward I think has been laid out 

by the DNI’s staff working with the intelligence community and is 

focused on looking at access across the community, looking at the 

configuration of systems so that it’s not possible anymore to have 

a CD that you put in a computer and walk out with lots of data 

and is focused on audit and monitoring, and we have started moves 

in all of those directions to implement capabilities which I think 

will make us stronger and not sacrifice our duty to share. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, thank you very much and 

thanks for the great work you’ve done in the past with the community and we look forward to continuing to work with you. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. O’Sullivan, welcome, and I say on behalf of all of us thank 

you for your commitment to the country and to the effort up to this 

point, and I for one hope this is an expeditious process, that we 

move on and that we can have you within the DNI with your expertise, which I think are invaluable to us. 

10 

Let me follow up on what Senator Chambliss raised and specifically go to one area. I think we can all agree that there is duplication within the DNI as it relates to analysts. Now, there’s not a 

part of the IC community that analysts aren’t crucial to their work, 

and I guess I would ask you is there a point we can get to where 

we have over-analyzed an issue? Do you have the lack of confidence 

in the rest of the IC community that you strongly feel that there’s 

a need to continue to grow analysts within the DNI, or is that an 

area that you’d feel comfortable relying on the products that come 

from the rest of the intelligence community? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The DNI’s role is that of setting standards, 

making best practices move between organizations, doing common 

training and sharing the skills that we have across the community. 

It’s a valuable role and it needs to be there. We also need the DNI’s 

function, and we’ve had it for a long time in the community in the 

body of the NIC, to integrate analysis that comes from all the disparate and different skill sets of the community—an imagery analyst piece versus a SIGINT analyst piece versus what would come 

from an all-source analyst or a military analyst. To get the full picture for intelligence, somebody needs to integrate that and the DNI 

has picked up that ongoing community responsibility. I do not believe that they have added unnecessarily to it. That integration job 

is a very, very big job. 

Senator BURR. In most cases would you agree that within the 

DNI they take that raw data that is available and analyze that to 

get their own snapshot? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I think they take the raw data that’s available 

and see what happens when you put it together. 

Senator BURR. Let me ask you, if I could—one of the frustrations 

I go through as a member of the Committee—and I might speak 

on behalf of the entire Committee—is we’re asked to do oversight 

on the intelligence community. In most cases we’re denied access 

to raw data. I would ask you, if confirmed today, would you do everything you can, in the instances that we feel we need the raw 

data, as a Committee to be supplied the raw data to do our oversight job? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I would indeed, if confirmed, pledge to do everything possible to get the information that you need to do your job 

to the best of my ability. Now, I understand that there are sometimes competing jurisdictions across committees and that the raw 

information may fall into that bucket. But, again, I would pledge 

to do everything possible to make this Committee’s role of oversight 

of intelligence effective. 

Senator BURR. I would hope, with the coordinating role that you 

see Director Clapper in, that he could overcome those territorial 

boundaries and make sure, especially within the IC community, 

that we have the tools we need. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Director Clapper is quite persuasive. 

Senator BURR. Let me ask you one last question if I could, and 

this is really regarding the 2007 NIE. That Estimate was on Iran’s 

nuclear program and former CIA Director Jim Woolsey said publicly that this was the worst and most irresponsible National Intelligence Estimate ever, that confused its headlines with its footnotes, and the headline was that Iran had stopped its nuclear 

11 

weapons program, but the footnote said oh, by the way, it’s still enriching uranium. 

In my view, an additional problem was that key judgments of 

this NIE were publicly released. Now, this has not only complicated 

our intelligence efforts within our allies and our partners but it 

could also serve to have a chilling effect on future NIEs. If analysts 

believe that there’s a chance that any part of their work might be 

made public they could alter or hold back their fullest analytical 

assessments from policymakers. 

What’s your personal view as it relates to publicizing the National Intelligence Estimates? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The men and women of the intelligence community are responsible for informing policymakers in the decisions 

that they have to make. We are committed to providing the most 

fulsome views to those policymakers, including all of the footnotes, 

including all the debates. 

The policymakers then make the decisions for how best to take 

that information forward and use it. Of course, we are concerned 

for the security and sensitivities that you noted and we would 

make those sensitivities clear as part of our production of the product. 

Senator BURR. Would you agree that that could affect the analytic product if too much of that became public? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I think that the analysts in this intelligence 

community are more devoted to making sure that policymakers 

have the information on their desk; that they would not withhold 

anything because of that. 

Senator BURR. Great. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you, Ms. O’Sullivan. 

Really one main question. How would you assess the state of affairs in collecting and analyzing intelligence from detainees that 

we’re capturing around the world? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I believe what we’re doing across the community—including with our partnerships with DOD and law enforcement—that we’re getting the best access to the information we can. 

When we can get access to people we are getting the information 

that we need. The capabilities and tools that we have are effective 

in supporting that. 

Senator RUBIO. The other question I had, I think, as we’re watching events in the Middle East unfold, are there any lessons you 

take in terms of long-term strategic analysis that we could learn 

with regard, for example, to what’s happening in Egypt in terms 

of long-term planning for our different intelligence community 

agencies? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The events in Egypt are rapidly unfolding and 

the intelligence community is working full out to track them on the 

ground. But the minute that things started earlier on in Tunisia, 

the intelligence community started looking at the longer-term strategic impacts. 

12 

That’s a balance that we always pursue. We set aside and value 

as part of our trade craft the stand-back look and the projection of 

things and trends as they go forward, as well as our obligation to 

keep the policymakers currently informed of events as they unfold. 

So I don’t think that we would ever lose sight of that. 

And of course, we will always do after-action looks to see if there 

was something more that we should have done as we look back. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam Chair, I appreciate this hearing. And I 

also want to say how great it is to see you back as a picture of good 

health as we begin this hearing and we are glad you’re here. 

Ms. O’Sullivan, let me ask you, picking up on Senator Rubio’s 

question, because I think the whole question of Egypt and what we 

knew when is critical. 

Can you tell me when the intelligence community first alerted 

the President and other policymakers that Egyptian street 

protestors were likely to threaten President Mubarak’s hold on 

power? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The IC has assessed for some time that the political stagnation in these countries has been untenable in the long 

run and briefed that up to policymakers. Our experts have been 

closely following the drivers of change from economic instability 

and conditions to the youth bulge in these areas and other societal 

factors that underlie the current crisis. 

We will continue to monitor developments as we go forward. And 

we will continue to feed, in a continuous process, indicators of additional instability across the region. 

Senator WYDEN. That’s helpful, but that’s not the question I 

asked. The question I asked was when did the intelligence community first alert the President and policymakers that protestors were 

likely to threaten President Mubarak’s hold on power? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. We have warned of instability. We didn’t know 

what the triggering mechanism would be for that, and that triggering mechanism happened at the end of the last year. 

Senator WYDEN. So did you give him a sense at the end of last 

year—I mean, if you don’t want to give me a specific date—I am 

interested in when the President was told how serious this was. I 

mean, if you tell me it was the end of last year or last week or last 

month—you don’t have to give me a specific, you know, specific 

date, but this goes again to the function of intelligence. And to me, 

the intelligence community’s primary job is to collect information 

from people who know important things. And you can’t just gaze 

into a crystal ball and try to guess what can’t be predicted. 

But I do want to get a general sense of when you all told the 

President that we were faced with something that was as serious 

as what we have seen in recent days. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I’m afraid I’m not going to be able to satisfy 

your specific question. My duties involved a more general understanding of the debates that were going on and not the face-to-face 

briefing of the President over this past year. 

Senator WYDEN. You were told yesterday I was going to ask this 

question, weren’t you? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Not in this detail, sir. 

13 

Senator WYDEN. All right. Because I think—I’m told by staff that 

we notified you specifically, because I wanted to get into this area. 

So I think it’s unfortunate we’re not getting more specifics, given 

the fact you were put on notice. 

Speaking more broadly, do you think it’s realistic to expect U.S. 

intelligence agencies to have deep coverage of every country in the 

world, or should policymakers just expect to focus really on high 

priority countries and issues? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The intelligence community has to have coverage of every area of the world that we possibly can in preparation 

for those hot spots that policymakers need to focus on. We don’t get 

to relax our vigilance on global coverage as we chase the current 

unfolding crisis. 

Senator WYDEN. What’s the role of the DNI in all this? When the 

DNI, for example, lays out certain priorities for intelligence collection and analysis, how will you expect the various agencies to 

react? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The DNI has a very critical role. The DNI adjudicates between competing requirements and then allocates resources aligned to those top priority requirements. 

And the classic example you’ve just laid out is one that we frequently wrestle with, which is how do we cover the whole world 

and maintain the crisis collection and assessments on ongoing and 

unfolding events. 

Senator WYDEN. Let’s see if I can get one other question in, 

Madam Chair, and that’s the role of the DNI in relations with the 

CIA. 

The Congress created the position of DNI so that there’d be 

somebody who was responsible for looking across all of the various 

intelligence agencies to make sure the enterprise was as effective 

as possible. And one of the questions that those of us on the Committee ask every time we confirm a new Director or a Deputy Director of National Intelligence is how well is the concept working. 

So from your vantage point as a senior manager at the CIA, how 

well is the concept of a Director of National Intelligence working 

in practice? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I can tell you unequivocally, as a member of the 

senior management team at CIA, that we are fully on board with 

the DNI’s leadership and vision for the community. It resonates 

with us, his vision; with all the men and women of the community 

it resonates. His vision focused on mission and integration works. 

It makes sense to everyone. 

We went through a lot of stand-up pains in the community, but 

in my assessment and my experience over the last year or so—and 

especially as Director Clapper has come on and laid out his vision—I believe that most of that is behind us. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. O’Sullivan, thanks for coming by and having a chance to 

visit yesterday. And I’m pleased to be here with a Missourian nominated for such a high and important position in the security of our 

country. 

14 

You’ve been at the CIA for what, the last 15 years? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Since 1995. 

Senator BLUNT. So you’ve been there during the entire time that 

we’ve changed structure from—— 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUNT [continuing]. From 2001 until today. 

A handful of years ago, what was your job at the CIA—four or 

five—the last job before the one you have now? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I was the Director of Science and Technology at 

CIA. 

Senator BLUNT. So in all places—I was actually going to ask Senator Wyden’s question, because I thought you probably have had as 

good a view of this from inside as almost anybody. And I heard 

your answer yesterday, which you gave the same answer again 

today. And I hope your optimism’s well founded. 

What do you think about DNI Clapper’s—how’s the reorganization that he is in the midst of going to impact the way that the 

DNI responsibilities are handled differently than they have been 

before the reorganization? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. His reorganization reflects his vision. 

So it’s focused on integration. It’s focused on efficiency in both 

the structure that he is standing up and the management team 

that he has, which is why he’s restructured the way he has. And 

so it resonates because it’s true from top to bottom. He’s walking 

the talk in his own organization, as well as laying the path for the 

community. 

Senator BLUNT. And how would you describe his vision as different? Is he so very focused on integration as the principal responsibility, or how would you see his vision for what the job is, as opposed to maybe what the job has been doing before? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Well, I’m very thankful for all the people who 

came before in these jobs, because there was a lot of heavy lifting 

that had to be done. So we’re standing on their shoulders. But 

what General Clapper is able to do now—because I think the community is at that point, and the vision he has brought starts with 

mission. And mission is what motivates the men and women of the 

intelligence community. That’s why we are here every day. That’s 

why they make the sacrifices they do. 

And so when you start with mission and you lay that out and 

then show how integration can make that mission more effective, 

you can get extraordinary things out of the people in this community. And that’s why I think it’s resonating, and that’s why I’m optimistic. 

Senator BLUNT. And what is the principal mission of the DNI? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. To protect our country. 

Senator BLUNT. To protect our country. And the DNI’s unique 

role in that is what? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. The DNI has the responsibility of integrating 

the community. He has the responsibility of being the intelligence 

advisor to the President, carrying forward all the information that 

the intelligence community brings. He has a responsibility of making sure that the intelligence community acts in compliance with 

the laws and the Constitution and values of our country, as well 

as making sure that all of the intelligence community keeps ConVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Jul 19, 2011 Jkt 066577 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\66577.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
15 

gress and our oversight Committees completely and currently informed. That’s the start of the list, but not all of it. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good afternoon, Ms. O’Sullivan. I, too, like Senator Blunt, want 

to thank you for taking the time to pay me a visit yesterday, and 

it helped me prepare for the hearing today. 

I think we discussed yesterday I sit on the Armed Services Committee and have an interest in that interaction between the intelligence community and the military, particularly outside of war 

zones. I believe there’s some need to clarify those relationships. 

Do you think that there are areas where we need new guidelines 

or new agreements between the IC and the—I’ll use some more 

acronyms—the DOD, intelligence community and the Department 

of Defense? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I believe that, particularly in war zones, we operate quite effectively together, largely because our combined and 

joint mission is so clear. There aren’t competing requirements. 

We’re all pointing at the same thing. 

As far as additional guidance or structures, the DNI has worked 

very closely with the DOD and the SecDef to set up a number of 

bodies to work through CONOPS, policy, resource allocation, requirements allocation. So all of those lower-level structures are 

being put in place to make sure that we work as effectively back 

here as we do out in the field. 

Senator UDALL. This isn’t necessarily the time to do this, but I 

think at some point perhaps we could more specifically pursue that 

question, say, for example, in Egypt, what sort of coordination was 

occurring there between what our defense analysts see and perceive and those in the ODNI world as well. 

Let me move to energy security. I think in your written response 

you mentioned energy security, along with climate change, as concerns that would have national security implications. What specific 

actions would you envision the IC taking now to make energy security a real priority, given what we’re seeing in the Middle East and 

the potential for this unrest and instability to spread? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. As I was stating earlier, our analysis of the 

trends and the instability and impacts includes economic indicators. Energy security is a huge driver of that. It underlies a lot of 

the decisions and risks that are made, decisions that are made as 

we go forward. 

The analysts in the community have stood up. All of them have 

long-term strategic analysis plans that include looking at those 

longer-term issues, such as energy security, and including climate 

change, for which we’ve stood up a climate change center. 

Senator UDALL. Again, I look forward to working more with you 

if you’re confirmed. 

Let me turn to cybersecurity. Senator Feinstein led a very worthwhile and informative CODEL to China a year ago in May, and one 

of the subjects that we discussed in a series of meetings with the 

Chinese was cybersecurity. I know in your written responses to the 

pre-hearing questions, I think you said, ‘‘The current balance favorVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:09 Jul 19, 2011 Jkt 066577 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\66577.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
16 

ing cyberactors who desire to exploit our vulnerabilities is likely to 

increase over the next five years.’’ 

You’ve got an engineering and science and tech background. Can 

you identify areas in which we can be working harder and maybe 

in a more focused way to address cybersecurity threats? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. You put your finger on one of the most complex 

and evolving threats that our country faces. It is indeed an increasing threat because, as you said, the advantage goes to the attacker 

in the cyber world. The IC in this endeavor has some very unique 

skills and capabilities that we can contribute. We have a couple of 

responsibilities and obligations as well. We track and identify cyber 

threats and warn of them. In addition, we have a responsibility to 

protect our own networks. 

It is in the course of that endeavor that we probably have some 

of the most valuable things that we can share, because our networks for a long time have faced both sophisticated and persistent 

attacks. So we’ve learned a great deal in the course of defending 

them. And NSA in particular brings a lot of very unique skills, 

which we are working and sharing, under the direction of the DNI, 

across the national security community. 

Senator UDALL. So it’s no secret that it’s much easier to go on 

offense. It’s much harder to defend networks and assets in cyber. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Particularly in an open society. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, our strength is sometimes our weakness, 

but vice versa as well. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what we’re here to defend. 

Senator UDALL. CYBERCOM is standing itself up, and I’m curious if you’d have any thoughts in regard to the intelligence community’s relationship with CYBERCOM. And, more specifically, do you 

have any concerns that laws and guidelines governing this area are 

lagging behind either the threat or our capabilities? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. CYBERCOM is standing up. And so what we’re 

primarily going through now is setting up the interface structures 

between us, making sure that we hook up all the different parts 

of the community as this new organization steps forward and begins to take a more and more active role. 

So at the time I don’t see any particular laws or authorities that 

are required. But, if confirmed, I would certainly pledge to bring 

back to you anything that I discover. 

Senator UDALL. Well, thank you. 

Madam Chair, I operate in the spirit of you never get in trouble 

for something you didn’t say, although my wife would disagree with 

me on occasion. But I do look forward to working on the Committee 

with the Chairwoman and with the Vice Chairman on cyber security and the important challenges we face there. But I also think 

we have some real opportunities if we get out front. 

So, again, Madam Chair, thank you for the time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Udall. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Risch. I know. And I practiced. 

Senator RISCH. The former Vice Chairman used to help me out. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I know. 

Senator RISCH. I will pass. Thank you. 

17 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh. I’m embarrassed. 

I would like to ask one question. When I came on this Committee 

around 2001, it was right after the Peru shootdown incident. And 

this all struck us very, very strongly. 

Since that time, you have been chair of the Peru Air Bridge Denial Program accountability board. And the report, which was classified, has been unclassified and released. And essentially the Peruvian military and the CIA, which was involved in identifying the 

Bowers plane, admitted to the mistake but claimed the proper procedures had been followed and the plane had refused orders to 

land. 

The IG report found that the CIA may have misled Congress and 

the Justice Department by withholding information about the drug 

interdiction program. And there were other problematic incidents, 

more than 10, where planes were shot down and operational rules 

were violated as part of the CIA program. 

Now, it’s my understanding that the board, which you chaired, 

conducted an examination of the conduct of 23 officers and recommended administrative penalties for 16 retired and current officers. In 2009 Director Panetta accepted the board’s specific recommendations, which remain classified personnel decisions. But 

nonetheless, a substantial period of time had passed, and I am very 

concerned about misinforming the oversight committee, which I 

think is really untenable to have happen. 

What are your thoughts, having gone through this experience, to 

prevent what happened here from ever happening again and to 

really face up to an error and certainly testify or make an accurate 

report to the oversight committee about it? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. What we found that led to the behaviors that 

were cited in the IG report were numerous instances of people asserting compliance with procedures rather than documenting them 

in detail. It was sloppy and incomplete reporting. As a result of 

that, the board made several systemic recommendations, some of 

which were urged by the members of this Committee, to implement 

a lessons learned program. 

And so what we’ve done is we’ve just finished the first running 

of the lessons learned program based on this as a case study, and 

we’re focused on the management cadre because they are the ones 

who set the standards for what are acceptable reporting levels. 

We also as a board agreed that the gravest offenses committed 

by the people that were sanctioned were those that touched on the 

grave responsibility of people to report accurately and completely 

to Congress. And we reserved our stiffest penalties for the people 

that we found had been careless in those duties. We feel that that 

is a startling standing lesson learned to all of our future management officers and are working hard to make sure that they all hear 

that lesson. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I very much appreciate that. And, 

you know, I hope that because of your work that something like 

this will never happen again, not only the shootdown, which killed 

innocent people, but the misrepresentation to this Committee and 

to the other Committee in the other house as well. 

18 

Do you feel that this Committee can be assured that this will 

never happen again? 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. I think that you can be assured that you have 

our pledge to do everything possible to make sure that we don’t 

make mistakes of omission, that people provide full and complete 

reporting instead of assertions of fact, which is what this Committee needs to be able to do their oversight duties. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. That’s right. That’s right. And I thank you. 

I know this is painful work, but it’s also very important. So I thank 

you for that. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, any other questions? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Just quickly. I want to go back to the 

question Senator Wyden asked you about when did the President 

know and what did he know with respect to Egypt. We’re going to 

have a lot of lessons learned—or at least the opportunity to have 

a lot of lessons learned at the conclusion of this process, however 

long it takes or wherever it may go. And as part of our oversight 

duty we need to make sure that we are asking the hard and tough 

questions of the community with respect to the job that our folks 

are doing on the ground and the quality of information that’s getting to the number one customer, which is the President. 

So what I would ask that you do, based upon the answer you 

gave and his follow-up question and the answer to that, I would 

like for you to go back and you know the people that know the specific answer. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And I would like for you to give the 

Committee in writing the timetable that the community advised 

the President of the seriousness of the situation surrounding President Mubarak, what we knew and when the President was told 

about the fact that he may be—or that this situation may evolve 

into one of the type of activity that we in fact have seen over the 

last week or so. And if you would do that in the next 10 days, I 

would appreciate that very much. 

Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Any shortfall in the response was entirely mine 

based on my own background and lack of involvement in the process of notification. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And I understand that. But it’s a 

question that’s been asked and that we do need the answer to. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think that’s right. Thank you, Mr. Vice 

Chairman. 

Anyone else have any other questions they would like to ask? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Mr. Risch always has questions. 

[Laughter.] 

But he keeps them to himself sometimes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It’s good to see you again, too. 

Ms. O’Sullivan, let me thank you for being here. I think you’ve 

answered the questions. There will be some questions in writing. 

I trust you’re answering them as well. And we look forward to processing this as soon as we can. 

So thank you very much, and the Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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