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THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY: 

THE CONSUMER’S EXPERIENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

ANN BEGEMAN, Republican Staff Director 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican General Counsel 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 22, 2010 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 78 

WITNESSES

Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. Government Accountability Office ................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Holly A. Haas, Consumer ........................................................................................ 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney General, North Carolina Department 

of Justice ............................................................................................................... 51 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

John Ansbach, Legislative Director, United States Organizations of Bankruptcy Alternatives .............................................................................................. 62 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Hon. Julie Brill, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission ............................... 68 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

APPENDIX

Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from Texas, prepared statement ...... 91 

Hon. Mark Pryor, U.S. Senator from Arkansas, prepared statement ................. 92 

John Mark Spaulding, prepared statement ........................................................... 92 

Letter, dated April 20, 2010, to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and Hon. Kay 

Bailey Hutchison from Jean Noonan, Counsel, American Coalition of Companies Organized to Reduce Debt (ACCORD) ................................................... 93 

Letter, dated October 9, 2009, to the Federal Trade Commission, Office of 

the Secretary, from Gail Hillebrand, Financial Services Campaign Manager, 

Consumers Union ................................................................................................. 95 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to: 

Gregory D. Kutz ................................................................................................ 99 

William and Holly Haas ................................................................................... 100 

Philip A. Lehman ............................................................................................. 101 

John Ansbach .................................................................................................... 102 

Response to written question submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to 

John Ansbach ....................................................................................................... 104 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to Hon. Julie 

Brill ....................................................................................................................... 105 

Letter, dated October 16, 2009, to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade 

Commission from Susan Grant, Director of Consumer Protection, Consumer 

Federation of America on Behalf of Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Consumer Action, the National Consumer Law Center on 

behalf of its low-income clients, the Center for Responsible Lending, the 

National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumers 

League, U.S. PIRG, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, the Arizona Consumers Council, the Chicago Consumer Coalition, the Consumer Assistance 

Council, the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina, the 

Consumer Federation of the Southeast, Grass Roots Organizing, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., the Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition, MidMinnesota Legal Assistance, and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council ... 108 

Article, dated August 6, 2009 entitled ‘‘Economic Factors and the Debt Management Industry’’ submitted by Richard A. Briesch, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University ...................... 121 

(1) 

THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY: 

THE CONSUMER’S EXPERIENCE 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller 

IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. We will begin this hearing. 

And others are coming. I’ve been there, you know. I was late a 

lot. 

All right. This is important. This is very important. Millions of 

American families have suffered serious financial setbacks during 

the economic turndown, which promises to go on for a while. Sometimes it’s because somebody in the family has lost a job. Sometimes 

it’s because a family member has gotten sick and medical bills are 

piling up. As we all know, even people who think they have good 

health insurance end up owing thousands of dollars out of their 

own pockets, and that’s another hearing and another subject. 

For thousands of Americans and West Virginia families, our economic downturn has meant falling farther and farther behind. It 

also means struggling every month to pay bills. And it means 

thinking seriously about what happens if they can’t make even 

their minimum monthly payments to their creditors. 

One person who found himself in this situation was Mark 

Spaulding, who lives in South Charleston, West Virginia. And between the credit card bills and the hospital bills, he and his wife 

owed more than $23,000. That is not unique. He wasn’t behind on 

these bills, yet he was worried. He had a job, and he believed in 

paying what he owed. But, he wasn’t sure how he was going to pay 

it all off. So, he looked for help. And he found a California company 

called U.S. Debt Settlement that looked reputable. That’s—it’s hard 

to see from South Charleston to California, so he was doing this 

off the Internet, and had to make that judgment. 

He called a toll-free number. He talked to a sales representative 

named Holly Slater. She told him that U.S. Debt Settlement could 

act as his financial representative and could negotiate with his 

creditors to cut his debt by as much as 50 percent. 

William and Holly Haas, of Concord, New Hampshire, had a 

similar experience with a debt settlement company called ConVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
2 

sumer Credit Counseling of America. Notice the—sort of the integrity of these names. And I’m very pleased that they’re here with 

us. And they’re going to have something to say. 

What Mr. Spaulding and the Haas family has—and thousands of 

other Americans have learned the hard way, is that these debt settlement companies are not what they claim to be. And that is what 

we are talking about today. They promise to reduce debts by 40, 

50, or even 60 percent, and then collect thousands of dollars in fees 

up front. They promise to settle the debts, but collect up front. 

When you go into a candy store, you buy a Baby Ruth candy bar, 

you get the candy bar, and then you pay the fee. But, it’s sort of 

reversed here. 

Today, we will learn that these companies keep the fees, but 

don’t keep their promises. In reality, signing up to work with these 

families and these companies usually makes struggling consumers 

financially worse. And that’s where that is. They fall farther behind 

on their debts, they see their credit scores plunge. And they get 

sued by their creditors. 

In written testimony, Mr. Spaulding says he followed U.S. Debt 

Settlement’s advice for 14 months and paid them more than $2,400 

in fees—up front. Today he owes, in fact, 40 percent more than he 

did when he began on his debts, and his credit score is ruined. He 

has two court judgments against him, and he has been advised he 

should think about declaring bankruptcy. This is outrageous. It is 

appalling beyond words. 

So, these debt settlement companies are kicking people when 

they are down. That’s the way I look at it. I come from West Virginia. We see that a lot. And even though they take patriotic 

names, like U.S. Debt Settlement or Consumer Credit Counseling 

of America, and have all kinds of emblems, which I will show you 

in a bit, their actions are, in fact, profoundly un-American. This is 

serious, and it is a growing problem, and I’m pleased to report that 

our States’ attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission 

are fighting these fraudulent companies. 

We’re going to hear testimony about these companies from newly 

sworn-in FTC Commissioner Julie Brill and from Phil Lehman— 

Have I got that right?—who is Assistant Attorney General from 

North Carolina. And we thank you for coming. 

Much of this committee’s work, and my attention as chairman 

over this last year, has focused on consumer protection. It’s what 

everybody else gets angry about, but doesn’t do anything about. So, 

I’ve decided that we’re going to do something about it in this committee, and we are. And the terrible part is that it’s not really very 

hard to ferret out and that it’s so rampant. And that’s so wrong. 

We have the authority to conduct independent investigations in 

this committee. And last October, I used this authority to ask the 

GAO Special Investigations Office to conduct, in fact, a covert investigation on this problem and the matter of debt settlement as 

an industry. I told them I wanted to know what really happens to 

a consumer who calls one of these 800-numbers. We will hear the 

results of that investigation right here, today. And I think members of the Committee, should they show up, and the American 

public will find them pretty disturbing, alarming, and depressing. 

3 

So, I want to thank today’s witnesses. I look forward to your testimony as much as I look forward to some of our members showing 

up. 

And we will start with you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

FORENSIC AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the debt settlement industry. 

Today’s testimony highlights the results of our investigation into 

fraudulent and deceptive marketing and business practices. 

My testimony has two parts. First, I will discuss the results of 

our investigation, and then I will discuss the results of other investigations. 

First, as you mentioned, posing as fictitious consumers with significant credit card debt, we contacted 20 debt settlement companies. We attempted to pick companies that, on the surface, ranged 

from credible to egregious in their marketing. We did not enter into 

any agreements with these companies. The vast majority of companies that we’ve contacted provided fraudulent, deceptive, and otherwise questionable information to our fictitious consumers. 

The monitor shows key themes that we found, including advance 

fees, exaggerated claims of success, telling consumers to stop paying their bills, and linking debt settlement to Federal programs. 

The basic program setup was for consumers to make a monthly 

payment into a bank account. Once that account had accumulated 

enough funds, the companies promised to settle debt with creditors 

for pennies on the dollar. For 17 companies, advance fees were collected from consumers before any debt was actually settled. Companies told us that their service fees ranged from 10 to 18 percent 

of the outstanding debt. These fees were usually taken directly 

from the bank account during the first 12 months of what were 

typically multiyear programs. In the most egregious cases, 100 percent of the consumer’s first 3 or 4 monthly payments were used for 

fees. 

Other fees charged by these companies included monthly maintenance, trust, and bank fees. Exaggerated claims—— 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interrupt, for a moment. 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I failed to identify you. 

Mr. KUTZ. That’s fine. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, it isn’t. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KUTZ. I’m undercover at this hearing, so—just kidding. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I know. I know. But, the folks listening in, et 

cetera, or the folks behind you, don’t know. And that’s my fault, 

and I apologize. 

You are, in fact, the Managing Director, Forensic Audits and 

Special Investigations, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

GAO. 

Please proceed. 

Mr. KUTZ. Thank you. Now everyone knows who I am. 

4 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ve blown your cover, yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KUTZ. You’ve blown my cover. All right, I can’t use that one 

again. 

Exaggerated claims of success provided our fictitious consumers 

with false hope of program completion. Examples included claims 

that 85 percent, 93 percent, and even 100 percent of clients successfully completed these programs. The reality, according to Federal and State investigations is a success rate of less than 10 percent. 

One industry association represented that their members have a 

34 percent success rate. Whether single digits or 34 percent, this 

low success rate shows the negative impact of advance fees on financially distressed consumers. 

We also found that 17 of these 20 companies advised our fictitious consumers to stop paying their creditors. Although industry 

associations say their members don’t do this, 9 of the 17 were, in 

fact, their members. I have no doubt that for these programs to 

work, consumers must stop paying their bills. However, our fictitious consumers were told to stop paying their bills even when they 

were current, which would have a significant negative impact on 

their credit scores. 

Several companies advertised that their debt settlement programs were part of a Federal Government program. My favorite is 

the company that advertised that its program was, and I quote, ‘‘a 

national debt-relief stimulus plan,’’ end of quote. These companies 

made it appear as if government agencies and stimulus dollars 

were linked to their programs. Although I find this to be ridiculous, 

and I’m sure you do, too, many consumers likely fall prey to these 

fraudulent marketing tactics. At the end of my presentation, I will 

play excerpts from several of these undercover calls. 

Although the vast majority of companies provided fraudulent and 

deceptive information, several did provide sound advice. For example, one company told us to take care of our late mortgage payments before worrying about our delinquent credit cards. In another case, our fictitious consumer was told that if we could make 

our monthly payments, then perhaps debt settlement was not a 

good solution. 

Moving on to my second point, the experience of our fake consumers is similar to many real consumers, like the ones sitting to 

my left. Cases from 12 Federal and State agencies reveal allegations of fraudulent and deceptive practices involving over 200,000 

consumers across the country. This information is taken from Federal and State, open and closed, civil and criminal cases. 

In addition—and you’ll hear from FTC—they are taking actions 

to enhance consumer protection, including a proposed ban on the 

type of advanced fees that I just described. 

The Better Business Bureau recently designated debt settlement 

as an inherently problematic type of business. Other businesses 

with this designation include payday loan centers and wealthbuilding seminars. I’m sure you understand, that’s not good company. 

In conclusion, I can’t tell you that all companies in this industry 

are bad actors. However, it wasn’t very hard for us to find the rotVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
5 

ten apples of this basket. My advice to consumers, Senator, is, 

buyer beware. 

As I mentioned, I’m now going to play for you some of the undercover calls we made to debt settlement companies. You will see the 

transcription of the conversations on the monitors as you listen. 

[Video presentation.] 

TRANSCRIPT OF UNDERCOVER GAO CALLS TO DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES

Telling consumers to stop paving their creditors. (Industry trade groups say their 

members do not do this.): 

Clip 1: Call from GAO to A New Beginning Financial (TASC Member) 

Debt Settlement Company: You don’t actually have to be delinquent to be in our, 

into our program, but once you do enter the program you don’t make credit, you 

don’t make your payments to the creditors. 

Clip 2: Call from GAO to Freedomdebt.com (USOBA) 

Debt Settlement Company: Once you enroll in the program, you will no longer 

make any of your credit card payments. 

Fictitious Consumer: OK, so . . . 

Debt Settlement Company: That’s correct. 

Fictitious Consumer: So then, what’s, what’s gonna happen with my, uh, creditors? I mean . . . 

Debt Settlement Company: They’re, they, they’re, uh, they’re . . . you’re not gonna 

pay ‘em! 

Fictitious Consumer: I shouldn’t, I shouldn’t pay a few of these cards at all? 

Debt Settlement Company: You’re not. . .when you are in our program you will 

not pay any of your creditors anymore . . . 

Fictitious Consumer: [cross-chatter] 

Debt Settlement Company: . . . throughout the whole program. 

Clip 3: Call from GAO to Credit Solutions of America 

Debt Settlement Company: I’m, I’m saying I don’t, don’t tell anybody not to pay 

their bills. I say 100 percent of the clients who have been successful have stopped 

paying their bills. 

Fictitious Consumer: OK. Alright . . . right . . . so now, so . . . so now I’m 

caught between a rock and a hard place. Do I put money away in my savings account or do I use that money to pay my bills, if I’m in your program? 

Debt Settlement Company: If you’re in our program, umm, put that money into 

your savings account. 

Fictitious Consumer: OK. 

Claims of high success rates: (Federal and state investigators have generally found 

single-digit success rates.) 

Clip 4: Call from GAO to Web Credit Advisors via Free Debt Settlement Now 

(USOBA Member) 

Debt Settlement Company: OK, great. So, it’s important for you to know we have 

thousands of clients. We’re also an accredited business with the Better Business Bureau with an A rating. Umm, and, uh, we have zero unresolved customer complaints. And that’s because we do exactly what we say. And we help 100 percent 

of the people who enter this program eliminate their debt, uh, in less than 3 years. 

Clip 5: Call from GAO to ProCorp Debt Solutions (TASC Member) via Free Debt 

Settlement Now 

Debt Settlement Company: Now, our fallout ratio in the program is probably the 

lowest in the country. Fallout ratio meaning people that sign up and then don’t complete the program. 

(cross-chatter) 

Fictitious Consumer: Do you know what it is, roughly? Debt Settlement Company: 

Yes, it’s less than 7 percent. Fictitious Consumer: Wow, that’s tremendous. 

Debt Settlement Company: It’s my job to know those numbers. It’s my job to know 

those numbers. 

Fraudulent claims of links to government programs: 

Clip 6: Call from GAO to Freedom Fidelity Management (CA) via The Bailout 

Group 

Fictitious Consumer: With the government the way it is, does this government approved thing, does that have anything to do with the stimulus package? 

6 

1 Unsecured debts are those debts for which there is no collateral, such as most consumer 

credit card debt. 

Debt Settlement Company: No, no. It’s just, it’s just government approved. They 

allow for us to do this. 

Fictitious Consumer: OK. 

Debt Settlement Company: Um, you know the banks received, you know, bailout 

money last year—I’m sure you saw it on the news. There has to be some type of 

assistance for people on a consumer level also. 

Other Fraudulent, Deceptive or Questionable Representations: 

Clip 7: Call from GAO to ProCorp Debt Solutions (TASC Member) via Free Debt 

Settlement Now 

Debt Settlement Company: And there are actually 12,000 companies in the U.S. 

that do what we do. Only 200 of them are licensed and regulated. Uh, they’re regulated by TASC, which is The Association of Settlement Companies. . . . They are 

the regulating body for this industry. 

Fictitious Consumer: So TASC . . . 

Debt Settlement Company: They’re like the SEC for stock traders. T–A–S–C. 

Fictitious Consumer: So, for you all, that would be kind of like, in your industry, 

the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval? 

Debt Settlement Company: Correct. That’s exactly what the story is. 

Clip 8: Call from GAO to ProCorp Debt Solutions (TASC Member) via Free Debt 

Settlement Now 

Debt Settlement Company: The companies that operate like ours are the ones that 

are safe, stay around forever. We’ve never been inquired on by the Attorney General, ever. You find me a debt settlement company that can say that, and I’ll move 

over there and work for them. Every debt settlement company that I’ve ever come 

across has had investigations or inquiries by an attorney, the Attorney General for 

their state. The Attorney General doesn’t even, doesn’t even look our way. 

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman, I applaud your efforts today to protect 

consumers from the kinds of fraud and abuse we’re talking about 

here. 

That ends my statement, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kutz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FORENSIC

AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation into fraudulent, abusive, and deceptive practices in the debt settlement industry. As historic levels of 

consumer debt have dramatically increased the demand for debt relief services, a 

growing number of for-profit companies have appeared, offering to settle consumers’ 

credit card and other unsecured debt for a fee as an alternative to bankruptcy.1 The 

companies say they will negotiate with creditors to accept a lump sum settlement 

less than the amount owed—purported to be as low as pennies on the dollar in 

many cases. In addition, these companies often say their programs can result in 

lower monthly payments for consumers than what they had been paying their creditors, and that their programs will help consumers get out of debt sooner than going 

through bankruptcy or making only minimum payments on their credit cards. They 

commonly use radio, television, and Internet advertising to solicit consumers. The 

marketing claims appeal to consumers who may be vulnerable, given the stress of 

their financial situations. 

Some consumers who have hired these companies have complained that they did 

not obtain relief from their debts and ended up in worse financial circumstances. 

For example, according to a sworn statement given to state attorneys, a 75-yearold New York woman ended up paying more than $5,100 to a company to settle only 

$3,900 of debt on one account. The company failed to settle a second one, which she 

ultimately paid off for about $1,000 more than what she originally owed. At the time 

she signed up for the debt settlement program, she had been a widow for several 

years and was working as a pharmacy clerk to help pay her bills and mortgage. She 

stated that she often neglected her own needs and accrued more debt trying to help 

her adult daughter care for two children and a sick spouse. She also stated that she 

was desperate for help and was easily sold on entering a debt settlement program 

7 

2Spam is unsolicited ‘‘junk’’ e-mail that usually includes advertising for some product. 

through an unsolicited telephone call and an offer to reduce her debts by 24 to 40 

percent. Even though the debt settlement company cost her more than she originally owed, it still counted her as a success story. 

Federal and state agencies have made allegations that some debt settlement companies engage in fraudulent, abusive, and deceptive practices. You asked us to conduct an investigation of these issues. As a result, we attempted to: (1) determine 

through covert testing whether these allegations are accurate; and, if so, (2) determine whether these allegations are widespread, citing specific closed cases. To 

achieve these objectives, we conducted covert testing by calling 20 companies while 

posing as fictitious consumers with large amounts of debt; made overt, unannounced 

site visits to several companies called; conducted interviews with industry stakeholders, such as industry trade associations and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); 

and reviewed information on Federal and state legal actions against debt settlement 

companies and consumer complaints. We did not actually use the services of any 

of the companies we called. 

For our first objective, we identified debt settlement companies by searching online using search terms likely to be used by actual consumers, and by observing television, radio, and newspaper advertisements. We selected companies from across 

the Nation to call as part of our covert testing by using several criteria, such as: 

(1) types of marketing claims or pitches, such as refund offers, service guarantees, 

or targeting of specific groups of consumers; (2) presence, if any, of consumer complaints through BBB and other resources; (3) represented size of businesses, to include both small and large companies; (4) availability of consumer-friendly information on companies’ websites, such as financial education resources, comparisons to 

other types of debt relief, or advice on handling credit card debt; (5) membership 

in various industry trade organizations, which requires adherence to specified 

standards of conduct; and (6) claims of advertising presence on television or radio. 

In one case, we identified a company through a spam e-mail message received by 

one of our staff members, which provided a link to the company’s website.2 The 20 

cases that we selected incorporated a range of debt settlement companies, including 

some that appeared to make egregious claims and others that appeared more reputable. We found that some of the 20 companies we called are marketing companies 

that refer potential clients to other—sometimes multiple—affiliated companies. In 

most cases, we were unable to determine the exact business relationship between 

these entities. For the purposes of this testimony, our 20 cases represent the original company we called, plus any related marketers and any other affiliated companies with which we spoke. In addition, we called some companies more than once, 

depending on the circumstances. The findings for these 20 cases cannot be projected 

to all debt settlement companies. For our second objective, we identified allegations 

against debt settlement companies from review of closed and open civil and criminal 

investigations pursued by Federal and state enforcement agencies over the last decade. We did not attempt to verify the facts regarding all of the allegations and complaints we reviewed. We also identified five closed civil and criminal cases where 

courts found the debt settlement companies liable for their actions and interviewed 

affected consumers. 

We briefed Federal Trade Commission (FTC) officials on the results of our investigation. In addition, we referred cases of fraudulent, deceptive, abusive or questionable information provided by the 20 debt settlement companies we called to FTC 

as appropriate. We conducted our investigation from November 2009 through April 

2010 in accordance with standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Background 

For-profit debt settlement emerged as a business model as other, decades-old 

forms of consumer debt relief came under increased regulation. Traditionally, consumers with large amounts of debt turned to nonprofit credit counseling agencies 

(CCA) for debt relief. CCAs work with consumers and creditors to negotiate debt 

management plans (DMP), which enable consumers to pay back unsecured debts to 

their creditors in full, but under terms that make it easier for them to pay off the 

debts—such as reduced interest rates or elimination of late payment fees. In addition, CCAs often provide consumers with financial education and assist them in developing budgets. In order to qualify for a DMP, consumers must prove they have 

sufficient income to pay back the full balances owed to creditors under the terms 

of the potential DMP. As part of a DMP, CCAs contact each of a consumer’s creditors to obtain information about what repayment options the creditors may be willing to offer to the consumer. The CCA then creates the final DMP and a repayment 

8 

3Some creditors may sell a consumer’s debt to a collection agency after the consumer misses 

payments for a given period of time—typically 6 to 12 months. The collection agency will then 

attempt to collect payments from the consumer. In such cases, debt settlement companies will 

generally negotiate with the collection agency seeking the consumer’s money. 4FTC’s regulatory authority related to false advertising is contained in section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)), which makes unlawful both ‘‘unfair’’ and ‘‘deceptive’’ acts or practices that affect interstate commerce. 5The notice primarily discusses three categories of debt relief services—credit counseling, debt 

settlement, and debt negotiation. While some consider debt negotiation to be another term for 

debt settlement, FTC refers to debt negotiation as a separate type of debt relief service. In this 

context, debt negotiation companies are those that offer to obtain interest rate reductions and 

other concessions from creditors on behalf of consumers, but do not claim to obtain full balance 

payment plans or lump sum settlements for less than the full balance. See 74 Fed. Reg. 41988, 

41997 (Aug. 19, 2009). 6 74 Fed. Reg. 41988 (Aug. 19, 2009). 

7 Under the TSR, advance fees are currently banned for several other industries, including 

credit repair services and advance fee loans. 

schedule, with payments typically spread over 3 to 5 years. Throughout the length 

of the DMP, the CCA distributes funds to each of a consumer’s creditors after the 

consumer makes each monthly payment to the CCA. Nonprofit CCAs typically receive funding from consumers and from creditors. 

Many for-profit CCAs emerged as the level of consumer debt rose over the last 

decade, leading to new consumer protection concerns. FTC and state attorneys general took legal action against unscrupulous CCAs that engaged in deceptive, abusive, and unfair practices. For example, some CCAs charged excessive fees, abused 

their nonprofit status, misrepresented the benefits and likelihood of success of their 

programs, and committed other deceptive and unfair acts. The Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS) also undertook a broad examination effort of CCAs for compliance with 

the Internal Revenue Code and revoked or terminated the Federal tax-exempt status of some agencies. As Federal and state actions cracked down on these consumer 

protection abuses, a growing number of consumers became unable to afford traditional DMPs. As a result, many companies began offering for-profit debt settlement 

services for consumers. 

Debt settlement companies offer to negotiate with consumers’ creditors to accept 

lump sum settlements for less than the full balance on the consumers’ accounts. The 

process typically requires consumers to make monthly payments to a bank account 

from which a debt settlement company will withdraw funds to cover its fees. Some 

companies require consumers to set up accounts at specific banks, while others 

allow consumers to use their existing bank accounts. These monthly payments must 

accumulate until the consumer has saved enough money for the debt settlement 

company to attempt to negotiate with the consumer’s creditors for a reduced balance 

settlement.3

Debt settlement companies typically charge a fee for their services and require 

payments either at the beginning of the program as an advance fee or after settlement as a contingent fee. Some companies structure the payment of advance fees 

so that they collect a large portion of them—as high as 40 percent—within the first 

few months regardless of whether any settlements have been obtained or any contact has been made with the consumer’s creditors. Others collect fees throughout the 

first half of the enrollment period in advance of a settlement. Companies that 

charge a contingent, or ‘‘back-end,’’ fee generally base it on a certain percentage of 

any settlement they obtain for consumers. They sometimes charge a small, additional fee every month while consumers are attempting to save funds for settlements. In addition, some debt settlement companies handle only one part of the 

overall settlement process, such as the front-end marketing or the negotiation with 

creditors, while other debt settlement companies conduct every part of the process 

themselves. 

Currently, there has been only limited Federal action taken against debt settlement companies. Since 2001, FTC has brought at least seven lawsuits against debt 

settlement companies for engaging in unfair or deceptive marketing.4 In August 

2009, FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the Telemarketing 

Sales Rule (TSR) to enhance consumer protections related to the sale of debt relief 

services,5 including debt settlement services.6 In its notice, FTC offers multiple criticisms of the debt settlement industry and states that its ‘‘concerns begin with the 

marketing and advertising of the services, but also extend to whether such plans 

are fundamentally sound for consumers.’’ The proposed rule would amend the TSR 

to do the following, among other things: 

• prohibit companies from charging fees until they have provided debt relief services to consumers;7

9 

8 Va. Code Ann. §§ 6.1–363.2–.26. 9 Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–63–301 to –305. 10Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33–14–101 to –103. 

• require companies to disclose certain information about the debt relief services 

they offer, including how long it will take for consumers to obtain debt relief 

and how much the services will cost; and, 

• prohibit specific misrepresentations about material aspects of debt relief services, including success rates and whether a debt relief company is a nonprofit. 

In its notice, FTC demonstrates that the requesting or receiving payment of advance fees before debts are settled meets its criteria for unfairness, and therefore 

designates advance fees for debt settlement services as an abusive practice. FTC 

considers advance fees an abusive practice due to the following: 

• the substantial injury to consumers caused by advance fees, based on the low 

likelihood of success for debt settlement programs and the significant burden 

on consumers paying advance fees—especially fees charged at the front end of 

a debt settlement program, which FTC states ultimately impede the goal of relieving consumers’ debts; 

• the injury to consumers caused by advance fees outweighing any countervailing 

benefits; and, 

• the business practices prevalent among debt settlement companies making the 

injury to consumers reasonably unavoidable, such as representations in advertisements obscuring the generally low success rates of debt settlement. FTC also 

states in its notice that many consumers entering debt settlement programs are 

counseled to stop making payments to their creditors in order to facilitate settlements, which has a harmful effect on these consumers’ credit scores. 

Given the absence of specific Federal law, some states have taken the initiative 

and enacted their own legislation regulating the debt settlement industry. The regulations vary widely from state to state, however. For example, Virginia’s detailed 

legal framework requires debt settlement companies to apply and pay for an operating license, to enter into written agreements with potential customers that describe all services to be performed and provide the customer a right to cancel at any 

time, and to charge only a maximum $75 set-up fee and $60 monthly fee, among 

other restrictions.8 Other states, such as Arkansas 9 and Wyoming,10 have chosen 

to simply ban most types of for-profit debt settlement companies from operating in 

their states at all. Individuals who violate those states’ bans are guilty of a misdemeanor and could face up to 1 year imprisonment in Arkansas and up to 6 

months imprisonment in Wyoming. On the other hand, New York and Oklahoma, 

among others, have not yet enacted any laws specifically targeting this industry, 

thus leaving the public to rely on generally applicable consumer protection laws. 

Covert Testing Shows That Some Debt Settlement Companies Engage in 

Fraudulent, Abusive, and Deceptive Practices 

Our investigation found that some debt settlement companies engage in fraudulent, deceptive, and abusive practices that pose a risk to consumers already in difficult financial situations. The debt settlement companies and affiliates we called 

while posing as fictitious consumers with large amounts of debt generally follow a 

business model that calls for advance fees and stopping payments to creditors— 

practices that have been identified as abusive and harmful. While we determined 

that some companies gave consumers sound advice, most of those we contacted provided information that was deceptive, abusive, or, in some cases, fraudulent. Representatives of several companies claimed that their programs had unusually high 

success rates, made guarantees about the extent to which they could reduce our 

debts, or offered other information that we found to be fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise questionable. We did not actually use the services of any of the companies 

we called. A link to selected audio clips from these calls is available at: http:// 

www.gao.gov/products/GAO–10–593T. 

Advance Fees 

The debt settlement companies we called generally represented that they would 

collect fees before settling our debts—a practice FTC has proposed banning due to 

the harm caused to consumers. We were able to obtain information about fee structures from 18 of the 20 companies we called while posing as fictitious consumers 

10 

11Of the two companies for which we were unable to obtain fee information, one company presented an audio recording of general information about its program, and one company’s representative told us we did not have enough debt to qualify for its program. 12Federal and state agencies have defined success as consumers being able to obtain the results that the debt settlement companies promised them. 

with large amounts of debt,11 and found that their fee structures generally recall 

the concerns expressed by FTC. Specifically, we found that 17 of the 20 companies 

represented that they collected advance fees before debts were settled. Company 

representatives told us that the advance fees are calculated based on a percentage 

of the consumer’s debts to be settled, citing figures that ranged from 10 to 18 percent. Moreover, representatives from several companies told us that our monthly 

payments would go entirely to fees for up to 4 months before any money would be 

reserved for settlements with our creditors. Only 1 of the 20 companies we called 

represented that it followed a contingent fee model based on a percentage of the reduction of debt it says it obtains for consumers. Representatives from this company 

said a fee equal to 35 percent of each client’s reduced debt was charged. Some companies also represented that they assessed monthly maintenance and other additional fees. One of the 17 advance-fee companies also revealed that it charged a contingent fee after each debt is settled based on a percentage of the debt reduction. 

FTC has banned advance fees in several industries, such as credit repair, based 

on analyses that determined these practices to be unfair because sellers often do not 

provide the services for which they charge. The agency has proposed a similar ban 

for debt settlement, stating that the advance fees cause substantial injury to consumers. FTC justified this stance toward debt settlement, in part, based on the following findings: advance fees induce financially strapped consumers to stop making 

payments to their creditors; and consumers are unlikely to succeed in debt settlement programs, given evidence from Federal and state agencies that generally 

shows single-digit success rates.12 Moreover, FTC stated concerns in its notice that 

advance fees for debt settlement may actually impede the process of saving money 

to settle debts, especially substantial fees collected at the beginning of a program. 

This business model may be especially risky for consumers who are already in financially stressed conditions, given that interest, late fees, and penalties often continue to accrue on the consumers’ accounts as they work to save money toward settlements. In addition, consumers with already limited financial resources may be 

unable to direct adequate funds toward saving for settlements if their resources are 

being devoted to paying fees. 

We asked representatives of some companies what services we would receive as 

we paid advance fees while saving money for settlements. These representatives 

generally stated that our advance fees would pay for financial education, updates 

from attorneys, and communications with our creditors—such as cease and desist 

letters, to attempt to prevent harassing telephone calls. One representative, however, was unable to provide an explanation of what services we would receive for 

our advance fees beyond the fact that her company’s attorneys would ‘‘look at’’ our 

accounts every month. Several companies we called had basic financial education resources on their websites or provided links to such resources by e-mail. Industry 

representatives have stated that advance fees are needed to cover essential operating costs, such as overhead and providing the types of services mentioned above 

for their existing clients. However, FTC found that marketing and acquiring new 

customers make up a large portion of the operating costs for debt settlement companies. We were unable to verify whether any companies we called provide ongoing 

services for clients they enroll in their programs, given that we did not enter into 

business relationships with them. 

Directing Consumers to Stop Paying Creditors 

We also found that the companies we called generally follow a business model 

that poses a risk to consumers by encouraging them to stop making payments to 

their creditors, a practice that harms consumers because of the damage it typically 

causes to their credit scores. Representatives of nearly all the companies we called— 

17 out of 20—advised us to stop paying our creditors, by either telling us that we 

would have to stop making payments upon entering their programs or by informing 

us that stopping payments was necessary for their programs to work, even for accounts on which we said we were still current. The following quotes demonstrate 

some of the statements made by representatives of the companies we called regarding our payments to creditors: 

• ‘‘You stop paying, uh, those payments out to those creditors. The only thing 

you’re going to have to worry about is this payment here [to company].’’ 

11 

13 As stated above, some companies we called referred us to one or more affiliates. We were 

unable to determine the relationship between these companies and their affiliates. 14While TASC requires its member companies to make a series of disclosures in its discussions with potential clients, the individual completion rate for each company’s program or the 

34.4 percent overall completion rate mentioned in TASC’s study are not among the required disclosures. 

• ‘‘One-hundred percent of our clients stop making their monthly payments as 

soon as they enroll into the program.’’ 

• ‘‘I won’t tell anybody not to pay their bills; I said one-hundred percent of the 

clients who have been successful have stopped paying their bills.’’ 

• ‘‘Say you enrolled in the program. At that point you would no longer make any 

of your credit card payments. All of them would go late.’’ 

Among the 17 companies encouraging us to stop paying our creditors or representing that stopping payments is a condition of their program,13 5 were members 

of an industry trade group called The Association of Settlement Companies (TASC) 

at the time we made our calls. TASC’s written standards, adherence to which is required of all member companies, explicitly state ‘‘No Member shall direct a potential 

or current client to stop making monthly payments to their creditors.’’ A representative of 1 of these 5 TASC member companies told us that she could not direct us 

to stop paying our creditors, but later stated that if we could afford to make our 

payments then her program was not ‘‘the best solution’’ for us. In addition, a representative of 1 of these 5 TASC member companies appropriately screened us out 

by telling us that we had too low of income to afford that company’s program under 

the scenario we presented; he later described his company’s program as requiring 

clients to stop making their payments. In addition to these 5 TASC member companies, we spoke to a representative from another TASC member company who told 

us that we did not have enough debt to qualify for that company’s program. In addition, 4 of the companies that told us to stop paying our creditors or represented that 

stopping payments was a condition of their program were members of a different 

industry trade group called the United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives (USOBA) at the time of our calls. According to USOBA representatives 

whom we interviewed, its member companies do not tell potential clients to stop 

paying their creditors. We received particularly good advice from a representative 

of 1 additional USOBA member company—not among the 4 listed above—whose 

representative told us that we should worry about taking care of our late mortgage 

payments before we worried about settling our credit card debts. 

Stopping payments to creditors results in damage to consumers’ credit scores. According to FICO (formerly the Fair Isaac Corporation), the developer of the statistically based scoring system used to generate most consumer credit scores, payment 

history makes up about 35 percent of a consumer’s credit score. Moreover, the damage to credit scores resulting from stopping payments is generally worse for consumers who have better credit histories—such as consumers who maintained good 

payment histories prior to entering a debt settlement program that required them 

to stop making payments. In its notice, FTC also discussed the harmful effect that 

stopping payments has on consumers’ credit scores. 

Success Rates 

In several cases, representatives of companies we called claimed success rates for 

their programs that we found to be suspiciously high—85 percent, 93 percent, even 

100 percent. In its notice, FTC cites claims of high likelihood of success as a frequent representation in the debt settlement industry. The success rates we heard 

are significantly higher than is suggested by evidence obtained by Federal and state 

agencies. When these agencies have obtained documentation on debt settlement success rates, the figures have often been in the single digits. For example, as part of 

an annual registration process in Colorado, the state’s Attorney General compiled 

data on success rates for all debt settlement companies statewide. The data show 

that, from 2006 to 2008, less than 10 percent of Colorado consumers successfully 

completed their debt settlement programs. Our case studies discussed below provide 

additional evidence of similarly low success rates. 

Industry-reported data have claimed a higher success rate for debt settlement programs. According to TASC, data gathered from a survey of some of its largest member companies in 2009 shows that 34.4 percent of consumers participating in a debt 

settlement program offered by a TASC member company completed their debt settlement programs by settling at least 75 percent of their enrolled debts.14 A previous study released by TASC in 2008 claimed overall completion rates between 35 

and 60 percent. However, Federal and state agencies have raised concerns with the 

12 

15 According to data it provided to us, BBB has received thousands of complaints about debt 

settlement companies in recent years, with the number of complaints rising from 8 in 2004 to 

nearly 1,800 in 2009. This figure may underestimate the total number of complaints related to 

debt settlement, as not all companies providing debt settlement services are classified as debt 

settlement companies by BBB. According to BBB, these complaints are related primarily to debt 

settlement companies: (1) charging advance fees without providing services as promised to consumers and sometimes without providing any services at all; (2) failing to disclose important 

information to consumers, such as unannounced fees; and (3) failing or refusing to provide refunds to consumers. 16 According to BBB, its rating system uses grades based on a proprietary formula that incorporates information known to BBB and its experience with the business under assessment. The 

ratings are intended to represent BBB’s degree of confidence the business is operating in a 

trustworthy manner and will make a good faith effort to resolve any customer concerns. The 

rating system uses grades from A to F, with plusses and minuses, so that A+ is the highest 

grade and F is the lowest. Some debt settlement companies may currently have a BBB rating 

higher than a C¥ because they were misclassified (e.g., characterized by BBB as something 

other than a debt settlement company) or because debt settlement does not represent a substantial portion of its services. 

methodology behind TASC’s data. For example, these agencies have argued that: (1) 

TASC’s data were self-reported by its member companies, and may not reflect all 

member companies; (2) not every TASC member company that submitted data defined completion in the same way; and (3) the fact that consumers complete a debt 

settlement program does not necessarily imply that these consumers successfully obtained the debt relief services for which they paid. We did not attempt to validate 

success or completion data from TASC or Federal or state agencies. 

TASC and USOBA have cited several factors that might contribute to consumers’ 

success rates in debt settlement programs, such as that most consumers entering 

debt settlement programs are in extreme financial hardship and may choose to quit 

their program after settling some debts and improving their financial situations. 

However, FTC stated in its notice that the prevalent fee structure in the debt settlement industry—substantial up-front fees—may be a major factor in the generally 

low consumer success rates as well. TASC and USOBA have both offered suggestions for ways to boost consumer success rates, such as improved processes for determining consumers’ suitability for debt settlement programs. 

Debt settlement success rates also play a key role in the BBB rating system for 

companies in the industry. Due to the volume and nature of consumer complaints,15

among other factors, BBB recently designated debt settlement as an ‘‘inherently 

problematic’’ type of business and, in September 2009, implemented new rating criteria for debt settlement companies to reflect this designation. Under this designation, no debt settlement company may earn a BBB rating higher than a C¥.16

While BBB has designated other types of businesses as inherently problematic— 

such as pay-day loan centers, businesses that charge fees for publicly available information on government jobs, scientifically unproven medical devices and products, 

advance fee modeling agencies, and wealth-building or real estate seminars—debt 

settlement companies are the only type of business currently allowed by BBB to escape the inherently problematic designation if they provide evidence to BBB that 

they meet a series of criteria. These criteria require a debt settlement company to 

prove, among other things, that: 

• It has substantiated all advertising claims, including claims relating to the benefits or efficacy of debt settlement; 

• It makes certain disclosures to consumers, including clear and conspicuous disclosure of program fees and the risks of debt settlement; 

• It has adequate procedures for screening out consumers who are not appropriate candidates for debt settlement; and 

• A majority (at least 50 percent) of its clients successfully complete its program 

and obtain a reduction in debt that is significant and exceeds the fees charged 

by the company. 

According to a BBB official, he was unaware of any debt settlement company that 

had yet successfully demonstrated that it met these criteria, as of March 2010. Officials from TASC and USOBA told us they strongly disagree with BBB’s new rating 

system for debt settlement companies. According to these officials, the new rating 

system minimizes the importance of resolved consumer complaints, requires an unrealistic measure of programs’ success rate—50 percent—and inhibits consumers’ 

ability to differentiate between reputable and disreputable debt settlement companies. 

13 

Guaranteed Reductions in Debt 

Representatives from some companies also guaranteed or promised that they 

could obtain minimum reductions in our debts if we signed up for their services. For 

example, some representatives stated that they would save us 40 to 50 cents on the 

dollar once they negotiated settlements with our creditors. In its notice, FTC cites 

claims of specific reductions in debt as an example of a consumer protection abuse 

in the debt settlement industry. 

Fraudulent or Other Deceptive Representations 

We found examples of companies offering fraudulent or other deceptive information, such as using names and imagery for their services that indicates that their 

program is linked to the government. Table 1 below shows examples of fraudulent 

or deceptive information from companies we called. 

Table 1: Examples of Fraudulent or Deceptive Information Provided by Debt Settlement Companies We Called 

No. Representation Comments 

1 Debt settlement companies are ‘‘licensed and regulated’’ by TASC, which is ‘‘like the SEC [United 

States Securities and Exchange Commission] for 

stock traders.’’ 

TASC is a nonprofit trade association that lobbies 

lawmakers on behalf of the debt settlement industry. It is not a licensing or regulatory authority. 

2 Stopping payments will ‘‘knock [credit score] down 

a couple of points . . . However, unlike bankruptcy 

or any other credit counseling program, this only 

affects your credit while you’re in the program.’’ 

According to FICO, stopping payments to creditors 

as part of a debt settlement can drop credit scores 

anywhere between 65 to 125 points. In addition, 

missed payments leading up to a debt settlement 

can remain on a consumer’s credit report for 7 

years even after a debt is settled. 

3 Debt settlements will be noted on consumers’ credit reports as ‘‘paid in full’’ or ‘‘paid as agreed.’’ According to FICO, settlements are typically listed 

on consumers’ credit reports as ‘‘settlement accepted on the account’’ or ‘‘settled for less than full balance.’’ 

4 Company advertises a ‘‘National Debt Relief Stimulus Plan.’’ The company’s services are not affiliated with a 

government program or part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the ‘‘stimulus’’). 

5 Company promised that calls from creditors seeking money will ‘‘slow down and eventually stop’’ if 

we just told our creditors we had hired the company. 

Debt settlement companies cannot prevent creditors from contacting consumers. Companies often 

advise consumers to terminate all communication 

with their creditors, ask consumers to assign power 

of attorney to them, and send cease and desist letters to creditors in an attempt to cutoff further 

communications. 

Source: GAO. 

Five of our cases are highlighted below. The companies in these cases made multiple fraudulent or deceptive representations either to our fictitious consumers by 

telephone, on their websites and through company documents or to our staff during 

unannounced, overt site visits. Table 2 below shows basic information represented 

by these companies, including the location, fees, and industry trade association 

membership of each of these companies and their affiliates, if any. (Table 4 in appendix I provides summary information on all 20 companies we called.) 

Table 2: Representations Made by Select Debt Settlement Companies We Called 

No. Location of company and affiliates Fees a Association 

membership b

1 Florida; affiliates in Florida, 

Massachusetts, California, 

and New Jersey b

• Advance fees based on 15 percent of enrolled debt, 

with monthly payments required throughout program.

TASC; c affiliates 

in TASC and 

USOBA 

2 Unknown; affiliates in 

Arizona, Texas, and 

California b

• Advance fees based on 12 percent of enrolled debt 

• First 3 monthly payments go to fees. 

• $25 monthly maintenance fee. 

• Additional contingent fee based on 4 percent of reduction in debt company obtains for clients.

Affiliate in 

USOBA 

14 

Table 2: Representations Made by Select Debt Settlement Companies We Called—Continued 

No. Location of company and affiliates Fees a Association 

membership b

3 California • Advance fees based on 16 percent of enrolled debt, 

with monthly payments required throughout program.

• First 3 monthly payments go to fees. 

• $100 fee for out-of-state clients. 

TASC (at the time 

of our call) 

4 California • Advance fees based on 17 percent of enrolled debt, 

with monthly payments required throughout program.

• First 3 monthly payments go to fees. 

• $840 maintenance fee (total throughout program) 

• $623.50 trust account fee (total throughout program).

TASC 

5 California • Advance fees based on 15 percent of enrolled debt TASC (at the time 

of our call) 

Source: GAO analysis of information obtained from debt settlement companies. 

aFee information reflects fees disclosed to us; some companies may charge additional fees that were not disclosed. Debt settlement 

companies typically charge fees requiring payments either at the beginning of the program as an advance fee or after each settlement as a contingent fee. Some companies structure the payment of advance fees so that they collect a large portion of them—as 

high as 40 percent—within the first few months regardless of whether any settlements have been obtained or any contact has been

made with the consumer’s creditors. Others collect fees throughout the first half of the enrollment period in advance of a settlement. 

Companies that charge a contingent fee generally base it on a certain percentage of any settlement they actually obtain for consumers. They sometimes charge a small, additional fee every month while consumers are attempting to save funds for settlements. bSome companies we called referred us to one or more affiliates. It was not always clear to us exactly with which company or affiliate we were speaking, where the companies or affiliates were located, or what the relationships were between the companies and 

affiliates. In some cases, separate affiliates of the same company claimed to be members of different industry trade associations. cWhile Company 1 claimed to be a member of TASC, it appears this was a false representation. 

Company 1 

Company 1 made several fraudulent and deceptive representations. We identified 

Company 1 when one of our investigators received an unsolicited spam message 

through his private e-mail account advertising debt settlement services, with a mailing address in the country of Lebanon listed at the bottom. A link in the message 

brought us to a website advertising ‘‘New Government Programs! New free and easy 

programs are available for those who are in debt right now! Take advantage while 

they’re still available 

[sic].’’ (See figure 1 below.) The website also featured logos for TASC and BBB, 

along with other insignias declaring ‘‘Satisfaction Guaranteed’’ and ‘‘Privacy 100 

percent Guaranteed.’’ When we called the number listed on the website, a representative answered using the name of an affiliate different than the company name listed on the website. He explained that the website was a ‘‘generic advertisement’’ to 

spread information about his company. Throughout our conversation, he made multiple statements that we found to be deceptive or questionable. According to the representative, the ‘‘worst case scenario’’ for settlement of our debts would be ‘‘40 cents 

on the dollar.’’ He stated that his company has helped 100 percent of its clients get 

out of debt in 3 years or less, and that ‘‘every single creditor settles. There’s not 

one creditor we haven’t been able to reach a settlement with.’’ When asked about 

the government programs advertised on the website, he replied ‘‘What we’re offering 

is not part of any government program whatsoever. . . . It’s just that the government is allowing this to take place at this time. . . . The government is putting 

pressure on banks to allow things like this so that, you know, there are no more 

bankruptcies or things along those lines.’’ Even though the website displayed a 

TASC logo, we were unable to find either Company 1 or this affiliate on TASC’s 

member directory. The Executive Director of TASC confirmed to us later that neither Company 1—as it listed itself on its website—nor this affiliate is a member of 

the organization. The affiliate’s website displays a logo for USOBA, and we confirmed its membership with that organization. 

15 

17We also identified an additional website at a different address that was nearly identical to 

the one that referred us to the two representatives discussed above, with the same phone number and logos for TASC and BBB, but listing what appeared to be a different company name 

entirely. 18TASC’s executive director confirmed that Company 1 is not a member. 19Prior to our site visit, we found a testimonial from an alleged client on Company 1’s website 

claiming that Company 1 helped her to cut her monthly bills in half in 24 hours. 

Shortly after we called Company 1 the first time, we noticed that the website contained some changes—when we attempted to leave the website on later visits, a popup message appeared declaring ‘‘If we can’t get you out of debt in 24 hours we’ll 

pay you $100!’’ (See figure 1 above.) We called Company 1 again and a representative said that he was with Company 1. He later stated that he was actually with 

an affiliate of Company 1—a different affiliate than the first representative with 

whom we spoke. He described the website for Company 1 as a ‘‘landing page’’ used 

to attract business to his company. This second representative also offered deceptive 

or questionable information, such as a 93 percent success rate for his program. 

When asked about the government programs advertised on Company 1’s website, he 

replied that the government program was related to creditors’ ability to obtain tax 

credits from the IRS for the debts they sell to collection agencies. Regarding the 

offer to get consumers out of debt within 24 hours, he said that this was for clients 

who have the financial resources to make a large lump sum payment at the very 

beginning of the program. However, he added that ‘‘ninety-nine point 9 percent of 

the people that come to us do not have the ability to do that.’’ When we asked about 

the risk of being sued by our creditors, he told us that ‘‘a judgment is nothing more 

than a fancy I.O.U.’’ We were able to find this second affiliate on TASC’s member 

directory, and the Executive Director of TASC later confirmed that this affiliate is 

a member of TASC.17

We made a site visit to Company 1 in Florida. The owner of Company 1 admitted 

that the company does not really exist and is really just a marketing website, and 

told us he actually owns a different company that offers both debt settlement and 

mortgage modification services. He claimed that he did not know that Company 1’s 

website contained information about an alleged government program, and logos for 

TASC and BBB. However, he acknowledged that neither Company 1 nor his real 

company is a member of TASC despite the logo featured on the website.18 When 

asked about the offer to get consumers out of debt within 24 hours, he replied that 

this was a ‘‘typo’’ and that the offer should say 24 months rather than 24 hours.19

Our investigators observed employees at the location listed for Company 1 representing on the telephone that they were employees of the second affiliate mentioned above. Moreover, when the owner of Company 1 gave our investigators a copy 

of the script his employees use when speaking with potential clients, the text of the 

script implied that they were representatives of the second affiliate. We were unable 

to determine the actual relationship, if any, between Company 1, its affiliates, or 

the other company the owner claimed he runs. 


422KUTZ1.eps
16 

20 A recent report by the Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition stated that debt settlement 

companies ‘‘often seem a many-headed Hydra’’ with parent companies split from other divisions 

that handle the marketing and solicitation. The report further states that this division of services causes confusion for consumers trying to track the progress of their debt settlement, and 

for agencies attempting to enforce compliance. 21 IRS Form 990 is a Federal information return filed annually by tax-exempt public charities. 

Information reported on this return includes assets held, contributions received, and grants 

paid. 

Company 2 

Company 2’s online and radio advertisements feature multiple fraudulent or deceptive claims. The company’s website advertises that its services will ‘‘Reduce balances to 40 percent—60 percent,’’ ‘‘Eliminate excessive Credit Card Debt interest 

immediately,’’ and ‘‘End late payment fee’s [sic].’’ When we called Company 2, it referred us to at least 3 different affiliates. It was not always clear exactly with which 

company’s representatives we were speaking.20 Representatives from these affiliates 

described Company 2 as a marketing group that referred potential clients to them. 

We also identified radio advertisements placed in several major cities purporting to 

be from Company 2, in which it claimed to offer a ‘‘government authorized’’ and 

‘‘government approved’’ debt settlement program. When we called the telephone 

number listed in one of the radio advertisements, a representative answered from 

one of the affiliates of Company 2 that we had spoken to earlier. When asked about 

the government-approved debt settlement program, the representative acknowledged the radio advertisement and replied ‘‘it is government approved. . . . They 

allow for us to do this. You know, the banks received, you know, bailout money last 

year. I’m sure you saw it on the news. There has to be some type of assistance for 

people on a consumer level also.’’ According to this representative, Company 2 runs 

similar advertisements on television and radio stations nationwide. 

We were unable to visit Company 2 because we could not determine its physical 

location. However, we visited the affiliate whose representative discussed the radio 

advertisement with us, which is located in California. Officials from this affiliate 

told us that their company is ‘‘the most legitimate debt settlement company,’’ and 

that their employees receive commission based on the number of clients they enroll 

in the company’s program. They also claimed that their company was not associated 

with Company 2, and refused to disclose to us the number of clients in their program or the total amount of consumer debt their company is currently handling. On 

two separate covert telephone calls we made to Company 2, representatives of this 

affiliate stated they were with Company 2 at the beginning of each call but later 

informed us that they actually were with the affiliate and that Company 2 handled 

their marketing. When asked during our site visit if we could see their call center, 

officials refused. 

Company 3 

Company 3 targets Christians for its debt settlement services by employing a Biblical marketing theme, both on its website and over the phone. Representatives of 

Company 3 told our fictitious consumers that they run a nonprofit ministry affiliated with their for-profit debt settlement company, with funds from debt settlement 

feeding into the ministry and missionary trips overseas. In addition, representatives 

told us that their program has an 85 percent success rate and that they would negotiate our debt down to 40 or 60 percent of what we currently owed. About the risk 

of being sued by our creditors, a representative remarked to us that ‘‘It’s just a computer thing. I mean, sometimes there’s a handful of them that they’ll have reserved 

to go after and it’s just random. But even if they were to do that in your case, it’s 

just a small percentage; we’d be able to advise you at that time, too. You don’t need 

an attorney in the matter or anything like that. It’s just a civil thing.’’ 

We visited Company 3 in California, where we found it located in a strip mall 

near a grocery store. The owner of Company 3 told us that he owned a mortgage 

company and sold cars prior to entering the debt settlement industry. Company 3 

handles the front end of the debt settlement process by signing up clients, and uses 

a third-party company and law firm for the rest of the process. Most of the employees of Company 3 are contractors who earn $200 commission for each client enrolled, with bonuses for employees who enroll a high number of clients. According 

to Company 3 officials, they enrolled approximately 1,200 to 1,300 new clients in 

the first 21⁄2 months of 2010. When asked if we could see a copy of their IRS Form 

990 for the nonprofit side of their operation, the owner replied, ‘‘The Bible says you 

should never let the left hand know what the right hand is doing.’’ 21 Company officials provided us with a sample of its contract, which states that ‘‘In the event Client comes into a lump sum of money and wishes to settle an account before original 

17 

22We did not attempt to verify the facts regarding all of the allegations pursued by Federal 

and state agencies that we identified. 

designated completion date, Client must first pay [Company 3] Fee. The remainder 

of the lump sum will be utilized in settling Client’s unresolved program debt.’’ The 

contract also states that Company 3 does not provide legal representation or any 

legal advice to its clients. 

Company 4 

We became interested in calling Company 4 when we noticed on its website that 

it advertised a ‘‘U.S. National Debt Relief Plan,’’ with a logo depicting a shield filled 

with a U.S. flag. When asked about this plan, a representative stated that it was 

‘‘a consumer advocacy program entitled [sic] to help consumers get out of debt’’ but 

that ‘‘it’s not a government agency. We just take advantage of the fact that the government are [sic] giving money to the banks to get out of debt and we just show 

you and go through the route of settling out your accounts.’’ The representative also 

told us that our first 3 monthly payments would go entirely to paying fees with no 

money set aside for savings. He said that Company 4 uses this advance fee structure because, during the first few months of the program, the company would be 

setting up our account and mailing cease and desist letters to our creditors, and ‘‘to 

show that you have the commitment to be in the program.’’ 

When we visited Company 4 in California, officials told us that the company only 

handles the front-end marketing of the debt settlement process, and that it had enrolled approximately 1,000 clients in the first 21⁄2 months of 2010. In early March 

2010, TASC issued a statement on its website noting a recent increase in companies 

practicing deceptive marketing, including companies sending letters to potential clients resembling government documents and using terms like ‘‘U.S. National Debt 

Relief Plan.’’ Company 4 marketed the ‘‘U.S. National Debt Relief Plan,’’ and is a 

member of TASC. 

Company 5 

A representative of Company 5 advised us that we could not afford its debt settlement program because our fictitious consumer’s income was too low and his expenses were too high. He suggested that we consider credit counseling or bankruptcy as options if we were unable to make substantial improvements in our budget. However, when we indicated that we may obtain a new job soon that would boost 

our income, he provided details on how Company 5’s debt settlement program 

works. He told us that it generally takes about 7 to 8 months to save up enough 

money to begin negotiating settlements. When we asked what services we would be 

paying for during those first 7 to 8 months, he replied that our fees would pay for 

the ability to get out of debt within 36 months, and monthly education and updates 

from the company’s attorneys. Company 5’s website advertised that it can help consumers who are experiencing stress, anxiety, and depression associated with being 

in debt. When we asked about these services, the representative laughed and said 

these services are arranged through debt negotiators who will hold monthly strategy 

calls with us. 

We attempted to visit Company 5 in California, but found that it was no longer 

at the location listed on its website. Employees of several other companies in neighboring office suites told us that Company 5 had moved to another office down the 

hall, which was listed under a different company name. An official from this company denied knowing anything about Company 5, and claimed that his company did 

not provide debt settlement services. However, records we obtained indicate that the 

name of Company 5’s owner is the same as the name on this official’s driver’s license. In addition, the website for this other company indicates that it does, in fact, 

provide debt settlement services. After we returned from our site visit, the website 

for Company 5 was down for maintenance. 

Allegations of Fraud, Abuse, and Deception in the Debt Settlement Industry 

Are Widespread 

We found the experience of our fictitious consumers to be consistent with the 

widespread complaints and charges made by Federal and state investigators on behalf of real consumers against debt settlement companies. We identified allegations 

of fraud, deception and other questionable activities that involve hundreds of thousands of consumers.22 We drew this figure from closed and open civil and criminal 

cases governments have pursued against these companies over the last decade. Our 

calculation likely underestimates the total number of consumers affected, since we 

obtained information from only 12 Federal and state agencies about the clients withVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
18 

23We obtained information from the following agencies: Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Department of Justice, and state law enforcement agencies in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, New York, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. They identified clients through company records, individual complaints, and restitution paid. We focused on select 

states with enforcement actions listed in a National Association of Attorneys General letter. We 

did not attempt to query all 50 states. 24 According to the letter, the 128 enforcement actions listed in its attachment do not represent a comprehensive list of all cases filed or regulatory actions taken against debt relief companies. We did not attempt to verify the facts regarding all of the actions listed in the letter. 

Details regarding 3 of these enforcement actions are provided below, as case studies 1, 3, and 

4. 

in their jurisdiction that they identified in some of the cases they pursued.23 Federal 

and state agencies have reported taking a growing number of legal actions against 

companies that offer these services in recent years. As mentioned above, since 2001, 

FTC has brought at least seven lawsuits against debt settlement companies for engaging in unfair or deceptive marketing. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) said in an October 2009 letter to FTC that 21 states brought at least 

128 enforcement actions against 84 debt relief companies, including debt settlement 

companies, over the previous 5 years.24 The group stated that the number of complaints received by the states about debt relief companies—especially debt settlement companies—had more than doubled since 2007. Last, the group noted that any 

business model requiring ‘‘cash-strapped consumers to pay substantial up-front fees’’ 

raised significant consumer protection concerns and agreed with a consumer group 

that called it ‘‘inherently harmful.’’ 

Attorneys general from 40 states and 1 territory submitted the letter, saying they 

supported FTC’s proposed rule changes to combat unfair and deceptive practices in 

the industry. They cited similar debt settlement activities that prompted their own 

enforcement actions, including the following: 

• collecting advance fees in many instances without providing services; 

• misleading consumers about the likelihood of a settlement; 

• misleading consumers about the settlement process and its adverse effect on 

their credit ratings; 

• making unsubstantiated claims of consumer savings; 

• deceptively representing the length of time necessary to complete the program; 

• misleading or failing to adequately inform consumers that they will be subject 

to continued collection efforts, including lawsuits; 

• misleading or failing to adequately inform consumers that their account balances will increase due to extended nonpayment under the program; and 

• deceptive disparagement of bankruptcy as an alternative for debtors. 

The state attorneys general expressed concern the industry would grow exponentially given the current economic climate and a regulatory environment that allows 

substantial advance fees to be collected. They criticized the advance fees as providing minimal incentive for companies to perform services because they get paid 

whether or not they take any action on behalf of the consumer. They also noted that 

low set-up costs help in the promotion of debt settlement as a cheap business opportunity. They stated that they would continue to take enforcement actions against 

unscrupulous operators in the industry, but that they also believed the proposed 

FTC rule changes would substantially aid law enforcement agencies in addressing 

harms caused to consumers. 

We developed case studies from five closed civil or criminal actions in which state 

or Federal courts found debt settlement companies liable for fraudulent, unfair or 

deceptive actions that left clients in worse financial condition—bankrupt, owing 

more debt, and with lower credit scores and more judgments against them. We also 

examined the experiences of a consumer from each of these cases. Table 3 below 

shows key information from each of these five cases. Further details are discussed 

below. 

19 

Table 3: Select Cases of Debt Settlement Companies Engaged in Fraudulent, Abusive, or Deceptive Practices 

No. Company 

location 

Federal/state 

agency Case details 

1 Arizona; affiliates in Arizona 

and Florida 

New York Attorney 

General 

• More than 500 New Yorkers withdrew from the debt settlement program after paying over $1 million in fees only to receive more debt, tarnished credit ratings, and increased collection calls and creditor lawsuits. 

• Nearly half of the New York clients that completed the program during the Attorney General’s investigation, or 27 out 

of 64, ultimately paid more than they originally owed. 

• Only 0.3 percent of the New York clients realized the promised savings. 

• A New York court found the company and its affiliates liable 

for statutory fraud and ordered restitution for clients who 

paid more than they owed. 

2 New York and 

Vermont 

U.S. Attorney 

General 

• An attorney and his law firm associates misappropriated and 

embezzled millions of dollars from 15,000 clients seeking 

debt reduction help over a 6-year period, forcing some customers into bankruptcy. 

• The group lured consumers through television and radio advertisements by falsely claiming a 50 to 70 percent savings 

off unsecured debt, an improvement in credit scores and 

bankruptcy avoidance. 

• Only 8 percent of the group’s clients completed the program. 

• Clients paid advance fees for these services and funded escrow accounts from which their creditors were supposed to 

be paid. The fees were not considered ‘‘earned’’ until consumer debts were settled. 

• The fees collected were used in part to fund huge payments 

to the attorney and two of his associates before they provided any services to clients. 

• The client escrow accounts were drawn upon, in part, to 

cover overdrafts from the law firm’s operating account and to 

make payments to the attorney’s wife, among other things. 

• The law firm filed for bankruptcy in 2003. 

• A Federal jury found the attorney guilty in 2005 on multiple 

felony counts, including fraud. His six associates pled guilty 

to Federal charges. 

3 Florida North Carolina 

Attorney General 

• Two companies and their owners ran an illegal debt settlement business using unfair and deceptive practices, collecting over $500,000 from about 220 North Carolinians who 

rarely obtained the services they purchased. 

• North Carolina law prohibits anyone from acting as a forprofit intermediary between residents and their creditors for 

the purpose of reducing, settling, or altering debt payments, 

except in limited circumstances. It specifically bans advance 

fees for these services. 

• The companies and their owners, one of whom was an attorney, marketed their services in part using third-party ‘‘referral agents’’ who received compensation for directing consumers to the group. 

• Many clients dropped out of the program dissatisfied. Few 

received refunds or obtained settlements with their creditors. 

Many filed for bankruptcy. 

• A North Carolina court found that the group’s actions violated state law and banned the parties from doing any debtrelated business with state residents. In a separate action in 

January 2009, the attorney was disbarred for a period of 5 

years. 

20 

Table 3: Select Cases of Debt Settlement Companies Engaged in Fraudulent, Abusive, or Deceptive 

Practices—Continued 

No. Company 

location 

Federal/state 

agency Case details 

4 Maryland Maryland Attorney 

General 

• A Maryland attorney, his law firm and their marketers used 

unfair and deceptive trade practices to collect $3.4 million 

from about 6,200 clients over a 2 year period to settle debt 

but provided little or no services in return, causing harm to 

consumer credit histories and credit scores. 

• The group told clients that its employees were qualified credit counselors capable of recommending the most appropriate 

action, but instead it provided virtually the same advice to 

everyone—enter debt settlement plans profitable for the 

group. 

• The group reached an agreement in 2007 with the Attorney 

General, agreeing to immediately cease and desist selling 

unlicensed debt settlement services, pay restitution to customers, and pay investigatory costs and a fine to the state 

consumer protection office. 

• The Attorney General filed a lawsuit in 2008 against the 

group for violating the terms of their agreement and the 

state’s consumer protection act. The court ordered the group 

to fulfill the terms of its previous agreement, pay a fine and 

costs of $180,000, and pay restitution of almost $2.6 million. 

5 California Federal Trade 

Commission 

• Four related California companies lured more than 1,000 

consumers into a debt settlement program through false 

promises of reducing debt, halting collection calls, removing 

negative credit report information, and holding payments in 

trust to settle accounts—from which, the FTC alleged, more 

than $2 million later went ‘‘missing.’’ 

• FTC filed a complaint against the companies in August 

2002, alleging that numerous consumers who enrolled in the 

program saw their indebtedness increase after incurring late 

fees, finance charges, and overdraft charges. Many ultimately filed for bankruptcy. 

• The Federal court entered default judgments against all four 

companies, banning them from engaging in any debt settlement services and ordering them to collectively pay $1.7 million in restitution to consumers, among other actions. 

Source: GAO analysis of case studies discussed below. 

Case Study 1 

An Arizona company and its affiliates used false advertising and deceptive mar- keting to fraudulently induce more than 500 New Yorkers into paying over $1 million in fees for a debt settlement program that left them with more debt, tarnished 

credit ratings, and increased collection calls and creditor lawsuits. The group told 

clients that consumers typically saved between 25 percent and 40 percent, including 

all fees and charges. It also promised to substantially reduce credit card debt in as 

little as 24 months. However, according to the New York Attorney General, only 0.3 

percent of the company’s clients realized these savings and few ever completed the 

program. Only 64 of the group’s New York clients finished the program during the 

time period of the Attorney General’s investigation (between January 2005 and September 2008); another 537 withdrew from the program after paying fees. Those who 

finished the program complained of being deceived and harmed by the group. Nearly 

half of them actually paid more than they owed. For example, one said, ‘‘I actually 

paid 87 percent more than what was originally due.’’ Another said that the company 

‘‘did not settle any of my accounts until I was actually sued by my creditors.’’ A 

state court found the group liable for statutory fraud, ordered it to pay restitution 

to clients who completed the program but paid more than they owed, and prohibited 

it from doing business with consumers in New York unless it posted a $500,000 performance bond. 

The group required clients to authorize electronic debits from their personal bank 

accounts in an amount that typically ranged between $300 and $1,000 each month, 

depending on the consumers’ cash-flow and expected settlements. The group told clients that once the funds accrued to a sufficient amount, it would negotiate with 

creditors for a settlement. Clients were instructed to stop making credit card payments during this time and to cease all communication with their creditors. The 

group did not include most of the program fees it charged in its calculation of the 

‘‘savings’’ clients would achieve. The fees included the following: $399 for ‘‘set up’’; 

an amount equal to three times the clients monthly payment for ‘‘enrollment’’; $49 

21 

per month for administrative and bank fees; and an amount equal to 29 percent of 

the difference between the amount originally due and the settlement amount for a 

‘‘final fee.’’ The set-up and enrollment fees had to be paid in full before the group 

would allow money to accrue for a settlement. 

The experience of one New York family exemplifies the harm suffered by the 

group’s clients. According to a sworn statement the wife gave to state attorneys, the 

couple owed about $21,700 in credit card debt accumulated after the husband was 

laid off. In 2006, the wife received a call from a telemarketer saying that the Arizona company had looked into her family’s credit history and found that it could 

cut their credit card debt in half. She and her husband joined the program and 

began making $325 in monthly payments to settle five accounts, even though they 

were current on their bills. ‘‘Who wouldn’t want to save 50 percent on her credit 

cards?’’ the wife told state attorneys. The couple was advised to stop paying their 

creditors, which they did after being told by the company that no penalties and interest would accrue as a result. The couple was soon being harassed by their creditors, who called at all times of day, including evenings and weekends. Four of the 

couple’s small accounts were settled during this time. However, the creditor with 

the largest balance, which totaled about $19,000, took the couple to court. The pair 

withdrew from the program and settled the lawsuit for $28,000, including $9,000 

in penalties and interest. They subsequently had to pay this creditor $300 per 

month. The wife called this outcome ‘‘disastrous for us.’’ Nevertheless, the couple received a ‘‘congratulations’’ letter from the company, saying the pair had paid only 

79.3 percent of what was originally owed on the four settled accounts. 

Documents that the couple gave state attorneys, however, show otherwise: after 

adding the $2,506 in fees they were charged, the pair actually paid more than 140 

percent of what was originally owed on the four accounts. The wife told state attorneys that the Arizona company ‘‘failed our family in every respect, and we are 

counted as one of its success stories!’’ 

Case Study 2 

An attorney and his law firm associates defrauded about 15,000 clients seeking 

debt reduction help, causing them to lose millions of dollars and forcing legions of 

them to file for bankruptcy. The group lured consumers through television and radio 

advertisements, falsely claiming a 50 to 70 percent savings off unsecured debt, an 

improvement in credit scores and bankruptcy avoidance. The group, with offices initially in New York and later in Vermont, further promised that if clients did not 

receive a settlement, they would be entitled to a full refund. Clients paid fees for 

these services and funded escrow accounts from which their creditors were supposed 

to be paid. Under the terms of the contract that clients signed, the fees were not 

considered ‘‘earned’’ until consumer debts were settled. The group, however, did not 

reduce debt for most of its clients (only 8 percent completed the program, according 

to a witness cited by the U.S. Department of Justice) and failed to pay refunds to 

many of those who withdrew from the program or were forced into bankruptcy. Instead, the fees collected were used in part to fund huge payments to the attorney 

and two of his associates before they provided any services to clients. The client escrow accounts, meanwhile, were drawn upon to cover overdrafts from the law firm’s 

operating account and make payments to the attorney’s wife, among other things. 

The law firm filed for bankruptcy in 2003. A Federal jury found the attorney guilty 

in 2005 on multiple felony counts, including fraud. His six associates pled guilty to 

Federal charges. 

To enter the law firm’s debt settlement program, clients signed an agreement that 

authorized monthly automatic deductions from their bank accounts. The first four 

payments often went into a retainer account to collect advance fees owed to the 

firm, despite the fact that the clients had pressing debt problems. The advance fees 

equaled about 25 to 28 percent of the total projected savings from the client’s debt 

settlement plan. Thereafter, about half of payments also were deposited into an escrow account to settle client debts held by creditors until the retainer account was 

fully funded. Subsequent monthly deductions went into escrow account until enough 

money accrued to make a settlement offer on behalf of the client. Although not formalized in written contract, many clients were instructed to stop making their minimum monthly payments to creditors. They were told that continuing to pay creditors would inhibit the firm’s ability to reach a settlement. 

One of the firm’s New York clients who Federal authorities interviewed enrolled 

in the debt settlement program after hearing an advertisement on the radio. The 

woman, who owed $60,000, was experiencing marital problems and feared becoming 

a single mother with small children and a large amount of debt. She called the tollfree number and arranged for a meeting at a New York office. One of the firm’s associates, who later pleaded guilty to interstate transmittal of stolen money and preVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
22 

paring a false tax return, told her that the advance fees she paid would be held in 

trust until all of her debt was settled. She paid about $7,000 to $8,000 to the firm 

to settle her debts until one of her creditors obtained a judgment against her, causing her bank account to be frozen. When she contacted the firm to withdraw and 

ask for a refund, her calls were not returned. She ultimately filed for bankruptcy. 

The firm never secured a settlement on her behalf. She filed a civil lawsuit and won 

a default judgment against the firm for $10,000 including attorney fees, but told us 

she never recovered any money from the court decision. In relating her experiences 

with the debt settlement company, she described the attorney as ‘‘a ghoul and a vulture . . . preying on vulnerable consumers.’’ 

Case Study 3 

Two Florida companies and their owners ran an illegal debt settlement business 

using unfair and deceptive practices, collecting over $500,000 from about 220 North 

Carolinians who rarely obtained the services they purchased and found themselves 

in far worse financial positions. North Carolina law prohibits anyone from acting 

as a for-profit intermediary between residents and their creditors for the purpose 

of reducing, settling or altering debt payments, except in limited circumstances. The 

state ban specifically includes situations where an individual is receiving advance 

fees to provide these services. To enforce these laws, the North Carolina Attorney 

General filed a complaint in February 2008 accusing the group of operating a ‘‘classic advance-fee scam, designed to extract up-front fees from financially strapped 

consumers whether or not any useful services are performed.’’ The companies and 

their owners, one of whom was an attorney, marketed their services in part using 

numerous third-party ‘‘referral agents’’ who received compensation for directing consumers to the group. One such referral agent listed a local telephone number which, 

when dialed, actually rang a telemarketing ‘‘boiler room’’ in Massachusetts or Florida. The group and its agents told consumers that their unsecured debts could be 

reduced by up to 60 percent in as little as 1 to 3 years and thus avoid bankruptcy. 

The group typically charged clients an advance fee of 15 to 25 percent of their total 

debt, paid through monthly debits from their bank accounts. It also advised them 

to cease all communication and payments to creditors, stating that it could stop any 

harassment and provide ‘‘legal protection.’’ When consumers were sued, however, 

the group gave them no legal assistance. They also experienced difficulty in contacting the group and were often put on hold, disconnected, or ‘‘given the runaround,’’ state prosecutors said. Many clients dropped out of the program dissatisfied. Few received refunds or obtained settlements with their creditors. Many filed 

for bankruptcy. A North Carolina court found that the group’s actions violated state 

law and banned the parties from doing any debt-related business with state residents. State prosecutors ultimately secured refunds for some of the group’s clients. 

In a separate action in January 2009, the attorney also was disbarred for a period 

of 5 years. 

An example of the service the group’s clients received can be found in the experience of a rural North Carolina couple. According to the wife’s sworn statement, the 

pair found it increasingly difficult to meet their monthly financial obligations after 

the husband became ill and temporarily lost his income. They searched for ways to 

reduce their unsecured debt on the Internet and found what turned out to be one 

of the group’s referral agents. They were told that the initial monthly payment of 

about $1,700 would be deducted from their bank account for the first 3 months of 

the program to cover attorney fees. Subsequent monthly payments of about $1,200 

were to go toward settlements with creditors. The couple joined the program in 

hopes of avoiding bankruptcy and made their first installment in February 2007. 

Seven months later, the wife called the group for a status on her account and was 

told the couple had only accrued about $3,000 in savings, despite paying the group 

over $11,000 to date. She also learned that none of their credit accounts had been 

settled and they had been charged additional attorney fees of $499 each month. 

They withdrew from the program and demanded a full refund, since the group had 

done nothing ‘‘other than take our money with no accountability.’’ The couple started receiving collection notices and threats of lawsuits. Their debts had now increased since they were no longer making payments to creditors. In an attempt to 

save their home from foreclosure, the couple filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. They 

also took second jobs as janitors to help pay off their debts. The wife told us that 

during the day she works as a bank teller and her husband is employed as an electrical engineer. One of their creditors suggested they call their state Attorney General. ‘‘My husband and I are worse off than before we entered into an agreement 

with (the group) for debt settlement services,’’ the wife said in her sworn statement. 

The state Attorney General ultimately secured a full refund for the couple. 

23 

Case Study 4 

A Maryland attorney, his law firm, and their marketers used unfair and deceptive trade practices to collect $3.4 million from about 6,200 clients over a 2-year period 

to settle debt but provided little or no services in return, causing harm to consumer 

credit histories and credit scores. The group told its clients that they could settle 

debts with creditors for half of the total amount owed, but either did not do so or 

negotiated agreements that saved significantly less than promised. Only $811,136— 

less than a quarter of the money the group collected—was either paid to creditors 

or refunded to clients. Moreover, about $240,000 was taken from client trust accounts to pay for the law firm’s debt and expenses. The group told clients that its 

employees were qualified credit counselors capable of recommending the most appropriate action, but instead it provided virtually the same advice to everyone— 

enter debt settlement plans profitable for the group. The Maryland Office of the Attorney General began an investigation of the group because it was not licensed to 

provide debt settlement services in the state. The group reached an agreement in 

2007 with the Attorney General, agreeing to immediately cease and desist selling 

unlicensed debt settlement services, pay restitution to customers, and pay investigatory costs and a fine to the state consumer protection office. However, the Attorney 

General filed a lawsuit in 2008 against the attorney, his law firm, and their marketers accusing them of continuing to provide debt settlement services, thus violating 

the terms of their agreement and the state’s consumer protection act. The court 

ruled in favor of the Attorney General and ordered the group to fulfill the terms 

of its previous agreement, pay a fine and costs of $180,000, and pay restitution of 

almost $2.6 million. As of March 2010, the attorney had only paid $20,000. 

Clients made numerous complaints to the Maryland Office of the Attorney General, detailing the financial harm they suffered from the group. A New Hampshire 

couple struggling to pay their bills joined the debt settlement program in August 

2007 and authorized the firm to automatically deduct about $650 from their checking account each month, according to a letter they sent to the Attorney General. Although the couple had approximately $41,000 in credit card debt when they joined 

the program, the wife told us that they had a good credit history and had never 

missed a payment. However, she said that they were told they had to stop making 

payments to their creditors when they entered the program. The collection letters 

and phone calls from creditors started ‘‘arriving constantly’’ by the end of September, the couple told the Attorney General. Threats of lawsuits followed 2 months 

later. The couple withdrew from the program in February 2008, after paying the 

firm $3,895 and receiving no relief from their debts. They told the Attorney General 

they were so far in default on their credit cards, with interest and fees added on 

top, that they considered bankruptcy to be the best option available to them. According to the wife, their credit score dropped from 720 down to 605 as a result of their 

experience with this debt settlement program. She added that they ultimately entered into a consumer credit counseling program after they learned that state law 

requires such counseling prior to bankruptcy. When asked to compare the two different debt relief programs, she said that credit counseling is ‘‘legit’’ and helps consumers to get out of debt, but that ‘‘debt settlement is a crock.’’ 

Case Study 5 

Four related California companies lured more than 1,000 consumers into a debt 

settlement program through false promises of reducing debt, halting collection calls, 

removing negative credit-report information, and holding payments in trust to settle 

accounts—from which, FTC alleged, more than $2 million later went ‘‘missing.’’ The 

companies’ telemarketers told consumers that the group could cut their debt by as 

much as 60 percent in exchange for a nonrefundable fee, thus improving their financial status. The companies did not disclose that the fees typically amounted to hundreds or thousands of dollars. They said that the monthly payments withdrawn 

from consumers’ bank accounts would be held in trust to settle their debt at a reduced amount. Consumers were instructed to immediately stop paying their unsecured creditors so that they would be considered a ‘‘hardship,’’ putting them in a 

better position to negotiate settlement terms. The companies stated that they would 

contact the creditors and tell them to cease all contact with their customers, thus 

preventing collection calls. They also told consumers that any negative information 

that appeared on their credit report would be removed at the conclusion of the program. 

FTC filed a complaint against the companies in August 2002, alleging that numerous consumers who enrolled in the program saw their debt increase after incurring 

late fees, finance charges and overdraft charges. Negative information often appeared on the consumers’ credit reports—such as charge-offs, collections and wage 

garnishments—and will stay on their record for a period of up to 7 years. FTC deVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
24 

termined that in numerous instances, the companies did not contact consumers’ 

creditors or collectors, nor did they return calls. FTC later determined that more 

than $2 million the companies collected to be held in trust for making settlements 

was missing. Given their worsened financial condition, many consumers ultimately 

filed for bankruptcy. The Federal court entered default judgments against all four 

companies, banning them from engaging in any debt settlement services and ordering them to collectively pay $1.7 million in restitution to consumers, among other 

actions. FTC brought suit against four executives of the companies, but these cases 

ended in settlement agreements without any liability or fault established. As part 

of the settlements, however, the executives agreed to be permanently banned from 

participating in debt settlement services and to pay between approximately 

$220,000 and $2.6 million, depending on the amount of consumer injury that 

stemmed from their activities. The monetary judgments were largely suspended, except in two instances where the executives surrendered property and other assets 

to help satisfy what they owed, because of their inability to repay consumers. 

The experience of a secretary from Riverside, Calif., illustrates the harm that FTC 

determined the companies to have caused consumers. She joined the program after 

receiving an e-mail in August 2000 and being told by a representative from one of 

the companies that she could be completely out of debt in 16 months, according to 

a written statement she gave to FTC under penalty of perjury. At the time, she 

made about $27,000 a year, owed a total of $7,000 in credit card debt and was making little progress toward reducing her balances given that her salary barely covered 

rent, food, car payments, and insurance. The company also offered a debt management class, which she stated had appealed to her because she wanted to learn how 

to better manage her money. She never received the promised training, though, despite asking for it several times. Three months after she joined the program, letters 

from creditors started arriving threatening legal action if she did not pay. Counselors with her debt settlement company told her to ignore them, calling the move 

a ‘‘scare’’ tactic. She started to panic after she received a court summons in late 

2000 stating that a lawsuit had been filed against her. A counselor again told her 

not to worry, that everything would be OK. After a court summons arrived from a 

second credit card company, a counselor told her to fax the documents to the company and that staff would deal with it. The state courts, however, entered two judgments against her in March 2001. She later received notice that her wages would 

be garnished by 25 percent. ‘‘I was frantic,’’ she stated. ‘‘I was barely making ends 

meet on my salary.’’ By July 2001—less than a year after the secretary entered the 

debt settlement program—her credit card debt had more than doubled to about 

$15,000, because of late charges, interest, and other fees. She filed for bankruptcy 

that same month. She later sued the company that enrolled her in the program and 

settled for what she had paid in program fees, about $1,700, plus court costs. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time. 

25 

APPENDIX I: DEBT SETTLEMENT COMPANIES

Table 4 below summarizes examples of fraudulent, deceptive, abusive or questionable information provided by the 20 debt settlement companies we called. We have 

referred these cases, as appropriate, to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 

Table 4: Representations Made by Debt Settlement Companies We Called 

No. Location of company 

and affiliates Fees a Association 

membership b Case details 

1 Florida; affiliates in 

Florida, Massachusetts, California, 

and New Jersey b

• Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required throughout program.

The Association of 

Settlement Companies (TASC);c affiliates in TASC and 

United States Organizations for 

Bankruptcy Alternatives (USOBA) 

• Marketing website that referred us to two affiliates 

• Representative from one affiliate (a member of USOBA) 

stated ‘‘everyone who enters the program makes the independent decision to stop paying their creditors’’ 

• Identified through spam e-mail message received by one 

of our investigators 

• website advertised ‘‘New Government Programs!’’ and ‘‘If 

we can’t get you out of debt in 24 hours we’ll pay you 

$100’’ 

• Representatives claimed high success rates—93 percent 

and 100 percent 

• Representative from USOBA-member affiliate claimed 

that ‘‘worst case scenario’’ for our settlements would be 

‘‘40 cents on the dollar,’’ and that ‘‘every single creditor 

settles.’’ He also promised that hiring his company would 

ensure that calls from creditors would ‘‘slow down and 

eventually stop’’ 

• Representative from TASC-member affiliate claimed that 

TASC was ‘‘like the SEC for stock traders’’ and serves as 

the regulating body for the industry 

• Owner of company acknowledged TASC logo featured on 

website despite company not being a member of TASC 

• For further details, see section on ‘‘Company 1’’ in this 

testimony 

2 Unknown; affiliates 

in Arizona, Texas, 

and Californiab

• Advance fees 

based on 12 percent of enrolled 

debt.

• First 3 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

• $25 monthly 

maintenance fee.

• Additional contingent fee based 

on 4 percent of 

reduction in debt 

company obtains 

for clients.

Affiliate in USOBA • Marketing website that referred us to at least three affiliates 

• Representatives from two affiliates told us we would not 

make our monthly payments to creditors while in the program 

• Representative from one affiliate told us we could not afford debt settlement and suggested that we consider 

bankruptcy as an alternative 

• website advertised ‘‘Reduce balances to 40 percent—60 

percent,’’ ‘‘Eliminate excessive Credit Card Debt interest 

immediately,’’ and ‘‘End late payment fee’s [sic]’’ 

• Company’s radio advertisements claimed ‘‘government 

approved’’ and ‘‘government authorized’’ debt settlement 

• Representative from one affiliate stated creditors would 

send letters to us indicating that our settled accounts are 

considered ‘‘paid in full’’ 

• For further details, see section on ‘‘Company 2’’ in this 

testimony 

3 California • Advance fees 

based on 16 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required throughout program.

• First 3 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

• $100 fee for outof-state clients.

TASC (at the time 

of our call) 

• website targeted at Christian consumers 

• Multiple representatives told us we would not make payments to our creditors once we entered company’s program 

• Representative told us that stopping payments to our 

creditors would ‘‘knock [our credit score] down a couple of 

points,’’ and that our credit would only be affected while 

we were in the program 

• Representatives claimed that program has 85 percent 

success rate, that lawsuits from creditors were ‘‘just random’’ and did not require an attorney, and that they 

would negotiate our debt down to 40 to 60 percent of 

what we owed 

• Representative told us that creditors would report our accounts settled for less than the full balance as ‘‘paid in 

full’’ or ‘‘paid as agreed’’ 

• Owner told us during our site visit that the company recently dropped its TASC membership due to rising costs 

• For further details, see section on ‘‘Company 3’’ in this 

testimony 

26 

Table 4: Representations Made by Debt Settlement Companies We Called—Continued 

No. 

Location of 

company 

and affiliates 

Fees a Association 

membership b Case details 

4 California • Advance fees 

based on 17 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required throughout program.

• First 3 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

• $840 maintenance fee (total 

throughout program).

• $623.50 trust account fee (total 

throughout program).

TASC • Company advertised ‘‘U.S. National Debt Relief Plan,’’ 

with a logo depicting a shield filled with a U.S. flag 

• Representative stated that, upon entering the program, 

we would ‘‘no longer be making payments to your creditors on a monthly basis’’ 

• Representative justified first 3 monthly payments going 

only to fees as necessary because it covered initial set-up 

costs and ‘‘to show that you have the commitment to be 

in the program’’ 

• For further details, see section on ‘‘Company 4’’ in this 

testimony 

5 California • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt.

TASC (at the time 

of our call) 

• Representative told us we were too poor for debt settlement and advised us to consider bankruptcy as an alternative; later described company’s debt settlement program 

• Representative stated that we could not continue paying 

our creditors while in company’s program 

• After our undercover call but prior to release of this testimony, company appears to have gone out of business 

• For further details, see section on ‘‘Company 5’’ in this 

testimony 

6 Texas • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required during 

first 24 months 

(program length 

unknown).

Unknown • Representative stated that ‘‘One-hundred percent of our 

clients stop making those [credit card] payments’’ in 

order for program to work; later directed us to divert 

money from paying creditors to account from which company withdraws fees 

• Representative advised us to give company’s telephone 

number to creditors as our telephone number, to avoid 

calls from creditors 

• Representative stated ‘‘basically what we do is . . . we 

negotiate with your creditors to basically cut your bills in 

half. So when we go to negotiate, we go to negotiate at 50 

cents on the dollar. That’s what we guarantee. Now, we 

can also get less,’’ and added as an example one major 

bank that he claimed ‘‘normally settles’’ for only 30 cents 

on the dollar. 

• Represented their program could prevent creditors from 

suing us or garnishing our wages 

7 California • Advance fees 

based on 10 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required during 

first 12 months 

(of estimated 38- 

month program).

Unknown • Advertises ‘‘National Debt Relief Stimulus Plan’’ 

• Representative told us we would stop paying our creditors, and that ‘‘the only thing you’re going to have to 

worry about is this payment here [company’s fees]’’ 

• Representative stated that lawsuits were a ‘‘scare tactic’’ 

• website states it can ‘‘Prevent Creditor Harassment’’ 

• Representative claimed company could reduce our balances so that we would pay ‘‘anywhere from 30 to 60 percent on what you owe’’ 

8 Texas • Advance fees 

based on 12 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required during 

first 15 months 

(of estimated 48- 

month program).

• First 4 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

TASC • Regarding payments to our creditors, representative stated ‘‘you’re gonna have to cut them off so that they haven’t 

received anything’’ 

• Representative claimed ‘‘every account that we work on 

will be at least 40 cents on the dollar’’ 

9 Texas • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required during 

first 12 months 

(of estimated 24- 

month program).

Unknown • Representative stated that ‘‘one-hundred percent of our 

clients stop making their monthly payments as soon as 

they enroll into the program’’ 

• Representative encouraged us to explore other debt relief 

options as well as debt settlement 

• Name of company changed during our investigation 

27 

Table 4: Representations Made by Debt Settlement Companies We Called—Continued 

No. 

Location of 

company 

and affiliates 

Fees a Association 

membership b Case details 

10 Texas • Advance fees 

based on 17 percent of debt, with 

monthly payments required 

during first 19 

months (of estimated 48-month 

maximum program).

USOBA • Representative stated that upon enrolling in company’s 

program ‘‘you would no longer make any of your credit 

card payments. All of them would go late’’ 

• Representative claimed to ‘‘negotiate your debt down to 

50 percent or less of what you owe’’ 

• Representative said advance fees paid for attorneys who 

would ‘‘look at’’ our account monthly 

• Representative was unable to explain refund policy by 

telephone 

• Representative suggested we change our address on billing statements to address for company’s attorneys 

11 Florida • Unknown—only 

received recorded 

information.

Unknown • Telephone number listed on website went to a 7-minute 

recording 

• Recording stated that we would stop paying our creditors 

upon entering program 

• Recording claimed to send letters to credit bureaus that 

would ‘‘remove any late marks that you may have received on the account’’ 

12 California • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt.

Unknown • Front-end marketing company, with 28 different websites 

used to solicit customers for referral to one debt settlement company 

• Representative stated that affiliate handling actual settlement process would call us back; we did not receive a 

return call 

13 Texas • Advance fees 

based on 10 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required throughout program.

USOBA • Representative stated that program does not work for everyone, but does work for everyone who has a hardship 

• Representative stated company’s services are helpful to 

consumers ‘‘because we allow [consumers’] accounts to go 

delinquent and past due and into collections’’ 

• An e-mail sent after our call stated that upon enrolling in 

the program, ‘‘we will inform your creditors that you will 

no longer be making payments on the accounts’’ 

14 Arizona • Advance fees 

based on 12.9 

percent of enrolled debt, with 

monthly payments required 

during first 10 to 

12 months (of estimated 30-month 

program).

Unknown • Representative stated that ‘‘9 out of 10 of our clients are 

current,’’ but stop making payments when entering program 

• When asked whether to stop paying accounts that are 

current, representative replied ‘‘Absolutely’’ 

15 California • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt.

• First 3 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

• $30 monthly 

maintenance fee.

• $14.50 monthly 

trust account fee.

TASC • Representative stated that she could not interfere with 

our obligation to pay our creditors, and encouraged us to 

continue making payments if we could afford to do so at 

the same time as saving for settling debts 

• Representative later stated that if we could continue 

making our minimum payments ‘‘maybe this [debt settlement] isn’t the best solution for you’’ 

16 Florida • Contingent fees 

based on 35 percent of reduction 

in debt company 

obtains for clients.

• First monthly 

payment goes to 

enrollment fee.

• $53 monthly 

maintenance fee.

USOBA • website targeted at Christian consumers 

• Representative stated that ‘‘you stop paying everybody. 

That’s what makes you qualify. You fall behind.’’ 

• Company’s contract states there is a $1,000 termination 

fee for dropping out of the program 

• Representative suggested that we could pay our initial 

fee with a credit card 

• Representative offered to also provide us information on 

debt consolidation loans, to determine which option would 

be best 

17 California • Advance fees 

based on 18 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required during 

first 18 to 24 

months (of estimated 36-month 

program).

USOBA • Representative encouraged us to take care of our late 

mortgage payments before worrying about paying off or 

settling our credit card debts 

28 

Table 4: Representations Made by Debt Settlement Companies We Called—Continued 

No. 

Location of 

company 

and affiliates 

Fees a Association 

membership b Case details 

18 Unknown • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt, with monthly payments required throughout program.

• First 3 monthly 

payments go to 

fees.

Unknown • website targeted at Christian consumers 

• website describes one of the ‘‘blessings’’ of its program as 

‘‘Immediate increase of spendable cash-flow [sic]’’ 

• Representative told us the program is based on our stopping payments to creditors 

19 Maryland • Advance fees 

based on 15 percent of enrolled 

debt.

• $9.85 monthly 

bank fee.

Unknown • Representative stated that it ‘‘wouldn’t make sense’’ to 

continue making payments while in a debt settlement 

program 

• Representative said that program ‘‘works for some’’ but is 

‘‘not great for others,’’ and that company discourages consumers from debt settlement if they plan to buy a house 

soon, due to credit score damage 

20 California • Unknown—representative said 

we did not have 

enough debt to 

qualify for program.

TASC • Representative stated that we did not have enough debt 

to qualify for the company’s debt settlement program 

Source: GAO analysis of information obtained from debt settlement companies. 

aFee information reflects fees disclosed to us; some companies may charge additional fees that were not disclosed. Debt settlement 

companies typically charge fees requiring payments either at the beginning of the program as an advance fee or after each settlement 

as a contingent fee. Some companies structure the payment of advance fees so that they collect a large portion of them—as high as 40 

percent—within the first few months regardless of whether any settlements have been obtained or any contact has been made with the 

consumer’s creditors. Others collect fees throughout the first half of the enrollment period in advance of a settlement. Companies that 

charge a contingent fee generally base it on a certain percentage of any settlement they actually obtain for consumers. They sometimes 

charge a small, additional fee every month while consumers are busy attempting to save funds for settlements. FTC has criticized advance fees, stating that consumers often suffer irreparable injury as a result of paying them in advance of receiving services. The agency maintains that the practice of taking fees before a settlement is obtained results in a number of adverse consequences for consumers: late fees or other penalty charges, interest charges, delinquencies reported to credit bureaus that decrease the consumer’s 

credit score, and sometimes legal action to collect the debt. bSome companies we called referred us to one or more affiliates. It was not always clear to us exactly with which company or affil- iate we were speaking, where the companies or affiliates were located, or what the relationships were between the companies and af- filiates. In some cases, separate affiliates of the same company claimed to be members of different industry trade associations. cWhile Company 1 claimed to be a member of TASC, it appears this was a false representation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have, incidentally—there are several of 

those comments which I couldn’t understand. Do you have text 

which is available? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, we do. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have text. 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I just—I want to have that. 

Mr. KUTZ. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. 

And now, we will turn to The Honorable Julie Brill. 

Well, I—I’m just doing it in order of what I see here. I’m not 

going to be stage-managed, OK? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I will be stage-managed. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Haas—Mr. and Mrs. Haas. You’re of Concord, New Hampshire. 

Mrs. HAAS. Yes, I am. 

The CHAIRMAN. And please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HOLLY A. HAAS, CONSUMER 

Mrs. HAAS. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison, for inviting me to speak with you today about my 

experience with debt settlement. 

29 

I live in New Hampshire with my husband of 17 years. I have 

three sons and one grandson. My son served proudly with the U.S. 

Navy until 2009. 

In June 2007, our credit card interest rates were increased. The 

credit card company told us our debt-to-income ratio was too high, 

and that justified an increase, even though we were current. These 

increases made it difficult to meet our monthly budget, due to dramatic increases of our monthly payments. We were never late on 

our payments, but we needed help to reduce them. 

In July 2007, after watching TV commercials on credit counseling, we started researching credit counseling companies on the 

Internet. We found one, in particular, that was close to home in 

Massachusetts: Consumer Credit Counseling of America; and because it had ‘‘America’’ in it, we thought we couldn’t go wrong. 

We called CCCA and spoke with a man named Tom Roy, who 

talked to us about credit counseling, but, because of our credit card 

balances, he persuaded us to do a debt settlement. For a fee, they 

could get us an attorney, that they selected, who would work to settle our debts. In the end, we would pay 46 percent of our debt and 

a retainer of $7,500. This would cut our credit card payments in 

half. Forty-eight payments would go into an account and would be 

used to pay the attorney and the settlements. After trying to work 

with our creditors, to no avail, this sounded like a better option for 

us. 

On August 4, 2007, we received the contract and sent it back, 

signed, along with the checking info for the installments. We were 

instructed by the CCCA not to pay our credit card bills, because 

the credit card companies would not negotiate settlements with 

current accounts. By September, the collection letters and calls 

started. Money was going into our holding account, and the attorney that Consumer Credit Counseling of America put us in touch 

with started taking his fees. 

The attorney’s name was Richard A. Brennan. We heard nothing 

from him, so we researched our attorney on the Internet. To our 

dismay, we found numerous serious complaints about him. 

Afraid that we were being scammed, we called Brennan’s client 

services number, as instructed on the contract, for questions, which 

we thought was Brennan’s office staff. But, it turned out to be a 

totally separate entity in Boca Raton, Florida. The person assured 

us that our case was being handled properly, so we continued with 

Brennan to help us with our debt. 

In November 2007, we called client services, due to collection 

threats. They no longer handled Brennan’s cases, and referred us 

to a number in Maryland that no one answered; the voice-mails 

were always full. We called client services again, who said the 

creditors agreed to settle our credit card debt at 80 percent. In reality, nothing was being done on our case and the attorney was 

still taking our money from our account. 

In February 2008, we got a call from Howard Lee Schiff, a law 

office hired by Sears credit. They were going to sue us. We told 

them that we had a lawyer and that they needed to contact him. 

We again called client services, and the woman told us they no 

longer instructed clients of Richard A. Brennan, again giving us 

the contact number that gets you nowhere. 

30 

We decided to Google his name. The complaints were worse. The 

Better Business Bureau rated him an ‘‘F,’’ and the AG of Maryland 

had reached a settlement with him to discontinue debt settlement 

practices, but the attorney was still practicing debt settlements. 

After learning this, we realized we had to stop working with him 

immediately. We then faxed a letter to the bank that had the holding account, and told them to stop all payments to Brennan, and 

to stop all transfers. We immediately closed our checking account, 

for fear that they would still take the money out anyway. The next 

day, we sent a letter to the attorney’s office, terminating his services. 

On February 25, 2008, we consulted with an attorney in New 

Hampshire, to see if we could undo the damage that Brennan 

caused. We were now so far in default that we thought our only 

option was bankruptcy. At our consultation, we found that neither 

Consumer Credit Counseling of America nor Brennan was licensed 

for debt adjustment in New Hampshire, making our contracts with 

them illegal. He said we should formally complain to the AGs’ offices in New Hampshire and in Maryland, and the New Hampshire 

Banking Commission, which we did. 

There is now an order to cease and desist in New Hampshire, 

and the AG’s office in Maryland had Brennan disbarred from their 

State. 

Our New Hampshire attorney told us about Consumer Credit 

Counseling Service of New Hampshire and Vermont, a licensed, 

nonprofit company that is affiliated with the credit card companies 

to help manage debt. We joined the program on March 10, 2008. 

In 6 months’ time, we were about $13,000 behind from where we 

started. Our credit scores had gone from excellent to poor. All credit extended to us now is at a higher rate, if at all, and banks who 

once gladly financed our cars won’t look at us. Insurance companies 

have given us a higher quote, due to their—our credit history. 

Debt settlement companies are very misleading. They have no regard for State or local laws. Debt settlement is much different than 

debt management. As we now know, a debt settlement plan does 

extreme damage to your credit. And in our opinion, they don’t work 

and shouldn’t exist. 

In 2 years, we have paid about $32,000 toward our credit cards, 

and we now owe approximately $34,000. If we started with a legitimate company first, our current debt would be about $13,000. We 

would have paid off our credit cards in April 2011. With our current payment plan, we will be debt-free October 2012. 

Now, we don’t spend beyond our means. If we want to buy something, we save up first and we do not use credit cards at all. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Haas follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOLLY A. HAAS, CONSUMER

After numerous years of unrequested credit limit increases from our credit card 

companies and them sending us checks with our monthly statements to use for credit, in June 2007, we noticed an increase in our interest rates on our monthly statements. After calling the credit card company, we were told that our ‘‘debt to income 

ratio was too high’’ and that justified an increase in rates. This was in spite of the 

fact that we were making payments on time. Increased rates made our payments 

higher and this is what made it difficult to pay these cards off. 

31 

My husband and I, realizing our ever increasing financial debt with credit cards, 

were paying more than what we could afford in credit card payments and needed 

some advice in how to reduce them in some way to make it easier to pay our necessary bills without struggling each month. We were never late on any of our credit 

card payments at this time. 

In late July 2007, after researching debt management companies on the Internet, 

we called Consumer Credit Counseling of America, (CCCofA) 1060 Osgood Street, 

North Andover, MA to get more information on debt reduction. We chose this company because it was the closest we could find from our home in Concord, NH and 

we thought they were credit councilors to help manage our debt. The representative, 

Tom Roy, asked us about our credit card balances and assured us that there were 

options for us, either reduction or settlement. First he talked about ‘‘credit counseling’’ where they would set up a payment plan with the creditors and help reduce 

the interest rates. However, he thought that it would be better for us to do a debt 

settlement plan. For a small referral fee to fill out the paperwork they could get 

us an Attorney who would work for us to settle our debts with the credit card companies. For our total debt of $48,648 we would be paying forty-six percent (46 percent) or $23,821 and an attorney fee of $7,500 for a total sum of $31,321. This would 

reduce our monthly payments from $1,327 a month to $653 (estimate) for a period 

of 4 years. The monthly payments would go into a bank account which they would 

set up for us. The money in that account would collect over time and be used to 

pay the attorney and the settlements for each of the creditors we had. They told 

us that their attorney (unknown at the time) would pay them off as he got word 

that the credit card companies agreed to settlement with the money accrued in the 

account. After trying to work with all of our creditors beforehand about reducing 

the interest rate and being denied, this sounded like a better option for us at the 

time. 

Once we agreed to go with the debt settlement and Consumer Credit Counseling 

of America sent out our contract in the mail, this was the last time we ever could 

get a hold of Tom Roy. They gladly took $400 electronically from our checking account for their referral fee. It took about 2 weeks to get the contract. 

Finally, on August 4, 2007, we received the contract in the mail, read and signed 

it and sent it by fax back to Consumer Credit Counseling of America, along with 

our checking account information for the monthly installments and a hardship letter 

to our creditors, as instructed. During that time, we were verbally instructed not 

to pay our credit card bills—which were not overdue at that time, because the credit 

card companies would not negotiate settlements with current accounts. If the credit 

card companies or collection companies called, we were told to say ‘‘We are not neglecting our debts, we have hired an attorney. Please call (the number) for more information.’’ We were instructed to fax all collection letters to our attorney, which 

we did. (Exhibit A) 

32 

Exhibit A 


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422HAAS4.eps
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422HAAS5.eps
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By the end of September 2007, the collection letters and phone calls started arriving, money was going into our ‘‘Global Client Solution Banking Services at Rocky 

Mountain Bank and Trust’’ (Exhibit B) account thru electronic transfer and the Attorney’s office was surprisingly now taking our money out of our holding account 

automatically for his fees ($649.13 each month for August and September). We still 

had not spoken to or heard from our Attorney. After calling the ‘‘client’’ phone number provided to us in the beginning to no avail and finding out who he was from 

our contract’s business heading, we decided to research about him on the Internet 

to get more information about him. To our dismay, we found numerous serious complaints about our attorney. 


422HAAS12.eps
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Exhibit B 

Shocked to think that we were being scammed and afraid that we’d lose everything we owned, we called the ‘‘client number’’ at the Client Services Department. 

The person on the other end in Boca Raton, FL, assured us that our case was being 

handled properly. We had requested at that time, that we get a copy of all correspondence to and from the creditors and the attorney from the date of the agreement until now. They agreed and said they would. About a week after that, the only 

copies we got were the ‘‘Cease and Desist Communications’’ and the POA for the 

companies we carried credit cards with. They were dated 9–25–07. Wanting to believe in the good of people, we continued with this Attorney to help us with our ever 

growing financial mess. 

In November 2007, we again called our Attorney’s Client Services Department 

due to threatening collection letters, calls and threats of lawsuits. The Client Services representative told us that they no longer handle Richard A. Brennan’ s cases 

and referred us to a number in Maryland that when called it just rang and rang. 

No one ever answered the call. When we tried to leave a message for the paralegal, 


422HAAS13.eps
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the voice mailbox always said it was full. We were just like the 1000 or so other 

people who wrote complaints about the attorney on the websites. We again called 

the Client Services representative in Boca Raton, FL and told them that no one was 

answering the phone and that we were really concerned and he asked what our 

questions were. We told him that we didn’t think anyone was working on our debt 

settlement case and he said that they got information from all creditors reducing 

our debt to 80 percent. (We feel that he just told us that to appease us.) Relieved, 

we asked him to send copies of those letters as we had already requested all copies 

of correspondence. He said he would. To this date, we never got those letters. At 

this time, nothing was done on our case and they were still withdrawing money 

from our account each month and the attorney was still taking money from our 

holding account. (Exhibit C) 

Exhibit C 


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In January 2008, we continued to get collection letters from creditors and we were 

still faxing them to the number they provided us in the contractual agreement. We 

continued to try to call the Frederick Law Group, LLC, now in Maryland, to get 

some information on our file to no avail, but continued to not pay any credit card 

bills as instructed. By now, our credit cards were over limit (with fees), overdue 

(with fees) and interest charges sky-rocketed and the Attorney was still taking our 

money. 

On February 19, 2008, we got a call from a Law Firm representing a creditor. 

They were going to sue us. We told them that we had a lawyer representing us and 

that they needed to contact them. The lady commented that the file doesn’t show 

that we have an attorney and took the information and hung up. Immediately, we 

called the number our contractual statement first provided us. The woman told us 

the same thing. They no longer instruct clients of Richard A. Brennan, again giving 

us the contact information that gets you nowhere. 

Upon trying to call this Attorney, we once again decided to Google his name. The 

complaints were worse, the Better Business Bureau’s rating of this business is an 

F, and we found where the Attorney General of Maryland had reached a settlement 

with him but the Attorney is still fraudulently scamming hundreds of debt-stricken 


422HAAS16.eps
48 

people. (Exhibit D) This settlement occurred unbeknownst to us, a month or so after 

we signed our contract with him. According to an on-line report the attorney’s company we were working with in Boca Raton, was ‘‘out of business’’ as of October 2007. 

We never received any notice of this and he still took our money each month. 

Exhibit D 

On February 19, 2008, my husband faxed a letter to the company that is in 

charge of taking out our money and told them to terminate our account and stop 

all direct payments to the account. We immediately closed our checking account for 

fear he would still take the money out anyway. (Exhibit E) 


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Exhibit E 

On February 20, 2008, we faxed a letter to the Attorney’s new office in Frederick, 

MD, terminating his POA over our creditors and terminating his (lack of) services 

due to breach of contract. (Exhibit F) To this date, Attorney Brennan’ s office has 

sent us two more blank contracts to fill out to continue the debt settlement with 

him that we started back in August 2007, even after he was fired. We still can’t 

believe how bold this rip off artist is. 


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Exhibit F 

On February 25, 2008, we had consulted with an Attorney here in Concord, NH 

to see if we could undo the damage that this scamming Attorney caused us. We 

were now so far in default that we thought our only option was bankruptcy. (Exhibit 

G) It was at this time that we found out that any company doing debt adjustments 

must be licensed with the State of NH. Neither Consumer Credit Counseling of 

America nor Richard A. Brennan was licensed in NH. Thereby making our contract 

with either of them illegal and making the fee Consumer Credit Counseling of 

America retained also illegal. He told us that we should write letters to the Attorney 

Generals Offices in NH and MD and the NH Banking Commission, which we did 

2 days later. (Exhibit H) There is now an order to ‘‘Cease and Desist’’ here in NH 

along with paying back Consumer A, which is us. (Exhibit I) The Attorney General’s 

Office in MD has managed to Disbar Richard A. Brennan from ever practicing law 

in the State of Maryland. (Exhibit J) 

This Concord, NH Attorney also told us about a program in town that is a licensed, legitimate non-profit company and is affiliated with the credit card compaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE

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nies. Anyone who filed for bankruptcy in NH must use this program for 6 months 

before filing anyway so we joined the program in hopes that we didn’t have to file 

bankruptcy. On March 10, we signed an agreement with Consumer Credit Counseling Service of NH and VT to have them help manage our credit card debt. (Exhibit K) At that time, our credit card debt had increased from $48,648 to $57,236 

a difference of $8,588. This was not including the $3,895.08 we paid Attorney Brennan, so now we were $12,483 behind from where we started. Our credit card companies refused to take off the interest charges and fees due to our issue with Richard 

Brennan and to date we are still working with Consumer Credit Counseling Service 

of NH and VT to pay off our credit cards balances. 

The far reaching affects from what this debt settlement lawyer did to us; is our 

credit scores have gone from excellent to poor; All credit extended to us now is in 

the higher interest rate bracket—if at all. Banks who financed our cars and we had 

in good standing with, won’t look at us to finance another if we ever needed too. 

We can’t refinance anything at lower rates, including our mortgage. Auto insurance 

companies have given us higher quotes due to our credit history. 

What we have learned from our experience is; Debt Settlement companies have 

business names very similar to the ‘‘real’’ ones, so it’s hard to tell who is legitimate 

and who isn’t. Debt ‘‘management’’ is much different then debt settlements; these 

debt settlement companies will tell you the key words that you want to hear, like 

‘‘reduce debt/payments in half’’, ‘‘first step toward building wealth’’, ‘‘build a bank 

account with liquid assets you never thought possible’’, ‘‘pay off your debt in 4 

years’’. They are in business to make money, they are not in business to help consumers with financial debt problems, they have no regard for State or local Laws 

and in our opinion they don’t work. 

We have read the book by Dave Ramsey, ‘‘Total Money Make Over’’ and have followed his debt free living to the letter. We’ve learned that in order to get our heads 

above water and stay above water, we don’t spend beyond our means; if we want 

to buy something, we must save a little each pay period and pay with cash when 

we have saved enough. We try to put more toward our credit card debt to get them 

paid off faster but that doesn’t always happen each month. Since we started with 

CCCS of NH, we have not used credit cards even for Christmas or birthdays. When 

we first started with CCCS of NH we had $57,236 in debt. In 2 years we have paid 

$31,895 toward our credit cards and now owe approximately $34,037. 

If we had started with a legitimate debt management company first, put what we 

paid Atty. Richard A. Brennan toward our debt, our current debt would be approximately $12,858. This means we would be completely credit card debt free in April 

2011. With our current payment plan we will be debt free October 2012. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That’s a stunning, stunning experience. 

Mr. Phil Lehman, Assistant Attorney General in the Office of 

North Carolina’s Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division, 

Raleigh, North Carolina. 

We welcome you. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. LEHMAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee. 

And, as you said, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important and 

timely consumer protection issue, and one that is a very high priority for the attorneys general around the country, particularly in 

these very difficult economic times, when consumers are overwhelmed with debt and looking for ways out that are legitimate 

and that work. 

Before I continue with my remarks, I’d like to follow up on what 

Mr. Kutz and what Mrs. Haas testified to. And I can tell you, as 

someone working in an attorney general’s office, that the stories 

they told are not isolated examples. I, along with my colleagues 

around the country, hear these kind of stories every day. It’s a very 

52 

serious problem, and what they talked about, again, is not uncommon. 

Unfair and deceptive practices in the marketing and delivery of 

debt settlement services continue to be a major problem for consumers and for law enforcement. Financially distressed consumers 

are looking for help in managing their debt burdens. Unfortunately, too many of them have fallen prey to unscrupulous debt settlement companies. These companies advertise heavily on television and on the Internet. They make grandiose promises that 

they can cut consumers’ debt burdens in half and leave the consumer completely debt-free in 12 to 36 months. 

The reality is far different from the rosy view that’s painted in 

these commercials. In the view of the attorneys general, deceptive 

conduct in the sale of debt settlement services is widespread. In 

our view, this is not a case of a reputable and beneficial industry 

that is marred by a few bad apples. 

Last October, 41 State attorneys general joined in comments in 

support of the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed rule on the 

sale of debt relief services. The comments noted that complaints to 

AGs’ offices had more than doubled since 2007 and that the States 

had brought more than 128 enforcement actions against debt relief 

companies. The attorneys general reported that too many consumers have paid substantial fees for debt settlement services that 

were often not provided. 

We identified a number of very specific, serious problem areas 

that regularly occur in the debt settlement industry. These are, 

first, as we have just heard, there are widespread deceptive representations in the sale of debt settlement services. In our experience, consumers are regularly misled about the likelihood of getting 

all their debts settled, the length of time it takes to get any debt 

settled, and the amount of money it will cost them as fees. 

Second, another major problem is the failure of debt settlement 

companies to inform consumers about the negative consequences of 

the debt settlement process. Based on what consumers have told 

us, there are many pitfalls with debt settlement programs. Consumers are directed not to communicate with or make payments to 

their creditors. When that happens, collection efforts intensify. 

Debt balances balloon due to default interest rates and late fees. 

The consumer’s credit standing will continue to deteriorate. Collection lawsuits and wage garnishment actions may follow. 

And we have heard from the banking industry that they do have, 

and would like to offer, options to consumers who are overwhelmed 

with debt, but they can’t, because consumers are told not to talk 

to their creditors and not to make payments. 

The third problem, and a very significant one, is the charging of 

significant advance fees before any real services are delivered and 

before any results are obtained. By the industry’s own admission, 

the majority of consumers drop out before debt settlements are 

completed. Since these fees are front-loaded, the debt settler gets 

paid whether or not it completes any settlements. There is little incentive to perform with this advance-fee model. If the debt settler 

does not perform and the consumer drops out after 6 months, the 

debt settler keeps the fees that it has collected, even though the 

consumer has obtained no benefit. 

53 

This is why the attorneys general that supported the FTC comments support a prohibition on the collection of advance fees for 

debt settlement services. We believe that the elimination of advance fees is the key to cleaning up this industry. 

My State, North Carolina, has already taken that step. In 2005, 

our General Assembly enacted an advance-fee ban for debt settlement services. It has worked well, both for enforcement purposes 

and to limit debt settlement abuses. 

Debt settlement companies can, and do, operate without charging 

very large advance fees. We’ve been informed by two major national companies that they can do business in North Carolina and 

that they can continue to do business by collecting fees only after 

successful settlement of debts. I know the debt settlement industry 

strongly opposes any prohibition or serious limitation on advance 

fees, but it is not, as they claim, a death sentence for the industry. 

One other thing I would like to mention is that, despite our 

North—very strict North Carolina law—a problem that was highlighted by Mrs. Haas is that attorneys are now getting into this 

field, and we have seen a number of examples where attorneys are 

used as fronts by debt settlement companies to get around State 

regulatory laws. In many States, including ours, licensed attorneys 

are exempt from both the debt settlement laws and, generally, from 

our unfair and deceptive practices laws. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you further explain that, sir? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes, I’d be happy to. The debt settlement industry—the services are—I would describe them as very segmented. 

As Mrs. Haas testified to—she responded to an ad by Consumer 

Credit Counseling of America. That is not a debt settlement company, it is a lead-generator. And the lead-generators then refer the 

consumer to somebody. In our case, in North Carolina, since debt 

settlement with advance fees is illegal, lead-generators may refer 

the consumer to a law firm, an out-of-state law firm. The law firm 

is there in name only. When the consumer signs the agreement, it’s 

in the name of a law firm. It’s a law firm retainer. So, the consumer thinks they’re getting a law firm to represent them, which 

also would mean representation in the event of a lawsuit. And so, 

it gives the consumer an added comfort zone that they wouldn’t get 

from a commercial debt settlement company. 

The fact of the matter is, the law firm does none of the work. All 

of the customer service, negotiation, accounting, and management, 

is handled by an outsourced debt settlement provider. So, the law 

firm is there in name only, and they then contend they’re not subject to State laws. They do not want to respond to subpoenas, because of attorney-client privilege, and so on. But, that is a fairly 

new problem, and I think it’s done as a way to get around State 

laws. 

In our State, we’ve had two litigated cases against law firms and 

a settlement in another case where a law firm was involved. So, 

yes, it is a problem. 

Those are my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I’d be happy to answer 

any questions. And I can speak on behalf of other attorneys general 

offices, that we greatly appreciate the attention that you and your 

committee are giving to this very important issue. 

Thank you. 

54 

1FTC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the Telemarketing Sales Rule to address the 

sale of debt relief services, 74 Fed. Reg. 41988 (Aug. 19, 2009). The comments submitted by 

NAAG are available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670–00192.pdf. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. LEHMAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, and members of the Committee, my 

name is Phil Lehman. I am an Assistant Attorney General in the Consumer Protection Division of the North Carolina Department of Justice. I have served in that capacity for 22 years and have specialized in litigation and legislation relating to consumer credit and credit fraud. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the 

Committee and to share my experience about consumer protection issues relating 

to the business of debt settlement. 

I. Unfair and Deceptive Practices in the Offering and Performance of Debt 

Settlement Services are Widespread and are a Major Consumer 

Protection Problem for State Attorneys General 

Consumer abuses in the marketing and delivery of debt settlement services have 

been a major consumer protection problem for state attorneys general. The problem 

is particularly acute in the current economic downturn when many consumers are 

overwhelmed with debt, are delinquent in credit card payments, and are looking for 

legitimate ways to cope with their debt burden. Unfortunately, too many of these 

consumers fall prey to unscrupulous debt settlement businesses that make grandiose offers of debt reduction but deliver little relief. In our experience, most consumers are worse off after enrolling in debt settlement programs. Typically, consumers’ debt balances increase with added interest, their payments are diverted to 

the debt settlement company instead of the creditor, and collection efforts, including 

legal action, are stepped up against the consumer. 

Last October, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) submitted 

comments on behalf of 41 attorneys general to the Federal Trade Commission in 

support of the FTC’s proposed Rule on Debt Relief Services.1 The attorneys general 

noted that unfair and deceptive activity in the debt settlement industry was widespread. Citing the fact that consumer complaints had substantially increased and 

that attorneys general had filed over 128 enforcement actions against debt relief 

companies, the comments welcomed the comprehensive regulatory initiative proposed by the FTC: 

The States view the eradication of unfair and deceptive practices in the debt 

relief industry—and the harm caused to consumers and the marketplace by 

these practices—as a consumer protection priority . . . [The States] submit that 

the comprehensive bright line approach reflected in the proposed rules would 

substantially aid law enforcement agencies in addressing the harms that have 

been caused to consumers by unscrupulous practices in the debt relief industry. 

In the comments, the attorneys general described some of the prevailing problematic debt settlement practices based on information obtained from cases and numerous consumer complaints: 

1. Deceptive solicitations, including unsubstantiated claims of consumer savings 

and the length of time required to complete the program. (See sample solicitations attached as Exhibit 1.) 

2. Failing to adequately inform consumers that collection efforts, including lawsuits, will continue against them due to the extended nonpayment of consumers’ 

accounts while in the debt settlement program and that the consumer’s credit 

standing will deteriorate. (Sample solicitation: ‘‘You’ll avoid bankruptcy, put an 

end to harassing phone calls from creditors, and allow your credit score to dramatically improve.’’) 

3. Failing to adequately inform consumers that before debts are settled, the balances on their credit accounts will increase significantly due to accumulating interest and late charges. (Default rates on credit card accounts can be as high 

as 30 percent, so a consumer’s $10,000 debt could rise to $13,000 after 1 year 

of nonpayment.) 

4. Lack of adequate screening and individual budget analysis to determine 

whether a debt settlement program is suited for the consumer. 

55 

2 Attached is a copy of a payment schedule offered to a North Carolina consumer by Heritage Debt Relief in December 2009. It calls for the payment by the consumer of $6,906 in fees to 

Heritage. The consumer has to make monthly payments of $575 for an unspecified period of 

time. The consumer’s first 5 monthly payments of $575 are allocated entirely for Heritage’s fees, 

followed by half ($287.74) of the next 14 months payments. 3 A study published by the Colorado Attorney General’s Office based on annual reports submitted by debt settlement companies from 2006 through 2008 revealed that only 7.8 percent of 

consumers who began debt settlement programs in 2006 had completed them by the end of 

2008. 53.3 percent of consumers had dropped out of the programs. The Colorado information 

came from licensed debt settlement providers, not outlaws or ‘‘bad apples.’’ See Comments of 

the Colorado Attorney General on the FTC’s proposed debt relief amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670–00189.pdf. In a 

lawsuit brought against debt settler National Asset Services (NAS), the Florida Attorney General alleged that over a six-year period, only 13.5 percent of Florida residents had completed 

NAS’ debt settlement program. In a similar case brought against NAS, the New York Attorney 

General alleged that out of 1,981 New Yorkers enrolled in the NAS program, only about 3 percent completed it. 

5. Deceptive disparagement of consumer credit counseling services and bankruptcy, which are often more effective alternatives for the consumer. 

6. The collection of substantial advance fees before any meaningful services are 

rendered, so that the debt settlement company profits even if the consumer receives no benefits. (Fees typically range from 15 percent to 18 percent of the 

consumer’s debt, and are collected in the earlier months of the program before 

settlements are concluded.) 

7. Advising consumers to cease payments on their credit accounts and to cease 

communications with their creditors. 

8. Failing to provide regular information to consumers about collection of fees, 

status of debt settlement accounts, and communications with creditors. 

The consumer protection problems in the area of debt relief services are not limited to a few bad actors; they are pervasive throughout the industry. The whole 

premise of debt settlement is based on consumers not paying their debts and not 

communicating with creditors, i.e., essentially encouraging breach of contract. The 

theory is that the older and more delinquent the debt, the easier it will be to negotiate. Only after sufficient funds are accumulated in the consumer’s settlement account (after deduction of fees), which can take a year or more, the debt settler may 

initiate some settlement negotiation activity. Consumers are taking a big risk, while 

interest charges mount and the debt settler’s fees are being collected, that they will 

eventually get relief from all their debts. 

During the extended period of time while consumers are making payments to 

their debt settlement accounts, problems are likely to arise. Creditors have not 

agreed to any debt relief plan, they are not receiving any payments, and they are 

blocked from offering debt resolution options directly to their customers. These 

months of nonpayment and non-communication lead not only to increased debt, but 

also to increased collection efforts and legal action. 

Further, a significant portion of the consumer’s initial payments is diverted to the 

settlement company’s fees.2 If the consumer drops out before the settlement process 

is concluded, as is usually the case, he or she will lose the fee payments, while facing increased debt account balances.3 The debt settler therefore profits whether or 

not it accomplishes anything for its client. 

Because of these rampant consumer abuses in the debt relief industry, 41 attorneys general specifically support the FTC’s proposal to prohibit debt settlement companies from collecting advance fees. The advance fee ban, while opposed by much 

(but not all) of the debt relief industry, is the key to preventing fraud and ensuring 

that debt settlement services will be performed. There is precedent for such an advance fee prohibition, particularly for suspect services that purport to help distressed debtors. The Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679b(b), 

and many similar state laws prohibit credit repair businesses from charging fees 

until all promised services are fully performed. Similarly, the Telemarketing Sales 

Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (a)(4), prohibits advance fees for loan brokering services, another business activity characterized by deceptive promises and minimal performance. Many states prohibit advance fees for foreclosure relief and mortgage loan 

modification services because of widespread consumer fraud in the offering and delivery of those services. The FTC is also recommending an advance fee prohibition 

in its proposed Rule on Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (75 Fed. Reg. 10707, 

March 9, 2010). 

56 

4 1963 N.C. Session Laws, Chap. 394. 

II. North Carolina Law Prohibits Debt Settlement Services If Advance Fees 

Are Charged 

Debt relief services are not a new phenomenon, nor are the consumer abuses associated with such services. Over 40 years ago, at least 13 states, including North 

Carolina, enacted ‘‘debt adjusting’’ or ‘‘debt pooling’’ statutes not just to regulate, but 

to prohibit, the then-prevailing model of debt settlement. In fact, North Carolina 

and the other similar state statutes made debt adjusting a criminal offense. The 

1963 preamble to the North Carolina statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–423, et seq., explained the reasons for banning debt adjusting services, reasons which are still very 

pertinent today: 

. . . these [debt adjusting] practices have grown to such proportions that for the 

most part they have become a national menace by preying upon unfortunate 

people and harassed debtors, and those engaged in such practices, except for a 

few, have engaged in false advertising, have falsely held themselves out as competent and able to solve debt problems regardless of any and all circumstances, 

have lured ignorant and unsuspecting people into executing contracts heavily 

loaded in their favor and have charged large fees for alleged services which results in piling debt upon debt.4

In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a similar Kansas 

debt adjusting statute in a case brought by the Kansas Attorney General against 

a company known as ‘‘Credit Advisors.’’ The Court held that the prohibitory statute 

did not violate due process rights and noted the State’s evidence that the business 

of debt adjusting ‘‘lends itself to grave abuses against distressed debtors.’’ Ferguson 

v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726. 

The original definition of debt adjusting in the North Carolina and similar statutes covered debt settlement activities but applied only where the debt adjuster received funds from the consumer to distribute to the consumer’s creditors. To get 

around the statutes, debt settlers in recent years arranged for third party bank accounts to receive the consumer’s funds. By this method, the debt settlement company did not hold consumers’ money but could still direct the disbursement of funds 

to pay its fees and to pay creditors if and when settlements were reached. 

In 2005, the North Carolina General Assembly, recognizing the abuses perpetrated by the new breed of debt settlers, amended the debt adjusting statute to 

simply prohibit advance fees for any debt settlement or foreclosure assistance services, whether or not the debt settler directly managed and disbursed consumer 

funds. The amendments have created a bright line test for compliance and have 

been effective enforcement tools. The 2005 amendments do not prevent debt settlement companies from operating in North Carolina as long as no fees are charged 

prior to completion of settlements. The Attorney General’s Office is aware of at least 

two national debt settlement companies currently doing business in North Carolina 

without charging advance fees. 

Licensed North Carolina attorneys are generally exempt from the debt adjusting 

statute but unfortunately, some attorneys have run their law firms as debt settlement businesses with some of the worst deceptive practices in the industry. Two of 

the North Carolina Attorney General’s litigated enforcement cases have been 

against out-of-state law firms who defrauded consumers by diverting funds out of 

client settlement accounts. One continuing area of concern is the practice by some 

debt settlement companies to use attorneys as fronts to offer their services in states 

that have restrictive debt settlement laws. A debt settlement company will arrange 

for an out-of-state law firm to contract with a North Carolina resident. The law firm 

then assigns all of the accounting and debt negotiation work back to the debt settlement firm. To claim an exemption from the debt adjusting law, the law firm may 

associate a local North Carolina attorney to represent the client in name only. 

III. Consumers Need Effective Debt Management Assistance 

There is clearly a need for legitimate, effective debt relief for consumers who cannot pay off their credit card accounts and do not want to file for bankruptcy. However, the current model of debt settlement is not the answer. Most debt-strapped 

consumers can benefit from financial counseling, budgeting, and debt management 

services offered by nonprofit consumer credit counseling agencies. These agencies 

offer debt management plans that allow for the orderly reduction of debt under a 

payment plan agreed to by both the consumer and the creditor. Fees are nominal 

and monthly payments are paid promptly to creditors, not held back for 12 months 

57 

or more as with debt settlement. While in the plan, the consumer gets protection 

from collection contacts. 

One of the problems with current debt management programs is that they do not 

offer significant principal reduction. The logical next step, which would benefit both 

consumers and the banking industry, would be a combination of a multi-year payment plan followed by forgiveness of principal after successful completion of the payment plan. Principal reduction is now being incorporated into mortgage loan modification programs. Unfortunately, accounting rules relating to debt charge-offs have 

prevented principal reduction programs from being implemented. A coalition of 

bankers, consumer groups and credit counseling services have approached the Office 

of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) to authorize these programs but the OCC has 

not been receptive to date. 

IV. Conclusion 

The debt settlement industry has been characterized by deceptive solicitations, 

overpromising of results, underperformance of services, and excessive fees. Too 

often, debt settlement companies have profited off of economically distressed consumers while delivering little relief in return. My colleagues in other attorneys general offices and I appreciate the attention the Committee is giving this important 

consumer protection problem. 

58 

Exhibit 1—Sample Debt Settlement Solicitations 


422LEHM1.eps
59 


422LEHM2.eps
60 


422LEHM3.eps
61 

Exhibit 2—Sample Debt Settlement Fee Schedule 

The CHAIRMAN. Am I not correct in saying there are some 86 to 

96 of the States’ attorneys general that are active in this? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Just from my experience, yes, most—the large majority of attorneys general are. And, as I said, 41 attorneys general 

signed very detailed comments in support of the FTC rule. And in 

those comments, which I would commend to the Committee, there 

are many examples of the kind that we’ve heard from today, and 

also examples of enforcement actions taken by attorneys general. 

But, that’s—41 out of 50, that’s 82 percent, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that’s what I meant to say. 


422LEHM4.eps
62 

Thank you very, very much. 

Mr. John Ansbach, who is Legislative Director of the United 

States Organization for Bankruptcy Alternatives, USOBA, and 

General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer for EFA Processing, 

from Houston, Texas. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN ANSBACH, 

LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES 

ORGANIZATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVES 

Mr. ANSBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Quick correction. I’m not the Chief Compliance Officer, I am the 

Chief Operating Officer of that company. I’m happy to correct that 

in the record. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, thank you so much for 

the opportunity to contribute to this very important meeting and 

this very important discussion. 

My name is John Ansbach. I am the Legislative Director for 

USOBA. We are a trade group based in Houston, Texas. We represent approximately 200 companies that operate in the debt settlement industry. In addition to supporting those companies with 

best practices, we also serve as a resource to consumers who are 

looking for information about the debt relief process, generally, and 

how to select an honest and ethical provider in this industry. 

I am also employed, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, by a company that actually performs debt settlement work. In my role, I directly oversee approximately 100 employees, Texans, who talk to 

consumers every day and who work to help these folks to find a 

way out of debt without ending up in personal bankruptcy. 

There has been a lot of discussion today about personal experiences. The Chairman—sir, you’ve had some stories, and obviously, 

we’ve heard Mrs. Haas’ story. If I may, I’d like to begin my remarks with a consumer story, as well. 

A wonderful woman, by the name of Ms. Faith Zabriske, suffered 

an injury a few years ago. After utilizing her credit cards to pay 

her medical and her living expenses, she fell behind on those payments. At that point, she did exactly what the Better Business Bureau and others tell her and so many to do, which is to simply call 

your bank; they’ll work with you. What she found instead, and 

what she was told candidly—the woman from the bank said, ‘‘I’m 

not supposed to tell you this, but until you fall behind on your payments for 6 months, we can’t help you,’’ essentially telling her to 

stop paying her debts or there would be nothing that the bank 

could do for her. 

She tried credit counseling. They were similarly unhelpful. And 

she found her way to a debt settlement company in Dallas, Texas. 

After working her debt settlement program and saving the money 

and working with the counselor, I am very pleased to report that 

Ms. Zabriske is today debt-free. She is on her very last payments 

with her last creditor, and is well on her way to financial stability. 

Mr. Chairman, Ms. Zabriske, as well as another gentleman 

named Mr. Gary Ross, another consumer that had a very successful debt settlement experience, are both here today. They are, in 

fact—that’s Mr. Ross and Ms. Zabriske, who have held up their 

hands—they’ve come today from Texas and Illinois. I understand 

63 

it is not possible for them to tell their story to the Committee, or 

here in testimony, but I want the Chairman to know, and the 

members, that if there is any interest in visiting with folks who 

have, in fact, had a good experience, if there is something instructive in that, then they would be, both, very happy to appear and 

talk about what their experience was. 

The CHAIRMAN. You must have come up with them at the last 

moment, because we asked you—the Committee asked you if you 

wanted to have anybody testify, and you declined to have anybody 

testify except yourself. 

Mr. ANSBACH. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think that’s 

actually accurate. I do understand that the Committee staff visited 

with staff from both USOBA and our sister trade group. I understand that Mr. Ross, in particular—his name and contact information were provided. Of course, we only found out about this hearing 

7 days ago. But, in any event, I assume that their ability to talk 

and, certainly, to share perhaps what makes a good debt settlement versus a bad experience, such as Mrs. Haas had—perhaps 

there is some instruction in that. And again, they’re here, if anybody would like to visit with them. 

It is certainly the case, Mr. Chairman, that—and I want to be 

very clear about this—despite the fact that Ms. Zabriske or Mr. 

Ross had a good experience—and, certainly, we are aware of hundreds and thousands of others who have had a good experience in 

debt settlement, both—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that again? You’re aware of hundreds of thousands of people that have had—— 

Mr. ANSBACH. Hundreds and thousands. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. What is hundreds and thousands? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Well, in particular, the Federal Trade Commission, when it held its hearing—a public forum and open public comment, there were 200 comments that were submitted by consumers 

directly who had, unlike me, been through a debt settlement program. And they ran 40-to-1 in support of, and in favor of, at least 

preserving the options of debt settlement. In addition to those, my 

company alone, and many of those that are represented here today, 

also have literally piles and piles of written testimonials that we 

would be very happy to share. 

We don’t think, by any means, that that means there is no problem in the industry. In fact, I would very much agree with what’s 

been said by Mr. Lehman and Mr. Kutz, and having heard Mrs. 

Haas’ experience, it’s very clear to us that we have significant challenges in our industry. And, candidly, it’s the reason that folks, like 

myself, my counterpart at TASC, and a number of us, spend so 

much of our time going to different states, working on debt settlement-specific legislation. 

Along these lines, I wanted to share a couple of examples of what 

we think is a very important and needed regulatory approach. I 

know Senator Boxer is not with us today, but in California specifically, we have been working now for 3 years on Assembly Bill 350, 

which not only has fee regulation in it, which I think we all agree 

is critical, but it is a comprehensive piece of legislation that has insurance and surety and licensing and bonding requirements, as 

well as some of the things that the Federal Trade Commission have 

64 

proposed, which we fully support. AB 350 has passed the House. 

It is pending in the Senate. We are hopeful, although, obviously, 

they have budget difficulties in the State, and I’m not sure where 

that will go, but we’re hopeful it will move. 

I think an even better model is the Tennessee model. Tennessee 

passed a piece of legislation that is very specific on fees. And I 

want to be very clear on—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ansbach, this is fascinating testimony, and 

you’re speaking to your own advantage by not speaking to the nature of the hearing. You’re talking about what states are doing to 

try and get rid of the kinds of problems that your association 

causes. You’re leading us to believe that what you do is absolutely 

wonderful and that all of these other experiences are just anomalies. 

It is our impression that it is quite exactly the opposite of that 

and that you’re fundamentally making happy talk in front of a very 

serious problem. And I don’t appreciate that. 

Now, if you have testimony which reflects upon, not what States 

are doing, but how you see this problem, which is being represented here and which will be further represented by the person 

next to you—the lady next to you—that’s what I want to hear. 

That’s what you’re here for. You’re not here to talk about what various States are doing. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Mr. Chairman, I do apologize if in any way I’ve 

insulted this body. Because we were discussing fee regulation, I 

thought it would be instructive to know what has been worked on 

for the last 5 years. It was only in that respect that I wanted to 

offer what Tennessee has done. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, well, you’ve done that now, so let’s get back 

to the subject. 

Mr. ANSBACH. What I want to be very clear about, Mr. Chairman, is—and I, again, apologize—this is not a rosy picture. I have 

160 people that I employ, that do this work every single day. We 

work very hard to help folks. Now, that does not mean that we are 

100-percent successful and that, in any way, Mrs. Haas or any of 

the other stories have been anomalies. I don’t think that’s true at 

all. I think there are some significant issues in the industry, and 

we need to address them. 

With that said, the Federal Trade Commission has proposed a 

number of things in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Eighty 

percent of it is incredibly important. We need more disclosure requirements. We need more prohibited misrepresentation rules. We 

need fair advertising rules. The one portion of the rule that we are 

unable to support, as Mr. Lehman has pointed out, is the advancefee ban. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, which is—of course, is the only thing that 

makes you money. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Respectfully, I would—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize, Senator McCaskill; I seem to be asking questions, and I shouldn’t be doing that. But, I can’t quite help 

myself. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You’ll get a chance, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I know that. I’m just taking any chance I can 

get. 

65 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just thought maybe you, you know, hadn’t 

been around here long enough, and I could—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, right. Right. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, you don’t disagree with my statement, that 

the one thing that you don’t agree with is the one thing which puts 

money in your pocket. 

Mr. ANSBACH. I do, respectfully, disagree. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And how would you disagree with—no, I’ll ask 

that question later. Proceed with your testimony. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, sir. 

The advance-fee ban that’s proposed essentially says that a small 

business owner that does this work must operate without revenue 

for up to a year. That is the absolute—I mean, that’s what it does. 

And because it—the reason it’s a year is because consumers must 

have time to create a savings. In that year, up to that time period, 

folks that I employ, and others, must be able to stay on the phones, 

to talk with them, to empower them with information about this 

process. The reality is, I cannot afford to pay my employees for a 

year without any revenue at all. That is the reason that we characterize this as the death of the industry. That is the reason, I suspect, that 85 percent of our members have indicated, in response 

to surveys, that they will go out of business if an advance-fee ban, 

in particular, is passed. 

All—to be very clear, all of the rest of the rule is incredibly necessary and needed. There are, absolutely, issues in this industry 

that must be addressed, but an advance-fee ban, actually, as Mr. 

Lehman has already pointed out, has a very obvious consequence. 

Most, if not all, of our members don’t do business in North Carolina anymore, because they can’t afford to. I don’t see that as a successful outcome, because what has then happened, consumers no 

longer have any other option. They have bankruptcy, they have 

credit counseling, and nothing in the middle. 

I do not believe, with all due respect, that that is the consumerprotective outcome that we are trying to get to with this regulation. 

Mr. Chairman, I—you’ve been very gracious with your time. If I 

may just share a few very last things. And I will promise to answer 

any questions that you may have. 

Under the very fee structure that is being proposed to be outlawed, our members, as well as our sister trade group’s members, 

have resolved almost $3 billion in unsecured debt for consumers. 

Clearly, there are positive results that are happening in this industry. We would simply ask that we be given the opportunity to stay 

at the table. And again, we’re incredibly grateful that we were invited today. We simply want to continue to participate in this process. We want to help find appropriate and strong consumer protection regulation, whether it is here in Washington, D.C., or in the 

states. 

And in that regard, I’m happy to answer any questions that you 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ansbach follows:] 

66 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN ANSBACH, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVES

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you so much for the opportunity to be here today and to contribute to what I hope is a helpful and informative hearing for you on the topic of 

debt settlement. 

My name is John Ansbach, and I volunteer in service as the Legislative Director 

of the Unites States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives or ‘‘USOBA.’’ 

USOBA is a trade association in Houston Texas whose members are ∼ 200 companies that offer debt relief services to financially strapped consumers who are trying 

to avoid bankruptcy. In addition to supporting these member companies, USOBA 

also serves as a resource to consumers who are trying to find out information about 

the debt resolution process and what to look for in an honest, ethical provider. It 

is in my capacity as the Legislative Director of USOBA that I appear before you 

today. 

I want you to know, as well, so that I can shed light on other areas of interest 

to the Committee, that I am also the Chief Operating Officer and Genera Counsel 

of what we in the industry refer to as a ‘‘back-end’’ company. As such, our company 

works for other companies servicing their clients. In this role, I directly oversee 

more than 100 Texas employees in the City of Frisco just north of Dallas who talk 

to debt settlement consumers every day, supporting them, negotiating for them, giving them information about the unsecured debt process and otherwise helping them 

to meet their savings goals and succeed in their programs. 

The title of today’s hearing is ‘‘The Debt Settlement Industry—The Consumer’s 

Experience.’’ In this regard, I want to offer as much information as I can to help 

this committee better understand debt settlement and what it can and has done to 

help consumers. 

In this regard, please let me begin today with a real life example of debt settlement. It is the story of Faith Zabriske, a wonderful woman in my home state of 

Texas who has lived the nightmare of being overwhelmed by debt, and who utilized 

the services of a debt settlement company to not only survive that nightmare, but 

to emerge from it stronger and financially stable. 

Ms. Zabriske suffered an injury a few years ago and like many Americans was 

forced to turn to her credit cards to pay medical bills and other living expenses to 

survive. 

Although she recovered from her injuries, she was soon overwhelmed by the debt 

created by her ordeal. At that point she did exactly what the Better Business Bureau and consumer advocates tell consumers to do who are in such situations: she 

called her credit card company to find out if they would work with her on repayment of the debt. At the time, Ms. Zabriske had a credit score in the high 700s and 

had always paid her debts timely. 

Unfortunately, what Ms. Zabriske found from her creditor was not help, but rather a refusal to work with her. She was told that until she was 6 months delinquent, 

the bank wouldn’t work with her. She tried credit counseling, as well, but they were 

similarly unhelpful. 

It wasn’t until she enrolled in a debt settlement program that she found true support. After working her program, saving money as needed, her provider was able 

to help Ms. Zabriske settle all of her debts and today she is debt free, on the path 

to financial stability. 

Ms. Zabriske is here today, having traveled all the way from Texas to tell her 

story. USOBA offered to have her appear today to tell this story herself, but she 

was not extended an invitation. 

Mr. Gary Ross from Illinois, another consumer who had a successful experience 

with debt settlement is also here and prepared to tell his story. HE was also offered, 

but like Ms. Zabriske was not extended an opportunity to tell his story. 

If any member of this committee or anyone else would like to visit with either 

of these good folks to hear their story and their experience, they welcome the opportunity to visit after this hearing. 

Ladies and gentlemen of this committee, Ms. Zabriske and Mr. Ross represent 

just two of hundreds of stories of consumers who have had successful outcomes in 

debt settlement programs. In fact, in the Federal Trade Commission’s own public 

comment period, of the 200 consumer testimonials the Commission received, we understand those testimonials ran 40:1 in favor and in support of preserving debt settlement as an important option for consumers in need. 

And in fact, that is truly what we are here to talk about: preserving options. The 

truth is that USOBA, as well as our sister trade group the Association of Settlement 

Companies (‘‘TASC’’), supports strong consumer protection regulation in the debt 

67 

settlement industry, including the overwhelming majority of what has been proposed by the FTC in its August Notice of Public Rulemaking. Stronger consumer 

disclosure requirements are needed and should be adopted. Rules proscribing certain misrepresentations in advertising are needed and should be adopted. In fact, 

USOBA and TASC have been arguing and working in support of these actions as 

well as others for more than 5 years now in roughly 20 states, including but not 

limited to licensing and registration requirements; bonding and insurance requirements; strong advertising rules; reasonable fee regulation including limits on 

amount and timing of fee collection; contract requirements that set out specific language that must be included for the benefit of consumers; requiring education for 

consumers; even requiring multiple language efforts where debtors in need don’t 

speak English as a first language to ensure an understanding of the program. These 

efforts are ongoing even as we sit here today in California, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Connecticut and Maryland. Nevada, Tennessee, Minnesota, Oregon, Utah, Montana, Delaware, Rhode Island and Colorado have already 

adopted debt settlement statutes with input from both consumer groups and industry trade organizations. 

In short, the industry has supported and continues to work for strong consumer 

protection regulation of this industry; regulation that manages to enact such protection while preserving the ability of honest, ethical companies to provide consumers 

with the services and options they need. 

What we cannot support, however, and what we understand the FTC is attempting to implement via the Telemarketing Sales Rule, is fee regulation that would kill 

the industry. The FTC’s proposed ‘‘advance fee ban’’ would put 85 percent of our 

members—most of whom are small business owners—out of business. They would 

accomplish this by essentially starving these businesses of revenue, disallowing the 

collection of any fees for services rendered unless and until there was a settlement 

of a debt, a process that often takes up to a year or more. In short, the FTC proposes to require American businesses owners to work for free for up to a year—paying their own employees to talk to and help consumers; paying their rent; addressing expenses related to information technology and required infrastructures—all the 

while being unable to collect fees from the very consumers they are trying to help. 

The truly troubling part of this effort is that there exists another more reasonable 

alternative, which the states themselves have adopted and which would be preempted by this effort. More specifically, the states of Colorado, Utah, Montana, Nevada, Delaware and Tennessee have adopted a capped and limited pay as you go 

fee structure that both limits the amount of money a consumer may be charged and 

when the fees may be collected. 

Tennessee in particular has a very workable system that balances good consumer 

protection and the rights of honest ethical providers to be compensated for their 

services. Under the Tennessee law, a provider may charge in one of two ways: a 

savings model that allows for fee recovery based on what the provider saves the consumer; and, a ‘‘pay as you go’’ fee system, under which no more than 17 percent 

of a consumer’s enrolled debt may be charged. Further, fees cannot be collected any 

sooner than in equal payments spread out over half the life of a consumer’s program. In a typical case where $10,000 in debt is enrolled then, a consumer may not 

be charged more than $1,700. This fee must then be collected over half the life of 

a program. Where programs typically last thirty-six months, half the life would be 

eighteen months, thus fees of $1,700 over eighteen months or $94 per month. The 

result is a good, middle of the road approach than ensures a consumer does not face 

high up front fees, while preserving a modicum of revenue for his or her provider, 

allowing the business to pay its employees and rent. 

Distinguished members, the allegations that are often made by the consumer 

groups in particular, and which you may hear today, resonate around one critical 

point: that debt settlement services are ‘‘rarely if ever provided to consumers’’ as 

promised. Well ladies and gentlemen, please allow me to report the following facts 

that we believe refute such assertions: 

• USOBA members alone have settled more than $1.4 billion in unsecured debt 

over the last few years. 

• This debt was settled for consumers who experienced an average reduction of 

53 percent; that is, they settled their debt for 47 cents on the dollar. 

• Our members alone are right now servicing more than 277,000 consumers, consumers who will be stranded and left to bankruptcy if the FTC’s rule is passed 

as drafted and these providers go out of business. 

• When you add TASC’s members into this mix, you find that roughly $3 billion 

of unsecured debt has been settled for America consumers. 

68 

If I may, let me also add for you the very most recent numbers from my company, 

just one USOBA member company that services other providers working for consumers: 

Last month alone, in March 2010, we: 

• Settled 1,491 individual accounts with a value at enrollment of $9.14 million. 

• Those accounts were settled for $3.9 million, or $0.36 on the dollar, a savings 

of 64 percent to the consumers. 

Over the last 3 months (Jan–March), we: 

• Settled 3800 accounts (3,793) with a total value at enrollment of $22.9 million. 

• Those accounts were settled at an average of $0.36 on the dollar, again saving 

those consumers 64 percent on their outstanding debts. 

To date, my company has settled more than 39,000 accounts with a value of 

$214.5 million at approximately $0.40 on the dollar—a 60 percent savings to American consumers. We are currently working on settling $1.17 billion in debt for our 

consumers, again most if not all of whom will be stranded and abandoned to bankruptcy if we are forced out of business by the FTC’s proposed fee ban. 

On this last note, I do want you to know the impact of the FTC’s proposed fee 

regulation on employees. In my home state of Texas, alone, we estimate more than 

1,100 Texans will lose their jobs if this rule is adopted. These are hard working 

folks employed by USOBA member companies, only. If we add the TASC companies, 

we estimate this number is closer to 2,500–3,000 jobs lost just in Texas. While we 

do not have numbers in every state, we do know that hundreds if not thousands 

of more jobs will be lost from this rule, specifically in California and Florida, where 

debt settlement is a much needed service due to economic conditions and the still 

lingering effects of the housing bubble. In short, it is likely if not certain that as 

many as 10,000 Americans will lose their jobs if the FTC rejects the approach adopted by the states and proceeds instead with the radical fee ban they propose. 

Senators, we know you—like USOBA and TASC—want to protect consumers. And 

we know you—like USOBA and TASC—want to ensure that honest, ethical debt settlement companies can continue to help those consumers, keeping employed the 

thousands of hard working folks who dedicate their days to helping people get out 

of debt responsibly and ethically. In that, please allow us to work with you and the 

Commission on a reasonable approach that includes reasonable fee regulation, as 

well as the many other consumer protections we and so many others support. 

On behalf of the 160 people in my company in Frisco, Texas, the thousands of 

others employed by our members companies, the more than a quarter million consumers they serve right now across the country, as well as the folks employed by 

TASC and the consumers they serve, I thank you so much for the opportunity to 

contribute to this discussion and I look forward to trying to answer any questions 

you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And finally, the Honorable Julie Brill, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JULIE BRILL, COMMISSIONER, 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

Ms. BRILL. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. We’re trying to save your life, incidentally. 

Ms. BRILL. Oh, really? 

The CHAIRMAN. Of the FTC. There are those who are—— 

Ms. BRILL. Oh, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN.—who are malevolently proceeding to try and remove your powers. That will not happen. 

Ms. BRILL. And we certainly appreciate all your efforts in that 

regard, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Rockefeller, members of the Committee, I am Julie 

Brill, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. 

69 

Thank you for inviting me to testify about a critical issue for consumers during these difficult economic times: problematic practices 

in the debt relief industry. 

I’m honored to be here today in my brand new role as an FTC 

Commissioner. As you know, I’ve spent almost my entire career 

working to protect consumers from unscrupulous business practices. I’d like to thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity 

to bring my consumer protection skills and experience to the FTC. 

American consumers are overwhelmed with mortgage and credit card debt. At least 13 million Americans owe $10,000 or more in 

credit card debt. Of those households that are carrying credit card 

debt, the average amount of the debt load is approximately 

$16,000. And over 14 million American households are 30 or more 

days delinquent in their credit card bills. Many of these consumers 

have lost their jobs or have seen their working hours cut back, 

making their debt load all the more worrisome. 

Such financially distressed consumers are vulnerable to schemes 

that promise miraculous solutions to their debt problems. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, these consumers have a target on 

their back. 

You’ve heard compelling testimony this afternoon from the GAO 

regarding the deceptive and unfair marketing of debt settlement 

services. While there are some consumers, like Ms. Zabriske and 

Mr. Ross, who have benefited from the services offered by debt settlement companies, the GAO’s disturbing findings are consistent 

with what the FTC has encountered in many of our own investigations. Debt settlement firms frequently convince consumers to pay 

large fees by falsely promising to obtain deep reductions in the consumers’ debt. 

You’ve probably heard the advertisements on the radio or latenight TV: ‘‘In debt? Can’t pay your bills? Debt collectors calling you 

at all hours? Call us now. We will negotiate with your creditors so 

that you can become debt-free.’’ Through advertisements like these 

and follow-up aggressive telemarketing pitches, debt settlement 

companies often make dramatic savings promises that they cannot 

keep. 

They also sometimes make misleading statements about the fees 

that the consumers must pay for their services. Consumers may 

end up shelling out large sums of money up front, hundreds or 

even thousands of dollars, with nothing in return but empty promises. 

Now, keep in mind, the financially strapped consumers who respond to these sales pitches are having trouble paying creditors before piling on the fees of a debt settlement company. Many consumers, like Mr. Spaulding in West Virginia and Mr. and Mrs. 

Haas, who are here today, simply can’t keep up with paying the 

new fees and covering their existing debt, and are forced to drop 

out of these programs, often forfeiting all the money they’ve paid 

in fees, leaving them worse off than when they started. 

The Commission has been actively pursuing those debt relief 

service providers and other fraudsters who prey on Americans 

hardest hit by the financial crisis. In an effort to improve law enforcement and set clear standards for the debt relief industry, the 

Commission published a proposed rule last August. The proposal 

70 

1The views expressed in this statement represent the views of the Commission. My oral presentation and responses to any questions you may have are my own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or any other Commissioner. 2 A list of the Commission’s law enforcement actions against debt relief companies is attached 

as Appendix A. 3 In addition to consumers who lost money from fraudulent debt relief companies, hundreds 

of thousands, if not millions, of consumers have been harassed by automated robocalls pitching 

services in violation of the Do Not Call provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The Commission has charged companies engaging in these robocalls with violations of the rule. See, e.g., FTC 

v. Economic Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–CV–3347 (N.D. Ga., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 

17, 2009); FTC v. 2145183 Ontario, Inc., No. 09–CV–7423 (N.D. Ill., preliminary injunction 

issued Dec. 17, 2009); FTC v. JPM Accelerated Servs. Inc., No. 09–CV–2021 (M.D. Fla., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 31, 2009). 

would amend the telemarketing sales rule to cover debt relief providers that promote and sell their services over the telephone. 

It would be premature to speculate about whether the Commission will issue a final rule, and, if so, what the rule might contain. 

But, I can assure you that the proceeding has been thorough, 

thoughtful, transparent, and fair. The Commission received written 

comments from over 300 individuals, corporations, and organizations. The Commission also hosted a public forum to discuss the 

proposed amendments, with stakeholders representing a wide variety of viewpoints. And the Commission staff has had extensive discussions with industry representatives, consumer advocates, and 

other interested parties. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to describe how the FTC 

is protecting financially strapped consumers from those debt relief 

services that engage in deceptive and abusive practices. 

I’d be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brill follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JULIE BRILL, COMMISSIONER, 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

I. Introduction 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the Committee, I am Julie Brill, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘FTC’’ 

or ‘‘Commission’’).1 I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and the 

Commission thanks this Committee for its interest in the work of the FTC to protect 

consumers from deception and abuse in the sale of debt relief services. 

The Commission has long been active in protecting consumers of financial products and services offered by entities within the agency’s jurisdiction. With Americans continuing to feel the effects of the recent economic downturn, the Commission 

has stepped up its efforts to stop fraudulent financial schemes that exploit consumers who are particularly vulnerable as a result of financial distress. Stopping 

deceptive debt relief practices is one of our highest consumer protection priorities. 

Providers of debt relief services purport to help people who cannot pay their debts 

by negotiating on their behalf with creditors. Debt settlement companies, for example, market their ability to dramatically reduce consumers’ debts, often by making 

claims to reduce debt by specific and substantial amounts, such as ‘‘save 40 to 60 

percent off your credit card debt.’’ To be sure, some debt relief services do help consumers reduce their debt loads. In too many instances, however, consumers pay 

hundreds or thousands of dollars for these services but get nothing in return. 

The FTC utilizes its four principal tools to protect consumers of debt relief services: law enforcement, rulemaking, consumer education efforts, and research and 

policy development. To halt deceptive and abusive practices and return money to 

victimized consumers, the Commission has brought 20 lawsuits in the last 7 years 

against sham nonprofit credit counseling firms, debt settlement services, and debt 

negotiators, including 6 in the past year alone.2 These cases have helped over 

475,000 consumers who have been harmed by deceptive and abusive practices.3 The 

Commission continues to actively investigate debt relief companies and will continue 

aggressive enforcement in this arena. As the Commission’s law enforcement experience has shown, victims of these schemes often end up more in debt than when they 

71 

4 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 et seq. 5With respect to its research and policy development in this area, in September 2008, the 

Commission held a public workshop entitled ‘‘Consumer Protection and the Debt Settlement Industry,’’ which brought together stakeholders to discuss consumer protection concerns associated 

with debt settlement services. Workshop participants also debated the merits of possible solutions to those concerns. An agenda and transcript of the Workshop are available at www.ftc.gov/ 

bcp/workshops/debtsettlement/index.shtm. Public comments associated with the Workshop are 

available at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/index.shtm. 6 15 U.S.C. § 45. 7 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108. Pursuant to the Telemarketing Act’s directive, the Commission promulgated the original TSR in 1995 and subsequently amended it in 2003 and in 2008. 8The Commission also has law enforcement authority and, in some cases, regulatory powers 

under a number of other consumer protection statutes specifically related to financial services, 

including the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1666j; the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o; the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1691–1691f; the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j; the Electronic 

Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r; the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809; and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111– 

8, § 626, 123 Stat. 524 (Mar. 11, 2009). 9The FTC Act exempts banks and other depository institutions and bona fide nonprofits, 

among others, from the Commission’s jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44 and 45(a)(2). These exemptions apply to the Telemarketing Act and the TSR as well. 10Since the beginning of 2009, the FTC has brought 40 cases against defendants engaged in 

deceptive practices targeting financially-distressed consumers. 11The Commission has addressed similar problems with respect to companies offering to resolve consumers’ mortgage debts. The Commission has engaged in an aggressive, coordinated 

enforcement initiative to shut down companies falsely claiming the ability to obtain mortgage 

loan modifications or other relief for consumers facing foreclosure. In the past year, the FTC 

has brought 17 cases (against more than 90 defendants) targeting foreclosure rescue and mortgage modification frauds, with other matters under active investigation. In addition, state enforcement agencies have brought more than 200 cases against such firms. Further, as directed 

by Congress under the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–8, the Commission 

has initiated a rulemaking proceeding addressing the for-profit companies in this industry. 

Under the proposed rule, companies could not receive payment until they have obtained for the 

consumer a documented offer from a mortgage lender or servicer that comports with any promises previously made. Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 10707 (Mar. 9, 2010). 

began. Especially in these difficult economic times, when so many consumers are 

struggling to keep their heads above water, this is unacceptable. 

Below, this testimony provides an overview of the three common types of debt relief services, as well as the Commission’s law enforcement efforts with respect to 

each. The testimony then describes the Commission’s proposal to amend its Telemarketing Sales Rule (‘‘TSR’’) 4 to strengthen the agency’s ability to stop deception 

and abuse in the provision of debt relief services. Finally, the testimony addresses 

the FTC’s ongoing efforts to educate consumers about debt relief options and how 

to avoid scams.5

II. The Commission’s Authority 

The Commission enforces Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,6 as well as the Telemarketing and 

Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (‘‘Telemarketing Act’’),7 and the associated TSR that prohibit certain deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices.8 The 

Commission has used this authority to challenge debt relief providers within its jurisdiction 9 who have engaged in deceptive or abusive practices. In addition, the 

Commission works to protect consumers from a wide range of other unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices in the marketplace, such as credit-related and government grant scams, mortgage loan modification scams, deceptive marketing of health 

care products, deceptive negative option marketing, and business opportunity and 

work-at-home schemes.10 The FTC works closely with many state attorneys general 

and state banking departments to leverage resources in consumer protection. 

III. Overview of Debt Relief Services and FTC Law Enforcement Efforts 

Debt relief services have proliferated over the past few years as greater numbers 

of consumers are struggling with debts they cannot pay. A range of nonprofit and 

for-profit entities—including credit counselors, debt settlement companies, and debt 

negotiation companies—offer to help consumers facing debt problems. As detailed 

below, consumers have complained of deceptive and abusive practices in all of these 

services, resulting in the FTC and state enforcement and regulatory bodies bringing 

numerous cases.11

72 

12To be eligible for a DMP, a consumer generally must have sufficient income to repay the 

full amount of his or her debts, provided that the terms are adjusted to make such repayment 

possible. 13See Appendix A (items 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, and 20). 14FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., No. PJM 03–3317 (D. MD., final order May 17, 2006). 15See FTC Press Release, FTC’s AmeriDebt Lawsuit Resolved: Almost $13 Million Returned 

to 287,000 Consumers Harmed by Debt Management Scam (Sept. 10, 2008), www.ftc.gov/opa/ 

2008/09/ameridebt.shtm. A court-appointed receiver is continuing to track down the defendant’s 

assets, and the FTC expects to make another distribution this year. 16See United States v. Credit Found. of Am., No. CV 06–3654 ABC(VBKx) (C.D. Cal., final 

order June 16, 2006); FTC v. Integrated Credit Solutions, Inc., No. 06–806–SCB–TGW (M.D. 

Fla., final order Oct. 16, 2006); FTC v. Debt Mgmt. Found. Servs., Inc., No. 04–1674–T–17–MSS 

(M.D. Fla., final order Mar. 30, 2005). 17See FTC v. Express Consolidation, No. 06–cv–61851–WJZ (S.D. Fla., final order May 5, 

2008); FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., No. PJM 03–3317 (D. MD. 2006). 18See FTC v. Integrated Credit Solutions, Inc., No. 06–806–SCB–TGW (M.D. Fla. 2006); FTC 

v. Express Consolidation, No. 06–cv–61851–WJZ (S.D. Fla. 2008); United States v. Credit Found. 

of Am., No. CV 06–3654 ABC(VBKx) (C.D. Cal. 2006); FTC v. Debt Mgmt. Found. Servs., Inc., 

No. 04–1674–T–17–MSS (M.D. Fla. 2005); FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., No. PJM 03–3317 (D. MD. 

2006). Although the defendants in these cases had obtained IRS designation as nonprofits under 

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, they allegedly funneled revenues out of the 

CCAs and into the hands of affiliated for-profit companies and/or the principals of the operation. 

Thus, the FTC alleged that the defendants were ‘‘operating for their own profit or that of their 

members’’ and fell outside the nonprofit exemption in the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C.§ 44. 19See FTC v. Express Consolidation, No. 06–cv–61851–WJZ (S.D. Fla. 2007); United States v. Credit Found. of Am., No. CV 06–3654 ABC(VBKx) (C.D. Cal. 2006). 20 Eileen Ambrose, Credit firms’ status revoked; IRS says 41 debt counselors will lose tax-exempt standing, Baltimore Sun, May 16, 2006; see generally TSR Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 

41988, 41992 (Aug. 19, 2009). To enhance the IRS’s ability to oversee CCAs, Congress amended 

the IRS Code in 2006, adding Section 501(q) to provide specific eligibility criteria for CCAs seeking tax-exempt status as well as criteria for retaining that status. See Pension Protection Act 

of 2006, P.L. 109–280, § 1220 (Aug. 2006) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(q)). Among other things, 

Section 501(q) of the Code prohibits tax-exempt CCAs from refusing to provide credit counseling 

services due to a consumer’s inability to pay or a consumer’s ineligibility or unwillingness to 

agree to enroll in a DMP; charging more than ‘‘reasonable fees’’ for services; and, unless allowed 

by state law, basing fees on a percentage of a client’s debt, DMP payments, or savings from 

enrolling in a DMP. In addition, as a result of changes in the Federal bankruptcy code, 158 nonA. Credit Counseling Agencies 

Credit counseling agencies (‘‘CCAs’’) historically were nonprofit organizations that 

worked as liaisons between consumers and creditors to negotiate ‘‘debt management 

plans’’ (‘‘DMPs’’). DMPs are monthly payment plans for the repayment of credit card 

and other unsecured debt that enable consumers to repay the full amount owed to 

their creditors but under renegotiated terms that make repayment less onerous.12

Credit counselors typically also provide educational counseling to assist consumers 

in developing a manageable budget and avoiding debt problems in the future. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, some CCAs registered as nonprofit organizations 

with the Internal Revenue Service, but in reality operated as for-profit companies 

and engaged in aggressive and illegal marketing practices. Other CCAs incorporated 

and openly operated as for-profit companies. 

Since 2003, the Commission has filed six cases against for-profit credit counseling 

providers for deceptive and abusive practices.13 In one of these cases, the FTC sued 

AmeriDebt, Inc., at the time one of the largest CCAs in the United States.14 On the 

eve of trial, the FTC obtained a $35 million settlement, and thus far has distributed 

$12.7 million in redress to 287,000 consumers.15 In the various cases, the FTC 

charged that the credit counseling agencies engaged in several common patterns of 

deceptive conduct in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and the TSR, including: 

• misrepresentations about the benefits and likelihood of success consumers could 

expect from the services, including the savings they would realize; 16

• misrepresentations regarding CCA fees, including false claims that they did not 

charge upfront fees; 17 and 

• deceptive statements regarding their purported nonprofit nature; 18

• violations of the TSR’s provisions that require certain disclosures and prohibit 

misrepresentations, as well as the requirements of the TSR’s Do Not Call provisions.19

Over the last several years, in response to abuses such as these, the IRS also has 

challenged a number of purportedly nonprofit CCAs—both through enforcement of 

existing statutes and new tax code provisions—resulting in the revocation, or proceedings to revoke, the nonprofit status of 41 CCAs.20 In addition, state authorities 

have brought at least 21 cases against CCAs under their own statutes and rules. 

73 

profit CCAs, including the largest entities, have been subjected to rigorous screening by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee. Finally, nonprofit credit counseling 

agencies must comply with state laws in 49 states, most of which specify particular fee limits. 21See, e.g., FTC v. Debt-Set, Inc., No. 1:07–cv–00558–RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 

2008); FTC v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV–07–4087 (E.D.N.Y., final order Aug. 29, 2008); FTC 

v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06–701 DOC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal., final order Oct. 2, 2008); FTC v. Jubilee 

Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02–6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal., final order Dec. 12, 2004). 22See Appendix A (items 1, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19). 23See, e.g., FTC v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV–07–4087 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); FTC v. Innovative 

Sys. Tech., Inc., No. CV04–0728 GAF JTLx (C.D. Cal., final order July 13, 2005). 24See, e.g., FTC v. Debt-Set, Inc., No. 1:07–cv–00558–RPM (D. Colo. 2008); FTC v. Better 

Budget Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04–12326 (WG4) (D. Mass., final order Mar. 28, 2005); FTC v. Jubilee Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02–6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2004). 25See, e.g., FTC v. Debt-Set, Inc., No. 1:07–cv–00558–RPM (D. Colo. 2008); FTC v. Better 

Budget Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04–12326 (WG4) (D. Mass. 2005). Some providers are also misrepresenting that their service is part of a government program through the use of such terms 

as ‘‘government bailout’’ or ‘‘stimulus money.’’ See, e.g., Steve Bucci, Settle Credit Card Debt For 

Pennies?, Feb. 2, 2010, www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/settle-credit-card-debt-for-pennies–1.aspx; see also FTC, Press Release, FTC Cracks Down on Scammers Trying to Take Advantage of the Economic Downturn (July 1, 2009), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/shortchange.shtm. 26See, e.g., FTC v. Debt-Set, No. 1:07–cv–00558–RPM (D. Colo. 2008). 27See, e.g., FTC v. Innovative Sys. Tech., Inc., No. CV04–0728 GAF JTLx (C.D. Cal. 2005). 28See, e.g., FTC v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06–701 DOC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. 2008); FTC v. Jubilee 

Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02–6468 ABC (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2004). 

B. Debt Settlement Services 

For-profit debt settlement companies purport to obtain lump sum settlements for 

consumers with their unsecured creditors for significantly less than the full outstanding balance of the debts. Unlike a traditional DMP, the goal of a debt settlement plan is to enable the consumer to repay only a portion of the total owed. Debt 

settlement providers heavily market through Internet, television, radio, and print 

advertising. The advertisements typically make claims about the company’s supposed ability to reduce consumers’ debts to a fraction of the full amount owed, and 

then encourage consumers to call a toll-free number for more information.21 During 

the calls, telemarketers repeat and embellish many of these claims. 

Most debt settlement companies charge consumers hundreds, or even thousands, 

of dollars in upfront fees, in many cases with the entire amount of fees due within 

the first few months of enrollment and before any debts are settled. An increasing 

number of providers spread their fees over a longer period—for example, 12 to 18 

months—but consumers generally still pay a substantial portion of the fees before 

any of their payments are used to pay down their debt. And most consumers drop 

out of these programs before completion because they cannot afford, as many of the 

plans require, to simultaneously: (1) pay the provider’s fees, (2) save money for the 

settlements, and (3) continue making their monthly payments to creditors to avoid 

late charges and additional interest. Consumers who drop out typically forfeit all 

of the money they paid to the debt settlement company, regardless of whether they 

received any settlements from their creditors. 

Since 2004, the Commission has brought eight actions against debt settlement 

providers, alleging that they failed to deliver the results promised to consumers and 

deceived consumers about key aspects of their programs.22 The defendants’ misrepresentations included claims that: 

• the provider will, or is highly likely to, obtain large reductions in debt for enrollees, e.g., a 50 percent reduction or elimination of debt in 12 to 36 months; 23

• the provider will stop harassing calls from debt collectors as well as collection 

lawsuits; 24

• the provider has special relationships with creditors and is expert in inducing 

creditors to grant concessions; 25

• the consumer will not have to pay substantial upfront fees,26 and 

• the consumer will be able to obtain a refund if the provider is unsuccessful.27

The Commission also has alleged that debt settlement companies represented that 

consumers can, and should, stop paying their creditors, while not disclosing that 

failing to make payments to creditors may actually increase the amount consumers 

owe (because of accumulating fees and interest) and would adversely affect their 

credit rating.28 In addition to the FTC cases, state attorneys general and regulators 

74 

29See, e.g., Minnesota v. American Debt Settlement Solutions, Inc., No. 70–CV–10–4478 

(Minn., 4th Dist., filed Feb. 18, 2010); Illinois v. Clear Your Debt, LLC, No. 2010–CH–00167 

(Ill. 7th Cir., filed Feb. 10, 2010); Colorado Attorney General Press Release, Eleven Companies 

Settle with the State Under New Debt-Management and Credit Counseling Regulations (Mar. 12, 

2009), available at www.ago.state.co.us/pressldetail.cfmpressID=957.html; Texas v. CSA-Credit 

Solutions of Am., Inc., No. 09–000417 (Dist. Travis Cty, filed Mar. 26, 2009); Florida v. Boyd, No. 2008–CA–002909 (Cir. Ct. 4th Cir. Duval Cty, filed Mar. 5, 2008). 30See FTC v. Economic Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–CV–3347 (N.D. Ga. 2009); FTC v. 2145183 

Ontario, Inc., No. 09–CV–7423 (N.D. Ill. 2009); FTC v. JPM Accelerated Servs. Inc., No. 09–CV– 

2021 (M.D. Fla. 2009); FTC v. Group One Networks, Inc., No. 8:09–cv–352–T–26–MAP (M.D. 

Fla.2009); FTC v. Select Pers. Mgmt., No. 07–0529 (N.D. Ill., final order May 15, 2009); FTC v. Debt Solutions, Inc., No. 06–0298 JLR (W.D. Wash., final order June 18, 2007). 31See cases cited supra, note 30. 32See Appendix A (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 14). 33See FTC v. Economic Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–cv–3347 (N.D. Ga. 2009); FTC v. 2145183 

Ontario, Inc., No. 09–cv–7423 (N.D. Ill. 2009); FTC v. Group One Networks, Inc., No. 8:09–cv– 

352–T–26–MAP (M.D. Fla. 2009); FTC v. Select Pers. Mgmt., No. 07–0529 (N.D. Ill. 2009); FTC v. Debt Solutions, Inc., No. 06–0298 JLR (W.D. Wash. 2007). 34See FTC v. Economic Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–CV–3347 (N.D. Ga. 2009); FTC v. 2145183 

Ontario, Inc., No. 09–CV–7423 (N.D. Ill. 2009); FTC v. JPM Accelerated Services Inc., No. 09– 

CV–2021 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 35TSR Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 41988 (Aug. 19, 2009). 36 15 U.S.C. § 6102(b). 37Outbound calls to solicit the purchase of debt relief services are already subject to the TSR. 38These public comments are available at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm. 

have filed over 117 law enforcement actions against debt settlement providers under 

state statutes that, among other things, ban unfair or deceptive practices.29

C. Debt Negotiation 

For-profit debt negotiation companies assert that they can obtain interest rate reductions or other concessions from creditors to lower consumers’ monthly payments. 

Such companies often market debt negotiation services through so-called automated 

‘‘robocalls.’’ Like debt settlement companies, many debt negotiation providers charge 

significant upfront fees and promise specific results, such as a particular interest 

rate reduction or amount of savings.30 In some cases, the telemarketers of debt negotiation services refer to themselves as ‘‘card services’’ or a ‘‘customer service department’’ during calls with consumers in order to mislead them into believing that 

the telemarketers are associated with the consumer’s credit card company.31

The FTC has brought six actions against defendants alleging deceptive debt negotiation practices.32 In each case, the Commission alleges that defendants: (1) misrepresented that they could reduce consumers’ interest payments by specific percentages or minimum amounts, (2) falsely purported to be affiliated, or have close 

relationships, with consumers’ creditors,33 and (3) violated the TSR’s Do Not Call 

provisions, among other TSR violations.34

Our law enforcement colleagues at the state level also have focused attention on 

bogus debt negotiation companies. The states have brought at least ten cases 

against such firms, and the FTC will continue to work closely with our state partners on these and related issues. 

IV. The Commission’s Rulemaking Proceeding 

In August 2009, the Commission published in the Federal Register proposed 

amendments to the TSR to address abuses in the debt relief industry.35 Congress 

authorized the FTC to conduct rulemaking proceedings under the Telemarketing Act 

using the Administrative Procedure Act’s ‘‘notice-and-comment’’ procedures,36 and 

this proceeding has moved expeditiously and is nearing completion. 

The TSR amendments proposed last August would, among other things: 

• extend the existing protections of the TSR to inbound debt relief calls, i.e., those 

where consumers call a telemarketer in response to a general media or direct 

mail advertisement; 37

• mandate certain additional disclosures and prohibit misrepresentations in the 

telemarketing of debt relief services; and 

• prohibit any debt relief service from requesting or receiving payment until it 

produces the promised services and documents this fact to the consumer. 

In response to this proposal, the Commission received written comments from 314 

stakeholders, including representatives of the debt relief industry, creditors, law enforcement, consumer advocates, and individual consumers.38 In November 2009, 

Commission staff hosted a public forum on the proposed TSR amendments, at which 

participants representing all of the major stakeholders discussed the key consumer 

protection issues and problems that are present in the debt relief industry and posVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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39 A transcript of this forum is available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsr-debtrelief/ 

index.shtm. 40The letters are posted at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm. 41The brochure is available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre02.shtm. 42Fiscal Fitness: Choosing a Credit Counselor (2005), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/ 

pubs/consumer/credit/cre26.shtm; For People on Debt Management Plans: A Must-Do List 

(2005), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre38.shtm; Knee Deep in Debt 

(2005), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre19.shtm. In the last year 

and a half, the FTC has distributed more than 248,000 print versions of these three publications 

combined, and consumers have accessed them online more than 760,000 times. 43Over the last 6 months, the Money Matters website has received approximately 50,000 hits 

per month. 44 NeighborWorks America, the Homeowners Preservation Foundation (a nonprofit member of 

the HOPE NOW Alliance of mortgage industry members and U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development-certified counseling agencies), and other groups are distributing FTC materials directly to homeowners at borrower events across the country, on their websites, in their 

statements, and even on the phone. The Nation’s major mortgage servicers now provide to consumers, while they are on hold, information derived from FTC materials about the tell-tale signs 

of a mortgage foreclosure scam. 

sible solutions for them.39 After the forum, Commission staff sent letters to industry 

trade associations and individual debt relief providers that had submitted public 

comments, soliciting follow-up information in connection with certain issues that 

arose at the forum.40 Sixteen trade associations and companies responded and provided data. At this time, the Commission staff is reviewing the entire record in this 

proceeding and drafting a final rule for the Commission’s consideration. 

V. Efforts to Educate Consumers 

To complement its law enforcement and rulemaking, the Commission has made 

significant efforts to educate consumers about debt relief services and alert them to 

possible deceptive practices. Most recently, the agency released a brochure entitled 

‘‘Settling Your Credit Card Debts,’’ which offers struggling consumers tips on seeking assistance with their debts and spotting red flags for potential scams.41 This 

brochure, along with additional educational materials on debt relief,42 is available 

at a new FTC web page, www.ftc.gov/MoneyMatters.43

In addition, the Commission has conducted numerous education campaigns designed to help consumers manage their financial resources, avoid deceptive and unfair practices, and become aware of emerging scams. For example, the FTC has undertaken a major consumer education initiative related to mortgage loan modification and foreclosure rescue scams, including the release of a suite of mortgage-related resources for homeowners.44 Moreover, the agency has focused outreach efforts 

on a number of other issues faced by people in economic distress, including stimulus 

scams, rental scams, church ‘‘opportunity’’ scams, offers for bogus auto warranties, 

and solicitations for phony charities that exploit the public’s concern for the welfare 

of our troops and public safety personnel in a time of crisis. 

The Commission encourages wide circulation of all of its educational resources 

and makes bulk orders available free of charge, including shipping. We provide FTC 

materials to state attorneys general and other local law enforcement entities, consumer groups, and nonprofit organizations, who in turn distribute them directly to 

consumers. In addition, media outlets—online, print, and broadcast—routinely cite 

our materials and point to our guidance when covering debt-related news stories. 

VI. Conclusion 

The FTC appreciates the opportunity to describe to this Committee its work to 

protect vulnerable consumers from deceptive and abusive conduct in the marketing 

of debt relief services. Stopping the purveyors of empty promises who prey on consumers facing financial hardship is among the FTC’s highest priorities, and we will 

continue our aggressive law enforcement and educational programs in this area. 

APPENDIX A 

FTC Law Enforcement Actions Against Debt Relief Companies 

1. FTC v. Credit Restoration Brokers, LLC, No. 2:10–cv–0030–CEH–SPC (M.D. 

Fla., complaint issued Jan. 20, 2010) (debt settlement and credit repair) 

2. FTC v. 2145183 Ontario, Inc., No. 09–CV–7423 (N.D. Ill., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 17, 2009) (debt negotiation) 

3. FTC v. Econ. Relief Techs., LLC, No. 09–CV–3347 (N.D. Ga., preliminary injunction issued Dec. 14, 2009) (debt negotiation) 

4. FTC v. JPM Accelerated Servs. Inc., No. 09–CV–2021, (M.D. Fla., preliminary 

injunction issued Dec. 31, 2009) (debt negotiation) 

76 

5. FTC v. MCS Programs, LLC, No. 09–CV–5380 (W.D. Wash. preliminary injunction issued July 13, 2009) (debt negotiation) 

6. FTC v. Group One Networks, Inc., No. 09–CV–00352 (M.D. Fla., preliminary 

injunction issued March 25, 2009) (debt negotiation) 

7. FTC v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No. CV 07–4087–JG–AKT (E.D. N.Y., final order 

Aug. 29, 2008) (debt settlement) 

8. FTC v. Debt-Set, No. 1:07–cv–00558–RPM (D. Colo., final order Apr. 11, 2008) 

(debt settlement) 

9. FTC v. Select Pers. Mgmt., Inc., No. 07C 0529 (N.D. Ill., final order May 15, 

2009) (debt negotiation) 

10. FTC v. Express Consolidation, No. 0:06–CV–61851–WJZ (S.D. Fla., final order 

May 5, 2007) (credit counseling) 

11. FTC v. Connelly, No. SA CV 06–701 DOC (RNBx) (C.D. Cal., final order Oct. 

2, 2008) (debt settlement) 

12. United States v. Credit Found. of Am., No. CV06–3654 ABC(VBKx) (C.D. Cal., 

final order June 16, 2006) (credit counseling) 

13. FTC v. Integrated Credit Solutions, Inc., No. 8:06–CV–00806–SCB–TGW (M.D. 

Fla., final order Oct. 16, 2006) (credit counseling) 

14. FTC v. Debt Solutions, Inc., No. CV06–0298 (W.D. Wash., final order June 18, 

2007) (debt negotiation) 

15. FTC v. Jubilee Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 02–6468 ABC(Ex) (C.D. Cal., final order 

Dec. 12, 2004) (debt settlement) 

16. FTC v. Nat’l Consumer Council, Inc., No. ACV04–0474CJC (JWJX) (C.D. Cal., 

final order Apr. 1, 2005) (credit counseling and debt settlement) 

17. FTC v. Better Budget Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 04–12326 (WG4) (D. Mass., final 

order Mar. 28, 2005) (debt settlement) 

18. FTC v. Debt Mgmt. Found. Servs., Inc., No. 8:04–CV–1674–T–17MSS (M.D. 

Fla., final order Mar. 30, 2005) (credit counseling) 

19. FTC v. Innovative Sys. Tech., Inc., No. CV04–0728 (C.D. Cal., final order July 

13, 2005) (debt settlement) 

20. FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., No. PJM 03–3317 (D. MD., final order May 17, 2006) 

(credit counseling) 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCaskill, do you have a—opening thoughts, comments 

that you would like to make? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I have questions, and I will certainly 

defer to the Chairman for questions first. 

My thought is that, if doing away with advance fees does away 

with these companies—probably a good thing. Probably a good 

thing. 

So, I will defer to your questions and look forward to my opportunity to ask questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are looking forward to your opportunity. 

Mr. Kutz, I’d like to ask you the following. First of all, thank you 

for your testimony. And thank you, in fact, for all the work that 

GAO does, in general. And I understand that, in your testimony, 

you’ve not named the particular companies you’ve investigated. 

You’ve given them case numbers. It’s very—that’s very professional, and it’s correct. I’ve decided that I’m not particularly professional, and so, I’m just naming the names of all the companies. 

And I hope that you’ll forgive me for that. 

So, let’s start with what you call ‘‘case number 1.’’ Your investigators, who were pretending to be financially distressed consumers, started a website called ‘‘FreeDebtSettlementNow.com’’ 

Can you please describe this website? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. If we could also put up, on the monitor, one of 

the advertisements they had on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

77 

But, actually, Senator, this case came to us through a spam email from Lebanon. And when you actually clicked on the e-mail, 

it took you to FreeDebtSettlementNow. And so—and, for example, 

on the monitor, it shows some of the advertisements they had 

about a government program. If you read that, you can see that’s 

another one of these outrageous cases of false, deceptive—in this 

case, I call this fraudulent marketing. So, that’s a company that 

then led you—so, they’re one of the front companies that Mr. Lehman described here, and they were funneling work to companies 

called Procorp and Web Credit, which are members of the trade associations: TASC and USOBA. And that’s where the actual backend processing of the actual debt settlement was. 

And within that, there were a whole number of, I guess, deceptive and fraudulent claims. For example, one of the companies— 

Web Credit—claimed a 100-percent success rate—and you heard 

that in the tape, at the beginning, or the excerpts in the beginning—I mean, ‘‘100 percent of consumers successfully settle within 

3 years.’’ And, as you’ve heard from my colleagues at the table, 

that’s just an outrageous claim. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. And you say, in your testimony, that 

Web Credit advisors belongs to a debt settlement industry association, which is called USOBA, United States Organization of Bankruptcy Alternatives. That’s an organization that Mr. Ansbach is 

representing here today, is that not correct? 

Mr. KUTZ. That’s correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you also say, in your testimony, that the 

telephone representative from Web Credit advisors made multiple 

statements that GAO found to be, quote, ‘‘deceptive or questionable,’’ close quote. Can you please describe these statements, and 

explain why they are deceptive, and why they are questionable? 

Mr. KUTZ. Certainly. The first one is the 100-percent success rate 

for people enrolling in the program. As we’ve described, I believe 

the FTC and the State AGs would say it’s closer to less than 10 

percent. No one knows for sure, I don’t think. If you look across the 

industry, one of the organizations says it’s 34 percent. But, 100 

percent is something that would not be reasonable to expect under 

any circumstances. 

Another one says everyone in the program makes the independent decision to stop paying their creditors. Worst-case sceVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE

422GAO1.eps
78 

nario, you will save 40 cents on the dollar. They also promise that 

hiring the company would ensure that calls from creditors would 

slow down and eventually stop. So, those are combinations, Senator, in my view, of some fraudulent claims or, at a minimum, deceptive or otherwise questionable. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, as I think you mentioned before, they sort 

of claim to be somehow a part of government activity. 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes. In this particular case, you see on the monitor 

exactly what they had advertised. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think what you’ve just described to me is outand-out fraud. I’m not a lawyer. Senator McCaskill is. And don’t 

mess with her; she’s a very good one. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ansbach testified that companies in his organization are ‘‘honest and ethical.’’ That was in quotes. It sounds 

like you don’t agree. 

Mr. KUTZ. I can’t speak to all 150 or 200 companies, but several 

of our worst cases were, in fact, members of his trade association, 

yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m just going to—we’re going to have some fun 

here, Senator McCaskill. We’ve got lots of time and few members. 

So, it’s yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. I—let me first ask Mr. Ansbach. Mr. 

Ansbach, have you made public all the members of your organization? 

Mr. ANSBACH. No, ma’am, we have not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And why not? 

Mr. ANSBACH. I think that’s something that’s going to change. 

We’ve discussed that. We’ve been asked about that. As the Senator 

may know, the Association of Settlement Companies does. That’s 

our sister group. In the past, the leadership in our trade group, 

candidly, was concerned that publishing a list of members ended 

up being a subpoena list. We were concerned about—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Probably a genuine concern. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Well, ma’am, we do think that we represent a lot 

of very good folks. But, the reality is, I think that these are good 

folks, and we have an agenda item on our conference this summer 

to talk about that. I think that all that should be published. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I’m looking at all the case studies— 

GAO’s case studies—and I see that Prime Debt Services is a member of yours. American Debt Settlement Group is a member of 

yours. Credit Solutions of America, I’m familiar with, because our 

attorney general has sued them. They’re a member of yours. 

You have to understand that the premise of the business is offensive, in this way. The premise is that when people are in debt and 

worried, they are more easily persuaded that someone can help 

them, because they’re desperate for help. And when someone tells 

them, ‘‘You don’t have to pay your bills anymore and we’re going 

to make a lot of your bills go away,’’ that is like asking a 5-yearold if they want to get a Happy Meal. It is equivalent to that. And 

what is hard for me to understand is how your association thinks 

79 

you can stop the inevitable march of regulation, lawsuits, enforcement actions, because I don’t think you can produce statistics that 

show that you’re helping anyone. 

I have prepared for this hearing. I’m not aware of any statistics 

that show that you’ve helped anyone. In fact—— 

And let me ask Mr. Lehman this. It’s my understanding, Mr. 

Lehman, that one of the problems in these lawsuits that are being 

brought by the attorneys general is the fights over discovery, that 

it has been very difficult to get the documents, to get the data, to 

be able to make sure that every fact is uncovered so that, first, the 

members of Mr. Ansbach’s organization have due process, but, most 

importantly, if—whether or not these are civil cases for consumer 

action, or whether or not these are criminal fraud cases. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes, Senator McCaskill. That is true; it’s been very 

difficult for the attorneys general to get any verification of any of 

the claims that are made. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m sorry. I don’t think you have your—does 

he have his microphone on? 

Mr. LEHMAN. I’m sorry. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. There you go. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes, it has been very difficult for attorneys general 

to get any verification of the claims made by debt settlement companies about success rates and amounts of—numbers of debts settled and that kind of thing. And I know, in the Credit Solutions 

case that you refer to, that the Missouri attorney general has 

brought, and along with, I might add, four or five other States, 

they have said that it has been very difficult to get information 

from—on their investigations of that company. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Ansbach, do you have data that you 

could give the Committee today? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And is it data that has been—that is 

subject to our questioning of the companies and getting at the—I 

mean, are you actually maintaining that the majority of people 

that you sell this service to, that you actually produce? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Senator, I have data that I would provide to you, 

and the only reason I would bring it to you is if I trusted it. What 

I can tell you, if I may—and I apologize, I don’t remember if you 

were in the room when we first started—our members, alone, have 

settled $1.4 billion in unsecured debt. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how much was the unsecured debt that 

they were—that was the outer perimeters of what they were given 

to try to settle? Does that represent 10 percent? Five percent? 

Forty percent? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Sorry, I don’t appreciate the question. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, you say you’ve settled $1.4 billion in 

debt. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. ANSBACH. That means you have saved your customers that 

much debt? 

Mr. ANSBACH. No, I’m sorry. The aggregate value of the debt that 

was—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. ANSBACH.—held is $1.4 billion. 

80 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. ANSBACH. TASC, the other trade association, last year alone, settled another $1.1 billion in debt. That debt is settled at roughly 

somewhere around 53 to 50 cents on the dollar. So, with all due 

respect, Senator, when you say that we’re not providing any value, 

there are a lot of folks that would disagree—folks that received 

these settlements—folks that got their debts settled and ultimately 

paid 53 cents on the dollar and who are now on their way to financial stability. I think there is significant value in that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, then, why isn’t a contingency fee appropriate? Why do you have to have the money up front? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Right. The—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why is that—why do you go out of business—if, in fact, you are successful in settling that percentage of 

your debt, there is no way you go out of business with depending 

on your success as the parameter for your fee payment. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Again, with respect, Senator, I disagree. The issue 

is really a very simple one. No business, big or small—but most of 

ours are small business owners—can operate without revenue for 

a year. It cannot be done. I run a business. I don’t think you’ll find 

anyone in this room that runs a business that will tell you that it 

is a stable financial model to operate without revenue. 

Now, please, if that—that being said, I agree absolutely 100 percent with what’s being said here today, particularly about these 

egregious ads that have government seals on them. Every time 

we’ve gotten one, we’ve sent it to the Federal Trade Commission 

or some of the Senators that have expressed interest in that. The 

question here is not regulation or no regulation. And you said we 

can’t stop the inevitable march. I don’t want to stop the inevitable 

march. I spend more time in Sacramento and Tallahassee and Austin and Springfield, Illinois, than I do in my hometown, trying to 

get regulation in place. The question is, Can we get regulation that 

will protect consumers from this very bad stuff, but still allow honest, ethical companies to provide the services? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, you now have the premier auditing investigative agency in the world that has now determined that a 

number of your members engaged in flat-out fraud— 

uncontroverted facts. Now, are you going to ask those members to 

leave your organization because they have participated in this kind 

of activity? Are you going to take any action against them, and 

clear out these clearly deceptive practices that are going on? Because I know why these people did this on the phone. They get paid 

by how many people they sign up. Correct? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Not all do. No, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are you telling me that the people that he 

did these case studies on—are they all your members, or just some 

of them? 

Mr. ANSBACH. I do not know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me read them to you. 

Web Credit. Are they one of your members? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Senator, we have 200 members. I do not know 

all—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. You don’t have a list with you? 

Mr. ANSBACH. No, ma’am. I do not. 

81 

Senator MCCASKILL. You—is Procorp Debt Solution a member of 

yours? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Ma’am, I just saw the GAO report as—well, actually I’ve not seen the report. So—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. ANSBACH. I don’t know—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, here’s what—here’s—you understand 

the credibility gap that exists in this hearing, I assume, by now. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Senator, what I understand is that there are serious problems that we need to talk about. And what I also understand is that there is an attempt to say that, because there are serious problems, that nobody should do business in this industry. 

And with that, I absolutely disagree. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I will tell you, that since the Chairman is in a frisky mood—as Desi Arnaz would say, ‘‘You’ve got 

some ‘splainin’ to do.’’ 

There is a serious issue facing this country. I will not sit on this 

committee—and I know the Chairman—the Chairman will not— 

and I know, having gone through the confirmation for the new 

Commissioner at the FTC—I can’t decide which is worse, the 

FreeCreditReport.com or you guys. You are preying upon the fears 

of people. You’re making a lot of money, and you’re delivering a 

substandard product; and many, many times, you’re engaging in 

fraud to get the customers, by promising something that you know 

is not true, that they can quit paying their bills, that you’ve had 

100-percent success, that you’re going to settle the debts, and your 

record of success—and you’ve had so few dropouts—on and on and 

on. And, you know, you should just tell your members—and I look 

forward to learning all—will you give us the list of all 200 of your 

members? 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, ma’am, I will talk—again, I’m not the legislative director, and I’m certainly not—I’m sorry—I’m not the executive director and I’m not the owner of the trade group. My plan is 

to go back to our board and say, ‘‘This is important and we should 

publish the list.’’ So, assuming that, then, yes, ma’am, you have my 

word. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK, well I will be checking in with the Missouri attorney general. We are told that Credit Solutions of America is one of your members. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Yes, ma’am. 

Mr. ANSBACH. And if they have to keep fighting for discovery, I 

think the U.S. Congress is going to have their back. So, I think the 

word needs to go out—if you can prove what you say, I suggest you 

get to proving it. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Senator, I’m trying my very best with you to say 

that anybody that makes a claim of 100 percent—I’m a born and 

raised Texan, so pardon me if say this with some lack of delicacy— 

let’s take him out back and beat him with a stick. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well—— 

Mr. ANSBACH. I mean, I don’t—you are not going to find me or 

my group, or anybody that believes in responsible service, defending any of that. Now, what I would like to say to you, and I’m desperately trying, is to say to you, ‘‘I have statistics. I have numbers.’’ 

I even have some numbers that are specific to Missouri that show 

82 

how much money we’ve saved consumers in Missouri. I’m simply 

asking you, please don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. 

There are people that do this well, and there are customers that 

get help. Two of them are right here with us today. 

Senator MCCASKILL.—well, I—listen, I’m willing—you know, I’m 

from the ‘‘Show Me State.’’ But, it’s awfully hard, when an organization won’t even tell who’s in the organization, to take your data 

very seriously. And I say that as a former auditor. You’ve got to 

show the data, and you’ve got to let us look, and let these attorney 

generals look, and let the people that are trying to fight for consumers look, and they’ve got to get everything. And if what you’re 

saying is true, you’ve got nothing to be afraid of. But, it doesn’t appear that way. It appears that everyone has circled the wagons. 

You’ve told your salespeople, ‘‘Close them, close them, close them. 

Get the money up front. If they drop out, don’t worry about it; 

we’ve already made our money.’’ That’s what it looks like, Mr. 

Ansbach. And it looks that way to anybody with common sense. 

So, I’m just giving you the challenge—and I know the Chairman 

wouldn’t have this hearing if he didn’t feel the same way—I’m giving you the challenge, and telling you, if what you’re saying is true, 

then you’ve got to show us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

I believe the states, Mr. Kutz, that have sued are Texas, New 

York, Maine, Missouri, Florida, Illinois, and Idaho. Now, that’s just 

on case number 6, which is Credit Solutions of America, which is 

part of your organization, right? 

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you answered that rather quickly, but 

when asked by Senator McCaskill about other companies—you 

know, a list of 200 is very small, and you pointed out that you 

weren’t the—— 

Mr. KUTZ. Executive Director, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. No, that you weren’t the Chief Compliance—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. [inaudible.] 

Mr. ANSBACH. It’s OK, ma’am. I—I mean, at the risk of perhaps 

talking out of turn, I understand the passion in this. I’m sitting 

two chairs down from Mrs. Haas, who obviously had a horrific experience that I would never, in my life, defend. But, you know, I 

have an office full of folks that I believe in very much. I know 

sometimes even they make mistakes. But, I think there’s good 

work to be done here, and I just want to find us a way to do it. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s just an amazing statement. 

Let me try to get at it a different way. What percentage of the 

people that you say that you serve—I mean, 200 companies is a 

very small amount. You’re actually the Chief Operating Officer— 

you corrected me—you’re not Chief Compliance, you’re Chief Operating—you have even more reason to know what these—what the 

200 companies are. But, you don’t. You simply don’t. 

Mr. ANSBACH. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I misspoke. 

I’m—my role with USOBA, the trade association is—I’m the volunteer as a Legislative Director. I’m the Chief Operating Officer of 

just my company. 

83 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you didn’t have to get—you didn’t have to 

pay up front. You didn’t have to get paid up front. I’m sorry. I’m 

just being cynical. 

The—what percentage of the people that you take on, and your 

200 organizations take on, do you think do well by their clients? 

Mr. ANSBACH. If you’ll permit me, I want to—I know I’ve got 

some data to provide you with. And, by the way, I want to encourage you—if you want to ask questions to anybody else on the panel, 

I’m sure—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, you’re my interest right now. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ANSBACH. I just—I don’t want to hog the microphone—so I’d 

be happy to do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. You can joke about this, if you want. 

Mr. ANSBACH. No, sir, I don’t think it’s a joking matter at all. I 

will tell you that the statistics that we’ve discussed—the 35-percent 

number—34, 35 percent, which I think was referenced—is a TASC 

number. We think that number has merit. That means that 35 percent of consumers will settle all of their debts in a particular debt 

settlement program. What that means is that there’s still 65 percent that do not complete the program. It’s very important to understand what that means. And this is the difficulty we’ve had with 

the discussion on success rates. 

The CHAIRMAN. How would you react to that, Mr. Kutz and Commissioner Brill—35-percent successful? 

Mr. KUTZ. It was 34. But—and I think there may be a question 

of what the definition is of ‘‘success’’ there, because, I mean, I think 

success—we would assume that you settle all your debts. I think 

the success rate there may have been some or all of the debts. But, 

it’s very different from what the State AGs have found, which is 

less than 10 percent. So, certainly less than 50 percent is clearly— 

makes sense to me, given who you’re talking about. And I don’t 

know if FTC has any further data on that. But, I think less than 

34 or—34 has got to be the high end of what we’re talking about. 

The CHAIRMAN. Commissioner Brill? 

Ms. BRILL. Mr. Chairman, we have asked for this kind of data 

as part of our rulemaking procedure, and we are currently analyzing data that has been provided to us, not only by Mr. Ansbach 

and some of his compatriots in the industry, but also by the State 

attorneys general and others. And at this point, because the rulemaking process is underway, I don’t want to comment on my view 

or the Commission’s view about that data. But, to the extent that 

the information we have is public, we’d be more than happy to 

share that with you. I don’t have the numbers with me right here 

today. But, we’d be more than happy to share what—— 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, well—— 

Ms. BRILL.—with you what we have. 

The CHAIRMAN.—you could have just said that. 

Mr. Ansbach, in your testimony, you present a lot of numbers 

showing the debt settlement companies that save consumers 

money. I didn’t hear anything about the numbers showing how 

much your industry costs consumers. Remember, in my opening 

statement I said they often end up owing more than they did beVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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fore. So, you say that you’re saving them money. How much are 

you costing them money? 

Mr. ANSBACH. If I understand the Senator’s question, you’re asking, What damage does debt settlement, as a program, cause? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ANSBACH. You know, it’s—actually, it’s a very important 

question, and it gets to the root of the 35-percent number. In and 

of itself, a debt settlement program does not cause damage. What 

does cause damage is not paying your creditors. Obviously, that’s 

whether you’re in a debt settlement program or not. What does 

cause damage—of course, not paying your bills causes damage in 

the form of a worsened credit rating or litigation. And that’s the 

very reason, Mr. Chairman, that I would join with the colleagues 

here at the table—disclosure agreements in contracts must tell people that, ‘‘If you stop paying your bills, then these things will happen.’’ And that is a disclosure requirement for USOBA. It is a disclosure requirement for TASC. Clearly, the members that have 

been related here today failed, and did not, in those respects. And 

I know Senator McCaskill has left us, but to that extent, we will 

absolutely be following up with those companies. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think that—Mrs. Haas, didn’t you say that you and your husband owe $20,000 more now than when you enrolled? 

Mrs. HAAS. We owed $13,000 more, 6 months after we enrolled, 

immediately after we terminated our attorney—$13,000. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you ended up owing $13,000 more. 

Mrs. HAAS. Thirteen—that’s not including what we had already paid our attorney. We had paid our attorney $3,800. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Kutz and Commissioner Brill, would 

you say this is pretty standard? Because, that’s the question, Mr. 

Ansbach, I was asking you—costing people, as opposed to saving. 

Mr. KUTZ. Well, I would say you have the additional fees, plus, 

of course, many creditors are going to continue to charge interest, 

penalties, and late fees. So, again, how the numbers shake out with 

the industry savings, I’m not sure how they calculate that, but 

there’s—it’s a fairly interesting possible calculation you could 

make. 

Ms. BRILL. I agree. There are different levels of potential damage. And I think that was what your question was getting at. So, 

I agree that it’s something that’s important to consider as a whole. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lehman, the—when a company decides to go 

into business, it’s not my understanding that they raise their capital to go into business from customers and then offer, as an excuse, that, ‘‘We couldn’t have—since we charged you fees up front, 

that’s the way we could do business.’’ And then, I believe that Mr. 

Ansbach said that only went on for a year. But, this has been 

around for quite a long time. Does that mean—do you think he 

thinks that, after that first year, that the fees don’t have to be paid 

up front? It would be my impression that they continue to have to 

be paid up front as new customers come in. 

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, is business done that way in this country? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Well, I think any kind of business that you start, 

even a law practice—you’ve got to start it and you’ve got to buy 

85 

books, you have to have clerical help, you have to have equipment 

of various kinds. I know people who have started a law practice, 

and it takes—it does take some time to make any money. You do 

have to have a capital investment. If you’re starting a restaurant 

or a car repair shop, you have to put money into it first. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, you put your money into—— 

Mr. LEHMAN. You put money into it. 

The CHAIRMAN.—it first. Somebody else puts their money into it 

first. You don’t—— 

Mr. LEHMAN. And what—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You don’t charge the restaurant customer upfront fees and then feed that person a month or a year later, right? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Exactly right. It would be like—yes—somebody 

contributing to the restaurant today for the privilege of having a 

meal, 2 years from now. And that is one of the problems with the 

industry, is that the entry barriers are very low. That’s why we 

have, by the industry’s estimates, over 1,000 of these companies 

out there. You need very little money. Most of the work, that we’ve 

found, is outsourced. Somebody can set up a debt settlement company, outsource all the marketing and lead-generation work, can 

outsource the work to actually do the negotiations, to the extent 

they’re done, can outsource the accounting, the drafting of consumers’ banks accounts to deposit in the debt settlement account. 

And, frankly, this confuses consumers, because they don’t know 

where the ‘‘there’’ is, who is actually doing the work. As I gave the 

example before, with the law firm, the law firm is out there, in its 

name and with the retainer agreement, but it wasn’t performing 

the services. So, you have this kind of network of companies, and 

it’s hard for the consumers to identify who is the responsible party. 

And it could be hard for regulators, too, to determine, you know, 

where the real action is. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ansbach, you say you’re a volunteer? Are 

you here as a volunteer? 

Mr. ANSBACH. As hard as it is to believe, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in it so strongly that you’re here as 

a volunteer. 

Mr. ANSBACH. I have seen the benefits of this program, when 

done right. I do believe in it. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it, Mrs. Haas, that I’m having a hard 

time accepting that as anything but a joke? 

Mrs. HAAS. Chairman, because I’ve been through a lot, I don’t believe him, either. I don’t think debt settlement should be allowed 

to practice any kind of consumer help whatsoever. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think, if they charge fees before they provide services, which, in most cases, they don’t do, that they should 

be in business at all? 

Mrs. HAAS. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. The attorney that we 

had paid took our money and did absolutely nothing. And we got 

no refund. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if that were the case in, let’s say, 60 percent 

of all their clientele—and let’s—and it’s probably more than that— 

would that not be enough reason to say they should not be in business at all, that they are harming the majority of their customers? 

86 

Mrs. HAAS. I don’t think they should be in business, because of 

their illegal practices. They don’t follow State and local rules. They 

mislead the consumers. And they take their consumers’ money and 

are—and the credit reports—the credit—your credit is damaged beyond belief. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kutz, and particularly Commissioner Brill— 

no, I would say, actually, particularly Mr. Lehman—the—there is 

so much of this we—in this country, right now and always. Americans can always find a way to skim a buck, and they can always 

find a way to take it off of somebody who is in crisis, is desperate, 

and who will fall for what they have to say. And they don’t have 

to make their promise. And the glorious way that America works 

is that we concentrate on the big picture and on the big people, and 

we don’t concentrate on the little people who are hurting and in 

trouble. That’s what you do. That’s what you do, and that’s what 

you do, and that’s what you do. And that’s what you have suffered 

through. It’s sad. 

My question is, how can they remain in business? And is there 

a way, if they are practicing fraud—and you say deceptive—the 

fraud and deceptive practices—why are they in business? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, there are many, 

many companies out there. If that over-1,000 figure is accurate, 

that’s a lot of companies. We have a lot of attorneys general that 

are interested in this issue that are bringing enforcement actions. 

There is no way that we can target the number of companies that 

are out there. 

And, as I also said, the barriers to entry to this business are very 

low, so it is not hard for companies to shut down, move on, and 

reopen. So, for enforcement purposes, it’s kind of like playing a 

game of whack-a-mole. You can get a few, but you cannot cover the 

whole realm of bad practices out there. 

But, I—you know, the—I think the answer is to continue enforcement, to continue cooperative enforcement efforts among the 

States, to advocate for strong Federal rules or Federal legislation 

and to—you know, and encourage legislation in the states. But, 

it’s—it is a big problem, and it’s going to take a lot of resources to 

address it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is this something—I mean, I would be delighted 

to prepare legislation in this committee. Is this better done by 

states? 

Mr. LEHMAN. The—as I said earlier, the 41 attorneys general 

supported the proposed FTC rule. So, I think it’s fair to say the attorneys general would approve and appreciate Federal legislation 

to create at least a Federal floor of practices for the debt settlement 

industry. There are some States that do have laws. And it was interesting for me to see some of the attorneys general of those 

States that still advocate for a—for Federal law in this area. 

The CHAIRMAN. This has already been gone over, but it’s so utterly repulsive to me that I can’t help but talk about. This is one 

of their products. And we’ve had many other hearings on the 

scamming of poor people. And we had one which simply—see this 

way, this is, ‘‘Find out if you are eligible,’’ in big blue print. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

87 

And in this previous one, this—the fact that this was big blue 

print—and you don’t have a lot of small print on here; it’s down 

here. The other one, there’s a lot of small print. And so, people sort 

of ‘‘find out if you’re eligible.’’ Well, you can’t very well say ‘‘no’’ to 

that. You’re desperate. You’ve got debts. You’ve got people closing 

in on you. So, you push it. And then you’re kind of hooked into that 

thing. 

This is the—what is this? The—yes, that’s your Commission. 

Now, Mr. Ansbach has already said that he’s appalled that this is 

on this piece of material. But, this is available broadly, under the 

companies that he represents. 

And then, I think we have, over here, the Social Security Administration, which strikes me as an enormously—those two—an enormously cynical attempt to—along with the—sort of, the stimulusVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE

422NCRA1.eps
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package aspect of this—it’s a cynical attempt to sort of give credibility to a group that doesn’t have any credibility. 

And I look up here. Where’s that lovely American flag? No. I’m 

talking about the other chart. Yes. See, now this—I—this is really 

wonderful, ‘‘The future of debt settlement begins with accountability, credibility, and transparency.’’ 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I would say to—ask Mr. Kutz, Mrs. Haas, Mr. Lehman, Commissioner Brill, How many of those tests do you think that his group 

of 200, with this eagle and American flag as their symbol, meet? 

Mr. LEHMAN. It doesn’t measure up, from the evidence and the 

complaints we’ve received, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Haas, would you have a view on that? 

Mrs. HAAS. I know when we looked into our credit counseling on 

the Internet, and we found Credit—Consumer Credit Counseling of 

America, that’s what sold us. It was American. Why—you know, we 

can’t go wrong. If it says ‘‘America’’ in there, we can’t go wrong. 

The CHAIRMAN. And there’s no way that you can analyze this, because you haven’t gotten into it. 

Mrs. HAAS. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. Commissioner Brill? 

Ms. BRILL. We have been very concerned about offers that make 

representations that they’re somehow part of the government, part 

of the stimulus plan, that have shields like this on it. We’ve 

brought cases in this area, as have the States. It’s a tremendous 

concern, for the exact reasons that Mrs. Haas is pointing out. It 

lends an air of credibility. That is the concern. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but the question I was asking Mr. Lehman—and then I’ll say Mr. Kutz—they don’t measure up on those 

three promises, do they? That’s not a question; I shouldn’t have 

said that. Do they measure up on these three promises? 

Mr. KUTZ. All but one of the USOBA members we spoke to and 

dealt with did not meet up to them. And the other one, we just 

didn’t get anything that was not—that was bad, necessarily. One 

was reasonably good. The other five or so would not measure up 

to those standards, in our judgment. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I sort of think that we’ve gotten what we 

can out of this. There are a lot of questions. I feel a great sense 

of sadness about this. And also anger—not denying that there may 

be, you know, a couple of your companies that do a good job. And 

you’ve got some nice people sitting in the back who are ready to 


422USOBA1.eps
89 

come up front and testify. But, boy, we sure didn’t run into any of 

those people. And we’ve worked very hard, and these are professional investigators behind me, and they are hired on to this committee to do—that’s what they do, they investigate. They look for 

wrong-doers and people who take advantage of people. And we 

have a lot of hearings about this. And it’s very, very sad to me that, 

at a time of such economic distress, that there are so many companies, in so many ways with people, whether they are pop-up Internet deals or, you know, all kinds of scams. People fall victim to 

them. 

I come from the State of West Virginia, where there are a lot of 

very, very poor people who are desperate and, for a whole lot of 

reasons, are in all kinds of trouble. And they—you know, they give 

their faith to God and their money to these companies. And I don’t 

know how you—-on a net basis, I guess you probably turn out all 

right, in that case; but, you certainly don’t turn out all right financially. 

And I just express disdain and contempt for these kind of efforts. 

And I, frankly, am glad there are committees, like us and the Federal Trade Commission, that look for these things and try to stop 

them. We’ve got to be honest in this country. We’ve got to treat our 

people with respect. A lot of people don’t. Or—— 

Do any of you have closing comments? 

Mr. KUTZ. Can I make a comment—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Please. 

Mr. KUTZ.—on what you said, I mean the faith in God? Interesting thing is, three of the companies used Christianity as the link 

to bring people in. Giving, of course—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Good point. 

Mr. KUTZ.—an air of credibility. Then they provided the fraudulent and deceptive information after that. And I found that, Senator, to be particularly despicable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Any others? 

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I’d just say, attached to my written 

remarks that I’ve submitted to the Committee are some other examples of misuse of Federal information or Federal debt relief programs, stimulus money, and that kind of thing. The one that was 

blown up, that you just displayed, is one that is running right now. 

We heard about that within the last week. And it’s—if you go onto 

the Internet, on many sites, that link will pop up and it’s—the one 

you showed said ‘‘North Carolina Relief Act,’’ but there are similar 

sites for West Virginia—West Virginia Relief Act, Florida Relief 

Act, and so forth. 

So, yes, the problem is still ongoing. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Mr. Chairman, just the few last remarks that I 

would leave the Committee with. One of the things that we did not 

get to today, but I think perhaps the Chairman wants to be sure 

that you consider. There does appear—and it’s not just from our 

point of view, but consumer activists have stated this, as well— 

there is going to be some type of a need to help people that cannot 

afford credit counseling, but who want to still avoid bankruptcy. 

And, in that regard, we have tried—obviously with some failing, 

but we have tried very hard to fill that particular void. Some numbers say as high as 30 percent of folks cannot afford credit counVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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seling, but want to avoid bankruptcy. I would simply ask the 

Chairman that, as we move forward on this important issue, allow 

us to continue to work on this and get better at this, allow us to 

join you in condemning some of the particularly egregious ads that 

we’ve seen here today. And we will continue to join, as best as we 

are able to do, if you allow us for that. 

The CHAIRMAN. That was a touching closing statement. I guess 

mine would be, I don’t know how you sleep at night. 

Mr. ANSBACH. Well, with all due respect, Senator—— 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(91) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this afternoon’s hearing. The continuing 

home foresclosures, high unemployment, and unprecedented levels of consumer debt 

that have accompanied our current economic recession have given rise to new industries tailored to helping those in need. The recession has also given rise to just as 

many scams and unscrupulous individuals willing to take advantage of those who 

have fallen on hard times. We have a responsibility to understand the services 

available to consumers to address their economic troubles and ensure those services 

are accompanied by appropriate consumer protections. 

As more and more people are being overwhelmed by their debt, there is a greater 

demand for debt relief services. Consumers unable to fully repay their debt generally have three choices—credit counseling, where consumers enroll in a program 

designed to allow them to pay off the full balance of their debts over a longer period 

of time; debt settlement, where a third party negotiates with creditors to lower the 

overall balance due from the consumer; and bankruptcy. 

Debt settlement can seem very appealing, with promises of lowering the overall 

debt owed and avoiding the negatives associated with filing for bankruptcy. Unfortunately, too little is known about the debt settlement industry. It is unclear exactly 

how many of these businesses are in operation, how many consumers use their services, and—more importantly—whether the current debt settlement business model 

benefits a significant number of consumers. 

There have been a number of concerns raised about debt settlement. Foremost 

among these is the allegation that many companies use deceptive advertising to lure 

vulnerable consumers. These misrepresentations may include promises about settling debts in an extremely short timeframe, for unrealistically high savings, and 

without disclosing the actual costs to the consumer. In Texas, such misrepresentations have given rise to more than half a dozen enforcement actions by Attorney 

General Greg Abbott’s office. 

Last fall Chairman Rockefeller commissioned GAO to conduct an investigation 

into the advertising and marketing practices of debt settlement companies, and I 

am interested to hear their findings. 

I am also interested in learning more about the fee structure used by debt settlement companies. Many reportedly charge a significant portion of their fees at the 

outset of a consumers’ program, and critics have expressed concern that these fees 

are being paid before any real service has been performed or any debt has been settled. The fee structure is the subject of a current rulemaking at the Federal Trade 

Commission, and we are fortunate to have Commissioner Brill here today to discuss 

this. I am curious to hear how different fee models work. There is no question that 

a business must have revenue to operate. However, there does appear to be the potential for abuse in a system where the majority of fees are paid before any tangible 

benefit to the consumer is realized. 

I am also pleased to welcome John Ansbach here today as a representative of the 

debt settlement industry. Mr. Ansbach, who is from my home state of Texas, is Legislative Director for the United States Organization of Bankruptcy Alternatives 

(USOBA) and General Counsel for EFA Processing, based outside Dallas. My staff 

has met with Mr. Ansbach on a number of occasions, and he has been a tireless 

advocate for the industry, relaying USOBA’s support for sound business practices 

among debt settlement companies. Mr. Ansbach and other representatives of the industry have worked very closely with the FTC during the creation of their proposed 

rule, and I know they support many of its provisions. 

Among other things, I understand Mr. Ansbach is prepared to discuss the stories 

of some consumers who may have benefited from debt settlement services. At the 

same time, we will hear from Mrs. Holly Haas and her husband today. I want to 

thank them for being willing to share their experience with us, so that we can better 

understand how a consumer can be negatively impacted by a debt settlement program. 

92 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I look forward 

to hearing from all of our witnesses. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS

I thank Chairman Rockefeller, for holding this hearing on the consumer’s experience in the debt settlement industry. Today’s dialogue is important as many consumers continue to be targeted in a distressed economy. 

According to the Commission’s 2010 annual report on the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, ‘‘the FTC receives more complaints about the debt collection industry 

than any other specific industry.’’ In 2009, the FTC received over 88,000 complaints 

about third-party debt collectors—comprising almost 17 percent of all consumer 

complaints the agency received that year. 

The FTC report also notes that many consumers may never file a complaint with 

an entity other than the debt collector. Therefore, consumers may not recognize that 

debt collection violations have occurred or that the FTC manages a complaint database and enforces specific consumer protection laws. By extension, this means that 

not all consumers’ experiences may have been recorded. 

In Arkansas, abusive debt collection practices appear to be on the rise. Our state 

attorney general’s staff has reported a steady increase in the number of abusive 

debt collection consumer complaints received in the state. In 2007, the state received 510; in 2008, 659 complaints; in 2009, 667 complaints. 

As Chairman of the Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance Subcommittee with oversight authority over the Federal Trade Commission, I recognize 

the FTC’s important work to enforce against consumer abuse in the debt collection 

and debt settlement areas. I look forward to hearing Commissioner Brill’s perspective and her thoughts about what else should be done. 

We also will hear from members of the business community with us today. I welcome their thoughts regarding how to better police the marketplace from actors that 

violate consumer protection statutes. 

In this tough economic environment, Americans are repeatedly targeted by fraudulent actors seeking to exploit their vulnerabilities. I know today we will hear from 

some consumers first-hand about their experience and I welcome their insights. 

The investigation instigated by Senator Rockefeller is important and I commend 

him for his vigilance and illumination of consumer abuse. As we strive to protect 

Americans from unfair or deceptive financial practices, the importance of the FTC’s 

role in this domain is underscored. I look forward to a robust conversation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN MARK SPAULDING

Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of 

the Committee for the opportunity to share my experience with you. My name is 

Mark Spaulding and I am a resident of South Charleston, West Virginia. I am writing to tell you about an experience I had with a debt settlement company. 

A few years ago, my wife and I were both having medical problems and were 

starting to fall behind on our bills. I did not want to file for bankruptcy, so I contacted a debt settlement company. In March 2008, I contacted U.S. Debt Settlement 

Company (USDS) from an Internet advertisement that I had seen. When I called, 

I spoke to a lady and told her I was trying to pay off some hospital bills, some old 

and some new. I was asked what other types of unsecured debt I had, and I told 

her that I had some credit card debt, but was current with all of my payments. I 

was asked how much I owed the hospitals and the credit card companies, and I told 

her. I was then asked to fax copies of my bills for them to review. 

After the review, I was told that USDS could help me reduce my debt as much 

as half, and sometimes for as low as 40 cents on the dollar. I was told they have 

the best success with credit card companies. I was also told I could be well on my 

way to financial freedom and reestablishing my good financial situation. This all 

sounded very good to me, so I went with it. 

I filled out an application and gave USDS all of my medical bills and credit card 

information. I also gave my banking information so they could automatically withdraw the enrollment fee and monthly service fee. I was asked to sign a ‘‘power of 

attorney’’ form so they could contact my creditors on my behalf. After that, I was 

signed up for a 48-month pay-off schedule. 

I was told it was best not to have any contact with my creditors, and that USDS 

would handle them. Within 2 months the credit card companies were calling me for 

payments. I called USDS to ask what I should do. I was told that I should screen 

my calls and send any and all correspondence to USDS and they would take care 

93 

1See October 26, 2009, and March 8, 2010, letters from Andrew Housser, on behalf of The 

Association of Settlement Companies, to the Federal Trade Commission, available at: http:// 

www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/index.shtm. 

of it. I asked if I should let the credit card companies know that I was in a debt 

settlement program. They said no, and that if I were to do that, they would not negotiate a settlement. I was reassured that settling with credit card companies is 

what they do best. 

During that time, calls and letters from my creditors were coming in. Calls at 

home and at work seemed nonstop. I would fax the collection letters to USDS and 

they said that they would handle it and not to worry. 

After paying $296.41 per month for 6 months and $55.00 per month after for service fees, nothing in the way of negotiations had started. I called USDS to ask why 

nothing had started yet, and I was told that waiting is all part of the negotiation 

process. They told me that I should start saving money to start negotiations, and 

wait. 

A few months later, I started receiving letters from my creditor’s lawyers and 

summons from the courts. Again, I forwarded this information to USDS, and they 

told me not to worry and that this was all part of the negotiation process. At that 

point, 14 months had gone by and nothing had been done to settle my debt. I called 

USDS to express that I was afraid of being sued by the credit card companies. I 

was told I should ‘‘hurry up and wait.’’ At that point, USDS asked me how much 

money I had saved in my banking account. I told them about $1,200.00. They told 

me that was not enough to settle anything, and that I should agree to the terms 

of the credit card lawyers. 

Now I have two judgments against me and will end up paying 40 cents more on 

the dollar than I originally owed. In December 2009, my negotiator said bankruptcy 

would be my best option. I had paid over $2,400.00 to USDS for a service that I 

never received. I was strung along all that time for them to say that they could not 

help me. I was furious about the lack of service and their slow response time. 

I asked for a refund and was told that they would settle with me for $600.00. 

That is when I decided to file a complaint with the West Virginia State Attorney 

General’s Office. Since then, USDS has given me a full refund. No one should have 

to go through this type of grief from a company that has been entrusted to help with 

someone’s personal finances. Now I am back to square one, only worse off than I 

was before. This has been a costly lesson that will take me several years to recover 

from. 

AMERICAN COALITION OF COMPANIES ORGANIZED TO REDUCE DEBT (ACCORD) 

Phoenix, AZ, April 20, 2010 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

Ranking Member, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison: 

The American Coalition of Companies Organized to Reduce Debt (ACCORD) is a 

trade association representing debt settlement firms and related businesses that are 

committed to ensuring the highest standards of professionalism and integrity in the 

debt settlement industry. ACCORD and its members support fair regulation of debt 

settlement practices that will fully protect the interests of consumers who can benefit from debt settlement services. 

Responsible debt settlement is unquestionably a benefit to consumers, especially 

in economic times like these, when large numbers of consumers are facing unmanageable credit card debt. One conservative estimate of the obligations to credit card 

issuers and other unsecured creditors that debt settlement companies resolved for 

consumers last year is $1 billion.1 Not only do consumers facing financial hardship 

benefit from debt settlement, creditors do as well because it allows them to collect 

debts that might otherwise be discharged in bankruptcy or sold to debt buyers for 

a small fraction of their face value. 

Despite these benefits, the bona fide debt settlement industry has suffered from 

bad publicity arising from bad actors in the industry and consumers who, for various reasons, did not achieve expected results. Consumer groups and law enforcement have charged some companies with exploiting the financial vulnerability of 

94 

2The common short-hand reference to an ‘‘advance fee ban’’ can cause confusion. Some industry members have begun to advocate a ‘‘pay-as-you-go’’ model, which they define as collecting 

a fixed fee on a monthly basis over the first half of the expected duration of the program. This 

model, which at best is a very accelerated pay-as-you-go scheme, does little to solve the problem 

of collecting fees from consumers unlikely to experience any or much debt relief. It entitles the 

debt settlement firm to collect sizable fees regardless of whether any debt is settled. On the 

other hand, proposals that require a debt settlement firm to settle all of a consumer’s debts before collecting any fee go too far in the opposite direction. ACCORD advocates a fair compromise: 

the debt settlement firm should be permitted to collect a portion of its fee as each debt is settled 

and the creditor is paid the negotiated amount. 

debt-strapped consumers by taking fees from them and not delivering the promised 

services. In some cases, it appears that purported debt settlement firms engaged in 

outright fraud. 

Often, however, debt settlement firms enroll consumers who simply lack the financial resources to succeed in a debt settlement program. Front-loaded fees provide 

a strong economic incentive for debt settlement companies to do this. Consumers 

complain when they find themselves unable to save the money needed to settle with 

their creditors. They may have already paid hundreds or thousands of dollars in fees 

to a debt settlement firm, only to find themselves with unpaid debts to their creditors that have grown even larger through accumulated interest and late fees. When 

debt settlement companies have the contractual right to collect fees whether or not 

a consumer’s debts are settled and creditors paid, this sad outcome is often inevitable. Creditors remain unpaid; consumers fall even deeper into debt. The only person who benefits is the debt settlement company. 

The essential problem is that, under this fee model, debt settlement companies 

have the incentive to sign up every possible consumer for their programs. Whether 

the consumer succeeds or not, the company collects its fees. In many cases, careful 

screening of potential clients would reveal that a consumer is not a suitable candidate for debt settlement. Debt settlement companies have no incentives, however, 

to perform such screening. This is the disincentive the Federal Trade Commission’s 

current rulemaking would correct. 

A key initiative of ACCORD since its 2009 formation has been to support the 

Commission’s proposed amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule addressing 

the practices of debt settlement companies and other providers of debt relief services 

to consumers. In particular, ACCORD believes that the proposed ban on collecting 

fees until services are performed is a vitally important provision, which will benefit 

both consumers and the debt settlement companies that work for them. 

ACCORD believes that adhering to two principles will generate the respect the 

industry deserves from consumers, consumer advocates, Congress, law enforcement, 

and the consumer financial services industry. 

1. A ban on advance fees; 2 and 

2. Fees based on the savings achieved for consumers. 

These two principles protect consumers from the nightmare we all fear—a debt 

settlement program that leaves a consumer in worse financial shape than when he 

started the program. By agreeing to take no fee until a creditor is paid, and by basing the fee on the amount of savings negotiated, the debt settlement company will 

ensure that its client debtors always benefit from its services. ACCORD members 

have either already adopted these two principles or pledged to transition their operations to incorporate them in the coming months. 

With these two simple changes, a true ban on advance fees and a fee calculation 

based on the success of debt settlement negotiations, abuses in the debt settlement 

industry can end. These principles align consumers’ interests with their debt settlement company’s interests—the consumer can work her way out of unmanageable 

unsecured debt and the company can earn an appropriate fee for its services. 

Critics of the debt settlement industry sometimes point out that some consumers 

drop out of the program before a single settlement is negotiated. When that occurs 

today, the debt settlement company can usually collect its fee even though the consumer has received no meaningful benefit from the program. This is a situation ripe 

for abuse. Careful screening of prospective clients will reduce the chance of enrolling 

consumers for whom debt settlement is not a suitable choice. This is precisely the 

effect of the Commission’s proposed advance fee ban. The debt settlement company 

will bear the risk that the consumer will not see the program through to the settlement of her debts. 

Some industry members will point out that many consumer ‘‘drop outs’’ do so 

through no fault of the debt settlement firm and that even the most careful screening will not eliminate the problem of drop outs. This is unquestionably true. ACVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
95 

CORD and its members have found, however, that careful screening, excellent customer service, and full disclosure greatly reduce this problem. 

The ban on advance fees is an important step in transforming the industry to one 

that always works for consumer interests. Alone, however, it is not enough. Equally 

important is the concept of a fee based on the company’s success for the consumer. 

This provision ensures that a consumer will not be left worse off by beginning a debt 

settlement program. 

Some industry members suggest that abuses can be prevented by simply capping 

the fees a debt settlement company can charge, based on the amount of a consumer’s unsecured debt. ACCORD disagrees. Such an approach still allows companies to collect fees even when the consumer receives no benefit. Even when a settlement occurs, under this approach the net cost to the consumer, including the debt 

settlement company’s fees, can exceed the original debt. Indeed, ensuring a debt settlement company’s right to collect a fee based on the enrolled debt ensures a disconnect between the value of the service and the size of the fee. In contrast, a success-based fee links the consumer’s benefit and the amount of the company’s fee, 

providing the debt settlement company with a strong incentive to achieve good results for its clients. 

Occasions will exist in which the debt settlement company cannot negotiate a significant savings for the client debtor from a particular creditor. It may seem unfair 

to the company to deny it a fee despite its best efforts on the consumer’s behalf. 

This objection does not withstand scrutiny, in ACCORD’s view. On average, creditors do negotiate significant reductions for appropriate consumers. Despite the occasional situation in which the success-based fee structure yields no fee, the debt settlement company will generally be able to earn fair fees while achieving valuable 

benefits for its clients. 

Perhaps the most important issue facing the Federal Trade Commission as it considers its final rule on debt relief service providers is whether to provide a broad 

exemption from the advance fee ban when debt settlement services are offered by 

licensed attorneys. ACCORD believes that such an exemption is unjustified and will 

effectively negate the consumer protection provided by the advance fee ban. Today, 

in anticipation of a likely FTC rule banning the collection of fees before debts are 

settled and paid, debt settlement companies are affiliating with ‘‘attorney networks’’ 

that hope to circumvent the advance fee ban. If affiliating with attorneys proves to 

be an effective strategy for the continued collection of advance fees, the Commission 

rulemaking is likely to have little impact on the abusive practices that have concerned the agency and this committee. 

ACCORD is grateful for the Committee’s leadership and continued interest in this 

important consumer protection issue. We appreciate the opportunity to make our 

views part of the record of this hearing. 

Best regards, 

JEAN NOONAN, 

Counsel. 

CONSUMERS UNION

San Francisco, CA 

To: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary 

From: Gail Hillebrand, Financial Services Campaign Manager, Consumers Union 

Re: Telemarketing Sales Rule—Debt Relief Amendments—R411001 

Date: October 9, 2009 

Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports, will be filing joint 

comments during the extended comment period with the Consumer Federation of 

America, the National Consumer Law Center, and other consumer and community 

groups. We are also separately submitting this analysis of the white paper entitled 

‘Economic Factors and the Debt Management Industry’’ by Richard A. Briesch, PhD, 

Associate Professor, Cox School of Business at Southern Methodist University (August 6, 2009). The white paper has significant limitations that render questionable 

its ability to support claims about the level of any benefit to consumers from using 

debt settlement services. That report fails to demonstrate that debt settlement services benefit most consumers who sign up for it. 

This report was released by the industry-sponsored organization Americans for 

Consumer Credit Choice (ACCC) and is branded as ACCC. The report does not disclose whether it was funded by ACCC or by members of the debt settlement industry. The ACCC’s website does not disclose its members. When ACCC released the 

report in August 2009, it stated that: ‘‘ACCC, with other industry and interested 

groups’’ requested the analysis. (Press Release, ‘‘Americans for Consumer Credit 

96 

Choice Releases Debt Management Industry Study,’’ August 7, 2009, http:// 

www.consumercreditchoice.org/node/4.) ACCC also stated that it asked the study’s 

author for an independent objective assessment of the consumer benefit, if any, provided by debt settlement companies. 

The study includes data from only one debt settlement company, which is not 

identified. There is no way to tell from the study report if that company, its undisclosed fee structure, practices, dropout rate, or success rate are or are not representative of the debt settlement industry as a whole. In addition, the study does not describe important information relevant to the consumer experience such as the 

amount or timing of the fees, the total fees paid by the consumers in the sample 

to the debt settlement company, or the amounts by which the debt grew during the 

time of the debt settlement program. The study also does not provide data on the 

number or percentage of debts settled for all consumers in the sample, nor even for 

all of the 40 percent of consumers who did not drop out of the program during the 

study period. 

The study’s author forthrightly admits some of its limitations. The study’s author 

discloses that: ‘‘it is unclear whether or not the findings can be generalized beyond 

this firm to the industry as a whole.’’ (p. 23) The study also states bluntly that: ‘‘Accurate measures of consumer completion and cancellation cannot be calculated.’’ (p. 

2) For consumers with canceled accounts—those who dropped out of debt settlement—the author states: ‘‘. . . it is very difficult to determine if value was generated for these customers.’’ (p. 23) The study states that the dataset included no 

information about either settlements or offers of settlement for the consumers who 

canceled, even though that was more than a majority of the sample. 

The study documents a shockingly high cancellation rate. 

The study reports that that 60 percent of the customers in the large sample canceled the service within 2 years. (p. 2) The majority of consumers who signed up 

for debt settlement dropped out. For more than half of these consumers, the only 

reason given in the study for cancellation is ‘‘other.’’ The consumers who owed the 

most dropped out at a higher rate than the overall dropout rate (64.5 percent vs. 

60.57 percent overall). (p.15, Table 2) 

This is a very high cancellation rate for an industry that often charges substantial 

fees upon signing up. The author asserts that a 60 percent cancellation rate is not 

excessive because other subscription-based businesses such as wireless service providers also have high cancellation rates. (p.15) However, there is no discussion 

about how the fee structures of those services compare to the fee structure in debt 

settlement. In addition, consumers who pay monthly for a cell phone also receive 

services each month, and are heavily marketed to upgrade their current plans or 

to switch companies. In debt settlement, consumers pay sizable fees upfront, and 

those who cancel without having any debts settled have not gotten what they 

sought- relief from their debts. The median duration of the debt settlement contract 

at cancellation was 5 to 6 months. 

The study contains incomplete information about the reason for consumer cancellations. Reasons for cancellation are attributed as follows: bankruptcy—13.5 percent; inability to save—6.8 percent; buyer’s remorse, that is, cancellation in an initial period of up to 90 days—9.2 percent; actual or attempted settlements directly 

by the consumer—14 percent; and ‘‘other’’— 56.5 percent. (p.16) Because more than 

half the canceling consumers are listed under ‘‘other,’’ the study gives no detail on 

the reasons for cancellation for the majority of consumers who canceled. Categories 

such as ‘‘debt not being settled’’; ‘‘unhappy with service’’; ‘‘program unsuitable for 

the consumer’’ or ‘‘consumer did not understand the program’’ or ‘‘promises to consumer not kept’’ apparently were not used. 

The author suggests that the cancellation rate is overstated because the debt settlement company’s records indicated that 14 percent of those who canceled did so 

in order to ‘‘settle/try to settle on own.’’ (p.16) But these consumers still canceled; 

presumably after paying some fees. It is not reported whether those consumers later 

settled their debt on their own; but even if they did so there is no reason to attribute that to the efforts of the debt settlement company. In addition, if consumers 

did not settle their own debts, those debts presumably may have grown in size before the consumer canceled the debt settlement contract due to creditor charges such 

as late fees or penalty interest rates. 

With respect to the category of consumers who canceled due to bankruptcy, the 

study’s author states that these consumers were ‘‘forced out of the program due to 

litigation.’’ A different perspective is that these consumers should have filed for 

bankruptcy instead of signing up for debt settlement and saved paying an upfront 

fee of perhaps 2 percent to 4 percent to start a debt settlement program. 

Common reasons that consumers would cancel any type of service are that they 

are unhappy with the service, think it costs too much, or it doesn’t meet their expecVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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tations. The large ‘‘other’’ category may include customers who were signed up for 

an unsuitable program, those who were not satisfied with the program, and those 

with other reasons. It is simply impossible to tell from this study. 

The study cannot support any conclusions about the results for consumers, because 

information about any settlements or even offers is missing for more than half the 

sample. 

The report fails to include any information about debt settlements or offers of settlement for those customers who canceled, because the company studied did not retain this information. (p.17) Consumers who canceled may have experienced worse 

results than other consumers—they may not have had any debts settled at all. Indeed, this might be why they chose to cancel. The study’s author forthrightly concedes: ‘‘it is very difficult to determine if value was generated for those customers 

[who canceled].’’ (p.23) 

The remaining conclusions are of limited value because they don’t reveal what portion of the non-canceling consumers are excluded from the table on consumer welfare 

metrics. 

For that 40 percent of the sample for which there is data about offers and settlements, the study reports information about the size and frequency of offers and settlements, but only for those consumers who had at least one settlement or one offer 

of settlement. The report doesn’t disclose how many consumers had no debts settled, 

and how many had no offers of settlements. It simply reports settlement data ‘‘conditional on the client settling at least one account.’’ (p.17) While it is not entirely 

clear, it appears that the information about offers also includes only consumers who 

had at least one offer. The study appears to essentially divide the non-canceling 40 

percent of the sample into groups—those with at least one settlement or offer, and 

those without. The study doesn’t disclose the size of each group, and it gives success-related data only for the first group—those who experienced some success. This 

is like calculating average results by first omitting from the average all of the people who received zero results. 

The comparison between debt settlement costs and consumer credit counseling costs 

attributes some costs to credit counseling that are not paid by the individual in order 

to receive that service. 

The study’s comparison of the relative costs of consumer credit counseling and 

debt settlement include payments made by creditors, and not by the consumer, in 

the cost of consumer credit counseling. (p.11) The author suggests that creditors 

should be indifferent between making a fair share payment to a consumer credit 

counseling agency or giving individual consumers a discount of up to the same 

amount on the debt. However, the study offers no evidence that this is the case in 

practice. In addition, this argument ignores the value that creditors place on the 

services that legitimate credit counseling services provide such as education, advice 

on budgeting, and overseeing monthly payments to creditors over multiple years. 

Since the cost analysis in the study includes some costs not paid directly by the 

individual consumers using the service, but instead spread throughout the credit 

system, the cost comparison discussion in the study does not provide a valid cost 

comparison from the perspective of the individual. 

The study’s discussion about the relative cost of consumer credit counseling and 

debt settlement also does not appear to consider the fact that the 60 percent of consumers who dropped out of debt settlement in the sample still owe all of the debt 

they started with; may have paid a set-up fee plus monthly fees or more; and because of late fees or penalty interest rates, may owe more debt at the end of the 

program than they did at the beginning on any debt that has not been settled. 

The study cites another source stating that the average cost of consumer credit 

counseling services with a 5-year plan to pay off debt is $910 paid by the consumer 

and another $764.89 paid by the creditors. (p.11) Debt settlement would cost these 

consumers much more in fees. If these consumers were charged a total fee of 18 percent fee of the debt, which is within the range cited in the report, then they would 

owe an average debt settlement fee of $4,338 (averaging the three mean debt levels 

for the three subsamples to yield an overall mean debt for the sample of $24,099). 

(See p.15, Table 2; calculation of the overall sample mean by Consumers Union) 

These numbers make clear a conclusion not drawn by the report; that consumers pay 

much higher service fees for debt settlement than for debt management plans offered 

through consumer credit counseling agencies. Of course, it is difficult to compare the 

costs of apples and oranges. If consumers do get their debts settled, they should pay 

less on those debts, but the report provides no basis to assess how frequently that 

occurs overall for the full sample. Also, with a debt management plan administered 

by a consumer credit counseling organization, the amount owed falls each month as 

the payments are made. That benefit is missing in debt settlement. 

The study shows that many consumers did not benefit from debt settlement. 

98 

In spite of the methodological limitations, the numbers reported in the study suggest that the majority of consumers did not feel that they were benefiting from debt 

settlement since 60 percent of them canceled. The study also shows that even those 

consumers who did not cancel received offers or settlements on less than all of their 

debt at each of the three time periods comprising the sample of 12, 18, and 24 

months. (p.15) 

The study’s reported percentages of debts settled appear to be calculated using 

only consumers for whom at least one debt was settled. (p.17) These results do not 

reveal how many consumers had no debts settled at all. These results also do not 

reveal how many consumers came in with the apparent median of four debts, and 

left the program with some of those debts unsettled and having grown larger in the 

time elapsed during debt settlement program. (p.15, Table 2) This is like estimating 

the consumer benefit without averaging in all of the ‘‘zero benefit’’ people who got no 

settlements at all. 

Even for those consumers for whom at least one debt was settled, it appears that 

the debt settlement provider studied was consistently unable to settle all of the debt 

during the time of the sample. (For reasons not disclosed by the author, the study 

did not sample results at a time period that matched the usual end time for a debt 

settlement program.) The study concludes that ‘‘conditional on receiving at least one 

offer, clients seem to receive offers from more than 67 percent of their accounts and 

debts.’’ (p.20) This means that even if the consumer had saved enough to fund all 

of the offers, and accepted all of the offers, this would still leave the consumers who 

got some offers saddled with 33 percent of the debts they started out with, plus additional creditor charges which might include late fees, additional interest, and perhaps penalty interest, accrued during the time period for debt settlement. 

The numbers from the study’s tables can illustrate some points not drawn by the 

study (Data from study is noted, other calculations are by Consumers Union) 

The study examined 4,500 customers of one debt settlement provider. (p.15) Here 

is some further analysis by Consumers Union using the average debt, cancellation 

rate, and average results reported in the study. 

The sample was divided into three groups of consumers, who owed an average 

(mean) debt of $7,927; $16,966; and $47,404. (p.15, Table 2) Since each group was 

equally represented, this yields an overall initial average debt for the full sample 

of $24,099. 

Just over 60 percent, or 2,700, of those consumers canceled the program within 

6 months to 2 years of entering the program. (p.15) The study doesn’t disclose the 

total fees paid by those consumers. Using the mean debt in the sample and a 2 percent set up fee, which is the low end of the range cited in the study, those consumers 

who dropped out would have paid $1.3 million in fees, and there is no evidence as 

to whether or not they received any settlements before leaving the program. Under 

the 6 percent set up fee cap promoted by the trade organization USOBA in its recent model act, a similar group of consumers could be charged $3.9 million in frontloaded set up fees before canceling. 

Of the 1,800 consumers who remained in the program, the study does not disclose 

how many settled at least one account. However, for consumers who did settle at 

least one account, the author reports at Table 5 that the mean ‘‘ percent total debt’’ 

for the three sub-samples was 54.7 percent, 54.1 percent, and 53.1 percent, respectively. (p.17) The average of those three numbers is 54 percent. In other words, an 

undisclosed percentage of the minority of consumers who did not cancel had at least 

one debt settled, and among those consumers, 54 percent of their debt was settled 

at either 12, 18, or 24 months from entering the program. These consumers still had 

substantial remaining debt—46 percent of what they started with. 

These consumers also had a substantial number of accounts remaining. For the 

undisclosed percentage of consumers who had at least one account settled, the percentages of all accounts settled were 52 percent, 51.5 percent, and 53 percent, for 

a mean of 52 percent. (p.17, Table 5) 

Let’s look at those results in plain language: 

• After one to two years under a debt settlement contract, even those consumers 

who had not canceled and who had at least one debt settled still owed 46 percent of the total debt that they owed when they started the debt settlement program, plus whatever amount that debt had grown to during the interim. 

• After one to two years under a debt settlement contract, even those consumers 

who had not canceled and who had at least one debt settled still owed money 

on 48 percent of the debt accounts that they brought into the debt settlement 

program. 

The study’s numbers suggest that the 4,500 studied consumers: 

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• Cancelled at a rate of 60 percent, or 2,700 consumers. (p. 2) 

• Owed a total of $108.5 million in debt. (extrapolation from table 2, combined 

mean debt of $24,099 for each of 4,500 consumers) 

• Paid $2.2 million in set up fees if they were charged a 2 percent set up fee. 

(This is a conservative estimate; the study cites other sources noting a range 

of 2 percent to 4 percent set up fees). (p.12) 

• Lost $1.3 million in those set up fees when 60 percent of them dropped out. 

• Would owe over $19 million in fees if they were charged an overall fee of 18 

percent of the debt, which is within the two ranges cited by the report of 14– 

20 percent or 15–25 percent (this does not include a reduction for any fees still 

owed when the consumer dropped out). (p.12) 

• Continued to owe $85 million in debt one to 2 years after starting debt settlement. 

The remaining debt calculation is based on the full initial debt, of just over $65 

million, for the 60 percent who canceled and just under $20 million for the 46 percent of remaining debt for those who got at least one settlement. The actual remaining debt number may be higher, because this calculation applies to the entire 40 

percent non-canceling group the remaining debt percentage of 46 percent which the 

study provides for that subset of consumers in the non-canceling group who received 

at least one settlement, and the study does not document or claim that each noncanceling consumer had even one debt settled during the study period. Of course, 

the debt numbers could actually be higher because the debt amounts for unsettled 

debt can be expected to continue to increase during the settlement program. 

The study does not analyze or discuss the cost to consumers of high upfront payments for debt settlement. 

The study asserts that charging consumers reasonable upfront fees, i.e., fees before settlement, ‘‘can be justified’’ but it offers no analysis of the actual fee amounts 

charged for debt settlement. (p. 24) The fee structure and fee amounts imposed on 

the 4,500 consumers in the sample is not disclosed, and the report also has no discussion of the amount of fees lost by the 60 percent of customers who canceled, 

every presumably after paying both a setup fee and monthly fees. 

The study also contains some internal inconsistencies. 

As released in August 2009, the study contains some inconsistencies and makes 

some assertions it does not support. The study states on page 13 that 20.5 percent 

of consumers who canceled did so because of bankruptcy, while Table 3 on page 16 

says that bankruptcies accounted for 13.5 percent of cancellations. 

Table 3 identifies 14 percent of consumers who canceled in order to ‘‘settle/try to 

settle on own,’’ but the text on pages 16 and 20 treats the consumers in that 14 

percent as if all of them in fact did pay off their debt on their own. 

On page 3, the study says that more than 57 percent of clients have offers to settle at least 70 percent of their debt, but the only table of data to support this, found 

at page 17, contains data only on the offers for those consumers who received at 

least one offer to settle a debt. Consumers who received no offers are omitted from 

the analysis of results, which would bias the reported results upwards by excluding 

the ‘‘zero’’ category from the calculations of mean (average) results. 

Analysis prepared by: 

GAIL HILLEBRAND, 

Financial Services Campaign Manager. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

GREGORY D. KUTZ

Question 1. What is the average fee amount charged to consumers as a percentage 

of the consumer’s unsecured debt? 

Answer. We are unable to provide information about the average fee amount 

charged to actual consumers nationwide, as this analysis was beyond the scope of 

our investigation. However, we were able to obtain fee information from 18 of the 

20 debt settlement companies we called while posing as fictitious consumers. Of 

these 18 companies, 17 represented that they collect advance fees before debts are 

settled. Representatives of these companies told us that the advance fees are calculated based on a percentage of the consumer’s debts to be settled. The advance 

fees cited most commonly ranged between 15 and 17 percent. Moreover, representatives from several companies told us that our monthly payments would go entirely 

to fees for up to 4 months before any money would be reserved for settlements with 

our creditors. Only 1 of the 20 companies we called represented that it followed a 

100 

contingent fee model where primary fees are charged based on a percentage of the 

reduction of debt it says it obtains for consumers (in this case, 35 percent). Some 

companies also represented that they assessed monthly maintenance and other fees. 

One of the 17 advance-fee companies also revealed that it charged a contingent fee 

after each debt is settled based on a percentage of the debt reduction. 

Question 2. On average, how long does it take for consumers to buildup sufficient 

funds in an escrow account before those funds are used by debt settlement companies to negotiate and reduce the consumers’ credit card balances? 

Answer. We are unable to provide information about how long it takes for actual 

consumers to buildup funds to be used for settlements, as this analysis was beyond 

the scope of our investigation. However, based on our knowledge of the industry, 

the length of time needed to obtain a settlement for a consumer may depend upon 

several factors, including: the consumer’s number of accounts, amount owed to each 

creditor, availability of pre-existing funds, the length of time the consumer’s accounts are past due, and the willingness of creditors to negotiate settlements, among 

other things. 

Question 3. In instances where consumers with insufficient income indisputably 

cannot pay a debt settlement company, how often do debt settlement companies 

turn away consumers after their initial consultation? 

Answer. We are unable to provide information about how often companies turn 

away actual consumers who do not have sufficient income to afford a debt settlement program, as this analysis was beyond the scope of our investigation. 

Question 4. Could you describe to the Committee, based on your investigation, the 

method of solicitation most often associated with consumer abuse in this area? (Are 

you seeing mostly online solicitations touting consumer savings, telemarketing, 

mailings, radio advertisements)? 

Answer. We did not conduct an assessment of method of solicitation most often 

associated with consumer abuses as part of our investigation. However, during the 

process of identifying debt settlement companies and selecting 20 companies to call, 

we found examples of online, television, print, and radio solicitations, some of which 

we found to be fraudulent, abusive, or deceptive. In one case, we identified a company through an unsolicited spam message received by one of our investigators 

through his private e-mail account. This message advertised debt settlement services, listed a mailing address in the country of Lebanon at the bottom, and contained a link that took us to the company’s website. Most of our investigative work 

to identify debt settlement companies was conducted online. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

WILLIAM AND HOLLY HAAS

Question 1. By what percentage were you told your principal would be reduced? 

Did your chosen debt settlement company achieve that level of promised reduction? 

Answer. We were told (and it’s written in the contract) our principal would be reduced to 46 percent of the total debt that we owed. We did NOT receive any reduction from our debt. Instead, numerous fees and penalties were added onto our balances because we were not paying them (as instructed by the debt settlement company). It actually increased our debt approx. $9,000 more than what we owed before 

going thru debt reduction for the 6 months that we continued with them. 

Question 2. Did your debt settlement company clearly explain to you how your 

monthly payments would be used? 

Answer. No. The referring company told us that the monthly payments would go 

into a holding account where it would stay until there was enough money in the 

pot to pay a settlement and pay the attorney fees. They did not tell us that the 

$7,500 attorney’s fees would be paid first, before the credit card companies and the 

debt settlement company negotiated our settlement. 

Question 3. What do you believe law makers should do to encourage better protection of consumers from abusive debt collection practices? 

Answer. Clearly, there should be some regulation of the way they take your 

money. Debt settlement companies, if allowed to exist, should have to document and 

prove how much time they work on your settlements each month, and be allowed 

to take out a certain percentage each month when they do work on your case, with 

a maximum cap of some sort (5 percent) of your monthly payments, just for overhead expenses. Only after they negotiate and the settlement is complete, should 

they be allowed to charge and receive payment for their services. What incentive 

to do they have to negotiate a settlement if they take their fees off right from the 

start? This is how any ‘‘normal’’ business works, and so it should be for debt settleVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ment. We also believe that these debt settlement companies should receive heavy 

monetary fines if they don’t document time as required, (or falsely report time) and 

for falsely advertising things that they simply cannot do. They should be licensed 

in the same state that they do business, regulated and watched with a paper or electronic trail, and affiliated with credit card companies so the consumer knows that 

they are honest and legitimate. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

PHILIP A. LEHMAN

Question 1. Mr. Lehman, consumer complaints related to debt collection are on 

the rise in Arkansas. You mentioned in your testimony, ‘‘In our experience, most 

consumers are worse off after enrolling in debt settlement programs.’’ Could you 

elaborate upon that for the Committee please? 

Answer. The typical debt settlement program requires a consumer to pay substantial advance fees, to cease direct communications with creditors, and to cease making payments on credit accounts. As a result, the consumer’s limited funds are diverted to the debt settler instead of the consumer’s creditors. The consumer becomes 

further in arrears while interest and default charges mount and the consumer’s 

credit standing deteriorates. Since the consumer is not communicating with creditors, collection efforts intensify and collection lawsuits are more likely. The debt settler offers little protection against collection activity and typically does not begin 

settlement efforts for a year or more. In the meantime, the consumer is left to deal 

with collection pressure and ballooning account balances. 

It is undisputed that the large majority of consumers drop out of these debt settlement programs before they are completed. Many of these consumers cancel because 

they are not seeing any results. These consumers may have paid thousands of dollars in advance fees to the debt settler. They are not likely to get refunds because 

the fees are deemed fully earned when paid. Therefore, these consumers have lost 

valuable time and money due to being sidetracked in a debt settlement program. 

Many could have resolved their delinquent accounts directly with their creditors. 

Many end up filing for bankruptcy after the debt settlement program fails. 

Question 2. Do you think that a fixed-fee pro-rated payment structure over a certain period of time, as proposed by some members of the debt settlement business 

community, is a salient solution to the consumer complaints reported by many state 

attorneys general? 

Answer. No. The prorated payment models we have seen still frontload the consumer’s fees. Typically, they require the consumer to pay a total of 15 to 18 percent 

of the consumer’s debt as a fee collected over the first 12 months of the program. 

Since settlements often do not take place until after a year or more, the debt settlement company gets paid whether it delivers results or not. 

Once its fees have been fully earned, the debt settler has little economic incentive 

to perform. The program becomes like a Ponzi scheme, requiring new customers to 

generate revenue in order to provide services to earlier customers. 

Question 3. What do you see as Congress’s or the Federal Trade Commission’s role 

in further preventing consumer abuse in the area of debt collection and other relief 

services? 

Answer. A Federal role is appropriate because debt settlement abuses are national in scope and most debt settlement providers operate on an interstate basis. 

The State Attorneys General, in their public comments to the Federal Trade Commission, have strongly supported the FTC’s proposed debt relief services amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The FTC’s proposed Rule comprehensively 

addresses consumer abuses through enhanced disclosures, prohibitions on deceptive 

representations, coverage of attorney-led debt settlement providers, and prohibitions 

on advance fees. S. 3264, the Debt Settlement Consumer Protection Act, sponsored 

by Senators Schumer and McCaskill, has a similar comprehensive approach that 

will protect consumers. 

While the Attorneys General support Federal regulation and enforcement in this 

area, it is important that the States have the authority to enforce any Federal laws 

or rules. The Federal standards should set a floor of consumer protection and should 

not prevent the States from enacting stronger legislative measures. 

Question 4. What is our recommendation for better protecting consumers from 

debt collection abuses moving forward? 

Answer. The debt settlement industry has been characterized by deceptive advertising, misleading representations, spotty performance and the charging of excessive 

fees before delivery of services. As noted above, a comprehensive approach as proVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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1Please note that the definitions reflected here were provided by the Federal Trade Commission and were posed to USOBA members verbatim. 

posed by the FTC rulemaking and S. 3264 is best suited to address the widespread 

consumer protection problems. 

However, the key to protecting consumers from future harm is a prohibition on 

advance fees. Debt settlement companies should not be allowed to profit while the 

consumer loses. North Carolina and now Illinois have adopted strict limitations on 

advance fees for debt settlement services. There is precedent for such a prohibition 

from regulation of other debt-related services that were notorious for widespread 

consumer abuses. Under the Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act and most 

state credit repair laws, advance fees are prohibited for credit repair services. The 

FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule bars advance fees in loan brokering, another area 

characterized by false promises and minimal performance. Many states currently 

prohibit advance fees for foreclosure relief or mortgage loan modification services, 

and the FTC has recommended a similar ban in its proposed Mortgage Assistance 

Relief Services Rule. 

Question 5. What qualities or criteria would help distinguish debt settlement programs that legitimately help consumers versus those that take advantages of vulnerable people? 

Answer. A legitimate debt settlement program should have a demonstrated record 

of performance and should earn its compensation from successful completion of settlements. Unfortunately, reliable evidence of completion rates and settlement results has not been available from the debt settlement industry. Without such evidence, it is difficult to acknowledge any debt settlement company as beneficial to 

consumers. A more responsible debt settlement program would incorporate the best features 

of credit counseling and debt management plans. Consumers would be offered budget and financial planning counseling before beginning any payment program. As 

with debt management, consumers would make monthly payments that would be 

distributed to creditors under a plan agreed to by the creditors. The consumers 

would then be relieved of collection efforts and escalating finance charges. If the 

consumer performed under the payment plan, the consumer would receive an 

earned benefit of significant principal reduction. This hybrid debt management/principal reduction model is supported by lenders and nonprofit credit counseling agencies but accounting rules from Federal banking regulators have impeded its implementation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

JOHN ANSBACH

Question 1. What is the range of administrative fees charged to consumers by 

your member companies? 

Answer. Although USOBA has not surveyed its members to determine the range 

of fees charged to consumers by each, USOBA believes that the most common service fee charged by USOBA members is 15 percent of the debt enrolled by a consumer at the time of contract formation. Further, we are pleased to share the following data and statistics, all of which were provided to the Federal Trade Commission in January: 1

(a) 77.58 percent of USOBA member companies providing information in a recent survey primarily use a ‘‘fixed fee’’ model in which fees are spread out in 

a series of payments over a fixed period of time. 

(b) 10.34 percent of USOBA member companies providing information in a recent survey primarily use a ‘‘front-end fee model’’ in which the company requires consumers to pay as much as 40 percent or more of the fee within the 

first three or 4 months of enrollment and collects the remaining fee over an ensuing period of 12 months or less. 

(c) None of USOBA member companies providing information in a recent survey 

primarily use a ‘‘back-end model’’ in which the consumer pays all of the fee 

upon program completion, paying a fee equal to a percentage of total savings. 

Question 2. What do you believe is the ideal pay structure a debt settlement company should implement to assist consumers in reducing unsecured debt? 

Answer. USOBA believes that the ‘‘ideal pay structure’’ is the one adopted in 

State of Tennessee. Under such a structure, fees are capped not only in amount, 

but in timing, as well, i.e., fees are capped at 17 percent of the enrolled debt and 

providers are then required to spread fee collection out over ‘‘half the life’’ of a conVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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2 By way of example, if a consumer enrolls $10,000 of debt in a debt settlement program, the 

maximum allowable fee would be 17 percent of that debt, or $1,700. That fee would then be 

spread out over half the life of the consumer’s program, or 18 months in an average three-year 

program. As such, the maximum allowable monthly fee under this hypothetical would be $94.44 

per month ($1,700 in equal payments over 18 months). 3 ‘‘consistently,’’ ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘occasionally’’ 

sumer’s program.2 Because programs are typically 3–4 years in length, this means 

that fees must be spread out over a period of 11⁄2 to 2 years. Such an approach has 

been adopted in Nevada, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Montana, Idaho, Tennessee and 

Utah and is under consideration in Texas, California, New York and several other 

states. 

Question 3. Do any of your member companies encourage consumers to discontinue communication with their credit card companies? 

Answer. While USOBA cannot speak to the specific practices of every one of its 

members, it is against USOBA member policies to encourage consumers to discontinue communication with their creditors. What USOBA does support in this 

area is member companies fully informing consumers of their rights as well as providing information, generally, pertaining to the repayment of unsecured debts. 

Whether or not to continue servicing any particular debt is ultimately a decision 

that consumers must make on their own and in consideration of their own personal 

circumstances. It is a debt settlement company’s responsibility to arm consumers 

with as much information as possible so that such a decision can be made considering all of the facts and consequences. 

Furthermore, USOBA would also advise that most of USOBA’s members’ clients 

are already unable to meet their monthly creditor obligations by the time they first 

contact a debt settlement provider. A recent survey of USOBA members revealed 

that approximately 61 percent of consumers were missing debt payments 3 prior to 

starting their program. This number climbed to 93 percent when consumers who 

would be missing payments ‘‘very soon’’ were factored in. 

In short, although USOBA is aware of instances where consumers have been told 

not to pay their bills, USOBA also believes that many if not most potential debt 

settlement consumers are already not able to pay their bills when they come to a 

debt settlement program. What they need is accurate information to make informed 

decisions about how to address their specific situations, and USOBA encourages its 

member companies to provide that information. 

Question 4. What do you see as the best solution for preventing consumer harm 

in the debt settlement sector? 

Answer. USOBA believes that the best solution for preventing consumer harm in 

the debt settlement sector is a strong state licensing and registration regime, coupled with insurance and/or surety bonding requirements for providers to ensure 

ability to address consumer wrongs. While we do believe that the states are best 

positioned to articulate appropriate rules and regulations pertaining to contract requirements, as well as reasonable fee regulation, we do also believe that there is 

a role for the Federal Trade Commission to play in prescribing debt settlement 

rules, regulations and guidelines for what is and is not proper advertising. We 

would also respectfully suggest that there is an additional role for the FTC to play 

in working with the industry to promulgate appropriate standards for consumer disclosures and a common vocabulary that could normalize disclosures across all forms 

of debt relief providers, not just debt settlement companies. USOBA also respectfully suggests that the debt settlement law recently enacted in the State of Tennessee, which contains many of these provisions, should serve as a model for any 

effort to prevent consumer harm in the provision of debt relief services. 

Further, two additional regulatory and/or legislative tools should be considered to 

prevent abuses in the debt settlement sector. First, a change in the United States 

tax code regarding debt settlement tax treatment should be considered. In much the 

same way that short sales under certain circumstances no longer create a taxable 

event (pursuant to the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act and Debt Cancellation), debt settled by consumers (through the services of an intermediary and otherwise) should not create a taxable event. This change would remove a major impediment to debt resolution and eliminate abuses created by such taxation. 

Second, USOBA would also respectfully suggest the provision of some measure of 

protection from creditors for consumers who can demonstrate they are actively, 

faithfully working a debt settlement program, similar to the forbearance enjoyed by 

customers of credit counseling programs. Because aggressive collection activity is 

generally the single most significant reason why consumers are forced to withdraw 

from debt settlement programs, often seeking protection in bankruptcy, providing 

104 

insulation from collection efforts to those consumers would go a long way toward 

raising program completion rates. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

JOHN ANSBACH

Question. Mr. Ansbach, you stated at the hearing that two individuals that had 

positive debt settlement experiences had prepared statements about their experience. Please provide copies of those statements to the Committee. 

Answer. As requested, please see the statements from Mr. Gary Ross and Ms. 

Faith Zabriske, which are attached to this document. Both Mr. Ross and Ms. 

Zabriske are individuals who had positive debt settlement experiences and traveled 

to Washington, D.C. (from Illinois and Texas, respectively) to tell their stories. They 

were both in attendance at the Senate hearing. 

TESTIMONIAL

Gary Ross 

Harwood Heights, IL 

My name is Gary Ross and I’ve come here today to tell my story of how debt settlement successfully helped me get my finances in order. Without the option of turning to a debt settlement company, I would be either sinking further into a debt load 

from which I would never escape. This industry is very important for people, like 

myself, who have fallen into hard times. Please do not take away this option when 

you are drafting your legislation. 

My story begins 5 years ago. I had always made it a point to pay my debts on 

time, but, when I was terminated from my position after thirty-nine years of service, 

I was faced with enormous financial hardship. I was out of work for a year and a 

half. During this time, I accrued a great deal of debt. And although I was lucky 

enough to find a job, my expenses including mortgage, utilities, groceries and credit 

card payments seemed insurmountable. 

I was paying the minimum on my debts but I couldn’t keep up. With the late fees 

and high interest my creditors were charging, I fell into even greater debt. I was 

scared and felt desperate. I wanted to pay my debts, and I certainly did not want 

to file for bankruptcy or I was petrified of losing my home. Even after I got a job, 

I was paying the minimum payments and I felt like I would never be able to pay 

off everything I owed. 

After researching my options, I decided to pursue debt settlement. I had heard 

good things and I liked that the debt settlement company would take responsibility 

for all of my debts and communicating with my creditors. As soon as I started working with the debt settlement company, I felt relieved. They took over everything. 

All of their personnel were polite, understanding and professional. 

They explained the program, what was required of me and what I could expect. 

I was told the importance of good communication and keeping current with my payments. They explained that while I was accumulating money in my account, they 

would make settlements with my creditors. They also explained that if I was sued 

by any of my creditors, they would point me to resources that would guide me 

through the process. That was exactly what happened! I was sued, but I wasn’t 

scared. I was able to complete the paperwork and appear in court. This company 

gave me the courage to handle court appearances. 

After 3 years, I completed the program and am now debt free. I did not lose my 

house like I would have in Chapter 7 bankruptcy—I have since paid off my house 

and I own it. I have to say that without debt settlement, I would not have been 

able to resolve my financial problems. I think it’s very important for consumers like 

me to have this option. Please keep that in mind as you look at the industry. 

Thank you for letting me tell my story. 

GARY ROSS

Distinguished Members of the Committee: 

My name is Faith Zabriskie and I live in Bedford, Texas. I am the Director of 

Finance for a prestigious downtown Dallas business. While money matters are an 

important part of my professional career, like so many American citizens, health 

concerns placed me in a difficult financial situation. Without the help of debt settlement, I might have lost my home or wound up in bankruptcy, both of which would 

have been devastating on both a personal and professional level. 

105 

In 2007, I suffered an injury to my knee and was forced to turn to my credit cards 

in order to pay medical bills and other expenses necessary to survive. I recovered 

but was overwhelmed with the debt created by my ordeal. 

I contacted my credit card company to find out if they could work with me on repaying my debt. I had an ‘‘excellent’’ credit score in the high 700s and had always 

paid my debts on time. To my dismay, I was told that until I was 6 months delinquent they would not help me. 

I tried credit counseling as well, but they were even more unhelpful. Among other 

things, they advised me to sell my house and move into an apartment. I simply 

could not accept that my only options were losing my home or filing for bankruptcy. 

It wasn’t until I enrolled in a debt settlement program that I found true support. 

After working the program and saving money as needed, my provider was able to 

help me settle all of my debts. I am currently making payments on my last account 

and am well on my way toward being debt free and financially stable. 

I am so thankful to have had debt settlement available to me and I implore you 

to preserve it as an option for other American consumers who are so desperately 

in need. Thank you for your time. 

Best Regards, 

FAITH ZABRISKIE

Bedford, Texas 

SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF FAITH ZABRISKE

The following is from an unsolicited e-mail dated May 3, 2010, received by a debt 

settlement provider from their debt settlement consumer Faith Zabriske: 

‘‘I wanted to share with you an absolutely exciting experience that occurred this 

weekend but was in the making for the last 2 years—with the help of your company. . . 

As you know, back in 2007, a slip and fall at home resulted in reduced income— 

thus a fall back on credit cards to make ends meet. Increased rates by the cc companies created disaster and I connected with (your debt settlement company) - 

Prior to the slip & fall—I had zero balances on credit cards and a credit score 

of 780. My mortgage rate is 3.125 percent. After the fiasco with the credit cards, 

my score plunged as low as 480!!! 

After 2 yrs and a successful settlement on all accounts (almost debt free)—my 

score has climbed back. 

Trans Union score: 651—which qualified for a ‘‘preferred’’ customer rate with 

Honda finance—I was able to purchase a new 2010 Odyssey EX-L with ease—the 

credit report did indicate that several credit cards were paid on a reduced scale— 

settlement. And, because scores are also based on debt to income ratio, the debt that 

was erased through [your company’s] negotiations, left a revolving balance $4.0k— 

down from $90k!!!! And, yes, I was required to pay taxes on portions settled—and 

planned accordingly. In addition, the paid on time mortgage, utilities, etc assisted 

the cause. [Your] consumer counseling encouraged paying these items FIRST—and 

then cc debt next. 

The Honda Pre-approval process—on line—was painless! By following the Consumer Report new car process—[I] realized a $4.0k savings via Internet sale and 

a waiver of $700 destination fee by choosing a vehicle on their lot—pre-visit assisted 

choice of dealer—by knowing their inventory. Self-education of consumer issues was 

also encouraged by your counselors. 

I wanted you to know how good it feels to be able to reclaim my life—provide for 

my family—and truly enjoy the accomplishments of my hard work—and the help 

and guidance (you) provided played a huge role. . . . 

I can’t thank you and your team enough!!!! 

Best, 

Faith′′ 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK PRYOR TO

HON. JULIE BRILL

As I stated in my testimony, in August 2009, the Commission published in the 

Federal Register proposed amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule (‘‘Rule’’) to 

address abuses in the debt relief industry. Given the pendency of the Rule before 

the Commission, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on matters on which 

the Commission may have to render a judgment in that proceeding. Accordingly, my 

106 

answers are limited to information the Commission has obtained in its law enforcement in this area. 

Question 1. In your opinion, why have reported consumer complaints of unscrupulous debt settlement companies been on the rise over the past few years? 

Answer. Consumer debt has soared to record levels in the past 2 years, and when 

consumers are in financial distress, fraudsters peddling phony solutions generally 

follow. As you stated, reported complaints about debt settlement companies have increased in recent years. Complaints to the FTC about debt relief services (which include debt settlement companies) have increased about 18 percent in the last year. 

The FTC takes into account the nature and number of complaints it receives when 

making enforcement decisions. The Commission has brought eight cases against 

debt settlement companies in recent years, alleging that the defendants deceived 

consumers into paying hundreds or thousands of dollars in upfront fees through 

false promises that they would obtain settlements of consumers’ credit card debt for 

substantially reduced amounts, such as 50 to 60 cents on the dollar. The Commission also has brought a number of cases against other debt relief operations, including actions against sham nonprofit credit counselors and debt negotiators. 

In addition, State Attorneys General and state regulators are extremely active in 

this area. In recent years, the states have brought 124 actions against debt settlement companies. 

Question 2. Based on the cases the FTC has brought and research conducted by 

your staff, do these debt settlement companies generally retain upfront and administrative fees even in instances where they have not successfully reduced consumers’ 

debt? 

Answer. All of the debt settlement companies sued by the FTC allegedly had fee 

structures allowing them to retain all upfront and administrative fees, even in instances where they did not successfully reduce consumers’ debt. Some of the defendants provided partial refunds in isolated cases when consumers complained, typically to the Better Business Bureau, the State Attorney General, or the FTC, although this appears to have been infrequent. 

Question 3. Are there some legitimate companies in the debt settlement industry 

that do in fact achieve their stated goals and aid consumers in reducing their debt? 

If so, how do they achieve these goals and how do their approaches differ from the 

practices of the unscrupulous companies? 

Answer. The extent to which there are companies in the debt settlement industry 

that achieve their stated goals and aid consumers in reducing their debt is a central 

issue in the ongoing rulemaking proceeding. It would therefore be inappropriate for 

me to express a view on this issue at this time. 

Question 4. You mention in your written testimony the FTC has alleged that some 

companies were encouraged to ‘‘stop paying their creditors’’ while failing to disclose 

that not making payments to creditors could increase the amount owed and could 

adversely affect their credit score. Could you elaborate on that for the Committee 

please? How common is that practice in the debt settlement industry? 

Answer. Based on the cases the FTC has brought, many debt settlement companies advise consumers to stop paying their creditors without disclosing that this 

could increase the consumer’s debt burden (through accrued interest and late 

charges) and adversely affect his or her credit rating. The FTC has charged five 

companies with advising consumers to stop paying their creditors. I also note that 

the GAO testified that, out of calls that investigators made to 20 debt settlement 

companies, 17 companies encouraged the investigator to stop paying creditors. 

Question 5. How does the Commission alert consumers to deceptive financial practices including some abusive debt collection activities and what else do you think 

needs to be done to protect consumers? 

Answer. To complement its law enforcement and rulemaking activities, the Commission works diligently to educate consumers about deceptive financial practices, 

providing information to consumers in both English and Spanish. For example, the 

agency recently released English and Spanish versions of a brochure entitled ‘‘Settling Your Credit Card Debts,’’ which offers struggling consumers tips on how to obtain assistance with their debts and spot red flags for potential debt relief scams. 

The FTC has distributed more than 248,000 print versions of this or two other debt 

relief brochures in the past 18 months, and consumers have accessed one or more 

of them online more than 760,000 times. These materials are now available at a 

new FTC web page, www.ftc.gov/MoneyMatters. Over the last 6 months, the Money 

Matters website has received approximately 50,000 hits per month. 

More broadly, the Commission has conducted numerous education campaigns designed to help consumers manage their financial resources, avoid deceptive and unfair practices, and become aware of emerging scams. For example, the FTC has unVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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1The Spanish-language version of ‘‘Debt Collection FAQs’’ (‘‘Preguntas Frecuentes sobre 

Cobranza de Deudas: Una Guφa para Consumidores’’) is accessible at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/ 

pubs/consumer/credit/scre18.shtm; ‘‘Credit and Your Consumer Rights’’ (‘‘El Cre ́dito y Sus 

Derechos como Consumidor’’) is accessible at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/ 

scre01shtm; and ‘‘Knee Deep in Debt’’ (‘‘Endeudado Hasta el Cuello’’) is accessible at 

www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/scre19.shtm. 

dertaken a major consumer education initiative directed at consumers who are 

struggling to pay their mortgages. The initiative, which includes a suite of mortgage-related resources for homeowners, explains how to avoid mortgage loan modification and foreclosure rescue scams. NeighborWorks America, the Homeowners 

Preservation Foundation (a nonprofit member of the HOPE NOW Alliance of mortgage industry members and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developmentcertified counseling agencies), and other groups are distributing FTC materials and 

information directly to homeowners at borrower events across the country, on their 

websites, in their mailings, and over the telephone. 

With respect to abusive debt collection activities, the FTC educates consumers 

about their rights and responsibilities in a number of ways. An FTC brochure, entitled ‘‘Debt Collection FAQs: A Guide for Consumers,’’ explains the Federal Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act in plain language. The brochure is accessible at 

www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre18.shtm. In 2009, the FTC distributed 123,500 paper copies of the brochure to consumers in response to inquiries to 

the FTC and through non-profit consumer groups, state consumer protection agencies, Better Business Bureaus, and other sources of consumer assistance. In addition, online users accessed the brochure on the FTC’s website 456,162 times. The 

FTC also publishes Spanish-language versions of this and related brochures, including ‘‘Credit and Your Consumer Rights’’ and ‘‘Knee Deep in Debt.’’ 1 The FTC distributed 12,400 paper copies of the Spanish version of ‘‘Debt Collection FAQs’’ in 

2009. Online users accessed the brochure in Spanish 7,792 times in 2009. Most recently, in September 2009, the FTC released a video explaining consumer rights regarding debt collection. The video can be found at www.ftc.gov/debtcollection and 

www.youtube.com/ftcvideos. The Commission also provides consumer education through its Consumer Response Center (‘‘CRC’’), whose highly trained contact representatives respond to 

telephone calls and correspondence from consumers, in both paper and electronic 

form, and provide them with relevant information and materials. A toll-free number, 

1–877–FTC–HELP, makes it very easy for consumers to contact the CRC. 

The Commission encourages wide circulation of all of its educational resources 

and makes bulk orders available to anyone free of charge, shipping included. We 

provide FTC materials to State Attorneys General and other local law enforcement 

entities, consumer groups, and nonprofit organizations, who in turn distribute them 

directly to consumers. In addition, media outlets—online, print, and broadcast—routinely cite our materials and point to our guidance when covering debt-related news 

stories. Finally, the FTC extends the reach of its consumer education initiatives 

through public speaking engagements to groups across the country. 

Question 6. What is your recommendation for better protecting consumers from 

these types of abuses moving forward? 

Answer. Given the pendency of the rulemaking proceeding, it would be inappropriate for me to express a view as to how to best protect consumers from these types 

of abuses. Aside from that issue, I fully expect that the agency will continue to expand both its enforcement efforts and its consumer education initiatives and outreach. 

Question 7. What is one example of an egregious and fraudulent debt settlement 

practice the FTC has reviewed or resolved, and in your view, how could it have been 

avoided? 

Answer. As one example, in October 2007 the Commission alleged that four companies and their principals, Robert and Miriam Lovinger, marketed their services 

through websites that offered a ‘‘Debt Meltdown Program,’’ described as ‘‘an aggressive method of helping consumers out of the debt trap and away from the bankruptcy path.’’ The FTC’s complaint alleged that the defendants told consumers that 

they would obtain settlements that would substantially reduce the consumers’ debt. 

The defendants allegedly promised to negotiate with creditors and begin making 

payments to them within several weeks after consumers joined their program, and 

to provide personalized financial counseling. Defendants also allegedly told consumers to have no further contact with their creditors and to stop paying them immediately, enabling the defendants to negotiate for them. The defendants, however, 

allegedly failed in many cases to contact each creditor as promised, and consumers 

continued hearing from creditors about their debts. In addition, the Commission alVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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1 Consumer Federation of America is a nonprofit association of some 300 nonprofit consumer 

organizations across the U.S. CFA advances the consumer interest through research, education 

and advocacy. 2 Consumers Union of United States, Inc., publisher of Consumer Reports, is a nonprofit membership organization chartered in 1936 to provide consumers with information, education, and 

counsel about goods, services, health and personal finance. CU’s publications and services carry 

no outside advertising and receive no commercial support. 3 Consumer Action is a national non-profit education and advocacy organization that has 

served consumers since 1971. CA serves consumers nationwide by advancing consumer rights 

in the fields of credit, banking, housing, privacy, insurance and utilities. 4The National Consumer Law Center is a nonprofit organization specializing in consumer 

issues on behalf of low-income people. NCLC works with thousands of legal services, government 

and private attorneys, as well as community groups and organizations, from all states that represent low-income and elderly individuals on consumer issues. 5The Center for Responsible Lending is a not-for-profit, non-partisan research and policy organization dedicated to protecting homeownership and family wealth by working to eliminate abusive financial practices. 6The National Association of Consumer Advocates is a non-profit corporation whose members 

are private and public sector attorneys, legal services attorneys, law professors, and law students, whose primary focus involves the protection and representation of consumers. NACA’s 

mission is to promote justice for all consumers. 7The National Consumers League, founded in 1899, is America’s pioneer consumer organization. Its mission is to protect and promote social and economic justice for consumers and workers in the United States and abroad. 8 U.S. PIRG serves as the federation of non-profit, non-partisan state Public Interest Research 

Groups, which take on powerful interests on behalf of their members. The PIRGs have long advocated for a fair financial consumers marketplace. 9The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is a nonprofit consumer education and advocacy organization, established in 1992 and located in San Diego, CA. 10The Arizona Consumers Council has been educating, protecting and advocating on behalf 

of Arizona consumers since 1966. 11The Chicago Consumer Coalition advocates for social and economic justice. 12The Consumer Assistance Council, located on Cape Cod, works with the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office to provide consumer information and to mediate complaints. 13The Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina is a bank watchdog agency 

promoting and protecting community wealth. 14The Consumer Federation of the Southeast is a not-for-profit consumer advocacy group 

founded in 2003 and dedicated to consumer advocacy in the Southeastern United States. Its goal 

is to establish a vigorous, new, pro-consumer agenda built upon public awareness, consumer 

education, and coalition-building. 

leged that defendants regularly withdrew money from consumers’ trust accounts to 

pay their operating expenses. 

In August 2008, the defendants agreed to settle the Commission’s charges. The 

settlement barred the defendants from violating the law again and barred the 

Lovingers from offering debt settlement services to consumers in the future without 

first obtaining a $1 million performance bond. The settlement imposed a $7 million 

judgment on the defendants that was partially suspended based on an inability to 

pay. The judgment may be imposed in full in the future if the Commission learns 

that the defendants misrepresented their financial condition during settlement negotiations. The judgment also required the Lovingers to transfer proceeds from the 

sale of property they owned to be used for possible restitution to injured consumers. 

The Commission works to prevent scams like this one from taking advantage of 

consumers by a combination of aggressive law enforcement (including seeking consumer redress where appropriate), extensive consumer education, guidance to industry as to how to comply with the law, and, where appropriate, promulgating rules. 

October 16, 2009 

DONALD S. CLARK, Secretary, 

Federal Trade Commission, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: TELEMARKETING SALES RULE—DEBT RELIEF AMENDMENTS—R411001

Dear Secretary Clark: 

These comments are being submitted by Consumer Federation of America,1 Consumers Union,2 Consumer Action,3 the National Consumer Law Center on behalf 

of its low-income clients,4 the Center for Responsible Lending,5 the National Association of Consumer Advocates,6 the National Consumers League,7 U.S. PIRG,8 the 

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,9 the Arizona Consumers Council,10 the Chicago Consumer Coalition,11 the Consumer Assistance Council,12 the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina,13 the Consumer Federation of the Southeast,14

109 

15Grass Roots Organizing is a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization in Missouri, with a membership 

of more than 450 households. Founded in 2000, GRO’s mission is to create a grassroots voice 

for economic justice and human rights for all Missourians. 16 Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc. is a nonprofit law firm that provides free legal services 

to low income, elderly and working poor individuals in 17 counties in Northeast Florida. JALA’s 

consumer law unit focuses on assisting those who have been victims of predatory lending, unfair 

collection practices and other illegal business practices. 17The Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition was founded in Baltimore, Maryland in 2000 to 

provide a voice for Maryland consumers. Its mission is to advance and protect the interests of 

Maryland consumers through education and advocacy and to ensure fairness and safety in the 

marketplace. 18Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance is one of the network of Legal Aid programs in Minnesota 

that provides legal advice and representation for low-income clients in a wide range of areas, 

including consumer law, family law, health law, housing and landlord/tenant law, public benefits law, youth law, disability law, and elder law. Among its services, MMLA, through its Legal 

Services Advocacy Project, engages in legislative and administrative advocacy, conducting research and policy analysis and providing community education and training. 19The Virginia Citizens Consumer Council is a statewide grassroots volunteer consumer education and advocacy organization. 

Grass Roots Organizing,15 Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc.,16 the Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition,17 Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance,18 and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.19

We applaud the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for its thorough analysis of the 

debt relief industry and for the essential amendments that it has proposed to the 

Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) to protect consumers from abusive practices in debt 

relief, including for-profit debt settlement services, debt counseling services, and 

debt negotiation services. These amendments are crucial to protecting consumers 

from deception and ensuring that they do not pay for false promises rather than real 

results. 

Summary of Comments 

We strongly support the proposed rule, and in particular these crucial elements: 

• A strong, effective ban on requesting or taking fees in advance of achieving final, 

documented results for consumers. We recommend that the results must be 

based on the consumer’s acceptance of the creditor’s offer, as documented in 

writing. 

• Coverage of calls that consumers make in response to advertisements for debt relief services in the general media. Since for-profit debt counseling, debt settlement, and debt negotiation services are commonly advertised on the Internet, 

on television, or by other means which are designed to induce consumers to 

make inbound calls, not covering those calls would create a huge loophole. 

• Prohibitions on specific material misrepresentations. This provides greater clarity to debt relief service providers regarding the types of claims that the FTC 

will consider to be deceptive. 

• Specific required disclosures about how the service works and other important 

information. We recommend that these disclosures be made before the consumer 

enrolls for the service, whether they have to pay or not at that point. 

In addition, we recommend that the TSR should prohibit debt relief services from 

these other abusive practices: 

• Changing the addresses on the consumer’s accounts so that the debt relief company receives the bills and notices, not the consumer. 

• Instructing or advising consumers to have no further contact with their creditors. 

• Instructing or advising consumers not to make any payments to their creditors 

directly. 

• Making any representations about the percentage or dollar amount by which 

debts or interest rates may be reduced, or in the alternative, requiring that any 

representations about results be based on those which are documented by actual 

customer experience over the prior 2 years for all of the debt those consumers 

brought into the program. 

• Failing to provide a ‘‘money-back’’ cancelation period of at least 90 days in the 

contract, plus more time if there has been a material breach of the contract or 

a material violation of law. 

We further recommend that the exemption in TSR for telephone calls in which 

the sale of goods or services is not completed, and payment or authorization of payment is not required, until after a face-to-face sales presentation should not apply 

110 

20 ‘‘Economic Factors and the Debt Management Industry,’’ Richard A. Briesch, PhD, Associate 

Professor, Southern Methodist University, August 6, 2009, at 12, available at http:// 

www.consumercreditchoice.org, see also Keest, supra. 21Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett on behalf of the Consumer Federation of America, the National Consumer Law Center, and U.S. PIRG before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the U.S. Senate regarding consumer protection and the credit crisis, February 

26, 2009, http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/File/PlunkettlTestimo 

nylSenatelCommercelFebl26(3).pdf. 22http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20settle.html?lr=1&emc=eta1. 

with respect to telemarketing of debt relief services. This exemption could swallow 

the rule, as well as favor some debt relief providers over others. 

In our comments we will address the problems in the debt relief industry and why 

the proposed amendments to the TSR will help address those problems. We will also 

explain why specific language changes and additions are needed in order to improve 

the coverage and workability of the TSR in regard to debt relief services. We believe 

that strong FTC rules will benefit not only financially distressed consumers but also 

creditors who are owed money and legitimate debt relief services that truly provide 

consumers with help for their debt problems. 

The Proposed Amendments are Sorely Needed 

In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR), the FTC has vividly described the 

pervasive illegal conduct that has occurred as for-profit debt relief services have 

emerged. 

1. Debt settlement services are fraught with problems. 

A debt settlement service promises to attempt to settle credit card and other unsecured debts for significantly less than the full amount owed. However, the consumer 

has to save enough to fund those lump sum settlements to each creditor. Settlement 

negotiations do not commence until the consumer has saved enough to settle at 

least one of the debts involved, and there is no likelihood that all of the debt can 

be eliminated unless the consumer saves a very sizable amount of money. Since 

multiple debts are often involved, the process may take several years. While the 

savings period is running, the debts grow in size due to creditor charges for interest 

and penalty fees. Entering a debt settlement program does not stop the consumer 

from being called by debt collectors, experiencing negative credit history, being sued 

for the debt, and having wages garnished after a judgment. 

The fee is often calculated on the amount of the consumer’s debt or on the projected savings, regardless of whether the debt is ultimately settled or not. As the 

FTC noted, there are different fee models, but the most common is the ‘‘front-end 

fee’’ which requires consumers to pay a significant portion of the total amount within the first few months and the balance within a year or less—often well before any 

negotiations have taken place. Individuals who can’t save enough to settle their 

debts end up paying hundreds, even thousands of dollars but getting no benefit in 

return. The so-called ‘‘flat fee’’ approach also involves significant fee payments well 

before any settlement is achieved. For example, the consumer may be charged a setup fee of from 2 percent to 4 percent, plus additional fees until the fees total from 

14 percent to 20 percent of the full amount of the original debt brought into the 

settlement program, with the entire percentage fee paid over the first half of the 

program.20

Non-completion rates are very high and the rate of successful settlements is very 

low, as we will discuss further in our comments on the proposed prohibition against 

advance fees. 

Earlier this year, Consumer Federation of America (CFA) testified before Congress that debt settlement firms often mislead consumers about the likelihood of a 

settlement, cannot guarantee that a creditor will agree to a reduced payment, often 

mislead consumers about the effect of the settlement process on debt collection and 

their credit worthiness, and charge such high fees that consumers often don’t end 

up saving enough to make settlement offers that a creditor will accept, causing 

many consumers to drop out of the program.21

The problems consumers face in debt settlement have been much in the news: 

• The New York Times reports that consumers rarely benefit from debt settlement 

services. ‘‘More often, they say, a settlement company collects a large fee, often 

15 percent of the total debt, and accomplishes little or nothing on the consumer’s behalf.’’ Debt Settlers Offer Promises But Little Help, New York Times, 

April 19, 2009.22

111 

23http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/08/business/fi-debt-relief8. 24http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/march–2009/money/scams/highfee-debtsettlement/scams-high-fee-debt-settlement.htm. 25http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/12/earlyshow/living/money/main5008357 

.shtml. 26http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/SavingandDebt/ManageDebt/DebtSettlement 

ACostlyEscape.aspx. 27http://www.la.bbb.org/BusinessReport.aspx?CompanyID=100046948. 28See FTC press release at www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/08/edge.shtm. 29Testimony of Travis B. Plunkett on behalf of the Consumer Federation of America, the National Consumer Law Center, and U.S. PIRG before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the U.S. Senate regarding consumer protection and the credit crisis, February 

26, 2009, http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/File/PlunkettlTestimo 

nylSenatelCommercelFebl26(3).pdf. 30Debt management services offer to make arrangements for consumers to pay their entire 

debts with reduced interest rates and fees and over longer periods of time; debt negotiation 

firms offer to make consumers’ debts more affordable by obtaining lower interest rates and other 

concessions from the creditors. 

• The New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has called debt settlement a 

‘‘rogue industry.’’ Cuomo Subpoenas Debt Settlement Firms, Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2009.23

• Debt settlement was identified in the March 2009 issue of Consumer Reports 

as one of five ‘‘financial traps.’’ Financial Traps are Flourishing, Tough Times 

Have Bred Five Costly Come Ons: High Fee Debt Settlement, Consumer Reports, March 2009.24

• The CBS Morning News says that complaints to the Federal Trade Commission 

about debt settlement ‘‘more than quadrupled between 2006 and 2007.’’ Debt 

Settlement Can Hurt More Than Help, May 12, 2009.25

• Smart Money reports that using these companies is ‘‘fraught with risk, not to 

mention outrageous fees.’’ Debt Settlement: a Costly Escape, August 6, 2007.26

The Better Business Bureau of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San 

Bernardino Counties offers this caution about debt settlement services: 

Complaints on these companies allege that creditors continue to harass clients, 

fees and interest continue to accumulate, and that the companies do not contact 

the creditors. Usually, creditors turn the claims over to collection agencies, file 

suit and pursue collection of the money owed to them. Debts are seldom settled, 

customer’s credit is ruined, and many people are sued forcing them to seek 

bankruptcy protection. Typically, it is difficult to obtain refunds from the companies.27

The FTC and state agencies have brought many cases against debt settlement 

companies. The FTC case against Edge Solutions, Inc. provides a good example of 

the types of problems that consumers have encountered with debt settlement services.28 The company allegedly promised to reduce consumers’ debts to 55 cents on 

the dollar; told consumers to stop making payments to their creditors, which would 

place them in a ‘‘hardship condition,’’ making negotiations possible; promised that 

debts would begin to be paid to creditors within several weeks; required consumers 

to set up direct debits from their bank accounts to an account controlled by the company, from which their fees and debts would be paid; promised one-on-one financial 

counseling, which in most cases was never provided; buried in the agreement the 

fact that consumers must pay 45 percent of the total fee upfront before any payments would begin to creditors and that this might take several months; failed to 

negotiate with and pay creditors as promised; and caused consumers to incur late 

fees, finance charges, overdraft charges, and negative information on their credit reports, and to face various types of legal action by creditors. 

In its Congressional testimony, CFA concluded that, ‘‘The essential promise made 

by debt settlement firms to the public, that they can settle most debts for significantly less than what is owed, is often fraudulent. There is general consensus that 

credit counseling, if done well, can provide significant benefits for some financially 

distressed consumers. No such consensus exists for debt settlement.’’ 29

2. The proposed amendments wisely cover all types of for-profit debt relief services. 

The FTC has taken the correct approach in covering all types of for-profit debt 

relief services in the proposed amendments to the TSR. While they may operate differently,30 for-profit debt counseling, debt management, and debt negotiation services share some of the same characteristics as debt settlement services (in fact, 

sometimes the terms debt settlement and debt negotiation are used interchangeably). These businesses often charge significant fees upfront and make representaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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31 ‘‘Credit Counseling in Crisis: The Impact on Consumers of Funding Cuts, Higher Fees and 

Aggressive New Market Entrants,’’ National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Federation 

of America, April 2003, http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/creditlcounselinglreport.pdf. 32See FTC press release at www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/ameridebt.shtm. 33See FTC press release at www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/05/dsi.shtm. 34See FTC press release at www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/debtreduct.shtm. 

tions that lead consumers to believe that they will get debt relief in return—representations that are sometimes false. 

A 2003 report 31 by the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) and CFA about 

credit counseling and debt management programs described problems with some 

debt management services, including: failing to make consumers’ debt management 

program on time, or at all; deceptively claiming that fees are voluntary; not adequately disclosing fees; charging excessive fees; and falsely purporting to be nonprofit organizations. The report also noted that newer entrants in the industry were 

generally more aggressive in their marketing tactics, particularly with Internet and 

telemarketing advertising. 

The FTC has cited many enforcement actions against debt counseling and debt 

negotiation services that illustrate the need to protect consumers by bringing these 

companies under the amendments to the TSR. For instance, in the largest debt 

management cases ever brought by the FTC, AmeriDebt allegedly misled consumers 

into believing that it was a nonprofit credit counseling service that would teach 

them how to handle their debts.32 Instead, it enrolled them in debt management 

plans operated by a service provider. Furthermore, contrary to AmeriDebt’s claims 

that there were no upfront fees, it kept consumers’ initial payments as fees rather 

than disbursing them to creditors as promised. 

In the case against Debt Solutions, Inc., the FTC alleged that the company 

charged consumers hundreds of dollars for a ‘‘debt elimination program’’ that, despite its claims, did not greatly reduce interest rates or result in thousands of dollars in savings as represented.33 Furthermore, consumers were not told that the 

promised savings would take decades to achieve and that the majority of savings 

would come from increasingly paying more toward their debts every month, not 

from reduced interest rates. 

To protect consumers from deception and abuse, all types of for-profit debt relief 

services should be covered by the proposed amendments. If debt counseling and debt 

negotiation services were not included, some debt settlement companies might try 

to escape the requirements and prohibitions by claiming to be engaged in those 

businesses instead. Furthermore, as the FTC has seen, some companies provide a 

range of debt relief options. For instance, Debt-Set offered a ‘‘debt consolidation program’’ for consumers whose unsecured debts were overdue by 1 month or less and 

a ‘‘debt settlement program’’ if the debts were overdue by a longer period.34 The 

FTC must be careful not to create any loopholes that would allow some businesses 

to escape the rules that apply to their competitors. 

We agree that ‘‘product’’ should be added to the definition of debt relief service 

so that the rules cannot be evaded by recasting the service as a product. In addition, 

we suggest adding ‘‘or seek to alter’’ to the definition to avoid creating a loophole 

for services that might simply claim to attempt to alter the terms of the debt. The 

revised definition in §310.2 (m) would read: 

Debt relief service means any product or service represented, directly or by implication, to renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter or seek to alter the terms 

of payment or other terms of the debt between a consumer and one or more unsecured creditors or debt collectors, including, but not limited to, a reduction in 

the balance, interest rate, or fees owed by a consumer to an unsecured creditor 

or debt collector. 

Key Aspects of the Proposed Amendments 

1. Advance fees must be prohibited to prevent substantial consumer injury. 

We strongly support the proposed restriction in section 310.4 (a)(5) to ban fees in 

advance of consumers actually getting the services they are paying for. The FTC has 

proposed that debt relief services should not request or receive any payment until 

providing the customer with documentation that the particular debt has been renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered. We agree that this is essential to 

protect consumers from the substantial injury that is caused when they pay fees upfront and little or no services are ever rendered. 

Consumers pay significant fees for debt relief services, often before any services are 

actually provided. 

113 

35See FTC press release www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/nationwide.shtm. 36See comments to the FTC by The Association of Settlement Companies, December 1, 2008, 

page 2, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796–00036.pdf. 37See U.S. Debt Resolve (Johnson), Tr. at 72–74 mentioning that 40 percent or more is collected within the first three or 4 months and the rest in 12 months or less and again at Tr. 

108 that 65 percent of the fees will be paid in 6 months ‘‘and the client won’t have any results 

at that point in time.’’ 38See http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtsettlementworkshop/536796–00022.pdf, page 12. 39See Debt Consolidation Care at http://www.debtconsolidationcare.com/debt-settlement 

.html, Fidelity Debt Solutions at http://www.fidelitydebt.net/debt-consolidationlp1.html?s=gaw 

&kw=Debt%20settlement&gclid=CIayr5ikip0CFQ62sgod9xz32Q, FixYourDebtProblems.com at 

http://www.fixyourdebtproblems.com/debt-relief-help-settlement/, Debtamerica Relief at http:// 

www.debtmerica.com/a/debtsettlementlgoogle.html?gclid=CND21LGmip0CFSTFsgod 

qlEd3g. 40See FTC press release at www.ftc.gov./opa/2008/08/smsomax.shtm. 

Consumers pay significant amounts of money for debt relief services. For instance, 

Homeland Financial Services and four other companies charged non-refundable fees 

of up to 15 percent of consumers’ unsecured debts with the promise of reducing 

those debts by as much as 40 to 60 percent.35 This seems to be typical of debt settlement companies; whether the fees are based on the total amount of debts or the 

projected savings, they appear to range from 14 to 20 percent.36 For instance, for 

debts totaling $25,000, the consumer would pay $3,500 to $5,000 if the fee was 

based on the amount of the debt, which seems to be the most common method of 

calculation. This is a very large amount of money, especially for consumers who are 

already in financial distress. 

Furthermore, as in the case of Homeland Financial Services, negotiations with the 

creditors usually begin only after the consumer has paid a large percentage of the 

fees. One company representative at the FTC’s September 2008 Public Workshop on 

‘‘Consumer Protection and the Debt Settlement Industry’’ indicated that in the 

front-end fee models consumers could pay 40 percent or more within the first three 

or 4 months, 65 percent within 6 months, ‘‘without any results at that point.’’ 37 We 

also note the comments at that workshop of the United States Organization for 

Bankruptcy Alternatives acknowledging that ‘‘Some business models call for the fee 

to be paid up front in its entirety, over the first several months of the program prior 

to any negotiating with creditors takes (sic) place.’’ 38 The flat fee model, the second 

most common according to industry representatives at the workshop, works similarly, with the entire amount collected over the first half of the enrollment period. 

As we commented previously, debt settlement negotiations cannot start until consumers have saved enough money for the service to make offers to their creditors. 

That can take years, depending on the amount of the debt, the willingness of various creditors to cooperate, and the consumer’s capacity to save. For consumers with 

multiple debts, negotiations are typically initiated in sequence; when one is settled, 

the consumer starts saving for the next. This stretches the process out even further. 

Debt settlement companies typically advertise that they will help consumers become 

‘‘debt free’’ within two to 4 years; none claim that they can resolve debt problems 

in less than 12 months.39 Part of the reason why the process takes so long is that 

in addition to saving funds toward a settlement, consumers are paying a substantial 

portion of the fees upfront. 

Meanwhile, the consumers are instructed not to make any payments to their 

creditors, or even to have any contact with them. Even if a settlement company does 

not explicitly direct customers not to pay their creditors, such encouragement is implicit. There is simply no way that the vast majority of highly indebted consumers 

can save enough to make a viable settlement and pay fees without reducing or 

eliminating the payments they make to creditors. By the time settlement negotiations begin, if at all, consumers’ debts have become higher because of interest and 

penalties, and the amount of money at their disposal has been reduced by the fees 

they have paid, diminishing the chances that they will be able to make viable offers 

to their creditors. 

For-profit debt negotiation and credit counseling companies also charge significant 

fees before providing services. Debt Solutions charged $399 to $699 in advance for 

its debt negotiation ‘‘program.’’ Consumers paid $675 upfront to Select Management 

Solutions, which promised to reduce their credit card interest rates. When the service, which consisted of three-way telephone calls with their credit card companies, 

did not produce the results that consumers were led to expect, the company allegedly refused to honor its refund policy.40 National Consumer Council, masquerading 

as a nonprofit credit counseling service, debited $500 from consumers’ banks accounts as an ‘‘establishment fee’’ and $50 per month thereafter from the monthly 

payments that consumers thought were going to their creditors, without disclosing 

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41See FTC press release and link to complaint at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/ncc.shtm. 42See press release with link to ‘‘2008 Consumer Complaint Survey Report,’’ July 30, 2009, 

http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/File/Consumer%20Complaint%20 

survey%20Report%20PR%207-30-09.pdf. 43See FTC press release at http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/creditcouncel.shtm. 44See press release at www.oag.state.ny.us/medialcetner/2009/ma/may19bl09.html. 45Testimony of Kathleen Keest on behalf of CRL, CFA and NCLC before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, 

May 12, 2009, www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/policy-legislation/congress/ftc-ccdp-testimony–5–12–2009final.pdf. 

that the company would not start negotiating a payment plan with creditors until 

6 months or longer had elapsed.41

Disclosures and prohibited misrepresentations, no matter how effective, are inadequate to prevent substantial injury by themselves. Unjustified fees and abusive practices must also be prohibited. 

While the disclosure requirements and prohibitions against misrepresentation 

that the FTC has proposed are helpful, they alone are not sufficient to prevent the 

substantial injury that the FTC has described. As the FTC has correctly pointed out, 

when consumers are considering debt relief services, they have no way to know 

whether the representations being made are true or not; they can only judge that 

after they have enrolled (sometimes long after), when the programs have either produced results or failed to do so. 

Furthermore, consumers who need help with debt problems are often in very 

stressful situations. A survey CFA recently conducted showed that the fastest growing complaints that state and local consumer protection agencies received last year 

were about aggressive debt collection practices.42 As the FTC noted in the NPR, this 

makes consumers very vulnerable when they respond to solicitations that promise 

them relief. The required disclosures that the FTC proposes will help consumers understand the total cost of debt relief services, how they work, and what other alternatives may be available. But desperate consumers will tend to focus most on the 

representations made in the advertisements about how these services can relieve 

them of their debt worries. We see the required disclosures and prohibited misrepresentations as good complements to, but not substitutes for, the proposed ban on advance fees. 

It is abusive to charge fees in advance for services when most consumers do not 

benefit. 

The information that the FTC and state agencies have gleaned from enforcement 

actions against debt relief companies revealed extremely low success rates. The vast 

majority of consumers who signed up for those services derived absolutely no benefit 

in exchange for the fees they paid. For example, in the case against National Consumer Council, the court-appointed receiver found that only 1.4 percent of consumers obtained the promised results.43 In recent New York cases against debt settlement companies, the state attorney general alleges that only 1 percent and 1⁄3

percent of consumers received the services they were promised.44

The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) testified in Congress in 2009 that the 

debt settlement business is inherently problematic because it specifically targets 

consumers who are least likely to complete their programs. CRL said that the business model which requires consumers to pay between 14 and 20 percent of their 

debt in fees before they can reach a settlement means that few were likely to benefit 

and most were likely to drop out because they could not keep up the monthly payment to the debt settlement company and save funds for settlements at the same 

time.45

In case after case against various types of for-profit debt relief services, the FTC 

has found that very few, if any, consumers got real help with their debt problems 

after having paid hundreds, even thousands of dollars in fees. We agree with the 

FTC that it is an abusive practice to charge consumers in advance for debt relief 

services that they are likely never to receive. Not only do financially distressed consumers lose what little money they have left to the high fees charged by these companies, but they are left worse off than they were before when the promised results 

are not achieved, facing higher debts, further damage to their credit records, and 

the possibility of lawsuits and wage garnishment. In this respect, the consumer 

harm is more severe than in situations involving recovery services, credit repair, 

and advance fee loans. 

Furthermore, even in the minority of situations where the results are achieved, 

that is often long after the consumer first enrolled. In the meantime, it is not clear 

what services have been provided for which the firms should be compensated beyond 

a de minimus amount, as we will discuss later. This situation is very similar to that 

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46 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et. seq. 47 ‘‘An Investigation of Debt Settlement Companies: An Unsettling Business for Consumers,’’ 

National Consumer Law Center, March 2005, http://www.nclc.org/issues/creditlcounseling/ 

content/DebtSettleFINALREPORT.pdf. 48 ‘‘Economic Factors and the Debt Management Industry,’’ Richard A. Briesch, PhD, Associate 

Professor, Southern Methodist University, August 6, 2009, available at http:// 

www.consumercreditchoice.org. 49The August 7, 2009 press release states that ‘‘ACCC, with other industry and interested 

groups’’ requested the study, see http://www.consumercreditchoice.org/node/4. 50 Id. page 15. 51 ‘‘Look Out for That Lifeline, Debt Settlement Firms are Doing a Booming Business—And 

Drawing the Attention of Prosecutors and Regulators,’’ BusinessWeek, March 6, 2008. 

fore results, if any, are achieved. The approach that Congress took in addressing 

this problem was to enact the Credit Repair Organization Act, which bans advance 

fees.46 That is the correct approach here. 

Industry has not provided reliable, credible empirical evidence of the value or success of for-profit debt relief services. 

There has been no reliable, credible empirical evidence from industry of the value 

or success of for-profit debt relief services. In researching the debt settlement industry for a 2005 report, NCLC found that it was very difficult to obtain information 

from companies or industry associations and was forced to conclude that ‘‘Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine what the companies actually do to earn these 

fees.’’ 47 As the FTC has noted, what little information has been provided by the 

debt settlement industry fails to show the success rate—that is, the number or percentage of consumers who pay for services and fully achieve the promised results. 

A recent study 48 released by Americans for Consumer Credit Choice (ACCC) does 

not provide this evidence. There is no list or other information about the ACCC’s 

members on its website, but it appears to be a debt settlement industry group.49

The study is based on data of 4,500 customers from only one debt settlement company, which is not identified. The author contends that this is a ‘‘very significant 

sample of consumers in this industry.’’ 50 However, there is no information about 

what percentage of the company’s customers, or of the industry as a whole, this represents to support that contention. There is also no information about the company’s 

fee structure. 

The author points to other limitations—for instance, the company does not retain 

information regarding offers and settlements for consumers who dropped out of the 

program—and acknowledges that the results from this company may not be applicable to the industry as a whole. 

We also note that there is no explanation of how this company was selected for 

the study, or by whom. While the data cannot be taken as representative of all debt 

settlement companies, if this is an example of the industry at its best, it reveals 

some serious shortcomings. For example, a shocking 60 percent of customers canceled their participation in the program before completing it. The author touts this 

drop-out rate as better than the 80 percent 51 or more that some have described as 

typical of debt settlement and compares it favorably with the churn rate for subscription services such as mobile phones. 

We would not characterize the majority of customers dropping out of a debt settlement program before completing it as a good result, especially when there is no evidence that any of the drop-outs settled even one of their debts through the company’s efforts. Furthermore, the comparison to the churn in the wireless phone industry does not fit. Cell phone customers don’t usually pay in advance of receiving 

the service, as debt settlement customers do. And many undoubtedly switch their 

wireless service provider because another one has offered them a better deal. It’s 

unlikely that debt settlement customers drop out because another debt settlement 

company has offered them a better deal. 

Given the predominant front-loaded fee structure in the debt settlement industry 

and the fact that the customers of this company who canceled had been in the program for a median of 5 to 6 months (and some for much longer), we can assume 

that many paid a substantial portion of their fees before dropping out. The report 

provides explanations for why some customers canceled (13.5 percent of the dropouts filed for bankruptcy, 6.8 percent were unable to save, 9.2 percent had ‘‘buyer’s 

remorse’’ within the first 2 or 3 months, and 14 percent settled on their own or were 

going to try to do so), but there is no explanation for why more than half (56 percent) of those who dropped out did so. Some may well have been discouraged after 

paying fees for months and getting no satisfactory results. It also seems clear that, 

with such a high cancelation rate, the settlement firm was enrolling customers in 

the program for whom it was not appropriate in the first place. In fact, it seems 

116 

52See comments made at the FTC’s September 2008 public workshop on debt settlement by 

American Express (Flores), Tr. 142–43, and the ABA (O’Neill), Tr. at 96–97; see also comments 

by Bank of America in ‘‘Look Out for that Lifeline, Debt-Settlement Firms are Doing a Booming 

Business—and Drawing the Attention of Prosecutors and Regulators,’’ BusinessWeek, March 6, 

2008. 

likely that this company made little or no effort to determine suitability at all, 

which we believe should be a requirement for all debt relief services. 

Of the 40 percent still in the program, the report does not make clear how many 

had actually settled even one of their debts. The report provides results only ‘‘conditional on’’ settlement of one debt or receipt of one settlement offer. No statistics are 

provided in the published report for the people who had no debts settled. CFA asked 

the author and was told orally that 55.7 percent of those who did not drop out had 

settled at least one debt. That means that 44.3 percent of those still in the program 

had not settled any debts at all. And of the total of 4,500 customers in the study, 

only 22 percent had settled even one debt. 

The 40 percent remaining in the program at the time of the study had been in 

it for at least 12 months; some had been in for 18 months and some for 24. It is 

possible that more of these customers may eventually settle at least one debt, and 

that those who have already settled at least one debt may settle more. It is also 

possible that more customers may drop out without settling any debts. 

Since there are no statistics based on customers actually completing the program, 

which supposedly takes 36 to 48 months, the study does not answer the fundamental question that the FTC has long posited—what is the number or percentage 

of consumers who pay for debt relief services and fully achieve the promised results 

of the elimination of debt? 

Furthermore, the fact that the rate of offers was higher than the rate of settlements (for those who had settled at least one debt) shows that not all offers are 

acceptable. Some offers may be for more money than the consumers can afford, and 

some may be rejected because they are not as good as consumers were led to expect. 

At any rate, the percentage of offers made, which is highlighted in the report to 

demonstrate the value of this company’s services, cannot be used as a real measure 

for success. 

The author of that study argues that prohibiting any fees until debt relief services 

have actually been provided is analogous to forbidding insurance companies from 

collecting premiums until a claim is filed. But when consumers buy insurance they 

receive a legally binding commitment that the company will pay in the event of specific future events. For-profit debt relief services cannot make similar promises of 

specific results, even if they attempt in good faith to help consumers. First, creditors 

are under no obligation to agree to settle debts, reduce interest or enter into payment plans. Indeed, as some creditors say they choose not to deal with for-profit 

debt relief services at all.52 Second, these services have no control over whether 

their customers will be willing or able to accept and fund any offers that creditors 

may make. 

Nonprofit credit counseling services have ongoing relationships with creditors and 

understand what their payment requirements are. They determine in advance if 

consumers can afford acceptable payment plans and, if not, provide advice about 

other alternatives such as bankruptcy. There may be a modest consultation fee or 

set-up fee, but the charges for administering debt management programs are usually assessed on a ‘‘pay as you go’’ basis for the services provided. From the information available about for-profit debt relief services, it appears that they charge significant fees early on in the programs without any reasonable assurance that they 

can help consumers and without providing real educational or other services. There 

is no reliable, credible evidence that even a majority of their customers get the relief 

they have paid for. 

The advance fee ban must not be weakened by preconditioning its application on 

guaranteeing or representing a high likelihood of success. 

The FTC’s questions ask whether there is another formulation of the advance fee 

ban that would be more appropriate than a ban conditioned on the provision of the 

promised goods or services. The answer is no. 

Limiting the ban only to instances of a guarantee or representation of a high likelihood of success has been made would create numerous opportunities for evasion. 

First, an impression or expectation of future success could be created by the lead 

generator, rather than the representations of the direct seller or telemarketer. Once 

an impression of likely success has been created, it could be very hard to dispel. 

Furthermore, and most fundamentally, the very reason that a consumer would use 

a debt relief service is to get their debt problems resolved. A rational consumer 

117 

53Florida, Oregon, Iowa, North Carolina, and Kansas. 54 National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection, section 12.3, 6th edition 2008 and 

Supp. 

would not sign up without the expectation of a high likelihood that he or she would 

get satisfactory results. 

In essence, the expectation of a high likelihood of success is inherent in the customer’s acceptance of a debt relief service. A representation of success should not 

have to be shown as a separate requirement for application of an advance fee ban. 

Such a limitation would very significantly undercut the value of a ban. In fact, we 

believe that representations of success should not be allowed at all, for reasons that 

we will explain later. 

The FTC also asks whether there are alternatives to an advance fee ban that 

would sufficiently address the problem of low success rates in the debt settlement 

industry. There are not. 

A small initial fee may be acceptable in limited circumstances. Some claim that for-profit debt relief services are entitled to front-loaded fees because of they provide assistance to the customer or provide value at the onset. This 

is not supported by the facts. There is no evidence that these companies provide 

meaningful consumer education, and even if they did, that would not justify charging hundreds, let alone thousands of dollars. Until satisfactory outcomes for customers are actually accomplished—setting up a debt management plan, settling the 

debts, or negotiating changes to the debts—the basic service that is promised is not 

rendered even if some minor preliminary steps to provide a possible future agreement have been taken. The concerns expressed by some companies about how to get 

customers to pay their fees are somewhat ironic—how can they represent with confidence that customers will be able to pay off their debts through their programs 

when they are not confident that the customers will have sufficient funds to pay 

them? At any rate, those concerns are outweighed by the concerns about substantial 

injury to consumers when they pay in advance for debt relief services that may 

never be provided. 

A small initial fee could be reasonable when a debt relief service performs substantial work at the onset such as conducting a real, individualized financial analysis to determine if the program is suitable for and will result in a tangible net benefit to that consumer. Such a fee should be capped at $50, to avoid reintroducing 

the market incentive to sign up people who are unlikely to benefit from the service. 

Several states have enacted laws that limit the set-up fee that debt settlement services can charge to $50 or less.53 Set-up or enrollment fees for debt counseling serv- ices are also limited in some states; for instance, Arizona caps them at $39.54

Adequate proof of results must be provided before fees may be requested or paid. 

It is essential that consumers be provided with adequate documentation that their 

debts have been renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered before payment 

can be requested or received. The FTC’s proposal describes the types of documentation that would be acceptable but does not specify the form in which it should be 

provided. This portion of the proposed rule should be clarified to specify that the 

documentation be provided to the consumer in writing and be from and binding on 

the creditor. 

Furthermore, for debt settlements, it is extremely important that the documentation show that debt has been fully settled for a specific dollar amount. A fully executed debt settlement agreement is the preferred document. Other documents 

should be considered only if they are equally binding. This is particularly important 

in order to avoid any confusion about what can trigger an allowable fee—actual settlements, not unaccepted offers to settle, and not preliminary conversations between 

a debt settlement service and a creditor. 

Finally, we are concerned that debt relief services may assert that they should 

be able to charge fees if they have obtained offers from consumers’ creditors, even 

if the consumers do not accept them. As the ACCC study of one debt settlement 

company illustrated, not all offers are accepted. Allowing fees to be collected based 

on offers could provide incentives to negotiate offers that do not reduce or alter the 

debt in any significant way and that do not benefit consumers. We do not believe 

that this is what the FTC intended and the amendment should make clear that the 

fee payments are contingent upon, and payable no earlier than, on consumers having accepted binding settlement offers made by creditors. 

Fees should not be disproportionate to the results achieved. 

The proposed ban on advance fees for debt relief services would mean that fee 

payments could no longer be disproportionate to the results that are actually 

achieved in terms of the elimination of the debts. For instance, if a consumer asked 

a debt settlement company for help with three debts, a fee would be paid for each 

118 

55 California Department of Corporations vs. Nationwide Asset Services, Inc., No. 38300, 4– 

5, August 4, 2006, http://www.corp.ca.gov/OLP/pdf/oah/N2005120755.pdf. 56Taking a power of attorney over any bank account held in the name of the consumer or 

held by any third-party should be determined to be an unfair business practice. It is inherently 

deceptive to encourage the consumer to open a bank account and then take the right to remove 

funds directly out of that bank account by a power of attorney. If the consumer wishes to authorize an electronic debit from his or her bank account, the Federal Electronic Fund Transfer 

Act provides the framework for that transaction, including a right to cancel an authorization 

for preauthorized periodic payments. 

debt as it is settled; the consumer could not be asked to pay a fee based on the total 

amount of all three debts when only one has been settled and the other two are 

still outstanding. 

In the case of debt management plans, payments to creditors are not made in a 

lump sum but are spread out in monthly installments. If we understand the FTC’s 

intentions correctly, under the proposed amendment the debt management company 

would take a portion of the fee each month when it makes the payments to the consumer’s creditors. However, the language in the proposed amendment does not 

make this clear. We are concerned that consumers could be required to pay the entire amount or a significant portion of their fees at the time that they are enrolled 

in a debt management plan, giving them no protection if the service stopped forwarding their payments to their creditors. 

To address this and other issues we have raised, we suggest that proposed § 310.4 

(5) be revised to read: 

Requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration from a person for 

any debt relief service until the customer has agreed to the creditor’s offer and 

the seller has provided the customer with written documentation in the form 

of a settlement agreement, debt management plan, or other such valid contractual agreement, from and binding on the creditor, that the particular debt has, 

in fact, been renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered and that shows 

the specific dollar amount, interest rate, or other terms as applicable, and in the 

case of debt settlement, that shows that the debt has been settled and released. 

With respect to a debt management plan that calls for making payments over 

time to a creditor, no fee may be received earlier than the proportional amount 

of progress made toward reducing the debt. 

The advance fee ban as structured will not prohibit consumers from using legitimate escrow services. 

We agree that the ban on advance fees will not prohibit consumers from using 

legitimate escrow services that they control in order to save money in anticipation 

of a settlement, including money that may eventually be used to pay a debt service 

provider. However, it is crucial that no fees can be deducted by or on behalf of the 

debt relief company until the services have been provided and consumer has been 

given the required documentation. We are concerned about business models in 

which the consumers open accounts with third-party services and give the debt settlement services a power of attorney to remove the fees from those accounts. This 

arrangement is described in some detail in a California case involving Nationwide 

Asset Services.55

Any escrow arrangement must give the consumer, and only the consumer, the 

right to withdraw the funds at any time. Furthermore, the consumer should be able 

to choose the escrow service and not be obliged to use one that assesses higher fees 

than other bank accounts of the same type.56

2. Other abusive practices should be prohibited. 

In addition to banning fees in advance of actually providing debt relief services, 

there are other abusive practices that should be addressed by the TSR in order to 

provide adequate protection for consumers. 

Changing the addresses on consumers’ accounts so that the debt relief company receives the bills and notices, not the consumer, should be prohibited. 

This prevents consumers from receiving notices about penalties, referral to collection, and other impending actions—information consumers need in order to protect 

their interests pending any reduction, settlement or other negotiated resolution of 

the debt. 

Instructing or advising consumers to have no further contact with their creditors 

should be prohibited. 

This prevents consumers from responding to notices and offers for direct negotiations from their creditors and could worsen their situations by prolonging their debt 

problems and increasing the fees that they must pay to the debt relief services and 

the likelihood of lawsuits and other adverse actions. It may also prevent the conVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
119 

sumer from receiving information about how high the debt has grown during the 

delay for debt settlement/negotiations. 

Instructing or advising consumers not to make any payments to their creditors directly should be prohibited. 

This prevents consumers from making even minimum payments to their creditors 

in order to forestall or reduce the risk of penalties, damage to their credit reports, 

lawsuits, and other adverse actions while they are waiting for the debt relief services to be rendered. 

Making any representations about the percentage or dollar amount by which debts 

or interest rates may be reduced should be prohibited. This is inherently misleading because each person’s debts and capacity to pay 

them is different. Furthermore, there are varying levels of cooperation among creditors; some will not even deal with for-profit debt relief services at all. Even if a debt 

relief service has a high rate of success overall, the success rate does not guaranty 

that every customer will achieve the same results. Moreover, fine-print disclaimers 

do little to dampen the expectations created by such claims. 

Representations of results are also misleading when they are not regularly 

achieved for all of the debts for a significant majority of the customers. For example, 

suppose that a debt settlement company regularly settles half of the debts for half 

of the initial debt amount—an assumption which we believe is very optimistic in 

light of high drop out rates. If half of the debts are settled, that means that the 

debt settlement company’s customers still owe the full amount, plus new creditor 

interest charges, on the remaining unsettled half of their debts. It would be very 

misleading to claim: ‘‘We settle debts for 50 cents on the dollar,’’ in this circumstance. A consumer who had started debt settlement with two debts of $12,000 

each and had one debt settled for $6,000 would have paid the $6,000 settlement and 

still owe $12,000—that consumer would be on the hook for 75 cents on the dollar 

in remaining debt and the payment for the settlement, not even counting the 

amount of the debt settlement company’s fees. 

We believe that a prohibition against making any representations about the percentage or dollar amount by which debts or interest rates may be reduced is the 

best way to protect consumers from expectations that may not be fulfilled. If this 

recommendation is not adopted, we suggest as an alternative a ban on making any 

representation about the percentage or dollar amount at which a debt may be reduced or the amount a consumer may save unless the provider maintains evidence 

that the represented result was achieved for all debt enrolled in the program for at 

least 80 percent of the clients who began the service in the most recent two calendar 

years. Evidence supporting claims of results should be verified by an independent 

audit. 

However, if any representations about the percentage or dollar amount by which 

debts or interest rates may be reduced are allowed, there should also be a required 

disclosure that those results cannot be guaranteed for each individual customer. 

Furthermore, debt relief companies should be required to submit their audits to the 

FTC so that the information is publicly available. 

Failing to provide a ‘‘money-back’’ cancelation period of at least 90 days in the contract, plus more time if there has been a material breach of the contract or a material 

violation of law should be prohibited. 

A cancelation period gives consumers time to assess whether a product or service 

is right for them. In the case of debt relief services, a minimum of 90 days to cancel 

with return of all monies paid except for payments that have already been made 

to creditors would enable consumers to make that assessment and provide a disincentive for debt relief services to market to and contract with consumers who are 

not likely to benefit from the services. 

We also suggest that consumers should have the right to cancel in the event of 

a material violation of law or breach of contract by the seller. This would protect 

consumers from the worst actors and give a competitive advantage to sellers who 

honor the law and comply with their contractual promises. 

3. Inbound calls for debt relief services must be covered by the rule. 

We strongly support the extension of the existing telemarketing sales rule’s disclosure and misrepresentation provisions to inbound calls to debt relief services. Limiting the coverage only to outbound calls would ignore the marketing realities and 

allow a very large loophole in the TSR to continue. For-profit debt counseling, debt 

settlement, and debt negotiation services are commonly advertised on the Internet, 

on television, and by other means which are designed to induce the consumer to 

make an inbound call. Protecting the consumer from misrepresentation and requiring disclosure of key information only for those potential debt relief customers who 

receive a phone call, rather than also for those who are induced by an advertisement 

120 

to make a phone call, would make no policy sense, leave a large loophole in place, 

encourage evasion of the rules, and give a competitive advantage to those who use 

advertising to induce inbound calls. 

An additional reason that inbound calls must be covered is the role of lead generators. For example, National Consumer Council used pre-recorded messages left on 

consumers’ answering machines as well as direct mail to induce consumers to call 

in order to generate leads for several other companies. Both the representations 

used to induce calls from consumers and those made during the calls should be covered. The TSR should make clear that it applies to lead generators. Furthermore, 

we believe that the debt relief providers who accept those leads to should be held 

responsible for the representations made to generate them, including those made 

during inbound calls. 

4. We support the disclosures required in the proposed amendments. 

Consumers must be told the truth about the debt relief services. It is very important that the current general disclosure requirements under the TSR apply to inbound calls for debt services as well as outbound calls, as the FTC has proposed. 

We also agree that the additional disclosures pertaining to debt relief services are 

needed. They will help consumers understand exactly how these services work, what 

to expect from them, and whether they are likely to serve their needs. Combined 

with the advance fee ban, the disclosures would provide strong consumer protection. 

The disclosures will also help consumers understand their own obligations and the 

impact that the services may have on them. For example, it is crucial for consumers 

to know that contracting with a debt relief service will not necessarily prevent their 

creditors from taking collection action, that their credit ratings may be affected, and 

that the savings they may realize may be considered taxable income, and that the 

debt balance increases when payments are not being made. 

We understand that payments for debt relief services are often debited from consumers’ bank accounts within a few days after they have enrolled in the programs. 

However, if the disclosures are designed to help consumers make informed decisions 

about whether to sign up or not, they need the information before making the contractual commitment even if the payment will be later. Therefore, we suggest that 

§ 310.3 (a)(1) could be improved to provide greater protection to consumers, not just 

for debt relief services but in other types of telemarketing sales as well, if it required the disclosures to be made before the earlier of payment or an obligation to 

pay. The revised subsection would read: 

Before the earlier of payment or an obligation to pay for goods or services offered, 

and before any services are rendered, failing to disclose truthfully, in a clear and 

conspicuous manner, the following material information: 

5. Prohibitions against specific misrepresentations are useful. 

We agree with the FTC that it is useful to add a specific prohibition in § 310.3 

(a)(2)(x) against misrepresenting any material aspect of a debt relief service, such 

as the amount of money or percentage of debt that consumers must accumulate before negotiations with their creditors are initiated, the effect of the service on collection efforts, how many consumers attain certain results, and whether the service is 

nonprofit. This provides greater clarity to debt relief service providers about what 

they can and cannot do. 

6. The exemption for transactions that are not concluded until after a face-to-face 

sales presentation should not apply to debt relief services. 

We believe that the exemption under § 310.6 (a)(3) should not apply to debt relief 

services. Even if the exemption may have made sense for certain types of telemarketing sales, in the sale of services to be delivered in the future such as debt 

relief, the fact of a face-to-face meeting simply does not create a sufficient safeguard. 

It would be far too easy for the real sales process to occur by phone or other remote 

means and then a simple signing meeting to be used to escape all application of the 

rule. 

Furthermore, a face-to-face exemption could create the anti-competitive result in 

which industry players who deal with potential customers only via the Internet or 

phone must adhere to standards of disclosure, non-misrepresentation, and the very 

important advance fee restriction, while those who arrange for a face-to-face meeting do not. 

Conclusion 

The ‘‘police the marketplace’’ approach taken by the FTC will protect not only consumers but any legitimate debt relief services that actually provide real benefits to 

consumers. Those debt relief services will be entitled to fees, and should have a betVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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ter chance of succeeding in the marketplace when their competitors are stopped 

from taking significant fees without achieving real debt relief. 

We agree with the FTC that additional measures must be taken to address America’s debt problem, including continued enforcement, consumer education, and more 

flexibility in the options that creditors provide to consumers. There should also be 

obligations for debt relief services that may go beyond the scope of the TSR. For 

example, debt relief providers should be required to conduct an individual financial 

analysis for all potential customers to determine whether the service is suitable for 

and will provide a tangible net benefit to them before enrolling them. 

Furthermore, there should be similar rules to protect debt relief customers when 

the use of the telephone is not involved in the transaction, such as when they are 

solicited for and enroll in debt relief services entirely through the Internet. 

The FTC has not included mortgage foreclosure rescue and modification services 

in the proposed amendments to the TSR because it has received authority from Congress to promulgate separate rules in that regard. However, the issues are very 

much the same and the FTC should address them with equally strong rules. 

We believe that the proposed amendments to the TSR are a good and necessary 

step to protect debt relief customers from false promises and financial injury. We 

appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments and will be happy to answer 

any questions that the FTC may have in regard to our views and suggestions. 

Submitted by: 

SUSAN GRANT, 

Director of Consumer Protection, 

Consumer Federation of America. 

On behalf of: 

Consumer Federation of America 

Consumers Union 

Consumer Action 

The National Consumer Law Center on behalf of its low income clients 

The Center for Responsible Lending 

The National Association of Consumer Advocates 

The National Consumers League 

U.S. PIRG 

The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 

The Arizona Consumers Council 

The Chicago Consumer Coalition 

The Consumer Assistance Council 

The Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina 

The Consumer Federation of the Southeast 

Grassroots Organizing 

Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc. 

The Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition 

Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance 

The Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND THE DEBT MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY

Richard A. Briesch, Ph.D.—Associate Professor, Cox School of Business—Southern Methodist University 

August 6, 2009 

Executive Summary 

The current economic climate makes the need for debt management programs 

even more acute. More consumers are finding themselves in financial hardship due 

to high unemployment, low home equity rates, lack of access to bankruptcy protection, and the ‘‘credit crunch’’ so well documented in the press and by legislators. 

This economic climate implies that many consumers are one emergency away from 

financial hardship. There is no question that the multitude of people currently in 

financial distress need programs that reduce the principal of their debt to stave off 

bankruptcy (Manning 2009, Plunkett 2009). 

Debt management programs (DMPs) come in several forms, but their basic structure is similar: they require some sort of consumer education if they are accredited 

by national trade associations (Keating 2008, USOBA 2008), consumer participation 

is voluntary (Hunt 2005, Plunkett 2009) and a plan is set up to make the consumer 

debt-free in two to 5 years. The key differences in the organizations are the mechanisms they use to finance the organization and to help consumers pay off their debt 

(Hunt 2005, Plunkett 2009). In this paper, I refer to organizations that help conVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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sumers pay off their debt by reducing interest rates as consumer credit counseling 

services (CCCSs) and organizations that help consumers pay off their debt by reducing principal as Debt Settlement Programs (DSPs). The efficacy of these different 

approaches has been discussed by a variety of authors, but these discussions have 

lacked a clear and detailed consumer welfare analysis, which is provided in this research. 

One of the most important findings of this research is that the different approaches (CCCS or DSP) help consumers by increasing their economic welfare as 

compared to paying off the debt under the original conditions. However, the consumer welfare analysis suggests that DSPs create the greatest consumer welfare of 

any approach. In fact, consumer welfare is higher under DSPs than under the 60- 

60 rule (repay 60 percent of the debt principal in 60 months) suggested in the literature (see e.g., Keating 2008, Manning 2009). If consumers are allowed to repay 

their debt over 3 years, the affordability of the DSPs (as measured by monthly payments) is similar to the affordability of a program based upon the 60-60 rule. Additionally, creditors are helped by both CCCSs and DSPs as their losses are lower 

when consumers use DMPs as opposed to other alternatives. 

This research empirically examines the efficacy of one DSP company in this industry. Key findings, which are consistent with the observation that programs which 

reduce the principal of the debt may be the only means to keep a growing number 

of consumers out of bankruptcy, include: 

1. Accurate measures of consumer completion and cancellation cannot be calculated from the data, as almost 30 percent of the cancellations are due to the 

consumers either directly paying off the debt or being forced into bankruptcy. 

Further, the cancellation data does not contain information regarding offers received or debt repaid, so it does not accurately reflect value generated by the 

company. That said, the raw cancellation rate (60 percent over 2 years) is much 

less than speculated (85 percent within 1 year) and is similar to or better than 

other subscription-based service industries (e.g., mobile telephone and cable television companies) that have Better Business Bureau certified members. 

2. Conditional on the consumer receiving an offer or settlement, the firm had 

mean, median and mode settlement offers at or below 50 percent of the original 

debt. This number beats the 60-60 rule and suggests that the firm is generating 

significant consumer benefits. 

3. The debt settlement company generates tremendous value to its clients, as 

more than 57 percent of the clients have offers to settle at least 70 percent of 

their original debt, and the most common situation (almost 30 percent of the 

clients) having settlement offers for at least 90 percent of their original debt. 

4. The debt settlement company has an increasingly higher value to customers 

with higher account balances and higher total debt, but lower number of accounts. 

5. Once ‘‘fair share’’ payments are taken into account, CCCS fees and payments 

for a consumer account can exceed 29 percent of the consumer debt, levels 

which Plunkett (2009) calls ‘‘exorbitant.’’ This finding suggests that regulation 

is required to ensure transparent reporting of all fees and payments is required 

for all companies offering Debt Management Programs. 

6. Reasonable upfront fees by DSPs (before settlement) should be allowed because DSPs generate value for consumers and incur expenses generating this 

value. This fee structure is similar in nature to the one used by CCCSs, attorneys and other service-providing firms. 

These findings suggest that a ‘‘common sense’’ approach should be used with the 

DMP industry. A common sense approach implies that regulatory and other consumer advocacy groups focus on ensuring that there is sufficient regulation to be 

able to identify and, if necessary, prosecute bad actors without harming economic 

competition which increases consumer welfare. The industry analysis also suggests 

several regulatory recommendations which could further benefit consumers: 

1. Focus on making alternatives transparent so consumers can make better decisions: disclose total fees including ‘‘fair share’’ and all other consumer fees, 

success metrics of offers received, settlements accepted and percent of debt settled. This disclosure has the additional benefit of allowing interested third parties, e.g., consumer advocacy groups and government agencies, to calculate the 

economic impact of this industry on consumers and other industries. 

2. Provide guidance for handling of client monies in ‘‘fiduciary’’ accounts, especially in terms of timing between audits, what happens if a consumer cancels 

service, appropriate interest rates, and whether or not (and under what cirVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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cumstances) companies can make payments on behalf of consumers. The regulators should allow DSPs to establish trust accounts with their clients, which 

would include: 

a. Requiring consumers to save money every month as one condition of 

making ‘‘satisfactory progress’’ in the program. DSPs should have the ability to monitor, but not control (or make disbursements from) these funds. 

b. Proving regulatory protection for consumers from litigation and creditor 

calls while consumers are making ‘‘satisfactory progress.’’ Other protections 

to ensure that consumers are protected from cancellation fees paid to DSPs 

and unethical business practices, e.g., ensure that the financial institutions 

holding the funds are independent of the DSPs and no fees are disbursed 

from the accounts without full disclosure and regulatory oversight and approval. 

c. Allowing disbursements from these accounts only with consumer and 

DSP approval and for payment to creditors, approved fees, and to the consumer if they cancel the program or for new financial hardships. 

3. Require financial education of consumer, and require specific metrics in 

terms of meeting short-term and long-term education and outcomes (see, e.g., 

Clancy and Carroll 2007, Keating 2008, Staten and Barron 2006). 

Introduction 

While the current economic climate (discussed below) provides strong support for 

programs which help consumers get out of debt, the strongest arguments for programs which take the approach of reducing the principal comes from organizations 

and individuals who are either antagonistic or agnostic to this approach. For instance, the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (or 

BAPCPA) suggests a ‘‘60-60’’ standard for debt repayment outside of bankruptcy, 

where the 60-60 refers to the consumer entering into an agreement with their creditors 60 days prior to bankruptcy to repay 60 percent of their debt within a ‘‘reasonable’’ timeframe. Additionally, both Plunkett (2009) and Keating (2008), who use 

pretty strong rhetoric in denouncing companies using this approach, support a 60- 

60 rule that allows consumers to repay 60 percent of their debt within 60 months 

and acknowledge that a growing number of consumers may be forced into bankruptcy without access to ethical and proconsumer companies offering this alternative. For the remainder of this document, the term ‘‘60-60 rule’’ refers to repaying 

60 percent of the debt within 60 months, not the BAPCPA plans. 

Within the debt management industry, firms have taken two different approaches 

in their debt management programs (DMPs). The first approach, called Consumer 

Credit Counseling Services (or CCCSs), helps consumers by reducing the interest 

payments and, potentially, fees on the debt, but still has consumers pay 100 percent 

of the principal. The second approach, called Debt Settlement Programs (or DSPs), 

helps consumers by reducing the principal on the debt (Hunt 2005, Plunkett 2009). 

These approaches also differ in how the firms are funded and their taxable status. 

CCCSs are generally nonprofit firms and are funded by both account maintenance 

fees from consumers as well as ‘‘donations’’ from creditors which may take the form 

of ‘‘fair share’’ payments and/or direct grants (Boas et al., 2003, Plunkett 2009). 

DSPs, on the other hand, are generally for-profit firms, and are funded through fees 

charged directly to consumers without any payments from the creditors (Hunt 

2005). 

Before proceeding further, I acknowledge that both types of organizations have 

had firms which have taken advantage of vulnerable consumers (US Senate Hearings 2005, Clancy and Carroll 2007, Plunkett 2009), so some of the heated rhetoric 

directed at different approaches by organizations with vested interests is not only 

self-serving, but is also counterproductive. The focus of legislative efforts should be 

to protect consumer welfare by ensuring that the goals of the industry (consumer 

education and debt relief) are met, to ensure that organizations act in ethical and 

transparent ways and to impose appropriate sanctions on any company that willfully take advantage of consumers, i.e., ‘‘bad actors.’’ 

One of the reasons that I argue that the heated rhetoric and trying to use regulation to eliminate other approaches are counterproductive is based on the notion that 

competition produces efficiencies, which, in turn, increase consumer welfare and economic growth. A fundamental principal of the Federal Trade Commission is that 

competition benefits consumers through lower prices and increased variety. This 

philosophy is summarized as: 

124 

Competition in America is about price, selection and service. It benefits consumers by keeping prices low and the quality and choice of goods and services 

high (FTC 2009a). 

Therefore, rather than take the position of being an advocate for a specific approach to helping consumers to get out of their situation, this research is focused 

on understanding the different approaches and calculating the consumer benefits associated with each approach. The benefits are measured in terms of both total consumer welfare (i.e., how much will consumers pay in total for different approaches) 

consumer affordability (how much must the consumer pay each month), and how 

much are firms collecting as a percentage of the original debt from the consumers 

and creditors. It is important to include payments from creditors to the firms, as 

they represent indirect fees charged to consumers because the creditors should be 

indifferent between giving consumers a discount of the same amount that they pay 

the firms in ‘‘fair share’’ payments or any other way the firm is compensated. 

Probably the most important finding of this research is that both CCCSs and 

DSPs increase consumer welfare over the alternative of the consumer paying off 

their debt using a fixed payment of 2 percent of their original debt every month (the 

recommended minimum payment). However, DSPs increase consumer welfare much 

more than CCCSs and have similar affordability to CCCSs when the payments can 

be made over 3 years (instead of 5 years for CCCSs). Given the findings in the extant literature that creditors are also better off when consumers use DMPs, it appears that DMPs are a ‘‘win-win’’ for both consumers and creditors, so regulators 

should be encouraged to use a common sense approach to this industry: protect the 

vulnerable consumers while supporting competition among the different approaches 

to getting rid of consumer debt. This competition is consistent with the Federal 

Trade Commission’s approach to other industries and would result in increased consumer welfare over the long term. 

Some of the key recommendations for regulatory agencies include: (1) protecting 

consumers from litigation and calls/threats from creditors while they are making 

‘‘satisfactory progress’’ in accredited DMPs. Satisfactory progress needs to have 

measurements related to educational goals as well as financial goals (i.e., being current on payments for CCCSs and saving enough for DSPs); (2) providing DSPs with 

the ability to set up trust accounts for their clients that have very specific limitations on disbursements (i.e., approved payments to creditors, approved fees to DSPs, 

payments to consumers for cancellation or new hardships, etc.); (3) require full disclosure of all fees consumers directly or indirectly (e.g., ‘‘fair share’’ payments, 

grants from creditors, etc.) pay; and (4) provide guidance of how companies can accurately measure program effectiveness, e.g., does receiving offers for all enrolled 

debt constitute program completion? 

The remainder of this document is organized as follows. In the next section, the 

economic factors which are increasing the necessity of this industry are briefly reviewed. Next, the different alternatives are provided with an eye toward understanding the economics and limitations of the alternatives. In section three, the performance of a specific DSP is analyzed. This firm provided a significant dataset, the 

details of 4,500 randomly selected clients. In analyzing the clients, we use a stratified sampling approach, also called a ‘‘strata approach.’’ The clients are combined 

into different groups, based upon their debt levels. These different stratums are 

then analyzed to see if consumer behavior or firm performance differs between the 

groups. As far as we know, this type of analysis of the efficacy of Debt Settlement 

Programs has not been published. 

In the next section, the economics (both for consumers and the firms) of the debt 

management programs is analyzed in more detail. Specifically, consumer welfare is 

estimated and compared under a variety of assumptions. This paper concludes with 

public policy and industry recommendations. 

Current Economic Climate 

The importance of the consumer debt management industry has become increasingly important as the U.S. economic recession continues. Table 1 shows the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in the United States, which has reached 9.4 percent as of May 2009. 

125 

Table 1—U.S. Unemployment Rate 

Year Month Percent 

2008 May 5.5 

Jun 5.6 

Jul 5.8 

Aug 6.2 

Sep 6.2 

Oct 6.6 

Nov 6.8 

Dec 7.2 

2009 Jan 7.6 

Feb 8.1 

Mar 8.5 

Apr 8.9 

May 9.4 

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/). 

Even worse, the long-term unemployment rate (those unemployed more than 27 

weeks), rose in May by 268,000 to 3.9 million U.S. Households, roughly triple the 

number at the start of the recession (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Note 

that employment is generally a lagging indicator (e.g., it improves after the economy 

improves), an uptick in the U.S. economy will not provide immediate relief for these 

households. 

The high unemployment rate coupled with the fact that the average credit card balance at the end of 2008 was more than $10,000 for approximately 91 million 

households (158 million individuals or 78 percent of all households) who have credit 

cards (Woolsey and Schulz 2009). A silver lining is that in April of 2009, seasonally 

adjusted total consumer debt was decreasing at a 7.5 percent annual rate (Federal 

Reserve 2009). However, household leverage (total debt to disposable income), while 

decreasing, still remains at 130 percent from a high of 133 percent in 2007. This 

number can be contrasted to the 55 percent leverage in the 1960s and 65 percent 

leverage in 1980s (Zuckerman and Todd 2009). 

An implication of these statistics is that many consumers are barely able to pay 

their debts and are one emergency away from financial hardship—a recent study 

found that medical bills were a contributing factor in more than 60 percent of all 

bankruptcy filings (Himmelstein et al., 2007). From this hypothesis, one would then 

expect consumer credit card and personal loan default rates to be increasing. Figure 

1 confirms this belief, as consumer default rates on credit cards stands at 7.49 percent in the first quarter of 2009, and consumer defaults on personal loans stand at 

2.93 percent in the same period. If anything, these numbers understate the problems consumers are having. In a report prepared for the National Foundation for 

Credit Counseling, Harris Interactive (2009) found: 

• 26 percent of households admitted to not paying their bills on time. Minorities 

may be more severely impacted, with this number rising to 51 percent for African American households. 

• In the last 12 months, 15 percent of individuals were late paying a credit card 

and 8 percent admitted to missing at least one payment, and 6 percent have 

their debts in collection. 

• 32 percent admit that they have no savings, and only 23 percent state that they 

were saving more than a year ago. 

• 57 percent of households do not have a budget, and 41 percent give themselves 

a grade of C, D, or F in their financial knowledge. 

One may conclude that given the financial turmoil in this market, credit card 

companies may be hurt as well. However, a recent study found that since the bankruptcy law was reformed in October 2005 (2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 

Consumer Protection Act or BAPCPA), the credit card industry has recorded record 

profits, although more factors (e.g., interest rate spreads, increased fees, etc.) enter 

into this profitability than simply the increased difficulty of entering into bankruptcy (Simkovic 2009). 

A recent study estimated that as many as 800,000 households have been precluded from entering bankruptcy due to BAPCPA (Lawless et al., 2008). Therefore, 

the need for a service which helps consumers manage and pay down their debts and 

to work with the credit card companies is more acute than ever. In fact, recent legislation requires credit card companies to recommend credit counseling education and 

debt management programs to consumers in financial trouble (Reddy 2009). So what 

are consumers’ alternatives when they find themselves in financial hardship? Their 

alternatives are grouped into four broad categories (Hunt 2005) that vary in terms 

126 

*Sources: Bank of America 2008 10K; page 127—Table 15, page 128—Table 16, page 172— 

Table 37; American Express 10K; page 50, page 56; Chase 2008 10K; page 155, page 81, page 

128; CapitalOne 2008 10K; page 73—Table C, page 76—Table F. 

of a continuum of how much of the debt can the consumers afford to repay (all, partial or nothing): 

1. Bankruptcy—either chapter 7 or chapter 13. 

2. Debt Management Programs—This includes any service which tries to help 

the consumers pay off their debts (outside of bankruptcy) either through reduction in interest rates, debt reduction or other means. 

3. Other financing—This includes raising money through sales or refinancing of 

current assets (e.g., home equity loan). 

4. Repayments on original terms. 

Figure 1—Bank Charge Off Percentages 

Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Bank. 

Overview of Consumer Alternatives 

This section provides an overview of the different alternatives that are available 

to consumers who are in financial hardship. Before discussing the alternatives, a 

brief discussion of the process or stages involved is provided (based on Mojica 2009).*

1. Financial Hardship 

First, consumers have some financial hardship which limits a family’s ability to 

continue paying their debts. For instance, Himmelstein et al. (2007) found that medical bills were a contributing factor in more than 60 percent of all bankruptcy filings 

and that medical portion of the debt was more than $5,000 or 10 percent of family 

income. A creditors willingness to work with a consumer, e.g., give grace periods, 

reduce interest rates and/or debts, is directly linked to the consumer’s ability to 

demonstrate that a true hardship was the cause of the household’s financial crisis 

(Dash 2009). 

2. 30 Days 

Once the consumer is at least 30 days late in payment, and for every 30 days 

thereafter, a notice is sent to credit bureaus indicating delinquency. At this point 

the consumer usually starts receiving calls from the creditors requesting payment. 

Eventually, credit cards and other revolving credit are canceled for the consumer. 

Once the account is delinquent, credit card fees may be dramatically increased, although new Federal legislation has put curbs on credit card companies in terms of 

fees and interest rate changes (Reddy 2009). Reddy did cite a consumer whose interest rate jumped from 12 percent to 24 percent due to late payments even though 

the credit card company did agree to work with the consumer. 

In the current economic crisis, credit cards are willing to extend the grace periods 

for consumers who have true hardships, even reducing the total debt amount. HowVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:34 Jul 15, 2011 Jkt 067327 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\67327.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE

422BRIE1.eps
127 

*Source: Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/ 

consumer/credit/cre27.pdf. See http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegis 

lation/legislation/uk/insolvencyact.pdf, for a description of the insolvency act of 1986 which established this system. 

ever, these deals come at a price—a consumer’s credit score may drop 70 to 130 

points as a result (Dash 2009). 

3. Six Months 

The creditor writes off the debt. At this point, the account may be sold, sent to 

a collections agency or a law firm. Generally, the amount of debt collected by these 

agencies varies, but examination of 10K reports from various creditors indicates 

that credit card companies are receiving about 10 percent of the outstanding debt 

when it is sold. 

More recently, credit cards have become more willing to negotiate terms with consumers, but they generally require that consumers be at least 90 days delinquent 

and are accepting ‘‘dimes if not pennies on the dollar’’ (Dash 2009). Given the relatively low recovery rate, it suggests that other alternatives (e.g., lawsuits, selling 

debts to collection agencies) provide even lower returns for the creditors. 

4. Lawsuit as Option 

Creditors may sue consumers to collect bills. From a consumer standpoint, this 

option adds legal fees to the debt they already cannot afford. Assuming that the 

creditor gets a judgment, it may be enforced by garnishing wages, sales of assets, 

etc. 

From a consumer standpoint, there is a mine field waiting for them once they get 

into financial trouble. Generally, the creditors will not work with a consumer until 

they are at least 90 days delinquent, and they may increase interest rates or fees 

simply because the consumer contacts the creditor for help (Dash 2009). Further, 

creditors are more likely to help consumers who do not have a history of financial 

troubles, so they are less likely to help those most in need (Dash 2009). Under a 

practice known a ‘‘global default’’, creditors can move an account that is current into 

default because the consumer is delinquent to a different creditor, (see, e.g., testimony U.S. Committee on Financial Services 2007). Once the credit card is in default, legislation limiting harassing calls really does not apply to the original creditors, only third party collectors. One would expect very high dropout or cancellation 

rates for the first 6 months a consumer is enrolled in a program, until the regulatory protections take effect. Therefore, some sort of protection for consumers who 

want to settle their debt and have enrolled in certified debt management programs 

is required. Ironically, studies have found that credit card losses are 32 percent 

lower for the clients who enter DMPs before fair share payments are included (Hunt 

2005), so it is against the creditors own best interests to force the consumer into 

litigation. England has solved this problem for their consumers in financial difficulty 

using the insolvency act of 1986. In this act, if enough creditors (generally 75 percent) agree to the debt reduction plan, the other creditors are legally bound by the 

repayment plan even if they did not agree to the plan. 

Bankruptcy*

Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy are legal means of settling debts. 

Chapter 7 is a liquidation of assets, and the reform act of 2005 (2005 Bankruptcy 

Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act or BAPCPA) placed many hurdles 

for consumers to use Chapter 7 (and instead force them to use Chapter 13). These 

hurdles includes means testing, higher fees and increased costs and risks for those 

assisting consumers filing Chapter 7 (Simkovic 2009). Once a consumer uses chapter 

7, they cannot file again for 8 years and are limited in filing for other legal remedies 

for several years. Additionally, the filing stays on their credit report for 10 years 

(Hunt 2005). One unfortunate side effect of filing bankruptcy is that many employers check potential employee credit history, so this may have an effect on future income and job prospects. 

Chapter 13 filings on the other hand are considered ‘‘wage earner plans’’ where 

the debt amount is reduced based on the consumer’s ability to pay, and a plan is 

set up so that consumers pay their debts in three to 5 years (Hunt 2005). Hunt 

(2005) suggests that attorney and trustee fees amount to approximately 14 percent 

of the debt, and creditors’ average about 35 percent recovery of the debt. However, 

he also suggests that only 33 percent of consumers finish the program, less than 

the average for voluntary debt management programs. In a white paper, the United 

States Organization for Bankruptcy Alternatives suggests that the completion rate 

is much lower, only 20 percent to 25 percent (USOBA 2008). As with Chapter 7, 

128 

Chapter 13 filings go on a consumer’s credit report (although for a shorter period 

of time), and their ability to file in later years is limited. 

Bankruptcy as an alternative for most consumers has become much more limited 

since BAPCPA was passed in 2005 (Lawless et al., 2008). They estimate that as 

many as 800,000 U.S. households have been prevented from filing bankruptcy in the 

last few years. 

However, this does not mean that total bankruptcy filings are down, only that 

consumers are being moved from Chapter 7 (liquidation) to Chapter 13 (partial payment) to move this option away from paying nothing toward paying something. 

When these settlements are sold on the open market, they generally receive only 

18–21 cents on the dollar (Manning 2009). Given the above estimates that the judgments only return 35 cents on the dollar, the net effect to the creditors is that they 

only receive pennies on the dollar through this route. One would expect that creditors would attempt to stay away from this alternative. 

However, once there is more than one creditor, they face a classic ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ (Poundstone 1992). The basic idea is that even though all of the creditors 

are better off by avoiding bankruptcy and legal judgments, each individual creditor 

is better off by cheating (e.g., initiating legal judgments to be the first one in line). 

This problem has also been called the creditor’s dilemma (Bainbridge 1986). Therefore, some regulatory guidance is required beyond BAPCPA, which suggests the 60- 

60 (pay off 60 percent of debt in 60 months) as a standard, and would limit creditors 

to 80 percent of the debt principal if they do not reach an agreement (Manning 

2009). Assuming that they collect on the judgment, this 80 percent rule provides the 

wrong incentive to the creditors, as they are better off using litigation. Therefore 

this 80 percent standard should be lowered to 60 percent to match the 60-60 rule. 

Consumers must also go through counseling services (regardless of whether or not 

they enroll in debt management programs) prior to filing for bankruptcy. The National Foundation for Credit Counseling estimated that their members provided 1.26 

million education sessions for bankruptcy in 2007 (Keating 2008). Some recent research has suggested that the educational component may be important for consumers (Staten and Barron 2006). Staten and Barron find that consumers who enter 

counseling are significantly less likely to file for bankruptcy in later years, and have 

significantly lower risk scores than consumers who choose to not enter counseling. 

A nagging concern is whether the reason for the good outcomes is self-selection 

(e.g., motivation of consumers) or efficacy of the program (Clancy and Carroll 2007; 

Hunt 2005). That said, academic arguments over the source of the outcomes of these 

programs miss the key point. Regardless of the underlying cause, if consumers are 

more successful once they enter the programs, shouldn’t those programs be encouraged and protections for consumers who are making satisfactory progress enacted, 

so that their chance of finishing the programs and gaining their benefits are enhanced? This is a classical agency problem where the credit card companies (and 

public policy) should not care about why clients are more successful, only that they 

are more successful once they enter into the educational programs. While it may be 

difficult to determine measures of the program outcomes, an approach similar to 

that used in Stanten and Barron (2006) where consumers are surveyed years after 

exiting the programs to determine financial health through risk scores, credit scores, 

bankruptcy rates and other measures would seem to be a good start and should be 

required for all organizations offering counseling services. 

Refinance 

Refinancing the debt using assets is a viable alternative for only a few consumers, 

as it requires consumers to receive appropriate interest rates and to have sufficient 

equity in their home or other assets to pay down the debt. The second criteria can 

be a very high hurdle given that the median household filing bankruptcy has a negative $25,000 net worth (Lawless et al., 2008) and that household home equity is 

at historic lows—below 50 percent—and economists expect this trend to continue 

(AP 2008, Keating 2008). 

The other problem is that some consumers may have already used this option to 

pay off debts or to get needed cash for ongoing expenses, even education (Chu and 

Achohido 2008). Given the current crisis in getting loans, declining home values and 

variable interest rate mortgages that are getting ready to reset, this option is becoming less viable for most consumers (Manning 2009). 

The problem is that the credit cards use risk assessment to set interest rates, implying that consumer interest rates increase once delinquencies are noted on their 

credit reports (Chu and Achohido 2008, Plunkett 2009). A clear consequence is that 

consumers may not receive good interest rates, even on a home equity loan due to 

the credit problems. In addition, by refinancing, a consumer can lose their assets 

129 

(e.g., their homes and cars) if they default on the loan as they have converted unsecured debt into secured debt. 

Debt Management Programs 

Debt management programs (DMPs) come in several forms, but their basic structure is similar: they require some sort of consumer education if they are accredited 

by national trade associations (Keating 2008, USOBA 2008), consumer participation 

is voluntary (Hunt 2005, Plunkett 2009) and a plan is set up to make the consumer 

debt-free in two to 5 years. The key differences in the organizations are the mechanisms they use to finance the organization (consumer fees vs. ‘‘fair share’’ payments 

from credit card companies) and to pay off consumer debt (reduce interest rates and 

fees vs. reduce debt principal) (Hunt 2005, Plunkett 2009). In this paper, I refer to 

organizations that reduce interest rates as consumer credit counseling services 

(CCCSs) and organizations which reduce principal as Debt Settlement Programs 

(DSPs). It should be noted that neither of these organizations can force the creditors 

to accept their terms. It is the case that some creditors do not work with DMPs (of 

either type) or only make very small concessions (Hunt 2005). Given the national 

organization’s call for debt principal reduction as part of DMPs, it appears that, over 

time, the distinction between these two types of organizations may blur (Keating 

2008), making a stronger case for the strong value of DSPs to consumers. 

The importance of full disclosure of the funding sources cannot be overstated. Because the CCCSs receive some of their funding from the creditors (Keating (2008) 

estimates that about 50 percent of the funding for CCCSs come from creditors), 

there is a conflict of interest for these organizations, especially when the funding 

is tied to the amount of debt under management (Boas et al., 2003, Hunt 2005, 

Manning 2004). Second, because the CCCSs receive some of their fees indirectly, 

there may be an impression that they are less expensive than DSPs. However, the 

economic welfare of the creditors is unchanged if they give these fees to consumers 

as a reduction in the debt principal instead of to the CCCSs in the form of grants 

or ‘‘fair share’’ payments. Therefore, consumers are paying increased and undisclosed fees in their monthly payments. Further, the FTC recommends consumers 

ask about the funding sources as part of their consumer protection program (FTC 

2009c). I believe that stronger action should be taken, requiring disclosure of the 

fees, as information is the basis of education, and education is the first line of defense against fraud and deception, it can help you make well-informed decisions before you spend your money (FTC 2009b). 

Consumer Credit Counseling Services (CCCSs) 

CCCSs generally try to get rid of a consumer’s debt over 5 years and generally 

receive the majority of their funding from credit card companies (Boas et al., 2003, 

Hunt 2005), although the terms of the agreements have been evolving over time. 

Hunt states that the average account set up fee is $25 and monthly maintenance 

fee is $15. Over 5 years, this translates into $910 paid directly to the CCCS. Additionally, he notes the firms receive ‘‘fair share’’ payments (or even grants) from the 

credit card companies which average 6 percent of the amount that the credit card 

receives—which is more than 6 percent of the debt. For instance, assuming equal 

payments over 5 years and a 10-percent interest rate, a consumer with $10,000 in 

debt will pay $12,748.23 to the credit card company, which implies that the 

consolidator would receive another $764.89 in fees (for a total of 16.7 percent of the 

debt). The levels of the fees in this example appear to be similar to those in Chapter 

13 bankruptcy noted above. 

It should be noted that CCCSs collect the money from the consumers and distribute the money to the creditors (Boas et al., 2003), which implies a fiduciary duty 

is accepted by these organizations. However, they implicitly assume that consumers 

will pay back 100 percent of the debt, only at a reduced interest rate and potential 

reduction of some or all of the fees. 

Therefore, not only do they not conform to the 60-60 rule noted above, but this 

alternative may not be viable for some consumers who could pay back the debt 

under the 60-60 rule, forcing them into litigation and/or bankruptcy (Manning 

2009). 

From a consumer welfare standpoint, the key drivers of consumer welfare are the 

terms of the agreement: how much are the interest rates reduced, and how many 

payments are required? Plunkett (2009) suggests that these terms vary widely by 

creditor and by CCCS, so one area of needed disclosure are median terms negotiated 

by the CCCS for each creditor, as well as median consumer fees and ‘‘fair share’’ 

payments and/or grants from creditors. Clearly, the CCCS would need to disclose 

to their customers if a creditor did not accept the terms presented and would need 

to adjust the required payments. 

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In terms of calculating efficacy of the programs, both measures and approaches 

for the educational component are discussed above, so I focus on the debt reduction 

portion of the business. One set of measurements relate to the terms negotiated 

with the creditors. For instance, in the settlement offers and final settlements, how 

much is the original debt amount reduced? And how much of the original debt receives settlement offers? A second set of measurements are the successful completion rates of the program, although without some regulatory protection of consumers 

enrolled in these programs, these are not accurate measurements of firm performance because consumers can always be forced out of the programs through litigation 

by one or more creditors. 

Debt Settlement Programs (DSPs) 

For DSPs, the general idea is to have the consumers save money and pay the 

creditors in one or a few payments (depending upon the size of the debt) with the 

goal of paying off the debt in two to 4 years. Instead of focusing on interest rates, 

DSPs negotiate to reduce the principal of the debt, which implies one set of metrics 

is their ability to meet or beat the 60-60 rule noted above. Details of the size of the 

principal reduction are missing in the literature (although they are examined in the 

next section for one company), but companies claim to be able to reduce up to 50 

percent of the principal. Instead of taking money from the credit card companies, 

these organizations generally receive their fees from consumers. Plunkett (2009) 

writes that these fees average somewhere between 14 and 20 percent, and Manning 

(2004) claims that these fees can include a set up fee ranging from 2–4 percent, and 

service fees range from 15–25 percent. 

Without defending the veracity of the assumptions, if we take the same consumer 

above, who has $10,000 in debt, receives a 20 percent reduction in the debt principal 

and pays a lump sum at the end of 2 years? The consumer would end up paying 

$8,000 to the Credit Card Company or $4,748 less than they would have under the 

CCCS example above. Whether or not the consumer is better off would then depend 

upon the fees charged—the consumer would be indifferent (i.e., pay the same 

amount) if the fees were $4,748+$910 or $5,658 (56.6 percent of the original debt). 

As with the CCCSs, consumer welfare is strongly influenced by the key assumptions of the model, i.e., number of years before lump-sum payment, interest rate and 

the principal reduction amount. This example also shows where some confusion may 

enter into marketing and other communications: the consumer received a 20 percent 

reduction from the initial debt, but did they still have to pay interest on the debt 

while saving for the payment (note the results are the same as making payments 

for 2 years). So, a consistent method of communicating the principal reductions is 

required, where the amount of the final payment in relation to the initial debt is 

reported. Similar to CCCSs, transparency implies that median settlements for different creditors and credit status (e.g., in litigation) would have different principal 

reductions and would need to be disclosed. 

This model has some unique difficulties as well as common problems with the 

CCCSs. A key difference would be that consumers (or clients) are not required to 

accept settlement offers from the creditors. Therefore, any metric which attempts 

to only look at settlements would tend to underestimate (i.e., bias) the effectiveness 

of DSPs, meaning that a second set of metrics related to offers received from creditors would also be required. 

A second problem for DSPs is whether or not they should put client money into 

fiduciary accounts. In the data provided by the DSP analyzed in the next section, 

6.8 percent of the cancellations gave the inability to save as the reason that they 

canceled the service. On one hand, one could argue that the consumer must learn 

how to handle their savings to really get out of the cycle of debt, so no fiduciary 

accounts should be necessary. However, one could use the analogy of learning to 

crawl before learning to walk to analyze this situation. The end goal of the program 

is to have consumers self-sufficient, but they may need to learn how to save, and 

how to not dip into these savings for luxury items while paying off their debt. Therefore, it seems, at least at the beginning, the companies should at least monitor the 

savings of their clients to ensure that they are making progress. 

In a similar vein, one could argue that the companies should establish fiduciary 

accounts for their clients to ensure that they can actually pay off the offers once 

they are received. Otherwise, what should the company do with their clients who 

are not saving? However, the extant literature is ripe with examples of abuses for 

these accounts (see, e.g., Plunkett 2009). Therefore, guidance from regulatory, consumer advocacy and industry groups would be helpful in this area. 

My recommendation in this area is to strike a balance from the different approaches. First, allow DSPs to set up ‘‘trust’’ accounts where monies can only be released to pay creditors (with a signed letter from the creditor and consumer), to pay 

131 

agreed upon reasonable program fees (agreed upon on the creation of the account) 

or refunded to the client upon termination of the program or upon demonstration 

of a new financial hardship (e.g., medical bills). Second, the DSPs should be allowed 

to monitor these accounts to ensure that their client is saving, and consumer saving 

being one condition of making ‘‘satisfactory progress’’ in program. If the protections 

noted above were in place for consumers making ‘‘satisfactory progress,’’ the effect 

of not saving would remove their protections from creditors and litigation, creating 

a very strong incentive to save. It would be an interesting area for future research 

to investigate the savings rates for consumers who are enrolled in programs which 

have trust funds as an aspect of their programs. 

Finally, both CCCSs and DSPs suffer from the same problem where the original 

creditors (but not third parties) can continue calling them after they have signed 

up for a program and have asked (or the DMP has asked) for the creditors to stop 

calling (source: Fair Debt Collections Practices Act or FDCPA). Even worse, even 

though the consumer is trying to avoid bankruptcy and litigation, it can be forced 

upon the consumer by only one out of many creditors. This phenomenon has been 

called the ‘‘creditor’s dilemma’’ (Bainbridge 1986). In conversations with the DSP 

analyzed below fully 20.5 percent of the consumers who canceled the service gave 

bankruptcy as the reason for canceling the program, and another 19.3 percent who 

canceled the service gave a reason that was categorized as an ‘‘outside influence.’’ 

The problem is that consumers may be acting in good faith and trying to climb 

out of debt, the DMP may be acting in good faith to help the consumer and most 

of the creditors can be acting in good faith working with the DMP and the consumer, but one creditor can force failure of the entire process. To be honest, I can’t 

see a way out of this problem without regulatory action, as similar problems (called 

‘‘prisoner’s dilemmas’’) have been extensively studied and the solutions generally require modifying incentives of the actors (Poundstone 1992). The clear implication is 

that consumers need regulatory protection from litigation and harassing calls while 

they are making satisfactory progress in these programs. 

Timing of Fees 

Throughout the above discussion, the issue of when DMPs should receive fees has 

not been addressed, so this issue is addressed in this section. This issue is one of 

the most contentious for DSPs where Plunkett (2009) and others have suggested 

that other than small account set up fees, DSPs should not receive any fees until 

the debt is settled. A general response to this recommendation is that this requirement is analogous to forbidding insurance companies from collecting premiums until 

a claim is filed, or forbidding attorneys from collecting fees until the matter is settled or forbidding doctors or hospitals from collecting fees until the patient is 

healthy. 

The recommendation also ignores when value is created for the customers and 

when expenses are incurred by the DSPs in creating the value. DSPs create value 

for their clients in multiple ways. First, they offer financial education, budgeting, 

etc. as part of the program. Given that CCCSs charge consumers for this education 

(and receive Federal funding to support the education) (Keating 2008), there can be 

no argument that this provides value to the customers. Also, DSPs create value for 

the customers (and incur expense) when offers are received from creditors to reduce 

their debt (see empirical section below for quantification of this value) whether or 

not the consumers actually accept the offers. As shown in the next section, offers 

are received on some accounts within 2 months of enrollment in the program. 

This recommendation is also inconsistent with the way that CCCSs receive their 

fees. An analogous situation would require that CCCSs receive no fees (including 

grants and ‘‘fair share’’ payments from creditors and monthly account maintenance 

fees) until the debt is paid off (generally in 5 years), which would make the business 

economically unviable without massive government funding. Given the current Federal and state deficits, this funding is unlikely. 

Finally, the fact that consumers have to make payments, in and of itself, is educational. It forces consumers to get in the habit of saving and making payments. 

If the DSP has a ‘‘trust’’ account or is otherwise monitoring the savings of the client, 

similar expenses to those of CCCSs are incurred. 

Therefore, DSPs should be allowed to charge consumers fees prior to the final settlement because value is generated for the clients and expenses are incurred by the 

DSP to generate that value. That said, to help protect consumers, any fees before 

settlement should reflect actual value generated and expenses incurred. As noted 

above, full disclosure of fees is required for consumers to make good choices. 

132 

† Credit Solutions. 

Repayment on Original Terms 

The problem with this alternative is that consumers are already delinquent and 

cannot afford the payments. The delinquency may be temporary, but even under the 

new credit card rules, consumers would still have 6 months of increased interest 

rate payments due to the late payment (Reddy 2009). 

Analysis of Debt Settlement Program 

In this section, we analyze data from a DSP firm. The purpose of this section is 

to analyze specific performance metrics for the firm to establish as a basis for estimating consumer welfare in the next section. Given that the firm has not tracked 

education and financial health after a consumer leaves the program, these metrics 

are not analyzed. The remainder of this section is organized as follows: the next part 

provides a brief description of the data. Next, specific performance metrics are analyzed taking care to control for when a consumer enters the program. 

Description of Data 

The firm† provided three cohorts of random, stratified samples of their data. The 

data was stratified into the lowest quartile, middle 50 percent and top quartile in 

terms of total indebtedness of the client with a random sample of 500 clients drawn 

from each stratum. Three cohorts were also drawn from the data: clients entering 

24 months, 18 months and 12 months prior to the date of the data being accessed. 

Therefore, the database contains 4500 clients—a very significant sample of consumers in this industry. The client confidentiality is maintained through no identifying information (e.g., demographics, names, credit card account numbers, etc.). 

One limitation of this data is that once a consumer cancels their account, no information is retained regarding offers, settlements, etc. That said, the sampling methods imply that the results can be applied to the entire database of clients for this 

firm. While the results may not be applicable to the industry as a whole without 

some strong assumptions, they are likely applicable to similar firms in industry and 

allow several conjectures to be examined in detail. 

All creditor accounts, offers to settle (whether or not the client accepted the offer), 

offer amounts, date of the offer, whether or not the offer was accepted and if/when 

the client canceled the account are included in the data. In addition, the original 

creditor was provided so the question of whether or not there are differences in settlement offers due to the volume of accounts could also be tested. Table 2 provides 

simple descriptive statistics for the data. 

Table 2—Descriptive Statistics for Strata 

Stratum 1 (Lowest 25%) Stratum 2 (Middle 50%) Stratum 3 (Top 25%) 

Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 

Total Debt 7,927 8,000 1,223 16,966 16,138 6,788 47,404 40,201 21,884 

Num Accts 3.7 3.0 1.7 4.6 4.0 3.3 6.3 6.0 3.3 

Weeks in Program 49.9 49.0 33.4 49.4 50.0 46.1 46.9 46.0 32.4 

Pct Cancelled 59.1 58.1 64.5 

Several points are obvious in the table. First, the median weeks are similar for 

the three stratums. Therefore, from a time in program standpoint, it appears the 

strata are identical. Second, as expected, the number of accounts increases as the 

total debt increases. Finally, the cancellation percentages are roughly similar across 

the different stratums. However, the top stratum appears to cancel at a much higher rate. We can calculate the weighted average cancellation rate to be approximately 

60 percent, this rate is comparable to cell phone companies that average 2–3 percent 

monthly churn, or cancellation, rates (Mozer et al., 2000). Clearly, this rate is high, 

but it does compare very favorably with the 84 percent yearly churn rate (Plunkett 

2009). However, further analysis of the reasons for cancellation point to the difficulty in calculating accurate cancellation and/or completion rates. 

The reasons for cancellation for the customers in the database are summarized 

in the five reasons provided in Table 3. There are several striking results from this 

table. First, if the outcome of paying off debts is considered a success, then the cancellation rate is overstated because 14 percent of the consumers included as cancellations actually paid off their debt. 

133 

Table 3—Reasons for Cancellations 

Reason Percentage 

Bankruptcy (Chapter 7 or 13) 13.5% 

Can’t Save 6.8% 

Buyer’s Remorse a 9.2% 

Settle/try to settle on own 14.0% 

Other 56.5% 

Note: a Buyers remorse is limited to those customers who cancel within 30 days of the initial payment to the DSP, which can be 

30–60 days from the initial enrollment date. 

Second, a significant portion of the consumers (13.5 percent) are being forced out 

of the program due to litigation. Therefore, protection of consumers from litigation 

is required for those consumers making satisfactory progress in the program. Third, 

a significant amount of the cancellations (6.8 percent) are due to consumers not 

being able to save. Because the DSP does not monitor/require savings, a significant 

portion of the cancellations could have been prevented by significant incentives for 

the consumers to save. 

Therefore, the aggregate cancellation rate is a poor measure of the quality of the 

service provided. To help put the cancellation rate into context, Table 4 provides 

yearly and monthly churn rates across a variety of industries, companies and time 

periods (selected sample from Kohs 2006) and shows that the churn rate is lower 

than or comparable to some companies and subscription-based industries which also 

have Better Business Bureau (BBB) certified members. 

Table 4—Churn rates in other industries 

Annual 

Churn 

Monthly 

Churn Company Industry Data Year 

7.20% 0.62% Sirius Satellite Radio 2006 

10.00% 0.88% Web Hosting 2003 

10.00% 0.88% Western Wireless Wireless 2001 

11.00% 0.97% Alamosa PCS Wireless 2001 

15.00% 1.35% Nascar.com (premium subscribers) Sports Media 2004 

16.00% 1.45% Nextel Wireless 2005 

17.00% 1.55% Colorado teachers in ‘‘excellent’’ schools Education 2004 

17.00% 1.55% Schnader Harrison (lawyers) Legal 2003 

17.00% 1.55% DBS TV 2002 

18.00% 1.65% DirecTV DBS TV 2003 

19.00% 1.76% Alltel Wireless 2005 

22.00% 2.07% Analog cable subscribers Cable TV 2002 

23.00% 2.18% Cingular Wireless 2005 

23.00% 2.18% Colorado teachers in ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ schools Education 2004 

26.00% 2.51% Sprint Wireless 2005 

26.00% 2.51% Subscribers Cable TV 2002 

31.00% 3.09% Pagers 1998 

34.80% 3.56% T-Mobile Wireless 2005 

35.00% 3.59% Maricopa County (anglers) Recreation 2002 

45.00% 4.98% E-mail addresses 2004 

46.00% 5.13% Prepaid Calling Cards 2004 

46.00% 5.13% Digital cable subscribers Cable TV 2002 

51.00% 5.94% Globe Prepaid Wireless 2004 

52.00% 6.12% Florence (AL) Times Daily (readers) Newspapers 2005 

58.00% 7.23% Snowball.com E-mail newsletter 2000 

78.00% 12.62% Touch Mobile Prepaid Wireless 2004 

93.00% 22.16% VOOM HD TV 2004 

93.00% 22.16% Runoff at time of sale Home Mortgage 2002 

Analysis of Data 

In this section, different performance metrics are examined for the firm at the client-level. 

The first set of metrics in Table 5 provides performance metrics that can be used 

to calculate consumer welfare. The first column represents the conditioning of the 

metric: Settle—did the client settle at least one account, Offer—did the client receive at least one offer on the account, Cancel—did the client cancel all of their accounts. Note that the company did not retain offer and settlement information once 

the accounts were canceled. 

134 

Table 5—Consumer welfare metrics 

Condition Metric 

Stratum 1 (Lowest 25%) Stratum 2 (Middle 50%) Stratum 3 (Top 25%) 

Mean Median Std 

Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 

% Debt 51.0 48.8 0.19 48.5 46.7 0.27 49.2 47.5 0.19 

% Total Debt 54.7 50.7 0.30 54.1 50.6 0.45 53.1 49.4 0.32 

Settle % Accounts 52.0 50.0 0.27 51.5 50.0 0.39 53.0 50.0 0.29 

Days first 

settlement 

211 a 189 116 196 a,b 177 154 183 b 163 99 

% Debt 62.2 64.2 0.29 56.6 52.2 0.39 56.8 55.7 0.17 

% Total Debt 56.5 b 51.5 0.18 63.7 a,b 67.8 0.43 67.7 a 72.1 0.29 

Offer % Accounts 57.3 b 50.0 0.28 59.6 b 50.0 0.40 64.7 a 66.7 0.28 

Days first 

offer 

210 a 188 126 186 b 172 148 168 c 148 95 

Cancel Days Cancel 196 168 145 197 163 207 202 171 155 

Notes: Superscript a>b>c with probability less than or equal to 5 percent than they are the same. Values with same letter are not 

significantly different. 

The second column represents the metric and the remaining columns report the 

mean, median and standard deviations for the metrics. Medians are included as a 

second measure of central tendency. The percent debt metric measures what percentage of the original debt the consumer paid when the account was settled. There 

are not significant differences between the strata, although the results indicate that 

the median is less than 48 percent, or that the households received an average discount more than 50 percent. The percent of total metric indicates the percentage 

of the original debt that has a settlement (conditional on the client settling at least 

one account). Once again there are no significant differences between the strata, but 

the median across the three stratums is around 50 percent. The percent of accounts 

settled is not different between the strata, and hovers around 50 percent. This indicates that the size of the debt is not a driving factor in getting the account settled. 

Interestingly, the only significant effect conditional on settling one account is the 

number of days until the first settlement, where the smaller accounts take longer 

than the other two. However, the medians for all three strata hover around 6 

months. Note that, conditional on settlement, this organization beats the 60-60 rule 

noted above. 

But when the offers are examined, they suggest a slightly different story. First, 

there are no significant differences in the average amount offered (% Debt) for the 

three strata. However, the median offer is around 56 percent, much higher than the 

48 percent settlement, although both numbers beat the 60 percent of debt rule noted 

in the introduction. Hence, it can be concluded that the negotiations work for the 

clients. In terms of the percent of the original enrolled total debt (% total debt) that 

receives an offer, the highest quartile (median 72%) is significantly different than 

the lowest quartile (median 51.5%), but neither quartile is significantly different 

from the middle 50 percent (median 67.8%). This result (as well as the differences 

between means and medians) suggests high variance in the percent of debt settled, 

and that the significance on this metric may be spurious. If it is not spurious, it 

then appears that the creditors are more willing to make offers on higher debts, 

which is consistent with the analysis of Dash (2009). The results for the percent of 

accounts and days until the first offer support this hypothesis, where the highest 

quartile receives their first offer sooner than the lowest quartile and median strata, 

and the highest quartile has a larger percentage of accounts receiving offers than 

the other two strata. 

135 

Figure 2 provides a histogram of the percent of total debt that has either been 

settled or offered combining all three strata. There are a couple of striking elements 

to this figure. First, the most frequent value (also called the ‘‘modal value’’) for both 

settlements and offers is between 90 and 100 percent, indicating that the firm is 

generating value for their customers. Second, the distribution for both appears to 

be uniformly distributed (ignoring the mode). This seems to imply that consumers 

are progressing through the program; otherwise I would expect to find another mode 

where the clients get ‘‘stuck’’ in their progress. That said, the firm should strive to 

have 100 percent of the debt with offers. This figure also points to the difficulty in 

calculating a completion rate. Given that consumers are receiving offers on their 

debt but not accepting all of the offers, how should the accounts be counted? 

Figure 2—Histogram of Percent of Debt Settled and Offered 


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Figure 3 provides a histogram of the percent of the enrolled debt (i.e., original 

debt amount) that was either paid during settlement or had a settlement offer, conditional on settlement or receiving an offer. The settlement data appears to be normally distributed with the mean, mode and median slightly less than 50 percent, 

much better than that 60-60 rule noted above. A striking feature is that the average 

offers are almost normally distributed, but have a positive skew. This positive skew 

implies that the creditors tend to make more offers above the mode than below the 

mode. Given the distribution of the settlements is more balanced; it implies that the 

firm does a good job in negotiating better terms for their clients. Specifically, we 

see that the absolute frequency (not just percentage) is much higher for settlements 

below the mode than for offers. Similarly, the frequency for offers above the mode 

(and median) is much higher for offers than for settlements. The mean, median and 

mode (all measures of central tendency) appear to be the same, suggesting that the 

firm generates value to their clients by beating the 60-60 rule. However, to manage 

client expectations about possible benefits from the program, the firm should be 

transparent about the median and 75 percent quartile (i.e., 25 percent quartile in 

terms of discount) when calculating savings for the consumer. Given the convergence of mean, median and modes, a standard deviation should also be reported. 

Figure 3—Histogram of Percent of Debt Paid for in Settlements and Offers 

Next, we look at the cancellation data. There are no significant differences between the three strata. However, the median time to cancel hovers between five and 

6 months. Even though there is no data on the offers and settlements for these clients, I find it highly unlikely that this group received no offers in this time, as the 

median time approximates the median time for offers and settlements. It is much 

more likely that other, unobserved factors were more influential in this decision. 

Figure 4 combines the data from the three strata, and provides a histogram of the 

time it takes an account to be settled or the time it takes for an account to receive 

the first offer. For both settlements and offers, a negative skew is observed for the 

distribution. 


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137 

Figure 4—Histogram of Time for Settlement or Offer to be Received 

Interestingly, this implies that the creditors are generally very interested in settling the account, with the modal offer time being between 6 and 8 months. The 

firm can clearly improve in their performance by reducing the right tail of the offer 

distribution, i.e., ensuring that all accounts receive offers in a timely manner. This 

graph also depicts how the firm generates value for their customers in the negotiations. By receiving many offers quickly, they can make the creditors compete 

against each other for the lump sum payment from the consumer. This competition 

is in the form of reducing the principal of the debt. 

A problem with this distribution is that, without some sort of regulatory protection, the spurned creditors (i.e., those who do not offer good enough discounts on 

the debt, so they are not selected for the lump sum payment) can initiate litigation 

that would drive the consumer into bankruptcy, creating unnecessary cancellations 

for the firm. A second challenge for this firm is that the savings plan ought to require their clients to save enough in the first 6–8 months to pay off one of their 

creditors, potentially the creditor with the smallest balance. This finding supports 

the call for protection of consumers making ‘‘satisfactory progress’’ in paying their 

debts through Debt Management Programs. 

In summary, this analysis has several key findings: 

1. Creditors seem to make lower offers sooner to consumers with higher balances, 

2. The median cancellation time is between 5 and 6 months, implying (due to 

a lack of data) that the clients likely received offers, as the median is not very 

different than the median offer time. However, it is very difficult to calculate 

accurate cancellation rates (often used as a measure of ‘‘failure’’ of the programs) due to the fact that almost 30 percent of the clients cancel due to paying 

off their debts or going into bankruptcy. 

3. Both the median offer (approximately 56 percent of debt) and median settlement (48 percent) are better than the proposed 60 percent rule, so the firm is 

offering value vis-a ́-vis the proposed 60-60 rule. Further, the difference between 

the settlement and offer percentages implies differences between households 

(potentially due to hardship) and that some households receive tremendous 

value from the negotiations and relationships of the firm. 

4. Conditional on a client settling at least one account, the client seems to settle 

more than 50 percent of their debt and 50 percent of their accounts. This statistic is impressive as the program lasts 36–48 months, whereas the data only 


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138 

captures the first 12–24 months for the client. One would expect that at the end 

of the program, the settlement rate would increase. 

5. Conditional on receiving at least one offer, clients seem to receive offers for 

more than 67 percent of their accounts and debts. 

6. The figures seem to indicate that clients are progressing and paying off their 

debt, as the mode for the number of offers and settlements is between 90 and 

100 percent of the enrolled debt. However, the firm does have room for improvement, as the optimal graph would have 100 percent of the debt with offers. 

Calculation of Consumer Welfare 

In this section, the empirical results are used to calculate consumer welfare under 

a variety of assumptions and conditions. 

Table 6 provides the initial base-line estimates for consumer welfare. We use assumptions of 18 percent annual interest rate and minimum fixed monthly payments 

of 2 percent and 3 percent for debts of $4,000 and $10,000 (for similar assumptions, 

see, e.g., Warnick 2005). The fixed monthly payment of 2 percent is similar to current minimum monthly payments as noted in Warnick (2005). Affordability is measured using monthly payments, and consumer welfare is measured by the length of 

time required to pay off the debt and total amount paid by the consumer. By doubling their payment, consumers are able to cut the time to repay the loan in half 

and increase their total welfare by paying less to the credit card company. 

Table 6—Baseline Consumer Affordability and Welfare Calculations 

Payment 2% 3% 2% 3% 

Debt Level $4,000 $4,000 $10,000 $10,000 

Annual Interest Rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 

Fixed Monthly Payment $80 $120 $200 $300 

Years to Pay 7.8 3.9 7.8 3.9 

Total Payments $7,488 $5,616 $18,720 $14,040 

Percent of Original Debt 187% 140% 187% 140% 

The first scenario examined is when the same consumer receives help from a 

CCCS, and the firm is able to cut the interest rate to 10 percent from 18 percent, 

and has 5 years to repay (this may be an optimistic assumption, as Plunkett (2009) 

says that creditors are becoming less willing to reduce interest rates). The results 

of the consumer welfare calculations are provided in Table 7. In order to calculate 

total payments (to credit card and the firm), we assume the industry average of $15 

per month and a fair share payment of 5 percent of the payments to the credit card 

company (Hunt 2005). 

Table 7—Consumer Affordability and Welfare Calculations for hypothetical CCCS 

Debt Level $4,000 $10,000 

Annual Interest Rate 10% 10% 

Years to Pay 5 5 

Fixed Monthly Payment $85 $212 

Monthly Account Fee $15 $15 

Total Monthly Payments $100 $227 

% Baseline Payments 125% 114% 

Total Payments $5,999 $13,648 

Percent of Original Debt 150% 136% 

Percent of Baseline 80% 73% 

Firm Fees $900 $900 

% Fair Share 5% 5% 

Fair Share Fees $255 $637 

Total Revenue to firm $1,155 $1,537 

% Original Debt 29% 15% 

In terms of affordability, both cases are less affordable, i.e., have higher monthly 

payments than the base case of paying off the debt using with fixed monthly payments of 2 percent of the original debt. However, consumers are better off with this 

solution as they end up paying much less overall (range from 73 percent to 80 percent of the base case payments), even when the monthly account fees are included. 

We can conclude that this alternative does help consumer welfare, but it is a generally less affordable solution. If we examine total fees paid, they range from 15 percent to 29 percent of the total debt. Given Plunkett’s (2009) description of 30 percent 

fees as exorbitant, his standard suggests that the CCCS charges exorbitant fees to 

lower debt consumers. Additionally, if it is assumed that lower income consumers 

139 

have lower debt then CCCS charges higher fees as a percentage of the debt to lower 

income consumers than to higher-income individuals. In fairness, they can argue 

that cost of education is the same, regardless of the debt level, but it does not 

change the fact that they have a regressive fee structure. 

The 60-60 rule is analyzed in the next scenario. 

In this case, we assume 40 percent reduction in the debt principal, the interest 

rate remains at 18 percent and the firm has varying fees of 15 percent and 20 percent of the original debt balance. Table 8 provides the results of this analysis. This 

scenario is more affordable than both the base case and the hypothetical CCCS firm. 

Further, consumer welfare is highest where the consumer is paying 57–60 percent 

of the original base case scenario, even though the consumer ends up paying more 

than the original debt. The fees are now neutral in terms of percentages versus debt 

and/or income levels, and are progressive in terms of the total fees with respect to 

debt/income. 

Table 8—Consumer Affordability and Welfare Calculations for hypothetical 60-60 rule 

Debt Level $4,000 $4,000 $10,000 $10,000 

Annual Interest Rate 18% 18% 18% 18% 

Reduction 40% 40% 40% 40% 

Years to Pay 5 5 5 5 

Fees as percent of Debt 15% 20% 15% 20% 

Monthly Credit Payment $61 $61 $152 $152 

Monthly Fee $10 $13 $25 $33 

Total Monthly Payment $71 $74 $177 $186 

Total Payments $4,257 $4,457 $10,642 $11,142 

Percent of Original Debt 106% 111% 106% 111% 

Versus baseline 57% 60% 57% 60% 

Fee Payments $600 $800 $1,500 $2,000 

The next scenario is a simplified version of the DSP analyzed in the empirical section above. It is assumed that the fees on the account are 15 percent of the total 

debt, debt is reduced to 40, 50 or 60 percent of the original debt amount and the 

household makes a balloon payment at the end of 1 year (much shorter than normal 

estimates of 3 years). Table 9 provides the results of this analysis. First, this option 

creates the highest amount of consumer welfare among all of the different options: 

it is the only option where the consumer pays less than the original debt amount. 

It is also the least affordable of the options, with monthly payments three times the 

base case scenario. Therefore, we can conclude that the firm should carefully screen 

consumers for their ability to save and make this payment within 1 year. However, 

this finding is highly dependent upon the assumption that the consumer will repay 

the debt in 1 year, much less than the above scenarios. 

Table 9—Consumer Affordability and Welfare Calculations for hypothetical DSP 

Debt Level $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 

Reduction 40% 50% 60% 40% 50% 60% 

Years to Pay 1 1 1 1 1 1 

Fees as percent of Debt 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 

Monthly Credit Payment $200 $167 $133 $500 $417 $333 

Monthly Fee $50 $50 $50 $125 $125 $125 

Total Monthly Payment $250 $217 $183 $625 $542 $458 

% Baseline Payments 313% 271% 229% 313% 271% 229% 

Total Payments $3,000 $2,600 $2,200 $7,500 $6,500 $5,500 

Percent of Original Debt 75% 65% 55% 75% 65% 55% 

Versus baseline 40% 35% 29% 40% 35% 29% 

Therefore, we analyze a scenario with a more reasonable time-frame of 3 years, 

consistent with Manning’s (2009) assumptions, but still shorter than the CCCS or 

the 60-60 rule. Table 10 provides the results of this final scenario where the only 

change from the previous scenario is that the time to repay the debt is increased 

from one to 3 years. Not surprisingly, consumer welfare has not changed from the 

previous scenario. 

However, the affordability has increased to the point where it is comparable or 

better than the base-case and 60-60 rule scenarios, even though the consumers pay 

their debt in 3 years instead of 5 years. This result once again suggests that it 

would increase consumer welfare if they have protection from creditors and litigation while they are making satisfactory progress in a DSP. It also suggests that 

DSPs need a mechanism in their program to monitor client savings to demonstrate 

140 

to the creditors that clients are making progress toward being able to afford settlements. 

Conclusions and Discussion 

Similar to most studies, this research has several limitations. First, the empirical 

analysis only examines a single company over a single time period and does not contain educational measurements or other behavioral measurements after the clients 

exit the program. Therefore, it is unclear whether or not the findings can be generalized beyond this firm to the industry as a whole. Second, the data does not include 

information on settlement offers for canceled accounts, so it is very difficult to determine if value was generated for these customers. However, given that the median 

cancellation time is similar to the median time until the first offer, I find it unlikely 

that all of these clients received no offers if they stayed in the program long enough. 

Probably the most important empirical finding is that this firm adds significant 

value to their customers where the median and modal settlement offers are less 

than 50 percent of the original debt, much better than the 60-60 rule. This finding 

confirms the assumptions in Manning (2009) and calls for programs which reduce 

the debt principal as an effective means of helping consumers (Plunkett 2009). 

Given the high rate of cancellations due to bankruptcy (13.5 percent), this finding 

also suggests that consumers need regulatory protection from creditors (i.e., the 

‘‘creditor’s dilemma’’) while they are making satisfactory progress in the program. 

A second important empirical finding is that the upper bound for the cancellation 

rate is much lower than speculated (Plunkett 2009). However, accurate cancellation 

and completion rates cannot be calculated from the data, as consumers who cancel 

due to paying off their debt and who cancel due to entering bankruptcy are included 

in the cancellation rates. Further, completion of the program requires consumers to 

accept the offers. The data indicate that many more accounts have offers than are 

settled, with the modal client having more than 90 percent of their debt with offers. 

Even without adjusting the cancellation rate for these factors, the rate is comparable to or lower than other subscription-based businesses which have BBB-certified members. Therefore, excessive cancellation rates cannot be used as a rationale 

for excluding DSPs from certification. 

Finally, a large portion of the consumers who cancel (6.8 percent) indicate that 

they are not able to save enough. This implies that the DSPs need to monitor consumer savings as part of their program. One effective means for doing this would 

be to establish third-party trust accounts that have consumer protections in place: 

1. Require periodic audits of the accounts, 

2. Require arms-length relationship with the DSPs, 

3. Only allow disbursements to creditors (with signed letter from creditor and 

consumer), to DSPs (for pre-approved fees), to consumers who cancel the program or encounter new financial hardships. 

If appropriate savings are pre-conditions for consumer protection from litigation 

and harassment from creditors, consumers will have very strong incentives to save 

and pay off their debts. The policy simulations have strong implications as well. 

First, both CCCSs and DSPs increase consumer welfare versus the consumer paying 

off their debt. However, DSPs are the only option where consumers end up paying 

off less than 100 percent of their debt, so they create the greatest amount of consumer welfare of any option considered. Not surprisingly, the affordability of the 

DSP is dependent upon the length of time the consumer has to save to pay off their 

debt. If a three-year period is used, the DSP is comparable in affordability to the 

60-60 rule and can be more affordable than CCCSs. This finding adds support to 

the recommendation of protecting consumers in the programs to ensure that they 

have enough time to build their savings to pay off their debts. This finding also supports the regulatory recommendation of establishing fiduciary accounts that can be 

monitored by the DSPs to ensure that consumers are saving enough. 

The policy simulations also suggest that CCCSs may be overcharging some of 

their clients, where CCCSs receive 29 percent or more of the original debt amount 

in consumer fees and ‘‘fair share’’ payments. Even worse, their fee structure is regressive: where lower debt (and income) clients pay a larger percentage of the original debt amount in fees than higher debt (and income) clients. This finding suggests 

regulatory action to require CCCSs to disclose all fees, including fair share payments to consumers, is required to ensure transparency and that consumers can 

make good decisions. This finding also suggests that DMPs need to ensure that their 

fee structures are at least neutral or progressive in terms of the percentage and 

amount of the original debt amount to ensure lower income consumers are not paying unnecessarily large fees. 

141 

While not discussed in the empirical or policy sections, the extant literature suggests that education should be required to be provided as part of any certified DMP 

due to the positive outcomes. However, ‘‘satisfactory progress’’ in DMPs should also 

include satisfactory progress in the educational programs, which implies firms need 

to monitor and measure educational attainment. Technologies for this already exist, 

where consumers can already take driving educational courses over the Internet. 

Finally, we find that charging consumers reasonable ‘‘up-front fees,’’ i.e., fees before settlement, is consistent with practices in other industries, e.g., legal industry, 

and can be justified based on value provided to consumers as well as expenses incurred generating this value. Any attempt to ban these fees would have a chilling 

effect on the industry and is inappropriate for this industry. 

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Appendix A: Definition of Acronyms 

BAPCPA—Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 

CCCS—Consumer Credit Counseling Service. 

DMP—Debt management program—this term refers to a program that is intended 

to help a consumer pay off their debt, so it refers to both CCCSs and DSPs. 

DSP—Debt Settlement Program. 

Settlement—refers to when the consumer and creditor agree to terms (may be one 

or more payments, could be all or only some of the principal, fees and interest) to 

repay the debt. 

About the Author 

Richard A. Briesch is Associate Professor of Marketing. He received his BS degree 

in Applied Mathematics from Carnegie Mellon University, MBA from Rice University and PhD from Northwestern University. His research interests include: modeling consumer decisionmaking, sales promotions, and econometric methods, including non-parametric techniques. His articles have appeared in journals such as: Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of the American Statistical 

Association, Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Retailing, Marketing Letters 

and Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. He has won the Davidson award 

for the best paper in the Journal of Retailing in 2002, the Cox School’s research excellence award in 2009, and outstanding teaching award in 2007. 

For more information, visit: http://www.cox.smu.edu/academic/professor.do/ 

briesch 

Æ