23848 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 83 / Tuesday, May 1, 2007 / Notices 

submitting the following information 

collection request to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and approval in accordance with 

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 

The proposed information collection is 

published to obtain comments from the 

public and affected agencies. Comments 

are encouraged and will be accepted for 

‘‘sixty days’’ until July 2, 2007. This 

process is conducted in accordance with 

5 CFR 1320.10. 

If you have comments especially on 

the estimated public burden or 

associated response time, suggestions, 

or need a copy of the proposed 

information collection instrument with 

instructions or additional information, 

please contact Thomas McDermott, 

Firearms Programs Division, Room 

7400, 650 Massachusetts Avenue, NW., 

Washington, DC 20226. 

Written comments and suggestions 

from the public and affected agencies 

concerning the proposed collection of 

information are encouraged. Your 

comments should address one or more 

of the following four points: 

—Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

—Evaluate the accuracy of the agencies 

estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

—Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

—Minimize the burden of the collection 

of information on those who are to 

respond, including through the use of 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms 

of information technology, e.g., 

permitting electronic submission of 

responses. 

Overview of this information 

collection: 

(1) Type of Information Collection: 

Extension of a currently approved 

collection. 

(2) Title of the Form/Collection: 

Records of Acquisition and Disposition, 

Collectors of Firearms. 

(3) Agency form number, if any, and 

the applicable component of the 

Department of Justice sponsoring the 

collection: Form Number: None. Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives. 

(4) Affected public who will be asked 

or required to respond, as well as a brief 

abstract: Primary: Individuals or 

households. Other: None. The record 

keeping requirement is for the purpose 

of facilitating ATF’s authority to inquire 

into the disposition of any firearm in the 

course of a criminal investigation. 

(5) An estimate of the total number of 

respondents and the amount of time 

estimated for an average respondent to 

respond: It is estimated that it takes 3 

hours per year for line by line entry and 

that approximately 45,973 licensees will 

participate. 

(6) An estimate of the total public 

burden (in hours) associated with the 

collection: There are an estimated 

137,919 annual total burden hours 

associated with this collection. 

If additional information is required 

contact: Lynn Bryant, Department 

Clearance Officer, Policy and Planning 

Staff, Justice Management Division, 

Department of Justice, Patrick Henry 

Building, Suite 1600, 601 D Street, NW., 

Washington, DC 20530. 

Dated: April 25, 2007. 

Lynn Bryant, 

Department Clearance Officer, PRA, 

Department of Justice. 

[FR Doc. E7–8272 Filed 4–30–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–FY–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 4–41] 

Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S.; Grant of 

Application 

Procedural History 

On April 21, 2004, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Samuel S. Jackson, 

D.D.S. (Respondent) of Nashville, 

Tennessee. The Show Cause Order 

proposed to deny Respondent’s pending 

application for a certificate of 

registration as a practitioner on three 

grounds: (1) That Respondent had 

materially falsified his application, see 

21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); (2) that Respondent 

had been convicted of a controlled 

substances related felony, see id. §

824(a)(2); and (3) that Respondent’s 

registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest. See id. 824(a)(4); see 

also Show Cause Order at 1. 

The Show Cause Order alleged that 

Respondent had entered into a 

conspiracy with a drug trafficker, who 

was then wanted on federal charges, and 

a confidential informant, whom 

Respondent also believed to be a 

fugitive, to help them avoid 

apprehension. Show Cause Order at 2. 

More specifically, the Show Cause order 

alleged that Respondent had agreed to 

perform cosmetic dental work on these 

individuals and to arrange for plastic 

surgery on them for the purpose of 

altering their appearance so that they 

could evade arrest. Id. The Show Cause 

Order alleged that Respondent further 

admitted to authorities that he knew 

that the fugitive was a ‘‘big time 

hoodlum’’ and that Respondent had 

‘‘intentionally sought to participate in 

activity which placed the public at risk 

for further distribution of illegal 

controlled substances.’’ Id. 

The Show Cause Order alleged that 

Respondent subsequently pled guilty in 

the United States District Court for the 

Middle District of Tennessee on one 

count of conspiracy, a crime under 18 

U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment for 30 months. See id. 

The Show Cause Order also alleged that 

on October 1, 2002, Respondent’s thenexisting DEA registration was revoked 

by order of the then Deputy 

Administrator. Id. at 1. 

The Show Cause Order alleged that on 

October 20, 2003, Respondent applied 

for a new DEA registration. Id. The 

Show Cause Order alleged that in 

completing the application, Respondent 

stated that he had ‘‘voluntarily 

surrendered [his] DEA # to prescribe 

medications,’’ when, in fact, his 

registration had been revoked, and that 

this constituted a material falsification 

of his application. Id. at 1–2. The Show 

Cause Order further alleged that, in 

completing his application, Respondent 

had also answered ‘‘No’’ to the question 

whether he had ever been convicted of 

a drug-related felony. Id. at 2. The Show 

Cause Order thus concluded that 

Respondent’s material falsification of 

his application and his conviction 

rendered his registration inconsistent 

with the public interest. Id. 

Respondent, through his counsel, 

timely requested a hearing. The case 

was assigned to Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) Gail Randall, who 

conducted a hearing in Nashville on 

May 3 and 4, 2005. At the hearing, both 

parties called witnesses to testify and 

introduced documentary evidence. 

Following the hearing, the Government 

submitted a brief containing its 

proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and argument. 

On May 26, 2006, the ALJ issued her 

recommended findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and decision. In that 

decision, the ALJ concluded that 

Respondent did not intentionally falsify 

his application. ALJ at 28. The ALJ 

further found that while Respondent 

‘‘was less than completely candid and 

forthcoming’’ in his testimony regarding 


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1 While the final order relied solely on this 

ground, the order further noted the findings of the 

state board that Respondent had entered into a 

conspiracy with a known drug trafficker and 

fugitive as well as a confidential informant whom 

Respondent believed to also be a drug trafficker and 

fugitive for the purpose of assisting these persons 

to avoid apprehension. Gov. Exh. 2B, at 2. 

Specifically, the Tennessee board found that 

Respondent agreed to perform dental work on them 

and to arrange for them to obtain plastic surgery in 

California and have a safe place to hide while 

recovering from the surgery for the purpose of 

altering their appearance and enabling them to 

evade apprehension. Id. The Tennessee board also 

found that even after the authorities arrested the 

fugitive, Respondent nonetheless agreed to provide 

the services to the confidential informant for a price 

of $ 150,000. Id. at 3. Furthermore, according to the 

findings of the Tennessee board, Respondent met 

with the confidential informant and received a 

piece of luggage which he believed contained 

$150,000 in cash. Id. 

his criminal conduct, there were several 

mitigating factors including 

Respondent’s having cooperated with 

law enforcement officials and his having 

‘‘accepted full responsibility for his past 

conduct.’’ Id. at 30. The ALJ thus 

concluded that the denial of 

Respondent’s application ‘‘would be too 

severe a sanction,’’ and that while 

Respondent should be reprimanded for 

providing ‘‘less than truthful and 

complete information,’’ his application 

should be granted. Id. at 30–31. 

The Government filed exceptions to 

the ALJ’s recommended decision. 

Specifically, the Government contended 

that Respondent had not credibly 

testified ‘‘as to the essential elements of 

[his] felony conviction,’’ and that he had 

given falsified answers on his 

application. Gov. Exceptions at 11–12. 

The Government further maintained 

that granting Respondent’s application 

would not be consistent with DEA 

precedents which require that an 

applicant (or registrant) truthfully testify 

and accept full responsibility for his 

misconduct. Respondent did not file 

exceptions. 

Having considered the record as a 

whole, I hereby issue this decision and 

final order. I adopt the ALJ’s findings of 

fact except as expressly noted herein. I 

hold that the Government has not 

proved by substantial evidence that 

Respondent materially falsified his 

application. I further hold that the 

Government has not proved by 

substantial evidence that Respondent 

has failed to accept responsibility for his 

criminal conduct. I thus conclude that 

Respondent’s registration would not be 

inconsistent with the public interest and 

order that his application be granted. 

Findings 

Respondent is a 1997 graduate of the 

Meharry Medical College School of 

Dentistry. Tr. 148. Respondent currently 

holds a license from the State of 

Tennessee to practice dentistry. Resp. 

Exh. 1. Respondent previously held a 

DEA Certificate of Registration as a 

practitioner. On October 1, 2002, my 

predecessor ordered that Respondent’s 

DEA registration be revoked (effective 

November 22, 2002) on the ground that 

Respondent had entered into an agreed 

order with the Tennessee Department of 

Health which resulted in the revocation 

of his state license and therefore was not 

entitled to maintain a DEA registration. 

Samuel Silas Jackson, 67 FR 65145 

(2002).1

As explained below, the impetus for 

these actions was Respondent’s entering 

into a conspiracy under which 

Respondent agreed to help Paul Woods, 

an indicted drug trafficker who was 

then at large, as well as a confidential 

informant (CI) whom Respondent also 

believed was wanted by the authorities, 

to avoid apprehension. According to the 

record, in 1997 a Nashville-based DEA 

task force began an investigation into 

the criminal activities of Woods and his 

organization. Tr. 73. The investigation 

established that Woods and his 

organization were involved in the 

distribution of multi-kilo amounts of 

cocaine in the Nashville area. Id. at 74. 

The investigation ultimately resulted in 

the indictments of over thirty persons 

including Woods, on charges of cocaine 

distribution, firearms violations, money 

laundering and conspiracy. Id. 

Woods was charged in July 1999, in 

the initial wave of indictments. Id. The 

authorities were, however, unable to 

arrest Woods who had fled. Id. at 83. 

The authorities then approached an 

individual who was a lower-tier 

distributor and a secondary target of the 

investigation; this person agreed to work 

as an informant and to assist the 

authorities in locating Woods. Id. at 84. 

To gain the confidence of Woods, the 

authorities portrayed the informant as a 

fugitive. Id. Among other things, the 

informant specifically agreed to record 

his telephone calls with Woods and to 

provide a copy of the tape to the 

authorities. Id. at 81. During one of 

these phone calls, which occurred in 

December 1999, Respondent came to the 

attention of the authorities when Woods 

and the informant began discussing a 

scheme to alter their appearance by 

having dental work and plastic surgery 

done. Id. at 81–82. 

At the time of the investigation, 

Respondent was dating a woman whose 

niece was Woods’ live-in girlfriend and 

the mother of one of Woods’ children. 

Id. at 134–35. Respondent’s girlfriend 

asked him to assist Woods to help him 

‘‘avoid apprehension.’’ Id. at 150. 

Respondent testified that he was not 

coerced into helping Woods and that he 

understood that it was a crime to do so. 

Id. 

Respondent agreed to perform 

cosmetic dental work on both Woods 

and the informant to alter their 

appearance and to help them avoid 

detection. Id. at 86–87. Respondent also 

agreed to arrange for Woods and the 

informant to obtain plastic surgery in 

California and to find a secure location 

at which Woods and the informant 

could safely recover from the surgery. 

Id.; see also Gov. Exh. 11b at 4. 

Furthermore, the transcript of a 

December 15, 1999, three-way phone 

call between Respondent, Woods, and 

the informant, establishes that 

Respondent knew that Woods and the 

informant were fugitives. Gov. Exh. 11b 

at 6–7; Tr. at 113–15. Finally, according 

to an affidavit summarizing one of the 

recorded conversations between Woods 

and the informant, the price was to have 

been $180,000 each. Gov. Exh. 4, at 7. 

The ALJ further found that 

Respondent was aware that Woods and 

the informant were drug traffickers at 

the time he agreed to assist them. See 

ALJ at 5 (FOF 16); id. 6 (FOF 21). 

Moreover, the ALJ also found not 

credible Respondent’s testimony that he 

was unaware that Woods and the 

Respondent were drug traffickers during 

this period. Id. at 9 (FOF 37). In making 

these findings, the ALJ relied on what 

she termed ‘‘the extensive media 

coverage of these events,’’ and the 

testimony of a Task Force Officer 

interpreting the street slang of a single 

transcript of a telephone conversation 

between Respondent, Woods and the 

informant. Id. I conclude, however, that 

this evidence does no more than create 

a suspicion that Respondent knew that 

Woods and the informant were engaged 

in drug trafficking at the time he agreed 

to assist them and that the Government 

has not proved this fact by substantial 

evidence. See NLRB v. Columbia 

Enameling & Stamping Co., Inc., 306 

U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (‘‘Substantial 

evidence is more than a scintilla, and 

must do more than create a suspicion of 

the existence of the fact to be 

established.’’) 

As for the media coverage of the 

events, the Lead Task Force Officer 

testified that the Task Force’s inability 

to arrest Woods following his 

indictment ‘‘was covered on the three 

local stations as well as in * * * the 

paper.’’ Tr. 134. That was the extent of 

the evidence; the Government did not 

produce any evidence to show how 

many days the story was covered by TV 

stations and the paper. Moreover, the 


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2 The expletive is more commonly used to refer 

to a sex act. 

3 The Government also points to the Agreed 

Order of Revocation as establishing that Respondent 

knew that Woods and the informant were drug 

traffickers at the time he agreed to assist them. See 

Gov. Exceptions at 5. The ALJ did not rely on this 

exhibit in making her finding. Respondent was 

already imprisoned at the time he entered into the 

Order and did so under the advice of counsel. Tr. 

155. Moreover, the information filed by the U.S. 

Attorney made no such allegation. See Gov. Exh. 4 

at 1–2. Considering all the evidence on the issue, 

I consider the Task Force Officer’s testimony that 

Respondent ‘‘was totally truthful’’ regarding his 

involvement with Woods and the informant to be 

the most persuasive. 

4 The authorities provided only $52,000 in cash 

because they did not have the full amount. 

Government did not even show that 

Respondent was in the Nashville area 

on the days that the media covered the 

story, let alone that he reads the paper 

or watches the news on TV. In short, the 

media coverage is too thin a reed to 

support the inference that Respondent 

knew that Woods and the informant 

were drug dealers. 

Nor does Respondent’s participation 

in the December 15, 1999 phone 

conversation provide substantial 

evidence that he knew Woods and the 

informant were drug dealers. At the 

hearing, the Lead Task Force Officer 

testified as to his interpretation of the 

street slang used in the December 15, 

1999 conversation between Respondent, 

Woods and the informant. Specifically, 

the Task Force Officer testified that 

Woods’ comments that the informant 

was ‘‘like cool as [expletive 2] on the 

street,’’ and ‘‘holds a lot of weight,’’ 

establish that the informant was 

involved in drug dealing. Tr. 113–14. 

The Government did not prove, 

however, that Respondent interpreted 

the language as a reference to drug 

dealing as opposed to other forms of 

criminal activity. Indeed, it bears noting 

that the Government introduced only 

this single phone call to support the 

contention and even the Task Force 

Officer apparently did not draw the 

inference that Respondent knew that 

Woods and the informant were drug 

dealers. See id. at 134 (testimony of 

Task Force Officer; ‘‘we don’t know 

whether or not [Respondent] knew [that 

Woods] was under indictment for drug 

dealing’’). Moreover, the Government 

did not otherwise establish that 

Respondent was familiar with and 

understood drug slang. Again, the 

phone call evidence creates no more 

than a suspicion that Respondent knew 

that Woods and the informant were 

engaged in drug trafficking. See 

Columbia Enameling, 306 U.S. at 300. 

Finally, the substantial evidence test 

requires that the Agency ‘‘ ‘tak[e] into 

account contradictory evidence or 

evidence from which conflicting 

inferences could be drawn.’ ’’ Morall v. 

DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (DC Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. 

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)) (int. 

quotations and other citation omitted). 

Significantly, the Lead Task Force 

officer testified that ‘‘we don’t know 

whether or not [Respondent] knew [that 

Woods] was under indictment for drug 

dealing. We do know that he knew that 

Mr. Woods was a bad guy, a thug.’’ Id. 

at 134. The same officer subsequently 

testified that Respondent ‘‘was totally 

truthful’’ during an interview which 

occurred on the day of his arrest. Id. at 

141. Of consequence, during that 

interview, Respondent admitted only to 

knowing that ‘‘Woods was a ‘big time 

hoodlum’ and that he was in big 

trouble.’’ Gov. Exh. 6, at 3. Respondent 

did not admit to knowing that Woods 

and the informant were drug traffickers, 

a position he has consistently 

maintained.3 See Id. The ALJ’s decision 

‘‘entirely ignored [this] relevant 

evidence,’’ Morall, 366 U.S. at 178, 

which was part of the Government’s 

case. 

On January 13, 2000, Woods was 

arrested by U.S. Marshals. Gov. Exh. 4 

at 7. Thereafter, on January 17, 2000, the 

informant called Respondent to 

determine whether he was still willing 

to assist the informant in evading 

capture. Tr. 86. Respondent agreed to do 

so. Id. During the conversation, 

Respondent and the informant again 

discussed the price for the services and 

agreed on $150,000. Gov. Exh. 4, at 8. 

On January 18, 2000, the informant 

called Respondent and told him that 

‘‘he needed to get his money together.’’ 

Id. The informant advised Respondent 

that he would call him later to make 

arrangements to pay him. Id. Several 

hours later, the informant called 

Respondent back and the two agreed to 

meet in a store parking lot. Id. 

Later that day, Respondent arrived at 

the parking lot and entered the 

informant’s car. Id. The informant and 

Respondent drove to a different part of 

the parking lot where the informant 

gave Respondent a bag containing 

$52,000 in cash.4 Id. Task Force officers 

surrounded Respondent; Respondent 

threw the bag away claiming that he did 

not own it. Id. Respondent was then 

arrested and taken to the Nashville DEA 

office. Id. 

That evening, Respondent agreed to 

an interview. The interview was 

conducted by an Assistant United States 

Attorney and several law officers. Gov. 

Exh. 6. During the interview, 

Respondent fully discussed the 

circumstances surrounding his 

involvement with Woods. During the 

interview, Respondent described Woods 

as a ‘‘big time hoodlum’’ and that he 

was in trouble. Id. at 3. Respondent 

further stated that his girlfriend had told 

him that her niece’s boyfriend ‘‘was in 

trouble and that people were after him.’’ 

Id. Respondent also stated that while 

‘‘he knew Woods was in trouble [he] did 

not know for sure what kind of trouble.’’ 

Id. Respondent further stated to the 

investigators that while the informant 

was to pay him $150,000, ‘‘he was not 

going to make anything off this deal but 

hoped to get some dental referrals.’’ Id. 

at 4. According to the interview report, 

Respondent contacted an acquaintance 

in California to find a plastic surgeon; 

the acquaintance subsequently called 

Respondent back and told him the cost 

for the surgery and after-care would be 

$150,000. Id. Later, Respondent 

acknowledged that ‘‘he was going to do 

a full mouth reconstruction’’ on the 

informant ‘‘which meant probably 10 to 

20 crowns at $650’’ each. Id. at 5. 

Respondent also stated that ‘‘he was 

‘greedy and stupid.’ ’’ Id. 

At the hearing, the lead Task Force 

Officer testified that Respondent ‘‘was 

totally truthful’’ with the interviewers 

and that the information he provided 

was consistent with other information 

obtained in the investigation. Tr. 141. 

Respondent also agreed to cooperate 

with the investigation by making phone 

calls to another suspect and wearing a 

wire. Id. at.136–37, 152. Finally, the 

lead Task Force Officer testified that 

there was no indication that Respondent 

was involved in the buying and selling/ 

distribution of cocaine and had no prior 

criminal record. Id. at 130. 

The United States Attorney 

subsequently charged Respondent with 

one count of conspiring to violate 18 

U.S.C. 3, the ‘‘accessory after the fact’’ 

statute. Gov. Exh. 4; see 18 U.S.C. 371. 

The accessory after the fact statute 

makes it a criminal offense to knowingly 

provide assistance to an ‘‘offender in 

order to hinder or prevent his 

apprehension, trial or punishment.’’ 18 

U.S.C. 3. The information specifically 

alleged that Respondent had ‘‘agreed to 

provide or arrange for plastic surgery 

and dental work for * * * Woods and 

others after * * * Woods’ indictment on 

federal drug, money laundering, and 

firearms felonies.’’ Gov. Exh. 4, at 1–2. 

On July 20, 2001, Respondent pled 

guilty and was sentenced to a term of 

thirty months imprisonment and a term 

of three years of supervised release. 

Gov. Exh. 3. Respondent received 

sentence reduction points for his 

cooperation with law enforcement 

officials and for accepting responsibility 

for his conduct. Tr. 137. Respondent 


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5 On cross-examination, Respondent further 

explained that he answered ‘‘no’’ because he 

believed ‘‘that I was charged with one count of 

accessory after the fact, conspiracy to harbor a 

fugitive. There was no mention of anything as it 

relates to my involvement with the drug conspiracy. 

I had absolutely no involvement with the drug 

conspiracy.’’ Id. at 196–97. Later, Respondent 

testified: The question was, [h]as the applicant even 

been convicted of a crime in connection with a 

controlled substance? * * * I didn’t feel like I was 

convicted of that crime. I wasn’t charged with that 

crime. I wasn’t charged with a drug crime or a drugrelated crime. I wasn’t involved in any of that 

activity at any time. I’ve never been accused of that, 

ever. Id. at 213–14. 

subsequently served approximately 

twenty-two months at the Federal 

Correctional Institute, Forest City, 

Arkansas, before being transferred to a 

halfway house. Id. at 158, 160. 

According to Respondent’s 

unchallenged testimony, prison officials 

allowed him to attend continuing 

education classes at the University of 

Tennessee, College of Dentistry, in 

Memphis. Id. at 158–59. 

Following his release from prison, 

Respondent applied for reinstatement of 

his state dental license. Id. at 161. 

Respondent appeared before the 

Tennessee Board of Dentistry, which 

voted unanimously to reinstate his 

license. Id. at 161–65. 

After the Tennessee Board’s decision, 

Respondent contacted the DEA office in 

Atlanta, Georgia, to determine the status 

of his registration. Id. at 200. During this 

conversation, Respondent was told that 

his DEA number had been revoked and 

that he needed to apply for a new 

registration. Id. 

Thereafter, on October 3, 2003, 

Respondent re-applied for a DEA 

registration. Gov. Exh. 5, at 2. On the 

application, Respondent was asked 

whether he had ‘‘ever been convicted of 

a crime in connection with controlled 

substances under state or federal law?’’ 

Id. at 1. Respondent answered: ‘‘No.’’ Id. 

The application also asked whether 

Respondent had ‘‘ever surrendered or 

had a federal controlled substance 

registration revoked, suspended, 

restricted or denied?’’ Id. Respondent 

answered: ‘‘Yes.’’ Finally, Respondent 

answered ‘‘yes’’ to the question of 

whether he had ‘‘ever surrendered or 

had a state professional license or 

controlled substance registration 

revoked, suspended, denied, restricted, 

or placed on probation?’’ Id. 

The application also requires that an 

applicant give an explanation for a 

‘‘yes’’ answer to these questions. In this 

block, Respondent wrote: 

I voluntarily surrendered my license to 

practice dentistry in the State of Tennessee 

as a result of my conviction for accessory 

after the fact. I also voluntarily surrendered 

my DEA # to prescribe medications. The 

board of * * * Tennessee voted unanimously 

to reinstate my license to practice dentistry 

in the State of Tennessee on 9/19/03. 

Id. at 2. 

Respondent’s Testimony Regarding the 

Operative Events 

Respondent testified regarding his 

criminal conduct. When asked by his 

counsel whether he had committed a 

crime, Respondent answered: 

‘‘Absolutely.’’ Tr. 150. Respondent 

further testified that he ‘‘agreed to help 

arrange for him [Woods] to avoid 

apprehension, and as much as I want to 

blame other people for that, I can’t. The 

onus is firmly and squarely on my 

shoulders, and I take full responsibility 

for that.’’ Id. Respondent also further 

stated that his girlfriend did not coerce 

him into committing the act, and 

acknowledged that he understood he 

was committing a crime when he did it. 

Id. 

Respondent also testified that his 

conduct in agreeing to help Woods ‘‘was 

the absolute worst thing—the only thing 

I could have done worse was actually 

murder someone. * * * [I]t’s just a 

terrible, terrible thing.’’ Id. at 184. Later, 

when asked whether he was ‘‘wrong in 

[his] actions?,’’ Respondent stated: ‘‘I 

was absolutely wrong. I made a terrible, 

terrible mistake. I’ve paid dearly for 

that, and I make no excuses. * * *’’ Id. 

at 188. Finally, when asked by the ALJ 

why he agreed to assist the informant 

after Woods was arrested, Respondent 

answered: ‘‘Stupid. Absolutely stupid.’’ 

Id. at 223. 

Respondent further testified that at 

the time he committed the act, he was 

aware that Woods was a criminal, a 

‘‘hoodlum,’’ and a ‘‘hustler.’’ Id. at 151– 

52. Respondent maintained, however, 

that he was unaware of Wood’s money 

laundering activities and what firearms 

offenses he committed. Id. at 151. 

Furthermore, Respondent denied that he 

was aware that Woods and the 

confidential informant were cocaine 

dealers at the time he committed his 

crime. Id. at 190; see also id. at 195. 

Respondent further maintained that 

while he was familiar with the term 

‘‘hustler,’’ the term ‘‘doesn’t necessarily 

mean a person who sells drugs,’’ but 

rather, means ‘‘any person that’s doing 

something illegal.’’ Id. at 210. 

During its cross-examination, the 

Government asked Respondent about 

his motive. Specifically, the 

Government asked Respondent whether 

‘‘making a lot of money off of this was’’ 

his motive. Id. at 208. Respondent 

initially answered that ‘‘[i]t wasn’t a 

moneymaking scheme for me at all,’’ 

and that he agreed to help because his 

girlfriend asked him ‘‘to help her niece’s 

boyfriend, and it just kind of 

snowballed after that.’’ Id. at 209. 

Respondent further maintained that the 

$150,000 cash payment (for the 

informant) was to be shipped to the 

person in California who arranged for 

the plastic surgery. Id. 

When pressed by the Government as 

to whether he was to receive any money 

out of this, Respondent testified that his 

California contact was ‘‘going to do 

something nice for’’ him. Id. 

Respondent maintained, however, that 

there was no agreement under which he 

would receive a particular percentage of 

the payment. Id. at 210. 

Respondent also testified regarding 

his application. Specifically, 

Respondent testified that he believed 

that he had voluntarily surrendered his 

DEA registration because ‘‘at no time 

did we put up any resistance to the 

process.’’ Id. at 180. Respondent further 

testified that he thought a voluntary 

surrender and a revocation ‘‘were one 

[and] the same.’’ Id. at 181. On crossexamination, however, Respondent 

admitted that he had not signed any 

form in which he had agreed to 

surrender his DEA registration. Id. at 

207. Respondent further testified that he 

had ‘‘no’’ intent to mislead DEA 

regarding the status of his previous 

registration when he made the statement 

that he had voluntarily surrendered his 

DEA number. Id. at 181. 

The ALJ specifically found that 

‘‘Respondent credibly testified that at 

the time he completed his application, 

he believed he had voluntarily 

surrendered his previous * * * 

registration and that he was responding 

truthfully.’’ ALJ Dec. at 15 (FOF 64). I 

adopt this finding. See Universal 

Camera, 340 U.S. at 496. 

Regarding the application’s criminal 

history question, Respondent testified 

that he answered ‘‘no’’ because he did 

not think that he had committed a drugrelated felony. Id. at 182. Respondent 

further testified that he was not 

‘‘involved’’ in selling drugs, that the 

prosecutor had not charged him with 

that, and that the extent of his role was 

in helping Woods ‘‘evade capture.’’ 5 Id. 

at 184. Respondent further stated that he 

was ‘‘absolutely not’’ trying to conceal 

anything or misrepresent anything from 

DEA. Id. 

The ALJ specifically credited 

Respondent’s testimony on both issues. 

See ALJ at 15–16 (FOF 67). In light of 

the fact that Respondent fully disclosed 

his ‘‘conviction for accessory after the 

fact,’’ Gov. Ex. 5, at 2, I find no basis to 

reject the ALJ’s findings. 

I further note that there is no evidence 

that Respondent has ever illegally used 


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controlled substances. Relatedly, there 

is no evidence that Respondent ever 

used his previous DEA registration to 

prescribe a controlled substance for an 

unlawful purpose. 

Discussion 

Section 303(f) of the Controlled 

Substances Act provides that an 

application for a practitioner’s 

registration may be denied upon a 

determination ‘‘that the issuance of such 

registration would be inconsistent with 

the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f). In 

making the public interest 

determination, the CSA requires the 

consideration of the following factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing * * * controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

Id. 

‘‘These factors are * * * considered in 

the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 

68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). I ‘‘may rely 

on any one or a combination of factors, 

and may give each factor the weight [I] 

deem[ ] appropriate in determining 

whether * * * an application for 

registration [should be] denied.’’ Id. 

Moreover, case law establishes that I am 

‘‘not required to make findings as to all 

of the factors.’’ Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 

477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Morall, 

412 F.3d at 173–74. 

Furthermore, DEA precedent 

establishes that the various grounds for 

revocation or suspension of an existing 

registration that Congress enumerated in 

section 304(a), 21 U.S.C. 824(a), are also 

properly considered in deciding 

whether to grant or deny an application 

under section 303. See Anthony D. 

Funches, 64 FR 14267, 14268 (1999); 

Alan R. Schankman, 63 FR 45260 

(1998); Kuen H. Chen, 58 FR 65401, 

65402 (1993). Thus, the allegation that 

Respondent materially falsified his 

application is properly considered in 

this proceeding. 

For reasons explained below, I 

conclude that the Government has not 

proved that Respondent materially 

falsified his application. Furthermore, 

while I am deeply troubled by 

Respondent’s criminal conduct, I am 

satisfied that he has accepted 

responsibility for it and reject the 

Government’s assertion to the contrary. 

The Material Falsification Allegations 

The Government maintains that 

Respondent materially falsified his 

application in two respects. First, by 

answering ‘‘no’’ to the application’s 

question as to whether Respondent had 

‘‘ever been convicted of a crime in 

connection with controlled substances,’’ 

and second, by stating that he had 

‘‘voluntarily surrendered’’ his DEA 

number. Gov. Exceptions at 7–9. As 

explained above, the ALJ found that 

Respondent did not intentionally falsify 

his application in either instance. 

DEA precedents make clear that 

culpability short of intentional 

falsification is actionable in these 

proceedings. See, e.g., Samuel Arnold, 

63 FR 8687, 8688 (1998) (‘‘[I]n finding 

that there has been a material 

falsification for purposes of 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(1), it must be determined that the 

applicant knew or should have known 

that the response given to the liability 

question was false.’’). But even if 

Respondent should have known that his 

statements were false, the Government 

must still show that each statement was 

material. Accordingly, while I hold that 

Respondent’s conviction is a ‘‘a crime in 

connection with controlled substances’’ 

and that Respondent should have 

provided a ‘‘yes’’ answer on the 

application, the Government has not 

established the materiality of the 

statement because it ignores relevant 

evidence. 

As an initial matter, I conclude that 

the liability question is not limited to a 

conviction in which one is directly 

involved in drug dealing. The ‘‘in 

connection with * * * controlled 

substances’’ language is broad in its 

scope; its intent is to provide the 

Agency with the information necessary 

to determine whether an applicant/ 

registrant has committed a felony that 

may preclude his registration under the 

CSA. See 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). 

The text of section 404(a)(2) makes 

plain that it is not limited to a felony 

which directly involves drug dealing. 

As the provision states, a registration 

may be revoked based on a 

‘‘convict[ion] of a felony under this 

subchapter [the CSA] or subchapter II of 

this chapter [the Controlled Substances 

Import and Export Act] or any other law 

of the United States, or of any State, 

relating to any substance defined in this 

subchapter as a controlled substance.’’ 

Id. 824(a)(2) (emphasis added). While it 

is true that Respondent was not 

convicted of a felony under the CSA or 

the Import/Export Act, his conviction 

for the felony offense of conspiring to be 

an accessory after the fact is a 

conviction under ‘‘any other law of the 

United States.’’ Id. And his conviction 

is related to a controlled substance 

because his criminal conduct involved 

providing assistance to a person 

engaged in the unlawful distribution of 

cocaine which, if successful, would 

have allowed the drug dealer to evade 

apprehension and continue his illegal 

activity. Cf. Smith v. United States, 508 

U.S. 223, 237 (1993) (quoting Webster’s 

New International Dictionary 2102 (2d 

ed. 1939) (‘‘[t]he phrase ‘in relation to’ 

is expansive’’ and ‘‘means ‘with 

reference to’ or ‘as regards’) (other 

citation omitted). Respondent’s crime 

was therefore also—in the words of the 

application—‘‘in connection with * * * 

controlled substances.’’ 

Respondent was thus required to 

provide a ‘‘yes’’ answer to the liability 

question. This conclusion does not, 

however, close the inquiry because it 

must also be determined whether 

Respondent’s answer was material. 

‘‘The most common formulation’’ of 

the concept of materiality is that ‘‘a 

concealment or misrepresentation is 

material if it ‘has a natural tendency to 

influence, or was capable of influencing, 

the decision of’ the decisionmaking 

body to which it was addressed.’’ 

Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 

770 (1988) (quoting Weinstock v. United 

States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (DC Cir. 1956)) 

(other citation omitted); see also United 

States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489 (1997) 

(quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770). The 

evidence must be ‘‘clear, unequivocal, 

and convincing.’’ Kungys, 485 U.S. at 

772. 

Taken in isolation, Respondent’s 

answer is material because this Agency 

‘‘relies upon such answers to determine 

whether an investigation is needed prior 

to granting the application.’’ Martha 

Hernandez, 62 FR 61145, 61146 (1997). 

In almost every case, it is clear that a 

false answer to the question of whether 

one has ‘‘been convicted of a crime in 

connection with controlled substances,’’ 

Gov. Exh. 5., has ‘‘the natural tendency 

to influence’’ the reviewing official to 

grant the application because most 

applicants do not provide any further 

explanation. 

This, however, is not such a case. 

Here, Respondent disclosed his criminal 

‘‘conviction for accessory after the fact’’ 

on the application and this description 

is an accurate representation of the 

crime he was charged with and pled 

guilty to. Id. at 2. The Government 

offered no evidence to show how 

Respondent’s ‘‘no’’ answer would—in 

light of his additional disclosure— 

nonetheless have ‘‘the natural tendency 

to influence’’ agency personnel to grant 


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6 This is not to say that the revocation of a 

registration is limited to those situations where a 

registrant has either engaged in personal abuse of 

a controlled substance or illegally dispensed a 

controlled substance. Both sections 303(f) and 

304(a) make clear that Respondent’s criminal 

conduct is properly considered in this proceeding. 

See 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(4) & (5), id. 824(a)(2). 

his application without further 

investigation. The Government has thus 

failed to prove that Respondent 

materially falsified his application in 

answering the criminal conviction 

question. 

The Government also alleges that 

Respondent materially falsified his 

application by stating that ‘‘I also 

voluntarily surrendered my DEA # to 

prescribe medications.’’ Id. Here, 

however, Respondent had previously 

answered ‘‘yes’’ to the question whether 

he had ‘‘ever surrendered or had a 

federal controlled substances 

registration revoked, suspended, 

restricted or denied?’’ Id. at 1. Again, 

the information Respondent provided 

raised a red flag for agency personnel 

involved in reviewing his application. 

The Government argues, however, 

that Respondent’s statement was a 

material falsification because 

Respondent’s DEA ‘‘number actually 

was revoked pursuant to a final order.’’ 

Gov. Exceptions at 9. The Government 

further points to the ALJ’s finding that 

‘‘ ‘Respondent’s mere failure to request 

a hearing or to contest the revocation 

proceedings is insufficient for a finding 

of a voluntary surrender of his DEA’ ’’ 

registration. Id. (quoting ALJ at 25). 

It is true that Respondent’s 

registration was revoked pursuant to a 

final order and was not voluntarily 

surrendered. But neither the CSA nor 

DEA’s regulations define the respective 

terms and no agency precedent explains 

that there are consequential differences 

between them. 

Most significantly, even if the 

statement would—if viewed in 

isolation—be capable of influencing the 

decision by inducing a more favorable 

view of Respondent’s application—the 

fact remains that the statement 

immediately followed Respondent’s 

factually accurate representation that he 

had surrendered his state license ‘‘as a 

result of [his] conviction for accessory 

after the fact.’’ Gov. Ex. 5, at 2. In short, 

viewed in context, Respondent’s 

statements clearly placed agency 

personnel on notice that his application 

should not be summarily approved, but 

rather, subjected to an investigation. I 

thus hold that even though 

Respondent’s statement was false, it was 

not capable of influencing the decision 

and is thus not material. I therefore 

conclude that the Government’s 

allegations that Respondent materially 

falsified his application are without 

merit and turn to the public interest 

factors. 

The Public Interest Factors 

As explained above, in Section 303(f), 

Congress directed that I consider five 

factors in determining whether granting 

Respondent’s registration would be 

‘‘inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

21 U.S.C. 823(f). While I consider 

Respondent’s criminal conduct to be 

outrageous, having considered all of the 

factors and our precedents, I conclude 

that he is entitled to be registered. 

Factor One—The State Board’s 

Recommendation 

As the ALJ found, following his 

release from prison, the Tennessee 

Board of Dentistry reinstated 

Respondent’s license without 

conditions. While this factor is not 

dispositive, see John H. Kennedy, 71 FR 

35705, 35708 (2006), in this case it does 

support the granting of his application. 

Factors Two and Three—The 

Applicant’s Experience in Dispensing 

Controlled Substances and the 

Applicant’s Conviction Record Relating 

to the Distribution or Dispensing of 

Controlled Substances 

Significantly, there is no evidence in 

the record that Respondent ever used 

his previous DEA registration to 

illegally dispense a controlled 

substance. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence in the record that Respondent 

ever used his registration to divert 

controlled substances for personal use. 

Relatedly, Respondent has never been 

convicted of a crime directly involving 

the distribution or dispensing of 

controlled substances. Thus, both 

factors support the granting of 

Respondent’s application. 

Factors Four and Five—Respondent’s 

Record of Compliance With Applicable 

Laws Relating to Controlled Substances 

and Such Other Conduct Which May 

Threaten Public Health and Safety 

As explained above, Respondent 

committed a federal criminal offense in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. 3 and 371, when 

he entered into a conspiracy with 

Woods and an informant in which he 

agreed to assist them in altering their 

appearance and thereby help them 

avoid apprehension. Furthermore, even 

after Woods was apprehended, 

Respondent agreed to assist the 

informant. These are truly outrageous 

acts of criminality. 

Proceedings under sections 303 and 

304 of the CSA are, however, nonpunitive. See Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 

21931, 21932 (1988). The purpose of 

this proceeding is not to impose 

punishment in addition to the sentence 

handed down by the federal district 

court. As previously recognized, this 

proceeding ‘‘is a remedial measure, 

based upon the public interest and the 

necessity to protect the public from 

those individuals who have misused 

controlled substances or their DEA 

Certificate of Registration, and who have 

not presented sufficient mitigating 

evidence to assure the Administrator 

that they can be trusted with the 

responsibility carried by such a 

registration.’’ 6 Id.; see also Robert M. 

Golden, 61 FR 24808, 24812 (1996). 

As egregious as his conduct is, 

Respondent committed his crimes more 

than seven years ago. In the interim, 

Respondent has served his sentence and 

there is no evidence that he has violated 

the terms of his period of supervised 

release. Respondent pled guilty to the 

offense, was found by the federal 

district court to have accepted 

responsibility, and cooperated with the 

Task Force in its investigation. 

Moreover, in this proceeding, 

Respondent stated that he had 

‘‘absolutely’’ committed a crime, that he 

could not ‘‘blame other people for’’ his 

decision to help Woods avoid capture, 

and that he took ‘‘full responsibility for 

that.’’ Tr. 150. Of note, Respondent also 

testified that his conduct ‘‘was the 

absolute worst thing—the only thing I 

could have done worse was actually 

murder someone.’’ Id. at 184. 

Respondent added that ‘‘I was 

absolutely wrong,’’ and that ‘‘I made a 

terrible, terrible mistake.’’ Id. at 188. 

Finally, Respondent described his 

actions in agreeing to assist the 

informant after Woods’ arrest as 

‘‘[s]tupid[,] [a]bsolutely stupid.’’ Id. at 

223. That it was. 

The Government nonetheless 

contends that Respondent has not 

sufficiently accepted responsibility. In 

the Government’s view, Respondent 

‘‘has not been candid about the facts 

surrounding his conviction,’’ Gov. 

Exceptions at 6, because he has 

maintained in this proceeding that he 

did not know that Woods and the 

informant were drug traffickers. The 

Government also maintains that 

Respondent was not candid about his 

motive. 

The Government’s first contention is 

disposed of by my finding that the 

Government’s evidence only creates a 

suspicion that Respondent knew that 

Woods and the informant were engaged 

in drug trafficking. Having failed to 

adduce substantial evidence proving 

this as a fact, the Government is 

precluded from arguing that Respondent 


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has not been candid about his 

knowledge of Woods’ and the 

informant’s criminal activities. 

The Government further argues that 

Respondent lacked candor because he 

‘‘asserted at the hearing that he had no 

pecuniary motive.’’ Id. at 7. Ultimately, 

however, Respondent did admit that he 

had a pecuniary motive. Tr. 210. True 

enough, to obtain this admission, the 

Government was forced to engage in the 

legal equivalent of pulling teeth. But the 

Government offered no evidence to 

establish the amount that Respondent 

was to receive. 

While I find Respondent’s testimony 

on this point disturbing, the record does 

not contain sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that Respondent 

lacked candor and has not accepted 

responsibility for his criminal conduct. 

I thus conclude that factors four and five 

do not support a finding that 

Respondent’s registration would be 

inconsistent with the public interest. 

And having considered all of the factors, 

I further conclude that Respondent is 

entitled to be registered. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 28 CFR 0.100(b) 

and 0.104, I order that the application 

of Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., for a DEA 

Certificate of Registration as a 

practitioner be, and it hereby is, granted. 

This order is effective immediately. 

Dated: April 24, 2007. 

Michele M. Leonhart, 

Deputy Administrator. 

[FR Doc. E7–8261 Filed 4–30–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Office of the Secretary 

Submission for OMB Review: 

Comment Request 

April 12, 2007. 

The Department of Labor (DOL) has 

submitted the following public 

information collection request (ICR) to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and approval in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 

44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). A copy of this 

ICR, with applicable supporting 

documentation, may be obtained at 

http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain, or contact Ira Mills on 202– 

693–4122 (this is not a toll-free number) 

or E-Mail: Mills.Ira@dol.gov. 

Comments should be sent to the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Attn: OMB Desk Officer for U.S. 

Department of Labor/Employment and 

Training Administration (ETA), Office 

of Management and Budget, Room 

10235, Washington, DC 20503, 202– 

395–7316 (this is not a toll free number), 

within 30 days from the date of this 

publication in the Federal Register. 

The OMB is particularly interested in 

comments which: 

<bullet≤ Evaluate whether the 

proposed collection of information is 

necessary for the proper performance of 

the functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

<bullet≤ Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

<bullet≤ Enhance the quality, utility 

and clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

<bullet≤ Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submission of 

responses. 

Agency: Employment and Training 

Administration. 

Type of Review: Extension without 

change of a currently approved 

collection. 

Title: Domestic Agricultural In-Season 

Wage Report. 

OMB Number: 1205–0017. 

Frequency: Annually. 

Affected Public: Individuals or 

Households, Farms, State, Local, or 

Tribal Government. 

Type of Response: Reporting. 

Number of Respondents: 38,855. 

Annual Responses: 38,805 for ETA 

Form 232–A; 600 for ETA Form 232. 

Average Response Time: 15 minutes 

for ETA Form 232–A and 11 hours for 

ETA Form 232. 

Total Annual Burden Hours: 16,301. 

Total Annualized Capital/Startup 

Costs: 0. 

Total Annual Costs (operating/ 

maintaining systems or purchasing 

services): 0. 

Description: State Workforce Agencies 

must collect information on agricultural 

prevailing wage rates in order to 

implement Federal regulations 

governing the intrastate and interstate 

recruitment of farmworkers for 

agricultural (crop and livestock) and 

logging jobs. This information is 

collected by crop area and crop activity, 

wage rates paid, total number of 

domestic and foreign workers, 

productivity standards, and hourly 

earnings of piece rate workers. 

Ira L. Mills, 

Departmental Clearance Officer/Team 

Leader. 

[FR Doc. E7–8239 Filed 4–30–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–FP–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Employment and Training 

Administration 

Workforce Investment Act—Small 

Grassroots Organizations Connecting 

With the One-Stop Delivery System; 

Solicitation for Grant Applications 

(SGA), SGA/DFA–PY 06–11 

AGENCY: Employment and Training 

Administration (ETA), Labor. 

ACTION: Notice; amendment. 

SUMMARY: The Employment and 

Training Administration published a 

document in the Federal Register of 

April 5, 2007, announcing the 

availability of funds and solicitation for 

grant applications for small grassroots 

organizations with the ability to connect 

to the local One-Stop Delivery System. 

The document is hereby amended. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Linda Forman, Grants Management 

Specialist, Telephone (202) 693–3416. 

In the Federal Register of April 5, 

2007, in FR Volume 72, Number 65: 

—On page 16825, starting in the middle 

column, Part II (1) Award Information 

stated the following: The agency 

expects to award approximately 40 

grants. The grant amount for each 

‘‘grassroots’’ organization will range 

between $50,000–$75,000. 

Amendment 

The solicitation is amended to read: 

The agency expects to award 

approximately 50 grants. The grant 

amount for each ‘‘grassroots’’ 

organization will be up to $60,000. 

Signed at Washington, DC, this 24th day of 

April, 2007. 

Eric Luetkenhaus, 

Grant Officer, Employment & Training 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. E7–8258 Filed 4–30–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Information Collection Activities: 

Proposed Collection; Comment 

Request 

AGENCY: National Science Foundation. 


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