The Honorable D. Brook Bartlett, Chief Judge, United States District Court for 1 the Western District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-2411

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Dwight V. Seward, also known as * [UNPUBLISHED] Vince, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 6, 1997 Filed: June 11, 1997

___________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In 1 992, Dwight V. Seward pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base withi n 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 845a(a) (redesignated § 86 0), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced him to 1 42 months' imprisonment and eight years' supervised release. On four occasion s between August 1994 and March 1996, while serving his supervised release, Seward-2-

admitte d to violating his supervised-release conditions. Each time, the district court continue d him on supervised release and modified the conditions. Following a fifth claim by Seward’s proba

tion officer that Seward had violated his supervised release-- which S eward again admitted--the district court revoked his supervised release an d sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. Seward appeals, and we affirm. Initially, we reject Seward’s argument that the district court improperly imposed eight y ears of supervised release as part of his original sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § § 841(b)(1)(B), 860. We also reject Seward’s challenges to his revocation sen tence. The court was entitled to impose both imprisonment and additional supervised release, see 1 8 U.S.C. § 3583(h); United States v. St. John , 92 F.3d 761, 766-67 (8th Cir. 1996); the 24-mo nth term of imprisonment and three-year term of supervised release wer e within the maximum authorized terms of imprisonment and supervised release for the offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (e)(3); and the court was not required to credi t Seward with time he previously served on post-release supervision, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Sew ard also complains that the district court failed to consider as periods o f confin ement the time he spent in an inpatient treatment program and in residence at a halfway house. To the extent Seward is arguing that the court should have reduced his sentence to allow for that time, his argument fails. See United States v. Moore , 97 8 F.2d 1029, 1 031 (8th Cir.) (credit for prison time to be determined by Attorne y Ge neral, who has delegated authority to Bureau of Prisons). If, on the other hand , Seward is arguing that the Bureau of Prisons has not given him proper credit, such a claim is not properly before us. Cf. Moreland v. United States , 968 F.2d 655, 656 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (claim for sentence c redit was initiated through habeas corpus motion), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1028 (1992).-3-

Finally, we have considered and reject as contrary to the record or established law the contentions in Seward’s pro se supplemental briefs. The judgment is affirmed.
We deny Seward’s motion to vacate his supervised release, and we gran t counsel’s motion to withdraw. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.