Exhibit 101 

Exhibit 101 

687 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
688 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
689 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
690 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
691 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
692 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
693 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
694 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
695 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
696 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
697 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
698 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
699 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
700 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
701 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
702 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
703 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
704 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
705 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
706 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
707 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 102 

Exhibit 102 

708 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
709 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
710 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 103 

Exhibit 103 

711 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-5 RC-3

RC-3

RC-3

RC-2

RC-2

HOGR USAO 003003

712 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 104 

Exhibit 104 

713 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: JAMES NEEDLES 

Friday, November 4, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 9:10 a.m. 

714 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEVE CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

JUSTIN KIM, MINORITY COUNSEL 

JASON FOSTER, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY 

MAGGIE WHITNEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL, SENATE JUDICIARY 

COMMITTEE 

For the WITNESS: 

BRIAN WATSON, ESQ. 

Schiff Hardin 

233 South Wacker Drive, 

Suite 6600 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

715 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

MATTHEW CROWL, ESQ. 

Schiff Hardin 

233 South Wacker Drive, 

Suite 6600 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

716 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

7 

in charge? 

A It was in September of '07. 

Q When did you take over responsibility for Dave Voth's group 

with this case, the Operation Fast and Furious case? 

A I believe it was the first week of June, I believe it was 

about June 6th of 2010. 

Q Of 2010? And prior to that Mr. Gillett had been the ASAC 

with responsibility? 

A Yes, sir. Yes. 

Q And what was your understanding of the case prior to June 

6th? I mean, were you involved with any meetings? Did you have an 

awareness of what the plan was? 

A No, I wasn't involved in any meetings on the case. I knew 

it was a firearms trafficking case, guns being purchased in the Phoenix 

area going to -- purchased by straw purchasers, presumably going to 

other individuals who may have been transporting them to Mexico for 

cartel members. 

Q And certainly by June, you were aware that these guns were 

indeed showing up in Mexico -- 

A Absolutely. 

Q -- with relatively short time to crimes? 

A Yes. 

Q And did you have a sense when the case began back in, I think 

some of, you know, Hope started logging some of the possible suspects 

in August of 2009. Did you have a sense back in the late summer, fall 

717 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 105 

Exhibit 105 

718 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
719 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
720 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
721 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
722 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
723 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 106 

Exhibit 106 

724 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
725 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 107 

Exhibit 107 

726 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
727 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 108 

Exhibit 108 

728 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
729 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
730 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
731 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
732 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
733 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
734 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
735 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
736 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
737 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
738 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
739 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
740 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 109 

Exhibit 109 

741 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003408

742 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-5

RC-5

RC-1

HOGR WR 003409

743 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 110 

Exhibit 110 

744 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002273

FFL #1

745 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002274

746 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 111 

Exhibit 111 

747 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR WR 003450

748 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR WR 003451

749 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003452

750 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 112 

Exhibit 112 

751 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002077

752 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002078

753 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002079

754 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 113 

Exhibit 113 

755 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003460

756 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 114 

Exhibit 114 

757 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003469

758 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR WR 003470

759 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 115 

Exhibit 115 

760 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003477

761 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 116 

Exhibit 116 

762 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 006989

763 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 117 

Exhibit 117 

764 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR WR 003485

765 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 118 

Exhibit 118 

766 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR WR 005455

RC-2

767 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 119 

Exhibit 119 

768 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: JASON WEINSTEIN 

Tuesday, January 10, 2012 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 10:06 a.m.

769 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEPHEN CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

HENRY J. KERNER, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

KATE DUNBAR, STAFF ASSISTANT 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

M. SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

DONALD K. SHERMAN, MINORITY COUNSEL 

CARLOS URIARTE, MINORITY STAFF 

For the SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

MAGGIE WHITNEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

MATT VIRKSTIS, COUNSEL 

JASON FOSTER, MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, MINORITY COUNSEL 

BRIAN M. DOWNEY, MINORITY INVESTIGATOR 

ROB DONOVAN, MINORITY STAFF 

PATRICK BAILEY, MINORITY STAFF 

770 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

For the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: 

STEVEN F. REICH, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 

M. FAITH BURTON, SPECIAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 

771 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

9 

strengthening our relationship with Mexico has been recognized 

repeatedly by officials on both sides of the border. 

Given this level of commitment and given this record of 

accomplishment, it cannot reasonably be suggested that I or any other 

officials in this Criminal Division could have knowingly tolerated any 

situation in which guns were allowed to walk to Mexico, thereby 

endangering not only the citizens of both countries but also all that 

we have worked to accomplish with Mexico over the past 3 years. 

Now let me turn briefly to the prosecution of the case known as 

Wide Receiver. 

As part of the Criminal Division's efforts to assist in the fight 

against gun trafficking along the Southwest border, in the summer of 

2009 the Criminal Division offered a gang unit prosecutor to help the 

border U.S. Attorney's Office prosecute gun-trafficking cases. And 

as a result of that effort in the fall of 2009 one of our prosecutors 

was assigned to a case we now know as Wide Receiver, which is a case 

that had been investigated in 2006 and 2007 in the prior administration 

that had then set uncharged by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Arizona 

for about 2 years. 

To be clear, the case was investigated by ATF and the Arizona U.S. 

Attorney's Office and not by this Criminal Division. But when 

prosecutors in the gang unit reviewed the case in the fall of 2009 and 

decided to prosecute it they learned in the process that guns had walked 

in that case back in '06 and '07. 

It was in the spring of 2010 when I personally learned about the 

772 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

10 

gun-walking that had taken place during the investigative phase of Wide 

Receiver back in '06 and '07. I was stunned by those tactics which 

were unlike anything I had encountered in my career as a prosecutor; 

and, although the tactics had been used years earlier, I was 

sufficiently troubled by them that I raised them with Mr. Breuer and 

at his direction with top officials at ATF. I made clear to ATF my 

concerns about the tactics, and I was satisfied that ATF leadership 

shared those concerns and viewed those tactics as unacceptable. 

The Criminal Division's bottom-line assessment with respect to 

Wide Receiver was that although the guns should never have been allowed 

to walk in '06 and '07 we should not compound that error by allowing 

the gun traffickers to walk as well. So we decided to go forward and 

prosecute the case, notwithstanding any embarrassment it might cause 

for ATF. 

Had embarrassment to ATF been an overriding concern we could 

simply have let the case continue to lie dormant as it had for 2 years, 

but that's not what we did. We chose to move forward, notwithstanding 

the inappropriate investigative tactics that had been used earlier 

because those tactics did not affect the integrity of the evidence and 

because prosecuting the case was simply the right thing to do. 

Turning now to allegations of gun-walking in Fast and Furious. 

I want to be clear that I did not know at any time during the 

investigation of Fast and Furious that guns had walked during that 

investigation. I first heard of possible gun-walking in Fast and 

Furious when the whistleblower allegations were made public in early 

773 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

86 

If the Office of Enforcement Operations decides that the wiretap 

is legally sufficient and meets the statutory requirements, they will 

prepare a summary memo of the affidavit for higher level review. And 

they will send the memo and the supporting documentation to our front 

office where it will be assigned to whichever deputy AG is next 

available, with the goal of getting these reviewed as efficiently as 

possible. There are thousands of wiretaps every year. We want to get 

them reviewed and out to the field if they're approved so they can be 

used. 

So my role is to review the wires that come in. They come to me 

when it's my turn in the rotation to review them. 

Q And did you review wiretap applications in Operation Fast 

and Furious? 

A I reviewed what I believe to be three of the wiretaps in Fast 

and Furious, in what I now know to be Fast and Furious. 

Q Did those -- did you review the wiretaps themselves or the 

cover memo prepared by your staff? 

Mr. Reich. Before we get into what you did in Fast and Furious, 

would you mind asking as just a predicate what his general practice 

is? 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q Yeah, what is your general practice? 

A My general practice, which I understand to be consistent with 

the way DAGs have done this across administrations, is to review the 

summary memo in the first instance and to go to the affidavit only if 

774 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 120 

Exhibit 120 

775 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: WILLIAM MCMAHON 

Tuesday, June 28, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247 Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 10:05 a.m.

776 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEVE CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

DONALD K. SHERMAN, MINORITY COUNSEL 

For the SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

JASON A. FOSTER, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

BRIAN M. DOWNEY, INVESTIGATOR 

ROB DONOVAN, SENATOR GRASSLEY'S OFFICE 

JUSTIN KIM, MINORITY STAFF 

WILLIAM MILES, MINORITY PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

For the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: 

MOLLY GASTON, ATTORNEY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 

For MR. MCMAHON: 

GREG SERRES, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, ATF 

777 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

13 

Q Not legally, the person, the transferee is not legally 

allowed to buy the weapon -- 

A Correct. 

Q Then you would certainly find a problem with that? 

A Absolutely. 

Q All right. When did you first become aware of allegations 

that gun walking might have occurred in the Fast and Furious case? 

A Shortly after a takedown in January of 2011. 

Ms. Grooms. I'm sorry, I was confused by the question. I 

thought the witness said that he hadn't thought that the gun walking 

had occurred. 

Mr. Davis. Well, the allegations. I asked him about the 

allegation. 

Ms. Grooms. Sorry? I misheard you. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q So shortly after the takedown in January 2011? 

A [Nods.] 

Q How did that come to your attention? 

A I think there was some media reports or blog reports that 

that sort of thing were on our news clippings that we get every day. 

Q So you weren't aware of that before January 25 or the press 

conference or -- 

A Correct. 

Q Around that time. Okay. 

Did you do anything in your capacities as Deputy Assistant 

778 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

14 

Director to investigate those allegations? 

A Investigate, I mean I have talked to the individuals involved 

and tried to figure out where this was all coming from. 

Q Who were those individuals that were involved at that point? 

A Usually it was just Bill Newell. 

Q Bill Newell? 

A Right. 

Q So Bill Newell had an allegation that gun walking occurred? 

Is that what I'm understanding? 

A No. When I read these reports I would talk to Bill and say 

what are they talking about here? And we just had a discussion about 

that, that you know, it was not true and that sort of thing. 

Q But you didn't go and reach out to the actual agents who were 

making these reports? 

A There were no agents identified until a month or two later. 

Q And what did Mr. Newell relate to you about these allegations 

that gun walking had occurred? 

A That they were untrue. 

Q And what was his basis for the claim that they were untrue? 

A That his knowledge of the case, the way that this case was 

investigated, all of that. 

Q What is your current understanding of ATF's policy regarding 

gun interdiction? 

A Our policy on gun interdiction? 

Q Yes. Well, I'm sure you are familiar with section 

779 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

17 

being recorded as happening. 

Q Describe for me a little bit your relationship with Bill 

Newell? 

A I was his first line supervisor for I believe the 3 years 

that I have been in this position until just recently. We have 

day-to-day conversations about the ongoing activities in Phoenix. I 

have traveled to Phoenix a number of times, he has traveled to D.C., 

so a working relationship. I was his first line supervisor for those 

3 years. 

Q So day-to-day conversations about what is happening in 

Phoenix? 

A Uh-huh. 

Q Did you talk once a day, twice a day, three times a day? 

A It varied. There were some days we spoke three, four times 

a day and I know that because Bill would call, sorry for going over 

my limit of one call a day type of thing. He would say things like 

that. But there were times that I wouldn't speak to him for a couple 

of days. 

Q Why was he calling so frequently? 

A Just to keep me updated what was going on. I have seven SACs. 

Some I don't hear from quite as often. I have to usually reach out 

to them. And then I have others that will call me quite a bit more. 

I have a SAC that probably calls me five times a day. Bill was kind 

of in the middle. 

Q We have heard some testimony that he had a tendency to over 

780 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

18 

report to you, always wanting to keep you in the loop about what was 

going on in Phoenix? 

A Bill was pretty good at that, yeah. 

Q That was not necessarily just phone calls but written 

product, whether it is briefing points or memorandum or things like 

that? 

A That's correct. 

Q So as a result, you probably had a pretty good idea of what 

was going on in Phoenix? 

A I did. 

Q How often did you talk to folks below Bill Newell's level 

whether it is the ASACs or whether it is any of the group supervisors 

in Phoenix? 

A Hardly at all. If I was in town, I would maybe talk to them 

then. There was never really any phone conversations, maybe a couple 

of phone calls with Jim Needles. I had a little bit more of a personal 

relationship with him. He used to work with me when I was the SAC in 

New York. We actually went to the academy together so. 

Q How often did you see Mr. Newell in person? 

A During the year, I would probably see Bill, four, five times 

a year. I would make some trips out there, he would be in D.C. We 

would be in joint conversations together. 

Q And was your interaction with him, either in D.C. or in 

Phoenix, average, below average, above average compared to other SACs 

under your purview? 

781 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

19 

A Average. 

Q Just about average? 

A Yeah. 

Q So your trips to Phoenix, how frequently did you go out to 

Phoenix? 

A I would go out to Phoenix probably two or three times a year. 

I would probably go to other divisions about the same, some a little 

less, some a little more. 

Q Okay. So the information that Mr. Newell gave you on your 

daily telephone calls or your three or four times daily telephone calls, 

what did you do with that information? What was your sort of pattern 

or practice of using this stuff that he told you? 

A Mostly I would just either report it up or just give him 

advice on how to handle things or thank him for telling me what he told 

me. 

Q And what types of, would you ever go above Mr. Chait's level 

to Mr. Hoover or Mr. Melson based on certain things that Mr. Newell 

was telling you? 

A Not directly, no. There would be times that we would be 

together and I would relay information but that wouldn't go directly 

to -- 

Q To Mr. Chait? 

A Unless Mark Chait wasn't there and then I was either acting, 

or yeah, if I was acting then I would go directly to Billy -- Mr. Hoover. 

Sorry. 

782 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

20 

Q If you were acting -- 

A In Mark's position. 

Q So if, for example, Mr. Newell called and said hey, we got 

a problem with gun walking in Phoenix, that would go great straight 

to Mr. Chait and then you would just leave it at that? 

A If that happened, yes. I would bring it to Mr. Chait's 

attention. And I'm sure we would have a meeting after that. 

Q Sure. Okay. So it was from your perspective very chain of 

command oriented, your reporting? 

A I'm very chain of command, absolutely. 

Q Okay, when did you first find out about the Fast and Furious 

investigation? 

A It was probably the end of '08, either November or December 

of '08. 

Q All right, and what was the context that you found out about 

the investigation? How did that occur? 

A It was just I believe a conversation between Bill and I about 

this very good firearms trafficking case that they had ongoing out of 

our brand-new strike force group. 

Mr. Castor. That was '09, correct? 

Mr. McMahon. I'm sorry, '09. I'm in '11. Two years ago. I 

apologize. I got my position in '08. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q So you just said there was very good firearms trafficking 

case? 

783 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

35 

Mr. Davis. I have Exhibit 3. 

 [McMahon Exhibit No. 3 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q Read it if you want. I affectionately refer to this as the 

Ray Rowley memo. 

So the Ray Rowley memo here, very clearly, Mr. Rowley was 

expressing concern about the number of weapons going on in this 

investigation very early on, December 17, 2009, then you see up here 

an email at the top from Mr. Newell, I will address Ray's concerns with 

McMahon. Did Mr. Newell ever address these concerns with you? 

A I believe we did speak about Ray's involvement in this case. 

Q Okay. Can you describe some more about that conversation 

with Mr. Newell? 

A Sure. It was some concerns that Ray was dictating things 

from headquarters to the field which was not his job. I agreed. I 

said I would speak to Ray. That is about what I remember from this. 

Q Okay so Mr. Newell was not concerned about Mr. Rowley's 

actual concerns about the number of guns, but he was rather concerned 

that headquarters was interfering with his little operation down in 

Phoenix? 

A Well, that position in headquarters. He will never have a 

concern with me interfering with a case, but that position in 

headquarters, absolutely. 

Q So he never expressed to you Mr. Rowley's actual concern 

784 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

39 

A Absolutely, we had an offer from the Criminal Division, the 

gang unit, to provide us U.S. attorneys to prosecute individual cases. 

We normally don't get one attorney assigned to one case at any time, 

and we had this opportunity in this case and so we wanted to make sure 

we took advantage of that. We may have also talked about cases out 

of the Houston field division as well, because I know we have had 

meetings like that. And historically, we had someone from the Criminal 

Division assigned to a case out of Tucson which helped us an awful lot 

because we weren't getting the aggressive prosecution that we thought 

we needed on the case. So to assign someone from main Justice directly 

to one case is kind of a big deal. 

Q Let alone two people from main Justice being assigned 

directly to one case? 

A I don't think Kevin was going to be assigned to any case. 

Kevin was a supervisor of the gang unit. 

Q Okay. Okay. And again, just to reiterate, I just want to 

make sure I am hearing you clearly, you don't ever recall Dan Kumor 

expressing concerns about this case to you? It doesn't have to be in 

this meeting, just over a period of months. 

A Oh, I mean, yeah, we have talked about it, at some point 

during the case, about the number of guns ending up in Mexico, Dan would 

usually express his concern from the concern he was getting from his 

people in Mexico. 

Q And what concern was that? 

A That there was a large number of guns being recovered in 

785 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

40 

Mexico. 

Q And what was your response to that? 

A My response to -- 

Q To Mr. Kumor's concern. 

A That it is our concern as well. We are working this 

investigation the best we can to take down this group of individuals 

and stop them from putting the guns in Mexico. 

Q Did you ever coordinate with anybody under Mr. Kumor about 

in Mexico what was going on? 

A Did I ever coordinate with people in Mexico? 

Q Did you ever talk to anybody in Mexico, ATF or Mexican 

government, about this particular case? 

A I'm sure at some point I did. I had business in Mexico City 

as well. 

Q Who did you meet with down in Mexico City? 

A Our people in the attache office. 

Q Who specifically? 

A Well at the time when I first took the position, the attache 

was Davey Aguilar. And then Davey was removed, and we had an acting 

attache down there, Chilicot was his name. And then, eventually we 

put Darren Gil as the attache. And then Darren was removed, and Carlos 

Canino has been acting attache for a while. 

Q I believe Mr. Gil and Mr. Canino, I think they were the acting 

attaches during the case? 

A Darren was actually the attache and Carlos was the -- 

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47 

RPTS 

DCMN 

[11:04 a.m.] 

Q Was this concern addressed to people above Mr. Chait, 

Mr. Hoover, and Mr. Nelson? 

A I don't know. 

Q Did you ever address these concerns about the large number 

of weapons? 

A To people above -- outside the agency? 

Q Sure. Certainly they were well aware of the large number 

of weapons that were being trafficked in this case? 

A Who was? 

Q I mean, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Nelson -- 

A Oh, absolutely. 

Q So the concerns that were going on, were those being 

discussed? 

A Absolutely. Oh, absolutely. 

Q And what -- what I guess operational safeguards were in place 

to ensure that the guns weren't going to go to Mexico, weren't going 

to end up at crime scenes in Mexico? What safeguards were in place? 

A Well, I mean, every individual in this case was put into the 

tech system. So if they ever had a border crossing that would be 

checked, if ICE -- if CBP was doing the check southbound. 

All the guns that we suspected being purchased by this group were 

787 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

48 

put into our suspect gun database. We were obtaining a wiretap to help 

us identify when and if people are buying weapons and who is 

orchestrating that. So all of those safeguards and all of those 

techniques were put in place during this investigation. 

Q So if you had a hunch that one of these straw purchasers who 

is buying a lot of weapons, one of the many, if you had a hunch they 

were connected specifically to the Sinaloa cartel, which you mentioned 

earlier, again, what would you do to make sure that the weapons that 

he buys are not actually given to the Sinaloa cartel? 

A What would I do? 

Q Well, what would be done normally? What was not done in this 

case? And as the Deputy Assistant Director for the Western Field 

Operations, you know that this is occurring over and over and over 

again. So what steps did you take to make sure that, for example, Uriel 

Patino and other suspects in this case do not continue to buy weapons, 

do not continue to illegally transfer them to prohibited third parties, 

and they did continue to end up in Mexico? 

A Sure. Again, when you have a large group of people buying 

a large number of weapons, that is an issue. So there is constant 

communication between me -- what are we doing to slow this down? What 

are we -- what is our endgame? What is our plan? That is the direction 

I give. 

I mean, I don't ever, in this position, dictate how someone 

conducts an investigation. That is not what this position is. My 

position is to monitor, to support, to provide assistance to the people 

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49 

under my position. 

Q You knew that this was happening over and over and over again. 

They still kept coming in and buying weapons -- 

A I knew a large -- 

Q They kept ending up in Mexico. They kept being transferred 

to prohibited third parties. And, in your position, you just sat there 

and you didn't do anything because it wasn't your job to say anything? 

A I knew a large group of people were buying a large number 

of weapons. I never really got into the specifics of how many people, 

what days they were buying guns, when we found out that they bought 

a gun. I just knew we identified a large group of people that were 

buying a large number of guns. 

Q So you weren't into the specifics, even though a month after 

this investigation started you ordered the link analysis, just to link 

everybody up. That sounds pretty specific. 

A A link analysis so we can brief Criminal Division attorneys 

so that hopefully we can get them to like this case and want to 

prosecute. 

Q So the strategy here was not to actually facilitate the 

transfer of firearms? 

A Absolutely not. 

Mr. Castor. Let me ask one question. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q What is a large number of people? 

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52 

A Trafficking cases, yes, that, is infrequent. But we have 

wiretaps going all across the country. 

Mr. Castor. Carlton, sorry. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q How many wiretaps were there in this case? 

A I believe we applied for -- I think we used seven after -- I 

think we applied for nine. 

Q Seven. So there were seven wiretaps and you never bothered 

to read any of them? 

A Absolutely not. And there was no way I could. Some of these 

wiretaps would be up for, like, 2 days; and then we would be applying 

for another one. 

Q But you never bothered to read any of the applications -- 

A I knew that -- 

Q -- rich in detail? 

A I knew that we were applying for wires and that was what was 

important for me. 

Q Whose job is it to read the applications, if it is not yours? 

A Counsel, main Justice. I mean, there is quite a few levels. 

Q Why are you even in the chain of command if you're just going 

to pass on your work to the level above you? 

A That level is not above me. The Counsel and main Justice, 

the people that review wiretaps, that is what they do for a living. 

Q Put out a memo for a wiretap application, isn't that your 

job to sign off on that? 

790 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

53 

A No, I never signed off on a memo for a wiretap application. 

Mr. Davis. All right. I am going to introduce Exhibit 4 here. 

Hopefully, we can come to an agreement on what exactly occurred. 

Here is Exhibit 4. I will give you the original. That is for 

you. 

 [McMahon Exhibit No. 4 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q So this is dated February 5, 2010, a memorandum to Deputy 

Assistant Director, Westfield Operations. I assume that is you? 

A That is. That is my title. 

Q Through the Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field Division, 

from Group Supervisor, Phoenix Group 7. 

Subject: Request for Authorization to Seek Title 3 Intercept of 

Telephonic Communications. 

So this is a memo to you requesting authorization to seek Title 

3 intercept. There is some good detail in here. Not as strong detail 

as the actual wiretap applications themselves. Are you saying that 

you never read this, that you just approved it and sent it up to the 

next level? 

A If I -- if I -- if I had read this, I would have signed it 

and dated it. I don't believe I have ever read this. 

Q You don't believe you have ever read this. So what is the 

point of even sending it to you then? 

A I'm not sure if it was sent to me. 

791 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

54 

Q Memorandum to Deputy Assistant Director. This isn't you 

sending it on to somebody else. It is somebody sending it to you. 

A Correct. 

Q That's right. So do you sign everything that comes in your 

in box? 

A I do. 

Q Do you sign it immediately? 

A Do I sign it immediately? I sign it when I review it. 

Q You sign it when you review it. 

A Then I would put "approved". 

Q Okay. So, just to be clear, you never -- you've never seen 

this document before? 

A Not that I recall, no. 

Q Okay. 

Mr. Foster. Feel free to take some time to review it, just to 

make sure. 

Mr. McMahon. Sure. 

Some of the facts in here I am familiar with, but, again, this 

memo does not -- I don't recall seeing this memo. I don't recall ever 

signing a memo of request for authorization to seek Title 3s in any 

of my divisions. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q How does the Title 3 process work? Walk me through. If I'm 

Bill Newell, how do I get a Title 3 approved? 

A Well, he doesn't. 

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55 

Q If I am David Voth, how do I get a Title 3 approved? 

A The case agent usually would be the one that prepares an 

affidavit with an assistant U.S. attorney. Then it gets reviewed by 

ATF counsel, and then it goes over to main Justice. For the life of 

me, I can't remember the unit in main Justice. 

OEO. Thank you. 

They are the approvers in this. Then it goes back to the U.S. 

Attorney's Office, and then they present it to a judge. 

Q Okay. Just a last question before I hand over the 

questioning. 

The first sentence here, "this memorandum serves to request 

authorization" -- the memorandum is to you -- "to initiate a Title 3 

cellular telephone intercept." So if you never approved this, if you 

never saw it in the memorandum request authorization, how was this 

authorized? 

A By a judge signing the order. I mean, that's how wiretaps 

work. 

Q Mr. Voth can't simply sign it in -- sign it by himself and 

submit a wiretap application to a Federal judge. 

A No. It has to go through the process I just described. 

Q It seems as though you're a part of the process here. 

A Not the process I described, no. 

Mr. Davis. That's it. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. FOSTER: 

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71 

licensee. 

Q What about stocking the weapon? Does ATF get involved with 

the FFLs, telling them that they should stock more weapons in order 

to assist the flow of the gun traffic -- I guess the gun purchasers 

coming to that particular FFL? 

A Stocking, no. An ATF should not be doing that, no. 

Q And did you authorize agents to instruct FFLs to continue 

to stock or to sell these weapons? 

A No. 

Q And it is your understanding at this point that that didn't 

occur? 

A Yes. 

Q And that is your understanding from talking to SAC Newell? 

A Sure. This has never come up, the fact that we told anyone 

to stock weapons or anything like that. That has never come up. 

Q That is a new allegation for you? 

A Absolutely. 

Q Okay. Did you review the OCDETF application? 

A No, I did not. I reviewed it subsequent to all of this coming 

about, but, no, not before. It is not something that comes up to my 

level. 

Q So where -- I guess where does the review of an OCDETF 

application end? 

A It is at that OCDETF -- there is a committee in that district 

and that is where the review is done, right there. There would be a 

794 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

72 

member from the U.S. Attorney's Office, each of the agencies. They 

will have a rep, those cases get presented and reviewed and approved 

or not approved. 

Q I guess my question is within ATF. 

A Within ATF? It should -- I'm not even sure if it would get 

to the SAC level. It could be as low as the first-line supervisor, 

maybe the ASCA. I'm not sure. 

Q So if -- would you have gotten copied on the OCDETF 

application? 

A No. I may have gotten a copy at some point. I just don't 

know when. I don't know if it was during the investigation or after, 

just -- I'm sure -- I know there was a conversation with Bill about, 

oh, the case got OCDETF approval; we are going to get OCDETF funding. 

There were those kind of conversations. 

I'm not sure I got the actual application at that point. I know 

I have a copy of the application. It is an unsigned copy. So I just 

don't know when I got that. 

Q What kind of paper would you have gotten about Fast and 

Furious, the case from SAC Newell? 

A Sure. I think he provided a couple of briefing papers, more 

so near the end of the case than during. And most of the time we talked 

on the phone. 

Q And in the briefing papers that you got, was there anything 

that you found concerning within them? 

A Nothing concerning, other than the fact that we again had 

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73 

this large group of people buying a large number of weapons and the 

numbers were concerning, something that we needed to keep an eye on. 

What are we doing? What is our endgame? You know, that sort of thing. 

Q But those briefing papers didn't say anything in them about 

cutting short of the surveillance? 

A No. 

Q Or not moving forward with the case in instances when they 

had the opportunity to do so? 

A No. 

Q And certainly nothing about instructing FFLs to sell 

weapons? 

A No. 

Ms. Grooms. Let us look at one of those. 

I will mark this as Exhibit 5. 

 [McMahon Exhibit No. 5 

 was marked for identification.] 

Ms. Grooms. A briefing paper dated January 5th. 

Mr. Serres. January 8th? 

Ms. Grooms. I am sorry. January 8th. 

Mr. Serres. Okay. Thanks. 

[Discussion held off the record.] 

BY MS. GROOMS: 

Q Do you recall having seen this briefing paper in January? 

A Of? 

Q 2010. 

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74 

A A couple of months ago. Not January of 2010, no. 

Q So you didn't receive this briefing paper in January of 2010? 

A Not this briefing paper, no. 

Q But you received other briefing papers? 

A I did. 

Q That were in the same format or -- 

A Not really, no. The briefing papers I received were much 

shorter. I think the first one was only, like, three pages. But a 

little bit different format. There were more headings. 

Q So I want to call your attention to Paragraph 13: 

Currently, our strategy is to allow the transfer of firearms to 

continue to take place albeit at a much slower pace in order to further 

the investigation and allow for the identification of additional 

co-conspirators who would continue to operate and illegally traffic 

guns to Mexican DTOs which are perpetrating armed violence along the 

southwest border. 

So I understand that you couldn't recall having seen this memo, 

but do you recall whether this statement was in other memos that you 

saw? 

A No, this statement was not in any of the briefing papers I 

ever received. 

Q And was that your understanding of what was occurring? And 

I guess if you could give me your understanding, reading this now, of 

what this means, because I think we've had some controversy to that 

and then your understanding of what you thought was occurring.

797 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

83 

and yes, I have a meeting with him next week, we are going to discuss 

it. So it was just constant little things causing more delays. 

Q And did you ever personally get involved? 

A Not above -- not other than with Bill, just following up with 

Bill, what he was doing. 

Q Did you all discuss internally raising up the issues with 

main Justice? 

A I believe it was, yeah. And I know -- I shouldn't say that. 

I don't believe we did -- I know I didn't bring it up to anybody in 

main Justice. People above me knew about these delays and they may 

have, I'm not sure. And I know that there may have been times 

of -- passing in the hallway I would see Dennis Burke and say hello 

and how are we dealing with that case, just kind of remind him that 

it is something that is important to all of us. But I was never involved 

in any discussion about -- a personal discussion about what is going 

on here other than with Bill Newell. 

Ms. Grooms. Let's talk about the exit strategy. Let me mark 

this Exhibit 9. 

 [McMahon Exhibit No. 9 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MS. GROOMS: 

Q Actually, before we talk about this Exhibit 9, I just want 

to follow up on what we were just discussing. 

You said that you had concerns while you were waiting for the 

indictment, that the sale of these weapons was ongoing or that the 

798 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

84 

purchase of these weapons, transporting them to Mexico was ongoing and 

yet when you guys knew about the purchase of those weapons, you all 

were stopping that. So was your concern that they were purchasing it 

in ways that -- was your concern that they were purchasing it in ways 

that you didn't know about or -- 

A No, my concern was that we had enough to arrest these 

individuals and we can't allow them to continue making these purchases 

that we know are illegal at that point because we have indictable 

suspects at that point. That is the concern. We have made our case 

against these individuals, it is time to shut them down. 

Q I guess did you have any concerns that they were going to 

FFLs that you weren't in contact with or other places or -- 

A Well, we had some techniques that they were using at that 

point that were allowing us to know if they were making purchases. But 

I was worried we were continuing to allow them to do something that 

we knew at this point we had indictable defendants or subjects. 

Q So back to Exhibit 9. Is that a copy of the exit strategy 

that you were talking about? 

A It is. It is redacted, but it is. 

Q And from the email chain that is on the front of it, it appears 

that this was from around April 27th and then you emailed it to Mr. Chait 

on May 3rd. 

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85 

RPTS 

DCMN 

A Correct. 

Q What was the conversations around the creation of this exit 

strategy? 

A In April, again, what is going on? We were getting briefed 

on this, and we saw that this large group of people is getting a larger 

and larger number of weapons. So we needed to know what, formally know, 

in writing, what Phoenix field division had plans for this. So that 

is when Mark actually asked me to ask to get an exit strategy from 

Phoenix. Phoenix provided that in April, and then I passed it on to 

Mark in May. 

Q So who are you having these conversations with, you were 

having them with Mr. Chait? 

A Mr. Chait, there were other people in these briefings at that 

point. Again, it is a collective group of people that the had concerns 

about what is our end game. We were always talking about the end game, 

what we were doing to shut this case down. And, again, most of that 

was verbally between Bill and I, but we needed to have them formalize 

something in a written document. So that is when I requested this exit 

strategy. 

Q Who else was included in those conversations? 

A Oh, it could have gone up to the acting director, the deputy 

800 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

167 

seen this before, I think you said several times. Is that right? 

A Which? 

Q Number 4. 

A That's correct. To the best of my recollection, I don't 

remember seeing this. 

Mr. Davis. Okay. I have Exhibit 11 right here. 

 [McMahon Exhibit No. 11 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q So this is actually the email that was attached to Exhibit 4, 

the memo, from Mr. Newell to you on Friday, February 5th, 1:59 p.m. 

And I will give you a second to look at it really quickly. 

A Okay. 

Q Okay. First question is, who is Marino Vidoli? 

A He is the chief of our Special Operations Division. 

Q Okay. This email was sent to you from Mr. Newell, talking 

about how attached is the memo requesting the authorization, which is 

Exhibit 4. He also said that he could not scan the actual affidavit 

due to its size, that he was FedExing that to you, along with the 

original memo. 

A Okay. 

Q So I presume, based on your testimony, you never received 

that FedEx package. Is that right? 

A Not that I recall. 

Q So how many FedEx packages get delivered to your office on 

801 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

168 

a daily, weekly, monthly basis that you don't even see? Especially 

ones that you are aware that they are going to show up? 

A Well, most of the times, the secretaries open up the FedEx 

packaging and then put, like, a pink envelope in my box. 

Q Okay. 

A So I don't know how many things come in on -- 

Q So the secretary probably did it, put the pink envelope in 

your box for this one? 

A I don't know. I don't recall seeing this memo. 

Q Okay. And even though Mr. Newell clearly sent it to you on 

a Friday afternoon, you never asked about the memo or the affidavit 

that he was sending? 

A Correct. 

Q Okay. 

Mr. Foster. How frequently did Mr. Newell send you FedEx 

packages? 

Mr. McMahon. Very infrequently. 

Well, I shouldn't say that, because a lot of times travel vouchers 

and things like that may come in FedEx. But I'm not sure. Again, the 

secretary takes -- our mail system is a little antiquated, to say the 

least. If you mail something to our address, it goes to this processing 

center and gets irradiated, and it takes about 3 weeks to get to us, 

and it comes all yellow and crispy. So a lot of people FedEx other 

documents, like travel vouchers and credit card receipts and things 

like that. 

802 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

169 

But, you know, I don't actually get a FedEx. The secretary gets 

the FedEx. And then it is broken down from there and then passed out 

to whoever needs to sign things. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q I guess I'm having a hard time understanding. I mean, you 

testified earlier that bringing in the DOJ attorney on a case for ATF 

is fairly rare. That is what Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Cooley did in this 

case; that is fairly rare. 

A Well, we -- 

Q You mentioned that, you know, firearms trafficking, T3s, in 

ATF are extremely rare. 

A Uh-huh. 

Q You are Mr. Newell's direct supervisor. He sent you a FedEx 

package with the firearms trafficking T3 memo and affidavit, sent you 

an email, sent you a FedEx package. You said you had never seen it 

before today. 

I'm just having a hard time reconciling all those facts. I'm 

hoping you can help me out with that. 

A I said, first of all, that I don't recall ever seeing this. 

I'm not saying I didn't receive it. I don't recall seeing this. 

Q That is what you are saying now. I believe -- 

A That is what I said the first time you asked me. I don't 

recall ever seeing that memo. 

Q Okay. 

A I forgot the first part of your question. 

803 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

190 

going to go ahead and complete the transaction. 

Then I want to turn your attention to the following page. And 

this is where it gets a little tricky, in my view. This is an email 

from notifying Voth that their annual check is occurring, 

and they were requesting extensive documentation. And so 

tells Voth about this. And over the course of the next couple pages, 

Voth confirms that, you know, he essentially can help 

out with this, you know, with their regulatory -- on the regulatory 

side of things. 

So the concern here is, if doesn't go through with the 

transaction it discussed with Voth, they might be worried about getting 

jammed up on the regulatory side of things. You can see here with these 

emails that there was a discussion about the regulatory side of things, 

and it looks like Voth hooked him up. 

Is that concerning to you? 

A Very much. Very much. 

Q Okay. And so you were unaware that that type of thing was 

going on? 

A I was. I was. 

Q Mr. Newell didn't tell you about that type of thing? 

A No. 

Q And do you know if Mr. Newell knew about it, now, after the 

fact? 

A No, I don't know. 

Q Okay. Is this the first you're learning of this type of 

FFL 2

FFL 2

FFL 2

FFL 2

FFL 2

804 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

191 

thing? 

A First I'm learning of this, yes. 

Q Okay. So this is a problem. 

A Absolutely. 

Q Okay. 

A We have to keep that balance. We license the industry. 

That is our job. And then we also conduct criminal investigations. 

They can't bleed into one another. 

Q And it is our understanding, too, that Hope MacAllister was 

doing the same thing with another FFL, ; that she was calling 

on the phone, notifying the proprietor of , "Such and such 

a guy is come in to buy such and such weapons," and they essentially 

worked out a way to make sure the weapons changed hands to the suspect. 

And that is a problem? 

A It is. 

Q Okay. 

A The only time that I know that that was happening and I agreed 

with the technique was when we were actually -- when we put a tracker 

on one of the weapons. I mean, that, to me, is perfectly fine, when 

you garner the cooperation of the FFL to help facilitate this transfer 

so that we can actually track weapons. 

But I don't see that happening with these emails here. I don't 

think that happened in these cases, and that is concerning. But, as 

I said, there are times when I think it is helpful to do these things. 

Q So if you knew a particular suspect was coming in to by 20 

FFL 1

FFL 1

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199 

focus some of the prosecution resources on this case. 

Q As I understand it, there was some frustration that the T3s 

weren't moving fast enough? 

A Absolutely. 

Q That, you know, Emory Hurley, the AUSA, wasn't processing 

them? 

A Well, no. What came to me was the fact that OEO was -- there 

was a big delay with OEO. 

Q Okay. 

A And so, then that is when myself -- we were at a meeting with 

Jason Weinstein, and we brought it up to him after the meeting. And 

then he fixed it like that. He assigned it someone to just this case, 

and, sure enough, things started turning around much quicker. 

Q And you had similar frustrations with getting the 

indictments out the door? 

A Absolutely. Yeah. 

Q And you had wanted them in July, right? 

A We wanted them as soon as they could get them, is what it 

came down to. 

Q And why did you want them as soon as possible? 

A Well, it was time to take this case down. It was time to, 

you know, round everybody up and -- 

Q Because you didn't want them buying any more guns. 

A Well, it was also, we wanted to show everybody what great 

work we have done. And that was key. There was a lot of discussion 

806 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

200 

about that. You know, can we take it down right around the end of GRIT, 

because then we could have a bigger press conference. 

Q But, really, at the end of the day, you didn't want any more 

guns to be on the street. 

A Oh, absolutely. That's why we were arresting all these 

people. I mean, that is what our job is. 

Q So you wanted to lock up Patino in July. 

A I wanted to shut down this organization once we could shut 

down the whole organization as soon as possible. 

Q Because you didn't want any more firearms to go out the door. 

A Absolutely. I mean, that's our ultimate goal. We want to 

stop guns from going into Mexico from the U.S. And that's why we 

conduct this investigation. 

Q And by that time, you knew that these guns that Patino were 

buying and his associates in this network were making their way to 

Mexico. 

A Absolutely. And that -- 

Q Every day that the case wasn't shut down, every day that an 

indictment didn't occur, more guns had the prospect of being sold and 

subsequently moving to Mexico. 

A Sure. But guns are going to be recovered in Mexico for years 

to come. As I said, they have a long, long shelf life. They are being 

recovered in Phoenix, too. I mean, that is what is going on. So the 

quicker we can shut this group of people down and shut down this network, 

the better for everybody, absolutely. 

807 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 121 

Exhibit 121 

808 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: WILLIAM J. HOOVER 

Thursday, July 21, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 10:00 a.m. 

809 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEVE CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

HENRY J. KERNER, COUNSEL 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

JUSTIN KIM, COUNSEL 

GREGORY PROSEUS, INTERN, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

KRISTY MCNAMARA, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

For SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

MAGGIE WHITNEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

JASON A. FOSTER, MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

BRIAN M. DOWNEY, MINORITY INVESTIGATOR 

ROB DONOVAN, MINORITY STAFF 

For MR. HOOVER: 

GREG SERRES, ASSOCIATE CHIEF COUNSEL, ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 

MOLLY GASTON, ATTORNEY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, U.S. 

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

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Q And if you could tell us what led to that request? 

A We received a pretty detailed briefing in March, I don't 

remember the specific date, I'm going to say it's after the 15th of 

March, about the investigation, about the number of firearms purchased 

by individuals. 

Q Is that from Mr. Voth? 

A No. That would have been by our Intel division in the 

headquarters. I believe Mr. Voth came in sometime in early March and 

gave a briefing, but I do not recall being at that briefing. I know 

my name appears on a list of folks, but I don't recall attending that. 

The briefing that I received is going to be somewhere around 

the -- sometime late March. During that briefing I was, you know, just 

jotting some notes. And I was concerned about the number of firearms 

that were being purchased in this investigation, and I decided that 

it was time for us to have an exit strategy and I asked for an exit 

strategy. It was a conversation that was occurring between Mark Chait, 

Bill McMahon and myself. And I asked for the exit strategy 30, 60, 

90 days, and I wanted to be able to shut this investigation down. 

Q And by shutting the investigation down, you were interested 

in cutting off the sales of weapons to the suspects, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And you were worried, is it fair to say, that these guns were 

possibly going to be getting away and getting into Mexico and showing 

up at crime scenes? 

A I was concerned not only that that would occur in Mexico, 

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but also in the United States. 

Q And at that time did you request, in addition to the exit 

strategy, did you request any specific actions on the part of the 

Phoenix folks to make sure these guns didn't get out of their control? 

A I did not specifically request that. I allowed field 

operations to run that investigation. I did not make any specific 

request. Obviously, that's a concern anytime firearms get out of our 

control. And that's a little -- the control piece to that is a 

little -- we never really had control in some cases because, you know, 

we did not provide them the weapons, they were purchasing these at gun 

stores. And that's -- I'm not sure about the verbiage. 

Q Are you talking about the verbiage of gun walking? 

A Gun walking and control; that we have control in our ability 

to be able to stop some of these individuals that were purchasing those 

weapons. 

Q What's your definition of gun walking? I know different ATF 

folks have different views. 

A I believe I probably explained it to the committee in -- 

Q In May? 

A -- in May when we did our review. Gun walking in my opinion 

is much like in the narcotics trafficking case where we provide firearms 

and somebody would leave the scene with something that we have provided 

to them, whether it's firearms or narcotics or whatever the contraband 

is. That's what I believe was firearms walking. 

Q What term do you give when ATF is conducting a surveillance 

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in, or maybe Mr. McMahon didn't think these facts are alarming? 

A You know, I can't speak to what Bill McMahon did. He may 

very well have looped Mr. Chait in on some of those items. I don't 

know. You have to ask them about that. They are certainly not going 

to feel the need to come up and brief me on all of the specific 

investigations that go on throughout the Bureau. And I trust their 

judgment to be able to make calls concerning these types of events. 

That's why they're in positions that they're in. 

Q After you asked for the exit strategy in March of 2010, what 

did you do to ensure that that was going to be implemented? 

A We have staff meetings twice a week. I would continually 

ask. If I would see Mr. McMahon I would say, hey, Bill, you know, we're 

developing the exit strategy, and he would tell me that Phoenix is 

working on it. And I would continually ask questions about how the 

case was progressing. I knew that they were also into a title 3 stage 

and that they were obtaining information from that. And I would just 

ask questions when I would see Mr. Chait or Mr. McMahon. 

Q Did you get involved with the title 3 applications at all, 

did they get sent to you? 

A No, sir. 

Q Have you since read them? 

A I have read some of them. I have not read all of them, yes. 

Q And when did you read them? 

A Probably March or April time frame, something like that, I'm 

guessing, of this year, 2011. 

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are just gathering information and intelligence from them. They don't 

even know they are giving it to you. 

Q Just basic-level street work for a special agent? 

A That's correct. 

Q A natural part of almost every investigation, I assume? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Did anyone ever tell you as a part of the briefings on Fast 

and Furious that they were not employing that basic tactic? 

A No, sir, I did not get that as part of a briefing. 

Q So did you understand in the course of 2010 that that was 

not being employed? 

A No, sir, but I was -- I knew that we had made some seizures 

of firearms that we believed to be headed south or destined for the 

border. 

I also knew that there were firearms that were being recovered 

in Mexico; did not know how those were moving. And I understood it 

to be the case that we were trying to determine how they were moving 

those firearms. Did we know, you know, we were trying to find out the 

information of when we knew about the sale, what we knew about the sale, 

and those kinds of questions. 

That's, kind of, the things that led up to the briefing I received 

in March that called for me to ask for the exit strategy. 

Q In March of 2010? 

A March of 2010, that calls for me to ask for that exit 

strategy, that I want a 30-, 60-, 90-day plan to end this investigation. 

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I also knew that I was bringing that to bear at a very difficult 

time because they had just started the Title 3 wiretaps. And I am sure 

that most people in here know the amount of manpower and significant 

pressure that brings about on an investigation, because you not only 

have many to staff the wire room and ensure you are doing proper 

minimization, but you also have to staff surveillance units on the 

ground. You continue to have to respond to FFLs if they call or if 

they are sending you 4473s. It just adds to the demands on everybody 

in that investigation to be able to move forward. 

But I also knew that we were discussing, as I answered a question 

before, that we were talking about a significant number of firearms, 

and I didn't feel comfortable with that. And I wanted us to have an 

exit strategy that allowed us to get to a point and we were going to 

wrap this investigation up, whether we were able to move up the chain 

or not. 

Q And I want to talk about the exit strategy in detail. But, 

first, in March 2010, when you called for the exit strategy, did you 

understand, did you have any understanding that ATF Phoenix Field 

Division Group VII was not employing basic investigative tactics as 

a part of this investigation, a part of Fast and Furious? 

A I don't recall having any information at that time that we 

were not looking at the major players in that investigation and maybe 

going to them and trying to flip them or otherwise utilize that 

information. 

Q If Dave Voth or ASAC Gillett or SAC Newell or Mr. McMahon, 

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Mr. Chait had ever come in and told you, you know, 6 months in to this 

investigation, 700, 800, 1,200 firearms being sold already but we have 

never talked to a suspect, would that have raised questions in your 

mind? 

A I think it just depends on the level of involvement of that 

suspect. 

If you've got straw purchasers -- and there were many in this 

investigation -- and I think these investigations or investigations 

in general, especially when they go OCDETF, they hang titles on these 

cases, and I think that sometimes it's a challenge to hang titles on 

these. But whoever hung the title on this Fast and Furious because 

of this OCDETF proposal, I believe it was originally done because the 

original group of straw purchasers were members of a car club. 

But I think, very quickly, early on, they found out that these 

guys were also buying firearms fast and furiously in that, from what 

I've learned, November-December-January timeframe. But they were 

in -- the normal trafficking group in an ATF firearms-trafficking 

investigation, you are talking about six or less, maybe seven, eight, 

or less straw purchasers involved with this group to be able to purchase 

these firearms and ultimately move them to wherever they are going. 

In this case, went from being called the Jacob Chambers case, with 

6 or 7 defendants, to rather quickly growing to 20 defendants and into 

an OCDETF proposal that ends up having a moniker hung on it like "Fast 

and Furious." And for lack of a better term, it exploded with the 

number of straw purchasers and the amount of information that our Group 

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VII and that strike force was getting. And I believe, for a bit, they 

were overwhelmed with all the information that was flowing and coming 

in, and they were trying to wrap their arms around all that information. 

And I don't think anybody envisioned the Jacob Chambers case, when 

it was initiated, I don't think they envisioned Fast and Furious and 

us sitting where we are sitting today. 

Q In March, you called for an exit strategy. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Walk me through that, will you? What specifically triggered 

your belief that the case had gone far enough and needed to start to 

wind down? 

A There had been a briefing in ATF headquarters sometime in 

early March. The director and I were unable to attend that briefing 

that was held, and I asked field ops to provide a briefing to the 

director and I, mid to late March, on what was said in the earlier 

briefing. I wanted to have a handle of what was going on. 

During that briefing, there was a slide that popped up about our 

headquarters' Intelligence Division, and it listed the straw 

purchasers, the amount of firearms that they had purchased, and, I 

believe, the value of money that would have been placed on each one 

of those firearms. And I was concerned about the top echelon of that 

chart and the number of firearms that they had purchased and the fact 

that we had not stepped to them. 

And I felt like -- I felt like, in my experience, that we should 

perfect that case and perfect it as quickly as possible. I knew that 

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A I think they intended to wall off what they could from the 

information from the wire taps. I also know that there had been 

discussions, I believe even earlier than March, with the FFLs to limit 

their inventory of these types of firearms so they could, you know, 

just tell the straw purchasers that, you know, it's going to take us, 

you know, a week or 2 to get those in. They were employing some of 

those techniques to slow down, if you will, the sale of these firearms. 

Q But Uriel Patino would still get firearms in the meantime? 

A Yes. 

Q And there wouldn't be any interdiction? 

A They did not -- they chose, at that time, based on the 

information they had, as I have spoken before, that they did not go 

to him. 

Q Yeah, but what did you think would happen at the time? You 

were worried about the number of guns. 

A Yes. 

Q You were worried about Uriel Patino, because he was on that 

chart -- 

A He was. 

Q -- showing how many guns he had purchased. And during this 

lengthy wiretap process -- 

A Yes. 

Q -- you wanted a way out. But the question is, were there 

any other operational controls put in place that gave you personal 

comfort that fewer guns -- or that ATF was going to get control of this? 

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A I did not get any specific instruction. I remember having 

conversations with -- actually, the day of that briefing when I asked 

for the strategy, I had discussions with Mark Chait and also Bill 

McMahon around that strategy and how we needed to ensure that we were 

taking steps to interdict as many firearms as possible and to move to 

close that investigation down. 

Q Uh-huh. And who did you ask for the strategy from, the exit 

strategy? 

A I think it would have been directed to Mark and Bill McMahon, 

Mark being the assistant director of field operations and Bill McMahon 

being the deputy assistant director for the west, which had 

responsibility for Phoenix. I would have asked them. 

Q And this is in March 2010. 

A Yeah, probably, the second half of the month. I don't 

remember the specific date, but the second half of the month. 

Mr. Lindsay. I want to introduce as Exhibit 3 the 

document -- this one to you. This is HOGR ATF-001178, and it is the 

Operation Fast and Furious exit strategy with cover email. 

 [Hoover Exhibit No. 3 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q Now, this cover email doesn't have you on it, but it has -- and 

it's dated May 3rd, 2010. I assume you have received this memo, and 

this is in the same timeframe of May 2010. Is that accurate? 

A Yes. It was sometime -- yeah, sometime, first of -- the 

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Q On the bottom page -- on the bottom paragraph of the first 

page of the exit strategy, not the email, it reads, "If we arrest Uriel 

Patino the firearms he has straw purchased thus far, we will only 

minimally impact the organization before Patino is replaced by another 

member of the organization." 

That would seem to read to me like they had the evidence to arrest 

Uriel Patino at that time. Is that fair? Was that your reading at 

the time? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q But what? Uriel Patino is the single largest purchaser, the 

person that you were principally concerned about -- 

A Right. 

Q -- in the March briefing. 

A Yes. 

Q They have enough evidence to arrest him. And yet this 

details a 90-day strategy until he might ever be arrested. 

A Right. 

Q And it comes 40-plus days after you made the request. 

A That's correct. 

Q So, at this point, we are looking at 130 days after your 

request and the concern about Uriel Patino, maybe they will be able 

to bring this case down -- 

A Right. I made the request in March, and the strategy was 

to end the investigation sometime in July. That's correct. 

Q It comes out in May, so the -- 

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A Right. 

Q -- end of July. 

A It would've been the very first part of May. It was May, 

June, July. That's correct. 

Q I guess I am struggling to square this a little bit -- 

A Okay. 

Q -- with your concerns -- 

A Okay. 

Q -- with the concerns about Uriel Patino, that 130 days, given 

the rate of straw purchases between November and March, that giving 

Uriel Patino another 130 days, without significant operational 

controls put in place, how that satisfied your comfort as the deputy 

director. 

A I think the issues that were raised with Patino were that 

they had -- my understanding, when I received this, was they had enough 

to make him a straw purchaser; they did not have enough to wrap him 

into this conspiracy. And that the strategy on the ground at the time 

was, Patino was providing them the link to Acosta and that they had 

information on -- it was, Acosta was throwing phones more than Patino 

was, and that they felt like they needed to have Patino to get to Acosta. 

We asked -- or, field operations was asking the Phoenix Field 

Division to do everything they could to interdict the firearms that 

were being purchased, not only by Patino but others in this 

investigation, in order to minimize the concerns that you are raising. 

But it still went to -- the 30-, 60-, 90-day strategy went to July. 

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I was hoping to end this as soon as possible. July was my absolute 

out time. We get to March, they have to advance on T-3s. They came 

back and they say, we need another 30 days of T-3s, and -- I am sorry, 

April -- May to June and then June to July, in order to be able to take 

this thing down. I asked field ops, I said, "This is it. We need to 

shut this thing down." And they were going to shut it down the end 

of July and bring this case to an end. 

Q And so, Patino was key to Acosta. 

A Patino was key to Acosta, as it was explained to me. 

Q So if you arrest Patino, bring him off the -- bring him out 

of the game, the principal straw purchaser, you might not be able to 

get Acosta? 

A Well, I think that's the choice you make. And the choice 

that the folks on the ground make between the strategy deployed by the 

strike force and the U.S. Attorney's Office was, we cannot step to 

Patino. 

Q What about arresting him and flipping him? 

A That's -- well, you can either -- you can step to him and 

do several different things. You can approach him and give him the 

opportunity to flip and work for you. You can approach him, and if 

he doesn't do that, then you can arrest him and then see if he will 

work for you. You can approach him and arrest him and then take him 

completely out of the picture. Those are the options you have at that 

time. 

Q But none of those options were employed. They let him sit. 

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They didn't touch him. They didn't talk to him. 

A That's correct. 

Q They didn't step to him. 

A That's correct. 

Q They didn't interdict his weapons -- 

A That's correct. Well -- 

Q -- in any significant number. 

A You are right; they did not step to him, period. And I think 

that was a mistake that we made. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. KIM: 

Q You mentioned that he came back to you for an extension of 

the T-3? 

A They didn't come back to me. They came back and told me that 

they were extending the Title 3s, which -- 

Q This is all contemporaneous with -- about the timeframe? 

A Yes. 

Q So you knew that they were going to go seek an extension for 

the -- 

A I fully expected an extension for the Title 3s based on 

everything I just told you about on my experience with Title 3 

investigations. 

Q Is it fair to say, then, that field ops was trying to keep 

this going a little longer, even after you had asked for the exit 

strategy? 

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A I don't know that that would be fair to say. I think what 

was occurring here was the natural progression of a Title 3 wiretap 

piece to this investigation. I don't think -- if you are asking if 

I thought that field operations was trying to push this along and not 

do what I was asking, I did not perceive that to be the case. 

Q You didn't get any pushback from -- 

A No, sir. 

Q -- field ops about the exit strategy request? 

A No, I thought that Mark Chait and I and Bill McMahon were 

on board that we needed to have an exit strategy and it needed to be -- 

Q And how common is it for you to ask for an exit strategy in 

an ATF investigation? 

A It's not common. I don't know that I have ever -- as the 

deputy director of ATF, I have never asked for an exit strategy -- 

Q Except for here. 

A -- besides this case. 

Q Besides this case. 

A Right. 

Q So this is a pretty big deal. 

A It is to me, yes. 

Q Coming from the top. 

A Yes. 

Q And did it concern you that it took about a month, over a 

month, to get from the time that you requested it to the time that one 

actually showed up on your desk? 

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A I think I have answered that. And it did concern me, but 

I also knew they had all these other things going. And the same people 

that had to write this exit strategy were the ones out working that 

wire and conducting the investigation that went along with this. 

You have to understand, you are working the wire room and their 

surveillance 24/7, you are managing that aspect of this, with 

significant numbers of people. You are also still following up on 

firearms purchases and trying to surveil those people along. You are 

also trying to develop other individuals that you might be receiving 

information on who are other straw purchasers. So it's quite an 

operation. 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q So what was your reaction when, at the end of July, the 90 

days is up, you've got the document to hold them accountable for it, 

and they say, well, it's not going to be brought down yet, the U.S. 

Attorney's Office isn't ready"? And the case wasn't brought down until 

January 2011. 

A Yes. I was -- 

Q A full 9, 10 months -- 

A Yes. 

Q -- after your request for an exit strategy. 

A Right. 

Q How did that happen? 

A I was -- well, ATF investigates cases, and we can present 

that information to the United States Attorney's Office. We do 

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not -- we may assist in drafting indictments, but that's all. Once 

it gets to that point, then it's in the control of the U.S. Attorney's 

Office for ultimately bringing that indictment to the grand jury and 

getting that rolling toward prosecution. 

Q Did you ever put any pressure on the U.S. Attorney's Office 

or Department of Justice to get this going? 

A We had conversations with -- I had field ops have 

conversations with Bill Newell to get to the U.S. Attorney's Office 

to imply the importance of this. There were -- I'm trying to 

think -- there were conversations -- we had conversations with Ed 

Siskel, I had conversations with Ed, speaking to the possible delay 

of the indictment. I do not recall that I ever called the Phoenix U.S. 

Attorney's Office directly.

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RPTS 

DCMN 

[12:05 p.m.] 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q Ed Siskel was the associate deputy attorney general handling 

ATF matters? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he take any action? 

A I don't recall right now. 

Q What did you tell him? 

A I just told him that we were hoping to have this case indicted 

much more quickly than it is being indicted. The information we were 

getting back through field ops was that it's the normal process through 

the indictment stage, and that they needed this to be able to run, or 

draft the indictments on 20 individuals, and we were obviously 

concerned about the time it was taking. 

Q Did you ask Ed Siskel to take action within the Department 

of Justice to expedite this? 

A No. 

Q Put command pressure down that chain? 

A I don't recall asking Ed specifically to do that, no. 

Q So you were -- 

A Just gave him my concerns. 

Q You were providing almost an excuse for the delay but not 

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asking for action? 

A I don't know that I was providing an excuse. I was just 

telling him -- giving him the information that I had received from the 

Phoenix field division about what was causing the delay. 

 [Hoover Exhibit No. 4 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q I want to introduce Exhibit 4, which is an email from SAC 

Newell to deputy assistant director McMahon dated April 27, 2010. You 

are not on this email, to be very clear. And I show it to you because 

it raises additional issues. And so I'll just give you a second to 

read it, but this is their correspondence relating to the execution 

of the exit strategy. You will see below on April 27th Mr. McMahon 

emails Mr. Newell, "Bill, we need to begin working on an exit strategy 

for this case. Let me know what your plans are for taking this case 

down, to include the timing." 

Now, I don't know whether there was earlier correspondence or 

earlier discussion, he's memorizing why this occurred on April 27th 

when you put the request in through field ops in March, I can't speak 

to that. But the response from SAC Newell I think is instructive. And 

he says -- there's portions redacted -- but he says in response, "I 

don't like headquarters driving our cases, but understand the 

sensitivities of this case better than anyone. We don't yet have the 

direct link to a DTO that we want, need, for our 

prosecution" -- redacted. Once we establish that link we can hold this 

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end -- within the time frame set forth in the document? 

Mr, Hoover. It was pushed along a little further than I would 

have liked because of some delays with the title 3s. I'm not sure how 

quickly. I do not have a timeline for how quickly we got the 

information at the U.S. attorney's office, but I can tell you I never 

envisioned a January indictment, I envisioned an August or September 

indictment. 

 [Hoover Exhibit No. 6 

 was marked for identification.] 

BY MR. LINDSAY: 

Q I want to introduce Exhibit 6, which is an email from William 

Newell to David Voth dated July 14, 2010. And this email -- and this 

again is responding in part to a Carlos Canino email. And Newell 

responds to Voth: Two rival DTOs went at it, Sinaloa and Juarez I 

believe. Maybe Jose Wall has more details. I told Carlos we were 

within 45 to 60 days of taking this down IF, capital I-F, the USAO, 

the U.S. attorney's office, goes with our 846, 924(c) conspiracy plan. 

Feel free to let Carlos know more details. 

This suggests that Mr. Newell at this time in mid-July when you 

thought the case should be days from coming down -- 

A Two weeks. 

Q -- is telling other people that he will come down in 2 months 

contingent upon a prosecutorial strategy that depends on a conspiracy 

for using firearms as a part of a -- in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

organization? 

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A Uh-huh. 

Q When you requested the exit strategy, was that at all what 

the exit strategy was getting out of this case contingent upon 

developing a 924(c) charge, perfecting a 924(c) charge? 

A No, sir. It was contingent upon that time limit and that 

time limit only. We had what we had at the end of that 30 60, 90 day 

plan, and that was when I wanted this investigation to be taken down. 

Q Were you ever told in July or any point leading up to July 

that the case was not being brought down potentially because they hadn't 

yet perfected a 924(c) charge? 

A No, sir. This is the first time I'm reading this. 

Q If Bill Newell or Mr. McMahon had come in and said, Well, 

but we're still working to perfect bigger and bigger charges, what would 

you have said to them at that point? 

A I would have allowed them to have a discussion with me. It's 

hard to speculate at this time based on what they would tell me, but 

I do not believe -- it would have had to have been an extraordinary 

circumstance for me to want to extend this beyond my original request 

for that 30, 60, 90 day exit strategy. 

Q In your view, is it justified to not bring down a case in 

order to build -- you know, over months and months and months -- in 

order to build bigger and bigger charges, given the public safety hazard 

we saw here? 

A I think -- again, it would have to be an extraordinary 

circumstance. I think I would have to know what they were thinking 

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conversations between ATF management and the management at the U.S. 

attorney's office to fix that. 

Q And did those kind of conversations occur in Phoenix? 

A My understanding was that Bill Newell was having constant 

communication with the hierarchy, not just Dennis Burke, but the 

hierarchy at the U.S. attorney's office. 

Q This is from Newell to you? 

A Well, it's reflected in several documents. It was I believe 

the briefing paper that Mr. Castor had me read earlier, that was in 

there. 

Q But did you make any effort to talk to the hierarchy at the 

U.S. attorney's office? 

A No. That's the responsibility of the SAC on the ground, and 

that's what field operations and the SAC on the ground does. I would 

certainly ask field operations throughout, especially after I asked 

for the exit strategy, are we in concert with the U.S. attorney's office 

and does the U.S. attorney's office know that we need to -- the strategy 

that we want to put in play is in play. 

Q Were you aware -- let me rephrase. 

When were you aware that there was a cooperating FFL in Fast and 

Furious or that there were multiple cooperating FFLs in Fast and 

Furious?

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RPTS 

DCMN 

[1:30 p.m.] 

Mr. Hoover. I really don't recall. I believe it would have 

probably been January of '09 maybe? Because the -- 

BY MR. FOSTER: 

Q January of '09? 

A No, I'm sorry. January of '10. 

Q January 2010. 

A January 2010. I'm sorry. Thank you for catching my 

mistake. 

We received a briefing on, I believe -- I believe it was Lorren 

Leadmon that provided us a briefing of seizures in Mexico. And I don't 

remember if there were two or three seizures that he described. On 

Tuesday mornings, the Intelligence Directorate will provide briefings 

to the Field Operations Directorate on significant events that take 

place, not just in ATF, but things they may uncover from open-source 

documents or from the other agencies or even off the high side, 

classified side. 

And I believe that -- I believe that that briefing is when I 

learned that part of the reason that we got into this case was that 

an FFL had provided some information to Phoenix Group VII about possible 

straw purchasers and Group VII went and looked at the 4473s. I believe 

that would have been -- 

Q So did you have an understanding then, in January of 2010, 

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101 

that there was an ongoing relationship of cooperation with not only 

that FFL but other FFLs? 

A I did not inquire as to the level of the relationship. I 

didn't ask that question. 

Q So, did you know that the FFLs were faxing, in real-time, 

4473s each time one of the suspects identified by ATF came into the 

store to buy or said they were going to be coming into the store to 

buy, that there was contemporaneous notice provided to the ATF by the 

FFL? 

A I did not until -- I believe it was after January of 2011 

that I knew that FFLs were faxing documents to ATF. And it was also 

my understanding that these were not contemporaneous, that there may 

be days between the time the FFL was faxing documents to ATF. I do 

not recall -- I don't recall anybody saying that the FFL was doing it 

all the time at the exact same time of the sale. I don't recall hearing 

that, no. 

Q What about advance notice or contemporaneous notice on the 

phone, where the FFL would -- you know, they have the list, they know 

who the ATF is investigating, and they pick up the phone and they say, 

"Hey, Uriel is in again," and ATF agents rush down there in order to 

cover it and do surveillance? 

A Oh, I knew there was some of that was taking place, but I 

don't -- I also don't recall that we provided the FFL a list of 

individuals. I don't recall -- I do not know that, if that occurred. 

I did not know that. 

834 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

112 

in training and outside of Phoenix during that time period and that, 

just prior to that time period, Mr. Gillett sought to have her get out 

of that training so that she could be there because there was going 

to be, quote, "significant investigative activity in the next few 

days"? 

A I'm not aware of that, no, sir. 

Q Just one more thing, and then I am going to turn the rest 

of the time over to Steve. 

Ray Rowley? 

A Uh-huh. 

Q It's our understanding he expressed concerns much earlier 

in the investigation, like November-December timeframe, about the 

numbers of guns and that he raised those issues, you know, from his 

position in headquarters. Something happened to -- you know, where 

there was some pushback from Newell or from folks out in Phoenix, you 

know, like, hey -- sort of along the lines of the email we looked at 

earlier, "Hey, don't run the case from headquarters." 

Are you aware of that? 

A I know there was a timeframe when Ray had some concerns about 

the investigation. I don't recall when it was. I don't recall -- 

Q What do you recall about Ray Rowley's concerns? 

A He -- I remember running into Ray in headquarters. And I'm 

trying to think what the -- I don't remember where -- I don't remember 

if we just passed each other in the hallway and we had a discussion. 

Ray and I came on the job almost at the same time together. I 

835 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

113 

have known Ray for 24 years now. And when I was the special agent in 

charge of Boston, Ray was one of my special agents in charge in Boston. 

So I have known Ray and talk to him all the time. So it would not be 

out of the norm for us to pass in the hallway and stand and have a 

conversation, not only about ATF but about his girls in softball or 

my guys in football and baseball -- my boys. 

So I don't remember exactly how the conversation came up. And 

he asked me if I was aware of the case out of Phoenix, and I said, yes, 

I had heard. And he said, you know, there is some significant movement 

of firearms in that case. And I go, I understand that. And this 

was -- and, as I recall, I think I said, well, I'm getting ready to 

have a briefing on that case, or be briefed on that case. 

And that was what I recall of Ray raising concerns about Fast and 

Furious. 

Q When people are raising concerns like Ray Rowley did and like 

a lot of other people did when they first learned about the numbers 

of guns -- 

A Uh-huh. 

Q -- is there sort of an unspoken undertone to that, that, you 

know, why aren't we doing more to stop these, or can we be doing more 

to stop the flow? 

A I think the prudent thing to do, in my opinion, is to get 

all the information about what's going on and what's taking place. 

I mean, at that time, I believe -- don't hold me to this, but I 

believe Ray was what we call our southwest border coordinator. And 

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114 

he was looking at not only Phoenix but all of our southwest border 

divisions and helping develop strategies and trying to determine if 

there were cases that crossed division boundaries and those types of 

things. And he would have had the ability to go hopefully talk to Bill 

Newell or Mark Chait -- or, Bill Newell or Bill McMahon and discuss 

those types of concerns. 

Q So, to your knowledge, nobody sort of told him, hey, you know, 

stay out of it, it's Bill Newell's case to run, anything along those 

lines, anything similar to that? 

A I have no knowledge of that. Not that I recall, no. 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q Now that you have had a chance to look at everything that's 

occurred and you are learning more, what do you make of the "not it" 

game? 

Everyone seems to say that, you know, it's not their problem, not 

their fault. The folks in Phoenix say, "Oh, no, it's the U.S. 

Attorney's Office. You got to understand -- you know, if you 

appreciated the difficulties in prosecuting these cases, you'd know." 

Other people in Phoenix say, "No, no, no. This is all 

headquarters-driven. This is all driven from the DAG's office. They 

told us to stop pursuing straw purchasers." And then we talk to people 

in headquarters, and they say, you know, like you have today, and other 

folks in headquarters that we have spoken to say, "We didn't know about 

any of this?" 

It just seems like there's no way to close the loop. You know, 

837 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

193 

Molly, would you mind writing a note and reminding me, please? 

Ms. Gaston. Of course. 

Mr. Hoover. Thank you. I'm sorry. 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q I think our hour is up, so we'll -- actually, one more 

question. Sorry. I think we're getting, hopefully, to the end of 

our -- 

A Okay. 

Q -- all our questions. 

Going back to one of the earlier exhibits, No. 4 -- 

A Okay. 

Q The top, where it says, "I don't like HQ grabbing our cases 

but understand the sensitivities of this case better than anyone." Did 

you ever have a concern at any time during this case that maybe Newell's 

folks were out doing some things that you wouldn't be comfortable with, 

especially given the 2007 issue? 

A No. I think the 2007 issue -- subsequent to that email, I 

had an opportunity to talk to Bill and Carson, and I think we came to 

a pretty clear understanding of what was expected. I did not have any 

issues after that with allowing Bill to run his field division. 

Q Phoenix is one of the more important field divisions, just 

given the firearms situation in Arizona, right? 

A As the deputy director of ATF, all 25 of the field divisions 

are important. Phoenix has a significant challenge with firearms 

going to Mexico; you are absolutely correct. 

838 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 122 

Exhibit 122 

839 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: MARK CHAIT 

Wednesday, July 20, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in 2247 Rayburn House 

Office Building, commencing at 10:00 a.m.

840 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEVE CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

HENRY J. KERNER, COUNSEL 

JUSTIN KIM, PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

CARLOS URIARTE, COUNSEL 

SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

VALERIE SHEN, MINORITY LEGAL ASSISTANT 

For SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

CHAN PARK, SENIOR COUNSEL 

JASON A. FOSTER, MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

DAN MARTINI, MINORITY LEGAL CLERK 

 

For MR. CHAIT: 

841 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

GREG SERRES, ASSOCIATE CHIEF COUNSEL, ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 

MOLLY GASTON, ATTORNEY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

842 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

26 

A Well, it's still ongoing. I don't know if I can get into -- 

Q Well, at this early stage you say there were a lot of people 

involved back in December? 

A Well, we indicted 20. 

Q You indicted 20? 

A Right. 

Q You keep saying there were a lot of people involved. Do you 

know how many people were involved? I guess my question is, it seems 

as though there were three individuals in particular who were buying 

far more firearms than anybody else? 

A Right. 

Q So even though you might say there were a lot of people 

involved, there were really three main individuals. Was there ever 

any thought of talking to those three particular individuals, Mr. 

Stewart, Mr. Patino, Mr. Moore? 

A Yeah, I mean, again, those are decisions that would have been 

made on the ground. 

Q Well, were concerns ever expressed to you at headquarters 

about the number of guns that were being bought by this firearms 

trafficking ring and sent to Mexico; did anybody ever express concerns 

to you, say, hey, Mark, we've got to shut this down, this operation 

is crazy, things are getting out of control, the numbers are climbing? 

A I don't know of an individual. I think we collectively at 

some point saw that we need to shut this down. 

Q And at what point did you collectively see that you needed 

843 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

27 

to shut it down? 

A I think we asked for the exit strategy in March. 

Q But you say there was no individual who ever approached you 

that said, hey, we need to shut this down? 

A I don't recall that individual. 

Q Did anybody ever express concerns about the strategy that 

was being used or maybe the lack of a strategy that was being used? 

Was there a strategy that was being used? 

A Well, I believe there was. I mean, using the strike force 

OCDETF concept, you know, they used certain techniques to try to bring 

together an organization because obviously they saw that this wasn't 

just individuals acting, that there was an organized effort, and I think 

it was to try to attack the entire cell to stop the activity entirely 

rather than address a few straw purchasers who could be replaced, you 

know, very quickly. 

Q So Ray Rowley never expressed any concerns to you about the 

number of guns, about the strategy here? 

A I don't remember Ray talking to me directly about -- I don't 

recall that. I mean, he may have. 

Q Did Ray -- you and Ray were buddies, he had an office in 

headquarters, you had an open door policy with him? He never expressed 

any concerns? 

A I don't remember that. 

Q Did Steve Martin ever express any concerns to you at any 

point? 

844 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

33 

being transferred? 

A I honestly don't know if there are others. I mean -- 

Q But it sounds like you're not aware of any during your time? 

A Well, we've had other cases with a lot of guns. I don't 

remember numbers per se, large numbers of guns. 

Q With these other cases were a lot of guns showing up in Mexico 

during these cases? 

A I don't recall the specifics of cases just in general. 

Q So you mentioned that you had asked for the exit strategy 

around March of 2010 after this meeting; is that right? 

A It was in the close proximity of the meeting. I don't know 

the exact date of the meeting. 

Q I'll make it easy. The meeting was March 5th, 2010. I'll 

make it easy on you and pass out the exit strategy memo so we can all 

take a look at that. 

845 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

34 

 [Chait Exhibit No. 2 

 was marked for identification.] 

Q This is your copy. The date it was sent to you is Monday, 

May 3rd, 2010. I'm going to ask you a question really quickly about 

this. I'm having a little trouble understanding something. I'm going 

to pass out one more exhibit. 

 [Chait Exhibit No. 3 

 was marked for identification.] 

Q This is an email from much later on. I don't believe you're 

on the email. It says exit strategy was from May 3, 2010, it eventually 

made its way up to you after it looks like at least a week or so, it 

finally made it up to your desk. So I'm going to turn your attention 

to the second page of the exit strategy towards the bottom, the last 

paragraph, we acknowledge that redaction is not the actual goal itself 

but an end to a means in that Uriel Patino and other straw purchasers -- 

Mr. Serres. Hold on a second, Carlton. He's on the wrong page. 

Mr. Chait. Thank you. 

BY MR. DAVIS: 

Q The last paragraph there, Uriel Patino and other straw 

purchasers are the lowest rung on the proverbial criminal firearms 

trafficking organizational ladder. If we arrest Patino for the 

firearms he has straw purchased thus far, we will only minimally impact 

the organization before Patino is replaced by another member of the 

organization. 

So let's contrast that with the other document I gave you right 

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35 

there in the middle, the email from Mark [Sonnendecker], Patino is a 

primary target in a large scale trafficking investigation here in 

Phoenix Group VII. This email was from July 28, 2010. 

So I'm having a hard time understanding whether Patino was the 

lowest rung on the proverbial organizational ladder or whether he was 

a primary target. Do you have any idea which was the case? 

A Well, obviously, you know, people write documents. I'm not 

sure what Mark [Sonnendecker]'s role is, but I think he was -- 

Q An advisory group setting? 

A I think he was an important suspect in this investigation, 

there's no doubt. 

Q No doubt, okay. But he was so important that he was the 

lowest rung on the proverbial criminal firearms trafficking 

organizational ladder. So it seems to me that if he was an important 

suspect, then that would certainly not mesh up with the exit strategy 

memo. Am I reading it incorrectly? 

A You know -- no, you're reading it correctly. I don't know 

necessarily who wrote this document. 

Q Who would have written the exit strategy memo? 

A I'm assuming it came from minimally the field division, but 

probably the supervisor, and he may have had an agent work on it 

collectively. I don't know. I've heard there were several versions 

of this. I don't actually know who wrote the final final on this one. 

Q So let me put things in context. So the exit strategy memo, 

May 3rd, 2010, it makes its way to your desk, and so far as I know this 

847 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

36 

is the only exit strategy memo. That's what we've been given and what 

we've asked for. So May 3rd, 2010. I could show you emails, if you 

want, where you express concern later on that the operation is not being 

shut down from July, from October. The operation finally was shut 

down, it's our understanding, in January of the following year, so 8 

months after the exit strategy was drafted. 

So I understand your point of view, you want this thing indicted 

and people taken off the street, but when this makes its way to your 

desk, the exit strategy, what do you do with it? What did you do with 

it? What was the role of the exit strategy if things weren't taken 

down for another 8 months? 

A Well, the role -- the use of the strategy was to make 

everybody aware that it's time to start focusing on closure. I'm not 

sure if I would have forwarded this on. I mean, I do send a lot of 

things to Mr. Hoover, as he's my boss. I don't remember if I did do 

that or not. The way we operate, you know, in field operations, my 

deputy assistant director is responsible for in this case that field 

division. I believe there were -- obviously there were some delays 

for different reasons, and I think what I've heard the delays are -- do 

you want me to answer that? 

Q Go for it. 

A Some of the issues around the Title IIIs and then preparing 

the indictment. 

Q Let me ask real quickly about the Title IIIs. So what is 

the process for getting the Title III approved? How does that work? 

848 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

37 

A The field works with the assistant U.S. attorney to prepare 

an affidavit for a Title III. It goes through -- I think it was dual 

tracked, and I think the process may have changed recently. We 

actually send one version through our house. We have an attorney that 

reviews it, a DAD. At the same time I believe -- 

Q Who is the DAD that reviewed that? 

A Well, DAD in this case of the West, Bill McMahon. 

Q He told us he had never seen the application, he never read 

a wiretap application, never even read a memo for authorization of the 

application. You're saying it's his job to review it? 

A I don't know at what point the process changed. I believe 

that in most cases the DADs do get them. So at the same time there's 

a track from the U.S. Attorney's Office, and I'm probably not a hundred 

percent. I believe they do go through -- at some point they go to OEO, 

Office of Enforcement Operations, at the Department, and I think 

there's some consultation with the Criminal Division. 

Q So in the ATF world, you're out of the loop, it's taken care 

of below you, generally Mr. McMahon would have taken care of it? 

A Sure. I mean -- yes. 

Q Okay. Did you ever see the Title III applications? 

A Since after the fact. I've looked at them in reviewing 

documents for, really to prepare myself for two things. One, a way 

forward for my organization, and so that I have a better understanding 

of the case. I did review them fairly recently. 

Q How successful was the wiretap in this case, or the wiretaps 

849 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

38 

in this case in terms of the information gleaned from the wiretaps? 

Were they as helpful as ATF had anticipated back in March when they 

went up? 

A I think that's, you know, maybe an individual decision. I 

think they were helpful to an extent. You know, obviously the fact 

that they had to go up many times, you had individuals that were changing 

phones quite a bit. That makes it cumbersome. But I would say it was 

helpful in the investigation. 

Q Okay. So if I give you a hypothetical and said when the 

wiretap -- when a wiretap went up there were, for example, 21 straw 

purchasers identified in this organization, and then after 3 months 

there were an additional four straw purchasers identified in the 

organization. To me it seems like that's not a very good use of time 

and energy. 

A Although -- we're still in an open investigation and I am 

still hopeful that there's more to follow. I think there is. 

Q The wiretaps are no longer up; is that right? 

A No, no, they're no longer up. I'm just saying more to follow 

in the investigation. There may be more subjects indicted and what 

have you. I think it's an individual's preference whether they feel 

it was worthwhile. 

Mr. Foster. Could you tell me -- just one second. Could you tell 

me more specifically if you recall when you read the Title III 

affidavit? 

Mr. Chait. When did this all begin? 

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62 

know if he mentioned to me, I mentioned to him, but I think we were 

both thinking the same thing. 

Q And then why -- why were you discussing an exit strategy at 

this point? You didn't recall any specific concerns being expressed 

to you, but why an exit strategy? Why the need to get out of this case? 

A Well, I think it seemed to us that collectively there were 

a lot of guns in the case and we -- they tried using a Title III for 

a period of time, and I think had some successes, but had some obstacles; 

and it just seemed like it was time to, you know, to get it wrapped 

up. So the exit strategy would allow them a little time to get things 

in order to close the case. 

Q And this is in March that you wanted the exit strategy? 

A That's right. 

Q And you received a copy of the exit strategy -- we looked 

at the email previously -- in -- May 3, 2010; is that right? 

A That is when I received it, yes. 

Q Was that the first time that you received a copy of the exit 

strategy, to your recollection? 

A I believe so, yes. 

Q So there was a significant time lag between your request as 

assistant director and your receipt of the exit strategy? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you receive any explanation for that timeline? 

A I really don't recall if there was. 

Q Did it concern you that -- that a request like that had taken 

851 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

63 

over, well over a month to provide to you and the deputy director? 

A I really don't remember at the time. I mean obviously, you 

know, we would have liked to have it sooner. 

Q When you received the exit strategy did you review it? 

A I did. 

Q What was your reaction at the time? 

A I think my reaction was we have got a game plan in place, 

and it was a little fluid the way I saw it. And on the long side, we 

would be 90 days out with the possibility of getting it closed up prior 

to. 

Q So in March you requested the exit strategy, and in May they 

provided it to you. But you still wanted potentially to close down 

the case until August of 2010. Did that seem to you, given the concerns 

that you had expressed about the number of firearms in this case, a 

reasonable time frame; is that consistent with what you had expected 

or were thinking about when you had first asked for an exit strategy? 

A We -- yeah, we were looking for a tiered -- a way to get them 

out, but allowing them to prepare for the prosecution and what have 

you. You know, there's a lot of things that we know now, that I know 

now, that I didn't know then. And it's difficult to go back and say 

should we have done something different, without knowing what I know 

today. 

Q Did you send any questions back or have any follow-up on this, 

on this exit strategy? 

A I don't believe I -- I don't remember that I did. My normal 

852 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

64 

course of operations would be for the DAD to really handle a lot of 

these things because, you know, this is -- obviously, it's an important 

case and it is one field division; we have 25 of them. So I would get 

a lot of different briefing papers and what have you, and some of these 

things are for my information. This is something we asked for, but 

it would be up to the DAD to work the SAC to carry the rest of this 

out. 

Q Right. In normal circumstances. But here, your boss, the 

deputy director, had also requested this document, so that might 

warrant or create an expectation for your additional engagement? 

A Right. 

Q And were you engaged in the close-out of Operation Fast and 

Furious in monitoring the performance of the exit strategy between when 

you received the document and the closure of the case in January 

of 2011? 

A I think I would say this. We -- I was monitoring it as far 

as timeliness. As far as the specifics, I would leave that for my 

deputy and really the command on the ground to carry it out. And I 

think there are probably some emails and things of me asking why we -- as 

far as closure, because I was under the impression we would be able 

to get this thing closed, I was hoping, in the July time frame, end 

of July, possibly August was my impression at the time. 

Q And did you have discussions with Deputy Director Hoover 

about -- about that timeline about the exit strategy? 

A I believe -- I believe I did. 

853 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

71 

come a time when you have to consider taking certain actions which 

may -- may spoil the opportunity to work in an organization or 

something. So safety should be one of the most important things, 

absolutely. 

Q Did you trust in SAC Newell and the Phoenix field division, 

ASAC Julad, ASAC Needles, group supervisor Voth, the case agent, to 

be taking public safety into account throughout this case? 

A Sure. I mean, you know, I have to trust the people that work 

for me. And I have learned a lot now, and there's some policy and 

procedure changes that I am making; but certainly, you know, you trust 

your people. 

Q Did you ever get down into the weeds of the tactics that they 

were employing in Operation Fast and Furious? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Is that your role as the assistant director for field 

operations? 

A I don't believe so. You know, we -- at any given time we 

have about 40-plus-thousand open investigations across field 

operations, and I certainly don't have the ability to know enough about 

every one of those cases. I have to rely on my people. I rely on the 

deputy assistant director, I rely on the SACs, I rely on ASACs, I rely 

on group supervisors, and I rely on AUSAs to work with us closely. And 

I don't get in the weeds. I really, I have too many other things going. 

I just, I don't feel that is my role as the assistant director. 

Q And did Mr. Hoover or Mr. Melson ever ask you about what was 

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76 

shut down, then so be it." 

So this indicates that Mr. Newell is waiting or trying to 

develop -- the case strategy on the ground in Phoenix is to develop 

a direct link to a DTO in order to get a prosecution. From your 

understanding of the case in March, April, May of 2010, was that link 

necessary for a prosecution? 

A I don't believe so, no. 

Q And you said earlier that the principal impediment to 

prosecution to taking down -- to taking down the case, was the lack 

of sufficient evidence for prosecution? 

A I would be concerned about evidence. I am less concerned 

about how far an investigation can go. When it is time to take a case 

down, it is time to take a case down. 

Q So this is where I am going. There is a huge disconnect here. 

You and Mr. Hoover are asking to bring this case down. Mr. Hoover's 

language - and he is friendly with Bill Newell -- this is very direct. 

A Yeah. 

Q Excuse me. Mr. McMahon's language to Mr. Newell is you 

know, get us the exit strategy. 

A Yeah uh-huh. 

Q You're saying your understanding of the case's status at that 

time was that the exit strategy hinged on sufficient evidence for 

straw-purchasing prosecutions or dealing without a license 

prosecutions or the other charges typically brought against straw 

purchasing efforts. 

855 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

77 

Mr. Newell, the SAC in Phoenix, is saying he is waiting for 

something else. He is waiting to find an evidentiary link to a DTO. 

Is that, is that -- is that strategy, that case strategy, that 

prosecutorial strategy that is indicated here in this email, was that 

your understanding of what was necessary to bring the case down? 

A I would say no. At the time -- at the time, we felt it was 

time to bring it down, regardless. I mean, there is a point -- we 

reached the point. That is why we asked for the strategy. To continue 

it for this purpose I think is outside the scope of what we were 

thinking. 

Q Did Mr. McMahon ever bring this email to your attention or 

tell you, hey, in fact Bill Newell is trying to connect everything to 

a DTO, so this is just going to drag a little bit longer while we do 

that? 

A I don't recall that ever happening. I think there was enough 

conversations from me to Mr. McMahon about getting the case closed, 

that it was pretty clear of what needed to occur. 

Q And would you and Mr. Hoover said, get the case closed, it 

wasn't contingent upon developing links to DTOs; it was contingent upon 

sufficient evidence to prosecute under the straw-purchasing laws and 

under the firearms licensing laws such that they are; is that right? 

A It was clear it was time to close the case. Whatever law, 

whatever charges they could make at the time -- because I know was other 

conspiracy and what have you, but bottom line is I was not looking for 

moving it further. It was time to exit. 

856 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

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briefed on this case weekly at the OSII meetings; you are aware of all 

of the seizures in Mexico where the guns have been recovered, the Naco 

seizure in November, the Mexicali seizure in December, the El Paso 

seizure in January, the Tohona O'odham Nation seizure in February, and 

it just keeps ticking and adding up, suspects that have been apprehended 

as transporters who have said the guns were going to the Sinaloa cartel. 

I know you sat through the March 5 presentation where it was very clear 

that guns were going straight to the Sinaloa cartel. 

So why didn't you suggest investigative tactics at that point? 

I understand that, you know, you trust the folks in the field, but I 

mean, there are just a lot of guns. 

A Well, most of the briefings from OSII are mostly just the 

recoveries. It is not giving us the investigative side. 

Q But did you ever check to see what the investigative side 

was? 

A Sure. 

Q I mean you have admitted that there was a massive number of 

guns here. Did you ever call Bill Newell and say what are the 

techniques that you are using? Are we doing any knock and talks? Are 

we doing any aerial surveillance? Are we doing any trackers? 

A I don't believe I did. I think probably the first briefing 

we had around the -- what was somewhat happening was with Dave Voth. 

Most of these things never rose to my level. It is easy to see now 

things very differently, but at that time what we were seeing wasn't 

exactly the same thing as what we see now. We see a very different 

857 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

139 

perspective today. 

Q Right. But you knew in January that there were 685 guns. 

You knew in March that there were almost 1,100 guns. You knew that 

the guns were going to Mexico. Everybody knew the guns were going to 

Mexico. What, if any, operational safeguards were in place to ensure 

that the guns weren't going across the border, to ensure that they 

weren't going to be recovered at crime scenes? You are the Assistant 

Director for Field Operations over the entire country, the biggest case 

that you have going on. What operational safeguards were in place to 

make sure the guns weren't flowing south? Did you ever -- 

A I don't think it was the biggest case we had going on at the 

time. 

Q Did you ever ask for any operational safeguards? 

A I don't remember if I did or not, but I guess the thing was 

that the fact we had an OCDETF-led investigation, and you know, we have 

a AUSA heavily involved in the daily activities of the investigation. 

I think they did not have lawful authority to arrest or seize under 

the things we talked about earlier. Could other things have been done? 

You know, looking back on it, probably so. 

Q I am going to introduce two real quickly back to back. Here 

is one and then here is eleven. 

 [Chait Exhibit Nos. 10 and 11 

 were marked for identification.] 

Q We have here two emails from you. The one on July 10, top 

of the page where we take down the Fast and Furious case during this 

858 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

143 

know -- unfortunately, I don't get into the weeds in a lot of 

investigations. 

Q So you wanted the operation shut down, you know, much earlier 

than it did. Did you want to get these folks off the street because 

they were dangerous? Is that what you were hoping, to get them behind 

bars? 

A I wanted to stop the activity. 

Q Stop the activity? 

A Once -- you know, sometimes there is a point where it is just 

time. 

Q Where are the defendants now that are indicted? Are they 

in jail, do you know? 

A I am not sure where they are now. 

Q Would it surprise you if 19 out of the 20 were living at the 

same address that they were before the indictments came around? 

A It wouldn't surprise me. 

Q Wouldn't surprise you. Okay. Just one other quick area of 

inquiry here. 

A But if I could just and I know you guys are aware of it to 

some extent. I mean, the case is still going on, and there is a hope 

to bring some other defendants to bear. So I mean -- 

Q I understand that. 

A All right. 

Q I am still waiting but I understand that, yes. 

A I can't speak to that part. 

859 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 123 

Exhibit 123 

860 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002416

861 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002417

862 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 124 

Exhibit 124 

863 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
864 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
865 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
866 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
867 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
868 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
869 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
870 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
871 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
872 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
873 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
874 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
875 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
876 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
877 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
878 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
879 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
880 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 125 

Exhibit 125 

881 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
882 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
883 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 126 

Exhibit 126 

884 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001178

885 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001179

886 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001180

887 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001181

888 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 127 

Exhibit 127 

889 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR ATF - 002588

890 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 128 

Exhibit 128 

891 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002407

892 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002408

893 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 129 

Exhibit 129 

894 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

ATF Agent ATF Agent ATF Agent

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agent ATF Agent

ATF Agent Cooperating FFL

895 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

896 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agen

t

ATF Agent

Cooperating FFL

ATF Agen

t

897 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agent ATF Agent

ATF Agent

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agent ATF Agent

ATF Agent

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

898 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agent ATF Agent ATF Agent Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL ATF Agent ATF Agent

ATF Agent

Cooperating FFL

899 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

900 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

 Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

901 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 130 

Exhibit 130 

902 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
903 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
904 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
905 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 131 

Exhibit 131 

906 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002568

907 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 132 

Exhibit 132 

908 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002565

909 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 133 

Exhibit 133 

910 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002575

911 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002576

912 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002577

913 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002578

914 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002579

915 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 134 

Exhibit 134 

916 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF 005007

RC-2

917 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 135 

Exhibit 135 

918 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
919 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
920 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
921 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
922 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
923 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
924 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 136 

Exhibit 136 

925 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001417

926 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 137 

Exhibit 137 

927 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002162

928 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002163

929 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 138 

Exhibit 138 

930 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100000978 Entered Date: June 16, 2010

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

Phone: Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: JAIME AVILA JR

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85035

DOB: Race: HISPAN

IC

Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/15/2010

ID 1: AZ DRIVER'S LICENSE #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 1

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

BARRETT FIREARMS MFG CO 82 50 BMG 14753 RIFLE

Suspect Gun: S20100000978

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

931 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 139 

Exhibit 139 

932 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

933 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

Cooperating FFL

934 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 140 

Exhibit 140 

935 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: WILLIAM NEWELL 

Wednesday, June 8, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2157 Lounge, 

Rayburn House Office Building, commencing at 10:07 a.m.

936 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEVE CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

HENRY J. KERNER, COUNSEL 

SUSANNE SACHMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

DONALD K. SHERMAN, MINORITY COUNSEL 

SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

CARLTON DAVIS, OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN ISSA 

MOLLY GASTON, ATTORNEY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

JASON FOSTER, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY 

BRIAN DOWNEY, INVESTIGATOR, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY 

ROB DONOVAN, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

937 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

For MR. NEWELL: 

GREG SERRES, ESQ. 

Associate Chief Counsel, 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

 

938 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

9 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q Okay. Mr. Newell, can you tell us how long you have been 

with ATF? 

A Since September of 1989. So approximately 23 years, I 

guess. 

Q Were you in law enforcement prior to that? 

A Two years with INS, which is now ICE. 

Q So how many years of law enforcement experience total? 

A Oh, probably about close to probably 24 years. 

Q And you were the Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix field 

office from when to when? 

A From June of 2006 until May of 2011. 

Q And currently what is your position? 

A I'm on detail to Washington at the Bureau headquarters. 

Q The decision to not focus merely on the prosecution on straw 

buyers as we understand it was rolled out some time during 2009. Is 

that your understanding? 

A Yes. Which -- there were several -- 

Q We understand the Department had an initiative at the Justice 

Department level -- 

A Right. 

Q -- communicated down through ATF to begin thinking about ways 

of going after firearms trafficking problems. 

A There was a strategy, the strategy to combat Southwest border 

crime from the Department that was late 2009 and then I think early 

939 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

10 

2010 officially in a memo. 

Q And could you tell us about how that was rolled out and some 

of the reasons for it? 

A As I recall and I want to say I think it was October or 

November -- it was October of 2009, I received an e-mail from our 

Southwest border coordinator which had a draft document related to the 

Department's strategy to combat Southwest border crime, the major 

crimes occurring along the Southwest border; and it was a departmental 

kind of focused strategy, if you will, on the different, you know, 

issues -- narcotics trafficking, bulk cash, human trafficking -- and 

firearms trafficking was one of those as well. 

Q Is Arizona one of those States that has a particular strong 

firearms trafficking problem? 

A Arizona is considered by -- well, by ATF and other agencies 

as kind of the eye of the hurricane, if you will, on the Southwest border 

because of the amount of drugs and humans and other related border 

crimes that occur along the Southwest border. Arizona is high in those 

numbers, yes. 

Q So the ATF Phoenix field division office was a key player 

in this? 

A Yes. All the Southwest border divisions were. All 

national divisions, really. 

Q Was that Ray Rowley that communicated that to you? 

A As I remember, I think it was Ray Rowley was the Southwest 

border coordinator at that time, yes. 

940 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

11 

Q What other folks in ATF management were directing this 

initiative, from your perspective? 

A Well, I know from my supervisor, Bill McMahon, we had several 

meetings with the SACs, Southwest border SACs, and he is over the 

western division, the western SACs. We discussed that strategy. And 

I know that we had conference calls on the strategy. 

Q What was the plan to push that strategy out into the field? 

A In what sense? In what form? 

Q The Department-level strategy was communicated to you and 

you had to implement it. 

A Right. 

Q And was there any guidance as to specifically how down at 

the agent level? 

A It was -- we received instruction, but we wanted to focus 

on firearms trafficking networks, organizations as per the strategy 

that the Department had pushed out, yes. 

Q And was there a goal to not merely focus on straw buyers? 

A The goal was to go after the infrastructure, the 

organizations themselves; and straw buyers are considered the low rung 

and one part of a larger organization, yes. 

Q Was there ever a decision made to allow straw purchasers to 

acquire firearms to watch where they would go? 

A What do you mean by "allow"? There is a legal -- there is 

legality involved. I mean, someone goes in and buys a gun and if it 

is a straw purchase, we have to approve it as a straw purchase. 

941 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

36 

to do with those 20 AK-47s? Is that a fair question? 

A It depends. Yeah, I guess it would be, but it depends on 

the circumstances. It is not unusual for people in places like Arizona 

and Texas and those places to go in and buy multiple firearms, multiple 

handguns, multiple long guns. It is not unusual, and it is not illegal 

in many instances. And so we have to put the evidence together to prove 

that, in fact, that transaction is illegal by many different ways. And 

that's what we struggle with to do all the time on these cases, because 

we have to look at each individual transaction and try to put those 

pieces of the puzzle together and try to determine how does this fit 

into that puzzle. 

Q Going back to my hypothetical, you're at the FFL, your badge 

is displayed, and the buyer looks over to you, acknowledges that you're 

with the ATF, and initiates conversation with you and says, do you have 

any questions? What other types of questions would you ask that 

potential buyer who initiated the conversation with you and wants to 

be completely open and honest with you? 

A Again, that is a scenario that has never happened to me in 

20-plus years of law enforcement. I don't think it has ever happened 

to anybody in ATF in my career. So it is a scenario that is almost 

in the realm of fantasy. 

But I would guess I would ask, how come you like AK-47s so much? 

You seem to like AK-47s. You must have a niche for AK-47s. Because, 

again, it is legal, as far as based on the scenario. 

Q In your experience in the Phoenix field office, do buyers 

942 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

37 

frequently come in and buy 20 AK-47s at a time? Is that a common 

occurrence? Does that raise any suspicions? 

A It is not a common occurrence. It is not common. And that 

is why a case like this was -- 

Q Like, if one of your case agents bumped into you at the water 

cooler and said, I just found out -- some FFL called me and said they 

had a person buy 20 AK-47s. Would that be the type of information that 

you would want your agents to follow up on? 

A Yes. Yeah, absolutely. 

Q And get the 4473s? 

A Sure. 

Q And talk to the FFL and find out if that suspicious -- 

A And put that purchase -- look at that purchase before you 

go approach someone. Again, when you're conducting an investigation 

like this, apart from -- just in general, a firearms-trafficking 

investigation -- and I did it many, many years on the southwest border 

in south Texas and south Florida and other places in the country -- you 

don't want to show your hand. I mean, if you suspect something is 

occurring, but you're well short of probable cause to be able to prove 

something beyond a reasonable doubt, especially in a jury in a place 

like Arizona, a State that has a lot of guns, and that is okay, you 

want to be able to say, okay, this purchase just occurred, okay? Let's 

find out if there are any other purchases that this gentleman made. 

943 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

43 

individual to -- 

Q Is there a volume of weapons in a particular transaction that 

would automatically ramp it up from reasonable suspicion to probable 

cause, or from something short of reasonable suspicion to reasonable 

suspicion? Is there any amount of weapons that would trigger that? 

A No, not -- 

Q No? 

A I mean, no, not in my experience. 

Q Okay. So a professionally dressed person comes into an FFL, 

says to the FFL, "I would like to buy 5,000 -- 

A Well -- 

Q -- AK-47s, and here is a wad of cash" -- 

A You're giving me a scenario -- 

Q Okay. 

A -- just like the scenarios you gave before -- 

Q Okay. 

A -- that have never occurred to me. 

Q Okay. But you would agree, there is a -- 

A Well, sure. 

Q Is 500 enough? 

A There is no set number. I mean, it depends on when you have 

enough evidence -- 

Q Okay. 

A -- supported by rock-solid documentation and evidence, in 

conjunction with the U.S. Attorney's Office, to be able to say -- 

944 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

44 

Q No, you're getting into prosecutions, arrest, and all that 

stuff. I'm getting into -- 

Ms. Grooms. Could we perhaps not interrupt the witness while 

he's answering a question? Because I would actually like to hear the 

answer to the questions. 

Mr. Newell. My issue is -- again, this goes back to the issue 

of, firearms, in and of themselves, are not contraband. You know, 

someone can have 100 AK-47s in their car, driving around on a Sunday 

afternoon in Phoenix, and get stopped by the police for speeding, you 

know, and there could be nothing wrong with that, absolutely nothing 

wrong with that. 

Now, if that was 100 kilos of cocaine, that would be a totally 

different story. But firearms, in and of themselves, are not 

contraband. So it's a legal commodity until it's taken from legal 

commerce to illegal commerce, or unless it's been modified in some way, 

you know, serial-number obliteration or whatever. 

So I can't give you a set number because it's really a set of facts 

supported by evidence, probable cause, to say that that person is, in 

fact, violating the law. And when we get to that point and we believe 

we have enough to effect an arrest, then we'll get with the U.S. 

Attorney's Office and get in a complaint or get an indictment. 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q My time is just about up, so I'll just ask one more question. 

Could you give us examples of what would be facts that count as 

reasonable suspicion to effect a traffic stop? 

945 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

45 

A Well, sure. If we have evidence that the form -- that the 

individual actually falsified the form in some way as to a false address 

or a false, you know -- the identification was false. 

If we thought that the person was in some way prohibited, you know, 

a convicted felon, illegal alien, had lied on the form for that. 

Or maybe that the person that was receiving the firearms was, in 

fact, prohibited; you know, the person went in, straw-purchased the 

firearms for his brother, who is a convicted felon, let's say, in this 

scenario, and we knew that to be the case, then, yes, we would do that. 

But that's because we had evidence to be able to support that. 

Q So is it fair to say that you need evidence that is external 

to what you're watching -- what one of your agents is watching? 

A Well, supporting, yeah, evidence that supports the charge 

that, in fact, that activity is, in fact, illegal, supported by probable 

cause. 

Q So it's very difficult or unusual for an agent to conduct 

surveillance and effectuate traffic stops based on observing what -- 

A Well, absent any other information, sure. I mean, because, 

again, firearms, in and of themselves, are not contraband. I mean, 

I think that's difficult for some people to understand. And it's just 

that, it goes to the whole thing about the statute of -- the firearms 

trafficking statute, the lack thereof, of being able to say, hey, we 

have a statute that, looking at this pattern of activity, we can say, 

"This, by statute, is illegal," instead of looking at each individual 

transaction and trying to piece all that together, which is what we 

946 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

57 

Q Well, I think -- and you can correct me if I'm wrong -- but 

I think that you're aware that at some point during the course of 

Operation Fast and Furious line agents made complaints about the 

tactical decisions made at the agent level to cease surveillance? 

A I became aware of that probably in February maybe of this 

year when the allegations were first made. 

Q So prior to February 2011 you were unaware of complaints from 

line agents in the Phoenix field division Group VII regarding 

surveillance tactics being employed on the ground? 

A To the best of my recollection, I don't remember anytime ever 

being advised that there was some discourse amongst the agents. I 

became aware of that when some of the documents were released that I 

saw. And I want to say it was probably February, early February, 

something like that, of this year. 

Mr. Foster. I'm sorry, would you repeat that? 

Mr. Newell. About what? 

Mr. Foster. The last thing you just said. 

Mr. Newell. To the best of my recollection, the first time I 

became aware that agents were being -- disagreed with the surveillance 

tactics was I believe the beginning of this year when the documents 

that I saw were released. 

Mr. Foster. Okay. Disagreed with an agent? 

Mr. Newell. Disagreed, yes. 

Mr. Foster. That's the first time you heard that they disagreed? 

Mr. Newell. The first time I disagreed with the surveillance 

947 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

66 

A Not me, but that was the FFL, right. 

Q So -- 

A Well, not me personally. 

Q Right. 

A Not me personally, right. 

Q But that the FFLs would slow down on future purchases? 

A Right. 

Q Presumably at the direction of ATF agents? 

A Yes. 

Q What was the basis for that decision? 

A Well, it was based on the fact that this was still early on 

in the investigation. And we were doing everything we could because 

we saw that there was a lot of purchases going on and we still didn't 

have enough evidence to stop this legally, we felt, in conjunction with, 

as we read in the briefing paper earlier with the Attorney General's 

Office, we had minimal evidence at that point. Now, this is December 

17th. The briefing paper from earlier is January 8th, so we're talking 

3 weeks later. And at that point we, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Attorney's Office we still felt we had minimal evidence. So that's 

just a step that was taken to try to develop more information on these 

individuals. 

Q I want to go into your collaboration, I understand that's 

my word, not yours, with the United States Attorney's Office for Arizona 

related to your investigations. Can you explain I guess what their 

basis was for, what their basis was for this strategy of working with 

948 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

88 

preventing those people from transferring the firearms to other people, 

as you strongly suspect, according to these talking points, that they 

are doing, right? 

A Those are tactical decisions that are made on the street, 

yes. You're right, yes. 

Q So you don't need probable cause to do those kind of things, 

there are ways you can interdict weapons, you can get the weapons out 

of the possession of the people who are about to transfer them to the 

traffickers? 

A You need -- 

Q Short of probable cause? 

A You need clear and convincing evidence if you're going to 

interdict and seize firearms that that firearm is going to be used in 

some illegal act. You have to have clear and convincing evidence 

supported by a series of facts to be able to go in and interdict those 

firearms. 

Q You said several times early in the interview you suggested 

that probable cause was necessary in order to, for example, work with 

the local police department to do a traffic stop. 

A I don't remember. If I said that, okay. 

Q That's not accurate, though, is it? 

A No. I mean you don't need probable cause, here's the thing. 

You need it -- to seek an indictment or a prosecution, you need to have 

probable cause that some illegal act has occurred. 

Q Right, I'm asking you about steps short of indictment and 

949 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

92 

to identify the whole network, knowing that if we took off a group of 

straw purchasers this, as is the case in hundreds of firearms 

trafficking investigations, some that I personally worked as a case 

agent, you take off the low level straw purchaser, all you're doing 

is one of -- you're doing one of two things, one of several things. 

You're alerting the actual string puller that you're on to them, one, 

and, two, all they are going to do is go out and get more straw 

purchasers. 

Our goal in this case is to go after the decision maker, the person 

at the head of the organization, knowing that if we remove that person, 

in the sense of prosecute that person, successfully, hopefully, that 

we would have much more impact than just going after the low-level straw 

purchaser. 

Q Right, and in order to achieve that goal, if in order to not 

tip them, if agents wanted to be more aggressive about attempting to 

interdict and discourage the trafficking that was going on -- excuse 

me -- the straw purchasing that was going on right in front of them 

that that would have been not consistent with the goal of the strategy 

as outlined in this paper, right? 

A The goal of the investigation, as I said before, is using 

the straw purchasers, identifying the straw purchasers, to get, using 

information we gleaned from them in a sense of where they're going, 

where they're dropping the guns off, to identify the middlemen, to 

identify the decision makers and seize assets when appropriate, and 

we have the ability to do that, identify bank accounts, identify 

950 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

93 

transporters, identify anything so that when we make the arrests, do 

the takedown, that we take down the whole organization. 

Q In the beginning of the interview, you also talked with Steve 

about a recovery of 40 guns in Naco? 

A I believe, I don't have that information. I believe it was 

40 guns in Naco. 

Q And I believe you said something to the effect of that they 

were, that this was the first sign that there might be a big case, that 

you were on to a big case? 

A It was one of those times that, yes, we had a case that was, 

that was coming together, we had more than just a couple of straw 

purchasers. We had a bigger group. 

Q So, in other words, the guns that were recovered, among the 

40 guns recovered in Naco, Mexico, there were guns that had been 

purchased by whom? 

A Some of the individuals that we had identified at that point 

in the investigation. I'm not exactly sure who it was but some of the 

individuals that we identified -- 

Q Right. I think you colloquially called them your 

purchasers, something to that effect, that they had been bought by our 

purchasers? 

A Well, the purchasers had been identified in the case at that 

point, some of them, I'm not sure all of them. 

Q So what do you mean by "our purchasers?" 

A I mean our purchasers in the sense of that investigation, 

951 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

103 

Q Did that occur a lot? 

A No. 

Q No. Are you aware of more than one incidence? 

A I'm aware of more than one instance, yes. 

Q But to your knowledge, in each instance there was a -- there 

was a control on the delivery such that there were authorities on the 

other side of the border that then were responsible? 

A Of the ones I'm aware of, yes. 

Q And the guns were actually interdicted or seized after -- at 

the end of the operation of operations? 

A Again, we are not talking about Fast and Furious. 

Q I understand. 

A We are talking about other investigations. And generally 

what would happen in a situation like that is the expectation is that 

if it all goes as planned, you being U.S. law enforcement in conjunction 

with your other law enforcement partners, would take it to the border 

and then the Mexican counterparts working in concert, not as the lead, 

but in conjunction with the U.S. law enforcement, take it from there 

and then take it to wherever the guns would go. 

Q But my question was, I believe, was are you aware of that 

occurring in multiple other cases and that in each case, that that was 

successful, that the handoff to the authorities on the other side was 

successful and the guns were actually interdicted, is that what 

happened? 

A In the instances I'm aware of, it was not successful. 

952 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

104 

Q And how many instances are we talking about approximately? 

A I believe it was just a couple that I'm aware. 

Q So 2 or 3? 

A 2 or 3, yes. 

Q And none of them were successful? 

A To my knowledge, no. To my knowledge, there was one case 

where the guns actually -- we had all the way to the border and there 

was just communication there. The other one is a case that they did 

not actually cross, to the best of my knowledge. 

Q Oh, but they were interdicted on this side of the border? 

A There was one instance that I'm aware of where transporters 

took the guns to the border and got spooked somehow and then we did 

not interdict them as far as I remember. 

Q You did not interdict them? 

A Right. 

Q Why not? 

A As I recall, they went into a neighborhood and we lost them 

as far as I know on surveillance. 

Q So there was every effort made? 

A Every effort made, but there is -- every case -- yeah. 

Q And these were straw purchasers who were doing the transfer 

rather than some intermediary beyond the straw purchaser? 

A I don't remember enough specifics about the case to remember 

what their role was specifically in the case. This was several years 

ago as I recall. 

953 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

109 

point, we had the key pieces of evidence we need to be able to charge 

people for their role in this organization. 

Q Was there significant new evidence related to Jaime Avila? 

Mr. Serres. I don't see how that is not talking about case 

specifics and the evidence of the case that we are trying -- there is 

a protective order in the district on discovery. There is local rules 

about talking about the evidence in the case. I don't see how that 

is not getting into that. I mean, I don't want to -- like I said at 

the beginning, I don't want to interrupt and keep -- having you detour, 

but that is the area that I think we are -- goes against what we are 

trying to do here which is to make him able to talk about what your 

inquiry is. 

Mr. Castor. This is pretty key to our inquiry because it has been 

maintained that you couldn't arrest these defendants. Agent Terry was 

killed, there is an immediate arrest which is different from everything 

else in the case. So I guess we are trying to get to -- was it just 

because of the tragedy that happened that -- in this particular 

instance? 

Mr. Serres. I think you can answer that question, if that is the 

question. 

Mr. Newell. What was the question? That was a statement. What 

was the question? 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q If these defendants hadn't been identified yet shortly after 

the Brian Terry incident, where a border patrol agent was killed, 

954 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

110 

immediately Avila was arrested and that is different than the rest of 

the defendants, what was unique about that? Was it the specific 

tragedy that changed things? 

[Discussion off the record.] 

Mr. Newell. I mean, what was different there was additional 

evidence later on in the case concerning Avila. That gave us the 

ability to charge him with using a false address which is what we charged 

him in the complaint. 

BY MR. CASTOR: 

Q As soon as the guns were traced to Avila, he was arrested 

immediately. 

A He wasn't arrested immediately. He was arrested -- 

Q Later that night, wasn't he? 

A Well, sure. To be honest with you, you're talking about a 

guy who changed his address and literally was a street -- as relayed 

to me, he was basically a transient and our agents went out with the 

subpoena and police department I think and found him in a matter of -- 

Q But you had 40 suspects at that point that you weren't going 

after their house. 20 of them were indicted subsequently? 

A 20, right. 

Q But you had 40 or so suspects. And the moment these firearms 

are found at the Terry scene traced back to Jaime Avila, boom, he is 

arrested, which is different than everything else that has been 

described to us with the other suspects in the case. So we are asking 

why. 

955 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

111 

A One of the guns was traced back to him, he was a suspect. 

Q But there is guns being traced back that are found in Mexican 

crime scenes that are being traced back, there is guns that are found 

in El Paso, there are guns that are found in Naco and that arrest didn't 

happen. 

A Well, again, at that point in time, we were still proceeding 

toward doing one indictment against, you know, the whole series of 

people. And that incident happened and then there was evidence that 

it was gathered later in the case to be able to arrest him on a complaint. 

BY MR. FOSTER: 

Q Surely you're not suggesting that you learned of the address 

change and the falsehood about the address on the form, you happened 

to learn about that on December 14th, the same night that Agent Terry 

was killed? That's not what you are suggesting, is it? 

A No. I'm not suggesting it at all. 

Q So you had the information that allowed you to make the 

complaint on him long before you actually did it, right? 

A I don't think it was long -- as I recall, the complaint lists 

purchases that were made in -- it was June or July. 

Q 6 months earlier, right? 

A Sure. Okay. 

Mr. Kerner. May I just ask? There was no precipitating event -- 

Mr. Serres. I am sorry. Can we go one questioner at a time here? 

I mean, we have gone to three now. 

Mr. Castor. Sure. No problem. 

956 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 141 

Exhibit 141 

957 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
958 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
959 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
960 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
961 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
962 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
963 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
964 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 142 

Exhibit 142 

965 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
966 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
967 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
968 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
FFL #1

FFL #1

969 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
970 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 143 

Exhibit 143 

971 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1


Microsoft Outlook


From: Newell, William D. 


Sent:
 Wednesday, July 28, 2010 7:50 PM


To:
 O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject:
 RE: Wicked One


Attachments:
 One week in Phoenix - One ATF case.pdf


These pics are just an example of some of the guns, ammo and magazines seized within the past week in


Phoenix related to the “large OCDETF case” I mentioned. When a 22 year old kid on State financial assistance


walks into a gun store and plops down $12,000 in cash to buy a tripod mounted .50 caliber rifle that’s a clue


(even for us) that he’s involved in trafficking firearms for a Mexican DTO. Another picture shows the 225 drum


magazines we seized from the same group. These are in BIG demand by the Mexican DTOs because each


drum hold 75 rounds of 7.62x39mm (AK47) ammo. Each one costs about $200, depending on where you go,


so we they aren’t happy we seized approx $45,000 in merchandise from them but of course money is not a


problem for them. If you have any questions, like “how in the hell....?” then feel free to call.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)


Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M ]


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 3:57 PM


To: Newell, William D.


Subject: Re: Wicked One


Well, now that Jeff Stirling is going back to the Mother Ship I expect they'll have the means to do more of that ... he's a


good man & he'll be a good ally for you guys (& us).


Kevin M O'Reilly


Director


North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


From: Newell, William D. 


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Sent: Wed Jul 28 18:53:52 2010


Subject: RE: Wicked One


Sure, just don’t want ATF HQ to find out, especially since this is what they should be doing (briefing you)! 

NSS F&F 000020

972 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
2


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)


Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M : ]


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 3:51 PM


To: Newell, William D.


Subject: Wicked One


Wicked One.


Even I'd remember that one.


This is great; very informative.


OK to share with Sr Director Dan Restrepo and with CT/CN Director Greg Gatjanis?


Would not leave NSS, I assure you.


Kevin O'


Kevin M O'Reilly


Director


North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


From: Newell, William D. < >


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Sent: Wed Jul 28 18:45:51 2010


Subject: RE: GRIT Surge Phoenix


Going very well actually. I attached the most recent weekly “report card” that we send to HQ on


Fridays. (Please keep to yourself). I didn’t include some of the case highlights because most are on-going


criminal cases including a couple of large OCDETF investigations . Bottom


line is that we are on-target to meet our FFL inspection goals as well as eliminate our backlog of “leads”. A


‘lead” is where we have solid information regarding firearms trafficking activity but not enough manpower to


work it. The best part about the GRIT for me has been the influx, albeit temporary (100 days), of Special


Agents, Inspectors, Support Staff, etc. They have allowed us to catch up on the backlog of leads as well as


follow up on newer information. They have also been instrumental in supplying much needed ground-level


support to several large-scale firearms trafficking investigations with direct links to Mexican DTOs. As an


example I have had 10 Special Agents working exclusively in support of a very large OCDETF case involving


firearms trafficking by the Sinaloa DTO. These agents have been so busy that they have expressed a desire to


extend past the GRIT deadline due to the amount of work still needed on this case, a very good thing. One


agent on detail from Miami (another hotbed of firearms trafficking activity as you well know) told me recently 

NSS F&F 000021

973 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
3


“I thought Miami was crazy!”. He’s never seen this level of illegal firearms trafficking activity before and wants


to stay another 30 days just to help out with this case. Most of this has taken place in the Phoenix area. In


Tucson we have been working hand in hand with the Tucson PD and have taken off several home invasion


crews. This past Friday we arrested a crew whose leader has “Wicked One” tattooed across his forehead, easy


to pick out in a lineup.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)


Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M ]


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 2:56 PM


To: Newell, William D.


Subject: Re: GRIT Surge Phoenix


No rush, certainly no forcing action on this, just wondering how's it going.


Take care,


Kevin O'


Kevin M O'Reilly


Director


North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


From: Newell, William D. < >


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Sent: Wed Jul 28 17:54:12 2010


Subject: Re: GRIT Surge Phoenix


Heading back to the office from Phoenix PD HQ, send you some info asap.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


ATF Phoenix Field Division (AZ and NM)


***


NOTICE: This electronic transmission is confidential and intended only for the person(s) to whom it is addressed. If you have


received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and destroy this message in its entirety (including all


attachments).


----- Original Message -----


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M. <

To: Newell, William D.


Sent: Wed Jul 28 17:52:48 2010


Subject: Fw: GRIT Surge Phoenix

NSS F&F 000022

974 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
4


Just an informal "how's it going?"


Kevin M O'Reilly


Director


North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


----- Original Message -----


From: Gatjanis, Gregory T.


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.; Kendall, Sarah M.


Sent: Wed Jul 28 13:29:53 2010


Subject: RE: GRIT Surge Phoenix


No. I haven't


-----Original Message-----


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 12:07 PM


To: Gatjanis, Gregory T.; Kendall, Sarah M.


Subject: GRIT Surge Phoenix


Have we gotten any readout on ATF's GRIT surge in Phoenix & in Arizona?


Regards,


Kevin O'


Kevin M O'Reilly


Director


North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


NSS F&F 000023

975 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
(This is a TNW Firearms, Model M2HB, .50 caliber rifle. See for yourself a )


Remember this seizure (see below) in Sonora, Mexico from last year? It was related to the Beltran Levya


DTO. This is the picture that the so-called gun experts said is “proof that the Mexican Army is supplying


the DTOs with firearms because this is definitely a military gun”....wrong, this gun is also a TNW and


was purchased in Tucson, Arizona (part of another OCDETF case). I had two agents from Tucson travel


to Hermosillo, Mexico and physically inspect this firearm and the other .50 caliber firearm seized – a


Barrett, Model 82A from Tennessee.


NSS F&F 000024

976 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Each drum magazine holds about 75-100 rounds of ammo – it depends on the caliber, and each retails


for about $200. Mostly sold at gun shows and they’ll sell out within an hour after the doors open and


mostly to “suspicious looking” individuals.....


10 AK-47 semi-auto rifles bought by two females headed south to Mexico through Nogales. We had


Arizona DPS stop them in order not to compromise the bigger case and when asked about the guns their


first response was “guns, what guns?”. Since they didn’t claim ownership we took an abandonment


until the “real owners” come to claim them, which of course we aren’t expecting anytime soon. 

NSS F&F 000025

977 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
“Bag o guns” – they had just purchased these second-hand at the Phoenix gun show. Were headed to


Mexico.


4,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm and 500 rounds of .38 Super – bound for Mexico now in our custody. 

NSS F&F 000026

978 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 144 

Exhibit 144 

979 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001935

980 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 145 

Exhibit 145 

981 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
982 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 146 

Exhibit 146 

983 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:( Fax:(

Print Date: February 25, 2011

FIREARMS TRACE SUMMARY

Trace Number: T20100191748 Request Date: August 16, 2010 Completion Date: August 17, 2010

 

 

 

 

 

 Badge No: C-3

 Investigation No: CENAPI

FIREARM INFORMATION

Manufacturer: ROMARM/CUGIR

Model: GP WASR 10/63

Caliber: 762

Serial Number: 1971DB5028

Type: RIFLE

Country: ROMANIA

Importer: CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST....

Obliterated:

Identifying Marks:

NIBIN:

Gang Name:

RECOVERY INFORMATION Recovery Date: 08/13/2010

Time to Crime:

SANTIAGO PAPASQUIARO, DR

MEXICO

Possessor:

DOB:

POB:

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

THE NATIONAL TRACING CENTER (NTC) HAS EXPERIENCED A DELAY IN OBTAINING THE INFORMATION ON THE

HISTORY OF THE FIREARM YOU ARE REQUESTING TO BE TRACED.

Additional Remarks:

1

The information in this report must be validated prior to use in any criminal proceedings.

Trace: T20100191748 Page 1 of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

984 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 147 

Exhibit 147 

985 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
986 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
987 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
988 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
989 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 148 

Exhibit 148 

990 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002454

991 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 149 

Exhibit 149 

992 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002084

993 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002085

994 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 150 

Exhibit 150 

995 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 002847

996 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 002848

997 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 151 

Exhibit 151 

998 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
999 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1000 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1001 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1002 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 152 

Exhibit 152 

1003 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002448

1004 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002449

1005 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 153 

Exhibit 153 

1006 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001706

1007 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 154 

Exhibit 154 

1008 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100001050 Entered Date: June 25, 2010

 MARK SONNENDECKER

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

Phone: (623) Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: ALFREDO CELIS

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85037

DOB: Race: HISPAN

IC

Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/24/2010

ID 1: #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 10

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1974DR1078 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1972DL1330 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1985ZS4512 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1969BP1516 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1972DM0786 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1971DD3813 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-0156-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AF-0099-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001050 Page 1 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1009 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1968BL3656 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-3715-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001050 Page 2 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1010 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100001078 Entered Date: June 30, 2010

 MARK SONNENDECKER

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

Phone: (623) Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: ALFREDO CELIS

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85037

DOB: Race: HISPAN

IC

Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/28/2010

ID 1: #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 10

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1985ZS2741 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-8299-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1971DG2808 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1974DR0043 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-9897-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1968BF0470 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1979ZE0769 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1982ZP1916 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001078 Page 1 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1011 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1969BP1047 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-7643-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001078 Page 2 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1012 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100001077 Entered Date: June 30, 2010

 MARK SONNENDECKER

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

Phone: (623) Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: ALFREDO CELIS

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85037

DOB: Race: HISPAN

IC

Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/29/2010

ID 1: #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 10

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-2390-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-2846-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-3909-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1982ZP6958 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-3409-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1969BR0089 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-0009-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1968BG2208 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001077 Page 1 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1013 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-0548-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AG-7795-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001077 Page 2 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1014 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 155 

Exhibit 155 

1015 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1016 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1017 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1018 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1019 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1020 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 156 

Exhibit 156 

1021 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100001049 Entered Date: June 25, 2010

 HOPE MACALLISTER

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

Phone: (623) Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: SEAN CHRISTOPHER STEWARD

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85008

DOB: Race: WHITE Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/23/2010

ID 1: #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 10

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1969BP1531 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1985ZS8142 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1972DL3449 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1982ZP7936 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1985ZS6092 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-7944-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AH-5818-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AP-8062-1989 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001049 Page 1 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1022 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 AO-9974-1994 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

ROMARM/CUGIR WASR-10 762 1972DL4024 RIFLE CENTURY ARMS INC (CAI),

ST. ALBANS, VT

Suspect Gun: S20100001049 Page 2 of 2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1023 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 157 

Exhibit 157 

1024 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002011

1025 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002012

1026 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 158 

Exhibit 158 

1027 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1028 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1029 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1030 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 159 

Exhibit 159 

1031 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1032 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 160 

Exhibit 160 

1033 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-2

RC-3

RC-3

RC-3

RC-1

RC-2

RC-2 RC-2

HOGR WR 003503

1034 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 161 

Exhibit 161 

1035 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002028

1036 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 162 

Exhibit 162 

1037 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002527

1038 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002528

1039 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 163 

Exhibit 163 

1040 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1


Microsoft Outlook


From: Newell, William D. 


Sent:
 Monday, August 09, 2010 9:17 AM


To:
 O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject:
 RE: Wicked One


Attachments:
 August 3rd TNW 50 cal.JPG


Got another one last week, a .50 caliber semi-auto. Headed for Sinaloa DTO. Part of the same “large OCDETF


case” I mentioned previously. We should be indicting in early October.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)


Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)


From: Newell, William D.


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 4:50 PM


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject: RE: Wicked One


These pics are just an example of some of the guns, ammo and magazines seized within the past week in


Phoenix related to the “large OCDETF case” I mentioned. When a 22 year old kid on State financial assistance


walks into a gun store and plops down $12,000 in cash to buy a tripod mounted .50 caliber rifle that’s a clue


(even for us) that he’s involved in trafficking firearms for a Mexican DTO. Another picture shows the 225 drum


magazines we seized from the same group. These are in BIG demand by the Mexican DTOs because each


drum hold 75 rounds of 7.62x39mm (AK47) ammo. Each one costs about $200, depending on where you go,


so we they aren’t happy we seized approx $45,000 in merchandise from them but of course money is not a


problem for them. If you have any questions, like “how in the hell....?” then feel free to call.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)


Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M. 

Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 3:57 PM


To: Newell, William D.


Subject: Re: Wicked One


Well, now that Jeff Stirling is going back to the Mother Ship I expect they'll have the means to do more of that ... he's a


good man & he'll be a good ally for you guys (& us). 

NSS F&F 000027

1041 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 164 

Exhibit 164 

1042 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1


Microsoft Outlook


From: Newell, William D. 


Sent:
 Wednesday, August 11, 2010 6:00 PM


To:
 O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject:
 Re: Wicked One


Timing would be good because we should indict our Phoenix case in late Sept/early Oct. We also have a press


conference in late August in Phoenix announcing the arrest of approx 40 straw purchasers in a dozen separate cases.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


ATF Phoenix Field Division (AZ and NM)


***


NOTICE: This electronic transmission is confidential and intended only for the person(s) to whom it is addressed. If you


have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and destroy this message in its entirety


(including all attachments).


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


To: Newell, William D.


Sent: Wed Aug 11 17:55:14 2010


Subject: RE: Wicked One


I’ll see if you can be ...


Kevin Michael O'Reilly


Director for North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


From: Newell, William D. 

Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 5:41 PM


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject: Re: Wicked One


No


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


ATF Phoenix Field Division (AZ and NM)


***


NOTICE: This electronic transmission is confidential and intended only for the person(s) to whom it is addressed. If you


have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and destroy this message in its entirety


(including all attachments).


From: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


To: Newell, William D. 

NSS F&F 000049

1043 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
2


Sent: Wed Aug 11 17:33:50 2010


Subject: RE: Wicked One


Have you been pulled into this discussion about an arms trafficking roundtable/conference in Mexico City


sometime in late Sept/early Oct?


Kevin Michael O'Reilly


Director for North American Affairs


National Security Staff


The White House


From: Newell, William D.

Sent: Monday, August 09, 2010 9:17 AM


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject: RE: Wicked One


Got another one last week, a .50 caliber semi-auto. Headed for Sinaloa DTO. Part of the same “large OCDETF

case” I mentioned previously. We should be indicting in early October.

Bill Newell

Special Agent in Charge

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)

From: Newell, William D.


Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 4:50 PM


To: O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject: RE: Wicked One


These pics are just an example of some of the guns, ammo and magazines seized within the past week in

Phoenix related to the “large OCDETF case” I mentioned. When a 22 year old kid on State financial assistance

walks into a gun store and plops down $12,000 in cash to buy a tripod mounted .50 caliber rifle that’s a clue

(even for us) that he’s involved in trafficking firearms for a Mexican DTO. Another picture shows the 225 drum

magazines we seized from the same group. These are in BIG demand by the Mexican DTOs because each

drum hold 75 rounds of 7.62x39mm (AK47) ammo. Each one costs about $200, depending on where you go,

so we they aren’t happy we seized approx $45,000 in merchandise from them but of course money is not a

problem for them. If you have any questions, like “how in the hell....?” then feel free to call.

Bill Newell

Special Agent in Charge

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Phoenix Field Division (Arizona and New Mexico)

NSS F&F 000050

1044 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 165 

Exhibit 165 

1045 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR USAO 003026

1046 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 166 

Exhibit 166 

1047 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-3

RC-3 RC-3

RC-3

RC-3 RC-3

RC-4

RC-4

RC-4

HOGR USAO 003027

1048 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 167 

Exhibit 167 

1049 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 005964

1050 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 168 

Exhibit 168 

1051 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1


Microsoft Outlook


From: Newell, William D. 


Sent:
 Wednesday, August 18, 2010 8:50 AM


To:
 O'Reilly, Kevin M.


Subject:
 Fw: Guns not viewed in Mexico


Want to give you a good example of the frustration we have in trying to assist Mexico with the firearms trafficking issue. In


this judicial district (Arizona), in cases involving the "straw" purchase of firearms eventually recovered in Mexico and


where we only have a confession by the "straw" and a falsified ATF F 4473 (form filled out by buyer and licensed gun


dealer), the U.S. Attorney's office requests that we have a "U.S. Agent" physically inspect the firearms in Mexico in order


to show the jury that the "straw" buyer was in fact part of a trafficking scheme. Other districts don't require this but hey it's


Arizona, I appreciate and respect the struggles the USAO has to go through with juries in this State to convince them of


the illegality of this. We routinely have "straw" purchasers tell us that "yeah, I knew what I was doing was wrong but the


money was good and who cares - the guns are going to Mexico right?". A very typical attitude and until some of these


folks start going to prison for violating Federal law then nothing will change. We have some "straw" purchasers who have


purchased several hundred "weapons of choice" and made good money doing it but in reality may never get prosecuted.


In trying to satisfy the Arizona USAO's request to have the firearms inspected in Mexico in order to be able to introduce


that in US Federal court we need Mexico's help but as you can guess it's a major pain to get access to these guns. The


longer the guns are in custody in Mexico (40 days+) the deeper in red tape they get buried. If it's less than 40 days since


the seizure it "should be" fairly easy but as you know nothing in Mexico is easy or quick. As an example and regarding the


August 4th seizure in Nogales, Sonora. Several of the firearms in that seizure are directly linked to a case we are ready to


indict here in the Federal system. We had these guns entered into our "Suspect Guns" system so when they were traced


in eTrace they "pinged" off this "Suspect Guns" list and our case agent was immediately notified. I then contacted the


Sonora PGR "SAC" and had it all worked out to have 2 of my agents accompany 3 PGR reps to see the guns yesterday.


There was an official order signed by the PGR which they can do in order to see any evidence being stored at a nearby


military base during the prosecution of a case. In Mexico the military bases are used to store most evidence since they


are deemed the most "secure". It was all arranged for my guys to travel to Nogales, Sonora yesterday at 9am which they


did and where they met 3 very helpful PGR reps. They all then traveled to the nearby military base, order in hand, to view


the 3 guns needed in our case in Arizona. Upon arriving at the military they were blocked from seeing the evidence even


though the PGR had an properly executed order allowing it. The General ended up getting involved and of course nothing


happened after that since it appears he was out of the loop on this which I partly blame myself for but that should have


been handled by the Sonora PGR's office. In reality the PGR's "order", a legal document, should have trumped the


General's objections but of course it's Mexico and once feelings get hurt all bets are off. Therefore after several


unsuccessful attempts to explain our legitimate reasons for being there including our desire to prosecute those


responsible for trafficking these firearms my guys came back to Phoenix. This is just one example, many more like it exist


where we have repeatedly attempted to inspect firearms seized in Mexico for the specific purpose of using that as


evidence in criminal proceedings. What should be a very simple process and something we should be doing all the time is


not happening because the Mexicans make it impossible, even when we follow their rules. We are more than willing to


address their repeated requests to hold all those involved in the trafficking of firearms accountable to the fullest extent of


the law but they need to be part of the solution and not the problem. My agents desperately want to make this work


because we see the damage caused by these illegal acts by "straw" purchasers and others involved in trafficking firearms


to Mexico. We want to hold them accountable under US law but it won't take many more times of having doors slammed


in their faces by the Mexicans before they give up and when that happens Mexico can stop complaining because we tried


and they failed.


Bill Newell


Special Agent in Charge


ATF Phoenix Field Division (AZ and NM)


***


NOTICE: This electronic transmission is confidential and intended only for the person(s) to whom it is addressed. If you


have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and destroy this message in its entirety


(including all attachments).

NSS F&F 000055

1052 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
2


From: Voth, David J.


To: Newell, William D.


Sent: Fri Aug 13 17:15:23 2010


Subject: Guns not viewed in Mexico


SAC Newell,


Below is a list of guns recovered in Mexico, straw purchased here in Phoenix, that we are submitting for charging in


August 2010 as part of GRIT initiative. As you are well aware the USAO in Phoenix wants a US law enforcement officer to


view the firearms prior to charging. These firearms have not been previously viewed to the best of my knowledge. This


list is only in preparation for the August charging initiative and does not contain every firearms we are alleging or


charging.


ATF Case Number Case Name Recovery Date Recovery Location Firearm type 

785115-1 4-Aug-10 Nogales, Sonora FN 5.7 pistol 

785115-1 21-Apr-10 San Dimas, Durango Romarm/Cugir 7.62 rifle 

163030-1 2 1-Feb-10 Tepic, Nayarit Barrett .50 caliber rifle 

785071-1 15-Apr-09 San Miguel, Guerrero Barrett .50 caliber rifle 

785115-1 26-Feb-10 Culiacan, Sinaloa FN PS90 5.7 rifle 

Thanks for assistance in this matter,


David Voth


Group Supervisor


Phoenix Group VII


******* NOTICE: This electronic transmission is confidential and intended only for the person(s) to


whom it is addressed. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify the sender by return e-


mail and destroy this message in its entirety (including all attachments). 

NSS F&F 000056

1053 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 169 

Exhibit 169 

1054 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002559

1055 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 170 

Exhibit 170 

1056 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: DENNIS K. BURKE 

Thursday, August 18, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 10:07 a.m.

1057 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEPHEN CASTOR, COUNSEL 

HENRY J. KERNER, COUNSEL 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

H. SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

For SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

CHAN PARK, SENIOR COUNSEL 

MAGGIE WHITNEY, INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

JASON A. FOSTER, MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, MINORITY COUNSEL 

JEREMY PARIS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL FOR NOMINATIONS AND OVERSIGHT 

BRIAN DOWNEY, MINORITY INVESTIGATOR

1058 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

For U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

M. FAITH BURTON, SPECIAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 

STEVEN F. REICH, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 

 

1059 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

91 

A No. I just want to give it more thought. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. LEAVITT: 

Q You mentioned earlier having greater appreciation for ways 

you could have sped up the process. Can you elaborate more on that, 

what you would have done to speed things up? 

A Yeah, although just to clarify, I think there was some 

testimony that the case was given to us in August. The case was 

actually given to us in October. We received over 3,000 documents. 

Mr. Foster. I'm sorry, what year? 

Mr. Leavitt. 2010. 

Mr. Burke. 2010. 

BY MR. FOSTER: 

Q What do you mean when you say the case was given to us? 

A There is a formal process when an agency gives us a case with 

their cover, and the actual full documentation of the case was given 

to us, our office in October 2010, and I believe it was represented 

that it was given to us in August 2010. 

Q You mean today in some of the questioning? 

A No, I thought there was testimony at one point. 

Q Oh, at one of the hearings? 

A Yeah, yeah. No, I'm sorry, I apologize, I didn't mean by 

anyone here. And so -- 

Q And why is that significant? You mean Mr. Hurley was 

working -- ATF, at least, has described it as a prosecutor-led strike 

1060 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

92 

force case, they've pointed to documents where those words are written. 

A Right. 

Q And that it's specifically a prosecutor-led case, everyone 

talks about how Mr. Hurley was the supervising AUSA on the case, and 

so are you saying that there are things that you didn't know, that your 

office didn't know until October of 2010 because it hadn't been 

formally -- you hadn't formally been provided all of the case documents? 

A I don't know that for an actual fact. I do know that in 

October 2010 our office was provided over 3,000 documents, and a lot 

of those documents were ROIs that our office had not seen before. 

Q You mean Emory Hurley hadn't seen before? 

A Correct. 

Q Okay. 

A He was not, it's my understanding that he was not reviewing 

all the ROIs, that there were -- I don't know if, of the 3,000 documents 

we received in October, whether there was a percentage there that he 

had seen, but I do know there was a huge data dump, file dump on our 

office in October of this case. 

Q And can you explain to us why that happens when it happens, 

how is the timing worked out? Is that something that you work 

cooperatively with the ATF to determine when you want to receive that 

level of detailed information? 

A Our perspective is the sooner the better, so the decision 

as to when the actual documents arrive is a decision made by the agency. 

Q Was it something your office had sought earlier and were 

1061 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 171 

Exhibit 171 

1062 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

1 

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

INTERVIEW OF: DENNIS K. BURKE 

Tuesday, December 13, 2011 

Washington, D.C. 

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn 

House Office Building, commencing at 8:35 a.m.

1063 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

2 

Appearances: 

For the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM: 

STEPHEN CASTOR, CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

ASHOK M. PINTO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, INVESTIGATIONS 

HENRY J. KERNER, COUNSEL 

CARLTON DAVIS, COUNSEL 

JUSTIN KIM, PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 

H. SCOTT LINDSAY, MINORITY COUNSEL 

DONALD K. SHERMAN, MINORITY COUNSEL 

Also Present: REPRESENTATIVE PAUL GOSAR 

For SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: 

MAGGIE WHITNEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

JASON FOSTER, MINORITY CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 

TRISTAN LEAVITT, MINORITY COUNSEL 

BRIAN M. DOWNEY, MINORITY INVESTIGATOR 

ROB DONOVAN, MINORITY STAFF 

PATRICK BAILEY, MINORITY STAFF 

1064 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

3 

For DENNIS K. BURKE: 

SARAH E. DEAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 

Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

LEE STEIN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 

Perkins Coie LLP 

Phoenix, AZ 85012-2788 

 

1065 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

45 

Mr. Stein. In particular, the one pair -- 

BY MR. KERNER: 

Q Let me ask you something about a little bit something else. 

You referred to the DAG. That was your director report? 

A Correct. 

Q Right? And also did you interact at all with the deputy 

chief of staff or Eric Holder, Mr. Monty Wilkinson? 

A On occasion. 

Q What was the nature of your interactions with him? 

A He would be someone you would contact if the Attorney General 

were doing any travelling in your area. He would coordinate through 

him. And then I also called him first when I was informed of the Tucson 

shooting. 

Q Okay. Did you have -- did you communicate with Mr. Holder 

at all, the AG himself? 

A In what respect? 

Q Did you communicate with him at any time? 

A Have I ever had conversations with the Attorney General? 

Q Yes. 

A Yes. 

Q What form did they take? 

A I was on the AGAC, and we would meet with him every 4 to 6 

weeks. And sometimes I would have a chance to talk at the meetings, 

and most times, I didn't. 

BY MR. FOSTER: 

1066 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

75 

organizational chart of who these people were and what potential 

charges there were and how they were all interconnected and how it 

worked. 

Q Do you recall any -- leaving any member with any reason to 

believe that interdictions were not occurring? 

A No. 

Q Any reason to believe that ATF agents were cutting off 

surveillance? 

A No. 

Q Any reason to believe that ATF agents were not effectuating 

arrests when they could? 

A No. 

Q Now, there has been some discussion about delays in the 

indictment. Can you tell us what you know about that and why it took 

so long for Fast and Furious to reach indictment? 

A Well, I think I discussed this in my first interview, that 

the file that was submitted to, for an indictment from ATF wasn't 

actually submitted until September, and then there were some other 

factors that led to delays, such as that IRS was involved in the case 

and doing some money laundering counts, and they asked for additional 

time to perfect those counts, and that led to some delay, too. 

Q Did you have concerns about the delays? 

A Yes. 

Q And what did you do to address those concerns? 

A I contacted Mike Morrissey a few times, asking him what is 

1067 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
 

 

86 

interest in the AG coming out for it. Please send me four or five lines 

about it, and I can brief Monty on it, especially time window. I am 

going to guess that Monty here is Monty Wilkinson; is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And then there is an answer from Mr. Cunningham back to you, 

also cc'ing Miss Scheel and others, You bet, good opportunity to see 

if January 6 and 7 are still our target dates for indictment and 

take-down press event. The AG's office, was that Mr. Holder himself 

who was expressing interest in coming out? 

A No, not to my knowledge. It was, I think when I said AG's 

office, I am indicating Monty. 

Q Okay. So Monty, you indicated earlier that Monty Wilkinson 

sort of did travel-related things? 

A Right. 

Q Okay. So this would have been in his wheelhouse basically? 

A Correct. 

Q But who was Monty interested in having come out? It wasn't 

going to be Monty Wilkinson showing up at the press conference, right? 

A No, it was the Attorney General. 

Q Okay. So this email is specifically in regard to the 

Attorney General coming out to join you for the take-down of Fast and 

Furious? 

A Correct. 

Q Do you know -- and then the target dates were January 6th 

and 7th, but of course, that got delayed? 

1068 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 172 

Exhibit 172 

1069 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-6

RC-1

HOGR DOJ 005979

1070 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 173 

Exhibit 173 

1071 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

HOGR USAO 003031

1072 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 174 

Exhibit 174 

1073 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001349

1074 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 175 

Exhibit 175 

1075 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-4

HOGR USAO 003038

1076 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 176 

Exhibit 176 

1077 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR DOJ 005986

1078 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 177 

Exhibit 177 

1079 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR USAO 003049

1080 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 178 

Exhibit 178 

1081 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001408

1082 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001409

1083 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001410

1084 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001411

1085 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 179 

Exhibit 179 

1086 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1087 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1088 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1089 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1090 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1091 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1092 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1093 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1094 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1095 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1096 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1097 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1098 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1099 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1100 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1101 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1102 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1103 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1104 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1105 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1106 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1107 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1108 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1109 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1110 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1111 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1112 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1113 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1114 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1115 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1116 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1117 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1118 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1119 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1120 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1121 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1122 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1123 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1124 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1125 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1126 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1127 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1128 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1129 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1130 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1131 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1132 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1133 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1134 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1135 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1136 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1137 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1138 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 180 

Exhibit 180 

1139 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

NATIONAL TRACING CENTER

Phone:(800) Fax:(800) 

Print Date: 

SUSPECT GUN SUMMARY

Suspect Gun Number: S20100000887 Entered Date: June 03, 2010

 PHOENIX FD GROUP VII

 PHOENIX, AZ 85004

 Badge No:

 Investigation No: 785115-10-

DEALER INFORMATION

Business Name:

Licensee Name:

Address:

GLENDALE, AZ 85302

Phone: (623) Ext:

FFL Number:

Invoice #:

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION

Name: SEAN CHRISTOPHER STEWARD

Address:

PHOENIX, AZ 85008

DOB: Race: WHITE Sex: Male

Height: Weight: Date: 06/02/2010

ID 1: #:

ID 2: #:

NOTICE

The firearm(s) listed below was entered into the Firearms Tracing System as a suspect gun. You have requested NTC

maintain a lookout for the firearm(s). If any of the suspect guns in this report are traced by another agency and/or

individual, your Division's Firearms Trafficking Coordinator(FTC) will be notified in writing by the NTC. The notification

will include the identity of the officer and/or agency requesting the trace. It will be incumbent upon the FTC or

yourself to contact the firearms trace requestor. The NTC will not release any information concerning your suspect gun(s).

Weapon Summary

Weapon Count: 21

Manufacturer Model Caliber Serial Number Type Importer

HS PRODUCTS (IM METAL) XDM 9 MG964035 PISTOL SPRINGFIELD INC (SI),

GENESEO IL

GLOCK GMBH 19 9 PED789 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 19 9 PHU288 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 19 9 PPT643 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 19 9 PPT641 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 17 9 PKV031 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 17 9 NLM169 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 17 9 NSP410 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 19 9 NSP412 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

GLOCK GMBH 34 9 NZC771 PISTOL GLOCK INC, SMYRNA GA

RUGER P95 9 317-36369 PISTOL

RUGER P95 9 317-36735 PISTOL

RUGER P95 9 317-40927 PISTOL

Suspect Gun: S20100000887

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1140 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Controlled Unclassified Information

RUGER P95 9 317-36391 PISTOL

RUGER P95 9 317-36744 PISTOL

RUGER P95 9 317-40932 PISTOL

RUGER P95 9 317-40736 PISTOL

TAURUS PT1911 45 NAX76576 PISTOL UNKNOWN IMPORTER

TAURUS PT24/7 9 TCV80815 PISTOL UNKNOWN IMPORTER

TAURUS PT92 9 TCV92420 PISTOL UNKNOWN IMPORTER

SMITH & WESSON M&P 9 DTY4885 PISTOL

Suspect Gun: S20100000887

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1141 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 181 

Exhibit 181 

1142 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-3

RC-3

RC-5

HOGR USAO 003047

1143 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 182 

Exhibit 182 

1144 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-2

HOGR WR 003533

1145 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR WR 003534

1146 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 183 

Exhibit 183 

1147 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-4

RC-4

RC-1

RC-1

HOGR DOJ 005987

1148 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-2

RC-2

RC-1

RC-1

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

HOGR DOJ 005988

1149 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 184 

Exhibit 184 

1150 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1151 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 185 

Exhibit 185 

1152 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
5&

5&

5&

5&

HOGR DOJ 006700

1153 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 186 

Exhibit 186 

1154 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-1 RC-1

RC-1 RC-1 RC-1 RC-1

RC-2

HOGR DOJ 006722

1155 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-2

RC-2

RC-2

HOGR DOJ 006723

1156 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 187 

Exhibit 187 

1157 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
5&

5&

5&

RC-1

RC-1

5&

5&

5&

5&

5&

RC-1

RC-1

5&

5&

HOGR DOJ 006755

1158 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 188 

Exhibit 188 

1159 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR USAO 003070

1160 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 189 

Exhibit 189 

1161 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR USAO 003073

1162 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 190 

Exhibit 190 

1163 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-5

RC-5

HOGR DOJ 005872

1164 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-5

RC-5

HOGR DOJ 005876

1165 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 005888

1166 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 191 

Exhibit 191 

1167 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

RC-1

RC-1

RC-5

RC-5

RC-5

HOGR USAO 003076

1168 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 192 

Exhibit 192 

1169 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-5

RC-6

RC-6

HOGR DOJ 005917

1170 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 193 

Exhibit 193 

1171 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002346

1172 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 194 

Exhibit 194 

1173 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1174 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 195 

Exhibit 195 

1175 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 002017

1176 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 196 

Exhibit 196 

1177 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1178 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 197 

Exhibit 197 

1179 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
RC-1

HOGR DOJ 005471

1180 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 198 

Exhibit 198 

1181 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR ATF - 001941

1182 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 199 

Exhibit 199 

1183 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
HOGR DOJ 006614

1184 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
Exhibit 200 

Exhibit 200 

1185 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
1

RPTS 

DCMN 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

GOVERNMENT REFORM,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF:ROBERT MONTAGUE WILKINSON

Friday, April 13, 2012

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in 2247 Rayburn House

Office Building, commencing at 10:00 a.m.

1186 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
2

Appearances:

For the COMMITTEE ON HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM:

HENRY J. KERNER, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR INVESTIGATIONS

CARLTON DAVIS, OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN ISSA

JESSICA LAUX DONLON, COUNSEL, OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN ISSA

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

DONALD K. SHERMAN, MINORITY COUNSEL

CARLOS FELIPE URIARTE, MINORITY COUNSEL

JEROME JORDAN, MINORITY INTERN

For the SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY:

MAGGIE WHITNEY, SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

JASON A. FOSTER, CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

TRISTAN L. LEAVITT, MINORITY INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

ROB DONOVAN, COUNSEL, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

BRIAN DOWNEY, INVESTIGATOR, OFFICE OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

1187 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
3

For the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:

MOLLY GASTON, ATTORNEY ADVISER, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

STEVEN F. REICH, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DANIEL J. LENERZ, ATTORNEY, APPELLATE STAFF 

1188 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
35

on?

A I mean, it really would vary, I think.Typically it would,

you know, he would needŞŞsometimes you have to plan things quickly,

but, I mean, something like thisŞŞit really varied.

Q Right.I mean, is it fair to say that ideally it would have

been more than 2 weeks in many circumstances?

A Yes.

Q And you don't have any recollection as to whether in the

conversation that you do recall with Burke, whether there was any nature

of rushing for an event so that there would have been a shorter time

window, as opposed to just a normal request that would have come?

A No, I don't recall that.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Going back to Exhibit 4, turn to the last page of Exhibit

4.Dennis Burke emails you, "I would not recommend the AG announce

this case.I can explain in detail at your convenience."And then

you respond, "Okay, I will call tomorrow."

A Correct.

Q And again you have no recollection of having a phone

conversation with Mr. Burke on this topic?

A No.I am sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.No, I don't

recall having a conversation with Mr. Burke on this.

Q Do you ever recall having a phone conversation with Dennis

Burke in this time period in midŞDecember 2010?

A As I said, I don't recall when the conversation occurred that

1189 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
36

I have indicated I have a vague recollection of, but other than that

conversation, I don't recall having any conversations with Mr. Burke

about this.

Q Okay.On the third page, flip up one pageŞŞ

Mr. Reich.Which exhibit?

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Exhibit 4.Right there at the very top, when Dennis Burke

informs you that the guns found in the desert near the Border Patrol

officer are traced back to the investigation we are going to talk about,

again you say "I will call tomorrow."So these are two, at least in

my mind, these are two pretty important events.Certainly this is a

very important point.

A Yes.

Q The guns traced back to the investigation.And then on page

4 recommending the Attorney General would not announce the case.Your

say on both occasions you will call tomorrow.

A Right.

Q I presume if you told him you would call tomorrow, that you

did call tomorrow.

A Correct.

Q But you only have recollection of one phone conversation?

A Well, I mean, when people call me and leave messages, I make

it a practice to return their calls.If I tell somebody that I am going

to call them, I am very good about following up.So I can't say that

I didn't attempt to reach Mr. Burke and just wasn't able to connect

1190 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
39

Q At least from the documents that we have been given, this

is the first time right there in Exhibit 7 that we see any reference

to guns being walked in the investigation.Did Dennis Burke mention

anything to you about guns being walked in Fast and Furious or around

this timeframe?Does that ring a bell at all?

A No, it doesn't, and I have no recollection of having any

conversations with Mr. Burke at any time regarding the tactics that

were used in this operation.

Q Let's flip over to Exhibit 5.You can put the other three

aside. 

1191 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
40

BY MR. FOSTER:

Q Carlton, you asked an openŞended question here.So do you

recall having any conversations with Mr. Burke at any time about why

he did not believe that it was a good idea for the Attorney General

to announce the investigation?

A I did notŞŞI am sorry, I did not mean to interrupt you.

I do not have any recollection of having any such conversation with

Mr. Burke.

Q So other than the email where he says he doesn't think it

is a good idea, you never had any indication from any source as to why

he thought it wasn't a good idea?

A I don't have any recollection of having any conversation with

him.The problems with the investigation came to light I guess in late

January 2011, and that is when I became aware of the tactics that were

used.

Q Right.I understand you don't recall any specific

conversations with him.I asked you a slightly different question and

my second question was slightly different.I asked if you had any idea

or any indication from any source as to why Mr. Burke communicated to

you his view that he didn't think the Attorney General should announce

the investigation?

A Not that I recall, no.

Q From any source?

A No.

BY MR. DAVIS:

1192 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
41

Q Let's go to Exhibit 5.You can put the other three away.

Mr. Reich.Give us a second.Take a minute and look at it.

Mr. Wilkinson.Okay.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q These are emails that Dennis Burke forwarded to you regarding

Brian Terry's death and that a Border Patrol agent had been shot.Just

essentially keeping you in the loop I presume is what he is doing, right?

A Correct.

Q And you said, "Please provide any additional details as they

become available," on page two.

A Right.

Q Do you have any specific recollection of any phone calls that

you had with Dennis Burke about this particular topic, about the Border

Patrol agent being shot?

A No.

Q Okay.When Dennis Burke sent you these emails, was this the

first you had heard about a Border Patrol agent being shot?

A To the best of my recollection, yes.

Q So there was no type of urgent notice or anything that was

sent out within the Department about an agent being shot?

A Not that I recall.

Q Okay.And when was the first time, to the best of your

recollection, that you can remember that the guns being found at the

scene where the Border Patrol agent was shot actually traced back to

a current investigation?Did that come from Dennis Burke as well in

1193 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits
42

the emails that we had looked at earlier?

A My only knowledge of that is what is contained in these

emails.

Q Okay.ATF conducted a trace of the weapons and they knew

that day that the weapons had traced back.They sent a sixŞpage

memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General 2 days later, and the first

you heard of it was from Dennis Burke, that the weapons traced back

to the investigation that you were planning on announcing, you had

discussed announcing?

A I am sorry, could you repeat the question?

Q Sure.So you are saying that the first time that you heard

about this, the weapons being traced back to the investigation was from

Dennis Burke?

A Correct.

Q Okay.Did you alert the Attorney General about that at all?

A I don't recall sharing that information with the Attorney

General.

Q Should the information have been provided to you or to the

Attorney General from Dennis Burke, or should it have occurred through

a different mechanism within the Department, like an urgent alert that

something had happened, that these weapons had traced back to an ongoing

investigation?

A I don'tŞŞI can't say how it should haveŞŞI mean, Dennis

Burke alerted me to the fact.But, I mean, information comes into the

Department through a variety of sources.

1194 Fast and Furious: The Anatomy of a Failed Operation Appendix I: Exhibits