-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re THOMPSON, Minors. September 10, 2015 

No. 324060 

Genesee Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-130960-NA 

 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and WILDER and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to 

two of her minor children, ET and AT, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (j), 

(k)(iii), and (k)(v). We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

 Respondent is the mother of four children. Two of these children died as infants while in 

respondent’s care. ET is respondent’s oldest child. Her second child, JT, died 18 days after his 

birth in 2006. JT died while sleeping in the same bed as respondent. The Department of Health 

and Human Services (DHHS) investigated the matter, which was substantiated for physical 

neglect. AT is respondent’s third child. At six months of age, AT weighed only 11 pounds. 

DHHS again investigated respondent and found that AT was medically neglected. In the fall of 

2008, respondent was provided with a variety of services and referrals aimed at correcting her 

parenting deficiencies. 

 Respondent’s fourth child, IT, was born in the fall of 2013. Approximately three weeks 

after his birth, respondent returned to her apartment with IT near midnight. IT was in a car seat. 

Because the apartment was cold, respondent turned the heat up to 90 degrees. She took off IT’s 

coat, but left him in the car seat and placed a blanket on him. Respondent fell asleep and did not 

awake until the following morning. By this time, IT had died of dehydration. The coroner ruled 

the death accidental, but found that it was the result of gross negligence. 

 After IT’s death, a safety plan was put in place. AT and ET began living with their 

father, and respondent was not allowed to see the children without his supervision. However, on 

February 4, 2014, DHHS learned that respondent had poured undiluted bleach on ET’s shoulder 
-2- 

blade in a misguided attempt to treat a ringworm infection.1

 Because respondent reported that 

she suspected both children had ringworm, DHHS instructed respondent to take the children to 

the hospital. Respondent complied, and both children received medication. DHHS filed a 

petition seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights to AT and ET shortly thereafter. 

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to AT and 

ET. 

II. DISCUSSION2

A. STATUTORY GROUNDS 

 Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found statutory grounds existed 

to terminate her parental rights to ET and AT. We disagree. 

 “To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence 

that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established.”3

 “We review 

for clear error a trial court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate determination that a statutory 

ground for termination of parental rights has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”4 

“A finding is clearly erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on 

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”5 

 Termination of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate pursuant to MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i).6 Termination is appropriate under this subsection if “[t]he child or a sibling 

of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse [and] . . . [t]he parent’s act 

caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if 

 

1

 The children’s father was not present at the time, having left the children in the care of his 

girlfriend. 

2

 Respondent has asked this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for clarification because 

the trial court did not address each subsection of MCL 712A.19b(3) individually. We do not find 

a remand necessary. The trial court stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

included the statutory bases for its order. We are satisfied that the trial court was aware of the 

relevant issues and correctly applied the law. We need no further information to facilitate our 

review. See MCR 3.977(H)(3); Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce, Ltd, 209 Mich 

App 165, 176; 530 NW2d 772 (1995). 

3 In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). 

4 In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). See also MCR 3.977(K). 

5 Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). 

6

 Although the petition cited MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), the trial court did not specifically refer to 

this subsection. Thus, we presume that the trial court did not rely on subsection (3)(b)(ii) when it 

reached its determination in this matter. 
-3- 

placed in the parent’s home.”7

 There is no doubt that siblings of ET and AT suffered physical 

injuries. Two of their siblings died while in respondent’s care. While it is unclear exactly what 

caused JT’s death, IT’s death was clearly caused by respondent having overheated her apartment 

and then falling asleep. Further, ET was chemically burned by respondent when she poured 

undiluted bleach on his shoulder. IT’s death and ET’s chemical burn also occurred in the recent 

past and after DHHS had intervened and provided respondent with resources. Under the 

circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that there was a reasonable 

likelihood of injury to ET and AT if returned to respondent’s care. 

 Respondent argues that the deaths of her children and the bleach incident with ET should 

not be considered under this subsection because her conduct was merely negligent, and that she 

did not intend to cause harm. Respondent relies on In re LaFrance,

8

 in which this Court found 

that the types of physical injuries contemplated by MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) must be “caused by a 

parent’s act . . . and not merely contributed to by an unintentional omission.”9

 However, unlike 

the respondent father in LaFrance, respondent here did not simply fail to respond to an 

accidental injury or naturally occurring medical condition. Uncontroverted evidence established 

that respondent caused IT’s death by turning the heat up to 90 degrees and leaving him in a car 

seat for 11 hours. The evidence also established that she caused ET’s chemical burn, not by 

failing to respond to his ringworm, but by actively pouring bleach on him based on advice she 

obtained from the internet. LaFrance does not support respondent’s position. 

 Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,”10 this Court need not consider the 

remaining statutory grounds cited by the trial court. However, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusions regarding the remaining statutory grounds. While the evidence tends to show that 

respondent did not intend to injure or kill her children, the fact remains that her conduct caused 

the harm that occurred. The circumstances of this case clearly and convincingly demonstrated 

that respondent, “without regard to intent, fail[ed] to provide proper care or custody” of ET and 

AT “and there is no reasonable expectation that [respondent] will be able to provide proper care 

and custody within a reasonable time considering [ET and AT]’s age.”11 The evidence also 

clearly demonstrated that “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child[ren]’s parent, that the child[ren] will be harmed if . . . returned to the home of the 

 

7

 MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). 

8 In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). 

9 Id. at 725 (quotation marks omitted). 

10 In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

11 MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 
-4- 

parent.”12 The evidence also established that respondent “abused the child or a sibling of the 

child and the abuse included” both “severe physical abuse” and “life threatening injury.”13 

B. BEST INTERESTS DETERMINATION 

 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it found termination of her parental 

rights was in the best interests of her children. We disagree. 

 Once a statutory ground has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in 

the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.14 This Court reviews a trial 

court’s decision regarding whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests for 

clear error.15 Whether termination is in the children’s best interests must be proven by a 

preponderance of the evidence.16 In considering whether termination of parental rights is in the 

best interests of the child, “the court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the 

children’s best interests.”17 These factors include the existence of a bond between the child and 

the parent, the parent’s ability to parent, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the 

advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the parent’s compliance with his or her 

service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being, and the 

possibility of adoption.18 

 Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by not explicitly addressing why 

termination was necessary in light of the fact that the children were placed with their father. 

Placement of a child with a relative “ ‘weighs against termination under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a),’ ” 

and must be considered as part of the best interest determination.19 However, the term “relative” 

as used in MCL 712A.19a does not include the child’s other parent.20 Therefore, the trial court 

 

12 MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

13 MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii) and (v). 

14 MCL 712A.19b(5). See also Moss, 301 Mich App at 86. 

15 In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). 

16 Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. 

17 In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

18 Id. at 713-714. 

19 In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), quoting Mason, 486 Mich at 

164. 

20 The term “relative” is statutorily defined, and includes only those related to the child “as 

grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent, aunt or uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, 

great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle, sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first 

cousin once removed, and the spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by 

death or divorce.” MCL 712A.13a(1)(j). 
-5- 

in this case did not need to explicitly consider the children’s placement with their father in 

determining their best interests. 

 Nor did the trial court err in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. 

Two infants had died in respondent’s care, AT had been medically neglected and failed to thrive, 

and ET received second-degree burns when respondent poured undiluted bleach on his skin. ET 

stopped acting out and improved in his school work when he moved from respondent’s home to 

that of his father. Although there was evidence that the children shared a bond with respondent, 

the testimony of case workers was that the children were happy living with their father and did 

not want to return to respondent’s home. There was testimony that the children would be 

harmed if they were cut off from respondent entirely, but their father made it clear that he would 

ensure that his children had a relationship with respondent. The trial court did not clearly err in 

holding that termination was in the best interests of each child. 

C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Finally, respondent argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her 

court-appointed attorney failed to file a jury demand. As this Court has explained: 

The juvenile court is required to appoint an attorney for the child in child 

protective proceedings. Although the constitutional provisions explicitly 

guaranteeing the right to counsel apply only in criminal proceedings, the right to 

due process also indirectly guarantees assistance of counsel in child protective 

proceedings. Thus, the principles of effective assistance of counsel developed in 

the context of criminal law apply by analogy in child protective proceedings. 

 To prevail on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [respondent] 

must show that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., she must “show 

that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

and that the representation so prejudiced” her that it denied her a fair trial. This 

necessarily entails proving prejudice to [respondent], which means that there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

would have been different.”[21]

 Respondent fails to show that her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness, much less that she was prejudiced as a result. In child protective proceedings, 

a respondent is only entitled to a jury during the adjudicative phase.22 In this case, the record 

shows that respondent decided to forego the adjudicative phase by willingly submitting to the 

court’s jurisdiction. Because respondent submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, there was no need 

for counsel to request a jury. Nor has respondent demonstrated a reasonable probability of a 

 

21 In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 197-198; 646 NW2d 506 (2001), overruled on other grounds In 

re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014). 

22 Sanders, 495 Mich at 406. See also MCR 3.911(A). 
-6- 

different result had such a request been made. Under the circumstances presented, the trial court 

clearly had jurisdiction over the children.23 Respondent has not demonstrated that she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

 

23 See MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Respondent argues only that a Genesee County jury may 

have refused to find jurisdiction out of sympathy. This suggestion is no more than speculation. 

Moreover, the argument is based entirely on facts not apparent in the record. Because 

respondent failed to preserve her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, our review is limited 

to the existing record. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 90; 808 NW2d 815 (2011).