Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-92 | September 28, 2018 Page 1 of 9 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff, 

v. 

Lawrence Lucas, 

Appellee-Defendant. 

September 28, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-92 

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Randy J. Williams, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D01-1704-F4-20 

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-92 | September 28, 2018 Page 2 of 9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, State of Indiana (State), appeals the trial court’s suppression 

of evidence obtained after a search of the home and garage of AppelleeDefendant, Lawrence Lucas (Lucas).

[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

ISSUE

[3] The State presents one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial court’s 

grant of Lucas’ motion to suppress is contrary to law.

[4] On the morning of May 11, 2016, Sergeant Matthew Gard (Sergeant Gard) of 

the Lafayette Police Department took a report from Bernard Brooks (Brooks) 

regarding an assault and theft. Brooks had been fighting with Lucas’ mother, 

Anita, the previous evening and had gone to Lucas’ home to sleep. Brooks fell 

asleep on Lucas’ floor, only to be awakened by Anita hitting him on the head 

with an aluminum baseball bat and by Lucas’ sister, Sharmeka, hitting him 

with her fists. Brooks was injured in the fracas and fled the home, leaving 

behind a jacket and a hat. Brooks also reported to Sergeant Gard that Anita 

and Sharmeka had taken his cell phone and $60 from his pocket.

[5] Based on Brooks’ report, Sergeant Gard procured a search warrant for Lucas’ 

home which provided for a search in relevant part as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-92 | September 28, 2018 Page 3 of 9

A yellow two story home with an attached two car garage with 

brick siding on the first level and yellow siding on the second 

floor, located at 3023 Yorktown Court, Lafayette, Indiana[,]

and to diligently search for, seize and forensically examine:

Clothing, [a] baseball bat, a cellular phone, U.S. currency, blood 

evidence or any evidence relating to an assault and/or theft 

occurring with said residence.

(Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II, p. 42). 

[6] Upon executing the search warrant, Sergeant Gard found blood about the home 

and a bloody baseball bat which matched the description Brooks had given him

in the kitchen. While searching, Sergeant Gard went through a door located in 

the living room and into the attached garage. A black vehicle was parked inside 

the garage. Next to the vehicle on the ground, Sergeant Gard found a bloodied 

jacket matching the description of Brooks’ jacket. Sergeant Gard looked inside 

the black vehicle and saw a large mound in the back seat which had been 

covered by a blanket. Sergeant Gard was concerned that objects could be 

concealed under the blanket, so he reached inside one of the vehicle’s partiallyopened windows and moved the blanket, revealing a large paper bag containing 

what Sergeant Gard suspected through his training and experience was 

synthetic marijuana. 

[7] Based on the discovery of the suspected synthetic marijuana, as well as a safe, 

“shake” on the garage floor, and a large cardboard box in the garage which 

bore the label “California Herb Company,” Sergeant Gard stopped his search 
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and procured a second search warrant authorizing a search of the home and the 

black vehicle for evidence of narcotics activity. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 15). That 

search yielded additional evidence. 

[8] On April 20, 2017, the State filed an Information charging Lucas with one 

Count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 

felony; one Count of dealing in a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike 

substance, a Level 6 felony; one Count of possession of a synthetic drug or 

synthetic drug lookalike substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and one Count of 

maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony. 

[9] On October 16, 2017, Lucas filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that 

the evidence procured from the search exceeded the scope of the warrant 

because “there was only bare speculation by Officer Gard regarding what was 

under the blanket.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 56). On November 27, 2017, 

the trial court held a hearing on Lucas’ motion. On December 20, 2017, the 

trial court entered its order granting Lucas’ motion to suppress, ruling in 

relevant part “that the officer’s entry into the vehicle and moving of the blanket 

exceeded the scope of the warrant and all evidence seized as a result of said 

action is suppressed.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 62). 

[10] The State now appeals. Additional facts will be added as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[11] We begin by noting that Lucas did not file a brief responding to the State’s 

appeal. As such, the State need only establish prima facie error to merit reversal 
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of the trial court’s ruling in Lucas’ favor. State v. Costas, 552 N.E.2d 459, 462 

(Ind. 1990). The State appeals following the trial court’s grant of a motion to 

suppress, which effectively terminated the prosecution of this case. Because the 

State appeals from a negative judgment, it bears the burden to show that the 

trial court’s ruling was contrary to law. State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 

2017). When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, we determine 

whether the record contains substantial evidence of probative value that 

supports the trial court’s decision. Id. “We evaluate the trial court’s findings of 

fact deferentially, neither reweighing the evidence nor reassessing the credibility 

of the witnesses.” Id. However, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law 

de novo. Id. 

[12] Lucas argued before the trial court that the search of the black vehicle exceeded 

the scope of the warrant because Sergeant Gard’s act of moving the blanket in 

the vehicle was an extension of the warrant to a place where none of the objects 

listed in the warrant could have been found. Lucas contended that Sergeant 

Gard could only speculate what was under the blanket, and, therefore, his act of 

moving the blanket was unreasonable. The State counters that the search 

warrant permitted a search of the garage and that, therefore, any containers, 

including the black vehicle located there, were also searchable under the 

parameters of the warrant. 
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[13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 requires that a 

search warrant describe with specificity the place to be searched and the items 

sought. Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). If a search exceeds the 

scope of the warrant, it is unconstitutional. Sidener v. State, 55 N.E.3d 380, 383 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Our United States Supreme Court has provided guidance 

on the parameters of a warranted search:

A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire 

area in which the object of the search may be found and is not 

limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening 

may be required to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that 

authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also 

provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and 

containers in which the weapon might be found . . . . When a 

legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its 

limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between 

closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or 

between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and 

wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the 

interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at 

hand.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (footnote omitted). It appears 

that our Indiana state courts have not decided the precise issue of whether the 

Fourth Amendment permits an officer who has procured a search warrant for a 

 

1

 We do not address whether the search at issue here was permitted under the Indiana Constitution, as Lucas 

did not develop a separate state constitutional analysis below, Lucas has not filed an appellate brief, the trial 

court did not specify the constitutional basis for its order granting Lucas’ motion to suppress, and, on appeal, 

the State does not proffer any separate state constitutional analysis. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14 n.1). 
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home and garage to also search any vehicles found on the premises. Although 

we are not bound by federal authority, we may look to it for guidance in the 

absence of state law. Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 355-56 (Ind. 2002). 

[14] The State draws our attention to United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 

1985). While executing a search warrant for Percival’s home and attached 

garage, agents found a vehicle in the garage. Id. at 605. The agents unlocked 

the trunk and found a suitcase containing a large amount of illegal drugs. Id. 

Percival argued that the search of the vehicle located in his garage exceeded the 

scope of the search warrant and that a vehicle should not be viewed the same 

manner as other personal items found in a home because a vehicle has a lesser 

connection to the premises than other household items such as furniture or 

cabinets. Id. at 612. 

[15] In rejecting that argument, the Percival court noted that while a vehicle is less 

fixed than a closet or cabinet, it is “no less fixed than a suitcase or handbag 

found on the premises, both of which can readily be searched under Ross if 

capable of containing the object of the search.” Id. Observing the trend in 

other jurisdictions upholding such searches, the Percival court held that “a 

search warrant authorizing a search of particularly described premises may 

permit the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the owner of, and found 

on, the premises.” Id. Percival has subsequently enjoyed support in our federal 

circuit and district courts. See e.g., United State v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543 (7th

Cir. 1996) (search of trunk of vehicle in attached garage pursuant to warrant for 

house “with detached garage”), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1020 (1996); see also United 
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States v. Rivera, 738 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (search of truck in 

driveway pursuant to warrant for home’s premises). 

[16] We recognize that Hoosiers have a heightened expectation of privacy in their 

vehicles. See Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995) (“With respect to 

automobiles generally, it may safely be said that Hoosiers regard their 

automobiles as private and cannot easily abide their uninvited intrusion.”). 

However, we find the reasoning of Percival to be persuasive and hold that, under 

the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant authorizing a search of a particularly 

described premises permits the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the 

owner of, and found on, the premises. 

[17] Here, Sergeant Gard procured a search warrant for Lucas’ “two story home 

with an attached two car garage” to search for “[c]lothing, [a] baseball bat, a 

cellular phone, U.S. currency, blood evidence or any evidence relating to an

assault and/or theft occurring with said residence.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, 

p. 42). When Sergeant Gard entered the garage, he had not yet located the cell 

phone or the $60 Brooks had reported stolen. Sergeant Gard was permitted to 

search the black vehicle and, in the process, to lift the blanket covering the large 

mound located in the back seat, because the vehicle and the mound were 

capable of containing those objects. Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21; Percival, 756 F.2d 

at 612. The State has shown that the trial court’s ruling granting Lucas’ motion 

to suppress was contrary to law. 
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CONCLUSION

[18] Concluding that the search of the vehicle in Lucas’ garage did not 

unconstitutionally exceed the scope of the search warrant, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[19] Reversed and remanded. 

[20] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur