U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Trey Gowdy, Chairman

Misconduct, Retaliation, and Obstruction at the 

Transportation Security Administration

Majority Staff Report

115th Congress

September 2018
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Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................4

II. Senior TSA Officials Engaged in Misconduct................................................................................8

A. An Assistant Administrator Committed Removable Offenses but TSA Senior 

Leadership Intervened to Allow Him to Stay at TSA ......................................................................8

1. The Assistant Administrator for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Engaged in 

Inappropriate Behavior Towards a Female TSA Employee ........................................................8

2. The Assistant Administrator Abused His Authority and Position ....................................15

3. OPR Recommended the Assistant Administrator be Dismissed from TSA......................19

4. Minutes After the Assistant Administrator Received the Notice of Proposed Removal, 

Senior TSA Officials Offered Him a Settlement Agreement .......................................................26

B. DHS OIG’s Investigation Determined Senior Managers Deviated from Agency Policy 

Regarding the Assistant Administrator..........................................................................................31

C. TSA Senior Officials Continually Circumvented the Disciplinary Process to Avoid 

Repercussions for Their Actions......................................................................................................33

1. Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement Drove While Intoxicated and Misled Police ..........................................................34

2. Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections Made Offensive Comments, 

Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct, and Lied..............................................................................38

3. TSA Security Officials Engage in Several Acts of Sexual Misconduct ...............................40

4. Double Standards for Misconduct.........................................................................................41

5. Regional Director in the Office of Global Strategies...........................................................43

6. Deputy Federal Security Director..........................................................................................45

III. TSA Used Directed Reassignments to Retaliate Against Its Employees ...........................47

A. TSA Policies on Directed Reassignments ...............................................................................48

B. TSA’s Use of Directed Reassignment Devolved Over Time .................................................49

1. TSA Leaders Changed Agency Policy to Dramatically Expand the Use of Directed 

Reassignments .................................................................................................................................49

2. Assistant Administrator Kelly Hoggan Played a Key Role in Implementing the 

Expansion of Directed Reassignments..........................................................................................54

3. TSA Leaders Promised Employees the Directed Reassignments Would Strengthen 

TSA’s Workforce and Consider Employee Needs and Preferences ...........................................56

4. TSA’s Leadership Instituted Mass Directed Reassignments..............................................59

5. TSA’s Mass Directed Reassignments Failed.........................................................................60

C. TSA Reassigned Jason Brainard from Iowa to Maine...........................................................61
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1. TSA Reassigned Brainard from Des Moines, IA to Portland, ME Despite Brainard 

Explaining This Would Cause Him Severe Hardship ..................................................................62

2. TSA Rejected Brainard’s Requests for Accommodations to Mitigate the Reassignment’s 

Impact................................................................................................................................................63

3. TSA Ultimately Granted Brainard a Settlement to Take Position in Kansas..................66

4. TSA’s Reassignment of Brainard Cost Taxpayers Over $100,000 ....................................69

5. Other FSDs Were Coerced to Retire Early in Exchange for Being Allowed to Remain in 

Their Positions for a Limited Time................................................................................................70

6. Senior TSA Leaders Acknowledge Brainard’s Reassignment was Inappropriate .........71

D. TSA Reassigned Andrew Rhoades from Minnesota to Florida...........................................73

1. Andrew Rhoades Identified and Highlighted Security Vulnerabilities and Wait Time 

Falsification at Minneapolis St.-Paul Airport..............................................................................74

2. Rhoades Was Issued a Directed Reassignment Due to Suspicions He Was Providing 

Information to the Media................................................................................................................79

3. Former TSA Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield Acknowledged Rhoades’s 

Reassignment Was Inappropriate ................................................................................................84

4. TSA Rescinded Rhoades’s Directed Reassignment After He Filed a Complaint with the 

Office of Special Counsel..................................................................................................................87

E. TSA Relocates the Honolulu International Airport DFSDs..................................................94

1. The DFSDs Identified Significant Operational Deficiencies at Honolulu International 

Airport ...............................................................................................................................................95

2. Deputy Assistant Administrator Joseph Salvator and Other TSA Senior Leaders 

Reassigned the DFSDs Out of Hawaii............................................................................................96

3. TSA’s Assistant Chief Counsel for Administrative Litigation Acknowledged TSA May 

Have Violated the Whistleblower Protection Act......................................................................100

F. TSA Inappropriately Employed Directed Reassignments.................................................102

1. TSA Improperly Used Directed Reassignments Against Other TSA Employees ...........102

2. Senior TSA Officials Reportedly Wanted to Use Directed Reassignments to Coerce 

Disfavored Employees to Leave TSA............................................................................................104

3. The Committee’s Investigation Prompted TSA to Institute Reforms and Reach 

Settlements with Affected Employees .........................................................................................106

IV. DHS OGC and TSA Lacked Transparency and Withheld Information from Investigative 

Entities ....................................................................................................................................................109

A. Under the Guise of the “Attorney-Client” Privilege, DHS OGC and TSA Refused to 

Produce Documents to the Office of Special Counsel.................................................................109

1. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is responsible for investigating reprisal for 

whistleblowing...............................................................................................................................109
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2. TSA planned to wait until OSC completed its investigations before determining 

disciplinary actions .......................................................................................................................109

3. TSA withheld information from its document productions to OSC ................................111

4. DHS OGC instituted the practice to withhold documents and information on the basis 

of attorney-client privilege...........................................................................................................112

B. TSA Refused to Comply with a Congressional Requests and a Congressional Subpoena

115
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I. Executive Summary

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is charged with safeguarding 

America’s aviation system. TSA screens more than two million passengers daily at 

approximately 430 airports.1 The agency’s mission is critical—there is no margin for error. With 

that in mind, and in light of a dynamic threat environment, it is imperative for TSA’s workforce 

to function cohesively and collaboratively, from senior management to the rank-and-file 

employees on the front lines of transportation security. In this regard, TSA is failing. 

Starting in 2015, the Committee received credible allegations of misconduct involving 

senior-level officials, and retaliation against whistleblowers who spoke up. The Committee 

launched an investigation and obtained documents and testimony substantiating many of the 

allegations. Senior TSA officials engaged in recurrent misconduct with minimal consequences. 

The Committee also found TSA leadership inappropriately used involuntary directed 

reassignments to retaliate against disfavored employees and whistleblowers, among other tactics. 

Making matters worse, TSA—under the direction of the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Office of General Counsel (OGC)—obstructed various investigations which 

would have shed light on the agency’s culture by withholding documents and information from 

Congress and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). 

The toxic combination of unchecked misconduct by senior officials and retaliation 

against rank-and-file whistleblowers undermined employee morale, reflected in the agency’s 

astronomical attrition rates (as high as 20 percent in some segments of the workforce during the 

period in question)2and abysmal ranking in a government-wide job satisfaction survey (336 out 

of 339 agencies and components in 2017).3 

Senior TSA Officials Engaged in Misconduct

The Committee found current and former senior TSA managers engaged in misconduct 

with alarming frequency, and routinely received favorable treatment during the disciplinary 

process. For instance, an internal TSA investigation concluded the Assistant Administrator for 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis pursued an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate

and misled investigators. TSA’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) recommended his 

dismissal. TSA leadership ignored OPR’s recommendation and retained this Assistant 

Administrator with a lighter penalty. Minutes after he received OPR’s Notice of Proposed 

Removal, the Chief Counsel’s Office offered the Assistant Administrator a settlement agreement 

containing a 14-day suspension and a demotion with no loss in pay. He accepted. 

 

1 Examining Management Practices and Misconduct at TSA: Part II, Hearing before the H. Comm. On Oversight & 

Gov’t. Reform, 114th Cong. (May 12, 2016) (statement of Peter Neffenger, Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin.) [hereinafter 

TSA Hearing Part II – Neffenger Statement].

2 Examining the President’s FY 2019 Budget Request for the Transp. Sec. Admin., Hearing before the H. Comm. on 

Homeland Security, 115th Cong. (Apr. 12, 2018) (statement of J. David Cox, Sr., Nat’l Pres., Amer. Fed. Of Gov’t 

Employees).

3 Partnership for Public Service, “Best Places to Work Agency Rankings” (2017), available at 

http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/overall/sub. 
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The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted its own investigation into TSA’s 

disciplinary process. DHS OIG found, “TSA senior leaders deviated from standard policy and 

practice in a number of key respects indicating that [the Assistant Administrator] received 

unusually favorable treatment in the resolution of his disciplinary matter.”4

In another example, OPR recommended the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the 

Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement for removal. This Deputy Assistant 

Administrator was convicted of Driving While Intoxicated in January 2015. This TSA official 

sped the wrong way down a one-way street and struck and damaged several parked cars. She 

misled police by claiming she was not driving the car and falsely implicated a TSA aviation 

community stakeholder as the driver. Contrary to OPR’s recommendation, TSA management 

offered the Deputy Assistant Administrator a settlement agreement containing a 14-day 

suspension. She accepted. 

TSA’s decision to mitigate the consequences of misconduct by senior officials 

contributed to the appearance of a double standard with respect to discipline. As one former TSA 

counsel testified, at a minimum, it “create[s] a perception of favoritism.”5

TSA Used Involuntary Directed Reassignments as a Means of Retaliation

The Committee found senior TSA officials used involuntary directed reassignments to 

retaliate against disfavored employees, including whistleblowers. TSA inappropriately 

reassigned employees to new positions hundreds of miles from their stations without any 

discernable organizational need. Many of the reassignments caused considerable hardship on the 

affected employees due to financial and family obligations, forcing some to leave TSA altogether 

rather than accept the new post. Several TSA employees reported hearing senior officials discuss 

issuing directed reassignments as a means of forcing out disfavored employees. 

A Federal Security Director (FSD), Jay Brainard, was directly reassigned from Iowa to 

Maine. Assistant Federal Security Director (AFSD), Andrew Rhoades, was directly reassigned 

from Minnesota to Florida. 

In Brainard’s case, he informed TSA the reassignment would cause his family severe 

hardship, but the agency refused to reconsider or offer him the accommodations he needed. 

Brainard moved to Maine, filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, and 

accepted a settlement to relocate to Kansas. 

According to Rhoades, TSA management retaliated against him based on the false 

premise that he leaked security issues at the airport to the media. If Rhoades accepted the 

reassignment, it would have caused significant hardship including losing custody of his children. 

He filed complaints with the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission and OSC. OSC 

intervened and blocked Rhoades’s directed reassignment. 

 

4 DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF INSP. GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW: TSA’S HANDLING OF THE 2015 DISCIPLINARY 

MATTER INVOLVING TSES EMPLOYEE 16 (OIG-18-35) (Jan. 8, 2018).

5 Steven Colon Transcribed Interview 107–08, Dec. 07, 2016 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Colon Tr.]. 
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TSA Reached a $1 Million Settlement in the Case of Three Reassigned Employees

OSC reached a $1 million settlement with TSA over the case of three Deputy Federal 

Security Directors (DFSDs) for retaliatory directed reassignments. Sharlene Mata, Heather 

Callahan Chuck, and Frank Abreu served as DFSDs at Honolulu International Airport. The 

DFSDs identified and reported significant operational deficiencies at the airport. All three 

DFSDs maintained a tense working relationship with the Honolulu FSD. Senior TSA managers 

reassigned the three DFSDs to the U.S. mainland. Employees going through a directed 

reassignment typically receive 60 days to report to the new post. However, the DFSDs in this 

case were concurrently issued temporary duty assignments requiring them to report to their new 

posts in four days over the Easter weekend. All three filed whistleblower retaliation complaints 

with OSC. In May 2018, OSC reached a settlement with TSA on behalf of the DFSDs, which 

restored Mata and Abreu to positions in Hawaii in addition to $1 million in total compensatory 

damages. 

TSA and DHS Obstructed Investigations into TSA Misconduct and Retaliation

In May 2016, former Administrator Peter Neffenger testified he would rely on the results 

of OSC’s investigations into allegations of whistleblower retaliation to determine whether to 

impose discipline. However, TSA subsequently refused to provide OSC with unredacted 

documents necessary to complete its review of the retaliation cases. At the direction of DHS’s 

Office of General Counsel (OGC), TSA claimed these documents were protected attorney-client 

communications. TSA’s obstruction impeded OSC’s investigations.

During the Committee’s March 2, 2017 hearing, then-Acting TSA Administrator Huban 

Gowadia testified about the decision to redact and/or withhold documents from the DHS Acting 

General Counsel, Joseph Maher. After DHS refused to show the documents it was withholding 

from OSC to the Committee, a subpoena was issued to compel the production of the documents 

in question. Although the Department continued to withhold the documents even in the face of a 

subpoena, the documents reviewed in camera by the Committee showed TSA’s redactions were 

applied excessively, inconsistently, and without legal justification, thereby creating the 

appearance the agency was intentionally obstructing OSC’s investigation.

In a January 18, 2018 bipartisan letter to Secretary Nielsen, the Committee requested a 

transcribed interview with then-DHS Acting General Counsel Maher and demanded the 

production of the full universe of documents covered by the subpoena. DHS and TSA refused.

TSA officials involved in wrongdoing remain in senior positions, a number of OSC 

whistleblower cases have yet to be resolved, and TSA and DHS OGC continue to obstruct the 

Committee’s investigation. The Department’s posture on oversight—especially on issues which

threaten to undermine TSA’s core mission—signals the underlying problems are not likely to be 

addressed by current leadership. 

TSA must improve its culture. As one whistleblower testified, “TSA’s problems are 

rooted in the areas of leadership and culture. Ours is a culture of misconduct, retaliation, lack of 

trust, cover-ups and the refusal to hold its senior leaders accountable for poor judgment and 
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malfeasance.”

6 For a myriad of reasons, including the safety of our country and her citizens, TSA 

must do better. The Department’s Office of General Counsel is currently standing in the way of 

that effort.

 

6 Examining Management Practices and Misconduct at TSA: Part I, Hearing before the H. Comm. On Oversight & 

Gov’t. Reform, 114th Cong. (Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Andrew Rhoades) [hereinafter TSA Hearing Part I –

Rhoades Statement]. 
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II. Senior TSA Officials Engaged in Misconduct 

Through the course of their investigations, both the Committee and the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) discovered a pattern of misconduct 

among current and former senior level managers. In one example, an Assistant Administrator 

committed offenses sufficient for removal from federal service. Other senior TSA officials, 

however, circumvented the normal disciplinary process to allow him to stay with minimal 

consequences. Similarly, other TSA managers and leaders faced consequences not 

commensurate with the severity of their misconduct. 

A. An Assistant Administrator Committed Removable Offenses but TSA 

Senior Leadership Intervened to Allow Him to Stay at TSA

Based on an anonymous complaint received on December 10, 2014, TSA’s Office of 

Inspection (OOI) launched an investigation into the Assistant Administrator for the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis. OOI’s investigation found he committed misconduct including

engaging in inappropriate behavior with a female employee, misusing his position during the 

hiring process, and lacking candor with investigators.

7 TSA’s Office of Professional 

Responsibility (OPR) recommended this official be dismissed based on these findings.

8 Despite 

this recommendation, senior TSA officials intervened to offer him a less severe punishment.

1. The Assistant Administrator for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

Engaged in Inappropriate Behavior Towards a Female TSA Employee

During the summer of 2014, a mentor-mentee relationship developed between the TSA 

Assistant Administrator and a female TSA employee. The relationship became inappropriate 

when the Assistant Administrator, the mentor, vocalized feelings for the mentee beyond those of 

friendship.9 The mentee, described their relationship to investigators:

We maintained this friendship through the summer of 2014, at which time 

I began to suspect [he] had developed feelings for me beyond those of a 

platonic relationship. These feelings were unreciprocated, and [he] and I 

went to lunch with a third party, [redacted name], to address the issue. At 

lunch [he] admitted to having feelings for me beyond those of friendship, at 

which point I told him, in the presence of [redacted name], that our 

relationship would never evolve into anything other than the friends that we 

had become.10

 

7 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, I150026, 5 (2015) [hereinafter

ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION].

8 Memorandum from Donna Rachuba, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to Assistant 

Adm’r, Office of Intelligence Analysis, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 15-5087, Notice of Proposed Removal (June 15, 

2015) [hereinafter Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal].

9

Id. 

10 Id. at 25.
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That fall, the Assistant Administrator’s behavior escalated. Colleagues of the female

employee stated she told them he was contacting her frequently, day and night, about problems 

with his home life.

11 If he called and she did not answer, the Assistant Administrator would text 

or email until she responded.12 The female employee told OOI the Assistant Administrator had 

become upset with her and accused her of not being a good friend, because she was not being 

attentive enough to him.13 She stated the two went to lunch to address the issue, and he again 

discussed his feelings for her, but ultimately, said he understood she would never be more than a 

friend.14 She further stated, the Assistant Administrator sent her a sexually explicit e-mail the 

next evening, the content of which upset and angered her.15

 

11 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 83–87.

12

 Id. at 83–87.

13 Id. at 25–28

14 Id.

15 Id. at 25–26. 
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The female employee told investigators, “[he] then added an inappropriate reference, which he 

referred to as comic relief. . . . The comment in conjunction with his recent behavior made me 

angry, so we had an argument, during which I expressed my exasperation.”16

The female employee further stated the Assistant Administrator apologized and offered to 

resign.17 She believed his resignation was unnecessary, but asked him to leave her alone for the 

foreseeable future.18 According to the female employee, the Assistant Administrator next spoke 

with her to inform her he would be the new Assistant Administrator of TSA’s Office of 

Intelligence Analysis, where she worked, and asked if she was uncomfortable with this. She 

stated she “did not give him much of an answer at the time.”

19 He continued to approach her in 

ways that made her uncomfortable after this encounter, but before he formally assumed the OIA 

position.

20 On November 24, she emailed a coworker stating “I’ve been visited twice already this 

morning. I’m very uncomfortable.”21 The Assistant Administrator disclosed this encounter to 

multiple coworkers, and even emailed her mother, writing “I already got my first visit. He asked 

me to go to lunch. I said no, and he got pissy. So we have to have another ‘talk’ today.”

22 That 

afternoon she emailed him stating, “I’m sorry but I can’t [sic]. No more synching, texting, 

emailing or visits. You are AA [], and I am [sic] a J-band here at TSA.”

23 She further stated, “I 

have kept all of your other secrets, and will continue to do so. So, please no more 

communication.”24

On March 12, 2015, OOI interviewed the Assistant Administrator about the allegation of 

an inappropriate relationship. The Assistant Administrator repeatedly told investigators there was 

“nothing sexual” about his relationship with the female employee, stating he viewed her as a 

“teenage daughter.”25 He stated he had never asked for the relationship to be more than 

friendship, and he had never engaged in sexual conduct with or written sexual things to her.

26

When OOI presented the Assistant Administrator with a copy of his sexually explicit 

email, however, he admitted he sent the message to the female employee. He also admitted they 

had discussed sex, the email was inappropriate, and they had gone back and forth about “we are 

not going to go sexual.”

27 The Assistant Administrator further admitted their relationship was 

inappropriate for the workplace.28 He acknowledged in a sworn statement he had made “an 

inappropriate sexual comment,” but maintained their relationship was not sexual or romantic.

29

The Office of Inspection explained in its Report of Investigation:

30

 

16 Id. at 26

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 184

22 Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 4; ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 186.

23 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 187.

24 Id. 

25 Id. at 33–34.

26 Id. at 34.

27 Id. at 34–45.

28 Id. at 35.

29 Id. at 39–40. 

30 Id. at 8.
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The Assistant Administrator admitted to the Committee he knew the relationship was 

inappropriate long before his interview with OOI, but did not disclose his conduct to OOI 

investigators.

31 He testified:

Q. So when you say you suspected, what precisely did you suspect prior 

to March 12th? [The start of the OOI investigation]

A. Well, the first thing I noticed was when [name redacted] ceased all 

communications for no reason around March 8th. That was my first 

indication. I mean, we were on good terms, talking, and then it just 

stopped. So at that point I pretty much assumed something was up.

Q. Did you have any guesses as to what was up, to use your words?

A. I certainly thought the possibility of an investigation the day she 

stopped talking to me.

Q. Why would you think that there would have been an investigation?

A. Because I knew – I mean, my relationship was not right.

Q. So you knew at that time your relationship was inappropriate?

A. I believe it was, yes.

Q. When did you first arrive at that understanding?

A. When I got told I was going to OIA, I knew I had a problem.

Q. What was the time frame of that?

A. November 21st, 2014, approximately.

Q. So did you do anything to act upon that knowledge that there was a 

problem?

 

31 Ass’t Adm’r Transcribed Interview 119–21, Apr. 2016 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Ass’t Adm’r Tr.].
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A. I did. Not enough, but I went to [name redacted], and I told her that 

there’s a potential that I’d be reassigned to OIA and for the first time 

she would be in my chain of command. I had indicated that I need 

to report it. She said – well, I asked her, do you have any concerns 

if I come in as your chain of command. She said no. I said, I need 

to report it. And she said, I wouldn’t do that. I’m close to leaving 

OIA and going to training so why bother? And I incorrectly did not 

report it. 

Q. So you didn’t report at any time between November of 2014 and 

March of 20 – the first of March, we’ll say, of 2015?

A. Right. The first time I said anything to my supervisor was actually 

the morning of my interview.32

The Assistant Administrator also claimed to OOI investigators he had disclosed his 

relationship to Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield, his direct supervisor at the time, and 

Acting Administrator Melvin Carraway, his direct supervisor in December 2014.33 Both Hatfield 

and Carraway told investigators the Assistant Administrator never disclosed any friendship or 

relationship with this subordinate.34 In fact, the Assistant Administrator admitted he only told 

Hatfield the morning of his interview with investigators. He stated: 

The fact that they said I did not discuss this with Acting Deputy 

Administrator, Hatfield, that is true. I said I discussed it with him. They 

interviewed Mr. Hatfield on March 4th. As of March 4th, I did not have a 

conversation with him. I spoke to Mr. Hatfield on the morning of March 

12th about my relationship with [name redacted]. Now, to be candid, the 

afternoon of March 12th I got pulled in for the interview. But when I said in 

that interview – they said have you talked to Mr. Hatfield about this, I said, 

yes, I have. I talked to him that morning about it. But when they interviewed 

him on March 4th, I had not spoken to him about it.35

Hatfield and Carraway both denied this happened.36 Hatfield testified:

Q. When did [the Assistant Administrator] reveal to you his 

relationship with [name redacted]? 

A. You know, I don’t – when you say reveal his relationship, I don’t 

know that he ever said, you know, “I’m revealing my relationship 

with [name redacted].” I think that in context of conversations 

 

32 Id.

33 Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 9–10.

34 Id.

35 Ass’t Adm’r Tr. 104.

36 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 61, 63.
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where early on we knew he was under investigation, and he would 

occasionally make declarative statements about his innocence or, 

you know, he had done nothing wrong in relation to her. 

So I’m not sure that there was really any other – any disclosure of 

relationship. And it was an assumption that I knew what the 

allegations were, and he would declare his innocence.37

The Assistant Administrator testified he did not disclose to investigators when he talked to 

Hatfield about the relationship. He stated:

A. I mentioned that I mentioned it – I disclosed it to my previous 

supervisor, John Halinski. I mentioned it to Mark Hatfield. And I 

said I may or – I said I can’t – I said I possibly mentioned it to –

well, it should be right in here –

Agency Counsel. You have a supplemental two pages. 

A. The third one was . . . 

Q. There was a third individual; is that correct?

A. Yes. I said something like I may have – may have or possibly 

mentioned it to Mr. Carraway.

Q. Did you describe when you disclosed it to Mr. Hatfield?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you see it as relevant at all that it had been that same morning?

A. I did not disclose when I talked to Mr. Hatfield about it.

* * * 

Q. Can you describe to us why you failed to disclose it? 

A. I thought it would look disingenuous.

Q. Okay. Do you believe that it was disingenuous to disclose or to 

communicate that you had disclosed it without providing the time 

frame?

A. Yes.

38

 

37 Mark Hatfield Transcribed Interview 58–59, Feb. 23, 2017 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Hatfield Tr.].

38 Ass’t Adm’r Tr. at 148–49.
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Carraway told OOI investigators the Assistant Administrator never disclosed to him he 

had a relationship with a subordinate.39 Carraway also explained he was in fact the Assistant 

Administrator’s supervisor at the time this was happening and the Assistant Administrator was 

ultimately reassigned to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.40

Another senior TSA official stated the Administrator asked him to lie on his behalf about 

the alleged sexual harassment of a different female subordinate TSA employee.41 Mark 

Livingston, a program manager with the Chief Risk Officer at TSA, testified the Assistant 

Administrator attempted to coerce him into lying to investigators. Livingston stated:

When I told [the Assistant Administrator] after he sexually harassed my 

executive assistant, he told me if I didn’t lie for him that I was going to be 

on his “S” list. And then when I told him that I would not lie after he 

sexually harassed her, he told me that if I didn’t, him and the others couldn’t 

work with me. 

What that meant to me was everybody else was covering for everybody else. 

They all circled the wagon. And I didn’t want to be a part of it. This was the 

third time that I had known [he] to be part of something tawdry. They were 

mostly all dirty. I didn’t want to be a part of it. And he made it clear to me 

that if I wasn’t going to be part of the dirtiness of the other SES’s, then they 

were going to shun me. I didn’t think that was a big deal. I figured it was 

just him, but it was everybody.42

Documents and testimony show the Assistant Administrator pursued an inappropriate 

relationship with a subordinate and sent explicit communications to her. He then misled OOI 

investigators about the nature of the relationship until he was presented with the sexually explicit 

email.

2. The Assistant Administrator Abused His Authority and Position

During the summer of 2014, the Assistant Administrator violated TSA hiring practices by 

hiring an individual outside the competitive process.43 His office posted an open position for a KBand Executive Advisor.44 The individual he wanted for the position applied but was not 

selected for the Best Qualified list. Witnesses indicated the Assistant Administrator was “notably 

disappointed” when his preferred candidate did not make the certification list.

45

 

39 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 63.

40 Id.

41 Mark Livingston Transcribed Interview 39, Apr. 5, 2016 (on file with Committee) [hereinafter Livingston Tr.].

42 Id.

43 Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 11–13.

44 Id.

45 Id.
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Susie Williams, then the Director of the Business Management Office within the Office 

of Inspection, worked closely with the Assistant Administrator throughout the hiring process.46

She testified how he went around proper protocol. She stated:

Q. Do you recall [the Assistant Administrator] asking you whether he 

had the authority to approve a noncompetitive promotion instead?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the conversation like?

A. He asked if he could noncompetitively promote [name redacted]

into the executive adviser position and asked for the cite policy 

reference, which then I provided.

Q. So, in a situation like this, would he have had to close the vacancy 

and then open up a new one?

A. You would close out the certificate, the competitive vacancy 

announcement, as non-selectees, and then reissue a 52, a new 

personnel action.47

Williams explained the announcement was prepared correctly for an Executive Advisor 

and she advised him to interview the applicants who made the certification list.48 The interviews 

were scheduled for 10-15 minute blocks with him alone.49 According to Williams, this was 

unprecedented. She testified:

Q. Your testimony indicates that 10- to 15-minute blocks for 

interviews, quote, “was unprecedented,” end quote. Why was this 

unprecedented? 

A. Because it’s never happened before. 

Q. How do you know that it’s never happened before? 

A. It hasn’t happened while I was – from the information that I know 

about, for the recruiting in our office. 

Q. Do you know why the meetings were scheduled in such short 

blocks? 

 

46 See generally Susie Williams Transcribed Interview, May 20, 2016 (on file with Committee) [hereinafter 

Williams Tr.]; see also Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 11–13.

47 William Tr. at 37.

48 Id.; see also ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 95.

49 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 95.
Page | 17

A. I don’t know. 

Q. Did [the Assistant Administrator] keep meeting notes? 

A. No.50

After the interviews, the Assistant Administrator indicated none of the candidates was 

right for the job, and instead, promoted his preferred candidate through a non-competitive 

process.

51 He assigned her fewer duties than an Executive Advisor would normally have

received, leaving the leftover work to the other Executive Advisor and directors.52 OOI found he 

attempted to “clear the air” and explain to the OOI Advisory Group why he chose the individual 

as Executive Advisor outside the normal processes.

53 He explained he was never looking for a 

subject matter expert—even though the job necessitated it—but was instead looking for a 

scheduler.54 The hiring of a Program Assistant went similarly. Williams testified:

Q. Do you have any recollection of the hiring of a program assistant by 

the name of [name redacted]?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you kind of describe the process through which she was hired?

A. [The Assistant Administrator] wanted to bring her over, 

noncompetitive reassignment. It’s not a promotion. We didn’t have 

a position that was available, a cover sheet that was established, like 

a PD. So we had to go through the position classification review 

process, which we did, and the outcome was a secretary position.

And she was initially provided a tentative offer, which was then later 

declined by [name redacted]. And then ultimately a reclassification, 

a new discussion occurred regarding the position, and then she was 

placed into the position.

Q. Was that unusual in any way?

A. It wasn’t unusual except for that just the manager didn’t want a 

secretary position for the position, for the classification of the 

position. 

Q. Did [name redacted] end up serving in the capacity as a secretary?

 

50 William Tr. at 81.

51 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 6; Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 11–12.

52 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 95–96.

53 Id. at 11–12.

54 Id..
Page | 18

A. As a program assistant position, was the final classification.

Q. That was the classification, but in terms of duties, was she acting 

more like a program assistant or –

A. Yes.

Q. So she actually did perform duties more like a program assistant.

A. Yes.

Q. What was [the Assistant Administrator’s] reaction when the 

description was returned as a secretary?

A. He said he didn’t want that position – didn’t want that position to be 

classified as a secretary.55

There is also evidence the Assistant Administrator used his position to influence other’s 

opportunities. One federal law enforcement officer with TSA explained in her sworn statement to 

investigators, “I was afraid to state my dissatisfaction of not getting the position. [The Assistant 

Administrator] has a reputation for getting what he wants and he knows many people. I was 

afraid my action I took would result in retaliation.”56

The Executive Advisor for the Office of Inspection noted in her statement to investigators 

regarding the executive advisor job search, “[t]he selection of [name redacted] by [the Assistant 

Administrator] caused a negative impact . . . ; I was a witness to many conversations regarding 

her lack of knowledge and experience, and the perception [he] selected her as a favor to the Front 

Office/John Halinkski [sic] [Deputy Administrator].”57 She also told OOI investigators: 

On June 3, 2014, at the OOI All Hands Meeting, [the Assistant 

Administrator] announced that he was not initially going to make any 

changes so that he could determine if anything needs to be fixed. He then 

stated that he was bringing (redacted) into OOI on a detail to be his 

Executive Advisor and (redacted) on a detail as his Executive Assistant. 

[The Assistant Administrator] stated that both of them would work directly 

for him. After the All Hands meeting, a handful of people asked me if I had 

lost my position as Executive Advisor.58

The Executive Advisor went on to explain how the decision to hire both these individuals 

presented problems within the office. She testified to OOI:

 

55 Williams Tr. at 45–46.

56 ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 128–29.

57 Id. at 148. 

58 Id.
Page | 19

In mid-June 2014 (approximately), (redacted) started a 90-day detail in the 

AA Executive Advisor position. After I introduced myself to her, she told 

me that she started with the Office of Global Strategies and worked there 

for several years, and spent one year with the TSA’s Front Office. When 

asked, she told me that she had not worked for [him] previously. I believe 

that (redacted) began working in OOI around the same time frame; she told 

me that she worked in the Office of Security Operations. During (redacted) 

and (redacted) tenure with OOI (June 2014 - early December 2014), 

whenever they entered [his] office, the door would always be closed.59

In the Assistant Administrator’s Notice of Proposed Removal, OPR stated his “action in 

posting and selecting for a position at the K band, based on its stated duties and responsibilities 

when [he] knew they were not the duties and responsibilities to be performed is inappropriate 

and unacceptable.”60 OPR further stated the actual duties and responsibilities of the position 

“would never sustain a K-band classification if reviewed.”61

Documents and testimony show the Assistant Administrator ignored the proper hiring 

process and chose to personally select individuals he wanted in those positions. Additionally, 

after hiring one particular individual, he removed a significant portion of that person’s workload 

and passed it on to others.

3. OPR Recommended the Assistant Administrator be Dismissed from TSA

TSA Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield testified the final decision to propose 

the Assistant Administrator for removal came from Heather Book, Assistant Administrator for 

OPR. Hatfield stated:

Q. You mentioned you didn’t recall how you found out about the notice 

of proposed removal for [the Assistant Administrator]. To clarify, 

do you know who had communicated that with you? 

A. It was either Heather Book or [Chief Counsel] Francine Kerner. 

Q. Do you recall who made the decision to propose [his] removal? 

A. That would be Heather Book, because that’s her role as the head of 

that office. So she takes it, you know, as I said, she fields – she 

staffs the cases, and then the case officer, I don’t – I don’t know 

what happened behind the curtain, but they process it somehow and 

they – I think they’re all attorneys. So they then forward it back to 

her, and I think they recommend to her, and then she either accepts 

 

59 Id.

60 Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 13. 

61 Id.
Page | 20

or modifies that recommendation and then forwards it to the deputy 

administrator.62

Hatfield believed the proposal for removal was a severe punishment—perhaps too severe—for 

the Assistant Administrator. He testified:

Q. So I just want to be clear here, looking at exhibit 3, the policy states 

again, “In accordance with TSA’s personnel security program, 

supervisors must report any information that raises doubts about an 

employee’s continued eligibility for TSA employment or security 

clearance such as access to sensitive information.”

Here, you’ve just been presented with a notice of proposed removal 

that indicates he, [the Assistant Administrator], exhibited poor 

judgment, he exhibited a lack of candor, he was untruthful in 

responses given to the Office of Investigation. Why doesn’t this rise 

to the level of something that under TSA’s policy a supervisor must 

report for review by the personnel security program?

A. It’s a reasonable question, and this is black and white. It’s all in 

writing. And when you sit in Solomon’s seat and you’ve got to make 

decisions about people’s lives, you take into account the totality of 

the situation, the specifics of the individual case, and I made my 

decision at that time. And I stand by it today. I’ll take ownership of 

it. If you have a problem with that, proceed accordingly.

I know there’s a lot of people who had a lot of animus for [him]. I 

was agnostic. I thought that he was a young man with potential. I 

think that he served his country honorably in the United States 

Marine Corps. And I think that he, unfortunately, had some bad 

supervisors who – you know, he learned a way of doing business 

there – I’d like to finish – he had a way of doing business there that 

was a little roughshod. 

And I think that in the course of all of this he faced termination, he 

suffered severe discipline. And I stand by my assessment of the case 

that he was a young man with potential for rehabilitation and 

deserved the punishment, but also deserved a chance to be 

rehabilitated. That’s the best I can offer you.63

Pursuant to TSA’s process, a deciding official ultimately determines the discipline, taking 

OPR’s proposal into consideration. Steven Colon, the former Assistant Chief Counsel for 

 

62 Id.

63 Id. at 88–89.
Page | 21

Administrative Litigation in the Office of Chief Counsel, testified how TSA determined the 

deciding official. He testified:

Q. In [the Assistant Administrator’s] case, who was the deciding 

official? 

A. I don’t even know at this point. So the assigned deciding official I 

believe was going to be Mr. McShaffrey, the deputy assistant 

administrator of OPR. 

Q. And how was the assignment formalized? 

A. It is actually formalized in the proposing – the proposal notice. In 

the proposal notice, you will indicate who the deciding official is 

and, you know, how to contact them and set it up. So that, to me, is 

the official document saying, okay, this person is your deciding 

official because you’re delivering it to the employee. 

How that was worked out by Ms. Book and Mr. McShaffrey and 

anyone else who may have had any involvement in that decision, 

that I do not know. 64

At the time, General Francis Taylor had been Acting Administrator of TSA for three 

weeks and wanted to be involved in any personnel decision.65 TSA Chief Counsel Francine 

Kerner told the Committee about her conversation with General Taylor. She testified:

What happened with this case was – this was during a period of 

transition, so we had the removal notice all written up and ready to 

go. Mark Hatfield was then the Deputy Administrator. General 

Taylor was named the Acting Administrator after Mel Carraway had 

been removed.

Shortly after General Taylor came on board – and he’s a formidable 

presence – there was a meeting called in his office. I didn’t call the 

meeting. The meeting was called by General Taylor. At that meeting 

was Mark Hatfield, General Taylor, Heather Book, and me. General 

Taylor made it very clear that he wanted to be – emphatic, he was 

emphatic, “Don’t I have a say?” And he was well aware of the facts, 

and he had an opinion, and his opinion is the one that I shared with 

you, that he had worked with [the Assistant Administrator], that he 

thought highly of his work, that this was a matter of the heart, that 

 

64 Colon Tr. at 143.

65 TSA briefing to Committee staff; Briefing by General Francis Taylor, Transp. Sec. Admin., Adm’r, to staff, H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Apr. 21, 2016) [hereinafter General Taylor briefing] and briefing by Transp. 

Sec. Admin. to staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (May 3, 2016) [hereinafter May 3, 2016 TSA 

briefing to Committee staff].
Page | 22

there was no question in his mind that [he] could be rehabilitated, 

and that he did not want [him] removed.66

According to the DHS OIG, this meeting took place on or around June 12, 2015, 

approximately one week after Taylor had assumed the role of Acting Administrator.67 In the 

meeting, Book strongly supported removing the Assistant Administrator while Hatfield 

supported a lesser penalty.

68 Kerner told the DHS OIG she agreed with Hatfield’s position, but 

did not explicitly state this at the meeting.69 Taylor ultimately decided the Assistant 

Administrator’s offenses were a “crime of emotion” and did not warrant removal, but instead 

should be penalized by relieving him of his leadership position and reassigning him.70 The 

decision to mitigate the Assistant Administrator’s punishment led to a series of unusual actions 

inconsistent with TSA’s normal disciplinary process. 

Originally, Scott McShaffrey, the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator of Office of 

Professional Responsibility, was to be the deciding official.

71 Typically, if a conflict of interest 

arises in a case, the deciding official chooses whether to recuse himself.72 According to Kerner, 

McShaffrey had worked closely with the Assistant Administrator in the past, but determined 

there was no conflict.73 On June 12, following the meeting with General Taylor, Book asked 

McShaffrey to take Donna Rachuba’s place as proposing official and issue the Assistant 

Administrator a 14-day suspension and directed reassignment.74 McShaffrey stated he was 

uncomfortable with this request, because as the designated deciding official, he had been walled 

off from the process and had not had the opportunity to independently review the facts of the 

case.75 McShaffrey found the handling of the case unusual enough to begin keeping private 

contemporaneous notes of the matter. Book then requested Rachuba to change her 

recommendation, which she refused to do.76 According to Book, Hatfield, who as Acting Deputy 

Administrator was also her supervisor, eventually asked Book to name him the deciding official 

instead of McShaffrey—even though Hatfield had previously worked under the Assistant 

Administrator.

77 Hatfield stated:

Q. Were you aware that Scott McShaffrey was the name of the deciding 

official on the draft notice?

A. Now that you remind me, I do.

 

66 Francine Kerner Transcribed Interview 75–76, Dec. 5, 2017 (on file with Committee) [hereinafter Kerner Tr.].

67 DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF INSP. GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW: TSA’S HANDLING OF THE 2015 DISCIPLINARY 

MATTER INVOLVING TSES EMPLOYEE 8–11 (OIG-18-35) (Jan. 8, 2018).

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 May 3, 2016 TSA briefing to Committee staff.

72 Id.

73 Id.

74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Id.

77 Id.
Page | 23

Q. How did you find that he was the deciding official on [the Assistant 

Administrator’s] case?

A. Just in the process, I would have been told that he was working on 

it. Yeah. So deciding – well, I don’t recall all the terms of, you know, 

but I do know, as you mentioned his name, because I remember 

Scott was involved, yes. 

Q. Was it customary for Mr. McShaffrey to – or somebody else from 

OPR to be the deciding official in OPR cases?

A. I didn’t have enough context to tell you what was custom or not. 

You know, I was taking it step by step as an individual case. And 

only in hindsight can I look back and say, okay, yeah, I mean, the 

other cases kind of fell along the same way. I didn’t have a year or 

2 or 3 of experience doing this. So –

78

* * *

Q. So you would typically, after recommendation from, say, 

McShaffrey, you would sit down and look at it and decide whether–

A. And I almost always dealt with and really only recall, Heather in 

terms of my direct. I mean, I saw McShaffrey on a regular basis, but 

typically Heather would represent that Office. 

Q. But after there was a recommendation, typically you and Francine 

Kerner and Heather Book would decide whether the case had been 

more straightforward and cut and dry?

A. Or whether it needed more attention.79

Hatfield testified he did not view himself as the deciding official, although he understood 

his role in the matter effectively rendered him the “de facto” deciding official. He stated:

Q. Would anybody else have considered you to be the deciding official 

on [the Assistant Administrator’s] case? 

A. You know, using that as the term of art, possibly, yeah. 

Q. And why would you say possibly if you just said that that was not 

your position? 

A. Well, I signed it, because that was my role as the deputy, to sign the 

 

78 Hatfield Tr. at 32–33.

79 Id. at 38–39.
Page | 24

final documents, but the decision was made with that group of four 

and, ultimately, the final decision was made by General Taylor, as I 

recall. 

Q. So you didn’t have any discussions about being formally placed in 

the position of deciding official or named the deciding official for 

[his] case or any other case that you were a part of? 

A. Well, by signing that, I was de facto – I mean, I signed it, so that 

made the decision. 

By the way, I supported this decision. I have no reluctance in telling 

you that, you know, in looking at the full scope of this case, I thought 

it was an appropriate disciplinary action. I thought it was a severe 

disciplinary action. He was suspended without pay. He was 

demoted three levels down, although – and he was taken out of the 

SES. 

So I’m not in any way trying to distance myself from that. It’s just 

the formal terms and roles, which I am going to beg for some latitude 

here that I don’t have the ability to give you, you know, real 

definitive answers. I certainly signed the final document, but I will 

go back and say that the decision was made with that group of four 

people.80

Book informed the Committee she had expressed concerns to Hatfield about a potential 

conflict of interest because he previously worked as a Federal Security Director under the 

Assistant Administrator.

81 Hatfield dismissed her concerns and effectively made himself the 

deciding official.82 According to Book, this had never happened before.83

On June 15, 2015, Scott McShaffrey delivered the Notice of Proposed Removal to the 

Assistant Administrator.

84 The proposal detailed four substantiated charges and their penalty 

range under the TSA Table of Offenses and Penalties.

85 The proposal detailed how he committed 

multiple offenses, and the lack of candor charges were aggravating factors in determining the 

penalty:86

 

80 Hatfield Tr. at 46–47. 

81 May 3, 2016 briefing to TSA Briefing to Committee staff.

82 Id.

83 Id.

84 Ass’t Adm’r Tr. at 162.

85 See generally Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal.

86 Id. at 14.
Page | 25

Under the aggravated penalty range, his four charges made him eligible for removal.87

Lack of candor alone has a recommended penalty of removal.88

Under TSA guidelines, the Assistant Administrator had seven days to submit an oral 

and/or written reply, which would then be considered by the Deciding Official to determine 

whether to sustain or mitigate the proposal.89

Other TSA officials learned of TSA’s handling of this case and were troubled by the 

agency’s failure to remove him and viewed it as evidence of a double standard in discipline for 

senior officials. Mark Livingston testified he believed the Assistant Administrator should have 

been removed based on TSA’s own investigation. He stated:

Q. You are referencing the ROI?

A. The result of the investigation for [the Assistant Administrator] from 

the Office of Inspection. In it there were three clearcut case[s] of 

lying from our inspector general. He was reduced from SES to LBand. That’s it.

Q. What does the Table of Penalties recommend for lack of candor?

A. The investigator recommended termination. The Office of Personnel 

Responsibility recommended termination. The Office of Chief 

Counsel recommended termination. But when it got to the head front 

office, either the deputy or the acting administrator didn’t do it. And 

when Mr. Neffrenger (sic), the administrator got it, his answer was, 

“Well, it has already been adjudicated.” You don’t get a second bit

(sic) of the apple. But what he didn’t do is he didn’t look at all the 

pending cases that are already there. 

* * *

That’s an example of what’s wrong with TSA. When there is an 

airtight proven case as a result of an investigation that is proven, not 

 

87 Id.

88 Id. at 14–15.

89 Id. at 16.
Page | 26

alleged or an allegation, but proven when there is concrete airtight 

proof of an SES who has misconduct and there is not appropriate 

taken, it doesn’t work.90

The same sentiment was shared by Assistant Federal Security Director for Mission Support, 

Andrew Rhoades. He stated:

[The Assistant Administrator] was given a very, very, very light infraction. 

In his example there were three lack of candor charges sustained by our 

Office of Inspections and the Office of Professional Responsibility. 

According to our table of penalties, one lack of candor charge is mandatory 

removal from service. He had three.91

TSA investigators found the Assistant Administrator pursued an inappropriate 

relationship with a subordinate, lacked candor in an interview with investigators, and abused his 

authority in his position. The Agency’s Office of Professional Responsibility investigated and 

recommended removal. Under proper protocol the deciding official should have been Scott 

McShaffrey, yet Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield requested to become the deciding 

official, even in the face of a conflict of interest. At that point, the Acting TSA Administrator, in 

collaboration with the Acting Deputy Administrator, Assistant Administrator of OPR, and Chief 

Counsel decided he would not be removed, instead offering him a simple settlement.

4. Minutes After the Assistant Administrator Received the Notice of Proposed 

Removal, Senior TSA Officials Offered Him a Settlement Agreement

On June 15, 2015, the same day the Assistant Administrator received the Notice for 

Proposed Removal, TSA counsel Steve Colon presented him with a settlement agreement.

Hatfield, Heather Book, the Assistant Administrator of OPR, and the Assistant Administrator all 

signed the agreement on June 18.92 The settlement rejected the recommendation to terminate 

him.

93

Colon drafted the settlement agreement at the behest of Francine Kerner. Colon testified 

he met with the Assistant Administrator to offer him the settlement. He stated:

Q. How did you learn that he was going to receive a notice of proposed 

removal? 

A. From my ultimate supervisor, the Chief Counsel, Francine Kerner, 

kept me after our usual meeting that we had on that – on Mondays 

at 11:00 a.m., and indicated to me that the Office of Professional 

Responsibility was going to serve a proposal for removal on [the 

 

90 Mark Livingston Tr. at 34–36.

91 Andrew Rhoades Transcribed Interview 97, Mar. 30, 2016 (on file with the Committee).

92 Settlement Agreement Between Ass’t Adm’r and the Tranp. Sec. Admin. (Jun. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Ass’t Adm’r 

Settlement Agreement].

93 Id. 
Page | 27

Assistant Administrator], but that the acting administrator, General 

Taylor, had determined that he wanted him to get – wanted him to 

stay on board. And so I was asked – I was told to meet with [the 

Assistant Administrator] to offer him a chance to take a settlement 

of the – of the proposed removal by taking the 14-day suspension 

and the loss of his position. 

Q. When did you meet with [the Assistant Administrator] to have that 

discussion? 

A. I met with [him] that afternoon on June 15th. I think it was around 

3:00 p.m. He had already been visited by assistant – deputy assistant 

administrator of OPR, Scott McShaffrey, who delivered the 

proposal to remove him, to him in his office space, which actually 

is in a SCIF. Because he was head – at that time, [he] was the 

assistant administrator of the intelligence group at TSA. At that 

point – right, I think, either – I think right prior to Mr. McShaffrey 

delivering a letter to me, he forwarded me a copy – I had requested 

of him that he forward me a copy of the proposal notice, so I could 

read it before I met with [the Assistant Administrator]. Prior to that 

time, I did not have any involvement with either OPR or any of the 

agency attorneys who had been apparently working on the proposal 

notice. So I didn’t know what was in it until I saw it.94

The settlement penalized the Assistant Administrator with a 14-day suspension, removed 

him from the Senior Executive Service for one year, and reduced his grade.

95 The proposed 

settlement did not affect his salary, even though he was demoted a grade.96

Acting Administrator Taylor never reviewed the Notice of Proposed Removal before 

TSA offered the settlement agreement.97 He reviewed only a summary memorandum provided 

by Acting Deputy Administrator Hatfield.98 Taylor conceded he was not aware the settlement 

agreement allowed the Assistant Administrator to retain his current salary level.99 

Colon believed the timing of the Assistant Administrator’s settlement—within minutes of 

receiving the notice of proposed removal—was odd. He testified:

Q. I recall you mentioning in the last hour that you had told [the 

Assistant Administrator] that the lack of candor charge, if you took 

it to the MSPB, is one that, given his prior position in the agency, is 

not one that you felt TSA would lose? 

 

94 Colon Tr. at 94–95.

95 Ass’t Adm’r Settlement Agreement.

96 Id.

97 May 3, 2016 TSA briefing to Committee staff.

98 Id.

99 Id.
Page | 28

A. That is correct. 

Q. Did you find it odd that [he], having faced this and three other 

charges, would be given the settlement that you ultimately drafted? 

A I found that it was odd that we would serve him with a proposed 

removal and then follow it up with a settlement. I just didn’t think 

it made any sense. You know, if you are thinking this is what you 

want to do to him, why would you serve him with a proposed 

removal that you had no intention of following through with. You 

know, I didn’t think that made any sense at all.100

Additionally, Hatfield appeared to be the deciding official for the settlement agreement.101 This 

conflicts with Chief Counsel Francine Kerner’s belief Hatfield was not the deciding official but 

was to settle the matter on behalf of TSA. She testified:

Q. The settlement agreement itself has Mark Hatfield as the deciding 

official.

A. Has Mark Hatfield as settling on behalf of the agency, which is a 

little bit different.

Can I just indulge you with a little bit of discussion of personnel of 

how the process works so that you understand how we got the 

settlement?

Q. Yes. Specifically, can you describe the parameters of what do you 

mean by personnel? Like in a disciplinary situation?

A. Yes, in a disciplinary situation.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay. So normally what happens when you’ve got – you’ve got 

the ROI, then you draft up whatever you think the proposal should 

be for discipline. If there is discipline. You may also give a letter 

of closure if you don’t think the report shows that anybody did 

anything wrong.

* * *

In this case, the administrator – the acting administrator, General 

Taylor, had already decided that he did not want the removal 

 

100 Colon Tr. at 141.

101 Kerner Tr. at 83.
Page | 29

action to be completed. Now, if [he] had not agreed to the 

settlement of the case, which was a demotion and a suspension, he 

would have had to face the removal action. And something to 

consider also is that, both with regard to the removal and the 

demotion, [he] had a right to go to the Merit Systems Protection 

Board. So even if you had gone to a deciding official and you had 

had the deciding official decide that he would just get demoted, 

[he] still had the right to take that to the Merit Systems Protection 

Board.

So here you have General Taylor deciding there won’t be a 

removal. And he understood the facts of the case very well from 

my observing what he said about [him] and what he said about the 

case.

Q. How do you think he became aware of the facts of the case?

A. Well, I know that he and Hatfield had a discussion about the case 

before we came in, because he started with a base of knowledge. 

And it was clear that Hatfield, who was deputy administrator, had 

talked to him.

102

Hatfield explained to the Committee he was the de facto signer for the settlement 

agreement—even though McShaffrey was the established deciding official as the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator of OPR. Hatfield stated:

Q. Would anybody else have considered you to be the deciding official 

on [the Assistant Administrator’s] case?

A. You know, using that as the term of art, possibly, yeah.

Q. Any why would you say possibly if you just said that that was not 

your position?

A. Well, I signed it, because that was my role as the deputy, to sign the 

final documents, but the decision was made with that group of four 

and, ultimately, the final decision was made by General Taylor, as I 

recall.

Q. So you didn’t have any discussions about being formally placed in 

the position of deciding official or named the deciding official for 

[the Assistant Administrator’s] case or any other case that you were 

a part of?

 

102 Kerner Tr. 83–85.
Page | 30

A. Well, by signing that, I was de facto – I mean, I signed it, so that 

made the decision.

By the way, I supported this decision. I have no reluctance in telling 

you that, you know, in looking at the full scope of this case, I thought 

it was an appropriate disciplinary action. I thought it was a severe 

disciplinary action. He was suspended without pay. He was demoted 

three levels down, although – and he was taken out of SES.

So I’m not in any way trying to distance myself from that. It’s just 

the formal terms and roles, which I am going to beg for latitude here 

that I don’t have the ability to give you, you know, real definitive 

answer. I certainly signed the final document, but I will go back and 

say that the decision was made with that group of four people.

Q. Do you know why Mr. McShaffrey did not signed the settlement 

agreement?

A. I don’t. I don’t know whether it was normal protocol to then move 

on to ask him or whether there was some reason that he didn’t do it. 

I was not aware of any.

Q. And, to clarify, I asked you if you had any communications about 

your role as the deciding official on [his] case, and you didn’t really 

directly say yes or no. 

A. I don’t recall.

Q. Okay.

A. But no evidence of this, I was de facto the final signature.103

The Assistant Administrator was given a Notice of Proposed Removal based on the 

investigation by OOI. The Notice explained the lack of candor allegation carried a punishment of 

up to removal. Multiple other substantiated allegations combined with the lack of candor charge 

should have resulted in his removal. Acting Administrator General Taylor, however, decided not 

to remove the Assistant Administrator based on Taylor’s conversation with Hatfield, Kerner, and 

Book. Kerner then instructed Colon to draft a settlement agreement to present to the Assistant 

Administrator, presented the same day as the Notice of Proposed Removal. 

 

103 Hatfield Tr. 46–47.
Page | 31

B. DHS OIG’s Investigation Determined Senior Managers Deviated from 

Agency Policy Regarding the Assistant Administrator 

At the Committee’s request, the DHS OIG investigated how TSA handled the Assistant 

Administrator’s misconduct and discipline.

104 On January 8, 2018, the DHS OIG released its 

report, confirming the Committee’s findings and concluding: “TSA senior leaders deviated from 

standard policy and practice in a number of key respects indicating that [the Assistant 

Administrator] received unusually favorable treatment in the resolution of his disciplinary 

matter.”105

The DHS OIG discovered senior current and former TSA officials “interfered with the 

disciplinary process in a way that circumvented the very TSA policies and procedures that were 

established to prevent favoritism in such circumstances.”106

According to the OIG, the Assistant Administrator’s case initially “proceeded along the 

normal course, with OOI investigating the allegations and OPR making a determination as to the 

appropriate charges to bring under the circumstances.”107 OPR Unit Chief, Donna Rachuba, 

“followed standard procedure, and her analysis and conclusions were informed by the facts and 

guided by relevant TSA policies.“

108

Further, the proposed penalty (removal) appears to have been warranted—if not 

required—by TSA’s Table of Penalties. However, the insertion of senior leadership caused the 

process to “go off course.”109 The OIG investigation released the following list—spanning 

eleven items—demonstrating the ways TSA senior officials improperly intervened or acted in the 

matter:

 DA Hatfield’s decision to circumvent the standard OPR process by 

involving General Taylor in the decision-making with respect to the 

TSES Employee’s penalty;

 DA Hatfield’s misleading suggestion to General Taylor that OPR had 

somehow exceeded its authority by proposing to remove a member of 

the TSES without senior leadership’s input;

 The failure by DA Hatfield, Chief Counsel Kerner, and AA Book to 

inform General Taylor—who was serving in an acting capacity and was 

entirely unfamiliar with TSA’s disciplinary policies and procedures—

 

104 Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Peter Neffinger, Adm’r., 

Transp. Sec. Admin. (Apr. 26, 2016) (The letter to Administrator Neffenger was forwarded to the DHS OIG to 

request the OIG initiate an investigation.); See also Letter from John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 

Office of Inspector Gen. to Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform (June 23, 2016).

105 DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF INSP. GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW: TSA’S HANDLING OF THE 2015 DISCIPLINARY 

MATTER INVOLVING TSES EMPLOYEE 2 (OIG-18-35) (Jan. 8, 2018).

106 Id. 

107 Id. at 13.

108 Id.

109 Id.
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that his involvement in the process was a deviation from standard 

practice and extremely unusual; 

 AA Book’s decision to circumvent OPR’s standard process by directing 

an OCC attorney to revise the NPR to remove the lack of candor charge 

and propose suspension instead of removal;

 AA Book’s decision to circumvent and/or improperly influence OPR’s 

standard process and objective, independent decision-making by asking 

the ADAA to take the [Unit Chief’s] place as the Proposing Official and 

dictating to the ADAA what penalty he should propose (i.e., a 14-day 

suspension with a directed reassignment following the suspension);

 AA Book’s decision to circumvent and/or improperly influence OPR’s 

standard process and objective, independent decision-making by 

attempting to dictate to the UC what penalty she should propose (i.e., a 

14-day suspension);

 AA Book’s decision to circumvent and/or improperly influence OPR’s 

standard process and objective, independent decision-making by 

replacing the ADAA with DA Hatfield as the designated Deciding 

Official; 

 Chief Counsel Kerner’s efforts to circumvent OPR’s standard process 

by initiating settlement negotiations with the TSES Employee before he 

was even aware that the Agency was considering his removal;

 OCC’s failure to comply with TSA Management Directive 1100.55- 9, 

Settlement Agreements, which requires that TSA’s Executive 

Resources Council (ERC) be consulted on any settlement agreement to 

which a TSES employee is a party, and tasks the TSA OCC with 

coordinating such agreements with the ERC;

 DA Hatfield’s efforts to ensure that the TSES Employee could “save 

pay” despite his demotion; and 

 Senior leadership’s efforts to achieve, by settlement, what it had failed 

to accomplish through its unsuccessful efforts to circumvent and/or 

improperly influence OPR’s standard process.110

Finally, DHS OIG discussed Chief Counsel Francine Kerner’s inability to fairly handle 

and adjudicate matters for the agency. The OIG explained:

 

110 Id. at 14–15.
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Chief Counsel Kerner proposed several justifications for the specialhandling of the TSES Employee’s case. First, she suggested that resolving 

the matter quickly via settlement saved the Agency money by ensuring the 

TSES Employee did not sit on paid administrative leave during the second 

phase of the disciplinary process (i.e., review by the Deciding Official). 

* * *

Based on DHS OIG’s review of cases involving similarly situated TSA 

employees, senior leadership does not appear to regularly pursue such cost 

savings by circumventing OPR’s standard process. Accordingly, DHS OIG 

does not find this justification compelling.111

Kerner told investigators she was concerned with the ways OOI and OPR functioned, claiming 

they had not fully developed the use of mitigating factors in their investigations. The DHS OIG 

found:

In particular, she noted that OOI does not always interview a subject’s 

supervisors to find out what kind of employee she or he is. Other witnesses 

echoed this concern. With respect to OPR, Kerner opined that the Agency 

had not devoted sufficient resources to OPR to make it the mature function 

it needed to be to properly adjudicate matters within its jurisdiction. 

According to AA Book, DA Hatfield echoed this concern to her – in 

particular, he had issues with the notion that a non-SES OPR employee 

could decide the professional fate of a member of the TSES without the 

input of senior leadership.112

The DHS OIG did not find Kerner’s justifications “compelling.”

113 The OIG wrote: “[o]perating 

outside of, or inconsistently with, existing policies and procedures subjects the Agency to risk. 

Among other things, employing a shadow disciplinary process for senior management fuels 

complaints about unjustly favorable treatment for high-level employees.”

114

C. TSA Senior Officials Continually Circumvented the Disciplinary Process 

to Avoid Repercussions for Their Actions 

Other senior TSA Officials engaged in misconduct with minor—and in some cases, no—

repercussion. The Committee received examples of senior level officials committing egregious 

acts of misconduct, being investigated for those acts, and then receiving a mild punishment not 

rising to the level required by the Table of Penalties. This pattern of mitigation allowed senior 

level managers at TSA to continue their misconduct, and consequently, decrease morale within 

the agency.

 

111 Id. at 15. 

112 Id. at 16.

113 Id.

114 Id.
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1. Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security Policy and Industry 

Engagement Drove While Intoxicated and Misled Police

On August 5, 2015, OPR issued a Notice of Proposed Removal to TSA’s Deputy 

Assistant Administrator in the Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement (OSPIE), for 

Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and misleading police about whether she was the driver of her 

vehicle.115 On October 26, 2015, TSA reached a settlement with her granting her a 14-day unpaid 

suspension instead of removal from federal service.116

The Deputy Assistant Administrator was arrested and charged with a Refusal of Breath 

Alcohol Test.117 According to the Notice of Proposed Removal (NPR), she was arrested after 

police officers “responded to a report of a white vehicle speeding the wrong way on a one-way 

street.”118 Police officers subsequently found her vehicle “parked facing westbound on the side 

of the one-way eastbound road with a person seated in the passenger seat.”119 The Deputy 

Assistant Administrator’s vehicle “was on the curb and it appeared to the police that it had 

sustained significant damage to the passenger side and that the front wheel base and axle were 

broken making the car inoperable.”120

OPR found, the Deputy Assistant Administrator “provided misleading and inconsistent 

information to police officers concerning who was driving her vehicle at the time of the offense, 

and how and when her vehicle was damaged.”121 The police report noted one of the responding 

officers approached the vehicle, tapped on the glass and “as [the Deputy Assistant Administrator]

opened the door, she put her hands in the air and without provocation announced ‘I’m not 

driving.’”

122 The officer reported “[w]hen [the Deputy Assistant Administrator] spoke, I 

immediately observed the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from her breath.”123 An 

officer asked her where the driver of the vehicle was and she identified another individual as the 

driver.

124 She claimed the driver left her alone in the car and went to an address, which she 

provided to the police.125 The NPR noted: 

[Her] attempt to blame someone else for the danger [she] put others in and 

for the property damage [she] caused was made more egregious by the fact 

that (redacted), the person [she] named as the driver of [her] vehicle is 

(redacted), a member of the aviation community. (Redacted) is a TSA 

 

115 Memorandum from Donna M. Rachuba, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to Dep. 

Ass’t Adm’r, Office of Sec. Policy and Indus. Engagement OPR 15-7266, Notice of Proposed Removal (Aug. 5, 

2015) [hereinafter Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal].

116 Settlement Agreement Between Dep. Ass’t Adm’r and Tranp. Sec. Admin. (Jun. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Dep. 

Ass’t Adm’r Settlement Agreement].

117 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., CASE NO. I150062, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 3 (May 

18, 2015) [hereinafter DEP. ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION].

118 Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 2.

119 Id.

120 Id. 

121 DEP. ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 3.

122 Id. at 23.

123 Id. 

124 Id. at 17.

125 Id.
Page | 35

stakeholder and a member of TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

(ASAC), which provides advice and recommendations to improve civil 

aviation security measures to the TSA Administrator.126

The Deputy Assistant Administrator’s assertions she was not driving the vehicle were 

contradicted by the witness who reported the crime.127 The NPR explains:

The witness identified [the Deputy Assistant Administrator] as the driver of 

the white speeding car and also told police that she had observed [the 

Deputy Assistant Administrator] exit the driver’s side of the car and then 

re-enter the car on the passenger side. . . . [T]he police officers discovered 

two parked cars nearby that had been struck and had damage consistent with 

the damage to [the Deputy Assistant Administrator’s] vehicle.”128

The ROI explained:

[A]fter several attempts during the breath alcohol testing, [she] failed to 

provide a sufficient breath sample as directed.129 [Her] statements to [the 

police officers] appear to have been intended to mislead the police into 

believing that [she was] not driving [her] car under the influence of alcohol 

prior to its coming to rest facing the wrong way on a one-way street, 

damaged and inoperable.130

The Deputy Assistant Administrator reported her arrest to TSA within 24 hours as 

required.131 On April 24, 2015, she pleaded guilty to the DWI charge and was sentenced to 180 

days in jail, 178 of which were suspended.132 She was interviewed by TSA’s OOI on May 4, 

2015.133 The Deputy Assistant Administrator “took full responsibility for her actions, according 

to the ROI. She did not contest the information in the police report.”134 She told OOI she had 

approximately four to five drinks and did not remember driving her car afterwards, her 

statements to the police officers, or hitting any parked cars.135

OPR determined the Deputy Assistant Administrator should be removed from federal 

service, noting “[a]s a Deputy Assistant Administrator and a member of the agency’s senior 

leadership team, the agency reasonably holds [her] to a higher standard of conduct than lower 

level employees.”136 It stated her “actions leading up to [her] arrest showed poor judgment. 

However, [her] subsequent attempts to conceal [her] actions by providing misleading 

 

126 Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 4.

127 Id. at 2.

128 Id.

129 DEP. ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 3.

130 Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 4.

131 Id. at 2. 

132 Id.

133 DEP. ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 3.

134 Id.

135 Id.

136 Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Notice of Proposed Removal at 3.
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information to the police regarding who was driving [her] vehicle has irretrievably undermined 

TSA’s ability to trust [her].”137

OPR noted the Deputy Assistant Administrator’s attempt to blame the ASAC member for 

driving the car “cannot be tolerated.”138 The Notice of Proposed Removal stated:

The negative nature of [her] conduct was further exacerbated by the fact 

that ‘her] consumption of alcohol to the point that [she] now maintain[s] 

that [she] cannot recall most of the events of the evening, including 

operating [her] car, was witnessed not only by a TSA stakeholder, but also 

by [redacted], [her] subordinate employee in OSPIE.139

Despite the severity of her conduct and OPR’s proposal to remove her from the agency, 

TSA granted the Deputy Assistant Administrator a settlement allowing her to remain in her 

position at TSA with a 14-day unpaid suspension and no demotion or change in salary.140 Under 

the terms of the settlement. She agreed to withdraw any pending legal claims against TSA, waive 

her right to pursue administrative or judicial action, and release the government of any claims or 

liabilities.141

Colon testified the Deputy Assistant Administrator’s supervisor mishandled the situation 

by failing to place the Deputy Assistant Administrator on administrative leave after she received 

the NPR.142 Colon ultimately attributed the decision to grant her the settlement to former TSA 

Administrator Peter Neffenger. He stated:

A. So I believe that Ms. Kerner was involved in – she had knowledge 

of it. I had heard about it. I didn’t have any involvement in it until 

after the proposal was issued, that there apparently was a movement 

by her supervisor that – the assistant administrator of the Office of 

Security Policy and Industry Engagement. We call it OSPIE, 

O-S-P-I-E, which is where [she] was the deputy assistant 

administrator, TSES. She – Mr. Mayenschein, when she received a 

proposal notice, you know, did not put her on administrative leave 

and did not change her duties. That ends up becoming a problem if 

I have to take that case to litigation because in a circumstance in 

which you’re proposing someone’s removal at that high level, they 

should not be continuing to do their job on a day-to-day basis, you 

know? At a minimum, he should have reassigned her to, you know, 

a job. She was, in fact, reassigned to counsel while the investigation 

was going on. She did not work for me. But, you know, so, 

ultimately it was my understanding – and so then I had mentioned 

to you earlier Michael Gaches, who is the person who covers for me 

 

137 Id. at 4.

138 Id. at 5.

139 Id.

140 Dep. Ass’t Adm’r Settlement Agreement.

141 Id. 

142 Colon Tr. 106–07.
Page | 37

when I am out, I had gone – I went on vacation and he ended up 

trying to negotiate a settlement of this case. And, if memory serves, 

it was because Mr. Neffenger had met with Ms. Kerner, and I 

believe – and I don’t know if he met with Ms. Kerner or he met with 

Mr. Mayenschein and told Ms. Kerner that he wanted to settle with 

her, but, ultimately, you know, we put forth, without her reply, a 

14-day suspension, no loss of security clearance – I’m sorry, no loss 

of position or no loss of the TSES. 

Q. You said you were out. Were you involved in the actual drafting or 

presenting of the settlement agreement in the case?

A. I am almost positive I reviewed – Mr. Gaches sent, I think, the 

negotiations back and forth in talking with [her] counsel. I didn’t –

I’m sure I reviewed the settlement agreement before it went for 

signature because I always do. You know? So I did see it, yes.143

Colon acknowledged the outcome of the case “was not the proper outcome” and the disposition 

of the Deputy Assistant Administrator’s and the Assistant Administrator’s cases contributed to 

perceptions of favoritism toward senior managers. Colon testified:

Q. What do you think the perception was in the agency about how [the 

Deputy Assistant Administrator] situation was handled? 

A. For anyone who knows about it, it’s – there was – for anyone who 

would know the circumstances of the misconduct and the ultimate 

outcome, that – you know, that that was not the proper outcome. 

Q. Do you think there is a perception at the agency that TSA senior 

management engages in favoritism at times? 

A. I believe that it’s – I believe when you don’t have – I believe that –

I know the perception. I believe that – I – you know, that it’s not 

necessarily favoritism per se. Because all of the – all proposal and 

decision processes, either at management level or at the OPR level, 

the deciding official has the right to mitigate the penalty. You 

know? Will that create a perception of favoritism? Absolutely. 

You know, I don’t know why General Taylor did what he did 

regarding [the Assistant Administrator]. You know, I don’t know 

why Mr. Neffenger did what he did, you know, to save [the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator]. But, you know, obviously you’re going 

to get a perception like that when you have your senior managers 

who have done, you know, bad things and you don’t, you know, 

come down on them whereas you – you know, you hear it all the 

 

143 Id. 
Page | 38

time, would you have done that for a line TSO? And, you know, as 

a comparison. Would a line TSO who had lied to the police, you 

know, said that an agency, you know – somebody who is a 

stakeholder of the agency, you know, was driving their car, and –

would they get off? And, so, I can see why.144

As Colon stated, TSA’s decision to allow the Deputy Assistant Administrator to remain 

in her position with only a 14-day suspension reinforced the perception senior leaders at TSA 

received more favorable treatment for misconduct than rank-and-file employees. 

2. Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections Made Offensive 

Comments, Engaged in Inappropriate Conduct, and Lied

On November 14, 2017, OPR issued a Notice of Decision (NOD) to remove the Assistant 

Federal Security Director for Inspections (AFSD) at a Midwest airport, from federal service. He 

was found to have made sexually inappropriate and racially offensive comments, engaged in 

inappropriate conduct, and to have lacked candor by falsely denying inappropriate comments.145

The decision to remove him came after years of misconduct, including incidents in which the 

airport’s FSD was present. 

On December 28, 2016, the FSD reported a complaint against the AFSD for Inspections 

to OOI alleging on November 30, 2016, the AFSD made inappropriate statements to a female 

employee, who was a subordinate in his division, comparing her breast size to his daughter’s. On 

December 28, 2016, the FSD also issued the AFSD a No Contact Order, prohibiting him from 

having any contact with the female employee.146 OOI’s investigation found the AFSD made 

numerous inappropriate and offensive comments about women as well as derogatory comments 

about Muslims.147

The female employee said the AFSD made approximately 10 to 12 statements she 

considered to be sexual harassment dating back to 2010 and detailed multiple inappropriate 

statements including the specific dates they occurred.148 She stated several of these incidents 

took place in the presence of other TSA employees, including a March 30, 2011, incident in 

which the AFSD, the FSD, and other employees discussed how many women they slept with 

while at port in the Navy.149 The female employee provided OOI with contemporaneous notes 

detailing incidents of harassment.150

 

144 Id. at 107–08. 

145 Memorandum from Donna M. Rachuba, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to Ass’t 

Fed. Sec. Dir. for Inspections, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 17-10087, Notice of Decision (Nov. 14, 2017). [hereinafter 

AFSD Notice of Decision]. 

146 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., CASE NO. I17-0046, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 3 (May 

19, 2017) [hereinafter AFSD REPORT OF INVESTIGATION]. 

147 AFSD Notice of Decision at 2–3.

148 Id.

149 Id.

150 AFSD REPORT OF INVESTIGATION at 16–17. 
Page | 39

The AFSD submitted to a polygraph examination.

151 The polygraph showed deception by

the AFSD in his responses to questions about whether he compared the employee’s breast size to 

his daughter’s.152 After being notified of the results, he admitted to making inappropriate 

comments toward women, recanted his original sworn statement, and provided a new one.153

Despite these admissions, the AFSD claimed he did not lack candor in his responses during the 

polygraph, tried to explain his inappropriate remarks, and claimed the female employee only 

became offended by his comments after she did not receive a promotion.154

Other accounts allege the AFSD made offensive comments stating women were less 

intelligent than men and were too emotional to hold leadership roles, such as “the reason the 

United States was in disrepair because women had been given the right to vote and women are 

not emotionally capable of being rational when it comes to politics”155 and telling a female 

employee “[he] hoped she had brought a global positioning system (GPS) because women in 

general were not smart enough to read a map or get from one place to another without 

directions.”156

One female employee explained, while she was pregnant, the AFSD made “mooing” 

sounds at her in the office on approximately four different occasions and he also said “[he] did 

not believe women should get maternity leave because, when women used to travel by wagon 

train, they would squat, have the baby, pick him or her up, and keep moving.”157

In addition to his offensive comments toward women, TSA employees stated he made 

derogatory comments about Muslims. Multiple employees acknowledged the AFSD referred to 

Muslims as “stupid ragheads” or “rag heads.”158 The AFSD admitted to making inappropriate 

comments about Muslims, including calling them “stupid ragheads.”159

In the Notice of Decision, the deciding official stated: 

[the AFSD’s] actions, taken as a whole, demonstrate a serious lack of 

judgment, which brings into question [his] reliability in performing [his] 

duties as a senior management official. I find that [his] actions have 

irrevocably damaged TSA’s ability to rely on [his] integrity, trustworthiness 

and to maintain confidence that [he] will appropriately perform [his] job 

responsibilities.160

The AFSD was allowed to engage in inappropriate behavior for at least seven years. 

Numerous employees stated either he harassed them or they witnessed his improper behavior

 

151 Id.

152 Id. 

153 Id. at 3–4.

154 Id. at 4–5. 

155 AFSD Notice of Decision at 2–3.

156 Id.

157 Id. at 3.

158 Id. 

159 Id. at 4.

160 Id. at 7.
Page | 40

over a span of time. TSA failed to respond in a timely manner, resulting in employees being 

subjected to years of harassment.

3. TSA Security Officials Engage in Several Acts of Sexual Misconduct

The Assistant Administrator’s and the AFSD’s sexual misconduct were not isolated 

occurrences. There is evidence of multiple instances of sexual misconduct by airport security 

officials including AFSDs and Deputy Assistant Federal Security Directors (DAFSDs). 

In September 2015, TSA issued a DAFSD a 14-day suspension for engaging in sexual 

relations in the workplace with a coworker between 2003 and 2009.161 The official accepted full 

responsibility for the misconduct, but had previously received a ten day suspension in 2005 for 

having an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee.162 A 14-day suspension is the 

maximum of the recommended penalty range for misconduct of a sexual nature, though the 

aggravated penalty range includes removal.163 

In a different September 2015 decision, TSA issued another DAFSD a 7-day suspension 

for sending a female subordinate inappropriate text messages between their personal cell 

phones.164 The DAFSD also left the female employee a voicemail referencing a recent article 

about a woman using an online dating application who had posted a picture online of herself in 

bed with a NFL player claiming she had slept with the athlete.165 The DAFSD asked in the 

message, “hey, that wasn’t you with [NFL player], was it?”166 The female employee told OOI in 

a sworn statement she felt “disrespected,” “extremely uncomfortable,” “sexual[ly] harassed,” and 

“degra[d]ed as a female.”167

Although OPR initially proposed a 14-day suspension, the deciding official reduced the 

DAFSD’s punishment to a 7-day suspension, a penalty in the middle of the recommended range 

for inappropriate/and or unwelcome verbal conduct of a sexual nature as opposed to the 

maximum.168 The deciding official cited the DAFSD acknowledged his conduct was 

unprofessional and inappropriate and indicated he “immediately stopped” his actions once “made 

aware of the objections” and his “approach to the workforce has changed dramatically” since the 

incident.169

A December 2017 Notice of Proposed Removal (NPR) for another DAFSD presents a 

parallel example to the Assistant Administrator’s case, but TSA’s disposition of the DAFSD’s 

case offers a contrast. According to the NPR, “[i]n or about 2012, [the DAFSD] had an intimate 

 

161 AFSD Notice of Decision.

162 Memorandum from Donna M. Rachuba, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to 

Deputy Assistant Fed. Sec. Dir. of Screening, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 15-9139, Notice of Decision (Sept. 11, 

2015) [hereinafter DAFSD1 Notice of Decision]. 

163 Id. 

164 Id.

165 Id.

166 Id.

167 Id. at 3. 

168 Id.

169 Id. at 9.
Page | 41

relationship with Transportation Security Officer (TSO), [redacted name], a subordinate 

employee. [The DAFSD] failed to report the relationship to [his] manager.”170 The DAFSD was 

also charged with Lack of Candor for falsely stating in an August 12, 2016 sworn statement, he 

had “not socialized with TSO [redacted] off duty” and had “never had a sexual relationship with 

TSO [redacted].”

171

After his initial denial, the DAFSD was confronted with the contradicting account in a 

second interview the same day. He then admitted he had a sexual relationship with the TSO and 

had sexual intercourse with her twice in 2012.172

The deciding official concluded the misconduct was aggravated and the DAFSD should 

be removed from federal service.173 The NPR noted: 

[The DAFSD’s] lack of candor is a serious offense. An employer has the 

right to expect any employee, when questioned about specific matters, to 

provide truthful and complete responses. An employee’s failure to be 

candid in response to agency inquiries and investigations calls into question 

the employee’s integrity, and has the potential to undercut the employee’s 

credibility in other matters. Lack of candor is particularly problematic, 

especially as a management official. The facts in this case show [the 

DAFSD’s] willingness to give an inaccurate account of events if it serves 

[his] self-interest.174

TSA’s senior management handled this case much differently than the Assistant 

Administrator’s case. The Assistant Administrator had a more senior title and management 

responsibility. He committed four counts of misconduct, including lack of candor. He only 

received a 14-day suspension with a demotion in title, not pay. By contrast, the DAFSD had a 

less senior title, fewer responsibilities, and engaged in only two acts of misconduct, but was 

removed from service.

175

These incidents illustrate a pattern of sexual misconduct among senior TSA officials. 

TSA must do more to prevent sexual misconduct and ensure officials who engage in such 

behavior are held accountable without double standards. 

4. Double Standards for Misconduct 

TSA’s lax treatment of misconduct by senior officials stands in contrast to the agency’s 

expectations of rank-and-file TSOs. For example, Kansas FSD Jason Brainard testified TSOs 

have been fired for picking up expensive pens dropped at a security checkpoint by inspectors 

conducting integrity tests. Brainard stated:

 

170 Memorandum from Denise D. Stark, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to 

[redacted employee], Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 16-1937, Notice of Decision (Dec. 6, 2017).

171 Id. at 2.

172 Id. at 2–3.

173 Id.

174 Id. at 5.

175 See generally ASS’T ADM’R REPORT OF INVESTIGATION. 
Page | 42

Q. Can you comment on the pen?

A. So the case in Des Moines which happened, as I understand it, a 

number of places because they were joking, it’s the most effective 

test they had. They come in with a pen. It’s a very expensive pen –

I – you know, if you are into pens. They dropped it –

Q. Is there a – is there a certain – is it manufactured by a certain –

A. It’s a Mont Blanc pen.

Q. And how much do those cost?

A. Couple hundred bucks. So they dropped it on the floor. TSO picked 

it up, hand it to Lee, Lee puts it into his pocket and goes home. And 

they talked him into resigning. They came back out and talked him 

into resigning.

There was an officer in Wisconsin, I believe, that he actually threw 

it in the dumpster because people just don’t put a value on pens. 

And I’ve got to tell you, I’m the biggest thief of pens in my 

operation. I’ll go to somebody’s office, I’ll pick up a pen and use it 

and I’ll walk out. I don’t do it for the intent to deprive somebody, 

but unfortunately, if I pick up a pen – I guarantee you, if you leave 

me a pen I’m taking it.

Q. Is there a reviewal of video that’s captured?

A. We actually had captured video provided to them and then they 

confront the employee with it.

Q. Provided to OOI.

A. Provided to OOI, yes, sir.176

Brainard further stated firing TSOs for picking up pens was indefensible given the issues with 

misconduct at the agency. He testified:

Q. Do they issue the individual a letter of reprimand or just removal 

recommendations?

A. No, they come out and in typical fashion they come out and they use 

their criminal investigative training to – to interview the employee. 

 

176 Jason Brainard Transcribed Interview 219–20, Apr. 8, 2016 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Brainard 

Tr.].
Page | 43

In this case the employee resigned. Oftentimes, that’s what they’re 

looking for, to get a result.

They come out and do the tests. They leave. We get the tape. They 

fly out, two of them again, and do this and then they leave. In the 

Office of Inspections, and I want to point this out ‘cause I think it’s 

important. The Office of Inspections has been on the hot seat 

because of the amount of time they spend on non criminal matters.

And part of the reason they come out and they take a case that is non 

criminal and refer it to the U.S. attorney, to the local state’s attorney 

and get a declination of prosecution so they can check that law 

enforcement box. It’s just a shell game to those guys. And they do 

it in almost every case and that’s why they do that, because they 

know the scrutiny they’re under in the amount of time they spend on 

criminal matters and it’s very, very minor.

Q. To your knowledge, do you know how many individuals were fired 

or forced to resign due to the stealing of a pen?

A. I don’t have – I don’t have a number, but I know enough that they 

were joking about the fact that it was the most successful test item 

they had.

Q. Integrity test item?

A. Integrity test item. And it’s very frustrating to hear about firing 

people for pens. I’m not saying that people shouldn’t be held 

accountable, but when we’ve got the problems that we do in our 

agency and they’re coming after our people for pens, that really –

it – it – I find it’s infuriating.177

5. Regional Director in the Office of Global Strategies

TSA’s Office of Inspection forwarded a Report of Investigation to OPR to review and 

adjudicate an investigation into a Regional Director in the Office of Global Strategies.178 The 

Notice of Decision from OPR includes the way the Director made comments describing fellow 

TSA managers and employees in profane and derogatory terms.179 The Director also allowed an 

Executive Assistant to complete some of the Director’s TSA Online Training Center training.180

 

177 Id.

178 Memorandum from Robert Miller, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to (Name 

Redacted), Regional Dir., Office of Global Strategies, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 13-0797, Notice of Decision (May 

7, 2013). 

179 Id. at 2–6.

180 Id. at 6.
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The recommended penalty range pertaining to using inappropriate language is a five to 

fourteen-day suspension, and the mitigated range, which allows deciding officials to take 

personal factors into account, is a Letter of Reprimand up to a four-day suspension.181 The 

penalty range for failure to follow policy, pertaining to the Online Training Center, is a Letter of 

Reprimand up to a fourteen-day suspension, with a mitigated range being a Letter of 

Counseling.

182 The Regional Director’s Notice of Decision letter mitigated a proposed fourteenday suspension to a five-day suspension:

The Second Step Grievance Decision further mitigated a five-day suspension to a Letter 

of Reprimand.183 The Grievance Decision plainly lays out the Regional Director did not dispute 

the facts but still did not uphold the required penalties:

184

 

181 Id.

182 Id.

183 Memorandum from Heather Sigrist Book, Dep. Ass’t Adm’r, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. 

Admin. to (Name Redacted), Regional Dir., Office of Global Strategies, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 13-0797, Second 

Step Grievance Decision – Letter of Reprimand (Sept. 6, 2013). 

184 Id. at 1.
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Notably, TSA chose a Letter of Reprimand—the lightest penalty. The Agency insufficiently 

claimed its mitigation was an effort to “promote the efficiency of the Federal Service:”

185

6. Deputy Federal Security Director

The Office of Professional Responsibility found the Deputy Federal Security Director 

(DFSD) was delinquent in making payments on his government credit card, ranging from $674 

to over $3,600, on thirteen occasions over a three-and-a-half-year period.186 The DFSD blamed 

the late payments on “weekend and/or after hours posting” of the payment made by phone, but 

later admitted he comments were “speculation.”187 The following table represents the level of 

failure by the DFSD to pay his debts:

Charge 1: Failure to Timely Honor Debts:

Specification 1: In September 2010, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $1,106.02 on your government travel 

card.

Specification 2: In October 2010, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $846.84 on your government travel card.

 

185 Id. at 2. 

186 Memorandum from Denise Stark, Unit Chief, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, Transp. Sec. Admin. to (Name 

Redacted), Dep. Fed. Sec. Dir., Operations, Transp. Sec. Admin. OPR 14-12814, Notice of Decision (May 29, 

2015).

187 Id. at 3.
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Specification 3: In November 2010, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $844.75 on your government travel card.

Specification 4: In December 2010, you were delinquent in your 

payment of 2,097.05 on your government travel card.

Specification 5: In March 2011, you were delinquent in your payment 

of $1,042.01 on your government travel card.

Specification 6: In July 2011, you were delinquent in your payment 

of $945.57 on your government travel card.

Specification 7: In October 2011, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $684.80 on your government travel card.

Specification 8: In May 2012 you were delinquent in your payment 

of $3,516.22 on your government travel card.

Specification 9: In October 2012, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $2,536.34 on your government travel 

card.

Specification 10: In November 2012, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $3,616.68 on your government travel 

card.

Specification 11: In January 2013, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $2,259.22 on your government travel 

card.

Specification 12: In May 2013, you were delinquent in your payment 

of $674.28 on your government travel card.

Specification 13: In January 2014, you were delinquent in your 

payment of $3,376.22 on your government travel 

card.

The DFSD gave his Executive Assistant the FedTraveler login information to submit and 

certify travel vouchers.188 A Financial Specialist told the DFSD it would be a violation of policy 

for her to certify and submit the vouchers on the DFSD’s behalf.189 Another Financial Specialist

told the DFSD the Executive Assistant could prepare the DFSD’s travel voucher, but the DFSD 

would need to sign in and submit it.190 The DFSD admitted he relied on his Executive Assistant 

to submit the travel claims upon return from a trip and authorized the Executive Assistant to 

 

188 Id. at 3–8.

189 Id.

190 Id.
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submit vouchers.191 The DFSD failed to submit six travel vouchers within five business days of 

returning from official travel per TSA policy.192

The DFSD drove a government vehicle six times without properly documenting the 

usage.193 A Program Analyst wrote in a statement the DFSD asked the employees who brought 

him the government vehicle and returned it to the parking garage to complete the TSA Form 209 

for him.

194 The Program Analyst told investigators: “[E]mployees state they are uncomfortable 

about signing a logbook for the mileage put on the car they did not drive.”195

The deciding official found having someone other than the individual certifies his travel 

vouchers after being told it would violate policy was an aggravating factor. The recommended 

penalty range for failing to pay a government credit card in a timely manner is a Letter of 

Reprimand to a fourteen-day suspension. The penalty range for failure to follow policy is a 

Letter of Reprimand to a fourteen day suspension. The decision letter mitigated a proposed 

fourteen-day suspension to a three-day suspension.

III. TSA Used Directed Reassignments to Retaliate Against Its 

Employees

On April 27, 2016, three TSA whistleblowers testified before the Committee in an open 

hearing about serious misconduct and management issues at the agency. These whistleblowers 

described an atmosphere of intimidation and retaliation at TSA. One of TSA’s principal methods 

of retaliation at the agency was through involuntary directed reassignments.

The Committee’s investigation found considerable evidence these directed reassignments 

were used improperly. TSA employees were issued lateral directed reassignments to new 

positions hundreds of miles from their stations without any discernable organizational need or 

justification. In many cases, accepting the reassignments would cause the employees significant 

hardship for reasons such as financial issues and family obligations. As a result of the 

Committee’s investigation, TSA made significant changes to its policy on directed reassignments 

and has reached settlements to date totaling at least $1 million with TSA personnel who were 

affected by this issue. 

Andrew Rhoades, the Assistant Federal Security Director (AFSD) for Mission Support at 

Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, and the recipient of a directed reassignment, testified, 

“[d]irected reassignments have been punitively used by TSA senior leadership as a means to 

silence dissent, force early retirement or resignations.”196 Rhoades testified: 

 

191 Id.

192 Id.

193 Id.

194 Id.

195 Id. at 9.

196 TSA Hearing Part I – Rhoades Statement
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Senior leader misconduct and retaliation, if left unaddressed, will place the 

American public at risk as managers are more worried of retaliation from 

their own supervisors than they are focused on defeating the threat. Directed 

reassignments, retaliation and misconduct are inextricably intertwined and 

help explain why the TSA underperforms.197

A. TSA Policies on Directed Reassignments 

A directed reassignment is an involuntary reassignment from one position in TSA to 

another. TSA Chief Counsel Francine Kerner described directed reassignments as “when you tell 

someone they have to go work someplace else.”198 TSA’s policy on directed reassignments is 

found in TSA Management Directive 1100.30-4 on Permanent Internal Reassignments. Under 

this policy, the issuance of a directed reassignment is explicitly predicated on the action being 

within TSA’s needs and interests. Karen Shelton Waters, Assistant Administrator for the Office 

of Human Capital, stated directed reassignments require a business justification.199

TSA’s old policy stated managers could “reassign employees involuntarily without loss 

in pay band or basic pay from one position to another for which they qualify, within or outside 

the local commuting area, when such action is in the best interest of TSA.”200 The policy further 

stated the “personal interests and desires of the employee shall be carefully considered, but the 

final decision shall be made according to the needs of TSA.”201 Declining to accept a directed 

reassignment could cause employees to lose their job. TSA’s policy stated “[m]anagement 

officials shall initiate a separation action if an employee refuses to accept a directed 

reassignment.”

202

 

197 Id. 

198 Kerner Tr. at 30.

199 TSA Briefing to Committee Staff. 

200 T.S.A., Office of Human Capital, TSA MD 1100.30-4, Handbook, Permanent Internal Assignments (Oct. 4, 

2007), effective Mar. 28, 2004, revised Jun. 27, 2012.

201 Id.

202 Id. 
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B. TSA’s Use of Directed Reassignment Devolved Over Time

While directed reassignments have been a longstanding feature of TSA’s personnel rules, 

their use changed considerably over time. Rhoades testified “[t]he practice of directed 

reassignments began under the tenure of our fourth permanent TSA Administrator [Kip Hawley] 

primarily at the direction of his deputy administrator [Gale Rossides],” but “[t]he practice 

continued and intensified with the next administrator [John Pistole] whose law enforcement 

background shaped his thinking on the subject.”203

1. TSA Leaders Changed Agency Policy to Dramatically Expand the Use of 

Directed Reassignments 

Directed reassignments intensified in 2013 under Administrator Pistole and Deputy 

Administrator John Halinski. TSA initiated plans for the large scale directed reassignment of 

FSDs throughout the country as part of a “leadership succession planning” initiative included 

reassigning FSDs to new positions en masse and assigning them fixed “tour of duty lengths.”204

TSA has a geographically diverse workforce, with airport security personnel in almost every

major city in the United States. TSA employees can be reassigned almost anywhere.

 

203 TSA Hearing Part I – Rhoades Statement.

204 Memorandum from John Halinski, Dep. Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin. to staff, Transp. Sec. Admin, Ongoing 

Leadership Succession Planning (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter Halinski Memo – Apr. 2013].
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Prior to 2013, directed reassignments were not widely known. One FSD testified: “[t]he

phrase ‘directed reassignments’ became prominent in TSA – prominently used starting in 2013. 

I had never heard ‘directed reassignment’ ever.”

205

Further, prior to 2013, FSDs were mostly hired through the USAJobs website rather than 

filled via reassignments. The FSD testified:

The FSDs were always selected, to my knowledge, through a posting on 

U.S.A. Jobs. And they would generate a pool of candidates and interested 

candidates would apply. They would generate the pool, interview the 

candidates. In rare circumstances I think people may have requested a 

transfer to go to different locations, but by [and large], it was done through 

U.S.A. Jobs.206

Administrator Pistole’s initiative promised to consider employee preferences and 

concerns about potential hardships for direct reassignments. But in practice, numerous TSA 

officials were issued directed reassignments, which had no discernible benefit for TSA and 

causing the employees significant hardship. This initiative was suspended by Acting TSA 

Administrator Mel Carraway in November 2014, but the program’s suspension failed to stop 

other senior TSA officials from issuing improper directed reassignments.

207

Several senior TSA officials attributed this change to Pistole’s and Halinski’s 

backgrounds. A former senior FBI official and a retired Marine General, respectfully, they were 

accustomed to workforces in which officials in the field were frequently involuntarily moved. 

TSA Chief Counsel Francine Kerner explained the rationale for this policy. She testified:

Q. And how and when are [directed reassignments] used at TSA?

A. Well, they used to be used by John Halinski, who is the Deputy 

Administrator under John Pistole until July of 2014, July 12 of 2014. 

They used to be used to move people around. He believed – he had

the military model of moving – he wanted to move FSDs around

from point A to point B. And so those cases, a lot of people were 

given directed reassignments under those circumstances. 

Q. So what was the purpose of the directed reassignment during that 

time period? 

A. Well, I think what he said was that he was moving people around to 

give them experience in different parts of the country.208

 

205 Brainard Tr. at 70

206 Id. at 19.

207 Id. at 73–74

208 Kerner Tr. at 30.
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TSA’s former Assistant Chief Counsel for Administrative Litigation Steven Colon gave a similar 

explanation for the move to large-scale directed reassignments. He stated:

Q. Was there a policy decision during that timeframe to use directed 

reassignment? 

A. Yes. It was my understanding there was a policy decision done in 

the Office of Security Operations under Mr. Pistole that there was 

going to be directed reassignments of Federal security director 

staff – I’’ sorry, Federal Security Directors, essentially – that it was 

going to be – he wanted them to be more mobile. He came from 

FBI, where everyone knows at FBI you got to move, you know. And 

so – whereas, that wasn’t the case at TSA, but he brought that in. 

And, you know, soon thereafter him and, I guess, Mr. Hogan had 

announced that that was what they – they were going to commence 

directly reassigning Federal Security Directors every 3 to 5 years.209

Kerner elaborated on TSA leadership’s rationale for these large-scale directed 

reassignments and how this was a departure from TSA’s established practices. She testified:

When you look at an organization like the FBI and you look at an 

organization like the ATF – I happened to have worked at ATF – you 

regularly expect to move as a SAIC. That’s just the way it is. The same 

with the military model. 

TSA was an organization that was built of people coming from all over the 

Federal and private sector, and some people came from organizations where 

moving on a regular and recurring basis was expected and considered 

desirable, and others came from organizations where you basically stayed

in one spot your entire career.

So, when we have someone like an FSD, many of them, when they 

originally signed up to work at TSA, they were planning on spending their 

whole career at the airport, like George Naccara. He was from Boston. He 

wanted to stay in Boston. That was where he had his heart. And if you 

moved that man to a different location, he wasn’t going to stay with TSA. 

Now, if, on the other hand, you’re a leader, like John Pistole or John 

Halinski, and you come from the FBI, where people move all the time, or 

you come from the military, where people move all the time, the Marines, 

where people move all the time, you feel that at some point we should be 

moving the Federal security directors around.

So it becomes a complicated picture of where people are coming from and 

 

209 Joseph Salvator Transcribed Interview 43–44, Apr. 15, 2016 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Salvator 

Tr.].
Page | 52

what they think is desirable for the organization.210

Kerner argued a variety of factors prompted the agency to issue FSDs directed reassignments. 

She stated:

A. And then you have headquarters and you have the FSDs. And the 

FSDs are working at airports where there is – if you look again at 

the history of TSA, the airports never had a Federal – they never had 

Federal people there in the way that we showed up with 1,000 people 

at this airport, 300 people at this airport. And so a lot of them went 

through the seven stages of denial, and, you know, they didn’t want 

a Federal presence in their airport. But then they got to like it 

because they had their own Federal security director that they could 

use to carry messages to Washington about the need for resources, 

about issues at the airport.

So that meant that, again, I think, at times, there might be people in 

the front office who felt that the FSDs had grown too close to the 

airport that they were supposed to be overseeing and regulating and 

that they were more of a voice for the airports than they were a voice 

for TSA. And so that’s been a difficult issue all along.

 

Also, some FSDs ran into trouble with the air carriers. For instance, 

we had FSDs at JFK who were moved out of their jobs. I think there 

were a couple – and if you ask me their names, I don’t know who 

they are. But I do know, at the time, that the air carriers were not 

happy with the way the lines were moving, and so FSDs might have 

been moved out because of that. 

So there are a lot of reasons that might lead to someone getting a 

directed reassignment. And so I personally was not involved in 

making those decisions, and we just dealt with the aftermath if 

people complained about their directed reassignments.

Q. So were the directed reassignments that you describe, under Mr. 

Halinski and that sort of model, was that only during that timeframe? 

Or was this –

A. Well, Gale Rossides, before him, had started doing some directed 

reassignments. But I don’t think – so she had directed reassignments 

too. And then he continued the practice and made it – I think he 

formalized it. 

And then it was when Mel Carraway came in as the Acting 

Administrator after Mr. Pistole left that the practice was formally 

 

210 Kerner Tr. at 38–39.
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stopped. It was no longer. a practice that was going to be followed 

as a matter of routine. And agreed that it was no longer going to be 

followed as a Neffenger matter of routine, and so he didn’t follow it 

as a matter of routine. 

But directed reassignments are an important part of the way you 

manage a Federal leadership, because you just have to have the 

ability to move people around when you’re doing work at 450 

locations. It’s not going to be – it’s not always going to be so easy. 

It’s hard to keep people where they want to work in the way that 

they want to work.211

Joseph Salvator, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Security Operations at 

the time, similarly attributed the mass directed reassignments to a desire to adopt a model similar 

to the FBI. Salvator also noted a desire to rotate employees in leadership positions between

headquarters and the field. He testified:

Q. You had mentioned previously that big movements happened 

in May, 50 to 60 directed reassignments in May 2013.

A. Just for OSO. There were others.

Q. What was the purpose, to your knowledge, of these big movements?

A. So I would reference the April 15th, 2013 memo from Mr. Halinski 

to the executive and L band workforce where he described the 

purpose. I believe the title of the memo was "Succession Planning."

Q. To your knowledge, how were these big movements in May 

succession planning? 

A. So, to my knowledge, what I believe was going on was A, 

Mr. Pistole coming from the FBI, was adopting an FBI model, to 

some extent, and where they move the FBI special agents in charge 

around. Also, to my knowledge and my perception is, there were a 

lot of federal security directors who had been in place for many, 

many years at the same airport. And, to my knowledge, there was a 

big gap – one of TSA’s problems – between people who were in 

leadership positions in the field not having headquarters experience 

and vice versa, people in the headquarters not having airport 

experience, created a large disconnect. So I think that was where 

they came up with that policy decision.

Q. Do you believe it was, to your knowledge, Mr. Pistole acting alone 

in deciding to adopt this FBI model, "FBI model," or were there 

 

211 Kerner Tr. at 39–41.
Page | 54

others involved in discussions about this type of succession 

planning?

A. I don’t know. I do know – I believe, to the best of my knowledge, 

that the movement started before I got to OSO, and I think even 

before Mr. Hoggan got to OSO, that they started doing the 

succession.

Q. To your knowledge, these big movements happened in May 2013 

and May 2014. Was there a big movement in May 2015 as well? 

A. I do not believe so. When – Mr. Carraway halted it at some point 

when he came in.212

2. Assistant Administrator Kelly Hoggan Played a Key Role in Implementing the 

Expansion of Directed Reassignments 

Kelly Hoggan, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security Operations, played a 

key role in implementing the expanded use of directed reassignments. Hoggan’s deputy Joseph 

Salvator assisted Hoggan in this task. Salvator stated he frequently served as what he called the 

“action officer” in the directed reassignment process. He testified:

Q. [D]id you play any role in any decision to reassign a federal security 

director?

A. As the deputy assistant administrator of OSO, I don’t have the 

authority to move a federal security director. That being said, as the 

deputy assistant administrator, when the ERC [Executive Resource 

Council] approved relocations of federal security directors, I was 

often the – what I would call the action officer.

Q. What does the term “action officer” mean?

A. I would have to usually, in a lot of cases, have called the FSD and 

say, you’re being reassigned.213

Salvator was also present at the Executive Resource Council meetings, where senior TSA 

officials determined who would get reassigned. He stated:

Q. Were you ever present at the Executive Resource Council when 

directed reassignments were discussed?

A. Yes, on a few occasions.

 

212 Salvator Tr. at 194–96.

213 Id. at 188.
Page | 55

Q. Do you know the dates?

A. I don’t. The Executive Resource Council meets every other 

Thursday.

Q. And did you ever vote on one of the Executive Resource Council’s 

decisions about a directed reassignment?

A. Yes, I believe I would have voted.

Q. Do you recall the individuals on whose assignments you voted?

A. I do not.214

Salvator also testified Hoggan was responsible for developing the majority of directed 

reassignments. He stated:

Q. How would they be given instructions about which assignments to 

prepare? They would have been approved by the ERC?

Agency Counsel. “They” meaning whom? Do you mean the HR 

within OSO? 

Q. HR within OSO.

A. On what to prepare?

Q. Yes.

A. Usually Mr. Hoggan.

Q. So this is before it’s gone to the ERC.

A. Yes. Mr. Hoggan makes recommendations to the ERC on the 

movements.

Q. Did you play any role in developing recommendations?

A. On occasion, but I could say the majority of them were with 

Mr. Hoggan.215

 Salvator stated Hoggan “figured out, I would say, 98 percent of [directed 

 

214 Id. at 189.

215 Id. at 191–92.
Page | 56

reassignments].”216 Salvator further stated there were two large waves of directed reassignments 

in May 2013 and May 2014 as well as others that took place in between them. He testified:

Q. Do you recall the approximate number of directed reassignments on 

which you voted?

A. I do not. I don’t think – so just to put it in context, there was two –

the big movements happened in May typically, so, like, the first May 

I was in OSO, we probably –

Q. To be clear, what year was that?

A. May of 2013. – there was probably 50, 60 reassignments, and then 

that second May, which was my tail end, there was probably 40 

reassignments. So those were the major times. Then throughout the 

year there was other ones that happened. So I wasn’t a voting 

member at those two large ones.

Q. How many directed reassignments occurred throughout the year 

between the two large ones you referred to in the May periods? 

A. I don’t know the exact number. It wouldn’t surprise me if it was 30 

or so.217

3. TSA Leaders Promised Employees the Directed Reassignments Would 

Strengthen TSA’s Workforce and Consider Employee Needs and Preferences

The leadership succession planning initiative, which served as the mechanism for the 

expanded use of directed reassignments, was presented to TSA’s TSES and Executive staff in a 

series of messages from TSA leadership. These messages stressed the initiative would strengthen 

TSA’s workforce and create opportunities for advancement while taking the needs and 

preferences of individual employees into consideration.

In a memorandum, Halinski wrote, “[o]ver the past two years, the Executive Resources 

Council (ERC) has thoughtfully assessed TSA’s leadership and organizational needs, and 

approved a number of selections/reassignments were endorsed by Administrator Pistole.”218 He 

explained “TSES and Executive leadership positions will be filled via recruitment, or through 

voluntary or involuntary assignment.”219

Halinski wrote the TSA Office of Human Capital’s (OHC) Executive Resources Division 

team would contact employees by e-mail with a list of vacancies, allowing staff to submit 

requests for positions of interest. He also indicated hardships would be taken into account during 

 

216 Id. at 197.

217 Id. at 189–90.

218 Halinski Memo – Apr. 2013.

219 Id.
Page | 57

the process, writing staff would “have the opportunity to raise to your AA and the ERD any 

undue hardship you would encounter because of a relocation or reassignment.”220 Halinski urged 

employees to “assess TSA opportunities and your long-term career plans so the ERC can balance 

organizational and employee needs.”221

 

220 Id.

221 Id.
Page | 58
Page | 59

4. TSA’s Leadership Instituted Mass Directed Reassignments

On June 3, 2013, Halinski sent another memo about the plan to use directed 

reassignments, entitled “Status of Succession Planning Initiatives.” Halinski thanked TSA 

employees for responding to OHC’s “request for resumes, position/geographic preferences, and 

hardship information,” noting, “we had a 99% response rate and you provided valuable input that 

was thoroughly considered by the ERC members.”222 Halinski wrote, “our initiatives are focused 

on planning for TSA’s future and ensuring that leadership has the professional development and 

support they need to succeed. This is the hallmark of a mature organization.”223

Another round of “leadership succession planning”—directed reassignments—

commenced the following year. On March 21, 2014, TSA’s Executive Resources Division emailed TSA’s TSES and Executive employees and SES candidate development program 

graduates informing them they were required to submit resumes in advance of a forthcoming 

Executive Resources Council (ERC) Leadership Succession Planning meeting.224

On April 8, 2014 OHC Assistant Administrator Karen Shelton Waters sent an e-mail 

listing current and projected TSES and Executive positions.225 Then in May 2014, the ERC met 

to make decisions on directed reassignments. Salvator attended the May 2014 ERC meeting 

where decisions were made on directed reassignments. He testified:

Q. So you were present in May of 2014 at the ERC when the – when 

directed reassignments were discussed?

A. Yes.

Q. Approximately how many were discussed at that time?

A. 60, 70, maybe.

Q. Was each directed reassignment voted on individually?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Hoggan present the recommendation for each directed 

reassignment to the ERC?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, did the ERC – let me rephrase that.

 

222 Memorandum from John Halinski, Dep. Adm’r., Transp. Sec. Admin. to staff, Transp. Sec. Admin, Status of 

Succession Planning Initiatives (June 3, 2013) [hereinafter Halinski Memo – June 2013]. 

223 Id.

224 E-mail from Pamela Skowron, Transp. Sec. Admin., to staff, Transp. Sec. Admin (Mar. 21, 2014, 6:35 a.m.) (on 

file with the Committee).

225 E-mail from Karen Shelton Waters, Ass’t Adm’r, Office of Human Capital, Transp. Sec. Admin., to staff, Transp. 

Sec. Admin. (Apr. 8, 2014, 10:19 a.m.) (on file with the Committee).
Page | 60

Would the ERC typically accept Mr. Hoggan’s recommendation, or 

was there often debate about the recommendation?

A. There was often debate.

Q. To your knowledge, in a general sense, how many of the 

recommendations that Mr. Hoggan made were adopted by the ERC?

A. The majority.226

Salvator did not believe any of the decisions appeared to be retaliatory. He stated:

Q. Did any of the directed reassignments discussed at the May 2014 

ERC meeting appear to be retaliatory to you?

A. Not in my opinion.227

5. TSA’s Mass Directed Reassignments Failed

Senior TSA officials failed to abide by the promises TSA made when it instituted its 

leadership planning initiative. Directed reassignments were issued against employee’s wishes. 

TSA’s decision makers not only failed to consider employee needs or the potential hardships, 

they ignored employee requests for reconsideration on such a basis. Experienced employees with 

strong records of performance suffered significant hardships from accepting their reassignments, 

while others, who declined the reassignments, were forced to leave the agency. As discussed 

later in the report, there is evidence some reassignments were issued as a means of retaliating 

against disfavored employees, including whistleblowers. 

On November 25, 2014, TSA Deputy Administrator Mel Carraway suspended the “Tour 

of Duty Lengths Initiative.”

228 This action was intended to halt the use of directed reassignments. 

Mark Hatfield, who became TSA’s Acting Deputy Administrator in January 2015 after Carraway 

became TSA’s Acting Administrator, confirmed directed reassignments were being used 

improperly at TSA and Carraway was troubled by the practice. Hatfield testified:

[Hoggan] was using the directed reassignment process to manipulate 

positions in the field and to both help people that were in favor and to punish 

people that were out of favor, in my assessment. And I felt that it was, you 

know – and, in fact, Mel Carraway suspended the use of directed 

reassignments. When he first got there, he was in agreement with this 

position as well.229

 

226 Salvator Tr. at 199–00.

227 Id. at 200–01.

228 Email from Email Melvin Carraway, Adm’r, Tran. Sec. Admin. (Nov. 25, 2014, 2:37 PM) (on file with the 

Committee).

229 Hatfield Tr. at 107. 
Page | 61

Even after Carraway suspended the program, TSA officials continued to issue improper directed 

reassignments. 

C. TSA Reassigned Jason Brainard from Iowa to Maine

Jason “Jay” Brainard was the subject of a directed reassignment in May 2014 as part of 

the leadership succession planning initiative. Brainard was one of TSA’s inaugural group of 

FSDs who joined the agency at its inception in 2002. He served as FSD at the Evansville, IL 

airport for over two years until taking a temporary detail to replace the departing FSD in Des 

Moines, IA in October 2004. Brainard applied for and was selected permanently take the job. In 

2005 his area of responsibility was reorganized to include all airports in Iowa and he became the 

sole FSD responsible for operations in the state.230 He served as FSD in Des Moines until his 

reassignment in May 2014. Brainard stated when he applied for the Des Moines FSD position in 

2004, “[t]here was no mention of mobility as a condition of employment within the 

announcement and there was no mobility agreement that I needed to sign.”231

Between 2005 and 2010 Brainard applied for other opportunities in TSA requiring him to 

relocate or be available to do so, causing him and his wife to refrain from purchasing a home in 

Iowa during that period. In 2010, after serving as FSD in Des Moines for several years, Brainard 

and his wife purchased a home in Iowa. He earned high performance ratings in the position, 

including the highest rating Achieved Excellence in 2013 and 2014, and was recognized with 

awards including the Federal Security Director of the Year Award and the Gale D. Rossides 

People First Award.232 Brainard noted:

Between 2012 and 2014 I recall what appeared to be a growing movement 

during Conference Calls hosted by TSA Leadership indicating there were 

certain positions in TSA that were subject to relocation in TSA-OSO. This 

messaging grew substantially more frequent in late 2013. Some Federal 

Security Directors had indicated to me they suspected an effort was 

underway to force out some of the older and longest serving Federal 

Security Directors.233

Brainard’s understanding at the time was “reassignments or relocation could be applied to a 

number of situations such as voluntary participation in the senior leadership development 

program (SLDP), the elimination of an office or program, or for poor performance,” but did not 

believe he was likely to be selected for such a reassignment given his operation had already been 

reorganized into the prevailing state-hub model and he had a strong performance record.234

Despite this, Brainard was reassigned.

 

230 EEO Complaint HS-TSA-01345, filed May 22, 2014 by Jason Brainard, amended by memorandum Jul. 18, 2014 

at 2. [hereinafter Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint].

231 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 2.

232 Id.

233 Id.

234 Id.
Page | 62

1. TSA Reassigned Brainard from Des Moines, IA to Portland, ME Despite 

Brainard Explaining This Would Cause Him Severe Hardship

During the “leadership succession planning initiative” in 2013 and 2014, Brainard 

submitted his resume as requested, indicating his desire to remain in Iowa, and did not list other 

duty stations of interest, explaining his family situation.

235 On April 14, 2014, Regional Director 

Robert Ball, Brainard’s supervisor, called him. Ball informed Brainard he was calling at the 

request of TSA headquarters to ask about Brainard’s three duty preferences because he had only 

selected his duty station in Des Moines. According to Brainard, “[Ball] advised me that he 

wasn’t aware I was selected for reassignment but because I was ‘within that window of time’ it 

may be a good idea to have other locations named.”236 Brainard discussed his family situation 

and reaffirmed his desire to remain in Iowa. Following the call, Brainard e-mailed Ball to 

identify Wichita, KS and Indianapolis, IN as his other choices. Brainard made clear to Ball a 

reassignment would pose severe hardship to his family stating, “I was both concerned and 

emphatic about our situation and stressed the fact that financially we were not in a position to 

support multiple households in different states and I informed him that such a situation would 

mean financial disaster to my family.”237

On May 9, Ball called Brainard to inform him he would receive a directed reassignment 

to Portland, ME. To Brainard, “this news came as a complete shock.”238 Brainard testified Ball 

indicated the directed reassignments were being used as a means of coercing employees to leave 

the agency. He stated:

Q. Was that the only notice you received prior to this TSA broadcast?

A. First time I had ever heard about it.

Q. And how much explaining did he do of why this was happening?

A. I said – well, first I asked him, was it Portland, Oregon. He said, 

Portland, Maine. I said, we have operations in Portland, Maine? He 

said, yes. I said – I – I was pretty, I guess, surprised. I did not expect 

it. I said, I – I’ve never asked to go to Portland, Maine. I turned in 

a request for something in the midwest. Why am I going to Portland, 

Maine? Who made this decision? And during the course of our 

conversation in trying to find out how this had happened he had 

informed me that they had tried to implement directed 

reassignments approximately two to three years prior in an effort to 

get people to leave the agency.239

 

235 Id.

236 Id.

237 Id. at 2-3. 

238 Id. at 3.

239 Brainard Tr. at 38. 
Page | 63

On the phone call Brainard also described his family’s circumstances and the hardships a 

reassignment to Maine would create. Ball said he would raise these issues with Hoggan. Brainard 

testified:

Q. On the phone call with Robert Ball did he discuss any of those 

factors you mentioned in Exhibit 1 as, you know, your 

circumstances or hardships?

A. I – I had explained these things to him. He said he would pass it up 

through his chain to Kelly Hoggan. We were not to interface with 

Kelly Hoggan. We were to interface directly through our regional 

directors.240

He also requested to be moved to an international Transportation Security Representative 

(TSAR) position in the Office of Global Strategies—a position with more benefits—instead of to 

Portland, Maine.

241 Ball informed Brainard he had checked with TSA leadership and there were 

no TSAR vacancies available. In early June 2014, however, vacancies were posted for the TSAR 

positions in London—Brainard’s preferred choice—and Berlin.242

On May 14, 2014, Brainard received a Notice of Directed Reassignment to Portland, ME. 

The notice included a 10-day deadline to accept the reassignment and a 60-day deadline to 

relocate. The notice stated, “[i]f you decline the directed reassignment, your declination is 

considered final and may not be changed. If you decline, or accept but fail to report for duty, 

TSA may initiate action to separate you from the Federal service for failure to accept a 

reassignment outside the commuting area.”243

Next to the space declining the assignment on the decision form was a clause stating, “I 

understand that, based on this election, action may be initiated to separate me from Federal 

service.”244

2. TSA Rejected Brainard’s Requests for Accommodations to Mitigate the 

Reassignment’s Impact 

Brainard spoke with the outgoing FSD in Maine, who had been reassigned to Milwaukee. 

The Maine FSD informed Brainard he would likely decline the reassignment to Milwaukee and 

instead retire. Brainard would have preferred a reassignment in the Midwest to Maine.

245 On 

May 16, he e-mailed Ball and informed him he intended to accept the reassignment, but also 

requested to be reassigned to Milwaukee in the event it was left unfilled. Ball informed him there 

was no process for changing location preferences but indicated he would communicate 

 

240 Id. at 39–40. 

241 Id. at 56–57.

242 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 3.

243 Memorandum from Karen Shelton Waters, Ass’t Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin. to Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., 

Transp. Sec. Admin., Notice of Directed Reassignment (May 14, 2014). 

244 Id. 

245 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 4.
Page | 64

Brainard’s request for consideration. Ball also noted, “[t]here very well may be backups already 

stacked that the ERC or leadership have pre-selected.”246 In June 2014, an AFSD with less 

experience than Brainard was promoted to be the Milwaukee FSD.247

Brainard spoke with three other K-Band FSDs who had been directly reassigned and 

concluded TSA was “employing the same tactics in an effort to force the resignation or 

retirement of other senior Federal Security Directors by assigning them to short-notice long 

distance locations they too did not select as a preference.”248 These included Jacksonville FSD 

Ed Goodwin, who was reassigned to replace Brainard in Iowa; Portland, ME FSD Robert Dyer, 

who was reassigned to Milwaukee, and whom Brainard was reassigned to replace; and 

Milwaukee FSD Louis Traverzo, who was reassigned to Little Rock.249

According to Brainard, these reassignments did not serve any business need for TSA. He 

testified:

The only thing I would offer is that where they wanted to send federal 

security directors there was no vacancy. Additionally, everybody at that 

location had the same experience that everybody else did. There was no 

business reason to move these people.

Mr. Dyer received a 5.0 on his last evaluation. He achieved excellence. 

Additionally, the operation in Maine is significantly smaller than the 

operation in Iowa. Six airports versus eight. It’s probably 120 employees 

less. And in terms of responsibility, it’s quite a bit less. The Iowa operation 

is much larger and much more complex. So, it just didn’t –

To get in that minute, one of the things that certainly bears relevance is the 

fact that when the Jacksonville operation went to Des Moines that was going 

to be about the same size of operation. Arkansas significantly smaller than 

Wisconsin for Mr. Traverzo. There was no business need whatsoever to 

move that skill set. Specifically it talks about needing that experience at 

that situation. That’s completely untrue.250

 On May 20, 2014, Brainard received Permanent Change of Station documents from 

TSA’s Business Management Office and noticed discrepancies between those authorizations for 

support and the ones in the documents he had received with the May 14 Notice of Directed 

Reassignment. He notified Ball and spoke with several staffers in TSA’s Business Management 

Office. On a May 23 (the date of the decision deadline) conference call, Brainard and other FSDs 

were informed the attachment included with the Notice of Directed Reassignment was outdated 

 

246 Id.

247 Id. at 4–5. 

248 Id. at 5. 

249 Id. at 5–6. 

250 Brainard Tr. at 57–58. 
Page | 65

and had been issued mistakenly.251 According to Brainard, the new policy eliminated tens of 

thousands of dollars of his relocation support.252

On the call, the FSDs were told, in order to obtain support, they would have to submit a 

written request for consideration of expenses not covered within the 60-day relocation 

window.253 Brainard directly e-mailed TSA Administrator John Pistole to request his assistance, 

telling him the news of the directed reassignment “was devastating for my family,” detailing the 

financial hardship it would cause and the additional difficulties the PCS issue created.254

Brainard later noted “TSA did support several aspects of the PCS move but only after submitting 

a justification request and placing me under additional great pressure and stress.”255

Brainard accepted the reassignment on the May 23 deadline. On June 25 he requested an 

extension of his reassignment after learning his replacement in Iowa would not arrive until 

September 2014 at the earliest. This request was subsequently denied.256 He testified:

Q. What is this extension you were asking him for?

A. It was an extension to report to my directed reassignment. They 

actually – they essentially didn’t give us a lot of lead time to report 

to my directed reassignment. My – my replacement, Ed Goodwin, 

I had spoken with him. He had no intention of moving. And I – and 

I had asked –

Q. He didn’t ask for Iowa?

A. Oh, no. No. No. No. And if you speak with him you’ll certainly 

know that for sure.

But Mr. – Mr. Goodwin said he wasn’t coming. And I – I had 

mentioned to Bob that if – if my replacement is going to be stalled, 

can I get time on this to get relocated. They denied that and they 

also TDY’ed in a temporary federal security director from 

Louisville, an assistant federal security director, named Luz Ponce. 

Her name is spelled L-U-Z, P-O-N-C-E. And Luz was assigned to 

Iowa as the acting federal security director on TDY for nine months.

Q. So why wouldn’t they grant you the extension?

 

251 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 7.

252 E-mail from Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., to John Pistole, Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin. 

(Mar. 23, 2014, 12:26 p.m.) (on file with the Committee). 

253 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 7. 

254 E-mail from Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., to John Pistole, Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin. 

(Mar. 23, 2014, 12:26 p.m.) (on file with the Committee). 

255 Brainard Amendment to EEO Complaint at 7–8. 

256 Id. at 8. 
Page | 66

A. There was no logical reason not to grant me an extension. They –

they – instead they opted to send me TDY in temp quarters three 

months and move Ms. Ponce into temp quarters for nine months. 

There was no reason to – to deny me the opportunity to stay. There 

was no permanent federal security director named. And the federal 

security director in Maine, Robert Dyer, had indicated he had 

planned on working at least one more year.

Q. So would you say there was any operational need to get you out to 

Maine –

A. None – none – none whatsoever.257

Brainard indicated TSA’s argument that his expertise was necessary to lead the operation in 

Maine was undermined by the fact the agency left it vacant for an extended period once he 

departed in May 2015. He stated:

When I went to Maine, the language that’s in the directed reassignment talks 

about my skill set being needed. It was critical that I was there. I left Maine 

in May of 2015. From May 2015 to current day, that FSD position is still 

vacant. As a matter of fact, they’ve chosen not to refill it.

So they did not need my experience that much that they did not refill the 

position. The operation has not changed. The operation is still federalized. 

There are still six airports and the responsibility is still the same. They still 

have not filled that position.258

3. TSA Ultimately Granted Brainard a Settlement to Take Position in Kansas

In May 2014 Brainard initiated an EEO complaint against TSA. On October 25, 2014, 

Brainard e-mailed Deputy Administrator Carraway requesting to return to Iowa and urging 

Carraway to end the use of directed reassignments.259 On November 25, 2014, Carraway 

suspended the “Tours of Duty Initiative.” 

Brainard e-mailed Carraway later that day to reiterate his interest in returning to Iowa.260

On approximately December 23 or 24, Brainard spoke with Carraway on the phone. Brainard 

noted, “I had actually spoken to Mr. Carraway in December of 2014 and he was – said he was 

going to be out of the country. I said, don’t give up hope. He said, I haven’t given up hope, 

neither should you and we’ll talk about it when I get back.”

261

 

257 Brainard Tr. at 51–52. 

258 Brainard Tr. at 75.

259 E-mail from Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., to Mel Carraway, Deputy Adm’r, Transp. Sec. 

Admin. (Oct. 25, 2014, 4:12 a.m.) (on file with the Committee).

260 E-mail from Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., to Mel Carraway, Deputy Adm’r, Transp. Sec. 

Admin. (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:25 p.m.) (on file with the Committee). 

261 Brainard Tr. at 96.
Page | 67

On January 7, 2015, Seattle DFSD David Dailey was announced as the new Iowa FSD. 

Dailey called Brainard that day to tell him he had sought to return to the Midwest, but not Iowa 

specifically and had been caught off guard by the timing of the announcement. Dailey explained 

Hoggan had offered him the Iowa FSD position and informed him Brainard would not be 

allowed to return to his old position.

262 Brainard testified:

A. I received an e-mail from David Dailey who was the deputy federal 

security director in Seattle, asked if I had time for a call. I spoke 

with him. He told me that he had been contacted by Kelly Hoggan, 

the assistant administrator for operations. He had been offered the 

position in Iowa as the federal security director. He had said to Mr. 

Hoggan, I thought Jay was trying to get back to Iowa. And he told 

him, that’s never going to happen. And there was no reason why he 

would prevent me from going back to Iowa.

I later learned that he had actually talked with Mr. Dailey early 

December and had arranged to have Mr. Dailey show up to Iowa 

short notice, in two weeks, and facilitate a move as quickly as 

possible.

Q. How did you learn that?

A. Because he showed up and moved to Iowa in two weeks. That’s 

never happened.263

Brainard e-mailed Carraway that day to inform him of the situation and seek clarification 

on what occurred. Carraway responded he was traveling internationally but would call Brainard 

when he returned. He also wrote, “I am fully aware of your situation and I have given you my 

advise (sic). I have not wavered nor should you.”264

In January or February 2015, TSA Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield contacted 

Brainard to try to settle with TSA and take an open FSD position in Kansas. He stated:

A. So, as soon as the January announcement came out for the new 

federal security director in Iowa I sent him an e-mail and said, hey, 

what’s going on? I just saw this come out today. Does this mean 

that this is off the table? And his response was, I haven’t given up 

hope, neither should you. There is a written record with that. And 

then at some point I talked with the Deputy Administrator Mark 

Hatfield.

 

262E-mail from Mel Carraway, Acting Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin., to Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. 

Admin. (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:04 p.m.) (on file with the Committee). 

263 Brainard Tr. at 94.

264 E-mail from Mel Carraway, Acting Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin., to Jason Brainard, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. 

Admin. (January 7, 2015, 2:04 p.m.) (on file with the Committee). 
Page | 68

Q. What were the circumstances of this conversation?

A. I had e-mailed Mr. Carraway and said, hey, any update on this? 

And Mark had referred out to me by phone and said, hey, I’d like to 

try and make this right. And -- so then, that’s when I got introduced 

to Mr. Colon, the attorney. And the only thing that I had asked for 

was to redirect the package they initially offered me to Kansas.

Q. So when he said, I’d like to make this right, had you initiated the 

conversation with Mr. Hatfield or he contacted you?

A. Mr. Carraway had Mr. Hatfield contact me.265

Brainard knew there was an open FSD position in Kansas and reached a written settlement with 

TSA to be moved there. He testified:

A. At that point, I knew that Keith Osborn was retiring. He had signed 

a non aggression agreement with the agency that he would leave in 

May of 2015 and Kansas was the next best thing to getting back to 

duty assignment.

Q. And then what happened?

A. Mr. Colon contacted me and I said, I’d like to get back to the 

midwest. And then he asked me for the terms of the settlement and 

I told him, I just want my PCS reset and directed to Kansas.

Q. And did he use the term "settlement"?

A. Yes. And there’s a settlement agreement that I have, a written 

settlement agreement. I don’t have it, but I can make it available.

Q. You have not provided that to the committee?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. Okay. And then you were asked to sign an NDA?

A. What is an NDA?

Q. A nondisclosure agreement.

A. That’s part of the settlement agreement. I believe it says that I 

couldn’t discuss the terms of the agreement and then it – there’s a 

 

265 Brainard Tr. at 98.
Page | 69

legislative clause, but I had to request something from legal in order 

to get it approved to discuss.266

According to the settlement, Brainard returned to the Midwest as the FSD in Kansas contingent 

on withdrawing his EEO complaint.267

4. TSA’s Reassignment of Brainard Cost Taxpayers Over $100,000

Although he was able to resolve his case, Brainard stated his reassignment cost taxpayers

over $100,000. He testified:

A. The – this is a Relocation Authorization. What money TSA had 

allocated for my PCS move.

Q. And what was that amount?

A. It shows here $113,000.00.

Q. So was that the full cost of moving you from Iowa to Maine?

A. Actually, when I got to Maine – and this gets into the conversation 

I had with the acting administrator, Mel Carraway. I had filed an 

EEO against the agency. And part of my dismissing the EEO, I 

asked them to redirect my PCS to Kansas. They asked if I had any 

other requests for a settlement. I told them I just wanted to be treated 

fairly because ultimately this has come on the taxpayers’ bill.

So I asked them to reset my PCS and move me to Kansas. And I 

believe there were some additional expenses incurred on that, but I 

did not get any money from the agency outside of what is in the PCS 

package. I did not ask for a cash settlement or anything else.

Q. So how much do you think it cost the government to make that 

move?

A. I don’t have that number on the top of my head. I can tell you that 

every federal security director that received one of these that took 

the PCS was in excess – earmarked in excess of 100,000. So you’re 

talking in upwards of a quarter million dollars for one particular 

move between two federal security directors.

Mr. Dyer was to move to Wisconsin. He was offered the same 

package. Mr. Traverzo moved from Wisconsin to Arkansas. He 

was offered that package. The FSD in Charlotte was sent to Los 

 

266 Id. at 99–00.

267 Id. 
Page | 70

Angeles. He was offered that package. His wife was sent from Los 

Angeles to Washington. She was offered that package. The – the 

FSD in West Virginia was sent to San Diego. He was offered that 

package. So all of the FSDs would have received a similar package 

or they had the option of taking a one-time cash amount.

Q. And then, during these period of years, would you say that many 

people were moved around every year?

A. There were a lot. I can’t recall the exact number. I can tell you that 

most of the federal security directors and the deputy federal security 

directors who left were as a result of directed reassignments.268

5. Other FSDs Were Coerced to Retire Early in Exchange for Being Allowed to 

Remain in Their Positions for a Limited Time

Brainard also noted FSDs were coerced to leave the agency by being granted limited 

extensions in their positions in exchange for retiring at the end of this period. He testified:

Q. Can you explain the meaning of this e-mail that you received on 

June 17th, 2014 from Karen Shelton Waters?

A. Yeah. So this e-mail was a national announcement. And this, 

basically, went out and gave people the option of voluntary early 

retirement. I took particular exception to the statement at the bottom 

of the first page that said, "Pressuring or coercing employees who 

are eligible for voluntary early retirement to apply against their will 

is a prohibited personnel practice." And the reason I did is because 

I knew there were a number of federal security directors who were 

given the option to stay at their duty station had they signed an 

agreement to retire one year later. That would be the FSD in St. 

Louis, Bill Switzer. That would be the FSD in Wichita, Keith 

Obsborn. And that would have been the FSD, I want to say in 

Houston, Mike Scott.

The FSD in Maine, Bob Dyer who was there, he was served a notice. 

And I believe I had turned that in as an exhibit, but those FSDs had 

signed a written agreement or what I call a non-aggression pack with 

the agency that they would be allowed to stay at their duty location 

one additional year with the caveat that they retire from federal 

service.

Q. So from your understanding of this voluntary early retirement 

authority – and it says "new," right? So it’s a new program here.

 

268 Id. at 53–54. 
Page | 71

A. They’ve had Vera a couple of times in TSA. I can’t recall 

specifically when those years were. It’s not often, but you know, 

this came out. Specifically, the – the verbiage down there struck me 

as odd because I know that a number of federal security directors 

had to sign an agreement that they would retire. And to me that’s, 

either you retire from federal service or you’re going to move.269

6. Senior TSA Leaders Acknowledge Brainard’s Reassignment was

Inappropriate 

TSA Chief Counsel Francine Kerner stated she did not believe Brainard should have been 

reassigned nor was there a sensible business case for doing so, but maintained the reassignment 

was legal because it was not an act of retaliation. She stated:

Q. I’ll just ask about a couple of other individuals, to the extent that you 

have knowledge about them – they had directed reassignments – and 

whether you believe it was appropriate. 

Jay Brainard was reassigned from Iowa to Maine. Are you aware –

A. I am aware. I know Mr. Brainard. We saw one another just recently 

at the FSD summit, at the Administrator’s summit in November. I 

happened to sit with him at the same table. We had a wonderful 

exchange. 

And, no, I do not think he should have gotten that directed 

reassignment. But was I asked in advance? No. Was it legally 

acceptable for him to get that directed reassignment? Yes. Do I 

think it made sense? No. 

Q. What’s the distinction between whether or not it makes sense and 

whether or not it was proper, in your mind? Because you’ve cited a 

couple of examples where you think –

A. Because it all comes down to what the decisionmaker has in the way 

of a business justification. And I don’t know that the business 

justification really made sense with Brainard. But I think that they 

needed an FSD at a different location. He was available. He was a 

good FSD; he’s still a good FSD. He was moved to a different 

location. That’s within the scope of the authority of the people who 

are making the decision. 

 

269 Id. at 49–51.
Page | 72

If they’re not making the decision as a prohibited personnel matter 

– in other words, if it’s not retaliatory for a protected disclosure –

then, even if it results in an individual choosing to leave Federal 

service rather than move, you know, that’s the choice that the 

individual makes when faced with a directed reassignment.270

Hatfield, however, stated Brainard’s reassignment from Iowa to Maine was inappropriate. 

The reassignment had no positive impact on security, and may have been an act of retaliation by 

Hoggan for Brainard’s outspoken concerns of the agency’s emphasis on the speed of screening 

over the quality of screening. He testified:

Q. So you mentioned people coming in and out of Mr. Hoggan’s favor, 

directed reassignments. Can you give examples of some people who 

were out of Mr. Hoggan’s favor and were therefore moved? 

A. Let’s see. Well, one in particular that I had direct involvement when 

I first got there was – gosh. He was the Federal Security Director 

from Iowa, and he had been directed, reassigned to Portland, Maine, 

and was separated from his family and had served there for some 

time, I think over a year. 

Q. Do you know how he was out of Mr. Hoggan’s favor? 

A. I don’t. 

Q And –

A. Well, I take that back. He was very outspoken. He was a very 

outspoken FSD and would often raise issues at the conferences in 

front of the whole group and was never bashful about challenging 

corporate policy or direction in – I would say in a constructive way. 

Q. What issues, security issues, did he raise that were challenging 

Mr. Hoggan? 

A. Well, I think one that he and many of us shared in the FSD ranks 

was the extraordinary emphasis on speed over quality of screening 

and this what many felt was an unreasonable reliance on a metric 

system that was oftentimes beautiful in full-color presentation on 

slide decks but was very detached from the reality of the front line 

where the actions were taking place. 

Q. Did Mr. Hoggan’s movement of this individual from Iowa to Maine 

affect security at all? Did it improve security? Did it decrease 

security? 

 

270 Kerner Tr. at 43–44.
Page | 73

A. Not by any observation I could make.271

In testimony before the Committee, former TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger ultimately 

acknowledged Brainard’s reassignment had been inappropriate. He testified:

Mr. Gosar. Well, I am glad you went that way because I would like to 

illustrate Mr. Brainard, who testified before this committee, that he 

was issued a directed reassignment from Iowa to Maine in 2014 with 

no apparent need or justification even though the move cost him 

significant financial hardship. His replacement and the person he 

was replacing were issued similar reassignments. In your opinion, 

was this an appropriate use of directed assignment, and if so, what 

is your justification?

Mr. Neffenger. If I may, it was not an appropriate use of directed 

reassignments, and that’s why I changed the policy.272

Brainard’s experience illustrates how senior TSA leaders improperly issued directed 

reassignments and why Carraway suspended the practice in November 2014. Brainard was an 

excellent employee by the agency’s own evaluation. His reassignment served no legitimate 

purpose, and the agency ignored evidence that proceeding with his reassignment would subject 

him and his family to considerable hardship. 

TSA officials, however, continued to improperly use directed reassignments even after 

the Deputy Administrator announced the practice would end.

D. TSA Reassigned Andrew Rhoades from Minnesota to Florida

Andrew Rhoades, who serves as an AFSD at Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport, received a

directed reassignment on February 19, 2015. The directed reassignment came after Carraway’s 

November 2014 suspension of the Tours of Duty Initiative, including the widespread use of

directed reassignments. When Rhoades’s directed reassignment was brought to Carraway’s 

attention after having already been issued, Carraway confirmed Rhoades’s directed reassignment 

was inconsistent with his suspension of the practice.

Rhoades’s directed reassignment was notable, because it was issued by Minneapolis-St. 

Paul FSD Cliff Van Leuven rather than a senior official from TSA’s Office of Security 

Operations as was normally the case. Mark Hatfield, TSA’s Acting Deputy Administrator at the 

time, confirmed this was inconsistent with TSA’s procedures for issuing directed reassignments. 

 

271 Hatfield Tr. 137–38. 

272 Examining Management Practices and Misconduct at TSA: Part II, Hearing before the H. Comm. On Oversight 

& Gov’t. Reform, 114th Cong. (May 12, 2016) at 57–58 [hereinafter TSA Hearing Part II].
Page | 74

1. Andrew Rhoades Identified and Highlighted Security Vulnerabilities and 

Wait Time Falsification at Minneapolis St.-Paul Airport

Rhoades joined TSA in 2002 as an AFSD for Screening at Minneapolis-St.Paul Airport. 

After briefly serving as DFSD in Las Vegas, Rhoades returned to Minneapolis, where he is 

currently AFSD for mission support. Prior to his reassignment, Rhoades had consistently 

received strong performance evaluations throughout his career at TSA. On TSA’s five-point 

scale, Rhoades said he generally scored “in the mid to upper fours,” which he characterized as 

“respectable.”273 Beyond this, Rhoades had a history of identifying and reporting security 

deficiencies and other problems at the airport, including failures to properly tag screened 

baggage and falsified wait times.274

As AFSD in Minneapolis, Rhoades noticed security officers were not tagging checked 

bags to document that they had been screened as required. Rhoades testified:

What had happened was spring break [2014]. It – what we do is we 

traditionally go to the airport and volunteer to schlep bags. It’s a way for 

managers to demonstrate to the airport employees that, you know, we’re not 

too good to do what you do. And at spring break I was taking an oversized 

bag to what’s called the CTX 80 and it was screened.

So usually it’s – you put it in this big screening piece of equipment and at 

the end you’re supposed to take a bag sticker and put it on the bag tag. 

Because if something were to happen and we needed to be able to – in 

what’s called our AOSSP, it’s a policy that says you have to have some 

form of identification that the TSA has screened that bag. Well, if you can’t 

prove that, technically you have to dump all the bags off an aircraft, which 

is a significant, emotional event. So you put the tag on there.

When I asked the – the security officer, where’s the tag during spring break 

he said, we don’t do that anymore. I said, what do you mean you don’t do 

that? And I didn’t want to get into an argument with him, but I know in the 

AOSSP we are required to do that. I know because my office orders these 

tags. Remember, the Office of Finance Logistics reports to me. And then 

Mike Stone, one of my managers said, Drew, they’re telling us to throw all 

these bag tags away. They don’t need them anymore.

So after that I went into a meeting and said – just AFSDs and Cliff and –

and at the time, his other deputy. And I said, hey, we have a problem. I 

was volunteering. They told me we don’t do bag tags. This is against 

policy. And they said, we don’t want to talk about it here. And what had 

happened was, after the meeting convened, Cliff, his deputy and only 

George Beech went into a separate, smaller meeting. And then, very 

quickly an e-mail was sent saying, hey, we need to put bag tags back on. 

 

273 Rhoades Tr. at 17.

274 See generally Rhoades Tr.
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But that had been going on for a while because – I mean, I don’t know how 

long they stopped doing that, but I only happened to notice it when I was 

screening – not screening bags, but helping with the bags.275

 Rhoades explained MSP’s practice of not using the bag tags presented serious security 

risks to aviation security. He noted planes should not be allowed to leave an airport without their 

checked baggage being matched to passengers, which requires the bags to be properly labeled. 

He testified:

Had I not wandered on those bag tags and just volunteered at spring break, 

that could be going on right now. So let’s hypothetically say you four are 

riding on – on a flight to DCA, and we have what’s called positive passenger 

bag match. That means let’s say, [someone], you have an emergency and 

you cannot fly, but your – your bag was put on the aircraft because at the 

time we didn’t know that you weren’t going to make the flight. Well – and 

let’s say [someone else’s] bag goes on there, but – but we don’t know that 

it’s been screened because it doesn’t have a tag.

So someone’s got to pull your bag off because terrorists will say, oh, I’ll 

just put my bag on there. I won’t fly. And they’ll blow up the plane. That’s 

why a passenger has to be matched with his or her bag on that flight. If 

you’re not on that flight your bag does not go on that – on that aircraft, but 

let’s say [someone’s] a true bad guy and his bag was never screened. We 

need to be able to prove that all bags on that flight have been screened.

So let’s say there are no bag tags on the whole flight because we’ve stopped. 

There is no way we can prove which bags have been screened and which 

bags have not been screened. It’s a huge security violation or a security 

problem. And if – and let’s carry that one step further. If we can’t prove 

all the bags at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport have been screened, you 

know what we should do? No aircraft should leave that – that airport. 

None. That is a huge security shortfall.276

Rhoades had also reported to his chain of command security checkpoint wait times were 

being falsified at Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. He stated:

Q. Earlier you mentioned fabricating wait times.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you provide a little bit more detail on what issues that you raised 

with regards to that matter?

A. Yes, I’d be happy to.

 

275 Id. at 110–12. 

276 Id. at 114–15.
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The first – well, before we begin about fabricating wait times, we 

had what’s called an FSD Office of Inspections. The Office of 

Inspection comes in and they interview select people throughout the 

whole agency. It’s like a pulse check – like a health check. And 

there was a report issued in – give me a second.

There was a report I think in 2013. I have a copy of that report and 

I can provide it. I don’t think I’ve provided it to this committee, but 

in there a supervisor from the checkpoint says, we believe the wait 

times that we report in are being falsified by managers. So that’s 

the first record of it.

Around March 1st, 2000, I believe it was ‘14, a TSM by the name 

of Brian Stout came up to me. What’s important about Brian is he’s 

the husband of Denise Stout who used to be my administrative 

officer. So he was looking to me for guidance. I could tell he was 

conflicted. He said, Drew, I need to talk to you about an incident 

that happened at the airport. And what had happened was he was 

viewing CCTV, closed circuit TV, to – to estimate the wait times. 

He had counted 18 minutes into a wait time report and then he got 

called away because there was an incident. And another manager 

came in and started collecting after he had tabulated 18 minutes.

Q. When was the 18 minutes –

A. It was –

Q. – brought up?

A. I believe it was March 1st. I thought it was 2014. So he – he 

collected 18 minutes. And then this other manager collected, I 

believe, five.

What’s important at the time is, any wait time report over 20 minutes 

needed to be reported to the headquarters because the headquarters 

was really sensitive of having long wait times. At that time it was 

only 20 minutes. Well, what got reported was only the 18 minutes 

that he counted. And he brought that up to his managers, who did 

nothing about it.

So, he was approaching me asking for advice. I said, you need to 

bring this up, Brian. I mean, you can’t let this go. I approached 

David McMahon, the deputy, and I said, Dave – I described in detail 

everything I’ve described to you and his quote was, at least we aren’t 

as bad as Chicago. So, instead of investigating it, instead of getting 
Page | 77

to the bottom of it, instead of saying, we can’t allow that, his 

response to me was, at least we’re not as bad as Chicago. Becky 

Roering also heard him say that.

Wait – wait times routinely are falsified in Minneapolis-St. Paul 

airport. That’s one of the reasons, candidly, why I don’t get wait 

time reports ‘cause they know if I did get it and I can prove it, I’d 

call it to their attention.277

Rhoades stated he reported this issue to his managers. He testified:

Q. So you mentioned baggage tags –

A. Yes.

Q. – as well as the wait time fabrication –

A. Uh-huh.

Q. – is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And you raised those issues to your managers?

A. I did.278

Rhoades testified he encountered retaliation after reporting the bag tag issue by being 

excluded from the distribution of certain information. He stated:

Q. And then earlier you mentioned that you were excluded from 

receiving certain information and removed from certain meetings; is 

that correct?

A. Meetings with the Somali community, but mostly omitted from 

what’s called snapshots or these reports from our coordination 

center that would highlight things about excessive wait times or a 

missed bag pull or a breach at checkpoint whatever.

Q. And then, to your knowledge, when did – when did that – when did 

those two things occur?

A. I stopped getting coordination or snapshots shortly after May 25th, 

2014 when I was the acting deputy at the time. And then I submitted 

 

277 Id. at 102–04.

278 Id. at 110.
Page | 78

a written report saying, we missed – I think it was – I think it was 

over 25 bags, but we missed all of these bags that went on the aircraft 

that were unscreened. What we should have done is we should 

have – technically, we should have shut down that airport, but I will 

tell you that would cost millions of dollars. And no one wants to go 

on record as saying this occurred. So when I submitted that AAR, 

that written report saying, this occurred, I never got reports after 

that.

Q. And how did you find out that this was occurring, that you were 

removed from –

A. Omitted?

Q. Omitted.

A. Because Becky Roering would say, Drew, here’s another report 

you’re not getting. She would show it to me.

Q. Did the FSD at the time or deputy FSD ever inform you of your 

exclusion?

A. It just – it just never happened. They never said, Drew, you know, 

you work in budget and finance, you don’t really need to see this. 

Because prior to that all AFSDs – because again, I used to be the 

AFSD for screening. So I would hope that I could add some value 

with respects to maybe helping them if they do step outside of policy 

or to say, maybe there’s a better way, or just process improvement.

Q. And the FSD at the time was?

A. Cliff Van Leuven.279

Rhoades raised the issue with Van Leuven, who called the matter an oversight. Rhoades 

did not find this explanation credible. Excluding him from this information harmed Rhoades’s

ability to perform his duties and weakened the overall security of Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport. 

He testified:

Q. Cliff Van Leuven. And you never raised the issue with them about 

your omission?

A. Oh, yes, I do.

Q. Okay.

 

279 Id. at 112–13.
Page | 79

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Would the omission create difficulties within your job?

A. Indirectly, yes. Like, let me give you an example. Recently I was 

designated a deputy. It was some time within the last six months. 

And an incident occurred at the airport. I never got notice of it. So 

I sent a note to Cliff Van Leuven and David McMahon and I said, 

look, if I’m -- if you’re going to place me in the deputy federal 

security job you cannot exclude me from incidents because I’m the 

approving authority on -- on various things that occur. And it’s –

it’s – it weakens our security posture if they’re going to place me as 

the deputy and then omit me from any of the reports. And I – I 

submitted that to them in writing.

Q. What was – to your knowledge, what was the reaction from Van 

Leuven and his deputy after receiving that information?

A. Oh, it was just a simple oversight. We didn’t mean to. Nothing is a 

simple oversight. Nothing is a simple oversight.280

2. Rhoades Was Issued a Directed Reassignment Due to Suspicions He Was 

Providing Information to the Media

TSA eventually issued Rhoades a directed reassignment. Evidence indicated TSA—

specifically Cliff Van Leuven—blamed Rhoades for a series of embarrassing leaks to the media, 

a charge Rhoades categorically denied. Rhoades’s directed reassignment was retaliation for those 

leaks.

The Notice of Directed Reassignment itself did not provide a reason for the move,281

which Rhoades found unusual. Rhoades testified:

Q. And on what basis did Mr. Van Leuven use for your directed 

reassignment?

A. As the – when I read the note I, candidly, could not find a basis or 

at least one that I understood. It – it appeared to be just, policy says 

this. Usually you have to cite a basis. The – the office is going 

through realignment. We need an AFSD support here. But I will 

note, there is a very big difference between the February 19th memo 

and the January 23rd, 2015 recommendation that I would like to at 

least be asked about because those – those differences clearly dispel 

 

280 Id. at 113–14. 

281 Memorandum from Clifford Van Leuven, Fed. Sec. Dir.., Transp. Sec. Admin. to Andrew Rhoades, Ass’t Fed. 

Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., Notice of Directed Reassignment and Change in Duty Station (Feb. 19, 2015). 
Page | 80

why I was being reassigned. The January 23rd, 2015 memo to Kelly 

Hoggan.282

Rhoades eventually obtained, through a FOIA lawsuit, a January 23, 2015 memorandum 

from Van Leuven to Hoggan requesting the directed reassignment.

283 This document outlined 

Van Leuven’s reasons for the reassignment.

284

Van Leuven wrote “[w]hile Mr. Rhoades leads a team that produces above average 

output, his leadership capacity is limited here by enduring negative perceptions, a lack of 

confidence/trust within his own staff, and evident contacts or loyalties to past leadership.”285 Van 

Leuven wrote “[a]s new TSA-Minnesota leadership works to change the leadership culture, Mr. 

Rhoades’s presence works counter to the leadership change needed in this environment.”286 Van 

Leuven also wrote Rhoades “has capacity,” but “that capacity is not being realized here, and it is 

optimal for both the employee’s professional growth and the agency to reassign the employee to 

another duty station.”287 Van Leuven wrote, “[i]t is my recommendation that he would be better 

utilized by the agency in a position that would sever past loyalties, provide a fresh start with a 

new leadership team and utilize his talent and leadership in a new and more effective way.”288

 

282 Rhoades Tr. at 23–24.

283 Id. at 23–25.

284 Id. at 23–24.

285 Memorandum from Clifford Van Leuven, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin. to Kelly Hoggan, Ass’t Adm’r for 

the Office of Sec. Operations., Transp. Sec. Admin., Request for Directed Reassignment (Jan. 23, 2015).

286 Id.

287 Id.

288 Id.
Page | 81
Page | 82

Rhoades explained the language about “loyalties to past leadership” was a reference to 

his relationship with former Minneapolis FSD Ken Kasprisin, who had previously served as 

TSA’s Deputy Administrator and Acting Administrator. Van Leuven also suspected Rhoades 

was responsible for a series of unflattering leaks to local media about TSA’s operations at the 

airport. Rhoades denies any involvement with the leaks. He testified:

Q. “Loyalties to prior leadership,” can you – to your knowledge, do you 

know what that would –

A. I do.

Q. Okay. Can you explain.

A. They’re specifically insinuating my relationship with Ken 

Kasprisin. At the time Mr. Kasprisin was on Fox News being 

interviewed about the differences between privatized airports, 

security. And, of course, he held the position of acting TSA 

administrator. So what the TSA thought or Mr. Van Leuven, Kelly 

Hoggan and Robert Ball thought was I was feeding Mr. Kasprisin 

information to talk to Fox News which was not correct.

It was interesting the "evident contacts" is an inference to my 

contacts with the media which again is not true because Tom Lyden 

on Fox News had admitted on camera and in the -- in an interview 

that he’s never spoken to me. First time I’ve ever spoken with Fox 

News or time Tom Lyden was February 21st, 2015 when I granted 

them an interview.

Q. So was Tom Lyden working on a story with a – an anonymous 

whistleblower?

A. No. Mr. Lyden – if – if you were to Google MSP Airport/TSA a 

variety of – of embarrassing news stories prior to February 19th, 

2015 would pop up. Breaches of airport security and those matters. 

Mr. Van Leuven thought that I was giving Mr. Lyden all of this 

information, which was not true.289

After receiving his directed reassignment on February 19, Rhoades drove to Kasprisin’s 

home that evening, and Kasprisin called Acting TSA Administrator Mel Carraway about 

Rhoades’s case. Rhoades testified:

Q. So going back to the – the reassignment decision. Would the 

Executive Resources Council have any – have any role in the 

decision to your knowledge?

 

289 Rhoades Tr. at 24–26.
Page | 83

A. Thank you for asking that question. The night of February 19th, 

2015, I drove to Ken Kasprisin’s home. He called the acting 

Administrator Mel Carraway. I listened to their conversation. Mel 

said, I’m surprised they did that to Drew because I rescinded that 

practice on November – I believe it was November 25th, 2014. I 

may have sent you an e-mail document called – from Mel Carraway 

that rescinded that practice.

Mel said, he shouldn’t have received that action because I don’t 

recall that being processed through the ERC. Meaning, our 

Executive Resource Council. And I heard Mel Carraway say those –

those – those words.

I called Mel Carraway about a week later on his business cell phone 

and spoke to him about that who confirmed my action did not go 

through the ERC, Executive Resource Council. So it appears Kelly 

Hoggan deviated from that practice and colluded between – with 

Bob Ball and Clifford Van Leuven to give me a directed 

reassignment.290

In a conversation between Carraway and Kasprisin, “[Carraway] indicated to [Kasprisin]

that he had rescinded the generalized Directed Reassignment policy and that this type of action 

should not have taken place.”291 Following his call with Carraway, Kasprisin had several 

discussions with Hatfield. In one of these conversations:

[Hatfield] stated he had already spoken to Kelly Hoggan regarding the 

Rhoades’s situation and inquired if I recalled FSDs ever having the 

authority to directly reassign a subordinate out of their immediate 

commuting area. I told him that in the 10 years I had spent as an FSD, as 

the Acting Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations, as the TSA 

Deputy Administrator and as the Acting TSA Administrator, FSDs never 

had that authority, that it was impractical, costly, and would result in 

countless legitimate grievances by those receiving such directed 

reassignments. Mark Hatfield parroted the same and indicated that if he had 

that authority as the Newark FSD, he never knew about it and he might have 

been tempted to use it given how many personnel challenges he faced at 

Newark.292

In one of the conversations between Hatfield and Kasprisin, Hatfield confirmed Rhoades 

was reassigned due to Van Leuven’s suspicion Rhoades was a leak to the media. Kasprisin 

stated:

 

290 Id. at 36–37.

291 Kenneth Kasprisin, Statement for the Office of Special Counsel Regarding Andrew Rhoades, (Undated). 

[hereinafter Kasprisin Statement].

292 Id.
Page | 84

[Hatfield] continued by relaying other statements made by Hoggan: that the 

reason for the reassignment was that the FSD (VanLueven) didn’t trust 

Rhoades and that he thought Rhoades was leaking information to a local 

reporter resulting in a series of bad news stories regarding the TSA 

operation at MSP; and that there were no performance or conduct issues 

with Rhoades. They just wanted him out of there because they didn’t trust 

him.293

In a further conversation with Kasprisin, Hatfield “stated that Kelly Hoggan stood there 

in his office and lied to him regarding FSD authorities,” which led Kapsrisin to respond that he 

was aware of at least three other occasions “in which Hoggan clearly misrepresented reality.” 

Hatfield also “assured [Kasprisin] that he would find a way to fix this mess and that he planned 

on a call the following day with those involved in generating Rhoades’s directed reassignment 

(Hoggan, Ball, and VanLueven).”294 At the suggestion of Van Leuven and Hoggan, Hatfield 

offered to rescind the directed reassignment if Kasprisin agreed not to have any contact with 

Rhoades or the media for a year.295

3. Former TSA Acting Deputy Administrator Mark Hatfield Acknowledged 

Rhoades’s Reassignment Was Inappropriate

Hatfield testified he believed Rhoades’s directed reassignment was inappropriate and 

took actions to stop it. He also stated Hoggan’s mismanagement of the situation contributed to 

Hatfield’s decision to try to reassign Hoggan outside of OSO. Hatfield testified:

Q. We’re familiar with some of his allegations. Do you know if his 

directed reassignment actually had to do with his reporting that wait 

times were falsified? 

A. Had to do with what? 

Q. His reporting that wait times were falsified. 

A. Oh. 

Q. When –

A. I never saw any – well, look, here’s what happened. I stopped it 

immediately. I said, “Wait a minute. This is directed reassignment. 

Those have been frozen.” “Oh, well, just frozen for FSDs.” I’m 

like, “No, no, no, no, no.” 

Secondly, how can an FSD order the directed reassignment? This 

is my question to Hoggan’s office. I don’t know whether it was to 

 

293 Id.

294 Id.

295 Id.
Page | 85

him or his deputy. I said, man, I’ve been an FSD for 10 years. I 

never had the authority to direct – if I had a problem player and I 

wanted to send them off or, you know, refresh the position. 

Because, you know, they were very frank, where they said, oh, he’s 

a problem in the organization there, and so they had the authority to 

do this. I challenged that. I said, I never knew that that was an 

authority of a Federal Security Director. 

Q. Did anyone ever tell you that FSDs could not directly reassign 

someone, or was it just kind of common knowledge? 

A. It was common knowledge. I mean, after 10 years of being an FSD, 

I never knew of anyone who did it, I never was offered that as an 

authority and never saw it written anywhere. So it was the best-kept 

secret in TSA, if that actually existed, but I have no belief that it 

existed. 

Q. So, to your understanding, the reassignment did not comport with 

TSA policy. Is that correct? 

A. I did not believe that it did. 

And let me go back to what I said earlier. You know, a directed 

reassignment is a tool. And so they tried to come back and say, “Oh, 

no, it’s happened,” you know, and gave me examples. And I said, 

wait a minute. You were eliminating that position or downsizing 

something here, and so it was done in a different context. As an 

involuntary move, it was unprecedented, to my belief.296

Hatfield further stated Hoggan supported Rhoades’s reassignment and defended it even after 

Hatfield questioned them about its propriety. He testified:

Q. You said they came back and told you this. Who is “they”? 

A. Either Kelly or his deputy. Those are the two people I talked to 

about it. 

Q. Okay. So Kelly Hoggan was supportive of this directed 

reassignment?

A. Yes. He was supportive of it, and he tried to justify it to me and 

tried to tell me that there was precedent for it, which I challenged 

him on. 

 

296 Hatfield Tr. at 160.
Page | 86

Q. Did this play into your decision to try to directly reassign 

Mr. Hoggan? 

A. The mismanagement aspect of it, yes. 

Q. Mismanagement of Mr. Rhoades’s situation? 

A. Yes, and his representation to me that it was an FSD’s authority to 

do this. And I could find no evidence that that had ever been the 

case, either through my research with HR in Washington or in my 

10 years as an FSD in the field.297

Hatfield stated the Office of Chief Counsel was “intimately aware” of Rhoades’s case, ultimately 

supporting his decision to stop the directed reassignment. He testified:

Q. Did you ever talk with Counsel about –

A. Of course. Throughout this. Counsel was intimately aware of this 

case. 

Q. And what did Counsel say about the ability of an FSD to directly 

reassign a subordinate? 

A. I don’t remember exactly, but I’m quite sure that -- well, nobody 

ever came and said, oh, yeah, here’s the authority, it’s written right 

here. So –

Q. Did the Office of the Chief Counsel ever try to stop you? 

A. No. 

Q. Okay. 

A Absolutely not. In fact, supported it, supported my stopping of the 

directed reassignment. 

Q. Do you know why they supported it? Was it because the movement 

didn’t comport with policy, or because they saw it as retaliatory and 

wanted to head off a lawsuit, or something else? 

A. You would have to ask them on that. 

Q. Okay.298 

 

297 Id.

298 Id. at 160–61.
Page | 87

Hatfield also confirmed he had several conversations with Kasprisin about Rhoades’s

case but did not seem to have a detailed recollection of these discussions.299

4. TSA Rescinded Rhoades’s Directed Reassignment After He Filed a Complaint 

with the Office of Special Counsel 

Rhoades believed the directed reassignment was retaliatory, so he retained a counsel and 

filed complaints with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and Merit Systems Protection Board 

(MSPB). These actions extended the clock for Rhoades to respond to the agency. He testified:

Q. So it’s – going back to the notice that you were handed. It said, 

“Please accept or decline this directed reassignment within ten 

calendar days of receiving this notice.” What was your reaction?

A. I did not respond to it because what had happened was, when the 

agency found out that I submitted an – an OSC complaint and an 

MSPB complaint, they shifted gears, if you will. And – and – what 

normally happens is, if you don’t accept in ten days they start 

separation. They – I’m sure you’ve heard from Sharlene Mata. I’m 

sure you’ve heard from Heather Callahan, but they move to separate 

you from service. But because I submitted an OSC complaint to 

MSPB, they started to say, well, we want you to rescind those two 

actions. And that’s when they sent me a settlement agreement.

I – I sought legal counsel from Lynne Bernabei, who’s a lawyer here 

in Washington, D.C., and they said, we’ll give you 21 days because 

you’re seeking legal advice. And so that initial ten days was 

extended. And then they were trying to – when I say "they," excuse 

me, the TSA headquarters was attempting to submit a settlement 

agreement to remove the action and rescind my OSC and MSPB 

complaints and that’s when I said, I – I decline. I’m not going to 

move forward with the settlement agreement. I’m not going to sign 

a nondisclosure agreement. I’m not going to accept this action.300

After filing complaints with the MSPB and OSC, Rhoades was contacted by TSA’s 

Office of Chief Counsel with a settlement offer, which rescinded his directed reassignment. 

Rhoades declined the offer, because it would require him to drop his claims against TSA and 

restrict him from speaking about his experiences. He testified:

Q. “Negotiate a settlement agreement,” can you – can you go into a 

little more detail?

A. I can. On February 19th I was issued a directed reassignment. I 

contacted Merit Systems Protection Board, as well as the Office of 

 

299 Id. at 161–63.

300 Rhoades Tr. at 35–36.
Page | 88

Special Counsel. During – while that process ensued, the TSA 

headquarters found out, because what you have to do is you have to 

serve your TSA headquarters through MSPB, that I had launched a 

complaint with the Office of Special Counsel and MSPB. I was 

immediately contacted by Mr. Steven Colon, who is the chief of the 

litigations branch, who sent me a written settlement agreement. I 

declined it.

Q. On what – on what basis did you decline it?

A. I could provide a copy of it for you, and I would like to provide a 

copy of it to you, but I read it. And it, basically, said I could not 

pursue any administrative actions against anyone at the TSA. It said 

I could not speak about my experiences. And it said that I could – I 

had to withdraw my complaints to the MSPB and the Office of 

Special Counsel. And the only thing they would do is rescind my 

directed reassignment. So it prohibited me in the future from being 

able to do what I’m, candidly, doing today and I thought that was a 

big risk.301

Former Assistant Chief Counsel for Administrative Litigation, Steven Colon, also 

testified that the decision to rescind the reassignment was, at least partially, made in response to 

Rhoades filing MSPB and OSC complaints. Colon stated:

Q. You indicated that the directed reassignment of Drew Rhoades was 

outside the batch of reassignments that was made? Do you know 

why Drew Rhoades was reassigned or had been given a directed 

reassignment? 

A. It is my understanding that he was having difficulty getting along 

with his Federal security director, you know. And that is – the 

rationale for it was essentially that the Federal security director was 

having issues with him in that he wasn’t taking direction or was 

challenging everything he had said to him, or saying, you know, 

that’s not how the old boss did it, and consistently did things like 

that. 

So there was a conflict between the two of them. And my 

understanding is the Federal security director went up to his regional 

director, Bob Ball, and they went through the Office of Security 

Operations. Unclear as to who they went through ultimately. But 

they made the decision that they had a vacant billet in Florida, and 

so they made the decision to do that directed reassignment. 

 

301 Id. at 14–15.
Page | 89

Q. And on what information do you base this understanding? And 

where did you obtain this information? 

A. Because I’d had conversations with the Federal security director, 

because at the time that the – at the time that the directed 

reassignment went into effect – the time the directed reassignment 

was ordered – Mr. Rhoades filed an MSPB appeal. 

So the MSPB appeal came in to me, and I looked at it, and I then, 

you know, I thought it was strange because, you know, we hadn’t 

actually seen many – most of the – we hadn’t seen any MSPB 

appeals on directed reassignments. 

And I actually wasn’t certain, you know, whether this had been as 

part of the group or whether was this outside the group. It seemed 

untimely because it came earlier, like the spring. Usually it was, 

like, April when you’d get all the OSO directed reassignments done. 

So I did some – so, ultimately – and then I found, I think the same 

day we got that, I also found out he had gone to OSC. So there was 

a question of whether we could resolve it or not. 

And so I went to Ms. Kerner, and I think Ms. Kerner went to Mr. 

Hatfield, and there was discussions with Ms. Kerner and Mr. 

Hatfield as to what to do with about this case. 

And ultimately we tried to revolve it by, you know, just pulling it 

entirely, and that got rid of the MSPB case, but pulling it, saying, 

you know, we’re just pulling the directed reassignment. 

We tried to resolve it that way, and the MSPB case went away. But 

I know we still were defending the OSC complaint.302

 

In March 2015, OSC took the rare step of requesting TSA issue a stay of Rhoades’s

directed reassignment, which TSA granted.303 On April 1, 2015, Van Leuven formally rescinded 

Rhoades’s directed reassignment, citing Rhoades’s response “detailing the hardship that would 

be caused by a reassignment to Tampa” specifically noting “child custody issues for both you 

and your spouse would create various legal and financial obstacles to moving, as well as, the 

threat of a possible loss of custody.”304 Given this hardship, Van Leuven said he “decided it 

 

302 Colon Tr. at 52–54.

303 Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Obtains Relief for TSA Whistleblowers Who Disclosed Security 

Risks (Apr. 29, 2015), https://osc.gov/News/pr15-10.pdf.

304 Memorandum from Clifford Van Leuven, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin. to Andrew Rhoades, Ass’t Fed. 

Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin, Rescission of Directed Reassignment (Apr. 1, 2015).
Page | 90

would not be in the best interests of you, or the Agency, to reassign you to Tampa, FL” and “you 

will not be directly reassigned.”305

Rhoades disputed Van Leuven was initially unaware of these circumstances. He testified:

[I]it was common knowledge that I was going through a divorce and a 

custody battle. And Mr. Van Leuven allegedly said he didn’t recall that, 

but that’s not true. He knew exactly what my family situation was. And I 

would argue that they did that purposely to try to get me to resign ‘cause 

they knew I could not leave the State of Minnesota or else I would lose 

custody of my children.306

 

305 Memorandum from Clifford Van Leuven, Fed. Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin. to Andrew Rhoades, Ass’t Fed. 

Sec. Dir., Transp. Sec. Admin., Rescission of Directed Reassignment (Apr. 1, 2015).

306 Rhoades Tr. at 40.
Page | 91

OSC issued a press release on April 29, 2015 announcing it had blocked Rhoades’s

personnel action as well as the suspension of another MSP TSA official. OSC wrote:
Page | 92

Andrew Rhoades, an assistant federal security director, reported violations 

of aviation security policy. Specifically, he objected to a supervisor’s 

proposal to have TSA screeners improperly handle confiscated weapons. 

Additionally, he reported that stickers were not consistently placed on 

checked bags that had been cleared by TSA. Both issues were remedied by 

TSA. Beginning in September 2014, a series of local news stories ran on 

security lapses at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. In 

December 2014, one of Mr. Rhoades’s supervisors sought to learn if one of 

his employees was providing information to the media. In February 2015, 

that same supervisor issued Mr. Rhoades a forced reassignment to an airport 

in Florida. In March 2015, the TSA granted OSC’s request for a stay. 

Subsequently, TSA formally rescinded its reassignment of Mr. Rhoades.307

While Rhoades’s directed reassignment was rescinded, his whistleblower retaliation 

complaint with OSC remains open. TSA Chief Counsel Francine Kerner acknowledged it was an 

“open question” whether Rhoades had been reassigned as a result of a protected disclosure.308

She stated:

Q. Have any of the directed reassignments been retaliatory for a 

protected disclosure? 

 

307 Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Obtains Relief for TSA Whistleblowers Who Disclosed Security 

Risks (Apr. 29, 2015), https://osc.gov/News/pr15-10.pdf.

308 Kerner Tr. at 44.
Page | 93

A. I’m not aware of any that were made for protected disclosure. I 

know the Office of Special Counsel is still looking at the Drew 

Rhoades case, and so that’s still an open question.309

Colon agreed the Rhoades case “could end up being a very large problem” and could potentially 

lead to a whistleblower reprisal finding.310 He testified:

Q. Did anyone in OCC ever raise concerns that the Rhoades directed 

reassignment was a potential violation of whistleblower rules? 

A. Before it happened? 

Q. Yes. 

A. I don’t know. 

Q. After it happened? 

A. And so after it happened, once he filed the MSPB case, and 

reading – you know, and he had gone to OSC at that point, you 

know, I looked at it from the point of view of the timing and, you 

know, what he had to say and, you know, whether, you know, he 

alleges that he’s accused of leaking stuff to the media, which, you 

know, having worked on the MacLean issue, I’m well aware that 

that could end up being a very large problem, you know. It could, 

you know. 

Whether they’re going to find whistleblower reprisal or not is still 

up in the air. But, you know, once it went to the MSPB and, you 

know, I was involved and Ms. Kerner was involved, you know, 

obviously there is – you know, they know that there’s now a risk. 

I don’t know if they sought out any legal advice before they did it in 

the first place which would have stopped the MSPB case from 

happening and the OSC complaint from happening. I just don’t 

know.311 

Former TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger said TSA was “supporting Mr. Rhoades in 

his complaint, which stands before the Office of Special Counsel.”

312 He deferred to OSC’s 

investigation, but acknowledged it would have been inappropriate if Rhoades was removed due 

to suspicions he was leaking to the media. He testified:

313

 

309 Id.

310 Colon Tr. at 120.

311 Id.

312 TSA Hearing Part II at 59.

313 Id.
Page | 94

Mr. Gosar. Now, Andrew Rhoades was issued a directed reassignment 

in February of 2015, which was stayed by the Office of Special 

Counsel due to concerns of retaliation for protected whistleblower 

activity and ultimately rescinded by the TSA. Can you explain how 

Mr. Rhoades’s reassignment was approved?

Mr. Neffenger. Again, I would defer to the person who made that 

decision. I don’t allow the policy under my watch, and we’re 

supporting Mr. Rhoades in his complaint, which stands before the 

Office of Special Counsel right now. 

Mr. Gosar. Now, part of the justification for Mr. Rhoades’s

reassignment was to sever past loyalties due to suspicions he was a 

source for the media, which he denies. Do you consider this an 

appropriate justification?

Mr. Neffenger. Well, again, that matter is being investigated right 

now by the Office of Special Counsel. If they find that to be true, 

then of course it wasn’t appropriate.314

Neffenger declined to recognize Rhoades’s directed reassignment was inappropriate in advance 

of OSC’s conclusions. While OSC has yet to conclude the case, there is substantial evidence the 

reassignment was whistleblower retaliation. This would not be the first time for TSA. In May 

2018, TSA reached a $1 million settlement with OSC to remedy the improper directed 

reassignment of three TSA officials originally based in Hawaii. 

E. TSA Relocates the Honolulu International Airport DFSDs

In January 2014 Sharlene Mata, Heather Callahan Chuck, and Frank Abreu were 

reassigned from their previous positions to serve as DFSDs at Honolulu International Airport as 

part of TSA’s realignment in Hawaii and the Pacific. This realignment reclassified what had 

previously been FSD positions—serving different parts of Hawaii and the Pacific—into DFSDs 

with portfolios including authority over different parts of the area.315

Mata had previously served as Lihue Airport’s FSD on the Hawaiian island of Kauai for 

eight years. Mata stated during this time she consistently received performance ratings of 

Exceeded Expectations or Achieved Excellence, the highest two ratings.316 She also was detailed 

to serve in positions of higher responsibility including Deputy Director of Field Operations and 

Regional Director. As part of the realignment, Mata was reassigned to serve as DFSD of 

Honolulu International Airport. The role was a demotion in title but increased her responsibility, 

because she became responsible for transportation security on Hawaii’s neighbor islands. 317

 

314 Id.

315 Mata O.S.C. Disclosure at 1.

316 Id.

317 Mata O.S.C. Disclosure at 1.
Page | 95

Chuck was TSA’s Diplomatic Liaison for the Asia Pacific region when she was 

reassigned to serve as a DFSD at Honolulu International Airport. She previously had served as 

TSA’s Director of Field Operations in OSO.318 As a DFSD, Chuck’s role was responsible for 

managing operations at Honolulu International Airport.319

Abreu was responsible for Guam and other Pacific islands under the airport’s 

jurisdiction.320 

1. The DFSDs Identified Significant Operational Deficiencies at Honolulu 

International Airport

The new DFSDs identified numerous significant deficiencies in operations at Honolulu 

International Airport. Chuck e-mailed the FSD, Stanford Miyamoto, on February 26, March 4, 

and March 11, 2014 to notify him of these issues, which included: (1) problems with maintaining 

tracking certifications; (2) failures in implementing standard operating procedures; (3) poor 

coordination between the training and screening functions;321 (4) failure to engage in tactical 

response plan exercises; (5) excessively high spending plans; (6) management control 

deficiencies; (7) noncompliance with regulations for access controls and asset control;322 (8) 

failure to accurately record airport wait times; (9) a lack of accountability within the inspections 

function; (10) improper use of cell phones in a classified environment; (11) and failing to 

provide the airport’s leadership team and cleared staff with intelligence briefings for several 

years. 323

 Mata stated Miyamoto was unsupportive of the DFSDs’ efforts to address these security 

issues. She identified similar deficiencies in airports in Maui and the island of Hawaii and raised 

them in meetings but did not submit them in writing.324 Mata stated:

I and DFSD Callahan [Chuck] began to correct these operational and 

administrative shortcomings.... [h]owever, we were ousted from our 

positions while primarily still in discovery mode and prior to having any 

meaningful opportunity to do so. FSD Miyamoto’s failure to support us in 

correcting these reported deficiencies and security vulnerabilities resulted 

in an immense cost to the taxpayer, that could have easily been avoided if 

 

318 Briefing by Heather Callahan Chuck to H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on directed 

reassignments. (Feb. 9, 2016).

319 Letter from Heather Callahan, Dep. FSD Pac., HNL, Office of Sec. Operations, to Equal Employment 

Opportunity, Complaint of Discrimination based on Gender, and Harassment and Retaliation by FSD Pacific, 

Stanford Miyamoto (Apr. 4, 2014). [hereinafter Callahan EEO Complaint].

320 Memorandum from Frank M. Abreu, Dep. FSD, Heather Callahan, Dep. FSD to Stanford Miyamoto, Fed. Sec. 

Dir., Pac., Office of Sec. Operations, Proposed Pacific Realignment Staffing Model (Feb. 14, 2014) (on file with the 

Committee).

321 Email from Heather Callahan, Dep. Fed. Sec. Dir. Pac., HNL, to Stanford Miyamoto, Fed. Sec. Dir. Pac. 

Regions, T.S.A. (Feb. 26, 2014, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee).

322 Email from Heather Callahan, Dep. Fed. Sec. Dir. Pac., HNL, to Stanford Miyamoto, Fed. Sec. Dir. Pac. 

Regions, T.S.A. (Mar. 4, 2014, 8:26 AM) (on file with the Committee).

323 Id.

324 Mata O.S.C. Disclosure at 4.
Page | 96

both proper management had been effected at the airports in the Pacific, and 

had myself and DFSD Callahan had the opportunity to correct such.325

The DFSDs requested TSA’s OOI conduct an inspection. OOI conducted its investigation in 

August 2014—after they had already been reassigned—and identified 96 Corrective Action 

Plans,326 which Mata called a “record number.”327

Mata and Chuck had strained relations with Miyamoto and both filed EEO complaints 

with TSA’s Civil Rights Office prior to their reassignment. Mata stated:

Immediately after assuming this new position my Supervisor, Pacific FSD 

Stanford Miyamoto began discriminatory and ultimately retaliatory actions 

against me. Soon thereafter FSD Miyamoto successfully and without merit, 

engaged the support of OSO senior leadership in effecting additional 

unwarranted reprisal actions against me.328

Chuck stated “[t]he FSD Pacific, Stanford Miyamoto, my direct supervisor has on an ongoing 

basis discriminated against me based on my gender. The FSD Pacific has, and continues to, 

harass and retaliate against me.” She cited examples excluding Chuck from participating in her 

assigned duties, undermining her authority, and sharing derogatory information about her to her 

staff.329

Following their reassignments, Mata, Chuck, and Abreu were tasked with developing a 

realignment plan to achieve greater cost efficiencies in the Pacific area. On February 14, 2014, 

they presented a proposed plan to reduce staffing by 34% and costs by 32%. Mata stated 

Miyamoto was initially impressed with their plan and approved it. But a couple of weeks later on 

February 28, Miyamoto tasked the Honolulu AFSDs with developing a new realignment plan 

and excluded Mata and Chuck from its development. 

2. Deputy Assistant Administrator Joseph Salvator and Other TSA Senior 

Leaders Reassigned the DFSDs Out of Hawaii

Deputy Assistant Administrator of OSO Joseph Salvator criticized the revised plan and 

harshly reprimanded Mata and Chuck’s work and conduct during an April 8, 2014 video 

teleconference. Mata and Chuck believed these criticisms were unfair. A number of problems 

Salvator raised came from the plan developed after the DFSDs were removed from the project.

On Thursday, April 17—less than four months into their tenure as DFSDs—Mata, 

Chuck, and Abreu were issued directed reassignments outside of the state of Hawaii. Mata was 

 

325 Id.

326 Memorandum from Joseph Salvator, Ass’t Adm’r, Office of Inspection to Kelly Hoggan, Ass’t Adm’r, Office of 

Sec. Operations, Federal Security Director’s Office Inspection Honolulu International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, 

HI: R140027 (Oct. 6, 2014).

327 Mata O.S.C. Disclosure at 4.

328 Id. at 1.

329 Callahan EEO Complaint.
Page | 97

reassigned to Seattle, WA, Chuck to Los Angeles, CA, and Abreu to Burbank, CA.330 In a highly 

unusual step, these directed reassignments were simultaneously accompanied by temporary 

internal assignment-details. Mata was expected to report to her new position on Monday, April 

21, four days later and the day after Easter Sunday.331 Mata reported she was subjected to further 

retaliation after relocating to Seattle, including being passed over for a DFSD position. Mata 

stated Regional Director Mike Irwin asked Seattle FSD Jeff Holmgren who he recommended for 

the vacant DFSD position, and when Holmgren recommended Mata and Irwin allegedly 

responded, “[n]ot unless you want to be the FSD of Moline,” which is in Illinois.332

Salvator testified he and other TSA senior leaders, including Hoggan and Pistole, decided 

to remove the DFSDs because they believed the leadership team in Hawaii was broken beyond 

repair and required changes. They believed it would be more appropriate to remove the DFSDs 

because Salvator and the other leaders believed the DFSDs were behaving unprofessionally and 

undermining Miyamoto. He stated:

Q. What happened to Ms. Callahan? Was she direct reassigned?

A. Yes.

Q. Why was she direct reassigned?

A. So there was this national effort going on. Most of the country had 

executed to it. Hawaii was one of the last. They were having 

problems. In April of 2014 –

Q. What problems were they having?

A. So in April of 2014, the administrator started getting phone calls 

from the workforce, the administrator started getting e-mails from 

the workforce, Mr. Hoggan was getting phone calls from the Hawaii 

workforce with grave concern over what was going on in Hawaii.

Q. And what – and my time is short, but I want to get as much as I can. 

What was going on in Hawaii, allegedly?

A. So they needed to consolidate, for the first time ever, the position 

for Guam and Saipan, the deputy for Honolulu, and now what used 

to be FSD Maui became a deputy. And now they all work for the 

FSD in Honolulu for the first time. 

To make this happen, there was business rules -- there was business 

rules associated with this that needed to be followed. The FSD 

 

330 Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Obtains Settlements for TSA Whistleblowers in Three 

Involuntary Reassignment Cases (May 23, 2018), https://osc.gov/News/pr-18-30%202.pdf.

331 Mata O.S.C. Disclosure at 9.

332 Id. at 23.
Page | 98

assigned the project to the three deputies, the now three deputies to 

work the plan. The plan never got submitted correctly to 

headquarters. The plan started making it out to the workforce. The 

plan put together by the three of them was, in my opinion, poor. It 

reduced the FSD staff by 34 percent, which was almost half, which 

was not the intent of this activity. And when the employees found 

out almost half of the FTE for Hawaii was going to be reduced, they 

started, rightfully so, speaking out.

Additionally, one Saturday morning Ms. Mata bumped into the 

Governor of Hawaii on a Saturday and spoke to him -- I believe 

spoke to him about the plan, all of this before the plan had been 

approved. The plan had not been properly followed. When we 

learned this, my supervisor, Mr. Hoggan, asked me to get everybody 

together and get them on the same page. 

I attempted to do that. I chaired a videoconference with the 

leadership in Hawaii. I had several people in the room with me on 

the VTC. The VTC was meant to get them on the same page, but 

during the VTC, I felt Ms. Callahan, Ms. Mata, to some extent 

Mr. Abreu, I felt they were unprofessional. I felt that they were 

undermining the FSD. They clearly were not leading this effort.333

Salvator stated other senior TSA officials including Pistole, Halinski, and Hoggan were involved 

in the decision to reassign the three Honolulu DFSDs. He testified:

Q. Did this conference – this teleconference occur before or after the 

inspection of Hawaii had been conducted?

A. Before. I thought it was going to be a simple, hey – a little bit of a 

counseling, but when I got done, it was my belief, and there was four 

or five other people in the room with me, that the leadership team in 

Hawaii was broken, dysfunctional, and was not willing to make it 

happen, and the workforce was suffering. 

This was, like, 2:00 on a – it was April 8th, I remember that. So I 

conducted it from 2:00 to 3:00. At 3:00 that day, me and 

Mr. Hoggan went up and we had a meeting with Mr. Halinski and 

Mr. Pistole. Mr. Hoggan ask that I provide them an overview of the 

VTC, which I did. A discussion ensued about we need to make a 

change. The discussion was –

Q. Who indicated that a change needed to be made?

 

333 Salvator Tr. at 291–93.
Page | 99

A. I don’t recall. There was, I think – again, Mr. Pistole was in the 

room, Mr. Halinski, Mr. Hoggan, Ms. – I gave them –

Q. Who else was in the room?

A. Mr. Pistole, Mr. Halinski, Mr. Hoggan, myself, maybe Kim 

Hutchinson, I think, Mr. Pistole’s senior advisor. I gave an 

overview of the VTC. The discussion ensued amongst the group -- I 

don’t feel like I was leading it -- that you could remove the FSD for 

failing to lead, or you could remove the three deputies for being not 

cooperative in the process, to me, clearly undermining the FSD, 

trying to make him look bad.

 

The decision was made -- Mr. Pistole was in the room -- to remove 

the three. It certainly –

Q. On what date did that occur?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was April 8th around 3:00.

It would not have been my authority to remove three deputy FSDs 

from one airport, from one location. That would certainly be 

something that the administrator would be involved in. 

The Deputy Administrator Halinski said –

Agency Counsel. I’m going to object to the extent that any of this is 

going to call for deliberative process. So to the extent that your 

answer calls for the manner in which the decision was made, I would 

object to that and instruct you not to answer, other than the final 

decision to remove the three DFSDs.

A. The deputy administrator said, okay, consult with Human Capital, 

Civil Rights Civil Liberties, OCC, and others. The following day 

we brought a group together, the senior leaders from those 

organizations, discussed how this would be done, what were the 

potential repercussions. And it was soon thereafter executed. All 

three, Frank Abreu, Heather Callahan, and Shar Mata were 

reassigned out of Honolulu.

Q. When you say soon thereafter, approximately how long after April 

8th?

A. I don’t recall, but it wasn’t long, exactly.334

 

334 Id. at 291–96.
Page | 100

3. TSA’s Assistant Chief Counsel for Administrative Litigation Acknowledged 

TSA May Have Violated the Whistleblower Protection Act

Former TSA Assistant Chief Counsel for Administrative Litigation Steven Colon stated 

he had warned Salvator the reassignments could be viewed as retaliatory in nature and would 

likely prompt a lawsuit. He testified:

A. And then there was the issue with Ms. Mata and two other 

employees in the Office of Security Operations regarding their 

transfer out based on the conflict with their FSD, Mr. Miyamoto. 

Q. And speaking of her work with Mr. Miyamoto, did you have any 

involvement in her transfer out of Hawaii, as you described it? 

A. I provided some legal advice to Mr. Hoggan and to Mr. Salvator. I 

had a meeting with Mr. Salvator in which he relayed to me the 

information about how a phone call he had with the three employees 

and Mr. Miyamoto went and that, you know, the employees were

combative against Mr. Miyamoto. The employees were defiant, I 

think is how he described it. And ultimately he felt that the 

employment relationship was broken. 

And so, you know, he asked me from a legal standpoint what could 

possibly happen, and I said, Well, you will likely get sued at least –

Q. What could possibly happen? 

A. Happen if we move them. I’m sorry. So if we were to move the 

three employees out, you know, directly reassign them based on 

their inability to work with their boss, what would be the outcome. 

You know, what would you think would happen? 

And I said, "You probably will get sued on multiple fronts. So if 

you’re going to do this, you need to – you know, if you’re going to 

do this, please make certain that you have all of your ducks in a row, 

and you’re going to have to stick by this decision." So I was right. 

Q. What ducks would have to be aligned? 

A. Everything that you’re doing. That you have enough evidence to 

establish that the employment relationship is broken, that it would 

be in the best interest of the agency to promote the efficiency of the 

service to directly reassign them out, that you would need to 

basically be able to meet the standard of, you know, for directed 

reassignments which is, essentially, that you’re not doing this for 

my prohibited reason, you know. 
Page | 101

I had no reason to believe at that time that anything that happened 

in all of this, you know, was based on any retaliatory, you know, 

reason, but I did warn him that it’s likely going to be raised.

335

Colon further acknowledged he was unsure whether any of Miyamoto’s actions toward the 

DFSDs were retaliatory. He testified:

Q. Do you have any reason now to believe that it was based on any 

retaliatory intent? 

A. Well, just generally speaking, that the investigation has gone on for 

a very long period of time. They also have filed EEO complaints, 

which Ms. Mata’s case and the other two are all pending and under 

my – those are under my jurisdiction, not the OSC matter. And that, 

you know, I came to learn at some point thereafter that there was an 

allegation that Ms. – I think it was Ms. Mata had been disclosing 

information regarding Mr. Miyamoto’s management style and I 

believe some of the – some metric numbers, you know, that she had 

been, you know, calling those into question, which then, of course, 

obviously triggers whistleblower reprisal, which –

Q. How did she call them into question? 

A. I believe she reported to headquarters, someone in headquarters 

staff, that – I think it had to do with some realignment of some sort, 

of the realignment of the airport function, and how I think there was 

going to be a net loss of employees. 

And Mr. Miyamoto had directed her and the other staff not to send 

things to headquarters and that it had to be run through Honolulu, 

which was through him. And ultimately they had been 

communicating directly with headquarters and not running those 

numbers through him. So that at least raises the specter of a 

whistleblower case, so –

Q. Do you believe that this action that Mr. Miyamoto took in any way 

violated the Whistleblower Protection Act? 

A I don’t know yet. I don’t know. I don’t have enough information to 

know that.336

Mata, Chuck, and Abreu all filed whistleblower retaliation complaints with OSC. While 

Mata and Abreu remained with TSA despite the reassignment, Chuck received additional 

 

335 Colon Tr. at 150–52.

336 Id. at 150–153. 
Page | 102

reassignments, eventually prompting her to resign. In May 2018, four years after the initial 

reassignments, OSC announced it had reached a settlement agreement with TSA, including $1 

million in compensatory damages for the three individuals combined and returning Mata and 

Abreu to comparable positions in Hawaii.337 Special Counsel Henry Kerner stated he was 

“pleased that we were able to achieve favorable results for the three TSA employees who had 

their lives thrown into disarray and hope this outcome will encourage others to speak up when 

they see something that could put the public at risk.”338

F. TSA Inappropriately Employed Directed Reassignments 

 As the above examples illustrate, senior TSA officials issued directed reassignments in a 

manner inconsistent with the agency’s policies and as a means of retaliation. Further, the 

leadership succession planning initiative—which promised to take into account employees’

preferences and potential hardships—issued reassignments serving no organizational purpose 

and denied requests for consideration based on significant hardships. As a result, a number of 

experienced and high-performing employees left the agency.

1. TSA Improperly Used Directed Reassignments Against Other TSA Employees

While the cases of Brainard, Rhoades, and the Hawaii DFSDs illustrate the problems 

with the use of directed reassignments at TSA, other examples exist as well. Former Jacksonville 

FSD Ed Goodwin, was reassigned to replace Brainard in Des Moines under questionable 

circumstances. Goodwin was directly reassigned, against his wishes, and replaced as FSD by a 

TSA official with little if any field experience.339 TSA ignored how the move would cause 

Goodwin significant hardship. Rhoades testified:

[Goodwin] was the primary care giver for his elderly parents – 89 and 95 

years of age. One of his parents was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. 

His only daughter was a senior in high school and he was upside down on 

his mortgage around the time he was issued his reassignment. There wasn’t 

a viable option that he could leave Florida.340

Goodwin believed TSA was improperly trying to force him and other older FSDs out and filed 

an EEO Complaint against the agency.341 He received a default order on liability in the case after 

TSA failed to respond to his case in a timely manner.342

 

337 Press Release, Office of Special Counsel, OSC Obtains Settlements for TSA Whistleblowers in Three 

Involuntary Reassignment Cases (May 23, 2018), https://osc.gov/News/pr-18-30%202.pdf.

338 Id.

339 Formal Complaint of Edward J. Goodwin, Goodwin v. Johnson, EEOC Decision No. 510-2015-00209X (Jun. 30, 

2015).

340 TSA Hearing Part I – Rhoades Statement.

341 Formal Complaint of Edward J. Goodwin, Goodwin v. Johnson, EEOC Decision No. 510-2015-00209X (Jun. 30, 

2015).

342 Order on Complainant’s Motion for Sanctions, Goodwin v. Johnson, EEOC Decision No. 510-2015-00209X 

(Jun. 30, 2015).
Page | 103

Hatfield also cited Goodwin as an example of someone who was reassigned for being out 

of Hoggan’s favor. He testified:

Q. Any other people you can mention who were out of Mr. Hoggan’s 

favor and therefore moved? 

A. The gentleman from Jacksonville, Florida, a Federal Security 

Director. 

Q. And why was he out of Mr. Hoggan’s favor? 

A. Again, I don’t know their personal history, but that, again, 

was -- again, you know, as I said, you would see these people, the 

flags go up, and suddenly somebody would get a reassignment. And 

it would be, like, well, is it because they’d been there a certain 

number of years? There was nothing documented. There was 

nothing that says your tour of duty -- and I don’t know if this has 

even been addressed today. There was nothing that said you get 

assigned to Chicago, Illinois, and your term is 5 years and you can 

re-up it for three additional 1-year terms, something like that, things 

the way they do it at the State Department for foreign or the way 

TSA’s international does it for their TSARs, the T-S-A-Rs, 

international representatives. It was a very veiled, unknown system 

of term limits and term lengths. 

And, I mean, you had people, and often it was, well, you’ve been 

there too long, we’ve got to refresh, we need to refresh that airport 

and refresh you. So those were sometimes kind of the 

justifications.343

 Former Los Angeles Airport FSD Mark Haught also received multiple retaliatory directed 

reassignments. In 2011, Haught was directly reassigned from Arlington, VA to Charlotte, NC at 

a cost of $197,000—which also led to a loss of over $400,000 on his home.344 In May 2014

Haught was reassigned again to Los Angeles. According to Rhoades, within 30 days of Haught’s 

move to Los Angeles, Haught’s wife, who was also a TSA employee, was reassigned from Los 

Angeles, CA to Washington, DC.345 In an EEO complaint filed in response to his initial 

reassignment, Haught stated:

TSA senior leadership is engaging in discriminatory activities that I believe 

to be in violation of federal law and regulation by issuing directed 

reassignments primarily to older male TSES employees who are in their 

50’s and 60’s, most of whom are nearing or eligible for retirement.346

 

343 Hatfield Tr. at 138-139.

344 Mark Haught, Statement for EEO Complaint, (Undated) at 5–6. [hereinafter Haught Statement].

345 TSA Hearing Part I – Rhoades Statement.

346 Haught Statement.
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Haught further stated he had been “unlawfully discriminated against and have been the subject of 

retaliation from Gale Rossides, Chris McLaughlin and Scott Johnson” and was “punitively 

reassigned from an Area Director position and downgraded to the FSD position in Charlotte” 

while younger and less experienced employees received more favorable treatment.347

2. Senior TSA Officials Reportedly Wanted to Use Directed Reassignments to 

Coerce Disfavored Employees to Leave TSA

In his EEO complaint, Haught stated he heard senior TSA officials discuss directed 

reassignments as a means of coercing employees to leave the agency.348 He said former Acting 

Deputy General Manager for Field Operations Scott Johnson asked when some older employees 

were going to retire, identifying several by name.349 According to Haught, “[Johnson] went on to 

say, ‘I know how to get rid of them – if I give them a directed reassignment they’ll retire and 

move on.”350

Another account suggests Hoggan adopted a similar mentality. A TSA employee named 

Arthur Drenth provided OSC a statement in which he said he frequently carpooled with Hoggan. 

Drenth stated that in approximately 2010: 

Mr. Hoggan mentioned he planned to reassign an OGS employee who lived 

in Annapolis. I don’t recall a name but the plan was to force the person to 

start reporting to TSOC in Herndon vs. where they had been reporting which 

was TSA HQ. Mr. Hoggan stated that the “commute will be so much worse 

they will quit or leave.”

351

On another occasion approximately in 2012, Drenth stated Hogan said, “he would ‘take out 

anyone perceived as a threat because my family has gotten used to THIS lifestyle.’ He clarified 

that he meant his salary.”352

 Hatfield testified he observed Hoggan using directed reassignments in a retaliatory 

manner and lost confidence in his leadership, leading Hatfield to attempt to reassign Hoggan out 

of OSO. Hatfield stated, “[y]ou know, I think that [Hoggan] had run a very dictatorial 

department. He was using the directed reassignment process to manipulate positions in the field 

and to both help people that were in favor and to punish people that were out of favor, in my 

assessment.”

353

 Hatfield stated it was apparent to him Hoggan was making directed 

reassignments improperly. He testified:

 

347 Id.

348 Id.

349 Id.

350 Id.

351 Arthur Drenth, Statement for OSC: Conversations That Took Place During Carpool (June 2, 2016) at 1.

352 Id.

353 Hatfield Tr. at 107.
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Q. How did you come into the information that Mr. Hoggan was using 

directed reassignments to move staff around? 

A. It was observable. It was an observable act. There was no rhyme or 

reason. It was very unilaterally driven.354

Hatfield said that “there was no memorialized process”355 for the 

reassignments and and that many had no legitimate justification:

Q. In this tour-of-duty request situation, do you know how FSD 

reassignments were chosen? 

A. I don’t. I don’t. I think it was a combination of ways. I mean, I’m 

going to give them all credit that there were a couple of valid ones, 

you know, but I think there were quite a number that were not 

supportable by a credible or legitimate argument as to why it took 

place.356

Hatfield further stated, when he evaluated Hoggan’s performance towards the end of summer 

2015, he observed deficiencies in his leadership skills. Hoggan made decisions based on 

favoritism rather than merit. He stated:

Q. Did you ever complete a performance evaluation of him? 

A. As Deputy Administrator, I did. 

Q. Do you remember when that was? 

A. End of the summer of 2015, when the cycle was ending. 

Q. Do you remember what rating you gave him? 

A. I don’t. I know it was lower than he expected. 

Q. Can you describe his performance leading up to that performance 

review? 

A. Yeah. I just observed leadership skills that were not of the standard 

that was demanded by that office. 

Q. Can you talk about those lacking leadership skills? 

 

354 Id.

355 Id. at 142.

356 Id.
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A. Yeah. There was very little transparency. There was a lot of 

distrust. There was a sense of, you know, in favor and out of favor 

for employees. There was very little observable reward for 

meritorious performance. And there had been the history of directed 

reassignments and the personnel moves, usually advancements or 

selections for open positions that didn’t always follow an observable 

process of fair selection.357

3. The Committee’s Investigation Prompted TSA to Institute Reforms and Reach 

Settlements with Affected Employees

Following whistleblower testimony in April 2016, former TSA Administrator Peter 

Neffenger testified before the Committee. Neffenger acknowledged directed reassignments had 

been used improperly. He stated:

I think it’s important that we look for an independent review of that to 

determine whether or not there was improper use there. I will tell you that 

I don’t think the manner in which we were doing directed reassignments 

prior to my arrival was justifiable. And even if it was appropriate, it wasn’t 

done in a way that was open, transparent, fair, and otherwise controlled, 

which is why I changed it and we put significant controls on that process 

now.358

Neffenger said he would wait for the results of OSC’s investigation and [d]epending on what 

they find, it may point to appropriate discipline.”359

The controls Neffenger referred to were substantial changes TSA made to its policy on 

directed reassignments—in response to the Committee’s investigation. On February 29, 2016, 

OHC Assistant Administrator Karen Shelton Waters circulated a memo suspending directed 

reassignments. The memo noted “management officials exercising the authority to effect a 

directed reassignment should consult with the Office of Human Capital (OHC) in advance of 

taking any action” and “[i]t has come to the attention of agency senior officials that this 

consultation with OHC is not being regularly sought and may have resulted in inconsistent 

applications of human capital policy and procedures.”360

The memo also directed “[u]ntil further notice and effective immediately, Directed 

(Involuntary) Reassignments must be routed through the Office of Human Capital (OHC) for 

review and approval by AA/OHC Karen Shelton Waters” and all program offices requesting 

approval of a reassignment must send an action memo to OHC outlining their request.361

Additionally, “[a]ll Directed Reassignments currently in process will be halted, reviewed, and 

 

357 Id. at 134–35.

358 TSA Hearing Part II.

359 Id.

360 Memorandum from Karen Shelton Waters, Ass’t Adm’r., Office of Human Capital, Transp. Sec. Admin. to staff, 

Transp. Sec. Admin, 1100 – Temporary Suspension of Directed (Involuntary) Reassignments (Feb. 29, 2016).

361 Id.
Page | 107

possibly returned to the program office for further action, if the nature of action is unclear or 

isn’t clearly supported as outlined in policy.”362

In December 2017, then-Deputy Administrator Huban Gowadia stated, “[s]o Neffenger 

had already stopped, you know, for example directed reassignments. That policy continues. We 

only have directed reassignments if it is in the interest of the mission and if all other avenues 

exhausted.”363 Kerner similarly testified that the use of directed reassignments had been severely 

limited in practice. She stated:

Q. So was Mr. Rhoades’s directed reassignment, or attempted thereof, 

one of the last attempts to directly reassign somebody? 

A. Well, after that, there was the directed reassignment that Admiral 

Neffenger did with regard to the FSD in Chicago. And I spoke about 

that. That was because of the meltdown of the lines in Chicago in 

the summer that he came onboard. 

I’m not aware of other directed reassignments that don’t have to do 

with closing offices or downsizing the workforce, things of that sort. 

Those are still being used as directed reassignments. In fact, I think 

we’ve actually gone to the point now where even where it would 

benefit the organization to issue a directed reassignment, we hesitate 

to do it because of all the criticism that’s been leveled in connection 

with the practice.

Q. You think it’s fair criticism? 

A. It was fair criticism, yes.364

Although the use of directed reassignments has been severely curtailed, OSC continues to 

investigate a number of complaints of retaliation and actively remains in negotiations with TSA 

on some of them. 

 

362 Id.

363 Huban Gowadia Transcribed Interview 40, Dec. 20, 2017 (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter Gowadia Tr.].

364 Kerner Tr. at 100. 
Page | 108
Page | 109

IV. DHS OGC and TSA Lacked Transparency and Withheld Information 

from Investigative Entities

Several TSA whistleblowers came forward to Congress, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to 

describe instances of senior level misconduct and retaliation. Each of these entities launched 

inquiries in response to the mounting allegations. At the direction of DHS’ Office of General 

Counsel, however, TSA withheld documents and information from Congress and OSC claiming 

they were protected attorney-client communications. DHS OGC and TSA maintained this 

position—even though the Committee subpoenaed the documents and the attorney-client 

privilege is not a valid basis for withholding documents from Congress and OSC.

A. Under the Guise of the “Attorney-Client” Privilege, DHS OGC and TSA 

Refused to Produce Documents to the Office of Special Counsel

The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received tens of dozens whistleblower retaliation 

complaints from TSA employees, especially after TSA’s use of directed reassignments. TSA 

publicly stated it wanted to wait until OSC finished its investigations before meting out 

discipline for retaliation. TSA, however, refused to produce the information and documents OSC 

needed to complete its investigations. Per guidance and direction from the DHS Office of 

General Counsel, TSA withheld information and documents from OSC on the basis of the 

attorney-client privilege—a privilege inapplicable to OSC.

1. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is responsible for investigating reprisal 

for whistleblowing

The Office of Special Counsel is an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial 

agency.365 It derives its authorities from the Civil Service Reform Act, the Whistleblower 

Protection Act, the Hatch Act, and the Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment 

Rights Act.366 OSC has the authority to investigate and prosecute violations of prohibited 

personnel practices, including whistleblower retaliation.367 Specifically, federal law prohibits 

agency officials “from taking, failing to take, or threatening to take a personnel action because of 

an employee’s whistleblowing.”368

2. TSA planned to wait until OSC completed its investigations before 

determining disciplinary actions

As outlined earlier in the report,369 TSA on multiple occasions retaliated against its 

whistleblowers. Many of these whistleblowers filed complaints with the Office of Special 

 

365 Office of Special Counsel, About, https://osc.gov/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2018).

366 Id.

367 Id.

368 Office of Special Counsel, Prohibited Personnel Practices (PPPs), https://osc.gov/Pages/PPP.aspx (last visited 

Aug. 29, 2018).

369 See Section III.
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Counsel (OSC). In fact, former Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner testified, when Congress 

extended whistleblower protections to TSA employees through the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act in 2012, “OSC has received more than 350 retaliation cases from the TSA 

employees.”370

In response to allegations of TSA whistleblower retaliation and senior level misconduct 

and mismanagement, the Committee held hearings in April and May 2016. At the May 2016 

hearing, then-Administrator Peter Neffenger testified he was “waiting for the results of the 

Office of Special Counsel investigation[s]” to determine whether discipline was necessary for 

whistleblower retaliation.371 Neffenger emphasized during the hearing he and TSA were 

reserving judgment until OSC finished investigating the retaliation claims. He testified:

Mr. Gosar. Now, part of the justification for Mr. Rhoades’s

reassignment was to sever past loyalties due to suspicions he 

was a source for the media, which he denies. Do you 

consider this an appropriate justification?

Mr. Neffenger. Well, again, that matter is being investigated right 

now by the Office of Special Counsel. If they find that to be

true, then of course it wasn’t appropriate.372

* * *

I will await the Office of Special Counsel’s review. I think it’s important 

that we look f or an independent review of that to determine whether or not 

there was improper use there. I will tell you that I don’t think the manner 

in which we were doing directed reassignments prior to my arrival was 

justifiable. And even if it was appropriate, it wasn’t done in a way that was 

open, transparent, fair, and otherwise controlled, which is why I changed it 

and we put significant controls on that process now.373

* * *

I’m very interested in the results of the Office of Special Counsel 

investigation into the existing cases with the individuals who appeared 

before you. Depending upon those findings, I will take immediate action 

against that.374

* * *

 

370 Transparency at TSA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform. 115th Cong. (2017).

371 TSA Hearing Part II.

372 Id.

373 Id.

374 Id.
Page | 111

What I’m waiting for is to see what the results of the Office of Special 

Counsel investigation tells me with respect to a couple of the people who 

have made such allegations.375

3. TSA withheld information from its document productions to OSC

Despite Neffenger’s commitment to take immediate action upon the completion of the 

OSC investigation, TSA deliberately withheld documents from OSC. Using the attorney-client 

privilege, TSA either refused to produce documents or produced heavily redacted documents, 

unnecessarily obstructing and prolonging OSC’s investigations. 

At the Committee’s March 2, 2017 hearing, then-Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner 

testified OSC was struggling to get the necessary access to information and documents it needed 

for its investigations. She testified:

Two pairs of companion cases illustrate the challenges OSC faces in getting 

needed information from the TSA. The complainants are TSA officials who 

experienced involuntary geographical reassignments, a demotion, and a 

removal, all allegedly in retaliation for their protected whistleblower 

disclosures. 

In these cases, TSA withheld information from its document productions, 

asserting claims of attorney-client privilege. OSC has asked TSA to 

withdraw the claims of privilege, but both TSA and DHS rejected these 

requests. There are several problems with TSA’s assertions of privilege. 

First, as discussed above, shielding information from OSC conflicts with 

our statutory mandate to investigate the legality of personnel practices. 

When TSA doesn’t disclose the reasons why they took an action against the 

whistleblower, we can’t investigate whether it’s retaliation. 

In addition, TSA’s attorney-client privilege review causes significant delays 

in investigations. In these four cases, OSC has spent months waiting for 

documents while TSA was reviewing responses for privilege.376

She further explained how TSA’s actions were delaying OSC’s investigations, which affected 

both OSC’s lawyers and the whistleblowers. She stated:

Our lawyers are spending too much time negotiating for documents, time 

that could be much better spent advancing the investigation. 

These delays also directly impact complainants who are waiting for relief, 

often when they are facing devastating situations at work. Despite the 

challenges created by TSA’s privilege claims, OSC is committed to 

 

375 Id.

376 Transparency at TSA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2017).
Page | 112

completing thorough investigations and protecting TSA employees.377

According to Lerner, “TSA has been somewhat of an outlier in its aggressive use of 

attorney-client privilege in several cases.”378 TSA’s practice was especially troublesome, because 

the attorney-client privilege is not applicable to OSC. As Lerner explained, OSC is “acting in the 

agency’s shoes.”379 She stated:

This is an interagency intergovernment investigation that Congress has 

asked us to conduct. 

It’s not appropriate for any agency to claim attorney-client privilege when 

they’re producing documents to OSC. It would be the same thing with an 

IG or GAO, an agency would never claim attorney-client privilege during 

an IG investigation. It’s not appropriate to claim it during an OSC 

investigation either.380

4. DHS OGC instituted the practice to withhold documents and information on 

the basis of attorney-client privilege

The Committee learned at its March 2, 2017 hearing the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of General Counsel decided to withhold documents from OSC on the grounds 

they were privileged. Then-Acting Administrator Gowadia testified:

Chairman Chaffetz. The whistleblower says I’ve been retaliated against. 

The TSA says, no, they haven’t. There’s a dispute. OSC is 

one of the organizations, I think the primary organization, to 

resolve that dispute, correct? 

Ms. Gowadia. Certainly. 

Chairman Chaffetz. You agree with that? 

Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Chaffetz. So what percentage of the information should the 

OSC be able to review in order to figure out the right 

conclusion? 

Ms. Gowadia. Sir, the OSC should have all the information they need to 

figure it out. 

Chairman Chaffetz. Define all of the information. 

 

377 Id.

378 Id.

379 Id.

380 Id.
Page | 113

Ms. Gowadia. Sir, I appreciate where you’re headed with your question on 

the information we redact for attorney-client privilege 

issues. In that regard, I have to say we follow departmental 

guidance.

381

 

She further stated:

I don’t believe information should be withheld from Congress unless there 

are certain provision, such as the attorney-client privilege, which, again, my 

hands are tied by departmental policy. I cannot take unilateral action, 

because there are ripple effects across the Department.382

When questioned about who specifically within DHS, Gowadia testified then-Acting General 

Counsel Joseph Maher would be the best person to talk to about DHS’ policy to withhold 

information from OSC.383

TSA Chief Counsel Francine Kerner confirmed Maher made the legal decision. She 

testified:

Q. [W]hat is TSA’s legal obligation to the Office of Special Counsel? 

A. We follow our legal obligation to provide them with documents and 

witnesses, and we talk to them on a frequent basis about cases they 

have under review. 

Q. Are there any limitations to this legal obligation? 

A. We assert privilege –

Q. Specifically –

A. – with regard to attorney-client or attorney work product. We do. 

That’s the Department’s direction. 

Q. The Office of General Counsel for the Department of Homeland 

Security? 

A. That’s correct. 

Q. Who within the Office of General Counsel made that determination? 

A. Well, certainly the acting general counsel has made that 

 

381 Transparency at TSA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th Cong. (2017).

382 Id.

383 Id. 
Page | 114

determination. He sent letters to the committee explaining what the 

Department’s position is. 

Q. And that person’s Joe Maher? 

A. Joe Maher. 

Q. Maher? 

A. M-a-h-e-r.

Q. Did you participate in that decision at all?

A. No. It’s the decision of the Department. I certainly have discussed 

the decision with him in the sense that I abide by it. But in terms of 

what the Department’s position should be with regard to asserting 

privilege, that is a departmental position and, at times, an 

administrative position; it is not a decision that is left for me as chief 

counsel to make.384

DHS OGC confirmed it was its decision and policy to withhold these documents. In a 

March 10, 2017 letter to the Committee, Maher made several assertions about the Department’s 

policy on the attorney-client privilege. Maher stated “The Department’s view is that these 

communications, in which managers seek legal advice and counsel in ongoing personnel matters, 

are not subject to routine disclosure to OSC.”385

The Department’s view failed to recognize OSC’s need to have access to information so it could 

complete its whistleblower reprisal investigations, as OSC is legally obligated to do. Maher 

further stated OSC can also issue a subpoena for the documents—failing to acknowledge such a 

step would only further delay OSC’s investigations.386

 

384 Kerner Tr. at 20–21. 

385 Letter from Joseph Maher, Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Mar. 10, 2017).

386 Id.
Page | 115

The Committee formally requested a transcribed interview of Joseph Maher in a January 18, 

2018 bipartisan letter to DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen to further understand the Department’s 

policy on the attorney-client privilege.387 Maher has refused to appear for a transcribed 

interview, withholding material facts from the Committee. The Committee has been forced to 

issue a subpoena for Maher’s deposition.388

B. TSA Refused to Comply with a Congressional Requests and a 

Congressional Subpoena

Following the March 2, 2017 hearing, the Committee sent a letter to Acting TSA 

Administrator Huban Gowadia requesting documents. DHS Acting General Counsel Joseph 

Maher responded on behalf of TSA refusing to produce all the requested documents. The 

Committee then issued a subpoena for those documents to Acting TSA Administrator Gowadia. 

Again, DHS OGC responded on behalf of TSA refusing to produce the compelled documents. 

The only accommodation TSA made was providing a belated in camera review. This review

solidified the Committee’s concerns. TSA’s redactions—done at the direction of the DHS 

OGC—were applied excessively, inconsistently, and without legal justification.

On March 6, 2017 the Committee requested the following documents from Acting TSA 

Administrator Gowadia:

1. All documents which OSC requested from TSA between January 1, 

2014, and December 31, 2016, but which TSA did not produce or which 

it produced with redactions;

2. A privilege log showing all instances in which TSA withheld 

information from OSC between January 1, 2014, and March 2, 2017, 

and the associated privilege(s) invoked;

3. The name of each individual at TSA or the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) who has advised TSA to withhold information from 

OSC or to apply the attorney-client privilege with regard to document 

requests from OSC between March 2, 2014, and March 2, 2017;

 

387 Letter from Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Elijah E. 

Cummings, Ranking Mem., H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to Hon. Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec., Dep’t. of 

Homeland Sec. (Jan. 18, 2018).

388 Deposition Subpoena to Joseph Maher (Sept. 14, 2018).
Page | 116

4. All documents and communications relating to the discipline of Steve 

Colon, Office of Chief Counsel; 

5. All documents referring or relating to procedures or guidelines for the 

application of attorney-client privilege or engaging with OSC on 

investigations that were created, changed, or that TSA relied upon in the 

past year; and

6. TSA’s plan for producing to OSC unredacted copies of all documents 

requested by OSC in any open cases and the expected date of 

completion.

DHS Acting General Counsel Maher responded on behalf of TSA, stating in a March 10,

2017 letter “the Department objects to the demand that it produce all privileged communications 

whether withheld in their entirety or redacted in part.”389

The Department offered to produce the requested privilege logs but not the actual documents, 

claiming they were protected attorney-client communications. Maher also stated, however, “[t]he 

Department has not developed written procedures or guidelines for the handling of attorneyclient communications in response to OSC requests.”390

Because DHS and TSA refused to produce all the requested documents, the Committee 

issued a document subpoena to then-Acting TSA Administrator Gowadia on March 17, 2017. 

The Committee subpoenaed the following documents:391

 

389 Letter from Joseph Maher, Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Mar. 10, 2017).

390 Id.

391 Subpoena to Huban A. Gowadia (Mar. 17, 2017).
Page | 117

Committee staff also met with Department OGC staff on March 17, 2017. Committee staff 

explained it has been separately and independently investigating whether TSA is abusing the 

attorney-client privilege as a means to avoid oversight.392 Further, this inquiry was part of a 

larger investigation dating back to the fall of 2015 into TSA’s personnel practices. The 

Department OGC staff failed to alleviate the Committee’s concerns about these allegations.393

DHS Acting General Counsel Maher responded to the subpoena. On March 31, 2017—

the date the documents were due to the Committee—Maher sent a letter to the Committee stating 

the Department is “not in a position to produce those documents at this time,” claiming again the 

documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege.394 This privilege was the only basis 

for which the Department decided to withhold the documents. In the letter, Maher also accused 

the Committee of trying to do backdoor discovery on behalf of OSC. He stated, “[w]e do not 

believe that oversight requests are a proper means for discovery by OSC or other noncongressional bodies.”395

In a May 2, 2017 bipartisan letter, the Committee demanded TSA “comply with [its] 

legal obligations immediately” pursuant to the Committee’s subpoena.396 The Committee further 

stated: 

It should be clear that the Committee’s subpoena is not an attempt at 

‘discovery by OSC or other non-Congressional bodies,’ as it was termed in 

the March 31 letter. Rather, the Committee issued the subpoena to further 

 

392 Meeting between Committee staff and Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. Office of Gen. Counsel staff (Mar. 17, 2017). 

See also, Letter from Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Elijah E. 

Cummings, Ranking Mem., H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to Hon. Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. (May 2, 2017).

393 Id.

394 Letter from Joseph Maher, Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Mar. 31, 2017).

395 Id.

396 Letter from Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Elijah E. 

Cummings, Ranking Mem., H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to Hon. Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec., Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. (May 2, 2017).
Page | 118

its own investigation and to obtain answers to specific longstanding 

questions.397

The Committee also requested Acting Administrator Gowadia, Chief Counsel Francine Kerner, 

and TSA counsel Steven Colon for transcribed interviews with the Committee.398

On May 11, 2017, Committee staff met with Department staff.399 At the meeting, the 

Department staff assured Committee staff the subpoenaed documents were innocuous.400

Committee staff offered to review the documents in camera to determine whether the documents 

were in fact necessary.401

Two weeks after the meeting, on May 26, 2017, Acting DHS General Counsel Maher 

sent a letter refusing to provide the Committee access to the documents.402 He also refused to 

provide the requested witnesses—Gowadia, Kerner, and Colon—for transcribed interviews, 

stating “[w]hile we will make these persons available for meetings, we believe that the level of 

formality associated with the transcribed interviews is unnecessary.”403 Maher also made clear 

DHS is responsible for how TSA responds to Congressional requests, not TSA. The letter states, 

“[t]he Department—not [Acting TSA Administrator] Dr. Gowadia—is making determinations on 

the handling of the documents.”404 Maher did not provide information about who within the 

Department is making those determinations.

The Committee continued to maintain its demand for the subpoenaed documents and 

request for the transcribed interviews of Gowadia, Kerner, and Colon. In a November 16, 2017 

bipartisan letter, the Committee asked DHS Acting Secretary Duke to immediately “arrange for 

delivery of the compelled documents and to schedule [the] transcribed interviews,” or “the 

Chairman will shortly issue deposition subpoenas for these witnesses.”405 Subsequent to the 

letter, DHS finally produced Gowadia, Kerner, and Colon for transcribed interviews.406 DHS, 

however, only produced the compelled documents in camera. While the parameters of the 

review were inadequate, Committee staff were able to determine TSA’s redactions, which DHS 

OGC directed, were applied excessively, inconsistently, and without legal justification. The 

documents were also substantively relevant to whistleblower retaliation.

 

397 Id.

398 Id.

399 Meeting between Committee staff and Dep’t of Homeland Sec. staff (May 11, 2017). See also, Letter from Hon. 

Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Mem., 

H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to Hon. Elaine Duke, Acting Sec. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 16, 

2017).

400 Id.

401 Id.

402 Letter from Joseph Maher, Acting Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (May 26, 2017).

403 Id.

404 Id.

405 Letter from Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Elijah E. 

Cummings, Ranking Mem., H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform to Hon. Elaine Duke, Acting Sec. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. (Nov. 16, 2017).

406 The transcribed interviews took place on December 5, 2017, December 7, 2017, and December 20, 2017.
Page | 119

Despite reiterating its demand for the compelled documents in the Committee’s January 

18, 2018 letter to Secretary Nielsen, DHS nor TSA have produced the documents.