NUMBER 13-12-00667-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

KENSON JACK JONES Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2

of Tarrant County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

By two issues, appellant, Kenson Jack Jones, challenges his conviction and 

sentence for sexual assault of a child under the age of seventeen, a second-degree 

felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2) (West Supp. 2011). We affirm.1

 

1

This case is before this Court on transfer from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth

pursuant to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 

2005).
2

I. BACKGROUND2

The State charged appellant with the sexual assault of A.S., his stepdaughter. 

A.S. testified that she woke up to find appellant on top of her, that he moved her 

underwear out of the way, and touched her vagina with his sexual organ. A.S. informed 

a classmate at her school that morning about what happened, and the classmate 

subsequently informed school officials. School officials later called the police. A.S. 

underwent a sexual assault examination at Cook Children’s Medical Center and police 

seized several items from A.S.’s home, including the clothes she was wearing during 

the crime and her bed sheets. Appellant’s DNA was tested after his arrest, and found to 

be a genetic match to both the sperm in the vaginal swab taken from A.S. and the 

sperm recovered from the underwear A.S. wore at the time of the crime. Appellant 

pleaded not guilty and the case was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty 

and assessed twelve years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient and 

that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime charged.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Standard of Review

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, our inquiry 

is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 684, 686–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) 

 

2

Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not 

recite them here except as necessary to our decision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
3

(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). It is the role of the trier of fact to 

resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from 

that evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19 (1979)). The trier of fact, in this case the trial court judge, 

is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight, if any, to be given to their 

testimony. Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 686–87; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard 

that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient.”

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912. 

2. Discussion

Appellant briefs authorities pertaining to the standard of review and makes a 

conclusory statement that: “[t]he State of Texas did not meet its burden of proof, proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt, in that it failed to prove that Appellant committed the 

offense as is set out in the [sic] indictments.” Appellant has not provided this court with 

an argument regarding how the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. 

Appellant has not discussed the essential elements of the offense or identified any 

element for which the evidence is arguably inconsistent. Therefore, we conclude that 

this point of error is inadequately briefed, and presents nothing for our review. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 

(observing that “this Court is under no obligation to make appellant’s arguments” for 

him). We overrule appellant’s first issue. 
4

B. Disproportionate Sentence

In his second issue, appellant argues that his sentence of twelve years’

imprisonment was so disproportionate to the crime, and to other sentences imposed for 

similar crimes, that it violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against 

cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. In 

order to preserve a complaint of this nature for appeal, a defendant must make a timely 

objection to the trial court. Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2009, pet. ref’d); Arriaga v. State, 335 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2010 pet. ref’d). Appellant did not object to the sentence at the time it was 

imposed, and so did not preserve this argument for our review. We accordingly 

overrule appellant’s second issue. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

_______________________

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

25th day of April, 2013.