BLD-086 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 21-2290

___________ DWIGHT LAMAR SPEARS, Appellant

v. WARDEN ALLENWOOD FCI

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 4-20-cv-01567) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 17, 2022 Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR ., and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: March 15, 2022)

__________ OPINION *

_________

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 PER CURIAM Dwight Spears, a federal prisoner incarcer ated in Pennsylvania, appeals pro se from the order of the United Stat es District Court for the Middl e District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will summa rily affirm the District Court's order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. By way of his § 2241 pe tition, Spears seeks to challenge his conviction and sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina (D.S.C. No. 08-cr-00112). In 2 008, a jury found Spears guilty of conspiracy to murder a federal law enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1 )(A). The sentencing court imposed a term of 240 months imprison ment. Spears was subsequently resentenced to the same term after the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that he should have been convicted unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1114. In 2012, Spears filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the South Carolina District Court denied. Both the sentencing court and the Fourth Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Spears filed an application for leave to file successive § 2255 motions in th e sentencing court in 2020, attempting to challenge his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1114. The Fourth Circuit de nied his application on the basis that some of his claims had already be en considered, and the remaining claims were without merit.3 In his instant habeas petition, filed in th e Middle District of Pennsylvania, Spears contends that he is actually innocent because he was never indicted for a violation of § 1114 by a grand jury, and the indictment did not include the necessary elements of conspiracy to commit murder. He further contends that the sentencing court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction due to fatal defects in the indictment. The District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition, finding that because he was challenging the validity of his federal sentence, he was require d to seek relief pursuant to § 2255, and he did not demonstrate that a § 22 55 motion would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy. Spears appeals. We have appellate jurisd iction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District C ourt’s legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Motions under § 2255 are the presumptiv e means by which federal prisoners may collaterally challenge their sentences. Se e Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); Okereke v. United Stat es, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Ci r. 2002). A habeas corpus petition brought by a federal prisoner under § 2 241 accordingly “shall not be entertained” unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner’s] detention.” 28 U.S. C. § 2255(e). This excep tion, known as the “safetyvalve clause,” is narrow and applies “whe re the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would preven t a § 2255 proceeding from affording [the4 petitioner] a full hearing and adju dication of [the] wrongful detention claim.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538; see In re Dorsainvil, 11 9 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997). We have found such circumstances to exist only in the rare situ ation where a petitioner has had no prior opportunity to challenge a conviction fo r actions subsequently deemed non-criminal by a retroactive change in law. See Cordar o v. United States, 933 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir. 2019). Spears has not made such a showing. As the District Court noted, he has not alleged any change in statutor y interpretation that would render his conduct non-criminal. See Bruce v. Warden Lewisbur g USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3 d Cir. 2017). He contends only that he is actually innocent and that the courts within the Fourth Circuit have obstructed all other means of recourse. Contra ry to his contentions, Spears is not entitled to obtain relief via a § 2241 petition merely because his § 2255 motion was unsuccessful. See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2017). He had an opportunity to raise the instan t claims in his initial § 2255 motion and he therefore cannot benefit from § 2255(e)’s safety-valve provis ion. Cf. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. In light of the foregoing, the District Court properly dismi ssed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. We accordingly fi nd that the appeal pr esents no substantial question, and we will summarily a ffirm the District Court’s order.