NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE CASHMAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 

CATERPILLAR GLOBAL MINING, LLC, 

CATERPILLAR INC., RAPTOR MINING 

PRODUCTS (USA), INC., AND RAPTOR MINING 

PRODUCTS, INC.,

Petitioners.

______________________ 

2014-154

______________________ 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United 

States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in 

No. 1:13-cv-1409, Judge Sara Darrow.

______________________ 

ON PETITION

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, DYK, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

O R D E R

Petitioners Cashman Equipment Company, Caterpillar Inc. et al., and Raptor Mining Products (USA), Inc. et 

al., defendants in the underlying patent infringement 

action, seek a writ of mandamus directing the United 

States District Court for the Central District of Illinois to 

reverse its order re-transferring the case to the United 

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2 IN RE CASHMAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY

States District Court for the District of Nevada. Respondents ESCO Corp. and ESCO Canada, which brought

suit against petitioners initially in the District of Nevada, 

oppose the petition. 

ESCO Corp. and ESCO Canada design, manufacture, 

and sell mining, infrastructure, and industrial parts and 

tools. Caterpillar Global Mining, LLC and Illinois-based 

Caterpillar, Inc. manufacture, among other things, heavy 

equipment for use in construction and mining. Raptor is 

a supplier of Caterpillar. Cashman, a Nevada corporation, sells Caterpillar products in Nevada and California. 

Caterpillar filed suit in the Central District of Illinois, 

seeking a declaration that its locking system product did 

not infringe three of ESCO’s patents. ESCO then filed an 

infringement action in the District of Nevada. In addition 

to naming Caterpillar as a defendant, ESCO joined ESCO 

Canada as a plaintiff, which in turn, claimed infringement of one of its own patents. ESCO also named Raptor 

and Cashman as defendants. The actions were consolidated, and the Nevada court transferred to Illinois. 

In its transfer order here on review, the Central District of Illinois held that, because it would have lacked

personal jurisdiction over Cashman at the time ESCO 

filed its complaint, the District of Nevada had erred in

concluding that ESCO’s action was one that “might have 

been brought” in the Central District of Illinois under 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). In so doing, the court determined that it 

was unable to find Cashman had continuous and systematic contacts with Illinois to warrant general jurisdiction. 

The court further concluded that it lacked specific jurisdiction over Cashman. The court explained that 

Cashman had only sold the accused products in Nevada 

and California. The court recognized that Cashman had 

been accused of procuring the accused products from 

Caterpillar’s warehouses and offices in Illinois. But it 

found that was insufficient to establish jurisdiction beCase: 14-154 Document: 25 Page: 2 Filed: 11/25/2014
 IN RE CASHMAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY 3

cause such purchase was not the reason Cashman was 

subjected to claims of infringement. 

Because transferring the case back to Nevada was the 

only way to adjudicate the related consolidated cases

together, the court granted respondents’ motion. Before 

this court, petitioners argue that the Illinois court in fact

has jurisdiction over Cashman and therefore erred in 

failing to consider its allegations of forum shopping and 

whether the Central District of Illinois would be more 

convenient to try the consolidated cases. 

The remedy of mandamus is available only in extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power. In re Calmar, Inc.,

854 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988). That standard is an 

exacting one, requiring the petitioner to establish that the 

district court’s decision was so clearly incorrect that it 

amounted to a patently erroneous result. See In re 

Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). No 

such abuse occurred in this case. 

To begin with, we agree that the consent of petitioners 

alone was insufficient to justify the Nevada court’s initial 

transfer of the cases to Illinois. Indeed, the Supreme 

Court has made clear that “the power of a District Court 

under § 1404(a) to transfer . . . [does not] depend not upon 

the wish or waiver of the defendant but, rather, upon 

whether the transferee district was one in which the 

action ‘might have been brought’ by the plaintiff.” Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960). 

Likewise, we agree with the district court that petitioners have not shown that this case falls within the 

exception that allows for transfer “to any district or 

division to which all parties have consented.” § 1404(a). 

Though Caterpillar, Cashman, and Raptor may have 

consented to jurisdiction in Illinois, the ESCO plaintiffs, 

who moved for the transfer to Nevada and opposed transfer from Nevada to Illinois, have not. 

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4 IN RE CASHMAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY

The district court, moreover, did not clearly err in 

concluding that petitioners have not established general 

jurisdiction over Cashman in the Illinois court. The 

activity that petitioners identified for establishing general 

jurisdiction in Illinois—communicating with Caterpillar 

employees, purchasing equipment from Caterpillar in 

Illinois, and occasionally sending employees for training 

and dealer meetings in Illinois—was deemed insufficient 

by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984). 

The district court further concluded that the claims 

against Cashman did not “‘aris[e] out of’ and ‘relat[e] to’ 

the defendant’s alleged manufacturing, using, or selling of 

the claimed invention” in Illinois. Avocent Huntsville 

Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). It may well be that the district court was correct in 

distinguishing, for purposes of specific jurisdiction, between selling in Illinois and procuring the accused products in Illinois for sale elsewhere. We need not decide, 

and express no view, on that conclusion, for we are satisfied that the court’s conclusion, at a minimum, was not a 

clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of power. 

Petitioners make much out of the fact that Caterpillar 

filed its action in the Central District of Illinois before 

ESCO and that its contacts in that district make it perhaps more convenient for trial. But because they did not 

satisfy the threshold question in a transfer decision of 

whether the case “might have been brought” in Illinois, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 

address those arguments. We therefore deny their petition. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. 

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 IN RE CASHMAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY 5

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Daniel E. O’Toole

 Clerk of Court

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