Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, 

Commander and President

Air Command and Staff College

Thomas H. Deale, Brigadier General, Commandant

Robert J. Smith, Jr., Colonel, PhD, Dean

Thomas G. McGuire, Colonel, PhD, Director of Research

Dennis P. Adams, Lieutenant Colonel, Series Editor

Richard Smith, PhD, Essay Advisor

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Wright Flyer Papers

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC/DER)

225 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1402

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426

Tel: (334) 953-3558

Fax: (334) 953-2269

E-mail: acsc.der.researchorgmailbox@us.af.mil
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT 

AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC

DISASTER RELIEF PLAN

lindsay totten

Major, USAF

Wright Flyer No. 49

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
ii

Project Editor

Belinda Bazinet

Published by Air University Press in December 2014

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent views of the Air 

Force Research Institute, Air University, Air Command 

and Staff College, the United States Air Force, the 

Department of Defense, or any other US government 

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the AU Press website: 

http://aupress.au.af.mil/

Copy Editor

Carolyn Burns

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and Prepress Production

Michele D. Harrell

Print Preparation and Distribution

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AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS

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AFRI

Air Force Research Institute
iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

Foreword vii

Abstract ix

Introduction 1

Background 2

Case Studies 4

Factors Affecting the Integration of RPAs 7

Current Status of Integration Efforts 15

Closing 17

Appendix 23

Abbreviations 25

Bibliography 27

v

Illustrations

1 Infrared image of ice jam threatening the bridge in North

Dakota’s Red River flood 3

2 Military operations area and restricted airspace in the

United States 9

3 Organizational chart depicting FEMA joint field office

structure 11

vii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer 

Papers. Through this series, Air Command and Staff College presents a 

sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distancelearning students. This series has long showcased the kind of visionary 

thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation 

pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. 

As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, actionable knowledge—research that addresses some of the most complex 

security and defense challenges facing us today.

Recently, The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print 

editions to an electronic-only format will fire even greater intellectual 

debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as 

the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers 

via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach more 

readers, but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve resources. 

In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues of The Wright 

Flyer Papers at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all.asp?cat=wright.

Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to 

disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our Air 

Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, space, and 

cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative and improved 

ways to defend our nation and way of life.

THOMAS H. DEALE

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

ix

Abstract

How should government agencies integrate remotely piloted aircraft 

(RPA) into emergency response plans in support of relief efforts following a major disaster? Highlighting two recent historical events—Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake—as cases for motivation and 

lessons learned, research will determine the feasibility of integration, 

identify the roadblocks, and suggest a way for RPAs to effectively participate in emergency response. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

should coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to integrate its RPAs 

into incident management plans in support of domestic disaster relief 

efforts.

Some DOD agencies have developed concepts of operations and employment for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Based on a 

presidential directive in mid-2011, FEMA is reassessing its disaster response system by rewriting its doctrine and developing a full-spectrum 

preparedness program. With Congress’s approval of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, the FAA is not only funded, but also 

energized to substantially improve its efforts to integrate RPAs into the 

national airspace system (NAS).

All these efforts present a critical window of opportunity where 

agencies should capitalize to integrate RPAs into the NAS, even if only 

temporarily. First, FEMA should integrate RPA support into its incident management systems, be familiar with their contributions, and be 

able to interoperate with them during a major disaster response. Furthermore, the FAA should establish RPA deconfliction procedures for 

immediate and temporary use in a disaster-stricken area. Finally, DOD 

crews should be trained to successfully complete the mission of supporting 

civil agencies in any domestic disaster response. These activities combine 

to ensure that the most capable assets are employed to effectively react to 

national emergencies.

1

Introduction

How should the military, government, and civilian agencies integrate 

remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) into emergency response plans to support 

relief efforts following a major disaster? 

Currently, RPAs cannot participate in domestic catastrophic events 

due to restrictive Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations—for 

example, having a chase plane or undergoing lengthy waiver processes. 

According to the DOD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, “Current 

access for UAS [unmanned aircraft system] is greatly limited primarily due 

to FAA regulatory compliance issues that govern UAS operations in the 

NAS [national airspace system].”1

 Although tests to validate the FAA’s 

current guidance on UAS flight in the NAS were recently accomplished, 

the efforts to integrate DOD RPAs into emergency response plans are 

extremely limited.

A two-year study on UASs in the NAS, commissioned in 2010 between 

the FAA and Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing, will not likely field results for 

many years.2

 The FAA considers the integration discussion a long-term 

activity, with the milestone of integrating civil UASs into the NAS targeted 

for not later than September 2015.3

 “Near-term efforts can help increase 

UAS access to the NAS immediately, while a full set of regulations, policy 

and procedures, standards, and technology must be developed and considered to allow UAS appropriate access to the NAS in a safe and efficient 

manner,” Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn said.4

The Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has not 

yet included RPAs as a viable resource in its National Response Framework

(NRF), the governing guidance for national response to a disaster.5

 However, much like the airspace over Afghanistan, where the military safely 

controls manned and unmanned assets, the FAA and FEMA could control 

and coordinate RPAs in the airspace surrounding disaster relief efforts. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security promises that “we will bring 

to bear the Nation’s full capabilities and resources to save lives, mitigate 

suffering, and protect property.”6

 Thus, there may be an inconsistency 

between established doctrine and effective planning for emergency situations, resulting in underutilization of the most modern and capable 

resources.

Ultimately, the affected agencies should coordinate, approve, and implement a plan for DOD RPAs to participate in FAA airspace in support 

of FEMA’s incident management plans. These platforms are an invaluable 

asset during recovery efforts after a national disaster.

A modified case study will frame the methodology, specifically using 

an explanatory research model to answer the “why” and “how” questions 
2

of this problem. Highlighting two historical events—Hurricane Katrina 

and the Haiti earthquake—as cases for motivation and lessons learned, 

the research will determine the feasibility of integration, identify roadblocks, and suggest a way for the government to integrate RPAs to effectively participate in domestic disaster relief efforts. An in-depth analysis 

of current RPA limitations, FAA regulations, and FEMA response plans 

identifies the roadblocks.

This research does not claim to support the premise that RPAs are the 

sole or primary aircraft responsible for relief missions. Rather, the research indicates how to integrate RPAs into an already robust air response, including such assets as helicopters, cargo transporters, and 

medical airlift. However, the niche filled by RPAs in emergency response, 

the dedicated and persistent incident awareness and assessment, is one 

currently unfilled by other platforms. This research should be valuable to 

the global RPA community (both military and civilian), as well as participants at all levels of the FAA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including FEMA.

Background

In 2010 an RPA executive committee comprised of affected agencies 

responded to Congress’s discovery of the slow progress on national airspace integration. The committee directly acknowledged the requirements of each agency’s participation and need for cooperation in its NAS 

Access Plan:

It is the intent of Congress, by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

and Emergency Assistance Act, to provide an orderly and continuing 

means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local 

governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the 

suffering and damage, resulting from an emergency or disaster. Further, it is the purpose of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 

to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident 

management system. This management system is designed to cover 

the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.7

With the proliferation of RPAs, there will soon be many platforms, 

both military and civilian, flying in the skies over America.

DOD’s current RPA roadmap acknowledges that “while the force 

structure continues to grow, the ability to integrate UAS into the NAS has 

not kept pace.”8

 Although the systems have existed for decades and are 

programmed to be essential to future air exploitation, the RPA community does not have overwhelming support from the masses. For example, 
3

a February 2012 Washington Times article led with “Look! Up in the sky! 

Is it a bird? Is it a plane? It’s . . . a drone, and it’s watching you. That’s what 

privacy advocates fear from a bill Congress passed this week to make it 

easier for the government to fly unmanned spy planes in U.S. airspace.”9

With the negative connotation the media gives to the term “drone,” the 

fear of personal privacy infringement, and the lack of positive publicity, 

the RPA platform and associated community have not earned a warm 

reception from the general American population.

Currently, remotely piloted aircraft cannot fly outside certain restricted areas in the United States. Most of these restricted areas are reserved for military use. However, the capabilities of these systems are 

undeniable: unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; incident assessment; and search and rescue with loiter times over 24 hours 

and the ability to provide real-time data to supported units with low 

overall risk. The applications of such capabilities are endless: border patrol, counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and disaster relief efforts. 

An RPA’s contributions in disaster response increase the situational 

awareness of decision makers (fig. 1).

Figure 1. Infrared image of an ice jam threatening the bridge in North Dakota’s 

Red River flood. (Reprinted from DHS, “CBP Unmanned Aircraft Aid Response 

to Red River Flooding,” States News Service, 9 April 2011).

The capability to produce a real-time infrared (IR), electro-optical 

(realistic-looking daytime TV), low-light, fused IR and low-light and 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR [can see through clouds]) full-motion 

video could be a boon to search and rescue, damage assessment, cor-
4

don placement, and humanitarian efforts after a major disaster. Many 

opportunities have been missed; countless lives could have been saved by 

RPA platforms. 

For example, one of those missed opportunities occurred after Hurricane Katrina wreaked havoc in 2005. RPA crews prepared to mobilize 

in support of the major response efforts, but unfortunately the aircraft 

remained crated because the FAA would not allow unmanned aircraft to 

participate in search and rescue missions. It took almost two weeks and a 

presidential order to allow RQ-1s (unarmed version of the MQ-1 Predator) 

to support relief efforts in 2010 after an earthquake destroyed Haiti.

Precedent should be set, guidance provided, and the infrastructure 

ready for RPA flight in the NAS before the next major national-disaster 

event occurs. Ultimately, long-term solutions—air traffic control systems 

improvements, new platforms with built-in avoidance technologies, and 

incorporated training—will allow unimpeded RPA flight anywhere in the 

NAS. However, this research indicates support for a near-term plan 

agreeable to all involved parties. This support can be instituted immediately upon activation of an emergency response network. Ideally, the 

FAA and FEMA will incorporate the recommended guidance into their 

publications, and the military will include training on the recommended 

procedures. This research is time-critical. The study should be finalized 

and the resultant suggestions implemented prior to the next major manmade or natural disaster in America or its territories.

Case Studies

Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina—one of the deadliest, costliest, and most destructive storms to hit the US coast—made landfall in southeastern Louisiana 

on 29 August 2010. The gale force winds inflicted much of the initial destruction, but the rain, levee breeches, and ensuing flooding in New Orleans caused the most significant damage and deaths. DOD’s Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) activated Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina one 

day prior to landfall, calling up thousands of National Guard troops. In 

the wake of Hurricane Katrina, First Air Force requested RPA support for 

search and rescue; however, there was not enough time for all the coordination required. Due to national airspace restrictions, the Air Combat 

Command (ACC) assets could not fly, said Tom Thibodeau, a consultant 

for ACC’s RPA management.10 The detachment commander from Nellis 
5

AFB, Nevada, described the attempted support as overcome by the massive amount of coordination required in a relatively short period of time.11

RPAs (MQ-1 Predators from Nellis) could have made various contributions, such as search and rescue, damage assessment, pathfinding for 

first responders, and security overwatch for civil disturbances. The base 

was ready to mobilize a single MQ-1 Predator, enough crews to fly continuous sorties, and a maintenance package of supplies, communications 

equipment, and maintainers within 48 hours of notification. During that 

time, the coordination process at the lowest levels began. Planners 

searched charts for possible launch and recovery locations within line of 

sight (LOS) of the potentially damaged area. The chief planner sought 

and received FAA approval for flight within the immediate vicinity of the 

disaster area. This airspace, cordoned by a terminal flight restriction 

(TFR), was prohibited for all aircraft except those specifically approved to 

assist recovery efforts.

Due to the expected infrastructure damage and relative inhabitability 

of the airfields in New Orleans, the RPA launch and recovery element 

(LRE) was located outside the TFR. The RPA’s takeoff, climb, and transit 

from a nearby airfield to the TFR provided a problem for the coordination phase. Planners sought Civil Air Patrol support to fly as an RPA 

chase plane from takeoff until it entered the TFR and then to escort it 

back to landing. This mitigation would have satisfied the FAA’s “see and 

avoid” requirement.12

Unfortunately, these coordination attempts fell short of the means 

necessary for RPAs to participate, especially when the federal disaster 

response was being pushed to its limits, both internally and publicly. The 

impact of RPA flight denial in the Hurricane Katrina response can never 

be fully quantified; however, the initiatives that arose in the aftermath 

sparked internal, informal, nonintegrated disaster response plans within 

the MQ-1 community at Nellis AFB. These efforts helped initiate integration opportunities for RPAs to contribute support during the next major 

disaster to strike NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility.

Haiti Earthquake

The earthquake which struck the destitute island nation of Haiti on 12 

January 2010 is also a significant case for analysis. The 7.0-magnitude 

earthquake with the epicenter near Port-au-Prince immediately inflicted 

severe structural damage to Haiti’s already poorly built infrastructure, 

causing a death toll in the thousands.

DOD RPA crews, aircraft, and a maintenance package were mobilized 

from the MQ-1 community, which had relocated 40 miles northwest of 
6

Nellis to Creech AFB. Rather than fly LOS for the entire sortie, based on 

the ill-suited infrastructure on the island and the terrain impeding constant contact between the controlling crew and the aircraft, the planners 

opted for remote split operations via satellite. In essence, an LRE would 

launch the aircraft LOS, and then hand it over to a crew at Creech through 

satellite communications. Based on needing immediate feedback during 

critical phases of flight, the LRE would take over the flight upon returning to base, once within LOS, mitigating the satellite delay. The aircrew 

sits in the ground control station, which can be located near the disaster 

area or, using satellite connectivity, half a world away.

Although Haiti is not in the NAS, the nearest suitable airfield in Puerto 

Rico requires FAA approval of takeoffs, landings, and several minutes’ 

worth of transit to airspace over international waters. “Securing approval 

from the FAA has been the most difficult part of the mission so far. Service officials had been in discussions with the agency for years about 

UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]operations at civilian airports, but it took 

Haitian lives hanging in the balance to move the mission along,” saidMaj 

Jeff Bright, the detachment commander.13 While approval authority resides with the secretary of defense, the president ordered the FAA to ensure 

flight coordination.

An LRE deployed to Puerto Rico, and the team launched the aircraft 

from Aeropuerto Rafael Hernandez, a civilian airport near Aguadilla.14

The launch and recovery windows were based on avoiding the bulk of 

civil air traffic at Aguadilla. Because the airfield’s control tower closed 

Class D airspace from the time the aircraft took off until it was established in the TFR corridor, the airfield was closed for a 15-minute window twice a day. The aircraft had to fly in the NAS for approximately 15 

minutes before reaching the TFR.

Since the FAA governs airspace over Puerto Rico, the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) and Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) constrained 

the crews, requiring a chase plane or observer since the RPAs were not in 

an active restricted or warning area. A chase plane was not feasible, so 

planners opted for ground-based observers. The observers visually monitored the aircraft while it transited to the airspace over international waters. Due to RPA pilot shortages, ACC complied with the FAA requirement for the observers to be rated pilots by supplying four pilots from 

F-16, KC-135, and C-130 Air National Guard units. Armed with binoculars, radios, and a beach chair, the spotters were evenly spaced along the 

transit flight path and remained in constant radio contact with the aircrew. On one occasion, the observer spotted a civilian Cessna flying 

through the off-limits TFR, radioed the Predator, and informed the con-
7

trol tower of the violation.15 The RPA crew visually acquired the traffic, 

avoided it, and continued on its transit.

The need for RPA flight included search and rescue, damage assessment, communications relays, and security overwatch. With most of the 

island’s communications equipment destroyed, an airborne radio asset 

would have been helpful for radio relays between command and control 

units and first responders, sequencing of humanitarian airlift flights which 

were overwhelming the tiny airport, and coordinating relief efforts.

Once deployed, convoy support became the RPA’s primary mission. 

Crews determined the extent of the infrastructure damage and viability 

of bridges in advance of the US Agency for International Development 

and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 

food convoys. The crews also identified rioting groups trying to stop convoys, rerouting convoys when necessary, and identified roadblocks set up 

by warlords in Port-au-Prince.

While the mission impact of the two RQ-1s’ contributions to the JTF 

were not notably significant, they were groundbreaking for the coordination accomplished. “Today, the Air Force team proved remotely piloted 

aircraft can operate safely alongside civilian, military and international 

air traffic during a large-scale air relief campaign,” commented Brig Gen 

Darryl Burke, Air Forces Southern vice commander and Air Component 

Coordination Element for JTF Haiti.16 Although JTF Haiti is an example 

of effective RPA flight in the NAS and the platform’s ability to perform 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), the coordination involved, 

lead time for approval, and operational integration into the airspace provides ample opportunity for improvement.

Factors Affecting the Integration of RPAs

FAA Restrictions to RPA Flight in the NAS

Because RPAs do not have the capability to “see and avoid” (visually 

clear the flight path), the FAA mandates that they cannot fly in the same 

airspace as other manned aircraft.

The 14 CFR Part 91, “General Operating Rules,” establishes a foundation 

for safe, predictable, and consistent operations in all classes of airspace for 

all types of aircraft in the NAS.17 FAA Order 7610.4N specifies procedures 

for air traffic control planning, coordination, and services during defense 

activities and special military operations within the NAS.18 The 2007 DODFAA Memorandum of Agreement allows approved DOD UASs to operate 

without administrative burden in specified airspace through the certificate 
8

of waiver or authorization (COA) process. The FAA published Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations 

in the U.S. National Airspace System, in March 2008. This guidance is the last 

official guidance published by the FAA, primarily for internal assessment 

of RPA flight operations.19

The military departments have a robust process for establishing 

manned aircraft flight standards and procedures. However, the current 

ambiguity in national regulatory guidelines and standards makes RPA 

compliance difficult to measure. While some RPAs may already operate 

safely, until the necessary RPA-specific “standards, regulations, and 

agreed-upon compliance methodologies” are defined, establishing regulatory compliance for more routine operations is difficult. In the meantime, 

“UAS operations within the NAS are treated as exceptions through the 

COA process.”20

“The COA process is outlined in FAA Order 7610.4, Special Military 

Operations, section 12, that identifies the procedures to be followed along 

with those found in FAA Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and Administration, part 6, chapter 18. This order describes the guidelines for receiving a grant of approval for a COA and therefore constitutes a reprieve 

from specific regulations within the CFR for the period specified,” Maj 

Scott Walker wrote.21 Public operators (all government assets) must have 

a COA from the FAA to fly in the NAS.22 The operating agency determines the airworthiness of the aircraft, rather than the FAA.

A notice to Airmen (NOTAM), an advisory within a dynamic database that pilots check prior to any flight in the NAS, must be issued and 

in effect whenever the aircraft uses the airspace. The COA mitigates the 

sections of 14 CFR Part 91 that RPAs are unable to comply with if the 

aircraft flies outside of active restricted or warning airspace. Only the 

restricted areas, shaded red, are FAA-approved for unimpeded RPA flight 

(fig. 2).

As of 21 January 2011, the FAA had 266 total active COAs, 151 pending, with 298 issued in calendar year 2010.23 The FAA’s advertised time to 

process an application and grant the COA is normally 60 business days. 

However, some complex missions may take longer, while renewals only 

take about 30 business days.24 The FAA has developed three versions of 

special COAs, including the DOD-FAA Memorandum of Agreement, 

disaster relief, and emergency COA shells. Only one RPA, the US Air 

Force’s Global Hawk, has been granted continual NAS access.25 DOD received a national COA in 2003, the first and only of its kind for Global 

Hawk flight in the NAS.26 Since the RQ-4 Global Hawk flies at altitudes of 

40,000 to 60,000 feet, it is not a safety concern for midair collision avoidance or other deconfliction issues for the FAA.27
9

Controllers are primarily concerned with three issues related to RPA 

flight in the NAS: containment, lost link, and flight recovery.28 Containment 

ensures that the aircraft must be able to maintain a given, defined airspace. 

Figure 2. Military operations area and restricted airspace in the United States. 

(Reprinted from Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, DOD Site Transition Plan, attachment 2 to Department of 

Defense Final Report to Congress on Access to National Airspace for Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems, October 2010, 9.)

Lost link profiles ensure the aircraft has a predictable and safe means of 

returning to a recoverable point if command and control of the aircraft is 

lost. Flight recovery means that the aircraft has an independent means of 

safely terminating flight in the event the link is unrecoverable.

Other FAA requirements for RPAs in the NAS are unnecessarily restrictive for DOD assets. DOD assets fly 24/7, mainly due to an IR camera 

which senses infrared returns (heat), rather than the visually acquired 

daylight spectrum. DOD RPAs also fly in airspace and conditions that 

would not meet the requirement for flight by flight visual rules. The FAA 

requires that the RPA pilot maintain currency in a manned asset.29 DOD 

RPA pilots do not maintain currency in manned assets, based on fulltime RPA duties, limited budget for training, and unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, the FAA mandates that a control station may not be 

used to operate multiple RPAs.30 However, there is one multiaircraft-control 

ground control station in the Air Force inventory, allowing a single pilot to 

control up to four MQ-1 aircraft.
10

In 2006 FAA and DOD senior leaders signed the “Disaster Management Protocols,” agreeing that “anything less than full cooperation between DOD and FAA will translate into a less than optimum response for 

those who depend on us during a time of crisis.”31 While DOD and FAA 

cooperation is arguably a crucial element, interoperability among these 

two agencies and FEMA is extremely important and requires further assessment.

FEMA Response and Incident Management Plans

In March 2011 Pres. Barack Obama declared in Presidential Policy 

Directive 8 (PPD-8):

The national preparedness system shall include an interagency operational plan to support each national planning framework. Each 

interagency operational plan shall include a more detailed concept 

of operations; description of critical tasks and responsibilities; detailed resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific 

provisions for the rapid integration of resources and personnel.32

The NRF builds current response guidance by using like doctrine, 

with specific annexes for major categories of events. The annexes attempt 

to describe the likely participants and the coordination organization 

structure. Federal, state, and local authorities develop their own interagency concept of operations (CONOPS) and operations plans (OPLAN). 

However, the current CONOPS/OPLANS, which are nested in the NRF, 

will soon undergo a major change based on PPD-8. The future of FEMA 

is the “National Preparedness Goal,” an interagency mission statement, 

from which emerges the “National Preparedness System” (NPS).

The NPS directs the creation of five national frameworks: protection, 

prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation. While the NRF concentrates mainly on response, these five high-level guidance documents cover 

the whole spectrum of NPS activities. Each of the frameworks then has a 

subordinate document, the interagency operations plan. These documents, 

not specific to a particular incident, will be more detailed, including some 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and best practices. The National 

Disaster Recovery Framework was completed and released in September 

2011, but the remaining PPD-8 deliverables are still being developed.33

The National Incident Management System (NIMS), described in a 

companion document to the NRF, provides standard command and 

management structures for response activities. “This system provides a 

consistent, nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local 

governments, the private sector, and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] to work together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, 

and mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or 
11

complexity.”34 The fledgling NIMS will mature with the implementation 

of the NPS. A CONOP “describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing Federal capabilities to accomplish critical tasks, 

and describes how Federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, State, and local plans to meet the objectives described in 

the Strategic Plan.”35 The CONOP is ideally suited for an RPA integration 

plan, although each affected agency will need to develop its own OPLAN.

The National Military Command Center initially coordinates any military response required.36 DOD maintains a defense coordinating officer 

for each of the 10 FEMA regions. That officer is the single point of contact 

at the joint field office (JFO) for requesting DOD assistance.37 NIMS advises that the operations section chief establish an air operations branch 

when the incident requires complex air operations.38 It also suggests that 

an air tactical group be designated when helicopters and fixed-wing assets must operate simultaneously in the incident airspace.39 Figure 3 depicts organizational structure for a JFO establishment.

Operations Section

Chief

Air Operations

Branch Director

Air Support Group

Supervisor

Air Tactical Group

Supervisor

Helibase(s)

Manager

Fixed-Wing

Base(s)

Manager

Helicopter

Coordinator

Fixed-Wing

Coordinator

Heliport/

Helispot

Manager

Helicopters Fixed-Wing

Aircraft

Figure 3. Organizational chart depicting FEMA joint field office structure. 

(Reprinted from Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, December 2008, 102.)

Although RPAs are technically fixed-wing aircraft, the intent is that the 

fixed-wing coordinator handle all manned airplanes. An RPA coordinator, 
12

on equal echelon with the helicopter and fixed-wing coordinators, handles 

all RPA operations.

The level of RPA interoperability with all assets, both air and ground, 

will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of RPA contributions to 

the combined efforts of responding agencies. Due to the regulatory, legal, 

and ethical differences from executing warfare, using DOD assets in the 

US homeland requires further investigation and coordination.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

DSCA is the support provided by US federal and National Guard military forces, DOD civilians and contractors, and component assets, in 

response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic 

emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities.40 It 

can be requested by civil authorities and approved by DOD officials, or 

used as directed by the president within the United States, District of 

Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, Guam, 

American Samoa, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and any 

territory or possession of the United States.41

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 

directs that “federal agencies may, on the direction of the President, provide assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster.”42

During the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately qualify for assistance under . . . this Act, the Governor of the 

State in which such incident occurred may request the President to 

direct the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources of the Department of Defense for the purpose of performing on public and private 

lands any emergency work which is made necessary by such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life and property. 

Such emergency work may only be carried out for a period not to 

exceed 10 days.43

The Post-Katrina Emergency Preparedness Reform Act of 2006 

amends the Stafford Act and requires a federal response capability inventory (not enacted), which should include a list of DOD organizations and 

functions that can support civil authorities.44

Department of Defense Document (DODD) 3025.1, Military Support 

to Civil Authorities, identifies the policy and responsibilities by which 

DOD responds to major disasters or emergencies per the Stafford Act 

and other authorities. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, states that the DOD will cooperate with and provide military 

assistance to civil authorities, as directed by and consistent with applicable law, presidential directives, and executive orders.45
13

DOD policy states that DSCA plans shall be compatible with the NRF, 

NIMS, and all contingency plans, using planning that considers command 

and control options and emphasizes unity of effort.46 No DOD RPA will be 

used for DSCA, including support to federal, state, local, and tribal government organizations, unless expressly approved by the secretary of defense.47

Furthermore, armed RPA use for DSCA is not authorized.48 DOD reported 

to Congress the importance of RPAs and highlighted the platforms’ recent 

contributions in the 2010 UAS Executive Committee report:

The airborne persistence and suite of sensors and radars that characterize UAS bring added capabilities to disaster and emergency assistance. DHS employs UAS for situational awareness, critical infrastructure assessment, and emergency response to aid planners and 

leadership on how best to employ resources to stem suffering and 

damage. Recent examples include the 2009 river flooding in North 

Dakota and Minnesota and the 2010 Mississippi Canyon oil spill in 

the Gulf of Mexico. In both instances, it was determined that the 

disasters were of such severity and magnitude that effective response was beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance was necessary. In both 

incidents, DHS employed UAS to provide aerial imagery to help assess flooding/oil extent and concentration.49

However, all RPAs used in these disasters were DHS assets, not DOD 

assets. Specifically, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) flew its 

Predator B aircraft (MQ-9 Reaper) in the response to the Red River flooding in 2009, 2010, and 2011.50 CBP has numerous COAs, most notably 

along the US-Mexico border for its primary homeland security mission. 

The agency flew its RPAs in the NAS through a relatively easy COA approval, since the CBP has existing COAs from one of its locations at Grand 

Forks AFB, North Dakota, to support pre- and post-flood impacts. A 

COA was also granted to the agency to allow unimpeded flight in support 

of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.51

DOD Participation in DSCA

The assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s 

security affairs (ASD [HD & ASA]) outlined for potential requestors of 

DOD support that “when deciding to commit DOD resources, consideration 

is given to military readiness, cost, lethality, risk, appropriateness, and whether 

the response is in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.”52 Civilian 

responders, including local, state, tribal, and federal authorities, must understand that DOD assets may not be immediately available for response, 

due to their primary mission and the time required to mobilize for each 

particular incident.

An RPA executive committee acknowledges that “DOD needs to be 

able to respond rapidly to operational tasking, typically from a COCOM 
14

[combatant command] such as the United States Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM). Many of these tasked missions relate to homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civilian authorities.”53

Additionally, the ASD (HD & ASA) proclaimed that “DOD is a full partner in the Federal response to domestic incidents and the DOD response 

is fully coordinated through the mechanisms outlined in the National 

Response Framework (NRF).”54 However, an information brochure produced by the ASD (HD & ASA) office does not fully capture the current 

situation with RPAs and associated lack of established interagency coordination and outdated guidance.55 The current established guidance for 

requesting DOD assistance and the vetting process for legitimacy of support remain unaffected by the addition of RPAs as one of DOD’s assets 

from which to devote to a disaster response.

NORTHCOM makes the distinction between homeland defense and 

DSCA specifically to allay the fears of those concerned for privacy. Incident awareness and assessment (IAA) is

similar to DOD’s definition of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. However, ISR is conducted outside the 

United States over foreign territory or within the United States during Homeland Defense events, while IAA is conducted within the 

United States in support of Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations. The change in title is necessary to make it clear that DOD 

does not collect intelligence on US persons. Incident Awareness and 

Assessment is the term used to describe the types of activities conducted to give commanders and primary decision-makers at the 

strategic, operational and tactical-levels, key pieces of information 

needed to make decisions regarding a DSCA operation.56

NORTHCOM mandates that all First Air Force RPA IAA “planning 

and operations will be fully compliant with the Posse Comitatus Act and 

Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities, as well as other US laws 

and policies regarding the use of US Armed Forces in a domestic role. 

Access to the national airspace presents one of the biggest challenges in 

DOD HD and DSCA scenarios,” acknowledges the AFNORTH concept 

of employment.57

Currently, RPAs routinely fly only in restricted airspace, which is not 

approved for general aviation or commercial flight. DOD assets operating 

in America include MQ-1s and MQ-9s at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, 

flying in restricted airspace over the DOD-owned White Sands Missile 

Range (WSMR). The FAA has issued COAs for these MQ-1/9s to cross a 

sliver of airspace between WSMR and Fort Bliss–owned restricted airspace. These COAs (one for each type of RPA) require the RPA to cross 

rather than loiter within the airspace, cross at or above 18,000 feet mean 

sea level, and report when clear of the airspace.58
15

The COAs are renewed annually, and the process takes several months 

of coordination. If a major national disaster were to occur within the 

airspace governed by any of the currently approved COAs, RPA flight 

would be fairly easy to coordinate. However, the COAs typically cover 

only the minimum required airspace for the mission of that specific platform and generally only near the airfield from which they operate. This 

limitation is a key factor for DOD participation in DSCA events.

Current Status of Integration Efforts

In the fiscal year (FY) 2009 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), Congress directed the creation of an executive committee (ExCom), comprised of DOD and the FAA.59 The Undersecretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics said, “The sense of Congress 

was that progress has been lagging in the integration of UAS into the NAS 

for operational training, operational support to the Combatant Commanders, and support to domestic authorities in emergencies and natural 

disasters.”60 The UAS ExCom is tasked to work on those efforts that will 

provide near-term access for RPAs operated by federal agencies. The FY10 

NDAA further directed DOD and the Department of Transportation, 

consulting with DHS, to develop a plan for expanded access to the NAS.61

National Aeronautics and Space Administration representatives were also 

invited to join the ExCom. The resulting National Airspace System Access 

Plan for Federal Public Unmanned Aircraft Systems, known as the NAS 

Access Plan, establishes the milestones for expanded airspace access, 

policy recommendations, and resources required by all participating 

agencies.62 The ExCom’s efforts give routine access to the NAS, but the 

solutions proposed can be partially useful in a temporary situation such 

as humanitarian relief.

DOD currently has 146 RPA units based at 63 continental United States 

locations, and by 2015, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) 

estimates that DOD will have 197 units at 105 locations, which is a 35 percent unit increase and a 67 percent increase in the number of locations.63

According to the Unmanned Systems Roadmap report, “The JUAS COE has 

published a joint UAS CONOPS, which includes concepts of operations for 

providing domestic support to civil authorities.64 AFNORTH discusses a 

disaster relief COA as a preapproved “off-the-shelf ” product, requiring 

minimal time to activate. However, the May 2011 concept of employment 

does not allude to AFNORTH having a disaster relief COA submitted.65

FAA spokesman Les Dorr said that the FAA has issued COAs for Haitian 

relief (January–February 2010), the Gulf of Mexico oil spill (June 2010), and 

the Red River flooding in North Dakota (April–June 2011). It also issued 
16

emergency COAs for the Japanese earthquake/tsunami (March 2011) 

and the Red River flooding, as well as to numerous law enforcement 

agencies.66 In response to Japan’s major disaster, the Air Force’s Global 

Hawk, based out of Anderson AFB, Guam, provided imagery of the 

Fukushima Dai-Ichi power plant. The aircraft identified boundaries of 

the radioactive plume and, eventually after crew ingenuity, temperatures 

inside the nuclear plant. Since the United States owns Guam’s airspace as 

part of the NAS, an FAA COA was required and issued within 22 hours 

of the earthquake.67

Real-time deconfliction is complicated, especially in urban, high-volume air traffic areas and when controlling numerous types of aircraft 

within a small area. Some suggestions include vertical separation for different types of mission sets and lateral deconfliction for aircraft that need 

to maintain the same altitude blocks.

A TFR, a type of NOTAM, is a construct already in use and recognized by all aerial participants of the NAS. It defines an area restricted to 

air travel due to a hazardous condition, a special event, or a general warning for the entire FAA airspace. The text of the actual TFR contains the 

fine points of the restriction. The FAA-DOD Protocols memo establishes 

a detailed process for coordination between the FAA and DOD, as well as 

outlining several scalable scenarios for aircraft deconfliction. However, it 

is not platform-specific and does not cover the contingency of RPA flight 

within the TFRs. A major disaster, one in which RPAs would likely participate, calls for an extensive TFR to allow for altitude stratification by 

mission type and possibly a joint operations area if a large amount of 

DOD traffic is anticipated.68 RPA platforms do not require traditional 

navigational aids, functional airport lighting, or a large ground-service 

footprint—one potential FAA advantage for RPAs to operate in an area 

where FAA services are disrupted.

The 432d Wing at Creech AFB established a draft CONOPS for DSCA 

operations, incorporating lessons learned from JTF–Haiti support. Integration among the affected agencies can be built from this type of initiative. However, the largest hurdle remains the combatant command’s responsibility to ensure FAA airspace is designated and approved for RPA 

flight.

The FAA received 23 funding extensions, experienced a two-week 

partial shutdown, and waited five years for congressional approval of reauthorization.69 President Obama signed the $63 billion FAA Modernization and Reform Act into law on 14 February 2012. Upon enactment, the 

secretary of transportation has 270 days to develop a “comprehensive 

plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system.”70
17

Closing

Recommendations

As FEMA regulations are created and updated, the working groups 

assigned to research and publish the deliverables should include inputs, 

requirements, and capabilities from DOD and FAA. These inputs should 

focus on unimpeded, but temporary, RPA integration into the NAS while 

being flexible enough for continual improvements in RPA technology 

and incremental increases in NAS access. The published guidance, in the 

form of the five national frameworks in the NPS, should include guidance on operational coordination and interoperability of responding 

agencies. Finally, to curb the concerns of those with privacy encroachment issues, this guidance should clearly outline the legal responsibilities 

of DSCA participants.

Due to the nature of the NPS, the publication of this material will have 

far-reaching audiences at all levels of government, earning a more widespread acceptance from local, tribal, state, and federal entities than any 

published CFR or congressional act. FEMA should include an off-theshelf plan for RPA integration into disaster response final products and 

the online resource center. This plan should be adaptable to any disaster, 

both man-made and natural, with precoordination already accomplished, 

to include command and control, potential mission sets, and processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination of the full-motion video feeds.

Since the FAA renewed funding and guidance with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, it should rapidly seek internal processes 

to safely deconflict RPAs in a temporary cordoned area for a major national disaster. Although the RPA-specific requirements in this new law 

are aimed at long-term, permanent solutions to RPA integration into the 

NAS, the means to capitalize on incremental increases in airspace access 

should be included. While the current COA process is sufficient for longer-term flight activity, it is not sufficient for the immediate response required in a disaster situation. The FAA should incorporate RPA deconfliction measures into its initial survey of a disaster area when building 

TFRs and ensure that RPAs are considered during the process.

The vertical transit profile was the concern for RPA flight in support of 

the Hurricane Katrina response. While the RPA would have been approved into the TFR surrounding New Orleans if it had departed and 

landed inside the TFR airspace, none of the airfields underlying that airspace were useable. The lateral transit profile, similar to the construct 

used in the Haiti earthquake response, is sufficient if properly established. 

The FAA should take into account the location of the RPA LRE in relation 
18

to the TFR built around the disaster area. The most ideal of all profiles is 

more the long-term solution to the “see and avoid” dilemma facing both 

the FAA and DOD.

This lateral transit airspace, basically a corridor, should be included in 

the TFR and treated with the same respect and caution afforded to such 

high-profile TFRs as the permanent restriction over Washington, DC, 

and the TFRs placed over air shows, erupting volcanoes, and presidential 

venues. Any publication of the NOTAM and depictions of the disaster 

area TFR must include the LRE location, the RPA lateral transit corridor, 

and the airspace centered over the affected region. Since the lateral transit 

profile seems to be the most likely existing option for air traffic controllers and aircrews, it should receive the focus of the FAA’s short- and midterm efforts. If properly established—avoiding the primary civil traffic 

routes, published through NOTAMs and emphasized in the local media—the TFR could be very effective in deconflicting RPAs and manned 

assets while providing the most efficient air response.

Currently, DSCA can only be approved by the secretary of defense 

(SecDef). This approval authority could be delegated to lower levels, such 

as the major command or numbered Air Force level, or to the combatant 

commanders. This delegation of authority may enhance responses to 

small disaster events, such as localized emergencies requiring search and 

rescue assets, especially if they do not detract from the DOD’s mission. 

One example would be a forest fire in the Lincoln National Forest near 

Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Since Predator and Reaper missions fly 

training missions nearby daily, the impact to the regular ACC mission 

would be minimal, but the benefits can be significant. This example demonstrates the unnecessary complexities associated with requiring SecDef 

approval. SecDef approval authority should be retained for such largescale events that would require reapportioning assets from Central Command. For example, a widespread chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear event on the densely populated northeast coast of the United 

States might require DOD to temporarily realign its global commitments. 

DOD should seek an updated DOD-FAA memorandum of agreement 

(MOA). The current MOA, written in 2007, can capitalize on incremental 

improvements towards RPA access to the NAS.

The RPA community is currently fully tasked, maximizing formal 

training unit (FTU) throughput to have a just-in-time aircrew production 

rate for ongoing and newly initiated combat air patrols (CAP). However, 

as evidenced by RPA support of JTF–Haiti, the DOD’s primary missions 

(FTU throughput and CAPs for combatant commanders) can still be accomplished while DSCA operations are in effect. A short-term surge, 
19

such as was the Haiti effort, can be absorbed by DOD; however, longterm or significant asset sourcing will need to be vetted by the SecDef.

DOD should develop a training plan that incorporates potential mission sets and NAS coordination procedures for its RPA crews. The CFRs 

governing DSCA, as amended in January 2011, mandate that “the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to incorporate DSCA into 

joint training and exercise programs in consultation with all appropriate 

Federal agencies.”71 A preview of a possible new training plan (see appendix), notionally called “Domestic Disaster Relief,” reveals that it should 

include academic, simulator, and/or flight training before awarding 

DSCA certification to a particular aircrew member. Academics should 

include governing directives, such as the applicable CFRs, FEMA’s NPS, 

and the FAA’s FARs, differences training between the crews’ primary mission of ISR and the DSCA mission of IAA, and TTPs of the most likely 

missions, such as search and rescue, damage assessment, and first-responder overwatch. The scenario-based simulator and/or aircraft flights 

would serve as the operational application of the doctrine, regulations, 

and discussions in academic training. Simulator training is recommended 

over flight training based on the capabilities of simulators to recreate the 

types of missions possible in a disaster response sortie. The suggested domestic disaster relief training plan is flexible and general enough to be 

incorporated into any RPA platform’s formal training or combat mission 

readiness training. The training can be tailored to any unit’s specific needs 

and can be accomplished in less than one additional training day.

Finally, one by-product of DOD participation in DSCA operations is 

the potentially favorable portrayal of RPA technology in the news media. 

In any DSCA participation, DOD should capitalize on the opportunity 

for positive publicity regarding the merit of its RPA mission in support of 

domestic disaster response.

Conclusion

In the last few years there has been a significant increase in efforts to 

allow RPA flight into the NAS. While the evidence mounts, the efforts are 

individualized by agency. The critical window of opportunity presented 

by several factors—enactment of the FAA Modernization and Reform 

Act of 2012, FEMA’s doctrine overhaul in response to PPD-8, and DOD’s 

increasing need for access to the NAS—combine to form a potential synergy of efforts. Integration is the missing piece in an existing structure 

that will allow for RPA flight in the NAS in support of disaster relief. Incorporating the recommendations into each agency’s efforts will produce 
20

that integration, hopefully in time before the next major disaster strikes 

the United States or its territories.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 52.

2. Rosone, “UAS in the NAS.”

3. US House, FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 161.

4. UAS Task Force, Unmanned Aircraft System, iv.

5. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response Framework.

6. DHS, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 31.

7. UAS Executive Committee, National Airspace System Access Plan.

8. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 52.

9. Shaun Waterman, “Drones over US Get OK by Congress,” Washington Times, 8 

February 2012.

10. SSgt Amy Robinson, “FAA Authorizes Predators to Seek Survivors,” Air Force Print 

News Today, 2 August 2006.

11. Detachment commander, Nellis AFB, Nevada, discussion with the author, 3 

February 2012.

12. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations, 8.

13. Michael Hoffman, “Predator’s Role in Civilian Operation Is a First,” Air Force Times, 

15 February 2010, 24.

14. Capt Nathan D. Broshear, “Airmen Fly Predator in Controlled Airspace over Haiti,” 

Air Force News Service, 28 January 2010.

15. Detachment commander, discussion.

16. Hoffman, “Predator’s Role in Civilian Operation.” 

17. UAS Executive Committee, National Airspace System Access Plan, 22.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 23.

20. DOD, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 55.

21. Walker, Integrating Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Systems, 19.

22. FAA, Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, F-1. 

23. Willis, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” 20.

24. Dorr, “Integrating UASs.”

25. Walker, Integrating Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Systems, 12.

26. “Global Hawk Receives First Certificate.”

27. DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 69 and 109.

28. FAA, Airworthiness Certification, 3-1.

29. Ibid., A-5.

30. Ibid., A-8.

31. FAA System Operations Security, DOD Air Forces Northern (First Air Force), and 

Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), Disaster Management Protocols, 3.

32. Obama, National Preparedness.

33. Federal Emergency Management Administration, Presidential Policy Directive 8, 

16; and DHS, National Preparedness System, 6.

34. DHS, National Response Framework, 4.

35. Ibid., 73.

36. Ibid., 56.
21

37. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

“Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”

38. DHS, National Incident Management System, 101.

39. Ibid.

40. Title 32, National Defense, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 185.3.

41. Ibid., part 185.1.

42. Buchalter, Military Support to Civil Authorities, 5.

43. Ibid.

44. GAO, Actions to Implement the Post-Katrina Act, 54.

45. DHS, “ESF #9,” 4.

46. Title 32, National Defense, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 185.4.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. UAS Executive Committee, National Airspace System Access Plan, 13.

50. “Border Security.”

51. Kostelnik, Role of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

52. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s 

Security Affairs, Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents, 1.

53. UAS Executive Committee, National Airspace System Access Plan, 9.

54. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s 

Security Affairs, Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents, 1.

55. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”

56. First Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 16.

57. Ibid., 17 and 31.

58. FAA Certificate of Waiver or Authorization.

59. House, National Defense Authorization Act.

60. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department 

of Defense Final Report, 4.

61. Ibid., 3.

62. UAS Executive Committee, National Airspace System Access Plan, 1.

63. Ibid., 2.

64. DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 118.

65. First Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 33.

66. Dorr, “Integrating UASs.”

67. Scott Fontaine, “Global Hawk Served New Role in Japan Aftermath,” Air Force 

Times, 14 August 2011.

68. FAA System Operations Security, DOD Air Forces Northern (First Air Force), and 

CONR, Disaster Management Protocols, 12.

69. Ashley Halsey III, “Obama Signs FAA Bill Set to Usher in Progress on New Air Traffic Control System,” Washington Post, 14 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

obama-signs-faa-bill-set-to-usher-in-progress-on-new-air-traffic-control-system/2012/02/14/gIQAzlmPER_story.html.

70. House, FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 159.

71. Title 32, National Defense, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 185.5.

23

Appendix 

Domestic Disaster Relief

A DOD RPA Training Plan

Training Events Time Allotted

Academics

•	 Introduction to DSCA	 	 	 	 4 hours

•	 Historical Examples	 	 	 	 .5 hour

•	 Need for DOD Support

•	 Principles of DSCA	 	 	 	 1.0 hour

•	 Chain of Command	

•	 Governing Laws	

•	 Differences in ISR and IAA	

•	 NAS Review	 	 	 	 	 1.0 hour

•	 National Airspace System Refresher	

•	 Communication	

•	 TFR Primer	

•	 DSCA Operations	 	 	 	 1.5 hours

•	 Mission Sets	

•	 Search and Rescue	

•	 Damage Assessment	

•	 Cordon Procedures	

•	 CBRN Operations	

•	 Building Awareness of Civil Authorities	

Simulator Training	 	 	 	 2–4 hours

•	 Scenario-based profile including:	

•	 On-Scene Commander (Airborne) for Rescue Effort	

•	 Infrastructure Assessment	

•	 Convoy Overwatch	

•	 Urban and Rural Area Events

•	 CBRN Event

•	 Natural Disasters (Flood, Fire, Earthquake, Tsunami, Tornado,

Volcano Eruption, Etc.)

25

Abbreviations

ACC Air Combat Command

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

ASD (HD & ASA) assistant secretary of defense for homeland 

defense and America’s security affairs 

CAP combat air patrols

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COA certificate of waiver or authorization

COCOM combatant command

CONOPS concept of operations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA defense support of civil authorities

ExCom executive committee

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAR Federal Aviation Regulation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FTU formal training unit

FY fiscal year

IAA incident awareness and assessment

IR infrared

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JFO joint field office

JTF Joint Task Force

JUAS COE Joint UAS Center of Excellence 

LOS line of sight

LRE launch and recovery element

MOA memorandum of agreement

NAS national airspace system

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NGO nongovernmental organization

NIMS National Incident Management System

NORTHCOM Northern Command

NOTAM notice to Airmen

NPS National Preparedness System

NRF National Response Framework
OPLAN operations plan

PPD presidential policy directive

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SecDef secretary of defense

TFR terminal flight restriction

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

WSMR White Sands Missile Range
27

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