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65–110 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–10] 

EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN 

AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 1, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 1, 2011, Equipping the Warfighter in Afghanistan .................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 1, 2011 .......................................................................................... 23 

TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2011 

EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Dee, Thomas P., Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ........................... 4 

Solis, William M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 27 

Dee, Thomas P. ................................................................................................. 31 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 29 

Solis, William M. .............................................................................................. 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 57 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 61 

(1) 

EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee 

meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense 

processes and procedures currently used to rapidly respond to and 

fulfill urgent warfighter capability requirements. 

These urgently required capabilities are defined by the Department of Defense as capabilities that if left unfulfilled, usually within days or weeks, could result in the loss of life and/or prevent the 

successful completion of a near-term military mission. 

We just received a classified briefing on equipping U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan and learned of the current capabilities being used by 

the warfighter, as well as what the warfighter currently requires. 

We want to make sure that the processes are in place or get put 

in place to get our warfighters the equipment they need as quickly 

as they can get that equipment. 

The Department’s record in quickly getting needed capabilities to 

the warfighter has not been what it should have been. This was 

most evident in the Department’s slow response to the improvised 

explosive device threat. On the other end of the spectrum of responsiveness is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program, which shows what can be done when the Department of Defense partners with industry. 

We believe we have now fielded the best warfighter equipment 

available, but as long as we have injuries in the field, we must continue to do everything possible to better protect our people. With 

147,000 service men and women operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our mission to ensure that they are provided with the 

most effective equipment available, in a timely manner, and not repeat previous mistakes. 

There have been numerous studies and reports by independent 

and government agencies that have all cited inefficiencies in the 

Department’s ability to rapidly respond to warfighter capability requirements. 
2 

The GAO [Government Accountability Office] notes that, currently, multiple entities in the Department of Defense reported a 

role in responding to similar categories of urgently needed capabilities: Five entities have a role in responding to counter-IED 

[counter-Improvised Explosive Device] capabilities; eight entities 

have a role in responding to ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance] capabilities; and six entities have a role in responding to command, control, communications, and computer capabilities. 

The committee is aware of an urgent request that was made last 

July by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for advanced analytic capability 

to analyze the tremendous amounts of intelligence information 

being collected. The request stated, ‘‘This shortfall translates into 

operational opportunities missed and lives lost.’’ 

Further, this specific capability was described by an intelligence 

officer in Afghanistan as ‘‘enabling U.S. Forces’ ability to find insurgent targets to skyrocket.’’ The specific capability being requested by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan was off-the-shelf. It already 

was being used by 30 separate units and agencies in Afghanistan 

and here in the United States. 

When our committee chairman and ranking member wrote the 

Department in October, 3 months after the request had been made, 

asking why this capability was being delayed, it was determined 

the request had not even yet made it to Washington. This analytic 

capability is only now being fielded in limited numbers while the 

fielding of the promised program of record capability has slipped 

from November of last year to the end of this month. 

The committee is also aware that due to the large number of 

services’, agencies’, and organizations’ failures to use common databases for these urgent requests, duplication occurs in responding to 

urgent requests. In one instance, an agency spent millions-of-dollars doing a proof of concept on an off-the-shelf rotorcraft unmanned aerial vehicle that was already being used by another 

service. 

According to the GAO, the Department does not comprehensively 

manage and oversee its urgent needs efforts; overlap and duplication exists in the Department’s urgent needs efforts; and several 

challenges, such as funding, training, technology, and maturity of 

proposed solutions, could hinder the Department’s responsiveness 

to urgent needs in the future. 

We recognize the Department has taken steps to create urgent 

needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, yet the Department 

has been at this for 10 years, and very clearly, much needs to be 

done in establishing an institutionalized capability and process. 

Congress has given the Department of Defense rapid acquisition 

authority. This authority allows for the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability gap that has resulted in combat fatalities. The subcommittee believes the Department could improve employment of 

this rapid acquisition authority and better inform decisionmakers 

within the Department that this authority exists. Over the past 5 

years, the Department has only used this authority four times. 
3 

The Government Accountability Office released a report today 

that is critical of the Department’s processes and makes several 

recommendations for improvements. I would hope the Department 

will expeditiously implement these recommendations. We are prepared to help, if necessary, legislatively. 

Finally, I again want to assure the men and women in uniform 

and their families that while the acquisition process has oftentimes 

been inefficient and duplicative, it has provided the best equipment 

available to our warfighters. 

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Texas, Silvestre Reyes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And today’s hearing covers the critical topic of how the Department of Defense fields urgent warfighter needs from the field. 

This subcommittee has always operated in a bipartisan manner 

that focuses on the needs of the troops in the field. 

So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing 

on this vital issue, and this being our first hearing, I hope it underscores the importance of this topic. 

For the purposes of providing oversight to DOD [the Department 

of Defense] and the military services on this issue, I think this subcommittee must focus on two key areas: One issue is the efficiency, 

as you mentioned, of responding to the operational needs of 

warfighters in a way that avoids wasting money. While efficiency 

is important and is always something that we should focus on, I 

think it comes in a distant second to the other critical issue, which 

is speed, the speed of DOD’s responses to urgent operational needs 

in the field, in other words, the warfighters and their needs. 

To me, this is the overriding issue that we face because getting 

a capability into the hands of a soldier, even if it isn’t the perfect 

solution or the most affordable, can and often does save lives. 

We saw this with the process DOD went through to get MRAPs 

[Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] in the field. In the 

end, it took Congress and Secretary Gates constantly pushing to 

get these life-saving vehicles deployed. That, regrettably, should 

not have been the case, but it is something hopefully we can all 

learn from. 

But after reading, as you mentioned, GAO’s testimony on this 

issue for today’s hearing, I am not entirely sure that the Defense 

Department and the military services have fully appreciated and 

learned the lessons they should have from the MRAP program. 

While I have no doubt that servicemembers and civilians alike at 

the Pentagon are doing the very best that they can to act quickly 

and that they are working hard every single day, it appears that 

the system, as we all talk about the system, for responding to urgent needs has become overly onerous, complex, bureaucratic, and 

slow. 
4 

The GAO identified at least 30 different organizations in the Department of Defense involved in responding to these urgent operational needs. They also point out that no single high-ranking individual is in charge. This is a critical lesson learned from the MRAP 

program. Given the massive amounts of funding involved, at least $76 billion since 2005, and then the urgency of the needs, it is not acceptable, simply not acceptable, to have the level of fragmentation and 

overlap that GAO has reported and found in their study. 

In addition to understanding what needs to happen with DOD, 

today’s hearing will hopefully also help our subcommittee identify 

where Congress can act to improve the system, whether through 

changes in how we provide funding or the authorities given to the 

military services. This needs to be a team effort between Congress 

and DOD. 

So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on 

this vital and critical issue, and I look forward to working with you 

on the topic as we build a National Defense Authorization Act for 

the year 2012. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Two bells followed by five bells means a series of votes is on. We 

have perhaps 10 minutes or so before we need to leave at about 2 

minutes before the vote is scheduled to close so that we can get our 

vote. So we can begin your testimony. Depending on how long your 

testimony is, we can have testimony from one of you or both of you. 

I want to thank you very much for coming today. 

Mr. Tom Dee, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Mr. Dee is 

also representing the Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn 

and the Department’s Chief Management Officer. 

And Mr. Bill Solis, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office. 

We will proceed with the panel’s testimony, as much as we can 

before we need to go to vote, and without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. 

Thank you, sir. You may begin. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. DEE, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. DEE. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members 

of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

Defense’s urgent operational needs processes. 

The experience of war has taught us that new enemy weapons 

and tactics will emerge in times of conflict and that we will not always have existing capability or capacity to adequately counter 

those new threats. Addressing those unanticipated threats is the 

underlying purpose of the Department’s urgent needs processes. 

As is the case for our deliberate requirements and resource allocation processes: JCIDS, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; PPBES, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting 

and Execution System; and the acquisition processes, the urgent 
5 

needs process is comprised of three main elements: deciding what 

you need, the requirements; providing adequate resources to buy it, 

the programming and budgeting; and assessing alternatives and 

executing a solution, the acquisition process, to include the operation and maintenance. A fourth critical step, fielding, is also vitally important to address since this can be the limiting factor in 

a contingency situation and will shape the suitability of any proposed solution. 

The challenge for the JUONs [Joint Urgent Operational Needs] 

process is how to execute each element on a much more compressed 

timeline, often in the absence of well-defined requirements, supporting CONOPS [Concept of Operations] and doctrine, and/or supporting operations and maintenance concepts. Working under such 

compressed timelines, the Department necessarily accepts some 

higher level of programmatic risk in traditional areas of cost, 

schedule and performance. In a time of war, schedule often becomes the risk that is least acceptable because the speed at which 

something can be fielded, even if it is only a mitigating capability, 

is often the most relevant factor in reducing the commander’s operational risk. Not surprisingly, therefore, the commander’s assessment of his operational risk is where the urgent needs process begins. 

As you pointed out and as identified in a recent GAO study, 

there are multiple mechanisms through which a commander can 

submit an urgent operational needs request. Appropriately, under 

Title X responsibilities, the service components have all established 

processes to facilitate a timely response to identified warfighter 

needs. 

In cases where a commander identifies the need as joint, the 

combatant commander certifies the requirement and forwards it to 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation as a joint 

urgent operational need. The Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, the J8, uses its established functional capability boards to assess both the validity and the urgency 

of the requirement. Should the Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for 

Requirements, the DDR, determine that the need is valid and that 

it is urgent, he passes it to me as the Director of the OSD’s [the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense’s] Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. 

I, in turn, coordinate with the service components, JIEDDO [the 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization], the ISR 

Task Force, other elements of OSD, including the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Material Readiness, and various 

Defense agencies to identify potential solutions to the validated requirements and any challenges or risks associated with executing 

that solution. 

We then formally task the appropriate component with the responsibility to satisfy the need. Now this is not a strictly linear 

process. As soon as the need is identified, the combatant commander, CENTCOM [Central Command] in most cases, Joint Staff, 

the JRAC [Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell] and the services begin collaborating to determine the most suitable way forward. 

There are many challenges associated with compressing the requirements, budgeting, and acquisition cycle, but despite these 
6 

challenges, through our urgent needs processes, the Department 

has provided our forces with the best force protection, command 

and control, counter-IED, and ISR capabilities available. 

Now, that is not to say that the Department is fully satisfied 

with our processes, with the speed at which we could field new capabilities, and our ability to anticipate the next threat or with the 

efficiency with which the whole process works. In our 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department recognized the continuing 

need to build agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of 

quickly identifying emerging gaps and rapidly adjusting programming and budget priorities to mitigate those gaps. Our urgent processes must provide a means of quickly prioritizing and quantifying 

requirements and of ensuring that the resources are available to 

enable rapid fielding of capabilities inside of the Department’s 

PPBES cycle. 

The Department has also acknowledged and largely concurred 

with the findings and recommendations of the April 2010 GAO report on DOD’s urgent needs processes. Contained in that report are 

recommendations that the Department implement the comprehensive management framework with better defined accountability to 

improve our responsiveness to urgent operational needs. 

Section 804 of the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act further directs the Department to conduct a complete review of the process for fielding capabilities in response to urgent 

operational needs and to include consideration of earlier GAO reports and a July 2009 congressionally directed study by the Defense Science Board on the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. 

The legislation recommends a streamlined and tightly integrated 

approach to the Department’s urgent needs processes, clear definition of the roles and responsibilities within the Department for the 

fulfillment of urgent needs, and the development of an expedited 

review process to determine which needs are appropriate for a 

rapid fielding process. 

Concurrent with the development of many of these reports, the 

Department has adapted its urgent processes. Beginning in 2009, 

the President’s revised strategy in Afghanistan has served as a catalyst to initiate, if not fully implement, many of the actions recommended in the GAO reports. Among the common findings of 

these many reports is the perceived lack of a common management 

framework and clear senior leadership of our urgent needs processes. 

Recognizing the need for improved synergies among the multiple 

organizations that contribute to the counter-IED campaign, the 

Secretary of Defense established a Counter-IED Senior Integration 

Group in November 2009 to leverage the efforts of JIEDDO, the 

military services, the Defense agencies, the MRAP task force, and 

the ISR task force. Under the leadership of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ashton 

Carter, and the Joint Staff Director of Operations, the J3, then 

Lieutenant General Jay Paxton, now Lieutenant General Bob Miller, the C–SIG [Counter-IED Senior Integration Group] provided 

clear priorities and common focus in the counter-IED fight. 

It quickly became clear, however, that counter-IED is not a 

strictly confined problem set. Multiple capabilities, ranging from 
7 

ISR to force protection, contribute to a successful counter-IED campaign. So under the Under Secretary of Defense’s AT&L [acquisition, technology and logistics] Dr. Carter’s leadership and with the 

Secretary’s consent, the C–SIG has evolved to include oversight of 

many of the most critical and urgent needs of our operational commanders. While the evolved role of the Senior Integration Group 

does not yet enjoy the clarity of a written policy directive, the senior governance board provides Department-wide focus on expediently meeting the urgent needs of our commanders. 

A recent organizational change indicative of this improved senior 

leader focus was the realignment of my office, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, from the Rapid Fielding Directorate within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to a direct report to Dr. Carter as the Under Secretary of 

Defense for AT&L. This organizational change has streamlined the 

decision process for those urgent needs submitted by the operational commanders and validated by the Joint Staff. 

For example, multiple urgent needs that had been identified 

since the beginning of this fiscal year had been languishing for lack 

of funding. With his direct involvement in the process, Dr. Carter 

was quickly able to bring the issue to the attention of Secretary 

Gates, who convened a meeting of the Department’s leadership and 

made a decision to immediately fund and execute these urgent 

needs. Within the authorities available to the Department, $350 

million was quickly realigned to support those critical needs that 

could be executed quickly. An additional $1 billion of requirements 

was also quickly sourced, but since the Department did not have 

the authority to reapportion these funds, a prior notification reprogramming request was submitted to Congress for approval. 

Please accept my thanks on behalf of the Department for your 

committee’s quick response to this request and approval of part 

three for urgent needs. But unfortunately, due to the Department 

acting without a fiscal year 2011 appropriation, the Department 

lacks a fiscal year 2011 source to support the requested urgent operations and maintenance requirements. Nevertheless, this action, 

this reprogramming action, demonstrates the Department’s commitment at the very highest level to quickly make the decisions 

necessary to respond to warfighter requirements. 

Another example of improved focus on urgent needs is the increased use of rapid acquisition authority, which you addressed in 

your statement, Mr. Chairman. It was originally provided in section 811 of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] for fiscal year 2005 and was further amended this year. Use of this authority is identified, further identified, as an interest item on your 

committee’s oversight agenda for the 112th Congress, and I would 

take to this opportunity to also thank the committee for its action 

in the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act that expanded this authority to include supplies as well as equipment and, 

more importantly, for expanding the authority from $100 million—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. I am sorry. We have a few minutes left in our 

vote. So we need to recess now to go vote, and we will finish you 

testimony when we return and then get to the testimony from 

GAO. Thank you very much. 
8 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. We will reconvene our subcommittee. There was 

a little confusion on the floor. The last vote was voiced, and that 

wasn’t very clear, so some people are still waiting I think for a vote 

that is not going to occur. 

Mr. Dee, we will let you complete your testimony and then proceed with the GAO testimony. 

Mr. DEE. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me pick up by again thanking you for the action the committee has taken in modifying the rapid acquisition authority within fiscal year 2011 expanding NDAA, expanding the authority from 

$100 million to $200 million per fiscal year. The Department has 

already made use of this expanded authority and used $116 million 

as part of the aforementioned decision by the Secretary to immediately fund those most urgent and executable needs. 

As our management framework continues to evolve, our processes and policies must ensure that all components place appropriate priority and use all available authorities to deliver timely 

and effective capabilities to meet the urgent needs of our operational commanders. To that end, in March 2010, Dr. Carter, 

Under Secretary for AT&L, issued a memorandum to the service 

components highlighting the flexible authorities provided through 

the existing acquisition regulations and policy and directing them 

should those existing authorities be insufficient to enable a rapid 

response to request the use of rapid acquisition authority. 

While the Department has enjoyed many successes in rapidly delivering capabilities to the field, there are still challenges to overcome. The most difficult challenge in rapid acquisition is not strictly acquisition, but rather prioritizing needs and quickly identifying 

the resources needed to execute a solution. 

While Congress cannot help us with prioritizing our warfighting 

needs, it can help to facilitate their rapid funding. The increase of 

rapid acquisition authority has helped, but identifying new funding 

in the year of execution remains a challenge. On average, the Department must expect a reprogramming request to take 3 months 

from the decision to fund an urgent need until the funds are authorized. In preparing our troops in contact for an upcoming campaign, a 3-month delay in funding can be an unacceptably long period. The Department needs immediate access to the funds needed 

to initiate actions as the soon as the need is validated. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget submission included a $300 million 

overseas contingency operation request and the fiscal year 2012 

President’s budget request includes $100 million in the base budget 

and an additional $100 million in the overseas contingency operations to provide immediate source of funding for urgent needs. 

While this money would not fully fund all of the Department’s urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are requested through Congress. 

Your support of these requests is a critical part of our improved responsiveness. 

As we have evolved our structures and processes and continually 

improved our responsiveness, we have recognized the value of 

many of the findings contained within the reports that your committee has sponsored over the past several years. While we have 
9 

embraced the need for focused senior leadership, as evidenced 

through the evolution of the Senior Integration Group, we are cautious not to allow the imperative to establish formal policy and 

process distract from the continual effort to rapidly field those capabilities identified by the operational commanders as urgent. 

The changes made in section 803 of the fiscal year 2011 NDAA 

expanding the authority given to the Secretary are appreciated. I 

also believe that the review required by section 804 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act will also help as we strive to strike the 

appropriate balance between acceptable levels of programmatic and 

operational risks. Pending the outcome of that study, the Senior Integration Group will continue to function as the Department’s senior level governance council as we develop and staff the permanent 

policy that will implement the guidance contained within the recent Quadrennial Defense Review to institutionalize rapid acquisition. 

Thank you, again, for your opportunity to speak with you today. 

While we still have work to do, I believe that the Department is 

on a path towards developing a more agile and efficient management framework for responding rapidly to urgent needs. And I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dee can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Solis. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SOLIS. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members 

of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. 

I had a detailed oral statement, but since a lot of the findings 

in the report that we are issuing today have been covered by both 

you and the ranking member, I am going to quickly summarize and 

maybe highlight a couple of things as we go forward. 

You mentioned a number of the entities, numerous entities that 

are involved in this urgent needs process—I think there were 31— 

and also that a number were also involved in capability development, like counter-IED, the lack of senior involvement, the fact 

that there is no tracking process. But there were a couple of things 

that I just wanted to highlight going forward, and that is, in part 

of this tracking process, I think it is not only good to track through 

from the time the process begins validation, the validation process 

once it comes out of theater to the initial fielding, but also, how effective is that solution we have fielded to the warfighter? Is it 

being used as it was envisioned? I think also going forward, is this 

something that we might be able to use into the future, another 

combatant command might be able to use the technology or materiel solution that has been developed? So I think having that tracking system and evaluating the effectiveness of that weapons system 

would also be very, very good. 

And finally, the only other point I want to make in terms of our 

report, as we pointed out, there are a lot of different entities involved. There is not a baseline policy in existence, and there is a 
10 

need for senior involvement. But also, we think there are some options for potentially consolidating some of these entities, and we 

laid out some of those options and both put the advantages and disadvantages in our report. And again, we made that recommendation that the Department explore those options, particularly the 

CMO [Chief Management Officer]. The Department has concurred 

with that. But I think going forward, that would be one thing that 

I would probably ask that the committee continue to observe, in 

terms of trying to come up with better processes, possibly through 

consolidation, that can help our warfighter get what he needs or 

she needs in the quickest possible manner. 

That concludes what I have to say at this point. I will be glad 

to answer any questions that you or the members of the committee 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

As chairman, I almost always ask my questions last, hoping that 

someone else will ask them, so I don’t have to. 

Mr. Reyes has graciously yielded to Mr. Turner because Mr. 

Turner is on a tight time schedule. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Reyes. 

I greatly appreciate that. 

With the votes and the schedule we have had, I appreciate the 

panel’s patience as we popped in and out. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

Gentlemen, as you know, we are operating currently under a continuing resolution. That means Congress never finished its work; 

we never got our job done. So we have not even agreed on a document that will pay the bills of the military for this year. Just now 

we are debating and pushing forward a short-term continuing resolution, one that would just kick the ball forward for only two weeks 

with the hopes that ultimately we will come to resolution on how 

we will pay our bills for fiscal year 2011. 

During the same time, in the environment we have coming out 

of Department of Defense continuing questions of looking to efficiencies and reductions and cost savings. And we are looking even 

now to the Congress discussing budget cuts, the Department of Defense for 2011, for fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012. And we have, 

then, this discussion on the urgent needs of the warfighter, emphasis on the word ‘‘urgent.’’ And I know that every time we discuss 

budget reductions or the continuing resolution, we have to have the 

effect—understand the effect of what it does to DOD to have the 

uncertainty of not having one full year of spending approved. We 

have the uncertainty of cuts and efficiencies, and in all of these discussions, people say, but it won’t affect the warfighter. But I think 

it does affect the warfighter. I think you probably think it affects 

the warfighter. And certainly I know it gives our men and women 

in uniform insecurity to know that we are looking at reductions in 

spending and even issues of not having an agreement on how to 

pay our bills. 
11 

I wondered if you could speak for a moment on your thoughts on 

the effects of a continuing resolution and its blanket of uncertainty 

that it provides as opposed to our finishing our work and giving 

you one full year of funding for Department of Defense as a picture 

and also, if you have any concerns as we go forward in discussing 

reductions in 2012 and how that might ultimately translate to effects to the warfighter. Someone? 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Reyes, again. 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. In my comments, I mention that the Department will always face unanticipated needs, and we will always 

have the need for adequate funding in an execution year in order 

to be able to resolve these unanticipated needs. 

In some cases, the needs may have been anticipated. We may 

have put money in requested funds in the last year’s—in the budget request for this year in order to be able to execute something 

that we knew was going to happen this year. There was an example given in the classified briefing that took place just before this 

about—and people are aware of Aerostats, the need for additional 

Aerostats. We had actually anticipated that need, and we had put 

funds—the Army had placed funds in their budget request within 

the fiscal year 2012 budget request for procurement of additional 

Aerostats that we just don’t have access to. 

So, in lieu of that, we have gone through a rather lengthy and 

a very large reprogramming request in order to attempt to get the 

funds for that. That reprogramming request is further complicated 

by the fact that there is not a fiscal year 2011 source. So included 

in that reprogramming request, where it is $180 million worth of 

operations and maintenance requirements in order to continue to 

support some things that we have fielded and are in the process 

of fielding right now, without an fiscal year 2011 appropriation, 

there is no fiscal year 2011 source. As you know, O&M [operations 

and maintenance] is 1-year money, so we can’t reach backwards 

into unobligated 2010 or 2009 funds. So we just don’t have a source 

to move any additional money into fiscal year 2011 O&M accounts 

right now. So, at some stage in the not-too-distant future, some of 

these capabilities that we are pushing forward to the field are not 

going to be able to be funded any longer. 

Now, will there be prioritization where we decide that, yes, we 

want to keep this particular system operating overseas and continue the analytical support for a particular system in lieu of doing 

something back here? That is very possibly the case. But it does 

have a fairly significant impact, both in terms of when we do manage to anticipate growing needs, anticipated needs that we have, in 

fact, put in the budget that we can’t now get access to, which leads 

us to the reprogramming action and then also just on the O&M 

side, just the complete inability to be able to move any money into 

an O&M account. 

Mr. SOLIS. We haven’t looked at that directly, but I would say 

anytime you have uncertainty, whether it is in the budget or any 

program, in terms of trying to figure out where this money is going 

to come from is going to cause issues, if not for the warfighter but 

for potentially other programs from where you may draw that 

money out of, because you don’t know where that money is going 

to come from to replace it. And it could ultimately have more of an 
12 

impact on programs that you have back here, as opposed to the 

warfighter, because they will try to find—the war fight is always 

a priority for the Department. 

But in terms of what happens particularly when you don’t know 

how much money you are going to have for a particular program, 

yes, it can have an effect on those particular programs. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Now my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. 

I have here one of the charts that was furnished to the committee. And I want to ask a question regarding the time frame that 

it represents. On this chart, it is titled the JUON process flow. It 

has got some time frames in there that I find rather lengthy in my 

opinion. It takes 14 days as the time required to triage one of these 

warfighter requests and then to forward to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Then the second part of it takes 30 days as the time that 

it takes to get this same request to the next step, which is getting 

it to a military service or JIEDDO. And that is only the beginning 

of the process before something actually gets out in the field. 

So the question I have is, why does it take 45 days to accomplish 

these two tasks? Is the problem a lack of people, a lack of funding, 

or is it a coordination issue? What can we do to speed up this process? And then is part of the issue that maybe it is slow because 

other entities in DOD don’t cooperate with your group? So if you 

can comment on that, I would appreciate it, because to me it seems 

like it is too long a process. 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Those time lines that you cited, 14 days within 

the Joint Staff to validate the requirement and then 30 days in my 

shop in order to be able to do the assessments and task it out. 

Those are not measures of how long it takes. Those are objective 

goals that we try to stay within whenever possible. 

Let me talk a little bit before I get to the specific time lines 

about what happens in those two processes. So what the Joint Staff 

does when they get a requirement from the operational commander, from the combatant commander, they work within their 

Functional Capability Boards to do two things: One, determine if 

it is a valid requirement, if there is any redundant activities going 

on or programs of record that could be accelerated in order to meet 

this requirement and then also to determine the level of urgency 

that something may have. So they are looking at it from a requirements perspective, working with the services through their Functional Capability Board to see what other activities may be going 

on in the Department that may be relevant with this, making sure 

going backwards with the combatant commander that they really 

understand what the requirement is. 

When we get these joint urgent operational needs, it is not as if 

you are getting a capabilities development document or a capabilities production document with very strictly defined performance 

parameters and objectives and thresholds and such. They tend to 

come in as a much vaguer statement of requirement. So trying to 

figure out, and this is one of the most difficult points in this whole 
13 

urgent needs process is, what is good enough. So what is it that 

we are really going to be able to pursue? 

Again, it is not we are going to build something to meet these 

performance parameters. We are going to try to identify something 

that can provide 80 percent of that requirement or 70 percent or 

whatever the commander determines is good enough. So there is a 

dialogue that goes back and forth, and that requirement should be 

viewed as somewhat fungible. And that is really what takes time 

on the Joint Staff process is to determine, so what is it really that 

you are looking for? How do we get down to the good-enough stage? 

And then they pass it to me. 

Now, my part of it, similarly determining what is good enough, 

let us identify the potential solution set. They are looking at it from 

a requirements side; I am looking at it from a solution set side. Let 

us look at the potential solution set that we have got; what is actually executable in the near term? What is the technology maturity 

level of this particular thing they are asking for? What is the 

producability of this? What it is it going to cost? Where is the 

money going to come from? So all of those things are what we are 

kind of working with in those two processes before they go out. 

One of the things that we are doing at the moment that I mentioned, the Senior Integration Group that falls under Dr. Carter 

and General Neller, is we are trying to consolidate all of that. And 

we do have and have had now for quite a while regular video teleconferences with both CENTCOM and with the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Command and the USFOR–A 

[U.S. Forces–Army] Command to talk through these requirements 

and resolve as many of those things in one spot as we can to reduce 

the time that it takes to be able to push things out. 

We have things that fly through the process in a number of days, 

single-digit number of days, and we have other things, depending 

on the complexity, largely when we can’t find a quick solution, and 

we have a few examples of those, that the search for a solution before you task it to somebody becomes a drawn-out process and has 

gone in fact beyond 30 days on some occasions. 

Mr. REYES. So I think what I am hearing you say is that these 

are optimum goals, for 14 days and 30 days, to get through these 

processes? 

Mr. DEE. That is right. I wouldn’t use the word ‘‘optimum.’’ I 

would say that our optimum goals would be single-digit days, you 

know, 1 or 2 days in each spot. But the reality is it sometimes 

takes longer depending on the vagueness of the requirement and 

the complexity of a potential solution set. So we use those just to 

have a measurement, to have a target that at least we can measure 

ourselves against and be able to apply some metrics and see how 

well we are doing. 

Mr. REYES. Do you track, statistically, do you track the average 

or of, say, 10 requests or 100 requests? Do you keep track of that 

kind of performance or not? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, I am sure Mr. Solis will be willing to add to this. 

Mr. REYES. I am going to ask him next. 

Mr. DEE. Our metrics on this process are not as good as we like. 

I will say that upfront. So we do track the individual requirement 

from the time it comes in until it gets satisfied, until it is delivered 
14 

and satisfied. So we do track that. We do track the number of days 

it takes. We don’t have a single consolidated database, authoritative database for doing that. But between the services, between 

Central Command, where most of these things come from, and the 

Joint Staff, all have databases that collectively provide that information. We don’t have a nice, neat OSD level dashboard that will 

present the metrics that we would like to see. We would like that, 

but we are not quite there yet. 

So we do track them individually, the individual items. As Mr. 

Solis I am sure will mention, it becomes when you are trying to roll 

up that data from so many different sources, it becomes very difficult to measure how well collectively you are doing within your 

process. We could identify with any particular requirement how 

well we have done. When you are trying to look at it collectively, 

it becomes somewhat difficult to get that more strategic level metric that says, yes, our process works great or it doesn’t. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. Mr. Solis. 

Mr. SOLIS. I just add, you know, as a mention, they can look at 

maybe from the time elapsed until initial fielding, but I think you 

have got to look at everything in between. And one of the things 

that we talked about was funding and not just what gets reprogrammed. But I think one of the hang-ups is, where does the 

source of funding come from, even before you get to the reprogramming process? 

And I think if you begin to start building it or breaking it down 

into the elements of where, what is happening, whether it is funding, whether it is in the acquisition process, then you can start to 

begin to look at where I should invest my time on these choke 

points. And I think that is the kind of thing that you really need 

to look at as you look through the process. 

So, ultimately, you can say, okay, here is where we need to spend 

our time. Here is where we need to figure out a way to work 

through this so we can ultimately field that requirement, as soon 

as possible. 

Mr. REYES. So somebody like an efficiency expert looking at this 

would find ways to greatly reduce the time? 

Mr. SOLIS. I think, first, you have got to have the information 

data to say, where are your choke points? And I think even the Department I think a couple of years back had what they call a Lean 

Six Sigma team going in and do a look-see at that. And I think 

they began to identify where some of these choke points were. And 

I think that is the kind of thing that you then begin to figure out 

where your solutions, how you are going to deal with all of these 

issues, whether it is funding, whether it is the acquisition process 

or if you have got to go out and get an acquisition to satisfy that 

requirement. 

Even the fielding process, sometimes, you know, if you are going 

to, like we were talking about before, up-armoring all vehicles as 

we did, you just can’t pull all of the vehicles out in one day and 

just not—you know. That all takes time. So I think you need to 

have where all these—how long is it taking in general for whether 

it is a counter-IED solution, ISR, whatever, so that you have the 

information so that you can begin to make good management decisions. 
15 

Mr. REYES. I am not sure I like the answer. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Now in order of the member’s appearance on the committee, Ms. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I read that the Congress has provided the 

Department with rapid acquisition authority to get things done 

quickly, but it has only been used four times since 2005. So can you 

explain a little bit about why that hasn’t been used more? And 

what were the four times? What did they request? 

Mr. DEE. Yes, ma’am. The report is a little dated now. Since that 

report was—the data was collected for that report, we did a few 

more rapid acquisition authorities. We just did one, which I mentioned in my statement, that the comptroller kind of honchoed or 

directed for $116 million to cover multiple projects to be able to 

move money very quickly. In the past, those four that were referred 

to, two of them were CREW systems, counter, radio-controlled IED 

counter-measure systems, and the other two were ISR systems. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am very interested, as I know many people 

are, in the IED problem that we have. And I see that we have invested $19.7 billion so far to counter that, and there is 3,100 people 

working on that. I guess I would like a little bit more explanation 

of, what do they do? What do 3,100 people do, and what have we 

gotten for our money with the $19.7 billion? 

Mr. DEE. I will talk to some of that. I think you are referring to 

some numbers associated with prior reports in the Joint IED Defeat Organization. So let me talk a little bit about what we have 

gotten for the money and not talk so much about their organization, which I prefer to defer to their director. As was addressed in 

a classified briefing, IEDs are still the number one casualty over 

in Iraq. When the Joint IED Defeat Organization was stood up 

back in 2006, you didn’t have a central focal point for counter-IED 

within the Department and, as importantly, you didn’t have a fund 

that you could rapidly reach into in an execution year again in 

order to deliver capabilities. 

So if you look at the capabilities that have been provided, it includes everything from CREW, which I just mentioned, counterRCIED, electronic warfare, which pretty much very well mitigated 

the radio-controlled IED threat. It includes things like mine rollers. 

It includes various force protection capabilities, standoff explosive 

detection capabilities. So there is a whole range of things that 

would not have been fielded had it not been for an organization 

like JIEDDO and for the flexible appropriation they had been given 

since their startup. In terms of their internal organization, again, 

I will take the question and defer that to the director. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I know there have been some successes at it. I 

represent Fort Leonard Wood, and they have the engineering 

school there. And I was there about a month ago, and they were 

showing me some of the equipment that they are training their 

troops to use in order to try to help with this problem. But they 

also showed me some examples of some IEDs that are come back 

from Afghanistan, and the ingenuity of our enemy is just really 

hard to deal when they take a log and hollow it out and just have 
16 

plastic tubing in it and somehow—I don’t remember if it was water 

or air to detonate it or something. But it makes it very, very, very 

difficult. So this is certainly something we have to continue to address. 

I just hope that we have had a lot of success with the amount 

of money that we have invested in this. And do you feel confident 

that things are going well in this area, that we are making the 

headway in this prevention? 

Mr. SOLIS. I will just take a shot at it. Just going back to your 

original question; what are these 3,100 people doing? Just, in general, there are three lines or three mission areas, as they call them. 

One is the attack network. One is defeat device, and the other one 

is training mission. One is dealing with materiel solutions, much 

of what we have talked about today. Another one is assisting the 

warfighter in providing information about the network of folks who 

are building or creating IEDs. And it is not necessarily an intel 

center, but it has maybe some of those—it looks like an intel center. And then there is a training mission about, as our troops are 

getting ready to deploy out to Iraq or Afghanistan, about how to 

deal with IEDs as they encounter them. I mean, that is sort of the 

broad three areas that they deal with. 

I think one of the things we have talked about with JIEDDO and 

while there is no doubt there have been successes in terms of some 

of the fielding, we still don’t have a real good sense—and this goes 

back to the thing that we are talking about today, about the effectiveness of all of the solutions—we can tell maybe on a one-on-one, 

but globally I don’t think we still have that information out there. 

So while I think that the money has gone to a lot of good things, 

I think there are still questions about how effective are all of the 

solutions that have been provided? Are they meeting all of requirements of the warfighter, and are they effective, is this something 

we want to transfer into some other combatant command? I think 

all of those kinds of things are still up in the air. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is there any consolidation of bringing together 

all of the processes and entities to centralize so these decisions are 

made in one place regarding all of these programs? 

Mr. DEE. So there is not a decision to consolidate all of the organizations or bring everything under a single hat. That was a recommendation that was contained within the congressionally directed Defense Science Board Report in 2009 to create a rapid acquisition and fielding agency, give them a one-half percent of the 

Department’s budget, set them aside and let them get on with it. 

The difficulty with doing that is that almost relieves the rest of 

the Department from worrying about what the most immediate 

threats are. So what we are working to do and which I think we 

are being relatively successful at is getting the larger institution, 

the 90 percent of the building in the Department that is involved 

in the normal requirements, resources, programming and acquisition process, involved in the game. To do that, what we have done, 

instead of saying that now JIEDDO no longer exists, ISR task force 

no longer exists, MRAP task force, all these other guys, you are 

now one organization, we pulled their reporting chain under a single spot. And that is Dr. Carter’s Senior Integration Group, which 

I addressed earlier, co-chaired by the J–3, General Neller. And 
17 

what that provides for us—and going back to an earlier question, 

what is the hard part of this is and what takes longer? The hardest 

part is getting everybody to accept that the requirement is a priority. If you have all of this coming to a central senior, very, very 

senior level decision point, that can say, yes, in fact, these are priorities, this particular requirement is a priority, and everybody 

from the requirements folks through the budgeting, the programming folks, the acquisition folks, all of the acquisition folk, the PM 

[Program Manager], the contracting officer, the head of the contracting activity, et cetera, et cetera, and to then go back out to the 

transportation community to be able to get something out into the 

field itself; once all of those entities are on the same sheet of music 

in terms of priorities and we can get the money there, then things 

tend to happen pretty well. 

So the hardest part has been getting a common understanding 

of priorities. And I think what Dr. Carter is doing with the Secretary’s permission through the SIG is going to provide that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your efforts. I am actually encouraged. I had 

two of my oldest sons serve in Iraq, and in their service, I was really assured by the military leadership, but I always hoped, too, that 

UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] would be overhead or some level 

of advanced technology. 

And I share the concern of Congresswoman Hartzler, too, that we 

are dealing with a well-financed enemy, sadly a very determined, 

educated enemy. And so what you are doing is just so important 

to respond to technological challenges to our troops that are identified. And with that in mind, and I know that you are working with 

the warfighter to receive input from them, and are there mechanisms in place where—I have just gotten back from visiting with 

the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And if I had suggestions from 

them, I would like to present them to you, but also, is there a 

mechanism where they can communicate directly with your offices? 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. We have many mechanisms for reaching back 

both into the services and to OSD and the Joint Staff, to identify 

new requirements to exchange ideas and such. Let me just talk 

real briefly some battle rhythm items. So depending on what level 

you are at, we have a biweekly civics secure VTC [Voice Teleconference] with the theater in order to discuss new technologies that 

may be emerging to allow them to take a look at these things. They 

all have—or certainly down at the brigade level, they have science 

and technology advisors that allow them to look at this. So from 

the upfront stuff, we have got new opportunities, technical opportunities that may be of value to you. We have that exchange through 

various VTCs and such. The Army’s research and development and 

engineering command hosts a weekly VTC with many of the same 

players but further expanded that goes to all of the different RCs 

and the leadership of all of the RCs [Regional Commands]—not the 

leadership, but kind of the action officer, 0–6 level within all of the 

RCs to sort of do the same thing, to review requirements, to review 

technical opportunities, to mitigate requirements, as well as just to 
18 

review the delivery of capabilities that may be going out there. At 

the senior-most level, Dr. Carter has every 2 to 3 weeks another 

forum where he has leadership of USFOR–A, ISAF and the different codes, the different RCs, the Intelligence folks, everybody, 

CENTCOM, ourselves, the Joint Staff and everybody in the building that is participating in this thing. So we have lots of venues 

for exchanging information, somewhat informally, but at least to 

make sure everybody understands the state of play both in terms 

of what may be available with technical opportunities as well as requirements. 

On the requirements side, there are multiple venues for identifying your requirements as well. Of course, the informal thing kind 

of kicks it off, but more formally, depending on the service, depending on the type of need that you have, we have this JUONs process 

that we are talking about it if it is a joint need, also in a lot of 

cases if it is a very technically difficult problem to solve. But the 

Army has what they call an operational needs statement process. 

The Marine Corps has a process. The Navy and the Air Force all 

have processes that through their component commands they can 

submit requirements that then get vetted through their services, 

again with OSD providing oversight of that and some visibility over 

the kinds of things that they are doing. 

Mr. WILSON. Another resource, we have very creative people in 

our country, such as the chairman of the subcommittee, who himself has numerous patents and has been a person who has been a 

visionary on different issues. 

And we have constituents come to us with very enterprising, entrepreneurial, helpful suggestions. Should we direct them to you, or 

who should we direct innovators to? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, you can always direct them to us or to me, and we 

can put them in touch with the right folks. There are lots of opportunities for industry and folks who have got ideas to participate in 

our process. And each service and organization has a slightly different ways of soliciting inputs, but we do go through broad agency 

announcements. We do requests for information, requests for proposals. JIEDDO has a rolling process that anybody can get on the 

site and look and see what kind of capabilities they are looking for 

and submit proposals. 

If there is something more specific that they have got which 

there may not be a solicitation out there for at all, we are more 

than happy to take a look at it. Of course OSD doesn’t execute anything, so we would refer to one of the services that has got responsibility for that particular capability area. 

Mr. WILSON. Again, I want to thank you. 

And 10 years ago, I was at the National Training Center in 

Desert Warfare training with the Army National Guard, and I like 

to point out that the equipment I have is now 5 generations removed, and I say that complimentary. So thank you very much for 

your efforts. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

We will have several questions for the record. I just have three 

brief questions before we recess the committee. 
19 

Mr. Dee, we understand that DOD is developing new guidance 

for its urgent needs process to be issued in a directive-type memorandum. When do you expect this new guidance to be issued? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, I told the GAO in response to the report in March 

of 2010 that that directive was forthcoming, and I think we are 

now a year later, and I don’t have it. But what has happened in 

that interim period, again, was the evolution of the Senior Integration Group. We are now codifying decisions that the Secretary has 

made in regards to using the Senior Integration Group as the single senior leadership point decisionmaker for the Department. We 

are codifying that in a directive-type memorandum. 

I would like to give you a specific date when it will be done, but 

given the coordination process within the Department, it could be 

anywhere between a month and 4 months from now. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. The next question. Does DOD have a visibility over how well urgent needs solutions are performing? If so, 

has the Department performed analysis of this data, and what are 

the results of any such analysis? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, again, the execution happens at many different levels of these various processes. Each entity, each component that 

executes these urgent needs processes has an assessment process 

in place. We have multiple, both the Army’s Test and Evaluation 

Command and the Marine Corps’ Operational Test and Evaluation 

Command have folks overseas in theater that do operational assessments or capability limitations assessments of systems that 

have been fielded. They distribute surveys of the users of these 

things to try to get an idea of how well they are using. 

JIEDDO does something similar, also leveraging the ATEC 

[Army Test and Evaluation Command] efforts but also using some 

of their own folks to do assessments both before things are deployed but, as importantly or even more importantly, while they 

are deployed to figure out what the operational effectiveness of this 

stuff is. 

So, within each of those entities, there is an organization that 

manages these assessments that provide to the operational users 

in order to determine if what we did think was good enough is in 

fact good enough to mitigate the particular capability gap. All of 

those reports—and I think in ATEC’s case, it is about 166 reports 

they have done in the past 18 months or so on urgently fielded requirements. Those are all available on the various component Web 

sites within the Department. They are not necessarily rolled up 

into a single spot. 

But the folks who are stakeholders in those particular capabilities, whether from the acquisition side, the requirements side or 

from the operational user overseas, they do have access to that. 

And those reports, as well as the service that they do, then inform 

any changes to the requirements that they may have, which may 

be a modification to a JUON. It may be the recision of a JUON, 

or it may be the submission of a whole new JUON, because what 

we thought was going to work just plain didn’t work and we are 

starting over again. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 
20 

Mr. Solis, you said that in addition to lacking comprehensive 

guidance, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point for urgent 

needs. Why is it so important that DOD have such a focal point? 

Mr. SOLIS. It sounds like they are going to have a senior focal 

point, based on what I heard today. But I think it is important because you need somebody who can go between all of the different 

offices, and we mentioned all of the different entities that are involved in the urgent needs process. Without that senior leadership—and we have seen that in other areas of counterterrorism, 

business transformation, contracting and contingencies, that when 

you have senior leadership—and I mean senior leadership at the 

AT&L level, which we are talking about in this case, I think that 

is going to help make things move different things through the 

process. Whether it be funding, whether it gets hung up for some 

other reason, I think that senior leadership can step in and make 

things happen. 

I think the most extreme example of that is the MRAP. When 

Secretary Gates said, we want to make this happen, it happened. 

I am not saying that the Secretary can do that at every time. But 

when you do have that senior leadership involvement, it can help 

facilitate and move things in ways that haven’t been even thought 

of. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Reyes, do you have any additional questions? 

Mr. REYES. I was just going to mention, although we are focused 

on challenges, are there some good news stories out there of things 

that we were able to deploy very quickly, capabilities that were 

asked for that we were able to get them out—kind of give you a 

shot at a good news story that you can comment on? 

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Thank you for that opportunity. 

But, yes, I think we do have lots of good news stories. Some of 

them were briefed at the classified briefing that happened beforehand. But we can mention the Aerostats, and you saw the effect 

that those are having, and that was a very quick turnaround on 

a very large, complex program that not the least part of the complexity being the fielding of those capabilities and actually getting 

them to all of these remote sites and getting them set up, which 

was a very difficult challenge. 

But if you look at—MRAP was mentioned already; MATV 

[MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle] mentioned already, all of those things. 

A lot of the counter-IED equipment, the CREW equipment, which 

has largely mitigated what was a very serious threat not many 

years ago. A lot of these things are tremendously good news stories. 

We have—although not a rapid acquisition fielding agency, not everything coming through a single office, between the components, 

the various task forces that we have and that have stood up over 

the years, we have pushed a lot of good stuff over into the field. 

And I said in my statement that we believe that our Forces have 

got the best force protection, counter-IED, ISR, C2 [Command and 

Control] capabilities in the world. A lot of that has been developed 

through these urgent processes. And we believe that sincerely that 

they do have that. 

We think there is still a ways to go. We are always looking for 

better technologies and better capabilities to provide to them. But 

we do think that given in your opening statement, putting the im-
21 

perative on the speed to get things over there, rather than on the 

risks associated with the traditional cost schedule and performances, we think we have had some successes since the early days 

of this war. 

Mr. REYES. Good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

I have but one brief question before we adjourn the committee. 

I hope you will humor me in a little poll that I am conducting. This 

has to be one of the most asymmetric wars in the history of the 

world. If you will take a piece of paper, without consulting with 

your colleague, and write down a number when I ask you for it and 

then read that number back to me. For every dollar that they 

spend on IEDs, how many dollars do we spend in response, like 

MRAPs and mine rollers and ISR and JIEDDO and just an educated guess? Write that number down. 

Mr. SOLIS. Sir, again, the question is how much do you think—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. For every dollar they spend for putting an IED 

out there on the road or out in the field, how many dollars have 

we spent in response to that, including things like MRAPs and 

JIEDDO and the whole gamut of things, the little dirigibles that 

are up there that are surveilling them, the pilotless aircraft. 

Okay. Mr. Dee, your number? 

Mr. DEE. Sir, this may be low-balling it, but I think it is probably 

at least 1,000 to 1. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I was wondering whether it was closer to a 1,000 

to 1 or a million to 1. 

Mr. Solis? 

Mr. SOLIS. I had put 1,000 to 1. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You put 1,000 to 1. 

Okay. Thank you very much for my little poll. Thank you very 

much for your testimony. And we will submit some questions for 

the record. We would appreciate you responding to that. We now 

stand in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 1, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 1, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 1, 2011 

(57) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Dee, we understand from GAO’s report and testimony today 

that DOD does not have in place a comprehensive approach for managing all of its 

various urgent needs processes. More specifically, GAO said DOD needs to develop 

DOD-wide guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities and authorities, and designates a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. GAO also recommended that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. We understand 

DOD concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations. Can you tell us what specific 

actions DOD plans to take to address them? Given that DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation to evaluate potential options for consolidation, can you give us examples of where you might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes, and 

any cost savings you may achieve through such consolidation? We understand that 

DOD is developing new guidance for its urgent needs processes, to be issued as a 

directive type memorandum. When do you expect this new guidance to be issued? 

Mr. DEE. As part of the review directed by Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383), we will consider the various improvements to the acquisition process for rapid fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs. The assessment will address the 

specific items required by Section 804 as well as those that have been recommended 

by the GAO, the FY09 Defense Science Board Report and others. Specifically we intend to develop DOD-wide guidance and evaluate potential options for consolidation. 

This review and report to Congress will be completed by January 7, 2012. 

As stated in our response to GAO report 11–273, published March 1, 2011, we 

will assess options for consolidation as part of the Section 804 study. 

We are currently coordinating a draft DOD policy memorandum to establish a 

‘‘Senior Integration Group for the Resolution of Joint Urgent Operational Needs.’’ 

Completion is contingent on the successful resolution of any critical comments we 

receive but we anticipate finalizing the memorandum in April 2011. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2011 calls for the Department to conduct a broad review of its urgent 

needs processes and report back to the Congress in January 2012. Who in the Department will be responsible for conducting this study? Based on the results of that 

study will an implementation plan be developed for any actions to be taken, to include milestones and metric to measure progress? Who would be responsible for developing and implementing such a plan? Do you anticipate the Department will take 

any actions prior to reporting back to Congress in January 2012? 

Mr. DEE. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will have overall responsibility for conducting the review in coordination with 

other components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Joint Staff and the 

Services. We are unable to appropriately respond to your other questions until completion of the review. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Numerous solutions have been developed and fielded in response 

to urgent needs over the past several years. These include large equipment items 

such as MRAPs, sophisticated counter-IED technologies and teams of experts to provide support with law enforcement and cultural awareness issues. Does your office 

track the amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded, and if 

so how much has been fielded in terms of costs? If you do not track these solutions, 

who does? Does DOD have visibility over how well urgent needs solutions are performing? If so, has the Department performed analyses of this data and what are 

the results of any such analyses? 

Mr. DEE. Urgent needs are primarily satisfied through Service acquisition processes and deployed in support of U.S. Forces who maintain accountability for the 

equipment and other urgent needs solutions. We do not have nor can we readily obtain a cost for the amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded. 

The Defense Science Board estimated, in September 2009, that $50B was spent by 

DOD for urgent warfighter needs from 2005 to 2009. Subsequently, the GAO estimated that department-wide urgent needs efforts cost at least $76.9B from Fiscal 

Year 2005–2010. 
58 

The various DOD Components fulfilling urgent needs track equipment and costs 

in accordance with Component and Department policy. Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, Army Test and Evaluation Command, the 

Marine Corps Systems Command and many other Departmental organizations provide a robust presence in theater to evaluate the performance of their equipment 

and report on their capabilities and limitations. 

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell hosts a monthly Central Command Joint Urgent 

Operational Needs (JUONs) Review to monitor progress in the fulfillment of JUONs 

and to provide CENTCOM with a venue to discuss any problems identified in their 

deployment or effectiveness of JUON solutions. Services maintain oversight of their 

responses to Component specific urgent needs. 

There have been no Department level analyses on the performance of urgent 

needs solutions. Service testing organizations often review the performance of individual initiatives to assess their capabilities and limitations and report these results 

to the Services. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In November of 2009, the Secretary of Defense established the 

Counter-IED Senior Integration Group (or CSIG) to integrate, prioritize and accelerate activities across the Department of Defense to counter the IED threat in Afghanistan. We understand that this group was initially planned to be temporary 

and to be discontinued in June 2010. What role has JRAC had with respect to the 

CSIG? How have the roles of this group fit into the urgent needs processes? Can 

you tell us what the status is of this group and is the department considering similar senior-level involvement for other urgent needs areas beyond counter-IED? Was 

the CSIG created to overcome any authority issues with regard to JRAC or the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization? If so, what were these limitations and how has CSIG 

been able to overcome them? 

Mr. DEE. The Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), participates as a 

member of the C–SIG. The C–SIG’s role has evolved to become the Department’s 

senior level governance council with oversight of many of the most critical urgent 

needs of our operational Commanders, not just Counter IED requirements. The C– 

SIG is expected to be re-chartered as the Senior Integration Group, in the near future, to reflect its broader role as the senior level governance council for the Department’s urgent operational needs. 

No, the C–SIG was not created to overcome any authority issues with regard to 

JRAC or the Joint IED Defeat Organization. 

Mr. BARTLETT. JRAC has moved organizationally a couple of times in the past few 

years, with the latest move elevating it to directly report to the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Why was this latest change 

made? Did JRAC previously experience any issues with having the necessary authority to do its mission? Do you believe this latest move places JRAC in the most 

appropriate position, and does JRAC have the authority it needs to effectively carry 

out its roles and responsibilities? 

Mr. DEE. This organizational change was made to streamline the decision process 

for those urgent needs submitted by the operational Commanders and validated by 

the Joint Staff. 

The JRAC did not previously experience any issues with having the necessary authority to do its mission. 

Yes, the personal involvement of senior leadership in the resolution of Joint Urgent Operational needs ensures that the JRAC is well positioned for success and 

provided ample authority to carry out its roles and responsibilities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As Mr. Solis from GAO stated in his testimony, in April 2010, 

GAO cited challenges in obtaining funding as a major factor that increased the time 

needed to field urgent needs solutions to the warfighter. Accordingly, to improve the 

availability of funding, GAO recommended that DOD (1) designate an entity to recommend the use of rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense where 

appropriate for urgent needs and (2) create an executive council to make timely 

funding decisions as urgent needs are validated. What action has DOD taken with 

regard to GAO’s recommendations? What other actions, if any, have DOD taken to 

improve the timely availability of funding for urgent needs? Does DOD have a 

means to continually evaluate the timeliness of its urgent needs funding processes 

and, if so, what does this evaluation show? 

Mr. DEE. The JRAC currently serves as the entity recommending use of rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense. The Counter Improvised Explosive 

Device Senior Integration Group (C–SIG), soon to be the Senior Integration Group 

(SIG), is a senior governance council co-chaired by the USD(AT&L) and The Joint 

Staff J–3 that provides oversight of the funding, contracting and fulfillment of critical urgent needs. 
59 

1GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, GAO–11–273 (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

2011) and GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save 

Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO–11–318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011). 2GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs, GAO–11–417T (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011). 3GAO–11–273 and GAO–11–417T. 

The Department uses Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding, belowthreshold reprogramming, above threshold reprogramming, and rapid acquisition 

authority to provide funding for urgent needs during the year of execution. 

To mitigate the inherent delays in the reprogramming process, the Department 

has requested funds for urgent operational needs. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget 

submission included a $300M OCO request which has not been appropriated and 

was not supported by the Defense committees. The FY12 President’s Budget Request includes $100M in the base budget and an additional $100M in the OCO request to provide an immediate source of funding for urgent needs. 

The JRAC monitors funding of Joint Urgent Operational Needs and the Military 

Departments provide oversight of their respective requirements. The JRAC has supported the C–SIG, in its evolving role, in monitoring the funding status of urgent 

operational needs under the oversight of the C–SIG. These evaluations have again 

demonstrated, as the GAO and others have found, that there are improvements that 

can be made to the funding processes. The results of the evaluations will be folded 

into the process improvements considered as part of the assessment and process improvements required by section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY11 (Public Law 111–383). Funding process improvements will be addressed in the report to Congress required by section 804. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How do you see the future integration of DOD’s urgent needs processes with its traditional acquisition system? Will these two processes remain separate or will there eventually be one integrated approach? 

Mr. DEE. The urgent needs processes are currently under review in response to 

section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011 (Public Law 111–383). The relationship of urgent needs processes and the ‘‘traditional acquisition system’’ will be assessed as a part of this review. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony, you said that GAO identified at least 31 entities that have a role in managing urgent needs, and that overlap and potential duplication exists among these entities. Can you give us an example of where such 

overlap and potential duplication may exist? 

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our most recent reports 1 and testimony 2, we found that 

overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are responsible. For example: 

Æ There are numerous places for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability. Warfighters may submit urgent needs, depending on 

their military service and the type of need, to one of the following different entities: Joint Staff J/8, Army Deputy Chief of Staff G/3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping 

Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine Corps 

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air Force 

Major Commands, Special Operations Requirements and Resources, or the Joint 

improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. These entities then validate 

the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to proceed through their 

specific process. 

Æ Multiple entities reported a role in responding to similar types of urgently needed capabilities. GAO identified eight entities focused on responding to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, five entities focused 

on responding to counter-improvised explosive device (IED) capabilities, and six 

entities focused on responding to communications, command and control, and 

computer technology. 

Additionally, we found potential duplication of efforts as several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and 

ISR capabilities. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own 

separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony you say that GAO identified ‘‘at least’’ 31 entities and that you identified funding for urgent needs to be ‘‘at least’’ $76.9 billion. 

Why can’t you be more specific as to the total number of urgent needs entities and 

costs? 

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work 3, DOD cannot readily identify the totality 

of its urgent needs efforts, including the cost of such efforts, because it has limited 
60 

4GAO–11–273 and GAO–11–417T. 

5GAO, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy, GAO–01–556T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2001). 

6GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability, and Management Tools Are 

Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO–05–70 (Washington, 

DC.: Dec. 17, 2004). 7GAO–11–273 and GAO–11–417T. 

visibility over all urgent needs submitted by warfighters—both from joint and service-specific sources. DOD and service officials cited two impediments to full visibility: the lack of a comprehensive tracking system to manage and oversee all urgent needs identified by the warfighter and a lack of clearly defined roles. Thus, we 

describe our estimate to be ‘‘at least’’ because the amounts we reported may underestimate the actual total amounts expended on urgent needs from fiscal years 2005 

through 2010 because the list of entities is not exhaustive. In conducting our work, 

we cast a wide net in an attempt to capture the universe of urgent needs entities 

and costs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You said that in addition to lacking comprehensive guidance, DOD 

does not have a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. Why is it so important that 

DOD have such a focal point? 

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work 4, it is important that DOD have a seniorlevel focal point to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to track and monitor 

all emerging capability gaps being identified by warfighters in-theater. Specifically, 

a focal point is necessary to 1) lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements; (2) act as an advocate within the department for issues 

related to DOD’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (3) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (4) 

maintain full visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. 

Moreover, without establishment of a senior-level focal point, DOD officials may be 

unable to identify areas for improvement, including consolidation, to prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to identify funding challenges and a means to address such challenges, or ensure collaboration to modify capabilities in development 

to meet several similar urgent needs requirements—and may be unable to reduce 

any overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or modified. 

We have previously testified 5 and reported 6 on the benefits of establishing a single 

point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD 

efforts to address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the transformation 

of military capabilities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You point out that DOD does not have a universal set of metrics 

for its urgent needs processes. Are you saying that DOD cannot determine whether 

its processes are working or not? 

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work 7, we found that disparate tracking systems 

limit DOD’s visibility over its urgent needs process and can hamper improvement 

efforts. Although the Joint Staff and the military services maintain databases to 

track urgent needs solutions as they move through their processes, more than a 

third of the entities we reviewed did not collect or provide the necessary information 

to those systems to track the solutions. Having disparate systems and a lack of adequate data makes it very difficult for DOD to comprehensively evaluate the progress 

of urgent needs solutions, perform analyses to determine effectiveness of the overall 

processes, and identify needed improvements. 

Further, our work found that DOD has not established a universal set of metrics 

for evaluating the effectiveness and tracking the status of solutions provided to the 

warfighter. The majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed reported that 

they do not collect all the data needed to determine how well these solutions are 

performing. Thus, DOD and military service officials have limited awareness of all 

urgent needs—including how well those needs are being met—which can hamper 

their ability to effectively manage and identify areas where overlap and duplication 

exist. Without the establishment of a metric or mechanism to track the status of 

a validated requirement, including its transition, and full visibility, the department 

may not be able to identify key improvements. Moreover, without a formal feedback 

mechanism or channel for the military services to provide feedback, the department 

is likely to be unaware of how well fielded solutions are performing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your report, you recommend that DOD’s Chief Management Officer should evaluate potential options for consolidation and you provide several examples of such consolidations. Are you saying DOD should pick one of these, or is 

your recommendation much broader? 

Mr. SOLIS. We did not intend that the department be limited to those ideas we 

presented. We analyzed several operations aimed at potential consolidations and in-
61 

creased efficiencies in an effort to provide ideas for the department to consider in 

streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. The options GAO identified are 

not meant to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. The examples we provided may 

not be the only possible ways to consolidate urgent needs entities or processes. We 

recognize there are benefits and trade-offs for each potential option and that DOD 

would need to perform its own analysis, carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Given 

the increasing number of urgent needs and the escalating fiscal challenges, it is critical for DOD to reevaluate the current status of how it fulfills its urgent needs and 

whether there is potential to reduce duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to 

achieve increased efficiencies or cost savings, or both. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus from the 

warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second standing ovation that followed 

lasted almost as long as the President’s war remarks. I am concerned that our government’s diverted attention from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in 

uniform fighting on the front lines. 

Will the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency plan and defense cuts in any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern equipment and support that they need? 

Mr. DEE. The Department continues to fund the urgent operational needs of the 

warfighter and uses Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, below-threshold reprogramming, above-threshold reprogramming, and rapid acquisition authority 

to provide funding for urgent needs during the year of execution. 

The President has supported and continues to support funding requests to fulfill 

urgent operational needs. The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget submission 

included a $300M OCO request to be used to fund urgent operational needs. This 

has not been appropriated and was not supported by the Defense Committees. This 

has required the Department to fund such urgent needs using other authorities 

that, in some instances, added delay in providing capability to the warfighter. 

The FY12 President’s Budget Request includes $100M in the base budget and an 

additional $100M in the OCO request to provide an immediate source of funding 

for urgent needs. While this money would not fully fund all of the Department’s urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are requested through Congress. 

Mr. TURNER. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing resolution 

on military operations. 

a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the warfighter? 

b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger our troops? 

c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on equipping the 

warfighter? 

Mr. DEE. Secretary Gates has stated that a yearlong continuing resolution or significant funding cut for Fiscal Year 2011 will cause a crisis for the Department of 

Defense. This includes significant impacts on the Department’s responsiveness to 

urgent needs. It affects anticipated urgent needs because we can’t access budgeted 

funding and must reprogram funds to cover these requirements. It also adversely 

impacts operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements because we are unable to 

reprogram any funding into the O&M account. 

Mr. TURNER. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus from the 

warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second standing ovation that followed 

lasted almost as long as the President’s war remarks. I am concerned that our government’s diverted attention from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in 

uniform fighting on the front lines. 

Will the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency plan and defense cuts in any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern equipment and support that they need? 

Mr. SOLIS. Our work has not evaluated the impact of the Secretary of Defense’s 

efficiency plan or defense cuts on meeting urgent needs identified by the warfighter. 

However, we have examined funding issues related to urgent needs in the past. For 
62 

8GAO, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance 

Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs, GAO–10–460 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010) 9GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address 

Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, GAO–08–665 (Washington, D.C..: June 17, 2008). 

example, in April 2010 8, we reported that the amount of time needed to field urgent 

needs solutions has been increased by the challenge of obtaining funding, in one 

case adding as much as 293 days to the time needed to field a solution to the 

warfighter. We found that funding challenges exist in part because the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not given any one organization primary responsibility for determining when to implement the department’s statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute timely funding decisions. In addition, we reported that 

DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been 

delegated to the services and combatant commands. However, we found that the 

services are reluctant to reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to joint urgent needs and that DOD faced challenges in consistently securing 

timely cooperation from them. Our prior work 9 has demonstrated that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical to overcoming the deeply entrenched nature of the department’s financial management challenges. Accordingly, 

we recommended in April 2010 that the Secretary of Defense designate an entity 

with primary responsibility for recommending use of rapid acquisition authority and 

that DOD establish an executive council to make timely funding decisions on urgent 

need requests. The department partially concurred with these recommendations and 

identified actions it planned to take to address them. 

Mr. TURNER. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing resolution 

on military operations. 

a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the warfighter? 

b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger our troops? 

c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on equipping the 

warfighter? 

Mr. SOLIS. The continuing resolution was not within the scope of our work. Thus, 

we did not evaluate the impact of continuing resolutions on equipping the 

warfighter. However, as stated previously, we have identified cases in prior work 

where funding challenges have lengthened the time needed to field urgent needs solutions to the warfighter. In these cases, the funding issues we identified occurred 

in part because DOD may not have been effectively managing the resources it had. 

For example, as noted above, in April 2010, we reported that funding has not always been provided in a timely manner for joint urgent needs in part because OSD 

has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to 

invoke the department’s rapid acquisition authority. In addition, we reported that 

DOD delegated the authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds for 

addressing urgent needs to the services and combatant commands, but faced challenges in consistently securing timely cooperation from them. 

Æ