IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20530

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

VIRAJ PATEL,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-CR-385-36

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Viraj Patel pleaded guilty to conspiracy 

to commit money laundering and was sentenced within the advisory guidelines 

range to 165 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, 

restitution in the amount of $8,970,396.15, and a $100 special assessment. He 

contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because the 

district court did not advise him of its authority to order restitution; that there 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 17, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if the district 

court had so advised him; and that a miscarriage of justice will result if the 

court does not vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings or 

alternatively reduce the amount of restitution to $250,000, the statutory 

maximum fine of which the district court advised him.

Patel concedes that he did not raise this issue in the district court. 

Therefore, review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Brown, 328 

F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 2003). To prevail on plain error review, Patel must 

show (1) a forfeited error (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that affects his 

substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). We 

have discretion to correct any such error if the error “seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 

Although the district court substantially complied with the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 at rearraignment, the court did not 

advise Patel of its authority to order restitution as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(K);

that error was clear and obvious. See United States v. Imeh, 291 F. App’x 637, 

640 (5th Cir. 2008). However, Patel has not shown that the district court’s 

error affected his substantial rights, as he has not shown that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for the district court’s error, he would not have 

pleaded guilty. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). 

The district court ordered a restitution award that was much higher than the 

fine of which the district court advised him at the rearraignment hearing; the 

court advised Patel of the possibility of a fine of up to $250,000 or twice the 

gross gain or loss, and the district court ordered restitution in the amount of 

approximately $8,900,000. However, the plea agreement advised Patel of the 

possibility of restitution and that he would be held responsible for a loss 

amount between $3.5 million and $9.5 million. At rearraignment, Patel agreed 

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that the district court correctly stated the terms of the plea agreement, and he 

signed the agreement in open court. The district court held Patel jointly and 

severally liable with his codefendants for the restitution award. In addition, 

the PSR and the district court at the sentencing hearing stated the exact 

amount of the restitution award, and Patel did not object. In view of the entire 

record, the facts suggest that Patel’s decision to plead guilty was an informed 

one. He has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 

court’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 

U.S.at 83. Further, in view of the entire record, Patel has not shown that we 

should exercise our discretion to correct the error because the error does not 

affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See 

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.

The Government contends that Patel knowingly and voluntarily waived

his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. 

Patel argues that the appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary because 

the district court did not advise him that the waiver covered any potential 

restitution order.

The record reflects that Patel knew he had the right to appeal and that 

he was voluntarily waiving that right by entering the plea agreement. See

United States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2014); United States 

v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). The plea agreement contains a 

general appeal waiver, as well as a separate paragraph expressly stating that 

Patel “waives the right to challenge in any manner, including by direct appeal 

or in a collateral proceeding, the restitution order imposed by the court.” At 

rearraignment, the district court advised Patel of the terms of the plea 

agreement and the appeal waiver provision; he agreed with the court’s 

summary of the terms of the agreement and signed it in open court. Patel did 

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not ask any questions or express any confusion concerning the appeal waiver. 

Accordingly, to the extent Patel challenges the restitution award, his challenge

is barred by the appeal waiver, and the Government’s motion to dismiss the 

appeal is granted as to this portion of the appeal. See United States v. Keele, 

755 F.3d 752, 754-56 (5th Cir. 2014); Higgins, 739 F.3d at 736-37.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART; MOTION TO DISMISS 

GRANTED IN PART. 

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