Chairman Rand Paul, M.D.

United States Senate

April, 2018

Chairman Paul’s Penny Plan Budget: 

A Budget for Fiscal Year 2019
1

Executive Summary

As leader of the global economy, the United States should serve as an example of how to reduce the 

pressures and fragility of massive public debts and how to initiate internal structural and fiscally responsible 

reforms. In so doing, we can help ensure the integrity of the interconnected, global free-market economic 

system. Though the federal budget has long diverged from these principles, this budget resolution defies those 

trends, providing a strong fiscal basis from which the U.S. economy can continue to grow and flourish.

The Penny Plan

An important part of any budget resolution is its bottom line: does it balance? This budget balances in 

just five years without touching Social Security. Congress can achieve these savings by repealing the 

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 and 

using the Penny Plan, which states 

that for every dollar the federal 

government spends in on budget

spending in a fiscal year, it must 

spend one penny less the next year.

This budget is a particularly 

effective implementation of the 

Penny Plan, because rather than 

making nebulous policy 

assumptions that will never happen, 

it sets out one common goal: balance. That is the one key assumption in this budget. Above all, the fiscal goal 

of each lawmaker should be a balanced budget. In order to achieve this goal, this budget simply requires 

Congress to make a one percent cut to on budget spending for five years. Rather than holding hands and 

agreeing to the common gluttony, this plan requires Congress to do the opposite: hold hands and sacrifice for 

the common good.

Health Savings Accounts

 While ultimately it will be up to the authorizing committees to make policy and put forward legislation 

to implement this budget, the Finance Committee is provided a reconciliation instruction to reduce revenue by 

$18.6 billion over the budget window to expand Health Savings Accounts. Expanding HSAs would certainly 

help improve health care in America, foster greater competition and consumer engagement, and ultimately help 

bend the cost curve. 

Despite the challenges Obamacare has presented to all health insurance markets, HSAs remain a great 

option for Americans to cover more of their health care costs, as has been recently noted, with advantages that 

include the accounts not only growing tax-free, but account holders also not having to worry about state or 

federal taxes on their contributions.1

One of the fundamental flaws in our current health insurance system is that insurance does not move 

with the individual from job to job, welfare to work, or into retirement. However, the individual owns their 

HSA, so it stays with them regardless of life changes, and there’s no expiration date on the funds.2 In order to 

better leverage the portability of HSAs, we should remove the high-deductible plan requirement so that 

individuals can not only possess an HSA throughout their life but continue to contribute to one. 

 

1 WillisTowers Watson, “Employees Fail to Take Advantage of Health Savings Accounts.” Press Release. December 12, 2017. 

https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/press/2017/12/employees-fail-to-take-advantage-of-health-savings-accounts

2 O’Brien, Elizabeth, “Why 80% of Obamacare Plans are Ineligible for this Tax Break,” MarketWatch. March 29, 2016. 

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-80-of-obamacare-plans-are-ineligible-for-this-tax-break-2016-03-29
2

 Furthermore, Congress should expand HSAs by increasing the contribution limits – so that patients can 

save for the entirety of their out-of-pocket costs – and allowing for HSAs to be used to pay premiums. It should 

also expand eligible HSA disbursements to include dietary supplements, over-the-counter (OTC) medications, 

gym memberships, and other activities that promote wellness and reduce overall health care costs.

Reconciliation

The original purpose of budget reconciliation, as enacted by the Congressional Budget Act, was to 

supplement Congress’ ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt-limit laws into compliance with the 

budget resolution’s articulation of fiscal priorities. In recent years, this privileged process has morphed from 

reconciling current law into a tool both parties use when in the majority to quell minority rights in order to 

exclusively achieve whatever policy preference the majority desires. This budget returns reconciliation to its 

original intent by giving instructions to each committee with mandatory spending in its jurisdiction, not just 

Senate Finance, rather than selecting those with jurisdiction over areas in which the majority seeks to pass 

signature legislation.

Budget Process Reform

Unwillingness to balance, a long history of process failure, and entrenched powers-that-be have all 

resulted in a system in desperate need of reform. In addition to providing a plan to balance the federal budget in 

five years without touching Social Security, this budget includes a number of process reforms that would allow 

Congress to begin to see more positive results from the federal budget process in the future, including 

strengthening and enhancing enforcement mechanisms and the budget functions.

This budget requires that in years in which Congress does not adopt a budget, the funding levels in the 

out-years of the most recent budget resolution would be enforced. It also makes apportioned functional totals 

enforceable against other priorities - forcing the Senate to consider the relative value of each budget function. 

It also raises the votes needed to waive budget points of order, reflecting the need for Congress to take 

its fiscal responsibilities significantly more seriously. Additionally, it creates a new point of order against any 

piece of legislation that contains funding subject to more than three different 302(b) allocations. This will 

effectively prohibit the use of omnibus appropriations bills, as well as limit consolidated appropriations and 

continuing resolutions to more easily avoid burying budget legislation in giant omnibus spending bills and 

forcing members to make binomial choices.

Though it is true that a portion of the duplication, fragmentation, and overlap comes from various 

presidential directives, Congress is not immune in this regard, often appropriating considerable funds to 

duplicative programs. It is for this reason that this budget includes a directive to the Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO) to amend its legislative scoring procedures to include a duplication assessment in each cost 

estimate.
3

P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. 631

For more than 100 years, the United States has been the world’s economic leader, creating economic 

norms that have allowed the global free market economic system to endure. In today’s significantly 

economically globalized world, the United States should be the one nation in the world – the shining city on a 

hill, to borrow from President Reagan – that should be leading by example to reduce the pressures and fragility 

of massive debts; to initiate internal structural and fiscally responsible reforms; and, in doing both, ensure the 

integrity of the interconnected global free market economic system. This truism renders the readily apparent 

fact that Washington is broken all the more troubling. The 2017 Gallup poll, “Confidence in Intuitions,” found 

just 12 percent of the American public have substantial confidence in Congress – up from 9 percent the year 

prior. To put that in perspective, 16 percent of respondents have a high level of confidence in internet news.3 

Though the scourge of dysfunction has spread to many corners of the federal government, nowhere is it

more evident than in the federal budget process. From start to finish, the budget process is riddled with delays, 

demagoguery, and dereliction of duty. The quality of results, or lack thereof, Congress has reaped from the 

budget process reflects what it has sewn. However, this affliction need not be permanent. But assuredly, the 

first step in the road to recovery must be to recognize a problem exists. 

How Did We Get Here?

The modern congressional 

budget process began in 1921, when 

the public demanded Congress rein 

in deficits incurred throughout the 

course of fighting World War I.

4 At 

the time, the federal deficit was 

roughly $13 billion or, adjusted for 

inflation, approximately $192 

billion.5 Congress chose to 

implement reforms because

appropriations subcommittees had 

become “partisans of the 

particular departments committed 

to their care and sought to make 

out the best possible case for the 

grants requested instead of seeking 

to shed light on the efficiency of 

departmental administration.”

6

In 

response to this eerily familiar 

phenomenon, Congress passed the 

 

3 Gallup Polling, “Confidence in Institutions.” 2017. http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx

4 Dewhirst, Robert E., and John David Rausch, Jr. “Encyclopedia of the United States Congress,” Facts on File, Inc. 2007. 

http://1.droppdf.com/files/BMJ8H/encyclopedia-of-united-states-congress.pdf

5 Office of Management and Budget, “Historical Tables,” 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/

6 Dews, Fred, “Brooking’s Role in ‘The Greatest Reformation in Governmental Practices’—the 1921 budget reform.” Brookings 

Institution. October 12, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/10/12/brookings-role-in-1921-budget-reform/

Congressional Budget Act of 1974 Budget Process Timetable

Date Action

First Monday in 

February President submits the Executive Budget Proposal to Congress

February 15 CBO submits economic and budget outlook report to Budget 

Committees

Six weeks after 

President submits 

budget

Committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees

April 1 Senate Budget Committee reports a budget resolution

April 15 Congress completes action on a budget resolution

May 15 Annual appropriations bills may be considered in the House, 

even if action on a budget resolution has not been completed

June 10 House Appropriations Committee reports last annual 

appropriations bill

June 15 Congress completes action on reconciliation legislation (if 

required by the budget resolution)

June 30 House completes action on annual appropriations bills

July 15 President submits mid-session review of his budget

October 1 Fiscal year begins
4

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. But, notably, budgeting and spending decisions remained distinct

processes until the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (hereafter referred to as the 

Congressional Budget Act) joined the two processes into one.

7

Congress included a detailed timetable in the Congressional Budget Act directing the President and 

Congress to follow a strict, 10-step process. But unfortunately, these guidelines are all but ignored by all parties 

lately.

8

 If only such delay were the reason the budget schedule collapses most years, but surely the blame lies 

with Congress. Congress has funded the government on time and under the process enacted through the 

Congressional Budget Act just four times: fiscal years 1977 (the first year the process was used), 1989, 1995, 

and 1997,

9

amounting to a success rate of 9.75 percent over close to half a century. Put a different way, 89 of 

100 senators currently serving in the Senate, including all members of the FSO Subcommittee, have never in 

their time serving in the Senate been able to vote to fund the government under the process governing the 

congressional budget process. 

The 40-plus years of budget failures are clear to see. Because the Congressional Budget Act provides no 

penalty if Congress does not do a budget resolution, it has simply opted not to do so this year, as it has done

nine previous times.

10

 In fact, when Congress adopted the budget resolution for FY 2016 in May 2015, it was 

the first budget resolution both chambers of Congress

had adopted since April 2009.11 In the years in which 

Congress has adopted a budget resolution, it has done so 

an average of 36 days after the target date included in the 

Congressional Budget Act.12 Despite Congress’ 

behavior indicating otherwise, budget resolutions are a 

necessary tool to ensure the fiscal health of the nation. 

Each resolution presents Congress with the opportunity 

to examine and revise the macroeconomic-level impact 

of federal outlay priorities from the previous fiscal year. 

In essence, budget resolutions allow Congress to alter 

debt, deficit, and revenue levels for the coming fiscal

year. If Congress were to ever find it appropriate to decrease spending from one fiscal year to the next, as it 

should, it would indicate its desire to do so through the budget resolution. Budgets inform spending, and 

without that skeleton the “body” falls apart. Priorities and conditions change from year to year, and when 

Congress opts to forego consideration of a budget resolution, it is declaring its satisfaction with not having a 

plan to address changing circumstances. Can one be surprised that in the intervening six years between FY 

2010 and FY 2016, during which Congress adopted no budget resolutions, the federal government operated 

with trillion dollar deficits?

13

Nevertheless, it would be folly to assert that our fiscal crisis would be resolved if Congress simply 

adopted a budget resolution each year. Adoption of a resolution is certainly a necessary first step in the 

process, but it is merely a first step. Congress has failed spectacularly in other areas of the budget process, as 

 

7 House Committee on the Budget, “The Federal Budget Process.” U.S. House of Representatives, December 7, 2011. 

https://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bprhistory.pdf

8 Chistensen, Michelle, D., “The President’s Budget: Overview of Structure and Timing of Submission to Congress.” Congressional

Ressearch Service, July 25, 2013. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43163.pdf

9 Desilver, Drew, “Congress has Long Struggled to Pass Spending Bills on Time.” Pew Research Center, January 16, 2018. 

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/16/congress-has-long-struggled-to-pass-spending-bills-on-time/

10 Heniff, Bill Jr., “Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical Information.” Congressional Research Service, November 16, 2015. 

http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL30297

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 U.S. Treasury, “Historical Debt Outstanding – Annual 2000 – 2015.” U.S. Treasury, June 8, 2016. 

https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_histo5.htm
5

CRs from 1977-2016: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42647.pdf, remainder from www.congress.gov. 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

Continuing Resolutions 

Fiscal Year 

Number of Continuing Resolutions by Fiscal Year 

well. The Congressional Budget Act gives the Senate from, at the absolute latest, June 3014 to the beginning of 

the fiscal year in October to pass each of the 12 (or 13 before FY 2006) separate appropriations bills. For the 

current fiscal year, the House passed one of their 12 bills. The Senate passed zero.

In considering spending bills and debating the substance thereof, senators are able to make changes from 

spending levels in years prior. But for the previous 10 fiscal years, Congress has been able to pass just 10, 8 of 

which were late. Congress passed four for FY 2008 and six for FY 2010. This is a failure rate of 91 and twothirds percent. Not since 2009 has Congress been able to vote on how, rather than whether, the government is 

funded.

Of course, the government has been funded, with few lapses, throughout that period - just by other 

means. Fiscal Year 2019 marks the 42nd year in which the Congressional Budget Act’s timetable will guide the 

budget process. Though Congress has succeeded in adhering to its target dates just four times in that period, it 

has been successful in passing 181 continuing resolutions, some lasting for as short as a single day. Continuing 

resolutions are intended to be safety valves to avoid a government shutdown, and the need to resort to such 

measures represents a 

fundamental failure. Rather

than using such measures 

sparingly, Congress routinely 

relies on CRs, passing an 

average of more than 4 per 

year. FY 2001 was a banner 

year for Congress in this 

regard. Congress passed a 

record 21 CRs, rather than 

13 appropriations bills.

15

 In 

fact CRs, and the explicit threat 

of a government shutdown 

should it be opposed, are used 

to jam through changes in 

policies and funding levels

which, if considered in 

isolation, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate would vehemently oppose.

Moreover, rather than passing individual appropriations bills as the Congressional Budget Act 

instructs, Congress has crammed what should have been 175 distinct appropriations bills into 23 

omnibus or so-called “mini-bus” spending packages, 7 of which were CRs, between 1986 and 2017. This 

is particularly galling, as the authors of the Congressional Budget Act also moved the beginning of the fiscal 

year back to October 1 from July 1 because it was thought the extra three months would be sufficient for 

Congress to act in a timely manner. Evidence suggests they were mistaken. When these delayed and 

Frankenstein’s monster-esque spending packages come before members for a vote, there are rarely 

opportunities for substantive debate or amending the text. What’s worse, in recent years, these monstrosities 

have become more frequent. From FY 1977 through FY 1997, Congress passed five omnibuses or consolidated 

appropriations bills.16 From FY 1998 through FY 2017, it passed 18.17 Though budget points of order (rules 

 

14 The House is constitutionally required to act before the Senate on Appropriations bills. Should the House conclude its business 

early, the Senate may address appropriations bills prior to June 30.

15 Saturno, James V., and Jessica Tollestrup, “Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices.” 

Consgressional Research Service, January 14, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42647.pdf

16 Saturno James V., and Jessica Tollestrup, “Omnibus Appropriations Acts: Overview of Recent Practices.” Congressional Research 

Service, January 14, 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32473.pdf
6

Data note: Years in which appropriations bills or the defense authorization bill were not passed in timely 

manner were excluded from the chart. This is a recreation of a chart originally published by The 

Mercatus Center in an article entitled “Unauthorized Appropriations Continue to Grow.”

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Percentage of Discretionary Spending 

Fiscal Years 

Unauthorized Appropriations as a Percent of 

Discretionary Spending 

the Senate has written out for itself, such as a prohibition on consideration of any legislation that would raise the 

deficit more than $5 billion over 10 years) can be raised, they are not self-enforcing, and so a senator must 

declare one violated, after which the full Senate must vote to enforce it. Further, it poses no higher hurdle than 

passage. 

Make no mistake, the Senate frequently votes to ignore such objections. In fact, since 1981, there 

have been nearly 100 instances in which the Senate has simply opted to waive a point of order.

18

 Budget 

points of order serve as prohibitions against various types of congressional actions or types of legislation and 

have been fixtures in the budget process since the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.19 Subsequent 

Congresses, most recently the 114th Congress, have adopted various additional points of order.20 Though points 

of order prohibit certain actions, any senator can motion to waive the application of a point of order 

preemptively or, if he or she is being generous, after another senator raises the point of order.21 In practice, 

when the motion is made to waive, the Senate votes to either enforce, or ignore, the budgetary concerns 

involved. Depending on the point of order, it is waived by either a simple majority or 3/5ths majority vote to 

ignore the costs of whatever legislation the Senate is considering.22 

Just as a farmer cannot expect to grow healthy crops from a poisoned seed, lawmakers cannot

expect fiscally sound results from a flawed process. At the end of FY 1997, the last year for which Congress 

adhered to the budget process, federal outlays were approximately $1.6 trillion.23 Adjusted for inflation, this 

represents roughly $2.4 trillion in 2017 dollars. But just two decades later, government was spending 2.5 times 

what it was previously: $4 

trillion.24 Is it any wonder that 

such a drastic rise in spending 

levels happened in the two 

decades during which the 

Congress failed to use the 

appropriate budget process?

Of course, the sole reason 

for such a meteoric rise in debt

and spending levels cannot be 

entirely attributed to 

irregularities in the budget and 

appropriations process. Such 

abandonment of process does, 

however, preclude the 

opportunity to address 

unauthorized and wasteful 

spending. Though not included in the Constitution, House and Senate rules have required appropriations to 

have congressional authorizations since the mid-19th century.25 Yet routinely, the vast majority of federal 

 

17 Ibid.; Fiscal year 2017 sourced from www.congress.gov. 

18 Federal Spending Oversight Subcommittee Staff Correspondence with CRS

19 Saturno, James V., “Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process.” Congressional Research Service, October 20, 2015. 

https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/814bf855-39fc-4626-9356-4235537a6f89.pdf

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as amended

23 Office of Management and Budget, “Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Suprluses or Deficits 1789-2020.” Executive Office of the 

President, 2016. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2016-TAB.pdf#page=29

24 Congressional Budget Office, “Budget Projections for FY 2018.” Congressional Budget Office, 2018. 

https://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget

25 House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI.
7

discretionary spending expenditures remain unauthorized. CBO reported that in FY 2016, the last year for 

which there is data,26 lawmakers appropriated $310 billion in unauthorized funds.

27

 This represents 

roughly 52 percent of the total non-defense discretionary budget and 26 percent of all discretionary 

spending.28 In FY 1999, unauthorized spending totaled $35 billion, or just 10 percent of discretionary 

spending.29

Though the dual funding process may seem like an unnecessarily arcane step, authorizations serve as

checks on zealous spenders by requiring a distinct body to approve funding from that which determines the 

level at which programs are funded. Congress instituted these procedures to bake an opportunity to reassess and 

improve federal programs into the funding process. It forces lawmakers to look at each activity receiving 

federal funds and deliberate on whether or not each federal program is necessary, how it can be improved, and

at what funding level it is warranted. Without utilization of this process, programs such as Inter-America 

Foundation, a foreign aid organization last reauthorized in 198630 and tasked with funding projects in Latin 

America and the Caribbean (which has in the past funded such projects as teaching Argentinians to be circus 

clowns),

31 continue to expend funds without significant oversight. Of course, the driver of our debt crisis is not 

unauthorized spending. However, this should not preclude Congress from proactively overseeing all federal 

funding.

But the truth of the matter is that federal debt and deficits do not come to be as a result of an 

unwillingness to address unauthorized spending. A significant contributing factor is an unwillingness to 

address the fact that in Washington many, on both sides of the aisle, rail against slowing the rate of 

growth of a program as if the program is actually being decreased. Only in Washington is slowing the rate 

of growth considered cutting it. Senators of both parties routinely come to the Senate floor or go in front of a 

camera to admonish their colleagues for cutting his or her favored priority or program, when in reality, those 

being admonished are merely suggesting that in the coming year the federal government spend more than it did 

this year, but perhaps not quite as much more. But characterizing such changes as a cut, rather than as a 

slowing of the growth of spending, does not help members fundraise or campaign as much as their saying that 

“Republicans want to pay for tax cuts with American lives” and “Democrats have hollowed out the military.” 

This sort of rhetoric from both parties makes advocating for even the mildest of spending reform politically 

infeasible for many senators and representatives that recognize the federal government has found itself in an 

extremely fiscally precarious place.

 

26 Federal Spending Oversight Staff Correspondence with CBO

27 Congressional Budget Office, “Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations.” Congressional Budget Office, January 

15, 2016. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51131-UAEA-Senate.pdf

28 Congressional Budget Office, “The Federal Budget in 2016.” Congressional Budget Office, 2016. 

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/graphic/52408-budgetoverall.pdf 

29 Christian, William, “Making Unauthorized Spending Wrong Again.” Citizens Against Government Waste, May 19, 2017. 

https://www.cagw.org/thewastewatcher/making-unauthorized-spending-wrong-again

30 Congressional Budget Office, “Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations.” Congressional Budget Office, January 

2018. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53444-eeaa-approps.pdf

31 Inter-America Foundation Grant Number IAF-AR-352, A-1, & A-4 
8

Guns & Butter

The dirty little secret around here is you can only get more military money if you give the other side 

more welfare money. We have warfare and welfare. That is guns and butter. It has been going on 

for a long time... [and what you] have is a looting of the Treasury, basically. Both sides are really 

culpable.

Senator Rand Paul, M.D. – Senate floor speech on February 8, 2018

----

The concept of Guns and Butter is a classic economic curve designed to demonstrate the idea of 

opportunity cost. For every X units of butter, you must sacrifice Y units of guns. There is simply no way to 

have both. 

Sometimes this trade off can be temporarily avoided 

through borrowing. Debt instruments allow a nation (and 

people) to trade future guns and butter for higher levels of 

both goods than they would be able to accommodate in the 

present. 

In certain scenarios, borrowing (delaying the tradeoff) 

makes sense. In dealing with emergencies or making 

investments, the necessary sacrifices tomorrow will either be 

less than future gains (investment) or less than present losses 

and their long-term consequences (emergency).

Unfortunately, the common mistake people make (often intentionally) is to misidentify wants of guns 

and butter as justifiable needs – investments and emergencies. Unlike true investments and emergencies, which 

are usually isolated events, borrowing for wants usually is perpetual - that is, until the point that credit becomes 

unmanageable and the necessary sacrifice becomes worse than having never borrowed in the first place. 

Nowhere is this more the case than in the federal government. In Congress, one camp sounds the alarm 

that without more defense spending (guns), Americans will not be safe. From the other camp we hear if there is 

not more domestic spending (butter), people will be left uneducated, naked, and starving in the streets. The end 

result is continual borrowing. 

Unfortunately, the American people will ultimately pay a heavy burden in the not too distant future for 

these borrowing practices. The irony is that, in the name of safety and prosperity, Americans will be LESS 

SAFE and LESS PROSPEROUS.

What is most troubling is that America is careening toward ruin for no reason; neither guns nor butter 

are lacking or could not be sufficiently funded with resources available. This begs the question of why? 

Deficits Don’t Make Us Safe

Figure 1 -

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gunsandbutter.asp 
9

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017

Billions of Dollars (2009) 

Fiscal Years 

Military Spending in Inflation Adjusted Dollars 

Many raising objections to unbridled military spending often cite Admiral Mike Mullen, former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who noted, “Our national debt is our biggest national security threat.”32

However, proponents of more military spending ignore this sentiment, asserting that U.S. military 

spending is at historic lows. But the numbers just do not support that claim. As Figure 2 shows, for the past 

decade, military spending has 

far exceeded its historic highs in 

constant dollars, with the 

exception of a few years. 

In fact, military 

spending in 2018 was already 

projected to be more than the 

apex of the Reagan Cold War 

buildup, before the Bipartisan 

Budget Act of 2018 raised 

spending caps on military 

spending further - without 

paying for them. The so-called 

“hollowing out” of the military 

that some claim the Budget Control Act has caused at worst caused military spending to drop below the height 

of Reagan Cold War spending by just 1 percent on average for three years – adjusted for inflation. Only in 

government can something be nearly the largest it has ever been and still be called “hollowed out.”

Moreover, in 2015, this “hollowed out” DOD itself identified a “clear path” to saving $125 billion 

without laying off civilian personnel or making any military personnel reductions. Instead, DOD would 

have “streamlined the bureaucracy through attrition and early retirements, curtailed high-priced contractors and 

made better use of information technology.”33 Instead of implementing the clear path, DOD buried the 

report, and cried to Congress that it was underfunded.34

Then there was the “Fat Leonard” scandal, where more than 480 Navy personnel, including 60 admirals, 

accepted bribes of “cash, prostitutes and other gifts” to influence defense contracts and outright defraud the 

federal government of millions of dollars, if not more.35 

The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction has identified millions of dollars wasted by 

DOD, including $29 million in lost heavy equipment,36 and at least $675 million on the Task Force for Business 

and Stability Operations.37 This of course is reconstruction, not defense. Could it be the case that our military’s 

nation-building activities are degrading its fighting capacity?

 

32 Bassett, Laura, “Admiral Mike Mullen: ‘National Debt Is Our Biggest Security Threat.” The Huffington Post, June 24, 2010. 

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/24/adm-mike-mullen-national_n_624096.html

33 Whitlock, Craig and Bob Woodward, “Pentagon Buries Evidence of $25 Billion in Bureaucratic Waste.” The Chicago Tribune, 

December 5, 2016. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-pentagon-bureaucratic-waste-20161205-story.html

34 Ibid.

35 Whitlock, Craig and Kevin Uhrmacher, “Prostitutes, Vacations, and Cash: The Navy Officials ‘Fat Leonard’ Took Down.” The 

Washington Post, March 26, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/seducing-the-seventh-fleet/

36 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Afghan National Engineer Brigade: Despite U.S. Training Efforts, the 

Brigade is Incapable of Operating Independently.” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January, 2016. 

https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-16-15-AR.pdf

37 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Statement of John F. Sopko before the Senate Subcommittee on 

Readiness nad Management Support,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 20, 2016. 

https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-16-14-TY.pdf

Figure 2 – Data from OMB Historical Table 8.8
10

Of course, all this spending and wasting comes from an agency that has never passed an audit and has 

claimed that is acceptable because of their size.

So, in this context, it seems Secretary Mattis might be misguided in saying the spending controls have 

harmed the military more than the enemy. But even if DOD is wasting money hand over fist (which it appears 

to be), could deficit spending actually make us less safe, as Admiral Mullin suggested? After all, the U.S. has 

the most advanced and capable military in the world.

Certainly no other nation could challenge the U.S. in terms of military superiority. But do they 

have to? In fact, there is historical evidence they do not. 

In 1956, the British, French, and Israelis went to war with the Egyptians over control of the Suez Canal. 

Egyptian forces were outnumbered 4 to 1, and in just a few months of fighting, at least 1,500 Egyptians were 

killed in action, with more than 17,000 were wounded and 2,000 captured. In total, fewer than 400 British, 

Israeli, and French troops were killed or injured.38 That is 19,500 Egyptians vs 400 British, Israeli, and French 

troops. 

Yet the war ended quickly and not in British favor. Russia was threatening to intervene on the 

Egyptians’ behalf, and the U.S. wanted to avoid an escalation of the Cold War. So President Eisenhower 

threatened to dump American holdings of the British pound-sterling and restrict their access to credit. 

The result is that the British withdrew expeditiously, in what has been widely noted as the end of the 

British Empire.39 

The threat harmed the British economy, but not nearly as much as if it was acted on, and a decidedly 

superior military force was brought to its knees by economic intervention relating to its country’s debt 

dependency. The British withdrew arguably in defeat because of economics, not a lack of military prowess. 

Defense hawks would be wise to take note. 

 

38 New World Encyclopedia, “Suez Crisis,” New World Encyclopedia, 2018. 

http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Suez_Crisis

39 McMaken, Ryan, “Financial Warfare and the Declining Dollar.” Mises Daily Articles, May 7, 2015. 

https://mises.org/library/financial-warfare-and-declining-dollar

Figure 3 - http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt
11

So how economically vulnerable is the U.S.? Figure 3 is an excerpt of a list produced by the U.S. 

Treasury to show major foreign holders of U.S. debt by month over the past year. Most of these countries are 

generally friendly to the U.S., but recall, the U.S. wielded debt influence against the British - our closest ally. 

We are told the necessity of military spending is because the world is more dangerous than ever before. 

We are warned about a China and Taiwan conflict; we are concerned about Pakistan; there is also concern about 

Russia. Yet the same people sounding these alarms to justify more military spending seem to have completely 

ignored the reality that many of the countries that would have an interest in U.S. engagement or deterrence in 

these and other conflicts own substantial amounts of our debt. 

Imagine if China began overtly making preparations to invade Taiwan. Taiwan calls for U.S. 

intervention. But China warns that if the U.S. does intervene, they will dump the U.S. Treasuries they hold on 

the global market, and they will walk away from U.S. bond sales. This would certainly cause a chain reaction 

that would cripple the U.S. economy worse than even the Great Depression. And there would be no New Deal, 

because there would be no loans to finance it. Moreover, even if the U.S. did want to intervene, the economic 

collapse and lack of access to credit would make it difficult to fund such operations. 

Of course, if the U.S. did stay on the sideline, Taiwan (probably joined by Japan) could threaten the 

same thing in favor of our intervention. That is lose-lose for the U.S. 

This same scenario could play out in numerous other military (or potentially military) conflicts. 

Certainly we should be concerned about our military capabilities and our capacity to fight and win wars. 

However, excessive debt degrades those capacities. The best battleships and fighter jets are of little use 

when out-of-control inflation makes it impossible to afford the fuel to put in them or to pay the personnel 

enough to man them.

Of course, some may argue that since the U.S. is such a major economic entity in the world market, and 

that the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, no country would ever seek to engage in economic warfare with 

the U.S. because they would ultimately hurt themselves, as well. But the U.S. military capacity is comparable 

to our economic size and influence in the world. So if our military size and scope does not deter our enemies, 

why would our economy?

Butter Still Spoils 

The butter camp fairs no better in terms of its supposed needs and lack of funding.

The butter camp’s argument for more 

spending is that without their programs, people 

would be ignorant, naked, starving, and dying in the 

streets. However, as the above chart shows, since 

1962, payments to individuals (which do not 

include Social Security or Medicare) have 

increased by a whopping 2678.7 percent in 

constant dollars, while the U.S. population has 

only increased 175.8 percent over that time 

period. Ironically, infrastructure spending (which 

is one of the few areas where most people agree it is 

acceptable to borrow) has stayed relatively 

constant. This does not count the myriad of other 

federal domestic spending programs that paid 

Figure 4 - Data from OMB Historical Data Table 12.1
12

directly from federal agencies. 

Of course, that does not mean 1962 was the optimal spending year, but the suggestion that a modest 

reduction in benefits of one percent for a few years would be Armageddon is nothing short of fearmongering. 

However, there will eventually be an Armageddon when it comes to these programs if Congress maintains its 

cognitive dissonance and keeps using debt to affect trade on the public good. 

As Figure 5 shows, interest on our debt is projected to increase from 7 percent of the federal budget to 

19 percent over the next 30 years. This means programs that are supposedly underfunded now will get 

significantly less funding tomorrow because of the borrowing today. 

This also will not happen gradually, the way it is in the chart. Instead, Congress will keep increasing 

funding for everything and borrowing to make up the difference, including interest. That is essentially taking 

out an advance on one credit card to pay the bill on another. 

Those who have banked political success on 

spending will continue to ignore the warnings until 

interest rates rise beyond control. At that point, our 

creditors will say enough, and that will start dominos 

falling just as could eventually happen with a military 

adversary. Eventually the easy credit music stops for 

everyone. 

At that point, it will not be a one percent cut to 

programs; it will be massive cuts to pay for interest that 

will be made worse as the overall American economy 

collapses and revenue plunge. 

 Moreover, this will not happen to our kids 

and grandkids; it will happen to us. How politically 

successful would most big spenders be if every time 

they promised or took credit for a few percentage point increases in funding today, they said, “There will be a 

20 percent cut to this program tomorrow”? That is exactly what every federal politician says when they support 

new spending that is not paid for or oppose spending reductions. 

Worst of all, this is a completely avoidable problem. There is a lot of room to save money without 

doing harm to beneficiaries. Unfortunately, instead of controlling spending and working to improve program 

effectiveness, big spenders in the butter camp continually call for more spending on existing programs, 

expanding such programs, and creating new ones. 

For example, every year, the Government Accountability Office publishes a report of duplicative federal 

programs. Some popular examples include over 200 Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) 

education programs, 47 job training programs, and 160 housing assistance programs. 

These programs highlight exactly what is wrong with the current budget process and the incentive to 

spend. Only in government would it make sense to create 47, 160, or 200 entities to tackle a problem, and the 

only reason it makes sense in government is politics. It might be warranted to have two or three different 

approaches to a problem, but politicians will get much more accolades from the butter camp if they create a 

new program than if they direct a constituency to an existing one. Even modifying a program is less 

palatable than a shiny, brand-new one. So, 200 programs get created. 

Figure 5- Data from https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115thcongress-2017-2018/reports/52480-ltbo.pdf
13

There is no question that duplication creates unnecessary overhead costs and breeds inefficiency. As 

costly as this is, our government has grown so large and politicians so addicted to spending that even when 

programs are blatantly wasting money, Congress pays little mind.

As David Muhlhausen points out in his 2013 book, Do Federal Social Programs Work? ̧the federal 

government spends millions of dollars to hire credible policy evaluation firms to study the effectiveness of the 

programs taxpayers fund. Generally, if the results of such studies show the program is working, it gets 

more money. If the study shows the programs do not work, the studies get buried and programs get 

funded (or expanded) anyway.40 

Take the Upward Bound program, for example. This program was created in accord with the Higher 

Education Act of 1965 (yes, 53 years ago) to help at-risk high school students complete school and pursue 

higher education. A study done by Mathmatica in the late 1990s found less than impressive results with 

Upward Bound. The study, published in 1999 and updated in 2004, found that “the program failed to have 

statistically measurable impacts on 20 of 21 outcome measures.” As for college attendance, the ultimate 

goal of Upward Bound, the study found only a three percent difference between program participants and a 

control group, and there was no statistical difference in college performance among the two groups.41

So, what action was taken? Well, by 2008, a second study was already in progress, so Congress 

canceled the study.42 President Trump has proposed phasing out the program, but President Bush did as well, 

and it still exists and spends more than $300 million annually.43 Ironically, many of the same congressional big 

spenders have rightly criticized private companies for burying studies and not taking action to rectify problems 

with their products. Apparently it is OK if government does it. 

It isn’t that this program is necessarily unique. There are countless programs that have problems that 

result in wasting taxpayer money. However, even programs that aren’t working have constituencies and 

anecdotes. Few people are passionate about ending or even reforming Upward Bound (it even has a nicesounding name), while those who utilize the program likely perceive it to be helping them, even if statistically it 

is not. If Congress tried to end this program or make it work better, even with evidence on their side, program 

participants would rally against the cuts. Thus, maintaining the status quo and/or expanding the program have 

upsides, while eliminating it has a political downside.

All this works well as long as Congress keeps 

borrowing, but it cannot do so forever. Imagine if Ford kept 

producing the Edsel simply because it did not want to upset 

the small number of their customers who enjoyed the car. 

Instead of ending the line, they made up for low sales with 

debt. Eventually, the money-losing, deficit-financed line of 

cars would pull down the whole company. When the 

company failed, it would also mean the end of the F-150, 

which is continually popular. 

 

Eventually, protecting the failing and inefficient 

does harm to the good. Of course, there is no doubt that if the government produced the Edsel, we would 

 

40 Muhlhausen, D.B. Do Federal Social Programs Work? Denver, CO, (2013).

41 Ibid.

42 Kreighbaum, Andrew, “Cutting College Prep,” Inside Higher Ed, March 28, 2017. 

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/28/questions-about-efficacy-college-prep-programs-white-house-vows-evidencebased-cuts

43 U.S. Department of Education, “Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Summary and Background Information.” U.S. Department of Education, 

2018. https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget19/summary/19summary.pdf
14

see a 2018 model...that few people would buy. 

Though the government’s size and scope are much larger, Congress cannot, like Ford, keep every 

program and still remain sustainable. Duplicative and failing programs will be cut one day, either in part or 

in whole because we simply will not be able to borrow any more. But successful programs will be cut, too, 

because for political gains today, failing programs were protected and expanded. The F-150s are 

sacrificed tomorrow (along with the Edsels) to avoid displeasing Edsel buyers today. 

How do programs get protected? One way is to make programs mandatory entitlements. Even though 

these programs do not have dedicated revenue streams like Social Security and portions of Medicare, they are 

guaranteed funding whether they are working or not. And in many cases, they are never looked at again by 

Congress, unless a politician is seeking credit for expanding them.

A similar way of avoiding a discussion of program effectiveness and need is to just keep funding 

programs even after they have expired. Annually, the Congressional Budget Office publishes a report 

identifying generally over 1,000 programs totaling more than $300 billion of spending for programs that are no 

longer authorized. 

Many programs have not been reauthorized in decades, meaning their effectiveness and structures have 

not been reevaluated. Again, the automobile industry annually updates their products, improving them, 

changing them for the times, and eliminating ones that do not work. Government does not want to do that, so 

they just keep funding it all without real reviews. Why? Looking too close at a program might expose 

skeletons and cost their champions reelections. So we are left with a government with tail fins and manual 

transmissions (shifted on the column), getting just eight miles to the gallon. 

The big spenders do not want people to know this. They want you to believe borrowing is fine. After 

all, it pays for “investments” and “emergencies” - that we can have guns and butter, and that not funding these 

programs is worse than being in debt. And they count on retiring before the bubble bursts. But it will 

burst, and we will have neither guns nor butter – unless we take action to right the fiscal ship now.

Health Savings Accounts

Reforms to Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are critical to ensure that individuals are better able to 

afford health expenses. Furthermore, they offer one of the few mechanisms for a free market to exist in our 

health care system. Congress should increase HSA contribution limits, allow for premiums to be paid with 

HSA funds, remove or expand the high-deductible health plan requirement for establishing an HSA, and expand 

the range of goods and services that are HSA-eligible. 

HSAs are tax-advantaged accounts used to pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses in conjunction with 

health insurance. HSAs were created in 2003 as part of the Medicare Modernization Act to allow individuals 

with an HSA-qualified, high-deductible health plan (HDHP) to save for expenses like meeting their deductible. 

The money contributed to HSAs comes off of taxable income directly, reducing the amount of money owed the 

IRS for that taxable year.

Despite the challenges Obamacare has presented to all health insurance markets, HSAs remain a great 

option for Americans to cover more of their health care costs, as has been recently noted, with advantages that 

include the accounts not only growing tax-free, but account holders also not having to worry about state or 

federal taxes on their contributions.

44

 

44 WillisTowers Watson, “Employees Fail to Take Advantage of Health Savings Accounts.” Press Release. December 12, 2017. 

https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/press/2017/12/employees-fail-to-take-advantage-of-health-savings-accounts
15

Both consumers and their employers fund HSAs. A 2017 survey found that 73% of employers offer 

HSA plans to their employees, with 62% of large employers in the U.S. that offer HSAs also contributing to 

those accounts on their employees’ behalf. In fact, the survey also found that, last year, 43% of employees 

enrolled in HSA plans did not personally contribute to the HSA.45

While an HSA’s balance can carry over, there are limits on contribution levels.46 In 2018, the 

contribution limits to HSAs are $3,450 for individuals and $6,850 for families.47 However, the maximum 

allowable out-of-pocket amounts under Obamacare are $6,650 for individuals and $13,300 for families.48

It is undisputed that health insurance premiums are continuing to rise under the (un)Affordable Care 

Act. Unfortunately, deductibles have also sharply increased under Obamacare. On average, deductibles for the 

“most popular” Obamacare plans are almost $4,000.49 However, under the ACA, options for consumer-directed 

health care are limited. As of 2016, “only 19%” of Obamacare plans, despite featuring a high deductible in the 

majority of the plans, were eligible for HSAs.50 If consumers are able to obtain an HSA-qualified plan, they 

cannot save the full amount necessary to cover their potential out-of-pocket costs in their HSA, and those 

enrolled in lower-premium bronze plans often have deductibles upwards of $5,000.51 The gap between the outof-pocket limit and the contribution limit for HSAs clearly makes the case for increasing the contribution limit 

for HSAs. At a minimum, individuals should be able to cover their costs prior to meeting the deductible with 

tax-free HSA funds.

One of the fundamental flaws in our current health insurance system is that insurance does not move 

with the individual from job to job, welfare to work, or into retirement. However, the individual owns their 

HSA, so it stays with them regardless of life changes, and there’s no expiration date on the funds. In order to 

better leverage the portability of HSAs, we should remove the high-deductible plan requirement so that 

individuals can not only possess an HSA throughout their life but continue to contribute to one. 

In order to pay for its new programs, the ACA made a number of changes to consumer-directed health 

care accounts, including stopping non-prescription over-the-counter (OTC) medications from qualifying as a 

medical expense.52 In the current environment of increasing health care costs, we should be empowering people 

to save for wellness in addition to health care. 

Therefore, it is imperative that Congress allow HSA funds to be used for purposes such as purchasing 

dietary supplements, OTC medications, gym memberships, and other activities that promote wellness and 

reduce the potential for costly chronic conditions. 

While ultimately it will be up to the authorizing committees to make policy and put forward legislation 

to implement this budget, the Finance Committee is provided a reconciliation instruction to reduce revenue by 

$18.6 billion over the budget window. This instruction could be used for any revenue matter, but one possible 

approach that this budget encourages the Finance Committee to consider is to expand Health Savings Accounts. 

 

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Miller, Stephen, “IRS Sets 2018 HSA Contribution Limits,” Society for Human Resource Management, March 6, 2018. 

https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/benefits/Pages/irs-sets-2018-hsa-contribution-limits.aspx

48 United Healthcare, “Out-of-Pocket Maximum,” United Healthcare, 2018. https://www.uhc.com/united-for-reform/health-reformprovisions/out-of-pocket-maximum

49 Pearson, Caroline F., and Elizabeth Carpenter, “Plans with More Restrictive Networks Comprise 73% of Exchange Market.” 

Avalere, November 30, 2017. http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/plans-with-more-restrictive-networks-comprise-73-

of-exchange-market

50 O’Brien, Elizabeth, “Why 80% of Obamacare Plans are Ineligible for this Tax Break,” MarketWatch. March 29, 2016. 

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-80-of-obamacare-plans-are-ineligible-for-this-tax-break-2016-03-29

51 Ibid.

52 La Couture, Brittany, “Health Savings Accounts and the Affordable Care Act.” American Action Forum, December 17, 2014. 

https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/health-savings-accounts-and-the-affordable-care-act/
16

These would certainly help improve health care in America, foster greater competition and consumer 

engagement, and ultimately help bend the cost curve.

Senior Benefits

One thing that needs to be made clear is that this budget does nothing to Social Security. Social Security 

is “off-budget,” which means no budget can make or assume making changes to that program. 

That is directly contrary to the rhetoric of those who have previously opposed fiscally responsible 

budgets and will undoubtedly oppose this one. 

Any suggestion that this budget does harm to Social Security is fake news. However, pretending that 

all is well with Social Security and Medicare is deceptive and does harm to the people that depend on 

these programs.

Recall from Figure 5 that mandatory spending remains 

relatively unchanged as a percentage of the budget, holding 

steady at about 62 percent. This is not because demand for 

resources ebbs. It is because Social Security and Medicare 

Part A make up more than half of mandatory spending. 

These programs are funded through trust funds, 

which include failsafe measures that prevent benefits from 

exceeding revenue in the event the trust fund is exhausted. 

As Figure 6

shows, in 2034, 

the Social Security 

Trust Fund will 

run out of money and will reduce or delay benefits by 23 percent 

immediately.

53

 

 TO BE CLEAR- if NOTHING is done, anyone 51 years old 

or younger TODAY will never collect full Social Security under 

the current model as projected. They will experience a 23 

percent reduction in benefits to maintain the program’s solvency. 

Anyone over 51 that plans to be alive in 16 years will also 

experience such cuts, INCLUDING CURRENT 

BENEFICIARIES.

Anyone opposing making any change to the current 

structure of Social Security is in effect advocating for a 23 

percent cut to Americans’ benefits.

As troubling as this may seem, the Medicare trust fund goes 

bankrupt in the last year of the budget window, 2029. To quote 

from the most recent Medicare Trustees’ Report: 

 

53 Social Security Boards of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 

“The 2017 Annual Report.” Social Security Board of Trustees, July 13, 2017. https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2017/tr2017.pdf

“After trust fund

reserve depletion, 

continuing income is 

sufficient to support 

expenditures at

a level of 77 percent of 

program cost for the rest 

of 2034, declining to

73 percent for 2091.” –

Social Security Trustees’ 

Report 2017

Figure 6 - https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2017/tr2017.pdf
17

“[N]o provision exists to use general revenues or any other means to cover the HI deficit. ... 

Actuarial balance could also be reached by reducing benefits by 14 percent every year immediately, or by 

making no change until 2029 and then reducing benefits by 17 percent.”54

So why is Congress ignoring this issue, and, worse, why are some saying there is nothing to worry 

about? Why are we told grandma is being thrown off the cliff whenever modest reforms are proposed? 

Failure By Design

Structurally, budget resolutions under the Congressional Budget Act have fit similar molds. Much like a 

new model year for an automobile, there have been some new styles and features added to budget resolutions, 

but the basic structure has remained remarkably unchanged. In fact, the community and culture of budgeting 

has become resistant to change. There is a formula and a model to follow - ridged adherence to tradition and 

custom are considered paramount to innovations derived from the actual letter of the law. As a result, budgets 

fit in a few basic models. 

The budget, of course, is a plan for spending, and as most people know, few plans ever work perfectly. 

However, the federal government’s fiscal imbalance is not because of failed plans. It is because these plans

from the outset are never serious. They serve just two real objectives: 1) to send a message to voters that the 

majority party (of either party) is fighting for fiscal responsibility while protecting favored programs, and/or 2)

to enable the majority party (again of either party) to bypass the minority party’s ability to filibuster signature 

legislation. However, this paradigm is far from a requirement, and the circumstances are far from 

unsalvageable. This budget identifies and resolves many of the problems that preclude the budget 

resolution from being a more effectual tool for fiscal discipline by implementing a host of process 

reforms.

The actual spending plans in most budget resolutions are just a show, as Congress has few 

incentives in enforcing the resolution it has passed upon itself. While the spending levels in the budget may 

correspond to some assumptions about policy proposals, the only proposals ever discussed are those that budget 

writers want highlighted. Unpopular policies are not discussed, or, even worse, numbers are arbitrarily set to 

meet a targeted level to fit a narrative, and there are no underlying policies. 

As part of this fiscal theater, the minority party is given their due via an unfettered opportunity to offer 

amendments. However, through backroom negotiations, the hundreds of amendments offered are whittled 

down to perhaps one or two dozen which actually see the light of day. But as the underlying document being 

amended is not serious, neither are the amendments the minority party chooses to offer. Often, they are

designed for messaging purposes and to force members of the opposition party to take a stand on controversial 

but ineffectual provisions, known as “gotcha” legislating.

Nowhere is the farce of the congressional budget process more evident than in the use and abuse of

Deficit Neutral Reserve Funds (DNRFs). In general, budget rules prevent congressional committees from 

raising taxes to pay for new spending. A DNRF creates an exception to this rule; if you pass a bill to take the 

action articulated in the DNRF, you may pay for it with a revenue increase. So one might wonder why the FY 

2018 budget contained DNRFs for “modifying statutory budgetary controls,” “to prevent the taxpayer bailout of 

pension plans,” or for “implementing work requirements in all means-tested federal welfare programs.” If each 

one of these DNRFs were read as they mechanically work, they would be read as, “to increase spending to/for 

 

54 Social Security Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds,

“The 2017 Annual Report.” Social Security Boards of Trustees, July 13, 2017. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2017.pdf
18

Major Stages of the Reconciliation Process

Courtesy of the Congressional Research Service

[whatever messaging point a senator wants to make] as long as taxes are increased to offset the cost.” It would 

make no sense. Yet, many such DNRFs are included in each budget resolution.

In the end, while both sides may disagree on a plan neither expects to follow, they do agree on 

preventing the plan from being enforced. The only point of consequential disagreement is when there is a deep 

divide on one policy. Then, whichever party happens to be in the majority wields the budget process’ 

reconciliation mechanism to squelch a filibuster in the Senate. But even that is limited to passage of one bill.

Reconciling the Reconciliation Process with its Original Purpose

The original purpose of budget reconciliation, as enacted by the Congressional Budget Act, is to 

supplement Congress’ ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt-limit laws into compliance with the 

budget resolution’s articulation of fiscal priorities. In recent years, this privileged process has morphed from 

reconciling current law to a tool both parties use when in the majority to quell minority rights in order to 

achieve whatever policy preference the majority desires (meanwhile, both parties, when in the minority, deride 

its use for such a purpose).

In theory, reconciliation works like so: Congress provides reconciliation instructions to each committee

in the budget resolution that instruct each to take action. Each committee then takes up these instructions and 

amends existing law or passes new laws that bring its jurisdictional authority into adherence with the budget 

resolution. The Budget Committees then package the legislation without any substantive changes and send it to 

the full chambers for consideration. The respective reconciliation bills are then amended and passed, or not. 

As is too often the case, that which works in theory is corrupted in practice. Rather than reserving the 

reconciliation process (and its privileged status as immune to Senate filibuster) for its original purpose,

members of leadership of both parties have used it to pass legislation enacting various policy preferences 

of each party over the objections of the other. Though the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

of 1985 (P.L. 99-272) was the first instance in which Congress abused the reconciliation process, using it to 

implement various changes to the health care market, it was done so in a bipartisan manner. A Democrat 

majority in the House and Republican majority in the Senate under President Reagan ensured that one party did 

not hijack the process. However, the first unified government to use the process for purposes extraneous to 

spending, revenue, or debt legislation occurred in March 2010, when a Democrat government used 

reconciliation to pass Obamacare, as well as to expand federal involvement in student loans.

And unfortunately, both parties have strayed from this original purpose at one time or another. Most 

recently, in H. Con. Res. 71, a Republican-controlled Senate offered reconciliation instructions to just two pairs 
19

of House and Senate committees. Federal Spending Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Paul, however, offered

an amendment, S. Amdt. 1294, to H. Con. Res. 71 to expand reconciliation instructions included in the 

resolution to include instructions for each committee, as the authors of the Congressional Budget Act intended -

seeking to preserve the original purpose of reconciliation - but every Democrat and the overwhelming majority 

of Republicans opted to dispose of this amendment by a vote margin of 4-94.

Though reconciliation can be a venue for good policy, use of the reconciliation process exclusively for 

policy “wins,” rather than incorporating each committee with mandatory spending in its jurisdiction, shows a 

lack of seriousness in addressing the budget itself, regardless of the party using it in such a manner. Use of the 

budget and reconciliation processes to enact singular or limited policy objectives waves the white flag for that 

fiscal year on addressing debt and deficit. It would be a mistake to allow this to become accepted practice, 

rather than an episodic abuse of the system.

Though use of the reconciliation process to pass a wide variety of topics is rightly prohibited, among 

those prohibitions is, oddly, a change to discretionary spending limits. The rationale given is that there is an 

insufficiently close nexus between altering discretionary spending limits and changing spending or revenues. 

But how can one make the argument that imposing a limit upon spending does not inform spending? Surely the 

Appropriations Committee and Subcommittees responsible for discretionary spending would make decisions 

differently were they to have either larger or smaller amounts to dispense. Further, if the purpose of 

reconciliation is to reconcile existing spending, revenue, and debt ceiling law with the budget resolution, for 

what purpose is a committee prohibited from including discretionary spending programs that are within its 

jurisdiction in its package of reforms submitted to the Budget Committee? 

As is so often the case, such a question finds its answer in Senate precedent. During consideration of H. 

Con. Res. 448 in the 96th Congress, the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1981, the Senate gave 

authorizing committees reconciliation instructions amounting to approximately two thirds of the savings 

required under reconciliation. This realization sparked a debate regarding how reconciling discretionary 

programs could be in order given that authorizations of appropriations for programs did not actually change 

spending, and the programs authorized would be funded through later appropriation. The staff of the Budget 

Committee and then-Majority Leader Byrd’s counsel advised that, upon consultation with the Senate 

Parliamentarian, the original instructions on discretionary spending would be out of order as a result of the 

inclusion of the phrase “to modify programs.” 

The phrase was seen as too broad, as programs can be modified without resulting in changes to their 

future appropriations. In order to rectify this violation, the Budget Committee reported S. Con. Res. 9 (97th

Congress), revising the congressional budget for FY 1981-83 to include reconciliation, which revised the 

language in the reconciliation instructions to change entitlement law and “to report changes in laws within the 

jurisdiction of that committee sufficient to reduce appropriations levels so as to achieve savings.” That 

language was understood to mean that changes in authorization language of discretionary programs would be 

permissible under reconciliation procedures, provided such changes in law would result in affecting a change in 

later outlays derived from future appropriations. Further, it was understood that a change in authorization that 

caused a change in later outlays was considered to be a change in outlays for the purpose of reconciliation. 

With this in mind, the Senate adopted S. Con. Res. 9, with 88 in favor and 10 opposed.

A Revolutionary Approach

This budget is designed to succeed in controlling spending. It makes no specific policy assumptions. 

Rather, it sets a top-level spending goal and provides the requisite tools and flexibility for the committees of 

Congress to apply their expertise toward achieving fiscal targets goals. Every committee and every on-budget 
20

dollar is on the table – thus every member of Congress will be able to play a part and have skin in the game in 

reaching the goals set out in this budget. 

Unwillingness to balance the budget, a long history of process failures, and entrenched powers-that-be 

have resulted in a system in desperate need of reform. In addition to providing a plan to balance the federal 

budget in 5 years without touching Social Security, this budget includes a number of eminently reasonable 

process reforms that would improve the budget process itself and allow Congress to begin to see more positive 

results in the future. Among these are strengthening and enhancing the budget functions, scoring, enforcement 

mechanisms, reconciliation, and debate procedure.

GOALS

 An important part of any 

budget resolution is its 

bottom line. Does it 

balance? How many years 

does it take to do so? This 

budget balances in just five

years without taking a single 

penny from Social Security. 

Congress can achieve these 

savings by first repealing the 

Bipartisan Budget Act of 

2018 and then instituting 

what is known as the Penny Plan. The Penny Plan simply says that for every dollar the federal 

government spends on discretionary spending in a fiscal year, it must spend one penny less in the next 

year. 

 This budget is a particularly effective implementation of the Penny Plan, because rather than making 

nebulous policy assumptions that will never happen, it sets out one common goal: balance. That is the 

one key assumption in this budget. Above all, Republicans and Democrats should both aspire to one 

fiscal goal: a balanced budget. In order to achieve this goal, this budget simply requires Congress to 

make a one-percent cut for five years. Rather than holding hands and agreeing to the common

gluttony, this plan requires Congress to do the opposite: hold hands and sacrifice for the common good. 

TOOLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

 There are a wide variety of opinions and viewpoints in Congress, and it is for this reason that, rather 

than prescribing particular policies, this budget includes reconciliation instructions for every 

committee with jurisdiction over mandatory spending to simply achieve savings in accordance 

with the Penny Plan. In this way, Congress can exert its will and can decide for itself, through the 

committee structure, how to achieve the goals of this budget. The savings are found under a new 

budget function entitled “New Efficiencies, Consolidations, and Other Savings.”

BUDGET ENFORCEMENT

 A key concern with previous budget resolutions is that the means of enforcement are either disregarded 

or are nonexistent entirely. This budget makes certain enforcement changes that will help to ensure the 

long-term fiscal health of the federal government. First and foremost, it raises the threshold for 

waivers for every budget point of order. Raising the threshold for the Senate to waive these rules will 
21

simply make it harder for the Senate to pass bills that fall short in addressing long-term national fiscal 

stability, while holding the Senate to the agreement they made in the budget resolution.

 Further, this budget also includes a new point of order, at the same raised threshold, against any 

piece of legislation that contains funding subject to more than three different 302(b) allocations. 

This will effectively prohibit the use of omnibus appropriations bills, as well as limit consolidated 

appropriations and continuing resolutions, in order to more easily avoid burying budget legislation in 

giant omnibus spending bills and forcing members to make binomial choices.

 This budget includes a requirement that in years in which Congress does not adopt a budget 

resolution, such as FY 2010 through FY 2016, the funding levels in the out-years of the most 

recent budget resolution adopted would be enforced. This would be a significant improvement from 

current practice. In practice, more often than not, budgets spend in the first year and then save money in 

the out-years so that it looks fiscally responsible over the budget window. This is a gimmick of budget 

procedure, made even more gimmicky given the reality of Deem Resolutions. Annual adoption of 

budget resolutions is important, but should Congress fail in this regard, there is a ready-made solution: 

enforce the budget levels of the most recent resolution for the corresponding year. Congress has 

haggled over these spending levels. It has agreed to these spending levels. Why not make them 

enforceable? This budget establishes a point of order to make functional totals enforceable for the 

duration of the budget year and all other years contained in a budget resolution. Perhaps the 

enforcement of the out-years will incentivize the senators in both parties who are more enthusiastic 

about spending today than avoiding financial ruin tomorrow to adopt a budget resolution each year.

HELP ELIMINATE DUPLICATION

 Fortunately for Congress, GAO publishes an annual report on ways the federal government can 

eliminate duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. Since the inception of these reports, the federal 

government has failed to address 115 recommendations for cost savings.55 One can imagine that, 

despite particular policy preferences, eliminating duplication and fragmentation and ensuring the federal 

government’s stewardship of taxpayer dollars is as efficient as possible would garner widespread 

bipartisan agreement. This is a goal to which all public servants, political and civil, should strive. 

GAO’s most recent iteration of this report highlights billions of dollars in cost savings, which assuredly 

would help Congress adhere to the Penny Plan without compromising government services and 

effectiveness.56 

 It is for this reason that this budget includes a directive to CBO to amend its legislative scoring 

procedures to include a duplication assessment in each cost estimate. Though it is true that a portion 

of the duplication, fragmentation, and overlap comes from various presidential directives, Congress is 

not immune in this regard, often appropriating considerable funds to duplicative programs. Though 

often such duplications are enacted unwittingly, ignorance of the existence thereof is no excuse. 

Instituting this change is an easy way to ensure that members are at least aware that the bill on which 

they are voting is duplicative. 

 

55 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 26, 2017. 

https://www.gao.gov/duplication/overview

56 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 26, 2017. 

https://www.gao.gov/duplication/overview
22

RECONCILIATION

 This budget includes a Sense of the Senate that a change in discretionary authorization levels, such 

that they would result in a change in outlays, shall be considered a change in outlays. Including 

this provision creates a precedent with effect beyond this particular resolution. A Sense of the Senate 

gives authorizing committees another tool in the reconciliation process to help reassert their 

jurisdictional authority over programs. Without clarifying each authorizing committee’s role in 

reconciliation, the process becomes unnecessarily limited, to the detriment of the fiscal health of the 

government as a whole. 

PERFORMANCE BUDGETING

 Any casual observer of government knows that federal dollars are a finite resource. A growing 

contingent of budgeteers has made calls to create portfolios to better weigh federal priorities in a fiscally 

responsible manner. Rather than re-creating portfolios for this purpose, why not use the 20 budget 

functions already in existence? This was clearly the intent of the authors of the Congressional Budget 

Act, who created a budget function-based process from the outset. Further, making the apportioned 

functional totals enforceable against other priorities will force the Senate to consider the relative 

value of each function. Budget functions allow for greater clarity in Congress concerning agency 

activity and limiting duplication and fragmentation, while placing an emphasis on results. In other

words, make the decision whether or not to devote a greater portion of the pie to either Transportation or 

to Agriculture, to Commerce and Housing Credit, or to Community and Regional Development. 

Making these tough decisions is an overlooked aspect of budgeting, which is given due concern under 

enforceable functional totals. Further, rather than agreeing to plus up multiple priorities within one 

function, tradeoffs would need to be made, or a budget waiver would have to be issued.

 

 To aid in making functional totals enforceable, this budget also includes language requiring CBO to 

include how much of the cost falls under each budget function in each score it produces. One of 

the process reforms this budget includes is to force Congress to enforce the budget functions, otherwise 

known as categories of spending. If Congress does not know how much spending or savings in 

legislation would apply to a functional category, then enforcing functional totals would be impossible. 

Requiring CBO to include these percentages will assist Congress in ensuring it adheres to the spending 

decisions it made in the annual budget resolution.

EMERGENCY DESIGNATIONS

 One of the secrets of Washington is that whenever Congress wants, it can declare an emergency and 

throw the budget rulebook out the window. Section 403(a) of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget 

for Fiscal Year 2010 (S. Con. Res. 13) grants Congress the authority to designate direct spending or tax 

legislation as a response to an emergency, exempting the effects from budgetary enforcement.57 But 

importantly, there is no standard for what is determined to be an emergency. Though a budget point of 

order can be waived if 60 Senators agree to issue a waiver, the emergency designation is often baked 

into the legislation. This budget reverses that paradigm by stipulating that an emergency designation 

shall not apply as an exception to budgetary constraints unless the designation is adopted as an 

amendment. This will disallow the emergency designation from being baked into the base legislation, 

and, in so doing, forbid the Senate from arbitrarily declaring an emergency for the purpose of evading 

budget considerations.

 

57 S. Con. Res. 13
23

Other Possible Reforms to Consider for the Future

DUPLICATIVE PROVISIONS

 A surgical budget point of order against duplicative provisions. Implementation of this point of 

order would provide senators with an additional tool to ensure that the Senate did not unknowingly 

duplicate an already existing government effort or service. Further, even were the Senate to be intent on 

considering a bill in which its authors knowingly or unknowingly included duplicative provisions, any 

senator could motion that those provisions be stricken.

 Discretionary spending put on autopilot, as discussed, often leads to wasteful and/or duplicative 

spending. Creation of a point of order against providing appropriations to a program not already 

authorized in law, as well as against providing an appropriation exceeding its authorization level,

will assist Congress in reasserting control over spending practices that have, in recent years, been a selfinflicted pox on the Senate, sometimes resulting in funding programs and projects which authorizing 

committees explicitly de-authorize, such as the Next Generation Strategic Bomber. 

 The Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff did not request, nor did the Air Force have any desire 

for, the NexGen Bomber. The Defense Authorizing Committees did not authorize funding for the 

bomber, and yet somehow its appropriation ended up in the fiscal year 2012 conference report. As 

Senator John McCain said: “This is money for the NexGen Bomber that was not requested by the Air 

Force, nor was there any testimony by Air Force leadership – either civilian or military – in support of 

this additional huge plus up in funding. It magically appeared in the Appropriations Conference Report 

– out of thin air. This morning, I asked my staff to find out if this money would be wisely spent. The 

answer was, to be blunt, ‘No.’”58 

RESERVE FUND REFORM

 In recent years, there has been a proliferation of reserve funds that serve to message rather than 

substantively legislate. These cumbersome messaging tools are out of place in budget resolutions if they 

are not actionable. Therefore, the Senate should institute a point of order against the establishment 

of reserve funds that are designed to facilitate legislation that would not cause a change in 

spending and revenue or would cause changes that are incidental to the non-budgetary 

components of the legislation.

RECESS PROHIBITION

 As has been expressed, Congress has found significant problems sticking to a timetable. A point of 

order, at a 2/3rds threshold, against either chamber recessing after the start of a fiscal year for 

which there is a Cabinet-level agency or a major independent agency (defined as an entity with an 

operating budget of $1 billion or more) that does not have an active full-year appropriation would 

be useful in enforcing the congressional budget schedule. One of Congress’ most important 

functions is to exercise the power of the purse. Though achieving 67 votes is often seen as a 

prohibitively high standard, such a standard is necessary should Congress attempt to recess prior to 

fulfilling this fundamental responsibility. Creating a high threshold for either chamber to recess with 

this business unfinished would encourage the House of Representatives and the Senate to stay in session 

to fulfill this crucial constitutional function. 

 

58 McCain, John, “Remarks by Senator John McCain on the Conference Report of the FY2012 Omnibus Appropriations Bill.” Office 

of Senator John McCain, December 16, 2011. https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=48f0c068-a39a0237-fb09-7faf7546fb90
24

DEBATE REFORM

One of the tragedies of the budget process is that time becomes a practical limitation when the resolution 

comes before the Senate for amendments. Though the Senate has no time limitations on consideration 

of amendments, and could vote on amendments to the budget resolution until all of the amendments are

either adopted or disposed, this never happens in practice. Political expediency and exhaustion demand 

otherwise. But this does not mean that there are not ways to incrementally improve the process. In 

short, effective reform would recognize flaws in “vote-a-rama” but also recognize its value to the 

minority and those who otherwise are denied votes on amendments.

 When a debate enters its 25th hour, debate on amendments should be limited to 3 minutes each,

and all votes, with the exception of final passage, should be taken by division unless the yeas and 

nays are ordered (though following the 25-hour mark, no vote will be recorded unless cast from 

senators’ seats). This would allow the Senate to consider more amendments in a more orderly fashion. 

For what is often heralded by senators as the greatest deliberative body in the world, this reform, which

would further expand deliberations, should be widely agreeable. This reform would strike a balance 

between limiting senators’ rights and ensuring efficiency in processing amendments.

RECONCILIATION

 Exempting a large chunk of federal spending from direct oversight limits Congress’ ability to do its job 

in so far as fiscal policy is concerned. It is for this reason that expansion of that which is acceptable 

to put in reconciliation measures should include discretionary spending. Discretionary spending 

represents approximately a third of all on-budget federal expenditures. How can Congress be expected 

to balance a budget while running $1 trillion annual deficits and being $20.6 trillion in debt without each 

and every tool in its arsenal? Granting Congress authority to include comprehensive spending reform in 

a process aimed at addressing spending, revenue, and debt ceiling legislation would not be a departure 

from traditional purposes of reconciliation as much as it would be strengthening the process as a whole.

UNAUTHORIZED SPENDING

 Each fiscal year, Congress appropriates roughly $300 billion in unauthorized spending. It could be 

aided in reining in such irresponsible appropriations by changing CBO’s requirement to produce a 

report on unauthorized spending from January each year to following the passage of the final full 

year appropriation for the fiscal year. This would give Congress a fuller picture of the magnitude of 

this problem for the year.
25

The Ball Is In Congress’ Court

The budget presented here balances and begins rectifying and warding off fiscal calamity. 

While we have discussed some specific areas of the budget that are wasteful and could be cut or 

reformed to save money, the overall purpose is to illustrate that balance is a necessary goal. We are not 

short on Guns or Butter. 

This is clearly not the first budget put forward before Congress. However, prior budgets have 

all made specific assumptions about what to fund, what to cut, and what to change. Prior budgets have 

included targeted reconciliation instructions aimed at achieving a specific policy objective. This is not 

one of those budgets.

This budget makes clear that balance is the goal, and rather than making policy 

recommendations, this budget asks Congress, through the committee structure, to do its job. Let 

the expertise of the Chairmen, Ranking Members, majority and minority members, and staffs of each 

committee put their noses to the grindstone toward this goal. 

If, for once, we all hold hands for fiscal responsibility, we might just surprise ourselves and the 

American People in the process.
1

S-1 Budget Totals

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2019-2023 2019-2028

Budget Totals In Billions of Dollars:

Receipts 3,338 3,490 3,678 3,827 4,012 4,228 4,444 4,663 5,002 5,299 5,520 19,234 44,162

Total Outlays 4,142 4,066 4,099 4,137 4,178 4,224 4,271 4,384 4,496 4,618 4,749 20,703 43,222

 Off-Bud Outlays 853 915 980 1,048 1,120 1,197 1,274 1,357 1,439 1,531 1,631 5,259 12,492

 On-Bud Outlays 3,288 3,151 3,120 3,088 3,058 3,027 2,997 3,027 3,057 3,088 3,118 15,444 30,730

Deficit-Surplus 804.23 576.21 421.74 309.91 165.49 3.80 173.30 278.66 505.45 680.87 771.08 1,469.54 939.82
2

S-2 Assumed Outlay Effects By Budget Function in Billions

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

2019-

2023 2019-2028

050-National

Defense

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

150-

International 

Affairs

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

250-General 

Science, Space, 

And 

Technology

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

270-

Energy

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

300- Natural 

Resources and 

Environment

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

350-

Agriculture

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

370-

Commerce and 

Housing Credit

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

400-

Transportation

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

450-

Community 

and Regional 

Development

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3

500-

Education, 

Training, 

Employment, 

and Social 

Services

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

550- Health 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

570- Medicare

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

600- Income 

Security

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

650-Social 

Security

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

700- Veterans 

Benefits and 

Services

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

750-

Administration 

of Justice

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

800- General 

Government

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

900- Net 

Interest 5 9 12 18 21 27 35 43 50 60 66 280

920-

Allowances

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

930- New 

Efficiencies, 

Consolidations, 

and Other 

Savings 404,830 586,342 812,538 1,110,423 1,275,999 1,417,269 1,631,301 1,826,034 1,996,465 2,297,589 4,190,132 13,358,790

S-2 Assumed Outlay Effects By Budget Function in 

Billions cont.
4

950-

Undistributed 

Offsetting 

Receipts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S-2 Assumed Outlay Effects By Budget Function in 

Billions cont.
5

-1700

-1200

-700

-200

300

800

1300

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

$ Billions 

Deficit: Paul Budget vs Baseline

(2018-2028)

Paul Budget

Baseline
6

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

5500

6000

6500

7000

7500

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

$ in Billions 

Paul Budget Relative to Baseline

CBO Spending Baseline 

CBO Revenue Baseline 

 

Paul Budget Outlays