CGJ&@ ll®@@Dll®~ll 

An Administrative 

History 

Roger L. Sperry 

Timothy D. Desmond 

Kathi F. McGraw 

Barbara Schmitt 

u.s. General Accounting Office 

1981 

For.w. b, tbt BuperlnLenclent of Documeo\a, U.S. OOYerumtnl PrlntJnc OIBce, Wu.hinCtoo. D.C. :!CMal 
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" 
Foreword 

As my term as Comptroller General neared 

its end. I established a special project to sum

-

marize the significant internal events. directions. 

and changes that occurred between 1966 and 

1981. The purpose of the project was to bring 

together in one place the develoJOments affecting 

the role and operations of the General Account-

ing Office in this period. A number of key people 

have been involved in these developments. in

-

cluding some who have retired from GAO. I 

thought it important that we capture the views 

and recollections of those who participated in 

GAO's work as well as assemble the written rec-

ords while still available. 

It is my hope that those who will be concerned 

with GAO's management in the future will profit by having a coherent record of how the 

Office attempted to deal with the problems and 

issues of the last 15 years. f would have benefited 

had such a record been available to me . 

. There have been many changes in GAO

's 

role during the 1966-8 1 period. We at GAO 

have faced many issues: the work of the Office 

has become more complex: and. as the period 

ends. GAO 

will still face issues with which the 

new Comptroller General and the entire orga

-

nization will be concerned. This record can be 

a useful supplement to the book authored by Dr. 

Frederick Mosher in cooperation with the Na

-

tional Academy of Public Administration. entitled 

" The GAO: The Quest for 

Accountability in 

American Government." and the accompanying 

case studies edited by Erasmus H. Kloman. 

It has been my considerable privilege to serve 

these 15 years as Comptroller Ge

neral. I learned 

quickly what an important role GAO plays 

in 

helping to make the Government accountable. 

through the Congress. to the people it serves 

and to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. 

For 

GAO's achievements during this period. the 

credit goes to the thousands of employees who 

did the work and to those in the Congress and elsewhere concerned with making GAO a 

stronger. more ca

pable institution. 

Comptroller General 

of the United States 

III 
Contents 

Foreword ... .... .. ............. .. ... .................. _ ........ .......... .. ........... . III 

Acronvms ..... ... . ... ........... ................... ............. ... ...... ..... .. .... VIII 

Preface .. ...... .. . ..... ..... .. . ... .. ... .. .. . ... .............. ... . ..... ........ ... ........ x 

Part I 

Serving the Congress and Helping to Make 

the Government More Effective and Accountable ....... .. ..... .. .. . . 1 

Chapter 1 

GAO'. World in 1966 and How It Changed Through The 1970' • . . . .. ... . ... . 2 

A Turbulent Period for Society and the Nation ... . ..... . . .... . ..... ... . ... . . . ... . . . ..•........ 2 

Changes in the Federal Government .......... . . . .. . ...... _ ......... . . . . . . . .... . . . ..•• . ...... 2 

The Congress in 1966 and How It Evolved .. .....•........ . . ... ... ....... ..... .. .... . ........ 6 

GAO in 1966 and How It Got There . ....... . . ...... .... . . .. ... . . .. . .. ..•....... .. •. ... ... ... 9 

The Congress Increasing Demands .. ...... . . ... .. . .•...... . ................ . . . . . ... ......... 12 

Chapter 2 

Senrice. to the Congre ••.. . . ....... .... ... . .......... ...... . .... . . . .......... . . . . . . .. 16 

GAO's Basic Responsibility To Serve The Congress ... .... . . ........... .... .......... . ....... 16 

A Changing Attitude Toward Serving the Congress ...... . .. . .............. . ... . ............. 17 

Growth in Audits and Evaluations Requested by Committees and Required by Statute ......... 19 

Working for Individual Members of Congress . . . .... . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . ........... . . 20 

Basic Legislative Requirements Work Also Served Congressional Information Needs .. . ..... .. . 22 

Growth in GAO's Congressional Testimony ......... . ....... . . . .... . ... . .... . ...... . ......... 22 

Assigning GAO Staff To Congressional Committees . . . . ...... . . . .. . ..... . .... . ........ . .. . . . . 24 

Reporting on Pending Legislation ................ . .. . . . ...... . .. ... . .. . .•. ...... . .... . . . ..... 26 

Assisting House and Senate Financial and Administrative Operations ... .. •. .......•... . ... . ... 26 

Systematizing the Flow of Information to the Congress . . . . . . ...... . ..... .. . . . . ..... .. . . . ...... 27 

liaison with Committees and Members . .......... .. .. . ............ . . ... .. . . . . .. . .. .. . .. .... . . 28 

Chapter 3 

GAO'. Move to Goverument-Wide Program Evaluation • ....................... 30 

The Prouty Amendment--GAO's First Major Test of Program Results .... . ... . .. .. . . ..... , ..... 30 

Major Weapon Systems--Work of limited Scope Expands to Major Propomons ............... ·33 

Broadening the Scope of GAO's Reviews .........................................••......... 35 

Evaluation as a Fundamental Pan of Program Administration ............ . ........ .. ........ .. 38 

Chapter" 

Effort. to Improve Government Financial Management ... . .................. . 42 

Making Financial Management a Joint Responsibility . ......... . ............ . . . . .. ... . ....... _ .42 

Early Effons to Improve Accounting Systems .. .. . .. .......... . .......... . .... . . . . ... .•••.. .. . 42 

Efforts To Revive Financial Management Improvement--1966 to 1981 ... . ....•.. . .. . ... .. .. . . .46 

Renewed Collaboration Between OMB and GAO . ........ . . . ....... . .. . . . .. .. .• . ... .. ...... . 49. 

Other Significant Financial Management Events ................... .. .... . _ ........ . ......... _ .50 

Standardizing Regulatory Agency Accounting Requirements .... . . . .................. . ... . ..... 53 

Chapter 5 

The Evolution of GovernllJlental Auditing 

and Intergovernmental Audit Cooperation . ........ . ..... .............. .. ....... 56 

Internal Audit Beginnings in Federal Agencies .................. .... .. ... ............ . .. . .. . . 56 

Evolution of Audit Policy in GAO ..... . ................. .. . .. . . .... ........ . . .... . .......... 58 

Efforts in GAO and Elsewhere To Combat Fraud and Abuse . ...... . .. . .... . .... . . . . .. ....... 61 

Inspectors General Strengthen the Internal Auditor's Role ...... . .......... . . . ................ 62 

Intergovernmental Audit Forums: links Between Federal. State. and Local Auditors .... ... .. 65 

IV 
Chapter 6 

Expanding GAO' • .Iuriadiction and Cooperating with Other Agencie • ..... 70 

GAO Takes On New Agencies and Issues ......... , ....... . .. . .... . . . .... . . . . . .............. 70 

Efforts To Foster Cooperation with Executive Agencies ..... . .... . .. . .. . .. . ... . ....... .... ... 77 

The Continuing Problems of Access to Records ............ . ................................ . 78 

Coordination with Other Congressional Support Agencies . ...... .. .......... ..... ..... ....... 79 

Part II 

Managing GAO to Meet the Needs of Its Times ... .. , ........ ... .. ... 83 

Chapter 7 

Managing the Agency . . ......... ...... ..... . . ........ . ........ .... .. . .......... . ... . . 84 

Comptroller General--A Unique Office. Title. and Tenure .... -..... ..... ..................... 84 

How the Comptroller General Functioned ......... . .......... _ .. ......... .... .... _ .. . . . .. ... 84 

Adapting the Office To Achieve Staats' Goals .... . ...... . .............. .. ........ _ .... .. .... ·89 

The Deputy Comptroller General ..... . ................ ................ .. _ .............. .. .. 92 

Consultants Panels ......... .. . . . . ....................................................... ... 94 

GAO's Divlslons and Offices ....... . . .... ........ . .. .. .... _ ........ _ ... ...... .. ... .. ... . .. . . 96 

Chapter 8 

The Legi.lative Charter . .... ... ... . .. ... ....... . ..... . .. . .. . ...... .. . . . ...... . ...... 104 

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 . . .... . . . .. . ................ . . .. . ...... .. .. .. .... 104 

GAO Interests Encompass a Larger Sphere asThe Congress Shaped a New Budget Process .. 105 

The GAO Acts of 1974 and 1980 . ....................................... ...... . .. .... ..... 108 

Other Legislation Affecting GAO's Charter ... ..... . . ...... .............................. . . .. 116 

Chapter 9 

Reorganizing Along Program and Functional Linea .... . .... . .. . . ......... . .. 120 

The Organization in 1966 .................... . ...... . . . . . ............ . . . .. . ................ 120 

Early Changes to Strengthen Top Management . . .... .......................... . ..... . ..... 122 

The 1972 Reorganization Along Program and Functional lines .... _ ....... .••........ .. . . ... 123 

New Organizations in Response to Changlng Needs .. . . . .............. . . . .... .... . ... ....... 125 

Reorganizing the Handling of Defense Issues ........ ...... . . . .............................. 132 

Chapter 10 

Program Planning ....... . ............... .......... ...... ... ....................... . 134 

The Bonoms-Up Process of Job Selection ................... _ .. ... .. _ ...................... 134 

Top Management Initiatives Needed at "The Front End ............. _ ......... . . ... ........... 134 

How Program Planning Emerged .. ...... ... . . . . .... . ........ . ........... . ... . ............. 135 

The Issue Areas Context ...... . .... . .... . . .. .. .. ... . ....... . . . ... .. ... . ..... ...... . ... ... . 136 

The Issue Area Program Plan Was the Central Focus of the Process .... ... .. . .. . ........... . 139 

Assignment Selection and Approval ....... . ......... . .... . . . . ...... . .... . ........... . .. . ... 143 

Relationship Between Planning and Budgeting Still Being Developed .... . .. . . . . . ........ .. . . 144 

Part III 

Developments Affecting the Scope. Quality. 

and Impact of GAO's Work ........................................ _ .... .. .. 145 

Chapter 11 

Effort. to Improve the Product • .......... .................. ... ......... .... ...... 146 

Procedures Aimed at Getting GAO Work Done In Less Time. at Less Cost .................. 146 

Increased Emphasis on Front-End Job Planning--

The Project Planning and Management Approach (PPM A) ............ . .. . .... ...... _ ... .. 154 

Information Available to Professional Staff ............................... ..... .............. 158 

Contents Continued On Next Page 

v 
Contents Continued 

Chapter 11 (Continued) 

Methodology for Performing GAO Reviews .. . ... . . ... . .......... .•.......... .. ..•••. .. ..... 161 

Communicating GAO's Message . ... . ......... . .... . . .... . .... .. . ... ... .................... 163 

Internal RevielA'and Final Processing Time ....... . .. .... . .......... ... . ................ ... .. 166 

Chapter 12 

Divenifying The Agency'. Per.onnel . .. .. .. . ...... ... ....... ........... ........ ·174 

Building and Diversifying the Professional Audit Staff ..... ........ ...... .............. .. ... ·174 

Personnel and Staff Development Functions Reconsidered .. . . . .. . . .......... ....... ....... ·178 

Creating A Personnel System for GAO .. .. .. . ................ .. .... . .. .. . . . . ..... . . . ....... 185 

Chapter 13 

Equal Employment Opportnnity For Minoritie. and Women ... . ... .. . ... . . 194 

Equal Opportunity Efforts in GAO Tied to Legislation .................. . ........ ........ .... 194 

GAO's Equal Opportunity Profile in 1980 ........... . . . .... . . ...... . ... ....... . ....... · .... 20G 

Chapter 14 

Change. In The Regional Office • ..... . ....... .. .... .. ........ .... . ........... .. . . 208 

The Regional Offices Take Shape . . .. . ......... .. ........ . ... ........ .. .............. ...... 208 

Regional Status and Contributions ................ . .... . .. ...... ............ . .. . ...... . .... 209 

Frustrations and Opportunities .. ... __ .. _ .. __ .. . ............ ..... .... . ..... . ........... . .... 213 

Unity of Purpose ... . ... . . .... . . .. .. . ......... . .. ... ....... .. .. . .... .... .. . ........... ... .. 217 

Traumatic Transformation Under Teams ... .. . . . . ... .. ...... . .. . .. ... .... . ................. 218 

The Job Scheduling and Staffing System and Regional Input to Program Planning . .... . ..... 220 

Unity of Purpose in a More Progressive Framework ' . ............... . .... . .. . .. . ......... ... 222 

The Regional Offices: Past and Future ... .. . ..... .. . . . . . .......................... .. . ..... 224 

Chapter 15 

Legal Ded.lon. and Service • ................ . . . . ........ . ........ . ............... 228 

Nature of Operation of OGC in 1966 ...... . ... .. ... . . . . ......... . .... .... . ... . . . .... ...... 228 

Changes in the Organizational Structure ........................ . ...... .... .. ...... ........ 229 

Others Participate in Managing OGC . . . . . ........................ . ......... .... _ ....... ... 230 

OGC Participation in Formulating Office· Wide Policy ....... ..... ..... ... . .. . ...... . . . ... .. . 230 

Decisionwriting .. ........ . . .... ....... , ... , ................•... . ...•.... . .. .•. ... . . .. . . . . . 231 

Procurement Bid Protest Procedures . ......... . ......... • .. . . .•... ... • .. . . . .... . . ......... 232 

Providing Legal Assistance to the Audit Staffs .. _ . ......... . .... ... .................. ...... 233 

Executive Branch Impoundments '" .... . .. .. ....... .. ....... . ................. . . . .... . . .. 234 

Legal Information and Reference Service ... . . . ... . . . ...................... . ..... .... .. . ... 235 

Chapter 16 

Management Service • . ..... . ........... _ ............ . .. . .... . .......... . ...... . . .. . 238 

Evolution of the Management Services Organization .... . ..... . .............. . ............. 238 

Internal Financial Management .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... . ... . ............... . .......... . 241 

Information Management Becomes an Agency Goal. ... ... .... .. ......... . .... . . . .... .. .... 245 

Space Renovation and Acquisition ....... . .. . . . . . ... . _ ... ... ............. . .. .. ... .... . .. .. 249 

The "Operations Manual': .......................... _ ....................... . .. . ... . ....... 250 

Epilogue ...................................... ... ..................... ..... ........ 254 

Appendix 

Importance of Maintaining GAO's Role as an Independent Agency In 

the Legislative Branch To Assist the Congress in Its Oversight of the Executive Branch and Assuring that Appropriated Funds Are Expended 

LegaUy, Economically and Effectively ...... _ ........ _ .................. . . . ... .. ............ 256 

Attachment A . ... .... . . . .. .. ......................... .. ...... . ..... . ...... .... ... .. . .... . 260 

Attachment B .. .. . .... . . . .. ... ...... .. . . .......... . . .. .. . .................. .... . . ........ 262 

Index .......................... ..... .. . ..... ........ .... .......... ...... .. .. .. ... .... 266 

VI 

Acronymns 

ADP automatic data processing FAL Firm Assignment List 

AFMD Accounting and Financial FASB Financial Accounting 

Management Division Standards Board 

AICPA American Institute of Certified FBI Federal Bureau of 

Public Accountants Investigation 

AID Agency for International FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance 

Development Corporation 

AIRES Administrative Information FEA Federal Energy Administration 

Resources System 

FGMSD Financial and General 

AMOS Automated Management Data Management Studies Division 

System 

FLRB Federal Labor Relations Board 

AMPS Assignment Management and 

Planning System FaD Field Operations Division 

ARM Assistant Regional Manager FPCD Federal Personnel and 

BARS Behaviorally Anchored Rating 

Compensation Division 

Scales GAO General Accounting Office 

BLR "basic legislative 

requirements" work 

GGD General Government Division 

CAM Comprehensive Audit Manual 

GPO Government Printing Office 

CASB Cost Accounting Standards 

GSA General Services Administration 

Board 

GS&C General Services and Con- CBO Congressional Budget Office troller 

CPA certified pUblic accoun tant HEAR Hearing, Educational Aid and 

CRS Congressional Research 

Research Foundation 

Service HEW Department of Health, EducaCSC Civil Service Commission tion, and Welfare 

HRD Human Resources Division 

CSRA Civil Service Reform Act 

INTOSAI International Organization of 

DOD Department of Defense Supreme Audit Institutions 

EEO equal employment ID International Division 

opportunity 

IPC Information Policy Committee 

EEOC Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission IPE Institute for Program EvaluaEIA Energy Information 

tion 

Administration JSSS Job Scheduling and Staffing 

EMD Energy and Minerals Division System 

Vlll 
LCD Logistics and Communications 

Division 

OPP Office of Program Planning 

OPS Office of Publishing Services 

MDS Management Data System 

OPSS Office of Policy and Special 

MSPB Merit Systems Protection Studies 

Board 

OTA Office of Technology AssessNASA National Aeronautics and ment 

Space Administration 

PAD Program Analysis Division 

OAPS Office of Administrative Planning and Services POWER Producing Organized Writing 

OAS Office of Admin istrative Serand Effective Reviewing 

vices PPB Planning, Programming, and 

OBFM Office of Budget and Financial 

Budgeting system 

Management PPC Program Planning Committee 

OCC Office of the Controller of the PPMA Project Planning and ManageCurrency ment Approach 

OCR Office of Congressional Rela- PSAD Procurement and Systems Actions quisition Division 

OESP Office of Energy and Special PSR Programming, Scheduling, 

Projects and Reporting system 

OGC Office of the General Counsel RED Resources and Economic 

Development Division 

OIM Office of Information Management SARS Selected Acquisition Reports 

OIR Office of Internal Review 

System 

SES Senior Executive Service 

0155 Office of Information Systems 

and Services SPCD Skills for Performance and 

Career Development 

OMB Office of Management and 

Budget SSA Special Studies and Analysis 

section 

OMPS Organization and Management Planning Staff TCD Transportation and Claims 

Division 

OP Office of Policy 

WRO Washington Regional Office 

OPBA Office of Program and Budget 

Analysis 

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

IX 
Preface 

In this document, the project team worked to 

record the story of the forces and events that 

shaped GAO's evolution from 1966 to 1981. 

During this time major changes occurred in the 

Federal Government and in society. GAO changed 

also; it tried to become more responsive to 

congressional as well as societal needs and to 

maintain the professionalism of its staff and its 

products. 

More specifically, this is the record of what 

occurred inside GAO during the 15 years. By 

focusing on the challenges GAO faced and its 

efforts to meet them, this document portrays 

GAO's internal developments and directions in 

the context of the social and governmental climates which inevitably shaped them. The facets 

covered include managing the agency, major 

organizational changes, developing an interdisciplinary staff, and efforts to improve GAO's 

work products. Presented in three parts, the document first discusses GAO's external relationships-how it strove to serve the Congress and 

worked to make the Government more effective 

and accountable. Covered next are internal 

management and organizational issues, such as 

managing the agency, GAO's legislative charter, 

and program planning. Last are the operational 

matters affecting the scope. quality, and impact 

of GAO's work, such as implementing the team 

concept, human resource management. and the 

regional offices' role. 

Because GAO is a Federal agency, many issues it faces are like those of other governmental 

institutions-its bureaucracy: regional/headquarters relationships; maintaining effective planning, 

budgeting, and support systems; and equal employment opportunity. Many of its problems 

should be viewed in this context. In other ways, 

GAO is unique. It is one of the world's largest 

government accounting and auditing institutions 

and the only such institution devoting a major 

share of its resources to program evaluation. It 

is a legislative support agency which must maintain objectivity and independence to be effective. 

It has little opportunity to affect Government 

operations directly; instead it must rely on the 

merit of its recommendations and the efforts of 

others to effect improvements. Finally. the scope 

of its operations spans almost the entire Federal 

Government and reaches to international bodies; 

State and local governments; public accounting 

firms; and private contractors doing business 

with the Government, as well. 

By virtue of the independence and lengthy 

term afforded the Comptroller General, the 

holder of that office is in a pOSition perhaps 

x 

unique among Government executives to chart 

the course of the agency he heads. This document provides a factual accounting of how his 

interests and goals were translated into action 

and are reflected in the developments that have 

taken place within GAO. 

The team tried to be as thorough in doing the 

research as time permitted and as objective as 

possible in writing the story. It went about its 

work much as in any GAO review of a Federal 

program. It reviewed such GAO documents as 

internal memorandums, directives, and manuals; 

past editions of publications such as 'The GAO 

Review" and speeches and testimony by the 

Comptroller General and other officials. The 

team also researched articles and books written 

on GAO, especially Dr. Mosher's book and the 

accompanying case studies edited by Mr. Kloman. 

To supplement their research, team members 

interviewed people inside and outside GAO who 

had firsthand knowledge of the significant events, 

directions, and changes of the last 15 years. They 

visited several regional offices where they talked 

with managers, project leaders, and evaluators 

about office operations and specific ongoing 

projects. They interviewed the Comptroller General, present and former top GAO officials, members of the Comptroller General's panel of consultants, and other Federal officials. 

The full scope of GAO's role in Government 

is not well understood, and documents about it 

are relatively rare. This document differs from 

others on GAO in its scope, its focus, and its 

intended audience. It is the only document that 

deals mainly with GAO's development from 

1966 to 1981 and the only one giving extensive 

coverage to the agency's internal activities. Since 

much of the initiative for strengthening GAO's 

role and operations came from within, focusing 

on this aspect of GAO's history provides additional perspective. 

This history was prepared for the incoming 

Comptroller General, who will take charge of a 

General Accounting Office markeclly different 

from that of the 1960's. GAO's new management team may want to know how external 

events and internal changes helped reshape the 

philosophy and character of the institution; how 

GAO's functions, work agenda, and methods 

developed; what kinds of administrative problems arose and how they were handled: how the 

organizational structure evolved; and what GAO's 

current posture is. 

The GAO staff should also find this material 

of interest. Those at GAO from 1966 to 1981 

have been enmeshed in the changes and growth 
the agency has experienced. Sometimes the 

changes have left some staff members confused 

and frustrated. Although the staffs overall sup- port for the changes has been admirable. adjusting to them has not always been easy. This 

document may give the staff a clearer under- standing of some of those changes and highlight 

some of the challenges of the future. 

In addition, people outside the agency who 

have an interest in GAO's work and its place in 

the larger scheme of governmental affairs may 

also find this document useful. This includes peo- ple in the Congress who need and use GAO's 

services and are responsible for its oversight. 

Others in this group are administrators in organizations having functions similar to those of 

GAO-inspectors general and internal audit 

staffs and State and local government audit 

agencies. Keeping up with the times, responding to increasing congressional demands, and taking on 

the roles envisioned by the Comptroller General 

was not a simple or painless process for the Of- fice, as will be made clear in the chapters that 

follow. However, most observers would likely 

agree that, despite the difficulties encountered, 

GAO is a more diverse and, in many ways, more 

responsive institution today than it was in 1966. 

Whether GAO adequately responds to all expectations and fulfills the mandate In its legisla- tive charter will be left up to others to judge. John D. Heller, Assistant Comptroller Gen- eral, provided overall guidance and supervision. Dr. Mosher, now Miller Professor of Public Affairs 

at the White Burkett Miller Center for Public 

Affairs, University of Virginia. served as a con- sultant to the study team and provided access 

to his research materials. 

Many others participated in developing this 

administrative history. Special credit goes to 

Katherine Rivera who served so capably as sec- retary to the project team and typed the manuscript. Two summer interns, Glen Levis and 

Jonathan Towers. helped with the research and 

drafted many feature stories. GAO's divisions 

and offices provided the basic materials, and 

Raymond Wyrsch, an attorney in the Office of 

the General Counsel who drafted the chapter on 

GAO's legal services, deserves special mention. 

The chapters were reviewed by a reader panel 

consisting of Hy Krieger. Clerio Pin, and David 

Sorando-all senior GAO officials-and two 

members of GAO's Career Level Council, Alan 

Bogus and Guy Wilson. Many others in various 

parts of the organization informally reviewed segments of the manuscript. Also deserving recognition is the timely and competent work of two 

GAO editors, Mariann Thomson and Diane Lee, 

and the staff of GAO's Office of Publishing Ser- vices, especially Sharon Sebastian, who pre- pared the manuscript for publication. A joint effort though this history is, the per- spectives presented are those of the authors and 

they do not necessarily reflect the official poSition 

of the General Accounting Office. either as to 

the events depicted or their outcomes. The au- thors are solely responsible for the accuracy and 

interpretation of the data and information. Roger L. Sperry 

November 1980 

Xl 
IP@ITU TI 

Serving The Congress 

And Helping To Make 

The Government More 

Effective And 

Accountable 
CCIJu<ID[p)l1®IT J1 

GAO's World In 1966 And How It 

Changed Through The 19705 

Elmer 8 . Staats' IS-year term as Comptroller 

General was set in an arena of enormous change 

in the world. in our society. and in our Government. As the term began in 1966, our country, 

although involved in an expensive and debilitating war, enjoyed unparalleled prosperity and 

influence in the world. In the 15 years that followed. the Government vastly expanded its 

commitments and its demands on the Nation's 

resources. However. as the 1980's approached. 

it became evident that available resources were 

limited even as the Government was being increasingly challenged by tougher issues both at 

home and overseas. 

This chapter highlights the salient events that 

affected the General Accounting Office during 

these 15 years. It describes what GAO was like 

in 1966. how it got there. and how the Congress 

began to look more and more to GAO for advice 

and support on many of the challenges and prob, 

lems facing the Nation. 

A Turbulent Period For Society 

And The Nation 

The period 1966-81 was one of turmoil in the 

world and in the Nation. Abroad, the United 

States fought a war in Vietnam that its people 

found increasingly difficult to understand and jus- tify. The RUSSians crushed a rebemon in Czechoslovakia and invaded Afghanistan. but they also 

entered into arms limitation agreements and 

helped foster a period of detente with the West 

Meanwhile, the United States opened the door 

to mainland China and eventually established 

normal diplomatic ties. It also became more 

aware of the limits to its power. as nations constituting a " third world" emerged to exercise 

their own influence on world events. Attention 

focused on the Midclle East because of the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and its effect on that 

most precious of natural resource~il. Terrorism in its many forms became an increasingly 

popular tool of various individuals. groups. and 

even nations. The multinational corporation also 

became a larger force in world affairs. 

At home. turmoil was everywhere. The Nation experienced a civil rights revolution, race 

riots, antiwar demonstrations. and political activism on college campuses. Two national leaders 

were assassinated. A Vice President and then a 

President resigned in disgrace. With rising prosperity and population increases in the Sunbelt 

and the declines of older. northern cities. marked 

regional differences emerged. Energy prices 

soared follOwing establishment of the OPEC car2 

tel and the Arab oil embargo. The nickel candy 

bar went the same way as the 30-cent gallon of 

gas. and Inflation replaced unemployment as the 

foremost domestic economic concern. 

The basic texture of society underwent change. 

Women took major steps toward a mo,e equal 

role. The post-World War [I baby boom worked 

its way through the education system and began 

affecting the demand for housing. transportation. 

and other essential services. Couples waited 

longer to have children and then had fewer. The 

basic family structure came under increasing 

strains and the divorce rate increased dramatically. As society became more complex. many 

persons sought a simpler way of life. The average 

age of the population slowly increased. and issues affecting the aged attracted greater attention. 

This was also a period of great technological 

achievement and challenge. Men landed on the 

moon and returned safely to earth. Unmanned 

spacecraft traveled to many planets. soft-landed 

on Mars and Venus. and sent back pictures and 

scientific data. Test-tube babies were born. Scientists unlocked some basic secrets of life and 

began developing whole new life forms. Yet science failed to cure some problems and seemed 

to create others. The swine flu immunization 

program protected Americans from an epidemic 

that never occurred and had to be canceled 

when it was linked to paralysis and death. Three 

Mile Island dramatized the dangers inherent in 

nuclear technology if not properly used and controlled. Environmental pollution became a matter of great concern. 

As the 1970's came to a close. the limits of 

the Nation's growth were more evident. but citizens had Just begun the painful process of adjusting their living habits and expectations. The 

future suddenly seemed not nearly as bright. and 

many were beginning to question the capacity 

of Government and other institutions to cope 

with the issues and problems of the day. 

Changes In The Federal 

Government 

The 1960's and 1970's were decades of great 

growth in the Federal Government and centralization of power in Washington. Elmer Staats 

became Comptroller General during the 89th 

Congress. which President Lyndon Johnson 

termed the most productive in the 20th century. 

The PreSident set the tone for that Congress in 

June 1964: 

We stand at the edge of the greatest ere 

in the life of any nation. f:or the first time 
in world history, we haue the abundance 

and the ability tojree euery man from 

hopeless wont, an to free euery person 

to find fulfillment in the works of his mind 

or the fabor of his hands. The nation. this people, this generation, has man 's first chance to create a Great 

Society: a society of success without squa- lor. beauty without barrenness. works of 

genius without the wretchedness of pouerty. We can open the doors of learning. We can open the doors Qf fruitful labor and 

rewarding leisure, of open opportunity and 

close community-not just to the priuileged 

few, but to eueryone. • 

By the end of 1966, the Government under 

Johnson's direction and with the Congress' cooperation, had embarked on a course as challenging to American society as was the New Deal 

of the 1930's. Consider the scope of legislation 

enacted by the 89th Congress: 

• An antipoverty program and a new Office 

of Economic Opportunity. 

• Voting rights. • A broad housing program, including rent 

subsidies. 

• Aid to primary and secondary schools and 

college scholarships. 

• Appalachian regional development. 

• Regional medical centers. 

• Programs to combat air and water pollution. 

• Grants for beautification of city parks and 

streets. • A new foundation for the arts and 

humanities. 

MEN LANDING ON 11fE MOON hlghHgh.ed the 'echnologlcolodvoncos of 'hIS ern ,..,.. ...... 

3 
These laws were enacted during a time of 

major and growing expenditures for the Vietnam 

War that eventually totaled more than $150 bil- lion, yet the financial commitment to these ini- tiatives also grew substantially, In 1965, the Fed- eral Government spent $7,6 billion, or 6,4 

percent of the budget. on education, community 

development and housing. and health and wel- fare, By 1970, spending for these programs totaled $29,7 billion, or 15 percent of the budget. 

Even discounting for inflation, these expendi- tures tripled in 5 years,' 

Along with this growth came a trend toward 

decentralizing the responsibility for carrying out 

the programs, a trend that was to complicate the 

question of accountability for program resuits, It was not the Federal Government. but State 

and local governments, nonprofit organizations. and private contractors which were called on to 

provide services to the people, In many cases, Federal funds were merged with financing from 

other sources. and policy development and im- plementation became a joint responsibility, The Government followed a "services" strat- egy, rather than an "incomes" strategy, in at- tempting to serve the needs of the people who 

were the targets of the new legislation, This 

brought into the Government large numbers of 

social scientists, health care administrators, and 

other profeSSionals to run the programs: aid State 

and local governments: and, in some cases, de- liver the services, In short, the Government's 

work force changed. necessitating changes in the 

way programs were reviewed and evaluated, 

In the late 1960' s, the growth in domestic 

programs slowed somewhat as it became in- creaSingly evident that the Federal budget could 

not finance major new social programs and the 

costly Vietnam War at the same time, Attention 

shifted to environmental and consumer issues. 

The Congress enacted flammable fabric safe- guards. a truth-in-Iending statute, the National 

Environmental Policy Act, and occupational 

safety and health legislation. Riots in the cities, 

campus unrest. and rising crime rates spurred 

anticrime legislation and law enforcement as- sistance to States and localities, Laws prohibiting 

most interstate sales of firearms and combating 

organized crime were enacted, As the roles of Government changed and 

grew, the Congress turned toward new organi- zational and institutional arrangements, In ad - dition to creating two new Cabinet departments 

in the mid-1960's (Housing and Urban Devel- opment and T ransporlation ). the Congress au - thorized the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 

to oversee the public television network, an in- dependent U.S. Postal Service to deliver the 

mail. and the National Rail Passenger Corpo- ration (AMTRAK) to take over rail passenger ser- vice, The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 

1968 and general revenue sharing enacted in 

4 

1972 formalized the growing interdependence 

of the Federal Government and its State and 

local counterparts, The early 1970' s also featured a growing con- flict between the executive and legislative 

branches--each controlled by a different political 

party and government philosophy-over which 

branch should establish policy and which should 

carry it out. Although the separation of powers 

is embedded in the Constitution. accommoda- tions between the two branches that had made 

the process work began to break down , An early 

action was the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin res- olution, As the Vietnam War escalated, the Con- gress became increasingly concerned about the 

level of total Federal spending and enacted a 

succession of rather ineffective expenditure ceil- ings, By late 1972, the issue reached a turning 

point when the Congress failed to agree on a 

$250 billion spending ceiling ;')r fiscal year 1973, 

but created a special jOint study committee on 

the budget This started the actions that even- tually led to establishing a new congreSSional 

budget process and strict controls on the im- poundment of funds by the executive branch. 

Watergate and the impeachment of President 

Richard Nixon dominated the Congress' atten- tion for nearly 2 years, More than any other event 

in recent times. the Watergate break-in and sub- sequent coverup focused the Congress' anention 

on its own strengths and Iirnitations vis-a-vis the 

executive branch, The Senate Select Commit- tee, chaired by Senator Sam Ervin, contributed 

greatly to disclosing the story. and the House 

Judiciary Committee acted with great courage 

on impeachment. But it was the special prose- cutors. the courts, and the news media that uncovered much of the damaging evidence, Al- though the President was eventually forced out 

of office, he successfully resisted the efforts of an 

all but united Congress to obtain data essential 

to fully disclosing key occurrences surrounding 

Watergate , This unfortunate affair catalyzed 

congressional action on many fronts. including 

the 1973 War Powers Act. the 1974 Budget Act. 

and further campaign finance reform measures, Eventually. many statutes. rules, and regulations 

were put in place and a host of other actions 

were taken to make Government more open. 

more ethical. and more democratic, FollOwing Nixon's reSignation, world events 

soon brought about a refocusing of attention on 

policy matters, The Congress grappled with the 

unwieldy energy issue, It enacted a series of laws 

providing authOrity for many new initiatives and 

establishing new governmental unitr-the Fed- eral Energy Administration, the Energy Research 

and Development Administration, and eventu- ally the Department of Energy-but it never 

seemed to get on top of the issue, As the decade 

closed, however, the Congress took major steps 

to accelerate construction of priority energy proj-
ecls. recover oil companies' windfall profits. finance synthetic fuel development. and decontrol 

fuel prices. 

Economic issues also needed more attention 

as the Congress entered the last half of the 

1970·s. Major legislation included the Trade Act 

of 1974: Federal aid to New York City: tax cuts. 

incentives. and reforms: and social security financing reforms. Inflation. unemployment. and 

decline in productivity became increasingly serious problems that defied a common solution. 

By the close of the decade. the Federal Govemment was increasingly being called upon to 

protect industries threatened by imports. provide 

antirecession assistance. and shore up State and 

local govemments and U.S. companies in finan -

cial trouble. 

The approval by California voters of Proposition 13. sharply limiting State property taxes. 

highlighted popular reaction to the growth of 

government and increased intrusion in the affairs 

of businesses and individuals. Congressional responses to this trend included a series of regulatory reform measures. proposals to limit total 

Federal spending by law or constitutional 

amendment, increasing use of the legislative 

veto, and providing more attention to its over· 

Sight responsibilities. 

Thus, this period exhibited great growth in 

Federal Govemment responsibilities. strong reaction to governmental inefficienCies, and a 

growing sense that our problems transcended 

the Government's ability to cope with them, In 

contrast to the optimism, energy. and hope expressed by Lyndon Johnson in 1964. President 

Jimmy Carter perceived a fundamental threat to 

the Nation. a crisis of confidence, in the summer 

of 1979: 

The erosion of our confidence in the 

future is threatening to destroy the social 

and political fabric of America. • • • Our 

people are losing • •• faith , not only in 

government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and 

shapers of our democracy." 

Carter proposed ways the Nation could regain 

its confidence and per.;evere. Although many did 

not share his assessment of the situation, no one 

could deny that major challenges faced government in the 1980's and that a time of possibly 

great change lay ahead. 

SENATE WATERGATE COMMJ1TEE heanngs wete the focus of national aHention In 1973 

5 
The Congress In 1966 And How 

It Evolved 

the President to carry them out, even from the 

beginning, the two branches were involved in 

each other's functions. Even though the Con- gress sometimes played the dominant role in 

establishing govemment policy during the 19th 

century, the initiative for defining the Nation's 

problems and recommending solutions became 

finnly established in the executive branch during 

the 20th centu.ry. The executive branch con- ducted foreign policy, proposed major new leg- islation. and drafted the budget War and other 

emergencies caused the Congress to grant the 

President many new and broad powers to act 

unilaterally. The Congress increasingly exercised 

its influence through checks and balancesquestioning, amending, delaying, or negating the 

executive's actions. The judicial branch also be- came more actively involved in interpreting the 

meaning of laws and ruling on their 

constitutionality. 

The Constitution established the Congress as 

a coequal branch of Govemment and included 

among its powers the authority to assess and 

collect taxes, regulate interstate and foreign com- merce, coin money, establish post offices, de· clare war. and maintain the Armed Forces. Working largely through a system of about 50 

standing and special committees. the national 

legislature enacts laws authorizing Govemment 

programs, establishing organizations to carry 

them out. and making appropriations to fund 

them. It also oversees execution of the laws. 

EXECUIlVE DOMINATES THE POUCYMAKING 

PROCESS 

Although the separation of powers doctrine 

provides for the Congress to make the laws and 

6 

Oversight: Its Increasing Popularity In The Congress 

The Congress has exercised oversight as far back as the Whiskey Rebellion in 1792, but 

this function has traditionally taken a back seat to other congressional activities, such as 

enacting legislation and servicing constituents. The picture changed somewhat during the 96th 

Congress, led in part by House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill. The National Journal reported that even before the 96th Congress opened, Speaker 

O'Neill had commented to a group of congressional aides that: "There are so many programs 

in this govemment of ours that are obsolete in nature and we have done nothing about them . • • • America is crying for us to put oversight to work and that is what we are going to do 

in this Congress. " 

Where effective oversight was exercised in the past, it was usually the result of initiatives 

by a single committee or member. Indeed. some have made reputations on their oversight 

work. Notable examples were the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, a pioneer 

in evaluation. and the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Alaska Lands of the House 

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. whose staff several years ago produced one of the 

first oversight manuals. Members noted for their oversight work include Senator William 

Proxmire and former Representatives H. R. Gross and John E. Moss. Over the years. the 

Congress has considered various proposals to make oversight more systematic and widespread. 

but it has generally backed away from placing specific requirements on its committees. GAO has strongly supported strengthening congressional oversight, believing it can be 

improved without new legislation by better analysis of proposed legislation. inclusion of ov- ersight requirements in legislation. more oversight of program design and regulation development. and better use of program evaluation information. It has also supported the objectives 

of general oversight reform proposals. e.g .. modified sunset legislation. because new laws 

could help translate congressional commitment into better oversight efficiently and system- atically. The Office. of course. supports existing oversight efforts through its reports and 

testimony and other less formal assistance to committees. The trend toward greater oversight activity in the 96th Congress was reflected in figures 

in a status report published by the House leadership: 

The record of the first session ' • • shows that formal oversight activity of congres- sional committees and subcommittees have increased by approximately 25 percent over 

such activity in the 95th Congress and by more than 50 percent over the 94th Congressan important and dramatic trend for the Congress as a goveming institution. 

Whether or not the Congress enacts oversight reform legislation. the trend toward increased 

oversight will likely continue as long as there is widespread concem about the effectiveness 

of govemment programs and the total level of Federal spending. 
Congress gradually came to recognize its 

need for more resources. By the mid-1960's. an 

essentially reactive Congress had coped with the 

strong policy initiatives of at least three aggressive 

Presidents-Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, 

and John Kennedy. In 1966 it was in the process 

of digesting the almost overwhelming legislative 

agenda of a fourth President-Lyndon B. Johnson. Unfortunately, the Congress did not have 

an information network and other resources 

needed to respond effectively. Instead, it had to 

rei\! heavily on the executive branch's extensive 

information network for reports, testimony. and 

other Information. The Congress slowly recognized that it needed independent sources to respond to its needs and to check out the biases 

of those sponsoring new programs or protecting 

established activities. As trust between the Congress and the executive branch broke down almost completely during the Watergate years, the 

Congress' dependence on the executive branch 

became intolerable, and it took steps to increase 

its already expanding resources. 

THE CONGRESS MOVES TO REFORM ITSELF 

AND STRENGTHEN ITS ROLE 

In asserting its status as a coequal branch, the 

Congress is sometimes hampered by its own 

decentralized organization. The executive branch 

can speak with one voice-the President's. The 

judicial branch acts ultimately through nine Supreme Court justices deciding cases as a unit 

The Congress, on the other hand. consists of 

535 members and more than 300 committees 

and subcommittees. It acts as a unit when enacting legislation, but the expression of its institutional needs is ultimately left to the more than 

800 entities-committee, subcommittee, and 

member offices-that constitute it. 

Even though policymaking powers had largely 

drifted to the executive branch, concerns about 

the Congress' effectiveness in carrying out its 

constitutional role periodically came to the forefront and institutional reform ensued. Two early 

examples are the Budget and Accounting Act. 

1921, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 

1946. When Elmer Staats was appointed CompTHE SENATE underwent many changes. Including new party leadership following the 1980 elections. NooorIQl Coptrol H'lIIorfcal Soclely 

7 
troller General, another such movement had 

already begun. In 1966. the Joint Committee on 

the Organization of Congress. established the 

previous year. recommended several reforms to 

help the Congress cope better with its increased 

workload. including 

• steps to curtail the power of committee 

chairmen. open committee sessions to the 

public. and create several new committees. 

• limitations on Senate committee assignments designed to decrease the senators 

workloads. end 

• adoption of a 5 · day congressional 

workweek. 

As a step toward enabling the Congress to 

regain the initiative in the budget process. the 

Committee also recommended that GAO help 

the Congress locate and summarize budget data 

and conduct cost· benefit studies.' Essentially. the 

Committee was pointing toward what became 

the central themes for GAO in the next 15 

years-finding out whether Government pro· grams were working as they were intended and 

providing relevant information when the Con· gress needed it. 

The Congress took 5 years to translate some 

of the Committee's recommendations into law. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 fell 

far short of some reformers expectations. but it 

did generate changes in congressional proce· dures, enlarge congressional staffs, and strengthen 

support agencies, including GAO. (This act is 

discussed further on p. 12 and in ch. 8.) 

Institutional reform gathered momentum in 

the 1970's. In 1971, the House adopted modest 

changes in the seniority system and changed its 

rules to permit more recorded votes on legisla· tion. Two years later. the House Democratic 

Caucus began subjecting committee chairmen 

to reelection by a publicly recorded vote every 

2 years. The move to reduce the power of com· mittee chairmen climaxed in 1975 when the 

large freshman class in the House helped depose 

three senior chairmen-Wright Patman (Bank· ing), F. Edward Hebert (Armed Services), and 

W. R. Poage (Agriculture). Although the Senate 

did not depose any of its chairmen. it also mod· ified its rules for appointing committee chairmen 

and ranking minority members. 

Both Houses conducted special studies of 

their committee structures. In the House. a select 

committee headed by Congressman Richard 

Bolling proposed sweeping changes in commit· 

tee jurisdictions, limiting members to serving on 

one major committee. and increased emphasis 

on oversight. In 1974. the House rejected this 

proposal for a milder one, but the changes 

adopted included an increase in the number of 

subcommittees, referral of bills to more than one 

committee at a time, and across·the·board sub· poena authority for aU committees. Three years 

later. the Senate reorganized its committee struc· 

8 

ture, by redUCing the number of committees from 

30 to 25 and limiting the number of committees 

and subcommittees on which a member could 

serve. 

Accompaying the procedural and organiza· 

tional reforms were large increases in congressional staff and growth in the number and power 

of subcommittees. According to the "Congres· sional Quarterly," the legislative branch had 

more than 38.000 employees (including those 

in support agencies) in 1979. a huge increase 

since the mid· 1960's. The chart below shows the 

growth in House and Senate staff between 1965 

and 1978' 

House and Senate committee aides. who ac· counted for much of the growth. increased from 

1.210 in 1967 to 3,052 in 1977 (a 152·percent 

increase). Not only did the staff available for all 

Senators increase. but for the first time. the Sen· ate also authorized a committee staffer for each 

Senator on the committee. And as the number 

of subcommittees grew. so did the availability of 

staff for those who became subcommittee chair· men. b In addition to the committees. ad hoc in· formal groups. such as the Democratic Study 

Group. were formed in each House to assist 

members in matters of special interest. The per· sonal staffs of members in both Houses also grew 

markedly to support the policymaking function. 

casework. assistance on Federal projects. and 

press relations. Congressional staff expertise has generally 

risen over the years due to the greater need for 

specialization and more technical sophistication. Also, staff resources have been more widely dis· 

tributed. to the benefit of junior and minority 

party membersJ 

The effect of congressional reform and staff 

growth on GAO is hard to measure, but at least 

two possibilities occur. First, the larger number 

of staff have a greater appetite for information. 

which tends to increase and diversify GAO's 

workload. Second. the Congress has strength· ened its own capability to conduct analyses and 

investigations of Government activities. This provides additional "competition" for GAO. espe· cially with regard to those committees and memo 

bers who are either unaccustomed to working 

with the Office or dissatisfied with the support 

received in the past. But overall, the trend has 

been toward a marked increase in demand for 

GAO services. (See ch. 2. I 

The Congress found itself in the midst of an 

information explosion . Accompanying the 

congressional staff growth was the proliferation 

of lobbying groups, growth of Washington law 

firms, establishment of public interest groups, and development of various independent reo 

search organizations. Even the Federal bureauc· 

racy increased its resources as a whole new cadre 

of professionals joined the Government to ad· minister the new social programs and evaluate 

their results. 
Figure 1-1 

Growth in Legislative Branch 

Support Staff. 1967-1977 

CODBre •• loDal Staff .96 1 

Members 

Senate 1,749 

House 4,055 

Subtotal 5.804 

Committees 

Senate 621 

House 589 

Subtotal 1,210 

Total 7.014 

Support ABende. 

Congressional Budget Office a 

Congressional Research 

Service b 

General Accounting Office 4,216 

Office of Technology 

Assessment a 

Total 4,216 

NOTES: 

• A •• ~ Dot ..... bU . ... .d aC . .... clata. b 0.111 • predec _ _ r .. _C)'. til. 

lAe l ... tt ........ r • • c. Sen/Ie ••• Jat.d., 

SOURCES: 

S ._. Ha __ o.d, .. Co ....... lo •• 1 Ca. •••• 

•• d ."0"-: StaHl •• the Co .......... I. Leglalaff(le Rqorm, t ... o., N. RI .... lb.c ... ad . •• d V.S. Go" . ....... a.d ••• Appc.· dla, FY n17'. 

GAO In 1966 And How It Got 

There 

Where the Office stood in 1966 was best 

summed up in testimony given the previous year 

by Acting Comptroller General Frank H. Weitzel 

before the Joint Committee on the Organization 

of Congress: 

We have over 2.000 professional ac· 

countants, auditors, and investigators. many 

of whom are certified public accountants. 

We feel that with the breadth of experience 

that this group of highly trained individuals 

can bring to bear we are capable of assistthe committees~in~~~~&.~~~ 

How had GAO reached this stage in its development, and how prepared was it to assist a 

reawakening Congress? Answers are necessary 

to understand GAO's contributions during the 

1966-81 period, but they will be discussed only 

briefly here. Mosher extenSively describes GAO's 

early history in his book and several others have 

written on the subject. 

" " la cr •••• la u __ 

1961 to . 970 to 

1970 . 970 1971 1971 

2.299 31.4 3,903 69.8 

4,545 12. 1 6,939 52.7 

6.844 17.9 10,842 58.4 

695 l1.9 1, 184 70.3 

705 19.7 1,868 165.0 

1,400 15.7 3,052 l18.0 

8,244 17.5 13.894 68.5 

a 208 oc 

323 763 136.2 

4,471 6 .0 5,105 14.2 

a 151 

4,794 13.7 6,227 29.9 

THE EARLY \'EARS 

According to Mosher, GAO's antecedents 

reach back to the legislative system of appro- priations established by the British Parliament in 

1688. GAO's American ancestry dates back to 

the beginning of the Republic, but the Office 

came into existence as a separate entity when 

the Budget and Accounting Act became effective 

July 1. 1921. The act established GAO as an age c~ "independent of the executive depariments ' to review, control, and audit Government accounts, and report on operations 

throughout the Federal Government.9 

Starting with about 1,700 employees inher- ited from the Treasury Department and a budget 

oLabout $3 million, the first Comptroller General, John R. McCarl (1921-36l. built an agency that 

concentrated primarily on making centralized 

voucher audits and rendering decisions on the 

legality of the disbursement of Federal funds. 

GAO's early goals .were to ensure strict compli- ance with the laws, accuracy and honesty of executive agency employees, and conformance 

with accounting forms and procedures prescribed by GAO. The Office concentrated its efforts on exercising administrative controls directly 

over executive agencies and did little reporting 

to the Congress on agency operations or assisting 

9 
the Congress in carrying out its own duties. The 

work was centralized in Washington, D. C. 

GAO's role expanded and changed consid- erably during the tenure of its second Comp- troller General, Lindsay C. Warren (1940-54). 

Government growth during the New Deal years 

and World War II made it impractical for the 

Office to continue auditing every Government 

voucher at a central location in Washington. In 

addition, two important laws changed GAO's 

role dramatically. The first was the Government 

Corporation Control Act of 1945, which directed 

the Office to audit Government corporations an- nually using commercial audit techniques. This 

required hiring professional accountants and 

started the process of replacing the existing staff 

of clerks, investigators, and attorneys. In addi- tion, the act necessitated onsite audits, a practice 

leading to the formation of a large field staff. The second key law was the Budget and Ac- counting Procedures Act of 1950, which au- thorized GAO to review Federal agency account- ing procedures and controls in lieu of checking 

thousands of ledger accounts. Rather than pre- scribing detailed accounting forms and requiring 

their use, GAO was authorized to prescribe accounting "principles and standards" to be observed by each executive agency. 

Out of these changes grew the Office's interest 

in developing a concept known as the compre- hensive audit. Outlined in late 1951-in what 

became known as the Westfall report-the purpose of the comprehensive audit was to determine how well each Federal agency carried out 

its financial responsibilities, which included 

spending funds only for clearly authorized pro- grams and conducting the programs effiCiently 

and economically. This type of audit went well 

beyond what was necessary to certify the accuracy of an agency's financial statements. The 

comprehensive audit included such steps as (1) 

studying the relevant laws and pertinent legislative history, (2) reviewing agency policies, procedures, and practices. (3) evaluating the effec- tiveness of applying public funds, and (4) verifying 

individual transactions. All important deficiencies 

encountered during such audits were to be fully 

explored, developed, and reported with rec- ommendations for corrective action. 10 

Making a comprehensive audit entailed fo- cusing on the financial management of a Federal 

agency and reporting the results of each audit 

PRESIDENT HARRY S . TRUMAN signs the Budge,l & Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 while Comptroller General 

Lindsey WalTen (behind the President) and others look on. 

10 
as it was completed, rather than in an annual 

report as contemplated in the 1921 act. To facilitate the audits, GAO established audit staffs 

at Federal agency headquarters and at locations 

outside Washington. D.C. In 1952, a formal sys- tem of regional offices was established and the 

audit procedures were codified in the Compre- hensive Audit Manual. So large was the Warren 

legacy that GAO was still digesting the changes 

nearly 30 years later. 

GAO's transformation continued. From a to- tal of more than 15,000 in 1946, GAO's staff 

size shrank to about 8,000 in 1950, to 6,000 in 

1954. and to a low of 4,100 in 1966. In 1956, 

the accounting, auditing, and investigative func - tions were consolidated into two large divisions---

Defense and Civil. A third. the International Di- vision, was added in 1963. Each of these divi- sions was largely autonomous and adopted its 

own auditing approaches consistent with broad 

gUidance provided by a small policy staff. Under 

Comptroller General Joseph Campbell. a prom- inent certified public accountant with roots in the 

private sector, the Office modeled itself more and 

more after a large accounting firm. 

HOLIFIELD HEARINGS 

[n 1951, the Congress granted GAO au - thority to examine the records of private com- panies entering into negotiated defense contracts, and in 1955, GAO's field offices began 

audits of negotiated, fixed-price contracts at in- dividual contractor installations. Taking increas- ing interest in this contract work, the Congress 

broadened GAO's authority in 1962 by enacting 

the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. This legislation, intended partly to safeguard the Government 

against inflated cost estimates in negotiated cost 

contracts, further stimulated GAO's defense contractor auditing. Departing from the broad concepts of the 

comprehensive audit, GAO conducted hundreds 

of individual audits at contractor locations. Inside 

the agency, heavy emphasis was placed on pro- ducing large numbers of reports. Often several 

reports were issued covering the same deficiency 

found over and over again in single audit contracts. The reports named names and often 

sought contractor refunds for overpricing. This tack eventually provoked strong reaction 

from the Defense Department and defense contractors during a series of hearings held in 1965 

by the House Committee on Government Op- erations' Military Operations Subcommittee. The 

hearings were chaired by Congressman Chet 

Holifield, a veteran congressman with a deep 

interest in GAO. Witness after witness attacked 

GAO's approach to auditing defense contracts, particularly its efforts to seek voluntary refunds. 

publicize only deficiencies, identify individual 

companies and offiCials. and report on cases of 

alleged wrongdoing referred to the Justice Department for further investigation. Aside from 

GAO officials, one of the few witnesses who supported GAO's role was Elmer B. Staats, then 

Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 

He was several months away from any inkling 

that he would be appointed Comptroller General, when he said: 

• • • the President and the Bureau of the 

Budget regard GAO reports as an impor- tant source of assistance in working toward 

our goa/ of strengthened agency management. In this same regard, I would like to 

emphasize that there has been a very substantial amount of cooperative and joint 

effort between the General Accounting 

Office and the Bureau of the Budget. We 

regard this arrangement as a very healthy 

development. 1 1 

Ten months later, as Staats was assuming his 

new duties as Comptroller Genera[, the House 

Government Operations Committee issued its 

report on the hearings. A draft of the report, sharply critical of GAO's defense contract audits, had previously been furnished to GAO for com- ment In a letter to Chairman Holifield, dated 4 

days before Staats assumed office, Acting Comp- troller General Frank Weitzel had outlined steps 

being taken to respond to the criticisms. Thus, 

instead of castigating the Office, the final Committee report primarily described changes in 

GAO contract audit policies and procedures and 

improvements made since the hearings. [n his 

book. Mosher notes some of the changes: 

• GAO would produce broader studies focused on the causes of deficiencies rather 

than publicizing individual cases. There- fore. the reports would be fewer in number 

and more comprehensive. 

• It would emphasize constructive and cor- rective changes for the future rather than 

past errors. 

• [t would more carefully guard confidential 

business information and would report on 

such information only after careful review 

by top-level GAO officials. 

• It would not include names and titles of 

alleged official offenders and recommendations for discipline in its reports. 

• It would not mention referrals of cases to 

the Department of Justice in its reports. 

• It would phrase its report titles in more con- structive and less controversial terms. 12 

Opinions differ about the impact the hearings 

had on GAO. Some in GAO at the time believe, 

in retrospect, that the long-range effects were not 

significant, but others saw the immediate impact 

as rather traumatic. The hearings took place at 

a time when the Office's contract work might 

logically have been reduced because the De- fense Contract Audit Agency had just been cre11 
ated, but one source asserts that the hearings 

caused virtual discontinuance of defense contract 

audits. Because this work had been conducted 

largely at GAO's fie ld offices, the cutback, according to this source, diminished the status and 

role of the field offices vis-a-vis the headquarters 

staff. 13 

Whatever the trauma. the hearings did help 

usher in a period of broader scale. more results 

oriented audits and evaluations. The Committee 

report also illustrated that the Congress does not 

always act with one mind in providing guidance 

to GAO. While the 1965 Joint Committee on the 

Organization of Congress was urging GAO to 

undertake a more policy-oriented. analytical role 

in reviewing the budget, the Holifield message 

seemed to be that GAO should exercise more 

care when venturing out of its traditionally nar- row financial management territory. As discussed 

in chapter 2, by 1969 the Congres!r--led by Sen- ator William Proxmire and the Joint Economic 

Committee-was again urging a heavy GAO 

presence in defense contracting. 

The Congress' Increasing 

Demands 

Despite those who urged GAO's return to a 

more limited view of its responsibilities, events 

in the Congress and in Government made a re- turn to the past impossible. Events described 

throughout this document illustrate how the 

Congress translated its growing need for its own 

information netvvork into new requirements on 

GAO. Some took the form of statutory mandates 

for reviews of individual programs, and others 

involved enactment of broad new statutory powers. Here are the highlights in chronolOgical 

order. 

SENATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE (1968)_ 

The Senate amended its rules to require that 

senators, candidates for the Senate, and Senate 

staff earning more than a specified income file 

each year with the Comptroller General a confidential statement of financial interest. In 1977, the Senate augmented this largely custodial func- tion by requiring GAO to (1) assist persons in 

completing their financial disclosure statements 

and (2) audit a randomly selected sample of 

statements each year. A year later, the Congress 

approved legislation establishing uniform fina n- cial disclosure procedures for top officials in all 

three branches of Government and relieved 

GAO of the responsibility to audit individual 

statements, but required the Office to report on 

the effectiveness of the legislative public disclosure process by November 1980." Thus, GAO 

was asked to help enforce ethics provisions relating to some of its bosses. 

12 

COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT 

PROCUREMENT (1969)_ 

The Congress established this commission of 

12 persons, including the Comptroller General. 

to study and report on the Government's procurement policies and practices. Staats and GAO 

staff were heavily involved in a 3-year study and 

subsequent followup on the Commission's many 

recommendations. Although Staats had previ- ously served on the Budget Concepts Commission. this was the first of several commission assignments mandated by statute for the Comptroller 

General and other GAO staff. 

LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1970_ 

A landmark law for GAO, this legislation put 

into effect some of the recommendations of the 

1966 Joint Committee on the Organization of 

Congress. The Office was now to review and ana- lyze the results of Government programs and 

activities on its own initiative or when requested 

by a cognizant committee. GAO was to have 

available experts in making cost-benefit studies 

and was to act as the Congress' agent in estab- lishing standardized information and data proceSSing systems. (See ch. 2.) While not giving 

GAO any basic statutory authority beyond the 

1921 and 1950 acts, this reorganization act con- firmed congressional interest in having GAO 

evaluate the results of ongoing Govemment 

programs. 

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FVND 

ACT OF 1971 AND FEDERAL ELECTION 

CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971_ 

GAO became a direct participant in the po- litical process when the Congress enacted these 

laws establishing new procedures for the financing and disclosure of Federal campaign expend- itures. Both laws assigned responsibilities to the 

Comptroller General, mainly relating to the dis- closure of campaign expenditures for Presiden- tial and Vice Presidential candidates. These du- ties were transferred to an independent Federal 

Elections Commission in 1974. (See ch. 8.) 

TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE AUTHORIZATION 

ACT (1973)_ 

In addition to authorizing the oil pipeline_ this 

law required the Comptroller General to review 

the information required by independent regulatory agencies to identify duplication and to 

minimize the regulatory burden on businesses 

and others. Although GAO did not want this re- sponsibility, the Congress was increasingly concerned about executive agency influence over 

the operations of independent regulatory agencier--considered creatures of the Congress by 

some. The Congress mandated GAO to act as 

its agent for a specialized task thought unsuited 

to the executive branch. 
CONGRESSIONAL BVDGET AND 

IMPOVNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1914. 

This law established the congressional budget 

process. enlarged GAO's program evaluation 

role. clarified and strengthened the information 

systems responsibilities given the Office in the 

1970 act, and involved the Comptroller General 

in congressional control over the President's authority to impound funds. Just as significant for 

GAO as these expanded powers was the decision 

by the Congress not to involve GAO directly in 

the new budget process. (In 1966 the Joint Com- mittee had urged that GAO be an integral part 

of the Congress' effort to regain the initiative in 

the budget process.) Instead. three new entities 

were created-the Congressional Budget Office 

and the House and Senate Budget Committees. 

ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT 

(1975). 

Besides enacting new energy measures. this 

law authorized the Comptroller General to con- duct "verification examinations" of information 

supplied to Federal agencies by those engaged 

in energy exploration, development, production. 

or distribution. For the first time. the Comptroller 

General could sign and issue subpoenas requiring persons to submit information. Basically. the 

Congress asked GAO to ensure that the Govemment had accurate, reliable data on which to 

base energy decisions. 

CHRYSLER LOAN GVARANTEE (1919). 

To forestall bankruptcy by the Chrysler Corporation. the Nation's third·largest auto maker, the Congress enacted legislation providing au- thority for up to $1.5 billion in Federal loan guar- antees. Final approval of the guarantees and 

their administration was vested in a five-person 

board with three voting members-the Secretary 

of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal 

Reserve Board. and the Comptroller General. 

The law also authorized the latter to audit im- plementation of the act. a potential conflict of 

interest for the Comptroller General. The Con- gress. however. needed an independent official 

to help administer the program and to audit it. and only the Comptroller General qualified for 

both roles. 

The role of the GAO, and of the Comptroller 

General. changed greatly during the 1966-81 

period. The chapters that follow discuss what 

was accomplished during that period and what 

was done inside the Office to make it all possible. 

CHRYSLER LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD posed challenges for GAO and the Comptroller General In 1980. 

13 
L Public Papers 0/ The Presidents. L!llldon B Johrl$Qn. 1963-64, Book I (Wa$hlngton. D.C. GPO. 1965), p 822. 

2. 8i Glnzbery and Rober! M. Solow. 1ld5., The Greos Soddy. Lessom Jor 

1M Futu~ (New York. Bask. BoQkl, 19741. P 10 

3, Weekly. Compilation ~ Pne.idemJa/ Documer1u, Vol. 15. No. 29 (wei?k 

i!Ildlng July 20. 1919), p 1237 

4 U.S. Cong., Joint Committee on The (hganillltJon of Ihe COOgl'es5. Or. ~nimrion cI COf'lgreu. 89m Coog .• 2nd 5eSS .• S. RepL 1414 (W.:Ishmgton. D. L 

GPO. 1966), p 5 

5. "Growing SllIff System on Hill Fon:es Changes in Congress:' C01Igra-. 

siornz/ QuarTerlv. 24 Nov 1979. p. 2631. 

6. $USj'In Hllmmond. "Congu!sslonal Change lind Reform: 5U1ffing the Can· 

gJflS," In LegblotJue Reform The Polley /mpga, ed. Leroy N RIe5elbach (LeI(' 

IngtOn. Mass.. . Loington Books. 1978). p. 183 

7. Hammond. p. 181 

14 

8. u.s Cong., JoinT Commlnee on Ihe OJqnnlz.l!don of the Conwea, Tes- timony 01 Frank H. Weitzel (5 Aug. 1965J. p Z2. 

9. FrederkkC Mosher, TheGl\O. The Quesr/OI"AcnxJtllabllfry InAmcr'l;(ln Gouemmenr (Boulder. Colo. Westview Prim. 19191. pp. 19, 58, 

10. U.S. General Accounting Office, OHlee of the OireeIor of Audlb. An An0/y5c5 oj Ih~ Audit Aaiultla oj lhe General Account/fig OJfi~ fWa!ohingfoo. 

DC. . Nov 19511 pp 4-6 

11 . U,S. Cong.. House. Comminee on Government ()penItions. Hearings on 

Compirolier Geneto1 ReportS /0 C~ 011 Audil5 "I Defe~ Contracts. 89Th 

Gong. 151 sess {Washington. D.C .. GPO. 19651. p 76 

12. Moshe" p. 157 

13, o.,vld Soralldo, '1"h11 Slgnll\can<:e of the Holillcld Hearings lor GAO." WRO Ledger, Dec. 1979,Jan 1980, p. 4 

14 PaKuaJe L Esposito, "Audiling Senllte Anandlll DlscJOIiure Statements," The GtI0 Reu!fJw, (Winter 1979), p. 30. 

CCDnro~l1®IT ~ 

Services To The Congress 

If for nothing else. the 1966-81 period win be 

remembered as a time when GAO expanded 

and strensthened its ties with the Congress. The 

services GAO provided to the Congress grew in 

size, scope, and stature during these years. In 

some ways, this growth was spectacular. For in- stance. GAO officials testified before congres- sional committees nearly 200 times in fiscal year 

1979, compared with less than 30 times a year 

in the mid-1960's. As the professional staff grew 

from fewer than 2.500 to more than 4.000. GAO 

more than quadrupled the staff time expended 

on direct assistance to the Congress. and the 

number of reports and other forms of commu- nication to committees and individual members 

grew similarly. The basic types of services GAO provides in 

response to direct request by the Congress have 

not changed grearly in more than two decades. They include 

• studies speCifically mandated by statute: 

• audits and evaluations of Federal programs 

and activities requested by committees and 

members; 

• assignment of staff to committees: 

• testimony at hearings; 

• advice on pendJng legislation: and 

• accounting, auditing. and advisory services 

for House and Senate financial and admin- Istrative operations. Another service-predominantly new in the 

1966-81 period--concerns identifying and re- spondJng to congressional information needs 

across the whole spectrum of Federal programs 

and activities. In carrying out all these services. GAO's goal 

was to provide information that effectively ser- viced the Congress' needs as qUickly as possible. To help meet this goal. GAO has increasingly 

emphasized the need for better communication 

between its staff and congressional requesters 

and has expanded and strengthened its congres- sional relations office. Direct contact with the 

committee staffs gave GAO staff a better sense 

of the Congress' needs. Recognizing the Con- gress' increasing need for information on com- plex issues, GAO has increased its capability to 

tackle such issues. 

GAO's Basic Responsibility To 

Serve The Congress 

Since GAO was established in 1921, there 

have been many dJsputes about such matters as 

whether the agency is an independent office or 

an integral part of the legislative branch and 

whether it should carry out certain executive 

functions. One thing that has never been in dJs16 

pute, however, is GAO's duty to provide various 

services when requested by the Congress or its 

committees and members. 

The primary purpose of the Budget and Accounting Act. 1921, was to establish a unified 

budget system in the executive branch. but the 

Congress recognized that. in doing so. a coun- terbalance was needed to ensure that the legis- lative branch retained control of the purse. I 

Thus, the 1921 act gave the Comptroller General 

broad investigative powers and required him to 

• • • make such investigations and re- pol1S as shall be ordered by either House 

of Congress or by any committee of either 

House having jurisdiction over revenue, 

appropriations, or expenditures.

2 

It was clear that the Congress wanted its com- mittees dealing with the public purse to have' 

GAO's services available to them. However, dur- ing the first 20 years or so of GAO's existence, the agency neither prOvided much direct assist- ance nor encouraged committees to use its services. The picture changed in 1940 with the ap- pointment of Lindsay Warren as Comptroller 

General. He was a Congressman from North 

Carolina, highly respected by his colleagues, 

who worked hard to foster closer ties between 

his agency and the Congress. By the 1950' s, a 

tradition of providing direct assistance to the 

Congress had become firmly established and 

work was being done at the request of many 

committees. GAO also responded to individual 

members' requests, concerning not only such 

matters as claims before GAO but also investi- gations of Government activities. The Comptroller General's 1960 annual report summarized 

GAO's policy toward serving the Congress in 

these words: 

One of the prime reasons the Congress 

placed the General Accounting Office In 

the legislative branch of the Government 

was to be assured of a reliable source of 

assistance in the financial area from an 

agency which was nonpolitical and inde- pendent of the executive branch. We leel. 

therefore, that our obligation to furnish assistance to the. Congress. its committees, and Members is of the highest importance. J 

The report said that GAO had furnished many 

special reports requested by committees and 

members on a wide variety of topics, had tem- porarily assigned more than 160 staff members 

to various committees. and had testified 37 times 
in 1960. Proudly, the report noted that the 

House majority leader had said: " I have found 

the General Accounting Office reports to be ob- jective, factual, and always in the public interest" 

In the years that followed. however. all was 

not as well as the picture painted by that report. 

GAO staff continued to work closely with several 

committees, but the close ties with accounting 

and financial manag~ment and the limited size 

of GAO's staff, compared with its legislative man- date, made it difficult for the Office to respond 

to emerging demands for timely information and 

analysis of how Federal programs were working. Among some officials in GAO, there was an at- titude that congressional request work often dealt 

with secondary or narrow subjects that provided 

few significant opportunities to improve Govern- ment operations or to save Federal funds. There 

was also concern that responding to such requests could result in embroiling GAO in political 

controversy and create pressure to produce a 

specific result. Nevertheless. GAO continued to 

give congressional request work high priority: it 

really had no other choice. 

A Changing Attitude Toward 

Serving The Congress 

When he came to GAO, Elmer Staats enjoyed 

a good personal relationship with members of 

Congress and he intended to build on it. He 

sought to enhance GAO's role in providing direct 

assistance and to thereby strengthen the Con- gress' ability to deal with the issues of the day. A week after assuming office. Staats COrre- sponded with every committee chairman to underscore the importance he attached to GAO's 

responsibility to proVide the Congress with ac- curate, independent reports and to assist com- mittees and members as much as possible: 

I am fully aware of the close working 

relationship which has been developed 

through the years between your Committee and the General Accounting Office. I 

want to assure you that it will be my constant aim to continue and strengthen this 

relationship.4 

Besides writing these letters. Staats visited key 

congressional leaders. He was told by some that. 

although they thought GAO was doing a good 

job, not enough of its output was relevant to the 

issues facing the committees. In view of these 

comments and his own review of the basic laws 

that had established GAO and authorized its ac- tivities, Staats became convinced, as had others 

in GAO. that the Office, in some important respects. was not carrying out its job. 

GAO began to increase its service to committees. During the 1960's, when the Congress 

itself was going through a reexamination, it was 

evident that many parts of the institution would 

be looking to GAO for help. In one of his first 

appearances before the Appropriations Com- mittees in defense of GAO's budget request. 

Staats said: 

• • • J feel very strongly that one of the 

ways we can increase our effectiveness is 

to work closely with 0/1 the committees and 

GAO Off iCIALS AND THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAfF met annually in the early years 

of the 1 %6·81 period. 

17 
subcommittees so that we are relating our 

time schedules and the subjects of our au- dits as closely as possible to the interests 

and work of the committeesS 

In this manner. he was declaring that GAO. in 

addition to responding to direct requests. would 

also direct its own work to committee interests 

as much as possible. GAO broadened its services 

through a variety of informal types of assistance. such as developing statements of legislative ob- jectives and reporting requirements. providing 

informal briefings on GAO's ongoing and planned 

work, and assisting committees by developing 

questions and other materials for their own use 

in hearings. GAO's annual reports also high, lighted such innovations as the establishment of 

a systems analysis staff in 1967 and an actuarial 

staff in 1969. To be credible. GAO had to demonstrate it 

could, in fact. do the kind of work the Congress 

wanted done and present the results when they 

were needed. The Office had already established 

a good record as a reliable audit and investigative 

agency, but it had done little to assess program 

effectiveness or address the larger issues facing 

the Congress. The first real test of the GAO's 

commitment came in mid·1967 when the Office 

was required to investigate the Nation's war on 

poverty. A second test concerned GAO's willingness to undertake reviews of major weapon 

systems and their cost overruns. In this case. the 

Comptroller General and GAO staff worked with 

congressional committees to negotiate the most 

appropriate means of meeting congressional in- formation needs. Both tests established a record 

of performance that carried over to other rela · 

tionships between GAO and its congressional 

constituency. 

REVIEW OF THE ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM 

As discussed in chapter 3. congressional concern as to the effectiveness of the Government's 

antipoverty program resulted in a GAO mandate 

to investigate the program. Thus. for the first 

time. the Office was required to assess the im- pacts of a highly visible and politically contro- versial program. To meet this challenge. GAO 

made a major investment to complete the as- signment within the tight deadline. The result. 

although not uniformly accepted on the Hill, 

showed GAO could contribute to the Congress' 

growing need for program evaluations. 

NEGOTIATING MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS 

WORK 

By 1969 the Vietnam War and controversial 

defense projects. such as the antiballistic missile 

system. had aroused congressional concern about 

the cost and direction of the Nation's defense 

programs. That year became known as "the year 

18 

of the cost overrun" follOwing revelations of 

major cost growth in weapon systems procure- ment, especiaUy the C·SA aircraft. Many congressmen were looking to GAO to 

help provide more authoritative information. The 

issue of how GAO would provide such assistance 

came to a head during consideration of the 1970 

Military Procurement Authorization Bill. In de- bate on this bill, Senator Abraham Ribicoff 

pointed out that an information gap existed. es- pecially for members not on the committees pre- siding over this legislation. Senator Richard 

Schweiker offered an amendment that would 

have required (1) the Defense Department to 

develop a system for reporting on major weapon 

systems contracts and (2) the Comptroller Gen- eral to audit the reporting system and major con- tracts he thought appropriate for audit This pro- posal. similar to ones introduced in the House. would have granted GAO subpoena power to 

obtain records from contractors. subcontractors. and procuring agencies' 

Earlier that year. the Joint Economic Com- mittee had published a report that proposed sev- eral new GAO responsibilities in defense pro- curement. including (1) a comprehensive study 

of defense contractor profits and (2) periodic 

weapon acquisition status reports. At Committee 

hearings, the Comptroller General expressed re- luctance to undertake most of these proposals 

because they required broad legislative authority 

and additional staff. but the requirement that 

GAO conduct a defense profits study eventually 

became law. Staats described this period in a recent 

discussion. 

There were a whole spate of bills that 

had been introduced to require GAO to 

audit [defense contracts). One of them said 

to audit any contnact where the current 

estimate of cost is 10 percent in excess of 

the original estimate. Another one said 25 

percent. Thousands of contracts would be 

involved. So we got concemed. Some of 

them got to be fairly serious. They would 

have absorbed all our manpower in GAO 

and we still couldn't have done it. 

I was. of course, opposed to it. • • • 

I finally concluded that GAO ought to take 

some initiative here. and I went up and 

talked to [Senator] Stennis and [Representative L Mendel Rivers] to the effect 

that if this legislation could be headed' off. 

I was willing to write both [Armed Services] 

Committees a letter saying that we would 

undertake reviews of the cost overrun 

problem, looking at the major defense con- tracts from the point of view of cost. performance, and schedules. 

Actually. there were two sets of letters. The 

first set. dated August 1. 1969. informed the 
committees of GAO's plans to give increased 

attention to defense procurement and the specific types of reporting contemplated. It also requested that the Congress give' 'the most careful 

consideration" to such proposals as the Schwei- ker amendment. Nevertheless, the Senate 

adopted the amendment a week later by a onevote margin. 47 to 46. In September. the Comptroller General wrote again to the House Armed 

Services Committee expressing outright oppo- sition to the Schweiker amendment and assuring 

the Committee that GAO already had the authority to achieve the Schweiker amendment's 

intent. In other words. GAO supported the basic 

reporting concepts but thought it unwise to fix 

the requirement In law.

7 

The House voted down a similar proposal. 

and the conference committee on the procure- ment authorization bill dropped the Schweiker 

amendment GAO worked closely with the committees to achieve this result and even prOvided 

the language for the conference report that asserted the requirement should not be fixed in 

law. The report also noted that the Defense De- partment was then perfecting a reporting system 

and that GAO planned to make selective audits 

of weapon systems contracts_ In addition. Sen- ator Ribicoff agreed to schedule hearings on 

GAO's capability to audit defense contracts. ISee 

ch.8.) 

Shortly thereafter. the Defense Department 

completed implementation of its quarterly Selected Acquisition Reports System ISARS) begun in February 1968. GAO had already established a new operating group in July 1969 to 

review the major acquisitions. including contrac· 

tor performance. which was only touched on in 

the SARS. In February 1970. GAO issued its first 

annual report on the cost. schedule. and per- formance status of 57 major weapon systems 

and on DOD's new acquisition system. The Of- fice continued. modified. and expanded this 

work over the following decade. as discussed 

further in chapter 3. 

Growth In Audits And 

Evaluations Requested By 

Committees And Required By 

Statute 

In the late 1960's and 1970' s, the amount of 

work requested by congressional committees 

and required by statute grew substantially. not 

only in numbers but also in scope and variety. 

As their need for information grew. congressional 

committees became increasingly aware that GAO 

could provide competent and reliable informa- tion on Government programs. policies. and re- lated subjects. In addition. the Congress began 

enacting several statutes a year mandating spe- cial one-time GAO studies or continuous moni- toring of Federal program implementation. The 

total number of reports issued to committees is 

shown in the chart below. 

Providing assistance to a committee some- times prompts a series of reports and congres- sional action to implement GAO recommenda- tions. An illustration of how the process works 

follows. 

The SOCial Security Amendments of 1965 

made the Medicaid and Medicare programs effective on January 1 and July 1, 1966, respec- tively. These new programs. paying the hospital. 

nursing home and doctor bills of aged and indigent people, thrust GAO into the private health 

care sector and substantially increased congres- sional demands on its resources. The increased 

demand for GAO's assistance was due. in part. 

to the major growth in expenditures for these 

programs. GAO's involvement started even before Med- icare became effective. On May 3. 1966. the 

Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee 

asked the Office to review the Medicare reimbursement principles proposed by the Depart- ment of Health. Education. and Welfare for pay- ing institutional providers. such as hospitals and 

nursing homes. and to report the results within 

3 weeks. The report. which met the deadline, 

raised substantive questions related to policy and 

administration which were considered before the 

final regulations were promulgated.' 

Two years later. the Senate Finance Com- mittee asked GAO to look into reports that a 

group of teaching physicians at Cook County 

Hospital in Chicago had generated over $1 mil- lion in fee -for-service payments under Medicare. The Committee requested that GAO complete 

its audit in only 6 weeks. A team from the Chi- cago Regional Office reviewed the circumstances 

involved in such payments and audited the medFlprea-I 

....... _C. ..... dr s ...... llt 

~I".I,... . • ,.- 300 I- r-" 

250 I200 

r- ,.-

150 

r100 ...... r- ~ f-

;.§2. I0 

70 71 72 73 74 75 7& 77 78 79 80 

N.... '!iMINraIt'" not....w. .. ,.,.. lID 

I For ~,.... ...... s..t.·IO.lm. 

19 
ical records of a sample of 75 Medicare benefi- daties. GAO presented its preliminary report to 

the Committee on July 1. 1969. in nationally 

televised hearings, stating that the services had 

actually been prOvided by residents and interns 

at the hospital. This testimony received wide coverage in the media as it disclosed the first of many 

scandals that would rock the Medicare and Medicaid programs over the next decade.' 

These two early landmark reviews. in which 

GAO delivered useful findings in demanding 

timeframes. established a close working relatio nship between the audit staff and the committees 

having jurisdiction over Medicare and Medicaid. 

At least 10 provisions in the Social Security 

Amendments of 1972 were attributable to GAO's 

work, including amendments providing for more 

effective utilization reviews, stricter conditions on 

payments for teaching physicians services. costrelated reimbursement for nursing homes. and 

increased Federal funding for nursing home 

inspections. 

Working for committees. however. was sometimes a mixed blessing. While some committees 

rarely requested GAO's assistance. others heavily burdened the Office with a series of requests 

that interrupted ongoing basic statutory work. 

Often the time frames were demanding. and 

sometimes the subject matter did not appear as 

significant as the interrupted work spelled out in 

GAO's own program plans. Nevertheless. GAO 

benefited from the increased visibility, the ad -

ditional clout of a committee request. and the 

increased prospects of action being taken on 

GAO's recommendations, since the committee 

had requested the analysis. Occasionally. committee interest in requesting 

a GAO study was translated into a specific sta- tutory reqUirement. Such requirements were 

sometimes enacted to appease program oppo- nents or assure members that program results 

would be carefully examined. Other requirements were enacted simply to provide data on 

the outcome of needed governmental actions. 

GAO usually tried to conllen proposed statutory 

requirements to committee requests to gain 

greater flexibility. It was not always successful. 

as the following list of some reviews required by 

statute indicates: 

• A special $200 million C-5A aircraft pro- curement contingency fund (quarterly reJX>r1s required). 

• Research. pilot. and demonstration pro- grams related to the prevention and control 

of water pollution. 

• A special supplemental food program for 

pregnant and lactating women. 

• Policies. purposes. and objectives of the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. 

Two further illustrations will show how mandated 

studies were conducted and what the results 

were. 

20 

DEFENSE INDUSTRY PROFITS STUDY (1971). 

As required by a 1970 law. GAO studied the 

profits of 74 large defense contractors and computed their before-tax average profit rates for 

both defense and comparable commercial work. 

Using three different methods. GAO found the 

rates of return on defense work averaged the 

same as or less than those on commercial work. 

It recommended the development of uniform 

guidelines for determining profit objectives on 

Government contracts, emphasizing the amount 

of contractor capital required rather than the existing practice of basing profits on a percentage 

of contract costs. 10 

The report was controversial since it did not 

support allegations of high defense industry profits. GAO's job was also made more complex 

because an early draft was leaked to the press 

and some asserted that the Office had yielded 

to defense contractor pressure and softened the 

final report_ The Comptroller General vigorously 

denied these assertions in congressional hearings. Later. the Office tightened controls on report drafts. a move which has been only partially 

successful in preventing premature leaks. 

HEALnt FACIUTIES CONSTRUCTION COSTS 

(1912). 

Concerned with the high cost of constructing 

health facilities. the Senate Committee on Labor 

and Public Welfare adopted an amendment 

which became part of a 1971 law requiring GAO 

to study ways of reducing these costs for facilities 

receiving Federal assistance. Special attention 

was to be given to innovative techniques. new 

materials. and the possible waiver of unneces- sarily costly Federal standards. Using a task force 

approach and assisted by a leading consulting 

firm, GAO undertook a broad-scale study of the 

many factors affecting construction costs. 

GAO identified several weaknesses in the pre- construction planning process but found no substantive evidence that the Governmenfs assist- ,mce program requirements themselves were 

inflating construction costs_ A major feature of 

the study was the use of life-cycle cost analysis: 

GAO dikovered that hospital planners generally 

did not use this approach in evaluating alternative construction plans. GAO concluded that lifecycle cost analysis was essential in the design of 

all hospitals. The report also discussed several 

ways of avoiding construction and increasing 

productivity of existing facilities. II 

Working for Individual 

Members Of Congress 

No law requires GAO to provide assistance 

to individual members of Congress. Although 

proposals for such a law have been made over 

the years. the Office has always resisted them. 

Nevertheless, GAO's basic policy for many years 

has been to be as helpful as possible to aU mem-
bers of Congress within the confines of staff re- sources and other work requirements. As congressional desire for obtaining GAO 

assistance increased beginning in the late 1960's, 

both GAO and the Hill discussed setting limits 

on member requests. However, proposals limiting GAO's assistance to some specific category 

(such as matters affecting only the jurisdiction of 

the requesting Congressman) were rejected. and 

GAO continued to consider the merits of each 

request individually. Top management believed 

that legitimate interests. such as those of the 

minority party in the Congress or members partic- ularly interested in specific constituencies like ra- cial or ethnic minorities, should be served as well. 

GAO undertook some major efforts on behalf 

of individual members. Sometimes the payoff 

was handsome, sometimes not. For example, 

work done for former Senate Majority Leader 

Mike Mansfield helped to bring about new controls on the types of research sponsored by the 

Defense Department. A request from several 

black congressmen in 1970 resulted in a report 

prOviding data on minority access and use of 

recreational facilities (golf clubs, swimming pools, 

etc.) financed by the Farmers Home Adminis- tration. And an audit of the impact of Federal 

programs in the city of New Bedford, requested 

by Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke, turned 

out to be a pioneering study of the Government's 

total impact on a given community. Nevertheless, GAO could never have met the potential 

demand from more than 500 congressional offices was and it had to ration resources devoted 

to rnost members' requests, which pertained to 

subjects of rather limited scope. 

As direct assistance to the Congress increased 

rapidly in the years around 1970, GAO's appropriations subcommittees became increasingly 

concerned about the amount of effort GAO was 

devoting to congresSional requests. At one point, Ernest Hollings, the South Carolina Senator 

heading one of these subcommittees, asked the 

Comptroller General whether he was using "good judgment and common sense" in responding to members' requests. Staats assured 

Hollings that if the work built up to a pOint where 

GAO thought it was "not feasible or manageable," he would go to the congressional leadership and the committees for assistance in holding 

mE COMPTROLLER GENERAL SIGNS the report on health facllilies construction costs. Looking on (standing 

I. to T.J are Robert Farabaugh. Kenneth Edmonson. David Hanna. Robert Ticl:!. James Walsh. and James Martin, task force 

leader. 

21 
down the workload. He expressed doubt that 

it would ever reach the point that GAO would 

have to request special legislation." 

Indeed. the member request workload never 

did reach a point where controls became nec- essary. The work for members peaked out in the 

mid-1970's at an average of about 250 reports 

a year. The number of requests was more than 

twice that amoun~ but GAO was able to satisfy 

many by making informal inquiries. providing 

the products of other ongoing or completed 

work, or referring the requesters to Federal agen- cies or other information sources. The amount 

of GAO staff resources spent servicing member 

requests never exceeded 10 percent of the total. 

By 1979. the number of member requests h2d 

declined, resulting in only 100 formal reports to 

members that year. 

Basic Legislative Requirements 

Work Also Served 

Congressional Information 

Needs 

Most of GAO's basic legislative requirements 

work-the jobs undertaken without a specific 

congressional mandate-relates in some way to 

congressional information needs. Basic legislative requirements work once was labeled "self- initiated" work. but the official nomenclature was 

changed to more accurately reflect the work's 

relationship to GAO's broad charter to serve the 

Congress. The Comptroller General's 1979 an - nual report was more specific: 

Because all of GAO's responsibilities 

flow from its enabling legislation and sub- sequent lows passed by the Congress. all 

of its work is. in effect, directed toward as- sisting the Congress. In deueloping work 

programs for our self-initiated work (as 

contrasted to work directed by a congressional request or mandated by specific stat- ute). we attempt to ascertain congressional 

needs so that we can produce timely information useful to the Congress and thus 

contribute to better Government. As a result, we often receive requests from committees or Members 10 perform work al- ready started or even completed. I • 

There is more in chapter 10 about commu- nication between GAO and congressional staffs 

in planning the agency's work, but it is worth 

noting here that direct assistance extends into 

the so-called basic legislative requirements activ- ities. In other words. if there were no "BLR" 

studies. the demands for direct assistance would 

likely be much greater. Similarly. the extent to 

which GAO's basic legislative requirements work 

anticipates congressional information needs panly 

determines its ability to respond when requested 

22 

or to avoid the need for a new study in response 

to a request by providing information already 

developed or being assembled. 

Growth in GAO's Congressional 

Testimony 

In the mid-1960's, GAO officials appeared 

before committees an average of two or three 

times a month. In the last few years, GAO tes- tified an average of once each working day. The 

subject matter varied as much as with GAO reports. As an illustration, the following chart lists 

the subjects on which GAO testified during a 

busy month in 1979. 

Most often, GAO was called on to discuss the 

results of a study relevant to the subject of the 

hearing. Occasionally, Staats was asked to testify 

specifically because of his own personal expe- rience in Government, the sensitivity of the sub- ject. or the breadth of the issues involved, as with 

matters affecting science policy. In these in- stances. he often took a personal hand in drafting 

the testimony. Who testifies on behalf of the Office can be 

as sensitive as the substance of the testimony. Committees often want an agency's top officer 

to appear at their hearings. and GAO generally 

is no exception. Staats preferred that the Office 

be represented by the Comptroller General or 

other top official down to the division director 

level. Although he tried to be available as often 

as circumstances warranted and his schedule 

permitted. he had to share this duty more and 

more with other GAO officials as the amount of 

testimony increased. For example. in 1979, he 

was the lead witness at about one·sixth of the 

hearings at which GAO testified. The heavy de- mand even overwhelmed some of the division 

directors. and required that GAO be represented 

more and more by subordinate officials having 

firsthand knowledge of the subject matter. 

Although testimony must often be prepared 

within tight timeframes, GAO staff carefully re- search and prepare the formal statements. On 

most occasions, they also prepare thick backup 

books containing extensive documentation to 

support the points being made. They also try to 

find out from the committee staff what questions 

are likely to be asked at the hearings, and fre - quently prepare suggested responses in advance. As the amount of testimony increased. prob- lems sometimes arose or became more aggra- vated. From time to time, ongoing work had to 

be interrupted or staff called away from suc- ceeding studies' to prepare for a hearing. Some · times a request for testimony arrived before all 

points about an issue were tied down, so the 

statements presented could offer only tentative 

findings and conclusions. Finally. presenting tes- timony sometimes took away the incentive to 

prepare a formal report that would benefit other 

parties and reach an audience wider than those 
GAO OmClALS TESTIFY al 1970 Joinl EconomIc CommlHee hearing 

Subjects On Which GAO Testified In May 1979. Figure 2-2 

HOUSE 

513 Office of Federal Procurement Policy 

5/7 Emergency preparedness around 

nuclear power plants 

5115 Impact and validity of PACE: A Federal employment examination 

5/16 Indochina refugee assistance 

programs 

5/16 Presidential Transition Act of 1963 

51! 6 Emergency preparedness around 

nuclear facilities 

5121 Improving development coordination 

5122 Two bills affecting small businesses 

5/23 Urban development action grant 

program 

5/23 Congressional oversight reform 

legislation 

5/23 Interelationships of Federal and D. C. 

retirement systems 

5/30 Enforcement of crude oil reseller 

price controls 

5/31 Uranium supply and demand 

estimates 

SOURCE: GAO '-""""'" """,. '"""'" 

SENATE 

5/1 Improving development coordination 

512 Davis-Bacon Act should be repealed 

5/2 fmplementation of time-frames in 

Speedy Trial Act of 1974 

5/7 Set aside program for Federal timber sales 

5/8 Merit Systems Protection Board and 

Office of Special Counsel 

5/16 S. 414. the University and Small 

Business Procedures Act 

5121 GAO report "Conditions of Older 

People: National Information 

System Needed" 

5/22 National Cancer Institute's management of a contract 

5/31 Placement of foster care children 

with members of the People's 

Temple 

23 
Figare 2-3 

GAO Staff Assigned to Congressional Committees 

1111 'I 

. I-- 1-1 1 

11 II,) 

I I-- I , 

, f--

')0 l- I---- I 

f-- r-- ~r--

I ,..,1 ' r-I 1 l- I-- r-- r-- . , ~~ f--

=== >-- f-- f--

'.It' i- ~ lI 

f--

I 

l- f--

',I, l- I ~ l- I--

~l' , 

I 

f- , 

! 

, I . 

'~I' 

I 

, I 

, I f--

~IJ I 

I 

, 

I 

, 

I I ~ 

III , 

, 

eJl" 

, I 

~~ r-- ' I . 

. , , , 

{)~) nl' 1: . (~~. -. . , - -, - - . - , ., . 4 . " , ,",',I 

Nllmb..-r r:i ~\~T';"-lIl" A.;.slg'lw.l 

. _ J 

H'1~.", . ... .... , I", .1111.·· • • L .. ,,,: ( .. ,"n".' .... ~ 

':)(,l1rl"-- Td,:1 ....... , .. ... """011 ...... "·'1 ''''' ... ,-,,,.h!>" .. - (.,\\, ,,,' rmpL"Y""-, ., : ,'-,; 

I .• , I', "',,"ll. .... :, ••• ~ " O,,'.,.j ........ ,,, , . 'j 

24 

,-- . ----~-~~~ 
tee requests for staff assistance. OCR. in tum. 

calls on the cognizant division to nominate specific individuals. Divisions are sometimes reluctant 

to part with their best qualified staff, but they 

generally understand the significance of this type 

of assistance. Previously some GAO staff were 

reluctant to accept the aSSignments because this 

experience did not seem to count as much toward advancement as other GAO work, but the 

Office policy was changed to give staff more 

credit toward promotions for Hill duty. 

OCR has to be sure that staff requested will 

be used productively and that the work to be 

done is within the competence of the staff available for assignment. Occasionally, committees 

request staff before deciding on their roles or 

request them to do jobs normally done by committee staff. The dividing line here is hard to 

draw. and GAO usually gives the committee the 

benefit of the doubt Once assigned to a committee. a staff member's work normally consists 

of exactly those duties which the committee 

states at the outset of the aSSignment; however, 

this is not always the case. Take the example in 

the accompanying story of Paul Grace, now a 

supervisory auditor in GAO's Energy and Minerals Division. . 

ASSigning staff is often useful to both GAO 

and the committees. For example. a few years 

ago, the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations needed auditors to help in a study of 

the Office of Technology Assessment. GAO 

could not do this work directly without a conflict 

of interest with a sister agency. so staff had to 

be assigned directly to the Committee where they 

would assist on matters in which a committee 

has authority to investigate but GAO does not 

Other examples of such an assignment are inA Staff Assignment That Turned Out To Be More Than 

Expected 

In June 1973. the House Judiciary Committee began on investigation of whether the Nixon 

administration was exerting political influence on antitrust litigation in the Justice Deportment. 

Chairman Peter Rodino wonted to augment the staff of his Subcommittee on Anti-Trust with 

persons having experience in auditing Deportment of Justice affairs. He tumed to GAO. and 

one of those chosen was Paul Grace. At the time of Grace's assignment in July 1973, he had 

just completed several years' work auditing the Justice Deportment's Bureau of Narcotics and 

Dangerous Drugs. Suddenly. instead of working with Justice officials who were trying to track 

down narcotics traffic. Grace was asked to consider whether "the President's men" were 

illegally intervening in antitrust cases. However. the new challenges hod just begun. As is customary with GAO stoff assignments to congressional committees. Grace become 

the equivalent of a full member of the Committee staff. but he retained his identity as a GAO 

employee. However, because of the politically sensitive nature of the assignment, GAO asked 

Grace to identify himself as purely a staff member and not as a GAO employee. If there were 

to be any political overtones on this assignment. GAO was going to maintain its neutrality. 

Very soon after Groce's aSSignment began. Vice President Agnew pleaded "no contest" 

to charges of taking kickbacks and resigned from office. The House Judiciary Committee was 

forced to put down its antitrust work and investigate whether the new Vice Presidential appointee. Gerald R. Ford. had a clean financial and political record. Grace and several Committee staffers were put in charge of checking Ford's financial statements for any possible 

involvement with Govemment contracts in his congressional district. When Ford "came out 

clean." Grace and the rest of the Subcommittee on Anti-Trust resumed their work. only to be 

interrupted once again. This time the interruption came from the floor of the House. In December 1973. as soon 

as the House approved the resolution to investigate whether to impeach the President, the 

House Judiciary Committee was asked to investigate whether the allegations against Nixon 

were valid: in short. whether the President did indeed have knowledge of any portion of the 

Watergate affair. its coverup, and related matters. Groce. along with the Committee staff, studied the testimony of every major White House official who hod testified before the Senate 

Watergate Committee. However. the stoff's study was interrupted in August 1974 by the 

resignation of the President. 

At this pOint. Grace and the other members of the Subcommittee once again resumed their 

work. Although the Judiciary Committee took no formal action. some of the Subcommittee's 

findings eventually became the basis for a GAO review of the need for closer controls and 

better data to improue antitrust enforcement. 

Thus. a GAO committee assignment which began as one duty expanded to include the 

vicissitudes of the year's major events. 

25 
vestigations of criminal statute violations. as well 

as those under the House Appropriations Committee's Surveys and Investigations Staff. 

Sometimes the assignment of staff to a committee is the most efficient means of providing 

needed information. Although GAO has considerable authority to obtain information. Federal 

agencies and others often pay closer attention 

to a committee request. especially if subpoena 

power or a public hearing is in the offing. Also. 

staff assigned are under direct committee supervision. so the committee has more control over 

how the work is done and the results reported. 

For the staff. the assignment can be a mixed 

blessing. They often gain valuable experience in 

how the Congress works and insights into the 

perceptions of key congressmen on a given topic. 

On the other hand. assessing the performance 

of such staff and giving them proper credit toward career development for the time they are 

assigned are continuing challenges for GAO. 

Reporting On Pending 

Legislation 

Another means for GAO to present its views 

to committees is through formal. written reports 

on pending legislation. For many years. congressional committees have followed the practice of 

referring proposed legislation to cognizant Federal agencies. including GAO. for their com -

ments. Often. if a committee receives unfavorable comments. it gives no further consideration 

to the bill. 

Of the 25.000 or so bills introduced in each 

Congress. no more than perhaps 10 percent 

have ever been referred to GAO for written re· 

ports. A few committees refer almost every bill 

to GAO. but most of them refer almost none. 

even though the subject matter may be relevant 

~2-4 O • ...-.._P...u.. 

.......... 

100 

600 

500 r l- tF I- t-r- ..... 

~ 

I- rt!2!l r0 

65 " 67 61 651 70 n 71 ." , . 7f 'It 17 11"" "-: • FGII" S-oalb JNriDd .... hpt. SO, 1916 . 

26 

to GAO audit operations. The Office can provide 

a written report on a bill without a formal request. 

but it rarely does so. 

As shown below, the number of GAO reports 

on pending legislation peaked at Slightly over 

700 in fiscal year 1971. Recently. however. this 

number has declined sharply. In fiscal year 1980. 

GAO issued fewer than 200 such reports. Several reasons account for this decline. 

• The Office of Congressional Relations 

worked out arrangements so that GAO 

could informally advise committees if GAO 

had no comment. OCR also urged them 

to limit their referrals to bills likely to get 

serious committee attention. 

• Audit divisions now have responsibility for 

preparing the reports. Although they take 

this responsibility seriously. they select bills 

to report on which are directly related to 

their work and/or which have a real chance 

of being enacted. 

• There are fewer bills today that clirectly affect GAO. For example. during the 1960' s. 

there were a large number of bills to establish new Federal grant programs. To 

ensure that GAO would be able to audit 

these programs. each required a GAO report unless the bill contained a clause providing GAO access to the grantee's records. 

• GAO more frequently uses other means to 

present its views, such as testimony at committee hearings. 

GAO's reports on bills can be useful in bringing to committees' attention the need for technical improvements. such as access-to-records 

clauses or strengthened financial accounting and 

reporting requirements. They are also a way to 

get on record the Office' s views on bills that directly affect agency operations. For example. in 

1975, GAO filed a 10-page report opposing a 

bill that called for congressional appointment of 

the Comptroller General and reducing his term 

to 10 years. The committee took no action on 

the legislation. 14 

Assisting House And Senate 

Financial And Administrative 

Operations 

GAO's Legislative Branch Audit Site is one 

of the Office's least-known activities. The site 

plays the same double role that all GAO divisions 

must play, both as an independent auditor and 

a service group of the Congress. The key difference is that the "auclitee" is GAO's boss. Now 

part of the Accounting and Financial Management Division. the site assists the Congress by 

doing 15 recurring financial audits of such units 

as the House Recording Studio and the Senate 

Restaurant: offering informal advice and assistance on administrative matters: and providing 
the perspective needed to make congressional 

housekeeping run smoothly. 

The site also serves as a convenient buffer 

between the Congress and top GAO manage- ment by helping to resolve sensitive issues that 

might otherwise require the Comptroller Gen- eral's personal attention. For example. if the Sen- ate Appropriations Committee requests a GAO 

study on the possible centralization of comput- erized Senate newsletter writing. the site must 

make sure that the final report is objective and 

will not appear to the Senate Rules and Admin- istration Committee (which oversees Senate 

computer operations) as if the study were conducted with only one committee's interests in 

mind. Sometimes. the responsibility to resolve 

housekeeping issues has led site staff members 

into some sticky situations. as shown in the accompanying example below. 

Systematizing The Flow Of 

Information To The Congress 

In 1966. the Joint Committee on the Or- ganization of Congress was completing its 

year-long study of that body's organization and 

operations. The Committee noted that the ex- ecutive branch had begun using planning. pro- graming. and budgeting (PPB) systems to define 

program goals. establish measures of perform- ance. analyze alternatives. and determine pro- gram benefits and costs. Aware that it was be- coming more and more difficult for the Congress 

to meet its responsibilities without adequate in- formation. the Joint Committee recommended. 

among other things, using automatic data processing equipment to process budget information 

and reorganizing GAO to: 

• • • participate in the establishment of 

a standard classification code of activities 

and expenditures, to assist in locating 

budget information. to provide expert assistance in the analysis of cost-effectiveness 

studies. and to prepare tabulations oj 

budget data. " 

Some mem bers of Congress were concerned 

that if the Congress did not have access to these 

new systems, it would be at an even greater 

disadvantage in coping with executive agencies 

in a modern. complex world. Representative 

Jack Brooks. a member of the Joint Committee, 

developed language providing for congressional 

participation in the systems' design and use of 

information from the systems, Brooks recognized 

that the supporting systems would have to be 

automated and that agreeing on the necessary 

terms. definitions. classifications. and even codes 

would be critical to making the PPB systems 

function effectively, ,,; In the next few years. the 

fundamental principles of PPB were incorporated to varying degrees in agency and Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) budget processes, but the label "PPB" was dropped and 

greater emphasis was given to other techniques 

for supporting budgetary decisionmaking. 

In the Congress. the requirements to develop 

standardized information systems eventually be- came part of Title II of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. OMB and the Treasury Department were to take the lead in developing the 

Straightening Out a Congressional Carwash 

In 1973 the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Parking requested Bernard (AI) 

Brady. the head of the site. to assist the Committee in a study of congressional parking 

problems. During the study. Brady and his crew of auditors discovered that a carwash business 

was being run by parking garage employees. The employees were simply charging a fee to 

wash a Congressman's car while the car was left in the garage. Brady quickly pointed out to 

the Committee that this business was in violation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 

1970, which requires that any private organization doing business in the Capitol buildings or 

on Capitol grounds be audited by GAO, After Brady presented his findings to the Committee. the carwash business disappeared. 

Many Congressmen began to complain to the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration. Wayne Hays. that they could no lon~er get their cars washed. Hays. sometimes 

referred to as the "meanest man in the House . . did not like the sound of these complaints. 

He and two other Committee members sat down with Brady and other GAO staJ! members: 

Hays wanted to do a little complaining of his own. It was a tense meeting. but there were nO 

fireworks. Brady. who wanted to resolve the whole issue cooperatively. devised a new pay 

system for the garage employees that allowed them to work half a day on the Government 

payroll and to run the carwash for the other hal/. Brady's system was incorporated into the 

Supplemental Appropriations Act. 1974. Congressmen could get their cars washed againlegally this time-and Wayne Hays could relax. 

27 
systems and accompaying standard classifications for program and financial data. The Comptroller General was to ensure that congressional 

interests in establishing and using the systems 

would be considered. 17 

By the early 1970' s, the level of executive 

branch commitment to PPB-type systems had 

declined, so the executive agencies concerned 

did not want to attempt a comprehensive approach to implementing the information systems 

provisions of the reorganization act. This left the 

door open for continuing the relationships be- tween the several decentralized units of the Con- gress and the executive branch that had resulted 

in numerous, confusing. and sometimes exclusive information channels. Working with the 

committees, however. GAO developed an over- all statement of congressional information needs 

in 1972. By that time the focus had shifted to 

design of the new congreSSional budget process, so many of the specific requirements identified 

by GAO. such as score-keeping requirements. 

tax expenditure information. and 5-year budget 

projections. became incorporated in the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974_" 

Through the Budget Act. Congress put GAO 

in charge of standardizing of terms. definitions. classifications. and codes and providing for 

congressional access to the information systems. 

but left the leadership for standardizing the sys- tems with OMS and Treasury. As expected. making any changes in the existing classification 

structures, such as budget functions and 

sub functions. appropriation accounts. and Gov- ernment programs and activities. was extremely 

difficult for GAO. For example. GAO recom- mended a revised structure for budget functions 

and subfunctions. but the Budget Committees 

did not accept the recommendations. Therefore. 

OMB retained the same basic structure but im- proved it later by adding national needs statements. Because this structure began to be used 

in the budget decision making process. the scope 

and content of each function were clarified-but 

GAO had little direct influence on the process. GAO has been more successful in carrying 

out some of the associated tasks assigned by the 

reorganization act and the budget act. For ex- ample. with excellent participation by Treasury. OMB. and the Congressional Budget Office. GAO published a glossary of budget terms that 

has gained wide acceptance. Also. GAO has appraised the budget systems and financial prac- tices of Federal agencies. giving particular atten- tion to the Congress' need for information. A 

comprehensive report on budget concepts and 

practices issued in early 1981 called for another 

budget concepts commission and outlined the 

issues it could address. 

Less widely known were GAO's efforts to 

establish and maintain an inventory of the major 

sources of budget. fiscal. and program-related 

information. The inventory is maintained on the 

28 

library of Congress' SCORPIO system for use 

by congressional analysts and is published in 

directory form periodically. At the request of several authorizing committees, GAO has also begun to develop a basic 

inventory of Federal programs and activities. Because of the many information systems. sources. and needs. there is no single inventory 

of all Federal programs or successful definition 

of what a program is. Oversight reform legislation 

considered during the 96th Congress would have 

required that a program inventory be developed 

by the House and Senate Rules Committees with 

GAO assistance. If enacted. this new mandate 

might bring about ultimate success in completing 

the inventory and ensuring its widespread use. 

Liaison With Committees And 

Membel's 

One of the important factors in the growth of 

GAO's assistance to the Congress was the 

strengthening of GAO's structure for interacting 

with the Hill. Until the late 1950' s or early 1960' s. GAO 

congressional relations were conducted largely 

by a small staff in the Comptroller General's immediate office. During the Campbell era. an 

Office of Legislative liaison was formally estab- lished. and when Robert Keller was appointed 

General Counsel. he incorporated this office into 

his own organization. Nevertheless. its functions 

and operating style remained essentially un- changed. The office was staffed exclUSively by 

attorneys in career positions who established 

working relations with staff on the committees 

for which they were responsible. During the 1966-81 period. the legislative li- aison function became a more integral part of 

GAO's management. When Keller was ap- pointed Deputy Comptroller General. legislative 

liaison returned to the Comptroller General's 

office. Fostering and maintaining good relation- ships was not the only function of the legislative 

liaison staff: they were also expected to keep top 

management informed of significant develop- ments affecting GAO. Twice-weekly meetings 

were held with the Comptroller General. his 

Deputy, and the legislative liaison staff. (Eventually. the meetings were expanded to include 

division directors and other top offiCials. and they 

were held once a week.) Direct contact was encouraged between the audit staffs and their 

counterparts on the Hill. as were efforts to consult 

with committee staffs in planning GAO's work. 

(See ch. 10.) 

As the Congress' demand for more GAO direct assistance increased. the legislative liaison 

staff had to increase. It became the Office of 

Congressional Relations (OCR) with its own director. and persons with audit backgrounds were 

appointed to the staff. The number of attorneysl 

advisors increased from three to four and eventually to five. However. even with more diver-
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS STAFF m~ l with D~puty Comptroller General ob~ rt Keller 

(I. to r.) T. Vincent Griffith. Smith Blair. Jr .. Robel1 Keller. Martin Fitzgerald. Roger Sperry. and Sam Bowlin. 

sified staff backgrounds and its increased size. 

OCR could not keep up with the ever expanding 

number and range of contacts. Some audit divisions chose to appoint their own " congressional affairs officers" to keep tabs on congressional requests and help the audit staffs with 

congressional contacts. Others simply shifted 

more of the burden to line audit staffs. 

Today. OCR remains small compared with 

the size of other Federal agencies liaison staffs. 

The audit divisions conduct most of the day-today contacts with the Hill. and OCR is little involved except for helping to resolve specific 

problems and attending particularly important or 

sensitive meetings. Many auditors and evaluators 

in GAO now recognize that both sides generally 

benefit from close and continuing contacts and 

that direct negotiatio ns with a committee or 

member's office requesting work does not necessarily mean losing control of the assignment 

or increasing its scope. The Comptroller General 

still expected to be kept fully informed of 

congressional contacts. but his sources of feedback necessarily expanded. 

One nagging problem remains. however. 

That is the mismatch between GAO's organization and committee jurisdictions. Few GAO issue areas fall exclUSively under the jurisdiction 

of a single committee. Similarly. the jurisdiction 

of many committees spans more than one GAO 

division or issue area. Some committees. such 

as Appropriations and Government Operations. 

have responsibilities that cover the entire spectrum of Government activity. Therefore. it is the 

exception. rather than the rule. when a single 

GAO division can conduct all GAO's business 

with a single committee and vice versa. By or· 

ganizing GAO's work under issue areas. the Office can respond on a given subject. no matter 

what Government agencies are involved. but 

there will probably continue to be some overlap 

necessitating centrally coordinated congressional 

relations. 

I Frt'OOl'l<kC Mosher. The GAO TI,., OuesrforAccou,llubilityrnA mencan Goocmmenf (Bouldl!r. erna WeshM!w Press. 1 ':179), p_ 5b 

2 31 USC 5:1. sec- :l12 (I1l2]) Bud!l<ll dnd A(,COUnhl1~ Arr 

3 U 5 Gc,wrJl] Atr.OI.mnng O f lire. AmlLwl Repon "/ rlre Compll'(Jllcr GI!t!· 

emf. 1960 'W,'~hm 9!011 . DC. GPO. 196 11. fl IS 

4 Comfl[ro ll ~! G~nt!ral Stallts. L'1l1er to [he ChalrtT\illl SoI~n/lte Committee on Gow.mml'l1[ Operations. 17 Mar 1966 

5 U S Cong HQU!l'! Commllll'l! on ApproprlatlOn!>. Suocommlnu-e on 

LL>gI5!al1ve B~nch. H(!IJ"n~ Of) LII!JIl;!o/(w BronclrApproprllltlom fn. FI$,o/ Yl!or 

1969IMa~' 1967). p. 656 

b Jowph POlS. Wotchdog Otl thf! Po rolllO(" A Swd.., 01 lIte Comptroller 

Qmerul 0/ rhe UI1~ecI SII./ft!li IWasnlltYIOIl. D C. Umv~l\I?tom; of AroonC"lI. 19791. p 31 1 12 

7 Contptrolk, G.:nerlll "!Mrs lelletS 10 the Chaiffn.'m. HoUSo! Commlll;sr 

on A"""d S<!'VKeIo. 1 Aug ]')(,<) ,md 12!:>..'Jl1 1'11.>'-1 

I'! Camplroll.!! C .. 'l1o!'llr, !~PO'1 nn r:rnposed prlrn:tjJld 'It relmbU!lWlInenl 

101 provKk'T Co<its llndel Publk 1 .. 1W 1:19 97 m 1429K:l M;)y 24. 19661 

9 US (,,"g. . 5.!nll[l'. Fmal" .. Cummine"" Chilirman Tl!:!llmun.ll oj Comp troller Gem!m! SWol$ {2 ,July 1%91 

10 CompnallOJl c. .. mc,,,r5 !l.Ipo1"1. "Dm<!n.<;I! Industry P:utlt Stu<!v" (8 1.1)'.18')6. Mill 17 197]) 

c(~~ .. 1~i~;~!tr,~ot!N~r20.c:~q21 'Studv oj He/lhh Flocilltl...s Construction 

12 U <; (ong. Senml! Comml!t~ on Appropnatlofls. Heonnq!. on Lcgk 

/Grille B1{lm"h ~p!oprialloll!o forFlsco1 Yen' 1973. 9200 Cong 2"d S('s~ IWash 

Ifl!1IOIl, 0 C GPO. PJ721. P 24 

1] Gene",1 A.:4;OUnIing Oilke Annual ReporT oJ the> Comp/rol~r Gl'lteru/, 

/ Q79tWashIn910fl. DC GPO. 191:1f11. p 2 

III Comptrolllli Gelleral SIMt~. U!l1 cr to 'he Chillrm,)n. Commlni?C' on HouSl/ Administration (8 177913. J'IIov 5. IQ75/ 

15. U S Cong .klInt Comllutli!1.' on rhl! Orgaruzatron of the Congress. Or 

gam,wllon of COIlg-ress H<tth e(mg 2nd S('Ss .. 5 Rep!. gill IW/I!hlllgton. D.C .. 

GPO. 196bt. p 27 

16. US COl'l9 I1 \lU~ Commlth!\! on Rull!S. TestlmOlIY o(Colllptrolb Gem- e ra! Swats (I l11t>c 19·1'l1. p 00 

17 PubliC l.4J ..... 4 1 5 10. ~" 2Ul 2{)[, IOcr 26. 197(1) Legisl"HIIiP R ... 'OrQ'1f) lIMon Act til 1'J7(J 

IS 1I S Cong . oo~ CommUlI?(' on Rufl's. Tesll11l1)"\i of Compl,oJl~'TGc!l1 

I'JUt Sraol.'l III Dec 19791 pp 61 ·62 

29 
CCiluroIJll100 ~ 

GAO's Move To Government· 

wide Program Evaluations 

As early as the 1950's, GAO had broadened 

its activities beyond financial or corporation au- dits relying on the Office's 1921 and 1950 statutory authority. Even then, economy and effi- ciency were bywords of the comprehensive 

audit, and looking into the managerial and administrative performance of an agency was com- mon practice. The efforts of those who pioneered 

this work set the sta~e for further evolution in 

the 1960's and 1970 s. 

Two Significant events set the stage for this 

evolution. Firs~ the Holifield hearings of 1965 

precipitated a major change in GAO's approach 

to reviewing defense contracting procedures. Second, the emergence of the Great Society 

programs expanded the Federal role beyond 

such traditional programs as building highways 

and meeting payrolls to ameliorating the prob- lems of the Nation's poor by providing health, educational, welfare, and social benefits. The 

benefits of such programs could not be easily 

measured, and the techniques and skills used to 

measure them were in their infancy. Few social 

scientists could determine the effectiveness and 

economy of these "soft issues," let alone GAO 

auditors so accustomed to working with concrete 

figures or countable inventory. 

As watchdog over the Federal purse strings. 

GAO was expected to ensure the proper use of 

Federal funds. But how could this be done with- out scrutinizing individual contracts or asseSSing 

quantifiable results? The Office began by stress- ing the importance of determining program re- sults and bringing in systems analysts and others 

to assist auditors in this new and challenging task. GAO's first major review of program results came 

with the Prouty amendment of 1968 requiring 

an evaluation of antipoverty programs. which 

sorely tested the skills and abilities of GAO and 

its staff. But the Prouty work launched GAO's 

extensive program results efforts and paved the 

way for more in-depth program evaluations and 

policy analyses. In the defense area, GAO broad- ened the scope of its work. It made reviews with 

the intent of improving the overall weapons ac- quisition process, which eventually evolved into 

mission analyses. GAO also addressed Federal 

agencies on their responsibilities to evaluate their 

own programs and encouraged academia and 

the evaluation community to share their 

knowledge. 

However, GAO's venture into the field of 

evaluation and analysis did not diminish its con- cern for economical. efficient management. 

Rather, evaluation and analysis supplemented 

30 

the proven financial and compliance audits and 

reviews of economy and efficiency. This expanded focus of GAO's work, applied to an 

ever-increasing number of Federal agencies and 

functions (see ch. 6), gave the Congress. the 

Govemment, and the public a more complete 

picture of how Federal dollars were being administered and what they were buying. 

The Prouty Amendment-GAO's 

First Major Test of Program 

Results 

During the 89th Congress, the legislative skills 

of President Lyndon Johnson, coupled with civil 

rights uprisings and the reaction to President 

Kennedy's assassination, resulted in enacting 

much of the fallen President's legislative program, including the Economic Opportunity Act 

of 1964 and the creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The potpourri of Govern- ment activities known as the antipoverty program thus was launched. Initial concerns about how well these activities 

were meeting their legislative mandate were ad- dressed in studies commissioned by the Senate 

Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. When 

the act came up for renewal in 1967, Senator 

Winston Prouty, a member of the Committee, 

rejected the studies as being "either factually in- accurate or based upon information supplied by 

interested parties which was never checked to 

determine its validity.'" Senator Prouty persuaded the Senate to require a GAO investiga- tion of the programs authorized under section 2 

of the act, including most significantly, 

• • • the extent to which such programs 

and actiuities achieue the objectiues set 

forth in the releuant part or title of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authonzm9 

such programs or actiuities.

2 

The Prouty amendment work has been de- scribed as one of the most comprehensive, complex, and difficult assignments ever undertaken 

by GAO. Concerned that GAO not be embarrassed by failing to meet this test the Comptroller 

General himself became involved in the project, which included a team of 250 auditors from the 

Civil Division and all regional offices. The total 

cost of the project was several million dollars, the 

largest ever for any GAO study. 

GAO's work plan was based on two closely 

related approaches. 
• Examinations of the management of the 

programs, efficiency of administration. and 

achievement of objectives at headquarters 

and field offices of responsible Federal 

agendes. grantees. and contractors. • Statistical and economic analyses designed 

to broaden the geographic coverage of the 

field examinations. 3 

The team examined those programs authorized 

the most money. that is, the Job Corps, Community Action. Neighborhood Youth Corps. 

Work Experience and Training. Concentrated 

Employment. and Volunteers in Service to 

America programs. as well as smaller programs 

authorized by law. For comparative purposes. 

GAO also obtained data on similar programs 

authorized under other legislation. GAO contracted with three private firms to 

assist in the statistical and economic analyses, to 

review previous analyses of the Office of Eco- nomic Opportunity and other agencies. to assist 

in reviewing that Office's information systems. 

and to interview current and former enrollees of 

the antipoverty programs. And in what became 

a precedent for many other GAO reviews. the 

Comptroller General insisted that a consultants' 

panel, composed of experts from academia. private industry, and Government. be formed near 

the end of the job to provide an independent 

view of GAO's methodology, results. conclusions, and recommendations. The new challenge posed by this work was 

integrating the tried and true methodologies of 

economy and efficiency audits with new tech- niques of measuring the impact of social pro- grams. Each antipoverty program had its own 

objectives, participants or beneficiaries. and activities. For example. the Head Start program 

was designed to help economically disadvan- taged preschool children in achieving their full 

potential through health. nutritional, educational, psychological. and social services. The 

Community Action Program. on the other hand, 

was intended to alleviate problems of the rural 

and urban poor through unified planning. or- ganizing. and implementing of available services. 

The GAO staff faced the difficulty of defining 

and refining antipoverty program objectives and 

the even more difficult task of determining criteria for measuring the programs' success. There 

were few measures of educational. social. nutri- tional, or cognitive changes in children and 

adults. GAO relied on its systems analysts and 

consultants to provide valid measures and on 

common sense criteria which the Congress 

would understand and accept. In the end, GAO 

concluded that the antipoverty programs achieved 

varying degrees of success and made numerous 

recommendations to improve program administration and operation. 

GAO met its l8-month deadline after an a11-

out effort to draft a 200 page summary report 

in 6 weeks. Dozens of supplementary reports on 

individual programs and projects, as well as five 

consultant reports, were issued later. The staff 

involved in this project had to cope not only with 

the new task and tight timeframe but also with 

major internal resistance to doing work that re- quired new techniques and involved high risks 

to the organization. 

Although the Comptroller General and his 

staff encountered some hostility. the Congress' 

official reaction to the report was generaily fa- vorable. A Senate Committee on Labor and 

Public Welfare report "found the GAO audit of 

value in carrying out its responsibilities," and 

Senator Prouty thanked GAO for a job well 

done. 4 But Senator Walter Mondale expressed 

"grave doubts" about whether GAO should be 

playing this role. Mondale was concerned that 

this work involved "political judgments" which 

required the sophistication of professionals with 

extensive training and experience in health, ed- ucation. legal services, and related fields.5 

There was also a problem of timing. GAO 

questioned whether certain Job Corps training 

centers deserved the level of support they were 

getting when the executive branch was propos- ing substantial cutbacks in the same activities. GAO officials were never accused of tailoring the 

study for political motives. but congressmen sup- porting the training centers raised questions 

about the method GAO used to select the centers 

it reviewed and the timeliness of the data on 

which GAO's conclusions were based. House 

Education and Labor Committee Chairman Carl 

Perkins took the Comptroller General to task for 

suggesting that funding for the program could 

be better spent by offering similar services 

through other programs. Perkins acknowledged 

that Staats' testimony had been helpful to the 

Committee, but he wanted GAO to recommend 

ways to improve the deficient centers, not ways 

to save money. . _ 

There is some indication that GAO was being 

criticized because of concern about the future of 

this and related programs and not because of 

any real reservations about its methods. In any 

case, the results proved that GAO could contrib31 
32 

(Top to bottom) 

C-SA A frcraJt--Air Force 

00-963 Oestroyer--NauV 

MaIn Battle Tank--Army 
ute to the Congress' growing need for information on program results. 

Major Weapon Systems-Work 

Of Limited Scope Expands To 

Major Proportions 

As with the antipoverty program audit. GAO's 

reviews of major weapon systems acquisitions 

represented a new and changing focus of work. 

Defense contracting procedures. especially as 

viewed from the perspective of the Truth in Negotiations Act, continued to be a subject of 

GAO's investigations. but GAO realized that review of priCing actions under individual contracts 

was a function more properly done by agency 

auditors. Evidence suggested that GAO work on 

individual actions discouraged agencies from reviewing such actions themselves. In the late 

1%0's GAO began to understand that review 

of the acquisition process itself was a better focus 

of work and that this review could be designed 

to accomplish two objectives: 

• Serve as the basis for giving Appropriation 

Committees current data on the status of 

given systems. 

• Serve to evaluate overaU acquisition management so that general improvements 

could be made and perhaps head off future 

problems. 

Then the events described in chapter 2. which 

had been precipitated by large cost overruns. led 

to a new approach in 1969. The new Major Acquisitions Group in the Defense Division focused 

on the basic causes of cost growth, schedule slippages. and deterioration of the expected performance characteristics of individual weapon 

systems in order to make recommendations for 

improving the weapon acquisition process.· From 

this work evolved reviews that encompassed not 

only military missions. capabilities. and alternatives but also major acquisitions in the civilian 

agencies. 

EARL V WEAPON SYSTEMS WORK DEVELOPS 

QUICKLV 

The Major Acquisitions Group began by verifying data supporting DOD's new selected acquisition reports. which were issued quarterly on 

the status of major weapons. In a matter of 

months. the group. along with regional office 

staff, planned its attack; verified DOD's cost. 

schedule. and performance data: and published 

a report on 57 major weapons. just about evenly 

split among the services. 7 

Publication of the initial report within the 6-

month deadline required the staffs concentrated 

effort. They had to become even more knowledgeable of weapon system development and 

acquisition processes. To assist them. GAO 

asked the Defense Department to provide cost 

and time milestones against which the staff could 

measure the success and timeliness of each 

weapon acquisition. On the basis of this first review. GAO concluded that 

• many development programs had considerable cost growth and the growth was 

continuing: 

• there were significant variances. existing or 

anticipated, between the performance originally expected and that currently estimated 

for a large number of systems: and 

• many of the systems' program schedules 

had slippages. existing or anticipated, of 6 

months to more than 3 years" 

GAO made no recommendations in the report. 

However, during the course of the assignment. 

it made many suggestions for improving the ac, 

quisition management process. and DOD accepted them. 

WEAPON SYSTEMS WORK EXPANDS 

In 1971. the group initiated staff studies to 

provide the Congress with an even more up-todate look at weapon acquisitions. Using an abbreviated reporting process. GAO provided data 

just 3 to 4 weeks old-perhaps the most current 

information ever provided on such a large scale. 

In addition to continuing appraisals of individual weapon procurements. GAO initiated indepth studies of specific functions in the acquisition process. By the end of fiscal year 1972, 

reviews included assessments of the procedures 

and practices in cost estimating. testing and evaluation of test results. and cost effectiveness 

studies. 

In 1974 the Major Acquisitions Group initiated another phase in its work-evaluating 

weapon systems based on the mission they 

were to accomplish. For example. a carri sk 

force. usually composed of two nuclear or conventionally powered aircraft carriers and 10 to 

12 support ships. is primarily responsible for accomplishing the Navy's sea control mission. 

GAO studied the Navy's ability to perform this 

mission: Could the Navy adequately defend critical sea lanes against enemy attack? Were the 

carrier task forces composed of the appropriate 

ships, and were they available on time and properly equipped? Would a different mix of ships at 

a different cost afford greater control and flexibility? Additional reports addressed the Navy's 

ability to accomplish its sea control mission in 

terms of personnel. logistics. and supply. 

Using this approach. the Office started looking 

at how the pieces fit together: Could the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force effectively accomplish their 

individual missions? Were the weapon systems 

being acquired appropriate for the missions? 

Were people and equipment available and operational? Answering these questions was an am33 
Figure 3-1 

Examples Of Major Weapons Systems Reviewed In 1973 

ARMY 

Aircraft: 

HLH helicopter 

UTI AS helicopter 

Missiles: 

Safeguard 

SAM-D 

TOW 

Vehicles-ordnance: 

MlCV (mechanized infantry combat 

vehicle) 

M60A2 tank 

Gama Goat 

Main battle tank 

Other: 

Tadire control support system 

Site defense system 

NAVY 

Aircraft: 

Light airborne multipurpose system 

(LA.MPS) 

S-3A 

Harrier 

F-14 Phoenix 

E-2C 

P-3C 

Sonar systems: 

AN/SQS-23 

ANIBQQ-5 

Missiles: 

Poseidon 

Aegis 

Harpoon 

AIM-7E1F 

Ordnance: 

Mark-48 torpedo 

Ships: 

SSN-637 submarine 

Trident submarine 

00-963 destroyer 

DE-1052 destroyer escort 

bitious task and required the input of not only 

the Major Acquisitions Group in the Procurement 

and Systems Acquisition Division but also the 

Logistics and Communications Division and the 

Federal Personnel and Compensation Division. 

The Office has traditionaily not examined 

matters of military judgment and strategy-the 

next logical step in the development of GAO's 

defense work. GAO was not privy to all information used in making such dedsions. and were 

the Office to evaluate them, it could duplicate 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff s responsibility. GAO's 

initial work on major weapon systems involved 

34 

General purpose amphibious assault 

ship (LHA) 

CVAN 68/69/70 aircraft carrier 

Patrol frigate 

Patrol hydrofoil 

Sea control ship 

Surface effects ship 

Other: 

Amphibious assault vehicle 

Submarine detection device 

AIR FORCE 

Aircraft: 

F-lll 

F-15 

F-5 

C-5A 

Missiles: 

Minuteman 111111 

Maverick 

Short range attack missile (SRAM) 

Other: 

Over-the-horizon backscatter radar 

(OTHB) 

Airborne warning and control system 

(AWACS) 

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY 

(l system) 

Defense sateilite communications system 

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 

(1 system) 

Sprint/Spartan missile program 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 

ADMINISTRATION 

(2 systems) 

Applications technology satellite 

Viking 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

(1 system) 

Automation of terminal control 

only the verification of cos~ schedule, and performance figures. It eventually began to examine 

broader issues. such as mission analyses. Although some GAO staff believe questions about 

military planning and strategy are not unlike policy issues posed at civilian agencies, GAO has 

never chosen to go down that road. 

CJVn. AGENCY ACQUISmONS COME UNDER 

REVIEW 

Several years after the start of major acqUisition work in defense agencies. GAO began to 

assess the cost. schedule. and performance of 
major civil agency acquisitions. Early systems 

examined were the Nation's first liquid metal fast 

breeder reactor. the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control system, NASA's space 

shuttle, and METRO-the Washington, D. c.. area's subway system. Eventually. the civil acquisition work grew to include reviews of each 

agency's cost-estimating procedures, research 

and development activities. and other acquisition 

functions. 

Broadening The Scope Of 

GAO's Reviews 

The antipoverty program reviews and evolution of the weapon systems work set the stage 

for the future . Convinced of GAO's ability to 

determine the effectiveness of Federal programs 

and pointed in this direction by the Congress, 

the Comptroller General encouraged the divisions to take on more such work. Some program 

results work evolved into program evaluations 

and policy analyses. GAO also encouraged Federal a!iencies to perform some of its traditional 

work. Financial management internal audit, and 

many of the routine functions GAO used to do 

were considered. and rightly so, a primary responsibility of the agencies themselves. GAO 

oversaw their efforts and concentrated on the 

broader based, Government-wide activities, such 

as consumer protection and nondiscrimination 

in Federal programs. 

THE SPACE SHUTTLE, ENTERPRISE, a major civil 

agency acquisition. also reviewed by GAO in the 1970's. 

THE PROGRESSION TO PROGRAM 

EVALUATIONS AND POUCY ANALYSIS 

Although GAO had opened the door to program results reviews, such reviews entailed a 

different type of analytical work than effiCiency 

and economy reviews, and often good data was 

not available to determine and assess program 

resuits.ZSOmetimes program results reviews ended 

up focusing on the practices and activities used 

to achieve objectives rather than assessments of 

whether objectives were attained. But such process evaluations offered valuable information. 

nevertheless. Some Federal programs. such as 

the administration of nondiscrimination laws, 

could be evaluated only in terms of the processes 

used to achieve stated purposes. In this case, the 

effects of discrimination against minority groups, 

such as the handicapped, were difficult if not 

impossible to pin down. Consequently. GAO 

evaluated and reported on the sufficiency of activities designed to eliminate or reduce discrimination rather than t7actual reduction in discriminatory practices. 

A recent exampl an evaluation focusing 

on process was "The World Wide Military Command and Control Systems-Major Changes 

Needed in Its Automated Data PrOCessing Management and Direction" ILCD-80-221. The report slated that the ADP program's objectives 

were yet to be achieved because DOD's management was so complex and fragmented that 

no one organization or person had a complete 

overview or central responsibility for program 

funding, budgeting. and management. This 

problem occurred even though DOD had spent 

over $1 billion on the program Since its start in 

the 1960's. 

As the Office gained experience and expertise, it made several reviews aimed directly at 

assessing program impact. or the results that programs were designed to achieve, and identifying 

causes that inhibit satisfactory performance. Ex- amples include: 

• "Early Childhood and Family Development Programs Improve the Quality of Ufe 

for Low Income Families" (HRD-79-401. 

Combining the results of independent research and its own work, GAO reported 

that these programs did result in reduced 

health. social, and educational problems in 

young children. Only a small percentage 

of children and families needing such assistance received it. however . 

• "War on Or!ianized Crime Faltering-Federal Strike Forces Not Getting the Job 

Done" (GGD-77-171. This report discussed the failure of 13 Federal agency 

strike forces to eliminate or even control 

organized crime. GAO also cited the need 

for the Department of Justice to develop 

35 
Figure 3-2 

Summary Of Staff Year. U.ed By GAO Program Category'" 

Financial Efficiency & Ongoing Costs/benefits Special Other 

Economy Program Studies 

1978 471 1288 2577 

(9%) (25%) (50%) 

1979 333 1204 1910 

(6%) (23%) (37%) 

1980 312 1278 1859 

(6%) (24%) (35%) 

* Includes direct assistance work. 

criteria and establish a system to evaluate 

the effectiveness of the program. 

By 1977 the Program Analysis Division (PAD) 

had begun to exercise its presence in evaluation. 

PAD's evaluation responsibilities were to provide 

leadership in developing improved techniques 

and methods for program evaluation and to improve program evaluation through assistance in 

the legislative process. To help develop and 

demonstrate the scientific nature of evaluation 

methods. a distinguishing trait. PAD undertook 

evaluations of significant national issues and programs, including: 

• " The National School Lunch Program" 

(PAD-77-6). the first report to demonstrate 

a methodology for comprehensive evaluation of the school lunch program. to identify the program' s potential for adverse 

health effects. and to define national pricepartiCipation relationships. 

• "Handgun Control: Effectiveness and Costs" 

(PAD-78-4). which had to use a variety of 

lnalytical approaches to provide the needed 

218 349 241 

(4%) (7%) (5%) 

254 554 881 

(5%) (11%) (17%) 

320 600 913 

(6%) (11%) (17%) 

information. The report demonstrated that 

multiple evaluation methods could be especially useful in analyzing the increasingly 

complex issues faCing GAO and the 

Congress. 

Concurrent with program evaluations, PAD 

also made program and economic analyses 

which developed from work focused onginally 

on budget-related issue analyses. The emphasis 

on the budget dropped soon after the work 

started, but the complex and sometimes controversial issues addressed were not bound by a 

single program, agency. or level of government: 

in fact. several transcended international boundaries. Landmark program and policy analyses 

included: 

• "The Long-Term Fiscal Outlook for New 

York City" (PAD-77-l l. which assessed 

New York's long-term fiscal and economic 

prospects and discussed a number of Federal policy alternatives to alleviate longterm decline in the older urban cities and 

to counteract the short-term swings in na· 

tional economic activity. 

~ - \- '\ '.1 •• l '1 t ' ') · 

., ~.; 

~ .. \~ 

-r f1 ~ ' " -. . . \ 

,. ' .1 ~. -<;;.~ .. . - ~ 

- .s: 

\ I 

GAO OFFICIALS AND STAFF observe the signing of GAO's reports on New York City'S fiscal problems 

36 
• " Investment Tax Credit: Unresolved Is· sues" (PAD-78-40l. which evaluated the 

investment tax credit's role in promoting 

national economic stability. The report discussed past studies. analyzed their strengths 

and weaknesses. and indicated a need and 

direction for future research. 

An example of a somewhat specialized type 

of study in which GAO has increaSingly been 

involved is model evaluation. GAO first used 

models in the late 1960' s when it contracted for 

the development of a mathematical model to 

predict. under varying environmental conditions. 

the water quality of the Merrimack River Basin 

in New England. In 1971 GAO issued a report 

which examined selected aspects of computeroriented war gaming, simulations. and contract 

studies sponsored by the Department of Defense. 

ysis of the methodology used in the computer 

program" and cited several specific interests. Thus, GAO became engaged in the comprehensive evaluation of large-scale models. The GAO 

report said emphasis should be placed on three 

areas: (1) model verification/validation. (2) sensitivity testing. and (3) model documentation. 

Moreover. each of the three was identified as 

being "essential in developing a computer 

modeL' '') 

This effort was followed by a GAO-initiated 

project in which the Transfer Income Model 

(TRIM). a large-scale model used in welfare pol- icy analysiS. was reviewed and evaluated. This 

project also resulted in a report to the Congress 

as well as a guideline on criteria developed in 

this model evaluation work. III 

SE1TING UP GAO'S EVALUATION CAPABIUTY 

More recen~y. in 1974. the Chairman of the 

House Committee on Science and Technology 

noted that much of the information in the Federal 

Energy Administration' s Project Independence 

Blueprint "was obtained by the use of computer 

simulation models." The Chairman requested 

GAO "to undertake a thorough review and anal· 

GAO's evaluation skills developed over the 

course of many years and are still evolving. In 

1967 a small systems analysis staff was created 

in the Office of Policy and Special Studies. In 

addition to being available to assist GAO auditors. the staff surveyed executive agency implementation of the new planning, programing, and 

Tax Policy Studies: Important New Work For GAO 

GAO's work in tax policy is one of the lesser known but potentially most significant new 

initiatives undertaken since 1966. According to Gerald R. Jantscher. who heads up the Program 

Analysis Division's tax policy team. this new work deserves special attention for a simple 

reason: almost without exception. all GAO issue areas touch on tax law in one way or another. 

Formerly. the exclusive province of the Congress' tax-writing committees and the Treasury 

Department. GAO began studying tax policy questions following enadment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Ad. GAO now assists Congress by supplementing 

the work of these groups in the overall effort to provide for sound tax policy. Jantscher. a former Brookings Institution economist and presently chief tax policy analyst. 

stresses that GAD has actually had the authority to conduct tax policy studies since passage 

of the Budget and Accounting Ad. 1921. Indeed. PAD's second Tax Policy program plan 

made note that the famous section 3120 of GAO's charter. which directs the Comptroller 

General to ;'investigate * * 11= all matters relatin$ to the receipt. disbursement. and application 

of public funds" included the word "revenue.' Jantscher recalled that. during consideration 

of the program plan. Comptroller General Staats had remarked that the reference to section 

3120 had caught his eye. He had thought of the section only in terms of tax administration 

studies, but he recognized the validity of a broader inte1pretation that encompassed tax policy 

as well. 

Other GAO divisions also encounter tax policy questions in work programed under other 

issue areas. In 1978. PAD's team collaborated on an International Division report on the "Impad on Trade of Changes in Taxation of US. Citizens Employed Overseas.' The report 

attraded a good deal of attention from private groups trying to change the tax laws in this 

area. Moreover. GAO's testimony on this report contributed to the passage of the Foreign 

Earned income Ad of 1978. PAD's team has also cooperated with the Congressional Budget 

Office and the Congressional Research Service on a 1978 report for the Senate Budget 

Committee on tax expenditures and their relationship to spending programs. 

Tax expenditures. another issue studied by Jantscher's tax policy team. are selective tax 

reductions for special groups and for people engaged in special adivities. Examples include 

the tax deduction for medical expenses and the tax credit for business investments in certain 

depreciable property. These tax breaks are called "expenditures" because they cause a loss 

of revenue and thus represent a kind of '·spending. " 

37 
budgeting system. Based on this survey. the staff 

planned additional work: however. the Prouty 

amendment intervened and the staff became in- volved in the antipoverty program review. At the conclusion of this work. the analytical 

staff encountered some roadblocks before find - ing their niche in GAO. For example. auditors 

were uncertain how to use the new evaluation 

skills. Always conscious of the "turf' that GAO's 

operating divisions thought belonged to them. 

the staff tried to work in problem areas which 

were not likely to overlap with other groups' or 

divisions' areas but which held potential for policy-related results. For example. the staff re- viewed the validity of data analysis and prelim- inary conclusions from the New Jersey Negative 

Income Tax Experiment. This work led to testi- mony before the Senate Finance Committee in 

August 1970 in its hearing on the President's 

proposed Family Assistance Plan-a major wel- fare reform proposal. 

Following enactment of the Congressional 

Budget Act. GAO established two new organi- zational units: the Office of Program and Budget 

Analysis (OPBAl. which was to respond to grow- Ing congressional needs in the budget area. and 

the CongresSional Information Service Group 

(CIS). which was to focus on GAO's program 

evaluation and information responsibilities. That 

latter unit. including the small research staff. was 

established in the Financial and General Man- agement Studies Division (FGMSD) but separate 

from the systems analysis assistance function. Its 

mission was to improve congressional and GAO 

capabilities to require and use information and 

program evaluation. and to cooperate with Fed- eral. State. and local government agencies in 

improving infonnation systems and evaluation 

processes. Both units eventually became part of 

the Program Analysis DiviSion. which developed 

evaluation guidelines and methods. investigated 

the application of Federal funds. and suggested 

ways for makIng Government more efficient. 

Systems analysis assistance and training responsibilities remained in FGMSD. In April 1980. establishment of the Institute 

for Program Evaluation reunited the two staffs 

which originated from the small beginning in 

1967. The Institute is to help ensure that GAO 

uses the best available evaluation methodologies. to. provide technical capabilities throughout 

the Office. to develop evaluation methodologies. and to make program evaluations designed to 

demonstrate new or improved methodologies. (See also ch. 9.) 

Evaluation As A Fundamental 

Part Of Program Administration 

As GAO built an evaluation capability within 

its ranks. it simultaneously emphasized tne need 

for the Congress and Federal agencies to use 

evaluation skills. In August 1972. Staats wrote 

38 

to all congressional committee chairmen em- phasizing the importance of program evaluation 

and urging the Congress to incorporate evalu- ation requirements into all Federal programs. He 

said. in part: 

• • • J urge that the Congress give careful 

consideration in authorizing new programs. 

or in reauthorizing existing programs. to 

including in the authorizing legislation specific statutory requirements for a systematic 

evaluation by the Department or agency 

involved of the results of programs in 

operation. 11 

GAO has emphasized (1) that the executive 

agencies must assume primary responsibility for 

gathering and analyzing the program data. and 

(2) that the Congress should provide the state- ment of program objectives and possibly even 

standards of performance to permit evaluation. Despite similar letters sent thereafter and tes- timony presented throughout the years. neither 

the Congress nor the executive branch has made 

evaluation a standard program requirement. 

However. GAO staff have worked with com- mittee staff on a few pieces of authorizing leg- islation to establish clearer program goals and 

objectives and to incorporate specific evaluation 

requirements. Many Congressmen also became 

increasingly aware. particularly in the late 1970' s. 

that committees needed to do a better job of 

overseeing the programs under their jurisdiction. Members in both the House and the Senate have 

sponsored sunrise and sunset legislation. which 

can improve reporting requirements. Sunrise legislation would require clear statements of objec- tives and reporting requirements before pro- grams are authorized operating funds. Sunset 

legislation would require ongoing programs to 

be reconsidered periodically before they are authorized additional funds. GAO supported this reform legislation as a 

means for the Congress to improve exercise of 

its oversight responsibilities by acquiring knowledge about the operation and results of laws and 

programs. interpreting such knowledge so it 

could judge the effectiveness of existing laws and 

programs. and effecting needed improvements. GAO also developed a set of suggestions for con- gressional oversight based on a request from 

Senator Patrick J. Leahy. The PAD report out- lined a process for planning and carrying out 

congressional oversight that committees could 

use to keep track of programs as they were car- ried out or changed in response to legislation. J2 

Despite extensive hearings and study. the Con- gress has not taken final action on any of these 

proposals. In carrying out Its responsibility to strengthen 

Federal agency evaluation capabilities. PAD is- sued several reports on program evaluation 
methodologies. The first. issued in 1976, sought 

to establish a conceptual framework and a common language in which analysts from various 

backgrounds could work and communicate effectively as they grappled with problems related 

to program evaluation. 13 Another report, produced by the Social Science Research Council 

under contract with GAO. extended work begun 

by the small central group in its 1970 review of 

the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment. It represented recognition by the social 

research community of GAO's role in audits of 

social research intended for policy decisions. The 

council's report recommended methods and 

techniques for auditing social experiments and 

focused on the issues of reinterviews. their impact on the outcome of social experimen ts. and 

alternative techniques to monitor research quality. The report also suggested action GAO should 

take to improve the quality of social science research in general. including reporting both the 

beneficial and adverse effects of social programs 

and developing in-house staff expertise ... 

A third report. issued in October 1979, resulted from GAO's recognition of common problems which all evaluators must resolve to ensure 

valid and useful studies. The report established 

six criteria--relevance, Significance. validity, reliability, objectivity, and timeliness-which evaluations must meet. particularly those whose conclusions are based less on concrete facts and 

figures and more on interpretations of opinions 

and observations. 

PAD also helped to establish the Federal 

Agency Evaluation Directors Seminar which met 

every 6 weeks and involved evaluation representatives from almost all the executive agencies. 

Close contacts are maintained with the professional communities that have an interest in evaluation. as well as with State and local government evaluators and representatives of auditing, 

evaluation, and policy groups from many coun-

. tries and international organizations. 

GAO further sought to improve Federal evaluation management and policy with reviews of 

agency evaluation activities. The earliest work of 

this nature was a 1975 survey of evaluation functions throughout most of the larger agencies. The 

Office also studied agency evaluations of particular programs or activities and often found that 

adequate evaluations were not being made. 

GAO staff members who are active in the 

professional evaluation societies have seen a 

change in attitudes in the last 3 or 4 years. Other 

evaluators at first wondered why GAO was interested in evaluation, and there was even some 

hostility to GAO's presence. They now have become more aware of GAO's ideas. efforts, and 

people. 

••• 

In 1966 GAO's primary work was financial 

audits and reviews of efficiency and economy. 

By 1981. the Office had firmly established program results reviews, evaluations. and analyses 

as major additions to the services it provides. 

GAO now reports not only how Federal moneys 

are spent but also whether Government programs are achieving their goals and objectives. 

The addition of program results reviews and 

evaluations to GAO's work plans was not an easy 

one. It entailed convincing Federal agencies to 

improve their own financial management so that 

GAO could devote more time to program oversight and establishing with the Congress the legitimacy of GAO' s new role. It also required that 

the staff redirect its thinking and develop new 

capabilities. 

GAO's constant striving to establish a credible 

evaluation capability reflects the many problems 

faced by the evaluation community in general. 

Recent statistics show that evaluations-whether 

performed by GAO or another institution-<an 

enable decision makers to apply increasingly 

scarce resources more effectively. and the defEDERAL AGENCY EVALUATION DIRECTORS' seminar. December. 1978. 

39 
mand for QOOCI evaluations has grown both in 

and out of Govemment However. the results 

of many evaluations have fallen shon of the 

sponsors' expectations. and often the reports lie 

unused in program managers' files. Although the 

experience gained will be valuable to future ef· forts. more remains to be done before GAO's 

program evaluations become fully accepted and 

used. 

I us Cong s.m.,,, Commlnw on \...Hbm <Inc! Ptlbllt: W"UnUl, Rq)(m on Economic o""oTrunlfl! Am~nlJ 01 1967. ':I01h Cong .. hi ~ 5 RI.'PI 90·563 rW.,shln!llon. DC. GPO, 1%11, p 2£»1. 

2 Public La .... 90 222 rD.rc 23 1%71 

3 ComDtrOllef (_aI', R!pOI't'RuYl_ 01 Economlr OppartUnlTI,' Pro grams" IB 13051S. Mar 18 1%91 

4 US Cong . $enallt COfflmlttwon Labor oVId Public WII!""re fcO<MlmI(' 

DDDotn>nilv AmendmI'nla of 1969 'Jill Cang loll Mm Wasn~Ofl _ 0 C Qlt) 19691. p i 

40 

5 US Cong ~_ Comll'll.nM on labor and Public WdIi\rl'- Heonngll 

on E~1c ODPorumJry Amend"""," of 1969. 9 151 COf'IIf h' ~ Wa~, 

Inglon. 0 C GPO. 1%91. P 367 

6 U S ~ Ac:counUt\il Offkc.AIltIlICll HI'pOIff 0{ 1M ~~ em rroI. J970 fWashtnglOO DC GPO, 1971 I. p 74 

7 ComptrOIlII'I Genetal', rvpon. . 'S1lI1Wo ollhe Ac:Qu.tIIon ol s.tealld Ma ...... WIIOpot! Sy,tcnu' (8 Ib30S8. F~ 6 . 19701 

, ''*' 9 Comp!fClk Ci0wrIli', I¥pOI1 Revww 01 ~ Prq«f 1nrJep.~ tvel uaDon SvsIt'm" rOPA 76 20, A", 21 1976) 

10 ComptrOller G.nwra!'s ~n ' 'GuIdIdirwI lor Model [;vlIlU6tlOn' (PAD 79· 17. JlIn 1979) 

11 Comptrollm Gcmorlli 51A1115 LI.1tel1 TO HOI.IIiol lind Senal(' Commlncl1 Cholmu;m, I J Aug 1972 

12 Comp'rollel ~n""Al's n!port, "Andinq Our How PtOYfllml Am Worklrl!:l Suggqsnons lor Conslt!SllOl\al OwrIIghl" IPA07H 33_ ~ I 1 Jl~171 

13 ComptrOllw G\>~t repo«.'Evalul\llOfI MId AnaMis 10 $uJ)pO(\ De Cl§lOnlMking' (PAD 76 9 5epI I , 19761 

14 ComptrO/ler Gcn.rrah IqIOft Autits and SoaaJ ~IS'· (PAD 79 I Clrn 19181 

CCIluffiIWl1®IT 41 

Efforts to Improve Government 

Financial Management 

Ensuring effective financial management sys- tems in Government has not often been on the 

"front burner" in Washington or been a pressing 

issue to the public. despite the huge sums at 

hazard to fraud, abuse, and waste and the oc- casional front-page scandals. But during the 

1930's and early 1940's, the need to improve 

the Government's financial controls was recog- nized by a number of national study groups. They declared that the existing Federal budg· 

eting and accounting systems were archaic. con- fused, submerged in red tape. and of little use 

to management. The state of the art was low 

compared with that in private industry: for in- stance, accounting and auditing processes were 

so intenmixed that it was almost impossible to 

distinguish them and auditing was severely 

handicapped. I 

The three central financial agencies-T reas- ury; GAO: and OMB's predecessor. the Bureau 

of the Budget-pursued different ends and im- posed conflicting requirements on the operating 

agencies. Treasury was interested in the inflowoutflow of funds and the Government's cash 

position. and the Bureau was concerned with 

appropriations and managerial control. At the 

same time, GAO was mandated to prescribe ac- counting systems. forms. and procedures and to 

monitor the legal and proper use of funds. It also 

prescribed a Government-wide chart of ac- counts. Operating agencies had to keep sepa- rate, often irreconcilable accounts to satisfy these 

separate demands as well as their own internal 

needs2 

Not until after World War II did the three 

agencies begin to coordinate their work through 

what eventually became the Joint Financial Man- agement Improvement Program. Over the years. and especially in recent years. the joint program 

was associated with many large-scale efforts to 

improve budgeting. accounting. auditing. cash 

management central financial operations. finan- cial staffing. and supportive legislation. But prog- ress was not always smooth. Some agencies 

were passive or opposed the jOint program's ef- forts, and the enthusiasm of the founders was 

not shared by all their successors. Government 

programs suffered because intenmediate and 

lower level managers were deprived of the in- sights good accounong data could provide. Also. the dialog between accountants and manage- ment was often not sufficient to work out system 

output needs. GAO stressed this infonmation 

vacuum repeatedly. I 

In spite of these problems. GAO strengthened 

42 

its campaign for financial management improvement using staff assigned exclusively to this work. This chapter discusses these efforts and related 

developments. including the establishment of 

various accounting standards boards. to improve 

accounting practices in both Government and 

private industry. 

Making Financial Management A 

Joint Responsibility 

Although the 1921 Budget and Accounting 

Act required the Comptroller General to pre- scribe the fonms. systems. and procedures for 

Government accounting, controversy persisted 

for many years about whether accounting lead- ership properly resided in GAO or somewhere 

in the executive branch. 

Soon after World War II, aides to the Comp- troller General. the Secretary of the Treasury. 

and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 

together with staff members of the Senate Com- mittee on Expenditures in the Executive De- partments. began infonmal talks. They discussed 

how to coordinate their several requirements. 

integrate line agency accounting practices for 

adaptation to central needs. and at the same time 

enhance an agency's managerial control over 

operations.' 

The present-day Joint Financial Management 

Improvement Program. a bridge between the 

three agencies. emerged from these talks in 

1948. It was then known as the Joint Program 

for ImprOving Accounting in the Federal Gov- ernment. Calling for voluntary, Government- wide action. the agency heads hoped to get financial systems installed which met each agency's 

managerial needs as well as central agency and 

congressional requirements, ~ 

Early Efforts To Impl'ove 

Accounting Systems 

After enactment of the George Act and the 

Corporation Control Act of 1945, which authorized GAO to do annual commercial-type au- dits of Government corporations (see ch. 1). 

Comptroller General Undsay Warren moved 

quickly to develop a more sophisticated capa- bility in GAO. Experienced accountants were 

hired from outside. public accounting finms were 

retained as consultants. and accounting gradu- ates were recruited from colleges. The conver- sion to accounting professionalism had begun. In January 1948, Comptroller General War- ren created an Accounting Systems Division with 
some 60 professional accountants separate from 

GAO's audit organizations. The division was to 

spearhead the joint program and to work with 

Treasury. Bureau of the Budget. and line agency 

financial staffs. The division's accountants began 

advising the line agencies and reviewing their 

proposed systems, as the management services 

staff of a large accounting firm would do.6 

The first Hoover Commission in 1949, with 

its recommendations stressing the managerial 

uses of accounting, also had a profound effect 

on GAO's scope and operations. Its view was 

identical to that of the jOint program principals. 

and most of its recommendations became law. 

For instance. the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (Public Law 1521 

authorized GAO to prescribe principles and 

standards for property accounting systems. a 

function sought for GAO by the joint program 

members. 

The most significant financial management 

legislation of the period. and perhaps since GAO 

was founded. was the Budgeting and Accounting 

Procedures Act of 1950, another legacy of the 

first Hoover Commission. The joint program had 

a large hand in writing this legislation. particularly 

title I. part II. called the Accounting and Auditing 

Act of 1950. Agency accounting systems were 

Significantly affected by this new law. They were 

declared to be the responsibility of executive 

branch agency heads. and were required to follow the principles and standards which the act 

authorized the Comptroller General to establish. 

Managerial accounting concepts 

not widely accepted 

Despite the benefits offered by improved accounting systems. few agencies were eager for 

change. There was never a ground swell of demand for first-class financial management systems. nor was there a penalty for noncompliance 

with GAO requirements. Generally, agency administrators expected their accountants merely 

to "bookkeep' obligations and disbursements 

and to ensure compliance with the laws, but not 

to venture into more sophisticated accounting 

system designs. 

The Office of Management and Budget. 

Treasury, and GAO collaborated on the original and each new edition of Federal agency 

guidance. and although each edition called for 

accrual accounting. the executive agencies-including Treasury-remained on an obligationcash basis. The law did not actually require that 

the systems use accrual accountins-a concept 

GAO defines as 

• • • The basis of accounting under which 

revenues are recorded when eamed and 

expenditures are recorded when goods are 

received and services performed even 

,JOINT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM principals' meeting in 1974 to ~gn terms of 

reference. Sealed al the table (1 to r.) are William Simon. Secretary of the Treasury: Robert Hampton. Chairman, Civil 

Serv1ce CornrrUsslon. Elmer StlIats. Comptroller General; Arthur Sampson. Administrator of General Services. and Robert 

Marik. ~Ie Director for Management and Policy. Office of Management and Budget 

43 
though the receipt of the revenue or the 

payment of the expenditure may take 

place, in whole or part, in another accounting period,7 

Use of the accrual method for preparing the 

budget on a cost basis was also resisted by important power centers in the Congress, In the 

words of the House Committee on Government 

Operations: 

[This Committee] has never been enamored with the idea that accrual account- ing and so-called cost-based budgeting are 

necessary or even desirable in many agen- cies of Government.' 

The Atomic Energy Commission presented a 

cost-based budget using accrual accounting, but 

the Congress forced it to return to an obligational 

basis in requesting funds, The Commission, 

however, continued to use cost-based budgets 

internally and present them lor information purposes, The committees preferred the traditional 

obligational system because it enabled the Congress to prescribe maximum amounts that could 

be paid out of a given appropriation, Thus, without pressure from the committees which control 

their funding, the operating agencies successfully 

avoided the extra effort required to institute costbased budgets supported by full accrual accounting procedures. 

Agency resistance to accrual accounting hit 

home in the 1960' s when the planning. programing, and budgetary system that President 

Johnson wanted installed throughout Government was deterred by the lack of cost data that 

only full accrual and depreciation accounting 

could produce.' 

ACCOVNTING SYSTEM APPROVAL RATE 

FALLS OFF 

GAO's own impetus toward accounting sys- tem improvement fell off in 1956 when the Accounting Systems Division was abolished and its 

functions transferred to the audit divisions. Comptroller General Campbell believed that 

day-to-day assistance in developing systems was 

more the business of the executive branch, as 

the two Hoover Commissions had asserted. The 

systems division staff. except for a small policy 

staff, were diffused throughout GAO's audit organizations. It was a signal to some that GAO's 

endeavors in financial management would decline. 10 For the next decade, in fact, GAO concentrated almost exclusively on agency and contract audits outside the accounting systems sphere. 

Until March 1966 only two or three people on 

the Accounting and Auditing Policy Staff were 

involved in system approvals. II 

The two Hoover Commissions had recommended that Bureau of the Budget specialists 

conduct year-round on-the-spot reviews of agency 

44 

budget preparation, accounting, and reporting 

and other aspects of the budget process. The 

Bureau increased its accounting staff in the late 

1950' s but was unable to get enough funding to 

support even one-third of the technical staff that 

GAO's Accounting Systems Division had employed. " The Bureau and its successor, the Office of Management and Budget, issued bulletins 

on financial improvement programs. However, 

these instructions were not mandated, and there 

was no followup. Even though there was ostensible agreement between the gUidelines provided 

by both the Bureau and GAO. the latter carried 

the main burden of enforCing them. 13 

Government accounting system improvement. according to the House Committee on 

Government Operations. was "disappointingly 

slow" after an initial surge caused by passage of 

the 1950 Accounting and Auditing Act. Some 

agencies slipped their promised compliance 

deadlines repeatedly-even those scheduled 

several years in the future. 14 In addition to citing 

the leadership vacuum. critics claimed that GAO's 

accounting prinCiples and standards were too 

uncompromising and heedless of the special situations in some agencies. 15 On the other hand. 

GAO had to see that accounting systems conformed to sound accounting prinCiples and accommodated the myriad of congressional infor- mation requirements. 

A number of new laws seeking financial management improvements in the Government were 

enacted in the mid-1950's. These laws and the 

accounting climate of the times motivated GAO 

to publish a guidance manual for Federal agencies. a consolidation of previous GAO 

memorandums. 

The approval rate was not high. Of 173 accounting systems subject to approval, 45 were 

approved as conforming to the Comptroller General's principles and standards from 1950 to 

1959. Only three additional accounting systems 

were approved from 1960 to 1964' • This excludes those of the Department of Defense for 

which there was no accurate count available. 

Even then, the statistics overshadowed another 

problem pointed out in a GAO report: 

While this report shows 41 complete systems as having been approved by the 

Comptroller General in civil departments 

and agencies. this does not necessarily represent the number that would be deemed 

adequate when measured against current 

principles and standards. Because of subsequent legislation and refinements in pre- scribed requirements, most of the systems 

that have been approved need reexami- nation >II * * 17 

These bleak statistics. of course, did not take 

into account qualitative improvements in general 
financial management. such as more sophisti- cated financia l structures: appointment of comptrollers: more consistent classifications for budg- eting. accounting. and reporting: automatic data 

processing; and improved internaJ audit staffs. 1I~ 

Still, the snail's pace of accounting system ap- provals was exasperating. and GAO and the 

agencies often disagreed about which features 

of proposed systems were necessary and practical. In addition to concerns about the extent to 

which accrual accounting would be applied and 

whether depreciation should be used as a cost 

factor, there were disagreements on such issues 

as how to account for transfer costs and how to 

allocate general and administrative expenses. '9 

fresh effort by the three central accounting agen- cies and more vigorous recruiting and training 

of accounting profeSSionals by the Civil Service 

Commission. GAO was asked to step up its re- views of accounting systems and to encourage 

and assist the Une agenCies through personal in- itiatives of the GAO staff. 21 

In 1965 GAO decided to pursue accounting 

system improvements during audits of agency 

operations and thus broaden the avenues for 

corrective action. It was hoped that auditors finding deficiencies in agency operations could point 

out root causes in the accounting systems and 

offer help in applying the Comptroller General's 

accounting principles and standards. 

AlTEMPTS TO EXPEDITE SYSTEM APPROVALS 

The House Government Operations Committee held hearings in 1964. 1966. and 1967 

to wrestle with the problem of laggard accounting 

system improvements. The Commmitee explored a number of possible actions, including 

legislation to hold up the funding of those agencies failing to meet their deadlines for system 

improvements. But such legislation was deemed 

to be impolitic, if not too severe'o 

The Committee's 1965 report recommended 

Combining accounting systems work with 

agency audits did not work out very well. The 

arms-length character of traditional auditing visa-vis the collaboration required to work out system improvements proved over time to be rather 

incompatible. The agencies were wary of GAO 

auditors wearing two hats. And some auditors 

apparently were not well versed in the Comp- troller General's principles and standards. In ad- dition. GAO staff were fearful of conflict of interest, because they might have to audit their 

own recommendations down the road. 

Keeping Accounting Principles And Standards Up With The 

Times 

GAO's "Accounting Principles and Standards for Federal Agencies [title II]" has been a 

dynamic document, as evidenced by the many changes made in it over the years. Up to the 

mid-1960·s. most changes were additions to the 1957 version based on plans existing when 

the manual was originally issued. They were based on new legislation, new accounting prin- ciples in the private sector. and requirements issued by Treasury and Bureau of the Budget. But many changes relating to procedural matters and the intemal workings of the accounting 

system. such as intemal controls, were GAO·s. 

The bases for these changes lay in the govemmental environment and the responsibilities 

assigned to GAO. It is interesting to note that private sector accounting principles concern 

financial reporting exclusively. whereas GAO principles have gone beyond that to include 

procedural aspects of systems design and operation. In the private sector. procedural aspects 

are left to management rather than standard-setting bodies. New types of agreements and transactions or more frequent use of existing ones necessitated 

further changes. Examples include lease-purchase agreements. more frequent leasehold improvements. and more foreign currency transactions. Private standard-setting bodies. the 

Accounting Principles Board, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board did research and 

issued authoritative pronouncements on these transactions and agreements. as well as other concems, such as reporting changes in financial pOSition. Based on these private sector standards and GAO's own initiative, further changes to title /I provided even more coverage in 

these areas. In the 1960's, the Federal Govemment began large-scale grant and subsidy programs and 

increased the number of insurance and guarantee programs. Many title II requirements resulted. Examples include specific requirements for reporting contingent liabilities common 

among guarantee and insurance programs. The most recent revision to title II was mode in 

1978. 

GAO's financial management staff believes that recent advancements in the state of the 

accounting art call for another updating of title II. The first step underway is the establishment 

of a conceptual framework upon which current accounting practices can be evaluated and 

standards can be established and maintained. 

45 
Efforts To Revive Financial 

Management Improvement1966 to 1981 

The status of financial management was bleak 

in 1966. By then. annual Govemment expend· itures exceeded $125 billion. At this point. 16 

years after the Accounting and Auditing Act of 

1950. GAO had approved only about a third of 

the accounting systems of the civil departments 

and agencies. No systems had been approved 

in the Department of Health. Education. and 

Welfare or any of its eight agencies. In the De· partment of Defense. only the Corps of Engi· neers (civil functions) had passed muster and the 

number of separate accounting systems was not 

even known .~' These two departments. which 

administered most of the Federal budget. as· serted their accounting systems were very diffi· cult to systematize because of their size and com· plexity and the huge variety of information 

needed from their systems. 

REINVIGORATING THE JOINT PROGRAM AND 

OTHER INITtA TIVES 

The Joint Financial Management Improve· ment Program was moribund when the new 

Comptroller General came to office. Early on he 

met with other joint program members to con· sider ways of stepping up the pace. They saw 

a need for more professional accountants 

throughout the Government and intensified reo 

cruitment and training in cooperation with the 

Civil Service Commission. The Chairman of the 

Commission joined the program as a principal. 

GAO pushed for Federal financial improve· 

ment in other ways. In 1 %6 GAO assisted in 

drafting a Presidential memorandum in which 

President Johnson requested all departments 

and agencies to move forward in this important 

area. The Comptroller General and his top aides 

met with a dozen agency executives in the spring 

to discuss system design and approval status, 

exchange views. and "clear the decks" as he put 

il2.1 In June, a memorandum to the heads of 

GAO divisions and offices from the Comptrolle, 

General emphasized the need to collaborate with 

the executive agencies and pointed out that the 

responsibility for Government financial improve· ment was as important as any other responsibility 

in GAO's charter. GAO staff were directed to: 

• Develop a continuing day·to·day relation· 

ship with agency officials and staff to facil· itate cooperative system improvements and 

seek a common understanding of account· 

ing system concepts and goals. • Identify for the agency heads the specific 

areas where system improvements and 

added training are needed. • Keep informed on system changes under· way and provide technical gUidance and 

help as appropriate. 

• Be available at all times to encourage im· provement efforts and to help resolve 

problems. " 

The Commission On Budget Concepts 

46 

In 1966 three separate Federal budgets were in use. the administrative budget. the con· solidated cash budget. and the notional income accounts. The competing budgets were difficult 

to reconcile. and their concepts and terms were confusing to many. 

The joint program and other authoritative observers hod long urged unifying accounting 

systems to target central budget needs. In March 1967. President Johnson established the 

President's Commission on Budget Concepts to begin such unification. Appointed to the 

Commission were the Comptroller General. Secretary of the Treasury. Director of the Bureau 

of the Budget. Senators. Congressmen. and distinguished accountants and economists from 

the private sector. The centerpiece of the Commission's recommendations was a unified 

summary budget statement to be used for the President's January budget. Treasury financial 

reports. congressional hearings on taxes and agency budgets. and public debate. Of special interest to GAO's position on accounting principles and standards was the 

Commission's support for accrual accounting. Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 68·10. with which 

GAO concurred (B·115398. May 8 . 1968). conveyed the Commission's recommendation that 

expenditures and receipts-ond the Federal sector of the national income accoun~be reo 

ported on the accrual rather than the cosh basis. But because the notional budget "drives" 

Government accounting systems and given the congressional preference for the obligational 

format. accrual accounting lost out and Bulletin 68·10 faded away. Beyond sustaining accrual 

accounting as a standard. GAO could do little more on its own. The only avai/able avenue 

wos to assign accrual accounting to the joint program where a united front could be organized. 

further research pursued. and solutions offered to the agencies. This was done in 1971 . In 1980. GAO urged creation of anorner budget concepts commission to determine how 

the budget process could be updated to meet the analytical needs of the 1980's and beyond. The commission would be charged with restoring unity and consistency. improving managerial 

and program accountability. and examining the feasibility of longer term budgetary planning. 
The Accounting and Auditing Policy Staff was 

to be the GAO focal point for accounting system 

improvement and to provide guidance. direction. 

and followup. It was directed to work with GAO's 

Office of Personnel Management to intensify inhouse training. An enlarged policy staff was authorized. and by 1970 about 55 professionals 

were assigned to system approval work. ,'. In addition. quarterly status reports on systems submitted for GAO approval were required of the 

divisions. 

A SEPARATE DMSION FOR ACCOUNTING AND 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 

In 1971. to furtherfocus attention on the need 

for improved financial management systems. a 

new division was established-the Financial and 

General Management Studies Division. Within 

the division. a Financial Management Group was 

established to cultivate improved accounting systems in the operating agenCies. The group was 

charged with prescribing GAO's accounting principles and standards. informally helping the 

agencies to upgrade their systems. and reviewing 

and approving agency accounting systems which 

met GAO's prescribed requirements. A separate 

FGMSD group. called Systems in Operation. 

established in 1972. was to audit approved sys- tems in use on a selective basis as required by 

the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950. Still 

another group-the Automatic Data Processing 

Group-was established to deal with the impact 

of computers on financial management systems. 

These groups. and the entire division. in fact. 

were to collaborate closely with the joint pro- gram. In October 1980. the division's name was 

changed to the Accounting and Financial Management Division (AFMD) and its head designated GAO's Chief Accountant. to further ensure 

that GAO effectively carries out its financial management responsibility. 

ACCELERATING 11IE APPROVAL OF AGENCY 

ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 

In 1966, GAO's approval procedure for accounting systems had two stages. Stage one was 

a review of the agency's stated accounting principles and standards underpinning the proposed 

system. Stage two was reviewing the accounting 

system. or segments of it. in actual operation. 

A8provals stepped up markedly in 1968 when 

1 complete systems. 3 system segments, and 

15 statements of agency principles and standards 

met GAO's requirements." 

In a further move to expedite matters, the 

GAO approval process was changed in October 

1969. First was review of an agency's accounting 

principles and standards. Next was examination 

of the accounting system documentation-the 

design. This change allowed GAO to confine its 

review to the design without becoming involved 

in the many details associated with a system's 

regular operation. GAO still reviewed systems in 

operation but only on a selective basis.27 The 

new approach confused year-to-year statistics on 

system approvals but was more logical and 

realistic. 

NOT ALL WAS SERIOUS BUSINESS at signing ceremony for GAO approval of FBI accounting system. April 27 . 1977. 

Seated at table are Mrs. Clarence M. Kelley: Clarence M. K~lIt>y. Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Elmer Staats, 

Comptroller General: and Kevin Rooney. Acting Assistant Attorney General/or Administration. 

47 
With the consolidation of all financia l man- tenslfied efforts began showing an immediate 

agement system work within FGMSD, renewed payoff. In the short span of 4 years. (1970-74), 

emphasis was placed on securing agency sub- an additional 50 agency accounting systems 

missions of their accounting systems for ap- were approved. 5 more than had been approved 

proval. Guidance to agencies was Simplified. sys- in the previous 20 years. Continual~ reinforced 

tern docume ntation review guides were by congressional support, growing ME recogdeveloped, and other aids to planning and doc- nition of the need for approved accounting sysumenting accounting systems were published. terns. and direct contacts with agency heads by 

Direct contacts were established between GAO GAO officials. the number of approvals almost 

officials and agency heads. lhe Comptroller doubled over the next 5 years, between 1975 

General became personally involved when prob- and 1980, when 98 more accounting systems 

lems appeared to be insurmountable. These in- were approved. Of the 312 agency accounting 

Figure 4-1 

Status Of Accounting Systems As Of Sept. 30,1980 

Pl'iadpl_ •• d . t • • cS. .. ct. Syet • • de.ie_ed 

U •• PPrG". d 

5.1IJec:t Co b •• "..s_ Ap,......,ed U •• PItf'OV" appro,,'" Approved o ___ liao. .... &01' .... 

Civil departments 

and agencies: 

Agriculture 6 6 3 1 2 

Commerce 8 8 7 1 

Education 2 1 3 2 1 

Energy 

Health and Human 

7 7 4 3 

Services 29 29 6 23 

Housing and Urban 

Development 2 2 1 1 

Interior 15 15 11 4 

International Develop- ment Agency 4 4 1 1 2 

Justice 11 11 10 1 

Labor 2 2 2 

State 8 8 4 2 2 

Transportation 9 9 7 1 1 

Treasu:r 20 20 18 1 1 

Genera Services 

Administration 9 9 3 3 3 

Veterans Administration 8 8 7 1 

Other agencies 51 3 54 34 12 8 

Total Civil 191 4 195 120 51 24 

Percent 98 2 100 62 26 12 

Department of 

Defense: 

Air Force 29 29 25 3 1 

Army 14 14 9 3 2 

Navy (including Marine 

Corps) 45 45 30 6 9 

Defense Agencies 17 17 9 3 5 

Total Defense 105 105 73 15 17 

Percent 100 100 70 14 16 

District of Colambla 

government 1 1 1 

Total 297 4 301 193 66 42 

Percent 99 1 100 64 22 14 

48 
systems which had been identified in 1980 as 

subject to GAO approval, 193. or 64 percent, 

have been approved'· More progress is in the offing. Both the De· 

partments of Defense and Health and Human 

Resources, which account for more than half the 

Federal Budget, recently made major policy decisions to correct accounting deficiencies which 

had previously prevented approval of some 56 

of their systems. 

AUDITING INSTALLED SYSTEMS 

AFMD's Systems in Operation Group reviews 

Federal agency accounting systems in operation 

to evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency in 

producing reliable financial reports for internal 

and external use and in contributing to management control of agency resources and decisionmaking processes. 

The large size and growing complexity of Federal programs and the geographical dispersion 

of agency accounting functions (the U.s. Anmy 

alone has 130 disbursing offices worldwide). 

coupled with the wide variety of accounting in- fonmation needed by Government managers at 

all levels. have created the need for highly com- plex accounting systems having increasingly dif- ficult- to-manage data bases. The Systems in 

Operation Group has developed a variety of approaches to review the large. complex account- ing systems. Using these approaches, the group 

made hundreds of reviews and studies which 

resulted in recommendations for improving accounting systems and financial management 

techniques. Generally, the reviews showed de- ficiencies in such items as 

• pricing, billing, and collecting systems ac- counting for amounts owed the Federal 

Government: 

• cost accounting; 

• accounting controls; 

• cash management procedures and prac- tices: and 

• payroll systems. 

These reviews continue to help focus on the 

need for adequate agency accounting systems. 

COMPUTER-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 

Practically all major financial and manage- ment systems in the Federal Government are 

now computerized. This fast-moving technology 

(2,500 computers 10 Government 10 1965: 

15,800 in 1980) has profoundly affected GAO s 

pursuit of financial management improvement. ~) 

The promise of high-speed computerization 

was enonmously attractive to Government and 

private sector managers. Data manipulation 

could be speeded up by several orders of mag- .nitude, and information bits could be arranged 

and displayed to meet any imaginable need or 

convenience. Often. however, these expensive 

machines were acquired without much under- standing of their intricacies or possibilities. 

The new complex technology. with its esoteric 

language, meticulous procedure layouts. and in- tricate transaction networks, was not easy for 

agency personnel to assimilate. On the other 

side, computer programers, steeped in computer 

lore, sometimes found accounting rituals difficult 

to understand and cope with_ Managers and programers were often on entirely different wavelengths and were wary about their respective 

turfs. Without adequate understanding and communication between the two sides, the "sins" 

of a manual system could be transferred intact 

to the computer, audit trails could be disjoined, 

financial reports could become degraded and 

mistrusted, and loopholes for fraud and waste 

could be overlooked. GAO reacted in three ways to the advent of 

computers in financial management systems. First. it evaluated computer hardware and soft- ware acquisition for their contribution to econ- omy. and efficiency, and effectiveness in Gov- ernment. The second approach was to check the 

auditability of computer-based systems. The . third was to make sure that computer-based sys- tems did not bypass or short-circuit sound ac- counting standards and principles. 

In adcUtion to emplOying computer techni- cians and scientists, FGMSD set up a staff of 

about 50 computer auditors----a new kind of ex- pert otherwise scarce in GAO and the agenCies. 

Financial system progress depended on how well 

the new speCialists bridged the gap between the 

computer room and the executive suite. 

FURTHER STEPS TO ACTIVATE THE JOINT 

PROGRAM 

Further steps were taken to develop a more 

active role for the joint program. The post of 

executive director was created and a small per- manent staff was installed in 1973. In 1974 the 

Office of the Joint Financial Management Im- provement Program was established in GAO, the 

costs to be shared by the member agencies. An 

executive secretary was appointed to handle 

public affairs and maintain liaison with represen- tatives deSignated by the operating agencies. The 

steering committee members, surrogates for the 

joint program principals, were asked to organize 

joint studies of financial management areas, de- vise short- and long-range plans for specific im- provements, keep in close touch with operating 

agency efforts, and designate joint improvement 

project teams by drawing on the staffs of the joint 

program members and the operating agencies 

affected. 

Renewed Collaboration 

Between OMB And GAO 

The drive for financial management improve- ment, particularly for modernized accounting 

49 
practices, has had its ups and downs over the 

past 30 year.;. but a new effort launched by the 

Office of Management and Budget holds promise. In May 1979, because of numerous GAO and 

agency intemal audit reports which the media 

widely reported. OMB announced the Financial 

Priorities Program. an initiative for upgrading financial management and intemal controls in the 

executive agencies. Some problems. had be- come intolerable. such as audit findings accu- mulating to $4.3 billion: unresolved. unpursued 

bad debts totaling $3 billion a year: overobli- gations in the hundreds of millions of dollars: and 

most major accounting systems falling short of 

the Comptroller General's principles and 

standards . .JO 

Something more than the usual exhortations 

was needed-and the new OMB program was 

to have some teeth. [n consultation with the 

Comptroller General. the Director of OMB developed the follOwing main goals for the first 

phase of the Financial Priorities Program. 

• Accounting systems: Get General Account- ing Office approval of all systems. • Intemal control: Upgrade control systems 

to reduce the risk of fraud. abuse. waste. 

and inefficiency. • Cash management: Build upon the work 

of the President's Cash Management Project 

• Audit followup: Resolve findings promptly 

and properly and hold down the backlog. 

• Outlay estimating: Improve accuracy and 

timeliness. • Debt collection: Use proper accounting and 

take prompt aggressive collection actions. • Overtime: Ensure accurate accounting and 

tighter control. 

• Grant financing: Increase use of letters of 

credit and electronic fund transfers and recover unspent funds. • Grant accountability: Fully implemented 

cost principles and standard administrative 

requirements." 

To meet these goals. OMB planned to inte- grate the Financial Priorities Program into the 

budget review process. work with GAO to im- prove executive branch policies and standards. 

and collaborate with the Office of Personnel 

Management and individual agencies to have 

specific financial improvement goals in personnel 

appraisal criteria. Inspectors general were asked 

to consider these financial priorities in ordering 

their work schedules. OMB is also revising its 

circulars to strengthen executive branch audit 

policy and to tighten adherence to cost principles 

in grant administration. J2 

Soon after the Financial Priorities Program 

was announced. meetings were held between 

high-level officials of OMB. GAO. and the var- ious agencies to discuss the number-one priority. 

getting accounting systems up to par. Some 

50 

agencies made firm commitments to submit their 

systems to GAO for approval, and others showed 

new interest in solving persistent problems that 

had prevented past approval. 

Other Significant Financial 

Management Events 

In the period 1966-81. there were many or- ganizations and events affecting Government 

accounting and financial management in which 

the Comptroller General participated that were 

not directly related to either GAO's activities or 

the Joint Financial Management Improvement 

Program. 

CONSOUDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 

Business-type overview statements of the 

Govemment's financial affairs had long been 

advocated by the jOint program principals and 

private sector experts. But the complexity and 

variety of Govemment activities. unique con- ceptual problems. and the state of the art in 

Govemment accounting seemed for many years 

to preclude such financial statements. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 

brightened the possibilities for overview state- ments by requiring standardized terminology. 

coding, and classification of budgetary and fiscal 

data. By the mid-1970's. too. most agency ac- counting systems had improved enough to make 

consolidated financial statements worth a dedi- cated try. 

In 1976 the Secretary of the Treasury put 

together an adviSOry committee of nationally 

known specialists and Government officials. in- cluding the Comptroller General, to explore the 

new prospects. The 2-year charter of the Advi- sory Committee on Federal Consolidated finan- cial Statements called for considering a number 

of technical issues. such as the format of the 

statements and how to report pensions_ com- mitments. and contingencies. 33 

Since 1976 the Treasury has produced an- nual consolidated statements in prototype form 

for exposure and comment. but many problems 

must be resolved before a clear consensus can 

emerge. In support of the effort, the Comptroller General chaired the Interagency Advisory Committee 

on Consolidated Financial Statements and task 

groups staffed with GAO and other agency rep- resentatives studied tax accrual. allowances. de- preciation, and several other conceptual prob- lems. Their final reports are expected in January 

1981. The Committee will go out of business in 

March 1981. 

COST ACCOUNTING STAND ARDS BOARD 

On August 15. 1970. an amendment to the 

Defense Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 91-

379) created a new agency. the Cost Accounting 

Standards Board, to develop and promUlgate 
uniform cost accounting standards for defense 

contractors and subcontractors. 

Legislative action on defense contractor cost 

standards can be traced. in part. to the efforts 

of Admiral Hyman L. Rickover. For a number of 

years he had testified. before congressional committees. on the need for standardized cost 

accounting procedures for defense contracts. 

Rickover continually hammered away at the 

Government's inability to adequately identify 

contractor costs with specific negotiated contracts. He argued that. because industry. the 

accounting profession. and the executive branch 

would not establish standards, the initiative 

would have to come from the Congress.·M 

• The GAO Recommendations 

Based substantially on Rickover's testimony, 

which was supported by Senator William Proxmire. Public Law 90-320 was enacted in July 

1968 directing the Comptroller General to study 

the feasibility of applying uniform cost accounting standards to negotiated defense procurement 

contracts and subcontracts of $100,000 or more. 

GAO determined that uniform and consistent 

cost accounting standards were feasible and necessary. This report became the cornerstone of 

the Cost Accounting Standards Board. 

Both the House and the Senate held hearings 

in the spring and summer of 1970 to examine 

GAO's findings. Testimony presented at these 

hearings reflected the views of various Federal 

agencies and industry representatives on the 

GAO report. Opponents of cost accounting 

standards attacked the manner and methodology of the report. They also objected that the 

cost of implementing and complying with standards would outweigh the benefits.:J; Rickover. 

however. projected that uniform cost accounting 

standards would save the Government $2 billion 

a year.3b 

• Composition of the Board 

The 1970 law created a five-member independent Cost Accounting Standards Board 

headed by the Comptroller General and reporting directly to Congress. The Comptroller General also was directed to appoint four Board 

members of varying profeSSional backgrounds: 

two from the accounting profession. one from 

a Federal department or agency, and an industry 

representative. 

A former GAO official. Arthur Schoenhaut. 

was chosen executive secretary to head the 

Board's staffY By April 1971. the Board had 19 

contract administration and cost accounting 

profeSSionals recruited from Government. industry. public accounting, and the academic 

community.38 

• Kinds of Standards Set 

During its 10-year life. the Board promulgated 

19 standards grouped in 3 categories: overall 

cost accounting matters; classes, categories, and 

elements of cost; and pools of indirect cost. 3. 

Three standards dealt with consistency in accounting for an individual contractor. Their purpose was to ensure that costs were consistent 

from year to year. 

The standards on particular elements of cost 

were directed toward selected trouble spots in 

cost accounting. They covered depreciation of 

tangible capital assets, compoSition and measurement of pension costs, accounting for insurance costs, and capitalization of tangible assets. 

The problem of assigning indirect costs was 

tackled under the third group-pooling and allocation of costs. These costs, not specifically, 

associated with a particular contract. are "pooled' 

and allocated as a cost of all the contracts. Standards in this area included allocation of home oflice expenses and allocation of business unit and 

general administrative expenses to final cost 

objectives. 

Perhaps the most innovative standard was 

one in the miscellaneous group-cost of money 

as an element of the cost of facilities capital. It 

changed the concept of accounting by stipulating 

COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOA.RD swearing in ceremony. 

51 
that a contractor's return on invested capital, 

previously considered as profit. be classified as 

part of its overall cost.'" This departure from gen- erally accepted accounting principles received 

mixed reviews. 

• Differing Views on the Board 

Many of the l:loard's critics. particularly from 

industry, complained that it moved too quickly. Rickover on the other hand suggested that "the 

development of standards has not progressed 

nearly as fast as I believe it should." Critics con- tinued to press their attack. In a 1979 hearing, 

one Senator wanted to know if the standards 

had achieved the $2 billion a year savings fore- casted by Rickover. The admiral admitted that his 

projection was perhaps ambitious. but there was 

no way of telling what costs would have been 

without the standards. The Department of De- fense indicated that through December 1978. 

there was a nonrecurring net decrease in contract 

costs of $230 million and estimated annual cost 

reductions of $130 million.41 A good part of this 

savings could be attributed to the Board's efforts. 

After issuing the 19 standards. the Board's 

work was largel, accomplished. Staats urged that 

the functions 0 the Board be merged into GAO 

or transferred to OMB maintenance. The Con- gress. however, decided to terminate the Board 

at the end of fiscal year 1980. 

Not all accomplishments are quantifiable. Cost accounting under defense contracts was in 

a confused state before the Board was created 

and this agency was the first to attempt uniform 

and consistent approaches. Regardless of what 

the future brings. the Board made its mark on 

the practice of cost accounting. 

THE IlAIUIOAD ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 

BOARD 

Although the Congress chose to abolish the 

Cost Accounting Standards Board it did not 

abandon the concept. Shortly after the Board's 

demise. the Congress passed the Staggers Rail 

Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-448J. which created 

the Railroad Accounting Principles Board in legislation aimed at restoring the economic health 

of the railroad industry. The Board's purpose is 

to develop uniform cost accounting principles 

which will reflect the economic costs of rail move- ment for managerial as well as regulatory purposes. The Comptroller General is to chair the 

Board and appoint six other members repre- senting the accounting profession. the railroad 

industry. major shippers, small shippers, economic professionals, and the Interstate Com- merce Commission." Staats did not want the job 

because he believed it belonged to the Interstate 

Commerce CommiSSion. the regulator of the rail- road industry. He thought GAO should furnish 

oversight. but the Congress apparently felt that 

the new Board would need the independence 

and credibility of the Comptroller General. 

52 

The Board may impose fines on carriers 

whose cost accounting systems fall short of th" 

Board's principles and on parties who disclose 

a railroad company's confidential data. The Cost 

Accounting Standards Board existed for 10 

years. The new Board. according to the law, must finish its work in 3 years. 43 

mE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 

BOARD 

The financial soundness of State and local 

governments and the way they keep their books 

also became a worrisome matter in the late 

1970's. The Cleveland and New York City financial crises were said to be directly related to 

accounting and budgetary practices. and the 

District of Columbia's books were found to be 

unauditable. Studies showed the state of the art 

in governmental accounting and financial management was very low. Financial reports were 

often unacceptably late, obscure. or deficient in 

reporting liabilities such as pensions and other 

contingencies. 44 

In the absence of uniform and consistent 

standards, the economy and efficiency with 

which Federal funds were administered by 50 

States. 3.000 counties, and nearly 90,000 local 

jurisdictions became an increasing national con- cern. Another vital interest was investor confidence in municipal bonds. the outstanding face 

value of which was over $300 billion. There were 

no disclosure standards for these bonds like 

those required by the Securities and Exchange 

Commission for other securities.

45 

These matters have not been totally ne- glected. however. There is a National Council 

of Government Accounting composed of some 

20 State and local accounting officials. GAO. 

Treasury. and the American Institute of Certified 

Public Accountants are members of its Com- mittee of Advisors. The Council is a voluntary 

part-time group which sets voluntary accounting 

standards for local and State governments and 

uses task groups to research governmental fi- nancial problems .... The Financial Accounting Standards Board 

(FASB). which sets standards for the private sec- tor. also began to look at accounting system 

problems in the nonprofit sector, including State 

and local governments.

41 The Comptroller Gen- eral and State and local financial officials were 

wary about whether accounting standards whose 

foundation was in the private sector could be 

effectively applied to State and local governments. The compromise proposal was a full-time 

government accounting standards board, which 

would cooperate with but be organizationally 

separate from FASB. A charter group was instituted to explore the idea of a Government Ac- counting Foundation and. under its aegis. a full 

time Government Accounting Standards Board 

having a permanent staff. Staats supported a 

3-year grant from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to finance studies and 

startup costs, and arrangements are being made 

to establish the Board, Additional funding is ex- pected from FASB and State and local govem- ments. There would be 12 trustees, including the 

Comptroller General. Six of the trustees would 

represent the private sector, The goal was to 

have the Government Accounting Standards 

Board in business by January 1981. If things run 

true to form, GAO will be generous in support 

of this better government effort, 

Standardizing Regulatory 

Agency Accounting 

Requirements 

In response to widespread complaints about 

the paperwork and reporting burden imposed by 

various regulatory agencies, the AFMD Regula- tory Operations Group was formed in 1978. Its 

objective is to evaluate the variety of accounting 

and financial reports required of such regulated 

industries of telecommunications, transportation, and energy to see how they might be minimized 

and simplified, Over 50,000 business enterprises 

are obliged to follow these accounting rules and 

requirements.

47 

Among the six regulatory agencies GAO re- searched, 22 different systems of accounts were 

identified; the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion, for example, has 8. Many firms also follow 

the private sector Financial Accounting Stand- ards Board accounting principles and standards, which do not agree with regulatory agency concepts on amortization and other factors in rate 

setting. In any event. regulated industries must 

cope with overlapping, duplication, and incon- sistency, Until GAO entered the vacuum, there 

was no mediator to help reconcile diverse views 

and requirements, 48 

In getting underway, the Regulatory Opera- tions Group is fOCUSing on the Securities and 

Exchange. Federal Communications, Federal 

Maritime, and Energy Regulatory CommiSSions, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. To help GAO 

plan the work and to build bridges between the 

parties of interest. the Comptroller General's 

Panel on Regulatory Accounting was formed 

with representation of regulated industries. State 

regulatory commissions, the public accounting 

profeSSion, and academia, 49 

Because of the high visibility of Government 

regulatory reform, the work of this new GAO 

group is of considerable interest to the Congress. 

The first report of the group dealt with accounting 

needs of the changing telephone industry, and 

the second dealt with costing systems for railroads. Hearings were held on the telephone industry report. and the railroad analysis was included in a congressional report on railroad 

deregulation, 

••• 

GAO worked steadfastly during the 1966-81 

period to improve financial management in Gov- ernment despite the lack of strong public interest 

and the resistance or passivity of the Federal 

establishment. Its ambitious goal was to get all 

agency systems up to GAO standards before the 

end of the period, The cause was refueled by 

excesses and scandals in Government. and GAO 

officials were quick to point out how dishonest 

public servants are aided and abetted by back- ward or loose accounting systems. Although the goal of approving all systems 

was not entirely met during this period, AFMD 

believes the stage has been set for such approv- als to occur, According to AFMD, both the De- partments of Defense and Health and Human 

Services reached agreements with GAO that 

should lead to approval of most of the remaining 

systems in the 1980' s. Unfortunately, another major financial managerrient problem has arisen to plague the Gov- ernment-the need for stronger internal man- agement controls. There has been a widespread 

concern over fraud and related illegal acts. many 

of which are the result of weaknesses in agency 

internal controls. Although GAO includes re- views of internal controls as a part of its approval 

process, these controls can be removed as the 

agency operates the system. Removal of such 

controls has become a significant problem 

Summarizing a series of accounting system 

stu",,,s of 11 major Federal organizations at 157 

fiscal offices-a cross section of Government 

activities at home and abroad, military and ci- vilian-a GAO report had this to say; 

Repeatedly, GAO found control weaknesses over virtually all aspects of account- ing operations--accounls receivable, collections, disbursements, obligations, and 

imprest funds-that aI/ow monetary losses 

to occur. The implications are very disturbing: it appears probable that similar 

problems exist throughout the Federal 

Govemment. 50 

To correct this problem, GAO has supported 

legislation that would require annual agency re- views of internal controls to ensure they are fu nc- tioning effectively and have not been removed, 

I T J&Ck Gary. Jr. "lmprowmenl5 In FederDt Accounting. Pas! Attorn- p!l~ kmenI5 lind Future Challenges." Federal Accounfanr, Dec 1959. p 5. 

2. Willitlm W Cooper and Woller F Frew, ''TuTr\BrQUnd at GAO," In Eric Louis Kohle'1. AeroulWng's Mon 0{ Pfirldpift. ed WiUIam W Cooper nd Yujl 

Qlri (Reston. Va Ralon PubliShlQg Co .. 19791. pp 130·31 

3 GeOrgi! M. u te, "Fed .. ral AccountlnB.Procedurts In Search of a Phllos Clphy," Gouemmllnl Accounlants' Journal, (Win"" 197879), p 1 

4 Frederick H Smith. "The Joint Financllll Managert:lentlmprovemtml Pr0- gram Is 20 Y~rs Old:' Tit. GAO Reufew. (Winter. 1%91. p 8 1 

5 Smith. p 81 

6 COOpe1 l1nd Frese, pp. 135 36 

7 U 5 General Accoun~ng Office dRIll report. "Feden.1 Budget Proem" 

(Dec. 2. 1980) 

53 
8 US C~.HouIt H.1Wpt.91 487 91IlCone lM-.IWllhlngtan. DC. GPO, 1970). P 32 

9 U S Cong.. tb.IM. H. Ittpl. 1159. 90th CorosI 2M -. rw..tlfr9on. 

DC: GPO. tot. S. 19681. Po 1~ 

10 Gaty. pp.. 12 13 

11 US Cong . HolM. CommitIft on ~ ~ end I,nw,t 

_ .... ,.". ............ -"""R_I«"""""_ .... leN. chit. F.b 1971. p 3J 

12. Gary, pp 1213 

13 c:.. "F.dMII Aecoundng ~ PI)!Ht 

14 H ~ 1159. pP S. 15 

15 RobM F Brandl. "Accountants 01 Ann.geddon"'· Fednal AcaxmtonI 

(Sum ....... 19651. p. n 

16. H Rep 1159 p 15 

17 U,S Coni.. IiouM SubcomJntna.e 0/ die' CornmIn.. on Cioval'Immt 

0,-_ H_ .. s.o.- a/ ""'"'" A<mu_ 5_/", GAO 

ApptOtlOl, huri"'lll 01 July 2 and July 2'8. 1964. 88th Coni.. 211d .... /W .... 11'900. 0 C GPO. 19641. p 69 

18. Brandt. pp 78-79 

~ 

~. '*""" M c.t~ "GAO __ -... ..... No ""-" 

Ao.»untonfll Jovrnof. tSswtng 1978). p f1 -

~ 

20. US Cong . Howe. Subc:omJnlnM d 11M Comminee on Gowmment H-u. on Subrn ..... 01 Apncy A«ounll"9 SWlcmr J", ~O ApprouoI. kuMgtoi ~ 19. 1%6, 89th Cong.. 2nd_ CWMhInglon. 0 C 

GPO, 19661. pp 98 99 

21 US Cong. , HouN.. H Rept. 179. 89th Cong I. _ (Wathlnglon. 

DC. GPO, Mer 17. 1965, pp 6-7 

2.]22. t-to....~onAJImCY~s,..aem. s..19 1966 pp h. 

23 HouM H-.on~~S~s. 19. 1966 pp 6 

7. 26 

11~;:' HOUM, He0rfr9 011 Agmcy At;c:tw"nlng S~ Stope 19. 1966 pp 

25 HoI.aM, Committee on Appropnelloni, Surveyt Mel Inl/lltllgllUOl'll Staff. 

dnslt. p 33. 

26 U.S C",n.ml A«oun""9 Olb, PropoMd Testimony on Accounllng Sys !em AppnMII.. 1 %9 

27 Comptroller G.neraI Staati. Mi!morandum 10 I'IadI of FedftaI dI;Iat1 nwnll MId ~ ''GtoneraI Ac:c:oundnQ 0fIIr:e 0Dmt1tont with R.Ipct 10 

Ea.ardw Agmcy Aocountlng lIl115398. Oct 16, 19691 

~~1~ ~ GAO', AcaJunrIng .nd FNno.I M.~ 

29 U 5 GnwraI Aecouming 0fBct. ·'ec.npulltB '" Gow:mmml w. CouIdn't Do Wlrhoul llwn' !June 19801. p 10 

54 

~ 

30, DIrIKfOf.IMMI 

Ind IpndII T MclnlyTt. (atIKhrMncl

J" , ''flnendel Memorandum Prton!Ia 10 hNdI 

Pmgram.

of ~ 

" 7 Mey 

"'" 31 'bid 

32 Ibid. 

J3. ~ wa.m E. Srmon, Con.oIcIared' FIncJnad ~ Proto. ~ R~ (W1IIhingIon, 0 c. ~ of dw T,....".. 1976). p 16. 

~Pu;:;. =~~PI DoTheyPnlllc! 

3S w s..-n HoIchIQa " An.ncIaI EucuttwsII1llllu1c CommwItion Gl\0 

UCAS 0rWt Report" . F.omrJ~ Mar 1970 

J6 RkkcwJ. p J I 

37 ' 'CoM Accouna~ Sumdartb Bootd '-'ppoInt«l: TM Q\O Revkw. ISpmg 1971 1, pp 69·70. 

38 Ar1ttw ~ '1M Work 01 dw eo. Acaluntlnll 5U1ndMdf 

Bomt" The ~O Hmaw, (IMn_ 19721. p 50 

19 COlI AccoI.mIlllU Swoc\IrdI Solid. Clolmulotl..,. Progra. R'PO'f 10 .h« 

CorIgreD IWNhlngton, 0 C. Nov 19801. p. a. 

40 CASB, Cum.J..,. Progr.u RIPO'f. P 5 

41 US Cong House, Subcommlttn 01 the Comrnlfteol on GowmIMflI 

0pen,,1IonI. HeorlngII 011 tJw ~tM Bronc:h ~ lor J98z. 96th 

Cong , 2nd ... (WMhtnglOn,OC. GPO. I980): p, S54 

42. U.S How.. H. R.pt. 96·1430, 96th ~, 2nd -. IWMhlng MIft., OC. GPO 5.pt 21), 118)), pp 3. 44 

43 H Rcpt 96-1430. p 44 

.. ~ c.n. ........ B 5taou. "_ ........... S- and l..oaI ~~ N.w en.s In Neec*f.net ~ for 

SeelIng llwn.' ~ Forum. Dc. 197'9, pp 7-8 

45 s.n.:,.. H.mIon A. wa.n.. Jt . " M\ri::IpII Accoundn!r 1M Se.m lor 

ScwdIrda.. M AccounIin9 Fonarn.. o.c 1979 pp. 14 IS 

46 NatIonal Council on GowmrrwnIllJ Ac:countlng. ''Research 011 0bjKI!vft. 

Conccpa and St.~ lor Accounting and F'mandol ReportIng lor St.td.oclll Gowmmmtl" IChicego. II. n dl 

47 US GmeraI ~nttng 0Hk.. Gen.ral c.o....rrnment DMsIon and FI 

nandBl and GrI'M!l'llI Mft~~tudlet DivIIIon, "Program PIIIn Cam Col 

lac:ted from NOfI·FIKIQI'lII SOi. trlllllieal rind PAperwork rmpllca~on" (Aug 

10. 1979). p 62 

.... ''''' 

49 Anlwr L Ulki. "R4lgu1i1Ory Opeaoons Gtoup: FGMSD F(Irljm, Apnl 

1980. pp I()..II 

50 ~ c.n.. .... rvport. ."ConcIn .... and WIdapr-:t \A.~ 

In Ifotmwll ConIfOlt R.ut In l.oIIon ThrtJ1.91 Fraud, W_. and AbwII' 

1FGM5[).8Q.651. Aug 28. 19801. cou.r 

CCl1CIlJJ)1r®IT W 

The Evolution Of Governmental 

Auditing And Intergovernmental 

Audit Cooperation 

For its first 25 years or so. GAO was the Federal Government's central auditor. Its army of 

clerks in Washington. which desk-audited all req- uisitions for funds. warrants. expense vouchers. 

canceled checks. and postal money orders and 

which processed claims against the Government. 

served as the Federal Government's internal 

auditor as well as the Congress' watchdog. 

Events in the 1940' sand 1950' s changed 

GAO's role and placed new audit responsibilities 

on Federal agencies. As the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program was being 

formed. it was becoming clear that Federal agen- cies would have to do most of the detailed audit 

work then done by GAO to ensure that account- ing and financial control systems were function- ing properly. Although most agencies were not 

anxious to take on this task. the next 30 years 

saw several efforls-some successful. some notto put in place the necessary machinery for ad- equate audits of governmental accounting and 

management systems. And as the States and lo- calities became more and more involved in ad- ministering Federal programs. the role of their 

auditors also assumed increasing importance. GAO became increasingly involved in the 

development of modem auditing practices at the 

Federal. State. and local levels. It moved its own 

operations from the central headquarters desk 

to the agency premises. For economy of scale 

and efficient division of labor. it campaigned vig- orously for internal auditing-<:hecks by each 

agency of its own affairs. As GAO extended its 

56 

scope beyond financial audits to assessments of 

economy. efficiency. and effectiveness. it urged 

other audit bodies to follow suit Concurrently. GAO pursued the financial management improvements discussed in the previous chapter. one aim of which was to ensure auditability of 

Government accounting systems. 

GAO also sought to elevate the organizational 

stature of auditors and thus strengthen their voice 

in management councils. Finally the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. strongly supported by 

GAO. brought audit chiefs into the executive 

suite. Regular communication and cooperation 

among audit bodies overseas and at home also 

became a reality. Out of the dialog with Federal. 

State. and local auditors evolved standards and 

guidelines useful to all. The distance GAO has 

traveled can be imagined by contrasting green- visored clerks ticking off voucher totals in Wash- ington in the 1940's with a GAO delegation in 

Nairobi. Kenya. in 1980 conferring on interna- tional audit philosophies. 

Internal Audit Beginnings In 

Federal Agencies 

The foundation for GAO support of internal 

auditing was laid in 1948 when the Accounting 

Systems Division was created in response to the 
..,. o 

'.i 

~ 

·v .. "

, 

=---,----

IlRf W!iE VOIJC~ JUJDrr lalAV§. GAO staff and records were housed in the Pension Building across the street from 

the present headquarters buiJdlng 

57 
joint program' s recommendation that the Comp- troller General promulgate uniform accounting 

principles and standards for agencies to follow 

in designing and installing their own accounting 

systems. The division was to see that adequate 

controls were an integral part of agency account- ing systems and that internal auditing was in 

place before the systems could gain the Comp- troller General's approval. 

Congressional and governmental review bod- ies were also getting into the act. The National 

Security Amendments of 1949 (PubliC Law 216) 

made the comptrollers of the Department of 

Defense and the three military departments re- sponsible for internal auditing and thus gave fur- ther support to the Accounting Systems Division. The first Hoover Commission pointed out that 

detailed checking of expenditures was properly 

a management function and should be part of 

the internal control system. In the fall of 1949. 

Comptroller General Warren ordered the elimi- nation of most control records and the desk au- diting connected with them. About 50.000 ledger 

accounts were to be discontinued. Onsite comprehensive audits were to become the rule. The Federal Property and Administrative Ser- vices Act of 1949 (Public Law 152). creating the 

General Services Administration. charged GAO 

with auditing all types of property accounts and 

transactions. It endorsed site auditing. too. Section 206 of the statute said: "Such audits shall 

be conducted as far as practicable at the place 

or places where the property or records of the 

executive agencies are kept * * *." The act also 

directed that audits include evaluations of the 

effectiveness of internal controls and internal 

auditing. The milestone Accounting and Auditing Act 

of 1950 ordered executive agencies in section 

116 to retain their documents for audit at agency 

locations rather than sending them in for desk- auditing at GAO when the Comptroller General 

so determined. The act also said that the primary 

responsibility for accounting and controlling Fed- eral funds rested with agency management In 

section 113 agency heads were given the re- sponsibility to design and install internal control 

systems, including internal audits, in conform- ance with the Comptroller General's accounting 

principles and standards. The statute also defined how GAO's audit 

procedures should be decided in relation to an 

agency's internal audit and control systems. Sec- tion 117 of the act said: 

58 

* * • the Comptroller General shall give 

due regard to generally accepted principles 

of auditing. inc/uding consideration of the 

effectiveness of accounting organizations 

and systems. intemal audit and control. 

and related administrative practices of the 

respective agencies. 

Thus. the Comptroller General was directed to 

assess the efficiency of an agency's management 

control systems before deciding on the scope 

and direction of GAO's audit work at the agency. 

In 1950. too. GAO dropped another book- keeping load by spinning off the Postal Accounts 

Division to the Post Office. in accordance with 

the Post Office Department Financial Control Act 

of 1950. From then on, GAO would audit at Post 

Office sites. review agency procedures. and test 

the efficiency of controls without checking every 

single document. 

Evolution Of Audit Policy In 

GAO 

Carrying out the 1950 act meant that GAO 

had to perform more of a policy-setting and lead- ership function for other Federal agencies. One 

step that paved the way for this role was a 1956 

GAO reorganilation that created a new Office 

of Accounting and Auditing Policy. (See ch. 9.) 

Its task was to review the audit reports of the 

operating divisions. maintain GAO's "Compre- hensive Audit Manual." and advise the Comp- troller General on policy matters. In 1971 the 

responsibility for establishing governmental audit 

standards was assigned to the Financial and Gen- eral Management Studies Division. * which pub- lished a stream of booklets, instructions. and 

manuals for the governmental accounting and 

auditing community. 

Among the leading GAO manuals are those 

familiarly known as the blue book. yellow book. 

and red book because of their cover colors. The 

blue book provides guidance for internal auditing 

in Federal agencies. The yellow book promul- gates universal audit standards applicable to all 

governmental entities. And the red book is a 

manual for more efficient financial and compli- ance auditing of Federal assistance programs 

operating at the State and local levels. 

T1I£ BLUE BOOK-GVmANCE FOR INnRNAL 

AVOrr 

One of the first publications was the 1957 

"Statement of PrinCiples and Concepts of Inter- nal Auditing for Federal Agencies," the forerun- ner of today's blue book. The statement came 

out as the comprehensive auditing concept be- gan to expand and affect the scope and direction 

of GAO reviews. It served to stake out the in - ternal audit sphere, mark out GAO's oversight 

role. and guide the development of internal audit 

systems. The statement was widely used In train- ing programs conducted by the Civil Service 

CommiSSion and individual agencies. I 

After some 10 years of lessons learned about 

internal auditing in Government and the private 

sector aod in the face of greatly expanded Fed-
eral programs. the guidelines were revised. The 

1968 edition was a product of extensive discus- sion with agency representatives. congressional 

staff members. and experts in other public and 

private organizations. 2 

It recommended that each department or 

agency have a single. centralized internal audit 

organization reporting to the agency head or to 

a principal executive next in line. The intent was 

to enhance auditor independence and freedom. 

concentrate efforts. and gain top-level attention 

to audit findings.3 The audit function, however. 

was not so elevated in most agencies until the 

Inspector General Act of 1978 required it. (See 

p.62) 

In defining the internal auditor's functions and 

scope of work. the 1968 statement emphasized 

appraising performance, evaluating efficiency 

and economy. testing records and reports. and 

examining financial reports. It recognized the 

need to augment auditing skills with such skills 

as statistical analysis. operations research. and 

computer programing. The statement asserted 

that the internal auditor should not participate 

in developing methods and procedures. however." 

In support of the blue book. a Federal man- agement circular issued in 1973 set forth the 

poliCies to be followed by executive departments 

and establishments in auditing Federal operations and programs. Its primary objectives were 

to promote and improve audit practices. use per- sonnel more efficiently. improve coordination of 

audits. and emphasize the need for early audits 

of new or substantially changed programs' 

The blue book was updated in 1974 and titled 

"Internal Auditing in Federal Agencies." The 

updated book characterized internal auditing as 

an integral part of management control in these 

terms. 

A necessary function of management is 

to establish and prescribe policies. plans, 

and procedures for carrying out programs 

and activities in pursuit of the objectives of 

the organization and to establish organizational or management systems for review 

of operations. The internal audit function can provide 

a highly valuable service to management 

by reviewing. appraising. and reporting on 

the extent and nature o[ internal compliance with rnanagement s policies. plans. 

and procedures as well as with applicable 

legal and external regulatory requirements" 

THE YELLOW BOOK-STANDARDS FOR 

GOVERNMENTAL AUDrnNG 

The explosion of Federal assistance programs 

beginning in the mid-1960's imposed new and 

complicated recordkeeping dernands on State 

and local reCipient organizations. Fifty States. 3.000 counties. and tens of thousands of local 

jurisdictions havmg all manner of accounting systems paid out Federal assistance funds and pro- vided services for family support. highway construction. housing. education. health, and other 

needs. There was a crying need for uniform, consistent audit standards to track accountability 

in the many programs and to keep managers, 

legislators. and the public properly informed.' 

Impetus was supplied by a 1962 Senate sub- committee study. and a joint program study in 

1967. which surfaced widespread deficiencies in 

Federal assistance audits.' 

Uniform. consistent standards would not only 

enhance federal assistance auditing but also improve financial management at all governmental 

levels. There would be common terminology for 

the audit community, and time and resources 

would be saved by enabling one governmental 

level to rely on the work of others. similar to the 

way GAO relies on internal auditing in Federal 

agencies. However. these audit standards were 

almost nonexistent. The national audit standards 

were those which the American Institute of Certi- fied Public Accountants (AI CPA) had published 

for its members. But these standards did not 

cover much of the work done by governmental 

auditors. 'J 

GAO took on the standards development job 

because it saw the need and had the resources. No other organization was in the position or in- clined to do so and GAO had a vital interest in 

adequate audit systems wherever Federal funds 

were deployed. H' This proj~ct was begun in 1970 

and carried out with the help of a task force 

representing the major Federal agencies involved 

in grant-in-aid programs and supplemented with 

part-time representatives from States, counties. 

cities. and universities. I I 

Tentative standards were developed and circulated for comment to AICPA. auditing and 

accounting associations. Federal departments 

and agencies, and State and local auditors. The 

final standards were first published in booklet 

form in 1972 as "Standards for Audit of Government Organizations, Programs. Activities & 

Functions. ,. 

The standards, which became known as the 

yellow book. were intended to be applied to audits of all Government organizations. programs, and functions-whether performed by auditors 

employed by Federal. State, or local governments: independent public accountants: or oth- ers. They rested not so much on any law as on 

a "fundamental tenet of a democratic society" 

that governments entrusted with public resources 

and the authority for applying them have a responsibility to render a full accounting for their 

activities. Based on this concept. the standards 

went beyond the traditional scope of auditing 

financial and compliance matters to auditing for 

economy. efficiency. and achievement of desired 

results. Through these standards. GAO advo59 
cated a scope 01 auditing lor others similar to 

what it had mandated for itself. 12 

The yellow book has continued to develop. The widespread interest in the yellow book can 

be gaged by the fact that over 125.000 copies 

have been distributed. There was a very minor 

revision in 1974. but not enough to justity a new 

edition. Later, due to developments in automatic 

data processing. some of the standards had to 

be supplemented. Therefore, "Additional GAO 

Standards: Auditing Computer Based Standards" was published in 1979. About a dozen 

other supplements to the yellow book have been 

published over the years, covering such topics 

as "How Auditors Develop Findings" and "Ben- efits of Expanded Scope Auditing of the Local 

LeveL" 

Members of AICPA's Committee on Relations 

with the GAO generally supported the standards. 

They said: 

The members of this Committee agree 

with the philosophy and objectiues aduocated by the GAO in its standards and be- lieue that the GAO's broadened definition 

of auditing is a logical and worthwhile continualion of the evolution and growth of 

the auditing discipline. 13 

Compliance with the yellow book's standards 

has been growing. For several years compliance 

was voluntary. OMB Circular A-73, published in 

1975. "advised" Federal agencies that the GAO 

standards should be followed. The standards 

gained greater authority when the 1978 Inspec-

------ ~====~--~----=-------~----------~ 

tor General Act ordered that each inspector gen- eral comply with standards established by the 

Comptroller General for audits of Federal establishments, organizations, programs, and activities. Further they must see that any work per- formed by non-Federal auditors is also in 

compliance. 

The standards acceptance by governmental 

auditors was so immediate and widespread that 

even GAO was surprised. Acceptance, however, was one thing; being able to follow the standards 

was another. as many governmental auditors 

simply had no experience in doing anything but 

financial audits. GAO has steadfastly supported 

the universality of the standards; it does not expect that all audits will include every element of 

auditing covered in the yellow book but believes 

that the basic procedures apply to whatever audit 

phases are undertaken. GAO and others have 

done extensive missionary work to spread 

knowledge on how to make audits of economy, efficiency. and achievement of desired results. 

As this is written, a new edition of the yellow 

book is being readied for publication. It incorporates standards relating to data processing. 

expands on existing ones, and presents a standard of auditor responsibility for detecting fraud 

and abuse. 

THE RED BOOK-A GVlDE FOR AVDITING 

FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 

Auditing federally assisted programs has proven 

to be a major challenge. About 1,100 Federal 

assistance programs are administered by 52 Federal entities. Most recipient organizations receive 

THESE WERE AMONG THE MANY GAO PVBLlCAnONS designed to supplement the basic audit standards 

60 
funds from several of these entities andlor under 

several federally assisted programs. 14 

Each agency that provides Federal money is 

responsible for ensuring that the recipients' rec- ords or activities are audited. A major problem 

in auditing Federal assistance programs was that 

agencies usually limited their audits to recipient 

records and financial controls relating to their 

own programs and ignored the other Federal 

programs administered by the recipients. As a 

result, duplication. overlap, underauditing and 

overauditing occurred. In addition, the recipient 

organizations had problems in following nearly 

100 confusing. inconsistent audit guides. 1.' 

GAO helped to bring some order to this con- fusion: GAO and joint program reports issued in 

1979 indicated that auditing recipients' records 

on a grant-by-grant basis was wasteful because 

it led to overlapping and duplicative audits and 

overlooked certain grants entirely. Subse- quently, President Jimmy Carter directed Fed- eral departments and agencies to improve audit 

coordination and to increase their reliance on 

audits made by State and local govemments. In 

October 1979, OMB issued a revision to Circular 

A-I02. "Uniform Administrative Requirements 

for Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Govemments. " which required that audits be made organizationwide. rather than on a grant-by-grant 

basis. using GAO's yellow book. To provide a 

uniform approach to such audits, GAO, OMB. 

and the Intergovernmental Audit Forum jointly 

issued an audit guide. known popularly as the 

red book. in February 1980. The red book, formally titled. "Guidelines for 

Financial and Compliance Audits of Federally 

Assisted Programs." indicates which audit standards should be applied (following AlCPA's audit 

standards and the yellow book). how audits 

should be planned. and how audit reports and 

work papers should be prepared. General pro- cedures for testing compliance with legal and 

regulatory requirements. studying internal con- trols. testing account balances, and other audit 

procedures are also included. tb 

OMB is implementing the single audit pro- cedures, and GAO plans oversight review of sin- gle audit effiCiency when the new procedures are 

in place. 

Efforts In GAO And Elsewhere 

To Combat Fraud And Abuse 

No one knows the actual extent of fraud and 

abuse in Government affairs, but the available 

estimates are staggering. The General Services 

Administration (GSA) scandals which broke in 

the spring of 1978 riveted national attention on 

fraud, abuse, and waste in Government. Prior 

GAO reports had disclosed numerous manage- ment and accounting system weaknesses that 

GSA had rarely corrected. One GAO official said 

that GSA's internal auditors were turning up 

fraudulent practices in the early 1970' s but that 

their Hndings got little management attention. 

A September 1978 GAO report on fraud in 

seven major agencies. including GSA. told how 

Government contracts, grants, and loan guar- antees were exploited through such means as 

false claims for benefits and services. bribery or 

corruption of public employees and offiCials. false 

statements to obtain contracts. and collusion in- volving contractors. According to the report. 

"opportunities for defrauding the Government 

are virtually limitless because of the number, 

variety, and value of Government programs." 

The passivity of the majority of agencies in deal- ing with the problem was particularly troublesome, and little was even known about the extent of the problem. The report said: 

Agencies haue not established management infonmation systems on fraud. As a 

result. they do not know the amount of 

identified fraud in their programs, nor can 

they estimate the potential amount of unknown fraud. Without such data, agencies 

haue no basis for establishing the leuel of 

resources needed to combat fraud. map 

antifraud strategies, and eualuate the scope 

and effectiueness of antifraud actiuities. The aosence of management information 

systems also precludes agencies from taking action aimed at identifying and anticipating fraudulent actiuity ' • • 17 

In the fall of 1978, the Financial and General 

Management Studies Division set up a task force 

on fraud and abuse to (1) assess the scope of 

fraud and other illegal activities, (2) determine 

where preventive measures are absent or inadequate, and (3) examine selected agendes for 

their susceptibility to illegal activities and degrees 

of risk. '" This action represented a renewed focus 

of the agency's efforts to combat fraud and other 

criminal abuses. Throughout GAO's history, auditors had been told to be alert for possible 

fraud and other violations of statutes. but because prosecution of such violations was the job 

of law enforcement agencies, GAO gave this 

aspect of its work lower priority or limited its 

efforts to gathering preliminary evidence on in- dividual cases. Now GAO is taking a broader 

scale systems approach to directly reviewing the 

problems. 

GAO ESTABUSHES A fRAUD HOTUNE 

At the suggestion of Senators James Sasser 

and Richard Schweiker, GAO established a na- tionwide toll-free fraud hotline. For the first time, 

private citizens were encouraged to contact the 

Government's watchdog about potential prob- lems in Govemment programs Involving waste, fraud. abuse, and illegal actions." 

61 
The hodine was opened on January 18, 

1979, and in the Erst 18 months, GAO logged 

over 21,000 domestic and overseas calls'o To 

screen the calls, GAO formed a hodine investi- gative unit First, the allegations received prelim- inary study by hotline phone operators. The al- legations ranged from illicit collection of small 

benefit checks to illegal Government contract 

awards. Those deemed substantive were ana- lyzed and referred to an investigative staff. After 

additional deliberation on their substance, alle- gations were referred to agency inspectors gen- eral or to GAO audit groups for followup. Spe- cific cases involving criminal activity were referred 

to the Justice Department. 

OTHER FRAVD TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES 

The second task force mission was to dig into 

the grounds and occasions for fraud. From a 

universe of about 130,000 illegal incidents in 21 

agencies, the task force selected about 5,000 

cases for analysis. The incidents were tracked 

back through management accounting and in- ternal control systems to determine why they had 

occurred and how the agencies had responded. A data base is being established from this sam- pling to identify root causes and recurring pat- terns of illegal activities and to see how they can 

best be prevented and detected.

21 

The third task force mission was to probe se- lected agency information or accounting systems 

and programs for weaknesses that invite or allow 

fraud. In one study of the Community Services 

Administration, GAO found loose control of 

cash, missing furniture and equipment, payroll 

anomalies, inaccurate inventory records, weak 

computer security, and deficient accounting sys- tems. GAO was reviewing the Department of 

Labor's Comprehensive Employment and Train- ing Act programs and the Naval Material Com- mand as this was written. The work of the fraud task force is not lIet 

complete. And in many ways, the executive 

branch's task of effectively combating fraud, abuse, and waste has just begun. Partly because 

of GAO's efforts, OMB has called on executive 

agencies to tighten up their fraud prevention 

measures and has taken further steps to strengthen 

agency internal controls. (See pp. 49 and 

50 .) The resources available in executive agen- cies to combat fraud and abuse have also been 

bolstered. It does not appear that there will ever 

come a time when it will be cost effective to seek 

to eliminate entirely the misuse or theft of Gov- ernment money. but GAO has worked to ensure 

that agency systems for preventing and disclos- ing these unfortunate incidents are as strong as 

practicable. 

Inspectors General Strengthen 

The Internal Auditor's Role 

The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public 

Law 95-452) was intended to reduce fraud, abuse, and waste in Government by centralizing 

and 5trengthening audit and investigative con- trols in the executive agencies. The act requires 

PRESS CONFERENCE KICKS OFF GAO FRAVD HOTUNE In January 1979 (I, to f .. Comptrollef Genefal Staats: Senator Jim Sasser: and Harold Stugan. Director. GAO Fraud Task Force) 

62 
-- - ----------

Figure 5-1 

GAO HotliDe Data Flow 

Hotline 

Allegations Analysis and 

Referral 

Agency Inspectors 

General 

each inspector ~eneral to comply with the Comptroller General s standards for auditing Federal 

organizations. programs. activities. and func -

tions. It also directs them to avoid duplication 

and thus ensure effective coordination and cooperation with GAO. 

Realizing that inspectors general must be 

clearly independent to function effectively, the 

Congress directed in section 3 that the inspectors 

general and their deputies be appointed by the 

President with the consent of the Senate. The 

law indicates that inspectors general are to report 

regularly to their agency heads or their close 

delegates and to the appropriate congressional 

committees. In addition, it provides that a department or agency head may not impede or prevent 

an inspector general from conducting any audit 

or investigation. 

ORIGINS OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

CONCEPT 

The history of the Inspector General Act can 

be linked directly, to Billie Sol Estes. the Texas "wheeler dealer ' who was convicted of fraud 

charges in the early 1960's. The Estes investigation. mishandled by Department of Agriculture 

investigators. prompted Agriculture Secretary 

Orville Freeman to establish an Office of Inspector General in 1962" The Congress' initial 

attempt to mandate a similar office occurred in 

1963 when a bill was introduced to create an 

Inspector of Programs and Operations at the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), but it was never enacted. In the following years, content to allow individual agencies 

to establish their own internal audit and investigative controls, the Congress did little to act on 

such legislation. 

Investigation Data 

Sensitive Cases/ 

Congressional Inquiries 

GAO 

Investigative Audit 

Summary Data on 

Potential Audit Areas 

GAO Audit Divisions For 

Planning Surveys/ Reviews 

Department of Justice 

For Prosecution 

This approach changed dramatically in the 

1970' s. Representative H. L. Fountain's Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and 

Human Resources reviewed HEW's procedures 

and resources for detecting fraud in its operations. The Subcommittee found that HEW s ca- pacity to investigate fraud allegations was "ridiculOUSly inadequate." This mammoth agency, 

involved at the time in over 300 programs spending about $118 billion annually. had only 10 

investigators in its central unit to monitor the 

activities of 129.000 employees. Following the 

1974-75 investigation, a law established an In- spector General at HEW. In 1977 legislation, 

which eventually became Public Law 95-452, 

was introduced by Representatives Fountain and 

Jack Brooks to establish inspectors general at six 

cabinet-level departments and six other agencies. 

There are now 15 inspectors general in the 

Federal Government. Bills favored by GAO are 

pending to establish them also in the Depan· ments of Defense, Justice, State. and the Treas- ury and in the Agency for Internationa l 

Development. " 

STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN AnONSANDAVDns 

The need for inspectors general to balance 

their responsibilities between audit and investi· 

gative work was raised by Senator Lawton Chiles 

at a 1979 hearing before the Senate Committee 

on Governmental Affairs.23 This dichotomy has 

been of major concern to GAO. Of the inspectors 

general appointed to date, only one has a finan· 

cial background. possibly foretelling a diminish· 

ing emphasis on the audit role. At numerous 

congressional hearings on the Inspector General 

63 
Act. GAO urged that more emphasis be given 

to systematic auditing and less to investigating 

individual instances of possible fraud. It recom- mended that the title "Inspector General" be 

modified to "auditor general" or "auditor and 

inspector general.'· To GAO this change would 

have been more than cosmetic. since it would 

have conveyed the importance of preventing 

fraud, not just detecting it. The Office believed 

also that the inspector general function had to 

be broadened to assist management in imple- menting preventive machinery and emphasizing 

the primacy of audit. 24 The Congress retained 

the inspector general title. but it provided a dep- uty for audit and a deputy for investigations. GAO continues to emphasize the importance of 

the auditing role.25 

Most of the inspector general staffs are dom- inated by auditors, historically in the front line 

of financial control systems. However: investi- gative work, given more publicity in recent years, has sometimes received greater emphasis. Re- cently, the Environmental Protection Agency's 

Inspector General had 110 auditors and 21 investigators, a ratio of over 5 to 1. Interior main- tained an 8-to-1 ratio of auditors to investigators, as did HEW. Not all offices are so structured, however. Agriculture's Inspector General has tra- ditionally maintained a large investigative unit. 

In response to the recent scandals. GSA's In- spector General also had a substantial investigative unit. 26 GAO continues to believe that au- diting and internal controls need prime attention. 

WHAT THE INSPECTORS GENERAL HAVE 

ACCOMPUSHED 

Translated into raw numbers, the early activ- ities of the inspectors general are impressive. Here are a few highlights. 

• The NASA Inspector General reported that 

auditors had questioned over $350 million 

worth of actions completed during 1979, 

for a net savings or cost avoidance of about 

$50.7 million." 

• HEW's Inspector General reported cost 

savings of $l.l billion in 1979.28 

• The Department of Housing and Urban 

Development's Inspector General opened 

over 2.000 investigations leading to 182 

convictions in 1979. In addition, 147 in- ternal audits and surveys recovered $6.2 

million in cash. "" 

• Agriculture's Inspector General reported 

that in the first 6 months of fiscal year 1980, 

447 audit reports and 976 investigative re- ports had been issued, resulting in $73 

million in recoveries, savings, claims, etc. JO 

• GSA's Inspector General slated that during 

the 6 months ended on March 31. 1980, 230 audit reports had been issued rec- ommending realizable savings of $40 

million. 11 

SECRETARY OF LABOR RAY MARSHALL SWEARS IN MAILIORIE FINE KNOWLES as Inspector General 

of the Department of Labor 

64 
Over the years. the Congress. the Office of 

Management and Budget. and various other organizations have touted the necessity and benefits of internal auditing. but progress sometimes 

has been limited. A May 27. 1980. GAO report. 

summarizing the findings of 70 reviews over the 

previous 4 years. cited shortcomings among Federal audit organizations: 

• Low priority on preventing and detecting 

fraud. 

• Insufficient financial auditing. 

• Inadequate and insufficient audits of grants 

and contracts. 

• Insufficient computer auditing. 

• Poor followup on findings. 

• Insufficient staff.32 

GAO concluded that establishment of the inspector general offices and other recent improvements had the potential to strengthen Government auditing but that it was too early to say 

whether their efforts would correct all deficiencies. GAO promised to continue working with 

internal audit and inspector general organizations 

and to advise the Congress of any further actions 

needed to solve the problems discussed. 

The Inspector General Act has taken some 

of the pressure off GAO's audit resources and 

has allowed the Office to look at the bigger issues. GAO can build on the work being done by 

the inspectors general and focus its efforts on 

program evaluations and areas transcending 

agency boundaries. To encourage this necessarily close relationship. GAO had initiated meetings with the inspectors general to discuss issues 

of mutual interest. 

Intergovernmental Audit 

Forums: Links Between Federal, 

State, And Local Auditors 

In numerous reports. speeches. and journal 

articles. but especially in intergovernmental audit 

forums the Comptroller General and other GAO 

officials spread the word about uniform. consistent audit standards: internal auditing practices: and the virtues of the single audit concept. 

The audit forums started in the early 1970' s 

when a group of concerned State auditors met 

with Comptroller General Staats and representatives of OMB. To improve coordination between Federal agencies and State audit personnel. the auditors proposed establishing national 

and regional audit councils. GAO agreed to support the effort and the Financial and General 

Management Studies Division began to develop 

a plan of action. The division's first efforts were 

to initiate a National Forum in Washington and 

to work with GAO's Atlanta regional office to 

pilot a forum in Federal Region IV.'" 

THE NATIONAL FORUM 

The National Forum, whose chair alternates 

every 2 years between GAO and OMB. consists 

of 20 Federal audit executives frorn GAO. OMB, 

and major grantmaking agencies. as well as the 

heads of 20 State and local government audit 

organizations. It meets four times a year to address issues of national importance. In addition, 

it prepares position statements on subjects such 

as maintenance and interpretation of audit standards which are subject to approval by the regional forums.:W 

REGIONAL FORUMS 

The Southeastern Intergovernmental Audit 

Forum held its first meeting in Atlanta in December 1972. At the GAO regional manager's invitation. the directors of the Federal regional audit 

offices and the auditors of eight southeastern 

States attended. The objectives of the forum 

were to "secure better communications in the 

governmental audit community and to achieve 

improved coordination and expansion of the 

usefulness of Federal, State, and local audits. "35 

Today. GAO assists 11 regional forums. GAO 

provides administrative support and designates 

staff members to serve as points of contact Each 

forum. however. retains its independence from 

GAO and from the other regional forums. Four 

forums deSignated GAO regional managers to 

permanently chair their groups and others elected 

chairmen from their membership: in some of 

these GAO provides the secretariat.'" 

The regional forums have done much to increase awareness. Through them. auditors have 

increased their awareness of the standards set 

forth in the yellow book and have been exposed 

to a key element of contemporary auditing---<!xpanded scope auditing (economy, efficiency, 

and program results). In carrying out GAO's philosophy of encouraging use of its standards 

through persuasion. GAO staff have worked 

closely with the regional auditors. 

But the forums do more than communicate; 

they act. Recent activities include (11 tests to 

determine whether a single audit of a multifunded recipient can satisfy all funding agencies. 

(2) helping with the development of a program 

results guide. (3) the creation of gUidelines for 

preparing requests for audit proposals. (4) the 

development of a peer quality review system, 

(5) the preparation of guidelines for a quality 

review of government audit agencies. and (6) a 

joint audit of a major federally assisted program.-" The regional forums have assisted in forwarding the single audit approach: in every case. 

their conclusions have been that the single audit 

is workable. However. the forums are not policymaking bodies: they only suggest and recommend solutions and actions. Policy continues 

to emanate from the appropriate audit agencies, 

GAO and OMB. 

65 
The forums appear to have been instrumental 

in increasing intergovernrnental audit cooperation. Since not everything can be corrected by 

the Federal Government, State and local governments need to be involved. However, the 

coordination has been baSically confined to individual situations as opposed to a centralized 

government -wide effort. 

I urge and challenge you to not only maintain 

but to expand on your current efforts to: 

• Improve communication, cooperation, and 

coordination among auditors at all levels 

of government. 

• Provide training and assistance to those 

auditors who review government programs 

Although intergovernmental audit collabora- and activities. 

tion has come a long way in a relatively short 

time, full-fledged cooperation is still some dislance away. On April 25, 1980, before the Third 

Joint Conference of Intergovernmental Audit 

Forums, the Comptroller General said: 

• Promote the acceptance and implementation of the single audit concept. 

• Promote and assist in the development and 

use of government accounting standards 

and principles. 

66 

INTOSAI 

Ouer. 140 diverse nations, members of the United Nations or its special agencies, are 

affiliated with the Intemational Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (lNTOSAli, founded 

in the early 1950's. A supreme audit institution is one which conducts public audits of its 

national government: for example GAO, the Board of Audit of Japan, and the Office of the 

Auditor General of Canada. The seat of INTOSAI is "Vienna, Austria. The Secretary General 

of INTOSAI is also the President of the Audit Court of Austria. 

The direct aims of INTOSAI are to promote improvements in evaluating govemmental 

performance, to strengthen financial management of govemment agencies and departments, and to make sure that they are in compliance with applicable lows and regulations. INTOSAI 

sponsors triennial congresses, regional seminars, cooperative training, study groups and publications. INTOSAI, in a word. seeks to elevate auditing capability in developed and developing 

countries alike. 

Comptroller General Stoats was appointed to INTOSAI's Governing Board in 1969. and 

he lent support to the institution. He and his aides participated actively in INTOSAl's triennial 

congresses and regional seminars, and GAO conducted annual fellowship training programs 

for audit officials of developing countries. GAO devotes stoff time to help prepare INTOSAI's "Intemational Joumal of Government Auditing," which is published in English, Spanish, and 

French. The editor since its inception in 1971 has been from GAO, with aid coming from 

Canada and Venezuela. Many of the problems facing INTOSAI, and especially the developing country members. are elemental. At a 1980 intema~onal seminar, the Comptroller General pointed out some 

salient ones. 

First there is a serious shortage of trained accountants and financial managers in 

govemments of countries that were studied. While this is caused primarily by lack of 

adequate training, other factors such as the low stature given to the accounting profession, low salaries, and other personnel problems in civil service systems, and the low priority 

given to upgrading the financial infrastructure are major problems. 

Second, the so-called "brain drain" causes an incredibly high tumover of trainees 

in most prOjects. Often, as soon as auditors receive additional training or education. they 

are offered better positions in the private sector or, perhaps. in another country. Third, there is a reluctance of major donors-intemational organizations and the 

developed nations-to mount a full-scale effort to provide the resources necessary to 

improve financial management in the absence of euidence that the govemments them- selves are prepared and willing to make the necessary reforms. 

In Staats' view, the primary needs are improved training and development opportunities 

for government auditors, especially in the developing countries. and creation of intemational 

accounting and auditing standards. He recommended closer regional arrangements among 

auditing bodies; multiple centers for training and leadership sponsored by such global bodies 

as the World Bank, the United Nations. and the Inter-American Development Bank; collab- oration among govemmen~ private industry, and public accounting auditors toward comprehensive auditing; and more accountability of international organizations themselves, through 

which more and more of the world's cooperatiue efforts will probably be channeled. 
• Continue to serve as a medium for gen· 

erating new ideas and ways to improve 

governmental accountability. 1M 

The auditing state of the art has advanced 

markedly in recent years due in large part to 

vigorous GAO campaigning. The Office has 

greatly extended the scope of its own auditing 

to assessment of agency economy. efficiency. 

and program results and is winning over other 

audit bodies to similarly enlarged horizons. GAO 

audit standards and guidelines are now in wide 

use in Federal. State. and local governments. 

More internal auditors are at work in the agencies. although they are not always in sufficient 

numbers and do not always have the needed 

mix of skills. Their potency has been heightened 

by placing them in inspector general offices so 

that internal audit findings can more readily gain 

the attention of top management. 

The outlook for internal controls is less cer· 

tain. (See ch. 4.) GAO has repeatedly emphasized that internal controls need constant sur· 

veillance. At this writing. GAO·s work has shown. 

however. that because management is not doing 

its job effectively and because auditors are too 

few. accounting systems that started with effec· 

tive controls can become error ridden and vul· 

nerable to fraud. This happens when new employees are not properly instructed in how to do 

their work. computer controls are removed to 

gain storage space or for similar reasons, and 

jobs are consolidated without considering the 

effect on internal controls. 

I Fn,wnnh H Mor5« ,10 "lnll!Tll<l1 Audlttny Ptln ple~ .md COntolp\S kII -d<~,/IJ A9'-'t .... I1!)· r"edr.roI Acw,,'lIDr'/ M..l 1<)70. PI' :l5.<j I 

l tloO~ 'h,tolm,,\ Au\ IIirl~ Pnncfpli" p 4 1 

J MClr.1<' "ll1f .. maI Au..!Ulng Pr pl~ ~:' PI' 42 'n 

jl o~ "'ntf'mai Audlrm,. PnrKlrIe: pp ~) ,16 

5 US Gtlno;or!\i Accounnng OHlci' "Inr('mai Au dl ng IT\ f l.'dl/raJ A90!nCIe~" 

!l'1 74 \. pol 

b GAO. ··Inll.'mal AuillbliS." p J 

7 Compll~~ lIc r Generlll SIAII~ ··St.1nd,mls 101 Autll! uf GUIIl'!nmt'nl4! Or 

~n 7..nIl Ilb . Progfiun5. Actllll!i1t5 & Furn:hnlls" (19721 11P ! II 

Ii U S (""'nl'ral ~cn ll ng Offi co.! . F,nanc'lll lind TWflIl Ma l'l~jI" m ... nl 

Ud '~ o,\/WOn Bnl'ting un publicllno,u 01 tho! velklv. . In n J. p 4 

q Comptroifci Ge cr ;,I '~ Dn dnrd~ 101 Audit." PI' I II. 

1U Elllworth H MOl":>" Jr "Opcfllllundl AuUlb,1tl lind Sl..1ndllrd.:; to. ,h., l-'ubllc SerlO<' rhe GAO Heuteu.IWink'l 19BI. pp 31 32 

I I FGMS[J BI-, ... tlng. pp 4 5 

12 Complm r cllI ' 'SlamH d~ 101 Auo.ll, .. PI> '·2 

I.! Coml)ll!llll'f ( Nl"ICllIl -'Stanwuh 10. AuJlt. ' P II 

14 U S (~ l'T<J1 Accounllng 01"'" .... "Guldebnt'<- 1(\1 flnllr'll:ldl C()!np lilll ll;~' 

l~ oj F .. d.:r"l1 ... A.~ slsI <'d PJogra~" Web I'lJolll). p • 

15 US Gcn .. ral ACcounhll9 OffKI' GAO Ml.I '~ mr N., .... , 2 1Nc ]<)A(). ,> , 

16 GAO,'('uniellnl's 1m Audiu..' Pr> I,,,, 

PARTICIPANTS CONfER AT 1980 INTOSAI MEETING In Kenya {\ to r . Mwal Kibakl, Vice -President of the 

Republic of Ke'!Yo?l. Comptroller Gl?n'!ral Sla315. Josaf Selb~ . Feder.,1 Republic of Germany. Jorg Kandulsch. Secretary 

General of INTOSAIJ 

67 
17 C~ General', n!pOI't. "Fedemi Agende$ Can. <lind Should, Do Mote To Combo, Fr.ud in Govanmenl ProIlI1'UN" (GGD78·62. Sept 19 

19781, pp I-HI 

18 Compcroller GotrHlftll fJmm B SlMts. !:)u.II!ITllmi BoIfore 1M SeMI ... Com 

mlnee on A~nons. "GAO Effons Related to Ih~ Pl'obIem of Fraud In tn. 

GowmnwnL • Z7 FiEb 1980 

19 s.tIator James R Sa$5et, "The Fraud Hodlnc," Cn"S' R« . 14 1Iotar 

1980. p. 52515 17 

20 US C---aI Accounong Office. "Fraud TMk Fore" Summar,..- INo-.· IS, 1980). p I 

21 CompcroUa Gt>nm.I S~~ Stlltemenr of 27 Feb 1980 

22. Judy G KopfI ' 'The in$'pOllC!ol'5 GItnmII-On Uw Spot W.ll~. Thr ~O ReuleW. ISprtng 1980). pp StlSI 

23. Kopff. p 51 

24 US Cong Senate. Commlnllft on ~mmenUlt AiflllJS. HII'O"f195 Of! 

Nom,""'on 0/ JFIIpM~ . 96th Coog . lsI sn~ (Wl'Isnlnglon. 0 C 

GPO. May 2. 19791. pp 3940 

25 Comptroller General Elmer B Staats. Rell\llrks .\' the 3rd Joint Conler lnee at chI! In!ergovt'mrn~u!.l AuiJIl ForulT15. DeILcI~. Tell. 25 API' 1'JMU 

26 US ,*fII!1111 Accounnng Office. "O!urC1otv of F"d,,"DI Audit ilI1d In_rec:fol 

Geneml ()rg!Inw.ttons·· (Apr (980), pp 7, 37, 46. 53, (lnd 62 

27 NotIOnal AerOTWlutlCllmd Space Adrnlfmtr<'ltfon. ··OItK .... 01 IrupeClOf Crtn era! S4rmlannwl RI!pOI1 '!Oct I 1979. MIll 3 1 I<)tj() "nd Apnl .lO. 19K1), 

p 7 

68 

28 Sc\ator ~~, " A BIll To Amend !he 1,1$pf'CfOI' ~rN Ad 

01 197ij " Corl9 R« . 6 Aug 19HO. p $10992 

~ 

29. D.oertrrwm 01 Houtlng "nd Urb.lln ~opment "Oftk.. of InsjXlClor 

Rqxnt 10 th.! Congrcss tor 1M Sill Monrh Petioc!.. Aprtl 1, 1980 10 

~bI.tr 30. 1'}80, pP 62·63 

30 Ooroartment of AQrIcUltIJUl, "Semiannual IWport Off It!!; 01 Inspector (;en 

eral. Oc1ob.r I. 197'J ~,!lreh 31 . 1980: ' ptdau 

31 General5fm.oIcn Adrnlnlsmmon. "C>ffi« ~ IMpeaOI' General R~ 10 

the CongJu. October I, 1979--March 31 , 1980:' (WashingtOn DC May I 

19801. p 14 

32. Com~roD.rr Gencrtal'. R!pOI1 . "GAO Findings on Federallnlemal AudU- A Summa",, ' tFGMSDHOJ9 I-Uy 'l7. 19801. P , 

J3 J Rus&fln Wiltshire, ''The Inl~nUlI Audn ForurM-lnllillliYes In 

inl(!rgovo!'rnmefllai Audlbny: ' TM Go\O Reuiew. (FaH 19n1. pp 22 2J 

J4 MortltTW, A. Dlnllflholel, " Intergowmmental Audit FORUn$," The GAO Reutew. lWlntlll 1974). p 34 

35 Dln.:mhofer. p. 4'J 

lb Ibid 

37 InlingullClmmmRl! 'Audit Forum" "Schedule 01 Audtl Forum Prot'l('" '' (June l. 1'.l801, pp 1.1, 7, 19, 20 

38 CompuoJln Gctn1lf4l. Rel'Nllkt 0125 Apr 1980 

CCIlD<ID~l1®IT eli) 

Expanding GAO's Jurisdiction 

And Cooperating With Other 

Agencies 

GAO moved steadily toward a broader view 

of Federal Programs and toward examining 

more agencies and more issues in the 1966-81 

period. In fact, scores of agencies, programs and 

issues were audited for the first time, some as a 

result of their formation and new audit authority 

for GAO and others as a result of GAO's own 

initiative. GAO reviewed management poliCies 

and programs at such agencies as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service, and the Federal banking agencies. The Office sent auditors into Vietnam at the 

height of the war and reviewed Governmentwide programs and activities, such as equal em- ployment opportunity, acquisition of ADP equip- ment, and intergovernmental relations. The Office has also moved toward greater in- teraction and constructive discussion with the 

Federal agencies being audited. Since GAO and 

the executive agencies share the goal of im- proving Federal management, cooperation between GAO and the executive branch is essential. Such cooperation. however. was not always 

returned: some agencies and recipients of Fed- eral funds attempted to block GAO's access to 

the records and people needed to make reviews. Although the adversaries' arguments were valid 

in few instances, GAO had no means of enforc- ing its statutory rights to records until 1980. The need for coordination with other congressional support agencies also became evident dur- ing this period when the Congressional Research 

Service, Office of Technology Assessment. and 

Congressional Budget Office were formed. Although GAO's relations with the new agencies 

had some snags. a coordination process has 

gradually been established and communication 

between agency staffs has been encouraged. 

GAO Takes On New Agencies 

And Issues 

Stimulated by many sources, including events 

of the time, GAO staff began looking at a larger 

number of Federal agencies and programs. The 

figure below provides a partial list of the issues 

and agencies audited for the first time under the 

new Comptroller General. 

Some of the agencies had been established 

since 1966: others existed before that time, but 

GAO either had done little or no work there or 

had not conceptualized its approach. For such 

agencies as the Federal Reserve Board and the 

70 

Intemal Revenue Service, the Congress enacted 

new audit authority. (See chs. 1 and 8.) In addition, GAO's 1972 reorganization did much to 

enable the newly formed divisions to expand into 

new issue areas. 

Although the events surrounding the first au- dit of each agency and issue are interesting, 

space and time do not permit a discussion of 

each. The following sections, however, summarize GAO's entry into the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Federal banking agencies, and 

several new issue areas. 

GAO FINALLY SUCCEEDS IN AUDITING FBI 

DOMESTIC INTELUGENCE OPERATIONS 

In the early 1970's, GAO entertained thoughts 

of reviewing FBI programs and activities other 

than payroll and accounts receivable. A breakthrough of sorts occurred in 1973 when Sam 

Ervin. Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee 

on Constitutional Rights, requested GAO to ex- amine the Department of Justice's Criminal His- tory Information System operated by the FBI 

with support from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Uttle was known about 

how information in this s\lstem was used and 

who had access to it. GAO recommended that 

the Federal Government establish a national policy on the development of such systems, the 

types of information to be retained, and participation by the criminal justice community. But 

this work did not come close to the program 

results reviews GAO was conducting at other 

Federal agencies. 

Shortiy after the report was issued in May 

1974, allegations of illegal FBI investigations in 

Chicago prompted Congressman Ralph Metcalf 

to request a GAO investigation of the FBI's domestic intelligence activities. The Comptroller 

General believed that only the support and backing of a full committee would demonstrate to the 

FBI the strong congressional interest necessary 

to gain their cooperation. By June 1974, GAO 

had the House Judiciary Committee and Chair- man Peter Rodino on its side. Accustomed to GAO's financial audits. FBI 

officials were shocked by the comprehensiveness 

of the congressional request-reviews of the 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of all FBI 

programs and activities, starting with domestic 

intelligence operations. Their initial reaction was 

to refuse access to records and people on the 

grounds that GAO had legal right to financial 
records only. But after researching GAO's stat· 

utory authority and legal precedents and interviewing other Federal officials. the FBI eventually 

concluded that GAO had authority to investigate 

FBI programs and reluctantly opened its doors. 

However, FBI recognition of GAO's authority 

was not the end of the Office's problems. 

FBI officials were gravely concerned about 

the confidentiality of their investigative case files. 

They feared that deliberate or inadvertent release of the information would identify and possibly endanger their informants and inhibit informant cooperation. They made repeated 

attempts to prevent GAO access to the files. GAO 

argued that it needed access to the files to evaluate program operations and compare practices 

and procedures with FBI policies. After months 

of negotiation, GAO and the FBI compromised: 

Figure 6-1 

FBI staff would summarize pertinent data from 

a GAO selected sample of files and hand over 

this information. GAO staff would then verify the 

summarized data on a test basis by reviewing 

randomly selected documents from a sample of 

the GAO sample. Although agreed to in writing, 

the FBI did not allow the test verification, and 

GAO qualified its report accordingly. 

The importance of verifying the FBI case files 

was dramatized when a Department of Justice 

special task force investigating aUegations of illegal FBI break-ins received evidence that FBI 

officials had withheld information from GAO. In 

summarizing the selected case files, FBI officials 

had deliberately omitted references to iUegal 

break-ins in the New York area. FollOwing its 

investigation, the special task force asked GAO 

to testify on its review and audit procedures at 

New Issues and Federal Agencies or Offices Studied 

Administration of nondiscrimination laws 

ADP procurement standards 

Audit standards 

Communications and the media 

Consumer and worker protection 

Dam safety 

Energy availability, shortages, reserves. and 

usage 

Equal employment opportuniry 

Ethics in Government 

Executive rescissions and deferrals 

(impoundments) 

Federal banking institutions 

Federal debt collection 

Food and nutrition 

Foreign military sales 

Intergovernmental relations 

International energy 

International trade and finance 

Law enforcement 

Medicare and Medicaid 

Metric system 

Military justice 

Multilateral economic assistance 

Paperwork requirements 

Pay comparability 

Pollution control 

... * '" • '" 

ACTION 

Asian Development Bank 

Bureau of Indian AHairs' 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission' 

Community Services Administration 

Consumer Product Safety Commission 

Council on Wage and Price Stability 

Department of Energy 

Energy Research and Development 

Administration 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

Farm Credit Administration 

Federal Bureau of Investigation' 

Federal Communications Commission' 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

Federal Energy Administration 

Federal Home Loan Bank Board' 

Federal Labor Relations Authority 

• oox:~e OIlI)fU"Ided beyQnd I\nlr.n la l tl ud ~ 

Federal Reserve System 

Internal Revenue Service 

Legal Services Corporation 

Merit System Protection Board-Office of 

Special Counsel 

National Center for Productivity and Quality 

of Working Ufe 

National Credit Union Administration' 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

Office of the ComjJlrolier of the Currency 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 

Postal Service 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

Selective Service System 

Small Business Administration' 

United Nations System 

World Bank 

71 
a New York grand jury. The GAO auditor who 

headed up the FBI audit work testified on two 

points in the indictment-that FBI agents had 

obstructed a congressional investigation and that 

FBI agents had lied to Federal investigators. De- spite his testimony and that presented by other 

witnesses. further prosecution did not occur. 

GAO's investigation at the FBI was also complicated by an overlap with congressional com- mittee investigations. Problems were resolved 

through the GAO auditors' professional handling 

of case file information and through assurances 

that GAO would investigate present intelligence 

activities and the committee would examine only 

past activities. The review of FBI domestic intelligence resulted in testimony before two congressional 

committees and in a 1976 report to the Congress. GAO recommended that the Congress 

enact legislation to (1) clarify the authority under 

which the FBI conducts domestic intelligence 

operations, (2) limit the types of groups and individuals warranting investigation and the extent 

of investigations. (3) limit the extent to which the 

Attorney General may authorize FBI use of non- violent emergency measures. and (4) require the 

Attorney General to report to the Congress on 

a periodic basis. The Department of Justice used 

the report in preparing guidelines for FBI domestic intelligence operations. and the FBI 

changed its operations along the lines suggested 

by GAO. GAO's report and hearings also provided the public with a better understanding of 

this important and controversial Government 

activity.' 

Working within the limitations imposed on it. 

GAO provided the requested report and main- tained its own audit standards while developing 

a working relationship with the FBI. GAO also 

reinforced its mandate to review all Federal agen -

cies and programs. even those sometimes con- sidered above public scrutiny. 

FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES FIND GAO .lUST 

AS PERSISTENT 

Two years after the start of the FBI audit. 

GAO embarked on another audit of Federal 

agencies unaccustomed to outside examination 

and again encountered problems. Until 1933, 

GAO audited Federal Reserve Board expenditures financed by funds collected from Federal 

Reserve System member banks, These funds. 

by a 1914 Attorney General ruling, were considered public moneys. The Banking Act of 1933 

reversed this ruling and GAO discontinued its 

audits. 

In 1959. the Congress considered a bill which 

would have directed GAO to audit the Federal 

Reserve System for the period beginning with 

the date of the enactment of the Federal Reserve 

Act, December 1913, to December 1958. 

Comptroller General Campbell objected to the 

bill, citing the tremendous staff required for an 

72 

audit encompassing 45 years, Campbell offered 

no opinion on subsequent legislation requiring 

a GAO audit of the Federal Reserve System but 

stated that the Office would carry out congres- sional intent by conducting any audits requested 

by the Congress, 

Subsequently. however, GAO overcame its 

reluctance and actively sought to audit activities 

in the Federal Reserve System, including the 

Fe&eral Reserve Board. and in the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Fed- eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Collectively, these agencies are responsible for Federal supervision of State and national banks. By 

1976. GAO had audit authority over FDIC only. but a longstanding dispute over access to bank 

examination reports and other documents permitted GAO to perform financial audits only. 

Even these. GAO believed, were limited because 

auditors could not gain full access to records 

needed to evaluate the financial condition of the 

agency. GAO qualified the annual financial reports accordingly. 

Since the early 1970's GAO had supported 

various legislative proposals to authorize GAO 

audits of the Federal Reserve System, including 

the Board, OCC, and FDIC. But opposition from 

the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and 

the banking industry had prevailed and the Con- gress had never passed the bills. In 1973 and 

1974. however. two major national banks failed 

and congressional concern about the quality of 

bank supervision increased. In January 1976, 

Wright Patman, Chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Domestic Monetary Policy. House Commit- tee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, and the 

man behind the earlier bills, asked GAO to study 

Federal supervision of State and national banks. The Senate Committee on Banking. Housing, 

and Urban Affairs, as well as the House Government Operations Committee, soon gave their 

support to the Patman audit 

Agreement on GAO's access to the records 

was long in coming. GAO negotiated with the 

Committee staff and the three agencies for 2 

months, but the Board refused to allow GAO 

access to its people and files. OCc. recently 

given a clean slate from a CPA firm, acquiesced 

early in the negotiations. and FDIC soon followed in OCC's steps, Then, the New York 

Times published a story that two more large 

banks might fail. The publicity caused the Board 

to relax its restriction somewhat. but GAO refused to accept the limited access the Board 

would have allowed. After additional negotiations, an agreement on access to Board. OCC. 

and FDIC records was reached. The agreement 

stated conditions on GAO's selection of banks 

to review, release of bank names, release of the 

final report (only after the three agencies agreed 

to it), and other issues. 

The Comptroller General established a bank- ing task force in April 1976 to respond to the 
congressional requests. The task force. reporting 

to the Assistant Comptroller General for Policy. 

broadened the scope of audit work Originally re- quested by the Senate Committee on Banking. 

Housing. and Urban Affairs from failed banks 

and a small number of problem banks to all failed 

banks and to a sample of the remaining 14.000 

State and national banks. In all. the task force 

reviewed Federal examinations of 900 banks. 

About 40 people--auditors. accountants. attorneys. systems analysts. statisticians. economists. 

and support personnel-worked full time on the 

task force. Over 1 weekend. more than 85 people recorded and coded data from the bank examination reports. Once this work was com- pleted. the task force had over 8 million pieces 

of data to put on the computer-the largest data 

processing task GAO had ever dealt with. 

The task force completed the audit work in 

about 6 months and drafted the report in about 

half that time. GAO's final report concluded that 

the Federal agencies should have used legal 

powers to effect changes rather than relying on 

promised but never implemented improvements. particularly for banks that eventually 

failed. The agencies also had done a poor job 

of informing banks of their examination findings. GAO recommended that the banking agencies 

or the Congress establish a mechanism for co- ordinating agencies' efforts to secure needed im- provements and resolve common problems. Fur- ther. GAO recommended that examinations be 

done on an as-needed basis. rather than on a 

schedule of once or twice a year. so that problem 

banks could receive closer supervision than 

banks having no problems2 

Contrary to the banking agencies' expectations. issuance of the final report did not end 

GAO's audit activities. In July 1978. the Congress passed the Federal Bank Agency Audit Act 

(Public Law 95-320). authorizing GAO to conduct additional reviews of the agencies' operaGAO BANK SUPERVISION TASK FORCE members and sUlff receiving awards for partidpation In the first compre· 

hensive review of the effectiveness of Federal bank superviSion. March 22. 1977 

GAO o mCIALS testifying before lhe House Banking Committee on lhe GAO Task Force Repon. Febull"Y I. 1977 

73 
tions. Although the legislation prohibited GAO 

from auditing international financial transactions, monetary policy matters. and Federal Open Market Committee activities. It authorized substan- tive reviews of the policies and procedures gov· 

ernlng regulation and supervisions of State and 

national banks. 

GAO AllDD'S 1lIE VIETNAM WAIl 

GAO's opening of a Saigon office in 1966 

was a response to many factors. The office had 

maintained small resident staffs in a European 

Branch in Frankfurt. Germany. and a Far East 

Branch in Honolulu for some years. These staffs 

were supplemented as needed by temporary 

travel assignments of professional staff members 

drawn from the various GAO offices. Overseas 

work was administered by the International 0perations Division. About 150 years of professional staff time or about 7 percent of GAO's 

total audit effort. was being applied to international activities worldwide. In the spring of 1966. U.S. involvement in 

Vietnam escalated. U.S. military supplies and 

construction equipment, along with large quan- tities of Agency for International Development 

(AID) commodity assistance, were pmng up in 

the ports and other open areas. Congressional 

concern grew over the huge expenditures .and 

lack of controls associated with the Amencan 

construction and supply buildup in South Vietnam. 

Both the House and Senate Appropriations 

Committees had urged GAO to move further 

into the international arena. Meanwhile, John 

Moss Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information. House Committee on Government ()perations, was pressing for an increased GAO eflort onsite. in Vietnam. As a result, GAO Issued a survey 

report to the Congress on July 18, 1966, and 

established a GAO office in Saigon in August. 

GAO's survey work In Vietnam centered on 

how well U.S. agencies In the country were carrying out their internal audit and management 

functions. Five Federal departments and agencies were operating programs costing billions of 

dollars yet there was only minimal audit activity. GAO ~uditors found particular need for Improved management of (1) the military a!,d ':"0-

nomic assistance programs (receipt, distribution. and end use 91 commodities and equipment), (2) the military construction program. and (3) 

AID's commercial import program. This work 

spawned numerous audits, each concentrating 

on specific issues. By the early 1970's, GAO's work in Vietnam 

had expanded In quantity and scope. As the nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam changed, 

so did the subject of GAO's work-from examining the provision of military and economic 

aid to determining the effectiveness of efforts to 

return government functions back to the people 

of South Vietnam. The number of audits decreased with the lessening U.S. involvement until 

GAO closed its suboffice in Saigon In December 

1973. 

GAO AIlDIT TEAM at Air Force LogIs1lcs Command. Ua Nang, Viet Nam. Seplember 3. 1968 

74 
GAO's work in Vietnam brought into focus 

some questions unique in GAO experience concerning assignment of staff members to poten- tially high-risk areas. The Comptroller General 

and Oye Stovall. then Director of the International Division. had to consider: 

• What were the responSibilities of GAO employees on assignment in a potentially hazardous foreign war zone? 

• What was the Comptroller General's responsibility to the Congress for audit and 

other work in a foreign war zone? 

• What was the potential effect of Vietnam 

assignments on the morale of GAO staff 

members and their families and. consequently. on the ability of the Office to con- tinue to attract and retain top-quality 

professional staff members? 

• To what extent could GAO's work in such 

a zone offer prospects of results at least 

equal in value to those of other areas where 

GAO staff were needed? 

It was decided that GAO's presence in Vietnam 

was necessary and assigned staff cognizant of 

these and other concerns. But as Stovall said: 

The U.S. Ambassador In Saigon Cool To GAO Study 

In October 1972. shortly before the Presidential election. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 

declared that "peace is at hand ... At that time. only 25,000 U.S. troops remained in Vietnam. 

but GAO planning was based on solid information that the American presence would continue 

indefinitely. The Saigon office continued its work. Peace was a little less at hand than Kissinger had predicted. and during the period between 

November 1972 and January J 973. the United States shipped massive quantities of equipment 

and supplies to Vietnam. Late in January. the peace treaty was signed and the United States 

began preparing to withdraw the remainder of its troops. Pressure began building for all 

civilians. including GAO staff. to pull out of Vietnam. In late spring. GAO received a request from the Chairman of a Senate Subcommittee on 

Refugees to look into the refugee problem in Vietnom. This was the fourth such request GAO 

had received over the years. and it came about the time Graham Martin arrived in Saigon as 

the new Ambassador. GAO had cultivated and maintained a good working relationship with the Embassy over 

the years. GAO relied on the Embassy for all of its logistical support. and good working 

relations were vital to getting any job done in Vietnam. However. as soon as Ambassador 

Martin found out that GAO had received the refugee request. he summoned GAO's manager 

in Saigon. Frank Borkovic. to the Embassy. This would be Borkovic's first meeting with the 

newly arrived Ambassador. Borkovic soon leamed that Ambassador Martin had little enthusiasm for GAO audits generally or the Subcommittee's latest request on refugees in particular. He informed Borkovic 

that he had been assured by GAO in Washington only the previous week that GAO would 

be doing no more work in Vietnam for the requestor on refugees. Borkovic tried to reassure 

Ambassador Martin by informing him that GAO had merely been asked to update its previous 

work. The Ambassador would not be mollified. At one pOint. he thrust a communication at 

Borkouic and insisted he read it on condition that he not reveal its contents to anyone else. 

Borkovic demurred. stating that if the communication contained information relevant to his 

responsibilities. he might hove to relay it to GAO's For East Branch Director in Honolulu. 

The meeting ended with a statement by the Ambassador that he would be contacting GAO 

headquarters when he retumed to Washington the following week. He did subsequently 

discuss the matter with a senior GAO official. but GAO went ahead with the job and issued 

its report. Relations between the Embassy and GAO cooled considerably thereafter. This. coupled 

with larger events associated with the U. S. withdrawal. triggered a period of uncertainty as 

to whether GAO would keep open its Saigon office. When an opportunity arose for GAO to 

open an office in Bangkok. Thailand-only an hours flight from Saigon-the decision was 

made to close the Saigon office in July 1973. From then until the end of the war in the spring 

of 1975. GAO staff performed its Vietnam work with temporary duty staff mostly from the 

Sangkok office. The workload continued or a relatively high level. and closing the Saigon 

office had [ittle effect on the final products. The staff generally liked the challenge of working in a war zone. and they believed their 

work contributed important information about some of the excesses associated with this conflict 

and prevented even greater waste of the taxpayer's dollars. 

75 

, 
• • • these basic considerations, onsmg 

from GAO's experience in Vietnam. have 

a continuing releuance and could come 

again quickly to the forefront in a future 

emergency involving United StOles com- mitment to action in a foreign area. 

These questions are particularly acute in relation 

to terrorist or guerrilla activities having no clear 

combat boundaries.' 

MEASURING FEDERAL PRODUCTIVITY 

GAO's interest in productivity began when 

the Comptroller General. following discussions 

with Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the 

Joint Economic Committee (which had recendy 

held hearings on productivity). undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the possibilities for 

measuring productivity in the Federal sector. In 

response. the Comptroller General convinced 

the Office of Management and Budget and the 

Civil Service CommiSSion to work with GAO in 

developing productivity measures. The Committee strongly supported this effort. 

Past attempts to explore the feasibility and 

usefulness of productivity measurement in Government organizations had had varying success. 

A 1960 Bureau of the Budget study. conducted 

under Staats' direction as Deputy Budget Director, concluded that development of valid productivity measures was feasible for a considerable portion of Federal activities. No further 

action on this promising beginning was taken at 

the time. But under GAO's direction. the jOint 

study team demonstrated that productivity 

measures could be prepared and subsequently 

developed measures for about 60 percent of 

Federal civilian activities. The joint team then 

recommended that a permanent Govemmentwide measurement system be established. The 

measurement system now in operation covers 

over 65 percent of the Federal work force. 

The Comptroller General regarded the measurement of Federal productivity as only the first 

step. He personally worked with Senator Proxmire to increase the Joint Economic Committee's 

support for GAO reviews of productivity programs in the private sector. He also recommended in 1974 that the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program find out what 

could be done to enhance the productivity of 

Federal workers. Also in 1974, he supported legislation which would continue the work performed since 1970 by the National CommiSSion 

on Productivity and Work Quality. GAO favored 

establishment of an invigorated National Center 

for Productivity with long-term financial support 

to ensure a consistent national productivity improvement program. 

In 1977 GAO established productivity as an 

issue area (see ch. 10) and a special productivity 

group in one of the divisions. GAO s coverage 

was broadened to include Federal efforts to fos76 

ter productivity improvement in the private sector and State and local governments. Many reports on productivity in all these sectors were 

released. 

GAO has been instrumental in creating an 

understanding of the importance of productivity 

to our economy. In April 1979. Senator Lloyd 

Bentsen, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, asked GAO to examine the possibility of 

establishing a focal point for Federal efforts to 

stimulate productivity and to draft recommended 

legislation. Both the Senate and the House introduced GAO's recommended legislation, but 

the Congress had not taken final action as the 

96th Congress neared adjournment. 

GAO consistendy emphasized the need for 

an effective national productivity effort properly 

supported by the President and the Congress 

and based on a national productivity plan. The 

recent national concern with productivity decline 

in the U.S. economy has borne out the significance of GAO's work in this area. 

ADDRESSING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 

RELATIONS 

During the 1966-81 period. GAO consistendy 

advocated strengthening the ties between the 

Federal sector and State and local governments, 

inclucling the improvement of procedures for 

administering and consolidating Federal grant 

programs. GAO supported the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, which directed the 

Office to study grant-in-aid programs when requested by a committee having jurisdiction, and 

anticipated that many requests would grow out 

of these requirements. Few actually materialized, 

however. 

The general revenue sharing legislation enacted in 1972 posed a new challenge to maintaining accountability for Federal funds because, 

by definition, State and local governments were 

granted broad latitude in using the funds. The 

Comptroller General. therefore. established the 

field of intergovernmental relations as a focus for 

GAO audits and evaluations. GAO's approach 

to reviewing the intergovernmental assistance 

system was problem rather than program oriented. The principal objective was to promote 

more effective operation of the Federal assistance system by identifying and analyzing major 

causes of intergovernmental conflict and recommending ways for improvement. Special emphasis was placed on examining the impact of 

Federal poliCies and practices from the perspective of State and local governments. Other major 

objectives were to (1) explore the extent to which 

Federal assistance, as a system. is responsive to 

governments or areas most in need and (2) help 

the Congress assess alternative policies for distributing Federal aid to States and localities. 

Because the Comptroller General believed 

that GAO needed to devote attention to general 

management issues endemic to the Federal sys-
tern. intergovernmental reviews were normaUy 

concerned with Federal policies and practices 

having broad applicability among various programs and agencies. The intergovernmental 

work also included evaluations of individual Federal programs if their principal objective was to 

provide general finanoal support to State and 

local governments. General revenue sharing and 

the New York City loan program, for example. 

have received considerable GAO attention. 

Efforts To Foster Cooperation 

With Executive Agencies 

Since 1966. GAO charted a course of cooperation and coordination with the executive 

Postal Service Audit Site : We're Here To Help 

What history of GAO would be complete without mention of those two biggest deceptions 

in the audit world: (1) the auditor's claim that "We're here to help you" and (2) management's 

claim that "We're glad to see you"? However. there have been times when these two deceptions became truths. One of them was at the Postal Service Audit Site-under the direction 

of William J. Anderson. now Director of GAO's General Govemment Division. 

On July 1. 1971. the Postal Reorganization Act brought the U.S. Postal Service into 

existence as on independent and a self-suffiCient agency. The objecti ve of the reorganizotion 

was to improve mail service through the application of business-like practices. About 1 year 

later. Anderson hod just completed a tour with GAO's For East Branch and upon his retum 

to Washington. he assumed leadership of the Postal Service audit site. Soon thereafter. Anderson adopted a strategy which hod served him well throughout his 

auditing career: The way to achieve cooperation from an agency and produce results which 

can benefit both GAO and the agency is to gain entry to the highest levels of management. 

This access not only serves as a vehicle for discussing GAO's findings. but it also can be used 

as a lever to make all levels of the agency responsive. Therefore. he took the initiative to meet 

with the Postmaster General-£. T. Klassen. The initial meeting was for the ostensible purpose 

of alerting Klassen to what GAO was up to in the Postal Service. (Anderson observed that 

it was fascinating how attentive Postal field officials became when he offhandedly managed 

to let them know he had recently been discussing one thing or another with "Ted" Klassen.) 

Klassen. formerly a corporate executive. had been chosen for the post after the Postal 

Reorganization Act of 1971 . It was thought that someone with experience in the private sector 

could best head up a semi-independent Govemment agency. Anderson persuaded Klassen that GAO could be an important source of supplementary 

information to the Postmaster General on what was going on across the Postal Service by 

reason of GAO's nationwide auditing capability. Indeed. soon after Anderson's first meeting 

with Klassen. the Postmaster General began approaching the GAO audit site for advice about 

various activities at the Postal Service. 

Once. in 1974. Klassen received a series of complaints about the speed of mail service in 

various parts of the country. Unable to get a satisfactory answer from his own organization. he arranged to have a 

friendly congressman request GAO to do a report on the Postal Service's system for measuring 

moil delivery performance. Later. Anderson was told that the Postal Service felt it needed an 

independent third partY of GAO's stature to assess the system's credibility. GAO accepted the 

request. The ensuing report met the Postal Service 's expectations. supporting as it did the 

accuracy of the Service's national delivery performance statistics. Unfortunately from the 

standpoint of the Postal Service. it also contained some harsh criticisms about the accuracy 

of local statistics and cited some examples of outright cheating by local postal officials to make 

their statistics look good. This assignment was also unusual for another reason. Anderson could not obtain the GAO resources to conduct the needed nationwide tests so he arranged to have a large number of 

the Postal Service's intemal auditors conduct them under GAO supervision. 

Anderson recalls that throughout the investigation. both sides wanted to produce an effective report. His crew and the Postal Service management met often to discuss issues cordially and 

informally. In 1976. about the time he was reassigned. Anderson gave the Postal Service "0 report 

card" on its first 4 years of existence in testimony before the Senate Committee on Post Office 

and Civil Service. In his statement he recommended-contrary to much sentiment at the 

time-that the Postal Service be given more time to see if self-sufficiency could be achieved. 

and he endorsed the establishment of a Commission on the Postal Service to determine what 

portion of the Postal Service's expenses should be supported by appropriations. 

77 
agencies while retaining the Office's independence and objectivity. The Comptroller General 

firmly believed that more progress in improving 

the Federal Government could be achieved by 

convincing Federal officials of GAO's ability to 

fairl~ and objectively examine programs and that 

GAO succeeded best when its work produced 

positive results and change for the better. GAO's 

cooperation and coordination took many forms. 

In the late 1960'5. they were translated into audits of broader scope. striving for fair and objective reporting and focusing on suggestions for 

improvements. Gone was the steady stream of 

harsh criticisms of agency practices and proce- dures. GAO could be considered an ally-but 

an independent ally. 

An example of this new posture was GAO's 

involvement with the Secretary of Defense in 

auditing the Vietnam War. While drafting its report on the absence of internal controls over 

military supply and construction procedures. 

GAO received a request from the Department 

of Defense to assist military personnel in identifying and plugging holes in the supply lines. 

The situation was critical: the U.S. failure to provide sufficient supplies to the Armed Forces was 

having a negative effect on their ability to achieve 

military objectives. The Comptroller General 

agreed to help DOD but only if GAO auditors 

could independently evaluate data and report 

findings. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara agreed. The arrangements worked out 

included weekly briefings with McNamara's staff 

and transmittal of GAO work progress reports 

directly to him-an unprecedented procedure 

that afforded the Secretary the most timely in - formation available. 

This example. relatively unknown throughout 

the Office. is just one of many signaling the start 

of GAO's initiative to work more directly with 

others in achieving common objectives. Other 

examples included improving Government fi - nancial management. encouraging open communications between GAO and agency officials. 

and supporting the establishment of Inspectors 

General in all Federal agencies. This new em- phasis on cooperation contrasted with the handsoff attitude associated with the classic audit approach. and many years passed before GAO and 

agency staff became accustomed to it. 

The Continuing Problems Of 

Access To Records 

To satisfy its mission and inform the Congress 

of the use and application of Federal funds. GAO 

must rely on the availability of people and records in the Federal agencies and elsewhere. Obtaining this access, however. has not always 

come easily. 

As stated in the Budget and Accounting Act, 

1921. and reinforced in numerouS subsequent 

laws: 

78 

All deportments and establishments shall 

fumish to the Comptroller General such 

information regarding the powers, duties, 

actiuities, organization. financial transactions. and methods of business of their respectiue offices as he may from rime to lime 

require them; and the Comptroller General. or any of his assistants or employees. 

when duly authorized by him. shall. for the 

purpose of securing such information. haue 

access to and the right to examine any 

books, documents, papers. or records of 

any such department or establishment.' 

Full access to records allows an independen~ 

fair. and objective review and evaluation of Federal programs and activities. Most Federal agencies. contractors. State and local governments, and others recognize this requirement and cooperate fully with GAO. Throughout GAO' 5 history. however. some executive agencies and reCipients of Federal funds attempted to block 

GAO's access. Some attempts were very obvious. as when the Federal bank regulatory agencies and the FBI cited legal grounds as barriers. 

Other attempts were more subtle. such as de- layed responses to GAO requests for documents. 

unavailable staff, and never-returned phone 

calls. Only the persistence and determination of 

GAO staff got the job done. Nevertheless. these 

delays can have a serious impact on the timeliness and completeness of GAO's work. 

In a few cases. GAO went to court seeking 

judicial confirmation of its legal right to records. 

For example. in 1962 the Hewlett-Packard Company. which had negotiated four contracts with 

the Air Force for electronic test and measuring 

equipment. denied GAO's request for cost records. The basis for the contractor's refusal was 

that production costs were not "directly pertinent' to GAO's audit because costs were not a 

factor in the contract negotiations. GAO asked 

the Department of Justice to take the case to 

court. The lower court ruled in GAO's favor but 

with reservations concerning the Federal Government's intrusion into private industry. Then 

in March 1968. the U.S. Supreme Court let stand 

a Court of Appeals confirmation of the lower 

court ruling. It was a landmark decision. fundamental to GAO's jurisdiction. 

A second access-to-records case, which is still 

being decided. involved five drug manufacturers. 

FollOwing up on congressional interest in the cost 

of prescription drugs supplied to Federal agencies, GAO attempted to audit several contracts 

entered into br the Veterans Administration and 

Department 0 Defense in 1973 and 1974. GAO 

sought voluntary access. hoping to convince the 

drug industry that it would be in their best interest 

because GAO would report in general terms on 

the pricing system with little or no reference to 

actual costs. Despite 3 years of negotiations. the 

drug compani':; denied GAO access and the law-
suits began. The first case to come to trial resulted 

in an initial setback for GAO at the lower court 

level. but the Office won its appeal at the Seventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals. which the Supreme 

Court let stand by refuSing a further hearing. In 

essence. the courts agreed that GAO had legal 

access to records documenting not only direct 

manufacturing costs but also indirect or overhead 

costs. such as research and development and 

marketing. Another drug manufacturers suit 

against GAO had the same outcome. Additional 

suits. involving three other manufacturers. are 

in various stages of litigation. However. some 

lower courts have ruled in these suits that GAO 

has a right to direct cost records only: GAO is 

appealing to gain access to indirect cost records 

as well. Because of the divergent lower court 

rulings. the Supreme Court will probably have 

to make a final decision. The Department of Defense and its various 

services and agencies also caused much difficulty 

for GAO in obtaining all pertinent records and 

files. Many of the problems could be traced to 

various DOD or service policies which placed 

restrictions on documents available to GAO. Some of these policies were revised several 

times, and GAO's access problems varied ac- cordingly. An early access problem illustrates the 

extent to which DOD could frustrate a GAO 

review. 

In the late 1960' s. the Defense Division had 

extreme problems with the Air Force while au - diting the F-l11 aircraft weapon system. It 

reached such a point that GAO drafted an entire 

report chapter detailing every instance of Air 

Force delay. The draft was sent to the Air Force 

on a Friday evening. Fearing congressional re- percussions. the Air Force settled matters with 

GAO by the following Monday. The final GAO 

report contained only a summary of the access 

problem and its resolution. 

When the full impad of these delays was 

mode known to the Headquarters. Air 

Force. the Chief of Staff promptly issued 

a new instruction clarifying the types of 

data that should be made immediately 

auailable to our Office and promised a re- view and revision of the Air Force regulation on this suliject. The action raken by 

the Air Force Chief of Staff has resulted 

subsequently in full and timely availability 

of the required data to us. The planned 

revision of the Air Force regulation should 

materially reduce the incidences of these 

kinds of difficulties.' 

These examples highlight some of the accessto-records problems GAO encountered through - out the years. Other cases involved the Emer- gency Loan Guarantee Board (established to 

help Lockheed Aircraft out of its financial in - stability in the early 1970's). the Agency for In · ternational Development. the military assistance 

program. the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. the Internal Revenue Service. 

the White House and its Council of Economic 

Advisors. the Department of Labor and the 

Farmworkers of America. and DOD's World 

Wide Military Command and Control System. 

Although there were few instances in which the 

adversaries' arguments were valid. GAO had no 

means of enforcing its statutory rights. Beginning 

in 1969. there were repeated efforts. sponsored 

first by Senator Abraham Ribicoff and then by 

GAO. to enact legislation enforcing GAO's right 

to access either by subpoena or through the Fed- eral courts. (See ch. 8.) Then in the General 

Accounting Office Act of 1980. the Congress 

gave GAO enforcement authority over Federal 

agencies as well as other entities, such as Government contractors and grantees receiving Federal funds. The authority does not. however. give 

GAO access to foreign intelligence activities or 

material specifically exempted by law. The 

Comptroller General is now authorized to seek 

a court order requiring a Federal agency to pro- duce records and to subpoena the records of 

contractors or other "non-Federal persons" to 

which GAO had right of access by law or 

agreement 

GAO's more cooperative attitude toward Federal agencies and the enforcement powers granted 

by the Congress strengthened its ability to obtain 

needed data. However. the movement toward 

more program evaluations complicated access 

problems by introducing questions of confidentiality and personal privacy and the potential for 

violating the integrity of social experiments. 

These and other problems. such as granting the 

Congress access to some types of data obtained 

by GAO. are beyond the scope of this document 

Suffice it to say that access to records will continue to require top management's attention. 

Coordination With Other 

Congressional Support 

Agencies 

lJntil 1970 only one agency in the legislative 

branch provided significant staff support to the 

Congress-GAO. True. there was a small Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress, but it had almost no capability to analyze 

information or go beyond its own resources. The 

years that followed brought dramatic changes as 

the Congress soughl more of its own information 

sources to help assert its independence from executive agencies. 

The first major change occurred in 1970 when 

the Congress created the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from the former Legislative 

Reference Service. In doing so. the Congress 

recognized its need for an organization that could 

produce. assemble. and analyze new information 

and store existing materials. in addition to simply 

making available information produced else79 
where. Indeed. the major development here was 

the large expansion of the analytical staff. 

Early GAO relations with CRS were cordial. 

and there was little question, either inside the 

two agencies or outside, about their respective 

roles. GAO had been consulted by the drafters 

of the Legislative Reorganization Act about CRS' 

role, which the Comptroller General viewed as 

a pool of capable analysts who could supplement 

existing congressional staff in doing research and 

analysis. Formal coordination was established, and informal relationships between the two 

agencies' staffs began to grow in several subject 

areas. There were few occasions on which GAO 

and eRS were asked to address the same sub- ject, and there were almost no joint study efforts. Over the years. this relationship has continued 

to be cordial and informal. 

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 

became the second new support agency with the 

enactment of the Technology Assessment Act of 

1972. OTA's basic functions were to assess the 

beneficial and adverse impacts of technologies 

and to analyze alternatives. In addition to taking 

on a complex new endeavor, this small agency 

had an unusual organizational arrangement that 

included a bipartisan Congressional Technology 

Assessment Board at its head. The board con- sisted of six Senators and six Representatives. one-half from each political party. OTA also was 

provided a Technology Assessment Advisory 

Council, consisting of the Comptroller General. 

the Director of the Congressional Research Ser- vice, and 10 public members. GAO's relationship with the Office of Tech- nology Assessment also had a good start_ and 

the committees which wrote the Technology 

Assessment Act consulted extensively with GAO. During testimony in 1969_ the Comptroller Gen- eral expressed the view that GAO could and 

should play an increasingly important role in 

monitoring Federal programs where technology 

assessment was an important consideration, but 

he also recognized the need for OTA and sup- ported its establishment. GAO was given the job 

of providing financial and administrative services. and GAO staff worked closely with OTA staff to 

get the agency housed appropriately and to es- tablish the necessary administrative framework. 

Problems began to crop up. however. over 

the types of studies OTA undertook in the name 

of te'chnology assessment. As a member of the 

advisory council. Staats kept close tabs on what 

the agency was doing and provided OTA staff 

with his direct input. In his view. the primary 

need for establishing the agency was a 

~ ' .• special capability to examine emerg- Ing Issues involVing new or expanding tech- nologIes and to assess potential impacts 

•. ' • for Congress to consider before 

cnses loomed or processes with undesira80 

ble consequences developed to an irre- versible stage. 

On the other hand, the Comptroller General 

believed OTA had accepted and performed tasks 

which were not unique to this mission and which 

could well have been performed by other legislative agencies.6 

Real control of what subjects OTA addressed 

was in the hands of the committees requesting 

the work and the Congressional Technology 

Assessment Board. so there was little GAO could 

do but raise these issues in council meetings and 

in committee oversight hearings. Aside from this 

difference over policy matters, relations between 

GAO and OTA staffs have been constructive and 

cordial. and the agencies have common interests 

they pursue together. OTA's stalling and budget 

are stili very small compared with GAO's. 

GAO's relationship with the third legislative 

support agency, the Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO)' did not develop as smoothly. Established 

in 1975 following enactment of the Congres- sional Budget Act of 1974, CBO is essentially 

the congressional counterpart to the Office of 

Management and Budget. It assists the Congress 

in carrying out the budget process established 

by the act by providing information to the newly 

established House and Senate Budget Commit- tees. Although CBO's stated duties differ from 

GAO's. the new agency-more than any other 

support agency-has a charter related to Federal 

spending and financial management, GAO's tra- ditional turf. The primary distinction is that CBO 

is involved at the front end of the process (budgeting), whereas GAO is more concerned with 

matters after the fact (auditing and program 

evaluation). Relations with eBO got off to a rocky start 

even before that Office was formed. The budget 

act provided that CBO would come into exist- ence with the naming of its first director. who 

was to be appointed by the congressional lead- ership after conSidering the Budget Committees' 

recommendations. However. the two Committees supported different nominees, and a stand- off ensued into early 1975. As the time ap- proached for a dry run of the budget process. both Committees formally requested GAO and 

CRS to join~y prepare the budget report-a re- sponsibility assigned by the act to CBO. Con- cerned about the potential consequences for the 

new budget process of further delay in appointing a director. the Comptroller General agreed 

to the request and offered to explore the idea 

that GAO and CRS perform all of CBO's func - tions. The request was assigned to the newly 

established Office of Program and Budget Anal- ysis (now the Program AnalysiS Division. as dis- cussed in ch. 9).' 

Shortly thereafter, agreement was reached on 

appointing Alice Rivlin as CBO director. and 

GAO and CRS produced the requested budget 
report. However. Staats' earlier suggestion that 

GAO and CRS assume all of CBO's responsi- bilities provoked a negative reaction from the 

Senate Budget Committee Chainnan. In a March 

1975 letter to the Comptroller General. he ex- pressed strong concern about GAO's Office of 

Program and Budget Analysis and the amount 

budgeted for it in fiscal year 1976. 

We envisioned clearly defined areas in 

which we expected the GAO to exercise 

substantial responsibility. Nowhere. however, am I aware that we either contem- plated or intended to countenance the cre- ation of an office such as the Office of 

Program and Budget Analysis seems to be. I will appreciate hearing from you at 

your earliest convenience regarding the 

justification for this operation. I also strongly 

suggest that you take no step toward fur- ther implementation of this enterprise until 

we have a chance to thoroughly discuss it. R 

In his reply 4 days later, the Comptroller Gen- eral prOvided GAO's perception of its responsibilities under the budget act, the reasons fo r es- tablishing the Office of Program and Budget 

Analysis, and the roles he envisioned for GAO 

in the new budget process. He noted that tide 

VII of the act authorized GAO to establish an 

"Office of Program Review and Evaluation" but 

that he had chosen a different name-one more 

descriptive of the duties to be perfonned. Staats 

summarized his position as follows: 

* * * it seems to us that if we are to carry 

out these [budget actl functions we need 

to establish a point in the GAO at which 

we can consolidate the hundreds of reports 

COMPTROLLER GENERAL STAATS AND CBO DIRECTOR RIVLIN at hearings before th e Subcommittee on Intergovemmental Relations. Senate Committeii' on Govemmental Affairs on the Sunset Act of 1977. March 28. 1977 

and recommendations which GAO develops over the course of a year and synchronize this consolidation with the timing 

of the congressional budget process. This 

task requires the synthesis of information 

in a form and on a time schedule which is 

completely unique to the GAO.

9 

The response. however. did not resolve the 

issue. A month later, the issue arose again at 

GAO's Senate appropriations hearing. Responding to questions, the Comptroller General care- fully explained the rationale for GAO's new office 

and contradicted assertions that it duplicated 

CBO's fu nctions. He also furnished lengthy letters further explaining GAO's position. The 

Committee was not convinced, however. and it 

reduced GAO's request for the new Office from 

165 to 104 staff-years, the same level as in the 

previous fisca l year. 

GAO had no intention of trying to forestall 

establishing CBO by assuming its functions or 

to cut the new agency out of the picture. The 

offer of assistance had been predicated on the 

long delay in appOinting a CBO director. After 

Rivlin's appointment, the Comptroller General 

met with her to discuss what GAO was doing. 

fn addition, GAO had kept in close contact with 

the Budget Committees. Staats had urged that 

all these parties maintain a continuing dialog so 

that the congressional budget process could suc- ceed-a goal he heartily supported. 10 Nevertheless, the congressional response indicated that 

some persons must have suspected a GAO attempt at preemption. Staats said that, in retrospect, a better course for suggesting that GAO 

and CRS assume CBO's duties would have been 

a telephone call instead of a letter. In that way, any misunderstanding could have been dealt 

with on the spot. 

Since these events, GAO staff have kept in 

reasonably close contact with their CBO coun- terparts, particularly concerning GAO's congres- sional infonnation responsibilities under title VIlI 

of the budget act (see ch. 2) and on new jobs. 

Both agencies have preferred that day-to-day 

relationships be kept informal. 

The cut in GAO funding was not the only 

action taken in 1975 to deal with the support 

agency duplication issue, however. Expressing 

concern about overlap between CRS. OTA, and 

GAO, the House Appropriations Committee 

urged a management survey of CRS. The Senate 

Committee supported the House Committee 

and urged "continued development of a process 

for merging the resources of these infonnation 

arms of the Congress to bring their collective 

strengths to bear on the issues before the com- mittees of Congress." 11 In a later report, the 

Committee strongly recommended that a research notification system be established in 

CRS." Soon thereafter, with the cooperation of 

the other agencies, CRS established a system to 

81 
STAfF OF THE ceO. CRS. AND OTA .lOIN GAO STAFf al a meeting of the Interagency Coordinanng Group. 

1978 

provide weekly listings 01 ongoing and completed assignments of the four agencies. classified by subject area. to all four support agencies. 

Since 1975. a process gradually emerged to 

coordinate the work of the four agencies. Top 

officials of these agencies get together periodicaUy to discuss issues of common interest. GAO 

has appointed liaison officers for each of the 

other agencies and has required its staff to contact the sister agencies when starting a new job. 

Working level staff meet also to discuss ongoing 

and planned work and to promote continuing 

working relationships. Informal communication 

between agency staffs has been encouraged. and 

provisions have been made for joint performance 

of assignments when appropriate. Finally. GAO 

and the other agencies each have issued widely 

distributed publications describing what each 

does and does not do. 

Congressional committees responsible for 

overseeing the support agencies have continued 

their interest in minimizing overlap and duplication. There have been allegations of duplication. but considering the volume of work done 

by these agencies. the duplication appears to 

have been minimized except when the Congress 

itself has requested more than one agency to 

study the same subject. GAO has emphasized 

its mandate to audit and evaluate executive 

branch operations-its basic statutory r(sponsi82 

bility-regardless of what congressionally requested studies are underway in other support 

agencies. However. GAO has continued to recognize the importance of good communication 

among the congressional support agencies as 

well as with the committees of the Congress. 

I Comptfollotr .G.:IWI;)I, NpOI't "FBI Dum..soc Inlo!l:Y'nn 0r!0'I,!1I00S0-

Th,m PuflXl'W IInd:",:opo.t I~ ThIll N~ To St- R~'o! .erA> 7~ ;,I) FI!b 

2t1 JlI76J 

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B.mk~ (OCG.77 I Jim J1 1(71) 

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L SI)\::I'f\.'. I'Il'eb !')!«J 

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t} Compnolllll' c...'rn!'h .. 1 Staa~ Utll." 10 Chllumbn ... ·111111' Comnun.", on II'oc Budg(!! 15 MIl, 1975, p J 

10 Ib.d 

II US Cong ~1\o'l1"'_ Commln~ ()Il AppropMnon, L~gI$Im'ut' Branch A~p!'DPnarloru. 1976. 94th COIl9 lSI ~_. 5 Ri.!pI q.<j 262IWMr.rngron_ 0 C 

GPO, 1975). p :I[) 

12 US COllg Sena ~ Commlnw on ApptOPtI4t1O,lt. Supplen,rtWtM Ap. 

propnotlOlU! Ild/. 19ib, 911111 Cong lSi _. s Rl.'9I 94 5 11 IWlI5ll1nq1Of'1 

DC GPO. 1l7~,). p 51 
[P)([lITli TITI 

Managing GAO 

To Meet 

The Needs Of 

Its Times 

83 
CCI}uc[llJ)tJ®lS 7J 

Managing The Agency* 

The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act states 

simply that the GAO "shall be· • • under the 

control and direction of the Comptroller General 

of the United States." I Managing GAO, of 

course, is not that easy. The Comptroller General 

must cope with the traditions and practices of a 

Federal agency in business since 1921. GAO also 

has unique characteristics, particularly the combination of its size, its geographic dispersion, and 

the analytical nature of its staff and operations. 

This combination makes change difficult to man- age, and while the Comptroller General can 

make changes. the organization expects change 

to occur in an orderly manner with due notice 

and consultation with those affected. 

Through the 1966-81 period. GAO's man- agement both changed and stayed the same. 

Many of the basic methods and values associated 

with the post-1950 comprehensive audit era remained embedded in the system. One basic 

change involved focusing more of GAO's efforts 

on improving the effectiveness of Government 

as contrasted with identifying individual deficien- cies. In addition. the audit and evaluation staff 

nearly doubled in size between 1966 and 1980. 

Such growth, as well as GAO's reorganization 

and new responsibilities. enlarged the manage- ment cadre. The more challenging tasks taken 

on by GAO and the diversification of its personnel made management's job more complex. and 

adviSOry groups were used as an important aid 

to managing. The autonomy formerly enjoyed 

by audit site heads and regional managers was 

weakened, and the agency became more bu- reaucratic as detailed operating procedures and 

how-to-do-it manuals multiplied. PartiCipative 

management became the way of doing business 

at the top. but some managers just simply 

wanted to be left alone to manage their own 

affairs. 

Comptroller General-A Unique 

Office, Title, And T enUl'e 

The Office of Comptroller General has several 

unique features. Firs~ the incumbent is presi- dentially appointed subject to confirmation by 

the Senate. This provides a link to both the leg- islative and the executive branches, but line re- sponsibility to the Congress alone. Second, the 

15-year term provides the needed independence 

and timespan to accomplish nearly any goal. 

"No'fo-ThI5 chapIlIr posed a real problem lor llw author This hIsIo!,\ Is to be on obt4rctlw account of GAO, deveklpmol'nt (l.voidInll (lny p.!1"SOfIa/ tribute 10 

the Comptrolln ~ and ttle result! of thOSf' action, on the agency. not him 

as a pe~1'\!II1ty Hoo.ooever. thaI approach 15 telilly not pO$SIbiI.! In this chaptl"! 

tlncl!', 10 some extent. II 6ddrt'$;S(!$ hit rTUllllI9'tmcnt style, Suffice ~ to »II Thlli 

although Ihls chapler Is lTlOfe " jWBOMlly" fexus«! on the Compttoller Gtm;mll 

!han !he r~ the ~ was 10 maN- it no 10m obtecnve 

84 

Last. the Comptroller General's authority spans 

the entire Federal Government and touches 

State and local governments and many nongovernmental activities as well. A Comptroller Gen- eral must be aware of political realities but be 

above partisan politics. He must be politically 

neutral about Government programs, so that 

GAO's staff can conduct their work objectively 

and independently of outside pressures. Above 

aU, his personal integrity must be beyond question. GAO operates under a series of statutory authorizations dating primarily from the 1921 

Budget and Accounting Act. Although some of 

the Comptroller General's statutory responsibil- ities are rather specific. the lion's share of GAO's 

resources are devoted to the most broadly de- fined duties (audit and evaluation). He is therefore provided wide latitude in setting the agency's 

course. 

GAO is accountable to the Congress in several ways. 11 must present a budget and obtain 

appropriations each year, and the Comptroller 

General must file an annual report at the beginning of each congreSSional session. It must answer to the House Government Operations 

Committee and the Senate Committee on Gov- ernmental Affairs, which have legislative and 

overSight jurisdiction over its charter. GAO must 

also respond to questions about the Office's work 

at more than 200 hearings each year. Finally. 

the Comptroller General and the GAO staff sit 

at the end of a telephone line where they can 

be contacted by the 800 or more congressional 

offices which have come to expect prompt and 

efficient service from GAO. All except classified GAO reports and other 

documents are now public. so both the news 

media and the public can-and do--<!xercise 

oversight as well. Language inserted in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 at GAO's re- quest laid the foundation for a 1977 policy 

change requiring that reports and legal opinions 

made at the request of congressional committees 

or members be released no later than 30 days 

after the reports are sent to the requesters. Pre- viously, there had been instances when such 

documents had not been released for extended 

periods. 

How The Comptroller General 

Functioned 

Top management is the directing, viSion-setting, standard-setting organ. As such 

it has specific tasks. It requires its own organization. And it jaces specijic top management challenges of structure and strot-
egy with respect to size and complexity. 

diversity and diversification. growth. change 

and innouation. 

-Peter F. Drucker. "Management: Tasks. Responsibilities. Practices" 

Because Staats saw GAO and the Office of 

Comptroller General as one and the same. he 

took it upon himself to be the agency's top man- ager as well as its chief representative to the 

world outside. Peter Drucker wrote that top man- agement's job is multidimensional and that it re- quires at least four kinds of human being: the 

thought man. the action man. the people man. and the front man.2 Although Drucker asserted 

that these four temperaments are almost never 

found in one person. Staats attempted all these 

roles during his 15 years at GAO. The extent to 

which he succeeded in each role varied with the 

nature of the role. 

BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE 

The Comptroller General brought to his po- sition in 1966 a quarter century of Government 

experience in a variety of responsible positions. 

mostly in the former Bureau of the Budget His 

sphere of knowledge and influence was further 

broadened through memberships in numerous 

organizations and professional societies. He also 

maintained connections with higher education 

by serving on the boards of trustees and visiting 

committees of several colleges and universities. Through his work on the Federal budget, he 

became interested in govemment·business relations and acquired membership in such organizations as the Conference Board and the 

American Management Association. All of this 

activity provided Staats with a great range of 

contacts and information sources to draw on. 

INTERACTING WITH PEOPLE 

Staats' management style contrasted sharply 

with that of his predecessor. Mindful of his 15-

year term (Cabinet officials' tenures average only 

about 2 years). he proceeded carefully and grad- ually. taking his time to understand the institution 

he headed and its people and to establish a 

dialog with his top assistants about what needed 

to be done and how to do it He built consensus, 

mediated, cooperated. and supported others' 

efforts. 

Staats was highly organized and packed a lot 

into a day. He liked to interact with other people 

and conducted much of his business through 

meetings. sometimes small and informal but 

often large and involving people from various 

organizational levels. He spent most of his time 

in the Washington. D. C.. area. but accepted 

Comptroller General's Participation On Board And 

Commissions 

The Office of Comptroller General sometimes extends beyond GAO's walls. From time to 

time. statutes establishing special commissions or councils have named the Comptroller Gen- eral as a member. In addition. he has served on commissions by Presidential appointment. 

One of Staats' earliest and most important appointments was to the Commission on Government Procurement. Established by law in 1969 to make a comprehensive study of Federal 

procurement statutes, policies. and practices. the Commission completed its work during fiscal 

year 1973 and submitted a four-volume report to the Congress. The report contained 149 

recommendations for improving Government procurement. 

Because of the Comptroller General's membership and GAO's considerable experience 

with Federal procurement law and agency procurement operations. GAO provided the Commission with much assistance during its study. Twelve GAO staff members were assigned to 

work with the Commission's scaff or its various study groups for a year or longer. Also. GAO's 

Office of the General Counsel provided legal assistance. In 1979 GAO completed a series of six progress reports on implementation of the Commission's recommendations. The reports were submitted to the House Committee on Govemment Operations. 

H.ere is a list of the commissions and boards on which Staats or his designee served. 

1967 President's Commission on Budget Concepts 

1969 Commission on Government Procurement 

1970 Cost Accounting Standards Board 

1972 Aduisory Council for the Office of Technology Assessment 

1974 Presidential Election Campaign Fund Advisory Board 

1975 Commission on Federal Paperwork 

1977 Task Force on the San Luis-Central Valley Project 

1979 President's Management Improvement Council 

1979 Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board 

1980 Railroad Accounting Principles Board 

85 
..... --""" --=- .. 

86 
A Week's Calendar Of The ComptroJler General's Activities 

October 1979 

MONDAY. OCT. 22 

9:00 am Meeting with Messrs. Scantlebury and POints. FGMSD. on article being 

9:30 

10 

11:15 

11:50 

Noon 

2:30 pm 

3:30 

drafted. 

Meeting with staff on proposal to issue only summaries of selected GAO 

reports to certain recipients. Messrs. Keller. HeUer. Pin, Fitzgerald. Wm. Anderson. and Brown attended. 

Briefing by Messrs. Scantlebury and Simonette. FGMSD. on review of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 

Meeting with Messrs. Scantlebury and Brandon. Director of Personnel. on 

selection of Deputy Director. FGMSD. 

Photo session with 45-year career awardee. 

Luncheon for INTOSAI fellows with Mr. Heller and Ms. Orr. Special Assistant 

to Mr. Heller. 

Meeting with Mr. Voss, Director. GGD. and staff on October 25 testimony 

on drug enforcement 

Interview with Mr. Jim Singer, reporter for the National Journal, on forthcoming article on GAO evaluation studies. 

TUESDAY, OCT. 23 

9:00 am Meeting with Mr. Charles Bowsher, Arthur Anderson Co. 

10 Meeting with DOD Deputy Secretary Claytor on Cost Accounting Standards 

11:30 

1:30 pm 

2 

3:30 

Board. 

Meeting with Messrs. Fitzgerald. Griffith. and Garvey, OCR. on proposed 

reply to congressional reguest 

Meeting with Mr. Krieger, FPCD, on upcoming Public Management Conference. 

Meeting with staff on study of House and Senate Financial Disclosure 

Systems. 

Meeting to discuss judicial decision on Gary Aircraft Corp. bankruptcy case. 

Messrs. Socolar, Fitzgerald. Wm. Anderson, and J. Martin attended. 

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 24 

10:00 am Speech to Industrial College of the Armed Forces class of 1980 on defense 

12:15 pm 

2:30 

4:30 

6 

decisionmaking. 

CG staff luncheon. Secretary of Agriculture Bergland was guest speaker. 

Briefing by Dan Leary, Director. Claims Division, on Office of Manasement 

and Budget debt collection project. Messrs. Socolar. Fitzgerald, and Scantlebury attended. 

Meeting with Henry Eschwege. Director, Community and Economic Development Division, and Messrs. Heller and Brandon on personnel selection. 

GAO office-wide awards ceremony. 

THURSDAY. OCT. 25 

10:00 am Testimony at Appropriations Committee hearing on drug enforcement 

11:45 

2:00 pm 

7:30 

FRIDAY. OCT. 26 

activities. 

Hearing, Educational Aid and Research Foundation luncheon at Cosmos 

Club (Comptroller General a board member). 

HEAR board meeting. 

Reception at Kramer Bookstore for Dr. Frederic Mosher. 

8:45 am OCR meeting. 10 American University board meeting (Comptroller General a board member). 

3:00 pm Meeting with Mr. Charles Bingman and Rosslyn Kleeman on President's 

Management Improvement Council. 

4 Meeting with Mr. Heller. 

7 Reception for Vienna State Opera and concert. 

SATURDAY, OCT. 27 

9:00 am In office for dictation and paperwork. 

87 
that had potential for budgetary savings, 

attempting to work even more closely with 

the Appropriations and Budget Committees. 

2. Increase the usefulness of GAO's work to 

the Congress. As Staats specified in GAO's question and answer booklet. "It is my objective to 

strengthen. wherever I can. the processes through 

whIch the Congress can obtain reliable infor- mation." For the Office. this meant making its 

work "more and more relevant to the needs of 

Congress." (See ch. 2.) But beyond this he asserted that. "The first and foremost responsibility 

for providing this type of information • • • 

should continue to rest with the operating agencies. themselves." In this regard. he saw GAO's 

job, in addition to undertaking its own evalua- tions of Federal programs. as advising the Con- gress of how well the agencies had done their 

jobs of evaluating the effectiveness of their own 

programs. He also saw GAO as making a par- ticular contribution by reviewing problems or 

programs involving more than one executive 

agency. 3. Broaden the role of auditors. general/y. 

and establish links with other audit organizations. Staats saw the Federal system of Government 

as resting on elaborate interlocking relationships 

between all governmentallevels-executive and 

legislative; Federal, State. and local. The prolif- eration of locally administered Federal assistance 

programs necessitated a widened scope of gov- ernmental auditing. no matter who performed 

it-Federal auditors. State and local auditors. or 

public accountants. Extending the principle even 

further. he believed that increasing world inter- dependence necessitated interaction with other 

nations' audit organizations and strengthening 

their capabilities. 

4. Strengthen GAO's inremal management 

systems and its personnel. Staats strove to in- crease GAO's managerial and organizational effectiveness and encourage excellence among the 

Office's senior managers. Beyond that he wanted 

to elevate the professional stature of all GAO 

personnel by hiring people with various back- grounds. developing and training staff. and encouraging participation in professional organizations. He said: 

When I come here, people were disco,uraged from joini'!ll. and were not per- mitted to become of/icers in on organiza- hon on the grounds that this might some 

way compromise their objectivity. I looked 

at it just the other way around: the more 

you get people to participate in profes- Sional bodIes, the more effective we can 

be. 

Beyond any specific set of goals. Elmer Staats 

tried to maintain flexibility. This extended to reslstlng all attempts to impose by statute depart- ·ments or subunits in GAO or to narrow the 

88 

Comptroller General's authority. He also said, "GAO's role will continue to change as the needs 

of the Congress change in response to the in- creasing Size and compleXlty of our Nation and 

its Government." 

DESIRE TO!IIAINTAIN INDEPENDENCE 

Although the Comptroller General wanted to 

work closely with the Congress and provide 

greater assistance. he also wanted to make sure 

the Office retained its independence. GAO de- cided what issue areas it would review. how the 

Office would be organized, and what procedures 

would be used to do its work. Acknowledging 

that the Congress has the right by law to call on 

GAO, Staats reserved to himself the final authority to determine the results and recommen- dations that would be reported from specific re- views. He said: 

We still have leeway in terms of the negotiation of what we do. what timeframe. 

the nature of the product, and so on. While 

it is important that we maintain our rela· 

tionship [with the Congress]. we always 

have to keep in reserve the question of our 

Independence. and we have to keep in reserve the question of priority of that work 

against other work. I consider the protec- tions that the statute gives the Comptrol/er 

General as being on intention that he operate in that kind of framework. 

The Comptroller General was equally adamant about being independent from the Presi- dent and the executive branch. He wanted GAO 

to be self-sufficient to the extent possible. This 

was the foundation for GAO's separate personnel system and its support for authority for GAO's 

attorneys to represent the Office in access-to- records disputes with the entities GAO audits. 

Several times. influential members of Con- gress proposed tighter reins on GAO. In 1975. for example, members of GAO's oversight com- mIttees In both Houses supported legislation to 

reduce the Comptroller General's term of office 

from 15 to 10 or 7 years, provide for congres- Sional Instead of Presidential appointment. and 

make it easier to remove a Comptroller General 

from office. GAO strongly opposed this legisla- tion and argued that, if these changes were 

made. future Comptrollers General might be re- luctant to audit programs having high political 

senSItiVIty or recommend changes in legislation. and that a congreSSionally appointed Comptrol- ler General would not be able to exercise GAO's 

"executive functio~s, " ~uch as settling accounts, 

apprOVIng accounting systems. and related authorities. (A paper addressing the independence 

of the Comptroller General and how that independence mi~ht be affected by congreSSional 

appointment IS Included as an appendix to this 

document.) 
Eventually. a compromise was reached that 

provided for a bipartisan congressional commis- sion to develop a list of potential nominees from 

which the President could choose the Comptroller General. The IS-year Presidential appoihtrnent and the original procedures for removal remained intact. (See ch_ 8. ) 

Independence. of course. requires accountability and oversight. On severa) occasions the 

Comptroller General encouraged the House 

Government Operations and Senate Governmental Affairs Committees to hold annual hear- ings on GAO's work. possibly based on GAO's 

annual report. This would provide an opportunity to better acquaint the Congress with this 

work. Staats put it this way: 

In other words. it would give the Comptroller General an opportunity to loy before 

a committee what he is dOing, what prog- ress he is making, what his accomplish -

ments have been, what he is trying to do 

to improve the operations and possibly get 

some useful/eedback. • • • That would 

be a form 0 oversight I would personally 

welcome. 

Adapting The Office To Achieve 

Staats' Goals 

Although the Comptroller General saw much 

value in the work GAO was doing when he assumed office, he wanted to fashion a larger, more 

Significant role for the Office. How did me adapt 

the organization to achieve his goals? He proceeded gradually and preferred to act through 

persuasion rather than executive fiat. He i(}-

volved his top managers in the decision making 

process but maintained ultimate responsibility for 

those decisions himself. Although there were many plusses in his man- agement style, there was controversy. too. Some 

COMPTROu.EH GENERAL STAATS AND DEPUTY COMPTROu.EH GENERAL KELLER conler wilh!:Con; 

gressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Commiuee on Governm(i!nt Operations before a 1979 hearing 

89 
in GAO thought he tried to move the agency too 

far, too fast: others believed not far or fast 

enough. Some questioned his effectiveness. not 

so much in identifying the changes needed as 

in implementing them. Others thought him too 

remote from the working levels to know the pulse 

of the agency. Whatever the consensus was, 

major changes occurred at what seemed an everincreasing pace, and very little was left unex- plored or untouched by the end of this term. 

DELEGATING AUTHORITY lIND 

RESPONSIBILITY 

Staats strongly believed in delegating author- ity but maintaining ultimate responsibility him- self. In an April 1980 interview, he said the cen- tral question about internal management was: 

Essentially how do you strike a balance 

between the need to delegate the maxi- mum feasible extent as against maintaining 

some kind of central guidance to' provide 

for consistent application of policy among 

the various divisions? 

We have been trying to delegate to the 

maximum extent. We try to put the burden 

of proof on the need to centralize. 

This is how he tried to maintain the balance. He 

continued. "If you have as many projects as we 

have I up to 1.500 on any given day J. then you 

have to delegate." 

Generally. he maintained control of the Of- fice's work through the planning process. 

If you give each of the divisions a lead 

role on one or more issue areas and say. 

"It is your job to plan GAO-wide. subject 

only to the advice. help. and some control 

that you ~et out of the Office of Program 

Planning .. you go a long way to decen- tralize the planning process as well as the 

execution. 

Staats' concept of decentralization was a spe- cial one, however. Decentralizing to him meant 

delegating responsibility to the next lower level 

of management-the division directors-not 

necessarily to the middle and lower levels of the 

organization where most of the authority had 

been in the past. The audit organization Staats 

inherited consisted of three largely autonomous 

operating divisions and 16 independent regional 

offices which controlled what work was done, 

who did it. when and how it was done, and 

where the results were reported. Audit site heads 

enjoyed much autonomy and could exercise 

their own initiative and ideas within general guidance furnished by the division director or re- gional manager. The result sometimes was a 

fragmentation of the work and some overlap and 

competition. but the auditors knew what the 

rules were and fashioned work plans and sched90 

ules to suit what they perceived as GAO's mission and the most promising opportunities. Staats' approach differed from that of the or- ganization he inherited. 

INVOLVING MllNAGERS IN THE 

DECISIONMllKING PROCESS 

When asked if he found GAO's environment 

different from that in the executive branch. Staats 

said the biggest difference he noticed was "the 

reluctance of [GAO J staff to argue and debate. 

and come forth with their own ideas." He felt 

that perhaps some people were more comfort- able following orders rather than helping to make 

policy. But follOwing his practice at the Bureau 

of the Budget. Staats encouraged debate and 

argumentation. partly because he felt that once 

a decision was made. "people who went through 

the process would be more knowledgeable concerning how you got from here to there ... Therefore . he generally followed a practice of involving 

his managers in identifying problems, coming up 

with suggested courses of action, and proposing 

solutions. He reserved to himself. however. the 

right to make the final decisions. One official 

characterized his style as "participative on the 

surface but authoritarian underneath." 

Staats recalled an experience in the Eisenhower administration about getting others' opin- ions before acting. 

I remember. {or example. when [Pres- ident Dwight D. Eisenhower came in at a 

Cabinet meeting and Secretary of Defense 

[Charles E. J Wilson was outlining some 

plans that he was thinking of putting into 

effect at the Pentagon and Eisenhower 

said: "Well what do your Joint Chiefs. your 

service secretaries think about this?" And 

Wilson hesitated a minute and then said: 

"At General Motors I got paid to do the 

thinking." That was his philosophy of management and that has always stuck in my 

mind. How could this person be so sure 

that he has the answer unless there had 

been some flow up from the organization 

as against imposition from above?" 

Certainly his favorite-and possibly overused---approach to effecting change was to create an internal task force to address a problem 

and propose solutions. He said: "As you know, 

every major change we put into effect here grew 

out of some task force, some effort where there 

has been input from down in the organization." 

Although task forces brought collective wisdom 

to bear on problems, they diverted key officials 

from other tasks. Also. they often did not represent the full range (grade levels) of staff affected by the change and usually did not include 

persons from outside GAO. Staats often supplemented internal task forces by using consultant 

panels (see follOWing section) and calling on his 
wide range of friends and acquaintances for additional advice. 

that side than go the other direction where 

we are making a fot 01 decisions where 

people say. 'They don t make any sense 

at all." or "I don 't know what the hell he 

is trying to get at." and tend to walk away 

from you or stiff-arm you. But you get a 

trade-off here. 

HOLDING PEOPLE ACCOUNTABLE 

To get further input. Staats usually sent proposed draft orders and regulations to his division 

directors for comment. This practice reduced the 

number of surprises and brought in additional 

points of view but often took time-which some 

interpreted as slowness or indecisiveness. Others 

questioned the clarity and utility of the processes 

established as a result of the task forces work. 

Staats had some thoughts about how his process 

worked: 

I guess some people would say I have 

gone too for in not being decisiue and firm 

in dictating changes that needed to be 

made. But I would rather run the risk on 

If there was an Achilles heel in the Staats 

management style, it may have been his reluctance to hold his managers fully accountable for 

their actions (or lack of action) and to confront 

the internal challenges to his administration. The 

reasons why likely included his reluctance to 

share ultimate responsibility with others and possibly the nature of the man himself. 

Getting Input For Management Decisions Through Employee 

Committees 

Responding to a need to prouide additional channels for input from young people. President 

Johnson instructed each Federal department and agency in October 1968 to create a committee through which young trainees and professionals could better participate in their organization's affairs. Responding uoluntari/y to the President's memorandum. the Comptroller 

General established a youth aduisory committee in February 1969. That first committee's charter directed it toward informing top management about career 

staff members' ideas for recruiting. training, and using staff members at their leuel. Therefore. 

it focused primarily on actiuities in GAO's Office of Personnel Management, In 2-day meetings 

generally held about four times a year. preselected topics were discussed and minutes were 

taken and forwarded to the Comptroller General. Other than the minutes, howeuer. there 

were few tangible products. and committee members became increasingly frustrated. 

Euentually both the committee itself and the topiCS were broadened. In 1 ~74 the committee 

was placed under the Deputy Comptroller General's guidance. and it sought to better serue 

the needs of both young professionals and GAO. A new charter permitted it to make more 

comprehensiue examinations of problems and recommend substantiue solutions. Later the 

membership was expanded to include all career ladder professional staff regardless of age 

and length of service. and the committee became the Career Leuel Council (CLC). 

Regular meetings inuoluing representatiues of all GAO diuisions and offices are now held 

four times a year. and the Council is a well-established channel between career employees 

and top management. Through its sub-committees. CLC has taken on many duties. including 

the burden of commenting on drafts of this history. CLC prouided input on numerous issues 

during fiscal year 1980. such as competitiue selection procedures. equal employment opportunity goals. and funding for trauel. Following in the footsteps of CLC, GAO staff at the GS-13 and 14 leuels established a 

Mid-Leuel Forum in 1980, The idea originated among staffers at the San Francisco regional 

office who were troubled by problems affecting their work and staff morale. Although establishing the forum was not supported GAO-wide. there was enough interest at the staff level 

and support by top management to get the group started. The Comptroller General told GAO 

officials in July 1980: "I, too, see the need for such a forum and whole-heartedly support 

efforts to organize one. " 

The Forum's charter said the group would address "not only policy and procedural matters 

but also other substantiue issues. including the technical aspects of the work." Its first major 

task was to review and respond to the June 1980 diuision directors' proposal for chonging 

agency operating procedures. 

Both CLC and the Mid-Leuel Forum became intimately inuolved in deueloping the diuision 

directors' recommendations to the Comptroller General on teams. regional office roles. competitiue selection, etc. With the growing recognition by top management that input to deueloping policy is needed from allieueis of the organization. these two bodies can expect to haue 

a full agenda from now on. 

91 
Staats believed that most people meant well. and he tried to provide an environment in which 

willing people could function effectively. He be- lieved that anyone given a job and the resources 

to do it would do his or her best to carry it out. 

As demonstrated by the organization" lack of 

enthusiasm for project management and the 

problems with implementing the team concept 

(see ch. 11). this was not always so. There is no question that Staats understood 

the need for effective implementation of man- agement decisions. He said: "I welcome a good. legitimate argument. but I also expect that when 

that argument is over and a decision made. that 

person i~ going to carry out the decision as best 

he can. But what happened when people did 

not do their best to implement a decision or 

lacked the skills needed to do their jobs effec- tively? Staats stated: "What I have tried to do 

is to deal with it pretty much on a day-to-day 

baSIS rather than systematically sitting down at 

a table with the person involved'" 

. As in other situations. he exercised great pa- tience and tolerance. He said: 

I don't know any of these top people who 

haue not been effeedue when there has 

been any rhubarb or strain. I would haue 

to say that the performance is not compIet~Iy euen among the diuisions. but I 

don t know if any situation has gotten to 

the point where it is a matter of discomfort 

for eIther me or the diuision director. 

What he was saying was that the' 'worst"' director 

was still good enough. still above the minimum 

passing grade. In fact. he said: "I really don', feel 

that anybody here had been trying to sit on his 

hands or tried to find ways to frustrate the di- rections or requests thai are made." 

During his long term of office. Staats had the 

opportunity to select one or more incumbents 

for every division and regional office. There were 

no outright dismissals or demotions. Instead. he 

used another technique. He waited for an op- portunity to move a person or simply persevered 

until an offending official retired. Staats ex- plained: "Another thing you can do. of course 

is to make a judgment on placement of peopl~ when vacancies open up. To some degree you 

are making an assessment then." He continued 

"Beyond that. if you feel that a division directo~ is not being responsive. you can work with him. but you do it on a case by case basis when a 

project comes up'" 

What effect did Staats patience and restraint 

have on the outcomes of his management ini- tiatives? Of course. there is no way to measure 

thIS. but the organization' s resistance to many of 

his initiatives showed that at least some believed 

they could go their own way with impunity. Per- haps the Office fared better because some ini- tiatives fell by the wayside. but certainly progress 

92 

was slower toward desired goals and at least 

some confusion existed about who was running 

the show. 

WHY NOT A GENERAL MANAGER TO 

IMPLEMENT POUCV DECISIONS? 

If implementation and accountability were not 

getting adequate attention. whv not appoint 

someone to take on these tasks? GAO's Organization Planning Committee recommended in 

1971 that an Assistant to the Comptroller Gen- eral for Audit Operations be appointed to man- age GAO's audit operations and central staff ser- vices. but Staats rejected the idea. (See ch. 9,) 

When the Office was reorganized in 1972, 

Staats appointed two Assistant Comptrollers 

General to share line responsibility for the seven 

newly created audit divisions and a third to oversee policy. program planning. and internal re- view. However. the plan did not work for various 

reasons and was gradually abandoned over the 

next few years, fn April 1980, Staats appointed 

three Assistant Comptrollers General whose di- rect management responsibilities varied with 

the It duties-pohcy and program planning. man - agement services. and program evaluation. These 

three. plus two division directors. constituted a 

strengthened Assignment Review Group which 

exerCIsed some control over individual job au - thorization. planning. and management. The thr~e Assistant Comptrollers General collectively 

chalTed the ASSIgnment Review Group. the In- formation Policy Committee. the Budget Com- mittee , the Executive Resources Board, and the Pe~sonnel Steering Committee, But the organi- zation chart still showed division directors re- porting straight to the Comptroller General-and 

the directors knew it. 

Thus. this discussion of Staats' management 

style ends where. It began-with his sense of per- sonal responslblhty for the Office of Comptroller 

General. ThIs IS how he put it to us: 

I think that "the buck stops here" and 

I also think if something gets off the tracks, 

then I am not going to put the responsibility 

on anybody else, I am here. If I wasn't on 

top of the problem. I should have been on 

top of it • • • If there is anyone who is 

going to get criticized, I think the criticism 

ought to come here, 

The Deputy Comptroller 

General 

The Deputy Comptroller General's Job could 

be hke that of some past Vice PreSidents-high 

visibility and little substance, The law states sim- ply that the Deputy Comptroller General "shall 

perform such duties as may be assigned to him 

by the Comptroller General. and during the ab- sence or incapacity of the Comptroller General 

or dunng a vacancy in the Office. shall act as 

Comptroller GeneraL '" 
Relations between the Comptroller General 

and the number two man were strained during 

Joseph Campbell's term. when Frank Weitzel 

was Assistant Comptroller General. ' Weitzel was 

appointed to his 15-year statutory term the year 

before Campbell. so the latter had no voice in 

selecting his principal assistant. Suffice it to say 

they did not get along. and there was relatively 

little communication between the two. When 

Staats assumed office. the atmosphere changed. Weitzei became much more a part of GAO's 

management team. and he and Staats worked 

well together until Weitzel's retirement in 1969. With Staats' support and recommendation. President Richard Nixon nominated another ca- reer employee. GAO General Counsel Robert 

F. Keller. to succeed Weitzel. Quiet. unassuming. and ingrained with a Government lawyer's cau- tion and discretion. Keller added the essential 

perspective of an insider who knew intimately 

both GAO and the Congress. 

He and Staats never worked out any formal 

division of responsibilities, Rather. each tackled 

the jobs for which he was best suited and kept 

the other informed. Staats characterized their 

relationship this way: 

The idea was to establish the same relationship I had when I was Deputy at the 

Bureau of the Budget and that, namely. 

was an alter ego approach. In a broad way 

there were matters which I understood the 

Deputy Comptroller General would take 

the initiative on, but at the same time he 

had my calendar and had an open invitation to come to any meetings that were 

held. I tried to keep him up to date and he. 

I think. did the same. So if I were not available. he was not completely green to what 

the issues were and he could pick something up in the middle of trouble. 

Keller handled congressional relations and all 

legislation affecting GAO except that important 

enough to require Staats' personal attention. He 

took a keen interest in the legal activities of the 

Office but let the General Counsel run his own 

shop. He signed all the legal decisions except the 

one or two a month that needed the agency 

head's personal imprimature. 

ROBERT F. KEllER ACCEPTS HIS COMMISSION as Asslstan. ComplTolier General in 1969 

93 
Asked in 1979 what the most difficult part of 

his job was, Bob Keller said: 

The most difficult part of my job is dealing 

with the Congress and its committees. I like 

to look at it as a challenge, but it is difficult 

because there are so many viewpoints in 

Congress. There are many committee 

chairmen and subcommittee chairmen, as 

well as individual members, to deal with. And sometimes it is very difficult to keep 

GAO in a position where we are helpful 

but do not become involved in the politics 

of a porticular problem. GAO has an ex· cellent reputation for being fair and objec· tive. Of course there are always some who 

don't agree with our cone/usions, but for the most part this results from differing po· 

litical philosophies among the members.' 

Perhaps equally important. Keller also served 

as a sounding board for GAO managers needing 

good advice or guidance. and especially in the 

later years of the 1966·S1 term, he acted as an 

arbiter in settling . internal management issues. With GAO for 40 years. he was regarded by 

some veteran staffers as "Mr. GAO." Keller told 

us: "I med to make myself available to anyone 

with problems in GAO and resolve them. to take 

as much of the burden as possible off of Mr. Staats." These ranged from division budget mat· ters to equal employment opportunity issues. Because he was a good listener, an excellent 

judge of character, and very supportive in getting 

staff through tough situations. he helped get 

things done in GAO and kept Staats' calendar 

open for matters that particularly needed his 

attention. Uttle went on at the Office that Keller did not 

have his hand in. He reviewed nearly every audit 

report and most correspondence prepared for 

the Comptroller General's signature. He shared 

his judgment with Staats on the likely reactions 

to GAO's recommendations on the Hill and else· where. He also chaired important projects like 

the reorganization task force in 1971. His sense 

of the importance of timing in getting things done 

stood him in good stead. As he noted. " 15 years 

ago if you came up with an idea that you needed 

an economist at GAO. people probably would 

have looked at you like you were crazy." 

Totally loyal to his agency and his boss. Keller 

courageously overcame severe personal health 

problems and. ultimately. a physical handicap 

that confined him to a wheelchair. He remained 

on station for all but the last year of the 1966- SI term. Asked about his tenure as Deputy 

Comptroller General. Keller replied that he was 

very satisfied with the job he had been given and 

his relationship with the Comptroller General. 

Proud of GAO. both as a place to work and as 

94 

an American institution. Keller was quoted by 

the GAO Watchdog on his retirement as saying: 

I've told many, many people that as an 

institution, GAO is tops. I think the people 

here are a great group to work with. We 

have our differences, but it's up to us to 

keep working them out. I think GAO is very 

important to government itself and to the 

public. We 've come quite for. particularly 

under Mr. Staats' tenure. and now we've 

got to keep going and keep it up. It's going 

to take a lot of dedication from a lot of 

people· 

Consultants Panels 

GAO had long used various sources of out· side advice and counsel. and the agency ex· tended this practice during the 1966-S1 period. As discussed elsewhere, the Office began using 

individual consultants extenSively in the late 

1960's. especially for help in doing its more com· plex work, such as the antipoverty program reo 

view. (See ch. 3.) Added to this cadre of exper· tise were two panels established to work directly 

with the Comptroller General and GAO's top 

management-the Comptroller General's Can· sultant Panel and the Educator Consultant Panel. 

Both panels were useful sources of outside ad· vice and support for many of the Office's initio 

atives, regarding both its work and its organi· zation and staffing. 

COMPTROllER GENERAL'S CONSVLTANT 

PANEL 

In July 1966. barely 4 months into his term, 

Staats and other senior management officials 

met to discuss the future work of the Accounting 

and Auditing Policy Staff, the group led by Ells· worth Morse that developed and maintained 

GAO's policies and basic operating methods. 

They agreed to form a panel of outside can· sultants that could, from time to time, discuss 

problem areas with GAO's senior management. 

The panel was to include representatives of 

Government, the accounting profession. private 

industry, and higher education. Nearly everyone 

invited to serve accepted. The first 2-day meet- ing, held in December. covered such subjects as: 

• The increased workload in transportation 

audits caused by the escalating war in 

Vietnam. 

• GAO's interest in the Government's policy 

on procuring goods and services from pri· vate industry versus providing them in· house. 

• A joint Budget-Treasury-GAO project to 

provide more detailed information on Fed· 

eral outlays by geographic area. 
These subjects were important to various 

Government operations and were on GAO's 

agenda. Both GAO and the consultants found 

the meetings to be useful, and they continued 

on a twice-yearly schedule throughout Staats' 

tenure. By the end of the term. the panel memo 

bership had expanded to 29 and the range of 

issues had broadened to include such items as 

(1) possible enactiment of a value·added tax 

(with discussion led by the Chairman of the 

House Ways and Means Committee ) and (2 ) 

issues related to U.S. technological innovation. 

The panel thus provided a source of expertise 

on many subjects for possible consideration in 

GAO's audit work and a sounding board for new 

ideas on how this work might be done. 

EDUCATOR CONSULTANT PANEL 

The Educator Consultant Panel was formed 

in 1955 to obtain support from profeSSional ac· counting and academic groups for GAO's con· version to a professional-accountant-based organization. The panel assisted materially in 

developing the audit staff, first by recommending 

that GAO employ a skilled academician to design 

and manage a staff acquisition and development 

program and then by helping GAO promote a 

wider understanding of its work in the academic 

community. The panel also served as a link to 

the campuses that aided in recruiting a qualified 

professional staff. 

In 1966, the panel consisted of nine members 

drawn from traditional academic accounting 

backgrounds and it played a less active role in 

GAO affairs than when first formed. In 1970 

Ellsworth Morse, then Director, Office of Policy 

and Special Studies, reassessed the panel's ac· 

tivities. suggested that its membership be broadened. and recommended that its agenda be wid· ened to cover the broader based program 

effectiveness focus then in the forefront of GAO's 

activities. New members appointed in the 1970's 

included public administrators. health care 

professionals, scientists, and psychologists. In 

1980, the panel had four official functions: 

• To act as a liaison between the academic 

community and GAO. • To provide advice on specific subject areas. 

• To serve as an official nongovernmental 

sounding board for GAO work. 

• To serve as a source of "resource persons" 

for GAO staff and the Comptroller General.' 

The panel's 2-day meetings, which follow a 

format not unlike that of the Comptroller Gen- eral's Consultant Panel, are attuned more to in- ternal management issues, such as matching reo 

search needs and researchers and GAO's 

communications strategy. Recently, the panel 

helped GAO to establish a doctoral research pro- gram and to examine the adequacy of the Of· fice's research methodologies. (See ch. 11.) 

Besides providing outside advice at periodic 

meetings, both of the panels serve as outlets to 

communities from which their members are 

drawn and as sources of expertise to meet other 

needs. Their continued utility will depend on top 

management's support in restocking the panels 

with high·quality members as vacancies occur, 

EDUCATOR CONSULTANT PAND,meeting wilh GAO offidals in 1967 

95 
and in devoting the time and attention to interact 

with the panels and benefit from their advice. 

GAO's Divisions And Offices 

Although GAO's divisions and offices changed 

in scope and composition during the 1966-81 

term, they retained (with a few notable excep- tions) many of the traits of their predecessors. As noted in other chapters, GAO's divisions in 

1980 were more functionalized and there was 

greater emphasis on planning. Personnel and 

administrative functions also were more decen- tralized. However. the management hierarchy. 

the organizational climate, and the management 

processes existing in 1966 largely endured. To 

improve the climate for making and carrying out 

decisions, some techniques. such as organiza- tional development. were instituted. But the 

process of change within divisions has depended 

largely on the personalities and goals of the per- sons occupying key positions. 

THE GROWTH IN BUREAUCRACY 

In his book on GAO, Mosher described GAO 

as "essentially an administrative organization 

•• * [that] probably approaches the Weber- ian model of a bureaucracy as closely as most 

other administrative agencies ~ 

What was this Weberian model? According 

to one source. Max Weber's definition of "bu- reaucracy" included (I) a division of labor in 

which each job is clearly defined and filled by a 

technically qualified person. (2) a well-estab- lished hierarchy having clear lines of authOrity 

and appropriate staffs and salaries for those at 

each level. and (3) a systematic set of aims and 

regulations so that actions can be impersonal and 

coordinated. II 

In many respects. GAO met all these criteria. Organization charts and operating manuals of 

GAO divisions showed a carefully defined divi- sion of duties among the various grade levels 

and clear departmental and subject-area juris- dictions. The duties varied somewhat from di- vision to division. but in nearly all cases they 

were carefully spelled out. Great care was taken 

to ensure. insofar as possible. that a qualified 

person filled each slot. Staff positions and salaries 

were. of course, defined both formally and 

informally. 

GAO also had a well-established hierarchy. Most divisions provided severa) layers of supervision and review between the auditors and the 

division director. Some divisions also had staff 

positions, such as issue area planning director. 

resource manager. legislative and special projects 

coordinator, and program and report reviewer. In addition. the region office management structure included staff assistants. assistant regional 

managers. and regional managers. The several levels of supervision and review 

were justified. at least in some cases. to ensure 

that GAO's output met high standards for ac96 

curacy, objectivity, and faimess-attributes of 

great importance to the Office. At the same time, 

the pyramidal structure was less flexible and 

adaptable than many judged desirable. Devel- opments outside the agency, expansion in staff, 

and the larger number of functions the agency 

performed brought with them more sophisticated 

control systems and procedures. The growth of 

such systems. combined with organizational lay- ering, sometimes constrained individual initia- tive. diversity. innovativeness. and-perhaps 

most importantiy-a willingness to take the risks 

necessary to progress. 

Personal management styles also affected the 

way GAO did its work. The Civil Division. 

headed by A. T. Samuelson when Staats entered 

office. was quite different from the Defense Di- vision directed by William E. Newman. Samu- elson. for example, stressed finding good people 

and allOwing them to take the initiative in planning and executing the work. He relied on a 

decentralized audit staff to make the contribution 

the Comptroller General expected of him. Newman also wanted good people. but he stressed 

a more centralized. production-minded organization under his strong personal control. Ten 

years later. Gregory Ahart's Human Resources 

Division. characterized by peer reviews. many 

audit sites. and a thorough approach to review- ing programs. contrasted in many ways with 

Monte Canfield's Energy and Minerals Division. 

whose staff was split between headquarters and 

audit sites and whose work focused extensively 

on energy planning and policy issues. including 

proposed draft legislation. 

Management on the division level could be 

very complicated. Most division directors were 

chosen on the basis of many years' experience 

in GAO and a strong background in the assigned 

subject areas. Some knew more about spotting' 

weaknesses in other agencies' management than 

the requirements of managing organizations of 

their own. Coupled with this was GAO's tend- ency to introduce new systems and procedures 

to correct problems or extend GAO's capabilities: 

for example, the planning process, competitive 

selection, a structured equal employment op- portunity program, and a job scheduling and 

staffing system. There was also a tendency to 

assign difficult management functions to com- mittees, rather than to specific individuals: for 

example, the Budget Committee. the Program 

Planning Committee, and the Assignment Re- view Group. Getting things done often required 

working through a bureaucratic maze. 

The organization nevertheless owed many of 

its strengths to its bureaucracy and the people 

who ran it. The work usually got done when it 

was needed, and the products-if not of uni- formly high quality-were rarely inferior and al- most always thorough and credible. The system's very stability provided great continuity and 

an extensive corporate memory. There was a 
Figure 7-1 

Sample Headquarters Division Organization Chart 

DIRECTOR 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR STAFF ASSISTANCE 

Division Liaison 

Congressional Affairs 

Special Projects 

EDITORIAL Program Support and 

SERVICES Evaluation 

I 

I I I 

Budgeting Management Personnel and 

Reporting Information 

ASSOCIATE ASSOCIATE ASSOCIATE ASSOCIATE 

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR 

Technical Direction Planning Issue Area Coord",r. Issue Area Ping Dir. 

Coordinator Sr. Group Director Core Group 

Sr Group Directors Sr. Group Director Sr Group Directors 

Group Directors Group Directors Group DIrectors Group D Irectors 

Professional Staff Professional Staff Professional Staff Professional Staff 

Support Staff Support Staff Support Staff Support Staff 

Figure 7-2 

Sample Regional Office Basic Organizational Structure 

• Regional Manager 

I 

Auditors-m·charge Manzsgement I 

Two Suboffices 

Council COMMITTEES 

Awards 

I I I EEO 

Professional EEO AdminIStrative I FWP Development Counse lors Officer Coordinator HEP 

I I 

Staff Advisory 

CORE GROUP CORE GROUP CORE GROUP 

Assistant Regional Assistant Regional Assistant Regional 

Manager Manager Manager 

I I I 

Staff Manager Staff Manager Staff Manager 

97 
certain esprit de corps in many divisions and 

offices, and the people took pride in their 

accomplishments. Coping with bureaucratic tendencies in government is a centuries-old worldwide problem 

for which there are no easy answers. What matters to GAO is that its administrative processes 

and structures be continuously monitored to 

minimize their interference with getting the work 

done and to ensure that they continue to serve 

a purpose sufficiently useful to merit their retention. 

GAO ADOPTS ORGANIZATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT AND PAIl11CJPATlVE 

MANAGEMENT 

The decade of the 1970's saw the increasing 

development and acceptance of a new branch 

of behavioral science-organizational development Its general goal was to improve an organization's productivity and quality of worklife by 

helping work groups and organizational units at 

aU levels to identify and resolve issues hindering 

effectiveness. 

GAO took early advantage of this development when, in January 1972, it contracted with 

Sterling Institute 10 evaluate the management 

practices and organizational climate at headquarters and the field offices. Following a 6- month survey of five management groups, the 

Institute found that management practices in the 

groups varied and resulted in "different organizational climates and performance." In its July 

1972 report, the Institute recommended an ambitious followup program that included (1) more 

systematic analysis to identify opportunities for 

redUcing unnecessary conformity and (2) development of a program to help managers delegale 

more responsibility. 10 The report was not enthusiastically received, however. and no further 

work was scheduled. 

GAO's OryanlzatJona/ Deoe /opment 

Effort Gets Unde rway 

The lack of enthusiasm for this initial work did 

not lessen management's awareness, especially 

among such officials as Clerio Pin and Tom Morris, of the need to improve GAO's work climate. 

In 1973 Pin's Office of Administrative Planning 

and Services (OAPS) quietly launched a small 

project to develop a supervisory training course 

for its own staff. Two GAO employees were assigned to develop and present the course, and 

OAPS also hired Larry W. Hillman, an organizational development expert. 

Starting with the Management Services Branch 

in OAPS, and with the cooperation of the Office 

of Personnel, a program began that was eventually to touch most GAO operating divisions and 

many of its regional offices. The first training activities consisted of informal interaction among 

small groups who worked together to solve prob98 

lems associated with their work. Often, It was the 

first time they had interacted this way. As HUlman 

explained it 

In uery fundamental terms, I'm taking 

an issue and resoluing it, deueloping a cooperatiue relationship among the participants as they resolue those issues, relationships that were not centered around "What s wrong with him or what's wrong 

with me," but centered around a task, a 

job to get done, a goal for that organization 

or primary work group. 

As management became aware that this process was having a positive impact on resolving 

organizational issues, GAO contacted Rensis likert, a noted theoretician in management and 

group behavior, to determine if there were ways 

of broadening the process' s application. It was 

agreed that Rensis Likert Associates, Inc" would 

make a pilot survey in the International Division 

and then develop an action program. The survey, which took place in the spring of 1974, 

found "considerable opportunity for improvement in organizational climate and style of managerial leadership." 

In August 1974, GAO entered into a formal 

contract with Likert Associates to undertake an 

organizational improvement program consisting 

of 

• a survey, using a questionnnaire, of the International Division staff to identify specific 

areas where managers would improve their 

leadership styles; 

• a 2-day management training session for 

the top management group: and 

• " survey feedback consultation," including 

consultation with each supervisor and his 

or her Immediate work group and " executive coaching" for those who wanted it 

The program's goals were to reduce harmful 

competition within and between operating groups, 

increase the work groups' effectiveness and performance, increase employee satisfaction, and 

reduce turnover of highly rated personnel. Another goal was to develop an internal staff to 

extend the program into other parts of GAO. 

This was the first highly visible large-scale 

organizational development effort in GAO. Although there were some reservations among the 

participating staff, the program was completed 

pretty much as planned. At the end of 1 year, 

Likert Associates resurveyed the division personnel to determine if organizational change had 

occurred. In November 1975, the division reported that " moderate, and statistically signifi- cant change had occurred. 0 0 0" 

Opinions differed about the benefits of the 

program. The International Division reported 
officially that "It is difficult to asseSs the impact 

of this program on ID productivity at this time 

due to the lack of productivity and performance 

measurement data."" Nevertheless, there was 

a perception that changes had occurred to create 

the type of climate that would improve 

productivity. The next step was to prepare an organizational development model-a blueprint for con- ducting these activities in other GAO units. By 

then, GAO had its own small organizational de- velopment staff whose capabilities were growing. 

The model, drafted by Dr. Hillman. and further 

developed by GAO's internal staff. provided the 

structure for their growing in-house activities 

which continued through the end of the Staats 

term. 

In March 1976. GAO contracted with Likert 

Associates for its last major effort--an organi- zational development program in the Commu- nity and Economic Development Division (CED). CEO's management and staff were very recep- tive and therefore created a climate for making 

significant progress. As the program progressed, the division began holding more frequent meet- ings at all levels to convey more information and 

involve more of the staff in the decisionmaking 

process. Minutes of weekly meetings between 

the division director and his operating group di- rectors began circulating to all CEO staff and 

served as an important communication link. 

Perhaps most significantly. CEO established 

six in-house task forces to address problems that 

surfaced in staff discussions. The task forces, 

which represented several grade levels and audit 

sites, dealt with such subjects as productivity and 

performance measurement. Washington-field 

Problem Solving 

relations. and report processing. They would investigate a problem, develop and agree on pro- posed solutions. and prepare a written report to 

the CEO director. As with GAO's external re- ports, management reviewed and commented 

on the draft. and their response to the task force's 

recommendations was incorporated In the final 

report. More importantly. CEO management 

acted on the recommendations and helped to 

establish a process that enabled staff at all levels 

to participate in addressing management problems and effecting change in organizational policy and procedures. The CEO project continued for about 2 years. 

Near the close of that period, CED's director 

reported: 

There is a consensus that CED has benefited from the [Likert[ effort. Not only has 

top management become more aware of 

staff concerns. but we feel we haue been 

able to solue a number of problems and 

alleuiate concems. There is a much greater 

openness on the part of staffs in discussions 

with their supervisors. 12 

DI~lslon Directors' Problem SoI~lngParticipative Management Reaches The 

Top Le~els 

As GAO's work became more complex and 

its relationships with the Congress grew, it became more apparent that top management 

needed to approach issues confronting the agency 

in a more collective fashion. GAO needed better 

communications, sometimes bridging different 

professional disciplines, and an atmosphere where 

creativity and the free exchange of ideas could 

flourish. 

The three component.<; 0/ an ef/ectiue decision are: timeliness. acceptance by those who 

will implement it. and the quality 0/ the decision itself. According to the theory. if satisfaction 

is the product of inuoluement. and quality the product of wisdom. the use 0/ a group method 

of decision making is likely to assure an effectiue decision. 

Formal problem soluing is a group method for resoluing conflict and improuing decisionmaking in organizations. It assumes that there is an agreement on organizational goals. It 

further assumes that there is an agreement on the problem and that it needs to be solued_ The generation of alternatiues that will attain the goal and minimize conflict is the focus of the 

problem soluing. Elements of the method inuolue: 

• The location and clear statement of the problem. 

• The definition of the conditions or criteria which a solution must meet to be satisfactory. 

• Search for and statement of reasonably promising solutions. • The conection of all facts releuant to the proposed solutions. • The eualuation of all suggested solutions and the examination of them in terms of the 

criteria or conditions which a solution must meet (essentials) and also those which are 

considered desirable (desirables). 

• The selection of the solution which best meet.<; the criteria. • The eualuation of the solution finally selected to see if it really solues the problem and 

does not produce aduerse side effect.<;. 

99 
However, internal issues and old habits blocked 

communication. Managers preoccupied with delivering the product, exercising control. and 

meeting others' demands were unaccustomed 

to communicating freely with each other. In addition. a growing distance had developed be· 

tween the policy directives of the Comptroller 

General and his top staff and the line managers 

of the operating units. After GAO's 1972 reor· 

ganization, turf problems between the divisions 

increased and jurisdictional lines were sometimes 

unclear. The division directors began meeting 

informally once a month to exchange informa· 

tion and discuss problems of mutual interest. But 

GAO still had no effective forum for exchanging 

ideas. bringing divergent views into focus. and 

resolving conflicts. 

Sometime in 1975. someone suggested that 

the directors spend 2 days at a location away, 

from headquarters 10 "thrash some things out ' 

A tentative agenda was drawn up. but after some 

rethinking. the proposed meeting was restructured to bring in the Comptroller General and 

other top officials. The meeting prOvided an opportunity for an exchange of views on many subjects. but its formality and the prevailing lack of 

trust posed barriers to real communication. 

Following this meeting. there were further 

discussions of how to encourage greater dialog. 

Shortly thereafter. it was decided that GAO's top 

management should increase their direct involvement in organizational development activo 

ities by applying problem·solving techniques to 

issues having GAO-wide Significance. The goal 

was to increase cooperation between the division 

directors and encourage innovative approaches 

to solving problems. 

In JUly 1976. a division directors meeting was 

convened to try out the new approach. The initial 

effort focused on the general subject of support 

from the staff offices which C1erio Pin managedU 

Although the division directors and Compo 

troller General Staats had met many times pre· 

viously. using many different forums. this was 

the first opportunity to freely present and discuss 

problems with a given segment of GAO operations. Likert Associates' president led the discussion, and Drs. Likert and Hillman participated. But the meeting accomplished little to 

focus the problems or propose workable solutions. Hillman put it another way: 

It was a catastrophe! Clerio said. "Let's 

talk about what's wrong and what your problems with me might be." Well. they' 

said. "Since you brought that up ' • • . 

And so they just took a great big stick and 

beat up on Clerio. 

Pin received only a verbal bludgeoning. but 

the result was not what the sponsors were looking for. In discussions that followed the meeting. 

100 

it was agreed that the next problem to be addressed should be well thought out in advance. 

The division directors agreed that the next issue 

for discussion would be a less complex internal 

management issue-how refreshments following 

division awards ceremonies could be financed. 

The division directors had been barred from us· 

ing money in GAO's operating budget to cover 

these costs and they paid for them out of their 

own pockets. This issue became known fondly as 

the " punch and cookies" issue. The thought was 

that the group should learn to walk before it 

could run. 

The exercise was a success. At a preliminary 

seSSion, the directors appointed a task force to 

define the problem, gather information, and propose alternative solutions. Then the directors met 

with Staats. agreed on a solution. and solved the 

problem I The fact that they were dealing with 

"punch and cookies' was only incidental to the 

larger event: the division directors had been able 

to work together. using problem-solving tech· 

niques, to resolve a problem of common interest 

Hillman characterized it as "one small step for 

this group but a big leap for GAO," 

With this first success under its belt. the group 

tackled somewhat more substantive issues. Staats 

actively participated in these meetings as chair· 

man. and Hillman assumed the role of facilitator. 

Hillman's job was to lead the group through the 

problem·solving process. make sure that each 

participant's views were heard. and help the 

group arrive at a consensus on the solution. 

Then in April 1977. after having been in existence for only 9 months. the group took on a 

problem of far larger scope than any previously 

addressed-why GAO had trouble responding 

to congressional requests in time for the information to be useful. Thus. the process was 

started that led to use of the team concept. a 

basic restructuring of the way GAO did its work. 

(See ch. 11.) At the time. Hillman and Likert 

both cautioned the group about its readiness to 

deal with such a substantial issue. suggesting in· 

stead that it identify and resolve issues of lesser 

magnitude and thereby develop the skills needed 

to take on broader issues. The group went 

ahead. nevertheless. 

Following some preliminary discussions. the 

directors' group. including Staats and other top 

management officials. met for 2 days in June 

1977 at Easton. Md. There the problem was 

redefined: "The processes. procedures. and approaches currenrly used by GAO in doing its 

work take too long and cost too much." " The 

group defined the essential conditions for the 

solution. proposed alternate solutions in five key 

categories (job planning. execution. review. 

agency comments, and other). and appointed 

a task force to develop a final plan. (See ch. 11.) 

Some thought that tackling the timeliness and 

cost issues was too big a leap at this stage of the 

• 
problem-solving process. As one of the participants put it: 

GAO was ready to tackle the timeliness 

issue but the process got in the way. We 

got too wrapped up in defining essential 

conditions and not enough inuolued in get 4 

ting feedback from the people who would 

haue to liue with the change. 

With the timeliness and cost issues in the 

hands of a task force. the directors group re- turned to more mundane problems. Although 

the participants were encouraged by the progress 

they were making in resolving problems. they 

found the process of reaching consensus took a 

lot of their time. Of course. the one most pressed 

for time was the Comptroller General. and he 

gradually stopped attending many of the sessions. As he did. the key task of group chainnan 

went by default to Hillman. Although. in the following months. other senior management officials started playing more 

active roles in the discussions. the group began 

to experience problems. Some members be- came increasingly uncomfortable with the 

vagueness of the group's mission and with the 

process itself. especially the requirement that a 

consensus be achieved on each problem resolution. Finally. in February 1980. the process 

collapsed. In some of the directors judgment. 

the process was not worth continuing unless the 

group could become more self-directing and 

more focused on issues. Not all of the participants 

agreed. however. One said: 

None of them offered me. and to my 

knowledge any of the other diuision direc- tors. a reason why they stopped partici- pating. As for as I am concemed they 

should not have withdrawn from the meetings. Instead. they should haue taken the 

initiatiue and tried to get the meetings fo- cused the way they needed to be focused 

to solue our problems. It also demonstrated 

uerY clearly to me that the directors needed 

cohesiue leadership and a willingness to 

put forth the necessarY effort and at/ention 

to resolue the problems. 

Shortly thereafter. the division directors met 

and proposed a new method of operation. They 

drafted a charter. developed an agenda. appointed a temporary chainnan (Gregory Ahart). 

and discussed their proposal with top management officials and Hillman. Ahart and others then 

met with Staats and obtained his approval of the 

charter. The group was to discuss matters of 

common concern. study ways to deal with or 

solve policy or operating problems. communi- cate the results to the Comptroller General to 

help him reach decisions on these problems. and 

monitor implementation to see that problems 

were dealt with promptly and effectively. 15 

It was agreed that. although the group had 

decided against using an outside facilitator. it 

would call for such assistance whenever needed. The group also decided that the chainnanship 

would rotate among them in alphabetical order. 

each serving a 6-month period. with Ahart thus 

becoming the first chairman. 

The group's first few months under its new 

charter were some of the most eventful in its 

existence. Just as it was getting started. major 

management problems surfac\!d in implement- ing the team concept. They were first brought 

to Staats' attention by the regional managers 

because of the impact teams was having on the 

regional offices. (See ch. 14.) In May 1980, the 

Comptroller General sent the division directors 

a list of 25 questions and issues. as well as a 

number of suggested solutions. and requested 

that the directors' group present its recommen- dations for action 4 weeks later. Following an 

intense series of discussions. the group devel- oped tentative recommendations that touched 

on almost every aspect of GAO's operation,;-

the role of the regional offices. the project team 

approach. program planning and the develop- ment of subject matter knowledge. job sched- uling and staffing. and the competitive selection 

process and perfonnance evaluation. The only 

options not considered were major changes in 

organization. 1b 

Staats approved the directors recommen- dations and requested that they prepare imple- mentation documents by August IS. In a key 

departure from the strategy pursued in devel- oping the team concept, Staats also requested 

that the group "solicit and consider the views of 

a broad spectrum of organizational components 

and strata in developing the [requested] docu- ments. * ,. *" 

After receiving comments, the directors met 

in subgroups and then drafted an overall set of 

recommendations which were presented to the 

Comptroller General in a September 1980 mem- orandum. The most telling statement in the 

memo was that the directors could not reach 

agreement on a single method of operation for 

all divisions. Not having been able to develop 

a common plan. they agreed to disagree. As the 

memo explained: 

Each Director feels strongly about how 

they should corry out their responsibilities. 

While there are many similarities in the way 

each operates or wants to operate there is 

enough difference that adherence to a single method of operating would require 

each Director to operate differently than 

they feel is best to accomplish their mission. We also realized that it would not be necessarY to operate under a single method 

101 
to either resolve the problems or accom- plish our mission. 17 

The directors asked that the focus of GAO's 

operations change from a process to a results 

orientation and recommended that each division 

adhere to a set of "basic management philoso- phies" in accomplishing its mission. Each division 

was to develop allan to operate under the phi- losophies outline . The team concept was to be 

discontinued as the way GAO did its work. and 

each future job was to have its own agreed-upon 

management structure. Although implementing 

documents legitimizing the Field Operations Di- vision's role were postponed pending resolution 

of other issues. the directors recommended specific actions on regional participation in program 

planning and changes in job scheduling. They 

said the other matters affecting personnel re- quired further study and action by other groups. 

In a memo issued 3 days later. Staats com- municated modifications to GAO's' operatin~ 

procedures that generally endorsed the directors 

recommendations. In the process, he recognized 

the group's " significant contribution" but dissolved it as a formally organized entity. " He later 

explained his rather terse announcement this 

way: 

This may have been a useful effort to 

break down the walls limiting communication. but the basic idea of trying to get 

the division di""ctOTS-<l1l of the~o agree 

on these things ran rather counter to what 

they said in the first part of their document. 

Each was to come up with their own plan. and we are to look at it to see whether it 

is realistic in this organization. A second. 

related malter was that it ate up an awful 

amount of time on the part of the division 

directors. I just felt that something more flexible 

would be belter. If any of them feel that 

102 

they need a meeting. I said I or one of the 

Assistant Comptrollers General would be 

glad to meet with them. But to structure 

periodic meetings having a formal agenda. 

formal minutes-I just didn t think that was 

the right way to go. 

So the directors' group ended, but the prob- lem solving techniques remained on call for use 

as needed by top management 

1 31 U.SC 41 we 301 (19211. 8udge1 IIInd Accounting ACl. 1921 

2 PttllT F Druckur. MIl1lOgmleru rltSb. RetpOMJlbr/llles. Pnrrlcu (New York. Harplf & Row, 19731. p 616 

3 Comptrolkrr ~I StaalS "FedtTlIIl Spendng Controls. The Role of 

the Comet,.. Accounl1ng Office:' spMCh of 24 ~ 1968. pp 20 21 

4 31 U S.C 42. Me 302 (19211. Budget end Accoundng Act 

S Cindy Ryan. "An Int~ IOoilh thto Man Bdllnd Ihe Scmes. M T~ G40 

RiMrw. (S!.immer 19791. p 35 

6 "K6!lIl1T Era End, ill GAO:' The G40 Watchdog. MAr 1980. p 5 

7 US General Aa:ou.nlif!g ()ftIa '''1lw Educ.oIOf AdviIory Committee of 

,0. U,S C4nw1lli Accoundng ." Uf'4IUbII,hed pillpel' pp ~6 

8 Fredm:kC MoIIwf, 1M GAO' TheQuat/orAttountabUlrllinAmencon Gouotm~nl ,Boulder Colo Westvk!w Pres.. 1919). p J43 

9 William H N-man and E. Kirby WIltnm, The Proceu Qj Manogcmem ConnpG 1kh<wIot, artd Proaict' !Engh!wood CDfb. NJ Prenlke HbH 19m, 

• 3 

10 S~ Insutul~ "Final Rapon 10 !he Gmer-'Aaountlng OffIce, Contr..a No GA 789' lJuly 24 19721. P I 2 

II DirectOf. International DIvision. Ml!mOl1lndUm to all dloAsIon penorlnel. 

19 Dec 1975. p 4 

12 Director. Community and EconomK Development DMsion. Mernoron dum 10 Dlrvctor, M"'"agltmllnl Services, 10 Apr 1978. p I 

,C) ~i Comptlolkn Ccnl.'ral SWlIS. MernOl1lndurn 10 division dlrvctOl'l. IS July 

It! Execullve SecrllUlty, Director's Conference. MtmOrandurn 10 conlerence anendea, ZOJune 1977. anachmanl 2. 

IS DINc1or. Human !WlOurca OMsIon. MolTTIOfbndurn 10 division dtnoClors, II Apr 1980, all.achmenl 

16 Chairman, 0Msi0n Oirvaor. Group. Memor",ndum 10 COfTl9IJ'OlIer Gen ,"~d. 2 Ju~ 1980 

17 Chairman. [)Ivt,Ion OIrOlClor. Group. Memorllndum to Com~ Gen tral. 9 Sept 1980 

18 Compr:roIk!f Genmil SLIIIIQ;, M.rmorMdum to on GAO proleWonal _ff 12 s.,x. 19&1_ p 2 

CClJuffijJ)l1@lS ~ 

The Legislative Charter "What are we in business for?" This is a ques- tion countless corporate executives and stock- holders ask when considering new investments 

and reviewing corporate budgets. The question 

is just as relevant to a Government agency and 

therefore to the General Accounting Office. To discover what GAO's "business' is. one 

must look at its legislative charter, the basic laws 

that authorize the agency's activities. For GAO, 

these laws include the Budget and Accounting 

Act, 1921, and the Accounting and Auditing Act 

of 1950. During the 1966-81 period. these laws 

were supplemented by the Legislative Reorgan- ization Act of 1970, the Congressional Budget 

and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. and the 

General Accounting Office Acts of 1974 and 

1980. This is the basic body of laws that guides 

GAO's course. 

This chapter summarizes how the Congress, with GAO's help, modernized and strengthened 

GAO's legislative charter during the period. It 

highlights briefly how GAO influenced the most 

important of these laws and provides examples 

of how the Office was given special aSSignments 

the Congress believed only GAO could perform 

effectively. Oddly. this charter-strengthening task 

is one of the least reported events in GAO's day- to-day activities, Except for general legislation. 

such as the Congressional Budget and Impound- ment Control Act. bills affecting GAO rarely get 

much coverage in the general press or even in 

GAO's own publications. The discussion here is 

designed to shed some light on the significance 

that this task holds for the health and well-being 

of the agency. 

The Legislative Reorganization 

Act Of 1970 

Excluding the legislation sponsored by GAO 

itself, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 

was one of the two or three most important laws 

affecting GAO that the Congress enacted during 

the past 15 years. The Office's involvement in 

drafting this law was crucial to GAO's future. Chapter 2 described how the act placed new 

requirements on GAO to assist in improving the 

flow of information to the Congress. The other 

significant feature of the act was contained in 

section 204 (al. which reads: 

The Comptroller General shall review 

and analyze the results of Government pro- grams and activities camed on under ex- isting law. including the making of cost benefit studies, when ordered by either House 

of Congress. or upon his own initiative. or 

104 

when requested by any committee of the 

House of Representatives or the Senate. 

or any joint committee of the two Houses, having jurisdiction over such programs and 

activities. I 

When this legislation was being considered 

in the late 1960's, GAO was already gaining experience and expertise in reviewing the results 

of existing Federal programs, (See, for example, the discussion of the Prouty amendment studies 

in ch. 3.) Indeed. although GAO supported this 

provision. it maintained both before and after 

the act became law that this language provided 

no new authority and that the Office could al- ready do such work under existing statute. Apart 

from being a reaffirmation of congressional intent 

that GAO review program effectiveness. the sig- nificance of section 204 lies in its Origins. 

As mentioned in chapter 2, the act was 5 

years in the making. FollOwing the final I JOrt 

of the Joint Committee on the Organizativ" of 

the Congress in 1966. legislation was introduced 

to carry out the Committee's 120 recommen- dations for congressional reorganization and re- form in such areas as the committee system, fis- cal controls, congreSSional staffing. ethics, 

housekeeping. and lobbying regulation. In 1967, 

by a 75-to-9 vote. the Senate passed a reform 

bill which focused on improving the information 

sources available to the Congress. GAO. for ex- ample. was to develop-jointly with the Treasury 

Department and the then Bureau of the Budgeta standardized information and data processing 

system. GAO followed these proceedings closely 

and worked with Senate staffers to perfect lan- guage affecting the Office. The Senate bill contained no language requiring GAO to make program results reviews; 

it would have required only that GAO employ 

experts in analyzing and conducting cost effectiveness studies of Government programs. The 

bill also would have increased committee staff 

and created a separate Legislative Research Service in the library of Congress. in part to assist 

committees and members in analyzing legislative 

proposals. 2 

The House of Representatives took no action 

on the bill. so it died at the end of the 91st 

Congress. However. strong interest continued in 

reforming and modernizing the Congress. and 

similar legislation was introduced in both Houses 

in early 1969. Responding to pressure for action 

on this legislation. the House Rules Committee 

appointed a special subcommittee in April 1969 

to consider the many reorganization bills and 

make its own recommendations. 
This subcommit1ee. chaired by Congressman 

B. F. Sisk of California. did not follow the usual 

procedure of holding hearings and then redraft· 

ing a bill. A massive record had already been 

developed by the Senate and by the former Joint 

Committee on Congressional Organization. Instead. the subcommittee met in closed session 

to compare similar provisions in the bills that had 

been introduced, study their intent. and develop 

its own bill. J This bill eventually became the foundation of the legislation enacted into law. 

Although GAO had followed these activities 

closely. it had no way of knowing what the special subcommittee's bill would contain until its 

chairman gave the House a public progress report in August 1969. Even that report gave little 

detail on the bill because the subcommittee's 

work was not yet completed. GAO's legislative 

liaison office contacted one of Sisk's staff aides 

for further information. and the Comptroller 

General wrote personally to the Chairman requesting a meeting to discuss GAO's future and 

how it could provide more assistance to the 

Congress.' 

Eight weeks later. Staats met with Sisk and 

two other Congressmen to discuss the section 

of the subcommittee's preliminary draft that pertained to GAO. During the meeting. the Comptroller General was asked for his reaction to language establishing a Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) that would report to a proposed 

Joint Committee on the library and Congressional Research. Among other things. CRS 

would have been authorized. when requested 

by a congressional committee. to analyze programs being carried out under existing law. Further, CRS would have had authority to request 

Federal agencies to supply relevant " books. records. correspondence. memorandum [sic). papers. and documents." and the agencies would 

have been required to comply.' Staats pointed 

out that this language would give CRS authority 

similar to that already vested in GAO and that 

CRS analyses of existing Federal programs 

would substantially duplicate GAO' s wo rk . 

Chairman Sisk was receptive to these assertions. 

FollOwing the meeting. GAO staff reviewed 

the language more carefully and, at Sisk' 5 suggestion, developed more detailed comments and 

suggestions on redrafting the language to avoid 

this duplication. A week after the meeting. in an 

October 20. 1969. letter Staats provided GAO's 

suggestions to the Chairman. The letter detailed 

GAO's efforts to increase its capability to assist 

the Congress and noted that GAO already had 

authority to review existing Government programs. Staats also emphasized that GAO had no 

objection to most responsibilities proposed for 

CRS to assist committees on proposed legislation 

and other legislative duties. but he suggested that 

the provisions duplicating GAO's work be dropped 

from the CRS charter.· Except for minor revisions. the draft language provided by GAO became section 204 of the Legislative Reorganization Act. 

Without the exchange that occurred. CRS 

likely would have ended up with a statutory responsibility to review existing Federal programs. 

This woufd have created a confUSing and uncomfortable situation for the Congress, the two 

support agencies (GAO and CRS). and the Federal agencies being reviewed. Also. the act would 

not have contained any language providing for 

GAO program reviews. only the language requiring GAO to have experts in cost-benefit analysis. As it turned out, the House Rules Committee. in its report on the legislation. provided 

a clear and workable distinction between the 

basic responsibilities of the two agencies. 

It is the intent of the bill that the principle 

supplementary staff for assistance to committees in their analysis of existing agencies 

and adivities shall be supplied by the General Accounting Office. But the complexity 

of committee responsibilities requires an -

other supplementary staff to provide mas- sive aid in policy analysis. For this purpose 

we propose that Congress expand the 

fundions and facilities of the Legislative 

Reference Service in the Library of 

Congress.' 

GAO Interests Encompass A 

Larger Sphere As The Congress 

Shaped A New Budget Process 

GAO's involvement in the Legislative Reorganization Act focused on provisions directly affecting the Office. Two years later, as the Congress responded to a growing awareness that the 

Federal budget. in total. was out of its control. 

the Comptroller General became involved in the 

larger questions of how to establish a new budget 

process and how it would work. Because GAO's 

charter makes the Office a key actor in financial 

management, its future would be greatly affected 

by budget reform legislation. Therefore, during 

the 18 months (January 1973 toJuJy 1974) that 

budget reform was actively being considered in 

the Congress. GAO was called on repeatedly for 

advice. 

Signed into law on July 12. 1974, the 

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act made several changes. First, it estab105 
lished a new process, overlaying existing authorization and appropriations procedures, for 

setting annual ceilings on total revenues and 

spending and the appropriate level of surplus or 

deficit. It created Budget Committees in each 

House and an independent Congressional Budget 

Office. It changed the fiscal year to begin on 

October 1 instead of July 1. Closer to home. it 

modified the structure for prOviding the Congress 

with program and budget information and 

strengthened GAO's program evaluation man - date, both subjects which had been covered in 

the Legislative Reorganization Act. Finally. it 

tightened congressional control of impound- ments through such means as reporting and enforcement by GAO.' 

Staats testified on this legislation several times 

before four committees. His first and perhaps 

most important. testimony occurred in March 

1973 before the Joint Study Committee on 

Budget Control. The Committee had been established 4 months earlier to find ways of dealing 

with the "disturbing fiscal situation faCing the 

nation." In a February 1973 interim report, the 

Committee concluded that "the legislative process should include an opportunity for the Congress to examine the budget from an overall 

point of view, together with a congressional system for deciding priorities. " and it preSCribed a 

set of general principles to establish the process." 

In his testimony before this Committee, Staats 

laid the foundation for the pOSitions GAO was 

to take throughout the congressional debate on 

this legislation. Because of his extensive background in Federal budgeting. the Comptroller 

General held strong views on the subject. Here 

is what he proposed and how the Congress 

responded. 

1. He expressed strong support of a congressional budget control mechanism. The Congress 

put one in place. 2. He suggested that the initial budget tar- get-the total revenue and expenditures the 

Congress could provide for a given year-be 

acted on by the entire Congress and that it not 

be an inflexible and rigid limitation. The budget 

act carried this out by specifying that two targets 

would be set by concurrent resolution (acted on 

by both Houses) and that the first target would 

not be binding on the Committees. 

3. He urged that the limitations apply to all 

congressional funding authorizations (not just 

those made through annual appropriations) and 

that the Congress resist efforts to remove Federal 

activities from the budget and thereby weaken 

congressional control. Although. the law exempted few programs from the budget process, 

the Congress resisted proposals to bring organizations like the Federal Financing Bank back 

within the budget. Instead, it settled on a re- quirement for continuous study of the provisions 

exempting Federal agencies from the President's 

budget. 

106 

4. Because of time pressures built into the 

existing budget procedures, Staats made two 

suggestions: first, that the executive branch submit an early analysis of uncontrollable or fixed 

costs and second, that the President provide an 

analysis of how the overall totals would be broken down by committees and subcommittees of 

jUrisdiction. The former was satisfied by a re- quirement (later abandoned) that the President 

submit a "current services budget" in November. The latter was not adopted. The Congress, 

wanting to keep questions of jurisdiction to itself, 

gave the job of dividing the totals among the 

committees to the conference committee acting 

on the budget resolution. 5. Staats supported the Joint Committee's 

proposal that a jOint staff be established to support the two Budget Committees. As he saw it, 

the staff could be augmented to handle seasonal 

workload peaks by assigning staff from GAO and 

CRS. This was a key proposal for GAO and one 

that the Congress rejected in favor of a separate 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). More about 

this follows. 

6. He urged that the Budget Committees hold 

public hearings on the budget. a proposal which 

was incorporated in the law and has become 

standard practice. 7. He suggested several alterna tives to give 

the Congress more time to act on the budget 

than the 5 months between January and July 

and to thus reduce or eliminate the need for 

Federal agencies to limp along under continuing 

resolutions for part of the fiscal year. One alternative he suggested, which the Congress adopted, 

was to begin the fiscal year on October 1 instead 

of July 1. which gave the Congress 3 more 

months to act on agency budgets. 8. Finally, Staats suggested that the Congress 

prepare a longer term funding outlook or pro- jection for future years based on actions taken 

during each session. The budget act requires 

CBO to prepare a 5-yea'r forecast near the beginning of each fiscal year. '0 

Thus. although the Congress ultimately en- acted many of the Comptroller General's suggestions, some hit the cutting-room floor. There 

is no way to show a cause-and-effect relationship 

for those that were enacted; indeed. Staats 

sometimes merely endorsed the Joint Committee's own proposals. The point is that the scope 

of his testimony went far beyond matters of direct 

interest to GAO. 

Staats' testimony did not ignore GAO, however. In addition to suggesting that GAO personnel be made available to a joint legislative 

budget staff, he made several specific suggestions on how GAO could assist the new budget 

process, including: 

• Preparing for each appropriations subcommittee analyses which would relate GAO's 

audit findings to budget areas where the 
subcommittees may wish to consider 

modifications. • Analyzing Federal agency budget 

justifications. 

• Responding to requests to obtain infor- mation on Federal programs and analyzing 

data for congressional committees. II 

He also highlighted GAO's interest in and responsibility for evaluating the effectiveness of 

Government programs and noted that others 

had made proposals to create "new agenCies in 

the Congress to assist in evaluating the results 

of Federal programs." In his testimony. he said: 

In discussing these proposals with Mem- bers of Congress and others, 1 frequently 

find that indiuiduals who make these pro- posals are unfamiliar with the extent to 

which the emphasis in the General Ac- counting Office on program evaluation 

type audits has increased. 12 

This leads back to the Comptroller General's 

support of a Joint staff for the Budget Committees 

instead of a separate CBO. Some have asserted 

that Staats wanted GAO to be the Congress' 

budget analyst. True, he continued to support 

a joint staff long after the Senate Government 

Operations Committee decided a separate office 

was needed, but his intent was to minimize the 

growth of congressional staff and make the best 

use of existing resources. In fact, Staats adhered 

to this position even in the face of suggesb" ... that the new budget office be placed in GAO, He made his position clear in a June 1973 letter 

to Senator Metcalf . 

While I personally fauor the recommen- dation of the Joint Study Committee on 

Budget Control for creation of a joint leg- islatioe staff to be supported by the General 

Accounting Office and Congressional Re- search Service, 1 support a strong congressional effort to analyze and control the 

budget and 1 will cooperate fully with any 

new organization designed to help accom- plish that purpose. 13 

Throughout congressional consideration of 

this legislation, GAO worked closely with the 

committees, especially in the Senate where the 

process was somewhat more open. The Senate 

Government Operations Committee even fur- nished copies of its draft bills, so GAO was able 

to provide its suggestions before the Senators 

voted on the bills, This procedure gave GAO a 

voice in settling such details as (1) deciding what 

resources it would have to furnish to CBO to 

help carry out the new Office's duties and (2) 

retaining GAO's role as the Congress' agent in 

standardizing and reporting fiscal and budgetary 

information. 

Generally, the budget act has matched and, in some ways, even exceeded its framers' expectations. The Budget Committees are a powTHE COMPTROLLER GENERAL TESTIFIES on the Budgel Control Act b"fore Senalors Robert P Griffin and H.obert 

C. Byrd lit a Senate Rules and Administration subcommittee hearing in 1974 

107 
erful new force on the Hill. However, the new 

budget process has been severely challenged. 

especially in recent years. and its long-tenn pros- pects are still uncertain. 

The GAO Acts Of 1974 And 

1980 

Important as the legislation discussed above 

was. the laws closest to the heart of GAO's 

charter were the General Accounting Office Acts 

of 1974 and 1980. These laws were supported 

or sponsored directly by GAO: they were the 

ones on which the Office invested the greatest 

amount of time and resources. Their many provisions dealt directly with problems affecting 

Office operations. 

The 1974 law contained several housekeep- ing provisions designed to make GAO operations 

and those of other Federal agencies more effi- cient. Its most significant title transferred the audit 

of transportation payments from GAO to the 

General Services Administration. This was the 

last of GAO's detailed voucher audit functions. 

and its transfer completed an outplacement proc- ess begun in 1950. 

The 1980 act contained other substantive 

provisions, two of which GAO had promoted for 

nearly a dozen years. It strengthened GAO's au - thority to enforce its statutory right of access to 

records at both Federal agencies (through liti- gation authority) and private contractors (through 

subpoena authority). Other provisions. such as 

the new procedure for appointing the Comp- troller General. did not originate in GAO but 

were generally consistent with pOSitions taken by 

Staats. The table (Figure 8-1) summarizes the 

provisions of both laws. 

RlBICOFF HEARINGS 

In 1967 Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced 

a bill to establish a Commission on Legislative 

Evaluation which would explore the best ways 

to set up an independent office of the Congress 

to do legislative evaluations. He proposed that 

the commission be chaired by the Comptroller 

General and that it furnish the Congress with its 

recommendations. No action was taken. The process leading to the two GAO acts had 

actually started in 1969 when hearings were held 

by Senator Ribicoff as Chainnan of the Government Operations subcommittee responsible for 

oversight of GAO. The hearings grew out of an 

agreement reached in the Senate on the military 

procurement authorization bill. In return for post- poning action on amendments calling for GAO 

studies of defense procurement activities. Sen- ator Ribicoff made a commitment to hold hear- ings on GAO's capability to analyze and audit 

defense expenditures. i4 

Actually, a much larger issue was involved: 

namely, whether GAO could provide the Con- gress with the kind of infonnation the executive 

branch could provide for itself and thus make 

108 

the two branches more equal. The hearings became an open forum for the Comptroller General to (1) inform the Congress about the programs he was instituting in GAO, (2) present his 

view of how GAO could better help the Congress, and (3) spell out what GAO needed to get 

its job done. His requests were relatively modest: 

subpoena power to better ensure access to defense contractors' records and an increased limit 

on the daily amount GAO could pay experts and 

consultants. FollOwing the hearings. there was 

general agreement that GAO's capabilities could 

best be strengthened through separate legislation 

to be sponsored by Senator Ribicoff. IS 

Over the next 13 months. GAO worked 

closely with the subcommittee staff to draft a 

mutually acceptable .bill containing seven titles. 

which in total would have had dramatic impact 

on GAO's authority and responsibilities: 

Title I-Assistance to the Congress. GAO would: 

• Review. analyze. and evaluate ongoing 

Federal programs. • Assign staff to committees to prepare cost- benefit analyses. 

• Analyze and review legislative proposals. 

• Provide status reports on major weapon 

systems, construction programs. and re- search and development programs. 

Title II-Office of the Comptroller General. 

• Change GAO's name to the Office of the 

Comptroller General. 

• Authorize two executive level IV positions in the Office of the Comptroller General. 

• Create the title of Deputy Comptroller 

General. 

Title IU-Audits of Government Corporations. 

• Authorize GAO to audit various corpora- tions at least once every 3 years instead of 

annually. 

Title N-Revision of Annual Audit Requirements. 

• Authorize GAO to audit various Federal 

funds and programs under the Accounting 

and Auditing Act of 1950 periodically. 

rather than annually. 

Title V-Employment of Experts and Consultants. 

• Authorize employment of experts and con- sultants at up to level II of the Executive 

Schedule. 

Title VI-Subpoena Power. 

• Authorize the Comptroller General to sign 

and issue subpoenas for contractor and 
Figure 8 -1 

GAO Legislation 

GENE.At ACCOUNTING OFFICE ACT OF I".: 

n de 

Title I-Statistical Sampling Procedures in 

the Examination of Vouchers 

Title II-Audit of Transportation Payments 

Title III-Audit of Nonappropriated Fund 

Activities 

Title IV-Employment of Experts and 

Consultants 

Title V-GAO Building 

Title VI-Audits of Govemment Corporations 

Title VII-Revisions of Annual Audit 

Requirements 

Title VII-Limitation of Time on Claims and 

Demands 

GENERAl. ACCOUNTING OFFICE ACT OF 19110: 

Title I-GAO Provisions 

Sec. 101-Unvouchered Expenditures 

Sec. I02-Enforcement of Access to 

Records 

Sec. lO3-Appointment of the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller 

General 

Title II-Conforming Amendments for Inspectors General 

Allows Federal agencies more flexibility in 

examining vouchers using statistical sampling methods 

Transfers audit of transportation vouchers 

from GAO to the General Services 

Administration 

Authorizes GAO audits of nonappropriated 

fund activities 

Authorizes maximum salary for experts and 

consultants employed by GAO and pemnits 

10 of them to be employed up to 3 years 

Entitles Comptroller General to use as much 

space as he deems necessary in the GAO 

Building 

Authorizes a reduction in the frequency of 

required repetitive audits of Government 

corporations and certain other entities 

Decreases from 10 years to 6 the amount 

of time a claim may be Hied with GAO 

Provides GAO limited authority to audit expenditures accounted for solefy on the approval or certification of the President or an 

agency official 

Provides the Comptroller General the authority to enforce GAO rights of access to 

Federal and non-Federal records 

Establishes a congressional commission to 

recommend individuals to the President for 

appointment to GAO's top two positions 

Amends the acts creating the Inspectors 

General in two cabinet departments to ensure their activities confomn to GAO audit 

standards 

109 
other non-Federal records to which GAO 

has access. 

Title VII-Enforce me nt of Decisio ns and 

Settlements. 

• Authorize the Comptroller General to institute civil actions in U.S. district court and 

be represented by his own attorneys to enforce settlement authority. 

• Authorize the Comptroller General to seek 

declaratory and injunctive reUef when Federal authorities are about to spend funds 

illegally or erroneously. ,. 

The last title had grown out of a ruspute between the Comptroller General and the Attorney 

General about the legality of the so-called Phil- adelphia plan-a requirement that Government 

contractors commit themselves to making race 

a factor for consideration in hiring employees. 

The Comptroller General ruled the Philadelphia 

plan illegal, but the Department of Labor went 

ahead with it following an Attorney General's 

ruling that the plan was legal. Both officers of 

the Government claimed the right to rule on the 

legality of Federal expenrutures, and when they 

differed. there was no means available to settle 

the dispute, other than throu~h congressional 

action. A Comptroller General s opinion could 

be ignored if contradicted by an Attorney General's opinion. The Congress narrowly stopped 

short of e nacting legislation upholding the 

Comptroller General's opinion on the Philadelphia plan. and the Federal courts upheld the 

validity of the plan. 

All in all. the Ribicoff bill was designed to 

strengthen and broaden GAO's authority so that 

the Office could provide more effective service 

to the Congress. In its report on the bill the Sen- ate Committee on Government Operations said: 

It has long been the judgment of many 

Members of Congress. and of this committee. that the work performed by the 

General Accounting Office would be far 

more meaningful and useful if attention 

were focused upon ongoing programs. current actiuities. and new proposals. This ap- proach. it wos felt. would enable the Congress, and its committees. to haue the 

benefit of the General Accounting Office's 

findings and recommendations in time to 

halt unsound practices and actiuities, or 

those of doubtful ualue or legality. It would 

also make the actiuities of the General Ac· counting Office more meaningful and releuant and afford the Conl1"ess an oppor· 

tunity to select the most eJjectiue program 

altematives. L 7 

The bill passed the Senate in October 1970 

with little debate and no dissent. The only sub- stantive change was the deletion of the provision 

authorizing GAO to review existing Federal pro- grams. which had been made part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. (See above.) 

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL AND OTHER GAO OFRCIALS TESTIFY before SenalOr Abraham Ribicoffs 

Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization on GAO's role In reviewing program results 

11 0 
However, the House failed to act, and the bill 

died when the Congress adjourned, 

RESISTANCE IN THE HOUSE AND IN 

EXECU11VE AGENCIES 

The legislation encountered strong opposition 

in the House Committee on Government Op' 

erations, GAO officials met with Herbert Roback, 

a key Committee staff aide and close adviser to 

Congressman Chet Holifield, a senior Committee member. Roback objected to broadening 

GAO's authority, especially to encompass studies of legislative proposals, and doubted the need 

for subpoena power or authority to go to court 

to settle disputes with the Attorney General. He 

was concerned about GAO's involvement in 

what he saw as political matters, and he also 

believed some disputes were best left to political 

solutions. 11$ 

Resistance was also building in the executive 

branch, The Office of Management and Budget 

reported its opposition to the legislation in 1971 

with this rather unusual statement. 

Although our report follows adjournment 

of the 91st Congress, we wish to state our 

position * * • in the event consideration 

is giuen to reintroducing similar legislation 

in the next session of Congress, ,. 

Apparently OMB was taking no chances! It 

was particularly concerned that the authority for 

GAO to review legislative proposals and the requirement that executive agencies make available "such information and documents as I the 

Comptroller General! considers necessary" would 

open up preliminary drafts of legislation later 

discarded and memorandums about agencies' 

suggested program alternatives, OMB also expressed concern about granting GAO authority 

to settle disputes in court, Noting that agencies 

could rely on the Attorney General's opinion 

when it differed from that of the Comptroller 

General, OMB said: 

There may well be emergencies or unforeseen euents, where the President would 

find it necessary to proceed on that basis 

in the public interest, and we do not belieue 

that right should be threatened by use of 

the injunctiue process, 20 

Senator Ribicoff reintroduced the bill early in 

the 92d Congress (March 1971)' but no further 

action was taken and no similar bill was intro' 

duced in the House, Because this kind of legislation has no natural constituency outside the 

Government, GAO's success would have to depend on perseverance and the force of reasoned 

discussion with the members and staff responsible for considering the legislation, 

In May 1971, GAO formally endorsed the bill 

in a report to the Senate Government Operations 

Committee, A month later, the Comptroller General took a new but unsuccessful tack. He presented a draft bill to the House Judiciary Committee containing the title VII provisions of the 

Ribicolf bill but modified to give jurisdiction to 

the Judiciary Committee instead of Government 

Operations," Judiciary, in turn, looked to the 

Justice Department for Buidance, Negotiations 

between GAO and the Department to iron out 

differences on GAO's proposed authority to set- tle disputes proved fruitless, and the Judiciary 

Committee took no action, 

As time passed, other matters involving GAO 

required action by the Congress, Following a 3-

year study of scandals at military post exchanges, 

the Senate Government Operations Committee 

isued a report calling for extensive reforms,22 In 

November 1971, Senator Ribicoff introduced a 

bill to provide for GAO reviews of certain nonappropriated fund activities, including post exchanges, Six months later, the Comptroller General forwarded to the Congress draft bills modifying 

the requirements for GAO audits of Government 

corporations and certain other Federal entities 

(titles UI and IV of the Rlbicolf bill) and liberalizing 

the limits on using statistical sampling for checking Federal agencies' expenditure vouchers, 

However, no action was taken on any of this 

legislation in the 92d Congress, 

As the 93d Congress opened, GAO reviewed 

all the proposals that had been made to date 

and developed its own omnibus bill, containing 

12 titles, to bring them together. Included in the 

draft bill were all the titles from the old Ribicoff 

bill except title 1. Assistance to the Congress 

(which had been rendered largely unnecessary 

by the Legislative Reorganization Act), plus titles 

providing for audits of nonappropriated fund 

activities and liberalized use of statistical sarnpling 

for auditing expenditure vouchers23 

The bill also contained five new titles, each 

designed to strengthen GAO's authority or make 

its operations more efficient. GAO requested 

authority to 

• broaden its role in providing budgetary, fis- cal, and program information to the 

Congress: 

• enforce its right of access to executive 

agency records: 

• gain custody and control of the GAO 

Building; 

• make periodic studies of Government con- tractor and subcontractor profits; and 

• transfer the audit of transportation pay- ments and recovery of overcharges to one 

or more executive agencies. 

Transmitted to the Congress in June 1973, 

the bill was introduced in both Houses that same 

month, and hearings were held in the Senate in 

August Strong resistance in the executive branch 

and in the House continued, particularly to the 

111 
provisions for subpoena power access-to-rec- ords enforcement, and authority to seek court 

review of disputes between the Comptroller 

General and the Attorney General. 

GAO OPTS FOR HALF A LOAF 

Beyond the opposition to specific ti~es. it was 

becoming increasingly clear that any bill having 

that many ti~es had little chance of success be- cause opposition to any one ti~e endangered the 

whole bill. Therefore, GAO deeded to split the 

bill into two parts, one containing the relatively 

noncontroversial titles and the other containing 

the titles which had attracted the strongest opposition. The Comptroller General forwarded 

two separate, revised bills to the Congress in 

December 1973. The following year. congressional attention 

focused on the noncontroversial bill which con- tained seven titles (statistical sampling of vouch - ers, transportation payment audits. nonappro- priated fund audits. employment of experts and 

consultants. GAO Building. audits of Govern- ment corporations. and revision of annual audit 

requirements). Both Government Operations 

Committees were receptive to the split and were 

ready to move this bill. The House Committee 

held hearings in June and the Senate Committee 

in August. 

Not all was smooth sailing. however. One 

obstacle was a series of issues raised in June 

1974 by the GAO Black Caucus. Among other 

things, the Caucus asserted that "serious labor- management problems in [the Transportation 

and Claims Division] are the real reasons for the 

Comptroller General ' • • proposing legislative 

action to force the transfer. " Instead of the transfer. the Caucus urged further study and more 

complete automation of the audit function. In 

the event of transfer, it insisted on development 

of "a carefully prepared implementation plan. 

mutually agreed to by GAO and the gaining 

agency, with input by all levels of employees of 

[the Transportation and Claims division]. and 

assistance from the Civil Service Commission." ", 

The Comptroller General responded that the 

basic reason for proposing the transfer was that 

"by its very nature it is primarily an operating 

function of the Executive Branch." He also as- serted that GAO was sensitive to the concerns. 

interests, and rights of its employees and ex- plained how they would be protected."" Never- theless. follOWing negotiations between Com- mittee staff and the interested parties. both 

Committees amended the bill to include additional safeguards of employee rights and ex- tended the period during which the transfer 

would occur. Another problem concerned custody of the 

GAO Building. Uke most other Federal buildings. the GAO Building is owned and operated 

by the General Services Administration. Even 

though GAO occupied only part of the bUilding, it wanted custody of the entire building so it could 

more adequately provide space for the growing 

staff. For years, for example, space constraints 

had precluded moving the Washington Regional 

Office (located in Falls Church, Virginia) into the 

building. Both GSA and the Office of Management and Budget opposed title V. GSA argued 

that assigning custody to GAO would be contrary 

to a law prescribing user chargers for building 

GAO omclALS READY FOR TESTIMONY on GAO bill In Augusl 1974 belore a Senate subcommittee (I. to r .. 

Tom Sullivan. Robert Keller. Elmer Slaats. Sam Hughes and Ellsworth Morse) 

112 
space and establishing the public building fund 

when half the space was occupied by executive 

agencies. Although the House Committee sup- ported GAO. the Senate Committee modified 

title V to give GAO "first priority" on space within 

the building. including displacement of executive 

agencies if necessary.'"' GSA still operates the 

building. but the Washington Regional Office 

moved there in 1979 and the executive agencies 

are gradually moving out. 

Having ironed out these and other. more 

minor problems. both Houses passed the legis- lation. With President Gerald R. Ford's signature 

on January 2. I97S. the General Accounting 

Office Act of 1974 became law. 

KEY CONGRESSMEN INFLUENCE ACTION ON 

TOUGHER ISSUES 

This left the so-called controversial bill on the 

back burner. Following the end of the 93d Con- gress. GAO officials took another look at the five 

titles in the bill submitted to the Congress the 

previous year. One major change in the Con- gress which ultimately had a major effect on the 

course 01 this legislation was the appointment of 

Jack Brooks as Chairman 01 the House Government Operations Committee. He succeeded 

Chet Holifield who had retired. Both Congressman Brooks and Senator Met- calf. Chairman of the Senate Government Op- erations subcommittee with jurisdiction over 

GAO. introduced bills to have all legislative 

branch agency heads appointed by the Con- gress. They prOvided for the congressional appOintment 01 the Comptroller General. shortening 01 his term. and his easier removal. 

Congressman Brooks' perception of the need lor 

this legislation was spelled out in his statement 

introducing the bills: 

These offices were created by Congress 

to serve congressional interests and they 

should be completely responsive to Congress. It is hard for me to understand how 

earlier Congresses could decide to leave 

their appointment to the President. 

Mr. Speaker. Congress can no longer 

take such a defeatist attitude on so important an issue. The doctrine 0/ separation 

0/ powers is basic to our system 0/ government. and Congress contributes to the 

weakening of that system when it permits 

the President to exercise authority in the 

legislabue domain.27 

The Comptroller Generai's response. already 

discussed in chapter 7. would come later. Meanwhile. in June I97S. Staats transmitted to the 

Congress a revised GAO bill containing the same 

basic provisions as in the previous year's bill ex- cept for the title on budget. fiscal. and program 

informu~un which had been incorporated in the 

Congressional Budget Act. Senator Metcalf introduced this bill on August 1. I97S, but no companion bill was introduced in the House. Senator Metcalfs subcommittee held hear- ings in October on lour bills: the GAO bill. Metcalf s own bill to provide lor congressional appointment 01 the Comptroller General. and two 

other bills to extend GAO's audit authority. In his testimony. Staats argued vigorously 

against the Metcall bill and expressed strong sup- port for the GAO bill. especially title I that would 

provide a means through the courts for enlorcing 

GAO decisions and settlements when the Attor- ney General disagreed. Concerning the latter. 

Senator Metcall highlighted what was probably 

the weakest link in GAO's argument-the relatively few times in recent years (only lour during 

Staats' term) when there had actually been a 

difference 01 opinion between the Comptroller 

General and the Attorney General. Then Metcall 

asked the hard question: "have you been tough 

enough or haven't you gotten along all right and 

don't need this authority?" 

In his reply. Staats came very close to as- serting that the lack 01 an enlorcement mecha- nism had a "chilling effect" on GAO: 

I think we haue been tough enough. but 

1 would also have to say to you honestly 

that the/act that we know that the Attorney 

Genera can ouerrule us may well have 

some bearing upon our willingness to do 

it. You are talking here essentially about 

whether an officer of an executive branch 

will have authority to ueto the Comptroller 

General on a matter of what does the law 

say with respect to authority to spend 

money,2M 

Notwithstanding this assertion. GAO lost the 

argument There was no further action on the 

GAO bill during the 94th Congress. and this was 

the last time during the IS-year term that any 

GAO bill contained a provision on enlorcing 

Comptroller General decisions. The House was another story. Congressman 

Brooks did not follow the custom practiced by 

his predecessor and many other committee 

chairmen 01 introducing (by request) legislation 

submitted to the Congress by Federal agency 

heads. Instead. Brooks generally introduced under his own name only those bills which he could 

support and which he thought stood a good 

chance 01 becoming law. Apart Irom the question 

01 ultimate enactment. the primary sticking point 

was the question 01 who would appoint the 

Comptroller General. how long his term would 

be. and by what procedure he could be removed. For more than 2 years. Staats stood firm 

in his opposition to any modification of proce113 
dures for Comptroller General appointment that 

would jeopardize the Office's independence. I! was not until August 1977 that proJlTess was 

made in resolving the difference. Chairman 

Brooks' Committee staff had drafted a bill which 

called for the appointment of the Comptroller 

General by the Congress from a list of nominees 

prepared by a commission comprising specified 

officers of the Congress, committee chairmen, 

and ranking minOrity members. The President 

was not to participate in the appointment or re- moval process. This feature of the draft bill raised 

several questions: Would the Comptroller Gen- eral be an "Officer of the United States"? (Such 

individuals must. under the Constitution, be 

nominated by the President and con finned by 

the Senate.) If not. could he continue to under- take the so-called executive functions which are 

part of GAO's responsibilities? Furthermore, would the proposed appointment and removal 

mechanism adversely affect the Comptroller 

General's ind ependence?~1 

In view of these concerns. Staats asked his 

General Counsel to identify alternatives to Chair- man Brooks' draft bill. The General Counsel re- sponded that among several approaches he had 

explored. the "least undesirable compromise" 

would involve the President's appointing the 

Comptroller General after considering a list of 

candidates supplied by a legislative group. The 

list could be "discretionary" or "mandatory," 

but the mandatory list raised constitutional ques- tions because the constraints it imposed on the 

President's apPOintment powers were likely be- yond those pennitted by the appointment pro- visions of the Constitution. However. he also 

observed that the question had not been tested 

in court and probably never would be even if 

the bill were enacted, provided that the President 

selected a nominee from the list. Staats proposed 

that the discretionary list approach be the first 

line of negotiation with the Committee staff. Subsequent objections from Chainnan Brooks' 

staff came as no surprise. The Committee staff 

held strong views that the Congress should dom- inate the selection of the Comptroller General. 

But both sides comrromised and agreed to support a congressiona commission that would submit a mandatory list of potential appointees to 

the PreSident. 

In April 1978. Congressman Brooks intro- duced House bill 12171 which contained the 

agreed-upon provisions for appointing the 

Comptroller General and his Deputy and procedures for enforCing GAO access to records of 

both Federal agencies and private contractors. The bill also contained a new responsibility for 

the ComptroUer General. I! amended the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 authorizing ·the Comptroller General to audit so-called un- vouchered expenditures-those expenditures 

accounted for solely on the approval or certificate 

of the President or an executive agency official. 

114 

Dozens of these funds were scattered throughout 

the Government, but they lacked oversight. 

Congressman Robert Eckhardt had introduced 

a separate bill with this provision the previous 

year, and Brooks supported the idea. From this point, events moved along rather 

routinely in the House. The Government Op- erations Committee held a hearing in June, and 

the Committee reported the bill in September 

with one major addition--statutory procedures 

governing the release of GAO draft reports and 

obtaining and handling comments by executive 

agencies. This new provision stemmed from the 

House Select Committee on CongreSSional Op- erations' June 1978 report which expressed con- cern about GAO's lack of timeliness in servicing 

the Congress, attributed in part to the time required to complete and review draft reports, in- cluding the time allowed executive agencies to 

submit comments. 3O Responding to this concern, 

GAO had instituted administrative changes to 

expedite agency comments. GAO had also be- gun sending the Government Operations Com- mittees weekly lists of draft reports sent to agen- cies for comment and including in the final 

reports discussions of any significant changes 

from the conclusions and recommendations contained in the drafts. However, the Committee 

was not satisfied: 

The Committee appreciates the Comp- troller General's effort to expeditiously 

meet the Committees concems by imple- menting the above administrative order. 

However, such administrative actions can 

be reversed by future management changes 

at the GAO. Further. these procedural 

changes do not fully address the concems 

raised earlier in this report regarding GAO's 

excessive reliance on formal agency 

comments. 31 

The GAO bill passed the House in October 

1978. but in the Senate, again, there was a different situation. Due to the death of Senator 

Metcalf the previous January, no one on the 

Senate Government Operations Committee was 

suffiCiently familiar with and interested in the 

GAO bill to move it. Senator Ribicoff had become Chainnan of the full Committee. and he 

was preoccupied with other matters. Senator 

John Glenn succeeded Senator Metcalf as the 

chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction 

over GAO. but he and his staff needed time to 

became familiar with the complex issues associated with some of the GAO bill's provisions. Near the close of the 95th Congress, GAO 

gained Senator Glenn's support of a last-minute 

effort for the Senate to pass at least some of the 

proviSions of the House-passed bill. but the effort 

failed in the final hours. 
OVERCOMING THE LAST ROADBLOCKS TO 

ENACTMENT 

By the beginning of the 96th Congress. both 

House and Senate Committees were ready to 

act on the bill. Chairman Brooks introduced the 

bill on the first day of the new Congress---,Jan. uary 15. 1979. His new bill IH.R. 241 was es- sentially the same as that passed by the House 

the previous October except for the addition of 

a second title designed to ensure that the In- spectors General of the Departments of Energy 

and Health. Education, and Welfare followed 

audit standards established by the Comptroller 

General. 

Executive agencies were opposed to many of 

the bill's provisions. especially those pertaining 

to GAO audits of unvouchered expenditures and 

enforcing access to agency records. The House 

Committee staff worked with these agencies and 

OMB in the spring of 1979 to resolve the differences. GAO also had some concerns, particularly 

on the section pertaining to the availability of 

GAO draft reports. When the House Committee held hearings 

in June, Chairman Brooks introduced a substi- tute bill incorporating changes, based on the 

Committee's discussions, that were designed to 

overcome the strongest objections. Staats sup- ported the substitute bill with the reservation that 

he would have preferred that the section on 

availability of draft reports not be written into law 

but discussed only in the Committee reports. However, James Mcintyre, Jr., Director of OMB, expressed a different view. Although he ac- knowledged the Committee's good faith efforts 

to iron out an acceptable compromise. he noted 

lIiat problems certain agenCies had raised were 

not addressed in the substitute. and he expressed 

strong reservations of his own, particularly about 

granting the Comptroller General authority to 

seek court enforcement of access to agency records. Offering only to work further to define a 

"limited and carefully circumscribed enforce- ment mechanism." Mcintyre said this about the 

substitute bill. 

The proposed amendment would vest 

virtually a standardless authority in the 

Comptroller General. The only basis for 

withholding information from even the 

broadest and most burdensome of requests 

would be a constitutionally based privilege. Such measures are potentially contentious 

and inappropriate. We would prefer that procedures by 

which the Comptroller General acquires 

documents remain as they are, supple- mented by the other provisions of HR. 24.32 

Chairman Brooks seemed surprised by OMB's 

lack of enthUSiasm, and he essentially laid down 

the gauntlet. 

I thought that we had agreed on this, and I made the mistake of thinking we were 

working with you all on this and had agreed 

to almost everything. Apparently. we agree 

on less than I thought. but I believe we still 

have the votes to pass it, and I hope the 

President will sign it. 3J 

Two and a half months later the Committee 

unanimously reported the bill without further 

major change. In its report. the Committee made 

pointed reference to OMB's testimony. 

By inference they suggest that GAO was 

assigned authority to audit financial transactions by the Budget and Accounting Act 

of 1921 and that any expansion beyond 

thllt authority should be subject to the approval of the head of the agency being 

audited. • • * Since HR. 24 was introduced early this year. the Committee has 

held extensive discussions with officials of 

the OMB in hopes of resolving the major 

objections to the bill. While resolution was 

reached on several issues. OMB steadfastly 

maintained this not so subtle attempt to 

limit congressional oversight of the executive branch. OMB's position in this respect 

represents by for the best argument for the 

need for Congress to strengthen GAO's 

strict oversight of the executive branch.

34 

The House passed the bill on October 29. 1979. and then it was up to the Senate to act. 

Senator Glenn' s subcommittee held hearings in 

October and December 1979 on the Senate version of the GAO bill. Senate bill 1878. This time, 

the primary administration witness was a Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General. Lawrence A. Ham- mond. Although he did not oppose the bill outright, he expressed strong reservations about the 

unvouchered expenditures and access-to-rec- ords enforcement provisions. In an interesting 

twist, the Justice Department volunteered to ref- eree access-to-records disputes between GAO 

and the executive agenCies. just as OMB had 

earlier. This proposal was as unacceptable to 

Senator Glenn as was OMB's to Brooks. 

In written comments on Senate bill 1878, the 

Departments of State and the Treasury ex- pressed strong opposition to the bill. 

FollOwing further negotiations between the 

committees, executive agencies, and GAO, the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs re- ported the bill after adopting several amendments designed to overcome the strongest 

administration objectives yet still preserve the 

bill's basic intent. One new subsection precluded 

GAO from bringing court action against a Federal 

agency or issuing a subpoena against a non-Federal party to obtain access to records in three 

situations. In one situation, the President or the 

Director of OMB could preclude GAO access by 

115 
certifying in writing that disclosure of the re- quested material "could reasonably be expected 

to substantially impair the operations of the Federal Government. .. '" Thus. OMB ended up being 

something of a referee in access-to-records 

cases. but its prerogatives were carefully limited 

and the occasions on which it would certify an 

exception were expected to be very rare. The Senate passed the GAO bill on February 

28. 1980. and the House agreed to the Senate 

amendments 3 weeks later. With President 

Carter's signature on April 3. 1980. the General 

Accounting Office Act of 1980 became Public 

Law 96-226. In signing the legislation. the Pres- ident said: 

The passage of this law reflects the impor- tance we all place on sound auditing practices within the Federal Goverment. • • • This legislation involves complex issues with constitutional implications and its 

passage required negotiations in good faith 

by all parties. I am confident that this cooperative spirit will extend to the implementation of the Act's provisions.'" 

A process which had begun in September 

1969 finally came to a close 10'/2 years later. All 

in all. the GAO bills at one time or another con- tained 19 titles. of which 16 were enacted into 

law. With the Congress' support, GAO got most 

of what it wanted. In the process, GAO learned 

that the support of key members of Congress is 

essential to overcome the resistance inherent in 

any proposal to strengthen the agency vis-a-vis 

the executive branch or other entities it audits. Because no great constituency or public fervor 

rallies behind an agency like GAO. it must win 

its own case. 

Other Legislation Affecting 

GAO's Charter 

In each Congress, dozens of bills are introduced that would give GAO new responsibilities. A few of them make it into law. Most often. the 

new duties consist of one-time requirements for 

an audit or evaluation. such as the Energy Re- organization Act of 1974. which directed the 

Comptroller General to evaluate the effective- ness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 

programs. Other legislation required GAO to 

take on new tasks. often executive in nature. that 

the Congress decided GAO was best suited to 

carry out An example was the Trans-Alaska 

Pipeline Act of 1973, which made GAO respon- sible for (1) advising the Congress on and over- seeing the collection of information required by 

13 regulatory agencies and (2) reviewing the 

need for reports currently required by these 

agencies. These functions, formerly done by the 

PRESIDENT ~IMMY CARTER SIGNS 'he GAO Acf 01 1980 

116 
Office of Management and Budget, were trans- ferred by the Congress over GAO's vigorous 

objection. (The Paperwork Reduction Act of 

19S0 transferred this responsibility back to 

OMB.) 

A second example-tinged with a little ironyillustrates graphically how the Congress some- times makes up its own mind when aSSigning 

new functions to GAO. During the 1966-S1 pe- riod, the Congress enacted four major Federal 

election campaign finance laws which gave GAO 

one or more duties or took them away. The first 

was a 1966 law establishing a Presidential Election Campaign Fund to provide public financing 

of Presidential campaign expenses. It would 

have allowed citizens to earmark $1 of their in- come tax payments to be set aside in a special 

fund for campaign expenses of the two major 

parties' Presidential candidates. with each getting 

as much as $30 million. The Comptroller Gen- eral was given supervisory responsibility for this 

fund; he was to ensure that payments made to 

political parties would be for reimbursement of 

actual campaign expenses. He was also made 

responsible for determining the popular vote 

which would form the basis for the amounts 

available for distribution. Although GAO had opposed earlier efforts to 

involve it in administering campaign financing 

reform measures, particularly those covering 

congressional candidates. it did not comment on 

the 1966 law as it was going through the Con- gress and raised no objection to its final approval. 

The functions assigned to GAO were adminis- trative, and the agency would remain above pol- itics. Following the law's enactment, the Comp- troller General took preliminary steps to set up 

the needed machinery in GAO. but by early 

1967, major defects in the law had become ap- parent and the Congress decided to suspend the 

law's implementation until it could decide on a 

formula to fix the defects. More than 5 years passed before another law 

was enacted. During that time. GAO's position 

shifted from neutrality to outright opposition. Commenting on one Senate proposal in June 

1971. the Comptroller General said: 

We are strongly opposed to placing the 

responsibility for the administration of Fed- eral campaign financing requirements in 

the Comptroller General. Our position. as 

we have stated in the past with regard to 

several bills, is that we should not be given 

the responsibility for audit, investigation, or 

enforcement in connection with Federal 

elections. We believe that the effectiveness 

of the Comptroller General and the Gen- eral Accounting Office depends in large 

measure upon maintaining 0 reputation for 

independence and objectivity. Not only 

must we remain free from political influ- ence. but we must zealously avoid being 

placed in a position in which we might be 

subject to criticism, whether justified or not, that our actions and decisions are prejudiced or influenced by political considerations. We are, therefore, apprehensive of 

any measure that might subject us to such 

criticism, the inevitable result of which 

would be a diminution of congressional 

and public confidence in our integrity and 

objectivity. 37 

Especially wary of being placed in the anom- alous situation of having to investigate and report 

on its principal. the Congress (in the case of 

congressional campaigns), the Comptroller Gen- eral suggested that the Congress instead consider 

establishing an independent, nonpartisan elec- tion commission to oversee Federal campaign 

spending. "" That year the Senate did enact a bill 

that would have established a Federal Elections 

Commission. but the House version. which pre- vailed in conference, provided for three "super- visory officers" to administer campaign financing 

disclosure requirements-the Secretary of the 

Senate for Senate campaigns, the Clerk of the 

House for House campaigns, and the Comp- troller General for Presidential campaigns and 

national political convention finanCing. The President signed the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 into law. and for the first 

time. GAO found itself in the arena of Presiden- tial politics and campaign finance.' The timing 

was propitious because the Nation was only 

months away from the Watergate break-in and 

all the dramatic events which followed. GAO was 

thus thrown into a maelstrom with only its good 

instincts. its integrity, and its considerable audit 

and legal experience to guide it. 

In April 1972. the Comptroller General es- tablished a separate Office of Federal Elections 

in GAO to administer the campaign finance law 

and appointed Phillip S. Hughes, former OMB 

Deputy Director and veteran Federal official, to 

head it. This was an unprecedented experience 

for GAO. GAO published a report summarizing 

its campaign finance administration experiences 

in 1975 (ACG (OFE)-74-5. Feb. 6. 1975), and 

Mosher discusses these experiences in his book 

as well. 

In the wake of Watergate, there was strong 

sentiment for further strengthening campaign fi- nancing and disclosure laws. Indeed, Hughes, testifying lor GAO in September 1973, asserted 

that: 

Based on our experience during the past 

year and a half and our audits and inves- tigations of campaign financing practices 

during the 1972 presidential election cam-

"In late 1971. thl! Coogfes.s also emw:IOO M!J)imI1C' ~!Ion rvil'Wlruting the 

Presklentl4l Election umpalgn Fund 10 be financed by 1m- dollat che<:kOtf on Incomll IU rt'tuml end mnkln!:llhl' Comptroller Ollnertll responlibl.lol cllIiuring compll/Sl\clI with the prolJlllons I!StlIbllshlng It HO""8wr, the Ill ..... did not tIIkc 

Illk'Ct un"] alte! Ihe 1972 Praklcntlallrlecllon 

117 
paign. we belieue that present laws are inadequate to rectify the abuses we haue seen.~ 

The idea of establishing an independent Federal Elections Commission had been revived by 

others. but Hughes said only that an improved 

law should be enforced "by an agency equipped 

with a flexible assortment of investigative and 

administrative powers." He expressed none of 

the strong opposition voiced by GAO prior to 

the 1971 law's enactment. In fact. in earlier testimony (June 1973). Hughes said: "We are not 

seeking any change in the present organization 

which divides responsibility among three Supervisory Offices. " 'K' In a quiet way. GAO was saying it would not object to continuing its role as 

overseer of Presic'ential election campaign 

expenditures. 

The momentum lor an independent Elections 

Commission was too strong. however. In May 

1974. the Senate passed a campaign reform bill 

creating an Election Commission composed of 

seven members. The ComptroUer General would 

have been a Commission member but without 

the right to vote. A few months later. the House 

passed similar legislation establishing a "board 

of supervisory officers" composed of the Clerk 

of the House. the Secretary of the Senate. and 

four other congressionally appOinted members. 

Drafts of this legislation would have continued 

GAO's involvement but removed its direct control over setting policy. Recognizing this. Staats 

and Hughes met with several key Congressmen 

and advised them GAO wanted out altogether. 

When the bill emerged from the House-Senate 

conference. it provided for establishing a Federal 

Elections Commission consisting of eight members. including the Clerk of the House and the 

Secretary of the Senate but not the Comptroller 

General. 

The Federal Election Campaign Act Amend -

ments of 1974 transferred all GAO functions to 

the new Federal Elections Commission. The 

transfer was effective May 30, 1975. Thus. GAO 

was voted out of a job it had strongly opposed 

taking on but to which it had grown accustomed. 

Larger events carried the day. 

... * * * ... 

Generally. the Office opposed statutory audit 

requirements because they bind the agency to 

a specific task. usually within a set timeframe, 

that could just as well be done by committee 

request where work aSSignments could be arranged administratively that gives both parties 

greater flexibility. There were exceptions. of 

course. such as the Federal Banking Agency 

Audit Act. which directed the Comptroller General to audit the three major bank regulatory 

agencies. (See ch. 3.) The Office also usually 

opposed executive-type requirements. such as 

118 

the regulatory information monitOring duties under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act. because they 

are more properly done by an executive agency. 

The theory holds that execution and auditing 

under the same roof are a poor match. 

Unfortunately. the trend in recent years has 

moved in the opposite direction. The Congress 

has enacted more and more statutory audit requirements and may be moving further in the 

direction of assigning GAO more executive-type 

functions. In the first 18 months of the 96th Congress. a half dozen laws containing GAO audit 

requirements were enacted. This same Congress 

also made the Comptroller General a voting 

member of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board. 

the first time he was given a direct hand in administering a major executive program involving 

up to $1.5 billion in loan guarantees. Another 

very recent law granted GAO authority to go into 

court to enforce the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation's compliance with legal obligations. The 

Comptroller General strongly opposed this 

requirement. 

The continuation of longstanding tasks which 

require considerable resources should also be 

assessed periodically for their contribution to the 

agency's basic mission. Additionally, the agency 

must avoid taking on new tasks which will require 

large amounts of limited resources but which 

have only passing value or can be more effectively performed elsewhere. 

Preserving. protecting. and modemizing GAO's 

legislative charter is an important top management job. GAO also has a special need to preserve its status as the Government's independent 

auditor and evaluator. Occasionally. even those 

with the best of intentions have proposed lellislation which was designed to enhance GAO s 

or the Congress' stature or authority but which 

would detract from GAO's independence and 

value to the Congress and the taxpayer. 

I Public u,w 91 510, ~ 2OIIIOclOIx'T 26 "HO!. lL'glsl.,llve Rlluf9!Inl zaoon ArT 01 1971) 

2 Cnny Rtt 7 MilT 1967. pp 5672 87 

3 Cmlg R~ . tI Aug lCJ&), p. 221CJ7 

4 Compnolll'.! ~n.nAI SLMts. l.<:!ncl 10 IIlL' HOnOf/lbll' 8 r Sisk. HQUSo! 

01 P1l'S(!nl4l1ves. 2!1 Aug 1%9 

5 Complroll('T Gcrwuli 4<1~. 1.;'111,1' 10 Chaltm<ln. Special Suixommmw on ~nlul lOl1 , ou~ Cum ~ on u~. 20 Ocl 111(,<) 

6 ComplTOIIer G"lWfar\ letter 10 Chairman Speaal Suixommln<!t', 20 0:1 196Il p J 

7 U S Cons Hw.w Commine>! on Rules.. LeglaJmIL~ R~lI:fJflO<l Ad 

0{ 1970. <Jist Cong 2nd sa5 . H ~'PI 91 1215 IW.,shlnglOT\ DC GPO. 19701 . p IS 

8 Put-He llIw 93 J4I1 UIIcs I V VU VlH 1\00 X I,Jul~ 12. 197/11 COllllrt!S 

SIOnlli Budge' and impoundm<'"' Connl'>l ACl of I Q7'l 

9 U ~ CQI1g JllInl Study Commlnl."e on l3udgo!1 CUlllJoi. H.-ow~ on ImplO~ln9 Cong'es5lo',oI Corll rel Oller Bw9t'/af}l OU la~ and Recl'!!pI TOfal,. 

Inlcnm report. 93rd Conq . 1st sess H Repl 93 1M {Wnshlng1011 . DC Fvb. 7. 19731. I) 2 

10 U S Cong Jornt Study Commlnee on Budget COllrrol. Ho!tJn"!Po on Improving Cong ~lon!l1 Budge! Conlrol h"ilnny~ held Jan ~l", JlJ7:i, p-p 91 94 

II Hcarlll9' .. J,," MAl 197:\. pp QI1 I'l!) 

12 H~nngs. Jan ~lII r 1973, pp 1)697 
14 U ~ Cons SotNw !:)ubcorn'n.J1ft on Eucum. ~1Inn Com mIftft 011 C.ownwtw:rl ap.,ObON HNf1f1!Ia .OI'I C~· 01 GAO 10 A~ 

and AudtJ ~ E..:peootdltura ~anngs hdd So>p! 1%9 pp J 2: 

I~ Comp" ..... ., Gel1l'lo$l ~Mt!o ..... 'Uer 10 C!w'"",Fl. ::.uocunvnltl~ ...... 0: WiCi RetlfganlUhOl1 "w""'i' <:OInmllt,'(' 011 ~"fUfW", ()po:t1l1lOm. 12 Juoe 

17 S Repl Yj 1:l&4 p :1 

I~ L F,~ ThompiOl'l ~fIIA. AIU'JfIIIl!'.l Mv""""ndum to 0111(\' '.II l"9 l5lahW L'-'l'l(ln 29 Oct lCf7U 

)') As~Wlt., Dh'CtOf OIlIe(' 01 MII,la9i'lIwnt Imd Bud!l<:1. 1.011\" I() elwlolr 

1M", Hou,"" Comml ~ on Co(lVj!"lfnenl Op..>tnUOM l'l,lan ]tj71 

20 OMS A~le DlleclCl'~ 1t'l1!!1 to Chlllrmtlll 1-iouSo' Cnmmln,'e on Ccv 

ftl'Nnef\IOpmaHOnJ. 19 Jan 1971 p 3 

21 Cortlpnl'lllotr Geneml ~'Mn. h'1tOM 10 ChlHfma.n Hou,,' CummnH on IhIlJudlcWlIV_ 2 Aug 197 1 

22 Wlahtnqrcm POll J NOlI 1'171 p I 

23 COf'9 Rec 21 ,JUM 10 7:1 f1P Sll~'n 

24 Prftldftlt C-'O B\ack C~_ MemOUlfldum ,'" Sub<mrVnlnef' OIl lcog ~ WId MAItM\' ~ ~ CommmN uti C"""-'T"VTWnl ()peranotll lOJuM IQN p!; 

2S CornptrOll;>r Gerwnd SI,,!!>. lAI\eJ '0 C",,"IN" ~bcommint'o' on Budg 

t'f!ng. ~,_ one! F~ul~ S0u1t., Commi!lft' on ~I Op eruont, 22 A~ 1974 p 2 

27 COflS! R« , Iq Julv 1975, p 22&6rH 

~ 

2ti U S Conq 5o!naw Subc:omtTIIn~ on ~'pOt'-' Acwunttng. and Man 

Commltt'-"e on (ioI,oemnwm OcwmIlCHn. Heon'!9 orl Go\O L~ 

hu.nng I'IIIId Oct I. I Q1S P Jl 

2<J R.cNord R PIawn Al.Kx:uttt Go.-rw!<'l Counwl Mo!nw'Ir.ndum 10 Comp fl'ne." c...~ 25 Auq I~n 

JO U ~ Cong H,..... SIt'-':l Commlttet' on CoogtC!WUMl Qowr.Iiof-. 

Gt-_1UIAccoull/lf", OIIIN! Mrvirf'l{ 10 r~ Cnngreu; An~. 'J5th Cony 211u_ H R"pt Ut,1317!WIl5h!ng!nn.DC GPO IQ7~!.p VII 

Jl US ~ Houw ComT1\ln..'(' on ~mml ~1IOru. c.rwr.t 

kcounq OHICIr Act 01 II}'M. qulh Cony I Sf _ H R"Pf (1()-42S ,WMh ~on, 0 C CiPO 1()7<JI p II 

32 U S CQl~ Hou\ot' Subcommlnl}f' on legtsIanon lind Nb~ 5oIrcu111y 

Commlnee on Co()W!l11ft'Wnt ~r.tlON HPOrI'9 (VI ~ AC('Ollrillng Ofllc~ A<t 011979 heMlny held Jurv II)'N, p 9() 

JJ HeclFmg on GAO Act 01 1979 p ~I 

J4 H RI!pI % '12~ p 9 

J!i US Cons. l:Wnllltl ComminCt' on Gowmmenllll Affllm., Cuneof Ac 

cr.IlI,tll"S_QlficttACf <J/ 1979 961h Cong 2nd ~ S Rep! % 570/WMhlnglon DC GPO. 19M), pp 12 13 

3b ~O /IoIcrrlU!l"rrIf'lIf N •. ·u.J M Apt )1JM() p 2 

37 ComplroUo!t (,"1"--,,111 SIalII$ w,'f11;!f 10 ChllltlTlc'ln. Sornal" Commlnl!e on Rul~ lind A(h"'IH~l1tlll<ln 15 Juoo 1971 p 3 

1ti Compb'OlWl (wllerlll s I..oUl'f 10 ClkllmllVl. StlfWlI ... CQmmln~e on Ru~ 

and Admlmltrarion 15 JUI'lill 1'171 P 4 

Jll U 5 C~ ')conal", Comml'lI'. on Rula and Adn"uMUallOfl TnfltflOtllo' 

til Phllbp S HlIIJhQ flO ~ I'l7Jl_ p 2 

40 U ~ C~ "Wnal« Commmw on Ruk!s.nd Adm!nimanon, TC!ItItrIOnIo' 

01 Phillip S HIM]ha [7 June 1973), p 5 

119 
CClli([l~l1®IT ® 

Reorganizing Along Program And 

Functional Lines 

GAO probably has done less reorganizing 

than most other Federal agencies. The long term 

of the Comptroller General and GAO's basic 

mission have made the Office a rather stable 

organization. Nevertheless, the agency's ability 

to puroue the directions set forth by the Comptroller General was affected by the shape of the 

organization and the relationships between the 

individual units. Therefore. reorganization was 

one of the tools used from time to time to effect 

change where change was needed. One major 

reorganization, implemented near the midpoint 

of the 1966-81 period. added new organizational 

units to carry out additional mandates and to 

help bring about some of the changes in personnel and operating style that top management 

wanted. 

This chapter looks at GAO's organizational 

structure, primarily in the headquartero divisions. 

It discusses the organization in 1 %6 and before. 

the relatively few changes made prior to 1972. 

the major reorganization of 1972. the new offices 

established to take on new duties and accelerate 

organizational change, and finally the recent 

study of the need to reorganize GAO's defense 

work. 

The Organization In 1966 

Coinciding with GAO's transformation in the 

decades follOwing World War II from a largely 

clerical and bookkeeping organization to one of 

modern, professional auditing, there were a 

number of organizational changes. Figure 9-1 

shows how the organization looked in 1949 

when the firot Hoover Commission made its report and the Congress was enacting legislation 

that would transform GAO.' 

GAO's organization structure reflected the 

largely clerical functions still centralized in Wash -

ington. Key units included the large Audit DiviSion, the Corporation Audits Division. and the 

Office of Investigations. The activity getting the 

greatest emphasis at the time-the developmen~ 

installation, and inspection of agency accounting 

system!r-was housed in the Accounting Systems 

DiviSion. a 

The simpler configuration in 1955 that was 

inherited by Comptroller General Campbell is 

shown in Figure 9-2. The large desk audit division!r-Accounting and Bookkeeping. Reconciliation and Clearance, and Postal Accounts-had 

been abolished under the transformation overseen by Lindsay Warren. 

Campbell revised the organizational structure 

to puroue the goals he perceived for the Office 

120 

and to streamline its operations. He envisioned 

GAO's function to be that of the Govemment's 

own public accounting firm. Campbell concluded that GAO's separate accounting and auditing functions should be merged, defense matters needed more attention, accounting and 

auditing policies needed harmonizing, and sharper 

delineation of line and staff activities would be 

more businesslike' The new arrangement (Figure 9-3) was already in place when a 1956 report 

by the House Government ()perations Committee expressed views on GAb's organization 

and administration not far apart ITom Campbell's.' 

This configuration differentiated the three 

major areas of (1) accounting, auditing, and investigative functions, (2) legislative and special 

functions, and (3) the Office of the General 

Counsel. The Assistant to the Comptroller General, Karney A. Brasfield. was assigned to coordinate the accounting, auditing, and investigative functions that had been merged into the 

operating diviSions, notwithstanding Campbell's 

directive that division directors report directly to 

him. Another Assistant to the Comptroller General, Robert F. Keller. was designated to head 

up legislative and special functions and to personally supervise legislative liaison. The General 

Counsel headed the third area. 5 

From the dissolved Accounting Systems Division and the Division of Audits, Campbell 

plucked about 10 policy experts and formed the 

Accounting and Auditing Policy Staff. Audit Policy was headed up by Ellsworth B. Morse. Jr .. 

and Accounting Principles, Standards, and Fiscal 

Procedures by Walter F. Frese. Morse was to 

monitor GAO's audit poliCies and to foster internal auditing in the executive agenCies. Frese's 

charter was accounting prinCiples and standards 

for executive agency systems, including "appropriate emphasis on internal controls and the staff 

responsibility for Governmentwide procedures 

for an accounting or fiscal nature." Both staffs 

were charged with reviewing proposed work 

plans of the operating groups and monitOring 

audit reports for consistency with established 

accounting and audit policy· 

Broken out of the monolithic Division of Audits that formerly housed about 2,800 people 

were three new divisions: Defense Accounting 

and Auditing, Civil Accounting and Auditing, and 

Field Operations.

7 Defense and Civil also absorbed the functions and staffs of the former 

Accounting Systems Division and Office of Investigations. The latter's local offices were merged 

into the Field Operations Division. There were 
Figure 9-1 GAO In 1949 

I Comptroller Genera! of [he United SIllIes I 

I Assislanl Complroler General I 

Executive Officer 

I Office of the Chief Clerk I 

Office of lhe Office of Office of Division Accounting Office of AssistMls 

General Investigations Admmlstratlve of Systems 10 the Comptroller 

Counsel Planning Personnel DIvision GeneraJ 

Audll Division ~ Corporation I Reooncllla" on H Audits and Clearance Cltllms Division 

DiviSion DivISIon 

PosTal AccounlS ~ Y Transporation 

Division Division 

I Accounting and .1 

Bookkeeping Division 

Figure 9-2 GAO In 1955 

Comptroller General of the United Siaies 

Assistant Comptroller General 

Accounting I Office of 'he I Office of Division of I Systems General Administrative Personnel Division Counsel Services 

Division of I Office of I Claims Division T ransporta!lon I 

Audits Investigations Division 

I European 

Branch I 

Figure 9-3 GAO in 1957 

Comptroller General of the United Stales 

Assistant Comptroller General of the United States I European Branch 

Accounting, Auditing and Investigative Functions Legislative and Special Functions 

I I I I 

Accounting Office of Office of the Office of Office of 

and Auditing Staff General Legislative Administrative 

PoliCY Staff Management Counsel liaison Services 

Defense Civil 

Accounting and Accounting Field Division Claims Transportation 

Auditing and Auditing Operations of Division Division 

Division Division Division Personnel 

(Investigations) (Investigations) 

'-

IFar East Branch 

121 
19 regional audit offices and 3 military audit 

branches at the time. (See ch. 14.) Defense work 

achieved division status because of rising 

congressional interest in defense contracting and 

growth in the national defense budget. 

The Defense and Civil Divisions compartmentalized themselves internally according to the 

executive agencies they audited Defense consisted mainly of Anny. Navy. Air Force. and general defense units. and Civil had about 12 units 

encompassing about 40 executive agencies and 

activities. Defense also acquired a Far East 

Branch with an office in Tokyo. The European 

Office in Paris. founded in 1952. reported directly to the Comptroller General. 

Recognizing the increasing complexities of the 

Government's international activities. Campbell 

added an International Operations Division in 

1963. The new division was given responsibility 

for all of GAO's overseas offices. so it functioned 

both as an audit division and as a service unit 

to the other divisions. as did the Field Operations 

Division for GAO's regional offices' 

Early Changes To Strengthen 

Top Management 

Comptroller General Staats made few changes 

in his first years while acquainting himself with 

GAO's operations and executives. As discussed 

earlier. most divisions and offices operated rather 

autonomously. and top management intertered 

little in the deployment of personnel. tne cnoice 

of work. or the allocation of resources within the 

units. There was no information system 10 speak 

of. Staats had relied on one or two aides who 

canvassed the divisions whenever there was a 

need for basic infonnation about operations and 

even administrative matters. Gradually the 

Comptroller General established staff offices to 

enhance his control over office operations. 

Late in 1966. the Accounting and Auditing 

Policy Staff was redesignated as the Office of 

Policy and Special Studies. In addition to overseeing internal policy and reviewing outgOing 

reports. that Office absorbed the functions of the 

Office of Staff Management to ensure a closer 

relationship between professional staff development and accounting and auditing policy." 

GAO also acquired an Infonnalion Officer. 

Previously there had been no focal point for relations with the press. Effons to get GAO's message in the media had been tenuous if not nonexistent. notwithstanding some press attention 

to individual repons. GAO was little known outside Washington. and even some on Capitol Hill 

were unfamiliar with its functions. scope. 

achievements. or potential utility. 

The following year. a Program Planning 

Committee and a small program planning staff 

were established to conduct semiannual reviews 

of operating division work plans. (See ch. 10.) 

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL BEING INTERVIEWED BY JOURNi\UST DAN RATHER. as aired on the 

national lelevtslon show 60 Mmures on Apnl 8. 1979 Media relafl0ns received more altentIon In the 1966-81 penod 

122 
The 1912 Reorganization Along 

Program And Functional Lines 

Major organizational change had been on the 

Comptroller General's mind since the late 1960' s. 

Influenced by the functional realinement he had 

implemented in the Bureau of the Budget. Staats 

wanted an organization that would enable GAO 

to broaden its review of Federal programs: to 

examine. compare. and improve the activities of 

all Federal agencies: and to extend the expertise 

and knowledge of GAO's staff. He believed that 

both GAO and the Bureau of the Budget. because of their Governmentwide responsibilities. 

had to be organized along program lines to ease 

internal management and across-the-board program reviews. Just short of 6 years after his arrival. the Comptroller General implemented the 

reorganization which not only changed the structure of the Office but also paved the way for new 

and different kinds of work. 

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS 

In 1970 Thomas D. Morris. an expert in organization and management planning. was appointed Special Assistant to the Comptroller 

General and asked to study GAO's organizational structure as his first assignment. Morris 

spent 6 months studying the Office's organization and management practices and discussing 

them with GAO's top managers. He found a 

steeply pyramidal structure in which 80 percent 

of the auditing and accounting work was concentrated in two large divisions-Civil and Defense. Division managers were too far removed 

from audit execution. and larer upon layer of 

review slowed the issuance 0 reports. Regional 

offices had a similar structure and often subjected 

draft reports to their own review process even 

before the reports reached the operating divisions. One solution to the regional hierarchy 

problem might have been to assign regional staffs 

to the operating divisions. but Morris became 

convinced that the regional offices were one of 

GAO's greatest strengths and that they should 

be retained as separate units. 

Morris also found that the divisions did not 

make enough reviews of Federal programs or 

functions on a Govemmentwide or multiagency 

basis. There had been some progress in this direction. but due to diverse organization and operating procedures. the agency was unprepared 

to routinely conduct such reviews. Some Civil 

Division audit staffs. for example. had begun 

examining Govemmentwide functional responsibilities and multiagency programs. such as 

health and the environment. but such undertakings were rare and the division was still organized 

by Federal agency. The Defense Division was 

functionally organized. but the audit staffs gen· 

erally restricted their reviews to the activities of 

a single military department. The exceptions 

were reviews of Govemmentwide procurement 

practices which had drawn the attention of the 

President. the Congress. and others. 

Assistant directors who exercised control over 

audit sites at Federal agencies protected their turf 

by restricting other assistant directors' access to 

their provinces. Although this practice may have 

helped minimize agency confusion about who 

in GAO was auditing which programs. it elfectively prevented some staffs from getting access 

to data in agencies not routinely audited by them. 

Another hindrance was the lack of subject matter 

expertise among staff. Consequen~y. GAO could 

not report on the economy. efficiency. or effectiveness of all Federal transportation activities. 

all Federal education activities. or the like. As 

one ' manager pllt it during the reorganization 

study: 

By not tackling major domestic programs 

handled by uarious agencies or major defense programs (other than major weapon 

systems acquisition). GAO is not respon- siue to the needs of the Congress in these 

uital arenas. We are able to tell them that 

certain trees in th" apple orchard aren't 

bearing succulent fruit (or maybe no fruit 

at all) but we aren't able to tell them 

whether the whole orchard is rotten. that 

maybe we should be growing peaches instead of apples, that orchards aren't really 

what the country needs. or that there are 

just too damn many apples (or orchards}. 10 

Morris asked three key questions in his discussion with audit staffs. 

• Is GAO working on the right jobs? 

• Is GAO obtaining optimum results from its 

work? 

• Is GAO using its staff resources effectively? 

He identified several problem areas. including 

inefficient planning. programing. and staffing of 

work: administrative roadblocks: and slow reporting and review procedures. The primary reasons for these problems were the absence of a 

staff to design. test. and implement solutions to 

problems: the high degree of decentralization in 

the divisions: and an or~anization which limited 

the Comptroller General s influence over current 

programs and projects. 

Morris recommended a two-step action plan. 

First was the immeellate implementation of a 

Management Improvement Program. including 

the appointment of an Assistant to the Comptroller General for Management Services and a 

Management Improvement Committee. The most 

urgent matters to be considered included (1) reducing report processing time. (2) revising the 

job assignment and scheduling procedures to induce greater advance planning, (3) reevaluating 

the system of manuals, directives. and instructions. (4) improving administrative support ser123 
vices, and (5) assigning junior staft to regional 

offices to relieve headquarters divisions of the 

training burden. 

The second step in Morris' action plan dealt 

with the need for a different organizational structure. He prefaced his recommendation with the 

question: 

What is the ideal future structure of Headquarters Diuisions if we are to insure the 

most professional direction of GAO in (1) 

identifying subjects for program reuiew. (2) 

planning reuiews, and (3) communicating 

the results to Congress and the agencies?" 

Morris said GAO executives generally believed that the answer was more divisions. each 

responsible for a functional or program area. and 

he provided two samples of possible functional 

organizations in his recommendations. He also 

proposed that a committee be formed to identify 

several alternative organizational structures and 

the pros and cons of each. 

PLANNING THE SOLUTIONS 

The Comptroller General adopted Morris' 

recommendations with little change. In January 

1971, he established a Management Improvement Program and directed Morris to solicit and 

condense proposals for improving the problem 

areas identified. A month later, he established 

the Organization Planning Study Group as part 

of the overall Management Improvement Program. Deputy Comptroller General Robert Keller 

chaired the group. which was directed to determine whether any revisions in organizational 

structure were desirable. Morris acted as advisor 

and staff to the group. About that time, the 

Comptroller General appointed Morris as Assistant to the Comptroller General for Management Services. 

The study group, which consisted of the division directors and a regional manager, held a 

series of meetings which ran through mosl of the 

year. From the beginning, it was clear that none 

of the members were satisfied with the present 

organization. Although aware of the direction 

Staats wanted to go, Keller encouraged the 

members to present their own perspectives on 

the problems GAO encountered in completing 

Its work and possible solutions. Each one submitted a proposed organization ptan. atong with 

alternatives in three categories-remaining structurally alined as is: realining by GAO· s own tasks 

and functions, for example. a division of financial 

audits and a division of program reviews: and 

realining by Federal program and activity. The 

group also solicited comments from others in the 

diviSions and offices. 

In April 1971, the group made its first recommendation-that the existing Office of Policy 

and Special Studies' policymaking responsibilities be separated from its operational responsi124 

bilities by establishing two separate entities. A 

new Office of Pollcy and Program Planning 

would make GAO-wide policy on accounting, 

auditing, and reporting requirements and conduct long-range strategic planning to ensure 

more complete and thorough examination of 

Federal programs and activities. The operational 

responsibilities--automated data processing, financial management. systems analysis. and actuarial science-would be constituted in a Financial and General Management Studies Division 

(FGMSD). Next, the study group proposed establishing an inspection and review program to 

provide an internal audit function for the Office. 

The Comptroller General accepted both recommendations and announced the establishment of FGMSD and the Office of Policy and 

Program Planning, both to take effect in JUly. 

In May the group made its third major recommendation. which was to establish an Assistant to the Comptroller General for Audit Operations who would function largely as an alter ego 

to the Comptroller General-something on the 

order of a general manager discussed briefly in 

Chapter 7. Staats ultimately rejected this proposal. "My basic idea," he said in October 1980, 

"was to hold the divisions responsible. and I 

didn't think we could do that and have somebody imposed between me and the division directors. I also did not see how one individual 

could have in his grasp all of the information 

about ongoing work that was spread among the 

various divisions." He said his judgment was 

confirmed somewhat by the confusion about the 

chain of command that followed the 1972 appointment of two Assistant Comptrollers General 

to oversee audit division operations. 

In August 1971, Keller-s study group proposed a major reorganization of the operating 

divisions. Under his guidance. the group con -

cluded that the accounting and auditing divisions 

should ultimately be organized on a Government 

function and program basis and identified one 

possible approach with seven divisions. The 

group restated its support for an Assistant for 

Audit Operations and suggested the incumbent 

be given general advice about the type of organization desired and a 2-year time limit to com -

plete the reorganization. Group members said 

any multidivisional structure would require close 

coordination to adjust responsibility for assignments as frequently as necessary. They cautioned against a complete reorganization at one 

time as being "much too disruptive." 

For a time, the Comptroller General took this 

proposal under advisement Meanwhile. he acted 

on another grouj> recommendation to establish 

a Procurement Division. As Staats explained it, 

the Procurement Commission on which he 

served had found that the Government had no 

central body concerned about procurement policy. He, therefore, announced establishment of 
a GAO Procurement Division in November 

1971, to set an example of a group that would 

be completely dedicated to the procurement 

process, Implementation, however, was not until 

later. 

CARRYING OUT THE REORGANIZATION 

Between September 1971 and January 1972. 

the Comptroller General studied the group's 

major recommendation and changed the proposed reorganization to his own liking. The final 

organizational alinement. announced on January 25, 1972, reflected his own experiences and 

views. Included in the final plan was a division 

responsible for reviewing Federal personnel and 

compensation programs-a division the study 

group had not proposed. He also rejected gradual implementation. 

In a memorandum to all GAO employees. the 

Comptroller General said: 

These changes are reflected particularly in 

the growing proportion of our effort which 

is deuoted to progmm results reuiews. Gouemmentwide reuiews. and cost/bene/it 

analyses. In order to meet these new deFigaro: 9-4 

OrgaDizational Change. of 

the Geaerat Accounting 

Office, 1971-1972 onu 

(:nmll,,,,,,Uer Gt'"t>'dl Curnptw[\,," (' ... n,-llIl 

"~'lJlllnl Comptlullo!t- Gen"flll- l'kPU'\o C{ompr.oll.>. C"ner"t 

L .. ylsl.u"" Uo1~n 

.~ .... orn.;:u 

Inln",",'Hun -----\-_ I,.I,"mflll.'n 

P"'''')n" .. 1 Mn""!1<"""""I-t-'f' ...... "o.,j Mlln"Y""..,nl Fedndl E.le<:hl.,"~ 

U"o;Of\l,._ 

F~1d ~rllllo"'" ---_Field Ope "llon~ 

Field O1llces Rl1Qlonlil OlllC'e~ 

ClllmJ;;;;;;;;;;;;:======::Z r,.,nJl)Ol1/1t10n ... nd Cl"IIn5 T,"nJpOnllllOn_ 

ThIIlInllllllAi inlCndl!d 10 Indltll,e ooJII the SOUlUlllnd dulinillloni 01 I~ 

mlllOl functions Ind ptII'Sontloll. Ttwre ,ue II numi.wf of mOliements of IICH",11In /II 1o 1 o'!PI ~Uonll l Ie",el§ '"lIllInI nol $hown 

5o.r.:.: Fredllrick C Mosher, "The GAO "he Ount for AccOunl4bllicy In American GoIIQrnmenl " 

mands and opportunities. we haue found 

it necessary to moue toward greater pro- gram and fundional specialization. II 

He also cited four benehts to be derived from 

the reorganization: accelerated growth of program and functional expertise among staff, 

greater opportunity for staff growth and advancement. more timely completion of work, 

and additional assistance to the Comptroller 

General in his expanded responsibilities. The reorganization is shown in Figure 9-4. 

At the same time. Staats announced the establishment of three Assistant Comptroller General positions, one to oversee the Office of Policy, 

the Office of Program Planning, and the Office 

of Internal Review (offices established as a result 

of earlier study group recommendations and restructured at this time) and two to assist the directors of the newly formed divisions and smooth 

the transition. This was the closest he ever came 

to establishing a general manager poSition. Even 

in announcing these three positions. Staats 

vested in the division directors, and not the Assistant Comptrollers General, maximum latitude 

in identifying audit areas, preparing and executing audit plans, preparing final reports, defending 

reports to review groups, and representing GAO 

to the Congress and agency officials. 

During the next 2 months, the division directors-designate, in collaboration with an Implementation Planning Committee headed by Deputy Comrtroller General Keller. prepared their 

individua plans for organization and staffing. 

Each plan identified the Federal agencies, programs, and functions under the division's cognizance, a Comptroller General Order implementing the new responsibilities. and a divisional 

staffing plan. The new organization became effective on April 3. 1972. 

The transition to the new structure went fairly 

smoothly. given the inevitable snags encountered in such a major reorganization. Staffing the 

new divisions became more of a problem than 

planning and executing the work. Looking back, 

the Comptroller General expressed the view that 

the anticipated benefits. except more timely reporting. had been achieved. 

New Organizations In RespoDse 

To Changing Needs 

The 1972 reorganization established the basic 

structure for GAO to conduct its audit and evaluation work. Additional units had to be created 

to respond to major Federal program growth in 

the 1970's and additional functions given to 

GAO. The two largest such units were the Energy 

and Minerals Division (EMD) and the Program 

Analysis Division (PAD). More recently in April 

1980, a third unit joined their ranks-the Institute 

125 
.' 

for Program Evaluation. Useful as these new 

units were in carrying out GAO's expanded roles, 

they also served as a source of new ideas. brought additional disciplines into the organiza· 

tion. and challenged the tried and true ways of 

the existing divisions. 

ENERGY AND MINERALS WORK 

GAO's work in the energy and minerals areas 

evolved along with the Govemment's involve· 

ment in energy activities and growing recognition 

that the supply of many natural resources was 

limited. Earlier energy had not been perceived 

as a national problem. and energy· related pro- grams were scattered throughout a number of 

Federal agencies. GAO's audit efforts were similarly dispersed, and they centered on energy 

issues only to the extent that such Issues affected 

the economy and effiCiency of agency programs. 

These programs were located mostly at the 

Atomic Energy Commission: the Department of 

the Interior: and the p?wer-marketing agencies. 

such as the Bonneville Power Administration. In 

GAO. primary audit responsibility rested with the 

old Civil Division and then the Resources and 

Economic Development Division (RED). 

In the early 1970's. emerging shortages in 

energy, as well as other natural resources, caused 

increasing congressional and public concern. In 

1972 the Comptroller General req uested RED 

to develop a plan describing what GAO could 

and should do in the energy area. A small group 

headed by J. Dexter Peach. then assistant to the 

director for planning in RED. prepared the plan. 

In a forerunner to what was to become the GAO- wide planning process. RED's energy plan set 

forth proposed lines of effort. identified specific 

jobs, and established job priorities. Following formal presentation and approval of the plan, the 

Comptroller General established an Energy Projects Group in RED to further plan and coordinate 

GAO's energy work. 

World events soon made the energy work 

more crucial. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War 

followed shortly thereafter, and with it came the 

OPEC oil embargo, long gasoline lines. and 

steeply rising petroleum prices. In December 

Staats established a new Office of Energy and 

Special Projects (OESP) to give energy issues 

more visibility and emphasis in GAO. The Office 

was placed under the direction of PhiUip S. Hughes, who was named an Assistant Comptroller General. RED's Energy Projects staff was 

transferred to the new office. In his announcement, the Comptroller General stated. "While 

we have increased our work related to energy 

programs over the past two or three years, it is 

necessary that we strengthen our activities in this 

area. " 12 

The new office assumed audit and liaison responsibility for the newly established Federal 

Energy Administration (FEA) and any statutory 

responsibilities placed on GAO regarding energy 

data collection and analysis. OESP also took on 

GAO's duties under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 

Act for reviewing the collection of information 

required by independent regulatory agencies 

and the approval of requests for collection of 

information proposed to be sent out by those 

agencies. 

One of Hughes' first initiatives was to recruit 

the staff that OESP needed, especially a new 

director. He had urged the Comptroller General 

to bring in someone who had fresh perceptions 

of energy problems and who would be less inhibited by the GAO climate and organization. The person selected was Monte Canfield, Jr .. a 

former Bureau of the Budget and Department 

of the Interior official who was completing work 

as deputy director of the Ford Foundation's EnDIE ENERGV PROBLEM IS SYMBOUZED here by gasoline lines stretchmg 8S far as the eye can see along Rockville Pike In M.ryland 

126 
ergy Policy Project. Hughes also encouraged the 

Comptroller General to bring in staff having 

backgrounds in other than accounting and business who would be more willing to take risks and 

focus more on the present and future than the 

past. His theory was that such recruits would 

attract still others having similar skills and inclinations. Not all in GAO agreed that this approach 

was appropriate for an audit organization. but 

Hughes' approach prevailed, the objective being 

to advance the cause of program results reviews. 

OESP's Energy Projects staff was responsible 

for developing overall plans and objectives for 

GAO's energy-related efforts. Its strategy was to 

try to do a lot of problem anticipation. For example. its first report on nuclear reactor development examined the past. present. and future 

of the liquid-metal fast breeder reactor program 

then being given highest national priority. In the 

materials area. which the new office had also 

been assigned. OESP tried to do work anticipating possible shortages. The thrust was toward 

the future. that is. equipping the Congress and 

the world in general to better see problems 

coming. 

In September 1974. OESP was renamed the 

Office of Special Programs. It retained its responsibilities for (1) GAO-wide planning and coordination of energy and materials studies. (2) 

special studies in these areas. and (3) regulatory 

reports review. It also acquired lead division responsibility for GAO's work on food programs. 11 

Meanwhile, the Government's energy activities were also undergoing transformation. The 

Atomic Energy Commission's responsibilities 

were split into two new agencies--the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration. On 

October I , 1977. that latter agency. FEA. and 

other energy activities were combined under the 

newly formed Department of Energy. The laws 

establishing these agencies and other laws shaping U.S. energy policy gave GAO increased authority and responsibility for reviewing energy 

activities: 

• The Federal Energy Administration Act of 

1974 mandated the Comp.troller General 

to "monitor and evaluate' FEA's operations by conducting four specific types of 

studies, including review and evaluation of 

FEA's collection and analysis of energy 

data. " 

• The Energy Policy and Conservation Ac~ 

of 1975 authorized the Comptroller General to conduct independent verification 

examinations of energy data. mcluding authority to inspect the books and records of 

private persons and companies under certain conditions. even when there was no 

contractual relationship between the private entity and the Government. 15 

• The Energy Conservation and Production 

Act of 1976 established a Professional Audit Review Team. the chairman to be designated by the Comptroller General. to review energy infonnation activities. 16 

In June 1976. the Comptroller General established the Energy and Minerals Division and 

gave it audit responsibility for the major Federal 

energy and minerals agencies and for interrelationships among all Federal departments. agencies. and programs involving energy and minerals. RED became the Community and Economic 

Development Division and assumed responsibility for the food programs work formerly 

housed in the Office of Special Programs. EMD's 

predecessor. The regulatory reports review functions mandated by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act 

were transferred to the General Government 

Division. 

Thus, OESP. which had a special mission and 

was populated by staff drawn from both within 

and outside GAO. evolved into a regular audit 

division. However. it continued to retain its former character under Canfield. When both he 

and Hughes left GAO in the late 1970' s, leadership was assumed by J. Dexter Peach, the career GAO employee who had helped get the 

new unit started. Many of the vestiges of EMD's 

original mold remain in place. and all of GAO 

has been innuenced by its evolution. 

PROGRAM ANALYSIS WORK 

At the time OESP was established in December 1973. the Congress was still 6 months away 

from giving its final approval to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. 

but the functions GAO would assume under the 

act had already crystallized. The Office knew that 

its program evaluation role would be strengthened and that it would get increased program 

and budget information responsibilities. Originally. OESP was slated to take on these added 

functions, and Monte Canfield came to GAO 

with the idea he would be involved in both energy and the budget. 

After a while. it became apparent these two 

jobs were too large for anyone person or organization. Therefore, in September 1974, the 

Comptroller General established an Office of 

Program and Budget Analysis (OPBA) to help 

support the new congressional budget process. 

Harry S. Havens. previously with OMB. became 

its first director 1 month later. 

In outlining how the new office would operate. the Comptroller General said: "OPBA will 

identify and evaluate major budget issues using 

multidisciplinary teams capable of assessing the 

options and the economic. financial and social 

impacts of different actions. " " Specifically. 

OPBA's responsibilities included: 

127 
• macroanalysis of major budget and fiscal 

issues. 

• budget-related revenue analysis. • analysis of executive budget and support- ing data. 

• coordination of GAO-wide support of the 

congressional budget process. 

• impoundment review and reporting. and 

• liaison with the Congressional Budget Of- fice and the Budget Committees. 

OPBA was to employ professional specialists 

in the various budget functional areas-national 

defense. transportation. agriculture. and so forth. GAO divisions and offices would carry out their 

nonmal program evaluation work as in the past. 

but OPBA was to use the results of that work in 

its budget studies, and the other divisions and 

offices were to support OPBA's studies as nec- essary. GAO's divisions had been accustomed 

to operating autonomously, so this blueprint for 

mutual cooperation represented a significant departure from past practices-one not welcome 

by most segments of the organization. When OPBA was created, the Congressional 

Budget and Impoundment Control Act had just 

been enacted and the Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO) was not yet in existence. Although 

both GAO and CBO would clearly have important responsibilities under the act. it was not clear 

how those responsibilities would differ. Under 

these circumstances, OPBA was to be the focal 

point for any of GAO's responsibilities under the 

act that did not fit readily into GAO's existing 

A Separate Organization Reviews Energy Information 

In the 1970'5. the lack of credible energy data and analyses not only made it hard for the 

Congress. the President. and the executive departments to evaluate the array of energy 

altematives facing the country but also contributed to the widespread public skepticism over 

the seriousness of the energy crisis. Therefore. the Congress provided for an independent 

Office of Energy (nformation and Analysis in FEA to gather energy data and furnish statistical 

analyses and forecasts. In 1977 these duties were transferred to the Energy Information 

Administration lElA) with the creation of the Department 01 Energy. One of the smallest and probably least known organizations spawned by the energy 

crisis is the Professional AudIt Review Team. which looks and acts more like a board or 

commission. and was formed in 1976 to oversee Federal energy data collection and analysis 

activities and report to the Congress and the President. 

The review team consists of representatives appointed by five Federal agencies involved 

in data collection and analysis-the Securities and Exchange Commission, Bureau of Labor 

Statistics. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of the Census. and Council of Economic Advisers. The chairman is appointed by the Comptroller General. and in its 4-year existence. the 

two incumbenrs have been career GAO officials in the Energy and Minerals Division IEMD). The team meets periodically. at the call of the chair, to plan and review the progress of its 

work and to discuss repor! drafts. The staff work is conducted by two full-time GAO staff 

members and a part-time staff director ana such other persons as are needed during peak 

periods. Personnel costs and other expenses are funded by the participating agencies I mostly 

GAO): there is no separate appropriation or other source of funds. So for, the team has issued three annual reports. The first . issued in December 1977. was 

quite critical of many aspects of the then Office of Energy Information and Analysis' acrivities. It cited limited progress in meeting legislative requirements. a lack of independence from the 

energy policy function. and the absence of means to determine the credibility of the computer 

model used to make many analyses. The team's second report was much more positive in 

commenting on the newly created EIA. 

The third report. issued in 1980. occupied a middle ground by praisina the continued 

independence of the data col/ection and analysis function and several recent EIA accomplishments. but it pointed out a need to 11) place more emphasis on validating energy information, 

(2) improve implementation of plans to improve the credibility of energy models. and (3) 

conduct user surveys in developing a National Energy Informotion System. 

The team's reports look and read a lot like GAO reports. but neither the Comptroller 

General nor the Director. EMD. exercises any direct supervision or review of the draft reports. The other Federal agency representatives participate as equal partners and would likely object 

to direct control in any way by GAO. The staff is preparing a detailed work plan following the 

GAO format. but the committee passing judgment on it will be the team and not any GAO 

planning body. Interest in energy information continues on the Hill. so the team could be in business for 

many years to come. 

128 
organizational structure and methods of analysis. Thus. OPBA's structure emphasized two dimen- sions of analysis. both centering on budget de- cisions. The first was analysis. grounded in eco- nomics. of overall fiscal policy and the economic 

impact of program alternatives. The second di- mension was analysis of the program impact of 

alternative budget strategies. 

During the early part of the winter of 1974- 75, this focus appeared reasonable. Indeed. it 

was validated by a request from the House and 

Senate Budget committees that GAO (through 

OPBA) and the Congressional Research SelVice 

cooperate in supporting a "dry run" of the new 

budget process. In effect. the two agencies were 

asked to fill a void left by CBO's delayed 

activation. By the spring of 1975. however. OPBA' s environment began to change. CBO was beginning 

to take shape. and its organizational structure 

and stated areas of emphasis raised concern 

about potential overlap with OPBA. Then came 

the Senate Budget Committee Chainnan's re- action and the cutback in OPBA funding previ- ously discussed in chapter 6. As this was occur- ring, the Comptroller General changed OPBA's 

name to the Office of Program Analysis. Shortly 

thereafter, the CongreSSional Infonnation Ser- vices Group, which was responsible for carrying 

out GAO's program and budget information du- ties and had a staff of 66. was transferred from 

the Financial and General Management Studies 

Division to the new office. The transfer had the 

effect of consolidating in the Office of Program 

Analysis those GAO responsibilities under the 

budget act which were Governmentwide in 

character. l! became clear during this period that some 

elements of OPBA' s original mission were no 

longer appropriate for the Office of Program 

Analysis, Accordingly, its mission was redefined: 

from then on. it would: 

• Prepare analyses having a broad perspec- tive, particularly where economic factors 

are important and major program impli- cations are involved. 

• Provide leadership and assistance in focus- ing GAO's analytical resources to support 

congressional decisionmaking processes for 

such major program issues. • Improve the usefulness of and access to 

Federal fiscal, budgetary. and program- related information for the Congress. 

• Increase the effectiveness and improve the 

quality of evaluation studies provided to the 

Congress. • Provide leadership in fulfilling GAO's re- sponsibility for reviewing. monitoring. and 

reporting to the Congress on executive 

branch impoundment actions. I" 

Because of the increasing responsibilities as- signed to the Office of Program Analysis and the 

significant increase in the size of its staff. an organizational change. effective July 4, 1976. des- ignated the office as the Program Analysis Di- vision (PAD). The basic mission remained the 

same. except for transfer of the impoundment 

control responsibility to the Office of the General 

Counsel. (See ch. 15.) 

From the creation of OPBA through mid- 1977. there was confusion inside GAO about the 

role of the new organization vis-a-vis that of the 

more traditional operating divisions. Such confusion was unavoidable given the nontraditional 

mission and staff composition of PAD. 

Unlike most 01 the other divisions, PAD was 

staffed larg~ly with speCialists, representing dis- Ciplines which had preViously not been found in 

substantial numbers in GAO. The only divisions 

having a similar concentration of specialists, 

FGMSD and EMD, had missions which were 

markedly different from that of PAD. EMD's 

mission was like that of most other operating 

divisions in that it was defined in terms of the 

issue areas. operating agencies. and programs 

for which it was responsible. FGMSD used its 

specialists to provide technical assistance to op- erating divisions. PAD. on the other hand, was 

expected to make certain sorts of reviews-like 

any other operating division-but its mission was 

defined primarily in tenns of the skills to be employed and the nature of the analysis. rather than 

the agencies or programs to be reviewed. 

The resulting controversy centered on PAD's 

responsibility for evaluation studies and studies 

based on economic analysis. That controversy, which had produced periodic disagreements with 

other divisions over individual reviews, came to 

a head at a Program Planning Committee meet- ing on May 31 and June 1. 1977. The uncer- tainty expressed by the other divisions about 

PAD's role led the Comptroller General to con- clude that the time had come to clarify PAD's 

mission and responsibilities. 

Two weeks later. Staats prepared and circu- lated a paper which (1) identified several issue 

areas for which PAD was to be responsible. (2) 

stated explicitly that PAD would do work in these 

issue areas that would affect programs within the 

jurisdiction of other divisions. (3) emphasized the 

need for interdivisional cooperation and agree- ment in these reviews. and (4) established a 

means of resolving any disputes. '" The issue 

areas assigned to PAD at that time were: 

• evaluation guidelines and methodology, • co ngressional budget and program 

information, 

• tax policy. • regional and national economic problems. 

and 

• alternative approaches or methods to 

achieve Federal program objectives. 

129 
In October 1977, a small segment of the Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division was 

transferred to PAD. This group was responsible 

for coordinating with the Office of Technology 

Assessment, supporting the Comptroller General 

as a member of the Technology Assessment 

Advisory Council, and providing Staais staff support involving science policy matters. Later, the 

National Science Foundation audit function was 

transferred to PAD, and it was assigned overall 

planning responsibility and leadership for the science policy issue area. 

The position of GAO Chief Economist was 

established in PAD on September 18, 1978, to 

emphasize the emerging importance of this discipline in GAO's work and to ensure the availability of high quality advice on economic matters for the Comptroller General and other senior 

GAO officials, SpecificaUy, the position was established to provide more economic analysis in 

GAO reviews of Federal proErams and policy 

and to better ensure that GAO presented to the 

Congress clear and consistent positions on economic matters. 

By the end of 1979, PAD's functions had stabilized under four major issue areas-science 

policy, evaluation guidelines and methodology. 

l 

• 

'" ~ 

, I , 

~ • .; ... .i 

- .. " 

J'~ " 

_ -""h 

~. If 

.,\' ?l • 

program and budget information for congressional use, and economic analYSis of altemative 

program approaches-with organizational units 

to match. As was the case with EMD, PAD began 

operating and looking more and more like other 

GAO divisions, but it retained some of the unique 

character associated with iis origins and the staff 

who populated it Also like EMD, its original director was succeeded by a career GAO official, 

Morton A. Myers. The turf battles seem to have 

subSided, and PAD has become generally accepted by the rest of GAO. 

INSTITUTE FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION 

Vet another new organization was created in 

April 1980, this time to help ensure that GAO 

used the best available methodology in its work. 

The institute was mentioned briefly in chapter 

3 in connection with the evolution of GAO's evaluation capability. lis origins are also discussed 

in chapter 11 as part of the discussion on GAO's 

methodology. The focus here is on how the institute was organized, staffed, and expected to 

operate. 

As was the case with predecessors to EMU 

and PAD, the institute was placed under the direct supervision of an Assistant Comptroller GenCOMPUTER SPECIAUST TERESA KENNER DEMONSTRATES NEW COMPUTER APPLICATION '0 f.now 

Program Analysts Division staffers ( 1. to r.l Dorothy Fegen. Ron Ramsey. Lou Femheimer, and Gloria Hernandez 

130 
eral. this time Harry Havens. In a departure from 

past practice. however, the Comptroller General 

announced that the person selected to head the 

institute would have an established reputation 

in the program evaluation community. The or- ganization was put on notice that someone from 

outside would be hired_ven before a search 

for candidates had been conducted. Eventually. Eleanor Chelimsky. a Mitre Corporation executive and president-elect of the Evaluation Re- search SOCiety, was selected. Most of the institute's initial staff were drawn 

from PAD's program evaluation group and part 

of FGMSD's technical assistance group. The in - stitute's initial duties were to: 

• Provide technical assistance to GAO op- erating staffs with increased emphasis on 

project design. 

• Develop evaluation methods as required 

by title VII of the budget act. 

• Make program evaluations to demonstrate 

new or improved methodologies. • Update GAO policy guidance to make sure 

that it reflects the best current practices for 

conducting program evaluations. 

• Develop a professional interchange program with other evaluation organizations. 

• Maintain a visiting committee of evaluation 

experts'o 

Following 2 months of studying her new man- date and successfully recruiting a deputy. also 

from outside GAO. Chelimsky outlined the in - stitute's new organization in September' \ 

Members of the Evaluation Research and 

Diffusion Group are to have "carte blanche" to 

conduct program evaluations in any substantive 

areas where they can contribute by demonstrat- ing new techniques. using old techniques in a 

new way. or testing recently developed evalua- tive or analyocal tools in a real-world environFigure 9-5 

ment. The group is to be as concerned about 

how evaluations are used by program managers. 

legislators. and others as it is about how the eval- uations are conducted. One project planned is 

to examine different GAO management levels' 

perceptions of how GAO reports are and should 

be used. The goal is to help people conducting 

evaluations tailor their information so that it has 

optimal potential for being used and acted upon. 

The Methodology Development. Standards. 

and Test Group is to take a pracocal approach. 

focusing on structuring new ways of doing things 

for which there is a documented need. This 

group also is to be responsible for spreading the 

word among agencies and congressional staff 

about ways of conducting evaluations, use of 

data. appropriateness of analytical techniques. 

and so forth. "In effect. the group is GAO's intelligence arm for methodology," Chelimsky 

said. It plans to develop an inventory of existing 

data bases maintained by Federal. State, county, and municipal governments and to devise ways 

of making the data compatible. The Specialized Skills Technical Assistance 

Grou}r-in essence. the technical assistance group 

transferred from FGMSD when the institute was 

established-is to continue making statistical 

analyses. developing questionnaires and sur- veys, and providing other assistance. as well as 

applying new techniques developed within the 

institute. The Evaluations Transfer Group is to work 

with Personnel to teach evaluation techniques 

to GAO staff members and to follow up on tech- nical assistance. " In size and scope. this may be 

the biggest effort ever undertaken by any agency 

in methodology training. " Chelimsky noted. The institute's Policy Liaison Group maintains 

liaison with the research community. Govern- ment evaluation organizations. congressional 

staff. and agencies. One of its projects is to help 

congressional staff members make hearings more 

Organization of the Institute for Program Evaluation 

Director Rotating Visiting 

Institute for Program Evaluation Committee 

I I I I 

Evaluation Methodology Specialized Evaluation Policy Research and Development. Skills Technical Transfer Liaison Diffusion Standards, and Assistance Group Group Group Test Group Group 

131 
effective by helping them understand evaluation 

procedures SO they can ask pertinent questions. 

The pohcy group also works closely with a Rotating Research Visiting Committee. The six 

members of thisconsultant panel serve 1 -year 

terms. dunng whIch they meet periodically with 

the institute's staff. 

Reorganizing The Handling Of 

Defense Issues 

Although it was generally agreed that the 

1972 reorganization had served the Office well. 

a feeling persisted that GAO's work in the national defense area was not as effective or well 

coordinated as it could be. In June 1980, four 

management vacancies opened up through retirements and departures and created an unanticipated opportunity for GAO to take a look at 

its defense-related efforts. The Comptroller General delayed filling these vacancies and commissioned Robert Moot. former Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (C;0mptroller), to conduct a special 

study of GAO s defense work and organization. 

The study focused on these questions. 

• Is GAO properly organized to carry out 

defense work? 

• Are defense-related issue areas scoped in 

the most logical manner? 

• Have things changed since the 1972 re- organization to suggest a restructuring of 

areas of responsibility between the Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division 

(PSAD) and the Logistics and Communication Division (LCD)?" 

Following 3 months of study and discussion 

with people in GAO, the Congress. the Department of Defense, and elsewhere. Moot prese!'ted his views to the Comptroller General. He 

saId GAO should (1) add emphasis to effectiveness ~ork through more reviews of military 

forces capabilIty to accomplish their assigned 

mIsSIons. (2) proVide for comprehensive review 

of defense force structure from "development 

to deployment," and (3) merge LCD and PSAD. 

He advocated that GAO reaffirm its policy not 

to question U.S. foreIgn policy or military threat 

assessment or force plans. but recommended 

that it examine the operation of Governmentwide functions to determine the efficiency and 

economy with which resources are used. For the 

merged division. Mr. Moot suggested an organizational structure along DOD mission lines 

such as strategic forces. general purpose forces: 

and research and development. The division 

would also retain jurisdiction over some civilian 

agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy. 

Rather than implement these recommenda -

tions. the Comptroller General opted to give 

132 

those who. would have long-range responsibility 

for managm~ defense activities an opportunity 

to assess theIT ments and conSIder other possible 

options. He turned this job over to Thomas 0 

Morris, the former GAO official who had bee~ so intimately involved in the 1972 reorganization 

and who had headed GAO's defense work in 

the. early 1970's. Morris was appointed Special 

ASSIstant to the Comptroller General in charge 

of LCD and PSAD and was made responsible 

for developmg fmal recommendations to the 

Comptroller General by December 31. 1980. 

Although the Comptroller General made no 

organizational changes at the time of Morris appointment in September 1980, he said: "It is 

clear to me * * * that changes-some rather 

fundamental-must be made to strengthen our 

effectiveness in the defense area. ,. Staats had no 

preconception about what kind of organization 

GAO should have when he launched the Moot 

study. Even after the study was completed, he 

had no resolution in mind more specific than that 

a change was needed to give greater stress to 

defense issues while preserving its GovernmentWIde character. consistent with the concepts underlying the 1972 reorganization. 

Morris completed his work a bit ahead of 

schedule, enabling the Comptroller General to 

announce the specific organization changes on 

December 22. First. he established a small but 

very senior Defense Programs Planning and 

AnalYSIS Staff to conduct continuous studies of 

defense issues and to delineate problems warranting greater coordination between divisions 

especially by the formation of joint teams. Sec: 

ond. he realined the responsibilities of PSAD and 

LCD into two new divisions-the Mission Anal· 

ysis and Systems Acquisition Division and the 

Procurement,. Logistics, and Readiness DivisIon-to obtam a better focus on key issues and 

congressional concerns. The goal was to enhance the contribution of GAO's reviews of major weapons and other systems involving large 

mvestments. whIle at the same time focusing 

mor~ attention on readiness, economy. and 

effiCIency. 

To exercise direction and overSight of these 

new ~nits on behalf of the Comptroller General. 

Morns was appointed Special Assistant for Defense and Material Management Studies. The 

re:-,ised divisions are to remain fully separate entities hke other GAO divisions. In addition. to 

help develop GAO's plans across the full spectrum of mission analyses, manpower. systems 

acqUISItion, procurement. logistics and readiness. 

a Comptroller General Consultants Panel on 

Defense Programs will be established. The revised organization is shown in figure 9-6. 

Although cautious at first to make basic 

changes in GAO's organization structure. the 

Comptroller General gradually molded the structure to make it more capable of carrying out its 
Figure 9-6 

Headquarters Organization To Conduct 

Defense And Material Management Studies 

I D.t!l'nr.e Progrnrns I Con~uhan1 !'",wl Comptroller General I r.~\o 0. R.v_d ("'" ... n'" INoe ...... ' 

I I I ~pl'cltll ASSlSllmt lur CH!'~n'k' J Miltl'!1II1 MIII'I69l'm~'''l ~tod ..... , ~ G"",' Co"n~' .n<! A~."n' I Comp!rolk~ Gcnero/ll 

lJd"!lS~ ProghlmsP!,mmng I & A!h'JhN~ ~lo1fj 

I ~--- --T-r-----·---------, I l MinIOn AndlY"~ & SYMcm~ I 

AcqUISItion OIl.oI)IOn 

I PrO(UII'lnl'nl , Log!~Uc~ lind I H","rJ n('~s DII,II)lon 

~ MISS-lOll An{liyo;e, I H Gcnel.'ll PrOCllll'ml(n! I 

._.~Sy$II!m) Dev,"lopml'nl i dud Acqul)IIIOn H ~uppl\o' . MDUll{'nllnceJ 

& Dlsillbuhon 

Command Com'llunoc,,'lUlh ., I --1 Fac,hl~) ACGulsd,on I 

& MlinagelTWnl 

COlli!"] & Inlelh':.lenc ... 

--l R,'jldlnO(S!> I 

missions. Without the 1972 reorganization. it is 

unlikely GAO would have moved as far as it did 

toward reviewing Federal activities without regard to organization boundaries in the executive 

branch. To put it simply. the Office was organized 

in 1966 to review activities of Federal agencies. 

Today. issue areas that often cross agency organizational boundaries dominate the way GAO 

plans and executes its work. However. the tendency in Congress and the executive branch even 

today is to focus attention often on organization 

rather than program. function or mission. GAO 

filled the gap resulting from the focus on organization by means that included organizing its 

own operations along program and functional 

lines. 

I u.s Genm.1 Accounbng Ollaee. Amu.OII/ Repof1 Q/ the Comprrollf!f (;en noI, 1949 rwashmglOn. DC GPO. I%jll, pp 50 57 

2 U 5 Cocnen.1 Accounllng OlllCe. Anmltll Repa" of th ... Ct)"'pt,oJk, G...., noI. 1955 !W.uhJnY'lDn. DC GPO 195b1 p 94 

3 Us. General Accounling OIhclt. AnnUl'll R~'JXIfI of rh .. Complm/lt!r Gt'n 

ertll. 1957 1Washlngton, 0 C GPO. i9"~ 1 p 230 

<\ 0.5 Cony. Hoo~ . CommIni(' on GoYemnwnl Ope'oluor~ The Ge~roI 

Accouru!njl Office, 84th Cong .. 20d ~ H Rep! 22(IIl (Wolshrngton 0 C 

GPO. 1956). pp 1 24 

5 Cllmpullller Geno!rtll J~Jlh Campbell Memllr""dulII Oullm.' (II 

Planned Changes In OtgtInWltilln lInd OPllrll~onS . JO Nov tlJ55 pp 2, 01 

6 Complroller Grne,al CIIU1pbell Memorandum 01 :m Nov 1955. pp 34 

I Fm.lllllli Pl'!5t!!lm:1 ;:.nd I I Dlh!!! Dlv l~ on, I ComO"'I)illion Dlvl)lon 

{;undu<L. 'I' (oatdln"' .... U , .. ~ ... "" "11 ha .... ..,..,.. cr>n(",nI "'0111 

"I ""lu01'\l '''.1111<1'''''' ,,, .. "'oJ ."'~ . r ... t..n.., .U~I '''. 

7 H Rq» 2264. PI' 23 2<1 

8 Charld E Hughll!l, "Th\! OwI'Sl.'/I.Ii Ott~e5 of the GenerCiI Accounting 

OIf1ce" The GAO Rel/lelll, (Summur 1971). p 130 

9 "N~ lIIId Nott.'S " ~ QO.O Review. (Winter 19(7), pp 74 76 

10 DaVId P Somodo, Mlu'lbger Washlnglan RegiIlnaJ Offic(" MimlOfilndum 

10 DirectOl' Offlee 01 Management lInd Planning St!rvices. 21j JUI'IO( 1971 

II Comptroller General Suw,m, Memo!'lIoC.um It) aD ernp!OVI?'5 01 the Gen· era! Accounling Offle<:, 25 J"n 1972 

12 Comptroller Gent.'fal Sll14~, Ml'mOfancium to heads of divbltJns ond 01 fie>!!>, ·Org.nlMlkmal Change In lhe Gerte1al Ac:rounllng ornee." III Dec. 11)73 

]3 "Funhl:r Modllk:nhom In GAO OrW'nLalnon," GAO MOf1(lgrmrmr Nfl .... 

16 Sept 1974 p 2 

14 15 USC 771(11 ) ()974), F.:d ... 'flI1 Energy Admln~lTilllon Act of 1974 

I!) 42 USC !).1H1. lIVe: 501 , Energy POlicy and ConSC!rv~ticm Act. 

I b Ptrblk Lnw 94 38.0, IAug 14, 1 'J7{)I, En\<tgV Conserv3rian dn(.! f"ooUCllon 

"" 17 GAO O"!'I~nlt!nr Ne~. 16 Sept 1974. p. 2 

18 ~usy OirKtOl. Plogram Arlllll/SlS 0i1llSlOll. Memorandum 10 Spt.'C1II1 

AS$llIlInI 10 fhl' ComplfOUI:f G...'T\CfaJ R L Spmy, 3 Mal, 1980, "tutehmen!. 

p 3 

Iq EucuD\ll' Secro,!l./Iry. PI'ogrClm PS"mullg Commlnl.'C. Memorandum 10 

Pl-OQfilm Plartnlng Commrnllll 5 June 1977. a~hmvnl 

20 Comptrollel ~rwlill,5taars Ml!InOfandum 10 he~ ol dlVTlions lmd 01 ocn. 18 Apr 1980 p S 

21 "Group HeMs Nanwd 10.- Program EvaluaOOn InsrilU(I! " G\O MonGgI!'· mml NflWJ;, 16 Sept 19t1O. p. 2 

22 " What Is thl' &$1 WIlY lor GAO 10 ~a.l WIth OefenM ls,sueJ'" GAO 

Manogemt.'tlf Nt:un, IOJunl' 19liO, p 1 

ZJ Complrollrn C"nt'flll SlNlIli, MOlmorolndUIII 10 hl'lIili of dlvl1lOrts .lind 01 

liclls. 22 [ko( 1980 

133 
CCDuc[ll~l100 J1 ® 

Program Planning 

• 

\. 

GAO did little central planning and program- ing of work prior to 1966. In those days of simpler missions, the headquarters divisions and regional offices scheduled staffs and Jobs rather 

independently, using processes that best met 

each unit's perceived needs. Audit topics, other 

than those assigned by congressional requests 

and work required by statute. were chosen al- most entirely at the operating level. The results 

typically were very useful in addressing narrow 

or transient problems but seldom touched on 

larger matters outside the bounds of a single 

Federal agency or program. During the period 1966-81. GAO moved to- ward a larger, more substantive function associated more with broad national issues. In this 

environment, management believed that better 

planning was necessary to make maximum u~e 

of resources. In addition. it would make GAO s 

work more timely and relevant by anticipating 

congressional needs for information and other 

support. The approach would require acclimating the institution to strategic planning concepts. After much cutting and trying, the Office put 

in place a system of planning. programing. and 

scheduling in the context of national issues-en- ergy, transportation, military readiness. occu- pational safety. and the like. As shown In chapter 

9, the headquarters divisions were reorganized 

to match. Not everyone was entirely satisfied 

with the details. but the system and its objectives 

seemed to be sound and to be functioning rea - sonably well. Eventually about 90 percent of the 

GAO work was classified as falling within the 

program plans developed through this system. 

What made this planning necessary was 

GAO's legal charter. Various laws authorize the 

Office to select audits, reviews, and evaluations 

on its own in addition to work generated by spe- cific congressional request or mandated by law. For instance, the Legislative Reorganization Act 

of 1970 requires the Comptroller General to: 

• • • review and analyze the results of 

Government programs and activities 

• • • when ordered by either House of 

Congress or upon his own initiative 

••• 

Almost /Wo-thirds of GAO's work fell in this 

category. Topics of likely interest to the Congress. of course, got the greatest emphasis. Prior- ity was given to audits and evaluations of on- going Federal programs, studies of alternative 

solutions to important problems, and opportunities to reduce program costs. 

How GAO came to recognize the need for 

better planning and to develop a system is this 

134 

chapter's tale. It starts by describing where the 

planning rudiments began-at the working level. 

The Bottoms-Up Process Of Job 

Selection 

GAO's own choice of assignments under its 

statutory responsibilities has traditionally germinated at the local level. During the Warren and - Campbell years, GAO established audit sites in 

Federal agencies and expanded its field staffs 

following the advent of corporation aud,ts, com- prehensive auditing, and onsite contract audIt- ing. There, auditors in the course of ongoing 

work spot "pay dirt" : instances of waste, Inefficient operations, departures from policy and re~

ulations, or other anomalies and propose audIts 

of them. Alert auditors also find leads in the pub- lic media and elsewhere. I 

Many worthwhile" audit subje~ts emanat~d 

from the "bottom up in the 1950 sand 1960 s. 

as they still do. Suggestions from regional office 

and headquarters operating staffs continued to 

be the chief source of study subjects. But lacking 

central coordination, as in the early 1960's, the 

audit subjects chosen were sometimes parochial 

or fragmentary or overlapped work. done else- where in GAO or by other Institutions. Some 

audits were undertaken not so much on merit 

as to use available time of staff aSSigned at given 

locations. The headquarters groups and audit 

sites. loosely linked, were strictly Federal agency 

oriented, and undertook few GovernmentWlde 

studies. There was rivalry in those days among 

and within the divisions. heightened by an in- centive system in some units that valued high- visibility audit topics and quantity production of 

reports. Schedules were often unattuned to 

congressional timetables, and work proceeded 

at its own pace. though sometimes interrupted 

by more pressing matters. 

Top Management Initiatives 

Needed At "The Front End" 

The situation was largely beyond top man- agement's control. The Comptroller General had 

no practical means of influencing what work got 

into the pipeline and had little say until finished 

reports emerged for Signature. It was then too 

late to reverse assignment choices or undo the 

hundreds. perhaps thousands, of staff-days spent 

on a review of transient value. There could be 

little accountability for resources expended ver- sus results achieved. 

The rising need for centralized coordination 

was manifested publicly in the Holifield hearings 

of 1965. (See ch. 1.) GAO was roundly criticized 

for. among other things. repetitive. narrow re-
ports and lack of timeliness. The new Comp-

~ troller General. 2 months after entering office in 

1. MarcnT966, 9.ul!inecr-h1iJn!eOUQ.Jrlstall com- { prehensive planning. and contrQLancl. i{1f=~d 

Congr= C.bgt.Jjolifi&ldJ.r:l.s J.\Jl\L19Ji6.l!'1ter 

,(8-1074711. Though the first efforts were at the 

division level, the need for GAO wi~ng 

_ S:mm::!5egwle...apparent. Management would 

nave tQ revive the organization. induce a sense 

of urgency in scheduling, and bring more order 

and wider horizons to the choice of audit subjects. 

How Program Planning Emerged 

Due to the unique character of the institution 

and the new courses being pursued. developing 

an effective planning process took considerable 

work and study. Having no' planning models to 

reference. the only feasible approach was a prag- matic one: to try various approaches to see what 

worked and what did not and to engage the staff 

in rethinking GAO's missions and how to go 

about them. It was slow going. especially to con- vince largely autonomous officials accustomed 

to exploiting targets of opportunity that there 

were virtues in scheduling finite staff-days, job 

milestones. and aSSignment completion dates 

according to a plan and subject to centralized 

control. 1\ Two steos got the process oping A Pr0Ftlm 1 pranning Committee repel consistin9-Q the 

Cqrn.2!rpller Gener;jLm.d..seniQ[ _0.89.,Jlfficials. -was fOimeaTrlJulv 1967 to ",,,iew short-range 

(6-monthl and long-range (3-year) plans then 

req uired of the operating divisions' At the same 

time the first Office-wide program planning staff 

began functioning led by Assistant to the Comp- troller General Lawrence J. Powers and Assistant 

Director Harry C. Kensky. It was charged with 

providing leadership in devising a programing. scheduling. and reporting system for GAO. In 

the beginning this activity consisted mainly of 

reviewing work plans prepared by the divisions 

and analysis and projections of staff-hours and 

job milestones. The long-range plans prepared by the three 

audit divisions in the 1960' s forecasted staff re- sources and use by "responsibility area. " the 

scope of division subunits which. in tum. con- formed to the organizational lines of the exec- utive agencies and bureaus for which they had 

audit responsibility. · The plans projected staff- year requirements by "lines of effort"(see p.l401 

and major jobs expected to start in both the 

short-range and long-range timeframes. 

In the early years. the long-range plans were 

put together by the audit staffs. Apart from a few 

groups which had been experimenting with a 

three-legged management structure that in - cluded a planning officer. few people in the di- visions had full-time responsibility for planning. Auditors accustomed to going from one job to 

the next were unfamiliar with planning concepts 

and uncomfortable with predicting what they 

would be doing 6 months from now. let alone 

3 years ahead. The very idea seemed to threaten 

their freedom to choose targets of opportunity 

as they came along. Preparing the plans also 

disrupted ongoing work as the staffs typically interrupted projects for several days to prepare the 

new and extensive documentation required. 

DUring a series of meetings called the " fall 

review." the Program Planning Committee reviewed the divisions' long-range plans with division management and the staff assigned to 

carry them out. To foster coordination and cross- fertilization of ideas. GAO officials with similar 

responsibilities were encouraged to attend. In 

reality. most of the sessions turned out to be 

"dog and pony" shows where staff described 

their showcase jobs and tried to impress their 

THE PROGRAM PLANNING COMMITTEE meets on an Issue area program plan 

135 
bosses with the priority of their responsibility area 

and the significance of the work planned. Even 

SO ~ the sessions gave top management broader 

exposure to the working-level staff and enabled 

the Comptroller General to convey his own ideas 

about what work should be undertaken. 

The divisions' short-range plans listing assignments to be performed in the next 6 months. 

completed in November and May. were to be 

resource allocation and planning tools for the 

regional offices. But the work actually begun 

deviated so much from what was shown in these 

plans that they were eventually abandoned. 

Still this kind of planning was a start. It 

brought top management in at the front end. 

when proposed ~ssignments were weighed and 

chosen. EntIy into the pipeline could be controlled to some degree. Nevertheless. the range 

of job choices stayed within the traditional 

bounds of agency jurisdiction and jobs proposed 

In the plans sometimes bore little resemblance 

to those actually conducted. 

No one. however. was completely happy with 

this planning arrangement. The Comptroller 

General and his staff were not satisfied that work 

was being channeled into the most significant 

areas or that staff were being deployed to best 

use. The divisions and their subordinate units 

were too compartmentalized to take on many 

Govemmentwide reviews. The audit staff was 

frustrated as well about the paperwork requirements and work interruptions that planning 

entailed. 

Most of these doubts were confirmed when. 

in February 1971 . the Comptroller General appointed a top-level Committee on Planning Improvement chaired by Gregory Ahart to assess 

existing procedures. In its report issued 4 months 

later. the committee described a "fairly general 

belief' that the context and timeframes of the 

required planning documents were not compatible with the manner in which work must actually 

be planned and managed. Thus the documentation was counter-productive in taking staff 

away from ongoing work and lowering morale. 

The committee made several recommendations. 

principally to: 

• Abolish the short-range planning 

documentation. 

• Modify long-range plans to elimioate descriptions of individual assignments but expand discussions of the responsibility area. 

factors affecting its significance. the major 

lines of effort. and planned changes in 

them. 

• Establish a planning staff, the Office of Program Planning (OPP). responsible directly 

to the Comptroller General to (1) assist with 

changes to overall Office objectives and 

goals, responsibility area definitions, and 

priorities to be given through resource allocations. (2) translate Comptroller General 

decisions into planning guidance. (3) mon136 

itor implementation, and (4) help determine and acquire future resources.:I 

A few weeks later the report was discussed 

and unanimously endorsed by a joint meeting 

of GAO's regional managers and division management. This se t the stage for the next major 

developments. 

The Issue Areas Context 

Issue areas were the next big change in planning. They were implemented in 1972, but the 

thinking about them had begun much earlier. In 

October 1967. only a few months into the implementation of program planning. the Comptroller General furnished guidance to his division 

heads on "areas of special or continuing interest," broad subjects and issues. to help them 

develop work programs. These were subjects 

covered in congressional testimony and potential 

audit areas of "Office-wide interest." Among 

them were management and control of data 

processing activities. supply management Office 

of Economic Opportunity programs and activities. and user charges. More memorandums followed. usually after a planning cycle was completed: each was a bit more specific than the las~ 

stressing the need for programing this type of 

work. 

In December 1969 the director of the program planning staff provided his own list of areas 

he thought the Civil Division should address. 4 

Undertaking reviews of these issues posed problems for the divisions. and even though the 

Comptroller General and his planners wanted 

this type of work done. they were not getting 

enough of it. 

Meanwhile. events were occurring in another 

part of GAO that contributed to this new approach to planning. In the 1960's the Seattle 

Regional Office. 3.000 miles from headquarters, 

found itself initiating much of its own work. To 

improve the relevance of this work. Seattle 

sIarted experimenting with molding new jobs so 

as to address not only the immediate audit subject but also to make a contribution in broad 

issue areas of importance to the Congress and 

the countIy. This approach intrigued the Comptroller General. who had been looking for a medium to relate GAO's work to larger affairs. William N. Conrardy. Seattle Regional Office -

Manager. was brought to Washington in 1972 

to head up the Office of Program Planning. develop these ideas further, and address the problems of the existing system. 

Conrardy drew up some 56 national issues 

as possible categories for GAO work and circulated them for review and comment. There were 

two kinds: (1) national concerns needing resolution or broad opportunities worth exploiting 

and (2) common Federal management functions 

whose effectiveness should be examined. A consensus emerged for about 20. following a process 
of merging some issue areas and dropping others. As issue area program planning matured 

over time. some were dropped. others added. 

and some merged. In November 1980 there 

were 37 issue areas assigned to the 11 operating 

divisions. (See Figure 10-1.) 

Figure 10-1 

GAO Issue Areas and Responsible Lead Divisions 

Food 

Domestic Housing and Community Development 

Environmental Protection Programs 

Land Use Planning. Management. and Control 

Transportation Systems and Policies 

Water and Water-Related Programs 

Consumer and Worker Protection 

Administration of Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Programs 

Federally Sponsored or Assisted Education Programs 

Federally Sponsored or ASSisted Health Programs 

Federally Sponsored or Assisted Income Security and 

Social Services Programs 

Federally Sponsored or Assisted Employment and Training 

Programs 

Automatic Data Processing 

Internal Auditing Systems for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs 

Accounting and Financial Reporting 

National Productivity 

Facilities Acquisition and Management 

Military Readiness. Mobilization Planning and Civil 

Preparedness 

Federal Information-Creation. Protection. Access. Disclosure. and Management 

Communications 

Logistics Management 

Intergovernmental Policies and Fiscal Relations 

Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention 

Tax Administration 

Data Collected from Non-Federal Sources-Statistical 

and Paperwork Implications 

Federal Oversight of Financial Institutions 

General Procurement 

Procurement of Major Systems 

Program and Budget Information for Congressional Use 

Economic AnalysiS of Alternative Program Approaches 

Science Policy 

Federal Personnel Management and Compensation 

International Affairs 

Energy 

Materials 

Evaluation Guidelines and Methodology 

Community and Economic Development Division 

Human Resources Division 

Financial and General Management Studies Division 

Logistics and Communications 

DIVISion 

General Government Division 

Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division 

Program Analysis Division 

Federal Personnel and Compensation Division 

International Division 

Energy and Minerals Division 

Institute for Program Evaluation 

137 
The new planning structure fitted well with 

the organizational structure which emerged In 

1972. Chapter 9 described how the Office converted to functionalized divisions in the 1970's. 

even as the divisions continued their regular audit surveillance of particular executive agencies. 

The 1972 reorganization widened horizons considerably. Ten programing and functional divisions each with a wide reach were put in place. 

Obviously a division titled "Human Resources" 

or "Logistics and Communications" could have 

considerable scope. cross many agency borders. 

and acquire a good deal of knowledge about 

these matters. But which matters? It was not 

enou~h Simply to list "environmental protection,' "health,'· "energy." or "military readiness." These issues had to be explored. defined. 

bounded. and related to lines of work and ulti· 

mately to particular jobs.; 

The rationale of planning by issue area was 

attractive. Management could' have a practical 

context in which to judge the worth and relevancy of new jobs and to deploy staff more ef· 

lIciently. More often than not, congressional requests could be shaped to fit these issue areas 

too. Most GAO work could be tied to matters 

that were-or soon would be~ngaging the 

Congress. 

implementation of this planning process was 

uneven. Even though some issue areas were not 

yet well defined and research capability was limIted. some divisions plunged right into developing issue area program plans. These experiments helped a great deal to hone the design. 

Other divisions. though willing. were slow to relate program planning to their own work and 

went through many program drafts to arrive at 

sound plans. One or two divisions were passive, 

going through the motions. as it were. but not 

OPP STAFF MEET to discuss an issue area program plan 

138 

by any means sold on the idea. The planning 

process continued to evolve with an Increasing 

sophistication In OPP. 

The combination of issue areas and functionally organized divisions facilitated work that transcended Federal agency jurisdictions and focused more on the future. Illustrative of how 

issue area planning works is this PPC discussion 

about one facet of the issue area, "Federally 

Sponsored or Assisted Employment and T raining Programs:" 

Impact of Ene'l1Y Shortages on Employment. I he Impact oj energy shortages on 

employment in this country could be immense. GAO needs to be thinking about 

the kinds of Federal programs which will 

be necessa'JI to ease the resulting problems. As a first step we should be identifying who (if anyone) in the Federal Gouemment is 'responsible for planning for this 

situation • • • what employment shifts 

are likely? Where will the future jabs be' 

Do [the Gouernment'sl training and employment programs and policies recognize 

the potential impoct of the energy crunch? 

What policy options are auailable?" . 

As this passage shows. the resources and expertise in one division, Ene'l1Y and Materials, can 

be drawn on by another. Human Resources. to 

address a related issue. 

Despite the promising features of issue area 

program planning. some staff perceived it as a 

wrenching, unnecessary change. Secure and 

comfortable with the old informal work schedule 

and Its short horizons. they were wary of such 

planning. Those who thought GAO work to be 

"unplannable" feared a loss of flexibility at the 
operating level. intrusion from the top. irksome 

paperwork and coordination. and a tight rein on 

job choices. 

The Issue Area Program Plan 

Was The Central Focus Of The 

Process 

The focus for issue area planning was the 

program planning document prepared by the 

responsible GAO division. i.e .. the "lead divi· 

sion. " 7 All divisions had at least one issue area. 

and they devised an "issue area program plan" 

for each. The plan spelled out the anatomy of 

an issue area-its scope, bounds. facets. and 

problems. It was essentially an amalgam of the 

previous short- and long-range plans describing 

what GAO intended to do in the issue area over 

the next 18 months to 2 years. The plan typically 

described several lines of effort. i.e .. specific sub- missions. fields of inquiry. relevant tasks. and 

questions to be addressed within the issue area 

during the planning period. The plan also in - cluded the division's long-range (3- to 5-yearl 

forecast of the issue area in more general terms. The issue area program plan was to be an evolv- ing document. with each revision describing the 

accomplishments and resource use of previous 

lines of effort. whether ongoing. revised, or 

finished. The lead division designed the program plan 

and proposed lines of effort and priority preferences with OPP advice and assistance. Divisions 

were asked to continuously examine. in preparing their plans, their issue area definitions. scope. 

and lines of effort. GAO planners researched the 

literature: conversed with the staff of other di- visions: collaborated with congressional staffs: 

and polled consultants and experts in the ex- ecutive branch, congressional support agencies. 

and field offices and others. Some divisions held 

regular seminars. sometimes away from the Of- fice, with discussion panels led by Federal agency 

and private industry speCialists. as well as GAO 

executives. 

The Comptroller General encouraged such 

conferences. as well as extensive regional office 

involvement. and continuously' urged more sys- tematic congressional input. (See ch. 14.) The 

idea was to explore the issue area thoroughly, identify all relevant lines of effort. and recom- mend priorities. Once the program plan was 

drafted. the division estimated staff and re- sources for each line of effort. totaling its own 

with that of other divisions and regional offices. 

The process has permeated the Office's thinking. Program plans now cover about 90 percent 

opp STAFF MEMBER works with a lead division coor· 

dinator on his draf1 plan 

A Program Planning Conference Provides Input On 

Employment And Training Issues 

GAO's Human Resources Division (HRD). preparing to update irs employment and training 

issue area program plan, convened a 3 -day meeting at the Department of Labor to hear 

discussion and uiews on how the diuision should allocate its limited resources to Q myriad of 

problems associated with Govemment-assisted employment and training programs. 

Among those addressing the conference were the Director of the President's National 

Commission on Employment Policy and staffs of congressional committees dealing with ed- ucation. labor. health. welfare. Govemment operations. appropriations. and finance. Other 

guest speakers represented the Congressional Research Service and the CongreSSional Budget 

Office. Among GAO'ers in attendance were some 20 representatiues of 11 regional offices, 15 

from uarious Department of Labor audit sites. and another 10 from HRD headquarters, the 

Program Analysis Diuision. and the Institute for Program Evaluation. Meetings such as this one are increasingly typical in updating program plans. The GAO 

staffs come away from the conference with renewed appreciation of the complexities of social 

programs. new knowledge of congressional uiews and priorities. and regional office perspec- tives. The revised plan for employment and training prepared following this meeting took 

account of the results of this airing. and those from outside the agency who participated had 

on understanding of GAO's audit and evaluation role in employment training. Efforts such as 

these help guard against insularity in GAO's p; •. on;ng process. 

139 
of GAO jobs. and the issue areas form the base 

of GAO's annual budget request to Congress. 

LINES OF EFFORT 

Conceived in the late 1960' s as a means for 

grouping individual jobs into a coherent subject 

area. a line of effort is basically a portion of an 

issue area reported in a program plan. Occasionally the line of effort embraced only one job 

but usually required a series of them. Planning 

instructions suggested that issue area and line of 

effort definitions not be so broad as to be all 

embracing or so narrow as to inhibit multiagency 

coverage-a difficult balance to sustain. 

The listing of lines of effort changed over time. 

Originally, issue area program plans identified 

some lines of effort as "priority:' others as " nonpriority." Such a listing offered choices to top 

management to help direct the focus of the work. 

In practice, however. the staff preparing a plan 

often devoted most of its attention to describing 

lines of effort it considered to be priority and 

more likely to be accepted. A few non priority 

items were added. sometimes as an afterthought. 

Therefore, the real choices available to top management often were limited. As a result. in late 

1980, priority designations were dropped since 

the divisions proposed allocation of resources 

among lines of effort were deemed indicative 

enough. 

The chart below shows three issue areas. related lines of effort and specific jobs planned 

under them. 

Most lines of effort were to be designed to 

address a subject from beginning to end in a few 

years, each job contributing a logical piece of the 

total response. However. as always. that intent 

could be frustrated. Some lines of effort were 

Figure 10·2 

Line·Of·Effort Examples 

ISSlJE AREA LINE OF EFFORT 

couched so broadly that almost any job could 

be fitted in so long as it brushed the basic subject 

area. This provided a means of going through 

the motions of planning but evaded the control 

wanted by top management. 

LEAD DIVISIONS AND COORDINATION 

Man~ issue areas were closely linked or cut 

across GAO division and Federal agency organization lines. For instance. matters in the issue 

area "energy" (Energy and Minerals Division) 

could not be pursued without due regard to 

"environmental protection" (Community and 

Economic Development Division). "Automatic 

Data Processing" (Accounting and Anancial 

Management Division) was a management concern in almost every Federal agency and was 

encountered by all GAO operating divisions. 

(See Figure 10-3.) 

Some Federal programs were not so " neat" 

as program planning would want to have them. 

Some programs were fragmented. and the aims 

of others were at cross purposes. Highway program goals. for instance. were not always compatible with housing programs. 

The need for interdivisional collaboration became evident as issue area terrains were being 

defined and bounded. Two or more divisions 

might be pursuing their issue areas in a single 

Federal agency where still a third had continuing 

audit responsibility. Each division had to know 

what the others were doing or about to do. The 

1972 reorganization created more divisions and 

their jurisdictions overlapped Federal agency organization lines. thus increasing the need for clarifying issue area responsibilities. Agencies were 

confused when contacted by several GAO teams. 

sometimes on seemingly overlapping audit topics. 

TYPICAL ASSIGNMENT 

Consumer and 

Worker Protection 

Are death and serious disability caused by workplace 

hazards being reduced' 

"Review of Grain Elevator Explosions" 

" Review of Causes of Workplace 

Fatalities" 

Federal Procurement of Goods and 

Services 

International Affairs 

140 

Assuring * * * maximum 

competition in procuring 

goods and services 

Assessing U.S. security and 

commitment 

"Competition for Negotiated Government Procurement Can and Should Be 

Improved" 

" Extent of Competition in DOD Relating to Foreign Military Sales" 

"3d Country Sales and NATO Cooperative Weapon Program" 

"Common Funding Initiatives in NATO 
To bring some level of order to this confusion. 

GAO adopted the "lead division" concept in 

1975. This gave one division the leadership in 

each issue area. the lead division being the one 

with the most background or expertise. That 

division would assume Govemmentwide responsibility for the subject 

But even this approach did not remove all the 

points of overlap or potential confusion. Specific 

coordination problems had to be worked out for 

each Federal agency. and GAO divisions had to 

have agency audit responsibilities in addition to 

pursuing issue areas. No matter how exclusively 

issue areas and lines of effort were drawn. however. there were bound to be overlaps or common threads among the program plans. These 

relationships had to be made explicit when programing a job. A single job conceivably may 

touch on several issue areas. When one division'sjob contributed to that of another division, 

the secondary line of effort was cited in the program plans and job document. and the lead division had to clear its plans with the "secondary" 

division. Usually agreement was a matter of 

course. but at times OPP had to mediate a turf 

problem or refer it to the Assignment Review 

Group (see below) for a ruling. 

Coordination did take place. however perfunctorily or reluctantly at times. and duplication 

of effort appeared to have been minimized. Job 

documentation. GAO's management information system. and the program plan's accountability model (see below) continued to cite the 

Figure 10-3 

primary and secondary lines of effort until the 

job ended, when contributions to the lines of 

effort could be assessed. 

PROGRAM PlANNING COMMITIEE 

This top management group functioned primarily to ensure that the selection of work by 

the audit staffs was consistent with overall GAO 

policy and strategy. Members were the Comptroller General; his Deputy: the General Counsel: 

the three Assistant Comptrollers General; the 

Director of the Field Operations Division: and 

the Director of the Office of Program Planning. 

who also served as executive secretary of ppc. 

OPP staff advised and assisted the divisions in 

developing their plans. The issue area program 

was refined through division/OPP interaction 

before being submitted to ppc. (See Figure 

10-4.) 

About once every 18 months. PPC normally 

met with the cognizant division director to review 

the program plan of each of the 37 issue areas. 

A change in issue area context, a significant tum 

of events. new indications of congressional needs, 

or reallocation of GAO resources sometimes necessitated interim meetings. At the meeting the 

committee reviewed general developments in 

the issue area: progress against the previous 

plan: and proposed revisions to the lines of effort, 

priorities. and staff allocations. Changes sometimes were suggested by OPP. PPC members, 

or other meeting attendees. 

M.trlx.: Tvplcal Interrel.tlono of Dlvlolon •• nd Their I .. ue Ar .... 

GAO Divisions 

Communlly and 

Energy and Procurement 

Economic Program Human Inter- GeneTal and Systems 

Issue Area Development Minerals AcqUISitIon Ana lYSIS Resources nallonal Government 

Science Policy Environmental Energy Procurement 

Protection of Major 

Progrllms Matenals Syslems·· 

Research & 

T,ansporta - Del.>elomenr 

tlon Systems 

lind PoliCieS 

Food Land Use Energy SCIt'nc(' Policy Consumer & Imerna 

Plannmg& Worker Pro- 1I0nai 

Control Malerl.,l~ le(110n AlialrS 

Transporta- EconomiC Fed SpanlIon System AnalYSIS of 50fed or As-

& PolICieS Ahernllllve s!s:ed HeAlth 

Progrllm ProgrAms 

Wl.Iler& Approllches Income 

Water Security 

Relllied 

HOUSing LlInd Use Energy Consumer & [nlergovemPlanmng lind W.orker Pro- menial 

Conlrol Mal(!r!als tecllon Polic!es & 

Admin of 

Non-Disc & 

Fiscal Re· 

la llons 

EqualOpp 

Programs 

141 
PROGRAM PLANNING COMMJ'ITEE AND OPP STAFF me .. regularly before each PPC session 

142 

Figure 10-4 

Outline of Program Planning 

Review Process 

ACTION PARTICIPANT 

Develop or revise Division 

plan 

Pre-PPC session re- OPP 

view on draft plan 

Revise plan based Division/OPP 

on OPP comments 

Final plan in hands Division/Opp 

of OPP 

Submit plan and OPP 

advance material to 

PPC members 

Prebriefing OPPIPPC 

PPC session PPClDivision/OPP 

Publish PPC ses- OPPIPPC 

sion minutes 

Publish approved Division 

plan 

Implement plan! Division 

monitor progress 

TIMING 

Continuous 

4 to 6 weeks prior to PPC session 

3 to 5 weeks prior to PPC session 

2 weeks prior to PPC session 

1 week prior to PPC session 

30 minutes prior to session 

2 weeks after session 

4 weeks after session 

Continuous 
Minutes of the meetings reported PPC's de- cisions. Staats personally reviewed and ap- proved the minutes of every meeting to assure 

that appropriate followup actions would be 

taken. As a program plan is updated or revised. 

the previous PPC minutes must cite specific actions taken. 

There was inevitably some frustration with 

PPC meetings among the staff if points important 

to them were not aired or staff did not get the 

guidance and advice they had come to expect. 

As with many things. the major benefit some- times resulted from thinking through 1he product 

and not in the product itself. However. the meetings provided an opportunity to exchange views 

on the work GAO should do at the front end of 

its job cycle. and it exposed GAO staff to the 

Comptroller General in a way that helped him 

assess their performance and potential. 

HOLDING mE DMSIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR 

CARRYING OUT mElD PROGRAM PLANS 

The best laid plans of mice and men do often 

go astray. and GAO was no exception to this 

adage. Not only were the staff s best intentions 

often waylaid by events. but sometimes. as in 

any large organization. staff simply failed to carry 

out what they had said they would do. Accountability was. therefore. necessary. 

Accountability has long been a challenge for 

GAO. Circumstances can change rapidly with 

time as new congressional requests come in, issue area priorities shift. budget and operating 

procedures change, or important new demands 

are placed on the office. The net results of GAO 

work. beyond a simple count of reports issued 

or cases successfully closed. are very difficult to 

measure. 

To compare progress against program plans. 

i.e .. achievements in issue areas. the Office in 

1978 began reqUiring its divisions to attach to 

their program plans an "accountabili ty modeL" 

a statement of progress achieved against each 

goal of the prior plan" It described how assign- ments underway conformed to the line of effort 

scope: the type of product intended. such as a 

report. staff study. letter. or briefing: the concrete 

results expected: and the work remaining to be 

done in the line of effort. The statement also 

listed each completed report or product within 

its line of effort and its net effect. It enabled PPC 

to review not only report tides or abstracts but 

also extrinsic results: GAO recommendations 

adopted. target agency procedures improved. or 

legislation enacted. Here are three examples of 

effects cited in the plans. 

• '"As recommended. funding has been post- poned and curtailed for this project." 

• "The report is used extenSively • , • by 

comminees. subcommittees and individual 

members of the Congress." 

• "This report played a significant role in 

DOD's withdrawing this [weapon] system 

from its budget with a saving of over $600 

million.'" 

Even with this procedure. however. accountability was elusive because studies did not always 

answer the questions originally posed nor did 

they always culminate in specific recommenda- tions. Some reports only offered observations, 

perspectives. or options for the Congress to consider. In other instances. GAO was not the sole 

actor or the full effects of the work would not 

emerge for several years. 

Notwithstanding these limitations. it was es- sential that PPC keep adjusting its accountability 

requirements and advise operating divisions 

when performance fell short of expectations. The 

committee's persistent stress on concrete results 

might have influenced divisions to choose the 

more "lucrative" assignments. GAO planning 

officials believed that improvements in accountability was a leading challenge for the future. 

Assignment Selection And 

Approval 

Once a program plan was approved. the divisions undertook the jobs that addressed the 

lines of effort proposed for the issue area. Each 

division listed its proposed work in a Firm As- signments List-the jobs to be started the next 

quarter. The lists circulated throughout GAO and 

served as a basis for planning the assignment of 

field staff. If time was available, Staats reviewed 

the lists. made marginal notes, and forwarded 

them to OPP for followup. OPP also reviewed 

the jobs listed for their merit. compatibility with 

the approved plan. timeliness. and expected 

benefits. If OPP and the division could not resolve any differences about a particular job, an 

appeal was made to higher authority. 

Initially. in disputes between this staff office 

and a line division, the division almost always 

won, as might be expected. Providing OPP the 

necessary support in these matters required a 

new vehicle. Staats established an Assignment 

Review Group to review prospective and ongoing Jobs in dispute. those markedly overrunning their schedules. and proposed jobs which 

OPP believed deserving of special review. Members were the Assistant Comptrollers General 

and two operating division directors who served 

for rotating 12-month terms. The Director. OPP, 

was the executive secretary. This group had sufficient "clout" and broad enough representation 

to act as an effective arbiter. 

The group dealt with about a dozen of the 

150 new jobs generally started each month. T ypical questions explored were: 

• Why should "X" division do a proposed 

aSSignment when "Y" division recently 

canceled a similar job? 

143 
• Is the job focus too narrow: can it be ex- panded for Government-wide coverage? 

• Is the methodology chosen _ i.e .. the ana- lytical technique. the most appropriate 

one? 

• Is this division reaching beyond its issue 

area: should an interdivisional team be 

assigned? 

• What can GAO say in this report that is 

new? Can the report make a difference? 

• Will the report get out in time to make a 

difference?'o 

The group's decision was almost always conclu- sive. Although there were procedures for ap- pealing to the Comptroller General. they were 

rarely used. 

Relationship Between Planning 

And Budgeting Still Being 

Developed 

Before the advent of issue areas. the planning 

process and the formulation of GAO's budget 

were more closely linked. In those earlier years 

when divisionwide plans were prepared along 

responsibility area lines. the divisions were asked 

to program all the staff-years they could profit- ably use in the planning period. Inevitably the 

divisions requested far more resources than 

available and more than GAO could reasonably 

expect the Congress to approve. Nevertheless. the figures gave the Comptroller General a larger 

universe from which to choose and provided the 

base for preparing the budget and allocating di- vision staff-years. When issue areas were established. ppe be· 

gan reviewing program plans on a cyclical basis 

and the planning process and budget formulation 

went their separate ways. Consequently. the 

planning process lost some of its meaning. Re -

sources allocated to divisions and the fi eld offices 

had to be converted to an issue area context 

after program plans had been approved because 

issue areas crossed division lines. In 1978 GAO 

established a two-person budget committee. 

which later consisted of the three Assistant 

Comptrollers General. OPP and the Controller's 

office began working closer together in determining resource allocations. GAO also began 

preparing its budget and allocating the funds 

approved by the Congress USing issue areas for 

both the headquarters staff and the field. At pe- riodic meetings. the budget committee reviewed 

with each division its resource allocation for each 

issue area. These actions brought the planning 

and budget processes closer together again. but 

the planning process' 18-month cycle prevented 

a complete interne. 

Under new procedures approved late in 

1980. the planning and budgeting processes are 

to be further integrated. An iterative process is 

144 

to begin in April with the "spring review." about 

6 months before the new fiscal year begins. Here 

the Office of Program Planning and the Office 

of Budget and Financial Management are to 

identify issues needing resolution and issue areas 

that may justify more or less resources than cur- rent levels. Next the divisions will be asked to 

respond to these findings and begin preparing 

their budgets. Several meetings may be held 

through the summer to exchange views. In Sep- tember the Comptroller General will decide open 

questions and determine resource allocations for 

the coming year and the succeeding budget 

year's request to the Congress. In October the 

affected divisions' plans will be adjusted to con- form to the decisions made. 

* * * * * 

A program planning system is still evolving 

and has some distance to go to satisy everyone 

up and down the line. The system has demon- strated, nonetheless. that there are manageable 

categories for the institution's myriad work and 

that the GAO agenda can be planned ahead 

within acceptable tolerances. The system was 

designed to encourage, even compel. division 

directors and other senior executives to lift their 

sights and think about their roles and miSSions. where their organizations ought to be heading. and how to proceed. 

The issue areamnes-of-effort matrix was also 

designed to maximize the use of resources. ad- dreSSing Govemmentwide affairs coherently. 

and gaining a march on emerging congressional 

information needs. Perhaps most important. the 

process assures that the GAO staff will devote 

attention to matters larger and more significant 

than those of passing interest or those associated 

with the operations of a single Federal agency 

or subdivision. 

I David J KlofTMfNlkcr Md Neal P Curtin. "Idea G<!flVToHOn In GAO. The GAO Reu~UI. (FilII 1'11731. pp 31 33 

2 CompfrOUer G..!netal Staab, Memol1lftC!um 10 tw~ of dtvl5loIU and of 

flees. "Program PIonning Cornmltt~:' 6 Julio' 1967 

3 U 5 Ge~<'I' Accounllng Offino. Committee on p,ogt."m ~nnl"9 1m 

pr~nwnt. "()pponunrty 10 Improve PI6ntilng IOf Accounting and Audillng Ful"lC1ion$." report to Ihe Compll'oIIel ~n:U. pp 9 10 

4 Harry C Kensky. MwIofaMum. "Mu.ltiagency Work an me UtlJ DlVI .ton·' oS DIrt 1969 p 2 

5 CompllolJ;:>I Genl'l'ai St.ao!IlS , Mcmoflmdum. ··Funhl'l Guidance on Pro gnr.m Plannmy:' 16 Sept 1975 

6 J6m1/S D Mllrtln. Milmortmdum. "PPC ~n on Fl'deral1v Sponsored 

01 A§5IS1ed EmpJoynwnt tlnd Tnlinlng f'rogr.Jms (?pc 79 23. Junt' 7 197')1· · 10 July 1979 p. 2 

7 Comptroller Gilnl!ft'll $tM1S Memorandum ·'1mpkolTMlnWlOn 01 the Lead 0tviSI0n Con(:~ :' J Feb 1975 

8 Jllnws 0 Martin. Memorbndum. Pr~og for Itw 197879 Progr .... m ~n"'ng CommlnO!O' Snsiom.." Z3 Mar 1978 

9 U S Gm~naJ·I\c(:O\.Inllng Ofllce. Proc;ur{'menl lind SysteJTl) Acqu!~lIon 

DiWlon . "ProQr .... m Plan IOf IIw Procur{'fMflt of MaiOI' Systems 1~ Arl/'a !3.000l: 197<1 pp A VII 6 6nd A VII 12 

9~~ John 0 HIlIlIlT, Mgmoril.ndum. "~gnm t Review Group." 7 Nov 
I:PruITli IJlJTI 

Developments 

Affecting The Scope, 

Quality, And Impact 

Of GAO's Work 

145 
CCDuroIJll1®D' 11 11 

Efforts To Improve The Products 

like its counterparts in the business world. 

GAO is in the business of delivering a quality 

product to its customers in a timely fashion. Its 

principal product is a report: its primary cus- tomers are the Congress. its members. and its 

committees. Unlike a typical business. however. 

GAO does not have the incentive of profitmaking 

to spur it on to continual product improvement. 

In addition. by virtue of its role as an independent 

critic. it has been given broad latitude by the 

Congress. 

During the period 1966-81. GAO worked to 

improve all operations leading to report produc- tion. This involved. first and foremost. changes 

in its basic way of doing business. The agency 

adopted project management with a view to re- ducing job cost and improving timeliness by cut- ting through duplicative authority and review layers. It developed. tested. and then adopted for 

use on all assignments a systematic process for 

job planning and management. GAO also took 

steps to assure that it used appropriate method- ologies in its work and that its auditors had ready 

access to up-to-date information about the areas 

under review. Finally. for completed products. 

it streamlined review and agency comment pro- cedures and worked to improve report readability. This chapter discusses all the major efforts to 

improve the timeliness and quality of GAO's 

work-from the beginning of the work to the 

final stages of the processes involved in publish- ing the report. A convenient way to approach 

this subject is in the order in which the work is 

done. Discussed first are the operating proce- dures (or canying out assignments: then how 

Rf;I'OItT TfJ THE CONe,RIo:.·~ 

asSignments are planned and managed (the Proj- ect Planning and Management Approach): the 

sources available to gather the information (the 

library): what methods are used to gather the 

needed data (methodology); how the message 

is communicated (report readability); and. finally, what is done to set the message out the 

door (report processing). As it discusses the major developments. the chapter also assesses how 

the changes were accepted within the agency 

and how successful they were in achieving the 

goals. 

Procedures Aimed At Getting 

GAO Work Done In Less Time, 

At Less Cost 

Various working arrangements were offiCially 

sanctioned over the years and achieved varying 

Figure 11-1 

Basic Characteristics Of GAO 

Communication Products 

• Significance 

• Usefulness and timeliness 

• Accuracy and adequacy of support 

• Convincingness 

• Objectivity and perspective 

• Clarity and simplicity 

• Conciseness 

• Completeness 

• Constructiveness of tone 

Soutce GAO Repon Manual 

COMPTROllER GENERAL STAATS and an e>tample of GAO's primary product-a. Tepan 10 

the Congress 

146 
degrees of success. Very late in the 1966-81 

period, GAO shifted the focus of its operations 

from a process to a results orientation. Basic 

management principles to which all assignments 

must adhere were specified, but the management structures for individual assignments were 

left to the divisions' discretion. 

Until 1978, jobs were typically developed and 

planned at headquarters or in lead regions and 

then carried out by two or three regional offices, 

Headquarters and the regional offices functioned 

as separate organizations but had similar hierarchical chains of command. In both settings 

audit managers supervised several jobs at once 

and "site seniors" assigned to the specific jobs 

reported to them, 

Mid-level staff in either Washington or the 

field usually drafted the report, If drafted in the 

field, the report was reviewed by one or more 

levels in the regional office and then forwarded 

to headquarters. There the report was turned 

over to the cognizant audit staff for another 

round of reviews and revision that might include 

a site senior. an audit manager. an assistant di· 

rector. an associate director, and a division director or his designee. Reports drafted in Wash -

ington went through the same headquarters 

review chain, Often the report was also reviewed 

by other divisions if they had jurisdiction over 

the subject matter. 

Drafts sometimes shuttled back and forth between the different review levels and between 

the headquarters and the field for revision or 

updating. Staffs tried to cut back on the time 

consumed through field visits or trips to headquarters and by conferences early in the report 

drafting stage to reach agreement on what the 

report would say, but there were often delays. 

The impact on job timeliness and cost which resulted from the duplicative lines of authority and 

review is not hard to imagine, Quality sometimes 

suffered as well, since the regional offices were 

not held accountable for the final product. Since 

the staff drafting the report knew it would be 

revised anyway, they had little incentive to spend 

a lot of time trying to prepare the best possible 

product. 

What was needed was a means to pinpoint 

authority and responsibility and to reduce the 

number of persons involved in supervising the 

job and reviewing the report draft. Staff also 

needed to be insulated from other duties so they 

could devote their time to getting the job done. 

A project team approach seemed to offer a solution to these problems by more clearly delineating lines of authority, reducing review levels, 

and evening out the balance of responsibility 

between headquarters and the regional offices. 

--- ----------, 

EARLY EXPERIMENTS WITH PROoIECT 

MANAGEMENT 

Project management had been used extensively in industry and Government. Convinced 

that project management was the only practicable way to run complex research and development projects, the Department of Defense and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration used it in all major new systems developments and in many smaller ones, Public accounting and management consulting firms which 

have to meet tight deadlines also used the tech -

nique extensively, 

This technique involves assembling a team to 

accomplish a specific, well-defined objective 

within a relatively short timeframe, Teams insulated from competing demands and exempted 

from most standard operating procedures seem 

to offer an efficient means of responding to today's challenges which a formal. stratified organization may be too inflexible to meet The 

jobs facing Government require diverse professional skills and the ability to cut laterally through 

organizational barriers, thus bypassing vertical 

decision making and review levels, 

Selecting the right staff is crucial to project 

success, Since the hierarchical overlay is removed and full authority and responsibility is 

delegated, project managers must be truly competent and able to operate successfully in a relatively unstructured environment. Team members, usually coming from different parts of the 

organization, must be able to work closely together and mesh their diverse contributions to 

meet project goals, 

Successful project management also requires 

that an organization fundamentally change its 

normal way of doing business, As Charles C 

Martin remarked in his book, " Project Management": "How to Make It Work": "Many caws of 

disillusionment have come about because top 

management thought it could adopt the name 

project management, change practically nothing, 

and still enjoy the benefits of project management .. 1 Or, as one GAO writer commented: 

"Clearly, if organization formalities such as 

layered reviewing cannot be bypassed, the team 

approach loses its raison d' etre, ,,' 

The project management approach was introduced in GAO in several high-visibility short 

timeframe efforts, (See the hospital construction 

cost study, ch. 2.) As indicated in a December 

4, 1972, memorandum to heads of divisions and 

offices, the Comptroller General clearly was attracted to the idea: "More use should be made 

of project managers * • '." He and others in 

GAO believed there were many benefits to this 

approach, including pinpointing of accountabil147 
ity, bypassing normal levels of review, speeding 

up completion of work. and motivating staff and 

providing greater job satisfaction. Early criteria for project management required that there be one level of review between 

project manager and division director and that 

the project manager be assigned full-time to one 

assignment. Jobs thought especially suitable for 

project management included those requiring 

1,000 or more staff-days with multiagency or 

Government-wide scope and relatively short 

timeframes. 3 

Efforts to introduce project management into 

GAO met with limited success, however. In late 

1975 a task force . led by the Office of Program 

Planning, was established to find out why. Their 

finding? "Project management has hardly been 

tried in GAO!'" The task force reported that the 

jobs on which it had been used had demon- strated the expected benefits-especially increased motivation and job satisfaction among 

the staff. But as of August 1975. only 13 of 1.320 

active jobs could be classed as project manager 

jobs. 

Among the reasons the approach had not 

been accepted and used. according to the task 

force. were a perceived shortage of capable peo- ple who could serve as project managers and the 

prevailing hierarchical management structure. Believing that GAO was not ready for such a 

drastic change as going to a project form of or- ganization, the task force recommended. in part. 

that: 

• Decisionmakers be "forced" to consciously 

select the best approach for doing specific 

jobs. project management certainly receiving consideration. • More visibility be given to various innova- tive approaches 10 jobs. including project 

management, and to the organizations and 

people using them. 

The Comptroller General endorsed these and 

the task force ' s other recommendations in Jan- uary 1976. He said the task force had aptly 

shown project management to be one potentially 

effective way of managing certain jobs. Conse- quently he encouraged GAO management "to 

give further thought and emphasis to the project 

approach as well as to other innovations in doing 

our job-perhaps a little quicker. a little better. '" 

Despite this encouragement. project manage- ment made scarcely more of a ripple in GAO 

than it had before. There continued to be some 

notable exceptions such as the Energy and Min· erals Division' s series of studies on the liquid 

metal fast breeder reactor. This study. as Eras- mus H. Kloman wrote in "Cases in Accounta - bility: The Work of the GAO," gave the project 

team approach one of its most valuable tests· Another was the 1976 study of bank regulatory 

148 

agencies discussed in chapter 6. These and other 

project-managed jobs typically were the foc us of 

much congreSSional interest: involved close co- ordination of a large. multidisciplinary and. in 

some cases, geographically dispersed staff: and 

had to meel tight deadlines. . At least two other internal task forces would 

recall that these jobs were generally regarded as 

highly successful. and recommend that project 

management techniques be adopted. One study 

conducted by the Community and Economic 

Development Division proposed that assign - ments be conducted by temporary teams-structures which would not require organizational or 

administrative change in GAO. The task force 

emphasized the concept needed to be tested 

before full implementation so that problems 

which arose from the change could be ironed 

out early. The Division Director instructed one 

of his operating groups to start experimenting 

with the team approach, but by this time, as the 

result of another task force's work. it was about 

to become standard operating procedure for the 

entire agency.7 

A TEAM APPROACH IS MANDATED AS mE 

NORMAL WAY OF DOING BUSINESS 

At its June 1977 meeting in Easton, Maryland. 

GAO's top management identified a number of 

problems with GAO's work, including the fact 

that many in the Congress perceived that GAO's 

work was not timely and, therefore. was not as 

useful as it could be. (See also ch. 7.) Management reached a consensus that, "The work of 

GAO takes too long and costs too much." The 

directors then identified the "essential conditions" which proposed solutions would have to 

meet. These included: 

• GAO standards of excellence must be 

maintained or upgraded. 

• Role of staff must be enhanced. • Appropriate structure and policies/proc- esses must be provided. 

• Supporting systems must be established to 

provide visibility and accountability." 

FollOWing the meeting the Comptroller Gen- eral established a high-level Task Force on GAO 

Effectiveness and selected Stewart McElyea, Di- rector, Field Operations Division. to be chairman. The other members were all from headquarters 

and included several operating division directors 

and other top managers. Their job was to devise 

changes that would result in delivery of GAO 

products to users at the time they would be most 

useful and at acceptable levels of cost. The task· force met frequently during the fall 

and summer of 1977 and actively sought opin- ions from other levels and organizations in GAO, 

both in headquarters and in the regions. It reviewed all parts of the GAO system and identified 
baniers to acceptable product timeliness and 

cost. Several of these baniers appeared to be 

direct consequences of internal working relationships. These included (1) the multiple levels of 

review. (2) "ping-ponging" of draft reports back 

and forth between levels of management. and 

(3) field/headquarters relanonships. 

Initially the task force members did not know 

what to propose. They were convinced. however. that the situation called for something more 

drastic than merely urging everyone to try to 

improve and suggesting some helpful measures. 

Whatever they proposed. they reasoned. should 

become institutionalized as an integral part of the 

regular system of doing GAO's work. 

The team approach surfaced as a way GAO 

had operated in the past when it could not afford 

to fail. The jobs performed this way had been 

viewed as successes. Meanwhile Henry Eschwege shared a draft of his Community and Economic Development Division task force report 

on the team concept with the other task force 

members and discussed the division' s proposed 

team experiment. 

After extensive discussion. the task force endorsed the team approach as the only workable 

solution for overcoming the baniers idennfied. 

To avoid the fate of the earlier project management efforts. the task force recommended that 

divisions adopt a project team approach as "a 

normal way of doing business." It proposed that 

a team leader for finite aSSignments be assigned 

from either headquarters or the field. team members report directly to the team leader regardless 

of their permanent organizanonal affiliations. the 

team be insulated from competing demands to 

the extent necessary and possible. and hierarchical levels of review be minimized.·

J 

As with all its recommendations. the task force 

was careful to leave most of the specifics of implementation up to the division directors. This 

hesitancy to be prescriptive led them to recommend teams as a normal way of doing business. 

When Staats reviewed their report. he concluded 

that teams should be the normal way of doing 

business. In light of the advice he got from others 

and previous experience with project management. he became convinced that mandating 

teams was necessa))' to ensure their widespread use in GAO. 11 

ROLES OF TEAM MEMBERS AND DMSION 

MANAGEMENT DEANED 

The team approach was officially underway 

but the road to full implementation proved to be 

slow and rocky. The transition may have been 

complicated because teams had been instituted 

without benefit of a trial run. Introduction and 

implementation were simultaneous for management and staff alike. Management. therefore. did 

not have a head start on knowing what problems 

would arise and how to deal with them. 

THE; TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING GAO EFFECnVENESS r(!c~iVe5 lhe Comptruller General's Award (lIthe 1978 

Honor Awards Ceremony. October 25. 1978. Members mcJud~·d Donald J Horan. elena P Pin. Larry Hillman. Gregory 

J Ahart Hugh Brady. Ham,' SHaven!;. S. D McElyea. Hl!.nl)' ('"hwl!ge . A F Franklin. John D. Heller. and J Kenneth 

FasLck. 

149 
The first problem pursued by top manage- ment was defining the roles of the individuals 

who made up a team. In May 1979-14 months 

after the approach had been officially adoptedthe division directors reached agreement on 

statements describing the responsibilities of the 

team director and the team leader. The team 

director was made responsible for the overall 

direction of one or more assignments and reo 

ported directly to the associate or division direc· tor. The team leader managed the assignment 

and reported to the team director. Normally. the 

team director was not expected to devote full 

time to anyone assignment. but the team leader 

was. The team leader and team director shared 

responsibility for the technical aspects of the 

work. The team director was normally to be a 

GS-1S and the team leader a GS-14 or 13. The 

roles of deputy team leader. subteam leader. and 

team member were defined and approved a 

short time later. 

Two other issues were the role of the associate 

director and the line of authority between the 

team and the division director. Solutions were 

again hammered out by the division directors 

and approved by the Comptroller Genera). The 

upshot was that the line of authority between the 

team and the division director was to be more 

direct with provisions for the associate director 

to be inserted into the line at certain key junctures 

if a division so desired. 

Figure 11-2 

The various titles, roles, and linear arrange- ments of staff established for teams were spelled 

out in a June 22, 1979 memorandum from the 

Comptroller General to aU profesSional staff entitled "Project Team Approach." Still other op- erating rules were formulated. In July 1979, 7 

new titles were established to replace that of 

"assistant director," a title held by more than 

300 middle managers and other officials but 

which no longer described many of their roles. Possibly it never had. since many of these offi- cials in headquarters had not been "assisting the 

director" in managing the division. but rather 

had been involved in specific finite assignments. It was anticipated that most in headquarters 

would have the new title "group director." This 

initiative was particularly unpopular with the per- sons giving up the assistant director title. 

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REGIONS' ROLE 

EMERGED 

The major change in the regions which teams 

brought about was the removal of regional man· agement from direct technical authority on in· 

dividual jobs. This authority was accepted as re- siding with team management. The fundamental 

role of regional management (including regional 

managers, assistant regional managers. and their 

assistants) was defined as "resource management," or activities related to the development 

and use of staff. (See also ch. 14.)" 

Comparison of Job Management Structures 

HIERARCHICAL MODE TEAMS 

HEADQUARTERS FIELD OFFICES HEADQUARTERS : FIELD OFFICES 

diviSi.n dir. director. FOD division director director. FOD 

associate director regional mgT. regional manager 

assistant director asst. reg . mgr. team director assistant R.M. 

audit mgr. • audit mgr. team leader 

site senior field senior sub· team leader 

staff staff team memberls) team member(s) 

150 
Matrix Management By The Book 

Matrix management has been one of the more difficult aspects of project management and 

its uariants that GAO staff haue had to adjust to. GAb is not alone in this: other organizations 

which haue attempted to flatten hierarchical structures haue found that operating under a 

matrix demands flexibility: patience: and. on the part of many. sacrifice. The extensiue literature 

on this topic would be a good resource for GAO to use to gain a clearer understanding of the 

potential pitfalls and opportunities inherent in this management structure. "Matrix" is said to 

be the definitiue book on the subject, and it would probably be a good place to start .• "Matrix" describes the traditional form of organization as one employing a single chain of 

command and shaped around a single dimension-a function. product. seruice, geographical 

area, client market. etc. In a matrix there are two organizing dimensions (roughly. job management and people management in GAO) and an accompanying dual command. or twoboss. structure. The pyramid is the architectural image for the traditional model. one of the most enduring 

designs built by humans. Its strength is its stability. The matrix. on the other hand. is best 

represented as a fabric. able to adapt to stress· and change,. Its flexibility comes from the 

interweaving of one dimension with another. of centralization with decentralization. and of 

specialization with integration. A matrix does make matters more complicated, however. According to the authors of "Matrix": 

• • • a matrix is an exceedingly complex organizational form that is not for everybody. To put it bluntly. if you do not really need it. leave it alone. There are easier ways to 

manage organizations. Or. as it says on the drug bottle. take only as directed. 

Under what circumstances. then. is matrix the preferred structure for an organization? The 

authors list three necessary conditions. The first is a need to focus attention on two equally 

critical goals. (GAO. for example. wants to achieve both timeliness and a high level of quality.) 

The second is a need to maintain an effective communications network. both for spreading 

information and for processing it and incorporating it into decisions. The matrix organization 

tends to develop more people who think and act in a general management mode, and thus 

its information-processing capacity is increased. Finally. a matrix format is desirable when an 

organization is under considerable pressure to make the best use of limited resources and to 

meet high quality standards at the same time. All these circumstances appear to fit GAO. If an organization determines that it meets the above conditions and, therefore. adopts a 

matrix structure. it can expect a long and difficult transition. GAO has found that out. According 

to "Matrix": 

The change to a matrix cannot be accomplished by issuing a new organization chart. People are brought up. by and large, to think in terms of 'one person. one boss' and 

such habits of mind are not easily changed. People must leam to work comfortably and 

effectively in Q different way of managing and organizing. * * * experience suggests 

tliat successful passage through the early evolution of a matrix. until it is firmly established 

in its mature form. is a process that will likely take two or three years. 'rhat is not a long 

time in the evolution and life span of an organization. but to those involved in the 

change, the period of transition can be quite difficult. 

The sharing of power and decisionmaking is likely to be one of the most difficult facets of 

a matrix for people to deal with. The authors maintain that this makes interpersonal skills and 

building effective working relationships with others more crucial. Thus, increased efforts in 

human resource planning. career development. and organizational development are among 

the factors thor can make the difference between success and failure in a matrix uenture. Davis and Lawrence point out that individuals must take more personal responsibility in 

a matrix as they can rely less on the organization to dictate what to do. They must exert more 

energy to redefine their roles, negotiate confliCts. and Imake subjective decisions about the 

appropriate coordination and direction of an activity. At the same time greater responsibility 

and freedom inevitably entail greater stress. For the organization as a whole, the increase in 

responsibility at lower levels brought about by a matrix means less control. It should also. however, foster a more committed and more productive staff and thus. overall, a more effective 

organization. 

In sum, a matrix presents the tradeoffs found in other walks of life. With this in mind, GAO 

is discovering for itself whether or not matrix management is worth the price. This is one 

question, unfortunately. that "Matrix" cannot prouide an answer for. 

151 
Over the next couple of years. regional responsibility for the quality of work was restored 

somewhat, but the rest of the organilation never 

fully understood the role nor accepted it as legitimate and worthwhile. Regional management's interaction with teams was viewed as interference and resented. Within FaD itself. many 

believed the concept of having responsibility for 

managing resources and for assuring V:'ork qual- ity without having authority for techmcal direction of staff was unworkable. 

The assistant regional managers were especially hard hit by the changes. In addition to 

shouldering the responsibilities mentioned. they 

had to function as team directors on at least one 

job and thereby to ensure the development and 

maintenance of their technical expertise. On their 

part. the division directors agreed to draw 10 

percent of all team directors from this group. This 

goal was never fully achieved, however. Among 

those serving as team directors. some found their 

total workloads excessive: their knowledge bases 

inadequate due to their remoteness from agency 

headquarters. congressional contacts. and other 

data sources: and their supervision duties restricted. Overall use of regional office staff as 

team leaders was more encouraging: regions furnished about 50 percent of the total 

FaD prided itself on having faithfully tried to 

carry out Office policy regarding teams. including 

redefining roles. It resented the fact. however. 

that the divisions did not appear, in many cases. 

to have taken similar steps. Some were operating 

as they had before implementation of the approach. with nonteam members reviewing work 

and providing direction on jobs. In effect. one 

part of the organization had adoptell a matrix 

arrangement-with responsibility for resource 

management differentiated from responsibility 

for team management-and some other parts 

had retained the hierarchical structure. This disparity prevented the divisions and regions from 

(onming an effective working partnership and 

exacerbated regional discontent. 12 

OTHER PROBLEMS WITH TEAMS 

While management considered concept papers and organization charts. staff assigned to 

teams struggled to make their own adjustments. 

Team leaders frequently found that more travel 

was required for them to adequately supervise 

and evaluate team members from other parts of 

the organization as well as to monitor job progress. They also found that travel funds sometimes 

were not available. Many doubted that. even with 

considerable travel. they would be able to discharge these responsibilities adequately. Formerly. regional management had been in a position to step in and fill voids in supervision and 

evaluation but were discouraged from doing so 

under teams. In addition, some team leaders simply were not ready for the role thrust on them. 

Divisions made little use of criteria for detenmin152 

ing the appropriate grades for team leaders,· 

more often than not simply assigning team leaders on the basis of availability. 

The impact of remote supervision on team 

members was a growing concern. Many were 

not receiving adequate on-the-job training. or 

complete and accurate performance evaluations. 

Reporting to both a team leader and their home 

unit caused discomfort and occasionally conflicts: 

some simply felt cut adrift, with no part of the 

organization totally responsible for them or holding them accountable. 

The way the team approach was implemented violated the principles of accountability, 

authority. and responsibility which it had been 

designed to enhance. Staff were assigned responsibilities without being given sufficient authority to carry them out. For example. team 

leaders had full responsibility for completing assignments. but they had no control over the staff 

or other resources assigned to them. Regional 

management had certain quality control responsibilities on jobs for which they lac~ed 

accountability. 

Team titles became a source of friction between headquarters and the regions as they vied 

with each other to secure the most prestigioussounding titles for their respective staffs. Because 

the competitive selection process for promotion 

(see ch. 12) placed great emphasis on team 

management experience. the perceived need to 

demonstrate such experience. rather than the 

requirements of the assignment. often served as 

the driving force behind team selection and structure. "Deputy team leaders" and "subteam leaders" proliferated whether or not the job required 

them. Titles could be misleading in other ways 

as well: a team leader reviewing recreation fa -

cilities on a military installation did not have responsibilities comparable to those of a team 

leader reviewing the financial status of New York 

City. yet both received credit for team leader 

experience. 

The problems which attended the implementation of teams might have loomed less large or 

been endured with less organizational strife if the 

implementation experience had indeed led to 

achievement of the Comptroller General's goal 

of getting jobs done in less time. at less cost. 

These benefits were not demonstrated, however. 

notwithstanding some encouraging early evidence. Some suspected that teams were. in fact, 

having the opposite effect. The lack of encouraging data was attributed to several different factors. including the fact that many parts of the 

organization never implemented teams properly 

in the first place. Whatever the reason. staff who 

viewed strained headquarters/regional relationships: low.morale: and blurred lines of accountability. authOrity. and responsibility as the pri-

"nw trlHma ...... fl;' ~IX-~kd aul In ch*<! "HllnlOIl P"pcr.·· pnrparfi'd.n 1<l7Y under ~ leadi!rshlp of Robe" W Ho'Inlon 
mary legacy of teams had little cause to support 

the concept. 

ASSIGNMENT STRUCTURES DIVERSIFIED BUT 

CONFORMITY TO BASIC MANAGEMENT 

PRINCIPLES REQUIRED 

In May 1980. in response to a formal list of 

complaints supplied by the regional managers. 

Staats requested the Division Directors' Group 

to review the team approach and related problems and give him recommendations for 

improvement. 13 

Following the process described in chapter 7, 

the group concluded that GAO might be using 

the approach on too many jobs and applying it 

too rigidly. As a result. the Office was not meeting 

the needs of individual assignments as well as 

broader and important institutional needs. They 

proposed that the teams structure be retained for 

the bulk of GAO's assignments but that the rules 

of teaming be flexibly applied when valid man -

agement considerations dictated some deviation. 

Essentially their proposal would have permitted 

the imposing of additional supervision and review levels into the team structure when deemed 

necessary to ensure job quality and optimal staff 

development and use. Other proposals. related 

to legitimizing the role of the regional offices. 

increasing their participation in program planning. and changing the Job Scheduling and 

Staffing System. are discussed in chapter 14. 

The division directors presented these and 

other proposals for improving GAO's operations 

in a June 2, 1980 memorandum to the Comptroller General that was widely distributed 

throughout the Office. Following receipt and 

analysiS of many responses and consultations 

with various adviSOry groups-in particular the 

GS-13114 Management and Policy Advisory 

Council and the Career Level Council-the directors outlined nine major problems in a September 9, 1980 memorandum: 

1. On-the-job training was not taking place. 

2. Staff often had the sense that they did not 

belong to a specific unit. 

3. Staff evaluations were often based on inadequate observations and/or knowledge 

of performance. were not timely. or were 

not given at all. 

4. Challenging work was not always being 

given to the staff--a situation perhaps attributable to the fact that team leaders had 

no knowledge initially of the capabilities 

of the staff assigned to them and so im- posed tasks that were relatively simple in 

order to be on the safe side. 

S. Team leaders and team members had unclear and incomplete authority. responsibility. and accountability. 

6. The roles of different management levels 

in both the regions and headquarters were 

unclear. 

7. The kinds of work done by headquarters 

and regional staff were different. but the 

staff did not understand why this was the 

case and perceived it as a weakness of the 

Office. Headquarters staff. for example, performed many duties. such as report 

processing and dealing with congressional 

staff. which regional staff did not. Team 

roles seemed to be different too. especially 

regarding the amount of supervision and 

travel required. 8. Career paths were not clearly delineated 

and seemed to have little or no link to a 

staff member's current assignment. 

9. Many of the staff did not feel comfortable 

reporting to two bosses-their home unit 

and their team management unit. 

The group members asserted that it had become clear to them that to solve the problems 

and, at the same time, to retain teams across the 

board would require such major adjustments to 

the concept that it would in fact become a hybrid 

structure of teams and the traditional or hierar- chical arrangement. They concluded that if GAO 

changed the focus of its operations from a process to a results orientation. it would provide a 

good basis for both operating as efficiently and 

effectively as possible and solving the identified 

problems. They listed a set of basic management 

principles to which GAO aSSignment structures 

should adhere. but maintained that they found 

it both impossible and unwise to agree on a uniform mandatory structure. Instead. they rec- ommended that each division develop its own 

operating plan and submit it to the Comptroller 

General by November 1980. The divisions 

would not have to use teams as their standard 

operating procedure. but they would have to 

ensure that they followed the basic management 

principles. 

In a September 12. 1980 memorandum to 

all professional staff. Staats endorsed the direc- tors' recommendations. Based on their input. he 

labeled the essential management principles to 

be used in carrying out all of GAO's work as 

follows: 

• Identify the responsibility chain for the ex- ecution of each aSSignment. 

• Minimize the levels of review and 

supervision. 

• Provide that only the staff essential to the 

successful completion of the project be involved in planning and executing that 

review. 

• Insulate staff from competing demands. 

• Provide productive and challenging work 

for the staff that, over time. fully uses and! 

or develops their abilities. 

• Periodically review the work of staff to de- termine the appropriateness of the grade 

structure. 

153 
• Provide feedback to the staff and their or- ganizational managers on how well they 

perform. 

Furthermore. he required that the division 

operating plans incorporate the project team approach as an important way to carry out GAO's 

work and specify goals for its use. The general 

criteria for using the approach would be those 

spelled out in the June 22. 1979 memorandum. Team titles were to be discarded. Both he and the division directors recognized, 

however, that such procedures were only the 

beginning. Management had to work at making 

them the way of life in each division. To em- phasize and demonstrate their commitment, the 

division directors agreed to incorporate their 

r.

lans for operation and for resolving the prob- ems into their Senior Executive Service con- tracts. 14 The Comptroller General made his po- sition very clear: 

Although the solution may appear to be 

a sharp departure from preuious ap- proaches. I take uery seriously the diuision 

directors' commitment to take personal re- sponsibility for resoluing these problems. For that reason, I am approuing the approach which they haue recommended to 

me. In this regard. I plan during my re- maining tenure to closely follow the prog- ress mode and to hold the directors ac- countable for their performance in soluing. 

within each of their units, the problems 

they haue recognized. 15 

Increased Emphasis On Front- end Job Planning-The Project 

Planning And Management 

Approach (PPMA) 

The team approach highlighted the need for 

a systematic and consistent approach to planning 

and managing asSignments. Under the hierar- chical structure, the various report review levels 

had provided a set of "after the fact" quality 

controls. The team approach with its diminution 

of the hierarchy offered an opportunity to build 

the requisite controls into the total assignment 

process-particularly its early stages. when care- ful planning and decision making could prevent 

wasted resources later on. In addition. it revealed 

that a common approach to the basics of job 

planning and management and a standard ter- minology were necessary to facilitate commu- nication between and within the organizational 

entities involved in team assignments. Finally, it 

showed that a systematic approach to planning 

and management was desirable in view of the 

environment in which GAO operated during 

these years. The Office's work had become in- creasingly complex and sophisticated while staff 

154 

resources remained comparatively limited. It had 

built a reputation for objective reporting, and its 

ever-widening audience was demanding ever- higher standards of quality. Principles of job planning had been propounded in one form or another in the "Com- prehensive Audit Manual" (CAM). The CAM. 

first issued in 1952 and revised periodically since, is GAO's authoritative reference for approaches 

to audit problems, specific audit techniques, and 

basic performance standards for audit 

assignments. One of these standards calls for adequate 

planning of all phases of work. inclueling " upfront" determinations of areas to be covered. 

procedures to be employed. staffing requirements, and a systematic plan for assigning work. 

The CAM recognizes the importance of flexibility 

in planning: " ••• written work programs 

• • • should never be used as a checklist of 

work steps to be performed in a manner which 

stifles individual initiative, imagination. and resourcefulness. "" However. the CAM did not 

solve GAO's planning problems. The CAM offers even less in the way of job 

management principles. It touches on manage- ment issues but does not really formulate a management approach which can be used on all jobs 

regardless of their technical aspects. And, the 

CAM was not really being used. Auditors running 

complex jobs with tight deadlines and farflung 

staff avoided it as too ponderous and too wordy. 

In fact. auditors often felt they knew instinctively 

how to run a job. What was needed was a set of organization- ally consistent job planning and management 

tools available in a handy, usable format. The 

solution was the step-by-step GAO "Guide to 

Project Planning and Management. " This guide 

was based on the premise that upfront planning 

would ensure the best use of GAO's increasingly 

limited resources. It called for the defining of 

issues. the setting of milestones. and the parti- tioning of a job into discrete segments. all of 

which would provide a more systematic way of 

managing the work and more objective criteria 

for assessing individual performance and job re- sults than GAO had had before. 

HOW PPMA WAS DEVELOPED 

PPMA development began with the formation 

of a small group in FOD to look at how individual 

assignments were planned by the regions. Their 

initial research revealed a definite need for im- proved planning. Meanwhile, as the team con- cept was implemented and the organization 

"flattened out. " they recognized that this need 

was not just limited to the regions. The group, 

therefore, persuaded the division dlrectors in the 

spring of 1978 to sponsor a GAO-wide project 

to develop a systematic approach for planning 

and managing assignments under teams. 
A task force of 14 people from 6 divisions. 

headed by Joe Stevens. Assistant Regional Man- ager. Norfolk. developed a Project Planning and 

Management System and incorporated it into a 

handbook. It was presented to staff members in 

a series of nine developmental workshops. Ex- cept for the Career Level Council representa - tives. all participants were at the team leader level 

or above. Most agreed that GAO needed a uni- form approach to planning and management. 

commonly citing that it would facilitate the im- plementation of the team concept and make 

working with each other easier. On the negative 

side. they expressed three major concerns about 

the proposed system: rigidity. excessive paper- work. and overemphasis on timeliness but lack 

of emphasis on quality. 

The proposed concepts and techniques were 

tested on 20 assignments believed to represent 

GAO's diversified workload. with team leaders 

from both headquarters and the regions. On the 

whole. the team leaders were impressed with the 

approach's emphasis on up front planning. They 

also felt that one of its greatest benefits was in 

clearly laying out factors that they usually con- Sidered only subconSciously. Many noted that 

the concepts and techniques were not new and 

had previously been used successfully on GAO 

jobs. 

The task force also looked outside GAO to 

see how nine comparable organizations-public 

and private-planned and managed their work. 

They found these organizations used a system 

containing many or all of the proposed ap- proach's elements and that it resulted in a 75- percent rate of meeting targets on time." 

Using all the information it gathered from 

these tests. surveys. and comparisons. the task 

force revised the guide and then circulated it 

widely for comment. Perhaps the major revision 

to the guide was a wording change. Many re- spondents objected to the term "system" in " Project Planning and Management System." 

claiming it implied rigidity. Because this reaction 

was so common. the task force changed the 

name to "Project Planning and Management 

Approach." 

The revised guide came out in October 1978. In a subsequent meeting with the Comptroller 

General. the division directors reached a consensus thai the guide was "conceptually and 

technically excellent." They also agreed that. 

upon adoption of the guide. a I-year shakedown 

period would be advisable so PPMA could be 

refined and incorporated in the CAM." 

HOW PPlIIA WORKS 

PPMA. as set forth in the guide. establishes 

a framework for each aSSignment based on five 

consecutive key phases: proposal. scoping. plan- ning. implementation. and evaluation. Each job 

is expected to pass through all five phases: however. these may overlap. Also the time and effort 

devoted to each phase is expected to vary ac- cording to the complexity. requirements. and 

circumstances of each job. At the end of each 

THE PPMA TASK FORCE assembles under Ihe leadership of Joe B Stevens. assislanl regional manager. Norfolk. 

155 
phase, five basic decision components must be 

determined andlor reevaluated: issues. cus- tomer, timing. cost. and communication method. By continuallv considering these five components, the staff in charge has a basis for deciding 

whether to continue, modify. or stop the job. Thus. the assignment is evaluated in each phase 

before additional resources are committed. The key working document throughout is the 

assignment plan. As formulated by the end of 

the planning phase , it breaks the major assign- ment issues into manageable segments. analyzes 

each ~gment in terms of the tasks necessary to 

develop it (a process labeled "task analysis" I. 

and identifies the staff members responsible for 

the various tasks and estimates staff-day require- ments. During th~ implementation phase. it 

serves as the tool for job control and revision. In the evaluation phase it provides the standards 

against which job results and staff performance 

are measured. PPMA envisions aSSignment plans as dynamic 

tools which can be changed when unexpected 

events occur, a new area surfaces which should 

be pursued. or a more efficient way is found of 

accomplishing assignment objectives. In fact. it 

expects that plans will change. It also expects 

that the impact of such changes on the assign- ment's resources and timefram'e will be readily 

apparent from the plans and can be smoothly 

factored in. Just how much amending of plans 

actually occurs is problematic. To work, the proc· ess o( change must overcome the natural human 

tendency to leave something alone once it is 

completed and approved. 

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN PPMA 

IMPLEMENTATION 

During the I-year shakedown period, the 

Office of Program Planning monitored PPMA 

Figure 11-3 

implementation to identify progress and prob- lems and to determine, assess, and endorse 

needed refinements. It found that GAO staff believed that PPMA was a good concept and that 

it basically represented the same things they had 

always done. but in a different (ormat. Unfor- tunately, it was causing some confusion and con- cem due to the following problems: 

• Inconsistent implementation. Requirements varied widely between divisions and 

regions and even between groups within 

divisions. As one official described it. ". • • implementation ranges (rom com- pletely ignoring the document to not mak- ing a move that hasn 't been wrung through 

the PPMA wringer." 

• The level of detail involved in task analysis. Some plans broke the work to be done 

down as (ar as hal( day segments. while 

others resembled the more general audit 

guidelines previously used in GAO. 

• The burdensome level and type of documentaHon. Divisions were requiring this to 

support decisionmaking at the critical points. 

In addition, confusion abounded as to who 

should decide the level o( task analysis detail and 

documentation necessary (or a specific 

assignment. The division directors set up a task force on 

task analysis to deal with these questions. The 

task force reported in December 1979 that assignment staffs should do that level of task anal- ysis necessary to document (1 I key targets and 

milestones and (2) responsibilities and expeda· 

tions of the staffs and their individual members. Generally, tasks should be analyzed at least to 

the extent of detailing those necessary to develop 

Key Dedsioas From Each PPMA Phase 

1 

Proposal 

.. 

Do we have 

JusUhcalion lor 

lin lIssIgnmenl? 

156 

.. 

NO 

.. 

.. 

.. 

.. 

I SCO~ing I Plan

3

ning Imp~men Eval~ation talion 

! OO :-have issues TIS II oable"? 1 How e we doing t H!" did 

• 

VE cUSlomers and YES... YES in m~'!lIng ./ we do? ..- .sufflclent • ..,. NO • ...." our ob,ectlves? 

informatIOn 10 .... 

sIan ptannmg? ... ... 

.... .. NO.. .. 

.... .. 

.. 

What dkt we learn? 

THE END 
Figure 11-4 

Steps in Task Analysis 

1. Precisely state the proJect's objective , The obJecDOCUMENTATION FOR TASK ANALYSIS 

tive can usually be stated Assignment Title: Review of DOD Container Shipments Overseas 

as a, quehti~n \or ques- _ ~ Issue: Is the re a need for centralized DOD management of container cargo 

lions . W Ie t le pro)- shipments? 

eel will Ir~' to answer (Result: Report to Congress) 

2 Set locth th. Une 01 - f- Segment (s,: reasomng we will use to 

answer the question. 

This logical progression 

of ideas should provide a 

framework for oblamlng 

information that IS both 

necessary and sufficient 

for answi.>ring the ques Segment 1: 

lion 

1. Is DOD using optimal container configurations? 

(Result: Draft chapter on cost effectiveness and 

potential savings) 

2. 15 DOD providing efficient service to its shippers? 

(Result: Draft chapter on level of service) 

Optimality of container configuarions used by DOD. 

(Result: Draft chapter on cost effectiveness and potential 

savings) 

3 Identify the work 

ESTIMATED 

START/COMP. TASKS/SVBTASK S PERSON STAFF 

R ESPONSUILE DAY S NOTES 

segm~nls to be per 

formed to obtam the 7111 -8/ 12 1. Jdentlfv methods used 

mformation Ihdt our hne by DOD to determme and 

of reasoning requires saflsfy container requlreFor management pur ments 

pose~ one or more J...: 1 1 IntervIew trafftc 

work segments can be ~ V management offICials 

grouped together £ l,..... 1 2 ReVIew DOD gUidelines 

"Id II I -~ overseas shipments "t en t y more speci ~ 

Ically the tasks needed to ~ J...- 1 3 Scan recent shIpment 

carry out Ih~ work hsts to msure gUldesegments /. hnes are bemg followed 

• ~ dnd In formation provided 

S Determine the most hy officials is accurate 

6 

effiCIent sequencmg of t- 1.4 Additional steps as 

tasks. needed \0 complete 

task 1 

7/ 18-8/19 2 Evaluate each of the methods 

identified in task 1 to de - termme if optimal configurations are being used . Determine responsIbility. and identify ahernativ'ti 

cost. and timmg lor 2. J each [ask 2.2 Steps as needed to 

complete 

2.3 Task 2 

811-9/2 3. Evaluate alternative methods 

for container selection 

J. Jones 10 l week 

01 wacatio 

2 

I 

2 

5 

.J.- Jones 15 

t--- _ / 

I---

2 

8 

5 

D. Doe 25 

157 
major issue segments. They said the assignment 

managers should determine the level of task 

analysis and the extent of documentation required for a particular assignment. 19 

[n that same month. the division directors 

turned in their approval of PPMA to the Comptroller General. They reported: "Although PPMA 

has not been as conSistently applied as we had 

hoped. our experience confirms that PPMA offers a sound and flexible approach for planning 

our assignments." They recommended that the 

Office of PoUcy integrate PPMA concepts into 

the CAM'· Staats approved the directors' recommendations. and PPMA is now an official 

component of assignment planning. Evidence is 

lacking. however. as to how widely PPMA is actually used. 

Information Available To 

Professional Staff 

If GAO's auditors were to be able to cope 

with the increasing demands placed on their time 

and their talents during this penod. they needed 

information and they needed it fast. Much was 

done to meet this need by expanrung GAO's 

Ubrary and establishing information services. 

In 1966. the GAO Library was of limited use 

to the audit staff. It was lodged. as it had been 

since the 1950's. in the Office of the General 

Counsel, and was geared primarily to the needs 

of the legal staff. II) addition. its subject classifi- cation and arrangement did not conform to ac- cepted standardized systems. nor did its staff in- clude one member with a degree in library 

science. Its reference services were of a passive 

character. reflecting the lawyer's preference for 

looking up the law himself. and it offered no 

services to the regional offices. 

Recognizing the auditors' need for research 

support. the Comptroller General hired a con- sultant to study how GAO Library services could 

be improved. Her report. dated September 

1972. included the following recommendations: 

• Establishing a centralized library system 

with responsibility for the direction and 

management of a GAO Technical Library 

and a GAO Law Library. 

• Appointing a library director. • Improving the library system. including up- grading the facilities (installin,g new shelv- ing, providing more floorspace. etc.), in- creasing expenrutures for books. simplifying 

procedures for purchasing publications. and increasing the use of microfilming' I 

THE GAO UBRAHY 

The consultant's recommendations were acted 

on quickly. [n 1973. a professional librarian was 

hired to preside over the expansion of the library 

in accord with the consultant's recommenda- tions. In 1975. the rapidly expanding technical 

collection and services were moved into new 

158 

quarters with modern library furnishings and be- came known officially as the Technical Library. The Law Library, its counterpart under the Office 

of Librarian. was renovated in 1978 and under- went further improvements in 1980. 

The library staff grew in both numbers and 

level of expertise. The library was staffed with 

professional librarians and technical information 

specialists. In time. each librarian was assigned 

primary responsibility for one of GAO's operating divisions. In this capacity, the librarian selects 

and catalogs materials related to the division' s 

issue areas and provides research assistance to 

division staff. The library's resources have also grown. Over 

the years the Technical Library collection has 

expanded to about 73.000 volumes, including 

100 looseleaf services. with most of this material 

received since 1975. Thanks in great part to the 

use of microfiche. which has accelerated growth 

of the periodical collection by solving the prob- lems of limited space and deterioration of printed 

materials, both libraries collectively stock about 

1,200 periodicals. This is an important development because periodical literature is the pri- mary source of current research and information 

in most fields. 

The library has a number of arrangements 

with other organizations to accelerate its expan- sion. For example, by becoming a "Government 

Depository Library. " the library became entitled 

to receive free selected publications from the 

Government Printing Office (GPO) as soon as 

they are published. The most dramatic advance in the library's 

research capabilities has resulted from gaining 

access to computerized bibliographic and legal 

information retrieval systems. Currently the library provides access to approximately 150 separate data bases. providing citations to articles. 

government documents. dissertations. legal and 

legislative information. research in progress. and 

organizations. 22 

The library's interlibrary loan service is fre - quently used to obtain items cited in bibliogra- phies generated by computerized literature 

searches but not in the library's collection. Its 

chief sources for interlibrary loans are the Library 

of Congress. other Federal agency libraries. and 

libraries of colleges and universities. 

To encourage the use of these services. the 

library has embarked on a number of projects 

designed to systematically increase user aware- ness. For example. "Literature Limelight. " published monthly. lists the latest books acquired. The library also publishes specialized bibliogra- phies listing materials in the collection on issues 

of interest to GAO. such as women. equal em- ployment opportunity. zero-based budgeting, 

and internal auditing in the Federal Government 

In addition. library staff have presented briefings 

in GAO training courses on the valuable role the 
EXAMPLES Of BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

published by GAO Ubl'l1ry to aId auditors' resenrch 

A TECHNICAL INfORMAnON SPECIALIST accesses 0 compu .. nzed bibliographic cia .. base. 
library can play in GAO's work and provide divisions with orientation sessions geared to their 

particular subject needs. All these activities have 

generated marked increases in demand for library resources and services. 23 

The accessibility of information to the regional 

offices has been a continuing problem. To deal 

with the problem. some regions in recent years 

have hired their own technical information specialists. Their duties generally include: 

• Obtaining documents through interlibrary 

loan or other means. 

• Setting ur. organizing. and administering 

a regiona office coUection. 

• Assisting regional office staff in planning 

and in doing research. 

• Keeping up with new publications and 

sources of information within GAO. 

Figure 11-5 

Some of the regions with technical information 

specialists have also been given direct access to 

the library's computerized data bases" 

GAO INFORMATION SOURCES CENTRAUZED 

In December 1979. the Office of Librarian 

became part of the new Office of Information 

Systems and Services (formerly the Office of Information Management). Culminating a trend 

which had been growing in GAO for several 

years. the new office was made responsible for 

overall management and coordination of internal 

and external information activities. (See ch. 16.) 

Previously each GAO information source was 

developed. maintained, and used independently, sometimes resulting in duplicative and 

inefficient service. 

GAO staff were the prime beneficiaries of improved information management. They now had 

Au On-Line Record o f a Compute ... Ani.ted 

Biblio graphy Search 

160 

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the phrases underlined 

The topic of the search was "dairy price sUFPons," the file accessed was AGRICOLA. whICh Is 

generated under the auspices of Ihe Nationa Agricultural LIbrary, and made available through the 

DIALOG system , 

• 
easier access to the assemblage of information 

data. files. and sources produced by the agency: 

a valuable research resource in itself. One of the 

more visible byproducts of the consolidation 

process was "GAO Documents." First made 

available in 1977. the publication provides a 

comprehensive record of current GAO reports. 

legal decisions. testimony. and speeches. It is 

produced monthly from a computerized data 

base maintained by the contractor-operated 

GAO Document Handling and Information Ser- vices Facility. The same facility can identify and 

provide copies of individual documents as well 

as research requests for information on GAO's 

publications by subject. issue area. budget code. 

or other such access point. Currently the facility 

responds to about 20,000 requests per month 

by GAO staff and others for GAO publications. In July 1980, a 90-day experiment with GAO 

report distribution procedures was introduced by 

the Joint Committee on Printing in connection 

WIth Its efforts to establish GPO as the central 

source for all Government publications. The 

Committee directed that the public had to pur- chase GAO reports from GPO. although GAO's 

Document Handling Facility would continue to 

fill requests from GAO staff members. as well as 

from the Congress. the press. libraries. and heads 

of Government agencies. The results. however. showed that GPO was ill-prepared to handle the 

distribution responsibility, and in September 

1980 the Document Handling Facility resumed 

the task of providing reports to the public-this 

time as a deSignated GPO sales agent. All parties 

involved. including GAO's report customers. ap- pear satisfied that this is the most effective and 

responSive arrangement, 

Increasing the availability of information resources to its staff was essential for GAO to con- tinue producing quality products in the sophis- ticated and complex environment in which it 

op';'rated during the past 15 years. Resource lim- ltaMns. a fact of modem life. increasingly re- qUired auditors to identify and build on the in- formation developed by colleagues both inside 

and outside GAO. They then had to carefully 

assess their anticipated contributions in light of 

this information to be sure they would be addressing issues most deserving of attention. 

Methodology For Performing 

GAO Reviews 

GAO auditors confronted increaSingly difficult 

analytical problems and subject matters that de- fied effective analysis using traditional auditing 

skills and techniques. Their work evolved from 

financial and legal compliance audits to reviews 

of efficiency and economy of operations and fi- nally to evaluations of program results and cost- benefit analyses of alternative approaches to deal 

with a problem or an issue. But as the late Ell- sworth H. Morse. Jr" former Assistant Comptroller General. once commented. the auditors' 

new type of work was: 

• • * not basically different from what he 

has traditionally done with financial transactions. accounting records. and financial 

reports. H,s work has always been aimed 

at evaluation. The extension of his function 

to program results merely moues him into 

a more difficult area * * * 2!o 

In fairness to the auditors. the difficulty was 

due not Just to unfamiliarity with the methods 

and objectives of the social sciences and their 

usefulness in performing a growing part of 

GAO's work. The state of the art of program 

evaluation was itself still underdeveloped. Par- ticularly for massive social programs, concepts 

and methods were needed to show what had 

been accomplished by a program compared to 

what had been intended and what had hap- pened to people affected by a program com- I'ared with people who had not been affected. Then too. programs often lacked clear. specific 

goals and objectives and usable data for meas- uring results. The tasks of determining valid ob- jectives and finding surrogate measures for levels 

of attainment or degrees of success or failure 

could be complex and frustrating indeed. It is 

hardly surprising that the process was once de- scribed as "nailing Jello to a wall." 

GAO took action on many fronts to meet the 

changing demands of its work. The Technical 

Assistance Group in the Financial and General 

Management Studies Division and the Program 

AnalYSIS D,VISion provided technical assistance 

when requested on individual jobs and dissem- inated suggested methodologies and approaches 

throughout the Office. In addition. GAO began 

to diversify its staH-always considered its most 

important resource-by employing people with 

backgrounds other than accounting and audit- Ing. (See ch. 12.) High-level experts, including 

a medical doctor. a mental health specialist. engineers. and economists. were added to the di- visions where they assisted in program planning. 

consultation on Job deSign. and review of draft 

reports. In a few instances specialists were added 

to the regional offices. GAO also made increasing 

use of consultants to integrate the work of other 

disciplines with its own and to bolster its credibiBt\! when studying problems not normally 

Wlthm the competence of auditors. 

The adoption of PPMA was another step 

GAO took to focus the staff s attention on meth- odology. In the front-end assignment planning 

it called for. auditors were expected. in a stepby-step process. to: 

• Substantiate underlying assumptions in the 

aSSignment. 

161 
• A.sure that the basic data necessary to do 

the work was accessible and reasonably 

reliable. 

• Identify special techniques, such as the use 

of computer analysis, questionnaires, and 

consultants. that could be used to develop 

issues. 

• Consider alternative approaches and select 

the most desirable strategy for accomplishing the assignment objectives'· 

What PPMA did not do, of course, was specify 

exactly how to go about doing any of the a.bove. 

It provided a framework, but the filling-in had 

to be done by the individual teams. 

At the Comptroller General's direction, the 

Office of Policy initiated a revision of the "Comprehensive Audit Manual" and the "Report 

Manual" in 1980. One of the major changes 

wotlld be the incorporation of P?MA principles 

and other considerations relating to methodology. The revision plans called for a four-part 

manual. Part II, "Selecting, Designing, and Man -

aging GAO Projects," was given priority and was 

thus the first part drafted. It included such innovative features as a checklist of questions that 

could be used to assess report quality; a detailed 

discussion of how and when to use quantitative 

techniques, standardized data bases, and sam-

-pling as methodological tools; and gUidance on 

sources of technical assistance available in GAO. 

These and other attempts to strengthen GAO 

methodology had a foundation to work from in 

existing gUidance. The CAM stated in chapter 8, 

for example: 

Extreme care must be exercised * • • to 

avoid prOjections of sampling results to octiuities. locations, or periods of time not 

included in the sample. "Iffy" projections 

are inappropriate where we haue little or 

no idea whether the items or transactions 

sampled are representatiue. Unless we are 

able to demonstrate in the report that our 

tests are representatiue. the results cannot 

be projected. 

To some extent. therefore, GAO's task was not 

to introduce new principles but to reformat and 

make more visible those already promulgated. 

GAO METHODOI.OGY COMES UNDER 

8CRUIlNY 

Increasingly in the late 1970's, as GAO reports claimed a wider and more sophisticated 

audience. some of its methodology came under 

question. Criticisms were voiced in the Congress. 

the executive branch. and even inside GAO itself. The 1978 report of the House Select Committee on Congressional Operations noted that: 

With only uery limited exceptions-notably 

in the work of the new Program Analysis 

162 

Diuision-the basic framework for the conduct of nearly all GAD studies may be characterized as a highly structured. expanded, 

and generalized uersion of the traditional 

approach to financial auditing. 

• •• For many of the types of fact-finding 

that GAO now performs. howeuer, this 

approach is ouerly detailed. 27 

Despite the CAM's prohibition of "iffy" projections from nonrepresentative samples, several 

GAO reports were criticized for relying on such 

projections. Articles appeared in periodicals such 

as Business Week and the National Journal questioning the quali ty of some GAO reports. Staats 

publicly defended the quaJity of GAO's work. 

but at the same time, he earmarked methodology as an area requiring greater vigilance. 

In its 1978 and 1979 meetings, the Educator 

Consultant Panel expressed its concern over 

GAO's methodology. The members noted that 

the number of disputed reports had increased 

and warned thaL unless GAO enhanced its 

methodological and research capabilities, it could 

lose credibility. In reponse. Staats requested 

PAD to establish a special panel of consultants 

to critique several GAO reports and comment on 

how GAO could increase its confidence in its 

methodology in the future. Ten consultants were 

selected from major policy research organizations and universities to examine 10 reports, selected because the divisions considered them 

"difficult" They represented a wide range of 

subjects, methodologies, and levels of 

sophistication. The consultants met with top GAO management to present their comments and suggestions 

m a day-long seSSion m December 1979. Their 

remarks on the technical aspects, presentation, 

and other facets of the individual reports they 

reViewed were forthright without being overly 

critical. The GAO participants' overall impreSSion 

was one of having been helped. rather than attacked. Certain features of the reports did, in 

fact. receive substantial praise. In addition to 

commenting on the specific reports. however. 

the consultants discussed a number of issues 

which affected GAO's capability to do quality 

work. Key points made by one or more of the 

consultants follow: 

• GAO probably does more evaluations than 

it should, given its present levels of staff 

and technical competence. It should confine itself to a few important "do-able" jobs 

and thus gradually build up a reputation for 

quality in evaluation as it did in fiscal 

auditing. 

• GAO should examine all requests for eval- uations to determine if the questions being 

asked are the " right" questions and are, in 

fact, answerable. If necessary. GAO should 
reformulate the questions asked into more 

answerable and maybe even more impor· tant questions. Such an exercise would in· volve, in part, reviewing the literature or 

previous work done in the area. 

• Reports should more clearly state what the 

impetus for the evaluation was or what con· cerns it tried to address: how the data was 

collected: and any limitations that affected 

the results (time and resource constraints, 

availability of data, answerability of ques· tions posed), 

• GAO needs additional specialists but could 

not possibly hire them all permanently and 

remain an agency of reasonable size. 

Therefore, GAO should build up an in- house cadre of methodological generalists 

skilled in techniques such as statistical sampling and multiple regreSSion and secure 

highly specialized competence from con- sultants. GAO may want to maintain a 

small network of "specialist-finders" who 

can quickly recommend additional sources 

of expertise. In addition, it probably should 

gradually identify areas of subject matter 

expertise in which it would be worthwhile 

to add an expert to the staff." 

The first step GAO took after the panel meet- ing was to promulgate a policy that GAO reports 

contain an expanded "scope, objectives, and 

methodology" section. It should provide a clearer 

idea of what was done. why it was done. and 

why the information found provided a sound 

basis for the conclusions and recommendations 

presented. The reporting format and level of 

detail of the objectives, scope, and methodology 

section would depend on the nature of the re- port. Then, in an April 18, 1980, memorandum, the Comptroller General announced that GAO 

needed to improve its assignment planning and 

methodology in general and to identify and give 

special attention to specific projects which were 

notably costly, sensitive, andlor complex. To 

accomplish these objectives, he: 

• Strengthened the Assignment Review 

Group, changing it from an adviSOry group 

to one with the authority to direct a division 

to alter the plans for a job. He deSignated 

John D. Heller as ASSistant Comptroller 

General for Policy and Program Planning 

to chair the group. 

• DeSignated Harry S. Havens, then Director, PAD, as Assistant Comptroller General 

for Program Evaluation. 

• Established an Institute for Program Eval- uation which would be responsible for providing technical assistance: performing 

methodology development: conducting 

transfer studies as well as some specific 

program evaluation assignments deemed 

costly, sensitive, andlor complex: revising 

GAO policy on conducting program eval- uations: and developing a professional in- terchange program with other evaluation 

experts to periodically assess its activities 

and the quality of GAO's program evaluation methodology. • Directed that the initial staff of the Institute 

would consist of the program evaluation 

staff from PAD and part of the Tech nical 

Assistance Group from FGMSD. 

He also alluded to, but did not specify. actions 

to improve the use of consultants, technical train- ing, and recruitment. The signal was clear: more 

needed to be done to assure that GAO appro- priately used the best available methodology in 

its studies. whether they were compliance audits, 

economy and efficiency reviews, or program 

evalua!\ons. and more needed to be done to gain 

respect and acce'p'tance in the eva luation 

community. 

Communicating GAO's Message 

The General Accounting Office is a publisher. 

The written report is GAO's primary product: 

most of its work, from fiscal audits to policy anal- yses, must be packaged in this way if the Congress, Government officials and employees, and 

the public are to fully benefit. The agency increasingly realized that no matter how well an 

assignment was planned and executed, the "ntire effort was futile if the results were not effectively communicated. GAO placed high priority, 

therefore. on improving the presentation and 

organization of its reports. This was not a simple task. Several facts of 

life in GAO militated against the production of 

topnotch written material by a group of auditors. For one thing, the majority of the staff came from 

academic backgrounds other than liberal arts 

and, therefore, had not had extensive literary 

experience. This fact led the Comptroller Gen- eral to remark once that the greatest shortcoming 

of new employees was their inability to communicate effectively. In addition, reports were 

seldom composed as an integrated whole: in· 

stead, they were usually pieced together in stages 

from workpaper summaries. Similarly, the formidable hierarchical review and revision process 

to which reports were subjected made them a 

group product, not the work of a single, skilled 

writer. It also had the effect of weakening auditors' identification with the written product they 

had contributed to and, thus, their sense of responsibility for its literary quality as well. 

GAO worked to improve the readability of its 

reports in several ways. Writing training was one. 

An extensive writing improvement program was 

launched in 1969. Early efforts concentrated al- most exclUSively on grammar and usage and, 

thus, were too narrow in scope to effectively tac- kle GAO's systemic writing problems. By 1972 

three levels of courses-roughly, introductory, 

163 
intermediate. and advanced- were offered to 

meet the writing needs of auditors at successive 

stages in their careers. These levels have been 

retained in the present training program. but 

since the mid-1970' s they have been infused 

with the POWER principle. 

The POWER (Producing Organized Writing 

and Effective Reviewing) course is the heart of 

the program. Developed by consultants and re- vised no fewer than four times internally. POWER 

is offered to persons in grades GS-12 and up. Its basic principle is that a general-to-specific. or 

deductive. structure is easiest for readers. POWER 

applies the deductive principle at the paragraph 

level first and then extends it to sections and 

chapters. The course also includes a unit on re- port review. asserting that a knowledgeable re- viewer who can not only spot problems but ar· 

Figure 11-6 

ticulate them and their solutions to subordinates 

can be an effective reinforcer of the course prin- ciples. "Common standards. common princi- ples. common perceptions. common vocabu- lary-when writer and reviewer have these. 

they're a team."2'> Evaluations of the effectiveness of POWER indicate it has improved both 

writing and reviewing skills. Options for followup 

training along the same lines as POWER are now 

being explored. 

Another way GAO has tried to improve its 

written products is by making editorial services 

available to the divisions. Throughout most of 

the period. the editorial staff was a centralized 

unit to which reports were sent in the very last 

stages of production. At first the editors did little 

more than check out the reports for grammatical 

correctness and conformity to Government 

How The GAO Report Presents Its Message 

A 

Thl.' Tille caplun" the mll~ 

of ,n.. ''''pon lind dIe .... ) ,h .. fl1adl."·' Wl ler('sr 

GRIM OUTLOOK FOR THE 

UNITED STATES NATIONAL 

BULK MAil SYSTEM 

! 

B 

The COVill Summ"ry ~ucclnclly 

illiteS rh\' me5Sllgl.' and III m"JO' 

pnll'l~ 

164 

c 0 

Th., Orge51 h'ghhllhrs rlw Th .. T.b~ 01 Conl.",'t d,a .... /I 

me,~ to Ihl.' Iud .. , .. nd tt":rI plClulI~ of th .. main ~Uty('~ In Int> 

provides ... ~hon nlln/UIIt.- vf Ih" I ... por ~ IIlgum" ... , 

"1l1li1 polnll> lind how rhey "re 

arguU'cl 

DIGEST 

GRIM OUTLOOK FOR THE U 5 

NATIONAL BULK MAIL SYSTEM 

MAJOR CAPTION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

E 

The Flndll1gs ChIlPIIl~ rllke 

t'lleh of ,how IIr9umcn~ and 

Ioglclilly res.m~ Ih" IIi!MOI1~ 

upponmg Ihell \Il'1lldlt~' 

PROPOSITION 

, I SUPPORT j SUPPORT 

CONCLUSIONS - - i 

RECOMME/'IIDATIONS I 

__ _ ~~E~~~ ':.O~~~~S __ J 

PROPOSITION 

SUPPORT 

SUPPORT 

PROPOSITION 

SUPPORT 

SUPPORT 

CONCLUSIONS 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

AGENCY COMMENTS 

~--------------~ 
Printing Office style in the brief turnaround time 

allowed. Then in 1972. management gave them 

the latitude to make more substantive changes. 

though the auditors responsible for the reports 

had the authority to accept or reject the changes. 

The auditors generally accepted the changes. although the changes sometimes required additional referencing. Problems occasionally arose. 

however. when repolis dealt with complex, technical subjects and the editors' recommended 

changes would have altered the meaning. 

By late 197 GAO had decided to decentralize the entire report editing staff and integrate 

it into the divisions and regions. This arrangement made the editors more accessible to the 

auditors and allowed them to get involved earlier 

in the report process. The division audit staffs 

also had complete control over the report process from the start of a job to the submission of 

a report to printing. and repo'is could be issued 

on a more timely basis. 

In theory. the decentralization would also allow editors to be assigned to a review on a parttime basis. particularly during the planning phase. 

They would be able to help specify reporting 

objectives by developing a tentative report digest 

and table of contents which would identify the 

major points to be developed in the report. The 

theory. however. has not yet become a reality. 

The extent to which regions and divisions take full 

advantage of this possible resource varies. Division editing staffs typically have remained qUite 

small. and their ability to provide input early. in 

jobs is often limited by the more urgent tasks of 

final editing and report production. 

In ]979. a "Checklist for Report Writers and 

Reviewers" was prepared and distributed to all 

profeSSional staff members. A joint project of the 

Office of Policy and the Office of Publishing Services. the checklist standardized the report format and articulated conceptually how a report 

should be organized. It broke a GAO report 

down to its components-cover, transmittal Jetter, digest etC.-and posed questions to use in 

judging how well each was written. The booklet 

included reminders of GAO reporting policies. 

principles taught in POWER recurring reporting 

problems. and technical reporting reqUirement>. 

GAO staff found it a useful reference tool. due 

largely to its handy "cookbook" appr03ch. 

The state of GAO prose improved over th~ 

years but certain problems remained. For example. GAO's writers still too frequently used 

buzz words. such as "optimum" and " impa:t" 

(as a verb) and wrote in the passive voice. As 

Staats wryly admitted at one point. GAO still 

used too many words and too much paper to 

convey its message. His speci£ic concerns. as he 

----

GRAPHICS TECHNICIAN prepares dsuat aids for 0 GAO report. 

165 
expressed them in November 1979. were as 

follows: 

Most of the reports that cross my desk 

are of a high quality both in content and 

form . The exceptions. howeuer. continue 

to trouble me. * .. * the written presentation of our audit results sometimes does 

not meet our highest standards. Specifi. 

cally, some of our reports do not pay sufficient attention to the essential principles 

of effectiue composition. They do not lay 

out clearly, concisely. and unequiuocally 

the major points being made, and often 

compound this problem by ineffectiuely 

organizing supporting euidence.30 

VISUAL AIDS 

The visual quality of GAO's reports received 

as much emphasis from top management during 

this time. as did the writing quality. As early as 

1967, the Comptroller General requested that 

much more be done to include appropriate i1 . lustrative material in reports. J1 He wanted visual 

aids to be considered in planning the assignment 

so visual information about a problem could be 

obtained as work progressed. These aids in· creased report processing time and costs and 

thus called for careful evaluation and special ap- proval beforehand. However. where they were 

used, the effect was striking. For example. a re- port dealing with the rather dry subject of "Pro- jected Timber Scarcities in the Pacific Northwest: 

A Critique of 11 Studies" (EMD· 79-5. Dec. 12. 1978), helped the reader understand the major 

features of the review studies and the differences 

between them by incorporating 13 charts andlor 

graphs in the text. In other cases attention-getting 

graphics were even placed on report covers. "The 55 Mile Per Hour Speed limit: Is It Achiev- able?" (CED-77-27. Feb. 14. 1977). for exam· pie. substituted a picture of a speed limit sign for 

the first seven words of the title on the cover. 

NEW REPORT FEATURES 

Finally. GAO changed the format of reports 

to communicate the basic message clearly and 

qUickly to the widest possible audience. These 

changes included organizing reports into chapters. making report titles more descriptive. and 

adopting the use of digests and cover summaries. Digests were introduced to give readers a 

short narrative of a report's principal points and 

the evidence supporting them. They were in- tended to read like a press release, to be no more 

than four pages long, and to be organized under 

mandatory section headings. T ypicaUy the au- ditors "composed" them by excising key pas- sages from the report text and plaCing them in 

a logical sequence. In 1975 the mandatory head- ings were abolished and digests were required 

to be individually written. At the same time cover 

summaries were instituted-quick summaries of 

166 

a report's essence and what GAO is recom- mending-to be placed under the report title on 

the cover. These digests and cover summaries 

were important because they were the first-<md 

often. the only-sections of reports widely read. The ComptroUer General's long-sought goal 

was to have the digests read like a good article 

in a large daily newspaper. He liked the way the 

journalistic style communicated the essential 

message clearly and quickly. To help achieve this 

goal. a requirement was established that all di- gests be reviewed by the Information Officer. 

This review was only advisory, however. and 

more often than not, the auditors who composed 

the digests had the last word-<:ompleteness and 

accuracy often prevailed over readability (even 

though they are not necessarily incompatible). However. if not typically of New York TImes 

quality. the digests were a welcome addition to 

readers pressed for time in the Congress and 

elsewhere. 

The trend toward summarization of GAO's 

report message continued to the end of the 15- year period. In May 1980 GAO stopped sending 

copies of unrestricted reports to the Congress to 

all but the reports' primary customers. Those 

recipients earmarked for " recurring subsequent 

distribution" are sent only report "summaries" 

consisting of the cover. the digest. and the table 

of contents. Recipients of these summaries are. of course. entitled to request copies of the full 

report if they desire. A test of the procedure in 

1979. in which more than 2,000 summaries of 

3 reports were sent out yielded only 33 requests 

for the full reports--a 1-112-percent request rate. 

GAO anticipated that the new procedure would 

result in printing cost savings of between $100.000 

and $200.000 a year. In all. GAO staff appeared to be making 

strides in report writing and presentation. In 1979 

a consultant reported that the level of conscious- ness about effective communication had risen 

considerably in GAO over the years and that the 

quality of the written products had markedly im· 

proved. If certain problems remained. the agency 

was at least on the right track: 

Increasingly ' •• the agency is realizing 

that uery porticular skills are needed to or· 

ganize and present the data that a management analyst discouers. The agency 

now acknowledges the extent to which the 

presentation of the data can make or break 

the audit it£elf.32 

Internal Review And Final 

Processing Time 

Once a GAO staff has systematically planned 

an assignment, carried out all work steps. and 

written a draft report. it still faces another hurdle 

in getting out a product that is both timely and 

effective-report proceSSing and review. As 
mentioned earlier, for many years GAO looked 

at this phase of its work, concluded this was the 

problem, and tried to do something to streamline 

it. Not all GAO's efforts were successful. The 

reason is probably due, in part, to the fact that 

the quest for infallibility is at least as deeply 

embedded in GAO's organizational culture as is 

the quest for timeliness. Perhaps it is more so 

because an emphasis on the accuracy of facts 

and figures is a classic feature of traditional au- diting and the hallmark of the agency's reputa- tion for credibility. GAO has always taken pride in the thor- oughness and factual reliability of its work. Over 

the years it has developed rigorous quality con- trols to help ensure that its reparts are accurate, are supparted by sufficient documented evidence, and are clearly written. These quality con- trols, spelled out in detail in the "Comprehensive 

Audit Manual" and the "Report Manual." include: 

• Independent referencing. • Agency review and comment 

• Supervisory review by division officials. 

• Review by the Office of Policy. the Office 

of the General Counsel, and editorial staff 

Messages From The Media 

on substantive, legal. and language/format 

matters. 

Reviews by the Office of Policy and the Office 

of the General Counsel are mandatory only for 

reports drafted lor the Signature of the Comp- troller General: these, however, constitute the 

bulk of GAO's work. 

Although GAO's reputation for excellence 

and integrity testifies to the utility of the various 

controls, they do take their toll on timeliness. As 

part of a comparative study of the four congres- sional support agencies sponsored by the Commission on the Operation of the Senate in 1976, 

Ernest S. Griffith sent a series of questionnaires 

to Senators and committee and subcommittee 

staff directors asking opinions on the agencies' 

products. The general response regarding GAO's 

products was that, while they were of high qual- ity, the review process was so involved that they 

were often too late to be really useful.

33 The 

House Select Committee on CongreSSional Op- erations found in its 1978 study of GAO that: 

The principal cost oj superaccuracy or unnecessary accuracy is not so much in the 

As more and more GAO products found their way into joumalistic circles, they began to 

be scrutinized for not only their basic message but also their presentation, Media critiques, 

while not always complimentary, helped to keep GAO's writers from becoming complacent 

and to increase the Office's determination to improve its communications, 

No one was more sensitive to media attention than the Comptroller General; one GAO 

manager recalled him soying: "We should always keep in mind that our reports are not only 

written for the Congress but for the media as well. " 

One recurrent source of feedback was the Washington Star's "Gobbledygook" column. 

It reprinted each day examples of obscure communication found in Government reports, 

periodicals, and memorandums. Several GAO products were cited. While most were legal 

decisions, several audit reports received this dubious distindion, For example, the following 

item appeared in the March 18, 1977. column: 

From a report on services to Indian Head Start grantees: . we recommena that the .:>_ecretary 01 Ht: w ~:lIrect the Director, Office of Child De- velopment, to insure that the Division's review of its specialized and general training and 

technical assistance programs include an evaluation of the most effective method of 

providing assistance in implementing the specialized training and technical assistance 

program and that the findings of the evaluation are implemented. 

While using nearly 60 words to make up one sentence is remarkable in a way, the Comptroller 

General was not pleased with such an "accomplishment." He let it be known that he was 

concerned over the references to GAO reports appearing in this column. Apart from the gobbledygook, the media comment on report quality that probably sent 

the most ripples through GAO was one personally addressed to Staats by syndicated columnist 

James J. Kilpatrick. In a 1977 letter, he made the following observations about the typographical 

quality of a recent report: 

As a working newspaperman, I am ordinarily a faithful reader of your nice bluebound 

GAO reports to Congress. but I am getting less faithful as time goes on ••• my 

confidence is shaken in them. 

(Continued Next Page ) 

167 
detailed review and referencing procedures 

(as time-consuming as they are) as in the 

time of the auditors or other factfinders and 

analysts in searching out and compiling 

such completely verifiable data in the first 

place. and in polishing working papers or 

other documentation to reflect all of that 

accuracy for the reviewer and referencer. '" 

Frederick C. Mosher suggested in "The GAO: 

The Quest for Accountability in American Government" that GAO's normal fastidiousness as 

an agency firmly rooted in accountancy was in· 

tensified by the "zinc stink" experience of 1955. In congressional hearings on a controversial 

GAO report alleging questionable Government 

practices in procuring zinc for strategic stockpiles. Comptroller General Campbell was forced to 

admit errors in the report It seems the memory 

of this damaging revelation influenced reporting 

practices from that time on .... 

Perhaps, then. it is not so much GAO's quality 

controls themselves that have impeded timeliness as much as it is the attention to detail they 

may have inspired and the ritual-ridden way they 

may have been applied. 

poucy REVIEW 

In November 1966 the Comptroller General 

established a task force. headed by Assistant to 

the Comptroller General Lawrence J. Powers. 

to study the problems related to report processing. The task force found that the time taken to 

process reports to the Congress was conSistently 

excessive-especially when compared with the 

time taken to do the audit work, In fact. the 

average time taken to process reports was 380 

calendar days, This was not surprising in view 

of the fact that the typical report underwent 

about 14 reviews involving as many as 20 in- dividual participants. In its January 1967 report. 

"Observations and Recommendations Relating 

to Processing of Audit Reports." the task force 

encouraged redUCing the number of reviewers 

and the number of reviews directed at both sub- stantive issues and personal preference matters 

of language and presentation. 

Messages From The Media-Continued 

I note from the cover page lof one recent report] • • • that the study was for the 

Depatment of Transportation, On page 1 and again on page 14, I see that something 

was blatent, On page 11 , , On page 7, atailties. On page 10. adversly. Your 

authors do not appear to on page 3 an agam on page 10, usage 0] between 

and among. And so on, I hiS may impress you as nit-picking, but I have been in the writing and editing 

business long enough to know that carelessness in small things implies carelessness in 

large things also, I respectfully submit that someone in your publications division needs 

a jacking-up, 

As it turned out. this particular report had been processed outside the Publishing Branch due 

to a backlog and so had not been subjected to all GAO's normal quality control procedures, Nevertheless. GAO's concern about customer reaction to its products led it to institute several 

new procedures, including a series of reviews to monitor quality, Happily. the fruits of these and other improvement efforts also received their share of 

attention. A 1918 article in the Federal Times had this to say about a new booklet. "GAO 

Ethics Code." produced by the Office of the General Counsel: 

And in the joyful spring spirit. we follow here with kind words for a government 

booklet. Since we are all the tirne griping about Federal gobbledygook and unreadable 

Federal instructions on tax forms and whatever. we think it's only proper to note a 

government publication that says what it has to say in clear, unmistakable English. 

'" '" '" '" >Ie 

Our congratulations to GAO • • • Would that other agencies that pass out gob- bledygook on the same subject follow GAO's lead, 

The Washington Star-in a switch from its nemesis posture iTT . 'Gobbledygook' '-described 

GAO's writing improvement program. highlighting the POWER course. and stated that. "From 

the top down, agency employees have been told they must know how to write SO their readers 

can understand," 

Clearly, if readers do nOl understand. they have only to let GAO know. 

168 
Figure 11-7 

Report Draft Routing Form (Circa 1976) 

-" .. Report _-IltIt I~I -........ -------------

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~ !! ~ ~ 

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vour reov i_ 

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my CGmmlnu 

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----- ---- .---

169 
The task force recommended that a lull-time 

functional assistant-in-charge of reporting be installed in the major groups of the operating divisions. It envisioned that the concentration of 

one key person on reporting would improve report quality to the extent that subsequent reviews, including that by the Office of Policy and 

Special Studies (OPSSI (now the Office of Policyl, could be limited solely to major issues. Two 

other lull-time functional assistants were recommended for planning and audit execution. 

The task force also recommended that time 

standards be established for the major steps involved in report processing, with all steps to be 

accomplished in about 2 IO days. The stated reasons for this recommendation are a distant echo 

of some of the purposes behind PPMA today: 

• To emphasize timeliness in assil}nment performance and reporting. 

• To identify reporting problems and bring 

them to the attention of management 

officials. 3. 

Staats endorsed the task force recommendations 

and even called for a test of the use of functional 

assistants. This concept never really caught on. 

however, and the Office's report processing 

problems remained. 

In 1970 the Committee for Improvement of 

Report Processing and Review Procedures 

was established under the chairmanship of Victor 

L. Lowe, then an associate director in GAO's 

Civil Division. The Committee members did not 

mince any words describing the situation they 

found: 

Processing a report through the existing 

procedures in GAO involves as many as 

50 reuiews and is trying in the extreme. After going over all of the steps inuolved, 

the Committee is not surprised that it takes 

so long. That reports get out at all is a 

tribute to the persistence of GAO staff 

members.

37 

Some progress in timeliness had been made. 

but performance still varied significantly from the 

time standards cited in the task force report of 

January 1967. For reports issued to the Congress 

in fiscal year 1970. the average elapsed time 

from first draft to report issuance was 8 months 

in the Civil Division, 11 months in the Defense 

DiviSion, and 13 months in the Intemational 

Division. 

The task force made recommendations relating to virtually all aspects of report processing. 

Perhaps the most substantive one was that relating to review by OPSS. At that time policy 

review took as long as 30 days. Reviewers wrote 

lengthy memorandums to the operating divisions 

containing detailed comments on reports sub170 

mitted. As the January 1967 task force report 

had lamented, the comments related not only 

to policy matters but to spelling, wording, grammar, andJ'resentation. Not all comments were 

considere "substantive," but those that were 

had to be resolved to OPSS' satisfaction. Often 

division directors had to enter into a process of 

negotiation with OPSS. Essentially OPSS was 

acting as division report reviewer. raiSing questions that should have been raised much earlier 

and at the operating division level. 

The task force members stated unequivocally 

that the OPSS' role should be limited. They believed that OPSS should review reports only 

for major issues and should review them only 

after they had been prepared in final form. Furthermore. the end result of such review should 

be a recommendation in writing that the Comptroller General either sign the report or not sign 

it. In the task force's opinion, the majority of 

reports would not be challenged by OPSS, and 

thus the time required to process them would be 

Significantly reduced. Even for those reports 

which required revision, it was expected they 

would be issued in less time than under the prevailing system. The recommendation for OPSS 

to prepare "go/no go" memorandums on reports reviewed was implemented, redUCing the 

timeframe required for that stage of processing. 

Currently this review takes about 7 calendar 

days. Furthermore, since April 1975, it has been 

performed concurrently with review by the Office 

of the General Counsel and with the final typing 

and proofing operations. 

REFERENCING 

According to the " Report Manual." "referencing" is an important quality control feature 

that helps ensure report contents are accurate 

and are adequately supported. Each report is 

expected to be referenced. Traditionally, a staff 

member who has not been directly associated 

with an aSSignment independently makes a 

word-by-word. line-by-line examination of a report and supporting documentation to determine 

whether they adequately support the findings. 

conclusions, and recommendations in the report. 

Although before 1978 the " Report Manual" required that all reports be referenced before issuance, some in GAO viewed the utility of this 

process with skepticism on several grounds. First. 

the process itself consumed time as did the painstaking efforts the staff made to ensure that every 

line of a report and every workpaper could pass 

the referencer's inspection. Second. referencing 

is viewed by some as reflecting a lack of confidence in the professional capabilities of the staff 

and as shifting responsibility and accountability 

away from those who prepare the report. In the 

interest of both timeliness and accountability, 

then, the Task Force on Improving GAO Effectiveness recommended that the divisions be 
given greater flexibility in determining the means 

for ensuring that reports are accurate and ade- quately supported. The Comptroller General 

endorsed this recommendation. and in March 

1978 the " Report Manual" was revised 

accordingly. In late 1979. Staats asked the Office of Policy 

to study current referencing practices. and to 

determine the extent to which alternatives to ref- erencing were being used, and what changes. 

if any, were needed. Policy found that GAO 

managers had not used available alternatives, 

such as personal verification by an assignment 

manager or a group director of certain key facts 

and positions or a critical review by a panel of 

experts. to the extent possible. When they did 

select an alternative method. they sometimes 

chose one that fell short of ensuring factual ac- curacy. Consequently. Policy revised the "Re- port Manual" again to tighten up referencing 

procedures a bit. Under the new procedures. 

draft reports may be subjected to either tradi- tional comprehensive referencing or selective ref- erencing of statements considered critical. At a 

minimum. selective referencing is expected to 

verify the accuracy of any quantitative data. 

When asked about referencing, the Comp- troller General summarized his frustration by 

stating simply. "I have given up!" As GAO continues to become more involved in program evaluation and policy analysis. referencing might be 

expected to undergo even more changes in the 

future. Other fact-checking procedures may be 

more efficient and more relevant. 

AGENCY COMMENTS 

The practice of submitting draft reports to 

agencies for advance review and comment was 

formalized into written GAO policy in the mid - 1950's. The Comptroller General always supported this practice. As he told a subcommittee 

of the House Govemment Operations Commit- tee in 1975: 

When I took office in 1966. I carefully examined the existing policy and endorsed 

it. I belieue this procedure helps to assure 

the factual accuracy of our reports. More- ouer. when the agency disagrees with our 

findings. conclusions. and recommenda- ~ons, the Congress is enotled to the agency's 

position as welf as our own. J!j 

Until the late 1970's. GAO's basic policy was 

to request formal written comments on self-initiated reports to the Congress. committees. and 

members. The maximum time prescribed for the 

return of comments was 60 days. Comments 

were then incorporated in the report to the extent 

appropriate for a proper presentation. According 

to the Task Force on Improving GAO Effectiveness. obtaining and evaluating comments took 

close to 3-1/2 months on the average. On request assignments, the requester's wishes were 

controlling on whether written comments were 

obtained, and usually the requester did not want 

them. 

The task force established in 1966 to study 

report processing singled out the time normally 

taken to obtain agency comments as being particularly susceptible to reduction and. therefore, recommended that comments be solicited im- mediately upon completion of audit work on an 

assignment, before the report was finalized. A 

May 1968 memorandum from the Comptroller 

General recommended more active followup 

after draft issuance as a timesaving tactic. 

In .1974, Staats directed that drafts be trans- mitted for comment only at the division director 

level because of the importance he attached to 

the draft reports. This requirement frequently led 

to pretransmittal delays while the draft 

• was reviewed by the division hierarchy be- fore being submitted to the director. 

• awaited review by the director. 

• was reviewed by the director. and 

• was revised based on the various reviews. 

The Task Force on Improving GAO Effectiveness recommended that both written com- ments and the 6O-day timeframe be exceptions-to be applied in controversial or sensitive 

cases-rather than rules. As he did with the other 

task force recommendations dealing with quality 

controls. Staats endorsed the call to flexibility. Emphasizing that GAO's objective was to ade- quately reflect agency views in its reports. he 

encouraged divisions to do this informally if pos- sible. He also clirected them to keep the time 

allowed agencies to formally comment to a min- imum. The "Report Manual" was subsequently 

revised to state that the normal time allowed 

would be 30 days. 

In the meantime, the House Select Commit- tee on Congressional Operations had also noted 

the delaying effects of the time allowed agencies 

to submit comments. While its 1978 report rec- ommended generally that the time required for 

report preparation and review be substantially 

reduced. it made a specific recommendation for 

reduction at the advance comment stage. GAO 

had. of course. already addressed this problem. 

but the Comptroller General took the additional 

step of getting the relevant Office of Management 

and Budget guidance to Federal agencies revised 

to emphasize the need for agencies to respond 

to draft GAO reports within the time allotted. J9 

The Congress looked favorably on the 30-

day timeframe-so much so that under the GAO 

Act of 1980, 30 days became the maximum 

amount of time GAO can give an agency unless 

the agency can show that a longer time is necessary and that the comments are likely to im171 
prove the accuracy of the report, Under no circumstances may this time period exceed 60 

days, 

Divisions appear to be taking advantage of the 

flexibility introduced into the comment process, 

Over half of GAO's reports are sent to the Congress without formal written comments from the 

agencies,40 Office policy requires, however, that 

even when oral comments are obtained, the aue1itors obtain some indication from the agency 

officials reviewing the report that they agree with 

the proposed treatment of their comments, 

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF REPORT 

PROCESSING 

Streamlining was also achieved in the administrative end of report processing, These procedures were routine but could be very time con- suming nonetheless, Around the mid-1970's 

several changes were introduced into processing 

that reduced the elapsed time involved, Word 

processing equipment which Simplified and 

speeded up the production and revision of copy 

was introduced for final typing, Also, reports be- gan to be printed after they were signed instead 

of before, eliminating extensive reprinting if the 

reports were changed during final review by the 

Comptroller General and other review staffs such 

as the Office of Policy and the Office of the Gen- eral Counsel. This change also eliminated a potential source of errors in the final report because 

new pages were no longer thrown out by mistake 

and old ones reinserted and printed, Finally, 

GAO began to use contractors for some of its 

printing workload. This decreased processing 

time and opened the way to greater productivity, 

1 ComplTo ~ C.ooral SIaOIS. MlimOrlli'ldum 10 heads of dlvl~n' and of· Ik:es. I Nov 1966 

2. Charles C Martin, Proi«t Mooogt'mt'''' How 10 Make /I WorlI' (N!;'"" YOlk. AMACOM. 19761. p 3 

3 Tlmothy 0 ,,"monel. 'The Tum Apprullth Stirrtng It""' Pot" The GAO 

R~IM"". (Spring 1978). p b3 

4. U,S G.n~aI Auounting OffIce, Task on Prc,ect ManageTN!Tlt. R~" 

to It. CampIT'OIIa G.neritl olthe Untll~d StalC$" (Dec; 19751. pp JO II 

5 GAO TMk Foret on P'ro,KI Monagemcnl. p I 

6. Comptroll0' General SIaBtJ. Memorandum 10 heads of dlvi5lon\ and 01 1Ic~. 7 Jan. 1976 

1 Erasmul H. KIoman, ~ .. CalC '" Acrountobilily. T~ Wot/{ oJ the Gl.O (Boulder. Colo Westview Pret!'. 19~1. pp 24·26. 

8 U S CAnmili Accounting Offke. Communlty and Economic Dewlopmenl 

DivIsion T6lIk Foree on WMhl~ Aeid RelalloN. "The T ellm Leader Contl!pl 

A ProlX)Ml for DoIng II &liter Job Faster" (CED-78·34. Feb 21. 197tU. U'pOrt 

10 the DirecTor CED 

9 US. Geneml Accounllng Office. TMk Fon::l1 on Improvtng GAO EfIOl(: 

tiveness. " Report of Findings. Conciu5l0rt5. lind Rl!Commendlltlons" INov 9. 1977). P 4 

10 GAO rllsk Foru on lmprovl"ll GAO EfflK1tVeness, pp 11 13 

II U S Genenai Accounong Office. Fldd Operntlons Dt~'ISion. "Jmplemen IlInon Plan:' 8 Feb 1978. 

172 

12, OiNCIor, Flir:ld OpmItions DtvtsIon. Memooandum toCompcrolleTGeneml 

Stoats. 3 Apr 1980 

13 Compl1'olM Gtrllo.'r1Il Staall, Memorandum 10 division dlrectorS, Ii May 

19!!() 

14 G~ J AIwt. Chairman. Dln.'clor!; Group. MelllOfaodum 10 Comp 

!J'OIWf Gem-ralStaal5. 9 Sept 1980 

l!t Compuol1 ..... Golnl/flll SIMIII. Memomndum to all GAO p,-otess.oTlilI SUlfI. 

12 Sc:pt. 1980. 

16 U S General Accounting Ollke. "Compretu!n:live AudiT Ml!1IUII1:' pan 

I. c~pll!f It!. P IS 2 

17 US (;Qrwml Accoonllny DUke. "OeveIoptmln, of she Pro:!«t PWnrllng and MImogumenT Approoch." Internal GAO refererx:1! docuroom 

18 ComplI'QUIlI' G~lI\er41 StoatS. Memorandum '0 dlWic:Jn director.;. 20 Ocl 

1978 

19 US GcneJ1ll Accounllng OffIce. Task Force on T~k Analysis. "TMh 

AI'll'lIys15 Whall, IT and How Should GAO Uw hr ' U'pOr110 'ht' dllII~on director'S, 

(NOli 19791. P 9 

20 Oll/iSlon Dir«ton.. Memorandum 10 ComptrolllJl Genl!Rll 51l1li15. 3 1A>c. 1979 

21 Ruth Rm,:, "GAO UbrllllJ .5ervlces An Apprfllsal" l!lUbmlned 10 GAO m 

fulfillment 01 COfllrbC\ No GA·8JO), Sept 20. 1972. pp 232& 

22 Susan Burns. "UbnallJ Resources AI GAO---A Useful Tool to.. Ihl:! Au dltors." TIw GAO Review. /Summer 1978). pp 39·42 

23 US CrilneraJ Accoondng . . OfficII ~ . OffIce 01 Ubrarian, "StaluS Repon on ActIvtue.s:· June 1977. pp 29·32. 

24 Anne Forlltv. " lnlonnatJon Access In all Information Age " The GAO 

R~w. ISpnng 1l)79i. pp &J 64 

25 Ellsworth H M«se. Jr "The Auditor Takes on Program EII,vUlluon." 

reprint. ~ r~1 ACCOunlonl. June 1973. p 9 

26 US General Aaounttng Offic:e. "GAO Gwde 10 Protect P\aonirog and Management: ' 0«. 1978. pp 33 to 3·6 

27 US Cong. HtJUM. Seler;t Committee OIl Congr~ ()pemdon!l. Gf!nrrol Accolmfing Offke Srrvtca fO Congreu; An AssessmenT. 95th Cang" 2nd wss .. H Rept 95 1317 (Washington, 0 C GPO. June 22. 1978). p 24 

28. B.twd on Dl ~ctOI. Progrollm Al'll'llysls Division. Mllmorandum lind nnach· mentli 10 ComptrOller General 4 Jail 1980 

29 Robert M Brown. Unl~r5ity 01 MalI,/land. "The GAO Wrltfng Program A Possible ModeJ." unpublished paper. p 19. 

30 U$ Genera! Accounting Qffic<.!. Office 01 Policy tIrId Olllee of Publishing Servkei. "ChecklisT 101 Report Wrlll!fS lind Reviewers." NO\!. I. 1979. fMm orandum Itom Complml1er General StlJlI\J 10 aU GAO prolllSSlol'II'Il II/ . 

31 Comptrolkn" ~I Staats. Memorandum 10 lin ffWmbers 01 the 511111. 13 So!pl 1968 

32 Brown. p !t 

33 Emdl 5 Gnfftth. "Four Agency ComporatiVII Srudy," COf19!':$&lon1l1 

SupPOrt AgellCiell A CompilaTIon 01 Pap.rrs PITtXIITd JOI 'M Commilslon on 1M ~ oIlhr Srnare, 94th Cong.. 2nd 5eU.. Commlnee prlnl 119761. p 113 

34 H RIlP'. 95 1317 p 29 

l5 Fre<knck C. Moshet, The GAO T~ Que51/Of" AccoumClbflil\lloAfflrfICOn Gowmnw:nl fBouIder. Colo. Westview Pres5.. 19791. pp 14748 

36 U.S Gernrrlll Accounting Office. ComptrOller General's TMk Force. "ObwlWltlonS and Rewmmendatioru Rellllmg to Procesiing 01 AudIt ReportS" (Jan 1%71. p :; 

37 U.S Glmtl"al Accounting OffIce. Committee for ImpTOYemenl of Report 

Processing and ReWlw Procedures. "ActIons Needed To E..-tpedlle IS!iUllnce 01 

ReportS," Jon 28. 1971, memor.mdum ro Comprroller GerwT4I 

Jij. U.S Cong., HOU5e. Gowmnwnl Operations COmmlnH. R~I.I!eUl 0( h~ 

POwrr5. Procedul'U, and Policies of 'he (H:orwroJ Accourt1lng Of/la!. heartng held Dec 10. 1975. p. 6 

39 Oftke of Managemenl llnd Budgel ClmJlar No A 50 Irev), Jl\n 15. 1979 

40 US. Cong .. House. Subcommlttee on l..egtsI.tItive Bmnch AP?fOPMllom. 

Commlnee on Approprllltlonl. Hellrlng5 on LegWatll.lf! Bmncn AppropnOlJons 

for FIKaI YftIr 1981 . port 2. 961h Cong.. 2nd 5eSI., (19801. p 682 

CCIJuffi~fr®D' n~ 

Diversifying The Agency's 

Personnel 

The composition of GAO's work force and 

the Office's method of managing it both changed 

significantly between 1966 and 1981. After a 

period of growth in the late 1960's and early 

1970's, employment leveled off. The number of 

accountants and auditors on board in 1966 was 

gradually supplemented with graduates in eco- nomics. statistics. computer technology. business 

and public administration. and other disciplines. By 1980, about half the staff had backgrounds 

other than accounting. This new cadre contrib- uted broader analytical skills to GAO's work 

through their diverse. educational backgrounds 

and expenence. TheIr presence went hand in 

hand with GAO's expanded coverage of Federal 

programs and activities and the move to program 

evaluation. But the identification. recruiting. and 

hiring of the new types of people needed to carry 

out GAO's ever-changing mission became a 

challenge in light of Civil Service Commission 

(CSC) constraints and some internal resistance_ GAO's personnel management practices 

underwent many changes during the period. ~Ithm the framework of overall guidance pro- VIded by GAO headquarters and civil service 

rules and regulations. each division and regional 

office used dinerent performance standards. pro- motion polICIes. and the hke to manage its hu- man resources. Before the Comptroller Gen- eral's arrival and for many years thereafter. 

central recruiting and staff development were 

geared to achieving organization goals and be- came the heart of GAO's central personnel 

operations. Starting in 1969. GAO began to modernize 

its personnel management system. a process 

which continues today. The staff development 

and personnel regulation functions of the personnel system were split in 1975 and put under 

separate organtzations. AddItional staffing. management and organizational changes continued 

through the early months of 1978. Eventually 

GAO began profeSSionalizing the Office's per- sonnel management operations and gained the 

Congress' approval for a separate personnel 

system. 

. Many of the. decisions and events occurring 

m th~ late 1970 s-accelerated recruiting of mi- nonties and women. a CSC audit, and continual 

revisions in the competitive selection processevidenced the difficulty of managing so diverse 

an organization as GAO is today. 

174 

Building And Diversifying The 

Professional Audit Staff 

GAO started to shed its image of a "green 

eye-shaded" clerical organization and to become 

a truly professional audit organization with the 

establishment 01 the Corporation Audits Division 

and the hiring of the first large block of profes- sional accountants in 1946. However. it was not 

until Comptroller General Joseph Campbell's 

appointment in 1954 that a broad-scale hiring 

and development program to increase the number of professional accountants. agencywide. got 

underway. Hired by Campbell in 1955. Dr. Leo 

Herbert (Director of GAO's Office of Personnel 

Management 1969-75). a former accounting 

professor. inventoried GAO's staff qualifications. He agreed with Campbell that GAO was suffer- ing because most staff were not qualified to per- form the type of audits Campbell thought GAO 

should be doing. Thus. Campbell asked Herbert 

to establish a program so that GAO's profes- sional staff would mirror the typical certified pub- lic accounting (CPA) firm of the day. Herbert 

deSIgned a professionalization program intended 

to enable all recruits to attain the level of GS- 14-a level to which Herbert thought GAO's 

professional auditors should aspire. A profes- sional auditor. in his opinion. was highly skilled 

in audit theory and practice. knowledgeable of 

GAO and the Federal Government. and able to 

manage any audit assignment Herbert retired 

m 1974 after 20 years of GAO service. to return 

to collegiate education: his contribution to the 

Office reflected in the J'rofessionalization pro- gram GAO implemente . The program designed by Herbert and others 

in GAO focused on three activities-recruiting. trammg. and rotating staff among the audit 

groups. 

First. GAO sought to hire the top college grad- uates with accounting degrees. The CPA firms 

with their extensive recruiting programs and at: 

tractive saianes, usually hired the "cream of the 

crop," so Herbert had to find ways to compete 

WIth them or draw qualified candidates from 

other sources. He began by establishing personal 

contacts with the deans and professors of accounting at numerous colleges and universities 

and setting up an Educator-Consultant Panel-
GAO then convinced CSC to grant GAO direct 

hire authority because of a shortage of qualified 

candidates on CSC registers. With the help of 

this authority and some hard digging at small 

colleges for qualified applicants. GAO was soon 

able to hire what Herbert believed was the cream 

of the crop of accounting graduates. 

Second. GAO established a training program 

for all auditors-from first-year staff to supervi- sory staff and mid-level managers. Central to it 

was a theory of auditing. developed by Herbert 

and others. intended to enable auditors to ex- amine any Federal program and identify its 

strengths and weaknesses. I Known familiarly to 

GAO staff as the theory of "criteria. cause. and 

effect" this concept was quite simple.

2 By know- ing the criteria or standards by which a Federal 

program or activity operated and identifying the 

status of that program at a particular time. an 

auditor could determine the difference between 

how the program should be functioning and how 

it wcs functioning. Applying the theory was more 

difficult. but by usin!! typical audit techniques. 

auditors could identity the cause and effect of 

that difference. Criteria. cause. and effect. of 

course. were the makings of a GAO report. 

GAO also emphasized the importance of at- taining CPA certificates and offered CPA review 

courses for those striving for them. The third phase of the professionalization pro- gram was staff rotation-familiarizing staff with 

several aspects of GAO audit work and the en- vironment in which it operated. Rotations were 

generally made within a division. but occasion- ally also between the divisions. especially in that 

first year. By the time auditors became GS-13's 

or GS-14·s. they were eXfected to be knowl- edgeable of many Federa activities and most 

GAO operations. The auditors were then prepared to take on any assignmenL However. 

ORiENTAnON SESSION for first-year GAO audIt staff 

many auditors tended to specialize in particular 

functional areas as they gained experience and 

advanced in grade levels and found areas that 

particularly interested them. In addition to ensuring competence in audit 

theory and practice. Herbert's training and 

profeSSional development programs were geared 

to creating loyalty to GAO among staff members 

that encouraged them to remain with the Office 

for their entire careers. Many considered this 

"cradle to grave" philosophy to be vital in meet- ing organization goals. Advocates contended that 

staff could be molded as desired to achieve goals 

with little of the disruption caused by frequent 

turnover. 

PROFESSIONAUZATION CONTINUES UNDER 

STAATS AND DIVERSIFICATION OF STAFF 

BEGINS 

Although Herbert and others continued the 

professionalization program after 1966. changes 

in the national work force and anticipated work 

force needs influenced the makeup of GAO's 

staffs. By the late 1960' s. qualified accounting 

graduates were becoming more scarce and GAO 

could not fully meet its recruiting goals. The 

Office had to look to other disciplines. About this 

time the Comptroller General and others were 

also expressing an interest in broadening the 

knowledge base of GAO staff because of the 

changing nature of the Office's work. Gradually 

GAO changed from an army of accountants and 

auditors to an army of interdisciplinary evaluators. But which disciplines should GAO choose 

from and how could it comply with CSC quali· 

fication standards for the job series applicable to 

GAO? GAO officials realized that academic train- ing in accounting did not give students any 

unique analytical skills or knowledge needed for 

the type of work GAO did at the time. Much of 

GAO· s work was expanding beyond financial 

and management auditing and was gravitating 

toward a new type of review-program effectiveness. GAO personnetists studied which qual- ities were evident in their most competent and 

successful staff members and found that intelli- gence. an aptitude for analysis. and common 

sense were critical. Expanding the knowledge 

base gradually. GAO sought graduates in busi- ness administration and related fields. Bound by 

CSC qualification and classification standards. 

GAO hired these graduates not in the GS-51O 

Accounting series. which required at least 24 

hours of accounting. but in a new specialization. 

the GS-343 Management Analysis series called 

GAO Management Auditor. To better assure 

these new recruits had the minimum knowledge 

necessary to work in a financial environment and 

assimilate audit techniques. GAO and CSC came 

175 
to an agreement that recruits must have a minimum of 6 hours of accounting courses. Initial 

efforts provided minimal results. but by 1970 

GAO was hiring a mix of persons from account- ing and other disciplines, most of whom were 

expected to perform on any of various audit as- signments, regardless of their college training. Both the expansion of GAO's work and the 

decision to hire staff members other than ac- countants encountered subtle opposition in some 

comers of the Office. But experience with the 

new work and determination to bring in staff 

from new disciplines overcame this opposition. 

The Office began to recruit an interdisciplinary 

staff giving GAO the new resources it neededstaff educated in the principles of management 

and business or public administration who could 

apply their own sets of skills to examine and 

evaluate the management and outcomes of 

agency programs and activities. 

Still finding it difficult to achieve recruiting 

objectives and hampered by CSC qualification 

and classification standards for accountants and 

auditors, GAO sought and eventually received 

from CSC in 1973 authority to hire under a sepFigare 12-1 

CompositioD of Staff as of 

September 1980 

TOTAL 

Professional: 

Evaluators· 3,185 

Management auditors/ analysts 163 

Accountants and auditors 150 

Program analysts 15 

Attorneys 165 

Actuaries and other 

mathematical scientists 64 

Engineers 11 

Computer and information 

specialists 60 

Economists and other social 

scientists 78 

Personnel management 

specialists 63 

Writer-editors 53 

Other 158 

Total profeSSional staff 4.165 

Other: 

Administrative and clerica l 976 

Wage Board 52 

Total other staff 1,028 

TOTAL 5.193 

• HEvalwltOl"1$ .. rww dUAIIc .. 11OI> .. N. unique to GAO Ir mo ... ":C\I .. wly 

dbcnbD thO! .... ork pcrlonn~d by "'."'Y 01 GAO .,,11 FOI' lhe mot! pllol, GAO .... lulllOn IWft form.rIy d ... tfled •• managl/menl audltonol anaivll!i. IICCOI,Inl anu. audltOft. and progr.m .... ~"SH 

176 

arate specialization in the accounting series. CSC 

also authorized GAO to continue to offer special 

rates, that is higher salaries, to use with the new 

titles-GAO Auditor and Supervisory GAO Aud- itor. The approval of these titles, along with the 

GAO Management Auditor specialization, while 

not fully descriptive of GAO's work responsibilities. was the beginning of CSC's recognition that 

GAO auditing was not the same as that of other 

Federal agencies. CSC classification standards defined accoun- tant and management auditor positions within 

the bounds of internal control and evaluation of 

management functions within a given agency. The standards did not fully apply to the broader 

scoped work of GAO and its external reporting 

to the Congress. The GAO specializations gave 

the Office wider latitude in hiring, but it did not 

resolve the fundamental dispute the Office had 

with CSC-position classification. GAO began 

efforts as early as 1973 to develop a single 

agency standard. Nothing came of this effort until 

1977, after CSC audited GAO's personnel management program. ' 

Between 1967 and 1975, direct hire authority 

aided GAO in hiring the people with the knowl- edge and expertise thought necessary to accomplish its work. CSC revoked GAO's direct hire 

authority completely in 1975 because, in CSC's 

opinion. it was no longer needed, but allowed 

the Office to establish and maintain a special 

register of applicants from both GAO and CSC 

sources. 

EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS 

GAO supplemented the growing diversity of 

its staff by using more consultants who could 

provide valuable advice and guidance on particularly complex assignments. These consultants 

offered a second, often new, point of view, which 

aided staff in designing and conducting studies 

and in reaching conclusions and making rec- ommendations. The Comptroller General be- lieved the use of consultants not only increased 

the credibility of GAO reports but also added to 

GAO's body of knowledge. 

Staats encountered difficulty in convincing 

some managers to use consultants. Often he 

personally identified particularly good canclidates 

and encouraged a division to recruit them. In 

addition, many prospective consultants initially 

needed convincing that they could contribute to 

the work of the Office. Gradually, however, the 

divisions recognized the value of consultants, 

and many divisions developed rosters of consultants to be tapped as the need arose. In April 1980 the Comptroller General directed the newly designated Assistant Comp- troller General for Program Evaluation to main-

·As an interim meMUl'e. GAO cJ.ru;.siBed mo5l new prolcs:slonal positions in the 

Managl!rTtenl AnlllysiS suries beginning In 1977 
lain an inventory 01 consultants, including experts 

in analytical techniques and program or man - agement fields. 

GENERAUSTS VERSUS SPECIAUSTS 

Diversification of the prolessional audit staff 

led to a controversy among GAO managers and 

staff over the use 01 academic knowledge and 

skills and the ciassification 01 starr members with 

specialized knowledge and skills. Perhaps brought 

out more by the qualifications required in the 

competitive selection process implemented in 

1976, the generalist-specialist controversy had 

been brewing lor many years, 

In the 1950's and 1960's, GAO's staff de- velopment program and the organizational cul- ture led everyone-graduates 01 accounting, 

business administration, mathematics. economGAO Specialists: 

ics, statistics-to believe that they were gener- alists who could handle any audit In reality, most 

01 these auditors were doing rather specialized 

work-management auditing-bur doing it across 

the spectrum 01 Federal programs. Hence, they 

became known as "generalists. " GAO auditors 

had to broaden their skills when the growth, so- phistication, and complexity 01 Federal programs 

occurring in the 1960's and 1970's made it ev- ident that GAO needed at least a core of staff 

members familiar with each of these programs 

and the techniques for reviewing them. Subject 

matter experts. usually the longer term residents 

of division audit sites. became more commonplace, Some were cultivated in the regional of- fices as well. These "experts." however. were 

usually subject to rotation or reaSSignment to 

meet the current needs 01 the division. But over 

A Sometimes Underused Resource 

As described in the text, specialists haue encountered certain difficulty in becoming an 

accepted component of GAO s resources, When the first ones arriued in 1967, they were 

neither fully used nor were their roles well understood. It took many years to find their niche 

in the Office. Here is a perspectiue on one group's experience. 

In the summer of 1971, the Procurement and Systems Acquisition Diuision (PSAD) hired 

Dr. John Barmby, whose background included extensiue experience in both the public and 

the priuate sectors, to apply the concepts of operations research and systems analysts to 

procurement audits. To do this Barmby established a small nucleus of highly trained specialists 

within the Office of the Director. They included operations research analysts, mathematicians, statisticians, and engineers. These analysts identify problems, place them in their proper 

context, suggest eualuation measures, indicate critical factors, and show the impact of uariations 

in the critical factors on the end resuli. PSAD needed this type of expertise to aid the auditors 

in reuiewing the complex and technical military systems common to its work. 

The PSAD systems analysis staffs reputation euolued slowly following its formation. Howeuer, it has ouercome the basic objections to its presence and has contributed to PSAD's work_ 

The first contribution relates to identifying potential issue areas and audit strategies for longterm planning. Second, the stoff's comments at the outset of any job help to define more 

clearly the purpose and scope of the proposed reuiew. Usual{y the staff tends to expand the 

areas of interest within the reuiew to prouide a better ouerall perspective in the final reports. 

A third contribution is assisting the diuision's audit operations by conducting cost-benefit, quantitatiue_ economic, and engin<:ering analyses: reuiewing draft reports: and partiCipating 

at congressional hearings. They try to concentrate their limited resources where the greatest 

potential return is possible. An early and crucial test of the systems analysis staff inuolued the controuersy surrounding 

the Army's proposed purchase of the new Belgian machine gun. The systems analysis staff 

provided numerical data to demonstrate the Army's proposal was more cost-effective than 

purchase from a domestic manufacturer. They were successful in conuincing a somewhat 

skeptical audit staff and then an even more suspicious congressional delegation. 

During the mid-1970's, one of the systems analysts, using work done in support oJ an ongoing audit, received an award Jor the best paper presented at a semiannual Military Operations 

Research Society meeting. The sophisticated computer analysis examined the merits of fighters 

and surface-to-air missiles under uarying assumptions during a hypothetical European conflict 

involving NA TO and the Warsaw Pact. This recognition contributed to the staff's acceptance 

by the professional and scientific com~unities and confirmed t~eir ability to do such analyses. Analysts anticipate that the 1980 s Will see a trend toward modemlZlng and modifYing 

current military systems rather than acquisition of many new ones. If this is true: new and 

more challenging opportunities for both the systems analysis staff and the traditional audit 

teams may arise. 

177 
the years the Comptroller General in particular 

stressed the need to build subject matter expertise. 

The rise of another class of staff, the "specialist" occurred in the 1970's. The specialist 

was tYPified by the automated data processing 

(ADP) expert, but many divisions had other 

types of specialists. such as PAD WIth It:' economists and FGMSD with its actuanal saentists. 

Specialists possess distinctive academic sknls, 

knowledge, and abilities which they generally 

use in a supportive or an adViSOry role to the 

generalist staff. They are assigned to audit:' because of their expertise and often they assist gen- eralists on the more traditional audits. segments 

of which require technical expertise. They. also 

perform specialized GAO work whether It be 

auditing an agency's acquisition and use of computers or analyzing the economic outlook of New 

York City. But herein lies the problem. Specialist:'. while 

performing valuable service~ for. GAO. have 

often been considered out of Its mamstream and 

less prepared to advance to the mid- and upperlevel management positions. Generalists. familiar 

with many more aspects of GAO and the Federal 

programs it audits. were considered more qualified for these positions. as evidenced by results 

of the competitive selection process. As a result. 

many specialists joined the ranks of the gener- alists to become more competitive and advance 

to higher grades. Unfortunately. GAO also lost 

some highly competent staff to other agencies 

or private industry, where they could use their 

skills uninhibited by limited advancement avenues. Those who stayed but became generalists 

usually had less opportunity to use the technical 

expertise they had originally brought With them. GAO has devoted much thought to the clas- sification and use of specialists. A task force studied the issue and recommended separate career 

ladders for the true specialists. Personnel issued 

a GAO order recognizing the diversity and com- plexity of GAO work and the need for a variety 

of skins to perform it The order assured attractive 

career opportunities for all staff members. re- gardless of discipline. but it did not say how thiS 

would be accomplished. In the mid-1970' s, GAO began work that 

eventually led to establishing the GS-347 Evaluator series to describe the work of the ma)onty 

of GAO staff members. that is, the GS-510 ac- countants and the GS-343 management audi- tors. The Office renewed its interest in the single 

series as the results of the CSC audit became 

clear (see p.l85). and converted to the new series 

in September 1980. Personnel estimated that 

about 80 percent of the audit staff had been 

reclassified as GAO evaluators. Only staff who 

regularly apply their technical skills and who are 

not involved in general evaluation activities re- tained their specialty classification. 

178 

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S LIMJJED 

INVOLVEMENT IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

The Comptroller General did not directly involve himself in most personnel matters. In fact, one of the first changes he made was to delegate 

responsibility for approving promotions of lower 

level staff members. (Comptroller General 

Campbell had personally signed 0/1 promotion 

papers.) However, Staats encouraged the re- cruiting and development of an mterdlsclplinary 

staff and maintaining a highly profeSSional audit 

organization. 

The Comptroller General encouraged staff 

members to join and partiCipate in professional 

associations such as the American Institute of 

Certified Puhlic Accountants. the Association of 

Government Accountants. the American Society 

for Public Administration, and the Federal Bar 

Association. Not only would such mernbership 

foster cooperation with Federal agencies. and 

establish links with other Government audit organizations but it would also enhance the competence of' GAO staff and increase their r~~og nition in the professional communities. In addition. 

Staats supported the introduction of several career development programs new to GAO. . In 1968 the Office introduced a short-lived 

career counseling program aimed at emphasizing 

to staff the need for both formal training and 

profeSSional activities as a means of career de- velopment The headquarters divisions implemented the program in different ways with differing results. but it was the first time that GAO 

tried to provide counseling on an Office-wid~ 

basis. In 1971 the first elements of an organi- zational development program appeared as top 

management discussed means of improving 

management practices. (See ch. 7.) Also in 1971. the Comptroller General established a stud)! 

group on professional and staff development as 

part of a more general management improvement program. The majority of the study group's 

recommendations concerning recruitment. train- ing, rotation, and promotion saw no definitive 

action. but it became the first of more than 35 

studies conducted between 1971 and 1975 

aimed at defining GAO's career management 

policies and practices. 

Personnel And Staff 

Development Functions 

Reconsidered 

GAO's primary goal was to make the audit 

staff more professional. The organizational struc- ture established to do this from the 1950's to 

1969 divided the elements of personnel administration into two separate offices. The Office of 

Staff Development was responsible for recruit- ing, training. and rotating professional auditors, and the Office of Personnel was responsible for 
the day-to-day procedural requirements of personnel. such as personnel policy. research. and 

evaluation. and the paperwork involved in recruiting, hiring. firing, promoting, and position 

classification. Initially Leo Herbert was responsible only for staff development. and all his efforts. and those of the Office of Personnel so far 

as he could influence them. were directed to the 

primary interest of GAO's top management. professionalizing the audit staff. Civil service requirements and personnel practices were defined and 

applied to this end. In 1969 Herbert became 

director of GAO's Office of Personnel Management. acquiring responsibility for the activities of 

both offices. The emphasis on training and staff 

development continued. and the procedural requirements remained secondary. 

As did OPM. the divisions and regional offices 

put most of their energies into staff recruiting. 

training. and development subordinating the 

documentation of personnel decisions. position 

classification, and position management. These 

professionalization efforts contributed to the 

achievement of GAO goals and the improvement of GAO products. 

At the same time, however. the divisions and 

offices, generally within the bounds of civil service regulations. applied personnel policies differently and primarily to achieve their own ends. 

Many of the differences can be attributed to the 

diverse experiences and management styles of 

the directors. But eventually they led to ill feelings 

among some of the staff. Competition for good 

staff among and within divisions drove many 

decisions at the expense of sound Office-wide 

personnel policy. The 1972 reorganization compounded the problems by soaking up the available management talent and creating greater 

demand for competent staff among the larger 

numbers of divisions. For many years. no one 

insisted on the implementation of a unified personnel system, with standard policies, procedures, and practices. which would ensure that 

staff were properly managed. 

The year 1975. however. marked the beginning of an extended process of reorganizing 

GAO's personnel functions that continued for 

about 3 years. GAO' s management had recognized that its personnel system needed improvement. After 6 years of combined operation. the 

staff development and personnel regulation 

functions were split and put under separate organizations. Organizational. staffing, and management changes in these units continued through 

the early months of 1978. DUring these 3 years 

the changes made were generally stopgap measures only; few. if any, permanent "fixes" were 

implemented. Then the appointment of a professional personnel director presaged basic change 

in GAO's approach to human resources 

management. 

CAREER MAN"GEMENT COMMnTEE 

In 1975, GAO established the Career Management Committee (CMC). By doing so. the 

Office elevated the efforts of an informal working group which had been assembled earlier to 

determine appropriate criteria for evaluating candidates for GS-15 positions. Concurrent with this 

project, the Office of Staff Development was 

trying to devise GS-9 to GS-13 performance 

appraisal criteria and to redefine the career ladder-the range of grades through which an employee may be promoted noncompetitively. In 

January 1976, the Comptroller General directed 

CMC to integrate these ongoing projects into a 

career management system for the professional 

audit staff. He appointed nine senior executives 

to an enlarged CMC and named Hyman L. Krieger and Fred D. Layton as cochairmen. The 

Comptroller General gave them overall responsibility. authority. and accountability for the career management system and its outcome and 

asked them to provide policy guidance and direction to a working task force composed of staff 

from several offices. 

The purpose of the to-be-created career management system. as defined by the Comptroller 

General. was to equitably insure the maximum 

development and utilization of GAO's most important resource. its staff, by: 

• matching the capabilities of employees with 

the needs of the Office; 

• providing procedures which clarify developmental needs and advancement 

reqUirements: 

• counseling for superior performance; 

• providing for selection of the most highly 

qualified candidates for supervisory/managerial positions; and. 

• rewarding staff who perform with 

excellence.

3 

In a working paper, CMC put It a little 

differently: 

The overall objective of this project is 

to integrate the currently ii/defined or separate elements of GAO's career management process into a whole system that will 

attract. develop. and retain personnel reo 

quired to meet GAO's present and future 

staffing needs. 

Both the Comptroller General and CMC recognized that despite numerous studies of GAO's 

personnel system over the previous 20 years, 

problems still existed. They sought to establish 

an integrated career management system that 

would satisfy both GAO's mission to serve the 

Congress in its overSight of the executive branch 

and employee needs in terms of career development and job satisfaction. . 

179 
COMPE11TIVE SELECTION PROCESS 

CMC identified the many elements needed 

for an effective career management system. from 

recruiting and hiring to development. placement. 

counseling. and promotion. After several months 

of discussion. CMC directed its initial efforts to 

refining the advancement requirements and de- velopmental needs of the professional audit staff. One of CMC's first recommendations was to 

lower the top grade of the career ladder from 

GS-14 to GS-12. CMC believed that GAO could 

not meet the advancement expectations of all 

audit staff to GS-14 given the growth in total 

staff which had occurred during the early 1970' s. Also, although a career ladder formally existed. 

informal competition was already taking place 

above the GS-12 level. 

They also were concerned about the lack of 

interdivisional promotions and cross-fertilization. Each division was developing and promoting its 

own cadre of people. In addition. CSC regula- tions required that supervisory positions (starting 

in GAO at GS-13 and GS-14) be given separate 

treatment in merit promotion plans. that is. han- dled competitively. CMC's first recommenda- tion-filling positions above GS-12 by compet- itive selection-as approved by the Comptroller 

General did not sit well with the staff and came 

to dominate CMC's deliberations through 1977 

and into 1978. 

CMC provided not only policy and guidance 

to what became GAO's competitive selection 

process. but also decided the specific steps in- volved in implementing it. The process. imple- mented in October 1976. underwent numerous 

changes in efforts to fine-tune it. As the CMC 

Task Force. established to provide operational 

support for CMC. monitored implementation 

and results, it developed application forms and 

then revised them or discarded them altogether. 

The task force defined and redefined appraisal 

criteria in attempts to secure consistent applica- tion among divisions. It set and reset application 

timeframes and deadlines and altered rating factors and quality ranking factors. such as perform- ance or training and development. and their as- signed weights. The monitoring efforts also 

involved verification of candidate-provided data. 

the interview process. selection of candidates 

from outside the advertising office. and screening 

panel composition and performance. Despite continuous monitoring. adjusting. and revising, the competitive selection process 

has never been fully accepted by the staff. in - cluding many executives making the selections. However. few people questioned that highly 

qualified candidates were not the ones chosen 

for promotion. Following some modification. the 

process also resulted in some promotions and 

reassignments across division lines. a goal sought 

by the Comptroller General. However. even dis- counting the disappointment and dissatisfaction 

of those employees applying but not being se180 

lected (naturally, they outnumber by a large 

margin those more satisfied individuals who have 

been selected). the process was seen as doing 

little more than formalizing the perceived "sponsorship" system used before October 1976. Equal employment opportunity considerations and goals that selections within an office 

or a division include a certain percentage of 

women and minorities simply compounded the 

problems in the process. GAO management is 

now studying the process. and further revisions 

are anticipated. Its future is in doubt not only 

because of its unpopularity with the staff and 

implementation problems, but also because 

GAO's new personnel system could require fur- ther l)1ajor changes. 

NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED HUMAN 

RESOURCES SYSTEM 

After the competitive selection process had 

been in operation for several months, during the 

monitOring period, CMC again inventoried on- going personnel activities. This review revealed 

that only a small portion of GAO's total human 

resources system was being addressed. 

During the spring of 1977, the CMC Task 

Force developed a model which linked all the 

elements of GAO's personnel system. (See chart 

below.) The theory behind the model required 

that GAO, to develop an effective personnel system. first define its mission and how it is carried 

out and then determine its staffing needs to ac- complish the mission. The model showed the 

logical flow amon~ the various elements of the 

total system. GAO s goals and objectives. as em- bodied in legislation. were the basic starting 

poin\. The goals and objectives determined the 

kind of products and services (e.g., reports, tes- timony. comments on proposed legislation, 

Comptroller General decisions. etc.) which GAO 

must prOvide. The product/service mix, in tum. 

determined the kinds of tasks which must be 

performed to provide them. These tasks were organized into pOSitions encompassing specific duties. Examination of the 

duties revealed the kinds of knowledges. skills. 

and abilities required (Job speCifications) and the 

performance standards incumbents must meet. 

These three pieces of information (duties, job 

specifications, and job standards) then formed 

the basis for useful and accurate position de- scriptions. The theory held that position descriptions derived in this manner acted as the "master 

link" between the demand side and the supply 

side_ Therefore. GAO had to clearly understand 

what the job entailed before it could recruit po- tential employees: select from among the most 

qualified auditors: assign personnel to positions 

matching their abilities: appraise their effectiveness: and provide them counseling. training. and 

rewards. 

During 1977 and 1978, GAO devoted extensive resources to both the demand side and the 
supply side. As the Task Force on GAO Effec- tiveness examined the Office's goals and product 

mix and recommended that GAO adopt a ded· icated project team approach for performing jobs 

(see ch. 11), CMC devoted efforts to the supply 

side. As a result of its discussions, GAO ~stab · 

lished a career counseling program. imple· 

mented a performance appraisal system revolv- ing around BARS-Behaviorally Anchored Rating 

Scales-renewed its executive development pro· gram, and identified means to identify and re- ward contributions of staff. 

omCE·W1DE CAREER COUNSELING 

GAO's counseling program originated from 

one of CMe's tasks to develop procedures for 

career planning, performance review, and career 

counseling. Sporadic and inconsistent counsel- ing programs had been implemented for many 

years, but most had centered on job perform- ance. The absence of an effective performance 

appraisal system had inhibited even these efforts. Most staff members relied on the guidance 

and advice of "mentors" to improve performance and develop career goals. 

Perhaps the most visible outcome of CMC 

work on the GAO counseling program was the 

Skills for Performance and Career Development 

(SPCD) Course. In 1977 a CMC subcommittee 

worked on the development of training manuals 

for the counseling program. Initially. a course 

was designed to teach staff four types of coun- seling-performance coaching, problem identiFigure 12-2 

fication, career counseling, and performance ap- praisal. Gradually, the subcommittee and its task 

force realized there was a greater need for teach- ing communication skiUs. Thus. the course ob- jective became the linkage of interpersonal com- munication skills with the four counseling modes. FollOwing a trial run, SPCD became available for 

all GAO staff members in 1979. Also in 1979 GAO established a Counseling 

and Career Development Center to provide direct career or personal counseling services when 

needed and to give staff skills needed to identify 

and handle disruptive or counterproductive be- havior patterns. The Office had recognized that 

many performance problems. whether caused 

by the work environment or by at-home situations, reduced productivity and accomplishment 

of GAO's goals. The center offers short-term 

gUidance and advice on resolving these prob- lems. Additionally, it increases awareness that 

supervisors are responsible for aSSisting staff in 

getting needed help. Too often in the past, su- pervisors ignored problems or retaliated against 

staff causing them. 

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

In 1975, the Comptroller General remarked 

that .. the selection and promotion of our top 

personnel is one of the hottest issues we need 

to continue studying." CMC took their cue and 

started plans to design an executive develop- ment program and implement it by October 

1976. In a staff paper, the CMC Task Force 

HumaD Reaourcea MaDagemeDt Syatem 

1 COl/!'o'SELINC ..r. 

1 5VSTtM 

I I 1 

1 f"tM tm APPJIIII$""L IIEWAAOS I SV~'f EM SVSTf).1 SYSTEM 

1 t J t 

I TlI"tIIIlf'l G"t ~ 

I [)£VELOPMENT 

Sf'f.CJ~TIONS I SVSlDl 

1 

/ \ 1 INTERNAL 1 I'OSrTLOt'o S 1 SUPPLY SYSTEM MAJOR COALS " r- PRODUCTS f-oo T AS KS f-oo wm, r- POsrrlON 

OBJECTIVES a SERVICES WEC

DUTI

IfI

[S 

(l) OF:SCRIPTIOr>l S 1-- ------------- 1 \ / J06 i l ~L.lCTION 

SlAf'&l)AADS I I I c;Y~1EM I EXTERNAL 

I t SUPPLY SYSTEM 

DETERMINANTS OF DEMAND I l "ECRUTTM[IIo1 I • SV~'EM 

181 
identified the overall purpose of an executive 

development program as assuring the organization of a competent executive pool in the face 

of uncertain requirements. It recommended design of a two-part program: providing developmental opportunities to all staff members and 

improving the skills of current executives. Un- fortunately. the competitive selection process 

claimed the attention of CMC to the exclusion 

of all else and little effort was expended on ex- ecutive development until 1977. In March of that 

year. a CMC subcommittee took a first step by 

soliciting comments on a list of knowledge and 

abiUty requirements for senior executives_ but 

development of GAO senior executives continued as in the past. Individuals were selected by 

various means to attend courses at the war colleges or development programs offered by such 

organizations as the Federal Executive Institute. 

Pennsylvania State University. or Dartmouth Institute. One observer lamented that GAO made 

"no real attempt to identify the needs of GAO 

executives and then select the executive training 

program best suited to meet those needs." 

The establishment of GAO's Senior Executive 

Service (SES) in October 1980 brought executive development to the forefront once again. 

SES required implementation of an Executive 

lmprovement Program and an Executive Candidate Program. The first is to make available to 

all SES members. consistent with Office re- sources and staffing requirements, the educational opportunities and assignments needed for 

strengthening their executive skills and achieving 

their career goals. The second is to set in motion 

the mechanism for selecting, preparing. and certifying highly qualified GS-15 candidates for SES 

vacancies. In addition. GAO recognized the need 

for a long-term development program for prospective SES members and is establishing a management development program for GS-13' s, 14·s. and 15's. GAO is designing an overall executive development program based on a study 

of GAO's executive positions and needs. When 

finalized. its curriculum will consist of seminars 

on GAO operations. formal in-house and external executive development courses. and temporary aSSignments with various GAO staff and 

regional offices and divisions. The future looks 

brighter. but effective implementation-lacking 

in the past-is still the key. 

GAO AWIUlDS AND REWIUlDS 

In 1966. there was no organized Office-wide 

awards program. For most GAO staff. getting out 

reports and receiving promotions in due course 

was all the reward they got. The late 1960's saw 

the inauguration of annual awards ceremonies 

with the Comptroller General attending and 

prominent guest speakers making presentations. 

Satisfying as these occasions were to the award 

reCipients. the program was not without its 

problems. 

During the 1970's. two task forces studied 

GAO's awards programs and made changes in 

awards policy and presentations. The program 

now operates on a two-tier approach-division 

or office and GAO-wide awards. The CompGAO AVDIT STAff attend the Skills for Performance and Career Development (SpeD) Course 

182 
troller General delegated authority to heads of 

divisions and offices to recognize superior performance with directors' awards and certificates 

of merit or appreciation. with or without cash or 

gifts. Consequently. the divisions and offices 

have established their own awards programs and 

hold award ceremonies throughout the year. The 

GAO-wide awards program is held once a year 

to recognize unusually superior and outstanding 

achievement. 

Despite the studies of GAO's awards program 

and actions taken. some staff will continue to be 

concerned about its fairness. Allegations of favoritism and distortion of the goals of any awards 

program are made periodically. and GAO is no 

exception. Awards take on added significance 

because they are recognized in the competitive 

selection process. The points given to applicants 

on the basis of awards can sometimes make the 

difference in making or not making the certificate 

of best qualified applicants. 

PERfORMANCE APPRAISAL 

Designing an effective performance appraisal 

system and implementing it fairly and consistently has always been as much a challenge for 

GAO as for other Federal agencies and private 

industry. The agency has never found a fully 

f

1; 

J' I' I ,cl 

~ I I 

I 

satisfactory system for measuring the results of 

its work and. therefore. the performance of its 

employees. With reports containing findings and 

recommendations as its primary product and no 

means to take direct action to affect program 

outcomes. GAO supervisors have had to rely on 

indirect measures of staH performance and 

largely subjective criteria to prepare performance 

ratings. Neither staff nor supervisors have been 

fully satisfied with the systems designed by various committees and task forces over the years. 

Complaints have centered on the subjectivity of 

performance ratings. poorly defined or no criteria. and inconsistent application of them. and 

emphasis on personality traits rather than performance of tasks and fulfillment of responsibilities. Appraisals prepared by "remote supervisors" under the team approach only complicated 

the problem in recent years. 

In addition. there has generally been an upward bias among supervisors in rating their staff. 

Inflated ratings help supervisors avoid confron -

tations with poorly performing employees and 

aid favored staff in obtaining promotions. 

Performance appraisals are integral to any 

effective personnel management system. They 

form the basis for many personnel actions. including performance and career counseling. pay 

GAO 50th ANNIVERSARY AWARDS CEREMONY, ~ II. 1971 Anendces Included Dr Leo Herben. ir ~c . 

GAO Ofhce of Personnel Management Robert F. Keller. Dl!:pUly Comptroller General. George P. Schultz. Director. Of(lce 

of Management and Budget. Represenlative Chel Holifield. Elmer B S lil<IIS. Comptmll(,f Gener.::a l. and Roben C. Weaver. 

Profes.o;or of EconomICS. City Umwrsuy of Nl:'IA' York 

183 
increases, promotions, awards, training and de- velopment, assignments, and adverse actions. 

Without an effective performance appraisal sys- tem, any organization, including GAO. encour- ages complaints. employee appeals. and poor 

staff morale. Although several appraisal systems 

were tried, none was completely successful. 

Following the implementation of competitive 

selection. CMC took a look at performance appraisals. Starting with some earlier exploratory 

research of two contractors examining the tasks 

performed by auditors and their frequency. the 

CMC Task Force developed the BARS-Behav- iorally Anchored Rating Scales-performance 

appraisal system. The BARS system emphasizes 

that appraisals require knowledge of what duties 

are performed, what levels of performance are 

expected, and what aspects of performance ar~ 

important. Appraisals are to be based on ob- served performance compared with prescribed 

standards. These standards are oriented toward 

describing behavior as opposed to traits, the emphasis of prior appraisal systems. 

Each prescribed performance level is "an- chored" by several BARS statements defining 

the various levels of performance. Raters are to 

examine each performance level for each duty 

assigned and then rate staff members accordingly. BARS is not simple. Raters have to deal with 

the tasks and performance standards for all job 

elements (e.g .. job planning, data analysis. writ- ten communication) for all grade levels on their 

staffs. Appraisals must be supported by examples 

of behavior, requiring raters to document each 

staff member's performance regularly. The de- velopers of BARS are relying on Office-wide 

orientation on the development intent. and ap~ 

plication 0/ BARS to ensure rapid implementation and foster staff understanding and accept- ance of the system. While BARS tries to reduce the subjectivity 

of ratings by concentrating on observable per- formance. it does not fully address achievement 

of goals or results. Therefore. the GAO Personnel 

System Project is developing an overall perform- ance evaluation system which will appraise both 

process and results. This system will use BARS for 

appraising processes (or manner of performance) 

and a results-oriented appraisal being developed 

using the experience gained from the San Fran- cisco regional office results-oriented appraisal 

system, the SES appraisal system, and results- oriented appraisal systems from other agencies. 

Key features of the planned system include: 

• Continued communication between man- ager/supervisor and employees. 

• Explicit, documented expectations at the 

beginning of assignments, including relative 

priorities and observable performance 

standards for both results and manner. 

• Monitoring and accumulating information. observations. and data on performance. 

184 

• Reviewing employee progress and modifying expectations andlor performance when 

warranted. 

• More objective comparisons of perform- ance against standards. 

• Flexibility to manage and tailor the system 

to the specific job. 

• Sufficient structure to provide for consist- ency and equity among jobs. 

A workable system is necessary now but will 

soon be even more essential. because it will have 

to support not only continued employment and 

promotions but merit pay as well. 

'" '" '" * '" 

CMC, although never officially disbanded, 

ceased operations in early 1978 with the arrival 

of a new Director of Personnel. (See p.185) CMC 

and its task force proposed several changes to 

GAO's personnel management system: some 

have already been implemented and some are 

still under development Its final success is yet 

to be judged. That success may have been impaired. or at least delayed, by first tackling com- petitive selection while leaving until later an es- sential improvement: performance appraisals. It 

was strictly a judgment call: the Comptroller 

General said that the competitive selection process had been designed first because he had seen 

a need to improve mobility and retain competence among mid-level employees. Competitive 

selection. however. (and most personnel actions) 

is only as effective as the performance appraisal 

system that supports it. Only when a complete 

performance appraisal system has been implemented can the success of the GAO career management system be assessed. 

CSC AUDIT 

Although the Career Management Committee identified and initiated resolution of many 

problems in GAO personnel management. a 

separate event accelerated these long-needed 

improvements. In September 1976. GAO re- ceived notice from the Civil Service Commission 

that the GAO personnel system was to be audited.

4 CSC scheduled four personnel practices 

for examination-classification and position 

management. merit promotion systems, equal 

employment opportunity (EEO)' and GAO's in- ternal process for pe~onnel management evaluation. The Comptroller General asked CSC to 

wait-the Career Management Committee had 

just recommended development of several new 

personnel practices. including merit promotions 

and lowering the career ladder to GS-12. He 

believed esc would get a more accurate picture 

of GAO's personnel practices after these new 

systems had been implemented and fine-tuned. CSC denied the request and conducted its audit 

as scheduled. 
The esc examiners spent 2 weeks at GAO. 

They concentrated on GAO's classification and 

position management practices of auditor and 

clerical positions alike and essentially ignored the 

remaining three areas scheduled for review. (However. they did comment favorab ly on 

GAO's new merit promotion program. which 

was just then being implemented.) In evaluating 

classification and position management, the ex- aminers followed a common practice of analyz- ing a random sample of positions and then selecting a problem-oriented sample of additional 

positions. They also requested additional information and documentation. Twenty-two months elapsed before CSC is- sued its final report. Correspondence between 

the two agencies during this period highlighted 

the basic points of disagreement. GAO believed 

that CSC was applying position classification 

standards that were inappropriate for GAO audit 

positions--a fact acknowledged by CSC examiners during the review and in their correspondence. Despite this, CSC stated in its October 

1978 final report that its findings on position clas- sification "highlighted problems not only with the 

classification practices existing in the agency. but 

also with the administration of the classification 

program itself." esc stated that the evolutionary 

nature of the function of the GAO auditor over 

the previous S to 7 years had not been reflected 

by GAO in classifying auditor positions and. consequently, affected the grading. titling. and series 

allocations for these positions. In CSC's opinion. GAO had promoted staff 

to GS-IS and GS-14 poSitions with no assurance 

that those promoted would actually perform duties incumbent on these grade levels. CSC found 

what it considered widespread overclassification. 

that is. overgrading: it believed GAO had not appropriatel~ analyzed duties actually being per- formed. CSC went on to state: "Part of the rea- son for the problem areas in classification .. * * reflected basic deficiencies in the support 

for and administration of the classification pro- gram in the agency." GAO had assigned too 

many non-classification-related duties to the clas- sification unit which. in CSC's view, precluded 

time and attention being available for its proper 

responsibilities.

5 

GAO strongly objected to the CSC conclusions, stating they were based on standards 

which GAO had long considered obsolete. The 

standards failed to fully recognize the responsi- bilities of GAO's professional audit staff. Sub- sequently, GAO renewed efforts-begun several 

years previously-to establish a single agency 

standard for GAO audit positions recognizing the 

nature of GAO work and the agency's mission 

to serve the Congress. By May 1979. CSC (by 

then the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) 

had approved trial application of contractor-de- veloped draft classification and qualification 

standards for the GAO Evaluator series. OPM 

approval of the draft evaluator standards marked 

the end of a struggle GAO had been waging 

since the early 1970's. and this classification series is now in effect for all but specialized 

positions. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 

CSC audit. however. was that it strengthened 

GAO's determination to convince the Congress 

to le£islate an independent personnel system for 

GAO. Although never officially voiced before the 

audit, the potential conflict of interest between 

OPM as overseer of Federal personnel practices 

and GAO as watchdog over Federal agencies, 

including CSC, was too close for comfort. 

Creating A Personnel System 

For GAO 

The Career Management Committee and the 

CSC audit made it clear to GAO management 

that improvements in the personnel system were 

warranted. For most of the 1966 to 1981 timeframe, the mechanics of personnel administration were subordinated to staff development 

goals. GAO now recognized that a better balance 

had to be struck between personnel administra- tion and staff development: personnel manage- ment required both to support and complement 

each other. GAO's first step was to hire a professional personnel specialist. a person educated 

and experienced in establishing and directing 

effective personnel programs. Following a thor- ough studl/ to define the qualifications needed 

for a new Director of Personnel and an exhaustive search for qualified candidates. the Comptroller General selected Felix R. Brandon. 11 , then 

Director of Personnel at the National Labor Re- lations Board. Brandon had served his entire 

career in the personnel management field and 

came to GAO highly qualified to take on the 

challenge confronting him. 

REORGANIZING GAO'S PERSONNEL SYSTEM 

Brandon recalls that the Comptroiler General 

defined his task as follows: "GAO's personnel 

system is in trouble and we are not sure what 

is wrong with it. Fix it!" Brandon studied GAO's 

personnel system and found that it had been 

directed for too long by too many nonperson- nelists. His solution centered on his idea of what 

a personnel office should do-provide services. 

This orientation toward service was important. 

Many personnel offices became enmeshed in 

personnel regulations often to the detriment of 

managers who need capable people to get their 

jobs done. In January 1978. before Brandon's arrival, 

GAO had reunited elements of the personnel 

administration and staff development responsibilities that had been split in 1974. Brandon es- tablished a Policy and Programs Group (see or- ganization chart below) to research and analyze 

personnel policies and programs, develop and 

185 
evaluate personnel policies and procedures. and 

establish labor-management and employee re- lations programs. Among its many duties. this 

group provides assistance on position management and classification (the target of CSC's ex· amination in 19761. allocates mid-level manage· ment positions and secretarial positions above 

GS-6. justifies supergrade positions. advises 

management on planning for and use of staff. and surveys GAO's personnel management 

evaluation system. It also provides advice and 

assistance on GAO's labor management and 

employee relations programs and on employee 

grievances and disciplinary actions. It administers the awards program and various other 

employee activities. It designed GAO's maxiflex 

program, developed the GAO Evaluator series, 

and issued the "GAO Personnel Sourcebook." 

The group also maintains GAO's Automated 

Personnel Accounting System. GAO's fledgling 

human resources management ir.formation 

system. 

Brandon also established personnel service 

teams in the Operations Group. each to provide 

operational support. advice. and guidance in all 

personnel management services to a different 

mix of GAO components. His goal was to es- tablish a "one-stop shopping system" so that a 

division or an office could receive coordinated 

services encompassing all personnel opera· tions-recruiting. position classification, upward 

mobility. and so forth. In the past, a different unit 

had hanclled each operation, often resulting in 

the user receiving conflicting advice and com- plicating any given personnel action. By creating 

the teams, Brandon hoped to encourage and 

facilitate the divisions and offices' use of 

Personnel. 

Figare 12-3 

Personnel 

Each team member had to become expert in 

one or two personnel activities and knowledge- able of many. Initially, each team had respon- sibility for basic personnel operations-position 

classification. staffing. upward mobility, and em· ployee relations. As the teams gained experience 

and competence, more responsibilities were 

added. like recruiting and examining and promotions through the career ladder. Eventually, each team was staffed to handle most personnel 

functions. 

Many divisions and most regional offices did 

their own recruiting of new staff. both college 

graduates and upper-level hires. These organi· zations knew their particular staffing needs and 

either accompanied Personnel's recruiters to col- lege campuses or went on their own. They also 

performed important management functions. like job assignment, employee counseling. per- formance appraisal. and selection of employees 

for promotion. Personnel's service teams pro- vided the necessary administrative support. 

STAFF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

Brandon assigned the Employee Develop- ment Group responsibility for training and career 

development and counseling.· The numerous 

changes in personnel organization and manage- ment had taken their toll. and by 1978 GAO 

internal training was in a largely confused state. As noted earlier in this chapter. for 20 years. 

GAO's internal training program concentrated 

on audit theory and practice. "Criteria. cause, 

and effect" was its hallmark. Although training 

courses had been revised and new ones added 

DIRECTOR 

Senior Executive DEPUTY Executive Assistan 

Service Unit DIRECTOR Administrative 

Assistant 

I I 

PERSONNEL EMPLOYEE POLICY OPERATIONS 

AND GROUP DEVELOPMENT 

PROGRAMS GROUP GROUP 

186 
as staff responsibilities changed, GAO had not 

committed the resources needed for a thorou~h , 

effective. and up-to-date training program.' It 

became recognized that neither the consultants 

who designed training courses nor the auditors 

who taught them possessed the total range of 

skills. knowledge. and expertise needed to de- velop and present a comprehensive training program for all GAO staff. Furthermore. GAO had 

no means of determining how the skills learned 

were being applied at the audit site. 

In 1979 Personnel hired several training and 

staff development specialists to devise a new 

training program for auditors and nonauditors 

alike. By this time. Clerio Pin. then Assistant to 

the Comptroller General for Administration. had 

decided that GAO must make the necessary 

commitment to the training and development 

needs of the staff. Not only is training of new 

··!The SupetVls!on 1 COUI"SIi! ~ revl!wd lind rCnllmed Prociuc:tlVI! OTgllnll(lUOnll1 

Communlcadon when :he rypIclll GS-il IIrtendee .... as no longer expected 10 

Supervl~ but 10 communictl1e f!!.C1S lind findings both In wri!ten products lind orelly I • 

staff important. so is the retraining of existing 

staff as new techniques are developed and GAO 

takes on new aSSignments. The first step was to develop a training model 

or framework for all GAO staff: auditors. nonauditors (editors, attorneys. librarians. personnelists, etc. ), secretarial and clerical workers, and 

data processing experts. The speCialists in the 

training branch started with the audit staff. using 

the results of a training needs assessment conducted by a subgroup of the Career Management Committee Task Force. This assessment 

determined the knowledge. skills, and abilities 

required of each grade level. GS-7 to GS-14. 

and how well and how often they were applied. The training specialists then developed a training 

model for each grade level. The model formed 

the basis for designing individual courses corresponding to technical audit skills required of each 

grade level as well as nontechnical skills, such 

as interpersonal communications and surervision. Simultaneously, a second group 0 specialists assessed secretarial and clerical staff and 

GAO Becomes Campus For Five Doctoral Students 

A unique educational experiment got underway in October 1980 as the first participants 

in the GAO Doctoral Research Program reported to work. The intent of the program is to 

provide an exchange of information between GAO and the academic community. The five 

students selected for the program will be involved in projects related to their academic fields 

pertaining to GAO issue areas. public policy. or GAO management issues. A member of GAO's Educator Consultant Panel-Morris W. H. Collins. Jr., of the Stennis 

Institute of Government. Mississippi State University-took the lead in developing the program. "Academic programs in other Federal agencies offer fellowships for independent research in 

topics chosen by the agency. or are aimed at the future em?,.'oyment of the researcher with 

the Government," Collins explained in a recent interview. This program is designed to fill 

a gap by allowing the student to be involved with an ongOing work project and the staff of 

the agency. " 

"Furthermore. the program will encourage in-depth analyses of topics relevant to GAO 

and provide a vehicle for exchange of knowledge between the academic community and 

GAO." 

One student. who is working toward a doctorate in agricultural economics at the University 

of Minnesota. joined the Community and Economic Development Division (CEO). He will 

work with CEO's food staff on Soviet grain exports. A second participant. a doctoral student 

in educational administration at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. reported to the Human Resources Division (HRD). She. in conjunction with HRD's education audit staff. will study the 

impact of recent social. economic. technological. and legislative changes on student learning 

levels. To qualify for the program. students had to have completed all course work leading to a 

doctorate short of their dissertations and be recommended by one of the members of GAO's 

Educator Consultant Panel. GAO offiCials with responsibilities in the students' areas of interest 

selected those individuals whose research plans fit most closely with GAO's needs. Students receive temporary I-year appointments. While at GAO. each student works with 

a "mentor," who provides guidance on GAO's intemal workings. as well as an academic 

faculty adviser. The mentor. faculty adviser. and student work out a contract detailing the 

student's and GAO's responsibilities to each other. in areas such as publication rights and 

access to data after the student has left GAO. 

Both GAO and the students hope to gain from the experimental program. GAO provides 

the students data bases. access to information not otherwise available and financial support. GAO benefits from the output of the research. the interaction of the student and the staff, and 

the input of the faculty adviser. 

187 
designed a training model and appropriate train- ing courses. Nonaudit staff members-librarians, attorneys, and others---do not receive technical 

training as such but attend communication and 

supervisory courses. By the end of 1981. the 

specialists are scheduled to have about 35 train- ing courses available. Recognizing the benefits to be gained by en- hancing training and development opportunities 

for staff, the Training Branch has underway a 

training needs assessment for all GS-15's and 

above. The results will be used not only to design 

training courses but also to assist GAO's e~ec

utive development program. Another innovative feature is the develop- ment of an evaluation system for all training 

courses. The system will measure impact on four 

levels: 

• Immediate class reaction to the course. • Pre- and postcourse changes in knowledge. • On-the-job impact measured by interviews. questionnaires, and observation. 

• Organizational impact. 

Once operational. the system should enable the 

training and counseling and career development 

branches to determine if program objectives are 

being met examine cost effectiveness. and pro- vide information for future courses and course 

content. If successful, the Training Branch's ef- forts should soon end a long drought in in-house 

training for GAO staff. 

SECURING AN INDEPENDENT PERSONNEL 

SYSTEM 

GAO was not the only agency trying to im- prove its personnel system. In fact. President 

Jimmy Carter. in fulfilling a campaign promise. sponsored legislation in 1977 to revise the entire 

Government's civil service system: "We have 

lost sight of the original purpose [of the civil ser- vice systeml-which was to reward merit "/' 

In October 1978 the Congress passed the 

Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and reinforced 

merit principles as the foundation of Federal em- ployment. The Congress also approved related 

reorganization plans abolishing the Civil Service 

Commission and establishing the Office of Per- sonnel Management. the Merit Systems Protec- tion Board (MSPB) and its Special Counsel. and 

the Federal Labor Relations AuthOrity (FLRA). In doing so. the Congress gave OPM the re- sponsibility for executing. administering. and en- forcing the civil service rules and regulations and 

gave MSPB and FLRA responsibility for inves- tigating allegations of prohibited personnel prac- tices or unfair labor practices. Formerly, most of 

these sometimes conflicting responsibilities had 

been vested in CSc. 

GAO's first serious efforts to establish its own 

personnel system began in 1978 when the Office 

of the General Counsel (OGC) drafted a bill cre188 

ating a separate GAO personnel system, which 

the Comptroller General forwarded to the Con- gress. However, reform of the entire civil service 

system held the Congress' attention that year. 

and Mr. Staats had no choice but to hold off on 

GAO's legislation until CSRA had been enacted 

and its impact on GAO assessed. Enactment of 

this new law further complicated GAO's position. CSRA did not consistently hold GAO responsible 

for all its provisions. For example, by not ex- cluding GAO. CSRA required the Office to adopt 

merit system principles and a merit promotion 

system for supervisors and managers but. by spe- cific reference, CSRA did not require GAO to 

ban prohibited personnel practices or to imple- ment a senior executive service. 

In addition, CSRA increased the possibility of 

conflicts of interest between GAO and agencies 

administering the civil service laws by requiring 

that GAO report annually to the Congress and 

the President on the activities of OPM and MSPB 

as well as conduct any audit or review needed 

to ensure compliance by Federal agencies with 

the laws, rules. and regulations goveming Federal employment. Since 1972 GAO had placed 

increased emphasis on reviewing Federal per- sonnel management practices. Because the then- existing law made GAO subject to some of the 

same civil service requirements as executive 

agencies, the then CSC had authOrity to require 

changes in GAO's personnel management prac- tices, including position classifications and man- agement. GAO, while making recommendations 

for improved personnel management. had no 

authority to direct or compel CSC to make 

changes. Critical reports to the Congress, how- ever. do have their impact Many GAO staff be- lieve it was such reports which led esc to initiate 

its review of GAO's position management system 

and practices in 1976. A .cause-and-effect rela- tionship was never proven. 

When it became evident that CSRA height- ened the potential for conflict of interest. the 

Comptroller General set up a steering commit- tee, composed of the Directors of Personnel. the 

Federal Personnel and Compensation Division, the Office of Congressional Relations, the EEO 

Office, and the General Counsel. to help secure 

passage of separate personnel legislation for 

GAO. The committee chairman suggested that 

GAO recruit a person with a strong background 

in personnel work to direct the effort laid out by 

the steering committee. The Comptroller General agreed and the person selected drew upon 

the work done in the previous year by OGc. 

Working closely with the staffs of the Senate 

Committee on Govemmental Affairs and the 

House Committee on Post Office and Civil Ser- vice, a bill was developed allowing maximum 

flexibility for GAO yet retaining for GAO em- ployees the basic protections of the civil service 

laws. While many members of Congress were 

sympathetic toward GAO and understood its 
_._, 

need for independence. GAO recognized that 

skeptics would have to be convinced of the need 

for a separate personnel system and that GAO 

was not looking for ways to subvert the civil ser· 

vice system. 

GAO developed four major arguments to jus- tify its need for the legislation: 

• The conflict of interest potential created 

especially by CSRA. 

• The contradictions evident in CSRA con- cerning GAO inclusion or exclusion from 

its many provisions. 

• The need for greater flexibility in managing 

GAO's work force than allowed under the 

civil service system. 

• The need to clarifv GAO's responsibility to 

adhere to section VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 prohibiting discrimination in 

employment. 

Success came on February 15. 1980. when the 

Congress completed action on the GAO Person- nel Act of 1980 and the President signed it into 

law. GAO officials were generally pleased with 

the law. believing it afforded GAO greater flex- ibility in managing its work force while retaining 

the merit system principles of Federal personnel 

management. 

Significant features of the legislation include 

the GAO Personnel Appeals Board. new em· 

ployee pay and compensation options available 

to the Comptroller General. and the option to 

establish a merit pay system. The legislation also 

authorized the estabBshment of a senior execu- tive service. which GAO implemented in October 

1980. It eliminated the major areas of future 

potential conflicts of interest and presented the 

Office an opportunity to fashion a personnel system tailored to fulfilling the agency's mission. 

ESTABUSHING GAO'S PERSONNEL SYSTEM 

Passage of the GAO Personnel Act set in 

motion those actions needed to design and im- plement a personnel system which was to begin 

operation in October 1980 and be fully imple- mented by October 1981. The Comptroller General appointed Clifford 1. Gould as Special Assistant to the Comptroller General responsible 

for directing implementation of the act. He also 

established a steering group. composed of As- sistant Comptrollers General Clerio Pin and John 

Heller. the Director of Personnel. the Director of 

the EEO Office. and himself. to provide policy 

guidance. Gould established a Personnel System Project 

staff to design and implement the personnel system. The staffs tasks included developing a reg- ulatory framework for the new personnel system. 

designing recruitment and placement programs 

for all prospective and current GAO employees. 

developing GAO's labor-management relations 

GA.O omclALS testifying on the GAO Personnel bill. July 10. 1979 

189 
program, providing the basic elements of GAO's 

overall EEO program, and designing a perform- ance evaluation system to meet the requirements 

of the Civil Service Reform Act (See p. 184.) 

As required by law, GAO published the reg- ulations establishing the new personnel system 

in the Federal Register to allow for public com- ment. Then the project drafted implementing 

regulations for emplo~ee comment and incor- poration in the "GAO Uperations Manual. .. Sep- arate orders were prepared for each speCific personnel management function, such as recruiting, EEO, and labor-management relations. "How- to" information-operation procedures, hand- books, and guidelines-will be prepared and 

published by Personnel. Many facets of the new 

system were put in place by October 1980. The GAO Appeals Board was established as 

an independent entity acting in place of OPM, MSPB, FLRA, and the Equal Employment Op- portunity Commission. The Board, and its General Counsel, handles appeals on such matters 

as adverse actions, prohibited personnel prac- . tices, union elections, determination of bargain- ing units, unfair labor practices, and discrimina- tion appeals. It has its own operation procedures 

and promulgates regulations governing em- ployee appeals. The Comptroller General swore in the five 

members of the Board on October I, 1980. They 

were selected from a list of candidates submitted 

by professional adjudication or arbitration or- ganizations, in consultation with GAO employee 

organizations and congressional committees with 

oversight of GAO activities. All five members 

have a number of years' experience in public or 

private personnel administration or labor relations. 

Pay and compensation options open to the 

Comptroller General include establishing a rank- in-person system rather than the more common 

rank-in-job system. A rank-in-person system al- lows assignment and compensation of persons 

based on expertise and competence rather than 

on grade level and time in grade. Experience has 

shown that it is well suited to a highly mobile 

service in which jobs have many similar responsi- bilities regardless of location. Adopting this sys- tem influences all other personnel actions from 

recruitment to retirement 

GAO also plans to establish a pay for per- formance system recognizing quality perform- ance with pay adjustments. In October 1980, the 

MEMBERS OF THE GAO APPEALS BOARD sworn in by Comptroller General s ... ts. October I, 1980. Members 

Include Ruthle Taylor, Robert T. Levan, EIIen Bussey, Willilim Meagher, and Chairman Edward Gallas 

190 
personnel system project staff published a "conceptual model" for an integrated approach to 

classification, performance appraisal. and pay. 

Comments received on the model will guide the 

development of the first design. 

Much work remains to be done. but GAO 

stands a chance of having in effect by fiscal year 

1982 a system that will free it from the greatest 

burdens of the present system-including the 

rigid and overly detailed competitive selection 

process-and to recruit and retain highly qualified new staff and to make available new opportunities for its most competent staff to be rewarded for their good work. The changeover will 

take several years, and at minimum. there are 

likely to be rough spots along the way. 

GAO'S SENIOR EXECU11VE SERVICE 

GAO's Senior Executive Service (SES) became effective in October 1980. Senior staff 

members (GS-16 and above) joined SES and 

became subject to a new set of personnel rules 

and regulations. performance requirements. and 

incentives. 

In November 1979 the Comptroller General 

asked James D. Martin, the Director of the Office 

of Program Planning, to form a committee and 

design SES. In just 6 months, Martin, other committee members, and their staff completed the 

research. analysis, and design of SES. Major considerations were pay and compensation, performance appraisals. executive development. 

and position management. The committee consulted OPM. Federal agencies implementing SES 

programs, GAO executives. staff. advisory com -

mittees, and others for advice and comment. 

SES. as developed by the Martin task force 

and approved by the Comptroller General. is a 

departure from the previous system, salary and 

career status depending on the person. not on 

the job. Compensation. retention. and tenure of 

individuals in SES depend on " executive success" measured on the basis of individual and 

organizational performance. including such factors as efficiency, productivity. quality of work 

or service, timeliness of performance. and success in meeting EEO goals. 

The pay of SES members is now more closely 

related to their performance. as well as their jobs. 

Subject to the pay ceiling. pay can be increased 

periodically to reward good performance. and 

individuals can qualify for cash bonuses and 

meritorious or distinguished executive ranksawarded on the basis of performance. SES members may also qualify for sabbatical leave of up 

to 11 months and are not subject to annual leave 

accumulation ceilings for leave accrued while 

serving in SES poSitions. Individuals who do not 

measure up may be removed from SES and 

returned to GS-1S positions. 

SES also provides for education and training 

programs. The Executive Improvement Program 

is to offer SES members courses. workshops. 

and other internal continuing education pro 

grams to keep their managerial skills sharp. Individuals in GS-1S positions may qualify for the 

Executive Candidate Program. which serves as 

a pool from which managers will select many of 

the new SES appointees as vacancies occur. 

The Comptroller General has overall responsibility for administering GAO's Senior Executive 

Service. Two Boards assist him: an Executive 

Resources Board, which develops policy. recommends SES candidates. and oversees all aspects of SES, and a Qualifications and Performance Review Board, which identifies candidates 

for entry into SES and certifies their qualifications. It also reviews performance contracts and 

ratings of most SES members and recommends 

performance ratings and nominees for bonuses 

and executive ranks. 

Integral to SES. obviously, is its performance 

appraisal system. The Comptroller General viewed 

this system "as an opportunity to maintain and 

foster the high quality and effectiveness of GAO's 

executive management." GAO designed this 

system to encourage excellence; increase managerial and organizational effectiveness; and provide the basis for bonuses, merit ranks, and other 

personnel decisions for senior executives. The 

system's central element is the contract or agreement between an SES member and his supervisor which spells out goals and objectives, the 

activities needed to accomplish them over a 

given period, and the measures of achievement. 

The Comptroller General identified initially five 

key results areas-Work Results. Job/Unit Management EEO/Affirmative Action, Staff Development and Management. and Institutional 

Management-in which he personally believed 

improvements were possible and where managers should devote time. energy, and talent. He 

provided managerial guidance for each area to 

assist his senior executives in focusing their attention on work matters which would ensure fulfillment of GAO's basic missions-serving the 

Congress and improving Government operations. These five areas became the basis for the 

performance contracts. The Comptr"lIer-General stated that the areas did not represent the 

senior executives' entire jobs but only the most 

important aspects of their jobs at that particular 

time. Therefore, they are subject to change at 

the beginning of each new contract period. Each 

executive has additional day-to-day responsibilities as well. Achievement of a mutually agreed 

upon critical element in each area ensures eligibility for either bonus awards or meritorious 

ranks. 

An effort is currently underway to more precisely define the "process component" of GAO 

executive positions and its results will be incorporated into the SES appraisal system. 

'" ,.. '" '" '" 

191 
The GAO Personnel Act of 1980 affords suf- ficient flexibility to design a system which can 

achieve the mutually dependent goals of GAO 

and its staff. Under the legislation GAO can more 

readily recruit and hire the people with the skills. knowledge. and expertise it needs. The Office. 

because of the more flexible compensation rates. 

especially at the entry level, will be able to recruit 

at those colleges and universities more widely 

known for their schools of government and public administration. schools whose graduates were 

formerly out of reach because GAO could not 

compete with the high salaries offered by private 

industry. GAO can design programs to develop. 

promote. and reward staff to enhance effective 

perlormance. 

192 

I Or ll ~ GiJo cdlS EmlilSl AndeJwo, Roger KlNan. Edward Breen. and FUld Smith fOI dewloping IN! ,,"udlt th!lory He dIe, AUli'n Voss. WlllWlm Conr~. Hyrmn Krw9"l'. 00naId Sc,,"tlebuf\l. Irwin d'Addarlo, Ellsworth MOTSIi?, "nd Rotwrc Rum fOl' cnllCAlly applying It 

2 "Condition:' a Stlilemenl of "WMI is.." WM ~dde<I to the Itw.:lry during tile l<JiO'~ 

3. MelTlOfliludum from CompIToIler General E1met B 5101J~ 10 head~ 01 dl visions and offices Illld tI!gIOf'illl mANJgef$. January 20, 1976 

t, Pursuant to !heCtvll ServICe Relonn Ad of 1978,(OfI9I"alo"'.1Iy opproved rflOrg.'Inlu.llon plans abolished the Civil SeMel! CommlS51on and ebU\bhslll1\! the 

QHI(Ii' of Pl'fSOOJWI Management and rellllro agencies. Set- p.IIgt' 101 funner dlK"lWIon 

!) U.'Illo1l lrom RQbvn J Drummond. Jr .. DlrecIO!. BUle"u of Personnel Man 

bgeTrnml tllalulibOO. Chili SeIVlCt! Comm!5Slon. 10 Comptroller General Elmer 

IJ SIBil!), October 12. 197R 

6 WO$IlIngton Posr M&rch:.l 1978. I> AIH 

CCDuru[p)l100 1l~ 

Equal Employment Opportunity 

For Minorities And Women 

In 1966. no one needed statistics to determine 

the status of women and minorities in GAO. A 

look at the faces of those at directors' meetings. 

audit Sites. and work locations was enough to 

see that GAO was managed and its profeSSional 

ranks staffed by white men. There were minor· 

ities and women at GAO. but they worked primarily as secretaries and typists and as lowgraded clerks in the Transportation and Claims 

Division. For the most part. GAO in 1966 reflected the attitudes about minorities and women 

prevailing in the society it served. 

Chapter 12 described GAO's efforts to diversify staff expertise. This was the first of many 

actions that provided employment opportunities 

for women and minorities. The diversification 

effort opened the doors to other disciplines which 

were not as white male dominated. and hiring 

from their ranks gave GAO new sources from 

which women and minorities could be tapped. 

Gradually. GAO exerted additional efforts to 

hire more women and minorities. Whereas most 

recruiting had been done year after year at accounting schools sparsely attended by women 

and minorities, recruiters started visiting colleges 

populated predominantly by minorities. GAO 

established a task force to build bridges between 

clerical and professional jobs and divisions and 

offices restructured dead-end jobs to afford 

greater job satisfaction, compensation. and opportunity for advancement. They also consciously sought out women and minorities for 

poSitions above the entry-level grades. 

Although the job is unfinished. GAO's employment of minorities and women increased 

between 1966 and 19S0. Women and minorities 

became an integral part of the work force in 

many ways. By 19S0. 20.4 percent of GAO's 

total work force were minorities compared with 

12.2 percent in 1966. More than 12 percent of 

the GS-T s and above were minorities in 19S0 

compared to 2.5 percent in 1966.· However. 

GAO-wide. white women and minorities are still 

underrepresented in certain occupations and 

grades; only 7 women or minorities occupy the 

95 filled positions at GS-16 and above. 

GAO had had to establish new policies and 

goals to bring about his change. The Comptroller 

General directed the development of 2- and 5-

year hiring and promotion plans and took steps 

to hold his top managers accountable for instill-

-Avallabllll stall ~tIa for 1906 do nor dllferenllalli be en pro!e:Ulona! lind sup 

port SQlff. Slr.ce GS 7 \AIM arid I! [he eTltTy lewl lor the nudlr·""",IIUIIOI' STllff. WI: 

used these numbers In the comparlKIJl. NaTurally, h~ Indud!! 'lOme nonaudlrstllff memb'!rs 

194 

ing equal opportunity in the work environment. 

To facilitate change, GAO developed a functionaJ racism course to increase awareness of the 

need for equal opportunity and neutralize discriminatory behavior. It was followed by a human relations program intended to transfer responsibility for GAO's equal employment 

opportunity program (EEO) directly to the divisions and offices. Each division and office fashioned a program to meet its own needs and priorities, often expanding programs beyond the 

concerns of minorities and women. Recently, a 

new director of equal employment was appointed to continue the task begun during the 

1966-S1 period. 

Equal Opportunity Efforts In 

GAO Tied To Legislation 

In 1966, the Federal Government's equal 

opportunity programs were gaining momentum. 

The Kennedy administration had introduced 

equal employment measures which adopted a 

more forceful approach of corrective action for 

past discrimination. The Johnson administration 

continued in this vein and spurred by the national 

civil rights movement. won enactment of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. It established the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 

and authorized it to investigate and take action 

against discrimination in most areas of private 

employment 

The act also stated: 

It shall be policy of the United States to 

ensure equal employment opportunities 

for Federal employees without discrimi- nation because of race, color. religion. sex 

or national origin and the President shall 

utilize his existing authority to effectuate 

this policy. t 

In 1965. President Johnson restated equal opportunity principles in an executive order which 

also required Federal agenCies to implement a 

continuing and positive program to eliminate 

discrimination on the basis of race. color. creed. 

or national origin. Affirmative action was becoming the standard for Federal equal opportunity 

programs. In 1967 another executive order incorporated equality on the basis of sex into the 

Federal EEO program for the first time. 

Although responsible for ensuring equal opportunity in the Federal Government since the 

1940·s. the Civil Service Commission's role was 

enhanced by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972. For the first time ever, the act 

placed the program and CSC's responsibility for 

it on a statutory basis. It reaffirmed the policy of 

nondiscrimination and affinmative action and 

empowered CSC to enforce its provisions. It also 

made CSC responsible for the annual review 

and approval of agency equal opportunity plans 

and for evaluating them. In tenms of policy, the 

act stressed an affinmative rather than simply a 

corrective approach2 

At GAO. Comptroller General Staats was to 

learn that persuading others and achieving re- sults would not come easy. Following President 

Johnson's 1965 executive order. he established 

an EEO program in GAO and issued an action 

plan to implement it. ' The 1966 plan identified 

two problems: 

• Lack of qualified minority group candidates 

for professional staff positions in the ac- counting and auditing activities of GAO. 

• The need to provide increased career op- portunities for minority group members 

already in GAO. 

It also set forth actions intended to resolve these 

problems: 

• Identifying and interviewing qualified mi- nority students at colleges regularly visited 

for recruitment purposes. • Visiting minority colleges to encourage and 

interest minority students in pursuing ca- reers with GAO. • Establishing training and development pro- grams intended to enhance career oppor- tunities for editors, legal assistants. and cler- ical staff.' 

In 1966, GAO established an Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Planning Committee to rec- ommend specific actions to increase the effec- tiveness of GAO's program. The Committee was 

to evaluate GAO's EEO program, but there is 

little evidence to indicate that any fonmal eval- uation took place. 

In 1968 GAO prepared a second action plan. 

The problems it stated and actions it proposed 

were similar to those identified in 1966. but it 

focused on the employment and career en- hancement of women following the 1967 ex-

.GAQ as /I legisIatlw bmnch iIgl'flcy .... ·,n nol bound to comply with equal 

opporwnlry ieglslllrion until 1972 when the EEO Act spedHcally brought lin 

IIR1t iI9Ilnd~. Including those In Ihe le9filabvt! branch. IInder 115 prov1Sloni 

GAO gerleraUy compblld with allll'g!sI/!1110n before 1972. GAO 15 cumonrlvllppeaUng II Fl!deraJ district cOlIn's ruling that GAO Is !'IOI subject to rhe 1%4 lind 

1972 Laws Sel! feeru~ Slmy, pllge 197 

ecutive order incorporating equal opportunity on 

the basis of sex in the Federal program. A third 

GAO plan issued in 1970 reiterated the employ'-

ment problems of women and minorities and 

outlined the first steps toward establishing an 

upward mobility program, equal opportunity 

training for supervisors and managers, and a 

complaint processing system. 

EXPANDING GAO'S £EO PROGRAM 

In the spring of 1971. the Black Caucus-a 

newly fonmed organization with a base among 

the approximately 600 clerical and technical em- ployees in the predominantly black Transpor- tation Division-staged a loud and large demonstration in front of the GAO Building. The 

group's major complaints were low-paying dead- end jobs, poor working conditions. and few training opportunities. A top-level management com- mittee subsequently met with Caucus leaders to 

hear their grievances and work toward solutions. Shortly thereafter a job rotation program was 

implemented in the Transportation Division. It 

enabled about 100 employees in GSA clerk po- sition (many of them had been in those positions 

for 15 or more years) to be promoted to GS-5. Renovation was planned for the Division's work 

area, a large open office with bare Boors, old 

furniture and equipment. and little privacy. Im- provements included paint, some carpeting. new 

furniture , and installation of partitions to break 

up this "bull pen. " 

GAO's personnel office began developing a 

secretarial training program to give clerks an op- portunity to develop skills which would enable 

them to move out of the T ransportatlon Division 

and into the auditing divisions. As it turned out, this effort was handicapped from the start be- cause the program had no job placement pro- visions after successful completion of secretarial 

training. Employees with new skills were kept in 

their old jobs while they competed for secretarial 

jobs in the main building and at audit sites in the 

metropolitan area. A few made it ou~ most did 

not. Audit site managers. for example, many 

times failed to select the newly trained secretaries 

to fill vacant positions because the "applicant 

lacked previous audit site experience." At the 

same time, many white secretaries were hired 

from outside GAO and penmanently placed in 

these positions.' 

1972 AFfIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN 

Conscious of the Transportation Division's 

problems and responding to the new require- ments in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 

195 
of 1972. the Comptroller General strengthened 

GAO's equal opportunity program and organi- zational structure to carry it out B)I the end of 

1972, he had appointed an Acting EEO Director, a full-time EEO Deputy Director. a full-time EEO 

Coordinator. and a part-time Federal Women's 

Program Coordinator. In 1972. GAO also established a Personnel 

Relations Planning Committee Ireplacing the 

four member EEO Planning Committee formed 

in 1966) to consider and resolve policy matters 

in the areas of personnel relations. union activ- ities. and equal employment opportunity. This 

committee. composed of key EEO personnel 

and division and office directors representing 

both headquarters and the field. met quarterly. The Director and Deputy Director. EEO: the 

EEO Coordinator: the Federal Women's Progtam Coordinator: the Director of Personnel 

Management: and the Assistant Director for Per- sonnel Operations functioned as a steering com- mittee of the full committee and met twice a 

month. To assist the Personnel Relations Plan- ning Committee and provide a voice for the rank 

and file employee. the Comptroller G~~eral es- tablished an EEO Advisory Council. (See p. 199.) 

In addition. several programs affecting the 

career development of support personnel were 

instituted in the Transportation Division. These 

included: 

• Establishment of a full-time Career Devel- opment Coordinator. 

• DeSignation of 22 training advisors for em- ployees at all levels. 

• Job restructuring. • Job training assignments. 

GAO's 1972 Affirmative Action Plan Iso 

named in response to the 1972 Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Act) underwent considerable 

change in its development and content It was 

first drafted in the fall of 1971 by Alex Silva. then 

an employee development specialist in the Office 

of Personnel Management. after a survey he had 

conducted of the agency's equal opportunity 

environment at the request of the EED Planning 

Committee. His proposal for the calendar 1972 

plan was presented to the committee in January. Recommendations included wide-ranging changes 

in the entire recruitment process. establishment 

of employment goals and timetables for minor- ities and women, establishment of career devel- opment programs. overhaul of the discrimination 

complaint processing system. appointment of 

EEO Officers. analysis of the equal opportunity 

environment in regional offices. extensive im ~ 

provement in administration of the merit pro- motion system and the competitive selection 

process, creation of upward mobility programs. acceleration of the schedule for improving work- ing conditions in the Transportation Division. and 

improved communications between manage· 

196 

ment and employees on equal opportunity and 

related issues. 

When the plan was presented to GAO's top 

managers for comment, it was generally viewed 

as too ambitious and unrealistic and as an over- reaction to the problems. The EEO Acting Director then began developing a consensus on an 

acceptable plan with key managers. After its re- vision the plan was submitted to CSC in May 

1972. 

As submitted to CSC. the plan established 

auditor recruitment goals of 10 percent for mi- norities and 10 percent for women. figures sub- stantially lower than those originally proposed. Goals by grade levels and timetables for their 

achievement had been discarded. Establishment 

of upward mobility programs was eliminated in 

favor of a feasibility study to determine whether 

they were really needed. Nevertheless. the final 

plan contained sufficient substance to mark it as 

a significant departure from the problem· state- ment plans of the past 5 

CmzENS ADVOCATE CENTER CRITICISMS 

In September 1972. 4 months after the plan 

had cleared GAO, an ad hoc committee of 

House members held fublic hearings on equal 

opportunity in Federa agenCies. The Citizens 

Advocate Center. a small nonprofit research or- ganization which several months earlier had be- gun to examine GAO from a mission-oriented 

perspective, was among those called to testify. The Center staff had interviewed key personnel. 

accumulated data. and generally gotten a feel 

for the agency. after which the study's original 

purpose was changed. Their interest began to 

focus on equal employment opportunity when 

Center staff saw only white men in responsible 

jobs and in decision making positions and noticed 

conditions in the Transportation Division. At the House hearings. Center representa- tives delivered a scathing attack on discrimina- tion in GAO. They supplemented their oral pres- entation with a voluminous written report. On 

the same day they presented a copy of their 

report to the Comptroller General. Staats asked 

Silva whether. based on his observations. he 

thought there was any merit to the Center's 

charges. Silva replied that for the most part. the 

Center had accurately assessed the situation. but 

he believed the Center was off base on a fun - damental point-the overall problem was not 

one of a GAO conspiracy with intent to 

discriminate. 

Silva saw the problem as an inability of GAO 

managers and staff to understand why affirma- tive action was needed and what form it must 

take if the situation was to dramatically improve. Several days later Silva was assigned to work 

totally on equal opportunity matters. In December he was promoted to the new full-time J'0- sition of EEO Deputy Director and relocate in 

the Office of the Comptroller General. Shortly 
thereafter he was allocated two full-time staff 

positions with additional personnel to be detailed 

as needed. In February 1973. GAO became the first Federal agency to have a "third party complaint" 

filed against it under the 1972 EEO Act. Filed by 

the Citizens Advocate Center, the complaint gen- erated considerable media attention. At the time, 

CSC regulations required that when an organi- zation or another " third party" alleged discrim- ination in an agency (unrelated to an individual 

complaint of discrimination), the agency must 

Formal Discrimination Complaints Filed 

As required by law of all Federal agencies, GAO established a system to adjudicate employee 

claims of discrimination. The first step was an attempt at informal resolution of the employee's 

complaint and, failing that. the second step required the aggrieved employee to file a formal 

complaint and GAO to investigate its merit. If unsatisfied with the. investigator's report and 

GAO's second attempt at informal resolution, the complainant could request a hearing before 

an independent examiner. The examiner recommended a final solution to the Comptroller 

General, who could accept. modify, or reject it. The complainant could then appeal the 

decision to CSC or go beyond the administrative process and file a civil action in a U.S. district 

court. In 1978 GAO changed its adjudication system to comply with the Civil Service Reform 

Act of 1978 and directed appeals to EEOC. Under GAO's independent personnel system. 

effective October 1980, similar administrative procedure for handling discrimination complaints 

will be followed except that appeals are to be filed with the GAO Appeals Board. In 1979 and 1980 employees filed 11 formal complaints against GAO-B on the basis of 

race and one each on the basis of religion, national origin. and age and sex. Two of the cases 

have been settled; the remaining nine are in some stage of the administrative process described 

above. (Information is not available on the number of complaints filed before 1979.) 

At least three earlier complaints of discrimination have been resolved through the Federal 

courts. One case settled with approval of the Court in early 1981 involved employees in the 

former Transportation and Claims Division. Four employees (one eventually dropped out) 

filed a closs action suit in 1973 alleging race and sex discrimination in training opportunities. promotion policies, hiring practices, and advancement to higher graded positions. The suit 

alleged that a "blatant pattem and practice of discrimination against blacks and women" kept 

most employees in the division in low-paying clerical jobs. GAO did not admit any merit to 

these allegations. However, GAO agreed to monetary and nonmonetary terms to settle the 

case. Former and present employees shared in a total settlement of $4.2 million. GAO agreed 

to oversee personnel practices and to ensure affirmative action and equal opportunity for all 

applicants and employees now in the Claims group of the Accounting and Financial Man- agement Division. GAO agreed to the settlement to avoid a protracted court trial involving 

former and present employees and its effect on the Office. Two cases were settled with Consent Decrees in March 1979. In one a white male filed 

a suit on behalf oj all white males who. since 1972, had applied for employment and were 

employed by GAO, alleging race discrimination. In the second suit, jour white employees, 

two men and two women. filed a suit making similar charges. The allegations included unequal 

enforcement af personnel policies and practices between blacks and whites and mandatary 

attendance at the functianal racism course, which osserted white racist attitudes but ignored 

nan white racist attitudes. In the Consent Decrees. GAO did not admit Violating any law or 

regulation and the Federal district court stated that no findings of any kind conceming the 

merits of the allegations had been made. The Consent Decrees provided for the payment of 

attorneys fees and court costs only. and GAO agreed to ensure that its poliCies and procedures 

would not discriminate against employees or applicants on the basis of race. 

A third suit filed in the Federal district court but not yet settled may affect the outcome of 

cases still pending because an initial ruling in that case removed GAO from the provisions of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1972 amendments thereto. A black attomey in the Office 

of the General Counsel alleged race discrimination when his employment was terminated in 

1977. He argued in Court that he was not protected by civil rights legislation applicable to 

other Federal employees. The merits of the case have not yet been considered because the 

Federal District Court agreed with the complainant and ruled that language in the 1972 

amendments to the Civil Rights Act exempts GAO from their provisions. GAO and the Department of Justice are appealing the decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia. No decision has been made yet even though the court of appeals received 

the case in December 1978. 

197 
investigate each allegation and submit a report 

on its findings and any corrective actions to both 

esc and the complainant. If the third party dis- agreed with the agency's findings and conclu- sions, it could request a CSC review. CSC could 

then make any additional investigation it thought 

necessary. This process was followed in GAO's case. GAO responded to the Center's allegations of 

rampant racism and lack of affirmative action by 

pointing, for the most part, to its 1972 action 

plan and the fact that it was being implemented 

under the general guidance of a full-time EEO 

Deputy Director. The Center, finding the agency's 

response unsatisfactory. requested a Commis- sion review. CSC responded by sending inves- tigators to examine conditions in GAO. They 

concluded that although GAO had many serious 

equal opportunity problems. the 1972 plan rep- resented a genuine effort to institute corrective 

action and the agency should be given adequate 

time to try to get its own house in order. 

Driven by these events and a growing aware- ness inside GAO that action was needed. the 

equal opportunity program gained momentum. 

For example, in the fiscal year 1973 recruiting 

year, GAO hired 73 minorities, or 25.6 percent 

of the total entry level recruits, for its professional 

staff compared with a goal of 10 percent in the 

1972 plan. When GAO officials learned that the 

program to teach secretarial skills to transpor- tation clerks had resulted in less then a 30-per- cent placement rate in secretarial jobs, successful 

trainees were immediately reassigned to the 

headquarterswide secretarial pool along with 

new hires and placed directly in the divisions and 

offices. This also turned attention to the need for 

more upward mobility avenues. 

Although the action plan had called for the 

Acting EEO Director to visit each regional office 

to spread the word about what was expected 

regarding equal opportunity, the Comptroller 

General decided to personally address the sub- ject at the annual regional managers' meeting. Renovation of the Transportation Division offices 

also proceeded ahead of schedule.· 

CONGRESSIONAL INTER£ST 

Perhaps spurred by the third party complaint 

and its attendant publicity, the House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations. 

House Appropriations Committee, cri tically 

questioned the Comptroller General on hiring 

and placement of minorities and women at 

GAO s appropriation hearings in 1973 and again 

in 1974. One Congressman zeroed in on the 

absence of women and blacks in senior positions, the upward mobility program, the high percent- age of blacks in the Transportation and Claims 

Division (TCD). and the proposed transfer of the 

transportation audit function to the General Ser- vices Administration. (See ch. 8.) 

198 

The Comptroller General and other officials 

described GAO's efforts to secure equal opportunity for applicants and employees alike. In par- ticular, they noted the special steps that would 

be taken to safeguard the employment rights of 

staff in the Transportation and Claims Division 

subject to relocation if the Congress were to ap- prove the transfer. The Comptroller General 

cited the actions GAO and its Educator Con- sultant Panel had planned to help attract more 

women and minorities to the business and man- agement schools in colleges and universities 

across the country. He also noted that as 

congressional watchdog over Federal agency 

equal opportunity programs, among other things, it was incumbent upon GAO to conduct a model 

program of its own. 

GAO's action plan for calendar 1973 picked 

up the pace established in 1972. The Office of 

Intemal Review was directed to evaluate the ef- fectiveness of the equal opportunity program. 

The personnel office was required to submit periodic progress reports to the Comptroller General on minority and female recruiting efforts. Information on a revamped complaint processing system was to be widely disseminated so 

employees could take advantage of it if needed. EEO officers, EEO counselors, and the EEO 

Advisory Council were to have periodic joint 

meetings to discuss matters of common concern 

and propose solutions. For the first time, employment data on the status of minorities and 

women was to be included in the automated 

data personnel system.7 

AFF1IlMA TIVE ACTION PlANS 

GAO's equal opportunity program continued 

to evolve in the mid- and late 1970's. Under the 

direction of William Conrardy, appointed parttime EEO Director in September 1973, the 1974 

Affirmative Action Plan stressed aggressive af- firmative action. The recruiting program was re- vamped to give added emphasis to visiting 

schools more heavily populated with minorities 

and women: higher goals for recruiting minorities 

and women were established: an upward mo- bility program was implemented; adcUtional EEO 

counselors were named and their use and effec- tiveness increased; EEO awareness was stressed 

to all staff; a Comptroller General's annual EEO 

award was established: and the Federal Women's 

Program became operational under a full-time 

manager. Many organizational changes occurred 

including: 

• In 1973 division and office cUrectors and 

regional m"nagers were appointed as EEO 

officers to emphasize the importance of 

EEO in day-to-day operations. 

• In 1973 the position of Director. Upward 

Mobility, and an Upward Mobility Office 

were established. 
• In 1974 EEO counselors and investigators 

were named at field locations. 

• In 1975. the position of a full·time EEO 

Director was established and the EEO Of· 

fice was formally established and its staff 

expanded to include EEO specialists. 

• In 1975 the Women's Advisory Committee 

was formed. 

• In 1978 the Handicapped Employees Ad· 

visory Committee was chartered. 

During these years GAO and the EEO Office 

also joined efforts to implement at least 10 ad· 

ditional projects geared to promoting equal op· 

portunity and achieving other goals and objectives. including career counseling, a promotion 

appraisal system. equal opportunity training for 

supervisors and managers. a functional racism 

course, internal EEO program evaluation. a pro· 

motion appraisal system for nonaudit staff. a 

Hispanic employment program. and an ex· 

panded human relations program. 

Several of these programs deserve special 

mention because of their impact on GAO staff. 

both minority and nonminority. men and women. 

ADVISORY CO_ITIEES 

Many of the frustrations of women and mi· 

norities in today's society stem from a feeling that 

they have no means to communicate their ideas, 

concerns, and needs to the people in charge. 

Management fails to make changes in policies 

and programs because it does not recognize the 

need for change and has no one available to tell 

them of it. 

New lines of communication were opened. 

The Office established three advisory bodies 

charged with identifying and communicating to 

management the special needs of their constit· 

uents. The first, the EEO Advisory Council. was 

established in 1971 when some of GAO's equal 

opportunity problems began to surface and be -

came apparent to both employees and the pub· 

Iic. Its purpose was to provide a medium for 

employee/management participation in equal 

opportunity matters: to improve communication 

between employees and management: to assist 

in developing the EEO Action Plan; and to rec· 

ommend improvements in EEO policies, procedures, and practices. 

The second, the Women's Advisory Committee. was offiCially sanctioned in April 1976 

and the third. the Advisory Committee on the 

Handicapped. in October 1978. Each had ob· 

jectives similar to those of the EEO Advisory 

Council-to improve communications with top 

management and present the issues and concerns of their constituents. 

Committee members are selected by GAO 

employees through annual elections to fill vacant 

seats. Naturally the members' effectiveness depends on the people involved and the effort ex· 

pended. Each member is authorized 8 hours per 

month to conduct committee business. although 

they also devote many lunch breaks and personal time to these endeavors. It became common practice for the Comptroller General. task 

force leaders. and most of GAO's top managers 

to funnel management proposals to these committees for their advice and comments. 

Staff in the EEO office also promoted the civil 

rights of all GAO employees. The first Federal 

Women's Program Coordinator. a position established by CSC directive. was appointed in 

1971. the Hispanic Employment Program Coordinator in 1973. and the Handicapped Coor· 

dinator in 1979. All now work full time to further 

equal opportunity through affirmative action. 

They oversee many personnel management ac· 

tivities, such as recruiting, hiring, placement. asSignments, promotions, training, and upward 

mobility. They also sponsor programs deSigned 

to increase employee awareness of the need for 

maintaining an equal opportunity environment. 

ENTRY.LEVEL RECRVmNG 

GAO's recruitment of women and minorities 

began in earnest in the 1970's. GAO began to 

identify and visit minOrity and women's colleges 

and then to interview and eventually hire qualified candidates. 

In 1970 GAO' 5 Office of Personnel Management hired a person to direct the overall recruiting program and increase the number of women 

MEMBERS OF THE EQVAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY COVNCIL, july 1980 

199 
and minorities hired at the entry level. Following 

GAO's traditional recruiting procedures. he first 

identified the predominantly black and women's 

colleges and universities. established personal 

contacts with deans and professors. participated 

in career day programs. and generally extolled 

the virtues of becoming a GAO auditor to faculty 

and students alike. He scheduled recruiting dates 

for the divisions and regional offices at these 

schools. He encouraged recruiters to talk to all 

applicants, regardless of race or sex. at the other 

schools already on GAO's recruiting list. 

The recruiting director enlisted women and 

minorities already employed by GAO as recruit· 

ers and sent them out to all colleges. with or 

without the regular recruiters. He scheduled 

meetings with all recruiters and emphasized the 

importance the Comptroller General attached to 

achieving GAO's equal opportunity goals: hiring 

minorities and women was an important one. He 

also implemented a system to track the recruiting 

and subsequent hiring of women and minorities 

to determine where additional emphasis was 

needed. 

Gradually the number of women and minorities in GAO grew as recruiting at all types of 

colleges-white. black. men's and women'sbecame more routine. 

UPPER-LEVEL RECRUITING 

Upper-level recruiting also helped integrate 

minorities and women into GAO. As described 

in chapter 12 GAO started in the late 1960' s to 

diversify the expertise and educational back· 

grounds of its staff. Some of these efforts were 

directed at mid- and upper-level pOSitions (GS- 11 and above) and complemented the integra 

tion of women and minorities into GAO's senior 

ranks. If GAO had waited until its college recruits 

gained the experience and competence to reach 

these grade levels. the integration would be at 

a lower level than it is even today. Divisions and 

offices were at first reluctant to hire any upperlevel staff from outside the agency because of 

concern about their ability to adjust to the GAO 

routine. They feared that a person in a supervisory or managerial position who was unfamiliar 

with work procedures and practices would only 

confuse and delay completion of assignments. 

In an effort to allay these fears and acquaint 

upper-level hires with GAO as quickly as possible_ GAO conducted orientation seminars. The 

program provided a general overview of GAO 

and introduced the new staff to the philosophy, 

techniques. and terminology used in the Office. 

Topics included GAO organization: relationships 

between divisions, offices, and regional offices; 

the cycle of a GAO review: and rating and promotion systems. 

Assimilation of people hired for upper· level 

positions, whether minority or not. met with resistance from some GAO staff members despite 

the orientation. Many resented the fact that the 

upper-level hires did not "pay their dues." so to 

speak. by advancing up the ranks from the entry 

levels. In their view, people hired from outside 

the agency limited advancement opportunities 

for those already in GAO as well. 

GAO generilily met its upper-level hiring goals 

for white women. blacks, and Asians. especially 

in more recent years. However, the agency fell 

short of its goals for Hispanics and American 

Indians. Those hired helped make GAO's middle 

and upper ranks somewhat more representative. 

UPWARD MOBILITY PROGRAM 

Upward mobility was one of GAO's earliest 

equal opportunity programs. At first dead-end 

jobs in the Transportation and Claims Division 

were identified and restructured to afford promotions and higher compensation for low-graded 

MEMBERS OF 11IE 1981 WOMEN'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

200 
staff. A small number of trainee positions were 

also established to provide employment opportunities at a lower level with lower entrance reqUirements. For example, the Office of Administrative Services redesigned the payroll clerk 

position to allow entry at the second lowest level 

on the Federal pay scale. These early programs 

were primarily geared to administrative or sup- port poSitions and as such could not be considered true upward mobility programs which generally entail a change in career paths. 

Responding to the requirements of the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, GAO 

designed a fomnal upward mobility program in 

1973 and implemented it in 1974. Its purpose 

was to provide career advancement opportunities for GAO's clerical, technical, administrative, 

and secretarial employees in limited mobility jobs 

through a combination of training, college education, and on-the-job experience. GAO established three upward mobility avenues that first 

year-management analyst asSistant, management analyst trainee, and claims ad/·udicator. 

By regUlation, the upward mobiity program 

focused on employees atl?wer grade levels, and 

many women and mmonties. who were concentrated at the lower levels because of inadequate 

education and past discrimination. derived sub-

--_._----- , 

stantial benefits from them. However, the program was not solely a means of providing advancement opportunities for women and 

minorities. It derived its impetus from a more 

basic issue-human resource development. In 

this pursuit, GAO's upward mobility program 

tried to provide career opportunities, without regard to race or sex, to all underused or underdeveloped lower level employees who demonstrated potential for greater responsibilities.' 

In the late 1970's, organizational changes affected the operation of the program. When first 

started, a full-time upward mobility director and 

staff administered the program. They established 

policy and procedures; identified and advertised 

the number and types of vacancies; evaluated 

applicants; and, finally. selected and placed candidates in the divisions and offices. They also 

monitored the performance and progress of each 

participant and tracked the entire program. Over 

the years, several of these procedures were decentralized to the divisions and offices because 

they preferred to identify their own upward mobility positions and select the incumbents. The 

Upward Mobility Office continued to advertise 

the positions and provide a list of qualified applicants to the divisions and offices. It remained 

a focal point for the program as well. 

UPWARD MOBJUTV PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS and Deputy Comptroller General Keller watching Comptroller 

General Staats signing memorandum authorizing the program 

201 
With the establishment of the personnel service teams in 1979 the upward mobility program 

was decentralized altogether. The Upward Mo- bility Office was disbanded and its staff reassigned to other positions in Personnel or elsewhere. Each personnel team administered the 

program for its set of divisions and offices. 

Decreasing staff requirements and changes in 

the organization and the work done by GAO led 

to the phasing out of several of the original up- ward mobility positions through the years. However, new positions were added as opportunities 

arose. As of October 1, 1980.23 staff members. 

12 in the regional offices and 11 in 6 of the 

operating divisions. were participating in the pro- gram. Most were management assistants: one 

was an editorial assistant and four were computer 

technicians. Since the program began in 1973. 74 graduates advanced to positions offering 

greater career opportunities. With the development of its own personnel 

system. GAO started reconsidering its traditional 

means of providing additional career opportunities not only for lower graded staff but for any- one with educational or experience qualifications 

below those normally required for professional 

positions. As this is written, GAO is considering 

the continuation or implementation of three pro- grams-upward mobility. cooperative education. and evaluator assistant-to expand career 

opportunities for potential GAO evaluators. 

FUNCTIONAL RACISM COURSE 

One of the most controversial equal oppor- tunity efforts was the functional racism course 

attended by GAO employees during 1977 and 

1978. Conceived in 1975 as a means to induce 

change in discriminatory behavior and increase 

awareness of the problems faced by minorities, 

the cou"e provided mixed results. The course grew from the Human Resources 

Division's efforts to improve its own racial cli- mate. The division designed a program which 

would ( 1) show how racism could be deleterious 

to the opportunities of minorities in the work 

environment. (2) identify how racism affects the 

Upward Mobility Offers Employee Opportunity For Achieving 

Career Goals 

GAO's upward mobility program combines doily work experience, on-the-job training, and 

college education to provide avenues of advancement for lower graded employees. Secretaries. 

clerks, claims adjudicators. or clericol workers can compete for higher paying management 

analyst. staffing specialist. computer programer. computer technician. budget analyst, or editor 

positions. S'uccessful completion of the 2-year trainee pOSition enables participants to advance 

to the entry level grade with no further competition. Since 1973. 74 upward mobility graduates 

advanced to positions promising greater opportunities. Lucy Hall is one of those graduates. 

Hall hod been employed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a fingerprint clerk and 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as a library technician before joining GAO in 1973. She enjoyed her work as a GS-5 moil and file clerk in the Office of the General Counsel's 

Index and Files Section. It involved tracking requests from the Congress. government agencies. 

and the public for GAO audits and Comptroller General decisions from receipt to final dis- position. She learned much about GAO's and the Federal Govemment's operations and 

activities but realized that her advancement opportunities were limited and that her career 

gools of having decisionmaking authority and determining her own work schedule would not 

be satisfied in this position. Even a promotion to GS·6 in Index and Files was a remote 

possibility because of the more experienced and competitive stoff members ahead of her. While deciding what to do and preparing for her eventuaf' enrollment in college. Hall 

attended a GAO-sponsored accounting class on Saturday momings. What she heard from 

other students about their jobs convinced her to try for GAO's upward mobility program. First 

she took some college courses at the University of Maryland and then applied for the program. 

Following on intenuiew by a panel of 6 selection officers. she and 20 other applicants were 

selected in 1976. In January 1977 she become a GS-5 management analyst trainee and was 

assigned to the General Government Division's Postal Senuice audit site. The Upward Mobility 

Office advised her on course selection at Howard University, and her sponsor advised her on 

scheduling class and worktime and on balancing the demands of GAO and college with her 

family responsibilities. He also provided the moral support much needed especially during the 

first hectic months. 

Hall was treated just as any other first year auditor. At each audit site and on each assignment, Hall received increasingly difficult and challenging tasks. During her 9 months at 

the Postal Senuice site. she helped conduct intenuiews and eventually conduded solo intenuiews. She also gathered, summarized, and analyzed data and drafted workpaper summaries. She 

worked primarily on two assignments at this site. One. a congressional request to review 

financial activities of the Postal Senuice Commission. sent her to New York City for 4 days. 

202 
total work environment, and (3) show how racist 

behavior can be neutralized. GAO subsequently 

hired a sociologist and a psychologist to refine 

the program with the idea of presenting it GAOwide. 

The 2-day course, as presented GAO-wide, 

centered on a conceptual model of discrimination that characterized institutional race discrimination (functional racism) as differential treatment of minorities which is (1) correlated with 

skin color, (2) results from the normal functioning 

of society and the organization, and (3) operates 

to the consistent disadvantage of minorities. 

According to the theory, racism today results 

largely from the operation of stereotypes which 

both conSciously and unconsciously affect crossracial interactions. Through stereotyping, the 

unique characteristics of a person are ignored: 

he or she is treated as a member of a class or 

group, for example, whites. blacks. or Asians. 

Since skin color is readily observed. it offers an 

easy way to group people and thus stereotypes 

them, especially since many societies negatively 

valued darker skin color. This negative valuation 

is reinforced through jokes. anecdotes, literature. 

schoolbooks, films, television, social exclusion, 

segregation, and so forth. 

To present the material efficiently and consistently. the course concepts were recorded by 

the program designers on video tape cassettes. 

GAO staff members. specially trained as facilitators, were present in the classroom to administer the course and lead discussions of the video 

tapes. The course was presented many times 

over a period of months until almost all personnel 

had been exposed to it. 

The program designers developed an extensive program to measure the impact of the course 

on staff behavior and institutional practices. 

Course consultants and facilitators administered 

pre- and postcourse questionnaires and conducted numerous personal interviews. Each division and office evaluated specific personnel 

practices, such as recruiting and hiring, competitive selection, promotions, work force analysis, 

and performance appraisal and counseling, to 

determine if longstanding institutional policies 

and procedures perpetuated functional racism. 

Upward Mobility Offers Employee Opportunity For Ac:hieving 

Career Goals-Continued 

The final report. with findings on overpayments to travel agents, received newspaper pUblicity. 

fn October 1977 Hall rotated to GGD's Capitol Hill audit site. where she audited the House 

of Representatives Finance Office. She performed financial auditing duties, including sampling, 

verifying, and tracing vouchers to check registers: reconciling subsidiary ledgers to the general 

ledger; participating in cash counts; and retrieving information from computer terminals. She 

had daily contact with House Finance Office personnel and prepared workpapers on both 

these interviews and audit findings. Her accounting courses and work tasks complemented 

each other. 

After 6 months Hall again rotated. this time to the division's Paperwork Management 

Group. She found her aSSignment on a review of paperwork burdens on the elderly and the 

interviews with officials and residents of senior citizens' centers particularly interesting. Hall's 

duties included traveling to the Social Security Administration in Baltimore and to Capitol Hill 

where she participated in both House and Senate staff meetings. She also helped draft the 

review summary. 

Throughout her 2-year training period, Hall received the support and encouragement of 

her sponsor. her supervisors. and her coworkers. Their help eased the burden of combining 

work and school responsibilities. Although the program authorized work release time (Hall 

attended classes two momings a week at Howard University and worked at GAO the remainder 

of the time), both combined required extra concentration and effort. Her successful handling 

of both was evident in her progress and development. Hall graduated from the upward mobility program in February 1979. She became a fullfledged management auditor and was assigned to the General Govemment Division's Financial 

Institutions Regulation Group. She continued to progress and received more and more difficult 

assignments under seueral supervisors. 

Hall was promoted to GS-9 in February 1980. She continues to work toward her degree 

at the University of Maryland. having transferred there in 1978. and expects to receive a 

Bachelor of Science degree in accounting in 1983. GAO's upward mobility program enabled Hall to cross over from a limited clerking job to 

a self-satisfying and opportunity-filled career. Her future is not yet assured. but prospects for 

additional success are {avorable. Not all who wanted to participate in this program have been able to. nor has the program 

worked as well for others admitted. but the Lucy Halls of GAO provide ample reward for 

those involved. 

203 
A consultant's report outlined the most noteworthy outcomes of the course as follows: 

• Ninety percent of the respondents stated 

that functional racism could be changed 

following their participation in the course. 

• Seventy-seven percent reported increased 

awareness of the problems that can occur 

because of functional racism. 

• Seventy-one percent reported an increased 

ability to deal with such problems. 

Did this course affect how people acted? Ac -

cording to the consultanl the course provided 

a useful way of looking at and understanding 

functional racism_ but appeared to have limited 

impact on behavior. The consultant concluded 

generally changing awareness was easier than 

developing more specific and concrete plans for 

reducing discriminatory behavior. "Awareness 

changes can logically be expected ,to precede 

behavior change and may constitute a necessary 

precondition for behavior change," the report 

said. The data showed that the course raised 

employee awareness of racial discrimination in 

GAO and the problems which can occur in an 

organization because of functional racism_ 'J 

Some employees believed, however, the 

course may also have heightened antagonism 

between blacks and whites. For all practical purposes, the course was mandatory for all staff 

members, and some said they were offended by 

being required to attend a course in which highly 

personal and often explosive feelings were discussed. Others were uncomfortable with the assertion that everyone was a racist. but especially 

the whites because they believed the course was 

designed to neutralize whites' discrimination 

against minorities. 

Many taking the course thought the packaging detracted from the message. When the 

Comptroller General and other top officials had 

taken part in a live presentation of the course, 

they developed a good relationship and had free 

flowing discussions with the instructors. However, when the course was given office-wide, it. 

by necessity_ used video tape and facilitators, As 

a result, the participants lost the benefits of the 

personal contact with the experienced consultants and psychologists who had developed the 

course. These qualities provided the basis for 

understanding the longstanding and previously 

unquestioned discriminatory behavior. Even the 

best trained facilitators could not fully overcome 

the limitations inherent in the video tape 

presentation. 

HUMAN RELATIONS PROGRAM 

Management realized that the impact of 

GAO's functional racism training would soon 

fade if its message was not reinforced. This set 

-the stage for planning and implementing a followon program. Known as phase 11 of GAO's An204 

tidiscriminationiHuman Relations program, the 

followon emboclied a transfer of responsibility for 

equal opportunity planning and implementation 

from the Comptroller General's office to the regional managers and division directors. 

Phase U allowed the divisions and offices to 

tailor their followon activities to meet their specific needs. The Office's experience in affirmative 

action planning had made it clear that various 

human relations problems affected not only discrimination, but also productivity and morale 

more generally. The character of these concerns 

differed appreciably from one division to another. Therefore. many managers elected to 

broaden the phase II program's focus to include 

such concerns as sexism. elitism, communications skills. and supervisory skills. 

As division and regional management assumed ownership of the program. detailed assessments of organizational climate were made 

with the assistance of consultants and behavioral 

psychologists. These assessments led to the development of human relations action plans aimed 

at reinforcing awareness gains, promoting institutional policy changes, and implementing human' relations programs_ Many of these plans 

suggested imaginative and creative approaches 

potentially useful to the entire agency. Some of 

the highlights included: 

• A series of luncheon speakers on human 

relations topics. 

• Formation of standing committees to monitor organizational climate and plan and 

promote awareness activities within regions 

and divisions. 

• Supervisory skills training with an emphasis on affirmative action/human relations issues. 

• Human relations skills workshops and seminars on human values. 

• Films and speakers on EEO/human rela- tions topics, 

• Participation in various community outreach programs. 

In many divisions and regional offices, these 

efforts moved the organization toward a greater 

awareness of cultural identity and a stronger emphasis on good human relations practices. In 

addition, phase II prOvided increased opportunities for staff to participate in change efforts, 

thereby increasing their sense of involvement, 

commitment. and accountability_ This sense of 

accountability was necessary for the long-term 

maintenance of an equal opportunity 

environment. 

Phase 1I depended on a high level of volunc 

tary activity, Every region and division submitted 

an action plan to the Comptroller General. and 

most regions and divisions took some steps to 

implement them, Progress was interrupted, however, by development and presentation of Hie 

Skills for Performance and Career DevelopmeRt 
course in 1980. (See ch. 12.) While the SPCD 

course complemented the goals of the human 

relations program, it also diverted many divisions 

and offices from their original plans. One pro· 

gram consultant advised that in the future, at· 

tention should be given to standardizing the level 

of effort devoted to affirmative action and human 

relations planning across GAO; other consult· 

ants, however. have counseled against a stand· 

ardized approach. 10 

COMPETfIlVE SELECTION PROCESS 

In addition to ensuring compliance with the 

Civil Service Commission's merit promotion 

guidelines and encouraging interdivisional pro· 

Figure 13-1 

motions and crossfertilization of staff expertise, 

the competitive selection process impacted the 

hiring and promotion of minorities and women. 

Data generated from competitive selection mono 

itoring efforts indicated that in the early years 

minorities had little success in competing for mid· 

management positions. It also showed that in 

more recent years, minority men and women 

were selected for promotions at a rate comparable to that for white men. However, it indicated 

that none of these three groups did as weU 

as white women, the most successful group i~ 

the competitive selection process. The results 

of the competitive selection process foUow in 

figure 13-1. 

Results Of The Competitive Selection Process By Race And Sex 

N_.b.r of P .... c •••••• Ccrtlfle-d p_c: •• t •• c S.leelcd 

Pcno •• Applyl •• 01 P ... -.o •• W.o Appll. d 0' PerMa. "'.0 Appll_" 

1976" 

White Men 258 39.5 13.6 

White Women 7 57.1 57.1 

Minority Men 7 14.3 14.3 

Minority Women 1 

1977 

White Men 1222 43.0 14.2 

White Women 49 63.3 34.7 

Minority Men 45 24.4 

Minority Women 15 20.0 

1978 

White Men 1909 38.6 11.1 

White Women 112 49.1 20.5 

Minority Men 108 37.0 11.1 

Minority Women 37 24.3 8.1 

1979 

White Men 1594 51.2 10.6 

White Women 113 61.2 23.9 

Minority Men 86 34.5 14.0 

Minority Women 58 34.5 12.1 

1980-

White Men 1617 60.2 10.0 

White Women 156 66.7 19.9 

Minority Men 132 29.5 8.3 

Minority Women 47 46.8 12.8 

4 Var Total. 

White Men 6600 47.8 11.4 

White Women 437 60.4 23.3 

Minority Men 378 32.0 9.5 

Minority Women 158 34.2 10. 1 

<'October. Nowmber, ond December 

\Janw ry through $eplembeT 

205 
GAO studied the competitive selection pro- cess from many angles and took many steps to 

encourage greater participation and success by 

women and minorities. A questionnaire sent to 

minority men and women in early 1978 indicated that many believed the successful candidates were preselected from within the divisions 

advertising the vacancies and outsiders had little 

chance of being selected: that the program's 

track record was proof of the futility of applying: 

that upper-level hires (many of whom were 

women and minorities) were at a disadvantage: 

' and minorities were not receiving the types of 

audit experience needed to make them 

competitive. Data collected during development of what 

became the GAO Evaluator series concluded 

that no statistically significant differences existed 

between the work experiences of women and 

minorities and their counterpart white men. 

However. there was a consistent pattern of 

women and minorities receiving somewhat lower 

job responsibilities. The study team stated that 

this last conclusion warranted further study to 

ensure that the differences do not become 

significant 11 

A more recent study assessing equal oppor- tunity in GAO's competitive selection system 

concluded that based on time-in-grade statistics. 

minorities and women were promoted as fast as 

or faster than white men. The apparently lower 

competitive selection rates may be considered 

artifacts of the change in GAO's recruitment profile. Before passage of the EEO Act of 1972, the 

percentage of white men recruited hovered 

around the 85-percent mark. It gradually dropped 

to 60 percent and by 1980 averaged about 55 

percent. The balance of women and minorities 

recruited through the mid-1970' s are now reach- ing the "promotability window:' and GAO could 

see a rise in their promotion rates to GS-13 and 

above. 12. 

GAO instituted administrative changes in the 

competitive selection process to overcome kinks 

In the system and to foster affirmative action. In 

April 1980, the Comptroller General expressed 

his continuing dissappointrnent in the slow progress being made in meeting goals for hiring and 

promoting women and minorities to GS-13 positions and above. To improve the situation, he 

established a 50-percent selection goal of women 

and minorities for these positions. He also asked 

the Director of Personnel to advertise GS-14 and 

GS-15 pOSitions both within and outside the 

agency, to ensure applications by enough qualified women and minorities and to present the 

selecting official with two certificates of eligibility 

so that both GAO and non-GAO applicants may 

be considered. At the same time. in concert with 

a Government-wide hiring freeze . the Comp- troller General put a ceiling on GAO staff levels 

and established a one-for-two replacement policy for auditor/evaluator and legal vacancies and 

206 

a one-for-two replacement policy for promotions 

in the GS-13 to GS-15 range." Naturally enough, many men and women, minorities and nonminorities. saw these decisions as a reduction in 

their chances for advancement. Not only did 

GAO staff have fewer positions to compete for, 

but they had more applicants to compete against 

for GS-14 and GS-15 positions. Some women 

and minorities feared a stigma would be attached 

to their promotions as well-people would be- lieve they had been promoted because of the 

goal rather than competence. Analysis of selec- tions made between April and September 1980 

showed that 36 percent went to women and 

minorities (20 white women and 12 minorities 

selected). Only two positions-both for specialists-were filled by applicants from outside GAO. 

GAO's Equal Opportunity 

Profile In 1980. 

Available statistics show that in 1966 the 12.2 

percent minorities employed by GAO were 

mostly in the GS-1 to GS-9 grade leveis: 24 

individuals were in grades GS-11 to GS-14: and, 

none were in grades GS-15 and above. In 1974. 

however. over 100 individuals were in grades 

GS-ll to GS-14 and 6 in GS-15's or above. By 

November 1980, over 400 minority individuals 

were in grades GS-ll to GS-14 and 14 had 

reached GS-15 or above. GAO's work force in 

November 1980 was composed of 59.6 percent 

white men, 20 percent white women, 7 percent 

minority men. and 13.4 percent minority women. 

Women and minorities were represented at all 

grade levels. especially through GS-12. though 

the percentage of minorities and women at GS14 and above was still quite small. Figure 13-2 

shows how the makeup of the total work force 

changed between 1966. 1974, and 1980; figure 

13-3 shows the November 1980 work force. 

In his last year as Comptroller General, Staats 

initiated additional actions to correct the imbalances. The recruiting efforts of the 1970's had 

paid off to the point where a number of women 

and minorities occupied all levels of the career 

ladder. But realizing that overcoming under representation at all levels requires many years of 

effort, the Office began a program in October 

1980 to revise the 2- and 5-year hiring and promotion plans which had been established at 

Staats' direction in 1979. These plans are to be 

based on newly available labor market data and 

should provide a more precise basis for understanding and dealing with shortfalls among women 

and minorities that existed in grades GS-13 and 

up. The Office for Civil Rights. established in 

October 1980, is to direct this effort. 

SENIOR EXECUlWE SERVICE 

The Senior Executive Service, established in 

1980. may provide another boost to achieving 
Figure 13-2 

GeDCTal AccoaDtiDB Offic. ADal",.t. of GS 

Employ ••• by Grad_ aDd MiDOrity 

....... .... ,.n. ,-~ __ 

..... n , ...... . ... ....,--,- _n .. , _1~n_J .. Al.L_fL~ ....... ~ .. "H""" 

'" ~, .. , "'_MU.IO' "'-MU.,., 

....... I.H ,,- ........ LM ....... ..00: ""'''''UI , .. , .... n.-

05· 1 •• """ • 000 GS,2 :17 578 •• 640 • %2 05·3 177 •• 2 74 55 • 54 53.5 

054 .34 403 • 70 56 • 103 ;20 

as·s •• 235 ,. . 565 1% ""9 05·6 12 115 IIXl .90 115 51. 

GS7 10 2 • 'Il') 2.2 125 392 

G5·8 • 51 11 "8 IS 349 

G5·9 37 •• OA •• 2 80 2& I 

GS·tO 2 2S0 

as· 11 .2 2U 42 S7 • 3 2 •• 05· 12 • " 30 •• 22 1 11'16 

GS-13 2 , 23 33 53 55 as· 14 2 7 7 .3 :H •• G$·15 ·1 •• 9 2. 

G5· 16 G5·17 2 2' • 52 

GS·lS • 

TOTAL 

>01 .22 """ 171 1.048 20' 

Flgare 13-3 

Ge.eral ACC:OII.tlDII Office 

ADal", ••• of ElDploy.e. by Grade aDd MIDortty 

No" ... ber 1980 

.. "rn .... " .. ,"" " .. ~" .. ""' .. '''' ,.~" ..... , .. ", " ........ ~~ ",11(0.1 ~, 

"~ • . " ~ • - -- MO, "'WI.'" - ........... ~ 

GS-I - - - - - e5·2 I 77 • •• 2 1 77 5 38.5 

as·3 • .0 '3 42. 7 7U 47 '.5 

G5·4 13 •• "' 41. 10 5 I 93 470 

es·s 13 52 89 35.9 12 .. 134 540 

G5·6 5 2 :1 1U5 4b7 2 09 11 3 502 

G57 72 226 122 3S2 3. IZ 2 86 27.0 

GS·8 I 23 27 '28 I 23 " 32. 

059 118 .... , 109 355 32 10 , •• IS • 

OS 10 1 125 5 b25 2 250 

GS II 17. 442 137 348 33 H4 >0 127 

G5-12 80B .78 162 136 •• 7 12.3 74 .2 

as· 13 24 '55 87 90 J? :IS 16 17 

as· 14 .12 " 0 :10 45 27 '0 • O • 

05· 15 317 932 " • I • 23 I 03 

GS 16~ a5-17 90 928 2 21 , 41 I .0 

aSls 

EL - - - - - - - - TOTAL 3.053 59. 1,020 200 360 71) ."" 13' 

equal opportunity goals. The Comptroller General announced equal opportunity and affirma- tive action as one of five key results areas by 

which he would judge the performance of his 

top managers. He stated that activities in this 

area should· 'assure that every staff member has 

an equal opportunity to develop and use the 

abilities they have, to develop new skills and 

abilities, and to reach their individual aspirations 

in the work place."" GAO·s top managers were 

to be responsible for activities to correct past 

inequities as well. The SES contracts should provide GAO's top managers with an added incentive for maintaining a healthy equal opportunity 

environment. 

I tl2 usc 2UUOd (I%4! CIvil RighbAct. 

2 David 1-, Rosenbloom. FNfmJl EqucJ/ Emp/QvmC'fll Owonllnlry. Poluia olld Public Pt'fWIlnri AdmlnlstrollQtl [f\kw Vorl! Pn.egcI' PubH,twrs. 19771. cl\apltn J 4 

JUS Go:nt.'fl! Accounllng 0ffiI:1! 'f'IiI,n 0/ ACTIon 1m ImpkolT"llmtilDon 01 

ComplmDm ("-.era/'s Pl'OtJfiSm [Of EQUIII Emplovmenl Opportunity:' Aug I 

'966 

4 U 5 Cen'lral Accounting Olllu. functional RaCIsm Program Ht'Id ()p l.'1llllOn~ 1:>tvI5Ion. 'PllrtloponlS Work Book" Ill'! 27 2R 

5 'Work Book • pp Z9 30 

6 'Work Buok pp 30 32 

7 WOI'k Book p 32 

IS VIctor J ChrtstlOIlSli!n and Nnnev E W,tX. ·UpwlUd Moblhl\l Fad And 

FaI1acln ·· Th/! GAO RI!uku!. ISummer 19191. pp 61 t6 

9 ··Antl O\!;crtm!Mlton Eftorts In Itte US (">l.:IW'i11 Accounllny OfficII " nl port to Ih~ Compffollo!! e .melili. ,June La. 19!1O 

iO Ibid 

II W J McCormick. Jr . DlroclCll' Or~nlUlllon lind Man&g\'tlWnt Planning Stall. MIIlTIOflIndum 10 Comptroll.n Goml"T1ll ,md Oepury omPlI~r CAllera!. Nov 1')78 

12 William E Beusse. Speoa! A,,5ISf/lnt, Offlt .. 01 rtw Complroll¥r CiItrwnIJ, tokrmorandum 10 A~nt to the ComplfoiJer C ... 'fI'mlI {Admlnlm<\nonl. 3 M3, 

1980 

13 CompUoUIIf GenerAl SIMI!. Memorandum to he,otds 01 dM.OIU iIIld 01 Ik"_ I Apr 19K(1 

14 Compuolkrr Gel'Wfal 51Mb;, MvmQtllodum to all GAO prolessioMl ,tall rnl!mbtrl'S GS tb lind abolN 0.,1 Apr t~ 

207 
CClJuru~l1®IT 1141 

Changes In The Regional Offices 

The regional offices are one of GAO's most 

valuable resources for carrying out its mission. 

They provide a flexibility to go out and get a job 

done regardless of geographic location or subject 

matter. They are also one of GAO's most distinctive features: no other congressional support 

agency has a regional structure. They are a formidable component of the organization. totaling 

15 in number. including about 20 suboffices. and 

employ about half the entire professional work 

force. 

The regional offices' role in relation to headquarters changed over the years. From their be- ginnings as scattered onsite locations for auditing 

war contractors. they rapidly grew in responsibility and autonomy. The8. around the time 

Staats took office. Government operations in- creasingly became planned and programmed in 

Washington. In response to the change in Gov- ernment and the Comptroller General's desire 

to perform broad-based multiagency reviews. 

certain GAO activities began to be centered more 

in headquarters and regional operations shifted 

gradually from an independent to a responsive 

mode. However. their capability to adapt to 

THE BOSTON REGIONAL OmCE is open for businE!ss 

208 

changing organizational circumstances and to 

offer the kind of support needed as GAO expanded its activities remained crucial to the regions' well-being and GAO's continued success. 

This chapter traces the regional offices' evo- lution from their earliest days to the year 1980. 

The Regional Offices Take 

Shape 

GAO had conducted field activities since its 

earliest days. The Office of Investigations. estab- lished in 1922. was the first GAO group to es- tablish a base of operations in the field . It was 

active in inspecting numerous Federal disbursing 

activities around the country for evidence of lax- ity. fraud. or other irregularity. In the 1930's au- ditors in the Audit Division's Soil Conservation 

Section were scattered around the country to do 

preaudits of agricultural benefit payments made 

under the New Deal's agricultural adjustment 

program. Field stations were located at conve- nient centers in the agricultural regions. and the 

vouchers were audited against the benefit con- tracts before the checks were issued by the 

Treasury. This decentralized arrangement proved 

highly efficient in that materials for answering 

questions were close at hand and, more impor- tantly, headquarters was relieved of the burden 

of reviewing and then storing millions of vouchers. I 

The trend toward decentralization accelerated 

sharply during Wortd War 11. The greatly in- creased number of payments to war materials 

contractors threatened to overwhelm the head- quarters audit staff and create a formidable back- log of unaudited disbursing officers' accounts. To 

alleviate this condition. Comptroller General 

Lindsay Warren set up a War Contract Project 

Audit Section in 1942 to conduct onsite audits 

at contractor plants of payments for work per- formed under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee and similar- type contracts. This unit reported to the Audit 

Division and consisted of 5 (later 6) geographic 

zones with audit locations in about 30 cities. The 

number of audit locations at contractor plants 

peaked at 276 during the war. Once again the 

field structure expedited the resolution of ques- tionable payments and the handling of large doc- ument volumes. Moreover. it permitted closer 

scrutiny of overhead and indirect costs than 

would have been possible in a centralized audit. 

fn 1947 the War Contract Project Audit Sec- tion was terminated and its responsibilities trans- ferred to a new Field Audit Section of the Audit 

Division. Over the next several years the auditing 

of civilian payrolls and the operations and staff 

of the Soil Conservation Section were trans- ferred to it as well. 
The direct ancestors of teday's regional offices 

took shape with the appointment of the Assistant 

Director of Audits for Field Operations in a new 

Division of Audits. The zones were abolished and 

replaced by 23 regional audit offices in 1952. These offices were aSSigned responsibility for 

conducting "comprehensive audits" of agency 

operations to determine their legality. efficiency. 

and economy. Consistent with similar changes 

in headquarters. the field staff would no longer 

be restricted to reviewing individual transactions 

or agency financial systems; they were expected 

to examine all aspects of agency management 

from the highest levels on down. Naturally. the 

change in work imposed new skills requirements 

on the regional offices, and they spent the next 

several years trying to convert and to develop 

a staff competent in this new audit approach. Here they were at a disadvantage compared with 

headquarters. which already had 6 years of experience with the new approach in auditing the 

numerous Federal corporations. 

In 1956 the Field Operations Division was 

established. and John E. Thornton. formerly as· 

sistant director for field operations in the Division 

of Audits. was named director. The new Division 

and its regional offices-now 19 in number as 

a result of mergers-were charged with performFigure 14-1 

ing work aSSigned by the recently created Civil 

and Defense Accounting and Auditing Divisions. 

That same year the field staff of the Office of 

Investigations was absorbed by the regional of- fices. Although subsequent realinements even- tually reduced the number of offices to 15 and 

regional roles and responsibilities were variously 

manipulated and redefined. the basic structure 

of Field Operations Division has remained essentially unchanged.' 

Regional Status And 

Contributions 

Extensive decentralization was a fact of life in 

GAO. but the extent to which authority. respon- sibility, and accountability for GAO's work were 

decentralized was never so clear-cut. From the 

beginning, FOD was considered baSically a service-oriented organization structured to provide 

the staff capability necessary to do the work re- quested by the headquarters divisions. As the 

"Comprehensive Audit Manual" stated: 

Regional offices • • * are responsible for 

performing work in agencies in accordance 

with the plans. programs. or other instrucV.S. Geueral Accounting Office Regions 

, SACAil.MtNTO s.t>.N . , ~". 

fR,lt.NC1$CO " 

eM" . \. 

, " . I 

" '. 

"'~ .. 

OlNVER 

-0 KANSAS CHY 9 

AlBUQU[RQUE 

o HI ClONAl 0 1 FIt[ 

• !OlJDLOCA liON 

• MLllTARY AUOIT STAff 

Not 5"0._: • E. U. AFB. FLA . 

• bo. ",IU. 

209 
tions issued by the associate or assistant 

director in charge of the operating groups 

concerned '" >II '" 

Within a framework thus constrained, how 

were the regional offices to function? One ap- proach was to treat them as personnel pools, or 

"body shops," whose primary virtue was their 

convenient location and whose primary purpose 

was to deploy staff to carry out audits programmed 

and directed by headquarters. Headquarters 

would then take the fruits of such labors and 

massage them into a report. An alternative ap- proach was to make them responsible for effec- tive completion of assignments, from their initi- ation to preparation of the final report, subject 

to overall direction by headquarters. This approach was more feasible in the days when the 

scope of GAO audits typically covered only a 

single location or installation. Multiagency and 

multiregion review. however, required coordi- nation with both headquarters and other regions. 

Throughout most of FaD's history, the regional 

offices' relationships with headquarters varied 

between these two poles, but the trend has nec- essarily been in the direction of centralized con- trol and nearly always with the headquarters 

divisions having the final say. Despite the variations, certain features of the 

relationship remained constant-dual lines of 

authority. split but not explicitly defined respon- sibilities, and only indirect accountability by FaD 

for the final product. Gradually GAO realized 

that these patterns had to be changed if the headThe Washington Regional Office 

The Washington regional office (WRO). GAO's fastest growing regional office, has many 

unique features which set it apart from the 14 other regional offices. It is the only office that 

must function simultaneously in both the regional and headquarters enuironments. It does 

not stron!1,ly identify with the geographical area it serues. as other regions do, since it shares 

this "turf' with headquarters staff. In many instances. staff haue more contact with headquarters staff than with fellow WRO'ers. The need for establishing a regional office in Washington, D. c.. was identified in the early 

1960's. There was growing concem, particularly in the Defense Diuision, that Gouernment 

contractors and installations in the area were not receiuing adequate audit couerage. The 

Defense Diuision lobbied strongly for the creation of a centralized regional audit office. The 

Ciuil Diuision. howeuer, was not as enthusiastic about a Washington regional office. Its director, 

A. T. Samuelson, questioned the wisdom of diuiding responsibility for ciuil agency audit work. 

He felt that a separate regional office would not substantially decrease his diuision's workload. 

Despite the controuersy, WRO was established in 1964 with Donald Scantlebury as its first 

regional manoger to perform civil and defense audits. with emphasis on the latter. His first 

priority was to build a well-balanced staff. His initial cadre of auditors came from other field 

offices, headquarters, and the then recently closed Marine Corps Finance Center. Since most 

were payroll and uoucher auditors, Scantlebury sought to diuersify and upgrade his staff by 

recruiting personnel, primarily accountants. who were better equipped to handle varied audit 

responsibilities. WRO's first location in Rosslyn, Virginia, was less than ideal. The roof leaked when it rained 

and buckets had to be strategically situated to catch the water. The place did haue the 

aduantage, howeuer. of prouiding WRO with a psychological as well as a physical separation 

from headquarters. This allowed the staff to establish its own distinct identity. In 1968 WRO 

moued to larger, more comfortable quarters in Falls Church, Virginia. 

Scantlebury established a troika organization focused around the three assistant regional 

managers, Each was made responsible for a primary function: job planning, job execution, 

or report reuiew. A primary reason for this organization was to "tum out an acceptable finished 

(audit) product," one that headquarters could accept without a great deal of rewriting. 

Although initially WRO had only Nauy work to do, its workload soon increased, and 

Scantlebury's managerial problems reuolued around stretching his resources to meet the 

demands. When GAO deemphasized defense contract work in the wake of the Holifield 

hearings. WRO shifted gears and began mouing into other areas of auditing. In particular, it 

assumed a more active role in ciuil work. When Staats took office WRO became heaui/y 

inuolued in work which emphasized Gouernment-wide issue areas and program 

effectiueness. 

Hyman Krieger. a GAO ueteran since 1946, became WRO's second manager in 1971. 

Shortly thereafter. the 1972 reorganization created six new operating diuisions. each with 

responsibilities for Gouernment-wide programs and functions. The number of diuisions euentually reached 10. with the net effect of broadening the scope of WRO's audit responsibility, 

210 
quarters/regions duumvirate was to remain a 

workable way of doing business. 

Each regional office had its own management 

structure with hierarchical levels of review and 

supervision through which products nowed on 

their way out of the organization. The regional 

manager was responsible for the overall quality 

of the staffs technical performance as well as for 

the "people management" functions of staff recruiting, training, and development. His principal 

efforts often were devoted to the technical operations, but many regional managers also took 

a strong interest in their staffs' well-being. 

The audit managers in the regions were responsible for overall supervision and control of 

several assignments. While they generally did not 

perform detailed audit work. they were expected 

to acquire a sound working knowledge of the 

activities under review so they could serve as 

both supervisors and technical advisors. Their 

responsibilities on given assignments included 

initial planning or interpreting the headquarters 

work plan. job execution, on-the-job training and 

staff development. and regional review of the 

workpapers andlor draft reports. Although they 

were primarily concerned with finite assignments. they were also responsible for any administrative, recruiting, training. or other functions the regional manager might assign to them. 

Below the audit managers were the site seniors, who performed onsite supervision and 

control of assignments. Their responsibilities and 

duties were baSically the same as those of the 

audit managers, except that they (1) normally 

The Washington Regional Office-Continued 

The divisions welcomed the opportunity to work with WRO because it represented a neutral 

third party that transcended organizational lines. Krieger took several steps to meet the increased demands placed on the region. One was 

to recruit more auditors whose backgrounds and interests were compatible with WRO's ever 

widening range of activities. WRO's staff size more than doubled from 1964 to 1972. and 

continued to grow in subsequent years. He also encouraged staff growth and development. 

Many of the staff management functions were spread out among staff members as auxiliary 

duties with committees createa to carry out these functions. A strong support system was 

created, which relieved professionals of much administrative work. 

David Sorando became WRO's third manager in 1975. Satisfied with WRO's workload 

mix and level of effort. he made some internal changes. Roles within the organization were 

redefined and duties were more precisely delegated. The strong technical role of the audit 

manager. which had become diluted with many auxiliary responsibilities. was reestablished. Staff management activities. such as appraisal. promotion, and counseling. had been dispersed 

among committees. Sorando abolished these committees and centralized their activities in 

designated senior-level staff. WRO derives many benefits from its strategic location. It often becomes involved in the 

planning and general coordination of audit jobs. WRO personnel are often assigned to congressional committee staffs and work closely with them in various assignments. In 1980. 47 percent 

of WRO's work was done in response to congressional requesl£-the highest percentage of 

any regional office. While other regions may concentrate on only a few issue areas. WRO 

works regularly in every issue area represented by the divisions and conducts intemal audit 

work as well. A new staff-year allocation sy,1em ensures that WRO can respond equitably to 

the needs of all the divisions. The wide range of WRO work has made it a good place for new auditors to gain general 

experience in many areas and specialized experience in highly technical areas, such as ADP 

aUditing. The opportunities far WRO auditors to develop professionally are well documented. In the last 3 years, WRO. whose staff members constitute 11 percent of FOD's total staff, has 

accounted for 22 percent of all FOt) promotions. WRO is a growing region because of GAO's expanding role and the substantial increase 

in congressional requests. It has. in fact. become the largest regional office. Fiscal year 1980 

marked WRO's most active recruiting effort to date: over 100 new staff members came on 

board. WRO does not operate in a vacuum Because of its unique situation with respect to 

headquarters. it guards its independence vigilantly and has consistently opposed any effort 

to make it a mere "body shop." This has remained an underlying concern, particularly in 

light of WRO's relocation from its suburban Virginia office to the headquarters building in 

1978. WRO has maintained its integrity intact. however. and continues to function effectively 

as a separate regional entity. 

211 
had only one assignment and so supervised the 

other assigned staff full time and (2) were themselves responsible for specific segments of the 

work program. 3 

The re~ional offices functioned in the 1950's 

and 1960 s as relatively autonomous units. due 

both to the latitude permitted by FOD Director 

Thornton and the patriarchal character of some 

of the early managers. These managers were a 

formidable group indeed. Variously described as 

"theory x." autocratic. and product- rather then 

people-oriented. they demanded dedication, dis- cipline, and high-quality results from their staffs. They were notable also for their longevity. some 

of them staying in one place as managers for two 

decades. The regional offices were fairly insu- lated from each other and from headquarters: 

for the limited interoffice communication that 

was exchanged, the regional managers typically 

preferred to be the sole contact points. They also 

tended to get personally involved in all jobs un- derway in the regions. The offices were small 

enough then to permit this hands-on control. 

In the late 1960's. due to the expansion of 

regional staffs and responsibilities. assistant re- gional manager (ARM) positions were added to 

the regional hierarchy. Their role was generally 

to assist the regional managers in carrying out 

their many duties. For the most part they were 

involved in job management and frequently 

functioned as report reviewers for the regional 

managers. 

Even in the 1960's. the regional offices were 

still doing some account settlement work and 

auditing of civilian payrolls. but they were be- coming more and more proficient in compre- hensive auditing. Many offices also became ex- pert in defense contract pricing reviews. Regional 

staff had audited cost-reimbursement type con- tracts since World War II, but the first review of 

negotiated fixed-price defense contracts was ini- tiated by the Kansas City Regional Office at a 

General Motors plant in 1955. Thereafter, the 

regional offices increased the number of staff 

assigned to contractor plants and major military 

installations for defense contract work. Attracted 

by the opportunity to identify huge monetary 

savings, some of the most capable regional staff 

devoted themselves to this work. The expertise 

they developed. coupled with their strategic lo- cation. conSiderably enhanced the stature and 

influence of FOD. These offices exercised much 

autonomy in programming the contract audits. 4 

During this period many close working rela- tionships developed between given staffs at 

headquarters and in the field. As headquarters 

staff identified people in the field they could work 

well with, they tended to seek them out job after 

job. Headquarters staff also found they could do 

more jobs by delegating more responsibility to 

their counterparts in the field. As a result, the 

regional responsibility for the reporting end of 

aSSignments increased. Instead of just sending 

212 

the workpapers and compilations of facts into 

headquarters after completing audits, the regions 

began fashioning their material into draft reports. However, there were instances when the field 

assumed more job responsibility. although lack- ing the close relationship with headquarters. As 

a result, a region would draft a report relying on 

its own perspective with little inkling of how 

Washington viewed the basic message. Then 

each regional office level rewrote the report ac- cording to its ideas of what Washington wanted. 

The result was a great deal of nonproductive 

effort. 

The regional offices had no responsibility for 

the final product. The last the offices saw of many 

draft reports was when they went out the door 

to Washington. The final reports that emerged 

little resembled the regional drafts. Those drafts 

were commonly turned over to Washington site 

seniors for rewriting and then were further re- viewed and massaged by the headquarters re- view chain. If the regional drafts were viewed as 

particularly unsatisfactory, they wound up on 

some reviewer's desk collecting dust or were just 

quietly disposed of. Those drafts that were returned to the regions for rewriting sometimes 

were accompanied by no more specific feedback 

than "I've got serious problems with this." Re- gional involvement in handling agency com- ments and in final report processing was almost 

nil. 

The upshot was that even though the regions 

gained responsibility for producing draft reports. 

they were rarely held accountable for them. They 

had little incentive to become highly proficient 

at report drafting either. because it seemed pointless to fuss too much with a product that was 

going to be revised extenSively by headquarters 

anyway.' 

Over time FOD came to share more of the 

work supervision with headquarters. Beginning 

in the late 1950's, the practice grew on multiregional aSSignments of allOwing one region to act 

as "lead" region and supervise the other participating regional offices. Such an arrangement 

was apparently originally adopted for conven- ience and efficiency rather than for its attractive- ness as a device for delegating significant re- sponsibility to the regions. Nonetheless it inevitably 

entailed some "letting go" by the headquarters 

divisions, and it helped satisfy the regions' need 

for more substantive involvement in the work. 

The Defense Division embraced the concept 

more eagerly and allowed lead regions more 

control than did the Civil Division. Neither divi- sion, however, parceled out much more reporting responsibility than preparing the initial draft, 

and the relative haziness of the parameters of 

what could legitimately be delegated and under 

what circumstances was a source of discomfort 

for both headquarters and the field. 

Thus over the years the "service-oriented" 

FOD had carved out a niche for itself in various 
phases of job management-programming, supervising. executing the audit, and reportingusually by stepping in where there was a need. 

Its job management responsibilities were not so 

much formally delegated by the divisions as they 

were relinquished by them for the sake of expediency. Ultimate control and accountability 

were retained by headquarters but otherwise 

FOD's relationship to headquarters varied depending on the individual offices and divisions 

involved. 

frustrations And Opportanities 

The role and responsibilities of the regional 

offices continued to evolve during these 15 

years. All the developments and changes discussed in earlier chapters could not help affecting 

the regions as well as headquarters. The basic 

organization structure founded on a separate 

Field Operations Division remained the same. 

and the regions' geographic boundaries changed 

little. However. in several significant areas. the 

regions' role and responsibilities vis-a-vis headquarters' underwent a shift. 

Increasingly during this period, GAO expanded and strengthened its ties with the Congress. This involved. among other things. more 

active liaison and more substantive participation 

in hearings. Although many headquarters groups 

tried to include the re$ions in their congressional 

contacts, the regions participation was necessarily limited by the simple fact of geographical 

distance. 

Also. beginning in the mid-1960' s. the regions' role in job planning began to change. The 

cutback in audits of individual defense contracts 

following the Holifield hearings combined with 

the Comptroller General's emphasis on broader 

based. multiagency reviews and headquartersbased program planning made the headquarters 

divisions the unquestioned arbiters of the scope 

and direction of GAO's work. Regional office 

participation in the planning process became relatively peripheral. being limited usually to sug- gesting individual jobs. attending issue-area or 

other planning conferences. and commenting on 

the program plans developed by the divisions. 

By 1980. however. efforts were made to 

strengthen the regions' planning role. carrying 

out Staats' constant interest in obtaining frontend regional input to the planning process. 

CHANGES IN THE REGIONS' ROLE 

GAO' s s~.jft from preoccupation with agency 

management deficiencies was further underscored in 1972 when the Civil and Defense Divisions were replaced by six new audit divisions 

organi2ed along broad program and functional 

lines. A related phenomenon was the growth in 

massive social programs and a concomitant demand by policymakers for evaluations of their 

effectiveness. Although these social programs 

were carried out in the States. cities. and other 

localities throughout the country, their audit and 

evaluation required headquarters programming.· There was still plenty of opportunity. how- ever. for the regions to contribute significantly 

to the execution of GAO's evaluation work. Their 

performance in poverty program audits in the 

late 1960' s-GAO' s "baptism by fire" in evaluation-was noteworthy for the level of effort 

expended, the adaptability shown by the staff in 

WASHINGTON REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF brief division stalf on Job progress 

213 
performing a demanding new type of work 

within a tight time frame, and close coordination 

with headquarters. The memory of the extent to 

which this venture taxed regional resources and 

spirit is still very much alive today. Every regional 

office got involved to some extent and in some 

offices, such as Chicago and Detroit. nearly every 

staff member participated. The regions have participated in many other program results reviews 

throughout the years. Nonetheless one observer 

of GAO warned: 

As the GAO places greater emphasis upon 

the review of complete gOllemmental pro- grams. the dominance of headquarters vis- a-vis the field may become even greater 

unless much more initiative and creativity 

are shown in developing more vital roles 

for field units. It is possible that the expanding application of the planning. programing. and budgeting approach_ as well 

as other managerial developments within 

the Federal Govemment. may result in_ 

such centralized program planning and 

control at the Washington levels of the respective Govemment agencies that the 

headquarters staff of the GAO will be in an 

even more strategic position to assert its 

primacy in the fonmulation and execution 

of the Office's audit. 7 

THE LEAD REGION CONCEPT 

Staats has actively supported the regional 

offices. Shortly after his appOintment. Staats 

made a round of visits to the regional officesa gesture which boosted morale. Thereafter he 

consistently urged the delegation of more responsibility to the regional offices. In November 

1967, he issued a memorandum endorsing the 

lead region concept and establishing gUidelines 

for its use. The potential benefits of the concept 

were cited as follows: 

• RedUCing the workload on the Washington 

supervisory staff. 

• More effectively utilizing regional office 

statl. 

• Enhancing staff development by placing 

greater responsibility on regional office 

statl. 

• Expediting the preparation and clearance 

of reports." 

This concept was, of course. not new; it was 

one of those ad hoc FODlheadquarters arrangements that had developed and flourished without 

ever being institutionalized or delimited. There 

had been the problem of making one regional 

office the " straw boss" for a job without headquarters relinqUishing sufficient authority and responsibility to carry out this role. However. the 

memorandum defined the central problem as the 

lack of "a common understanding as to the pro214 

cedure for deciding upon lead region arrangements" and prescribed a "fix" in the form of a 

set of ground rules. Unfortunately this reliance 

on definitions. clarifications, and rule formulations-typical of GAO-did little to solve the 

problem but did much to constrain the regional 

offices and hamper their effectiveness. Flexibility, 

after all. was a prime regional raison d' etre. Then 

too, perhaps confusion and conflict could never 

be ultimately eradicated as long as the agency 

was structured around two organizations in 

tandem. 

Problems with the lead region concept were 

acknowledged in 1971 when the Committee for 

Improvement of Report Processing and Review 

Procedures, detOuring from its main focus on 

expediting issuance of repprts, pointed out that 

the lead region concept was not working as intended. The committee said regional managers 

were not being given full responsibility for carrying out lead region assignments and Washington directors were not willing to accept their 

products. The committee echoed the 1967 

memorandum's focus on the lack of clear delegation of authority and responsibility. However, 

what the committee and others in GAO wanting 

to expand regional office responsibility were up 

against was a deep institutional bias known to 

GAO staff as the "welthey syndrome"-the 

tendency for the regions and headquarters to 

blame each other when problems arose. This 

could not be overcome by means of clarifying 

memorandums. written agreements, and guidelines. The nature of this problem came through 

when the committee pleaded the regions' case 

in these terms: 

The regional managers and their staffs are 

no less intelligent and capable than the 

Washington directorate and their staffs. It 

stands to reason that. if full authority and 

responsibility is delegated to a regional 

manager on a particular lead-region asSignment. he will carry out that assignment 

in the best way he possibly can' 

Perhaps what most stood in the way of delegating more responsibility to the field was another long-standing GAO concept. cited in the 

1%7 guidelines: 

The basic authority and responsibility for 

the assignment involving the application of 

the lead region concept. as well as others. 

rests with the Associate Director. This is a 

necessary organizational principle * ... * 10 

As a result of the Committee's comments on 

the lead region concept, a Task Force on Washington-Field Relationships was established in 

1971. The task force recommended that the term 

"lead region" no longer be used and that a written understanding be required for each assign-
STAATS' EARLY VISITS to the reg!onal offices 

-Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, California. March'1967 

-Boston Naval Shipyard. September 1966 

-Detroit postal facility. May 1967 

215 
ment identifying the job management responsibilities." The assumption seemed to be that trust 

and cooperation between the regions and headquarters could finally be achieved if only there 

were enough documentation backing it up. Beginning in 1972, therefore, the Job Management 

Agreement became part of the required paperwork for assignments requiring participation by 

more than one organizational group. This was 

a form which documented the division of responsibilities between a headquarters operating 

group and a field office and between field 

offices. I:.! 

The 1975 Task Force on Project Management 

(see ch. 11) felt obliged to deal with the topic of 

regional offices because of criticism that project 

management was "just another gimmick to 'get 

around' the system we've created and that by 

pushing this concept the Office is not facing up 

to more substantive. underlying issues 

• • . " lJ One of the key issues which kept surfacing during the task force's research was the 

question of whether more assignment responAnchorage-A Closeup Look 

sibility could and should be delegated to the regions. The task force found that the regions were 

shouldering many job responsibilities. Although 

the term "lead ·region" was no longer offiCially 

sanctioned. the concept survived. Of the multiregional assignments ongoing as of June 30, 

1975. regions had responsibility for supervising 

other regions on more than half of them. The 

regions also were preparing the initial draft reports on 75 percent of all the jobs they were 

involved in. But since they did not have the crucial responsibility for a quality end product their 

capabilities were not fully developed. their talents 

were underused, and their job satisfaction was 

limited. The task force suggested, therefore. that 

GAO experiment with more total delegation of 

certain jobs. Of course, project management provided an opportunity to give more responsibility 

to individuals in the regions but did not delegate 

anything additional to the regional offices per se. 

The implementation of this concept in GAO was 

extremely limited, however. 

Anchorage. Alaska, is GAO's most out-of-the-way sublocation. Staffed by 10 hearty individual5---{)1l of whom volunteer for this assigment-this office has been involved in a number 

of areas which can best be described as uniquely Alaskan. Opened and closed periodical/y 

in the past two decades, the Anchorage suboffice gained penmanence in 1974 in response 

to congressional interest in the Alaska pipeline. This office has maintained an ongoing review 

of the pipeline, but has expanded its areas of responsibility to include Alaskan tourism. the 

Outer Continental Shelf, and the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act. Recently. two members of the staff were directed to inventory an abandoned Air Force 

communications site, White Alice, some 300 miles west of Anchorage. Deserted since the late 

1970's. the site was rendered obsolete by the advent of sophisticated microwave and satellite 

communications equipment Undaunted by the remoteness of the location. Ronald Kelso. 

auditor-in-charge, accompanied by his associate. Jim Leonard. commuted to the site by first 

boarding a commercial airplane in Anchorage for a 200-mile flight to the small native village 

of l11iamna. From there a Piper Cub carried them to the vacant Air Force landing strip, at the 

base of Big Mountain. A number of forlorn-looking buildings were scattered around the area, one of which became home for Kelso and Leonard during the next 5 days. From this location, 

the men could see the communications site. perched 5 miles above, at the mountain 's peak. 

This caused them some concern as they envisioned the daily climb to and from the mountain. Fortunately, Kelso and Leonard found an abandoned military vehicle in good operating 

condition and two hundred 35-gal/on drums of gasoline. Kelso observed that the airstrip site 

was a little spooky, just like a ghost town . It seemed, he continued, that the Air Force had been 

there one day, then left the next, leaving everything behind. 

The lack of modern conveniences (no running water or electricity) did not faze the two 

men. They carried ample provisions, including food , flashlights, and a propane stove. Each 

afternoon, after conducting the inventory, they went to a nearby lake and caught salmon and 

trout for dinner. This was a relaxing and an enjoyable way to unwind from the mundane tasks 

of the day. 

Along with their usual camping equipment, Kelso and Leonard packed two .44 Magnum 

revolvers and a shotgun in case they encountered grizzly bears. which are common in the 

Alaskan wildemess. It is not unusual. Kelso indicated. to find one wandering around Anchorage. 

An avid outdoorsman. Kelso knew full well that grizzlies like to set up residence in abandoned 

buildings. Much to the auditors' relief. none were sighted. although bear tracks were found 

close to the site. 

This episode illustrates the type of work being done in Alasko. The Anchorage team, rugged 

GAO individualists, confronts challenges uncommon in their profession. They are dedicated 

people who must. from time to time. take physical risks in pursuit of their duties. The work 

of GAO thus encompasses many chal/enges in many climes. 

216 
• 

A few years later yet another voice was added 

to the chorus of those suggesting that Washing- ton/regional relationships needed improvement. 

A Community and Economic Development Division Task Force on WashingtonlField Relations 

reported in 1978 that the problem was rooted 

in GAO's dual organization structure. The task 

force members saw headquarters and the regions operating as two separate organizations 

with separate lines of authority. In addition. they 

said the regions were only indirecdy held accountable for their performance. Their report 

suggested forming temporary Washington/regional audit teams as a preferred solution. but 

it went as far as to raise the possibility of abol- ishing FOD as an entity while retaining a set of 

geographically separated offices as an alternative. " 

RESPONSIBIUTY FOR FINANCIAL AUDITS 

The regions gained a slice of autonomy when 

they were delegated authority for conducting fi- nancial audits of 18 Government activities and 

corporations as part of the 1972 reorganization. 

The entities for which FOD had full audit and 

reporting authority included banking activities. 

such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the military finance centers; and Government corporations. such as the Panama Canal 

Company and the St Lawrence Seaway De- velopment Corporation. At last FaD had work 

for which it was totally responsible: it programmed 

and executed the work and put out the final 

product. 

Much of this work was handled by the Wash- ington regional office. FaD welcomed this opportunity-so much so that it tended to give the 

financial audits priority over work assigned to it 

by the divisions. The divisions resented taking 

a back seat and FOD itself eventually concluded 

that there was no valid reason for WRO to be 

responsible for auditing activities which fell within 

issue areas assigned to other divisions. The banking activities, for example. logically belonged to 

the General Government Division. which was 

responsible for the issue area "Federal Oversight 

of Financial Institutions. " Therefore, FOD Director Stewart D. McElyea-believing there was 

enough split responsibility in GAO already--<,"- gineered transfer of this audit responsibility back 

to the divisions. In 1980, the responsibility for 

the financial audits was consolidated in the Accounting and Financial Management Division. 

Unity Of Purpose 

Recognizing the limitations and frustrations 

inherent in its role. FOD began in the early 

1970's to strengthen itself as an organization and 

forge the regional offices into a more united ent- ity. This movement begun by Thornton and 

actively pursued by his successor Stewart Mc- Elyea from 1976 to 1979. continued to the end 

of Comptroller General Staats' term under Frank 

Fee. Considering the autonomy enjoyed by the 

regions for so many years, forging this unity is 

a long-term project. 

One of the first steps FOD took was to institute 

a rotation policy for regional managers. After 

nearly 20 years of existence, some regional offices were still headed by their first and only re- gional managers. Richard Madison had been Atlanta regional manager since 1956 and Chief of 

the Southeast Zone for 4 years before that: Alfred 

M. Clavelli had been in San Francisco since 

1954: and James H. Rogers had been in Phil- adelphia since 1956. In the minds of many. these 

long tenures fostered stagnation. and it was time 

for a fresh start. So FaD made it a policy that 

the regional managers periodically would have 

to change places and that the maximum amount 

of time they could stay in anyone region would 

be 8 years. Some regional managers retired 

rather than face the prospect of moving. The 8- y~ar limit is more of a standard, however, than 

a hard-and-fast rule. and quality-of-Iife factors 

are carefully considered before a rotation deci- sion is finalized. Rotation was also encouraged 

for those promoted to the position of assistant 

regional manager but was not a requirement. 

In 1975 Thornton approved implementation 

of an FOD-wide Automated Management Data 

System (AMOS). McElyea. who was then Dep- uty Director, had strongly supported development of AMOS as a tool to improve individual 

and collective understanding of FOD performance and to improve FOD accountability for its 

resources. FOD had been using the same management information system since 1952, and 

sometimes it seemed as though the data it was 

Figure 14-2 

Inter-Regionat Communication 

ATL ------------ 10 

80S ---------- c::..::::.......J 

~:::::::-=.j - - - ---- - ----\~=PA ~ 

L-:::-----::-: ------------- ,:,:::.: CO::......J 

DI.mny Ih(' lal~' yl! a~ 01 th~ Srllau teTl'n, tn!;' FlIilkl OPU,1l 110". Dlvtsl<)o fOS ler/ld unity of purp~ hy IUnoeliu9 "!coId 

QunrteNo, ro.lglOMi co mmum II~on s through /I , ,,,n(rat PC/lot 

217 
capable of producing was nearly as old as the 

system Itself. In contrast. AMDS was very close 

to being a real-time system. Several re!POnal 

offices contributed to its development, and the 

Atlanta office designed a plan for its automation. Initially it was oriented toward job data, but grad- ually personnel and administrative records were 

incorporated into It as well. The advantages of 

timeliness and integration attracted the rest of 

GAO to AMOS. and by 1978 it had evolved into 

a GAO·wlde information system. Applying the 

system GAO-wide highlighted system limitations, 

however, and a more sophisticated system was 

installed In 1979. (See ch. 16.) 

Stewart McElyea took over as Director in 

January 1976. This is what he envisioned for 

FOD: 

Our basic goal is to establish a more 

businesslike atmosphere to Field Opera- tions Division Management. We are going 

to establish FaD plans, systems for measuring and providing feedback on perform- ance against these plans and a semblance 

of Divisional unity. In short, we are going 

to begin monaging, acting, and looking like 

the $75 million a year business that we are. FaD's long range objective is to operate 

as a single cohesive unit through the 15 

regional offices' • • is 

One of McElyea's early initiatives was to establish an Administrative Officer in each regional 

office to oversee and coordinate the administrative workload. This relieved auditors of many 

administrative tasks that had previously reduced 

their productivity and made such tasks the responsibility, as was proper. of lower paid staff. Another innovation was the advent of periodic 

area meetings where regional managers and assistant regional managers from a few regions got 

together for a few days to discuss issues of com- mon interest. 

McElyea's management style was more authoritarian than that of his r.redecessor. He believed conforming with the etter and spirit of all 

GAO and FaD policies was an essential first 

standard for his subordinates to follow, regard- less of their personal preferences. This posture, 

not an uncommon one among longtime GAO 

managers, had been shared by many of the 

original regional managers. It was when this approach was coupled with his interpretation of the 

team concept that he had his greatest Impact on 

FOD. 

Traumatic: Traasformation 

Under Teams 

The 1977 Task Force on Improving GAO 

Effectiveness identified several barriers to improved operations which involved both !he reDALlAS' ADMINIS1BAllVE omCER ",Ileves her cowork .... of many routine. yet timeconsumlng duties 

218 
gional offices and headquarters units-unnec- essary multiple levels of authority and review. 

draft reports going back and forth between levels 

of management. and "the way field/headquar- ters staffs relate to one another in performing the 

work."'· What the task force pointed out was no 

news because it had all been said before in dif- ferent ways by previous task forces and various 

observers. official and unofficial. But this time 

the Comptroller General's response was to man - date what he hoped would bring about basic 

change in this relationship by adopting a dedi- cated project team approach as the normal way 

of doing business. A team of regional managers. after consulting 

with all the other managers. drafted a plan for 

FOD' s implementation of this directive. At several problem-solving sessions. FOD manage- ment and all the regional managers worked with 

this document to identilv the changes that would 

be necessary within FOb to successfully operate 

under teams. The major change emerging from 

this process in January 1978 was an understand- ing that. on future assignments. regional man - agement would be responsible for the technical 

aspects of the work only when speCifically re- quested by the responsible operating division. 

Regional management's primary responsibility 

would be "resource management. " a term 

loosely defined as encompassing all aspects of 

staff acquisition. training. making aSSignments. 

assuring proper use and development of staff. 

and recognizing and rewarding staff for their ac- complishments. To many managers this repre- sented a rather dramatic change whose consequences were unknown. 

The plan was strongly endorsed by McElyea. however. He believed that regional management 

should concentrate on resource management to 

avoid duplicating operating division and team 

management responsibilities and to facilitate 

FOD' s adjustment to the new team approach. 

He was strongly in favor of the clear lines of 

authority. responsibility. and accountability which 

such an arrangement appeared to foster. 

The plan was outlined for members of the 

GAO Task Force on Improving GAO Effective- ness that same month and they found it generally 

satisfactory. 17 

Some confusion still remained. FOD soon 

became aware that many GAO staff members 

believed regional management had been cut off 

from technical responsibilities. This was probably 

due. in part. to the fact that FOD's implementation strategy had been couched mainly in terms 

of what regional management would not be 

doing. In the months that followed. FOD initiated 

efforts to draw a clearer distinction between re- sponsibility to direct jobs-which regional man- agement would no longer do unless asked---and 

the responsibility to interact with the teams doing 

the jobs-which it was essential that they do to 

fulfill their resource manageme nt role. FOD 

adopted the stance that a certain amount of tech- nical involvement was necessary to properly per- form resource management. For example, this 

involvement was necessary to facilitate intelligent 

decisions regarding the need for and commit- ment of the right resources to an asSignment. 

Once resources had been committed. re- gional management had to monitor their use by 

keeping abreast of significant changes in job 

scope and complexity and of whether staff mem- bers were being used in accordance with the Job 

Management Agreement. It was also imperative 

that regional management be aware of staff per- formance on jobs so it could fulfill its responsibilities for staff training and development. assignments. promotions. and awards. As regional management's role under teams 

further evolved. FOD focused on how it could 

continue to maintain the overall quality of the 

work of each region. It further defined the role 

to include offering technical advice to teams; 

aSSisting. when requested. in resolving problems 

between team leaders and team directors: and 

bringing technical problems to the attention of 

team leaders and division management Thus. regional management would function. in a sense. 

as a "cop on the beat. " 1M 

Pressure mounted on FOD nonetheless to 

demonstrate that regional management's role 

was. in fact. substantive. The Comptroller Gen- erallet it be known that he wanted the technical 

aspects of the role enhanced and emphasized to 

ensure that the expertise of the regional man- agers and assistant regional managers was fully 

tapped and to further his longtime objective of 

delegating greater responsibility to the. regional 

offices. At the same time Personnel CIted dIffi- culties in developing new job descriptions for regional management positions because the significance and worth of their contribution to 

GAO's work was not sufficiently clear. A more 

substantial basis for the desired classification levels was needed to satisfy Office of Personnel 

Management standards. 

Figure 14-3 

Operating Under Teams 

Regional 10· ..... Programing 

Office Division 

\; / • • 

"-:. 

r Team 

There wes a direct hne of authority between the tellm 

and Helldquarters progremming division The lines 

between the team and regional office and belWeen 

the regional office and Headquarters were less clear. 

219 
In response to these concerns, McElyea, 

Clerio Pin, and Robert F. Keller executed an 

agreement in January 1979 which provided that 

assistant regional managers and GS-14's in re- gional management poSitions would be expected 

to devote a substantial amount of time to the 

technical aspects of GAO's work. These included 

serving as team directors or team leaders, par- ticipating in strategic and project planning, serv- ing as the regional focal point for issue areas, 

and providing the regional link to and oversight 

of the work of regional staff assigned to jobs. In 

addition, divisions would be directed to use as- sistant regional managers as team directors and 

team leaders and to use regional managers as 

team directors when appropriate." Ultimately 

the division directors made a commitment to get 

10 percent of their team directors from FOD, and 

FOD established an objective of having all as- sistant regional managers function continuously 

as team directors on at least one job. 

Resource management. the other major as- pect of regional management's role. was not new 

to the regions. They had always been responsible 

for the major staff-related functions newly grouped 

under that term. The team concept. however. made FOD more sensitive to the importance of 

these functions. Staff members would be as- signed to team leaders outside their regional of- fices for long periods. and thus their career de- velopment needs could easily be neglected. To 

ensure that regional management maintained 

knowledge about staff capabilities and career 

expectations, FOD established "focal points." or 

managers responsible for the long-term devel- opment of mid- and lower-level staff. They mon- itored the use and performance of staff members. 

discussed these topics with them. and g~ve them 

periodic career counseling. Assistant regional 

managers typically functioned as the focal points. They were aSSisted by staff managers, profes- sional development coordinators. andlor training 

coordinators. Some segment of the regional ofFigure 14-4 

Example of Resource 

Management Focal Peint 

220 

Assistant Regional Manager 

GS-14 Assistant 

Core Group 

25-30 staff 

members 

Actlvlti .. Staff Development 

Performance Evalul!ltion 

TraInIng Needs Assessment 

Career Counseling 

PromorabllifY Assessment 

fice staff was assigned to each focal point, based 

on issue areas of interest, personal preference. 

or another grouping device. 

With a great deal of thought and effort, re- gional management's multifaceted role evolved 

to the point where it was reasonably well defined 

and clearly understood within FOD. This did not 

mean it was popular with everyone. Some main- tained that separation of job management from 

responsibility for the overall quality of work and 

for resource management was totally unworka- ble. but the new way of doing business was a 

fact of life that was gradually becoming accepted. 

However, headquarters staff, to a great extent, 

neither understood the role nor accepted it as 

worthwhile. "Resource management" was hard 

for them to appreciate because (1) they had al- ways taken for granted the personnel, travel, and 

similar support services available at a central location in the headquarters building. and (2) GAO 

has traditionally valued most those activities 

which contribute directly to the Office end prod- ucts. When regional management interacted with 

teams to provide advice, raise issues. or to get 

information necessary to fulfill their role. it was 

often viewed as interloping or an unwelcome 

intrusion. Division directors balked at using re- gional team directors and failed to reach the 10- percent goal. Regional management resented 

the fact that some in headquarters viewed them 

as not being in a position to have the knowledge 

base essential for team directors or to produc- tively and legitimately monitor team progress. Among the regional staff most disenchanted 

with the conversion to teams were the GS-14's. Formerly they had been audit managers. with 

responsibility for several jobs: now they were 

relegated to running only one. This develop- ment, coupled with their limited opportunities to 

interact on jobs aside from the ones they were 

assigned to, led them to believe that their tech- nical expertise and staff development capabilities 

were being underused. FOD tried to expand the 

management opportunities available to the 14's 

by using them as staff managers to aid assistant 

regional managers in performing resource management duties or as issue area coordinators for 

regional input to program planning. But. to the 

end. most remained bitter over the change. 

The Job Scheduling And 

Staffing System And Regional 

Input To Program Planning 

FOD was also making a major effort to up- grade its management and to operate more uni- formly and effiCiently by implementing improve- ments in job scheduling and staffing. Since the 

establishment of FOD, the system of deciding 

what work regional offices would do had been 

basically ad hoc. The operating divisions com- peting for regional staff independently programmed work into the different regional offices, 
and the regional offices independently accepted 

and scheduled such work. The regional man- agers used varied and diverse criteria in deciding 

what work should be done but basically. infor- mal commitments. personal relationships. and 

subjective judgment were the deciding factors. True. there were broad priority categories. but 

they left a lot of room for maneuver. Although 

various formal systems had been tried over the 

years. the reality of work scheduling remained 

essentially informal and unexplainable. More im- portantly. the regions lacked assurance that the 

work they chose to do was important from an 

Office-wide perspective. These problems had been recognized and 

addressed to a certain extent even before the 

advent of teams. A "tentative assignment list" 

of upcoming jobs was instituted. for example, and divisions had begun grouping jobs by priority. The team concept. however, reemphasized 

the need for a more structured. consistent approach to deciding what work should be done. The heavy focus on the team leader's respon - sibility for doing a job required a better knowl- edge of the job requirements to permit a good 

match with available staff. As part of its team 

implementation plan. FOD directed all regions 

to rank jobs for staffing by means of a "cascade" 

process. This involved applying a set of criteria 

to the jobs programmed for a given region in de- scending order until all available staff had been 

assigned. The criteria had been formulated to 

allow the regions to respond objectively. equi- tably. and uniformly to the divisions' requests for 

regional staff and at the same time to recognize 

the developmental and quality-of-Iife needs of 

each staff member. However. the regions did not 

apply the criteria conSistently: divisions continued to distribute work unevenly: and in general. 

a more comprehensive system was needed. 

An FOD study group developed an alternative 

system. known as the Job Scheduling and Staff- ing System (JSSS). which was approved for use 

throughout GAO in January 1979. Under JSSS. each headquarters division prepared monthly a 

list of jobs it was ready to start the succeeding 

month. This became known as the Firm Assign- ment List. or FAL. Because GAO's overall job 

priority system did not provide a fine enough 

breakdown for determining the order in which 

jobs should be staffed, JSSS added key ranking 

considerations-appropriateness of location. time 

criticality, and availability of appropriate staffto help the regions decide which jobs should be 

staffed. Once all assignments proposed on the 

combined FAL had been ranked. regional management assigned the staff it knew was becoming 

available. considering internal GAO projects to 

effect organizational improvements and addi- tional staffing needs for ongoing jobs. In deciding 

which staff to assign to the jobs, regional man- agement was to consider the capabilities of individuals: conflict-of-interest implications; 

professional and personal interests and needs; 

and such quality-of-Iife factors as travel. family 

situations. leave. and training. 20 

Notwithstanding intensive development ef- forts. JSSS proved not to be the right answer 

either. DUring the first 6 months of JSSS' Im- plementation, several problems were identified. On the scheduling end. the divisions were sched- uling jobs unevenly, resulting in over- and under-dema nds for regional staff at certain times of 

the year. Divisions were also programming work 

in excess of their budget allocations. The regional 

offices were frustrated because they could no 

longer work with their headquarters counterparts 

to develop jobs of mutual interest and then be 

assured the jobs would be scheduled for that 

region. On the staffing end, the criteria did not 

allow regional management to adequately meet 

the goal of satisfying the desires and career de- velopment needs of the staff. They also compli- cated the task of maintaining subject matter 

expertise. In November 1979, therefore, JSSS was revised to require that each division prepare a 

quarterly FAL listing jobs covering about 25 per- cent of its budget allocation. In addition. the cri- teria used by regional management to staff as- signments were changed to provide more flexibility 

in recognizing subject matter expertise, staff in- terest. and developmental needs. 21 

The need to develop and maintain subject 

matter expertise became an important issue as, under teams, the regions geared up to improve 

their input into the program planning process. 

This had been part of the January 1979 agreeDETROIT REGIONAL MANAGER AND ASSISTANT REGIONAL MANAGERS discuss upcoming staff 

assignments 

221 
ment between Keller. Pin. and McElyea. As the 

Comptroller General put it: 

I haue been of the uiew thaI the regional 

offices had a role 10 play which is ouer and 

aboue simply supplying. staff res~urces to 

carry out indiuidual audrts. -They re out In 

the field, they're out where the agencies 

are located'" oft "'. Each region is unique 

because of the problems that are found in 

that area. Each region has some Federal 

programs which are somewhat unique 

* * *. So I feh that the regions could play 

a more adiue role in deueloping our programming than they haue * • • 

Of course, individuals in the regional offices 

had been suggesting individual jobs since the 

heyday of the defense contract audits. Since the 

establishment of the program planning process. 

issue area managers and audit site heads had 

developed special relationships with particular 

regional offices that had been heavily involved 

in their work. Staff of these offices usually at- tended the issue area planning conferences and 

commented on the plans, Regional participation 

occurred relatively infrequently, however. As the 1970' s drew to a close, Staats called 

increasingly for more visible, more systematic 

regional input at the higher levels of program 

planning. But to be effective at these levels would 

require a strong commitment by the regions to 

developing and maintaining subject matter ex- pertise. It would also require that the divisions 

make specific commitments to fully aVall them- selves of this expertise and to program work to 

regions in line with these commitments. Regions 

would make such staff commitments only where 

heavy planning involvement made sense. be- cause of strategic location of Federal aCliVlnes. 

continuing workload in an issue area. or knowl- edge and/or interest of the staff. 

JSSS. however, posed problems for the en- visioned planning partnerships, Despite the re- visions that had been made to it. it still con' 

strained regional management's ability to use 

issue area continuity as a criterion in selecting 

jobs and assigning staff. A 1980 study chaired 

by the Office of Program Planning recom- mended that JSSS be redesigned to allow the 

divisions to annually set aside blocks of time for 

regional staff to work in deSignated issue areas. They would submit their plans to FOD. which 

would also gather information from the regions 

as to those issue areas where it made sense to 

them to establish staffing goals based on past 

experiences, demographics. and staff interests 

and expertise. FOD would then evaluate the in- formation it had received from the divisions and 

regions with a view to identifying conflicts and 

assuring consistency with FOD goals and Office- wide goals as expressed in issue area plans. It 

would then negotiate agreements with the divi222 

sions on annual issue area goals for each region, 

FOD would thus be playing the important role 

of bringing an organizational p erspective to bear 

on the individual and possibly parochial per- spectives of the divisions and regions. 22 

Unity Of Purpose In A More 

Progressive Framework 

In June 1979. in the midst of FOD's continuing struggle with organizational change. FranCIS 

X. Fee formerly regional manager in New York, 

succeeded Stewart McElyea as Director. His 

goals were similar to his predecessor's, but he 

had a more open. participative management 

style, He continued the trend toward instilling 

greater uniformity and consistency mto regIOnal 

operations. He encouraged regronal manage- ment to adopt a cooperative. enthusiastic atti- tude which could serve as an inspiration for the 

regional staff as well as for the rest of GAO, He 

wanted regional management to assun:e active 

roles in debating and developmg Office-Wide 

policies and procedures and then to willingly im- plement the final decisions and make them work. At his instigation. a committee of regional 

managers spent several months developing a for- mal statement of FOD goals and objectives to 

form the basis for FOD' s implementation of the 

Senior Executive Service (SES). The framework 

adopted. which conformed to SES functionaV 

managerial categories. prOvided for long-term 

FOD goals in supporting GAO objectives, short- term FOD objectives, and activities to be came,d 

out in each region in support of each of FOD s 

objectives. The SES categories which w~re iden- tified as "critical areas of performance for re- gional managers were "Technical Output" and "Personnel Management " The regional man- agers then entered into formal SES contracts 

with the FOD Director which were based on this 

framework but were tailored to the unique needs 

of the individual regions and the capabilities of 

the managers.2J 

Figure 14-5 

FOD Concept of Headquarters/ 

Field Relation.hip 
Among Fee's other important initiatives were 

managerial training and a program for career 

planning, counseling, and development. 

By the spring of 1980, the regions had been 

grappling with the same problems-teams, the 

roles of regional management and of the GS- 14's, JSSS, input to program planning. and oth- ers-for over 2 years. They felt that their voice 

was not being heard in headquarters and, fur- thenmore, that headquarters hadn't even both- ered, in some cases, to undergo the mandated 

organizational changes that FOD was finding so 

painful. The strain was exacerbating the "wei 

they" syndrome and dampening morale. The 

regional manasers fonmally expressed their con- cerns to the Comptroller General. He listened 

carefully and in April infonmed the Division Di- rectors' Group: 

I believe that serious consideration needs 

to be given to changing the way we are 

implementing the Project Team Approach 

and perhaps further clarification oj the role 

of the Regional Managers and Assistant 

[{egional Managers Jor the Juture.

24 

He asked the group to address these and re- lated issues and give him recommendations for 

action. After the deliberation process described 

in chapter 7, the Division Directors' Group rec- ommended that the role of FOD and the regional 

offices as it had evolved be legitimized by issuing 

a GAO order on their operations. The group felt 

that issuance of the order should be postponed, 

however, until all the other issues which affected 

that role had been fully resolved. In recom- mending that the team concept be abandoned 

as the way of doing most of GAO's work (but 

retained as a way of doing a portion of the work) 

and that each division develop its own operating 

plan, the Division Directors' Group opened the 

door for FOD to take a decisive hand in shaping 

its future role and responsibilities. They also of- fered specific recommendations to assure that 

regional offices became a more integral part of 

the program planning process. These incorpo- rated the proposal of the OPP study on JSSS 

for designating regional staff to be associated 

with specific issue areas," 

With some modifications, Staats endorsed 

these recommendations in a September 12, 1980, memorandum to all profeSSional staff. The 

memorandum also reemphasized regional man- agement's quality control responsibility and de- fined it to include assuring that appropriate su- pervision and effective perfonmance evaluation 

are provided to regional staff.2• 

In December 1980 FaD's operating plan was 

approved. It required that FOD: 

• Cooperate and communicate with the di- visions in developing a rartnership for ac- complishing the work 0 the Office. 

REGIONAL MANAGERS CONFERENCE in Chicago. Illinois. Oct. 13· 17. 1979 

223 
• Assure that work perfonned by regional 

stat! is of high technical quality and is pro- vided in a timely manner. • Decide the degree of regional technical direction and supervision for each job the 

regions are asked to perfonn. • Custom-design and staff each job so that 

only the stat! essential to the successful 

completion of the project will be involved 

in the planning. implementation. and com- munication phases of the review. 

• Execute a written understanding between 

regional and division management for each 

assignment identifying the job manage- ment responsibilities. 

• Evaluate stat! perfonnance and provide 

feedback to them. 

The plan also contained a provision for continuously evaluating the division's success in car- rying it out and in resolving GAO's operational 

problems. Overall. FOD's objective.was to progress to a point where as many of the regional 

staff as possible could carry out their assignments 

with as little supervision and review as possible. 

The Regional Offices: Past And 

Future 

From 1966 to 1981. the regional offices made 

many contributions to GAO and its work. They 

lived up to the Comptroller General's expecta- tion that they "had a role to play which is above 

simply supplyin~ stat! resources to carry out individual audits.' They influenced the operations 

of the Office significantly through their broadbased approach to its problems and the many 

improvement projects they initiated. Many GAOwide systems-the Assignment Management 

and Planning System. the Project Planning and 

Management Approach. JSSS. and issue area 

planning. for example-originated in the regions. In this respect. they were sometimes ahead of 

headquarters in implementing change. 

Regional Offices And Suboffices: Maximum Coverage At 

Minimum Cost 

GAO's work requires that its auditors be where the action is-that is. in close contact with 

Government programs and the officials responsible for them. The cost of having auditors from 

Washington regularly Crisscrossing the country to gather information would. of course. be 

prohibitive. As an alternative. GAO established its regional offices and suboffices to be its eyes 

and ears at the program operanng level. Like a group insurance policy. they provide maximum 

coverage at the minimum cost. 

The present regional structure of 15 offices seems to be working reasonably well. The 

Comptroller General has remarked that. while there is no ideal number of regional offices. 

the current number is adequate and probably should not be substannally increased. GAO's 

regional boundaries do not conform to those of the 10 standard Federal regions. and the 

question of realigning the regions to achieve such conformity is sometimes raised. Stoats neuer 

thought it was essential for GAO's configuration to match that of Federal agencies as long 

as GAO maintained. as it does. an office in each of the 10 Federal regions. Regional boundaries. although clearly delineated. are flexible . "Turf' disputes have apparently never been as prominem a feature of re~ional relationships as they have been for 

the divisions. Thus. the technique of . 'fly-throughs was allowed to flourish for a single region 

as a way to efficiently obtain broad geographic coverage in audit work. E3egun in the early 

1970's in Seattle. fly -throughs consist of quick visits to several locations by an audit team. This procedure enhances efficiency by eliminanng the communication. coordination. and 

learning problems inherent in a widely dispersed multi region audit team. The net effect is to 

maximize the expertise of the regional audit teams involved-expertise that would be difficult 

to impart to others-while minimizing both staff-day investments and calendar time. The regions have 22 suboffices (or sublocations) which vary in size and workload mix. St. 

Louis. a suboffice in the Kansas City region. boasts 36 auditors and is thus the largest in size. Ogden and Lowry Air Force Base. both in the Denver region, have the distinction of being 

the smallest suboffices. with two auditors each. 

Suboffices are established more or less ad hoc in response to a demonstrated need to do 

work in a particular area. There are as many reasons for their existence as there are suboffices. Two recent creanons. Houston and Albany. illustrate this point. The Houston sUboffice was 

established in 1976 to carry out new responsibilities given to GAO under the Energy PoliCy 

and Conseruanon Act of 1975. The Albany subaffice was opened in 1977 to enhance audit 

capability in the State and local government area. Upstate New York contains about 8 million 

residents and receives massive amounts of Federal assistance. 

(Continued Next Page) 

224 
FOD improved communications between regions in the later years. and a closer relationship 

with headquarters was made more likely. The 

FOD operating plan, job scheduling and staffing, 

and regional participation introgram planning 

required that the regions an headquarters effectively interact as a unit and communicate with 

each other more than in the past. 

1 Harve)/ C. Monslleld. The Comp/rolle, General A Swdy In lhe tow and Practice of Fioondlll Adm/nWI'IlIIOl'1 [New Hllven. Conn. Yale University PrC!5. 

1939), pp. 159. 164 

2. C E. MI.'fl'I1I. "!-I!!IoN of the Field Openl!ions Olwlon." The GAO Re· u/ew. (Summer 19711. pj) 128135 

3 US Genmll Act'oundog OffIce, FW!ld ()pemtlons Division. "Respens! blillies and Outla 01 RvgionaJ Manager. Audit MaMgef. Sile Su~'lri5()f . lind 51411 AssIJUlnt:' Intemal pilpql. JIm 1964 

4 David Sorando, "The SlgnlflcanCl' of thl! Holifield Hearings 101 GAO.-' The WRO Ledger. Dec 1979--.1an 1980. pp. 2·3 

5, U.s. Generlll AccounUng Dllke. Community lind Economic Developmem DlvI~ on T iISk Force on WlIshingtonlFleld Reladons. "Thl! Tellm Leader Concept: A Proposal lor Doing II BenerJob Faller" (CEO 78.,301, Fl.'b 21 , 1978). report 

10 Iile Director. CED. pp II 12. 

6 Somndo. p 5 

7 Jowph Pols, Watchdog 011 the Poromoe- A &l>dV of the Comptl'Oller 

General of the Unll~ Stflle5. Jan 1971 drll/t. pp 680-.81 

8 Comptroller Gen&m'll SIMIS, Memonmdum 10 !ll;coumlng lind auditing 

sUllt. 8 Nov 1967 

9 US General A«:ountlng Office . Commlttal! lor Improwmen! of Report Pf'O(:esstng Ilnd Review Procedures. "Actions N\.'eded To E)(~ll e Issu!lnc:e of Reports." JlIn 28. 1 t)71. p 23 

~O I~O;pfr ller General', memomndum 10 IKcounllng Ilnd aud!nng staff. 8 

J 1 Comptrollm Cenerlll SIMIS. Memonmdum 10 hf!lId~ 01 dM5iom o.l"Id 01 Ilees. 16 Mar 1972 

12 As&IsUInI Com:r:toUvr Gi£rwrlll E11w.'QI1h H ,'0401"5('. MI!mOr3ndum 10 hellc\s of divisions (In ffl c~. 29 5<lp1 1972 

13 U.S Gencr;:Il Accounting OfUc", Task Force on Project Management. "Ropen 10 the Comptroller Gliner;o,l of the United StOll!'.!" (Dec. 1975), p 30. 

14 CEO Tilsk Fon:e, CED·78·34, F ... b. 21. 1978 

15 U.s Generlll Accounling Office. Field Opemttons Oiv!sIon. "FOCUS 7& ~~;~FOD rW"<i!rence docurm.'flt p~red lor reglor141 rnanllgef1' meeting. BasIon, 

16 US Geneml Accounlill!! Office. Task Fon;e on Improvlng GAO Effae· liwnes:s. "Report 01 Flndin!J5. Conclusions. and Rl1Commendanons" (Nov, 9. 11)77). p. II 

17 U S, Generlll Accoundng Office, Field ~mlli ns DivisIon. "Imp/emen· tlltton Plan," 8 Feb. 1978 

18 U.S GenerllJ AI:(ounllng OfIke. Field ()pemtlanl DivisIon. "Opemtlng 

Under Teams," FOD reference poper. 5epf 1919,!'P, 508 

19 Deputy C~ G41rwnII Roben F Ke[ku, AsIS!lInf to the ComDflOlier General Clerio Pin. Reid ()pmtlons DIvision DlUlctot S, D Mc:EJyeli. Memo· tandum 01 Agn!en'lllnL 16 Jan. 1979 

Regional Offices And Suboffices: Maximum Coverage At 

Minimum Cost-Continued 

While some suboffices, like San Antonio and Dayton. have grown considerably in recent 

years, others have not. Sometimes the availability of suboffice staff does not match well the 

location of available work. necessitating extensive travel -by the staff to other parts oj the 

region. Sometimes, basic workload patterns change. New Orleans, originally established as 

a regional office in 1951, is a case in point. When the 10 Federal regions were established 

in the late 1960's. much of the workload moved from New Orleans to Dallas and Atlanta. In 

1970 it became a suboffice in the Dallas region. As of this writing New Orleans has 25 auditors, many of whom must travel elsewhere. particularly to westem Texas. for their work. Despite diminishing workloads and other changing circumstances, most suboffices keep 

going once they have been established. Some have closed down. as the Syracuse, New York, suboffice did in 1972. Others, like the Cocoa Beach suboffice, have been substantially reduced 

in size in recent years. Once staff permanently locate in a given city, it is costly and inconvenient 

to move them to another location. 

The relationship between rel/ional office and sUboffice varies, depending on the type oj 

work and the regional manager s style and philosophy. The Cleveland suboffice junctions as 

an integral part of the regional office. its independent status having been eliminated and its 

size reduced. The Detroit regional manager believes that mixing staff and assigning people 

where they are needed produces a useful cross-fertilization of ideas and has strengthened the 

region overall. In contrast, the St. Louis suboffice has a large defense-oriented workload. 

which keeps its auditors busy at that location. It. therefore. functions semiautonomously and 

mixes little with the staff of Kansas City. Morale can be a problem in suboffices. The most frequently cited concerns are extensive 

travel, work which lacks diversity, ana isolation. In addition, suboffice staff sometimes feel like 

second class citizens left out of the regional decision making process because of their location 

away from the main office. Regional management acknowledges these concerns and has tried, although not always with success. to make suboffice staff feel a part of the regional units. 

At this time there is no overall evaluation process for the suboffices. Frank Fee, Director 

of FOD. has indicated the need to study such topics as suboffice effectiveness, resource 

allocation, and management. 

Regional offices and suboffices serve a necessary and practical function. They allow audit 

coverage to be extended and GAO staff to be placed closer to home with less travel. Certain 

managerial and communications problems are direct byproducts of these organizational structures. But the question is, "what would GAO do without them?" 

225 
20. U.s CicnmII Accounting Ofb. FWd ~ OM.Ion, "Job Rlnklng .nd SUllfftng Subsystem." FOO ~ peper, Jon 1979 

21 Janws 0 MartIn. Oi~or. 0Hk. of Program Planning. M.tnOI'andl,lm 10 

~r Genm.I. 13 Nov 1979 

22 Gngcory J AhlIn. ChoIrman, 0tr.tt0B Group, ~ 10 Compo IfOIIa Gmiral 9 5.pt 1980. Atachnwnt /I "Pllp!!'I' o-dop.d: by Task Group on FfVI'Il·End Goo! Sctr!ng and RwIIioN 10 the Job Sclwdulhg and Staffing ~crn:' 

ZJ U.S Gmer.I Aa::ounl1l'lg OHk., FMIId Opn.uor. . "FQD Goals .nd~: A Framework lOr S.m!ng DMsion and RegIonal Goals .nd (lb. ~·Mat 1980 

226 

24 ~ ~ Staat., M.morandum 10 dMIIon ~ 10 Apr 

1980 

2:5 GmIofv J Ahart. ChllirmlM'l. DlNdorI Group, Memorandum 10 Compo IroIkrr GeMrIlf SIlIats. 9 ~ 1':180 

26. U.S General Accounllng 0ffIc.. F\ed Op.ntioN DIviMon, " F(X) Op 

eating Pian," Dec 1, 1980 

CC[}ucn[p)l1®IT ll!5) 

Legal Decisions And Services 

The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) is 

responsible for the legal and legislative work of 

GAO. OGC generally renders legal decisions and 

advice, through the ComptroUer General where 

appropriate. to 

• Congressional committees, members of 

Congress, and the Office of Management 

and Budget. 

• Federal agency heads and disburSing and 

certifying officers on the legality or propri- ety or proposed expenditures of public 

funds. • Officers or employees authorized to request 

relief on behalf of accountable and certilving officers. • Contracting and procurement officers and 

bidders. in connection with Government 

contracts. • Debtors and creditors of the Government 

who are dissatisfied with the handling of 

their affairs by other agencies. 

• GAO auditors in their review of agency 

programs and activities. 1 

GAO's authOrity to render decisions and 

opinions on the legality and propriety of Gov- ernment agencies' expenditures of appropriated 

funds is based on its statutory authority to settle 

accountable officers' accounts.' Agency heads 

of departments and accountable officers are also 

authorized by statute to apply to the Comptroller 

General for advance decisions on any legal questions involved in a proposed expenditure of ap- propriated funds.

3 

The importance of the law to GAO is under- scored by the fact that. until 1955. nearly all 

Comptrollers General and their predecessor 

ComptroUers of the Treasury were lawyers. The 

founders of the Republic in 1789 and of GAO 

Figare 15-1 

in 1921 considered it a judicial office, hence the 

long term and irremovability of the Comptroller 

General. The Campbell nomination ran into 

trouble because he was not a lawyer. although 

the same question was not raised about Staats. Mosher characterized the significance of 

Comptroller General rulings this way: 

Over the yea~, the decisions of the 

Comptroller General (and his predecessor. 

the comptroller of the treasury) have cumulated to enormous numbe~. They are 

very nearly the bible. ve~e, and multiple 

footnotes on law in the national govern- ment. a basic reference guide for officials 

of Federal agencies. They are available to 

Congress. the courts. and the public. The 

more important ones are brought together 

annually and published as Decisions of the 

Comptroller General • • '. A substantial 

proportion of these concern rather small. 

one-time questions, and some are very 

technical. On the other hand, the Comptroller General produces a number oj inter- pretations every year with broad and en· 

during implications on public policy. 4 

Since most of OGC's workload is generated 

from outside sources. it constantly makes ad- justments to ensure effective service for its "clien- tele." Organizational changes within GAO over 

the past 15 years also have required many 

changes in OGc. Its total staff now numbers 

about 125. all of whom are located in the head- quarters building. 

Nature And Operation Of OGe 

In 1966 

In 1966, OGC consisted of three main deci- sionwriting groups. as shown in the chart below. 

Offlc .. of th .. G ... er • • General Counsel I Coaa .... la 1966 

I 

II Legal 

I Deputy I 

Ref Sectionl General Counsel 

I 

Assoaale I 

General Counsel 

Associate I I 

General Counsel 

i i I 

I I I I I I I ~ 

Trllnsp Transp Mililllry Mililliry Mise Civillan Procurement Procurement Procurement 

I II I II Matters Pay I II III 

228 
The first group, the procurement group, was 

headed by the Deputy General Counsel and sub- divided into three sections. The second group, headed by an Associate General Counsel, was 

composed of two transportation sections and two 

military pay sections. The third group, also 

headed by an Associate General Counsel. con- sisted of a civilian pay section and a so-called 

miscellaneous matters section. 

The General Counsel played a dominant role 

in the day-to-day operation of OGC, making 

virtually all personnel and administrative deci- sions alone. The Deputy General Counsel functioned essentially in the procurement area as the "final reviewer' of bid protest decisions. The 

Associate and Assistant General Counsels played 

a relatively minor role in OGC's overall man- agement. being responsible for drafting and final- izing decisions in their respective areas. In line 

with this traditional management approach. there 

were no periodic staff meetings and only limited 

intraoffice communication. OGC viewed its mission as issuing decisions 

or opinions on the legality of proposed expend- itures of public funds, the great majority of which 

were rendered to organizations and individuals 

outside GAO. OGC also issued opinions in re- sponse to audit division requests, but this func- tion was looked upon as secondary and inciden- tal in nature. The audit staff requested a legal 

opinion by submitting a formal written request 

from the division director to the General Counsel. While this procedure was compatible with 

issuing legal decisions, it complicated rather than 

complemented GAO's audit process. On the whole OGC's decisions tended toward 

the disapproval of an agency's use of appropri- ated funds unless statutory sanction for such use 

could be explicitly identified. 

Figore 15-2 

Office of the GeDeral CouDsel 

Staats and the General Counsel appointed in 

1969, Paul Dembling. modified this organization 

and approach. First the organizational structure 

was consolidated. Second, the General Counsel 

began to playa more active role in the overall 

operation of GAO, with the Deputy, ASSOCiate, 

and Assistant General Counsels becoming more 

involved in managing OGC itself. Finally. OGC 

began to place far more emphasis on providing 

legal assistance to the audit divisions. These developments are addressed in the sections that 

fpllow. 

Changes In The Organizational 

Structure 

Over the past 15 years, OGC's organizational 

structure has undergone several changes and 

each was designed to either increase OGC's op- erational efficiency or adapt to a changing ex- ternal environment. 

In 1972 OGC realined its structure. It con- solidated the personnel groups under one As- sociate General Counsel. It also placed the pro- curement groups under an Associate and thereby 

freed the Deputy General Counsel to pay more 

attention to carrying out OGC-wide duties and 

work directly with the General Counsel. 5 Under 

this reallnement four Associate General Counsels 

were made responsible for assignments con- cerning (1) P2rsonnel law, subdivided into civil 

and military groups, (2) general government 

matters. (3) transportation law, subdivided into 

two groups. and (4) procurement law, subdi- vided into three groups. Each group was headed 

by an Assistant General Counsel. The chart be- low depicts this structure. To improve the legal assistance to audit diviSions, OGC established the Special Studies and 

Analysis Section (SSA) in 1973. Headed by an 

(Revised Organizlltion In 1972) I General Counsel I 

I Dep uty I 

General counsel 

I 

Associate tsSOCja e l Associate J Associate 

Genera l Counsel en. Counsel General Counsel General Counsel 

I I I I 

I I I L I I I 

Transp Transp General Civ111an M ililary Procurement Procurement Procurement 

1 II Government Personnel Pe'fS. 1 II 111 Maners 

229 
Associate General Counsel. SSA performs two 

general functions: it conducts detailed studies 

and analyses of broad-based policy questions of 

a legal nature and it provides more effective legal 

assistance to operating divisions by furnishing a 

more flexible and ready means to address and 

resolve any legal questions that might arise dur- ing audits. Audit divisions are assigned to SSA 

senior attorneys who in tum are supported by 

experienced staff that provide day-to-day assist- ance, often informally. Although SSA serves as 

a focal point for audit division legal inquiries, 

other OGC groups are encouraged to Frovide 

as much legal assistance in their areas 0 expertise as their primary responsibilities permit ' 

SSA also performs general adviSOry functions. 

Two key examples are its substantial involve- ment in (1) the enactment of the General Accounting Office Acts of 1974 and 1980 and (2) 

the evaluation of whether the Chrysler Corporation had met the statutory requirements to become eligible for financial assistance from the 

Government. This latter work was necessary because the Comptroller General. as one of the 

voting members of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee 

Board, was responsible for voting his approval 

or disapproval of matters under consideration by 

the Board.' 

OGC is also phasing out the transportation 

law groups, stemming from the enactment of the 

General Accounting Office Act of 1974. This act 

transferred to the General Services Administra- tion GAO's previous functions of auditing and 

adjusting payments to carriers and forwarders 

furnishing transportation to the Government.' 

(See ch. 8.) With the dissolution of the T rans- portation Division. which generated most of the 

OGC transportation law groups' workload, there 

was a steady decline in workload. GAO is not out of the picture altogether. however. The 1974 act gave the Comptroller Gen- eral the right to review the performance of GSA's 

new statutory responsibilities. Additionally, OGC 

continues to receive claims by carriers and forwarders for loss of or damage to property and 

oversees the use of travel agencies in procuring 

official travel services. These functions will most 

likely be carried out in one of the procurement 

groups. 

Others Participate In Managing 

OGC 

The overall management of OGC in terms of 

its operations and personnel became more par- ticipatory. with the Deputy, Associate. and Assistant General Counsels playing active roles. 

There was greater communication in setting internal policies and procedures, and more frequent staff meetings to discuss these matters. 

The Deputy General Counsel now plays a par- ticularly important role in managing OGC. almost achieving the status of a full partner with 

the General Counsel. 

230 

This more participatory approach brought 

forth more uniform policies and procedures for 

hiring, evaluating, and promoting attorneys. 

OGC-Iike other Federal legal office5-<)perates 

its own personnel system. In 1973 OGC established a Summer Legal Intern Program. which 

has been the primary source of its hires in recent 

years. This program was designed primarily to 

give OGC an opportunity to evaluate, in advance 

of permanent employment, the personal attributes and professional qualifications of potential 

professional staff members and to allow them an 

opportunity to learn about GAO. OGC employs 

about 16 summer interns who are assigned. for 

approximately equal periods during their stays, 

to two of the five functional sections. In each, the law students are exposed to a representatio~al cross-section of the legal questions they 

would be given as newly hired attorneys. The 

work products of each intern are critiqued indio 

vidually, and the intern's overall performance is 

evaluated in detail to decide which interns are 

to be offered jobs. 

In 1975 OGC set up a "rotating trainee at· 

torneys" group in which most newly hired attorneys are placed for the first 9 months of their 

employment These attorneys are assigned di· 

rectly to each section at stated intervals so as to 

expose them. early in their careers, to the full 

spectrum of OGC s legal functions. At the end 

of the rotating period. the attorneys are per· manently assigned to sections, taking into ac· 

count their desires and OGC's needs. 

In 1974 OGC established a more formal and 

definitive promotion policy for its decisionwriting 

attorneys (up to and including GS-15's). This 

policy. as revised in 1979. set forth criteria as to 

what attorneys are expected to do at each grade 

level. 9 It also established generally applied min· 

imum waiting periods for promotion to the next 

grade level. 

In the mid· 1970's. OGC also established a 

more formal and uniform procedure for consid- ering attorney promotions. Assistant General 

Counsels are responsible for evaluating whether 

attorneys meet the qualification and minimum 

waiting period criteria. Assuming an evaluation 

is favorable. the Assistant General Counsel forwards a recommendation for promotion to the 

OGC Promotion Review Board. which is chaired 

by the Deputy General Counsel and is composed 

of the four Associate General Counsels. The 

board reviews the recommendation and for· 

wards the file to the General Counsel with a 

recommendation for a final decision. 

OGC Participation In 

Formulating Office-wide Policy 

Reflective of OGC's more pronounced role 

as a general advisor to GAO as a whole and 

incident to its becoming more involved with the 

performance of audit work. OGC has become 
increasinqJy involved in formulating internal and 

external Office policies. In carrying out this func - tion, OGe's advice and counsel extends beyond 

simply commenting on legal matters. The General Counsel serves on several com- mittees: the Program Planning Committee. the 

Executive Resources Board, the Information Pol- ley Committee, and the Ethics Committee. He 

helps formulate recommendations and reach 

decisions having a broad impact on GAO's in- ternal operations. OGC played a major role in reviSing GAO's 

procedures for handling apparent climinal law 

violations and other cases of fraud or abuse 

found during audits. (See ch. 5.) On the basis 

of extensive discussions with the GAO divisions 

and offices concerned, as well as Department of 

Justice officials, OGC revised the Office proce- dures to provide for a more centralized referral 

system for climinal law violations. The proce- dures also provide for GAO coordination with 

agency Inspector General offices and similar in- vestigatory offices concerning specific instances 

of fraud or abuse within agency programs and 

activities. 10 

OGC also was instrumental in formulating 

GAO's poliey with respect to the Privacy Act of 

1974. The purpose of the act is to provide safe- guards for individuals against invasions of per- sonal privacy by imposing requirements for the 

collection. maintenance. use, and dissemination 

of personal information by Federal agencies. In 

response to a number of inquiries from GAO 

auditors about the effect of that act on GAO audit 

work. in 1976 OGC issued a legal opinion to all 

GAO divisions and offices. 11 It said that. gener- ally. the act did not affect GAO's access to records and provided guidance on how to avoid 

delays in acquiring access to agency records. 

Decisionwridng 

OGe's principal responsibility has continued 

to be writing decisions on the legality and propriety of Government agencies' receipt and ex- penditure of appropriated funds. These decisions 

on the legality of expenditures are considered 

binding on the executive branch and on GAO, 

but they are not binding on the Congress or the 

courts. Over the years, the Attorney General has 

also ruled on many aspects of government fi- nances but no way has been found to formally 

resolve disputes between him and the Comp- troller General. 

Some general changes in GAO decisionwriting are notable. First. there appears to be more 

of a tendency today when deciding cases to reas- sess rationales stated in previous Comptroller 

General decisions and other rulings. For exam- ple, in 1974 the traditional position regarding so- called employee make-whole remedies was 

reexamined.' 2 These remedies are designed to 

·'make whole'· an employee who has been deTH£ THREE GENERAL COUNSELS who served during the period were (1 to r ) Milton Socolar. Robert Keller. and 

Paul Dembllng Ifar right) 

231 
prived of compensation or benefits as a result of 

improper action by an agency official. The most 

comprehensive make-whole remedy is the Back 

Pay Act, which entitles an employee to retro- active pay during the period of an unjustified or 

unwarranted personnel action by the agency 

concerned. In construing this act more liberally 

than in the past, GAO expanded the number of 

situations under which an employee could be 

entitled to relief. Since 1974 GAO has rendered 

a series of decisions allowing back pay for vio- lations of various collective-bargaining agree- ments requiring the granting of promotions. overtime. environmental differentials. and park- ing facilities. 

A second distinct change is the tendency to 

interpret agency appropriations acts and au- thorizing statutes in a somewhat broader. more 

realistic way. This approach reflects greater ap- preciation of the fact that the Congress does not 

always specify in great detail in statutes the man- ner and purposes for which funds may be ex- pended in order to properly carry out the un- derlying program. An example of this approach is the gradual 

but complete change in GAO's policy about pro- viding funding for interveners in licensing or adjudicatory hearings by independent regulatory 

agencies. The issue was whether. without special 

statutory authority. a regulatory agency could 

pay persons representing groups that were not 

formal parties to the administrative hearing to 

present their points of view to the agency. in 

instances when financial help would be neces- sary to cover the costs of participation. GAO 

entered the controversy cautiously in 1972. with 

a well-hedged "yes" answer and grew bolder 

with each deCision in successive years. GAO's 

support for agency intervener programs was a 

factor in providing consumer and public input 

into a great number of controversial agency proceedings formerly dominated by industry 

spokesmen. 

Procurement Bid Protest 

Procedures 

During the past 15 years, all phases of GAO's 

legal role as an adjudicator of bid protests and 

reviewer of contractual disputes between Government procurement agencies and the bUSiness 

community have been marked by Significant de- velopments. GAO receives the protest of an in- terested party to the award of a contract for procurement or sale by a Federal agency whose 

accounts are subject to settlement by the Office. From a historical and practical perspective. GAO 

has become the highest level of appeal within 

the Government to resolve bid protests. In rec- ognition of GAO's expertise in this area. in recent 

years courts have often relied upon GAO deci- sions and advice in disposing of the bid protest 

cases brought before them. 

232 

During this period, GAO's legal role in Federal 

procurement has responded to external and in- ternal developments that resulted in changes of 

approach designed to improve the resolution of 

protests and achieve more effectiveness and fair- ness. These cha"ges reflected GAO's goal to 

maintain the delicate balance between a dissat- isfied competitor's right to a full and fair hearing 

and the Government's necessity for the timely 

acquisition of supplies and services to satisfy 

minimum needs at the lowest cost. Some changes 

were made in response to recommendations of 

the Commission on Government Procurement 

issued in December 1972. which were designed 

to formalize and expedite the resolution of bid 

protests. The major changes basically concerned 

(1) formalizing of bid protest procedures. (2) de- veloping administrative remedies. and (3) ex- panding of jurisdiction in the Federal grant area. 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 

From 1921 to 1967. protests were handled 

without publicly announced procedures. Re- sponding to increased congressional interest in 

this protest work and valid criticisms voiced at 

industry-Government symposiums on Govern- ment contracts. the first GAO bid protest procedures were issued in 1967 and 1968. 14 These 

procedures permitted the contractors involved, 

either the protesters or the awardees. to request 

conferences with the OGC attorneys handling 

the cases. They also reserved GAO's right to 

disclose the protests publicly and prOvided for 

notice to the successful bidders if GAO sustains 

the protests. In 1971 GAO announced extensive interim 

protest-handling gUidelines that (1) prOvided for 

speedier disposition of protests by establishing 

specific time limits on all parties involved. including GAO, (2) preSCribed strict timeframes 

within which protests were to be filed. (3) pro- vided for inviting all interested parties to protest 

conferences, (4) assured automatic partiCipation 

by all interested parties by prompt protest notifications and forwarding of relevant documents, 

and (5) reduced the number of cases of awards 

made before decision. 15 After 3 years' experience under those procedures. detailed permanent procedures which generally tracked the in- terim procedures were issued in 1975. They 

continue in effect today. 

Complementary measures and policies have 

been devised to resolve protests as fast as possible. These include summary denials where protests on their face have no merit and summary 

dismissals of matters which GAO does not have 

to decide. 

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 

One problem with bid protests has been find- ing a means to provide an effective remedy in 

the relatively small number of cases where GAO 
has decided that protesters were wrongfully de- nied contract awards. This is particularly difficult 

when the procuring agencies have already 

awarded the contracts and the contractors have 

commenced performance. Rather than require 

that the contracts be terminated. GAO for many 

years merely recommended that the agencies in 

the future not commit the improper practices 

disclosed by the protests. In recent years, GAO began recommending 

termination of the improperly awarded contracts 

and award to the protesters in appropriate 

cases. '· The recommendations. with which agen - cies have complied in the vast majority of cases. 

take into account factors such as urgency of the 

need, extent of performance. and prejudice to 

the protesters. Terminated contracts are made 

whole by being reimbursed for costs for perform- ance, and the wronged protesters either obtain 

contracts or other opportunities to compete. In 

other cases. GAO recommends other remedies. such as nonexercise of contract options. resoli- citation with a view toward termination if ben- eficial to the Govemment. and corrective action 

conti'ngent on further agency analysis. Since 

1970. these recommendations have been re- ported to specified congressional committees 

under procedures in the Legislative Reorgani- zation Act of 1970 requiring that the agencies 

report to the Congress on the actions taken on 

GAO recommendations. Corrective action has 

generally followed GAO's report. 

In addition. GAO began in 1975 to grant bid 

or proposal preparation cost£-the protester's 

costs of competing for the contract-where re- medial action is impractical but otherwise would 

have been warranted. 17 Previously GAO had 

decided that these claims would not be settled 

until appropriate criteria and standards for re- covery had been judicially established. The 

Court of Claims, in a decision announced in 

1956 and subsequently refined by decisions 

through 1974. determined that recovery is per- mitted only if a bidder or proposer would have 

received an award but for arbitrary or capricious 

Government action. " FollOwing the court's lead. 

GAO has granted recovery in several cases in 

the last few years. 

EXTENDING THE BID PROTEST PROCESS TO 

FEDERAL GRANTS 

While GAO's traditional bid protest role re- lated to the procurements of Federal agencies. 

GAO for many years had received complaints 

regarding procurements by Federal grantees. These complaints increased as the number and 

size of Federal grant programs expanded in the 

1960' s. In fiscal year 1976, Federal grant activity 

apprOximated $60 billion: $8 billion in construc- tion contracts were awarded under Federal 

grants in fiscal year 1974. Recognizing this and 

GAO's statutory obligation to investigate the re- ceipt. disbursement. and application of public 

funds, GAO announced in September 1975 that 

upon request of prospective contractors. the pro- priety of contract awards by grantees in further- ance of grant purposes would be reviewed. " The 

stated purpose was to foster compliance with 

statutory, regulatory. and grant reqUirements, 

with particular emphasis on compliance with 

competitive bidding requirements. 

GAO has received and decided a steady flow 

of complaints against the procurement practices 

of Federal grantees. An evolving and consistent 

body of law is developing from decisions on 

these matters. GAO has developed law on such 

key issues as (1) whether local procurement law 

or basic principles of Federal procurement law 

(the so-called Federal norm) apply, (2) the de- gree of discretion afforded grantees in contract- ing, and (3) the responsibilities of grantor agen- cies in enforcing and implementing applicable 

grant requirements. 

Providing Legal Assistance To 

The Audit Staffs 

Over the years OGC has continually provided 

legal assistance to the operating audit divisions, 

but during Staats' tenure both the nature and 

extent of legal assistance have significantly ex- panded. These changes resulted directly from 

both the Comptroller General's and the General 

Counsel's views that the operating divisions and 

OGC should work together as a team so that 

GAO could be more responSive to the needs of 

the Congress through preparation and issuance 

of more substantive. better documented reports. OGC's approach was made more flexible to 

provide more effective legal assistance. The na- ture of OGC assistance. provided mostly by SSA, is quite broad. It may include 

• providing formal or informal advice on spe- cific legal questions, 

• drafting "legally intensive" portions of au- dit reports 

• drafting proposed legislation. and 

• participating in meetings or congressional 

hearings where legal questions may arise'o 

Close working relationships have developed 

between OGC and the operating audit divisions 

in recent years, with attorneys effectively becom- ing members of individual audit groups and 

teams. The Director of the Accounting and Fi- nancial Management Division has observed: 

In recent years. we have been using the 

Office of General Counsel (OGC) more 

frequently to help us integrate any legal 

matters we now come across during our 

audit and review work. As a result. I believe 

that our audits and reports have been 

brooder in perspective. better docu - mented. more convincing. and more re ~ 

233 
sponsive to the needs of the Congress. I 

see this trend continuing because we are 

approaching our work differently today 

than we did a few years ago. Today the 

skills of many people including lawyers are 

needed to properly assess the results of the 

work in the many areas assigned to the 

Financial and General Management Studies Division.2! 

Because an attomey's overall perspective of 

the audit project at the outset can be quite ben- eficial. OGC has encouraged the audit divisions 

to involve attorneys at the early stages of a review. For example. an attorney may be able to 

identify legal issues that are not readily apparent 

to the audit staff. OGC has also emphasized auditors and attorneys working together during the 

review. In this way legal assistance can frequently 

be tailored to the auditors' needs. 

Illustrative of the types of legal assistance 

OGC provides to the audit divisions during reviews was a report to the Congress about crime 

on Federal land used for recreation. 22 Because 

a number of Federal agencies administer these 

recreation areas under different statutory authorities. OGC had to decide whether law enforcement on these lands was totally a Federal 

responsibility, totally a local government responsibility, or both a Federal and a local responsi- bility. OGC issued several opinions and helped 

draft the report. The report contained draft leg- islation providing enforcement authority for the 

agencies administering national recreational areas. 

After the report was issued. OGC prepared most 

of the testimony given before a congressional 

committee. 

Another means by which OGC provides ongoing assistance to audit divisions is the publi- cation of the "OGC Advisor." This publication, 

first issued in 1976, contains articles on legal is· 

sues which are considered of importance and 

interest to GAO. The articles are addressed to 

GAO's profeSSional staff and are written in a 

nontechnical and readable format. The "OGC 

Adviser" has addressed such common problems 

as access to records. conflicts of interest, the 

Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, and 

handling of issues in litigation. 

Executive Branch 

Impoundments 

In 1976 OGC assumed the responsibility for 

administering the Comptroller General's duties 

under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Before 1974 the practice of "impounding" 

appropriated funds was used by the executive 

branch as a means of containing Federal spend· 

ing as well as a way of deciding the relative merits 

and effectiveness of competing Federal programs. The Congress reacted to executive impoundment actions in a mixed fashion. and the 

234 

Comptroller General played a relatively minor 

role in connection with such actions. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was 

enacted to give the Congress greater control over 

executive impoundment actions.23 The act requires that all reductions of budgetary outlays 

below levels set by the Congress be reported to 

the Congress and provides ways for the Congress to express its approval or disapproval. Impoundments not approved by the Congress must 

be discontinued. Under the act proposed rescission$-permanent withdrawals of budget authority-require 

affirmative congreSSional action within 45 days 

of continuous congressional session to become 

effective. lal:king affirmative action by the Coogress, the impounded funds involved must be 

made available for obligation. Deferral$-tem- porary impoundment$-stand unless either 

House. by simple resolution. rejects a proposed 

withholding. Proposed rescissions have been rejected by the Congress more often than proposed deferrals. 

The Comptroller General assumed an important responsibility under this legislation in that 

he is required to review each Presidential impoundment message and submit a report to the 

Congress. This report sets forth the facts sur- rounding each proposed impoundment and its 

probable effects and, in the case of a proposed 

deferral. determines whether the proposal is au- thorized by law. The Comptroller General is also 

authorized to submit a report on any withheld 

budget authority without the required special 

message being sent to the Congress. Under certain Circumstances, he can bring a civil action in 

court to compel an agency to release funds which 

he believes to be improperly impounded. The Office of Program Analysis (now the Pro- gram Analysis Division) was initially responsible 

for administering the Comptroller General's duties under the act This responsibility was trans- ferred to OGC in June 1976 because of the legal 

intensiveness of the area. 

The Comptroller General filed a lawsuit against 

the executive branch in 1975 involving an improper impoundment 24 This lawsuit, which represented the first time the Comptroller General 

had initiated litigation in his own right was filed 

against the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development and the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget to release impounded 

funds for the homeownership assistance program under section 235 of the National Housing 

Act A judicial decision on the merits was never 

rendered because during the briefing stages the 

Department released the Impounded funds, thus 

causing the action to be dismissed. 

DUring the past 4 years, OGC has processed 

a number of reports responding to special messages transmitted by the President to the Congress. This function is carried out by SSA with 

assistance from the audit divisions. 
Conflict between the Congress and the Pres- ident over impoundment fell off sharply after the 

1974 law went into effect Aside from the one 

lawsuit, there have been few instances in which 

GAO has raised legal issues with executive 

branch actions. In 1977 GAO issued a lengthy 

report on the operation of the act during its first 

2 years, which said: 

On balance. GAO feels that the President has done a good job of implementing 

the Impoundment Control Act; GAO has 

had to report comparotiuely few unre- ported impoundments. and the ouerall 

quality of impoundment reports has im- proved since the first "special message" 

was sen! to the Congress. Nevertheless. 

further improvements can be made in the 

quality of impoundment reports. 2> 

GAO believes that certain provisions of the 

act should be amended in order to define key 

terms. give the Congress more flexibility with 

respect to disapproving proposed deferrals of 

budget authority. and clarify certain aspects of 

its operation. The Congress. however. has not 

yet acted on these proposals. 

Legal Information And 

Reference Service 

OGC's Legal Information and Reference Ser- vice (LlRS) provides ongoing legal support ser- vices to the General Counsel. the Comptroller 

General. the audit divisions. and the public. Many of the procedures employed in gathering 

and maintaining legal information have been 

streamlined or modernized during the 1966-81 

period. but there have been few changes in func- tional responsibility areas. LlRS is comprised of 

three subordinate sections. the Index and Files 

Section. the Index-Digest Section. and the Leg- islative Digest Section, but plans are being de- veloped to merge the functions of the last of 

these three with the Law Library. Together they 

provide little known but necessary support for 

GAO's legal. audit. and evaluation activities. 

IND EX AND FILES 

The Index and Files Section is the corre- spondence control center for all incoming and 

outgoing correspondence. reports. decisions. 

and other documents addressed to or signed by 

officials in the Office of the Comptroller General 

and the Office of the General Counsel. 

One major development here was implementation in 1978 of a computerized information 

system used in support of centralized corre- spondence control. This on-line system is used 

to store information extracted from incoming and 

outgoing materials. It provides immediate access 

to all case-related information processed since 

September 1978. Additionally. Index and Files 

retains manual card files going back to 1921. 

Thus. a researcher can obtain information. by 

using both the old card system and the new au- tomated system, for any case or group of cases 

processed by Index and Files since 1921. 

INDEX-DIGEST 

The Index-Digest Section compiles and main- tains the research material related to all legal 

issuances of the Office of General Counsel. It 

maintains an in-house research facility by con- stantly updating the various legal indexes, pre- pares for printing all legal publications emanating 

from the Office of General Counsel. and pro- vides research assistance to GAO legal and audit 

staffs, personnel from other governmental agen- cies. and other interested parties. 

This section produces an annual, bound vol- ume of Comptroller General decisions. Decisions 

selected for publication constitute approximately 

10 percent of the total decisions rendered an- nually. Digests of decisions not included in the 

bound volume are issued quarterly in pamphlet 

form. Office memoranda and non-decision let- ters are also assembled in the Index-Digest Sec- tion. but these documents are not available to 

other agencies and organizations. In 1968 the Department of the Air Force's 

Federal Legal Information Through Electronics 

system (FLlTE) began to include all Comptroller 

General decisions in its data base. This data is 

used by FLITE to respond to requests for infor- mation by subscribers to that system. Another major change in research technology 

occurred in 1977. when the published decisions 

of the Comptroller General were added to the 

data base of the Department of Justice's auto- mated research system. JURIS. Including the 

decisions on this system not only gives GAO 

attorneys access to a computerized search sys- tem that contains data on case law, digests, statutory material and the published Comptroller 

General decisions. but also provides other subscribers to the JURIS system with access to the 

published decisions. This latter data base will be 

expanded to include unpublished decisions as 

well as other GAO documents. 

LEGISLATIVE DIGEST SECTION 

The Legislative Digest Section provides leg- islative analyses and research assistance and 

compiles and maintains legislative history files for 

each bill and public law since the 1920s. It also 

maintains subject indexes, enabling a researcher 

to find legislation or reports dealing with a particular subject. and some subject files containing 

materials generated by Congress on a particular 

subject but which are not associated with a spe- cific bill or law. The section also has a file iden- tifying comments made by GAO on bills where 

the comment deals with a matter of GAO policy. such as our audit authority or new functions the 

agency might be asked to perform. The section digests the Congressional Record 

daily. highlighting legislation. comments. and ref235 
erences of interest to GAO. It distributes copies 

of laws, bills, reports and hearings to the various 

operating divisions and offices to keep them ap- prised of what is hapJ:>ening in Congress. In September 1977, a jointly funded project 

was initiated by Legal Information and Reference 

Service and the Congressional Research Service 

to convert GAO's legislative history collection to 

microfiche. The Government Printing Office. re- alizing the importance of this coUection. plans to 

market the microfiche collection through its sales 

program. Thus. this conversion will not only per- manently preserve the material for GAO use but 

also increase accessibility to the material by all 

GAO staff members. other Government agen- cies, and the public. In May 1979. the General Counsel an- nounced the formation of a legal information task 

force to study the legal information needs and 

services provided with the objective of recom- mending areas or functions needing improvement As a result of the task force's findings. the 

General Counsel announced plans in August 

1980 to merge the functions of the Legislative 

Digest Section with those of the Law Library so 

as to update technologically the legislative history 

function. Because the Law Library already pos- sesses the necessary skills. automated equip- ment. and operational procedures. the merger 

was considered the most efficient means to 

achieve the desired changes. The merger is 

scheduled for early 1981. 

>II '" ... '" '" 

OGC has undergone several important changes 

in recent years, most of which were designed to 

increase the effectiveness of service to its "clien- tele." Its role has shifted from the nearly exclu- sive function of writing decisions to one of in- tegrating the legal discipline with the audit 

divisions' production of GAO's essential product 

reports on the operations and programs of Fed- eral agencies. OGC's legal work now extends far 

beyond issues narrowly addressing the proper 

accounting of appropriated funds. 

GAO's expertise in bid protests has gained 

wide acceptance. and OGC's range of interests. 

236 

particularly in light of the auditor's demands for 

legal assistance, now embraces such matters as 

the nature and scope of agencies' regulatory authority and examining their implementation of 

statutory responsibilities for Federal programs. 

I CompttOlt!r GcrWBI's Order No 0130 10 !Juno? 17. 19701 

2 31 usc. 7 1 

3 31 USC 74 

4 Fn:deriI:;kC. MOther. ThC'Go\O TMOu~forAa:oul1lablllfll."Am~rt 

~m.ml (BouItWl. Colo WaMt!w PrIlS5. 19'791. p. 206 

5 emeraJ Counwl. Memorandum 10 keclds oJ divisions and olflces J 1 Ma, 

1972 

6 Rol"," G. C",llrli. "The $pvclllJ ludk!~ and Analym S\:!clion. Olllo;e 01 

the C><lneral COUllk1." TIll! Gc\O RC'ltlIlW. 1W!l\ulI 1')75J 

7 PubUr; UW 96 185, 93 SUI! 1324 (Jan. 7, 1980). Chryslm Corpr)l'{nlon 

Lo..n Guartlnwe Act 011979 

8 Pl.ibllc La .... 93 604. &I 5,." 1959. wcs. 20 1 203 Wan 2. 1975), Generlll 

Accounllng D lfl«! Act 01 1974 

9 OCC Imtrucdon No 745, lJune 21 1974), nv Apr 20. 1979 

10 GAO 0n:Jer 1130 I Llurw I. 19791 ~nd INIlenah In ftle' 8 

139747 S- abo Raymond J Wvnch. '1kttllTbIs of Possible CnrnlOal Vlo&e. lions: The OOC Adu/5eT, Oct 1478, lind "Deallng \1.11111 Fraud oIInd A~ In 

Federal Programs." The CXiC Adllfltor, Apr 1979 

11 G.rwIai CounMI' s opinion, 8 130441 M.v 10. 1976 Sfi No Paul G 

Drmblni. ToAO and tIur PrIvacy Act" Thr DOC Adlliwr. 0c1 1976 

12 U S General AccountLOg 0111«. A,V1uo1 Rrpon 0/ rhe Comptroller Gftl etOl. 1915 ashl~on. 0 C. GPO. 1976). p 63 

IJ RoIIeI! H Bros. "Paynwnt 0( I~ ~ In A!JIIITICl' ~lalory 

Procnellngs," In eo- In AcrounlobHlry The WorlI- 0/ rhe G\O ed.. E.rasmus H Klo"",n 18ou~ Colo. WnMew Press. 19791. pp 171 lItO 

14 U.s Genel"lIl Accounting Otflc~. Annual Repon uf lite Cornpln:NJer Gt.." ~I, J 968 (Washington 0 C GPO. 19691. p. 219 

15. U.S Generolll Accounr:mg Officill. Annual Rl!porr oj rhe COnlpln:Nkr exn era/, 1972 (WMhln$llOn, 0 C GPO. (973), P 35 

16 51 Comp Gen 479 (l972J 

17 T&HCompon\l. 54 Comp (oen 1021 (1975) 

18 Hilyer Products Companl/. /r,c-. v Unlred S,oln. 140 F Supp 409, 135 C, CI 63 (1956), 1(<<0 IndUSIMei. Inc v Unired SlGres. 492 F 2e1 1200, 203 

CI, CI 566 119741 

19 40 fed IWg 42406 1i')7!".1 

~ :d~? ~m~J;,' ~ 5..-rvIc~ Available 10 RegIonal Otka T~ 

21 ~onJ Socolar, 'Worillng \IJIlh OGC." TMOGC Aduber. Apr 1979 

22 ~ GeM",,", rqJOrI. 'Cnme In F~ fWcll!adon Anuo-A Senota Problem N'led!ng C~ and A9II11CI/Acdon IGGO 77 28. JUI19 21. 19n) 

23 PubkLaw93344. 31 USC 1401-14061Ju1v 12. 1974).Congr~1 

Budgel and Jmpounclnwnl Conrrol Acl of 1974 

24 ThomM T WllllllmllOl1. "GAO ~ 10 Coun Thl! !mpouodmenl Case 

~ GAO Revll!Ul. (Sprlog 19761 

25 ComptrOller CMml!ral'5 report, " RI!VII!w ol lhc !nlpoundrrwnr Control AI;! 

of 1974 After 2 Vl!oIIrs" J{XjC 77 20. Juu" 3. 1(77) 

CCIIDro[p)l1®D' ll® 

Management Services 

As GAO's work increased in complexity and 

scope and its staff became larger and more di- versified. a wider and more sophisticated array 

of management services was required. In the 

early 1970's, GAO's management services or- ganization identified this need and initiated a se- ries of improvements. The organization became 

a more cohesive structure: a sound financial 

management system was installed: and infor- mation sources and services in GAO were en- hanced by using new technologies. In addition, 

professionals in various service fields were put 

in leadership positions, and long-range planning 

became an integral aspect of service delivery. This chapter describes these and other important 

developments and explains how they were accomplished and how they were related to each 

other. 

Evolution Of The Management 

Services Orl,lanization 

Early in Staats term, centralized administra- tive support was provided by a small Office of 

Administrative Services. Officially this office was 

responsible for the functions of budget and fi- nance. records management. publications, and 

providing various office services to the audit staff. 

However. the systems and procedures in place 

tended to be cumbersome and outmoded: au- tomation was virtually nonexistent and the level 

and range of services provided were limited. In 

addition. the organization was staffed by rela- tively low-graded and unskilled personnel who 

had few avenues of opportunity open to them. GAO also maintained a Data Processing Cen- ter. which oversaw its fledgling ADP operations. 

The center operated a medium-scale Honeywell 

computer, which provided limited support for 

audit activities. It was responsible for assisting 

divisions and offices with AD? systems analysis 

and design, evaluating proposed AD? applications, and advising on and making recommen- dations for acquiring and disposing of AD? 

equipment. The center was also responsible for 

designing and programming internal management systems, such as payroll,personnel statistics, 

and some accounting applications. 

On the whole, the state of administrative ser- vices in GAO reflected the value this product- oriented organization had traditionally placed on 

them. The majority of the audit staff were prob- ably only dimly aware these services existed until 

something went wrong-a paycheck coming late 

or being misplaced, a service or an equipment 

requisition going unfilled. The Office of Admin- istrative Services' capacity was taxed just coping 

with day-to-day requirements and the emergen- cies that-perhaps more in this sphere of GAO 

activity than in any other-were continually 

cropping up. There was little advance planning. 

Despite these limitations, the state of administra- tive services in GAO was comparable to that in 

most other agencies at the time and was rea- sonably adequate for meeting the basic needs 

of a three-division organization. As GAO grew 

more complex in structure and more sophisticated in its work, however, it was imperative that 

administrative services be upgraded. When Thomas D. Morris was asked to study 

GAO's organization in 1970 (see ch. 9). one of 

his chief observations was that GAO lacked 

strong staff support elements. In 1971. the Di- rector of the Office of Administrative Services 

1111111~1II1111 ~lllllllm:1 )1111111111~~~IIIIIIII~llm~l~ GAO DATA PROCESSING CENTER on opening day. July 21 . 1970. 

238 
retired. providing an opportunity to reconfigure 

that organization and reassess its role. That year 

Morris was named Assistant to the Comptroller 

General for Management Services. responsible 

for overseeing the Office of Personnel Manage- ment: the Office of Administrative Services: Data 

Processing Services; and a new unit to be known 

as the Organization and Management Planning 

Staff (OMPS). In December these offices. except 

for the Office of Personnel Management. were 

consolidated into the Office of Administrative 

Planning and Services (OAPS) under the supervision of Clerio P. Pin. Director. Pln-a former 

GAO'er-had served in administrative poSitions 

at the former Atomic Energy Commission. 

THE EVENTFUL TENURE OF THE 

ORGANlZAnON AND MANAGEMENT 

PLANNING STAFF 

OMPS was created to fill a vacuum in GAO 

which MorriS had identified. In a way it provided 

a mechanism to continue doing studies similar 

to what Morris had done. It was to analyze the 

organization's interrelationships, practices, structures. controls. and administrative support services. Formally, OMPS was mandated to (1) 

make detailed studies to formulate plans for improving organization and management practices 

when requested by top management, (2) evaluate the recommendations of study groups and 

committees established to develop improve- ments and advise top management as to their 

feasibility. apFropriateness. and technical soundness, and (3 design. test. and help implement 

approved recommendations. This organization--<> sort of in-house management consulting team-was something new 

in GAO. Its first assignment was to follow through 

on the work of the Committee on Report Processing and Review Procedures. This involved 

monitoring the implementation of the committee's numerous recommendations by the various 

GAO components with report-related responsibilities. From then on, this small group of professionals had a full agenda of projects. many of 

which resulted from brainstorming sessions and! 

or assessments of agency needs by the management services leadership. I 

The scope of OMPS' projects ranged across 

the full spectrum of GAO activities: 

• An early study of in-house ADP requirements pointed out that GAO's intemal re- quirements for computer time were growing and would shortly. in fact. outgrow the 

capacity of its Honeywell 1250 computer. 

Nonetheless. it concluded that. except for 

the Transportation and Claims Division's 

activities. GAO's requirements for information sysiems could be met most effectively through contractor services or ADP 

support supplied by other Government 

agencies. As a result. the Data Processing 

Center was abolished and the in-house 

computer was dedicated solely to applica- tions of the Transportation and Claims Division. Outside resources were to be used 

for all other computer applications. • As a result of its study of Washington-field 

relationships (see ch. 14), OMPS recom- mended that the term "lead region" be 

abolished, that greater responsibility for 

certain functions be assigned to the field, and that the division of responsibilities be- tween Washington and field staffs on a 

given aSSignment be committed to writing 

in a job management agreement 

• In analyzing time elapsed during report 

processing, OMPS found that it was difficult 

to reconstruct the exact steps which occurred and how long each took. It. therefore, developed an instrument known as 

a Job History Record to be completed at 

the end of each aSSignment. documenting 

all Significant job milestones and dates as 

well as staffing and cost information. 

• Other projects. OMPS helped create the 

newsletter "GAO Hotline." the predecessor of the "GAO Management News: " 

helped the divisions established by the 

1972 reorganization draft their basic operating orders: and initiated early efforts in 

organizational development. (See ch. 7.) 

In February 1973, with the abolition of the 

Data Processing Center, a General ADP Sysiems 

Group was established within OMPS to develop 

long-range intemal ADPplans and to develop 

and maintain intemal ADP systems. Although at 

the time OMPS did little planning, it did assume 

responsibility for managing the recently developed Accounting and Auditing Programming, 

Scheduling, and Reporting (PSR) System, an 

automated management information system 

providing data on audit assignments in process 

or recently completed. This effort was consistent 

with the emphasis MorriS had given to the importance of timely and reliable data as a tool of 

management PSR, despite its relatively primitive 

design and operation, was used to provide pe- riodic "overview" reports on GAO operations. 

These early efforts in building a management 

information system for aSSignments were fraught 

with difficulties and growing pains. More will be 

said on this subject later. OMPS was always a volatile organization, due 

probably to its uniqueness in GAO, its broad 

239 
charter, and orientation toward responding quickly 

to pressing needs. For 2 years the unit was caUed 

Planning and Analysis Staff, and then it reverted 

in 1976 to being titled OMPS. Increasingly it 

assumed the management of various task forces, 

such as the Information Development Group 

(which developed the GAO Documents data 

base mentioned in ch. 11) and the Career Management Task Force. (See ch. 12.) Much of its 

work In later years was devoted to strengthening 

GAO's personnel operations and managing its 

organlzatior.al development efforts. By 1979 

Personnel and other organizations, such as the 

Office of Program Planning, were firmly established and in a position to deal with the type of 

internal mana~ment concerns that had formeliy 

commanded OMPS's attention. Therefore, OMPS 

was abolished, leaving a legacy of many of the 

support elements and management tools GAO 

has today. 

CHEATING A CONSOUDATED MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES ORGANIZAnON 

With the proliferation of GAO divisions and 

their subunits after the 1972 reorganization, the 

institution of issue area planning, and the growth 

in staff, providing the organization with suitable 

facilities, services, and information became both 

more crucial and more complex. The management services structure was reorganized to enhance its capability in this regard. After having 

served briefly as head of management services 

in 1971. Morris was named Assistant ComptroUer General for Management Services in 1974. 

and Pin became his deputy. Together they presided over a reconfigured and consolidated management services organization: the Office of Personnel Management, a new Office of Staff 

Development, the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of Publishing and Graphics Services, the Office of Ubrarian. the Planning and 

Analysis Staff (formerly OMPS), and a new Office of ControUer. The Office of ControUer was 

established to oversee GAO's budget administration, financial management, and management 

information systems-a formidable task involving extensive upgrading and automating of these 

systems.' 

In 1975 when Morris left GAO and Pin became Director of Management Services, one of 

his major challenges was to upgrade the caliber 

of the personnel in his organization. His goal was 

to recruit highly skiUed professionals. Beginning 

in the mid-1970's, professionals in such fields as 

GAO'S IN·HOUSE PRINTING PLANT produces over 55 million units a ye.r. It handles primarily short runs .nd 

requirements with extremely tight tlmeframes. Other work is contracted out. 

240 
library science. information technology. and rec- ords management were hired in increasing numbers. Sometimes he created organizations around 

these new staff members to take advantage of 

their skills. Dead-end positions were reduced to 

some extent by automation and by contracting 

out for services which GAO had been unable to 

pay its own emplovees adequately to perform. In one case GAO's customers were the prime 

beneficiaries. In 1977. GAO contracted with the 

General Electric Company to fill mail. phone. and counter requests for GAO reports by mem- bers of Congress or the public. This function had 

formerly been performed by low-graded em- ployees in GAO's Distribution Section, but this 

arrangement proved inefficient. In contrast. the 

Document Handling Facility. by accessing a 

computerized bibliographic data base developed 

for this purpose. could process each of the 

15.000 or SO requests it received each month in 

a matter of minutes. The data base was also used 

to generate the monthly abstract journal. GAO 

Documents. GAO's customers received im- proved service and GAO's auditors gained a 

readily accessible research tool. (See ch. 11 .) 

Organizing management services also en· tailed creation of the right type of structure to 

meet service needs, especially in the information 

area. Sometimes changes were made in a short 

period if needs changed or the new organization 

did not work out as anticipated. New applications 

of information technology, such as machine- readable data bases. became increasingly avail- able. In addition. GAO's primary mission en- tailed producing and delivering information. " In- formation mariagement" was identified as an 

essential activity if the agency was to avoid du- plication among its various information setvices. 

The staff s level of awareness also had to be 

raised regarding the availability of certain infor- mation services. A unit was needed to capture 

and respond to GAO staff s information require- ments and to set GAO-wide policy with regard 

to information services generally. 

Consolidating information activities was the 

next step. In July 1978. the Office of Information 

Managment (OIM) was created to help establish 

new ways to manage information technology. Also in that year a permanent high-level Infor- mation Policy Committee. chaired eventually by 

the Assistant Comptroller General for Policy and 

Program Planning. was established to develop 

information policy. manage information resources within GAO. and review information sys- tem planning and development. In November 

1979. the Office of librarian and the Records 

Management and Directives Branch of the Office 

of Administrative Services were merged with 

OIM to form the Office of Information Systems 

and Services (OISS). These offices were consolidated because they all dealt with information. 

and their efforts required coordination to avoid 

duplication and to improve information access 

and dissemination. 0155. was. therefore, made 

responsible for the overall management and coordination of internal and external information 

activities at GAO, except those which were the 

specific responsibilities of GAO divisions or the 

Office of Public Information. 

At the same time OIM was created. it and 

GAO's other support services were united with 

financial management operations under a new 

ollice of General Services and Controller (GS&C). 

Richard L Brown. GAO Controller since 1977. 

was named Director. The functions performed 

by GS&C included space management. payroll 

administration. information management, library 

services, budgeting. and publishing. As part of 

this 1978 reorganization. Clerio P. Pin was promoted from Director. Management Services. to 

Assistant to the Comptroller General (Administration) in charge of General Services and Controller. Personnel. and the Organization and 

Management Planning Staff. In the process the 

number of persons reporting to Pin was reduced 

from six to two, giving him greater opportunity 

to participate in agency policy decisions. In April 

1979. he was appointed Assistant Comptroller 

General for Administration. 

Strategic planning became an integral part of 

management services. Just as audit divisions are 

required to prepare program plans setting forth 

goals and ways to meet them, GS&C managers 

also set priorities. Although not required to, in 

1979 and 1980 they prepared program plans 

describing the objectives that each GS&C office 

would be concentrating on and how they contributed to the overall mission of GAO. Personnel 

now is preparing its own program plans. An Office of Security and Safety was established in GS&C in 1980 to manage and administer the GAO-Wide security program, including 

personnel. physical. and information security. The office was established in response to the 

recommendations of the Security Task Force. Organized in the fall of 1979. the task force was 

directed to update. strengthen. and streamline 

GAO security policy to bring it in line with Government standards and regulations. 

GAO's administrative organization as of October 1980 is shown in the chart below. 

Internal Financial Management 

Although none of GAO's support functions 

was a model of modern efficiency at the beginning of this period. its internal financial manage- ment system was a source of particular concern. 

Financial management operations in GAO 

frustrated and even mystified management and 

employees alike at times, but it was not for lack 

of oversight. In 1971 the Washington regional 

office audited GAO's fi nancial statements and 

accounts and found that the Office needed to 

(1) comply with the accounting standards it had 

established for Federal agencies. (2) make more 

complete use of its financial resources, and (3) 

241 
CLERIO P. PIN, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL for Administration. and Richard l. Brown. Director. General Services and Controller. discuss management services priorities. 

Figure 16-1 

The Management Services OrganlzatioD 

Assistant Comptroller General 

For Administration 

I 

Organization General Services Systems and 

Procedures Development Staff and Controller Analysis Staff 

I 

Office of Office of Office of Office of Office of 

Administrative Budget and Information Publishing Security 

Services Financial Systems and Services and Safety Management Services 

242 
collect in full amounts due the Government for 

which it was responsible." From 1973 to 1977. the Office of Internal Review (OIR) was required 

to review and render an opi!li9n on GAO's fi- nancial statement annually.l ln its reports OIR 

cited weaknesses in intemarcontrols and procedures. insufficient documentation. posting and 

duplicating errors. unliquidated obligations. fail- ure to reconcile travel advance balances. and a 

host of other management deficiencies. Over the 

years various task forces were organized to address GAO's accounting system problems. Both 

they and OIR did much to effect improvements. 

Many of GAO's financial management problems originated with events outside the control 

of the management services organization. The 

financial management operation was saddled 

with several fairly significant handicaps which 

hampered its effectiveness. First. an entirely 

manual system was still in place in 1972 when 

GAO reorganized and thereby multiplied the 

number of entities whose financial transactions 

had to be processed. In addition, the finance 

section had not had any leadtime to prepare for 

the change. Not surprisingly, the system was ill- equipped to cope with the increased workload. 

Secondly, over the next several years. the system 

was conSistently in a state of flux as various parts 

of it underwent the inevitable agonies associated 

with automation. The conversions did not hap- pen overnight: often. in fact. both the manual 

and the automated versions of a system were 

maintained simultaneously for a while to ensure 

that no transaction escaped processing. Large 

backlogs built up with each conversion. Finally. 

the finance section was continually plagued by 

a high turnover rate among its personnel. Few 

promotional opportunities were available in this 

limited sphere of GAO's operations. 

!JllJ.oll was the first financial management 

system to be automated. Clerio Pin recalled that. 

when he first started working in management 

services. the GAO payroll was usually in an up- roar and frequently in an overtime status. The 

Office switched to an automated system which 

was attended by the predictable bugs and back- logs and required operating both the old and the 

new systems for a time. (p 1976 GAO found it 

necessary to develop yetariother payroll system 

for several reasons. One of the important ones 

was that the system in operation was a "payment 

by exception" system. In other words e~c;,l:!...elJl

ploy~e wasJ'aid hislher salary unless ffi'e system ~s notifie not to. Many control features required to properly manage a payroll function 

were absent. Another reason was that. when the 

transportation rate audit function was transferred 

to the General Services Administration, the 

Honeywell computer on which GAO's payroll 

had been processed was also transferred. The 

decision was made Jo implement anew j)ayroTr 

:sy5tem wnich required a positive reporting of 

~f!)e anoatfendance. The system maintained by 

the Department of Justice operated this way, and 

it was adopted by the Office of Controller. with 

appropriate modifications to suit GAO's 

re>I~irements. 

L!.n essence the new system required all em- ployees to ~ubmiLtitlle aDd attendance reports 

l1gfore their payroll checks would be processed 

Leave and overtime were paid and recorded on 

a current-pay period basis. Earnings statements 

were issued every pay period and included additional information, such as current leave bal- ances. Management now had g~table ac- ~nting inforlTlatj.Q..n and audit traus, and emplo~ regularly received accurate, timely, 

and complete pay and leave data. The end result 

compensated for the many adjustments and cor- rections to employees' accounts that had to be 

made and the backlog that once again developed 

during the transition. 

In addition to converting to a positive payroll 

system. the Office of Controller implemented a 

new automated travel and miscellaneous pay- ments system that same year. Once again, the 

old and new systems were used simultaneously 

for a time. Until recently, processing backlogs of 

600 or more travel vouchers were common- place. Employees were notified of travel ad- vances outstanding only once a year. Every 

travel voucher was audited, regardless of the face 

amount. In 1979. after several years of effort, 

GS&C implemented a full travel advance management system which permits it to continuously 

reconcile and age the 2.000 travel advances totaling about $ 1 million that are outstanding at 

any given time. The status of each employee's 

travel advance balance is now printed on his 

biweekly earnings statement. and a reconciliation 

unit has been established to answer employee 

questions and straighten out any processing or 

other snags that may occur. Employees are required to liquidate travel advances promptly. Once they have been officially notified that their 

travel advance balances are delinquent, they 

must liquidate them within 2 weeks or they will 

be collected by payroll deduction. GS&C is 

meeting the goal it has established of processing 

and paying all travel vouchers within 21 days; 

the average time is 10.8 days. In addition. GS&C 

has streamlined its voucher auditing procedures 

so that. below a certain threshold. only a random 

sample is audited. For many years the prompt payment of a bill 

was more the exception in GAO than the rule. Payables were commonly as much as 6 months 

in arrears. One of the major problems was a 

failure to ensure that each transaction was 

backed up by the requisite paperwork-pur- chase order, delivery receipt, and invoice. Often 

divisions or offices would requisition services or 

products from a vendor without obtaining the 

approval of. and hence a purchase order from, 

the procurement unit Also, vendors often sent 

invoices to the person or office requesting ser243 
r 

vices or products instead of to the central procurement unit The invoices were then held for 

unnecessarily long periods or simply got lost in 

the course of circulating around the main build- ing. Once in GS&C, invoices were not always 

promptly paid. either; in June 1979 control logs 

showed 370 invoices which had been in GS&C 

for more than 30 days. In 1979 and 1980, a 

Payables Task Force. composed of Washington 

regional office staffers. worked with GS&C to 

identify and implement needed improvements 

in GAO's bill·paying procedures. Major changes 

recommended by the task force included file reo 

organization. increased staffing and training, and 

increased procedural documentation. All the reo 

commendations are eventually to be imple· mented. Another significant innovation in this 

area was the inslallation of an automated invoice 

tracking and aging system for control of requi· sitions from purchase order to payment GAO's 

goal is to pay all invoices within 30 days: it now 

pays most in about 12 days' 

. ., 

Figure 16-2 

lavolee. UapaldOver60Day. Show 

ImprovelDeat After Autolllated 

Traeklag Sy.tem laotalled 

125 -----------

100 ---I~--------------

75---~~------------

50 ----+-------

25 ------~--------------

--+--I --t! ~f ~~--tt--

I 1979,-=---'---'1-1 - 1980--1 

COMPtrrERlZED SYSTEMS have helped upgrade GAO IntmaJ financial management 

244 
Once the right expertise was brought to bear 

on the problems that existed. financial management operations gradually improved. Today 

GAO has a network of computerized systems in 

place which keep its finances in good order and 

provide GAO management and employees with 

timely. accurate. and useful financial information. 

Information Management 

Becomes An Agency Goal 

As discussed earlier. by the mid- 1970' s. GAO 

was coming to appreciate the importance of improving the coordination and management of its 

information resources. By this time assembling, 

processing. storing, disseminating. and accessing 

information involved a variety of technical. 

professional. and procedural activities and many 

GAO organizations. In addition. it was clear that 

information management. delivery. and utilization affected all of GAO. In fact. they were the 

lifeblood of the organization. 

A number of task forces were established to 

analyze how GAO could improve the efficiency 

and effectiveness of its information resources. 

The Information Management and Development 

Group was established in 1976 to apply new 

information technolqJies to the task of increasing 

GAO staff members awareness of and access 

to the wide variety of GAO publications and documen~udit reports, staff studies. memorandums. opinions, speeches, testimony. and 

Comptroller General decisions. The result was 

the GAO Documents project (discussed earlier 

in this chapter and in ch. 11).' 

In 1977 the Task Force to Study GAO Information Services and Activities was established 

to (1) recommend how to coordinate and manage the application of information technology 

covering not only GAO publications but also 

outside sources of research data and (2) explore 

the feaSibility of preparing a single inventory and 

directory of GAO's information products and services. The task force identified more than 100 

information sources-many of them produced 

in GAO-that were available to the staff. Through 

in-depth interviews with GAO staff, the task force 

found evidence that available information products and services sometimes were not yet well 

known or used. It susgested that prospective 

users had to muddle through an unnecessarily 

complex labyrinth to get to the information 

sources they needed_ Based on its limited work. 

the task force posited that more systematic 

knowledge of how GAO staff viewed information 

services would be helpful in organizing. structuring, and managing those services: in determining the products and services that should be 

provided: and in further stimulating their use by 

staff members. It did not develop a comprehenNOBILE MAlL EQUIPMENT provides staff in GAO Bulldhl9 wIth more efficient service 

245 
sive inventory and directory of GAO information 

products and services but asserted that doing so 

would not only be feasible but would provide a 

useful tool for acquainting the staff with the range 

and magnitude of available informational aids. In March 1978, with the establishment of the 

Information Policy Committee OPC) to oversee 

and coordinate information policy and services. 

the Task Force to Study GAO Information Services and Activities was abolishedb 

Since its first meeting in May 1978. IPC has 

established policies on a wide variety of infor· 

mation management Issues. To some extent. the 

group's initial deliberations have been oriented 

more toward " fire fighti ng" than toward making 

policies which will substantially shape the way 

GAO does business in the future. Policies agreed 

to thus far include: 

• ADP support for administrative and audit 

work should be centralized in GS&C. 

• The retention period for workpapers should 

be changed from 6 years to 3 years. 

• Cost analyses and feasibility studies should 

be done before any decisions are made to 

lease ADP services or buy a computer. 

• All audit support services should be pro- vided by the timesharing vendor with which 

GAO currently has a contract. unless the 

provider is a Government facility. 

In a few cases. however. IPC has set jlOlicies 

with greater long-range implications. For example. in April 1980. IPC determined that it is 

GAO policy to actively promote the efficient and 

effective use of information technology to in· 

crease the productivity of its work force. It then 

authorized GS&C to conduct a test of high·tech- nology information equipment to determine if it 

would be appropriate for use in GAO. In the test, auditors in the San Francisco and Atlanta reo 

gional offices and the Accounting and Financial 

Management Division will incorporate the use of 

electronic work stations into their work. The 

equipment used will have the capacity to do word 

processing. document transmission. light comOffice Of Internal Review: The Eyes And Ears 

Of Top Management 

In the 1960's, GAO had continually recommended in audit reports that agencies establish 

internal audit organizations. Meanwhile GAO itself usually relied on internal ad hoc task forces 

to examine financial operations and management actiuities. It seemed appropriate. therefore. 

for GAO to haue its own permanent. officially deSignated internal audit capability. 

Accordingly, the Comptroller General established the Office of Internal Reuiew (OIR) in 

1971 to reuiew the operations and peljormance of all GAO diuisions and offices and to report 

the resulting findings, conclusions. and recommendations to himself and the Deputy Comptroller General. This responsibility included identifying ways of making GAO operations more 

effectiue. efficient. and economical through: 

• Eualuating compliance with policies. procedures. regulations. and laws. • Eualuating the system of management controls ouer operations and resources. • Examining accounts, financial transactions. finanCial management reports. and related 

control procedures to determine their reliability and usefulness. 

• Making specific examinations required by the Comptroller General and the Deputy 

Comptroller General. 

Lloyd Smith was appointed first OIR director. For the next 8 years. OIR concentrated 

heauily on reuiewing financial records and controls and other administratiue operations. Since 

many of these areas were undergoing extensiue deuelopment and streamlining. aIR's efforts 

come at a particularly opportune time to haue a formatiue impact. 

During these 8 years. OIR also undertook work in other aspects of GAO operations. For 

example, from 1972 to 1975. OIR conducted the first comprehensiue study of GAO's personnel 

management. This inuolued analyzing thousands of questionnaires filled out by professional 

stoff at leuels up through GS·15. These were supp(emented by interviews with stoff in all the 

regions, the ouerseas offices. and the headquarters diuisions. The results were used in uarious 

ways: far example. the Dffice of Personnel Management used them for reuiewing stlJff recruiting 

and rotation practices. and the Office of Administratiue Planning and Services used them in 

planning and arranging for the physical working conditions of GAO offices. aIR also conducted 

annual eualuations, beginning in 1973, of the e[fectiueness of GAO's equal employment 

opportunity program. In 1980 OIR studied GAO s attrition rate for professional employees 

and mode seueral recommendations directed at improuing personnel management to ensure 

retention of high caliber staff. In a follow up to this reuiew. OIR examined OPM attrition statistics 

246 
puting, and graphics and to access data bases.' 

Gs&r will try to determine if interacting with 

such equipment enables auditors to improve the 

timeliness and/or quality of their work. In addition. any final evaluation of the project will need 

to consider other potential impacts. such as those 

related to equal employment opportunity. the 

need for paraprofessionals to help operate the 

system, and educational processes needed for 

professional employees. It is possible that with 

this project GAO has taken a step toward a 

" paperless" future. 

IPC has also called for development of a longrange information management/Ian. Its cornerstone is the consolidation an integration of 

GAO's various administrative management information systems. More than a dozen of these 

now exist The resulting integrated data base 

would be composed of four subsystems or modules: personnel management, financial management. assignment management. and project 

management. The last of these would provide 

ADP support for the Office of the General Counsel. the claims function , the library's bibliographic 

data bases. etc. In contrast. GAO's current management information systems were developed 

independently of one another with no systematic 

planning or effort to make one compatible or 

reconcilable with another. Fragmentation resulted. with one system run on one agency's 

computer, another on another agency's, some 

run on GAO's minicomputer, and all unable to 

communicate with each other. If tapped to provide information. such as the number of staff currently assigned to a given project. each would 

probably have given a different answer.' 

In 1978, GAO contracted with Price Waterhouse. & Co. for a study of its administrative 

information requirements. About a year later, the 

contractor delivered a requirements analysis and 

detailed functional specifications for an agencywide management information system known as 

the Administrative Information Resources System. or AIRES. AIRES was envisioned as reOffice Of Internal Review: The Eyes and Ears 

Of Top Management-Continued 

for departments and agencies employing people with similar skills and found that GAO's rate 

was relatiuely low, except for professionals in the general attorney series. OIR uses the some standards and quality controls in its reuiews as GAO uses in its audits 

of executiue branch actiuities. OIR reports are referenced. for example. and officials responsible 

for subjects discussed in the reports are giuen an opportunity for aduance reuiew and comment. 

OIR's work differs from traditional GAO auditing. howeuer. in seueral important respects. 

OIR generally does not receiue feedback from management as to correctiue actions taken as 

a result of its work. Also. while CAO blue-couer reports are auailable to the public. distribution 

of OIR reports is at the Comptroller General's discretion. Finally. unlike the audit diuisions, 

()IR had no comprehensiue planning system to ensure that its work was directed to the most 

important issues and concems. Instead, OIR conducted reuiews as requested from time to 

time by the Comptroller General and the Deputy Comptroller General or as suggested by 

diuision or office officials o r the OIR staff. What planning there was allowed for management 

input to the direction of OIR's work. but it was piecemeal and oriented largely toward shortrange goals. With the appointment of a new OIR director. Robert M. Gilroy in May 1980. the time 

seemed right for an assessment of OIR's role in reuiewing GAO operations. Gilroy reported 

in October 1980 that OIR could significantly increase its effectiueness if it deuoted more 

attention to assessing GAO's operational performance. He noted that aIR's work in adminIstratiue matters had been useful but that. considering GAO's most pressing management 

concerns, it need not command as substantial a leuel of effort as it did in the past. Other 

changes identified as likely to improue aIR's usefulness as a management tool included: 

• Becoming inuolued early in major policy and operational changes to facilitate monitoring 

their implementation and to lend objectiuity to later eualuations of them. 

• Performing fewer detailed reuiews and deueloping more efficient forms of reporting. 

• Installing a comprehensiue planning system. 

• Establishing formal follow up poliCies and procedures to ensure that management giues 

timely consideration to OIR's recommendations. 

Staats approued the refocusing of OIR's activities and requested that it be translated into 

an assignment-oriented program plan. Thus it appears that OIR will soon follow the rest of GAO 

in placing greater emphasis on the utilization of and results deriued from that most important and 

costly of organizational assets-people. 

247 
placing a number of GAO's existing independent 

administrative systems with an integrated system 

composed of five major subsystems and a com- mon data base. It also called for a single facility 

to be used for both processing and reporting in 

order to mini mile interchanges and the need for 

synchronilation of data among subsystems. GAO 

decided to use the Price Waterhouse report 

mainly as the backbone of the requirements 

analysis it will submit to industry when it solicits 

proposals for an integrated system· The Office 

has received permission from the General Ser- vices Administration to directly solicit proposals. 

as required by the Brooks Act. and the process 

is underway, III 

If and when GAO gets this consolidated information management system working effec- tively. it will conclude a long and sometimes frustrating search for systems that provide the 

information management needs when it needs 

it Chapter 9 noted that in 1966 top manaqement 

requests for information on agency operations 

had to be processed manually through the cognizant divisions and offices. which, in turn. often 

had to generate the needed data themselves. The obvious need for adequate information systems went unfulfilled for many years. The Planning. Scheduling, and Reporting 

System, mentioned earlier in this chapter, represented GAO's first attempt to capture and gen- erate timely, accurate data on aSSignments which 

could be used as a tool for managing them. like 

any other new system, it had "bugs" and was 

neither very timely nor very accurate. It did. however. give managers more information than they 

had had before. It whetted their appetites for 

more and better information and started them 

thinking about possible uses for it The Manage- ment Data System (MDS) replaced the Planning, 

Scheduling. and Reporting system in 1978. Its 

origin:; are discussed in chapter 14. MDS was 

designed to improve individual and collective 

understanding of GAO's performance and to improve accountability for the millions of dollars in 

resources entrusted to its operation. It was deficient in several respects, however. Divisions 

and regions entered data pertaining to their jobs 

independently without the entries being reconciled or consolidated into a master record. More 

often than not. the data provided on a given job 

by one division differed from that provided by 

a second division or regional office. Data already 

entered Into the system could be revised at any 

time, so an organization wishing to make its per- formance on an assignment look better for the 

record could do SO whenever it wanted. In addition, the reports produced by MDS were not 

timely, and it was very expensive. 

The Assignment Management and Planning 

System (AMPS) was adopted by GAO in April 

1979 with a view toward making it the starting 

point for system consolidation and integration. 

It replaced four previous assignment manage248 

FI •• re 1"'3 

Lo .......... PIa. For Coa.oUdatI.. M ••••••••• ••• o ..... alo. S", •• e._ 

ment information systems-PSR, MDS. and two 

other systems developed by divisions. AMPS 

was suffiCiently advanced and flexible to permit 

ready enhancement by the incorporation of 

other systems. The original version of AMPS in- cluded personnel action (Standard Form 50) and 

locator, time and attendance, and aSSignment 

management data. Subsequent additions have 

included travel reporting, general ledger, allot- ment ledger. and staff-year projection data. 

AMPS appears to be greatly superior to its pred- ecessors, and GAO managers have indicated 

verbally and by their level of usage that they find 

it a valuable tool. 

AMPS gives users a set of output reports that 

are produced regularly and also may be pro- duced on demand. There are four categories of 

reports which correspond to the information 

needs of management at different levels in GAO. Three of these report categories-job management, diviSion/region management. and top 

management-provide information related to 

the management of individual assignments and 

groups of assignments. A fourth category, called 

control reports, provides information to the 

AMPS administrators, as well as to the divisions 

and regions, regarding changes to the data base 

and potential erroneous entries. All the reports 

reflect the data stored in the data base at the 

time they are produced. Information on assign- ment milestones, products, performing organization and personnel aSSignments. priority. and 

other assignment descriptors is updated on-line. 

As a result, AMPS reports. such as the assignment description report (J 1). reflect daily changes 
in the data base. On the other hand, infonnation 

pertaining to staff resources spent on assign· ments is updated biweekJy after time and at· tendance data for the most recent pay period 

has been posted to the data base. II 

An important AMPS feature is "division own· ership:" that is, each division is responsible for 

posting its own data to the system and updating 

it. This allows for greater accuracy than would 

be likely if data was entered centrally. Accuracy 

is further safeguarded by the fact that once data 

has been entered into an assignment's master 

record, it is not subject to alteration. The use of AMPS to generate reports by the 

Office of Program Planning (OPP). the divisions. 

and the regional offices tripled during its first year 

of operation. OPP uses the data extensively in 

fulfilling its role of analyzjng GAO's perfonnance. 

OPP's quarterly "Overview Report on Selected 

GAO Activities." for example, is generated di· 

rectly from the AMPS data base. In addition, two 

Assistant Comptrollers General acquired their 

own tenninals for ready access to the system and 

to demonstrate top management's enthusiasm 

for it. 

AMPS will be integrated into the consolidated 

data base for which GAO is now soliCiting pro· 

posals. The type of facility which will operate the 

system will depend on economics and the types 

of proposals submitted. Presently the long·range 

plan provides for a request for proposals to be 

issued in late 1980 and a contract to be awarded 

about 6 months later. 12 

The centralization of ADP support for admin· 

istrative and audit work in 0155 and preparation 

of a long·range plan were steps which had been 

encouraged by the House Government Opera· 

tions Committee. which exercises oversight of 

ADP procurements Govemment·wide. For a 

while the Committee took issue with some of 

GAO's ADP procurements. but it has reacted 

somewhat more favorably to GAO's most recent 

efforts. In the Committee's view. GAO should 

serve as a model for the Govemment. and its 

interest in the Office's ADP procurements is likely 

to continue. 

Space Renovation And 

Acquisition 

If an organization's physical environment 

gives any insight into the character of that or· ganization, it would appear that GAO is a more 

progressive, more productive, and less drab 

place to work than it was in 1966. GAO's work· ing environment was overhauled in a priority 

project lasting several years. 

Before the space renovation effort started in 

1972. the GAO Building had not had major at· tention since its construction was completed in 

195 L Conditions within were depressing: gray, 

green. and beige were the prevailing colors. light· 

ing was poor, and carpeting was completely abo 

sent. Few employees below the GS-15 level had 

private workspaces; most offices had four or five 

occupants. At least 1 office in the Transportation 

and Claims Division. however. had nearly 500 

occupants. In addition, the building was uncomfortable. Designed in 1940. it was intended for use by the 

pre· World War II GAO---a large clerical audit 

staff which received financial documents from 

throughout the Government for centralized processing. Consequently. the design provided for 

a large open area for housing records with en- closed offices lining the perimeter. However. as 

audit activities became decentralized, the num· bers of professional staff increased. and new organizational divisions were created, GAO's space 

needs changed entirely. Private offices were created in the interior warehouse-type area, reduc· ing the available Ught and distorting air flow. Hot 

and cold spots resulted, as well as wind tunnels 

of surprising strength, some of which continue 

to defy correction. In 1971. Pin directed his staff to study these 

problems and launch a major effort to eradicate 

them. A survey was made of the entire headquarters building. Immediate and long·range 

space needs as well as the expected growth of 

each organizational unit were estimated, and 

then alternatives to the present system were ex· plored. Elements of modern spaee planning, 

such as the "office landscaping" concept, were 

studied and incorporated into the final plans. The renovation effort was planned in phases 

to allow for concurrent staging areas while other 

areas were being renovated. In 1978 an OAS 

official capsulized the undertakings up to that 

time as follows: 

Over 450,000 square feet of space have 

been renovated and furnished at a total 

cost exceeding $3.216.000. Over 1.000 

pieces of new fumiture have been pur· chased • • '. Over 11 acres of carpet 

have been installed. Over 1.900 people 

have been moved ' • *. Over 4,000 tele· 

phones have been installed. moved. up· 

graded. or rearronged. However. these sto· 

tisties do nor begin to reflect the 

compromises. the confrontations. the sue· cesses and the disappointments that the 

Office of Administrative Semices staff ex· perienced with this renovation effort. 13 

GAO's staff was generally receptive to the 

prospect of a better working environment. but 

at times during the renovation, that seemed to 

be about the only thing everybody agreed on. 

Issues such as how much money to spend: 

whether or not to requisition new furniture: and. 

in particular, how large to make the offices for 

the different grade levels all sparked considerable 

controversy and ruffled more than a few feathers. 

249 
Ultimately GAO chose a level of remodeling 

that leaned to the conservative side. Six-foot-high 

portable partitions were introduced to give each 

employee a relatively private working space but 

also to permit maximum flexibility in the event 

of future reconfigurations. Live plants were 

placed sparingly about the builcling to relieve 

austerity and were soon supplemented by many 

privately-owned ones. A new ceiling was installed 

to help correct the air circulation problems. Brightly colored wall-to-wall carpeting and new 

furniture completed GAO's new look. 

All in all. it was not an easy task. and the results 

represented a compromise between many conflicting needs. To accomplish almost any part of 

it required the blessing and intimate involvement 

of the General Services Administration. Tight 

coordination and nearly split-second timing were 

required to ensure that contractors completed 

their work on schedule and did not get in each 

other's way. Leadtimes of up to 5 months for 

deliveries and installations had to be 

accommodated. While the renovation was underway at headquarters, the regional offices also were extensively remodeled. In several cases they moved 

into new quarters. In one popular arrangement 

adopted by the offices. the management staff 

were located in offices in the core of the workspace and the administrative staff lined the pe- rimeter. This allowed the administrative staff to 

enjoy treasured window views usually reserved 

for higher grade levels. 

GAO not only renovated its existing space: 

it also acquired new space in the GAO Building 

as other agencies, such as the Federal Power 

Commission and the Federal Maritime Admin- istration. moved out. GAO had received first 

priority for space in the bUilding under the GenRENOVATED SPACE provides a pleasant working 

environment for GAO staff. 

250 

eral Accounting Office Act of 1974. (See ch. 8.) 

In December 1976. the Comptroller General re- quested GSA to release additional space to GAO 

to enable it to effectively discharge the additional 

responsibilities placed upon it by the Congress 

and to consolidate many of its activities located 

around the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 

area. In November 1977. GSA agreed to release 

space occupied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

GAO encountered repeated delays in the scheduled delivery dates, however. It did not receive 

the first portion of Bureau of Labor Statistics 

space until July 1980, with the remainder due 

by December of that year. By then GAO will 

have acquired another 70,000 square feet of 

space and will occupy about two-thirds of 

the bUilding. 14 

The renovation effort is scheduled for completion in 1981. In all, 556,000 square feet will 

have been renovated at a cost of over $4.5 million. But that will not end the task of ensuring 

that GAO employees have a satisfactory working 

environment That remains the day-to-day concern of the Office of Administrative Services. 

The "Operations Manual" 

Perhaps it could be said that GAO will become a mature agency-one which is fully developed--when it completes a detailed set of 

instructions to its employees known as the "Operations Manual. " This set of 10 thick looseleaf 

binders now available to all GAO employees 

contains administrative instructions and procedures on every imaginable subject from abbreviations to zip codes. Its objective is to assure 

effective communication by providing current, 

authoritative direction through directives that are 

complete, concise, easy to understand. and readily accessible. As a manual system it largely succeeds in meeting this objective. Instructions are grouped to provide each 

specialized audience complete information on a 

specific subject. Examples of the groupings are: 

organizations and functions, travel and transportation, and emergency preparedness and civil 

defense. The specificJnstructions can be readily 

revised and updated. 

These handy, how-ta-do-it manuals were a 

significant improvement over the previous system. Before they existed GAO's procedures for 

communicating Office poliCies and instructions 

were the subject of conSiderable discussion and 

some confusion among the divisions and offices 

and management services personnel. There was 

no central source where all GAO's administrative 

operating procedures could be found. They were 

generally divided up among Comptroller General Orders. personnel management manuals 

and memorandums, and various unaffiliated and 

uncontrolled interoffice memorandums. The 

Comptroller General Orders, the primary set of 

directives, was organized so that subjects were 

not developed completely in anyone part. The 
policies, the organizations and functions, and the 

delegations of authority pertaining to a given 

subject all had to be looked up separately, In 1971 it had become clear that GAO had 

outgrown such a fragmented system, and OAPS 

was instructed to update and revise it. Material 

pertaining to GAO's extemal accounting and 

auditing functions, such as that contained in the "Comprehensive Audit Manual" and the "Re- pon Manual. " was excluded from the project 

scope, 

To assist in developing a new system, which 

came to be known as the "Operations Manual," 

GAO hired a consultant from the National Ar- chives for 6 months," Her major contribution 

was developing a set of subject classification 

codes, OAPS staff then built on her work toward 

a simple, flexible system, One of their first major 

tasks was to develop procedures lor distributing 

the individual orders, The goal was to ensure 

that those who needed to see each order re- ceived it but that others who had no interest did 

not. It was agreed that some orders would be 

sent to all employees, but most would be distrib- uted to a more limited audience with the idea 

Format For Completing The 

Firet Page Of A GAO Order 

that sets of manuals would be located where they 

would be accessible to all. 

The next step was to conven the Comptroller 

General Orders, personnel management man- uals and memorandums, and other issuances 

into "Operations Manual" orders, The first or- der, describing how the "Operations Manual" 

system works. was issued in October 1973, 2 

months after GAO management had enthusi- astically approved the system, Over the next sev- eral years, the administrative services staff took 

the lead in converting existing orders and instruc- tions into "Operations Manual" format and style, a process that continues as this is written, As new, appropriate subjects for orders are 

recognized. the division or office having primary 

responsibility for the subject is responsible for 

drafing an order. obtaining the proper coordination and approval of the order by all other 

offices involved with the subject, and determin- ing the order's distribution, Each order contains 

all policy. delegations. and procedural informa- tion pertinent to the subject Interoffice memo- randums still have their place. but, in general, 

divisions and offices are encouraged to use orFigure 16-4 

I .... _ .... ' ... '~ 

~ Uft" . d $ •• , .. I Go .... 1 Ace ... " .. 0 11 ... f " ! Order . ...... We .... 1 ... f .. -' O Identify Ihe sub~cl cltlsslft· n INTERNA L orders. type ...... ,. I i 

here lhe offiCial office symbol 109,)0.1 '(j Clition code assigned to the 

cl lhe isSUing dIVISion or specifIC order 

office ~_.l. m 

If the sub~cl cannol be 

~Kr. .. __ Ul?l)fll,\TJIII AIIO IIX\ICIIn tI .,. DI'rIJaft or AIo'llDllAl. 

;;> 

lI£0./II8 COni en! 01 order governs completed on one line . use of chapters Sections type tht! second line In the / C*rTD I. ru- ~III _ L I __ Tlo. may be used to divide chap. potltlOn show n tel'S (or a ppendlxe5) 

h.,I • .., .... /"" !t..z=.-.. ~~'iiflif:!"!:' ;...:~, ::: •• :;"',:!!=:.~\O _~I :,::: :I ~ V.I. . ... 0._ .. 1 ""'_tl,.. ortJ •• 1'11 . .. , ..... ""lq 1",. ... tI .... . !WI ">C_II~ ' " 

I ..... 1.a\oO .. 0l or .. "_, ' U W'l ty 

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• . 

" ~_'" _ '10' j •• at '''Il'00' '10. 19'-~. ~ .... II .... . 

• :100'\\"" 1~ lOr "~"1I . t.o .. ~'l. ~hl ()cwI.cno'" ..... _~ IUl U· S.t • 

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The Initia ling ofhce will . r.. ,,11 _ 0 .. ". 1!I".o1.,r _t .. 1'1"". " _ .... 

seleC1 Ihe appropnate '. ":Lt l. ~ .. t v.- I ..... po ....... Ofn·., ~"' ...... 'n. __ . I'>'I..~, l Type Ihe name of Ihe dlVwkm I 

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entered here :::. .-... - o;,~ .~ . _ ~ '-'-'" orrl ~ . r ,.\., ...... ,"" PL. ... I .... M a. .... I~ 

251 
ders as the primary vehicle for communicating 

significant operating information. All orders must 

be reviewed and updated every year by their 

originators. 

The "Operations Manual" appears to be a 

successful communications tool. It is logical and 

easy to use, and most new orders can be readily 

associated with one of the existing subject clasSification codes. The distribution codes. recognized as a simple way to target an audience outside of using grade levels or names. have been 

adopted for use on other issuances besides orders. The manual has been accepted by diviSions 

and offices. who are generally cooperating in re- placing memorandums with orders. And. most 

important of all, GAO staff have at least one 

authoritative source they can turn to for answers 

to their policy and procedural questions. If there 

is any drawback in this system. it may be the 

very process of redUCing every conceivable internal process or procedure to a set of written 

instructions with the expectation they will be followed by everyone in the agency. As long as the 

instructions are perceived only as guides to be 

adapted or modified to suit the exigencies of reallife situations. they will be serving a useful 

purpose. 

.... '" ...... 

Management services is the last. but by no 

means the least, of the subjects covered in this 

document. Uke many of the other activities discussed in earlier chapters. management services 

have grown and developed greatly during the 

period, but the challenges ahead loom even 

larger. GAO vastly upgraded the management 

skiUs and resources devoted to this activity. As 

252 

just one example. in 1966 the top administrative 

officer was a GS-15 in charge of a small office 

periorming largely clerical functions. Today he 

is an Assistant Comptroller General who participates in aU the top-level councils and oversees 

a larger. more sophisticated, and broader-seoped 

set of organizations. Pin summarized the change 

this way: "Before we had an administrative organization that functioned like the corner momand-pop grocery store. Today we operate more 

like a supermarket. Both the services we provide 

and the attendant problems have grown to 

match," 

I Comptroller Gelle1'lIl SllIats. Memorandum [0 hellds of vls l1 ~ nnd of· 

flees, \7 Feb 1971 

2 Comptroller Geneml Staats, Memol'llndum 10 t! i:ld~ 01 dlvl lo !i and of Ilces, 16 Aug 1974. 

3. US Geneml Acco unDng Dlllce, W/lsh,ngton Regional Office. "ImprowmE!nfS Needed In Internal Controls ilnd AccounNng PractjcC5 01 the Unlt.:!d Stlltes General Accounl1 ng Olfttt'." report to the Comptroll er Gencnll. J"n II, 1971 

4 U S. Genenll Accountlng Ollke. (kner(l] Service5 and Controll!!!. " 1980 

Program Plen." pp. 6, 21 

5. Comptroll ... T Geneflll Staats. Memorllrn:lum to ht;!ads of dlV!slon~ lind of· flces. 19 ApI 1976 

6, U,S Gcneml Accoundng Ofllcle. T IIsk Force on GAO Inlormatlon SeMCI!S 

lind ActIVlUl'S. ""Repon af Progress ond Rn.ultf' IApl ]978) 

7 GAO Ordel 0138 I . "]nformatlon Te<:hnology" (Apr 17. 1980) 

8 GS&C 191'10 Progrllm Plan, P'P 8. 12 

l) Pl1cl! Wa!elhouse & Co .. AIRES Dellllled Functional SpI..'C!/lcallons. Vol 

I. Aug. 29 1979. pp. 25·3 1 

10. Public L."w 89·306 IOcr 30, 19651 

11 AnwrM::.!In Mnn./lgem~ ! Systllms. " Asslgnment Mnnagqment nod Pll'ln 

nlng System Reporu Users Guide." Aug. 1979. DP I 2 

12. GS&C 1980 Progt1'm P\a.n. P 47 

13. LofTY A HerTlTh!rnn. "" GAO'~ Space Renovatlon Eflon. Prolect MflOaye 

men! in thl" Real World,"" The GAO Reulew. (Spring 1978J. p, 6 

14 "" Long Ra~ Space 1mproWmen! .. nd Ulillzatlon PI .. n felT the Gilneml Accounting Olfke .. Mar, 1980. PI> 1 2. 

15. Thomas D Morns. A5iWant to the Comptro/ler Gencml 101' MIIMgIlmenr Sc!rvice. Mcmomndum to Comptroller Cknenl\ SlMts. 7 Oct 1971 

Epilogue 

The foregoing chapters have chronicled a 

long list of policies, programs, activities, and accomplishments at GAO from 1966 to 1981. Few 

would disagree that the institution is stronger and 

more capable today than it was 15 years ago. 

But there are at least two paradoxes associated 

with this growth and development Hrst, while 

it is now stronger and more capable, GAO may 

have as far to go in achieving today's more am- bitious and complex goals than those of 15 years 

ago. The agency has come far enough to realize 

how long a Journey it has undertaken. Second. 

while the institution's contributions to the Congress have become increasingly recognized, the 

course GAO will chart for the future is still not 

fully settled. Key questions include: What is the 

optimum balance of work in the broad areas o( 

(1) financial audits and financial management, 

(2) economy and efficiency reviews, and (3) program results reviews? And at what point will the 

amount of direct assistance to the Congress infringe on its necessary flexibility to do work required under its basic statutes? 

GAO today has available a multidisciplinary 

staff which includes accountants and evaluators, 

attorneys, actuaries, claims adjudicators and examiners, engineers, computer and information 

specialists, social scientists, personnel management specialists, and other disciplines. They are 

supplemented, as needed, by consultants and 

experts. These resources provide the Office with 

the range of skills. experience, and ability-on 

hand or on call-to perform requested audits 

and evaluations in just about any subject area 

Commenting on the 200th anniversary of the 

Senate, Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd said: 

Euery year we appropriate billions of 

dol/ars to fund domestic, military, and in-. temationa programs of uast consequence 

to the people of this nation and of the 

world. But we realize that the ad of legisla~ng or appropriating does not automatically solue a social, or economic, or political problem; .nor does it absolue the 

Senate of further responsibilities ouer those 

problems. We must haue legislatiue ouersight of the administration of the lows we 

pass; and we must haue strid accountability for the funds we appropriate. • • • 

When we consider the magnitude of the 

Federal gouemment and its annual budget 

today, we realize how difficult a task we 

would face in demanding such accountability if it were not for the assistance and 

uigilonce of the United States General Accounting Office. It is our largest and, in 

254 

many respects, perhaps our most important congressional support agency. Since its crea~on, the General Account- ing Office has euolued most admirably to 

prouiiie Congress with the kind of professionalism, nonpartisanship, and objediuity 

in its reports and recommendations that we 

need to perform our appropria~on and 

ouersight responsiblities. The GAO has become an integral part of the legislatiue process, and a support agency which makes 

possible a uigorous and independent Congress. 

The organization seems to haw a sound leg· 

islative charter and extensive resOurces to convey authoritative, unbiased information to a 

Congress always in need. And even the establishment of inspectors general will not diminish 

the need for an independent institution like GAO 

to review financial and management problems 

from Its broad perspective. 

The concern most frequently voiced about 

GAO's future Is about Its independence, both to 

choose what subjects it reviews and how it carries 

them out The Office has been made stronger 

and more independent by getting its own personnel system and enforcement mechanisms for 

its access-to-records authority. But Congress has 

been looking more closely at how the organization pursues 115 mission and the substantive 

requests for individual studies are still on the rise. 

This Is not to say that either oversight or dired 

requests for assistance are inappropriate, merely 

that the Comptroller General needs to preserve 

sufficient latitude to set GAO's agenda and carry 

it out 

Internally, the differences will no doubt persist 

between those who support the trend toward 

more program analyses and evaluations using 

state-of-the-art techniques and the conservators 

wedded to financial and management audits using the more traditional approaches. Today there 

is room (or both in the agency. Employees will 

continue to be concerned about their place in 

the organization, the opportunity (or constructive 

accomplishmen~ and their chances for advancement In an environment that ensures equal opportunity based on merit. With a willingness to 

compromise and good communication among 

management and staff and between headquarters and regional offices, there is no great barrier 

to addressing these 'issues effectively. 

At the close o( his book Mosher restated very 

divergent views about what GAO ought to be 

like in the future. Citing the value of GAO's credibility and the need to move cautiously as the 
agency becomes increasingly involved in ques- tions of policy and program, he alluded to the 

agency's unique position to attack problems that 

cross both executive agency organizational lines 

and congressional commmittee jurisdictions. He 

also urged that a balance be struck between 

short-range demands and long-range opportunities. There really is nothing further to offer ex- cept to note that the next 15 years will likely be 

as challenging and stimulating as were the last 

255 
Importance Of Maintaining GAO's Role As An Independent Agency 

In The Legislative Branch To Assist Congress In Its Oversight Of 

The Executive Branch And Assuring That Appropriated Funds Are 

Expended Legally, Economically, And Effectively 

EDITOR'S NOTE: This preuiously unpublished poper grew out of discussions between 

Comptroller General Staats and Assistant Com p -

troller General Ellsworth Morse about how to 

imp roue understanding concerning the concept 

of the Comptroller General's independence. In 

recent years, gouernment audit instituHons in 

other naHons haue strengthened their independence through modifications to prouisions for 

appointing and remouing chief auditors. This 

subject recelues attention in the United States 

from time to time in connection with proposals to 

reuise the means IJy which the Comptroller General is appointed. This Office's independence also 

was questioned in a motion to dismiss filed by the 

Deportment of Justice in response to a ciuil action 

brought by the Comptroller General in 1975 

against the Secretary of Housing and Urban Deuelopment for impounding approPriatedfunds in 

uiolation of the Impoundment Contro Act of 

1974. 

Some haue asserted that, as head of an agen- cy in the legislatiue branch. the Comptroller General acts as an "agent of the Congress" and is a 

legislatiue officer. On the other hand. GAO has 

asserted, and the courts haue confirmed, that the 

Comptroller General. while performing duties 

that are clearly an adjunct of the leslslatiue pro- cess, is an Independent officer oJ the United 

States who also performs many nonlegislatiue 

junctions. Stated simply in Staats' words, "He is 

an agent of Congress in the sense he junctions on 

their behalf. but he does not do their bidding. " 

Retaining this concept of independence requires 

that the Comptroller General remain a constitutional appointment made by the President. 

This poper has been updated. where appropriate, to reflect deuelopments following its preparation. 

The General Accounting Office. headed by 

the Comptroller General of the United States, 

is frequently referred to as an "independent 

oversight arm for the Congress, " the "investigative arm of the Congress," and "Congress' 

Watchdog over Federal spending." In all these 

references. it is clear the Comptroller General is 

responsible to the Congress although exercising 

wide latitude as to matters which he audits and 

complete independence in reaching his conclusions and recommendations. 

The framers of the Budget and Accounting 

Act of 1921 wanted to establish a strong agency 

256 

to serve the Congress. They wanted to head it 

with an official who, to use the words of one 

legislator, would carry out his audits, studies and 

investigations fearlessly and free at all times to 

report to the Congress his findings, including criticisms of executive agency actions which. in his 

opinion .. are improper. illegal, and inefficient or 

ineffective. The Congress recognized that in 

playing this role it had to be clear to all concerned 

that the Comptroller General was performing in 

an unbiased, objective, and nonpartisan manner 

and free of any fear of reprisal for taking actions 

or reaching conclusions that might be objectionable to the executive agency concerned or to 

any congressional committee or Member of 

Congress. 

In order to reinforce this objective: 

l. The Comptroller General is appointed for a 

IS-year, nonrenewable term. 

2. The Comptroller General is removable only 

by the Congress;(by jOint resolution) and 

then only for specified reasons, or by 

impeachment. 

3. While appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the President cannot 

unilaterally remove the Comptroller General. 

4. Provision is made for a Deputy Comptroller 

General who is similarly appointed by the 

PreSident and confirmed by the Senate. 

Other GAO staff members are employed under a personnel management system which 

is statutorily independent of that which governs executive branch employees. 

5. The Comptroller General is provided with 

retirement arrangements similar to those of 

Federal judges. 

6. As a J'residentially-appointed officer of the 

Unite States, the Congress delegated to the 

Comptroller General a number of "executive 

type' functions, primarily designed to assure 

that an offiCial accountable to the Congress 

was able to assist the Congress in assuring 

the financial accountability of the executive 

agencies. These include: 

• Auditing and settling the accounts of 

accountable officers. 

• Issuing opinions on the legality of proposed expenditures of public (unds. 

• Prescribing accounting prinCirles and 

standards for the guidance 0 the executive branch agencies. 

• Countersigning Treasury warrants. 
• Collecting or settling claims by or against 

the United States. 

• Bringing suits to require the release of 

impounded budget authority. 

• Participating as a voting member of the 

Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board. 

See Attachment A for more detailed state- ment about these functions. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL'S EXECUTIVE-typE FVNC110NS 

The constitutional power of the Congress to 

authorize and to make appropriations of public 

funds-the "power of the purse" -provides one 

of the most effective controls over the operations 

of our Government. 

The courts have recognized that many of the 

Comptroller General's most significant dutiesduties that assist the Congress in the exercise of 

its "power of the purse"-have been classified 

as "executive" functions. U.S. ex rei. Brookfield 

Canst. Co., Inc. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94 

(D.D.C.), affd U.S. App. D.C. 254, 339 F. 2d 

753 (1964). The Supreme Court. in Buckley v. 

Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, at 128. footnote 165, has 

suggested that his constitutional authority to 

carry out these duties turns upon the fact of his 

presidential appointment. 

A change in the method of selecting the 

Comptroller General to place the appointment 

power in the Congress rather than the President 

would alter his constitutional status and. there- fore. impair his legal authority to perform these 

"executive" duties. thus weakening the ability 

of the Congress to see that public funds are prop- erly expended. Such a change would risk disturbing the delicate constitutional balance that 

has been achieved and maintained for the 55 

years that the Office has served the Congress. The courts might hold that the Comptroller General. if appOinted by the Congress. could no 

longer perform these executive functions. Such 

a holding would strip away large areas of the 

Comptroller General's ability to safeguard the 

interests of the Congress in seeing that appropriated funds are expended in accordance with 

law and the intent of the Congress. 

As a result. this authority would be vested in 

executive branch officers subordinate to the 

President and dependent upon him for their jobs. 

This may be a chilling prospect when one considers the statement made by President 

Cleveland. when told by his Comptroller (then 

removable by the President) that he could not 

use a certain appropriation for a given purpose: 

"I must have that fund. and if I can not change 

the opinion of my Comptroller. I can change my 

Comptroller." (Remarks of Rep. Good in connection with the Budget and Accounting Act. 

1921 . 61 Congo Rec. 982 (1921)). 

The Congress in 1921 recognized that an independent official with such powers and duties 

had to be an officer of the United States and 

prOvided for his appointment accordingly. At the 

same time. it registered its clear intent that this 

officer was not an executive branch official when 

it specified that he was independent of the ex- ecutive branch. was accountable to the Congress, and, once confirmed by the Senate. could 

only be removed from office by joint resolution 

of the Congress or by impeachment 

NEED FOR COMPTROLLER GENERAL-GAO 

typE FVNC110N 

The U.S. form of government with its separation of powers and checks and balances requires a Comptroller General-GAO type function 

if it is to operate properly. There must be an 

efficient, independent audit system and the Congress must have a source of impartial and un- biased information. including evaluations of 

Government programs and activities that cannot 

be obtained without such an office. The quality 

of the information produced is a direct function 

of an independence of operation and a competence of performance that derives from that 

position of independence. As one key congressional committee staff member once said. "If we 

did not have a GAO. we would have to invent 

one." 

Audit institutions throughout the world look 

up to the Comptroller General and the GAO 

because of the long strides made in advancing 

the art of auditing and evaluating govemmental 

programs and activities and providing objective, 

unbiased reports to the Congress as well as to 

executive agencies and the public with evaluations and conclusions on executive agency per· 

formance and with recommendations for im- provement It is most unlikely that these advances 

could have been made without the independence of leadership and action to pursue them 

that characterize the Office of the Comptroller 

General. 

Preserving the independence of the Comptroller General. as deSCribed, is an essential component of a modern and conceptually advanced 

governmental audit system. Such a system, as it 

has evolved in the U.S. Government. enables the 

257 
Comptroller General to carry out an independent 

audit and evaluation function across the board 

in the Government on the basis of modern con- cepts of management control. He has the flexI- bility to select what requires audit attention based 

on known needs of the Congress and its com- mittees and on his conclusions as to effectiveness 

of agency management control systems. This 

freedom of action should not be degraded if the 

Congress and the pubUc want to keep a strong 

audit system as a key concept in our system of 

checks and balances. A weakening of his independence and flexi- bility to operate could conceivably result in GAO 

audit and evaluation efforts being directed only 

at subjects that key congressional committees 

want audited or investigated. A related result 

would be lack of balanced audit attention to all 

governmental e,rograms and activities by reason 

of pressure to 'layoff' some or by directing that 

so much be done on certain programs that no 

resources would be left to devote to others. This 

kind of a system could not be depended upon 

to produce objective and impartial examinations 

of Government programs and activities with log- ical conclusions and recommendations for im- provement This system might well lead to an 

audit system controlled in effect by congressional 

committees. In turn, this could lead not only to 

audit chaos and a resulting slackening of independent audit pressure for a high degree of 

agency management performance and improve- ment but also to lack of auditing of any kind on 

behalf of the Congress and the public In some 

important program areas. 

ROLE OF THE GAO IN PROVIDING DIRECT 

ASSISTANCE TO COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS 

OFCONGRESS 

GAO is frequently referred to as a "support 

agency" along with the Congressional Research 

Service. the Congressional Budget Office, and 

the Office of Technology Assessment • • • 

These agencies devote full time to meeting the 

specific requests which are made to them by 

committees and Members of Congress. They 

work in close adjunct to the Committees and 

represent, to a vety considerable extent, an ex- tension of the staff of those committees. 

The General Accounting Office devotes roughly 

two-fifths of its effort to meeting similar requests. This role has been recognized from the beginning 

of the Office in 1921 when the Comptroller Gen- eral was directed to "make such investigations 

and reports as shall be ordered by either House 

of Congress or by any committees of either 

House having jurisdiction over revenue, appro- priations, or expenditures. The Comptroller 

General shall also. at the request of any such 

committee, direct assistants from his office to fur- nish the committee such aid and information as 

it may request." Thus, the Congress recognized 

this dual role from the outset. 

258 

This dual role was further recognized in the 

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974 whiChtro- vided that the Comptroller General shoul re- view and evaluate the results of Government 

programs and activities when ordered by either 

House of Congress} or upon his own initiative, or when requestea by any committee of the 

Congress having jurisdiction over such programs 

or activities. 

The primary role of the Comptroller General, 

however, continues to be that of the independent 

initiator of audits and reviews of programs of the 

executive branch agencies to assure the Con- gress that these programs are carried out in ac- cordance with law, the intent of the Congress, with fiscal integrity. and as efficiently and effectively as possible. He is expected to-draw con- clusions and make recommendations-unpopular 

as they may be- for improvements in these pro- grams. He is essentially a critic of executive 

branch operations, whereas the other congres- sional support agencies are intended to provide 

primarily research and information services to 

committees and Members of Congress. 

ACCOVNTABIUI'Y OF THE COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL TO THE CONGRESS 

While the Comptroller General has been es- tablished by the Congress with a great measure 

of discretion and independent action, he is fully 

accountable to the Congress. The Congress has 

by law and by practice exercised its accounta- bility in several different ways: 

l. The Comptroller General must appear annually before the Congress for necessary op- erating funds lor the General Accounting 

Office, entailing detailed accounting as to the 

needs of the Office, its accomplishments in 

the prior year, and its plans for the future. 2. He must prepare an annual report to the 

Congress, setting forth the work which the 

Office has performed during the year and 

make special reports either on his own initiative or at the request of the committees of 

the Congress. 3. He is subject to baving his work reviewed by 

oversight committees of the Congress. in- cluding special committees established to examine the operations of the legislative branch 

(note particularly the • • • report of the 

Commission on the Operation of the Senate 

and the more recent review of the General 

Accounting Office conducted by the Select 

Committee on Congressional Operations of 

the House of Representatives). 

4. The GAO is being called upon increasingly 

to testily on its work before a multitude of 

congreSSional committees. • • • These 

hearings provide an opportunity for the commlttees to render a judgment on the adequacy of GAO's work. 
5. All actions or recommendations of the Comptroller General are subject to legislative action 

by the Congress or review by the courts. 

6. All reports of the Comptroller General to the 

Congress, unless classified for security reasons, are made public and. therefore, subject 

to the same scrutiny and criticism as reports 

or actions of any other part of the legislative 

branch. 

7. The Comptroller General can be removed for 

specified reasons of inefficient performance; 

permanent incapacitation. neglect of duty. 

malfeasance of office, or guilt of any fe lony 

or conduct involving moral turpitude, or by 

impeachment. 

NEED FOR AUDrrOR'S INDEPENDENCE 

WIDELY RECOGNIZED 

The method of selection of chief auditors and 

their tenure varies considerably from jurisdiction 

to jurisdiction. Many countries, however, have 

recognized the need for independence. For example. in Germany, the national at;ditor is appointed for life; in Canada, the Auditor General 

serves until age 65; in Italy and Denmark, the 

auditor serves until age 70; .France. the auditor 

serves until age 68. Similarly, the national auditor 

in most countries cannot be removed except for 

specific cause, and other statutory provisions 

have been established designed to assure independence of his actions and to prevent political 

interference in his decisions. _ 

The General Accounting Office. in~tand

ards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, 

Programs, Activities & Functions" issued in 

1972, provides that"* * * in all matters relating 

to the audit work, the audit organization and the 

individual auditors shall maintain an independent 

attitude." To maintain this necessary independence, the GAO made a number of suggestions 

but emphasized particularly that auditors'" • • 

should also be sufficiently removed from political 

pressures to ensure that they can conduct their 

auditing objectively and can report their concusions completely without fear of censure." 

In line with these standards, the GAO subsequently prepared drafts of model State laws 

which prOvided specific statutory language to 

assure necessary State auditor independence. 

The need for independence was widely recognized within the Congress when the 1921 legislation was being debated. Excerpts from statements made on this subject by leading Members 

of Congress are included as Attachment B. 

CONCW SION 

In the 60 years since the enactment of the 

Budget and Accounting Ac~ there has never 

been a major problem between the Comptroller 

General and the Congress. It is difficult to imagine any Comptroller General not willing to render 

a full accounting to the Congress for his stewardship. It is also difficult to imagine any President appointing a person to the post of Comptroller General who is not acceptable to both 

Houses of the Congress and both major political 

parties. A change in the method of appointment, 

therefore, can only lead to a weakening of the 

role of the Comptroller General and to rendering 

the General Accounting Office a less useful instrument to the Congress. 

259 
&lh1([1~nuffij)®IID1t & 

Executive-type Functions Of The 

Comptroller General Of The 

United States 

Settlement Of Public Accounts 

The Comptroller General's authority to settle 

public accounts is at the very heart of his responsibility to the Congress to assure that appropriated funds are properly spent and that the 

executive branch remains accountable to the 

Congress for their use. The assignments of responsibility. their significance and related legal 

authorities are discussed below. 

AUDITING AND SETILING THE ACCOUNTS OF 

ACCOUNTABLE omCERS 

31 U.S.c. 71 provides that all accounts in 

which the Govemment of the United States is 

concerned shall be settled and adjusted in the 

General Accounting Office. This authority carries 

with it the power to disallow payments determined to be improper. illegal. or otherwise in· 

correct and to hold accountable officers liable for 

such amounts. 

5 U.s. c. 5584 provides specifically in settling 

accounts for waiving. under certain conditions. 

claims arising from erroneous payments of pay 

or allowances. Other provisions of law authorize 

GAO to relieve accountable officers from liability 

for various kinds of losses. deficienCies. or illegal 

or otherwise improper payments. 

This function provides the basis of an impor· 

tant legislative branch check on the proper and 

legal handling of public funds by executive 

branch agencies. 

PRESCRIBING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND 

STANDARDS FOB THE GUIDANCE OF 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 

31 U.s.c. 66 provides that the Comptroller 

General shall prescribe the principles. standards. 

and related requirements for accounting to be 

observed by each executive agency. He also has 

the authority to prescribe the forms. systems. and 

procedures for administrative appropriation and 

fund accounting (31 U.S.c. 49). 

These autholities are regarded as an important type of legislative branch control over executive branch handling and accounting for public funds. The importance of having this authority 

vested in an officer of the United States in the 

legislative branch was emphatically reaffirmed by 

the Congress with the enactment of the Budget 

and Accounting Procedures Act in 1950. The 

report of the House Committee on Expenditures 

260 

in the Executive Departments in commenting on 

the First Hoover Commission proposal to transfer this authority to the Treasury stated: 

Under a policy established and steadfastly adhered to by the Congress. the 

Comptroller General of the United States. 

as an agent of the Congress. has been 

vested with authority to prescribe account- ing requirements for each of the executive 

agencies in order that appropriate audits 

might be made thereof and that the Congress might exercise control of appropriations and expenditures in the executive 

branch. The committee feels that this longestablished policy of Congress is an essential legislative control over public finanCial 

transactions. and must be held inviolate. It has. therefore. rejected this recommendation of the Hoover Commission. 

Issuing Opinions On The 

Legality Of Proposed 

Expenditures Of Public Funds 

31 U.S.c. 74 prOvides that heads of executive 

departments and their accountable officials may 

request and the Comptroller General shall render 

deCisions on any questions involving payments 

to be made by them. Advance decisions on the 

legality of proposed disbursements of public 

funds by executive agencies are binding on the 

GAO in auditing and settling accounlS. and the 

settlement of an account by the General Accounting Office is bincling upon the executive 

branch. Thus. this function provides an important check on compliance by executive branch 

agencies with the requirements of law relating 

to the handling of public funds. 

Growing out of the power to render advance 

decisions and to disallow credit for illegal or otherwise improper payments in auditing and settling accountable officers' accounts is the related 

function of rendering legal decisions on bid protests. These protests are received from unsuccessful bidders to supply goods or services to the 

Federal Govemment and who are aggrieved for 

one reason or another by the procurement agencies' decisions. Hundreds of these decisions are 

issued each year and represent an important service to the Government as a whole and to the 
co,:tractlng community in addition to providing 

an Important legal check on the propriety of ex· 

ecutive branch procurement activities. 

COUNTERSIGNING TREASURV WARRANTS 

31 USC. 76 provides: "AII warrants. when 

authorized by law and signed by the Secretary 

of the Treasury. shall be countersigned in the 

General Accounting Office." Under joint regu· 

lations of the Secretary of the Treasury and the 

Comptroller General over the years. the use of 

warrants to officially initiate recording of appro· 

priations on the books of the Treasury and of 

the agencies involved and document other cash 

receipt and disbursement transactions by the 

Treasury has been largely discontinued. They 

are still in use. however. for appropriations but 

countersignature in the GeneralAccounting Office 

has been discontinued except for those under 

continuing resolutions by the Congress. Count· 

ersigning of the warrants in these cases is considered an important procedural check on com· 

pliance of the executive branch with the provisions 

of the resolutions. 

COLLECTING OR SETfUNG CLAIMS BV OR 

AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 

31 U.s.c. 71 provides that claims by the 

Govemment of the United States or against it 

shall be settled and adjusted in the General Ac· 

counting Office. Other laws have authorized ex· 

ecutive branch agencies to settle their claims aris- ing from their activities. Some laws provide that 

sped fie types of claims against the United States 

be paid only after settlement by GAO. 

49 U.S.c. 66 authorizes transportation car· 

riers or forwarders to request the Comptroller 

General to review actions on their claims by the 

General Services Administration. 

31 U.S.c. 952 provides for the Attorney Gen· 

eral and the Comptroller General to jointly pro· 

mulgate regulations to be followed by Federal 

agencies in collecting. compromising. or discon· 

tinuing collection action of claims of the United 

States for money or property. 

31 U.S.c. 93 provides that the General Ac· 

counting Office shall superintend the recovery 

of all debts finally certified by it to be due the 

United States. 

These laws overall provide the GAO. a legislative branch agency. with appropriate author· 

ity to be directly involved in the processes of 

collecting or otherwise settling claims due the 

United States as well as claims against the United 

States. 

Bringing Suits To Require The 

Release Of Impounded Budget 

Authority 

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 31 

U.s.c. 1416. gives the Comptroller General the 

authOrity to bring civil actions against the Ex· 

ecutive to compel the release of impounded 

budget authority. In conferring this function upon 

the Comptroller General. which the Department 

of Justice has characterized as "executive:' the 

Congress has taken a firm stand on the question 

whether the Executive is to be allowed to de· 

termine which spending laws it might choose to 

ignore. 

The Comptroller General's function here is 

an effective mechanism for assuring that the Executive not thwart the will or trespass on the 

constitutional power of the Congress. The one 

suit brought under this Act. Staats v. Lynn. CA 

75-0551 (U.S. Disbict Court. D.C.). although 

not the subject of a decision by the Court. reo 

suited in the release of millions of doUars of Impounded budget authority. That case alone is 

strong evidence of the value of the Act to the 

Congress. If the Comptroller General were shorn 

of his authority to sue under the Act. impound· 

ments could once again burst forth as an issue 

leading to confrontations between the Congress 

and the Executive. 

Imposing And Collecting Civil 

Penalties Under The Energy 

Policy And Conservation Act Of 

1975 

Title V of the Energy Policy and Conservation 

Act of 1975 empowers the ComptroUer General 

to issue subpoenas and order disclosure of In· 

formation in connection with verification exam· 

inations of energy information submitted to certain Government agencies and financial 

information of vertically integrated petroleum 

companies. While this is an extension of Congress' inherent investigatory powers. the Act further authorizes the Comptroller General to assess 

civil penalties where orders to submit answers 

or records are violated. This power to assess civil 

penalties might be characterized as executive in 

nature. and therefore could be jeopardized were 

the Comptroller General appointed by Congress. 

Loss of this power would conSiderably diminish 

the force of the subpoena authority conferred by 

the Act 

261 
&1h1CIl~IluJJ[fi)®lJi)l1 J]3 

Quotations Concerning The 

Independence Of The 

Comptroller General 

Congressional debates in 1919-21 on the proposal to establish the General Accounting Office 

demonstrated that the Congress felt it was es- sential that the Office be free from political influ- ence and be as independent as is possible under 

our form of govemment The General Account- ing Office was established by the Budget and 

Accounting Act, 1921. 

Excerpts from the debates: 

INDEPENDENCE OF AcnON 

". • ' Our idea was that in some manner we 

should make these responsible head officers (of 

the GAO), having such tremendous powers and 

responsibilities, as independent as possible under 

our form of government, and should get as high 

a class of men as possible, and then give them 

the powers similar to what such officers have in 

other countries of the world and allow them to 

fearlessly cut down and cut out all the thousands 

of unnecessary expenditures of our Govern- ment They should be absolutely free and in- dependent of official influences. They will have 

to be cold-blooded and cut down appropriations 

in every c1irection that they deem proper and 

eliminate duplication and any superfluous em- ployees and antiquated methods and antiquated 

people and inaugurate efficiency and up-to-date 

business methods, and they have very great and 

far-reaching responsibilities, and they must have 

a free hand to properly perform their very great 

duties." 58 Congo Rec. 7129 (1919) (Remarks 

of Congressman Taylor of Colorado). 

....... "MR. BLAND. Did not the committee con- template that the comptroller general might not 

only be brought into conflict with the executive 

department and with the executive branches of 

the Government, but sometimes with one side 

or the other of the aisle in Congress, and possibly 

both sides, in the impartial c1ischarge of his 

duties? 

"MR. GOOD. Absolutely. That department 

ought to be independent and fearless to criticize 

wrong expenditures of money wherever it finds 

them. It ought to criticize inefficiency in every 

executive department where inefficiency exists. 

and one of the troubles with our present system 

is that the auditors dare not criticize. If they crit262 

icize, their political heads will come of(" 58 

Congo Rec. 7282 (1919). 

•• * •• 

"It was the intention of the committee that 

the comptroller general should be something 

more than a bookkeeper or accountant; that he 

should be a real critic, and at all times should 

come to Congress. no matter what the political 

complexion of Congress or the Executive might 

be, and point out inefficiency, if he found that 

money was being misapplied-which is another 

term for inefficiency-that he would bring such 

facts to the notice of the committees having jur- isdiction of appropriations." 61 Congo Rec. 1090 

(1921). (Remarks of Congressman Good). 

JUDICIAL CHARACTER OF omCE 

"Neither the President of the United States, a member of his Cabinet, nor anyone that have 

a claim before the comptroller general, has any 

right to dictate to him what his decision shall be 

upon the law and the facts involved in the case. It is a juclicial determination, just as clear and 

distinct as any question in court, and the chair- man of this committee is absolutely right when 

he says that judicial powers reside here and must 

be exercised by the comptroUer general. Beyond 

that the President cannot go: beyond that a Cab- inet officer cannot go; beyond that a claimant 

cannot go. There is a course of procedure, how- ever, which may be adopted. Anyone who feels 

aggrieved by the decision, taking issue with the 

fincling of the comptroUer, may go to the Couri 

of Claims and sue there to protect his rights, and 

may also go on to the Supreme Court of the 

United States. Here is a clirect line of judicial 

procedure." 58 Cong. Rec. 7278 (1919) (Remarks of Congressman Andrews). 

'" . . ... '" 

"Absolutely independent from the spending 

departments. We give it a judidal status. It ex- amines questions as a court examines questions, upon the law and upon evidence. " 58 Congo 

Rec. 7136 (1919) (Remarks of Congressman 

Hawley). 

'" '" '" ... ... 
"The position is a semijudicial one and the 

tenure in office is made secure so long as the 

official performs his work in a fearless and satisfactory way." 58 Congo Rec. 7085 (1919) 

(Remarks of Congressman Good). 

FREEDOM fROM POLITICAL 

CONSIDERAnONS 

"In creating the general accounting office and 

providing for the comptroller general and the 

assistant comptroller general, the committee was 

gUided by a single thought, and that was that 

these two officers should be placed upon a plane 

somewhat comparable to the position occupied 

by Federal judges. The positions are semijudicial, 

and it was the opinion of the committee that we 

should remove them as far as possible from political considerations. It was considered that as 

to the President's appointment. if it was made 

a political office, the President would in all likelihood appoint some one of his own political 

faith. [f the political situation should change and 

a PreSident of some other political faith should 

assume the duties of that office. then that succeeding President would likewise appoint some 

one of his own political belief. It was the desire 

of the committee that this situation should be 

avoided if possible. 

"You will recall that a former President, somewhat miffed because a Comptroller of the T reasury had ruled against his contention. sent word 

to the comptroller that if he could not change 

the opinion of the comptroller he could change 

the comptroller. It was the opinion of the committee that that condition should not be possible 

in the office that we were creating. an office that 

is to be, as it were, an arm of the Congress. 

where the official might be compelled to say to 

the executive officials. 'This appropriation shall 

not be expended for any other purpose than that 

expressly provided for in the appropriation.' We 

all know the tremendous influence that has always been brought upon the Comptroller of the 

Treasury, no matter who was President of the 

United States or to what political party he belonged, or who might occupy the position of 

comptroller." 59 Congo Rec. 8610 (1920) (Remarks of Congressman Good). 

APPOINTMENT 

"MR. GOODYKOONTZ. Does not he think 

that the comptroller general would be rather an 

agent or a mere arm of Congress, which itself 

has the power to select committees or agencies 

to gather information for it. and does not come 

within the category of general officers contemplated to be beyond the jurisdiction of Congress 

itself? 

" MR. GOOD. It was the opinion of the committee that framed the law that the officer we 

were creating here was an officer of the United 

States, and his appointment would have to fall 

under the provisions of Article U of section 2 of 

the Constitution." 59 Congo Rec. 8612 (1920). 

ABILITY TO OPERATE FEARLESSLY WITHOUT 

FEAR OF REMOVAL 

" By creating this department (GAO), Congress will have applied a practical business policy 

to the administration of the Govemment's fiscal 

affairs. Men will be employed as auditors who 

owe their positions to their training and ability 

and who do not secure their positions as a reward 

for political service. They will be fearless in their 

examinations, and can criticize, without fear of 

removal, executives who misuse appropriations 

or whose offices are conducted in an inefficient 

manner." 58 Congo Rec. 7085 (1919) (Remarks 

of Congressman Good). 

* ... '* ... *' 

"The creation of an independent auditing 

department will produce a wonderful change. 

The officers and employees of this department 

will at all times be going into the separate de- partments in the examination of their accounts. 

They will discover the very facts that Congress 

ought to be in possession of and can fearlessly 

and without fear of removal present these facts 

to Congress and its committees." 58 Congo Rec. 

7085 (1919) (Remarks of Congressman Good). 

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL THROUGH POWER TO 

REMOVE 

" MR. FESS. In other words. the man who is 

appOinted may be independent of the appointing 

power. and at the same time if the legislative 

branch finds that he is not desirable, aTthough 

he may be desirable to the appointin~ , power, 

the legis)ative branch can remove hIm'!' 

" MR. HAWLEY. Yes ' * *." (58Cong. Rec. 

7136 (1919)). 

.. ... ... ... ... 

263 
... • • If the bill is passed this would give the 

legislative branch of the Government control of 

the audit, not through the power of appointment, 

but through the power of removal. It seems to 

me that the whole plan gets back to the scheme 

of the Constitution of the United States, It restores something of the power that Congress formerly had and ought to have, but which in practice has been iarQeIv taken over by the Executive." 

58 Congo Rec. flu (1919) (Remarks of Congressman Temple). 

••••• 

... • • The report of the comptroller general 

should be made to the power which makes the 

appropriations • • '. We have control of the 

purse, and the Executive has no control of any 

money except moneys appropriated by Congress. The report should be made to the appropriating power, and the auditing power, it seems 

to me, with Its judicial functions considered especially should be independent of the executive 

264 

power as are other officen; exerdsing Judicial 

functions. The President of the United States has 

no right to remove a Justice of the Supreme 

Court or any other judge. Why should he have 

the right to remove the man who exercises judicial functions in interpreting the appropriating 

acts of Congress?" 58 Congo Rec. 7280 (1919) 

(Remarks of Congressman Temple). 

. '" '" '" '" 

"We thought that these men, having a judicial 

status, ought to have a judicial tenure of office. 

We have thought that they ought to be secure 

in the tenure of office unless they were incompetent, guilty of malfeasance of office, or dereliction of duty, or have otherwise shown themselves unfit to hold the place. Then they can be 

removed If In the judgment of the two Houses 

of Congress they ought to be removed." 58 

Congo Rec. 7136 (1919) (Remarks of Congressman Hawley). 

INDEX 

abuse and fraud, efforts to combat 61-62 

access to records: 70, 115; continuing 

problems of. 78--79 

accountability: of diviSions, 143; of people, 

91-92 

accounting: and Financial Management 

Division, 26, 47; computer based, 49; 

DIVISIon, 42, 44, 56, 58, 120; early, 42; 

early efforts to improve, 42-43; efforts 

toward approval, 45; principles and 

standards-story, 45; principles, standards 

and fiscal procedures, 120; requirements of 

regulatory agencies, standardizing, 52; 

schools for minorities and women. 194; 

system approvals, 44-45. 47-49; systems. accelerating the approval of. 47-49 

Accounting and Auditing: Act of 1950, 46, 47, 58, 104; Policy staff, 120, 122: 

Programming, Scheduling, and Reporting 

System, 239 

accrual accounting: 43-44 

activities of GAO: 84 

adapting the Office to achieve Staats' goals: 

89-92 

administrative: aspects of report processing, 172; Information Resources System, 246; 

procedures in procurement bid protest 

procedures, 232; remedies in procurement 

bid protest procedures, 232-233 

advisory committees in equal employment: 

199 

AdvisoryCommittee on the Handicapped: 199 

Affirmative Action Plan of 1972: 195-196. 

198--199 

agency comments: 172-173 

Agency for International Development: 73 

Agnew, Spiro: 25 

Ahart. Gregory: % , 101, 136 

Air Force: F-111 Aircraft, 79; test equipment 

contracts, 78 

AIRES: 246 

American Institute of Certified Public Account_ 

ants: 52, 59, 60, 178 

American Society for Public Administration: 

178 

Anchorage, Alaska-story: 216 

Anderson, William J.: 78 

annual audit requirements: 108 

anti-discriminationlhuman relations program: 

204 

Anti-Poverty Program: 18 

Appalachia: 3 

appointment of Comptroller General: 113, 114 

Appropriations and Government Operations 

Committee: 29 

266 

approval process of GAO: 47-49 

approval rate of accounting systems: 44-45 

Arab-Israeli War: 126 

argument and debate among staff: 90 

Armed Services Committees: 19 

arms limitation: 2 

assassination: 2 

assignment Management and Planning 

System, 247-249; Review Group, 92, 143, 163; selection and approval, 143-144; 

structures diversified but conformity to basic 

management principles required, 153-154 

assistance to Congress by GAO: 108 

Association of Government Accountants: 178 

Atomic Energy Commission: 44, 126, 127 

approvals of accounting systems: 44-45 

attempts to expedite system approvals: 45 

attorney trainees: 230 

audit(ing): Division, 120, 208, 209: Forums. intergovernmental, 65-67; of Governmental 

Corporations. 108; of installed systems. 49: 

policy in GAO, evaluation of, 58--61; 

Practices. development of. 56; procedure. 

early. 9-11 ; responsibility for, 217; staff, building and diversifying of, 174-178; 

standards, 59-60 

authority: of GAO. 70, 79; of team leaders, 153 

Automated Management Data Systems: 

217- 218 

Automated Personnel Accounting System: 186 

automatic data processing: 27, 136, 238. 239; 

in DOD, 37; in the military, 35 

Automatic Data Processing Group: 47 

awards: 182-183 

Back Pay Act 232 

bank failures: 72- 73 

Banking Act of 1933: 72 

banking agencies: 72-73 

Barmby, Dr. John: 178 

Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales: 181. 184 

Bentsen, lloyd: 76 

bill payments by GAO: 243-244 

bills: affecting GAO, 26; in Congress, reports 

on, 26 

Black Caucus. of GAO: 112, 195 

BLR studies: 22 

blue book (see also red book, yellow book): 

58--59 

Boards and Commissions-story: 85 

Bolling, Richard, Congressman: 8 

Bonneville Power Administration: 126 

Brady, Bernard (A I ): 27 

Brandon. Felix R. , II: 185. 186 
Brasfield, Karney A.: 120 

British Parliament: 9 

• 

broadened role of auditors, goal of GAO: 88 

Brooke, Edward, Senator: 21 

Brooks, Jack, Representative: 27. 63, 113. 

114 

Brown. Richard L.: 241 

budget: 4; ceiling, 4 

Budget Act of 1974: 4 

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921: 7,9. 16, 

42, 78, 104 

Budget Committee: 96 

budget-planning relationship, development of: 

144 

budget process, new, shaped by Congress, 

and GAO interests: 105-108 

Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 

1950: 10, 43 

budgeting and accounting systems, early: 42 

bureaucracy. growth in: 96-98 

Bureau of the Budget: 11. 42, 85. 123 

C-5A aircraft: 20 

Calvelli, Alfred M.: 217 

Campbell, Joseph: 11. 72. 93, 120, 174 

Canfield, Monte: 96, 126, 127 

career: counseling. Office wide, 181; Level 

Council, 153; management committee, 179. 

184. 185; Management Committee Task 

Force, 187; Management Task Force, 240; 

paths. 153 

Carter, Jimmy, President: 5, 61 , 188 

challenging work: 153 

changing attitude toward serving Congress: 

17-19 

charter of GAO: 104-118 

Checklist for Report Writers and Reviewers: 

165 

Chelimsky, Eleanor: 131 

Chiles, Lawton. Senator: 63 

China: 2 

Chrysler Corporation: 230 

Chrysler Loan Guarantee (1979): 13; Board. 

118, 230 

Circular A-102. Uniform Administrative 

Requirements for Grants in Aid to State and 

Local Govemments: 61 

Citizens' Advocate Center: 196-198 

Civil: Accounting and Auditing Division, 120; 

agency acquisitions come under review. 

34-35; and Defense Accounting and 

Auditing Division, 209; Division. 96, 122, 

170, 213; Rights Act of 1964. 189, 194; 

Service CommiSSion, 45, 76. 174. 184, 

188, 194, 205; Service Commission Audit, 

184-185; Service Reform Act. 188-185: 

Service Commission, 45, 76, 174. 184, 

188, 194, 205; Service Commission Audit, 

184-185: Service Reform Act, 188, 198 

classification of auditors: 176 

Cleveland: 52 

collaboration with executive agencies: 49-50 

Commission: on Budget Concepts-story, 47; 

on Government Procurement. 34, 232; on 

Govemment Procurement (1969), 12 

Committee: for Improvement of Report 

Processing and Review Procedures. 170, 

214; on House Administration, 27: on 

Report Processing and Review Procedures, 

239 

communications skills of GAO staff: 163 

Community: Action Program, 31 ; and 

Economic Development Division, 99, 127, 

148; Services Administration, 62 

competitive selection process in equal 

employment: 180, 205-206 

Comprehensive Audit Manual: 11, 58, 154, 

162, 167, 209-210 

Comprehensive Employment and Training Act: 

62 

Comptroller General: appointment of, 

113-114: background and experience. 85: 

goals and objectives. 86-88; how he 

functioned. 84-89; interacting with people, 

85-86; nominees for, 89; office, title, 

tenure, 84: powers of, 16 

computer based accounting systems: 49 

computers, the automatic data processing joint 

program, further steps to activate: 49 

conflict between Executive and Legislative 

Branches: 4 

Congress: 6-8, 11; decentralized. 7; 

dominance of, 6; evolution of, 6-8; 

increasing demands, 12-13; increased 

activities for GAO, 88; interest of in equal 

opportunity efforts of GAO, 198; makeup 

of, 7; members of, working for, 20-22; 

powers of. 6-8; reforms of, 7-8; relations 

with. 213: strengthening its role, 7-8; ties 

with. 16 

CongreSSional: Budget Act of 1974, 28, 38; 

Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 

1974, 13, 104, 105-106, 127, 128; Budget 

Office, 13, 70, 80: car wash-story, 27; 

Information Services Group, 38. 129; 

Quarterly, 8; Record, 235; Research 

Service, 70, 79, 105; support agencies, 

coordination with. 79-82: Technology 

Assessment Board, 80 

Conrardy, William N.: 136, 198 

consolidated financial statements: 50 

consolidated management services 

organization. creation of: 240-241 

Constitution: 4 

construction: 20 

consultants (see also experts): 108. 112, 163, 

176-177 

consultants panels: of Comptroller General, 

94-95: on Defense Programs, 132; of 

Educators, 95-96 

consumer protection: 35 

control reports: 248-249 

Cook County Hospital in Chicago: 19- 20 

cooperation: from other agencies, 70; 1AIith 

executive agencies 77-78 

267 
:oordination between divisions: 140-141 

:orps of Engineers: 46 

Corporation Audit Division: 120 

Corporation for Public Broadcasting: 4 

corporations: governmental, audits of. 108 

Cost Accounting Standards Board: 5l. .52: composition of. 51 ; GAO 

recommendations on, 51; standards of. 

51-52; views on. 52 

Counseling and Career Development Center: 

181 

Criminal History Information System: 70 

criteria of GAO evaluations: 38-39 

criticism of GAO: 162-163 

Dartmouth Institute: 182 

Data Processing Center: 238 

decisions and settlements, enforcements of: 

110 

decisionwriting in the Office of General 

Counsel: 231-232 

defense: accounting and auditing, 120; 

Contract Audit Agency. 11: Department, 

11, 18, 19,32.46.52.53,58. 78. 79. 

147: Division. 96. 170: industry profits 

study, 20; issues, reorganizing the handling 

of. 132-133; Programs, Consultants Panel 

on, 132: Programs Planning and Analysis 

Staff, 132 

delegating authority and responsibility: 90 

Dembling, Paul: 229 

Democratic Study Group: 8 

Deputy Comptroller General: 92-94 

development of staff: 178- 185 

digests in reports: 166 

discrimination: 35, 194 

dismissals and demotions: 92 

District of Columbia: 52 

diver.;ification of staff: 175--176 

Division Director.; Group: 153 

division directors problem solving participative 

management reaches top levels: 99-102 

Division for Accounting and Financial 

Management: 47 

Division of Audits: 120 

Divisions of GAO: 11 , 96--102 

Document Handling and Information Services 

Facility: 161, 241 

Drucker, Peter: 84-85 

drug manufacturers: 78-79 

.early childhood and family development 

programs: 35 

early years of GAO: 9-11 

Eckhardt. Robert, Congressman: 114 

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: 30 

editorial services at GAO: 164-165 

Educator Consultant Panel: 162. 175, 188, 198 

effectiveness of Government and GAO efforts: 

84 

efficiency-improving efforts at GAO: 146--154 

efficiency ratings: 183-184 

268 

• 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 90 

Emergency Loan Guarantee Board: 79 

Employee Development Group: 186 

employment procedure at GAO: 175 

energy: 2, 4-5: Conservation and Production 

Act of 1976, 127; Department 4. 127; 

Information Administration. 127; and 

Materials Division, 96. 125, 127. 148: and 

minerals work in GAO, 126--127: Policy 

and Conservation Act (1975). 13, 127: 

Projects Group, 126; Reorganization Act of 

1974, 116; Research and Development 

Administration, 127 

entry level recruiting in equal employment: 

199- 200 

Environmental Protection Agency: 64 

equal employment: opportunity, 180, 

194-207; Opportunity Commission. 190, 194: Opportunity Planning Committee, 195; 

Opportunity Coordinator, 196 

Ervin. Sam, Senator: 4, 70 

Eschwege, Henry: 149 

Estes, Billie Sol: 63 

evaluation as a fundamental part of program 

administration: 38-40 

evaluation capability of GAO: 37-38 

Evaluation Research and Diffusion Group: 131 

evaluation societies: 39 

Evaluations Transfer Group: 131 

executive: Branch, dominance of, 2: Branch, 

impoundments, 234-235: Candidate 

Program, 182, 191: dominates the policy 

making process, 6--7; Improvement 

Program. 182. 191: Resources Board, 92, 

191 

expertise in GAO: 123 

experts (see also consultants): 108, 109, 112, 176--177 

family planning: 2 

Far East Branch: 122 

Farmers Home Administration: 21 

Farmworkers of America: 79 

Federal: Agency Evaluation Directors Seminar. 

39; Aviation Administration, 35; Banking 

Agency Audit Act. 73, 118; Bar Association, 

178; Bureau of Investigation, 70-72, 78; 

Deposit Insurance Corporation, 72; Election 

Campaign Act of 1971, 12, 117; Elections 

Commission. 118; Energy Administration, 4, 

126; Energy Administration Act, 127; 

Executive Institute, 182; grants and the bid 

protest process, 233; Labor Relations 

Authority, 188; Legal Information through 

Electronics (FLITE), 235; Personnel and 

Compensation Division, 34; Property and 

Administrative Services Act of 1949. 43, 58: 

Reserve Board, 72; Reserve System, 72; 

spending, 4; Women's Program 

coordinator, 196, 199 

federally assisted programs auditing gUide (red 

book): 60-61 

Fee, Francis X.: 217, 222 
feedback for staff: 154 

Field Operations Division. 120-122. 209. 210. 

213 

Financial: Accounting Standards Board. 52. 

53: and administrative operations of House 

and Senate. assistance to. 26-27: and 

General Management Studies Divisions. 38. 

47. 61. 124: Priorities Program. 50 

financial management: a joint resPonsibility. 

42: events. other significant. 50-53: goal of 

GAO. 86: Group. 47: improvement efforts. 

1966-1981. 46-50 

firearm legislation: 4 

fixed price contracts: 11. 212 

food programs. supplemental: 20 

Ford. Gerald: 25. 113 

Fountain. H. L. . Representative: 63 

fraud: 53: efforts to combat. 61--62: hotline. 

61--62: Task Force activities. 61--62 

Freeman. Orville: 63 

Frese. Walter F.: 120 

front-end job planning. increased emphasis on: 

project planning and management 

approach: 154-157 

frustrations and opportunities in regional 

offices: 213-217 

functional racism course: 202-204 

funds. Federal. merging with outside funds: 4 

GAO: Appeals Board. 189. 190: becomes 

campus-story. 137: Documents. 241: 

"Hotline." 239: in 1966 and how it got 

there. 9-12: interests, expanded. and new 

budget process. 105--108: Management 

News. 239: Operations Manual. 190: 

Personnel Act of 1980. 189. 192: Source 

Book, 186 

"GAO:.The Quest for Accountability in 

American Government": 168 

General Accounting Office Acts: of 1974. 

1OS-113: of 1980. 79. 104. 10S-116: 

resistance to. by House and Executive 

agencies. 111-112. 115--116 

General ADP Systems Group: 239 

General Government Division: 127. 217 

General Services Administration: 58. 64. lOS. 112. 198, 250; scandals. 61 

General Services and Controller: 241 

aeneralists versus specialists: 177- 178 

George Act and the Corporation Control Act 

of 1945: 42 

Gilroy, Robert M.: 247 

Glenn, John, Senator: 114. 115 

goals of Comptroller General: 86-88 

Gould. Clifford I.: 189 

Government: Accounting Foundation. 52: 

Accounting Standards Board. 52-53: 

changes in. 2-5: commitments. 2: 

corporations, audits of. lOS: Corporation 

Control Act of 1945. 10: Depository 

Ubrary, 158; Operations Committee. 114: 

Programs. effectiveness of. 8; resources. 4 

Grace, Paul: 25 

grants. Federal. and the bid protest process: 

233 

Great Society: 30 

Griffith. Ernest S.: 167 

Gross. Representative H. R. : 6 

growth in audits and evaluations requested by 

committees and required by statute: 19- 20 

GS-131l4 Management and Policy Advisory 

Council: 153 

Guide to Project Planning and Management: 

154 

Gulf of Tonkin: 4 

gun control: 36-38 

Hammond. Lawrence A.: 115 

handgu n control: 36 

Handicapped Employees' Advisory 

Committee: 199 

Handicapped Coordinator: 199 

Havens. Harry S.: 127-129. 131. 163 

Hays. Wayne: 27 

Head Start: 31 

health legislation: 4 

Health. Education and Welfare Department: 

19. 46.64 

health facilities construction costs: 20 

Health and Human Services Department: 49. 

53 

Hebert. Frank Edward: 8 

Heller. John D.: 163. 189 

Herbert. Dr. Leo: 1 74. 179 

Hewlett·Packard Company: 78 

Hillman. Larry W.: 98. 100. 101 

hiring: goals in GAO. 205--206; latitude, 

175--176; policy of GAO. 88 

Hispanic Employment Program Coordinator: 

199 

Hispanics: 200 

history (legislative) of GAO on microfiche: 236 

Holifield. Chet: 11. 135 

Holifield hearings: 11-12. 30. 134 

Hollings. Ernest Senator: 21 

Hoover Commission: 43. 44, 58. 120 

House: Budget Committee. 13: Committee on 

Banking. Currency. and Housing, 72: 

Committee on Government Operations. 44. 

73: Committee on Government Operations' 

Military Operations Subcommittee. 11: 

Committee on Science and Technology. 37; 

Democratic Caucus. 8: Education and 

Labor Committee. 31: Government 

Operations Committee. 11. 45. 72. 89. 

171 : Judiciary Committee. 4: Select 

Committee on Congressional Operations, 

162. 167: Select Committee on Parking. 27 

HOUSing and Urban Development Department: 

52-53. 64 

Hughes. Phillip S.: 117. 126 

human relations program: 194. 204-205 

Human Resources Division: 139. 202 

human resources system: 180 

impeachment of Richard Nixon: 4 

269 
Implementation Planning Committee: 125 

imports: 5 

Impoundment Control Act: 234 

Impoundments, Executive Branch: 234--235 

independence of GAO, goal: 88-89 

independent personnel system: establishing, 

189- 191: securing, 188-189 

index and files of Legal Information and 

Reference Service: 235 

Index Digest Section of Legal Information and 

Reference Service: 235 

Indians: 200 

inflation: 4 

information: available to professional staff. 

158-161: Development Group. 240: flow 

to the Congress, systematizing, 27- 28: 

leaks. 20: Management and Development 

Group, 245; management becomes an 

agency goal. 245-249: Officer, 122: Policy 

Committee. 92. 241. 245: sources of GAO, 

centralization of. 160-161 

In£ ~ctor General: accomplishments of, 64-65: 

Act of 1978. 56. 59. 60. 62~3. 65: In 

governrnent. 63: origins of concept. 63 

installed systems. auditing of: 49 

Institute for Program Evaluation: 38. 125-126. 130-132. 163 

Integrated Human Resources System: 180 

intelligence: 79 

Inter-Agency Advisory Committee on 

Consolidated Financial Statements: 50 

Inter-Governmental: Audit Forum. 61 : Audits 

Forums, links between Federal. State and 

Local auditors, 6~7: Cooperation Act of 

1968, 4, 75: relations. 76-77 

Interstate Commerce Commission: 52, 53 

Internal: audit, beginnings in Federal agencies. 

56-58: auditor. role of, 62~: financial 

management in the management services 

organization. 241- 245; management 

systems of GAO. strengthening goal. 88: 

Revenue Service, 70; review and final 

processing time, 166-172 

International Division: 98, 170 

International Operations Division: 73. 122 

International Organization of Supreme Audit 

Institutions (INTOSAI): 66 

inventory of Federal programs and activities: 

28 

investigations and audits, balance between: 

~ 

investment tax credit: 37 

issue area program plan: central focus of the 

process: 139-143 

issue areas of GAO and lead Divisions: 137 

issue areas context: 136-139 

Jantscher, Gerald R. : 37 

Job Corps: 31. 32 

job: ranking, 221: Scheduling and Staffing 

Systern and regional input to program 

planning, 220-222: selection. bottoms up 

process of, 134 

270 

Johnson, Lyndon B., President: 2-3. 7, 30, 46. 90, 194 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 196: Economic 

Comrnittee, 12. 18. 76: Financial 

Management Improvement Program. 42, 46, 50, 56, 76; Program for Improving 

Accounting in the Government, 42 

Joint Committee: on the Organization of 

Congress. 8, 12. 27; on Congressional 

Opera tions. 25 

JURIS: 235 

jurisdiction of GAO organizations: 29 

Justice Depariment: 11, 70. 72. 78, 115 

Keller. Robert F.: 28. 93. 94, 120, 124, 125. 220 

Kelso. Ronald: 217 

Kennedy, John, President: 7.30. 194 

Kensky, Harry C.: 135 

Kilpatrick, James J.: 166 

Kissinger, Henry: 75 

Klassen, E. T.: 78 

Krieger. Hyman L.: 179, 213 

Labor Department: 62 

land, Federal. used for recreation: 234 

lawsuits filed by Comptroller General: 234 

Layton, Fred D.: 179 

lead divisions and coordination in program 

planning: 140-141 

lead region concept in regional offices: 

214-217 

leadership training: 98 

Leahy, Patrick, Senator: 38 

leaking of information: 20 

legal: assistance provision to audit staffs, 

2~234: background of Comptrollers 

General. 228: dedsions and services. 

228-236: Information and Reference 

Service, 235--236 

legislation: affecting GAO's charter. 116-118: 

pending. reporting on, 26 

legislative: Branch audit site of GAO, 26; 

charter of GAO, 104-118; Digest Section of 

Legal Information and Reference Service, 

235-236: Reference Service, 79: 

Reorganization Act of 1946, 7: 

Reorganization Act of 1970. 8, 12. 23. 27, 

50, 80, 84, 104, 105, 106, 110, 134, 233; 

requirements work also served 

Congressional information needs. 22 

liaison with committees and members: 28-29 

library of Congress: 28. 79 

library of GAO: 158-160 

likert, Rensis: 98, 99, 100 

lines of effort In program plan: 140 

liqUid metal fast breeder reactor: 35 

"literature limelight": 158 

Lockheed Aircraft: 79 

Logistics and Communications Division: 34 

Lowe, Victor L.: 170 

McCarl, John R. : 9 
McElyea, Stewart: 148, 212.217.218,219 

Mcintyre, James, Jr. : 115 

McNamara. Robert 5 .: 78 

Madison, Richard: 217 

Major Acquisitions Group of the Defense 

Division: 32. 34; Procurement and Systems 

Acquisition Division. 34 

management: Data System, 247: evaluation in 

GAO, 86; initiatives needed. 134-135: 

involvement in the decision making process, 

90--91; of GAO. 84-102: of personnel. 

Comptroller General's limited involvement 

in, 178: of Projects. early experiment with. 

147-148: participation. 98. 99- 102: 

principles, requirements of, 153-154: roles. 

153; services organization. evolution of. 

23&-241: structures at GAO. 147. 

149-150: styles. 96 

managerial accounting concepts: 43-44 

Mansfield. Mike, Senator: 21 

Martin, Charles c.: 147 

Martin, James D.: 191 

matrix management-story: 151 

Medicaid: 19 

Medicare: 19 

Merit Svstems Protection Board: 188 

Merrimack River Basin: 37 

message of GAO, communication of: 163-166 

message from the media-story: 167-168 

Metcalf. Ralph, Congressman: 70. 113. 114 

Methodology Development. Standards. and 

Test Group: 131 

methodology of GAO. scrutinization of: 

162-163 

METRO subway system in Washington: 35 

microfiche history of GAO: 236 

Middle East: 2 

military: missions, 32; Procurement 

Authorization Bill of 1970. 18 

minOrities, accounting schools for: 194 

Mission Analysis and Systems Acquisition 

Division: 132 

model evaluation: 37 

Mondale, Walter. Senator: 31 

Moot, Robert: 132 

Morris, Thomas D. : 98, 123. 124. 132. 238. 

239, 240 

Morse. Ellsworth: 94. 120. 161 

Mosher, Frederick c.: 11. 168 

Moss. John E., Representative: 6. 73 

Myers, Morton A. : 130 

National: Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), 35, 63, 64, 132, 147; Commission 

on Productivity and Work Quality. 76; 

Council of Government Accounting, 52: 

Energy Infonmation System, 127: 

Environmental Policy Act, 4; Forums. 65: 

Housing Act, 234; Joumal, 6: Rail 

Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK). 4: 

School Lunch Program, 36; Security 

Amendment Act of 1949. 58 

Navy, capabilities of: 32 

negotiated contracts: 11 

negotiated fixed-priced contracts: 212 

Neighborhood Youth Corps: 31 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: 20 

New Deal: 3 

New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment: 

38,39 

new organizations in GAO, in response to 

changing needs: 125-132 

new report features: 166 

New York City: 52. Federal aid to, S; fiscal 

outlook in, 36 

Newman. William E.: 96 

Nixon, Richard, President: 4. 25, 93 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 116. 127 

occupational safety: 4 

Office of: Accounting and Auditing Policy, 58; 

Administrative Planning and Services, 98, 

239: Administrative Services, 200. 238, 

239. 240; Budget and Financial 

Management. 144: Comptroller. 

240; Comptroller General. 108; 

Congressional Relations. 23-25. 26, 28: 

Economic Opportunity, 3, 30. 31. 136: 

Energy and Special Projects, 126: Federal 

Procurement Policy. 132: General Counsel, 

167, 170. 172. 229- 230, 231 ; Infonmation 

Management. 241: Infonmation Systems 

and Services. 241; Internal Review, 198, 

243: Internal Review-story. 246-247: 

Investigations, 120, 208; Joint Financial 

Management Improvement Program. 49; 

Legislative liaison, 28: librarian. 240: 

Management and Budget. 27- 28, 44, 

49-50, Ill. 171; Personnel, 178-179: 

Personnel Management. 47, 50. 90. 188; 

Personnel Management of GAO, 199; 

Policy. 165. 167, 170, 171, 172; Policy and 

Program Planning, 124: Policy and Special 

Studies. 37. 95. 122. 170; Program 

Analysis, 80, 129: Program and Budget 

Analysis. 38, 80, 81 , 127: Program 

Planning, 136, 148; Program Review and 

Evaluation, 81 ; Publishing and Graphics 

Services. 240: Publishing Services, 165; 

Security and Safety, 241: Special programs, 

127; Staff Development. 178. 179. 240; 

Staff Management. 122; Technology 

Assessment, 70, 80--81 

offices of GAO: 95-102 

OGC Advisor. 234 

oils: 2; embargo. 126 

on-the-job training: 153 

O'Neil!, np: 6 

OPEC: 2, 126 

Operations Manual: 250--252 

Organization and Management Planning Staff: 

239-240 

Organization Planning Committee: 92 

organizational development effort of GAO: 

98-99 

organizational structure (see also 

271 
reorganization): infonnal. 149- 150; of 

GAO. 96. 120--133; of the Office of 

General Counsel. 229 

organized crime: 35-36 

oversight responsibiUty of Congress: 6 

Panel on Regulatory Accounting: 53 

Patman. Wright 8. 72 

payroll system: 243 

Peach. J. Dexter: 126. 127 

pending legislation. reporting on: 26 

Pennsylvania State University: 182 

perfonnance appraisal: 183-184 

Perkins. Carl: 31 

personnel: and staff development functions 

reconsidered. 178-185: management. 

Comptroller General's limited involvement 

in. 178; of GAO. background of. 174; 

Relations Planning Committee. 196; System 

for GAO. creation of. 185-192; System 

Project. 184. 189: upgrading. 240--241 

Philadelphia Plan: 108 

Pin. Clerio: 98. 100. 187. 189. 220. 239. 241. 

243. 249 

Planning. Scheduling and Reporting System: 

247 

planning versus budgeting relationship: 144 

Poage. W. R. : 8 

policy: analysis. 35-37; and Programs Group. 

185; decisions implemented by General 

Manager. 92; making process. 6-7; of 

GAO. 16; review. 168-170 

population: of Congress. 8; of GAO. 9. 11 

post exchanges: III 

Post Office Department Financial Control Act 

of 1950: 58 

Postal: Accounts Division. 58: Reorganization 

Act. 78; Service-story. 77 

poveny: 18. 30. 31 

POWER: 164. 165 

Powers. Lawrence J.: 135. 168 

Presidential: Election Campaign Fund. 117; 

Election Campaign Fund Act of 1981 . 12: 

reSignation, 2 

Price. Waterhouse and Company: 246 

privacy: 79; Act of 1974. 231 

private industry: GAO juriscUction in. 78; 

services. 4 

problems of GAO. identifying: 123-124 

problem solving: of Division Directors. 99-102; 

-story. 99 

processing time. internal: 66. 172 

Procurement and Systems Acquisition 

Division. 130. 178; bid protest procedures. 

232- 233; Division. 124; Logistics and 

Readiness Division. 132 

productivity: 5; Federal. measuring. 76 

profeSSional: associations. 178: Audit Review 

Team. 127 

professionalization of staff: 175--176 

program: Analysis Division. 36. 38. SO. 125. 

129-130. 234; analysis work in GAO. 

127-130; cost reduction goal of GAO. 86; 

272 

effectiveness review. 175--176; evaluations. 

35--37; Planning. 134-144; Planning 

Committee. 122. 135. 141-143; Planning 

Conference-story. 139; planning. division 

responsibility. 143: planning. emergence of. 

135--136 

programs. domestic: 4 

progression to program evaluations and policy 

analysis: 35-37 

project: independence. blueprints. 37: 

management approach. 147-150: Planning 

and Management System handbook. 155 

project planning and management approach: 

154-158; development of. 154-155: 

progress and problems in. 156-158; work 

method. 155--156 

Proposition 13: 5 

protest procedures in procurement bids: 

232-233 

Prouty Amendment: 30--31 

Prouty. Winston. Senator: 30 

Proxmire. William. Senator: 6. 12. 51. 76 

QuaUfications and Perfonnance Review Board: 

191 

racism: 194 

Railroad Accounting Principles Board: 52 

rank-in-job-system: 190 

rank-in-person-system: 190 

recreational Federal land: 234 

red book-guide for auditing federally aSSisted 

programs (see also green book; yellow 

book): 60--61 

referencing: 170--171 

Regional: forums. 65--66: input to Program 

Planning. 220--222: status and 

contributions. 208 

regional offices: and lead region concept. 

214-217. changes in role. 213-214; deport 

from. 212; management structure of. 210 

-212; number of. 208: past and future. 

-story. 224-225; taking shape. 

208-209 

regions: rurals of. 150--152 

regulatory: Operations Group. 50. 53: refonn. 

4 

reorganization of GAO (see also organizational 

structure): along program and functional 

lines, 123-125; implementation of. 125; in 

1966, 120--122; of operating divisions. 124 

report: cUstribution. 241; Manual. 162. 167. 

170--171; organization. 166; processing. 

administrative aspects of. 172: production. 

improvements efforts in. 146 

reports from regional offices: 212 

research and development: 35 

reSignation of Richard Nixon: 4 

Resources and Economic Development 

Division: 126 

responsibilities of GAO. new: 70. 76-77 

responsibility. basic. of GAO to serve 

Congress: 16-17 
responsibility chain: 153 

review: 123. 153. 163; broadening the scope 

of. 35-38: by agency, 171- 172; 

methodology for perfonning. 161- 163: of 

Federal programs, 123--124: of staff work. 154; policy. 168-170; process at GAO. 147 

rewards: 182- 183 

Ribicoff. Abraham: 18. 19. 79. 108. III 

Rickover, Hyman L.: 51. 52 

Rivers. L. Mendel: 18 

Rivlin. Alice: 80 

Roback, Herbert: III 

Rodino, Peter: 25. 70 

Rogers, James H.: 217 

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. President: 7 

Rotating Research Visiting Committee: 132 

rotation of staff (see also staff): 175 

Russia: 84 

salaries: of auditors, 176; costs. and 

reimbursement, 23 

Samuelson, A. T.: 96 

Sasser, James. Senator: 61 

SCORPIO System: 28 

Schoenhaul, Arthur: 51 

Schweiker. Richard. Senator: 18. 61 

Selected Acquisition Reports System (SARS): 

19 

Senate committee: Budge~ 13: on Agriculture 

and Forestry. 6; on Banking, Housing and 

Urban Affairs. 72, 73; on Finance, 19. 37; 

on Govemmental Affairs, 89. 115; on 

Labor and Public Welfare, 20, 31 ; on Post 

Office and Civil Service, 78; Rules and 

Administration. 27 

Senate financial disclosure: 12 

Senate Select Subcommittee: 4 

selection process of GAO: 180 

Senior Executive Service; 182. 191. 222; in 

equal opportunity, 20~207 

separation of Powers: 6 

services: strategy of govemment versus 

incomes. 4; to the Congress. 29 

Silva, Alex: 196 

Sisko B. F. ; 105 

Skills for Perfonnance and Career 

Development Course: 181 

Smith, Uoyd: 246 

social: programs, audits of. 31: research. 39; 

Science Research Council, 39; Security. 5. 

19, 20 

societal complexity: 2 

solutions to GAO problems. planning of: 

124-125 

Sorando, David; 213 

Southeastem Inter-govemmental Audit 

Forum; 65 

space renovation and acquisition: 249- 250 

space travel: 2 

Special Studies and Analysis Section: 229- 230 

Specialists versus generalists: 177-178 

Specialized Skills Technical Assistance Group: 

131 

Staats. Elmer B.: 2, 7-8, 11, 12, 17-19.22. 38, 52- 53.66. 80-81. 84.85. 86. 88.89. 90. 91. 100. 101, lOS, 106. 113. 122. 143, 149, 165. 170. 171. 178.188, 195. 

206. 213. 214, 222 

staff: assignment-story, 25; assignment to 

CongreSSional committees. 23--26; 

competing demands on. 153; development 

program, 161-162; evaluations, 153; 

involvement in projects. 153: rotation. 175; 

selection of, 92 

Staggards Rail Act of 1980: 52 

Standards for Audit of Govemment ~ ..--- Organizations. Programs, Activities and 

Functions: 59-61 

State Department: 115 

Sterling Institute: 98 

Stevens, Joe: 155 

Stovall. Oye: 75-76 

Subcommittee on Inter-Governmental 

Relations and Human Resources: 63 

subpoena power: 108-110 

subway system in Washington: 35 

summaries of reports: 166 

Summer Legal Intem Program: 230 

Sunrise and Sunset regulation: 38 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1974: 27 

sUP1!ly line holes of Department of Defense: 

Supreme Court: 7 

Surveys and Investigations Staff of House 

Appropriations Committee: 26 

swine flu: 2 

Synthetic Fuels Corporation: 118 

Systems Analysis Staff: 18 

Systems in Operation: 47 

Task Force: on GAO Effectiveness, 181; on 

Improving GAO Effectiveness, 171. 217, 219; on Project Management. 21~217 ; to 

Study the GAO Information Services and 

Activities, 245; on Washington-Field 

Relationships. 214-216 

Tax Policy-story: 37 

team: approach mandate, 148-149; members. roles of. and division management defined. 

149- 150; problems, 152-153; titles, 152 

Technical Assistance Group: 161 

technology: 2; assessmen~ 25 

termination of contracts: 233 

terrorism; 2 

testimony of GAO; growth in, 22-23; 

preparation of. 22; who versus what, 22 

testimony (of GAO), frequency: 16 

Thornton, John E.; 209 

Three Mile Island: 2 

Title Observations and Recommendations 

Relating to Processing of Audit Reports: 168 

top management: changes to strengthen, 120-123; initiatives needed at the "front 

end," 134-135 

tougher issues of GAO bill: 113--116 

Trade Act of 1974: 5 

273 
training: Branch. 188; of auditors. 175 

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act of 1973: 12, 116, 118. 126 

Transfer Income Model (TRIM): 37 

transformation under teams: 218-220 

Transportation and Claims Division: 112, 239 

Transportation Division: 195, 196, 198. 200 

transportation payments: 108 

traumatic transformation under teams: 

218-220 

travel vouchers: 243 

Treasury Department: 27, 42, 115 

Truman, President Harry: 7 

Truth in Negotiations Act: 11, 32 

turbulent period for society and nation: 2 

United States Ambassador in Saigon-story: 

75 

unity of purpose: in a more progressive 

framework. 222- 224: in regional offices. 217- 218 

unvouchered expenditures: 114 

upper level recruiting in equal employment: 

200-202 

upward mobility: office. 198. 201; Program. 200-202: -story. 200-202 

usefulness of GAO's work to the Congress, 

Goal: 88 

Veterans Administration: 78 

274 

Vietnam War: 2. 4. 70. 73, 76, 7/l. 94 

visual aids in GAO reports: 166 

war: 6: Contract Project Audit Section. 208; 

Powers Act of 1973. 4 

Warren, Lindsay c.: 10. 16. 42, 120. 208 

Washington Regional Office-story: 211-213 

Watergate: 4, 117 

water pollution: 20 

weapons systems: 18-19: early development. 

32: expansion of, 32-34: expansion of 

work in. 32-34 

Weitzel. Frank H.: 9, 11, 93 

welfare policy analysis: 37 

Westfall report: 10 

White. Alice: 216 

women: 2. 194-207: accounting schools for. 

194; history 01 at GAO, 194: GS ratings. 194 

Women's Advisory Committee: 199 

work in balance, 153 

workload of GAO: 8. 21 

World War II: 208 

World-Wide Military Command and Control 

System: 79 

writing skills of GAO staff: 163-164 

yellow book: 59-60 

zinc stink: 168 

• 
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