### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on

Briefs J uly 22, 2003
STATE OF TENN ESSEE v. DARR ELL GLEN SMITH
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County No. 7923 Ben W. Hooper, II, Judge

No. E2002-01988-CCA-R3-CD December 18, 2003

The defendant, Darrell Glen Smith, appeals as of ri ght from his conviction by a jury in the Cocke County Circuit Court for first degree mur der. T he defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment withthe possibility of parole. He c ontends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense a nd (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial due

to juror misconduct. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J., delivered the opinion of the cour t, in which G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., and N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., joined. Edward C. Miller, District Public Defender, for the appellant, Da rrell Glen Smith.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral andReporter; John H. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; Al C. Schmutzer, Jr., D istrict At t orney Ge

neral; and James B. Dunn, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Te nnessee.
OPINION

This case relates to the defendant’s killing his mother on June 2, 1998. Rose Dixon, a driver for Quality Transporta

tion, testified that her job was to transport medical and me ntal patients and that she picked up the defendant from Peninsula Hospital on June 1, 1998. She said he refuse d to engage in any conve

rsation with her and when asked questions, he only repliedwith short

response s. On cross-e

xamination, she testif

ied that if she had k nown abou

t the def endant’ s conditio n, she would not have t ranspor ted him. Uly ss Smith, the defendant’s brother, testified that he went to his mother’s home on June 2 to look for h

er afte r his aunt had told him that she could not find his mother. He said that when he arrived at his mothe

r’s home , he saw t

he defe ndant, wh o said

that their mother was sleeping. He said that he opened

their mother’s bedroom door but did not see her and that the defenda nttold him that-2-

he needed to leave . He said

he did not see any blood on the de fendant at that time. He said that he returned to the victim’s home with his brother-in-law, Steve Tay lor, but thatthe defendant was not there. He said they we

nt to the back bedroom and found his mother covered in blood. H e said his aunt then called the police. He said that he ne xtsaw the defendant when the defenda nt was arrested and that the defendant had blood on hi s stomach a t that time. On cross-examination, he said the defendant looked dirty

when he saw him on June 2.

Armondo Fontes, a police office r for the Cocke Cou

nty Sheriff’s Department, testified that
on May 22, 1998, he was sent to the victim’s home to transport the defendant to an emerge ncy room to have him evaluated and that on June 2, he answered a domestic dispute call at the victim’s home. He said that when he arrived, he first t alked to M

r. Tay lor, who to ld him

“he’s ki lled her .” He sa

id he then knocked on the door at the victim’s home and the defendant c ame out with blood on his stomach. He said that after handcuffing the defendant, the defendant stated, “I had to kill her, she
was trying to poison me.” O n cross-ex amination, F ontes said that on May 22, the def endant appeared to be normal and was co operative . He said that on June

2, the def

endant to ld him his mother had forc ed him tocastra

te himself . He said there wa s nothing

at the vic tim’s home

indicating the defendant tried to conceal evidence

. Danny Ray Reece , a

police officer in the Cocke County Police Department, testified that on June 2, he was the first officer to enter the victim’s home. He said the ce iling fan light was broken, blood was on the ceiling , and ther e were fresh sig ns of a fo rced en try into the bedroom. He said that while he was inside the victim’s home, he found an ax, a steel rod wrapped in electrical tape, and two bloody

knives. On cross -examinat ion, Reec e said

the victim’s body did not appear to ha ve been moved since the killing and the weapons were in plain view.

Duane Johnson, a special agent for the Tennessee Bureau of I

nvestigation, testified that on June 2, he saw

an ax and a

steel rod with electric al tape wrapped around it in the victim’s living
room. He said there were strands of hair a nd a reddish-brown

stain on the electrical tape. He said he saw what

appear ed to be bl ood on th e followi ng: the front porch, the living room floor, the kitchen sink, the hallway

floor, the doorknob of the back bedroom, the victim’s bed, the curtains and walls of the back

bedroom, two knives, a pair of glasses that belonged to the defendant, and in the defendant’s bedroom. He said the victim’s head had been cut in multiple places and her rig ht arm had large areas of discoloration. On cross-examination, Johnson said that he had never investigated a murder case where the we apons were left in plain view.

Dennis Ray Daniels, a

special agent for the Tennesse e Bureau of Investigation, testified that he interviewed the defendant at the hospital after the victim was killed. He said the defendant stated that the victim

forced him to kill he

r and tha t she previously

forced him to castrate himself. He said the defendant stated that on the night of June 1, he vomited after eating barbeque and potato salad. He said the defendant stated his mother had poisoned him. Daniels said the defendant stated that he
was mad and a

fraid a nd that h e snappe d, first hitting his mother with a steel rod. He said the defendant stated tha

t he hit the

victim with

the ax multip le times because the vi ctim “woul d not go down.” He said th

e defendant stated that he s tabbed himself in the heart three times to try and “get-3-

it over with.” He said the defendant stated that he stabbed his mother a nd went to bed but did not sleep more than five minutes that night. On cross-examination, Daniels testified that the defenda nt was very alert du ring the ir interv iew but tha

t he was n ot sure ho w aware th e defe ndant wa s of his surround ings.

Dr. Cleland Blake, a forensic pathol ogist, t estified that he performed an autopsy on the victim’s body

and foun d multiple

wounds to

the head , a tear

on the lef t middle fi nger, a deep bruise
on the left arm, a

bruise on the right shoulder, and a tear in the skin on the right a rm. He sa

id some of the cuts on the victim’s head were the resu lt o f a blunt object while others were the result of a knifelike object. H e said

the electrical tape

on the ste el rod wa s likely used for a better grip. H e said the cause of death was blunt trauma to the head. Regina Fine, the defendant’s sister, testified that when the def endant was you

ng, he witnesse

d his brother ’s death

when a c ar ran o ver him. She said that t he defe ndant beg an to act

peculia r in his lateteens and that he never moved outof his mother’s home. She said her husband had to take the defendant to the eme

rgenc y r oom in 1996 when he castra

ted himself with gr

ass clipp ers. She s aid the defendant had

to go to the emergency

room and mental facilities multiple times for his mental problems

. She said the defendant alway s stay ed in his room and she did not remember him ever leaving the home. She

said the defendant called their mother the devil and a “ son-of-a-bitch.” She said that on June 1, 19 98, she ta

lked to her mother and her mother said the defenda nt was nervous and pacing around

the home. She said their mother did every thing for the defendant and there was no rational reason for him to kill her.

On cross-examination, Mrs. Fine testified that she was on friendly terms with the de fendant butthat he would not

visit with her. She acknowledged that the defenda nt was mad at their mother and the rest of the family when no one w ould co-sign a loan in order that he could buy a motorcycle

. She denied telling a

n employ ee of Forensic

Service s that the d

efenda nt told her

he could k

ill he r any time he wanted. Billy F

ine, the defendant’s brother-in-law, testified that he dr ove the defendant to the hospital on May 14, 1996, after the defendant castrated himself. He said the defendant was bleeding all over but showed no emotion.

Susan Janelle Dyer, the de fendant’s sister, testified that the defendant began acting peculiar during his senior year

in high sc hool and w ould isola te himself

from the r

est of the family , only leaving his room at

night when everyone else was in bed. She said that his personal hygiene was bad and that he never combed his hair. She said there was no rationalreason for him to kill their mother. Tunney Moore, th e for me r S he ri ff of Co ck e C ou nt y, testified that he went to the same church
as the victim and that she told him she was afraid of the defendant. He s ai d he helped the vict im send the defendant

to a menta

l health facility on seve

ral occasions when the defendant scar ed or assaulted her. He said that on June 2, when he asked the defendant why he had killed his mother, he said she was trying

to poison him. Pat Taylor, a deputy for the Cocke County Police De partment in 1998, testified that on May 22, he picked the defendant up at the victim’s home a nd dro ve him to a mental health facility . On the way, the defendant said he was going to hur this mother

because-4-

she had made him do bad things and had made him castrate himself. He said the defendant stated that his mother was poisoning him and trying to kill him.

Eric S. En gu m, a c li ni ca l p syc ho lo gi st sp ec ia li zi ng in ne ur op syc ho lo gy and foren sic psy ch ol og y, testifie d that the defenda nt suffe rs from pa

ranoid sc hizophren

ia “cont inuous wit

h prominent

negati ve sy

mptoms.” H e said re cords fr om three separa te mental institutions where the defendant was evaluated confirmed this diagnosis. He said the de fendant did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct when he killed his mother and still di d not unde

rstand th at killing

his mother was wrong. He said the defenda nt believed that his mother was the devil, that she poisoned him, that she injected him with chemicals at night, and tha t she menta lly f orced him to castr

ate himself.

Dr. Engum sa

id that in a

test to deter mine the d

efenda nt’s ability to

fu nc ti on in a c om mu ni ty, the defendant’s score was at the bottom. He said rec ords fro m Cheroke e Health Systems reported the defendant as having delusions about his mother as early

as 1986. He said the reports indicated the defendant had both visual and auditory hallucination s. He said t he defe ndant wa s taken to Lakeshore

Mental He alth

Institute in 1986 because he met the eme rgency commitment require

ment, th at he was a threat to himself or others. He said rec ords indicated the defendant suffered f rom extreme side effects due to the medications he used to control the schizophrenia.

Dr. Engum said that in May 1994, the defendant became depressed a nd exhibited violen t behavior, including beating his mother. He said the defendant was both homicidaland suicidal. He said that in 1996, when the

defenda nt castra ted himself, he g ave var

ious rea sons for h

is conduc t, including the following: (1) the peopl e at Cherokee Mental Health Center told him that if he did th

is, it would set h

im free; (2) his ps ychologist told him todo it; (3) it was his w ay of avoidi ng bein g sold into white slavery; and (4) his mother told him it was the only way he could be free of sin.

Dr. Engum said that at Peninsula Hospital in 1998, ni ne da ys before the defe ndant killed his mother, the defe

ndant sai d that voic es told him to kill his moth er to avo id being

sold into wh

ite slavery. He

said the report stated the defendant was delusional and ang ry. He sa id that on June 1, 1998, Peninsula discharged the defendant. He

said that when he met with the defendant in 2001, the defendant still had delusions about his mother. He said he had no doubt that on June 2, 1998, the defendant was suffering from psy

chotic delusions as a result of his paranoid schizophrenia and that the defenda

nt was re acting

honestly to his delu s ions when he killed the victim. He said that the defendant believed that his mother was the devil, that he was saving the world from her, and that he
was the only

person in the world

who could

perceive the victim’s true nature. He said he believed the defendant could never function in society and neede d permanent supervision to prevent the defenda nt from hu

rting hi mself or o thers. He said that in 1998, the defendant was not in reality at all. Dr. Engum said that he had been involved in over two hundred c riminal cases and that this was only the second time he had testified that a defenda nt could no t underst

and the w rongfu lness of h is actions.-5-

On cross-examination, Dr. Engum testified that the defendant was not me

ntally retarded. He acknowledged

that his diagnosis was based, in part, on what the defendant told him. He said that Peninsula Hospita l’s records reflected that the defe ndant was still experiencing auditory hallucinations when he was discharged on June 1. He admitt ed that being mentally

ill does not
necessa rily mean that a person

cannot appreciate the differe nce between right and

wrong. He stated that people with mental illnesses can still add and subtrac t but that th is goes t o their I Q, not the

ir mental stability. He acknowledg ed that reports from 1999, 2000, and 2001 record the defendant as having good hyg

iene and his thought pro cess as b eing or derly and rele vant. He stated, however, that he questioned the accuracy of those reports. He agreed, thoug h, that there were improvements when the defendant was hospitalized and given medicati on. Dr. Engum den ied ther e being a possibili

ty that the defendant was pretending to be de lusional to avoid criminal responsibility. He admitted that when the defendant

told his brother that their mother was asleep, one possible inference is that the defendant knew rig ht f rom wrong. On redirect examination, Engum testified that the reports that said the defendant had good hy giene and was orderly a

nd relevant may

be flawed because they

were notmade by

a psy chiatris t or psy

cholog ist and we

re made by w atching

the defe ndant thr ough a s mall glass hole.

Dr. Rokeya S. Far

ooque, a psychia

trist, testified that although the defendant was not
co mpetent

to stand tr

ial in 1998 , he was c ompetent at the time

of his tria

l. She said

that t h e defendant suffer ed from p aranoid

schizophr

enia but w as able t

o apprec iate the w

rongfu lness of his acts when he killed the victim. She said the defendant was given Haldol, a drug

used to de crease hallucinations and delusions, at Peninsula Hospital before beingreleased on June 1, 1998. She s aid that Haldol stayed in the bloodstrea m for three to four weeks.

On cross-examination, Dr. Farooque acknowledg ed that the defendant was a par anoi d schizophrenic, had been extremely psy chotic at times, and h ad been having psyc hotic delusions about his mother since 1986. She said reports indicated that the defendant was stable on medication at the time of his discharge from Peninsula Hospital on June 1 and that he committed the killing

just hours later. She said that the defendant never claimed h

e heard voices du ring the incident telling h im to kill his mother which, in combination with the defendant taking medication, indicated there was
no hallucination or delusion that made the defenda nt unable to appre ciate the

wrongf ulness of his actions. Sh e admi tted she w ould not ha ve discha rged a patient if she knew

he was c ontinuing

to have delusions and hallucinations. She said the defendant was given ora l Haldol when he was discharged, which wou

ld be used

to supplem

ent the in

jectio n o f Haldol if the injection was insuff icient to s tabilize him mentally. She admitted that if the injection was insufficient and the defendant did not take his oral medication, he could become psy chotic.

Sam Craddock, a psy

cholog ist, te stified that in September 1998 the defendant was not competent

to stand trial but that he was competent by August 1999. He said he concluded the defendant apprec iated the

nature o f his action s when he killed the victim based on the following factor s: (1) the defendant told Mrs. Fine, his sister, that he could kill her any time he wanted; (2) the defendant sometimes got upset with his m other when he was not psy chotic; (3) on June 1, the attending physician, Dr. May, did not descr ibe the defendant as being psychotic; and (4) w

hen he was-6-

diagnosed

aft er t he k illi ng o n Ju ne 2, th e defendant did not say he killed his mother because she poisoned hi m. Dr . C ra dd oc k s ai d h e b el ie ve d i t w as ju st as li ke ly t hat the defe ndant killed his mother because he was up set with

her as it was that

he killed her bec ause he w as having a psychotic delusion. On cross-examination, Dr. Craddock testifie d that he d id not know

for cer tainwhether the de fendantwas psychotic at the time of the vic tim’s killing and that if he was psyc hotic, he might have been unable to appreciate the w rongfulness of his actions.

The jury convicted the de fendant of first degree murde r. The defendant contends that he should have be en found

not guilt y by reason o f insanit

y beca u se he could not appreciate the wrongf ulness of his actions when he killed his mother. In the alter native, h e contends that he

should receive a new trial because the jury improperly

considered whether the defendant would spend a long time in an institution if they found him not guilty by reason of

insanity. We affirm the def endant’s conviction.
I. INSANITY DEFENSE

The defendant contends that he proved by cle ar

and convincing evidence that he wa s insane at the time of

the killing . With re gard to the defense of insanity , T.C.A. § 39-11-501 provides as follows: (a) It is an affirma tive def ense to prosecution that, at the time of the commission of the ac ts cons tituting t he offe nse, the d efenda nt, as a result of a severe mental dis ease

or defe ct, was u

nable to a pprecia te the nature or

wrongf ulness of such def endant’ s acts. Me

ntal disea se or defect does not ot

herwise constitute a

defense. The defendant has the burden of proving the

defense of insanity by

clear and convincing evidence. (b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” does not include an y ab no rm al it y ma nifested only by repeated criminal or otherwis e antisoc ial condu ct. (c) No expert witness may testify as to whether the defendant was or
was not insane as set forth in subsec tion (a). Such ultima te issue isa matter for the trier of fact alone.

With respec t to appel late rev iew of a j ury ’s rejection of a d efenda nt’s insan ity defense, our supreme court has stated:

[A]ppellate

courts in

Tenness ee should

apply the rea sonableness standardwhen reviewing a jury ’s rejection of th e insan ity defense. Consistent withthe expressed legislative intent of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-501(c ) and othe

r Tenne ssee sta

ndards g overning

appella te-7- review of factual finding s, this standard is properly deferential to the finding of the tri er of fa

ct. On the other ha nd, this standard does not totally insulate t

he jury ’s finding

from app ellate r

eview; r ather, it enhances appellate review by virtue of i ts simila

rity to the familiar sufficiency

standard which appellate courts are accus tomed to applying. Accord

ingly , appella

te courts in

Tenness ee should

revers e a jury verdi ct re

jecting the insanity de

fense only if, c onsidering the evidence in the lig

ht most fav orable

to the pro secution , no reas onable trier of fact could have f

ailed to find that the defendant’s insanity at th e time of the offense was established by clear and convi ncin g ev idence . . . . [W]e explicitly reject the notion that the Stat e mus t rebut defense proof of

insanity with substantial

evidence. The current statute cl ea rl y does no t impose such a burden of proof on the prosecution. The statu

te place s the burd

en of est ablishing this affirmative defense squarely on the defendant. Once this defense has been interposed, the prosecutionlikely will in most c ases atte

mpt in
some manner

to counter the defense proof . . . . [D]efense proof can be countered by

contrary experttestimony, lay

witnesses, or vigorous cross-examination designed to under mine the c

redib il ity of the defense expe rts. A review ing cou rt app lying the r easonab leness standardshould consider all the evide nce in the record in the light most favorable to the state in determining whether the jury appropriately

rejected the insanity

defense.

. . . . The weight and value to be given experttestimony is a question for the jury. [ State v. Sparks , 891 S .W.2d 607, 6 16 (T enn. 1995) ]. Where there is a conflict in the eviden ce, th e trier of fact is not requ ir ed to acce

pt expert te stimony

over othe

r evidence and mu st determine the we

ight and credibi lity

of each in light o f all the facts and ci rc umstances of the case. Id. Questions concerning the credibi lity

of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well
as all factual disputes raisedby t he evide nce, ar e for the trier of fact; appella te courts do not re w eigh the evidenc e or ree

valuate credibi lity determin ations. [ State v. Holder , 15 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 1999) ].
State v. Flake , 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002).

Evidence existed to show that the defendant was not psychotic or suffe

ring from delusions and hallucinations at the time of the offense. The defendant ha d taken an injection of

Haldol wh

ile at Peninsula

Hospita l, a medication that is usually eff ective in preventing delusions and-8-

hallucinations for three to four weeks. Dr. Farooque stated she believed that this medication should have prevented the defendant from becoming psychotic afte

r being discharged on

June 1. Moreover, after the killing, reports from the Cherokee Crisis Team indicated that the defe ndant did n ot claim his mother was poisoning him when they interviewed him on June 2.

Evidence also existed to show that the d efenda nt appre ciated th

e wrong fulness o f his actions when he killed the victim. When the defendant’s brother came to the victim’s home, the defendant lied and told his brother that the victim was sleepi ng and said he should leave. Although not conclusive, this suggests that the defendant knew that he did something wrong because he did not want his brother to discover

that he had killed their mother. Moreove r, the defendant

had prev iously been upset with his mother and the rest of the family w hen they did not co-sign a loan for him so that he could buy a moto rcycle. Al thou gh Mrs. Fine denied it , Dr. Cra ddock not ed that the defendant told his sister that he could kill her any time he wanted. The defendant told Mr. Daniels in their interview after the killing that he was mad and afraid when he killed the victim. Dr. Craddock testified that it was as lik

ely that the d efenda nt becam e upset w ith his mother for trying to convinc e him to take his medication or for some other reason and decide d to k ill he r. Dr. Craddock did not believe delusions and hallucinations caused the defendant to kill the victim.

The evidence shows that the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Having this mental disease , howeve

r, does not preclu de the pos sibility th at he co ul d b e fou nd le ga ll y sa ne by a ju ry. T.C.A. § 39-11-501(a) (1997). I t was the jury’s re sponsibility to give the proper w eight and value to the expert and lay witnesses in dete rmining whether the defendant was insane by clea r and convincing evidence. Flake , 88 S.W.3d at 554. Although the defendant argues that the jury erred in not finding

him insane

at the time

of the kill

ing, the jury chose to a

ccredit the wit

nesses wh o supported the state’s theory of the case: that the defendant’s medication was ef fective; that he was notpsy chotic a

nd delusio nal at the

time of the

killing; a nd that he knew his actions were wrong when he killed his mother. I

n the light most fav orable t o the state , a ratio nal trier

of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence. The evidenc e is sufficient to justify the defe ndant’s conviction.
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT

The defendant contends that he should receive a ne w tri al because the jury

improper

ly considered

how long the defenda

nt would be

institution alized if t

hey found him n ot guilty

by reason of insanity. The state ar

gues that the defendant’s evidence of juror misconduct is not allowed under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) and that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. We agree with the state.

Du ring deliberations, the jury submitted a que stion to the trial court asking whet her th e defendant would be i nstitutiona

lized for a long pe riod of tim

e if it found the defendant

not guilty by
reason of insanity. The trial cour t told the jury that

the cour t would not answer its question and that the jury should remember the evidence and the law as it had been g iven. At the hearing for a new trial, the defendant offered the trial court several questionnaires he sent to jurors after the trial and-9-

notes he had taken during a phone conver sation with one juror after the trial as evidence that

the jury improper ly considered the question of how long the defenda nt would b e institutionalized. In one juror’s questionn aire, the juror s tated tha t he orshe would have found the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity if assured tha t the defendant would have been treated for a long period of time. In addition, defense counsel’s notes from a telephone c onversation with a juror reflected that the juror would have voted

“guilty but insane” if that ha

d been a n option. T

he trial c ourt ref

used to consider the juror information.

Rule 606(b), Tenn. R. Evid., pr ecludesa juror f

rom testif yin g or off

ering a n affida vit “as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury ’s deliberations or to t he effect of anything upon any juror’s mind or e motion as influencing that juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict.” Three e

xceptions to

this rule a

re that a juror may

testi fy or off

er an af fidavit as to (1) whether ex tr an eo us pr ej ud ic ia l i nf or ma ti on wa s i mp ro pe rl y br ou gh t t o t he ju ry’ s attention, (2) whether any outside influence

was improperly br

ought to bear upon any

jur o r, or (3) whether the jurors agreed in advance to be bound by a quotient or g ambling verdict without further discussion. Id.

As the Adviso

ry Commission Co mment note s, this rule is the cod

ificatio n of the su

preme court’s adoption of Rule 606(b), Fed. R. Evid., in State v. B lackwell , 664 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. 1984). If the defenda

nt shows thatthe jury has bee n subjectedto extraneous prejudicial information
or improper influence, then we presume prejudice and the burden s hifts t o the state to rebut th

is presumption by either explai ni ng the exposure or proving that it was harmless. Id. at 689. The information that the jurors provided the defendant cannot be offered in c ourt unless it qualifies under
one of the thr

ee excep tions in 606 (b). I n the pre sent cas e, unlesst h e informa tion is extra

neous, it is inadmissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b). “Extraneous means ‘coming from without.’” State v. Coker , 746 S.W

. 2d 167, 171 (Tenn. 1988) (holding that the jurors’ alleg ed discussion about the possibility

that the defendant would hire someone to kill them was inadmissible becau se t he defendant had not shown that the jury lea rned of the threat from an outside source). The trial court in this case questioned whether the information was extraneous but ultimately found that it was not in deny ing the d efenda nt’s motion

for a new trial.

T he defendant bears the burden of showing that the jurors were exposed to extran eou s information and that their testimon y is t hereby pe rmitted under Rule 606(b), Tenn. R. Evid. See Blackw ell , 664 S.W.2d at 689. In State v. Henl ey , a cap ital post-conviction case, the petitioner sought to intr oduce an affidavit from one of the trial jurors in support of his claim of ine ffective assistance of counsel. 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997). The affidavit related to the jury ’s mindse t concer ning the refusa l of the pe

titioner’ s mother to

testify during the

sentencing phase of

the trial

. The supreme court stated that “the juror’s affidavit related to the precise subjec t matter about which
a ju ro r i s s tr ic tl y f

orbidden fro m testifying by Rule 606(b).” Id. at 581. The court h eld that th

is eviden ce “violate s the express terms of Rule 606(b) and should not have been considered”in the post-conviction proceeding. Id. Likewise, in the present ca se, the defe ndant in troduce d exhibits at the hearing for a new trial whe re the subject ma

tter rel ated tothe jury ’s mindset . Accor dingly , this-10-

information was not extra neous and not properly before the trial court. I

t cannot be used to show juror misconduct.

In any eve

nt, even werewe to consider the jury information submitted by the defendant, we would still be unpersuaded that there was any juror misconduct. The juror in the questionnaire stated that the jury decided unanimous ly th at the defendant apprec iated the

wrongf ulness of his conduct. Even if the jur

ors thoug ht about what would

happen if

they found him n ot guilt

y by reason of in sa ni ty, this does n ot nega te their f inding th at the defendant apprec iated the

wrongf ulness of his actions.

Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affir m the judgment of

conviction.

____________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE