Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

114th Congress

OVER-BUDGET OVERSEAS: 

THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S FAILURE TO 

PROTECT OUR DIPLOMATS

Majority Staff Report

Prepared For:

Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

December 6, 2016
1 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of State (the Department) operates more than 285 diplomatic facilities 

across the globe, including in some of the most dangerous countries in the world.1 Both 

Congress and the Department have an obligation to ensure American diplomats serving abroad 

are protected to the best possible extent. For this reason, the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform (the Committee) undertook a review of how the Department safeguards its 

personnel serving overseas.2

The purpose of the review was to ensure the Department builds our diplomatic facilities 

abroad with two critical goals in mind: (i) protecting diplomats and classified information; and 

(ii) protecting American taxpayers from unwarranted expenditures. 

This report will detail several case studies of the Department’s risky approach to 

constructing facilities where architectural significance is favored over secure facilities including 

in London, Jakarta, Beirut, and others. The Department’s favoring of architectural significance 

comes at the expense of ensuring our diplomats are in safe facilities and saving taxpayer dollars. 

The report illustrates what can go wrong when new design concepts are introduced under 

a compressed construction schedule and how costs skyrocket when aesthetics drive decisionmaking. 

The Department’s current approach to constructing diplomatic facilities abroad 

costs too much and takes too long, despite Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 

Director Lydia Muniz’ testimony to the Committee that, “[a]s I’ve explained and assured 

the committee, there’s no additional cost under the excellence initiative.”3 The 

Department’s current approach to constructing diplomatic facilities represents a shift from the 

Standard Embassy Design (SED) to Design Excellence. SED relied on building templates and 

greater use of off-the-shelf equipment to provide proven security and faster delivery times. 

Between 2002 and 2012, OBO completed 88 new overseas diplomatic compounds based on the 

SED program.4 Design Excellence,5 seeks diplomacy through architecture and relies on purpose-

 

1

 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Frequently Asked Questions, 

http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/faq/index htm#13 (“How many U.S. diplomatic missions does [the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security] protect overseas? The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for the protection of more 

than 285 U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide.”) (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 2

 Before publication of this report, the Committee provided an opportunity for the Department, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the contractor for both the London and Jakarta new embassy 

compounds to review and comment on the draft report. 

3 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, 

Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014). 4

 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Industry Advisory Panel Meeting Minutes at 25 

(Apr. 17, 2012) (on file with Committee staff). 5

 Perhaps recognizing its branding emphasized design over other concerns, such as security, OBO changed the title 

of the program from “Design Excellence” to “Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities.” Compare U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities: Message from OBO Director Lydia 

Muniz, http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/excellence/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), with Examining New Embassy 

Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, Hearing before the H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (opening statement of Ranking Member 

Cummings) (“In 2011, the Department launched a new embassy construction effort called Design Excellence.”). 
2 

built facilities,6

 often with millions of dollars in design costs and months of delay. After 

implementing Design Excellence in 2010, the Department has not completed a single DesignExcellence only facility, though several facilities using some of the concepts have been 

completed, including Paramaribo, Suriname and Mbabane, Swaziland. As a result, diplomats 

remain in outdated facilities and the costs of the buildings often bear little resemblance to the 

economic environment of the country in which they are located. For example, as of April 2016, 

the Department planned to spend $225,194,000–a per-desk cost of $1,719,038—for a new 

embassy compound (NEC) in N’Djamena, Chad,7 a country with a 2015 estimated per capita 

GDP of $2,600.8 The per-desk cost refers to the cost for each space for an employee to conduct 

the U.S. government’s diplomatic work, as opposed to a local guard, gardener, or the like. 

Additional examples provide greater clarity of the cost disparities. A comparison of the 

Department’s new consulate compound (NCC) facilities in northern Mexico is illustrative. In 

2011, the Department completed an NCC in Tijuana under the SED program. The total cost was 

$105,377,000 and a per-desk cost of $671,191.9 The Department built a hybrid-Design 

Excellence NCC in Monterrey for a total budget of $184,993,000, resulting in a per-desk cost of 

$929,613.10 Using Design Excellence, the Department plans to spend $191,509,000 ($1,859,310 

per desk) in Matamoros11 and $154,361,000 ($1,754,102 per desk) in Nuevo Laredo.12 Facilities 

in sub-Saharan Africa tell a similar story. A recently completed NEC in Mbabane, built as a 

hybrid Design Excellence facility, cost a total of $161,720,000, with a per-desk cost of 

$2,214,342.13 By way of comparison, the Department built an NEC under the SED template in 

Dakar, Senegal for a total cost of $203,638,000 and a per-desk cost of $486,009.14 

 

6

 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Calvin Shipman at 150-51 (Mar. 31, 2016) (“Q 

So would you say there is a diplomatic function and purpose in incorporating aesthetics into the design? A A 

diplomatic function? I think so, yeah. I would agree to that. Q And could you tell me in your opinion what you see 

as the diplomatic purpose of an embassy in general to be located in a location like Beirut? A Well, an embassy 

anywhere is the face of America in that location. You know, so it needs to be inviting. It needs to stand for what we 

stand for. Needs to represent us. So I don’t think you can do that without at least weighing aesthetics into that 

somewhere.”); see also id. at 148 (testifying that aesthetics is not prioritized over security, budget, function, or 

sustainability) [hereafter Shipman Tr.]; H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Richard 

Capone at 132 (Aug. 23, 2016) (discussing the role of aesthetics and noting “[y]ou’re portraying the U.S. You want 

a nice looking building. So, yes, aesthetics are a concern.”) [hereinafter Capone Tr.]. 7

 N’Djamena NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0002889) (showing a total budget of $225,194,000 for 131 

desks). 

8

 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, Africa: Chad (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd html. 

9

 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Tijuana NCC (Aug. 13, 2015) 

(showing a total budget of $105,377,000 for 157 desks). 

10 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Monterrey NCC (Aug. 13, 

2015) (showing a total budget of $184,993,000 for 199 desks). 11 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Matamoros NCC (May 22, 

2015) (showing a total budget of $191,509,000 for 103 desks). 12 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Nuevo Laredo NCC (May 22, 

2015) (showing a total budget of $154,361,000 for 82 desks). 

13 Mbabane NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0003731) (showing a total budget of $161,720,000 for 73 

desks with 100% completion). 

14 Dakar NEC PPR, Mar. 2013 (showing a total budget of $203,638,000 for 419 desks). 

4 

staff processed a total of 5,467 visas in 2015.23 The Department also intends to spend more than 

$257 million for an NEC in Mozambique,24 a country in which the Department processed a total 

of 2,665 visas in 2015.25 By way of comparison, the Department spent $203,638,000 to 

construct an NEC in Senegal,26 a country in which the Department processed a total of 5,856 

visas in 2015.27

A few case studies of ongoing projects illustrate the Department’s risky approach to 

constructing facilities. The new embassy compound in London is an example of what can go 

wrong when new design concepts are introduced under a compressed construction schedule. In 

that case, the result is premature certification to Congress and commencement of construction 

before the Department is even sure whether the building will survive a blast. But the 

Department’s failures in London are manifested at a more elemental level. The site team has, 

among other things, permitted uncleared foreign nationals to access the site without full 

screening; obtained construction materials for the embassy’s classified space in violation of the 

rules governing the acquisition of those materials; and failed to secure communications cables 

during construction. Rather than fix the problem and ensure it will not happen again, the site 

team—encouraged by the OBO and DS management—have embraced a “nothing to see here” 

approach. It is even more concerning that the person on the ground in charge of the security of 

the site was involved in a project where “something . . . was found in the wall.”28 The 

Department’s failures in London will likely require a delayed delivery of the facility, with the 

accompanying cost of approximately $22 million for a six month lease, in addition to any other 

delay- and personnel-related costs to ensure the facility is ready for move in.29

With respect to the embassy under construction in Jakarta, the indecision of OBO’s 

management has potentially cost the Department tens of millions of dollars in change order 

requests. The reason for the indecision appears to be aesthetics; management wanted a certain 

look to the curtain wall system. OBO Director Muniz misled the Committee about costs 

associated with the Jakarta NEC. When asked by Chairman Chaffetz about the thenupcoming request by the project’s contractor for additional funds, Director Muniz stated she was 

unaware of such a request,30despite a letter to OBO from the contractor approximately one 

month before the Director’s testimony to the Committee advising that a request for additional 

money was forthcoming. Further, the contractor’s request for $49 million in additional funds 

 

23 U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2015, tbl. IV, available at

https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2015AnnualReport/FY15AnnualReportTableIV.pdf (showing 179 immigrant visas and 5,228 non-immigrant visas) [hereinafter 2015 Visa Office Rep.]. 24 Maputo NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002884) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $257,820,000). 

25 2015 Visa Office Rep., tbl. IV (showing 0 immigrant visas and 2,665 non-immigrant visas). 

26 Dakar NEC PPR, Mar. 2013 (showing a total budget of $203,638,000). 

27 2015 Visa Office Rep., tbl. IV (showing 2,028 immigrant visas and 3,828 non-immigrant visas). 

28 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Helen Jones at 29 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter 

Jones Tr.]. 

29 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Construction Contract Award and Security 

Evaluation of the New Embassy Compound London 15 (July 2015) available at

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-cgi-15-31.pdf. 

30 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (“Chairman Chaffetz. No, I’m asking if you have any direct knowledge 

that they are about to ask you for a lot of additional money. Do you or do you not? Ms. Muniz. I don’t.”). 
5 

arrived the day after the Director’s testimony before the Committee and seeks payment based on 

the Department’s alleged delays with respect to selecting certain design elements of the facility. 

The embassy project in Beirut is another example of the Department favoring 

architectural significance over moving people to safer facilities as quickly as possible. Despite a 

2012 recommendation from the Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) that the post 

move to a safer facility, the Department has spent at least $45 million on its ongoing design of 

the new embassy.31 According to witnesses who testified to the Committee in transcribed 

interviews, challenges with the constructability of the design offered by this high-end architect 

will require our Beirut-based diplomats to remain in outdated and dangerous facilities at least 

nine months longer than necessary. 

In Mexico City in September 2011, the Department purchased a brownfield for the NEC 

contaminated with diesel fuel. To its credit, the Department recognized the risk and put the onus 

on the seller to clean up the site. Nearly five years later, however, the Department has yet to 

break ground, and the site remains vacant. Despite this, the Department has already spent more 

than $56 million designing the facility in Mexico City.32 This is in addition to the $120 million 

paid for the site, half of which was paid in advance while the remediation was pending. All the 

while, our personnel remain in a facility that does not meet current security requirements. 

The documents and testimony show that in Kabul, the Department flouted best practices 

and began construction without undertaking several cost-saving and risk analysis measures. The 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) reached a similar conclusion. The price tag for the 

Department’s facilities in Kabul will likely exceed $2 billion.33 When the Department’s OIG 

pointed out that there were dangerous electrical issues, OBO minimized this risk, as well. 

The Committee’s review uncovered the Department’s need for legislative guidance 

related to security features of diplomatic facilities to ensure Marines and Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS) agents charged with protecting our people and facilities have the 

tools necessary to protect American personnel. 

The Department is also spending millions to commission new art for its facilities. This is 

despite access to one of the largest and most impressive art collections in the world through the 

Smithsonian Institution.34 Congress should place a cap on the amount of money the Department 

may spend on artwork in diplomatic facilities. That amount should be limited to the transfer and 

maintenance of existing art owned by the government or loaned to the embassy. By way of 

example, the Department currently plans to spend more than $2.9 million on art at the NEC in 

 

31 Beirut NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500013-000000016) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $1,167,067,000 and 

“Design” as $45,286,000). 

32 Mexico City NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003121) (listing a “Total Project Cost” of $943,065,000 

and a design budget of $56,465,000). 

33 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Embassy Construction Cost and Schedule have Increased, and 

Further Facilities Planning is Needed at 1 (May 2015) (GAO-15-410) http://gao.gov/assets/680/670276.pdf. 

34 The Smithsonian Institution states it is “the world’s largest museum and research complex” and “includes 19 

museums and galleries” with “the total number of artifacts, works of art and specimens in the Smithsonian’s 

collections [] estimated at 156 million. . . .” Smithsonian Institution, Fact Sheets, Smithsonian Collections (Aug. 1, 

2016), available at http://newsdesk.si.edu/factsheets/fact-sheet-smithsonian-collections. 
6 

Islamabad.35 Pakistan has a 2015 estimated per capita GDP of $4,900.36 There is plenty of art 

available to choose from. The Smithsonian estimates it displays less than two percent of its total 

collection at one time.37 

OBO—the component charged with constructing diplomatic facilities abroad—is not 

positioned for success as currently structured. The report documents how OBO’s current 

leadership has disregarded portions of the Department’s internal guidance, contained in the 

Foreign Affairs Manual. The director has also made a practice of retaining expensive architects 

to design facilities, often costing in the tens of millions of dollars. 

OBO has a challenging mission, and the findings and recommendations contained herein 

are in furtherance of our shared goal of keeping our personnel abroad safe while ensuring 

efficient use of tax dollars. 

 

35 Islamabad NEC and Housing PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003071) (showing “Art” budget of $2,901,000). 

36 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, South Asia: Pakistan (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html. 

37 Smithsonian Institution, Fact Sheets, Smithsonian Collections (Aug. 1, 2016), available at

http://newsdesk.si.edu/factsheets/fact-sheet-smithsonian-collections. 
7 

FINDINGS

Design Excellence Findings: 

 OBO’s shift away from the Standard Embassy Design to Design Excellence brought 

about longer planning and construction schedules, which were accompanied by millions 

of dollars in increased costs for facilities. 

 Since the beginning of Design Excellence approximately six years ago, the Department 

has not yet completed a single Design Excellence facility, although it has completed 

some hybrid facilities. That compares to an average of just over eight facilities per year 

under the Standard Embassy Design. 

 OBO created and implemented Design Excellence without assessing the costs and 

benefits. 

 As a result of the Department’s new system of constructing facilities, our diplomats are 

forced to remain in outdated and less secure facilities for longer than is necessary. 

London NEC Findings: 

 More than three-and-a-half years after beginning construction, security-related issues 

have jeopardized the on-time delivery of the London NEC, potentially exposing the 

government to millions of dollars in additional costs above the $1.023 billion budgeted 

for the facility, which is one of the most expensive facilities ever constructed by the 

Department. 

 The Department agreed to move out of its current embassy by February 28, 2017. As 

part of that agreement, the Department agreed to pay rent to the new owner of 

approximately $22 million for an additional six-month lease term (or more than $3.6 

million per month). It is unknown when the Department will fully move out of its current 

embassy in London, but it will not be by the February 2017 deadline. 

 The London NEC project director and site security manager’s ad hoc approach to security 

is a vulnerability for the facility as the site team is failing to adhere to even basic 

elements of site security. 

 Time pressures associated with required occupancy of the London NEC are likely driving 

OBO and DS management’s view of the security failures, resulting in cutting corners to 

build an insecure facility. 

 The London NEC site team’s significant procurement failures potentially compromise 

classified spaces in the NEC. 

 OBO began construction of the London NEC before DS completed required blast testing, 

and failed to notify Congress that additional testing was needed. Although the curtain 

wall ultimately passed blast testing, had the system failed, taxpayers would potentially 

have been required to pay millions of dollars. 
8 

Jakarta NEC Findings: 

 The Jakarta NEC is unlikely to be delivered on time—from an expected completion in 

spring 2017 to the current estimate of the end of 2018—in large part because of OBO 

management’s inability to decide which version of the curtain wall system should be 

used. 

 Documents contradict OBO Director Lydia Muniz’ testimony to the Committee regarding 

the project contractor’s request for additional funds associated with curtain wall delays. 

 With both the Jakarta and London NECs’ curtain wall systems, the Department failed to 

account for the maintenance and eventual replacement of the structural silicone holding 

the curtain wall in place. 

Beirut NEC Findings: 

 Problems with the ability to construct the design of the Beirut NEC added at least nine 

months—and perhaps as much as a year—to the construction schedule. 

 The delays in project delivery are problematic because, as the Department’s OIG 

recognized in 2012, the current embassy consists of “deteriorating and dysfunctional 

facilities,” and there are “compelling security and functional arguments” to move as soon 

as possible. 

Mexico City NEC Findings: 

 The site for the Mexico City NEC was so contaminated that, five years after the 

Department purchased the site for $120 million, the Department has not yet begun 

construction of the $943,065,000 facility. 

 Given the delays associated with the remediation, it is unlikely the Department will 

occupy the new facility by its current projected date of July 2020, and it is not yet known 

whether the delay will entail additional costs. 

Kabul NEC Findings: 

 The Department’s failure to complete and use critical planning documents, including a 

strategic facilities plan, and failures to follow cost containment and risk assessment best 

practices led to some of the cost overruns and delays at the Kabul NEC site. 

 Because of the failure to plan properly, the Kabul NEC will likely be delivered at least 

two years later than originally planned and will cost at least $167.5 million, or 27 percent, 

more than planned, with further cost increases likely. 

Additional Findings: 

 At certain facilities visited by the Chairman and Committee staff, Marines and others 

tasked with securing the facility stated they had no ability to see in the dark past the 
9 

facility grounds. This could easily be remedied by purchasing night-vision or infrared 

cameras. 

 The Department’s Art in Embassies program uses a percentage of the construction 

contract to purchase art for the facilities, which often results in wildly disproportionate 

expenditures as related to the economic circumstances of the host country. An example 

of this is more than $2.9 million in art for the Islamabad NEC, a country in which the per 

capita GDP is $5,000. 
10 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 Congress should require the Department to return to an SED-type template as the default 

for all new embassy and consulate facilities.

 Congress should exercise greater oversight of the Department’s budget requests for new 

facilities and consider enacting a cap on the design costs of new facilities.

 Congress should make clear through legislation that the Foreign Affairs Manual is 

binding on the Department. 

 Congress should adopt legislation to align with the Foreign Affairs Manual that the 

Department may not award a contract—let alone begin construction— for a new facility 

until there is a full certification to Congress, including the resolution of any outstanding 

testing.38

 The Department should replace the London NEC project director and site security 

manager immediately due to the major security lapses on site. 

 Congress should require OBO to produce an annual Long-Range Building Plan and 

Long-Range Maintenance Plan. While these are required under the Foreign Affairs 

Manual, it appears that OBO has not updated them since 2013.

 Infrared cameras, capable of seeing clearly in the dark, should be required at all U.S. 

embassies and consulates abroad. At minimum, this should include each Marine and DS 

agent serving as a guard at diplomatic facilities having access to night-vision capabilities. 

 Congress should pass legislation requiring the Department to obtain donated or loaned art 

for facilities capping the per-facility amount for associated costs, such as insurance and 

transportation of the art.

 

38 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Construction Contract Award and Security 

Evaluation of the New Embassy Compound London 6 (July 2015) (noting the Department’s practice “does not 

comply with 12 FAM 361.1, which states that ‘no contract should be awarded or construction undertaken until the 

proponent of a project has been notified by the Department that the appropriate certification action has been 

completed,’ or 12 FAM 361.3, which states that ‘[t]he chief of mission is responsible for ensuring that no project 

subject to...certification...is initiated without certification...approval.’”) available at

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-cgi-15-31.pdf. 
11 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1

FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................................... 7

RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. 11

TABLE OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................ 13

HISTORY OF ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES WORLDWIDE ........................... 14

A. Beirut – 1983 and 1984 ..................................................................................................... 14

B. Kuwait – 1983 ................................................................................................................... 16

C. Dar es Salaam and Nairobi – 1998 ................................................................................... 17

D. Benghazi – 2012 ............................................................................................................... 21

E. Tunis – 2012 ..................................................................................................................... 22

F. Ankara – 2013 ................................................................................................................... 23

G. Other Attacks .................................................................................................................... 24

PROGRESSION OF EMBASSY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ........................................ 25

A. The Inman Era................................................................................................................... 25

B. Standard Embassy Design (SED) ..................................................................................... 27

C. Design Excellence ............................................................................................................. 36

1. OBO Switches from a System that Works to a System that Takes Longer, Costs 

More, and Creates Security Vulnerabilities ................................................................ 36

2. Design Excellence’s Brownfield Development Leads to Costly Remediation and 

Years-Long Delays in Moving Personnel in Mexico City .......................................... 47

3. State Department Office of Inspector General Assessments of OBO Embassy 

Construction ................................................................................................................ 49

THE DEPARTMENT DOES A POOR JOB OF MANAGING RISKS OVERSEAS: CASE 

STUDIES ...................................................................................................................................... 51

A. London .............................................................................................................................. 51

1. Background of the London NEC ................................................................................ 52

2. It is Unlikely the Department will Take Delivery of the London NEC by the Time 

Required in the Contract to Vacate the Current Facility ............................................. 56

3. Security Failures by Onsite Management Have Been Approved by the OBO and 

DS Front Offices ......................................................................................................... 60

4. The Department Began Construction Before the DS-Required Blast-Testing was 

Complete ..................................................................................................................... 98
12 

5. The London NEC Contains Unnecessarily Expensive Features that Will Do Little 

to Keep Employees Safe ........................................................................................... 105

B. Jakarta ............................................................................................................................. 109

1. The Department Likely Will Not Deliver the Project on Time, Given its Failure to 

Select Design Elements in a Timely Manner ............................................................ 113

2. Department Officials Failed to Testify Truthfully before the Committee ................ 116

3. Use of a Curtain Wall System That Has not Been Sufficiently Tested or Planned 

for Maintenance ........................................................................................................ 139

C. Beirut............................................................................................................................... 145

1. Our Personnel in Beirut are in Dangerous, Deteriorating, and Dysfunctional 

Facilities, as Recognized by the Department’s OIG in 2012 .................................... 147

2. The Department Concluded that an Untested Architect and Idiosyncratic Design is 

Appropriate for the New Embassy in Beirut ............................................................. 149

3. The Architect’s Design Requires Personnel to Remain in Obsolete Facilities for 

At Least Nine Months Longer than Necessary ......................................................... 153

D. Mexico City .................................................................................................................... 155

E. Kabul ............................................................................................................................... 157

1. The Committee’s Hearing and GAO’s Investigation and Report ............................. 160

2. Electrical Current Problems at the Embassy Put Personnel at Risk ......................... 168

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ............................................................................................................. 169

A. DS’s Representations about Security Issues ................................................................... 169

B. The Department’s Excessive Spending for the Art in Embassies Program .................... 173

OBO, AS STRUCTURED, IS NOT POSITIONED FOR SUCCESS ....................................... 174

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 177

APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................. 178
13 

TABLE OF ACRONYMS

ARB: Accountability Review Board 

CAA: Controlled Access Area 

CSP: Construction Security Plan 

CST: Construction Surveillance Technician 

DS: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

FAH: Foreign Affairs Handbook

FAM: Foreign Affairs Manual

FBO: U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (predecessor to OBO) 

NCC: New Consulate Compound 

NEC: New Embassy Compound 

OBO: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 

ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OSPB: Overseas Security Policy Board 

RSO: Regional Security Officer 

SED: Standard Embassy Design 

SOP: Standard Operating Procedures 

SSM: Site Security Manager 

 
14 

HISTORY OF ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES WORLDWIDE

The need for our nation’s diplomats to work in safe and secure facilities is an undisputed 

top national security priority.39 Security of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad has been a longrunning concern of the Congress and the Executive Branch. 

The numbers bear out this concern. There were more than 200 attacks at U.S. diplomatic 

facilities between 1987 and 1997.40 For the period between 1998 and 2013, DS classified at least 

296 attacks as “significant.”41 Even that number, however, may be under-inclusive. In a 56-

page report entitled, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel, DS 

stated: “[s]ome attacks may not be included because, in certain cases, the motivation of the 

attacks could not be determined,” and [t]his information is not an all-inclusive compilation, 

rather, it is a reasonably comprehensive listing of significant attacks.”42

Examples of attacks on U.S. facilities abroad illustrate the risk to our diplomatic 

personnel serving overseas. 

A. Beirut – 1983 and 1984

On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a delivery van containing 2,000 pounds of 

explosives into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.43 The resulting explosion killed 63 people, 

including 17 Americans.44 

 

39 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Ranking Member Cummings) (“First and foremost, 

the safety of United States personnel serving overseas is a top national security priority, and it’s critical to our 

country’s interests throughout the entire world.”). 

40 U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and 

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998 (Jan. 1999), available at http://1997-

2001.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_report html [hereinafter E. Africa ARB Rep.]. 41 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and 

Personnel 1998-2013 (296 total attacks listed), available at 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225846.pdf. 42 Id. at 1. 

43 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, FLASHBACK: April 18, 1983: U.S. Embassy Attacked in Beirut (updated July 

10, 2014, 12:41 PM), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-storyarchive/flashback-april-18-1983-u-s-embassy-bombed-in-beirut html [hereinafter CIA Beirut Flashback]. 44 Id. 
15 

Source: Wall Street Journal45

Elements of Hizballah were responsible for the attack, along with a series of kidnappings 

that were part of an attempt by that organization and other extremist groups to force U.S. and 

Israeli personnel to leave Lebanon.46 U.S. military forces were in the region to maintain stability

during the Lebanese Civil War.47 

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, as a result of the attacks, “then-Secretary 

of State George Shultz tasked an advisory panel to investigate the security of diplomatic facilities 

overseas.”48 The report the panel produced became known as the “Inman Report”49 and resulted 

in “security improvements at embassies . . . and the creation of the State Department’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security and Diplomatic Security Service.”50 The Beirut embassy bombing was the 

 

45 Debts of the Ayatollah, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/debts-of-theayatollah-1439507940. 

46 CIA Beirut Flashback; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015 at 369 (Jun. 2016), 

available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf. 

47 CIA Beirut Flashback. 

48 Id.

49 Id.

50 Id.
16 

deadliest attack in the Department’s history at the time.51 It would not be the last attack on a 

U.S. embassy in Lebanon, however. The following year, in September 1984, a truck bomb 

exploded outside the U.S. Embassy annex in Aukar, northeast of Beirut, killing 24 people, two of 

whom were U.S. military personnel.52 According to the Department’s 2015 report on terrorist 

organizations, Hizballah was responsible for both attacks.53 

B. Kuwait – 1983

On December 12, 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait “was bombed in a series of attacks 

whose targets also included the French embassy, the control tower at the airport, the country’s 

main oil refinery, and a residential area for employees of the American corporation Raytheon.”54 

The attacks resulted in six deaths (including a suicide truck bomber), and more than 80 injuries.55 

According to a media report, “[t]he suspects were thought to be members of Al Dawa, or ‘The 

Call,’ an Iranian-backed group and one of the principal Shiite groups operating against Saddam 

Hussein in Iraq.”56 

Source: New York Times57

 

51 Ass’n for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History, The Bombing of U.S. Embassy 

Beirut—April 18, 1983, http://adst.org/2013/04/the-bombing-of-u-s-embassy-beirut-april-18-1983/; see also 

Frontline: Target America, Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988, The attacks, the groups, and the U.S. 

response, PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html [hereinafter 

Frontline: Target America]. 

52 Frontline: Target America. 53 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 at 369 (June 2016) (“Hizballah’s terrorist attacks have 

included the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the U.S. 

Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984 . . . .”), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf. 

54 Frontline: Target America. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 James Glanz & Marc Santora, Iraqi Lawmaker Was Convicted in 1983 Bombings in Kuwait That Killed 5, N.Y.

TIMES (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/07/world/middleeast/07bomber html?_r=0. 
17 

C. Dar es Salaam and Nairobi – 1998

On August 7, 1998, near-simultaneous vehicle bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, claimed more than 220 lives, and wounded more 

than 4,000 others.58 Among those killed were twelve U.S. government employees and family 

members, and thirty-two Kenyan and eight Tanzanian U.S. government employees.59 The 

terrorists who perpetrated these bombings “intended to destroy the chanceries; to kill or injure 

US Government employees and others in the chanceries; and to damage US prestige, morale, and 

diplomacy.”60 

Dar es Salaam: 

 Source: CNN61

 

58 E. Africa ARB Rep., § Executive Overview. 

59 Id.

60 Id., § Executive Overview ¶ 1. 

61 CNN Library, 1998 U.S. Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 3, 2016), 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/. 
18 

Nairobi: 

 Source: L.A. Times62

Pursuant to a mandate from then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright, separate 

Accountability Review Boards (ARBs) were established to examine the facts and circumstances 

surrounding each of the two bombings.63 On January 8, 1999, the two Boards submitted their 

combined report, known as the “Crowe Report,” to Secretary Albright.64 The report stated: 

The security systems and procedures for physical security at the embassies 

in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as a general matter met and, in some cases, 

exceeded the systems and procedures prescribed by the Department of State 

for posts designated at the medium or low threat levels. However, these 

standard requirements had not sufficiently anticipated the threat of large 

vehicular bomb attacks and were inadequate to protect against such 

attacks.65 

While “[t]he Boards did not find reasonable cause to believe that any employee of the 

United States Government or member of the uniformed services was culpable of dereliction of 

his or her duties in connection with the August 7 bombings,” they: 

 

62 Lauren Raab, Saudi man linked to Osama bin Laden convicted in 1998 embassy bombings, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 

2015, 1:07 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-khaled-fawwaz-embassy-bombing-20150226-

story html. 

63 E. Africa ARB Rep. 

64 Id.; see also Letter from Adm. William J. Crowe, U.S. Navy (Ret.), to Hon. Madeleine Albright, Secretary, U.S. 

Dep’t of State (Jan. 8, 1999), available at https://fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_letter html. 

65 E. Africa ARB Rep., § Executive Overview ¶ 6. 
19 

did find, however, an institutional failure of the Department of State and 

embassies under its direction to recognize threats posed by transnational 

terrorism and vehicle bombs worldwide. Policy-makers and operational 

officers were remiss in not preparing more comprehensive procedures to 

guard against massive truck bombs. This combined with lack of resources 

for building more secure facilities created the ingredients for a deadly 

disaster. Responsibility for obtaining adequate resources for security 

programs is widely dispersed throughout the US government as is decision 

making for determining security policies and procedures. No one person or 

office is accountable for decisions on security policies, procedures and 

resources. Ambassadors who are specifically charged with responsibility 

for the security of US diplomatic personnel assigned to their posts lack 

adequate authority and resources to carry out this responsibility.66

With respect to the Nairobi facility, the ARB discussed several physical security-related 

vulnerabilities. The building was constructed before the standards recommended in the Inman 

Report, however, and was exempted from the current setback requirement:67

The Embassy building was constructed under the supervision of the Foreign 

Buildings Operations [(FBO), OBO’s predecessor] in the early 1980’s 

before the Inman standards were produced. It was located at the intersection 

of two of the busiest streets in Nairobi, near two mass transit centers. It 

lacked sufficient setback from the streets and from adjacent buildings. To 

help extend its limited setback, the Embassy was surrounded by a 2.6 meter 

high steel picket vertical bar fence. An outer perimeter was established 

beyond the fence with a line of steel bollards, ranging 5 meters to 18 meters 

in distance from the outer walls of the chancery. The window frames were 

not anchored into the core structure, but the windows were covered by 4mm 

Mylar protective film. 

Before August 7, Nairobi was designated as a “medium” threat post in the 

political violence and terrorism category, and the embassy was in 

compliance with that threat level’s physical security standards and 

procedures as prescribed by the Department—except for the lack of a 100ft. 

setback/standoff zone.68

 Before the attack, the U.S. Ambassador in Kenya issued a cable to Department 

headquarters asking about threats against the embassy “and emphasized the embassy’s extreme 

 

66 Id.

67 Id., § Nairobi Discussion and Findings (Finding number four: “Security systems and procedures at the embassy 

were implemented well within, and even beyond, the medium threat level established by the Department of State, 

although the building had virtually no setback, having been built before the standard was established and therefore 

was exempted.”). 

68 Id., § Nairobi: Discussion and Findings. 
20 

vulnerability due to lack of standoff. She asked for Washington’s support for a new chancery.”69 

In response: 

The Department responded to the Ambassador’s cable in January, 1998, 

saying that after a review of the threat, the post’s current security rating for 

political violence and terrorism of “medium” was appropriate, and that no 

new office building was contemplated by FBO. The Department offered to 

send a security assessment team to assist the Embassy in identifying areas 

where security could be upgraded, and they found ways to reduce the 

number of embassy personnel, through re-assignments to Pretoria.

70

The security assessment “did not particularly focus on upgrades in the rear of the embassy or 

possible vehicle bomb attacks, but instead concentrated on ways to reduce the danger from crime 

and political violence” and recommended several improvements.71 The improvements were in 

process at the time of the bombing, but “they would have made no difference in mitigating the 

blast, given its size. Nor would they have deterred the terrorists from getting as close to the 

chancery as they did.”72

 The facility in Dar es Salaam had similar physical security-related vulnerabilities. Like 

the facility in Nairobi before the attack, the Department deemed the facility adequate, based on 

Tanzania’s threat ratings at the time: 

Because the political violence threat (which includes terrorism) in Dar Es 

Salaam was considered “low,” there was no priority attached to providing a 

greater setback than existed. A security survey conducted by the 

Department of State’s Office of Security Oversight within the Office of the 

Inspector General in early 1993 noted that “the chancery’s setback of from 

25 to 75 feet from the roadway is considered adequate, given the terrorist 

threat level.” The Compliance Follow-up Review, dated March 1994, 

seemed to agree, noting in paragraph three that “while some Middle Eastern 

governments and organizations with ties to terrorism are present in Dar Es 

Salaam, they have not been active in targeting American interests in 

Tanzania. The low (threat) rating appears reasonable.” It was noted, 

however, that “dense traffic on the (Laibon) side street could pose a problem 

if the threat from terrorism were to increase.”73 

 

69 Id.

70 Id.

71 Id.

72 Id.

73 Id., § Dar es Salaam: Discussion and Findings; see also id. (Finding number one: “With the notable exception of 

failing to meet the Department’s standard for a 100 ft. setback/standoff zone, the security systems and security 

procedures at the US Embassy in Dar Es Salaam prior to and on August 7, 1998 were in accord with, and in some 

ways exceeded, Department of State standards for overseas posts assessed as having a ‘low’ threat rating for 

political violence and terrorism. In view of the August 7 bombings, it is apparent that the Department’s standards 

themselves, as well as the application of those standards to the majority of overseas Embassy facilities, are 

inadequate. The standards and their application require immediate review, for both short-term and long-term 

measures.”). 
21 

The RSO arrived shortly before the attacks and attempted to make improvements to 

enhance the security of the facility, even though the improvements were not required: 

Changes in physical security procedures such as those instituted by the new 

RSO in July 1998 and the previous addition of 4mm Mylar film on all 

windows were not required for “low” threat posts but were made anyway 

because of the recognition that “vulnerability” is a better criterion than 

“threat potential” in determining which security measures should be put in 

place at any given post.74

The Boards concluded: 

We must undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy for protecting 

American officials overseas, including sustained funding for enhanced 

security measures, for long-term costs for increased security personnel, and 

for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to 

meet the new range of global terrorist threats. This must include substantial 

budgetary appropriations of approximately $1.4 billion per year maintained 

over an approximate ten-year period, in addition to savings from the closure 

of overseas installations where increased capital and security costs 

outweigh the magnitude of overall US interests. Additional funds for 

security must be obtained without diverting funds from our major foreign 

affairs programs.75

D. Benghazi – 2012		

On September 11, 2012, armed extremists attacked a U.S. diplomatic facility in 

Benghazi, Libya.76 By the next day, those attacks, which, according to the 2012 ARB report, 

involved arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use of rocket-propelled grenades, grenades 

and mortars, led to the deaths of four U.S. government personnel: Ambassador Chris Stevens; 

Sean Smith; Tyrone Woods; and Glen Doherty. The attack also seriously wounded two other 

U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the destruction and 

abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.77 Also according to the 2012 

ARB report, “[t]he Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a U.S. ambassador since 

1988.”78

 

74 Id., § Dar es Salaam: Discussion and Findings. 75 Id., § Executive Overview ¶ 10. 

76 Benghazi Attacks: Investigative Update Interim Report on the Accountability Review Board, H. Comm. on 

Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Sept. 16, 2013). 77 Benghazi Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Benghazi ARB Rep.], available at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf. 

78 Id. at 2. 
22 

 Source: CNN79

The 2012 ARB, chaired by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, was convened by thenSecretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to examine the Benghazi attack.80 In its final report, 

the ARB recommended that the Department “should develop minimum security standards for 

occupancy of temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater 

flexibility for the use of [OBO] sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for 

security upgrades at such facilities.”81 It also recommended: 

Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, 

the Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the 

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and 

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical 

security measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and 

providing equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require.82

E. Tunis – 2012

Several days after the attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi, our embassy in Tunis, 

Tunisia was attacked by “hundreds of protestors who ransacked the U.S. embassy.”83 The result 

 

79 CNN Library, Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 31, 2016, 7:38 PM), 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts/. 

80 Benghazi ARB Rep. at 1. 

81 Id. at 9. 

82 Id. 83 Tarek Amara, Two dead as protesters attack U.S. embassy in Tunisia, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2012, 6:49 PM), 

http://www reuters.com/article/us-protests-tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914. 
23 

was four people killed84 and twenty-nine others injured.85 Media reports indicate that an al 

Qaeda-affiliated group was responsible for the attack.86

According to one media report,“[t]he protesters smashed windows, hurled petrol bombs 

and stones at police from inside, and started fires in the embassy and the compound,” and “[o]ne 

protester was seen throwing a computer out of a window, while others walked away with 

telephones and computers.”87 The attackers also set fire to a nearby American school.88

 Source: Associated Press89

F. Ankara – 2013

The U.S. Embassy in Turkey was the target of a suicide bomber in February 2013.90 

According to media reports, the attack occurred “on a walkway for embassy employees and their 

 

84 Karin Brulliard, In Tunisia, embassy attack tests fledgling democracy, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-tunisia-embassy-attack-tests-fledglingdemocracy/2012/09/20/19f3986a-0273-11e2-8102-ebee9c66e190_story html. 

85 Tarek Amara, Two dead as protesters attack U.S. embassy in Tunisia, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2012, 6:49 PM), 

http://www reuters.com/article/us-protests-tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914. 

86 Thomas Jocelyn, Al Qaeda-Affiliated Group Assaulted U.S. Embassy in Tunis, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 10, 

2014, 10:19 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/al-qaeda-affiliated-group-assaulted-u.s.-embassy-intunis/article/774103. 

87 Tarek Amara, Two dead as protesters attack U.S. embassy in Tunisia, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2012, 6:49 PM), 

http://www reuters.com/article/us-protests-tunisia-school-idUSBRE88D18020120914. 

88 Karin Brulliard, In Tunisia, embassy attack tests fledgling democracy, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-tunisia-embassy-attack-tests-fledglingdemocracy/2012/09/20/19f3986a-0273-11e2-8102-ebee9c66e190_story html. 89 Tunisia’s ruling party condemns U.S. Embassy attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 15, 2012, 6:29 AM), available at

http://www.cp24.com/world/tunisia-s-ruling-party-condemns-u-s-embassy-attack-1.957168. 

90 Tim Arango & Sebnem Arsu, Suicide Blast Kills U.S. Embassy Guard in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), 

http://www nytimes.com/2013/02/02/world/europe/2-dead-in-suicide-bombing-at-us-embassy-in-turkey html. 
24 

guests” and killed a local guard, in addition to the bomber.91 The blast also critically injured a 

journalist, who was at the embassy to meet with the ambassador.92

Media reported at the time that “[t]he blast blew a hole in what appeared to be a building 

that is part of the compound’s outer gate,” which was “part of a large complex that includes blast 

doors, reinforced windows and a series of metal detectors that visitors must navigate before 

reaching embassy offices.”93

Source: New York Times94

G. Other Attacks

Although each of the attacks detailed above occurred in an area of high conflict, U.S. 

diplomatic facilities have been targets everywhere in the world, even in countries that are 

otherwise considered “safe.” For example, on November 30, 2011, an unknown individual threw 

a Molotov cocktail at the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn, Estonia.95 On February 17, 2008, 

 

91 Ivan Watson & Greg Botelho, Guard killed, journalist hurt in suicide bombing at U.S. Embassy in Turkey, CNN 

(Feb. 2, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/01/world/europe/turkey-embassy-explosion/. 

92 Id. 

93 Id.

94 Tim Arango & Sebnem Arsu, Suicide Blast Kills U.S. Embassy Guard in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), 

http://www nytimes.com/2013/02/02/world/europe/2-dead-in-suicide-bombing-at-us-embassy-in-turkey html. 

95 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and 

Personnel 1998-2013 at 20, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225846.pdf. 
25 

demonstrators threw rocks, trash cans, flares, bottles, and other objects at the façade of the U.S. 

Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, breaking windows and doors.96 On January 12, 2007, assailants 

fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, causing slight damage to the 

building.97 Given the vulnerability of U.S. embassies and consulates throughout the world, there 

is an undisputed need for safe and secure facilities for those serving overseas. 

PROGRESSION OF EMBASSY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION		

OBO is the component within the Department responsible for the “acquisition, design, 

construction, maintenance, utilization, and sale of U.S. government diplomatic property 

abroad.”98 OBO is also responsible for ensuring that the construction of diplomatic compounds 

meets specific building codes and standards.99 “DS is responsible for ensuring that new embassy 

construction meets security standards.”100 

A. The Inman Era

As a result of the attacks on U.S. facilities in Beirut in 1983 and 1984, the Department 

convened a panel to study security issues at U.S. facilities overseas,101 which resulted in what is 

popularly known as the “Inman Report,” named for the head of the panel, Rear Admiral Bobby 

Inman (Ret.).102 

In brief, the Inman Report recommended creating what has become DS;103 consolidating 

the Department’s counterterrorism functions;104 standardizing and providing additional resources 

for threat analysis and alerting features at facilities;105 better contingency planning at posts;106

 

96 Id. at 29. 

97 Id. at 32. 

98 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Afghanistan: Embassy Construction Cost and Schedule have Increased, and 

Further Facilities Planning is Needed at 2 (May 2015) (GAO-15-410); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations, About OBO, http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/about/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (“OBO sets 

worldwide priorities for the design, construction, acquisition, maintenance, use, and sale of real properties and the 

use of sales proceeds.”). 

99 Id. at 3. 

100 Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Overview, 

http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (“DS develops and implements 

security programs to protect the more than 100 domestic State Department facilities as well as the residence of the 

Secretary of State.”). 

101 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New 

Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance Requirements at 4 (June 2006) (GAO06-641) [hereinafter GAO SED Rep.]. 

102 U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (1985), available at 

http://fas.org/irp/threat/inman/ [hereinafter Inman Rep.]. 

103 Id., § Summary of Principal Recommendations (“The Department’s operational security activities should be 

consolidated into a new Bureau for Diplomatic Security.”). 

104 Id. (“The Panel recommends a reorganization of the offices primarily responsible for security and counterterrorism in the Department of State,” which “will be reassigned to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.”). 

105 Id. (“The Panel recommends a number of improvements in the Department’s protective intelligence, threat 

analysis and alerting procedures. Additional resources must be dedicated to these activities.”). 

106 Id. (“The Panel recommends that contingency planning at the post level be improved.”). 
26 

consolidation and greater control over guard forces;107 including providing Marine Corps 

detachments at sensitive posts;108 and upgrading and standardizing physical security standards.109

According to the GAO, the Inman Report “recommended that the chanceries, consulates, 

and other office buildings at 126 of the 262 overseas posts be replaced due to security conditions 

and their locations.”110

Most relevant to the Committee’s investigation, the Inman Report recommended “that a 

substantial building program be undertaken to correct the security deficiencies of office buildings 

of the Department.”111 Although the Department’s standards at the time “provide[d] reasonable 

guidance for office building security,” other standards were deficient.112 Those deficient 

standards included “perimeter security—including walls, gates, guards, and vehicle barriers.”113 

The Inman Report noted: “[O]ur Embassies will continue to be the primary targets for acts of 

terrorism” against U.S. interests abroad.114

The Inman Report recommendations were implemented through legislation and internal 

Department guidance. Each U.S. diplomatic facility overseas is required to have a plan to 

address the threat of “large explosive attacks from vehicles”;115 have a 100-foot setback from the 

perimeter of the property;116 collocate all U.S. government agencies at the post;117 have two noncontiguous access points for vehicle entry/exit from the compound, and at least one of the 

 

107 Id. (“Responsibility for the local guard programs at our posts abroad should be consolidated under the general 

direction of the Diplomatic Security Service, performance standards should be established, manuals should be 

prepared, and training, both for the guards themselves and for the program managers, should be upgraded 

substantially.”). 

108 Id. (“Marine Security Guard detachments should be assigned to all highly sensitive posts and to all embassies 

where conditions permit.”). 

109 Id. (“The Panel recommends that the Diplomatic Security Service complete the revision of the physical security 

standards to include state-of-the-art physical security concepts. These should include appropriate standards for 

ancillary facilities. They should also include guidelines for residential security and for the effective use of armored 

vehicles and other security equipment. The standards should provide minimum requirements for all posts and 

enhanced requirements as threat conditions increase. The standards and guidelines should be made available to all 

who might have use for them.”). 

110 GAO SED Rep. at 4. 111 Inman Rep., § Summary of Principal Recommendations. 112 Id., § Physical Security. 

113 Id. 114 Id.

115 22 U.S.C. § 4865(a)(1)(A). 

116 Id. § 4865(a)(3)(A); 12 FAM 313(a)(2). The Secretary of State may waive this requirement if he “determines 

that security considerations permit and it is in the national interest of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. 

§ 4865(a)(3)(B)(i); 12 FAM 315.1(b). The Secretary must submit yearly reports to Congress on “all waivers” 

granted. 22 U.S.C. § 4865(a)(3)(B)(iii); 12 FAM 315.5(b). 

117 22 U.S.C. § 4865(a)(2)(A); 12 FAM 313(a)(1). The Secretary of State may waive the collocation requirement if 

the Secretary and “the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site” agree that 

security conditions permit deviation. 12 FAM 315.1(a). 
27 

adjacent streets must have bi-directional travel;118 and each of these requirements must be met 

before the government occupies post.119

B. Standard Embassy Design (SED)

Following the attacks in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the Department convened ARBs to 

investigate the bombings.120 Around the same time, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel 

“reported on the unsafe, overcrowded, deteriorating, and ‘shockingly shabby’ conditions of U.S. 

embassies and consulates.”121

Congress approached securing diplomatic facilities with renewed vigor. One such 

example is the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA).122 

SECCA authorized $900 million annually for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 to support 

“Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance.”123 These funds were “[i]n addition to 

amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated.”124 The GAO quantified the Department’s 

expenditures as of 2006 as “an unprecedented $21 billion, multiyear program to construct 201 

new embassies and consulates.”125

In response to SECCA and the ARBs’ findings, OBO implemented reforms to the way 

diplomatic facilities are constructed. The principal change was the implementation of the SED 

in the early 2000s.126 In a 2006 report, GAO described the SED process as follows: 

The standard embassy design is a tool that OBO reports better enables it to 

plan, award, design, and construct NECs; simplifies its construction 

process; and provides economically feasible facilities. The standard 

embassy design consists of a series of documents describing requirements 

for site selection, building plans and specifications, design criteria, site 

adaptation, and contract requirements. It also provides plans and 

requirements for all features of NECs, including office buildings, 

compound access control and utility buildings, housing for Marine security 

guards at posts with a Marine contingent, and perimeter fences. OBO 

believes that standard embassy designs help speed the planning, design, and 

construction of NECs by reducing the amount of time it takes to issue 

 

118 12 FAM 316.2(a)(1). 

119 12 FAM 315.3 (“If the applicable requirements and standards cannot be met at a facility, occupancy of the 

facility is prohibited until appropriate waivers and exceptions are requested and approved by the A/S for DS and/or 

the Secretary.”). 

120 GAO SED Rep. at 5 n.7 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy 

Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998 (Jan. 1999); Adm. William J. Crowe, 

Press Briefing on the Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es 

Salaam Jan. 8, 1999)). 121 GAO SED Rep. at 5. 122 Pub. L. No. 106-113, App. G, § 601, 113 Stat. 1501A-451 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4865). 

123 Id. § 604(a). 124 Id.

125 GAO SED Rep. at 1. 

126 Testimony of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State, Examining 

New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, Hearing 

before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (SED “was developed in 2002”). 
28 

requests for proposals, prepare contract documents and issue awards, and 

complete design reviews.127

The SED facility is a template that lays out the process for planning, designing, and 

building new diplomatic facilities in a standardized arrangement of classified and unclassified 

spaces that had been pre-certified by DS to meet all security requirements.128 The system was 

essentially two parallel bars—one for classified space and one for unclassified space—separated 

by a lobby: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Fact Sheet: Embassy Design 

(on file with Committee staff) 

 

127 GAO SED Rep. at 21. 

128 Id. 
29 

There was also a derivative SED, which also contained the two bars, but were not 

necessarily parallel: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Fact Sheet: Embassy Design 

(on file with Committee staff)

“The SED design is flexible,”129 and “[o]ver the years the SED has evolved and 

matured.”130 There were initially three principal designs for the SED: small; medium; and 

large.131 A 2003 GAO report shows the different sizes of facilities: 

 

129 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations

at 23 (Aug. 2008), available at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/109074.pdf [hereinafter OIG OBO Inspection 

Rep.]. 

130 Id. at 31; see also id. (“The SED was envisioned as an evolving, not static, design. Each year adjustments are 

made to the design, so that each ‘SED class’ after 2002 reflects modifications based on practical experiences with 

the prior design class.”). 

131 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities and 

Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements at 4 (July 2010) (GAO-10-689) [hereinafter GAO Sizing 

Facilities Rep.]. 
30 

Source: GAO132

Later, based on the experience with the SED, OBO developed two additional prototypes: the 

Extra Large or Special SED, and the Standard Secure-Mini Compound.133 

 

132 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Embassy Construction: State Department Has Implemented Management 

Reforms, but Challenges Remain (Nov. 2003) (GAO-04-100). 

133 GAO Sizing Facilities Rep. at 4. 
31 

A typical SED facility layout is captured in this GAO graphic: 

 

Source: GAO134

For SEDs, the “construction material was cast-in-place reinforced concrete,” for which 

DS “gave [OBO] the doors and windows, and then the blast windows were traditional punched 

windows.”135 An engineer from DS Research & Development (DS R&D) told the Committee 

“these were all very accepted, normal, typical types of blast-resistant design and construction.”136 

As a result, DS R&D’s “level of involvement in the SEDs was very minimal,” and “there was no 

 

134 Letter from U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Hon. Edward R. Royce, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign 

Affairs, and Hon. Eliot L. Engel, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, “State Department Construction: 

Basis for Building versus Leasing Decisions was Insufficiently Documented at Three Embassies” (Apr. 24, 2015). 

135 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Russell Norris at 175 (Aug. 17, 2016) 

[hereinafter Norris Tr.]. 

136 Id.

33 

most completed projects were significantly lower than the funding levels OBO reported as 

needed for those projects.”145 In fact, “[o]verall, OBO obligated a net $165.5 million less for 

these 18 projects than the amount it had reported to Congress it would need.”146 That surplus 

was used to acquire new sites and fund an entirely new facility that was to be built in a later 

year.147 The OIG report a few years later detailed several SED facilities that were completed at 

costs less than projected.148

Between 2002 and 2012, OBO completed 88 new overseas diplomatic compounds based 

on the SED program,149 as compared to zero done under a pure Design Excellence framework in 

the six years since that program began, as discussed below. The new facilities benefitted 

personnel on the ground by moving more than 27,000 people into more secure facilities in that 

period.150 In fact, the Department’s OIG noted in 2008 “OBO’s continuing use of the designbuild and [SED] concepts is effective.”151 As of 2016, OBO reports that more than 31,000 

government employees have moved to safer facilities.152

Several witnesses interviewed by the Committee who had worked on SED facilities 

testified that they are more routinely on time than the current Design Excellence facilities: 

 Djibouti, an SED, was delayed by “[a]bout a month. Ouagadougou [another SED] 

came in on time by about a month. Dakar [another SED] was six months early”;153

and 

 Of the three SED facilities the witness discussed, he listed Bucharest as “on 

schedule,” and “[t]here was no delays,” and Johannesburg as “on time as well.”154

Even when SEDs were delayed, it was usually by a period of a month or two, rather than 

many months, or even years, as with current facilities. That was the finding of the GAO ten 

years ago, when it recognized that, even when late, nearly all of the 18 projects reviewed “were 

sufficiently completed to allow posts to occupy their respective facilities on, ahead of, or within 

 

145 Id. at 2, 9. 

146 Id. at 17. 

147 Id. (“Accelerating funding of future year projects. For example, [the Department] reported that the new embassy 

compound in Freetown, Sierra Leone, was funded with approximately $60 million in funds previously obligated, but 

not needed, for other NEC projects.”). 

148 OIG OBO Inspection Rep. at 143-200 (listing SED facilities in Phnom Penh, Astana, Bamako, and others). 

149 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Industry Advisory Panel Meeting Minutes at 25 

(Apr. 17, 2012) (on file with Committee staff). 

150 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, People Moved to Safer Facilities (showing 27,649 

as of 2012) (on file with Committee staff). 

151 OIG OBO Inspection Rep. at 1. 

152 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Fact Sheet: Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities, 

available at http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/sites/admin-overseasbuildings.state.gov/files/pdfs/excellence.pdf. 

153 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Curt Olsen at 62 (Apr. 15, 2016). 

154 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Adel Ekdawi at 60-61 (May 4, 2016) 

[hereinafter Ekdawi Tr.]. 
34 

1 month after the scheduled move-in date.”155 One witness, when asked about the merits of SED 

facilities, said he “didn’t have any complaint” with them.156 

A chart provided to the Committee by the Department titled “Embassy and Consulate 

Projects Completed Under Budget and Under Schedule Since FY09” shows 11 SEDs meeting 

that description.157 All but one was completed under budget.158 In addition, four of the seven 

facilities listed as “Under Schedule” were SEDs, and one was a Standard Secure MiniCompound type SED.159

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State160 

 

155 GAO SED Rep. at 2 (“[A]lthough only one-half of State’s construction projects were completed according to the 

contractual schedules, all but three were sufficiently completed to allow posts to occupy their respective facilities 

on, ahead of, or within 1 month after the scheduled move-in date.”), 9 (same). The GAO report also recognized that 

some of the projects under construction at that time were behind schedule and potentially over budget, OBO had 

“taken actions to mitigate the impact of these delays.” Id. at 2-3, 9-10. 

156 Ekdawi Tr. at 62. 

157 U.S. Dep’t of State, Response to House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Question from Hearing on 

September 9, 2015: Embassy and Consulate Projects Completed Under Budget and Under Schedule Since FY09

(Oct. 6, 2015). 

158 Id.

159 Id.

160 Id.
35 

GAO’s 2006 report did express some concern that operations and maintenance costs for 

SEDs would outpace costs for the facilities being replaced.161 GAO concluded “these costs 

increases are driven in part by technical security requirements that resulted in greater utility 

consumption, the need for highly qualified technical staff, and new maintenance requirements 

that posts did not have at their previous locations.”162 GAO found the Department had not 

initially developed cost or staffing projections for these facilities, but it later did so in part.163 As 

a result, GAO recommended “the Secretary of State develop an integrated and comprehensive 

facilities plan that clearly specifies the financial and human resources needed for meeting the 

immediate and long-term operations and maintenance requirements for new embassy 

compounds.”164 The Foreign Affairs Manual now addresses this, requiring OBO’s Director to 

“[d]evelop[] a Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan and Long-Range Overseas Maintenance 

Plan.” 165 

The GAO’s report recognized the Department’s projection that, “[f]rom 2009 to 2018, 

[the Department] expects an average annual funding level of approximately $1.4 billion for NEC 

projects.”166 These projections were off the mark, perhaps because the Department 

fundamentally altered the way in which it constructed facilities abroad. As discussed below, the 

new facility in Beirut alone is budgeted to cost almost $1.2 billion. 

Despite its rhetoric today about the limitations of the SED program,167 the Department 

itself recognizes the benefits of this program. An internal document relating to the Jakarta NEC 

stated that “[m]any of the standard systems and materials used in the [SED] have proven 

themselves over time in terms of security and lowered maintenance costs, and have been retained 

behind the scenes in in [sic] the design for Jakarta.”168 The document also stated that “OBO’s 

approach to major building systems is evolving away from SED values” and instead “adapting to 

environmental and sustainability goals in urban environments.”169 OBO’s current position also 

seems to diverge from the results of an OIG inspection in 2008. In that inspection report, the 

OIG noted “[p]osts commented favorably about their new facilities,” and “[m]any have received 

positive feedback from their host governments that the facilities are architecturally attractive and 

appropriate.”170

Others in the Department have said positive things about Design Excellence. One DS 

witness testified in a transcribed interview that Design Excellence “has not negatively affected” 

 

161 GAO SED Rep. at 3, 27. 

162 Id.

163 Id. at 3. 

164 Id. at 4. 

165 1 FAM 281.1(11). 

166 GAO SED Rep. at 6. 

167 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (Director Muniz 

testifying that the SED is “basically . . . two separate bars of construction, it is less efficient, it is harder to get from 

one bar to the other than a cube” and calling the SED “a very fixed solution”). 

168 Undated Document regarding Jakarta NEC, CDP201500009-000005083 (on file with Committee staff). 

169 Id.

170 OIG OBO Inspection Rep. at 1. 

37 

Administration’s (GSA) program of the same name. GSA’s Design Excellence program seeks 

“to achieve top-quality design talent.”174 OBO’s current principal deputy director, Casey Jones, 

was in charge of GSA’s Design Excellence program before coming to the Department.175

Under the SED program, OBO completed 88 new overseas diplomatic compounds based 

on the SED program between 2002 and 2012.176 By contrast, the Department has not completed 

a facility fully using the Design Excellence program in the six years of the program’s 

existence.177 A chart provided to the Committee by the Department showing NECs and NCCs 

under design or construction as of January 2015 shows not a single Design Excellence-only 

facility completed. For facilities that have been completed, the chart notes: “These projects, 

while not specifically solicited under the [Design] Excellence initiative, are similar in approach 

because of the site, permit or other project requirements.”178

 

174 U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., Design Excellence Program, available at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104455 

(last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 

175 Biography of Casey Jones, Deputy Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State

Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, 

Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (“Prior to joining the State 

Department, he served as the Director of Design Excellence at the U.S. General Services Administration, where he 

was responsible for fostering excellence in federally commissioned architecture for a range of federal agencies, most 

notably the Department of Homeland Security and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.”). 

176 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Industry Advisory Panel Meeting Minutes at 25 

(Apr. 17, 2012) (on file with Committee staff). 

177 Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Paramaribo, Suriname (Oct. 5, 2016), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262833.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in 

Mbabane, Swaziland (June 27, 2016), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/259070.htm; Media 

Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Nov. 2, 2015), available at 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249108.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy to 

the Holy See (Sept. 9, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246729 htm; Media Note, United 

States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Cotonou, Benin (July 8, 2015), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244726.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in 

Vientiane, Laos (Dec. 5, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234696.htm; Media Note, 

United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Rabat, Morocco (Dec. 2, 2014), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234609.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy 

Office Annex in Abuja, Nigeria (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/11/233838 htm; 

Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Consulate General in Monterrey, Mexico (July 2, 2014), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/228726.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in 

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (June 24, 2014), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/228402.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Consulate 

General in Guayaquil, Ecuador (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/02/221462 htm; 

Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (Dec. 11, 2013), available 

at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218626 htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in 

Belgrade, Serbia (July 1, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211441.htm; Media Note, 

United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura, Burundi (May 21, 2013), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209767.htm; Media Note, United States Dedicates New Annex Facility in 

Manila, Philippines (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206461.htm; Media 

Note, United States Dedicates New U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal (Mar. 15, 2013), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206314.htm. 

178 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, New Embassy and Consulate Projects in Design 

of Construction (Jan. 16, 2015) (on file with Committee staff). 
38 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State179

When a project is under Design Excellence, the Department appears to note that fact in 

the relevant press releases. For example, when the design team was announced for the Beirut 

NEC, OBO wrote in its press release: “This project was solicited under OBO’s Excellence in 

Diplomatic Facilities initiative, a holistic approach to project development and delivery which 

seeks to utilize the best methods, technologies, and staff abilities to produce facilities that are 

outstanding in all respects.”180

 

179 Id.

180 Media Note, Design Team Selection Announced for New U.S. Embassy in Beirut (Oct. 29, 2013), available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215995.htm. 
39 

OBO claims that Design Excellence “reemphasizes that embassies should represent the 

best in American architecture, design, engineering, technology, sustainability, art, and cultural 

heritage, as well as represent America to the host nation.”181

Documents and testimony show these facilities are costing more than previous facilities, 

oftentimes including tens of millions of dollars in design fees and many months of the design 

process. The result is—as is the case in Beirut, for example—our diplomats abroad are 

remaining in facilities longer than necessary. It is also important to note, however, that many of 

the witnesses the Committee interviewed did not have concerns with the ultimate security of the 

facilities, even under the new system. 

Design Excellence has resulted in the Department building facilities in places like Harare, 

Zimbabwe and Maputo, Mozambique at a cost of more than $250 million each.182 These 

facilities are more than $100 million more expensive than similarly situated facilities in the 

region built under the SED program. Under the SED program—which worked well, particularly 

in places like sub-Saharan Africa—the Department previously completed facilities at a lower 

total cost. For instance, the Department delivered the NEC in Libreville, Gabon—an SED—for 

approximately $108 million.183 The NEC in Djibouti tells a similar story, with the Department 

delivering that facility for just over $150 million.184 

The Committee’s investigation of the Design Excellence program suggests that the 

Department prizes “architecturally significant” buildings with little regard to the cost. While that 

may make sense in certain high-profile world capitals, the design-first concept has been exported 

to places like Harare; Maputo; and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.185 

The significance of this shift toward prioritizing more expensive architecture is reflected 

in public statements from high-ranking Department Officials. Before he became Secretary of 

State, then-Senator John Kerry said of the SED facilities: “We are building some of the ugliest 

 

181 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Excellence in Diplomatic Facilities: Message 

from OBO Director Lydia Muniz, available at http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/excellence/ (last visited Dec. 2, 

2016). 

182 Harare NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002868) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $291,683,000 and a 

“Design” budget of $5,944,000); Maputo NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002884) (showing “Total 

Project Cost” of $257,820,000 and “Design” budget of $14,959,000). 

183 Libreville NEC PPR, Aug. 2012 (showing “Total Project Cost” of $108,762,706 and noting the NEC 

“[o]ccupancy started on August 9, 2012”). 

184 Djibouti NEC PPR, Nov. 2011 (showing “Total Project Cost” of $151,772,269 and noting the NEC “opened for 

official business . . . on October 23, 2011”). 

185 Harare NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002868) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $291,683,000 and a 

“Design” budget of $5,944,000); Maputo NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002884) (showing “Total 

Project Cost” of $257,820,000 and “Design” budget of $14,959,000); Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP2016-00016-0002439) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $212,298,000 and “Design” budget of $10,076,000). 
40 

embassies I’ve ever seen.”186 For her part, OBO Director Muniz said “I believe in the power of 

architecture.”187

During transcribed interviews with Committee staff, OBO personnel claimed not to value 

aesthetics over other factors in embassy design.188 But, as the Beirut NEC Project Manager 

testified, “an embassy anywhere is the face of America in that location . . . so it needs to be 

inviting. It needs to stand for what we stand for. . . . So I don’t think you can do that without at 

least weighing aesthetics into that somewhere.”189 

Director Muniz testified before the Committee that, “[a]s I’ve explained and assured the 

committee, there’s no additional cost under the excellence initiative.”190 The facts tell a different 

story. Two SED facilities built in sub-Saharan Africa—Libreville, Gabon and Djibouti—cost 

approximately $108 million and just over $150 million, respectively.191 For comparison, the 

budget for the Maputo NEC is more than $257 million, including approximately $15 million in 

design costs alone.192 The total budget for the Harare NEC is even higher, at nearly $292 

million.193 

The need to move U.S. diplomats into new facilities in Maputo and Harare is urgent. In 

Maputo, for example, the country is “is classified as ‘critical’ for crime, the Department’s 

highest rating on a scale of low-medium-high-critical.”194 During Chairman Chaffetz’ trip to 

Maputo, the regional security officer (RSO) reported there were more than 90 crimes against 

Americans there in 2014.195 The current facility in Maputo is “four adjacent buildings originally 

built in the 1950s as residences and modified over the years serve as the Chancery and Annexes 

 

186 Tanya Ballard Brown, Can U.S. Embassies Be Safe Without Being Unsightly?, NPR, (Feb. 26, 2013, 5:15 PM 

ET), available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/02/26/172978571/can-u-s-embassies-be-safewithout-being-unsightly. 

187 Fred A. Bernstein, Designing Diplomacy: Top Firms Selected for New U.S. Embassies, ARCHITECTURAL RECORD 

(Mar. 23, 2016), available at http://www.architecturalrecord.com/articles/11569-designing-diplomacy-top-firmsselected-for-new-us-embassies. 

188 Shipman Tr. at 148 (testifying that aesthetics is not prioritized over security, budget, function, or sustainability); 

Capone Tr. at 132 (discussing the role of aesthetics and noting “[y]ou’re portraying the U.S. You want a nice 

looking building. So, yes, aesthetics are a concern.”). 

189 Shipman Tr. at 151. 

190 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (response of 

Director Muniz in response to a question by Rep. Kelly). 

191 Libreville NEC PPR, Aug. 2012 (showing “Total Project Cost” of $108,762,706); Djibouti NEC PPR, Nov. 2011 

(showing “Total Project Cost” of $151,772,269). 

192 Maputo NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002884) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $257,820,000 and 

“Design” budget of $14,959,000). 

193 Harare NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002868) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $291,683,000 and a 

“Design” budget of $5,944,000). 

194 U.S. Dep’t of State, Mozambique: Scenesetter for CODEL Chaffetz, Cable No. 15 MAPUTO 318 (Feb. 27, 

2015). 

195 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and the 

Hon. Stephen Lynch on Maputo Security (Mar. 7, 2015). 
41 

on a single compound.”196 The embassy is essentially four houses the Department rented and 

then built a fence around: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State197

The current facility has essentially no setback, and the only separation from the embassy and the 

street is a metal fence. 

 There are a significant number of U.S. personnel working in Maputo: “The current US 

Embassy in Maputo employs more than 400 Americans and local staff who are spread 

throughout the city in multiple locations and are in buildings that do not meet current 

Department security standards. Post is on the Top 80 list of facilities to be replaced.”198 When 

Chairman Chaffetz visited Maputo, Ambassador Douglas M. Griffiths made clear he believed 

Maputo needed a new embassy and had sent several cables informing the Department 

headquarters of his concerns.199

 

196 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Facilities Fact Sheet Embassy Maputo (on file 

with Committee staff). 

197 U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Embassy Maputo, Mozambique, 

https://diplomacy.state.gov/discoverdiplomacy/explorer/places/195857 htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 

198 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and the 

Hon. Stephen Lynch on Maputo Security (Mar. 7, 2015). 

199 Id.
42 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff

The Department purchased the Maputo NEC site in 2007,200 and in 2016, the new facility 

is not yet complete. As of April 2016—more than a year after Chairman Chaffetz’ visit to the 

site—the Department’s schedule showed a completion percentage of zero.201 This is what the 

site looked like during Chairman Chaffetz’ March 2015 visit: 

 

200 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Facilities Fact Sheet Embassy Maputo (on file 

with Committee staff). 

201 Maputo NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002884). 
43 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff

The NEC in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea tells a similar story. The NEC there was 

supposed to be a Standard Secure Mini Compound, a type of SED.202 Under that design, the 

total budget for the facility started approximately $77.5 million, with approximately $2.5 million 

was for design costs.203 The Department broke ground in August 2012,204 and the facility was to 

be complete in July 2014.205 The current embassy is “in an old bank building,” and the 

employees there “have to have an armed guard take them from their living facilities to the 

embassy itself,” a “facility that by any standard is not properly secure.”206 

 

202 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2012 (listing the facility as “Standard Secure Mini Compound”); Examining New 

Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, Hearing before 

the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (OBO Principal Director Casey Jones: 

“At Port Moresby we started with what was essentially a standard embassy design. It was a mini standard design.”). 

203 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2012 (listing a total budget off $77,546,000 and a design budget of $2,543,000). 

204 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Aug. 2012 (“Ground breaking was August 6, 2012, 0900.”). 

205 Port Moresby NEC PPR, May 2012 (showing July 2014 as 100% on the “Cost Loaded Schedule”). 

206 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (statement of 

Chairman Chaffetz). 
44 

This is what the SED version of the Port Moresby NEC was to look like: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State207

When the project was 49 percent complete—and several months after Chairman Chaffetz 

visited the site in early 2014—the Department noted in an internal tracking document: “Work 

has been suspended on site per direction from the CO [contracting officer]. Negotiations are 

underway to de-scope and shutter project in preparation for new contract award.”208

The Department thus shut down a half-completed NEC project in a country that needed a 

new facility.209 In its place, the Department awarded a new contract in September 2015, more 

than a year after the facility was supposed to be complete.210 The Department replaced the SEDbased facility with a Design Excellence project that currently has an unknown budget,211 but as 

 

207 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002917). 

208 Port Moresby NEC PPR, June 2014. 

209 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (“Mr. Chaffetz. 

So they’re having to stay in the same facility. It is exceptionally dangerous, correct? Ms. Muniz. The reason Port 

Moresby is on the vulnerability list and getting a new embassy is because it’s dangerous.”); see also id (Chairman 

Chaffetz. “During my short visit [to Port Moresby], there was an attempted carjacking of an embassy staffer.”). 

210 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002917); Examining New Embassy Construction: Are 

New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight 

& Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (Mr. Chaffetz. Let’s go to Port Moresby for a second, because I had a 

chance to go visit there in February. When was that originally slated to be completed? Ms. Muniz. In 2014. Mr. 

Chaffetz. May of 2014, correct? Ms. Muniz. Yes. Mr. Chaffetz. And now when is it slated to be completed? 

Ms. Muniz. In early 2018.”). 

211 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002917) (listing a total budget of “-”). 
45 

of October 2015, the budget was to be more than $212 million.212 Of that amount, more than 

$10 million was for design costs.213

This is what the current version of the Port Moresby NEC is slated to look like: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State214

In testimony before the Committee, OBO’s principal director, Casey Jones, said the 

addition of a Marine guard detachment and additional desks resulted in a cost of $24 million over 

stopping the project all together and starting over.215 The numbers do not appear to bear this out, 

however. Looking at May 2014—just before Mr. Jones testified before the Committee—the 

Department budgeted approximately $79.3 million for the NEC,216 and an additional $17.6 

million for the Marine quarters.217 That total of approximately $96.9 million is less than the 

approximately $212 million budgeted in October 2015218 that has since turned into an unknown 

budget.219

 

212 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Oct. 2015 (CDP-2016-00016-0002439) (listing a current working estimate of a total 

budget of $212,298,000). 

213 Id. (listing a current working estimate design budget of $10,076,000). 214 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2015 (CDP-2016-00016-0002917). 

215 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014) (opening 

statement Casey Jones, Principal Deputy Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

216 Port Moresby NEC PPR, May 2014 (showing a total budget of $79,346,000). 

217 Port Moresby MSGQ/NOX PPR, May 2014 (showing a total budget of $17,658,000). 

218 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Oct. 2015 (CDP-2016-00016-0002439) (listing a current working estimate of a total 

budget of $212,298,000). 

219 Port Moresby NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002917) (listing a total budget of “-”). 

47 

 “Having unique designs for each facility requires more time for DS to review the 

designs and determine the necessary countermeasures; with DS already overloaded 

with tasks, the panel questions the advisability of requiring this extra time”; 

 “As enemies find new ways to attack U.S. facilities, having multiple designs makes 

developing and deploying countermeasures more difficult;” and 

 “Variations in design will require increased availability of non-standard items that 

require replacing (doors, windows, access barriers, etc.) particularly when a post must 

recover from a recent attack.”228

“OBO report[ed to GAO that SED] better enable[d] it to plan, award, design, and 

construct NECs; simplifie[d] its construction process; and provide[d] economically feasible 

facilities.”229

2. Design Excellence’s Brownfield Development Leads to Costly

Remediation and Years‐Long Delays in Moving Personnel in Mexico

City

Under the Design Excellence program, the Department looks at using “Urban 

Locations/Brownfield Redevelopment,” “Expanded Design Leadership,” “Hir[ing] Strong 

Design Teams with Good Leadership,” and “Industry Design Reviews” as guiding factors.230 In 

addition, OBO seeks LEED Silver certification for new projects.231

The Mexico City NEC site provides an example of issues related to brownfield 

development. The Department told Committee staff: “After searching for a new site for a 

number of years, in 2010 the Department identified and evaluated potentially viable sites—

focusing on centrally located properties in Mexico City.”232 The Department entered into a 

contract to purchase the site of a former soap and toothpaste factory, but, more than two years 

after starting remediation to clean up contaminated soil, the Department has not yet begun 

construction.233 The Department told Committee staff that this site was the “most suitable 

available property,” notwithstanding the contamination, and they were “not surprised” and it “is 

not unusual” for a brownfield to have contamination.234 As a term of the sale, the seller was 

 

228 Id. (emphases added). 229 GAO SED Rep. at 21. 

230 American Council of Engineering Companies, The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) Excellence 

and Opportunities at 10-11 (Aug. 14, 2013), available at

http://community.acec.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a35b31d2-9dba4a99-b0c4-94fe827ad764. 

231 Shipman Tr. at 125 (“Q Does OBO have a baseline they shoot for on each building? A It’s LEED Silver. 

Q LEED Silver for each new facility? A Yes.”). 

232 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Site Selection (Apr. 16, 2015). 

233 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Sept. 14, 

2016). 

234 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Site Selection (Apr. 16, 2015). 
48 

required to fully clean the site before the Department took possession.235 In September 2016, 

approximately five years after the agreement to purchase the site for the Mexico City NEC, the 

Mexican government approved the remediation, and the Department finally took possession.236 

This is approximately what the site looked like when Chairman Chaffetz traveled to Mexico City 

in April 2015: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State237

In the meantime, the current embassy in Mexico City lacks a proper setback and is situated on a 

busy street downtown.238

 

235 Promissory Purchase Agreement Between the United States of America and Inmobiliaria Colpal, S. de R.L. de 

S.V. § 9.b (Sept. 13, 2011) (Bates number 000001) (“Seller [Colgate] shall perform whatever works necessary, at its 

sole cost, to make and deliver the Property ‘Ready to Build’ on or before the Settlement Date.”) (emphasis added). 

236 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Sept. 14, 

2016); Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Oct. 3, 

2016). 

237 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). 

238 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and the 

Hon. Stacey Plaskett on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 24, 2015). 
49 

Mexico City is not an outlier in terms of costly brownfield development. The 

Department spent approximately $12 million to clean contaminated soil at the site of the London 

NEC,239 as well as significant amounts of money for remediation on other sites. For instance, the 

Department spent $640,427 “for the excavation and disposal of contaminated soil and pavement” 

at the Harare NEC site, $2.31 million at the Jakarta NEC site “to raise site with fill and the 

excavation and disposal of contaminated soil,” and $1.145 million at the Vientiane NEC “for the 

excavation and disposal of contaminated soil and the installation of a retaining wall.”240 In 

addition to these sums, the Department paid $228,300 “for quality assurance of remediation 

efforts” at the Mexico City NEC site, notwithstanding the contractual requirement that the seller 

of that site turn over a fully remediated site. 

The Department entered into a contract to purchase the Mexico City site in September 

2011, paying half of the purchase price up front, with the other half due on completion.241 In the 

five years since the Department purchased the property, nearly a year and a half since Chairman 

Chaffetz visited the site, and more than $225,000 in funds spent on remediation242

(notwithstanding that it is the seller’s responsibility to fully remediate the site243), the 

Department has not yet even broken ground. The contract between the Department and Colgate 

envisioned that the remediation would be complete by March 2015.

244 It was not complete until 

the summer of 2016.245

3. State Department Office of Inspector General Assessments of OBO

Embassy Construction

As the OIG recognized recently, “[t]he cost of building [NECs] is increasing.”246 As a 

result, the OIG will conduct an audit in 2017 related to “OBO New Embassy Construction 

Budget Planning.”247 The OIG recognizes that, “[g]iven the increased costs of constructing a 

NEC, it is important that OBO provide to its stakeholders transparent embassy construction cost 

estimates through its capital planning, project prioritization and budgeting methods.”248 The 

 

239 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Director Lydia Muniz by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (1-16) 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform December 08, 2015, Resp. No. 11 (Feb. 12, 2016). 

240 Id. 241 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015); see also Promissory Purchase Agreement Between the United States of America and Inmobiliaria Colpal, S. 

de R.L. de S.V. (Sept. 13, 2011) (Bates number 000001). 

242 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Director Lydia Muniz by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (1-16) 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform December 08, 2015, Resp. No. 11 (Feb. 12, 2016). 

243 Promissory Purchase Agreement Between the United States of America and Inmobiliaria Colpal, S. de R.L. de 

S.V. § 9.b (Sept. 13, 2011) (Bates number 000001) (“Seller [Colgate] shall perform whatever works necessary, at its 

sole cost, to make and deliver the Property ‘Ready to Build’ on or before the Settlement Date.”) (emphasis added). 244 Id.

245 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Sept. 14, 

2016). 

246 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Work Plan FY 2017 – FY 2018 at 7 (OIG-EX-16-02), available 

at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/2017-18_work_plan_final.pdf. 247 Id.

248 Id.
50 

OIG is also planning to conduct an audit of “OBO’s Value Engineering Program,”249 which was 

an issue in the Department’s construction of the NEC in Kabul.250

OBO should strive to be “willing to make tough decisions to balance the needs of 

stakeholders within fiscal realities,” as the OIG recognized about a previous Director of OBO.251 

Although, as the OIG’s OBO inspection report recognized, earlier iterations of OBO 

management were not perfect, they did instill “much needed discipline at all levels of OBO in 

managing projects, which is a crucial factor in containing costs and meeting construction 

schedules.”252 A balance needs to be struck that protects our diplomats and taxpayers with 

respect to diplomatic facilities abroad. 

 

249 Id. (“Value engineering (VE) is an organized study that analyzes the functions of systems equipment, facilities, 

services, and supplies to achieve essential performance, reliability, quality, and safety. All OBO projects with an 

estimated cost of construction over $5 million will have at least one VE study or formal waiver from the VE 

study.”). 

250 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

251 OIG OBO Inspection Rep. at 5. 

252 Id.

52 

employee to conduct the U.S. government’s diplomatic work, as opposed to a local guard, 

gardener, or the like. 

Documents and testimony show the London NEC is a project beset by dangerous 

shortcuts that were apparently brought about by an aggressive construction schedule. Those 

problems include: (i) beginning construction before properly certifying to Congress that the 

building will withstand an explosion; (ii) having uncleared foreign nationals on the site without 

being fully screened; (iii) procuring or fabricating materials for the classified space without 

following procedures to ensure that those materials are not subject to compromise by 

counterintelligence agencies; (iv) failing to properly secure communications cables during 

construction; (v) improperly permitting foreign nationals to participate in construction of the 

classified space; and (vi) failing to ensure that there is a guard posted at one of the entrances to 

the classified space.256 Even with these shortcuts, delivery of the London NEC may be delayed, 

potentially costing the government additional money. 

1. Background of the London NEC

The United States needs a new facility in London. The current U.S. Embassy in London 

was built in 1960, and does not meet current security and building standards for embassies and 

consulates.257 Rather than undertake a more than $500 million renovation that would still not 

meet all of the relevant standards, the Department decided in 2006 to construct a new 

embassy.258 In a fact sheet accompanying the new embassy’s ground breaking, the Department 

declared that “[t]he new U.S. Embassy will enhance the urban fabric of London and demonstrate 

exceptional American architecture, technology, and sustainability.”259

The current embassy in London has inadequate setback from the public area in Grosvenor 

Square, as well as the road next to the facility: 

 

256 Memorandum from Helen V. Jones and John Hall, Security Management, Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Apr. 29, 2016), Attachment to Letter from Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 

Reform, and Hon. Ron DeSantis, Chairman, Subcomm. on National Security, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 

Reform, to Hon. John F. Kerry, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 9, 2016) [hereinafter OBO SM London Mem.]. 

257 OIG London Rep. at 4. 

258 Id.; see also Briefing by U.S. Dep’t of State to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform staff on New London 

Embassy (Aug. 7, 2015) (noting that the renovation cost “was estimated to cost approximately $550 million”); 

Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Dep’t of State); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Embassy London, United 

Kingdom Ground Breaking Fact Sheet, Nov. 2013, available at http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/sites/adminoverseasbuildings.state.gov/files/pdfs/london_508.pdf. 

259 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Embassy London, United Kingdom Ground 

Breaking Fact Sheet, Nov. 2013, available at http://overseasbuildings.state.gov/sites/adminoverseasbuildings.state.gov/files/pdfs/london_508.pdf. 
53 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff
54 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff

The construction of the London NEC, like any diplomatic facility constructed abroad, is 

governed by three interdependent sets of procedures. The first is the Foreign Affairs Handbook, 

the second is that facility’s construction security plan (CSP), and the third is the set of standard 

operating procedures (SOPs) implementing the CSP for that site.260 The relevant portion of the 

Foreign Affairs Handbook, known as 12 FAH-6, governs in the hierarchy261 and is incorporated 

in a project’s CSP: 

Q And is 12 FAH[-]6 binding? 

A Is 12 FAH[-]6 binding? 

Q Yes, are you required to follow it as a site security manager? 

A Yes. And the CSP should incorporate[] those aspects of the 12 FAH[-

]6. . . . 

Q The CSP incorporates the 12 FAH[-]6 requirements? 

A Yes.262 

 

260 Ashbery Tr. at 82-83 (describing each document’s role). 

261 Jones Tr. at 38-39 (“Q Okay. In that hierarchy, hierarchy’s maybe not the right word, but in that group of three 

documents, the CSP the SOP, and the Foreign Affairs Handbook, which one governs? A The 12 FAH[-]6.”). 

262 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Raymond Bassi at 62 (Sept. 15, 2016) 

[hereinafter Bassi Tr.]. 
55 

The requirements of 12 FAH-6 remain static, but the CSP and the SOPs are generally unique to 

each site, depending on that site’s threat level for terrorism and espionage.263 The CSP and SOPs 

may change over the course of the project.264 The CSP also provides the basis for the 

Department’s certification to Congress that a particular project will be safe and secure.265

In addition to the site team’s security failures discussed below, there remain questions 

about the testing of the curtain wall façade of the building. With respect to curtain walls, OBO 

Director Muniz testified: “Glass curtain walls are non[-]load bearing exterior walls that typically 

provide for large, unobstructed spans of glass across multiple floors.”266 As one of the 

Department’s blast experts testified: “It’s called curtain wall because it basically hangs off the 

building. It is supported at each floor by a mechanical system that holds the thing up and off and 

away from the building.”267 Although curtain wall systems are commonly used in commercial

buildings, they have not often been used at U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, which have higher 

security standards, because “[c]ommercial buildings typically don’t try to preclude being shot at 

by high-powered rifles and attacked by mobs.”268 A former construction executive for the 

Jakarta NEC—another facility using a glass curtain wall system—testified that the use of such 

systems in diplomatic facilities abroad is “very, very unique.”269

This diagram shows some detail of the London NEC curtain wall:

 

263 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Bruce Cotterman at 19 (Aug. 18, 2016) 

[hereinafter Cotterman Tr.] (“Q Okay. Let’s talk about the construction security plan, or CSP at London. How was 

the London CSP similar to others that are drawn up and used by our office or drawn up and applied by your office? 

A They’re similar because of the threat level. The—our CSPs are developed based on the technical threat level of 

the post.”); Ashbery Tr. at 78 (“Q What are standard operating procedures? A Standard operating procedures 

would be a set of procedures that are a mechanism for implementing a construction security plan.”). 

264 Jones Tr. at 18-19 (describing a change to the London CSP); H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

Transcribed Interview of John Hall at 71 (June 26, 2016) (noting the London SOPs have not changed). According to 

the London site security manager, however, the CSP “remain[s] static over the life of the project.” Bassi Tr. at 61 

(“Q So does the CSP[] remain static over the life of the project? A Yes. Q It does? A CSP is static.”). 

265 Bassi Tr. at 62 (“Q Does the CSP provide the basis for the Department certification to Congress about a 

particular facility? A Yes. I believe it is included in the package.”), 110-11 (“Q I want to go back to the [CSP] so 

that I have a very clear understanding of what it is. So I think earlier today it was discussed that the [CSP] forms the 

basis for the certification to Congress. A Uh huh. Q And is the [CSP] related to the contract at the embassy? 

A It’s part of the certification package to Congress in which the State Department certifies to Congress they will 

build an embassy according to Public Law 101 and they will build it in secure certain ways, et cetera, et cetera. And 

as part of that is the construction security plan which outlines the steps that will be taken to do that construction.”). 

266 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

267 Norris Tr. at 29. 

268 Id. at 21. 

269 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Susan Patton at 102 [hereinafter Patton Tr.] 

(“A This is an 11-story office building with a glass curtain wall, which is incredibly typical. . . . Except for U.S. 

Government standard security standards, which are the same on our buildings. So that’s what makes—that’s what 

makes State Department buildings unique is the security requirements. They’re unique—no matter what we build, 

those standards apply. So that’s very, very unique.”). 

57 

The Department used the proceeds from the sale of the current embassy property and 

other properties in London to fund the London NEC. The Department sold the current chancery 

building to a group of Qatari investors, and “at the closing for the sale of the Chancery, State 

prepaid a 3 1⁄2 year lease for the [current embassy’s] Chancery for approximately $33 million.”271 

That lease period “covers the Department’s leaseback of the Chancery through February 28, 

2017,” and “[i]f the Department does not vacate the Chancery by that date, further rents will be 

due (that is, approximately $22 million for a 6-month extension).”272 

The financial penalties for the Department are high if it fails to meet the construction 

schedule. Further, Congress remains concerned about the costs of the London NEC such that it 

placed a provision in the FY 2016 Omnibus bill prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for the 

London NEC.273

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures in DS, Wayne Ashbery, testified he 

does not believe the Department will move into the facility by February 2017. He testified: 

Q Is it unlikely that the building will be occupied by February? 

A In my opinion, yes, it is unlikely.274

When asked about of some security-related issues, and whether “the resolution of th[em] 

might impact the schedule for delivery of the embassy,” he testified “I believe it may, yes.”275 

He based this understanding on the fact that DS’s final accreditation inspection—the inspection 

before a diplomatic facility is cleared for occupancy276—was initially scheduled for November 

2016. Now, however, it is not scheduled because DS is still ascertaining the extent of several 

security-related issues discussed below. Regarding the final accreditation inspection, the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Ashbery told the Committee: 

Q When is the final accreditation inspection scheduled for? 

A At this point in time, we have not scheduled it. 

 

271 Id. at 15. 

272 Id. The OIG’s report recognized that, “[s]hould the contractor require a full 44 months to attain substantial 

completion, performance would continue into February 2017,” and as a result, “[a]ny extensions past this November 

2016 deadline would force OBO to extend the lease for the current embassy Chancery building, which would cost 

additional money.” Id. at 16. 

273 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 7004(e)(1), 129 Stat. 2241, 2734 (2015) (“None 

of the funds appropriated under the heading ‘Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance’ in this Act and 

prior Acts making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs, made 

available through Federal agency Capital Security Cost Sharing contributions and reimbursements, or generated 

from the proceeds of real property sales, other than from real property sales located in London, United Kingdom, 

may be made available for site acquisition and mitigation, planning, design, or construction of the New London 

Embassy . . . .”).

274 Ashbery Tr. at 158. 

275 Id. at 157. 

276 Id. at 81 (describing the final accreditation, also known as phase three, inspection: “Phase three is at the 

completion of the project. At that point the project is substantially complete, there may still be punch list items. But 

it is making the determination that we feel the security is adequate for occupancy of the building.”). 
58 

Q Has it been previously scheduled? 

A Yes. 

Q When was it originally scheduled? 

A I was going to say it was originally scheduled to be in the November 

[2016] time frame. 

Q But that’s not going to happen? 

A That will not happen. 

Q Do you have any guess on when it might happen? 

A Not at this time. I would choose not to form an opinion on that until we 

have resolved the materials issues and know the full extent and scope of 

them. 

Q So you’re still learning the extent and scope of the materials issues? 

A I was going to say we still have an ongoing review of the materials 

issues associated with that project to ensure that at the end of the project 

we can confirm the integrity of that project, yes.277 

 A typical new construction project has three or four accreditation inspections at various 

intervals in the construction process, called phase one,278 phase two,279 and phase three or final 

accreditation.280 The London NEC has already had three visits for phase two alone, with at least 

one more phase two visit contemplated. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified: 

 

277 Id. at 157-58; see also id. at 114 (“Q Is the issue about the fabricated materials of concern to you at this point? A 

Yes. Q So I’m sorry, let me rephrase the question. The issue that was identified in this bullet, which continues, 

‘Materials are specifically fabricated locally for the London project and sent to site for random selection or 

inspection. REMEDY: SM will notify DS of the deviation to Division 1 section 01141, 3.11 A. and will request the 

appropriate mitigation,’ to your knowledge, has that issue been addressed or resolved? A I was going to say, not in 

its entirety. Q Do you have any reason to believe that this issue will not be fully addressed and resolved? A I have 

no reason at all to believe it will not be resolved. I am confident that we will resolve it. But it is not yet resolved.”). 

278 Id. at 80 (“Phase one, it occurs very early in the construction progress, generally before any of the building 

structures have been erected.”). 

279 Id. at 80-81 (“[P]hase two is midway between the construction project, it is generally when the sensitive portions 

of the building are under construction but have not been closed in so that the building systems are accessible and 

visible. It allows us to look at a lot of the detail work that we need to understand that may be hidden during the final 

construction.”). 

280 Id. at 79 (“Q Can you describe your accreditation process? A Sure. At multiple times during the course of a 

construction project we send a team of security experts out to review the current status of the construction project 

and construction program to ensure that the work that is being done is being done in compliance with public law, 

[OSPB] standards and construction security plan. Q How many times does it occur on a typical project? A On a 

typical project, it will occur three times— . . . . With time, that has evolved slightly to where it oftentimes actually 

involves four visits.”). 
59 

Q How many phase two visits are there typically, is there just one— . . . 

A I was going to say, that typically there will be just one. On larger 

projects, we do more than one. 

Q What’s the highest number of phase two accreditation visits you’re 

aware of? 

A Three or four. 

* * * 

Q How many has London had? 

A At this point, London we’ve had accreditation teams out there three 

times as part of phase two. 

Q Any further accreditation visits contemplated? 

A Yes. 

Q When? 

A That will be dependent on powers of construction and remediation of 

some of the issues that are identified. 

Q And to be clear these remain phase two? 

A Yes, they would not be part of the final accreditation. 

Q So London will have at least four phase two accreditations? 

A Yes, it will. 

Q Any chance it is more than four? 

A Depending on the findings of the next team. 

Q So the accreditation for the London facility is still up in the air, so to 

speak. Is that a fair statement? 

A It is still in process, yes.281

 Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery’s testimony demonstrates that, rather than undergo 

final accreditation of the facility in November 2016 as originally contemplated for the required 

February 2017 move-in, the London NEC does not even have its final phase two inspection 

scheduled, let alone its final accreditation inspection. In fact, the issue of “trying to mitigate” 

 

281 Id. at 85-86. 

61 

 Failure to secure communications cables; 

 Failure to properly partition the construction area in the classified space; and 

 Failure to ensure that a cleared American guard is posted at one of the entry points of 

the classified space.287

These issues were raised within OBO and DS following a March/April 2016 inspection 

(the 2016 Inspection) of the London NEC by OBO’s Security Management branch, the office 

charged with “ensur[ing] that the security guidelines are being adhered to at sites and ensuring 

that the SSM [site security manger] is implementing them.”288 Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Ashbery testified Security Management “[a]bsolutely” “has a role to play in the construction of 

new facilities.”289

That 2016 Inspection trip report was memorialized in a memorandum290 that “is designed 

to keep the director of OBO in the loop,” highlighting “issues the director needs to be aware 

of.”291 Security Management is responsible for these inspections “because these projects are so 

complex and they do need a series of eyes on them.”292 With respect to the 2016 Inspection, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified that, because of the severity of the issues uncovered 

in the inspection, “[t]here were many discussions going on about this topic at the time” following 

the issuance of the trip report.293

a. Failure to Screen Uncleared Foreign Nationals Onsite

The 2016 Inspection revealed that “uncleared foreign nationals are still not being 

screened before accessing the site,” and “[t]here are currently seven OBO . . . personnel without 

a [security] clearance that are not being screened.”294 The London CSP, SOPs, and 12 FAH-6 

 

287 OBO SM London Mem. 

288 Jones Tr. at 52; Capone Tr. at 28 (noting with respect to security management’s role with the CSP: “Q So they 

make it, they oversee it, and they implement it? A Yes.”); Bassi Tr. at 54-55 (“[A]ll elements of the construction 

security come from OBO. The funding, the resource requests, the construction security plans are written by the desk 

officers at the contract stage or the initiation of the project. And at the same time DS approves those plans to see 

that they conform with the accreditation side of the house.”). 

289 Ashbery Tr. at 78 (“Q Do you think security management has a role to play in the construction of new facilities? 

A Absolutely. Q You wouldn’t call them irrelevant? A Not at all.”). 

290 OBO SM London Mem. 

291 Bassi Tr. at 104-05 (“Q . . . I see here that this is an information memorandum. Can you explain for us just very 

briefly what an information memorandum is? A These memorandums are designed to keep the director of OBO in 

the loop. They’re loop memos is what they are. Each reporting officer and SM—OBO/SM [Security Management] 

has them come out, try to make it to a site four times a year. I instituted that when I was there. They weren’t going 

out enough. So the fact that I see [a named Security Management desk officer] at least four times a year is because I 

instituted that. And it’s really necessary because these projects are so complex and they do need a series of eyes on 

them, that this report is basically the highlights of issues the director needs to be aware of. And that’s what that is. 

It’s a snapshot of current issues for [Director Muniz] or whoever is in her position.”). 

292 Id. at 104-05. 

293 Ashbery Tr. at 84-85 (“Q Sir, when did you become aware of this memo? A Sometime in May 2016. Q Not 

long after it was issued? A Several weeks after it was drafted, but not long. Q How did you become aware of it? 

A I believe it was provided to me by OBO management. Q Do you recall who? A I don’t. It may also have been 

provided by my staff. There were many discussions going on about this topic at the time.”). 

294 OBO SM London Mem. at 1. 
62 

require screening of any person who does not possess a U.S.-issued security clearance, including 

passing a walk-through metal detector and an x-ray of the person’s bags, before entering the 

site.295 Despite attention from within the Department and scrutiny from this Committee, the site 

team still refuses to screen these seven people. As the site security manager testified: 

Q . . . This screening issue has been raised several times since April of 

2014. I understand there was disagreement. Are you screening these 

seven people today? 

A No.296 

OBO and DS staff onsite—particularly the project director and the site security 

manager—are permitting foreign nationals employed as locally engaged staff on the site without 

use of the walk through metal detector or the x-ray machine.297 This violates the policies 

governing security of the London NEC site, including SOPs and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. 

The OBO Security Management inspector testified: 

Q Is that a requirement? 

A Yes. 

Q Under the CSP? 

A Under the SOP. The CSP does require that people be screened. The 

SOP further details the requirement. 

Q SOP being standard operating procedure? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And that’s written down somewhere? 

A Yes, sir.298 

Another witness, from DS, stated: 

Q Okay. What does this mean in laymen’s terms? 

A This means that the OBO staff at the project site are not getting screened 

when they come onto the overall construction site. 

 

295 Cotterman Tr. at 23 (“Q What are the requirements for screening personnel onsite? A Our requirements for 

screening are anyone without a U.S. Government-issued security clearance to be properly screened, which entails 

[specific screening methods redacted]. That is our standard screening package.”), 24-25 (noting this procedure is 

required by 12 FAH[-]6, the London CSP, and SOPs). 

296 Bassi Tr. at 115. 

297 Id. at 69-70 (naming and describing the roles of these locally employed staff). 

298 Jones Tr. at 20. 
63 

Q Is that in violation of the CSP? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that in violation of 12 FAH[-]6? 

A Yes.299

It is also not a difficult policy to enforce; OBO sent a survey to “26 or 27” active projects 

to confirm that each project was implementing this requirement, and each of them was.300 In 

fact, “because it’s in 12 FAH-6, . . . this is a requirement in every CSP,” according to one 

witness.301 

In fact, the Director in OBO’s Office of Security Management made the point that 

enforcing the requirement is not difficult. In an August 2015 email discussing the survey sent to 

the other projects, she wrote in an email to the site security manager that he is “the embodiment 

of SM’s [Security Management’s] policies and procedures for London. You should set the 

example, rather than modify the procedures, especially when all eyes are on London.”302 She 

also wrote: 

It would not be a best practice to use the SOPs as suggestions and let the 

SSMs interpret them as they see fit. We can continue to debate the pros and 

cons, and authorities, but that isn’t in anyone’s best interest and is becoming 

a detriment to security and professional relationships with more debate. No 

one will benefit.303

The 2016 Inspection is not the first time uncleared foreign nationals were permitted 

onsite in London without full screening. In fact, the issue goes back more than two years and has 

been the subject of several previous inspection reports.304 The trip report identifies this as an 

 

299 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Transcribed Interview of Stanley Heisey at 30 (July 26, 2016) 

[hereinafter Heisey Tr.]. 

300 Cotterman Tr. at 45 (“Q Have you seen this problem anywhere else? A We’ve had lapses along these lines as 

far as screening, but they were immediately corrected. Once we find out, we correct them immediately. We have—

at the time of this particular incident . . . I believe it’s—at the time was . . . 26 or 27 other OBO projects underway 

that were in full compliance with this requirement. London was the only exception.”); Jones Tr. at 87 (“Well, the 

division chief said it’s not happening; we’re not going to lessen our requirement for just London when all other 27 

other sites are in compliance.”). 

301 Cotterman Tr. at 46 (“Q And because it’s in 12 FAH-6, I assume that this is a requirement in every CSP, correct? 

A That is correct.”). Indeed, the project director for the Jakarta NEC—a location with higher terrorism rating than 

London—testified every employee goes through the screening. Capone Tr. at 26. When asked why, he testified 

“it’s just easier. Everyone just follows the same procedures, and there’s just no questions,” though he recognized 

“every site security manager has his own little quirks as to how he operates, and he may or may not do that.” Id. at 

26-27. The Jakarta NEC project director unequivocally testified that it is “a part of the [CSP] that that screening 

take place.” Id. at 27. 

302 Email from Celia Moorhead, Director, Office of Security Management, Bureau of Overseas Buildings 

Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Raymond Bassi, London NEC Site Security Manager, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 

10, 2015, 5:22 PM) (CDP-2016-00020-0000315). 

303 Id.

304 OBO SM London Mem. at 1; Jones Tr. at 22 (“Q Further up in that bullet you write, ‘This was identified as an 

issue in April 2014.’ A Yes.”). 
64 

issue in April 2014, and March 2015, in addition to April 2016.305 In the instances before April 

2016, eight members of the project director and site security manager’s team were not properly 

screened.306 By March 2016, it was down to seven uncleared, unscreened local employees.307 

When asked about the identities of these unscreened personnel, the site security manager could 

name the ones who were the subject of the current report, but he could not name those covered 

by previous reports. He testified: 

Q How was it [the April 2016 Inspection] different on the March 27 report 

2015? 

A I don’t know. I’d have to look at the office staffing pattern. People have 

come and gone. My investigator, [name redacted], is no longer there. 

He retired. 

Q Okay. 

A [Employee name redacted] is no longer there. She moved back to the 

United States. Her husband was an American officer in the embassy. 

That’s it. 

Q Now, I believe the [C]ommittee’s been told that, in earlier iterations of 

this—of these reports, I think at one point, the number of these folks 

was up to nine. 

A Possibly, yes. 

Q Do you recall the names of those other two? 

A No, I don’t.308 

The site security manager also could not state with precision how many people have been 

barred from working on the NEC site because of issues with the person’s background. He 

believes it is more than five people but was unable to provide any details and deferred to his 

deputy. He testified: 

Q Let’s focus on that piece of it. How many—when a check has come 

back, how many folks have you restricted from the site? 

A I’d have to go to the files to check. 

Q More than five? 

A Yes. I believe so. 

 

305 OBO SM London Mem. at 1. 

306 Jones Tr. at 22. 

307 Id.

308 Bassi Tr. at 70-71. 
65 

Q More than twenty? 

A I’d have to check. 

Q You can’t give me any sort of ballpark other than more than five? 

A I’d have to go to the files and check. 

Q What kind of things came back in the checks? 

A I’d have to review the files.309

Vulnerabilities exist by virtue of the failure to screen all individuals entering the site, 

particularly those who have not been vetted to the level of a U.S. security clearance. One of the 

inspectors agreed that she was concerned about these vulnerabilities. She stated: 

Q Are you concerned about this? 

A Yes. 

Q Why are you concerned about this? 

A Because it’s a vulnerability. 

Q Describe how. 

A These people have access to workers who come within that office daily. 

And their bags aren’t being screened. So we don’t know what’s within 

those bags.310 

Another witness, with nearly 29 years of construction security experience at the 

Department,311 elaborated on the vetting deficiencies. He stated: 

Q What are your concerns? 

A My concern is that it’s a—presents a vulnerability to our security 

program for that particular project. There are multitudes of concerns 

that if we actually got into—would be considered classified. We have 

counterintelligence concerns. We have human interest concerns. Our 

concerns are that persons without a U.S. Government security clearance, 

 

309 Id. 82; see also id. at 84 (“A I can easily answer the question by collecting numbers, but my deputy handles the 

direct investigative program.”). 

310 Jones Tr. at 23. 

311 Cotterman Tr. at 49-50 (“Q And do you have any other specific experience in security? A My security 

experience has come with nearly 29 years with the Department of State.”), 138-39 (“Q Do you consider yourself an 

expert on security? A I do. Q How long have you worked in the field of security? A Coming up on 29 years. 

Q And that’s all been more or less in construction security, right? A Correct. Q And the construction security that 

we’re talking about is securing facilities as they’re being built? A Correct. Q To avoid intrusion into those 

facilities? A Yes.”). 
66 

particularly in this case, the locally engaged staff that are not being 

screened present a hostile intel vulnerability. We—myself specifically 

think that these individuals would and could be considered soft targets 

and approachable to possibly do us harm. 

* * * 

Q Okay. And without getting into classified information, the concern is 

that they could introduce contraband into the site? 

A That is correct.312

A DS employee indicated that, without screening, an individual could introduce 

contraband to the site: 

Q If someone were to enter unscreened without clearance would they be 

able to introduce contraband into the site? 

A To the site, yes.313 

He also testified: 

Q Okay. So the potential threat is the introduction of a device for espionage 

purposes? 

A Yes.314 

As a result, the inspection team recommended to the site team screen that all those entering the 

site who do not have a U.S. security clearance should undergo screening, as required by the SOPs 

and the Foreign Affairs Handbook.

315

These uncleared foreign nationals are assistants and other individuals who work for the 

project director and site security manager on the NEC site.316 Given the layout of the London 

NEC site, these unscreened foreign nationals are not limited to the offices: 

 

312 Cotterman Tr. at 28-29; Jones Tr. at 83 (“[W]e don’t know what’s in their bags, we don’t know what they’re 

bringing on, we don’t know if there’s cameras, we don’t know if there’s knives, we don’t know if there’s things to 

be implemented within the building to pass off to a worker that they engage with during the day.”). 

313 Heisey Tr. at 33. 

314 Id. at 45. 

315 OBO SM London Mem. at 1 (“SSM to enforce the SOP and FAH [Foreign Affairs Handbook] and conduct 

screening of all local workers to include LES [Locally Employed Staff] staff through the Walk through Metal 

Detector (WTMD) and materials screened through the x-ray as previously reported.”). 

316 Jones Tr. at 21-22 (“Q Can you list out the names and positions for each of these seven people? A No, I just 

know that there’s seven. Q You don’t know their positions? A The assistants, and I don’t know their exact 

positions for the other ones. There are at least two assistants. Three assistants, actually. Q But each of these seven 

people work for the [project director’s] office or the site security manager’s office. A Yes. In some capacity. Yes, 

sir.”). 
67 

Q Are there any obstructions between that office and the site? 

A No. There’s a walkway as you come out of the ACF [access control 

facility, where the metal detector and x-ray machine are located] that 

you can either go right onto the site or you can go into the office. 

Q And is there a guard or any sort of other mechanism to keep them from 

walking onto the site instead of turning left into the building? 

A Not that I remember.317 

Committee staff visited the London site, and there are no barriers between the OBO offices and 

the rest of the construction site, although there is an additional security checkpoint at the 

entrance to the classified space. 

Moreover, it would not take long to breach the site and inflict harm. Earlier this year, 

several adventurers breached the site in broad daylight, climbed several floors up the 

construction crane, and were off the site in “[l]ess than seven minutes.”318 The post-incident 

damage assessment concluded “[t]here [was] nothing” in the way of harm to the facility,319 but it 

demonstrates how quickly a breach can occur. 

During a visit to the London NEC site, the project director and site security manager told 

Chairman Chaffetz they rejected the inspection team’s recommendation that these uncleared 

foreign national employees should be screened.320 The site team’s reasoning hinges on the 

distinction that these foreign nationals have a “security certification,”321 but not a security 

clearance,322 as required by the Foreign Affairs Handbook. A security certification is an 

investigation by the RSO in London, including a credit check, criminal check, and reference 

check.323 A “security certification” does not grant the holder access to classified information, 

however. A DS witness testified: 

Q Can you explain the difference [between a security clearance and a 

“security certification”]? 

 

317 Id. at 101. 

318 Bassi Tr. at 33-35. 

319 Id. at 114. 

320 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016); see also Jones Tr. at 23-24 (“Q What was their reaction? A They weren’t interested 

in doing this. Q Were not interested? A No.”). The witness testified the site security manager “just said he wasn’t 

doing it.” Id. at 24. 

321 One witness described the difference between a security clearance and a security certification as follows: “I can 

only explain that a security clearance means that you actually have access or would be authorized access to 

classified information; where a security certificate does not give you actual authorization to get classified 

information.” Heisey Tr. at 34. 

322 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016). 

323 Jones Tr. at 80-81 (describing the process for a security certification); Bassi Tr. at 51 (noting the regional security 

officer concurred in this approach), 86-87 (describing the regional security officer’s approach to screening these 

people). 
68 

A I can only explain that a security clearance means that you actually have 

access or would be authorized access to classified information; where a 

security certificate does not give you actual authorization to get 

classified information.324

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery “emphatically” agreed that a security certification is 

not the equivalent of a security clearance, and that a security clearance is a specific term of art. 

He stated: 

Q In your mind is there any difference between a security certification and 

a security clearance? 

A There is absolutely a difference, yes. 

Q What is the difference? 

A I was going to say, a security clearance is what is given to American 

personnel that allows them access to classified information. 

Q So you wouldn’t say these [unscreened] people have a security

clearance, they just have a— 

A They do not have a security clearance. I would emphatically say they 

do not. 

Q So if 12 FAH[-]6 used the term security clearance, it’s a term of art, 

isn’t it? 

A A security clearance refers to something very specific. 

Q An ability to receive and access classified information? 

A Yes.325

The site team interprets the CSP, the SOPs, and the Foreign Affairs Handbook as 

requiring screening only for “construction workers,” and not locally employed staff with a 

security certification.326 The London site security manager affirmed that “according to [DS], 12 

FAH[-]6 only applied to construction workers,” and with respect to “office workers, 12 FAH[-]6 

wouldn’t apply to these seven local employed staff.”327 Members of the team charged with 

 

324 Heisey Tr. at 34. 

325 Ashbery Tr. at 101. 

326 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016); Bassi Tr. at 68 (calling the inspection team’s report on this issue “inaccurate,” 

because “it is not a violation of 12 FAH and it[’]s an issue that was already determined by DS to be a non[-]issue. 

So it’s inaccurate to say it is a violation of 12 FAH, it is not”), 77 (“as far as FAM [Foreign Affairs Manual] and 

FAH [Foreign Affairs Handbook], from what I can see, it’s for construction workers”). 

327 Bassi Tr. at 95 (“Q So according to Diplomatic Security, 12 FAH[-]6 only applied to construction workers, 

correct? And so therefore its office workers, 12 FAH[-]6 wouldn’t apply to these seven local employed staff. Is that 
69 

inspecting the London NEC for compliance with the construction security directives said, 

however, the presence of a “security certification” did not change their analysis that this violated 

the SOPs and the Foreign Affairs Handbook. A DS inspection team witness stated: 

Q They had security certifications, though. Correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. Was the security certification that they had sufficient in order to 

satisfy the requirement that allowed them not to go through the WTMD 

[Walk-Through Metal Detectors] or to have their baggage screened? 

A Not based on my interpretation of the FAH.328 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified, “the embassy employees that were working on 

the—in the OBO offices at the discretion of the site security manager, the RSO and in proxy the 

emergency action committee and the chief of mission could be permitted on site without physical 

screening.”329

 When asked, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery confirmed that with regard to 

implementing 12 FAH-6, as specified in a particular site’s CSP, and DS management, both OBO 

Security Management and DS are working toward the same goal of construction security. He 

stated: 

Q Would you consider these folks [OBO Security Management team 

members] to be rogue employees? 

A No, not at all. 

Q They are just somebody that has a good faith disagreement on what the 

policy means? 

A Yes.330

Testimony shows the site team did not take the inspection team’s criticism well. During 

discussions with the inspection team, the project director and site security manager yelled at the 

team, and the project director cursed at the inspector.331 The site security manager called the 

screening requirement “stupid.” An OBO Security Management witness stated: 

 

correct? So when— A Yes.”); 96 (“Q According to Diplomatic Security, there has been no violation of 12 FAH[-

]6 with regards to the seven locally employed staff. A That’s correct.”). 

328 Heisey Tr. at 32; Jones Tr. at 37-38 (same); Cotterman Tr. at 70 (same). 

329 Ashbery Tr. at 105. 

330 Id. at 91. 

331 Jones Tr. at 31-32; see also Cotterman Tr. at 33 (discussing a “very pointed conference call” with the project 

director and the site security manager). 
70 

Q Okay. And have they expressed to you why they are not doing that? 

Have they ever stated to you a reason for why they are not doing that? 

A [The site security manager] has expressed to me that it’s stupid.332 

Another witness told Committee staff in an interview that the site security manager did 

not require screening for these individuals because “it was a morale issue,” and “the morale 

issues were related to the un-cleared locally engaged staff, that if we screen them—that they felt 

that they were above being screened is what it was essentially stated.”333 One of the Security 

Management inspectors said this issue was “always an argument” with the site team.334

The site security manager told the Committee these seven uncleared and unscreened 

people “are trusted employees who we have allowed to participate in the project on the 

inside.”335 If they were intent on doing damage, he testified, they could alter investigative files 

for people seeking to work on the embassy.336 He stated: 

So if we don’t trust them, if we can’t trust them to do their unclassified job, 

then, in my opinion, we shouldn’t be hiring them. We shouldn’t be using 

locals anywhere in the world, if that’s the case.337 

He also claimed x-ray screening would not serve a counterintelligence purpose,338 although that 

contradicts his later testimony that he installed an additional x-ray machine onsite at a checkpoint 

before one enters the facility’s classified space.339 The site security manager’s rationale, 

however well intentioned, is contrary to the requirements of the governing rules. 

When this issue first arose, OBO and DS management discussed whether the standards 

should be changed for the London NEC to accommodate the London site team’s ad hoc 

approach.340 Those standards have not been changed, however, and it is within DS’s purview to 

 

332 Jones Tr. at 84. 

333 Cotterman at 31-32. 

334 Jones Tr. at 32. 

335 Bassi Tr. at 150. 

336 Id. (“If he’s a problem, he’s not going to come in with one device and do something with it when he has access to 

6,500 investigations that could be altered.”). 

337 Id.; see also id. at 150-51 (“Q So what I’m hearing is, and it’s uncomfortable to maybe put it in this way, but 

we’ve already entrusted them in a way that they could harm us much more significantly in other ways already? A 

Exactly. They could walk into the embassy every day and do something there, if that’s the case. But, again, these 

people are screened to a level—again, it’s environmental too. You look at who—what I made the analysis of it, I 

looked at we’re in the U.K., what’s their, you know, background, citizenship. Here we are, what’s the environment, 

what’s our relationship. There’s a whole bunch of factors involved in that. And then you look at, okay, what’s—

what’s the purpose? We have a cleared—I’m sorry. We have a local guard force that’s a contract force doing the 

screening on the workers. So there’s something that rubs me in the fact that I’m going to have a contract guard force 

screening a local worker who’s been vetted at a level similar to an American worker in the embassy. And this 

contractor—who’s going to screen the contractor?”). 

338 Id. at 152-53 (calling it a “fallacy” if “somebody was expecting that that’s [the metal detector and x-ray machine] 

where the chokepoint is for counterintelligence types of things”). 

339 Id. at 154 (“That’s why I installed the X ray at [another location on the site], with much argument from 

Washington saying what the—again, the book—the CSP did not call for it. I said, I’m not—I’m ignoring it. I’m 

going—you can’t stop me from going above standards, so I’m going above standards. It’s my call.”). 

340 Heisey Tr. at 39-40. 
71 

change the Foreign Affairs Handbook if it believes the London site team’s actions are consistent 

with the security of the site. A witness stated: 

Q Okay. So it wouldn’t surprise you that that very well could be the 

position of [DS], that they agree with the procedures going on at the 

London new embassy compound? 

A No, it wouldn’t surprise me that that was Mr. Ashbery’s view in 

speaking with the new London Embassy on that specific issue; Mr. 

Ashbery’s view, not DS’s view. 

Q So you think that Mr. Ashbery’s view is different from DS’s overall 

view on this issue? 

A I can tell you that if that is Mr. Ashbery’s overall opinion, that that is 

not what planning and policy within DS stated, who actually changes or 

gives interpretations to the 12 FAH[-]6.341 

After OBO senior management suggested changing the standards, the OBO Security 

Management Division Chief refused to lower the standards when other facilities are in 

compliance with the screening requirement. An OBO Security Management inspector stated: 

Q Okay. So they expressed that they believe the SOP should be changed 

to reflect the practices that were currently going on in London. What 

was the division chief and branch chief’s response to that? 

A Well, the division chief said it’s not happening; we’re not going to 

lessen our requirement for just London when all other—27 other sites 

are in compliance.342 

During his transcribed interview, Deputy Assistant Ashbery stated that DS is working to 

change the Foreign Affairs Handbook to clarify DS’s interpretation that screening applies only to 

construction workers, but there is no estimated time for completion of the revision. He testified: 

Q You drew a distinction at workers? 

A Yes. 

Q Why? 

A Because very specifically that is the intent of that standard. That 

standard is written very specifically to apply to the contractor’s 

construction workers as they enter the construction site. 

 

341 Jones Tr. at 128-29; Bassi Tr. at 56-57 (noting DS has ownership of this area). 

342 Jones Tr. at 87; Bassi Tr. at 108 (noting an OBO managing director “asked them to rewrite the SOP to be 

reflective of the DS interpretation [regarding screening of uncleared foreign workers], and that wasn’t carried out”). 
72 

Q So persons in an office are not considered workers? 

A That standard is not intended to apply to U.S. Government employees. 

Q That’s not what I asked. Persons in offices are not considered workers? 

A Persons in offices that work for the contractors may be considered 

workers in the terms of how that standard is written. 

Q But if it has the definitional narrowness, to which you [a]scribe, why 

not [say] construction workers or contract employees? 

A I would say that was an omission that, many times when people are 

writing standards, there are a level of vagueness that occurs, sometimes 

not intentionally. 

Q So why has this festered on for more than 2 years? 

A I would say because there’s a disagreement between individuals on that 

interpretation. 

Q Right. But if DS, as you say, is the policymaker. Why not change the 

FAH? You said these three employees have good faith disagreements? 

A Yes. 

Q Why not change the FAH? 

A I was going to say it is our intention to amend the FAH to provide that 

level of clarification. 

Q When do you intend do that? 

A It is in the process of being done. 

Q Do you have an ETA of completion? 

A I do not. I was going to say mostly because I— I cannot give an 

estimated completion on how long it takes to process a FAH change.343

During the meeting with the site team to discuss the inspection, one inspection team 

member told the site security manager: “tell Wayne Ashbery to put it in writing and I will attach 

it to my report.”344 According to that witness: “That never happened.”345 

 

343 Ashbery Tr. at 92-93. 

344 Jones Tr. at 130. 

345 Id. at 133; see also Heisey Tr. at 42 (noting that even Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery cannot make this 

decision alone, and “it’s not that one person gets to just make an interpretation decision. They [DS] get to make the 

decision on what they decide to do”). 
73 

The site security manager testified that DS did put that requirement in writing,346 but he 

also testified that the DS memorandum was never circulated within Security Management, the 

very organization responsible for inspecting the London NEC.347 Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Ashbery also testified he believed there was a written directive that DS did not believe the seven 

uncleared foreign nationals should be screened.348 During his transcribed interview, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Ashbery reviewed a memorandum to the file from the London NEC project 

director, in which the project director explained his rationale in not requiring these seven 

uncleared foreign nationals to be screened, including an email from Ashbery’s deputy, noting 

Ashbery concurs.349 As part of his analysis, the project director noted a conversation he had with 

the deputy site security manager for the Beijing NEC built in the mid-2000s.350 The London 

NEC project director writes: 

Additionally, and it seems unbeknownst to OBO/SM, other OBO 

construction sites around the world do not X-Ray and Mag [the walkthrough metal detector] OBO LES [locally employed staff]. As directly 

related from the former D/SSM [deputy site security manager] for the 

Beijing project, this included the Beijing NEC project, a project at 

significantly higher threat ratings. As stated by him, LES from the Beijing 

Mission were not screened via X-Ray and Mag.351

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery was the Senior Site Security Manager at the Beijing NEC,352

and he testified that was inaccurate. He stated: 

Q Okay. Have you ever seen this memo before? 

A I have not. 

Q The DS SM for the Beijing project, does that refer to you? 

A It does not. 

Q Who is that? 

A This would be the deputy site security manager for the Beijing project. 

 

346 Bassi Tr. at 92 (alleging the 2016 Inspection report “doesn’t reflect the fact that . . . DS, in January or February 

[2016], had issued a written correspondence to OBO/SM [Security Management] indicating, once and for all, that 

they had viewed this [not screening uncleared foreign nationals], looked at it, researched it, and that DS was 

satisfied on all fronts that the procedures were fine,” as well as DS’s conclusion “that the FAH was intended for 

construction workers, and that they would proceed to have that clarified and rewritten into the FAH so that it was 

clearer”). 

347 Id. at 93 (“Q So there was an official [DS] memorandum that was supposed to clarify their judgment on the 

issue, but it was just never distributed to those in security management? A That’s my understanding.”). 

348 Ashbery Tr. at 103-04. 

349 Ashbery Tr., Ex. 3, Memorandum to File from Rodney Evans, Project Director, London NEC, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Apr. 2, 2015) (CDP-2016-00020-0000005). 

350 Id.

351 Id.

352 Ashbery Tr. at 10, 72. 
74 

* * * 

Q Were you aware that the Beijing NEC was not screening locally

employed staff? 

A I believed Beijing NEC was screening locally, and paid staff. 

Q So are these two sentences inaccurate? 

A I with say [sic], yes, based on my knowledge of the Beijing NEC 

project. 

Q Having worked there? 

A Having worked there for the construction of the security transfer 

project, yes. 

Q As the site security manager— the senior site security manager? 

A Yes.353

He testified, with respect to the Beijing NEC project, “I can state that any locally engaged staff 

that entered the construction project for the Beijing secure chancery project were, in fact, 

screened with x rays and magnetometers.”354

The site security manager in London knows what can happen when security is not 

paramount at a project, as he was aware of a breach at another site.355 Because that incident 

remains classified, this report will not detail it, but one witness testified that “something . . . was 

found in the wall” at that site.356 As a security management witness testified: 

Q Since the time that you’ve been working for OBO, have there been sites 

that have . . . been compromised because contraband has been brought 

onto those sites [by] uncleared individuals? 

A Yes. 

* * * 

Q Where were those sites? 

A I’m not at liberty to say. However, I do know of one in particular that 

Mr. Bassi is aware of where some items were found. 

 

353 Id. at 104-05. 

354 Id. at 124. 

355 Jones Tr. at 29-30. 

356 Id. at 29. 
75 

Q Would you be at liberty to say in a classified setting? 

A Yes. 

[Committee Counsel]. Can you tell us what kind of items? 

[Witness]. It was just something that was found in the wall. 

[Committee Counsel]. Okay. 

[Committee Counsel]. And you said Mr. Bassi was involved? 

[Witness]. He’s aware of it. I believe he was working at the post at that 

time. 

[Committee Counsel]. Can you tell me what the item was that was found 

in the wall, or is that classified? 

[Witness]. I don’t know. 

[Committee Counsel]. Okay. That’s fine.357

That witness also testified she believed Mr. Bassi was the RSO at the compromised post.358 

In addition, the current site security manager in London “is the one who signed off on the 

SOP when he was our division chief” in Security Management.359 He testified the SOPs are “a 

guideline” that “could work in tandem with the CSP” in order “to create some type of baseline 

that SSMs [site security managers] would have to look at how the project should go forward.”360 

He also stated there was an undocumented understanding about screening of uncleared personnel 

and that the site security manager would have control over the issue. Specifically, he testified: 

 And there’s an SOP that says you have to do it [screen uncleared 

personnel]. And then we had a continuous discussion about that SOP. 

And I said: [OBO employee redacted], if you remember, when that SOP 

went on the screen in the conference room, when I was reviewing them, 

I said that’s a problem overseas. It’s an operational issue overseas. Put 

a caveat, and it wasn’t directed at [OBO employee redacted], it was 

directed to the group, I said: Put a caveat in there that allows the SSM 

to come back and discuss it so that if it’s a problem at that post, then it 

 

357 Id.

358 Id. at 102 (“Q And you said Mr. Bassi was involved there as well. A I believe he was the RSO there at the 

time.”). 

359 Id. at 85; Bassi Tr. at 91 (“Q Okay. Okay. But did you sign off on the standard operating procedures? A Yes, I 

did.”). 

360 Bassi Tr. at 65 (“Q So when I asked earlier whether this was a separate document, you said no? A It is a 

separate document, it is not part of the CSP. Q But it works in tandem with the CSP, does it not? A It is a 

guideline. It is guidelines. It could work in tandem with the CSP, yes. It is a separate document that is an office 

created document soliciting various information from various locations to create some type of baseline that SSMs 

would have to look at how the project should go forward.”). 
76 

can be looked at. And I signed the SOPs. I never reviewed if that caveat 

had been put in. And it wasn’t.

361 

The site security manager’s testimony about the “intent” of the SOPs—in which he stated 

“there was nothing that said that an SSM [site security manager] couldn’t have a dialogue about 

it, couldn’t come back and talk about his project and say, I have a different ground perspective 

here, can we adjust this”362— does not account for what the SOP does say. Undocumented 

understandings are inadequate for keeping facilities secure. 

The site security manager further testified that he would expect to see a revision of the 

SOPs had they been modified, and the London NEC SOPs had not been. He stated: 

Q And has this document [the SOPs] been changed since 2011? 

A I don’t know. I haven’t seen it. 

Q You haven’t seen it? 

A I haven’t seen the revised. 

Q Is that something as a site security manager you would expect to see? 

A A revision on those? 

Q Yes. 

A I would expect to see that they should be updated by now, yeah, because 

things change, technology changes. Some of our concern about 

prohibited and non[-]prohibited items to come on site, changes 

technology, changes they should be revised. The whole purpose was to 

have an acting document that could be quickly revised and changed.363 

In this situation, the person who approved the security requirements for the London NEC—

which requires screening of uncleared persons entering the site—is the very person accused of 

not adhering to the requirements, even when he has seen the result of security failures before.364 

During a transcribed interview, when asked “[w]ould you take this approach in a place like 

Moscow” with respect to the unscreened personnel, he replied, “[n]o. Absolutely not.”365

The site security manager in London testified that he has done some beneficial things.366 

One of those things includes the placement of an additional x-ray machine: “[T]he CSP did not 

 

361 Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added). 

362 Id. at 66. 

363 Id. at 66-67. 

364 Id. at 79. 

365 Id.

366 Id. at 19-20 (discussing perimeter security enhancements), 53 (testifying that “[t]he accreditation team is really 

impressed with my CSTs [construction surveillance technicians] documentation,” and noting an innovative way to 

keep track of each CST’s location), 80 (describing additional screening at a post in Africa due to local conditions). 
77 

call for it. I said . . . I’m ignoring it. I’m going—you can’t stop me from going above standards, 

so I’m going above standards. It’s my call.”367 The difference in that case, however, is that the 

enhancement went above the mandated requirements. The issues discussed in this report and the 

2016 Inspection pertain to the site security manager’s actions that fall below the requirements in 

12 FAH-6, the CSP, and the SOPs. 

The Department and the public have seen the results when security is not stringent at 

construction sites for diplomatic facilities abroad. In the late-1980s, the Department built a new 

embassy in Moscow that was “infested with spying systems planted by Soviet construction 

workers.”368 In Moscow, as in London, OBO’s predecessor, “already under pressure from 

Congress because of cost overruns and poor results in construction projects in other capitals, was 

pushing to move the job along.”369 As with the London NEC, the embassy in Moscow “was to 

be the most elaborate and expensive United States embassy ever.”370 The government spent 

twice the construction amount on remediation, seeking to rid the facility of the bugs that allowed 

the Soviets to “transform it into a giant antenna capable of transmitting written and verbal 

communications to the outside.”371 “At the time,” a report from the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence noted, “U.S. intelligence agencies believed they could neutralize any bugs they 

might find.”372 The report continued: “Unlike the Soviets, however, the United States did not 

employ a systematic, stringent security program to detect and prevent Soviet penetration 

efforts.”373 As with the current London project, the Moscow embassy used components that 

“were fabricated by [locals] off-site, with no U.S. supervision,” and: 

The Soviets inspected all materials on site before allowing their use in 

construction, frequently calling off construction if there were questions. 

The United States had a less exacting inspection system and was not willing 

to put security ahead of maintaining the pace of construction.374

 

367 Id. at 154 (“Q —but essentially, what I’m asking is would a metal detector prevent someone from— A No. 

Q —entering in a bug or— A No. Q —spying? A It’s a weapons item. The X ray would. That’s why I installed 

the X ray at [another location on the site], with much argument from Washington saying what the—again, the 

book—the CSP did not call for it. I said, I’m not—I’m ignoring it. I’m going—you can’t stop me from going above 

standards, so I’m going above standards. It’s my call.”) 

368 Elaine Sciolino, The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1988), available at 

http://www nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/the-bugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong.html?pagewanted=all. It 

bears mention that approximately 40% of the construction workers on the London NEC site are from non-U.K. 

countries in the European Union, “[m]any of them from Eastern Europe.” Bassi Tr. at 74 (“Q The 40 percent or so 

non U.K./EU folks— A No. Yeah, they’re—yeah. They’re EU folks, yes. Q But non U.K.? A Non U.K.—non 

U.K. citizens, yes. Q Many of them from Eastern Europe? A Yes.”). 

369 Elaine Sciolino, The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1988), available at

http://www nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/the-bugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong.html?pagewanted=all. 

370 Id.

371 Id.

372 S. Rep. No. 100-154, at 6 (1987), available at 

http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/100154.pdf. 

373 Id.

374 Id.

79 

certain percentage of off-the-shelf-type materials; (2) blind procurement, where the manufacturer 

does not know the destination of the materials and the materials are shipped securely by the 

contractor; and (3) procurement with inspection, when permitted.

382 When an item is required to 

be custom-made, the materials must either be built offsite (but under surveillance) or fabricated 

onsite by U.S. citizens with appropriate security clearances, depending on where in the classified 

space the materials are to go.383 

There are two types of classified space, called Controlled Access Area (CAA): 

(i) restricted and (ii) core.384 In CAA restricted space, the material may be fabricated by 

individuals without a security clearance and uncleared workers can install the materials under the 

watch of a construction surveillance technician who has a security clearance. A witness testified: 

Q Okay. What are the labor requirements for the fabrication of materials 

if you know for CAA restricted and CAA core? 

A The fabrication of CAA restricted materials can be done under—by uncleared people with surveillance by construction surveillance 

technicians. If it’s a core area material, the requirement is fabrication 

by secret-cleared U.S. citizen labor. 

Q Okay. And again, this is a requirement of 12 FAH-6 and the CSP, 

correct? 

A Yes.385 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery agreed. In his transcribed interview, he agreed that 

the procurement issues at the London NEC violate the FAH and the CSP. He testified: 

Q Is that a contractual requirement? Is it a FAH requirement? A FAM 

requirement? Something else? 

A Yes to both. 

Q Yes to contractual and to FAH? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. 

 

382 Heisey Tr. at 88-93 (describing the different procurement methods for CAA space). 

383 Jones Tr. at 39-40 (“Q And you said the construction security plan . . . requires that any material for the CAA 

[classified] space not be fabricated off site? A Any fabricated material. The difference is fabricated is items that 

are specifically made. Materials that are purchased off the shelf, are different, because you can purchase many of 

those and then use a percentage of those in the CAA.”). 

384 Ashbery Tr. at 165 (describing differences between CAA restricted space and CAA core space). 

385 Cotterman Tr. at 94; Jones Tr. at 43 (“The installation for those items, for CAA restricted, is uncleared [workers] 

under CST [construction surveillance technicians] or secret [cleared workers], which is above the standard. For 

CAA core, it is secret [cleared workers] only.”); see also Heisey Tr. at 51 (same). 
80 

A I was going to say, it’s included in both. It is a FAH/FAM requirement 

that has been captured in this construction security plan which is part of 

the Division 1 language of the contract.386

In CAA core space, as required by the FAH and the CSP,387 only American 

workers possessing a security clearance may fabricate material for the space and only 

cleared American workers may be in the space after the building’s structure is complete 

and interior finishing work has begun. A witness testified: 

Q And if any foreign national was doing any work in the core space, would 

that be a problem? 

A Yes. 

Q Would you classify it as a significant problem? 

A Yes.388

In the London NEC, there are at least seven items that do not meet the security 

requirements.389 These items fail to meet the security standards because uncleared personnel 

were involved in procuring these items, which were to be installed in the CAA space.390 Some 

of these materials are custom items and were fabricated by a foreign company, and that company 

has knowledge that at least some of the material is to go in the CAA core and restricted space at 

the London NEC.391 A witness stated: 

Q Okay. And in this particular instance the contractor, a subcontractor 

was going to a local company? 

A Yes. 

Q In the U.K.? 

 

386 Ashbery Tr. at 138. 

387 Id. at 166 (“Q Okay. What governs foreign nationals’ access to CAA space? Is it the FAH? A Yes. 

Q Anything else? A Construction Security Plan.”). 

388 Cotterman Tr. at 94; Jones Tr. at 113; Heisey Tr. at 16-17 (“Q Thank you. The [certain finish work redacted], 

was that in the core or restricted? A The [certain finish work redacted] was applied in both restricted and core. . . . 

The standards allow for that type of work to be done in restricted CAA by uncleared personnel under CST. In core 

CAA, it’s required that any type of finish work be done by cleared Americans only. Q Those cleared Americans 

have to have what level of clearance? A A minimum secret clearance.”). 

389 Ashbery Tr. at 125-27 (listing items); Jones Tr. at 45 (“Q Now, for these materials, they were fabricated 

somewhere off the NEC site? A Yes, sir. Q And that was the problem? A Yes, sir. Q And that was the problem 

for all of them? A Yes, sir. Q All of that material was going into the CAA space? A Yes, sir.”). Because of the 

security implications of this issue, this report will not detail the items or where they are to go in the NEC. 

390 Heisey Tr. at 23 (“Q And what is the requirement in question that was violated? A Having uncleared personnel 

involvement with the procurement. The DD 254 states that only secret cleared Americans can be involved with the 

procurement of controlled access area materials. Q So uncleared workers were procuring these materials? A 

Yes.”). 

391 Ashbery Tr. at 128-33 (discussing particular items’ fabrication by offsite and without proper supervision by a 

cleared American), 134-36 (describing particular items improperly fabricated for the London NEC). 
81 

A Yes. And as I understand it, other locations. 

Q And they were providing schematics of the area? 

A My— 

Q I’m sorry, blueprints of the area? 

A My understanding is they were providing shop drawings of the . . . 

destination disclosed and in some cases specific locations within the 

facility disclosed.392 

Because some of these materials are destined for the CAA core space, they are required to be 

made by cleared American workers.393 

 There is no question the procurement issues with respect to the London NEC are serious. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery called it “a significant problem.”394 During his transcribed 

interview, he stated: 

Q In the last hour, I believe you called the fabrication, what I’ll call the 

fabrication procurement issue, significant. 

A Yes. I was going to say, I do consider it significant. 

Q Do you consider it a big problem? 

A I guess I would ask you to define “big.” It’s a significant problem and 

one that we continue to work. 

Q Where is this on your ranking of priorities in terms of issues you’re 

dealing with? I understand you have a vast portfolio. 

A Yeah, it’s pretty high. 

Q Pretty high? 

A Yes.395

He also testified he works on “some aspect” of these procurement issues “[e]very week.”396 

When confronted with the improper procurement issues, the site team asked whether 

some of the compromised material could merely be inspected, and the DS representative on the 

 

392 Cotterman Tr. at 88; Heisey Tr. at 101-02. 

393 Id. at 94 (“The fabrication of CAA restricted materials can be done under—by un-cleared people with 

surveillance by construction surveillance technicians. If it’s a core area material, the requirement is fabrication by 

secret-cleared U.S. citizen labor.”). 

394 Ashbery Tr. at 139. 

395 Id.

396 Id.
82 

inspection team told the site team “don’t even ask,” according to a witness.397 The site team 

nevertheless “inspected it to try to figure out if there was anything wrong with it and kept it and 

used it.”398 Some of the material was “absolutely not inspectable because of the electronics in 

them” and was required to “be returned to the contractor.”399 When a DS member was asked 

why some of the compromised materials were not simply removed and replaced with noncompromised materials, the DS employee stated he was told “[s]chedule,” by “[m]ore than 

likely, the project director.”400 The DS witness testified: 

Q Let me move on to your second inspection in just a moment. 

With respect to the items that you have identified . . . is there any reason 

that they didn’t strip that out and install the materials properly rather 

than request an exception, if you know? 

A I don’t know. 

Q Did you ask the question? 

A Yes. 

Q And what response were you given? 

A Schedule. 

Q And who gave you that response? 

A More than likely, the project director. 

Q Rod Evans? 

A Yes. 

Q Because you had to stick to the schedule? 

A Yes.401

The site security manager stated that the contract for procuring these materials was 

“ambiguous, at least in certain areas,” and there is potential for debate “whether something is 

fabricated, manufactured, or produced.”402 Nevertheless, he testified that one “could be alarmed 

 

397 Jones Tr. at 46-48. 

398 Id. at 48 (“Q They inspected it to try to figure out if there was anything wrong with it and kept it and used it. A 

Yes.”). 

399 Ashbery Tr. at 132 (“Q And the [item redacted], those are noninspectable, or are they inspectable? A They are 

absolutely not inspectable because of the electronics in them. Q Okay. So what happens with those? A They will 

be returned to the contractor and [item redacted] will be procured and installed by the contractor.”). 

400 Heisey Tr. at 72. 

401 Id. at 72-73. 

402 Bassi Tr. at 100 (“Q And, you know, I’m going to confess, even now it’s hard to read the specific concerns in 

this way and have a good concept of how significant or not significant they are, how common they are or not. So I 
83 

in, for example, the fabrication issue.”403 He took credit for the mitigation,404 but stated that two 

items for the CAA space that were fabricated improperly and those “were a concern and a big 

concern, and I’m not going to diminish that whatsoever.”405 

Not long after the 2016 Inspection report, 13 OBO and DS employees traveled to London 

to inspect the compromised materials and attempt to remediate the issues.406 Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Ashbery testified in a transcribed interview that, as a result of the 2016 Inspection, 

OBO and DS “agreed that a member of countermeasures directorate, my staff, a member of 

ODNI staff, and a member of OBO SM [Security Management] staff would go out to support the 

project.”407 Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery himself went out there, as well, which he 

agreed was “unusual for the deputy assistant secretary for countermeasures to go out to a facility 

after a trip report from security management.”408 He had never traveled to a construction site “as 

a result of a trip report.”409 The Principal Deputy Director of OBO, Casey Jones, also traveled to 

London with Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery.410 Ashbery elaborated in his testimony: 

Q Let me ask you a broader question then, is it unusual for the deputy 

assistant security for countermeasures, the principal director of the 

[B]ureau of [O]verseas [B]uildings [O]perations, and two folks from 

ODNI to travel out to a construction site after receiving a trip . . . report? 

A I was going to say it is not what I consider the normal process, no. 

Q Can you expand on that a little bit. Why not? 

A We chose to travel together because we felt there were issues identified 

in the trip report in the follow on accreditation team that required 

attention at that level. As I said, [ODNI staff member name redacted] 

accompanied me at my suggestion.411

 

guess for any of the issues identified in the bullets in this memorandum, are any of them ones that we should be 

alarmed that happened in the first place at all? A Well, you could be alarmed in, for example, the fabrication issue. 

The fact that the contract, the way it’s written, it’s ambiguous, at least in certain areas, and the sequence of how it’s 

written. At the same time, the project is so immense that whether something is fabricated, manufactured, or 

produced, that’s debatable. And there’s a lot of argument over the true definition. And it doesn’t appear anywhere 

that anyone can find exactly that I know of, but everyone has their opinion or idea what fabrication is.”). 

403 Id.

404 Id. at 101 (“How that came in and the reason why the mitigation went so well quickly without impact is because 

the CSTs [construction surveillance technicians], my staff, actually followed exactly the CSP in the order of things 

they were supposed to do and did it 100 percent. So when the mitigation came, it was a recheck and a validation, 

and then they examined what was the contractor doing and how did this happen.”) 

405 Id.

406 Jones Tr. at 51 (“Q Thirteen folks went out to attempt to remediate this? A Yes, sir.”). 

407 Ashbery Tr. at 76. 

408 Id. at 87. 

409 Id.

410 Id. at 88. 411 Id. at 88-89. 
84 

Another witness testified that, as of August 2016, there were “probably 20 to 30” 

individuals in London working on remediation of the issues contained in the 2016 Inspection 

report. He stated: 

Q How many people have been over there trying to mitigate these issues? 

A I’ll give you a ballpark as to—I don’t know. 

Q Ballpark— 

A Many. 

Q More than 10? 

A I would say significantly more than 10. 

Q More than 20? 

A I would say more than 20, probably 20 to 30.412 

He further testified that each person on the mitigation team “are all people that have to be flown 

to London,” “have to be housed in London,” “have to be transported around London,” and “have 

to be paid per diem for every day that they are there,” including weekends.413

DS ultimately recognized the problem with these improperly procured items, concluded 

that inspection alone would be insufficient, and asked the OBO Security Management inspector 

to draft a request for an exception to the requirements of the Foreign Affairs Handbook.

414 An 

exception is a request to deviate from security requirements contained in the Foreign Affairs 

Handbook and/or the CSP,”415 which, if approved, will permit the compromised items to remain 

in the space. There was a “multifaceted” exception request for some of the compromised 

materials, which was approved by DS Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr.416 Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Ashbery testified he “presume[s] there will be an additional one” for other items.417 

 

412 Cotterman Tr. at 162. 

413 Id. at 162, 163 (“Q Including weekend days that they have to be there? A Right.”). 414 Jones Tr. at 42 (“Q Did anyone ask you to draft the waiver, or the exception, rather? A Yes. Q Who was that? 

A . . . DS.”), 103, 143. 

415 Cotterman Tr. at 91; Ashbery Tr. at 150 (“Q What’s an exception? A An exception is when the Overseas 

Security Policy Board standards are not met, and the exception is a process where a formal decision is made as to— 

to allow the deviation from the Overseas Security Policy Board standards.”). 

416 Ashbery Tr. at 152 (“Q How many exceptions requests are there for the London embassy? A To the best of my 

knowledge, there is one, and it is a result of the problems associated with this. It’s multifaceted. Q Has it been 

resolved? A It was approved. Q Approved. In full? A Yes.”). 

417 Id. at 152-53. 
85 

The problem with these improperly procured materials is that the manufacturers knew 

they were destined for the classified space for the London NEC.418 An OBO Security 

Management witness testified: 

Q What’s the issue? Why is it a problem? 

A Because the amount of time on target, knowing where it may be going, 

anything can be done to that piece of material. We would never know. 

Q Like what? What are the vulnerabilities? 

A Any technical or vulnerability where you can stick a bug in it or it 

wouldn’t be found otherwise. And that’s just one item. I’m sure there’s 

other things could become an antenna. We don’t know.419

The site security manager testified, with respect to this procurement issue: 

In this case, the items had markings on them indicating that the 

manufacturer had knowledge of where they’re going [in the CAA space]. 

And he would have knowledge of where they’re going because the plans 

that he was using were not classified plans. Some of the plans that are on 

the classified floors are actually mechanical plans and it is marked [for 

particular floors of the CAA space], and that stuff—those materials appear 

on the unclassified side. So the contractor can use that and give that to a 

company and they can make the product and send it. 

Somewhere, and I don’t know exactly, they were looking at it, exactly how 

it happened, but somehow [the contractor] transmitted either more 

information than should have gone or whatever. The product came in 

marked for the [a specific floor in the CAA space], which indicated the fact 

you knew it was going to the [that specific CAA] floor in the building. The 

[specific CAA] floor can also mean the [same] floor of the other areas of 

the building, because the central core of the building is huge and it’s a 

building in itself. That’s also the [floor level redacted], so it says level 

[redacted]. 

But if you peel that back a little more, the contractor made a very specific 

ductwork plan that follows, so he knows it’s going in that area.

420 

 

418 Jones Tr. at 48-49 (“Q So what’s the risk in all this? A Time on target. Q What does that mean? A The 

individuals that had the information knew it was for the new London Embassy. And the procurement process did 

not seem to be in line with the construction security plan. Q So I’m clear, the individuals who had the knowledge, 

you’re referring to the vendors? A Yes, sir.”); Bassi Tr. at 120-22 (detailing compromised items, including one set 

of items “that were being made that were specific to a location [in the CAA space] and only could wind up in the 

location”), 125-26 (same). 

419 Id. at 43-44. 

420 Bassi Tr. at 102-03. 
86 

The site security manager is the person “on the site at all times who would ensure that 

fabrication standards were met for products, items that were going to go into the CAA restricted 

space.”421 To its credit, after the procurement issues came to light, the Department assigned a 

third site security manager to the London NEC,422 though two are deputies.423 When asked “[i]s 

it usual to have three site security” managers, the site security manager stated: “[i]t’s unusual 

even to have two.”424

DS management had several discussions with the site security manager, one of which was 

“rather heated.”425 Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified the site security manager played 

a “minimal” role and should have been “more pivotal” in identifying the procurement issues, and 

that became a source of tension between the site security manager and DS management. 

Ashbery testified: 

Q What was his [the site security manager’s] role in identifying the issue? 

A I would say his role in identifying the issue was minimal. I conveyed 

my expectation that the— that he should have had a more pivotal role 

in identifying the fact that items were being fabricated off site and 

delivered to the site. 

Q Was that discussed in all three of your conversations with Mr. Bassi? 

A To the best of my recollection, yes. 

Q What was his reaction? 

A I would best say his reaction was somewhat defensive. 

Q How did that manifest itself? 

A I was going to say, it resulted in a rather heated discussion between the 

two of us during the first meeting. He raised some points that— at that 

point, which also justified some further looking into it and necessitated 

 

421 Heisey Tr. at 56 (“Q Okay. . . . Should there have been somebody on the site at all times who would ensure that 

fabrication standards were met for products, items that were going to go into the CAA restricted space? A Yes. Q 

Who would that have been? A The site security manager.”); Bassi Tr. at 15 (London NEC site security manager 

testifying that “[t]he site security manager is responsible for implementing and many times creating the program 

necessary to keep the project secure . . . ”), 17 (the site security manager “is the senior security implementer . . . for 

the construction project, it’s the security side of implementing it”) . 422 Bassi Tr. at 29-30 (when asked why a second deputy site security manager was assigned, the witness responded: 

“After we had looked at the procurement, fabrication problem at the site with the particular items, they looked at the 

sheer size of the project and the potential for other things like that to happen. Outside of our control, you know, part 

of the contract, we can’t predict and everything, we cannot predict. So [the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Countermeasures], basically in conversation, said we’re going to give you support—send you an enhanced support 

group for the duration of the project, and they report to you.”). 

423 Id. at 27 (“Q Do you have any deputies as site security manager? A I have two.”). The second deputy arrived 

in approximately July 2016. Id. 424 Id.

425 Ashbery Tr. at 141. 
87 

the additional conversations later in the week [when Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Ashbery was in London with the ODNI team in June 2016].426

Another DS witness testified the site security manager was aware of the procurement 

issues, but he apparently did nothing to stop it.427 The site security manager is the person who is 

charged with ensuring that the required security procedures are followed;428 indeed, he signed off 

on the SOPs for the London NEC.429 For his part, when asked “[w]ho’s ultimately responsible 

for ensuring items are procured and fabricated manufactured properly,” the site security manager 

replied “I don’t know.”430 

The site security manager also professed ignorance about how all of this will be fixed,431

and he has not had a conversation—nor is he aware of any conversations—with the project’s 

contractor or subcontractor about how this could have happened in the first place.432 He 

nevertheless testified that the project director and the site security manager are “at the top of the 

pyramid” on fixing the issues identified in the 2016 Inspection.

433

 

426 Id.

427 Heisey Tr. at 60 (“I didn’t need to specifically ask him [the site security manager] because, as this came out, as 

this issue came out, it became apparent to me that he was aware of it.”). 

428 Bassi Tr. at 14-15 (“Q Would you describe the site security manager’s responsibilities? A Site security manager 

is one of three key positions in a project. . . . The site security manager is responsible for implementing and many 

times creating the program necessary to keep the project secure. . . .”); Heisey Tr. at 117 (“Q Okay. So you believe 

that it is a problem that the SSM [site security manager] is not following the SOP. A Yes. Q Do you know why 

the SSM is not following the SOPs? A I would be speculating if I said why. Q Did you discuss it with him as to 

why he has failed to follow SOPs? A No. Q But you believe that it is a problem. A Yes.”). 

429 Jones Tr. at 85 (the current site security manager in London “is the one who signed off on the SOP when he was 

our division chief”); Bassi Tr. at 64 (“Q Who crafts that guideline [the SOPs]? A OBO SM [Security 

Management]. I sign them. Q You signed this for the London project? A No. That is the misunderstanding. I 

signed them as the director of site security management. The division director—my signature is on there as the 

division director. Q Your signature, to be clear, your signature is on the standard operating procedures? A That’s 

right.”). 

430 Bassi Tr. at 128. 

431 Id. (“Q . . . So when this issue arose, the issue covered in exhibit 1 [the 2016 Inspection report], arose in late 

March, early April of this year on the materials, a team went out, began looking at ways to mitigate this. What 

happens in the paperwork end? For instance, we heard of exceptions, deviations. A I don’t know. Q You don’t 

know anything about that? A No. I see the drafts and I’ve seen some of the paperwork, but the process and the 

actions, I don’t know. Q You’re not involved in that at all? A No, no.”). 

432 Id. (“Q Did you have any conversations with either BL Harbert or Sir Robert McAlpine [the local subcontractor] 

about how this could happen? A No. Q Are you aware of any conversations along those lines? A No.”). He 

apparently has not asked that question of DS, either. Ashbery Tr. at 145 (“Q Did Mr. Bassi ever ask that question 

[how this could happen], to your knowledge, or anything similar to it? A Not to my knowledge. Q Never to you? 

A Yeah, never to me, no.”). 

433 Bassi Tr. at 156 (“Q Who’s the person in charge of fixing all of the issues identified in exhibit 1 [the 2016 

Inspection report]? . . . A It comes from the—well, the PD [project director] is responsible for implementing it. . . . 

Then it’s delegated to the site security manager to execute it. The reality is that some of these things have different 

action personnel to carry them out if it’s technical. Q But in terms of the top of the pyramid. A The top of the 

pyramid is the PD [project director] and the SSM [site security manager], yeah.”), 157 (“Q No. I’m asking who’s in 

charge of fixing the items identified in— A Oh. Q —fixing the issues identified in exhibit 1? A Well, at the site, 

PD and the SSM.”). 
88 

When asked whether he blamed the site security manager and the project director for the 

procurement failures, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified: 

Q Do you blame Mr. Bassi for any of these issues? 

A I believe that there are steps that he could have taken that would have 

allowed these items to have been identified earlier; and the earlier you 

identify something, generally the easier it is to resolve. I don’t think in 

any fashion he is entirely to be blamed for any of them, but I think he— 

as stated earlier, I believe he could have been more pivotal in

identification of the issues so that they could be resolved quicker. 

Q How about Mr. Evans; is he to blame for this? 

A As the OBO project director on a project, he is the penultimate 

government representative on the project, so authority lies with him. I 

was going to say, I think it’s unrealistic to expect the project director on 

a project of this size and scope to have insight into the minute details of 

each individual item. So, again, I was going to say, I think there was 

some responsibility there, not specific blame, per se.434

Yet again, the experience with the embassy in Moscow is instructive. There, construction 

of the materials in the new embassy in Moscow, as in London, was done “in their [the Soviets’] 

own factories, out of view of American security experts.”435 Department personnel relied on its 

perceived ability to inspect the pieces.436 The Department failed. With respect to the London 

NEC, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified about the amount of potentially compromised 

material for the CAA space: “I wouldn’t consider it a small amount of material, no.”437 He 

expanded on his testimony: 

Q Have you ever seen this procurement issue or anything like this 

somewhere else? 

A Yes. 

Q Where? 

A At different times on different projects we’ve had individual items 

where such things have occurred. 

Q Multiple items or singular items? 

 

434 Ashbery Tr. at 144. 

435 Elaine Sciolino, The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1988), available at

http://www nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/the-bugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong.html?pagewanted=all. 

436 Id.

437 Ashbery Tr. at 148. 
89 

A Oftentimes it tends to be a batch of items where a series of things 

something occurred to. 

Q How frequently does this occur? 

A I would say not frequently, but it has happened. 

Q Ten percent of the projects? Less? 

A I would probably say 10 percent is probably an accurate number. What 

it is not reflective of is the percentage of materials involved in a project. 

It usually has typically only been very small amounts of materials. 

Q And this is not a very small amount of material? 

A I wouldn’t consider it a small amount of material, no. 

Q Is this the most significant you’ve ever seen in terms of a procurement 

compromise— procurement allegation compromise? 

* * * 

A It is definitely one of the largest, yes. 

Q Can you think of a larger one? 

A I mean, of course, the flaming example is the original embassy 

construction in Moscow; but that was before most of these policies and 

procedures existed, so it’s not an appropriate reflection. 

Q So [since] Moscow, have you seen anything on this level? 

A I don’t believe so.438

Like it tried in Moscow, the Department is counting on its ability to inspect much of the 

compromised materials in London, and the site security manager has told the DS team that the 

compromised materials “should be inspectable.”439 That was not true, as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Ashbery testified that many of the items were not inspectable.440 In fact, many of the 

 

438 Id. at 147-48. 

439 Heisey Tr. at 81 (“Q And how did [the site security manager] respond? A A similar responses to other times. It 

was just—it’s—it should be inspectable, so it shouldn’t be an issue type response. Q Did you explain to him that 

just because something is inspectable doesn’t mean that it satisfies the standard? A Yes.”). 

440 Ashbery Tr. at 141-42 (“Q What were the points you raised that required further looking into it? A The points 

he [the site security manager] raised are that there was a document that is referred to as a bill of materials that is a 

list of the project materials that will be used on a project, and it identifies in them whether or not a specific item is to 

be considered inspectable or noninspectable. It’s a very lengthy document with some 10,000 plus items listed on it, 

all the different parts and pieces that might go into a U.S. embassy. And his points were that a number of the items 

that were in question were listed on that bill of materials as being inspectable; and that, as such, he and his team 

received the products on site, inspected them, and moved forward. Q And you disagreed that that was the proper 
90 

security requirements in the Foreign Affairs Handbook, as well as site CSPs and SOPs, are 

“[l]esson[s] learned” “to prevent exactly what happened in Moscow.”441 A Security Management 

witness testified: 

Q And in fact that’s why we have these rules, right? 

A Yes. 

Q The rule against local fabrication is to prevent exactly what happened in 

Moscow? 

A Yes. 

Q Lesson learned? 

A Yes. 

Q Just like the SOPs that you were talking about? 

A Yes.442

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery reinforced this point with the site security manager, 

who became “quite defensive.”443 It is significant, that the result in Moscow was to tear down

and rebuild significant portions of the embassy, at a cost of $240 million (in 1990s dollars) and 

nearly 15 years of delay.444

c. Failure to Secure Communications Cables

The 2016 Inspection also revealed the site team’s failure to secure communications 

cables properly, and the fact that “[s]everal floors have security cables transiting through telecom 

rooms that are not secured.”445 The security requirements mandate that “[o]nce cables are pulled 

within those rooms, [construction surveillance technicians] are supposed to surveil those rooms 

when there [are] any uncleared workers in there.”446 If there are uncleared workers “working 

within the telecom room, [the contractor] is required to provide a cleared American to be there 

 

approach? A Yes. Q Why? A Because of my subject matter expertise in the inspection of materials, I felt that we 

typically do not consider some of those items inspectable, and that they should not have been identified as 

inspectable. So that’s why I disagreed with it.”). 

441 Cotterman Tr. at 90. 442 Id.

443 Ashbery Tr. at 148 (“I did reflect to Mr. Bassi that the core precept of no off site fabrication dates back to 

Moscow. Q What was his reaction to that? A At that point, his reaction, again, was quite defensive.”) 444 Kathy Lally, Bug-free U.S. Embassy building in Moscow opens for business, BALTIMORE SUN (July 7, 2000), 

http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2000-07-07/news/0007070212_1_embassy-building-american-embassy-newembassy. 

445 OBO SM London Mem. at 2. 

446 Jones Tr. at 104. 
91 

while any finish work is going on in a telephone room.”447 One witness told Committee staff 

“[e]very floor had that problem,” and none of the telecom closets were secure.448

While the cables remained unsecure for a period of time, the rooms were secured 

sometime in late-May or early-June 2016.449 The doors are now locked and alarmed, as required 

by the relevant policies. Nothing in the inspection team’s report or in the Committee’s 

interviews with relevant witnesses indicates foreign workers were handling telecom cables 

without the required surveillance. 

d. Failure to Properly Partition the Construction Area in the

Classified Space

The inspection team also found the classified space was not properly secured and 

partitioned before the start of finish work, as required by the CSP.450 Finish work refers to 

anything in the construction process coming after the structural portion is complete.451 The CSP 

requires: “In order to install the finish work in a CAA core area [the most restricted portion of 

the classified space], the room must be enclosed before you can start that, so that no one sees the 

finished product within that space.”452

There are very specific rules governing who may be in the classified space. As noted 

above, the policies permit foreign workers to complete assigned tasks in CAA restricted space 

under the surveillance of cleared American surveillance technicians.453 For CAA core space, no 

foreign workers are permitted in the space once finish work has begun, even with surveillance.454

The inspection team discussed the failure to properly partition the CAA space with the 

site team, and, according to one witness, “[e]veryone knew it was an issue.”455 One member of 

the inspection team agreed that “if any foreign national was doing any work in the core space,” it 

would be “a significant problem.”456 The site security manager said the failure to install the 

 

447 Id. at 104-05; Cotterman Tr. at 112-13 (“the contract requires the general contractor to provide secret cleared 

escorts . . . for access to these rooms, these telecom rooms,” and “Q That’s part of the CSP then, right? 

A Yes.”). 

448 Jones Tr. at 106. 

449 Id. at 107; Bassi Tr. at 133-35; Ashbery Tr. at 115 (“To my knowledge, it has, since this point in time, been 

resolved and the telecom rooms are being secured properly.”); U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, 

Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, London NEC (June 12, 2016). 

450 OBO SM London Mem. at 2. 

451 Jones Tr. at 111 (“In construction, there’s general construction and there’s finish work. General construction is 

you put the shell up and you get, you know, the base of the building up. Finish work is anything after that, to 

include windows.”). 

452 Id.

453 Id. (“Q And what are the rules of having foreign nationals in the CAA space? A CAA restricted, uncleared 

under CST [construction surveillance technician] for any given item that needs to be completed in there as far as 

finish work goes.”). 

454 Id. (“And CAA core, once general construction is done and the partitions are up, they no longer have access to 

those areas.”). 

455 Id. at 112. 

456 Id. at 113 (“Q And if any foreign national was doing any work in the core space, would that be a problem? 

A Yes. Q Would you classify it as a significant problem? A Yes.”); Bassi Tr. at 140 (“Q Is it generally a problem 

if foreigners are in CAA core space? A Absolutely.”). 
92 

partition “was a definite mistake by” the contractor and was based on a misreading of the 

plans.457 

The London site team permitted uncleared foreign nationals to have access to the core 

space on several occasions. The site team permitted local employees to install “a fireproofing 

type material” over beams in both the CAA core and restricted space under surveillance.458 The 

DS inspector told Committee staff: “Under the construction security requirements for [CAA] 

core [space] it’s not allowed.”459 The site security manager recognized this was “a 

vulnerability,” but contends “it was mitigated.”460 When asked why cleared American workers 

did not spray on the fireproofing material, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery said he did not 

know the reason and the project director and site security manager made the decision.461 The site 

team repeated the error by allowing uncleared workers to install certain electronic lighting and 

shade control systems in the CAA core space.462 That work was required to be completed by 

secret-cleared American personnel.463 

The site team also allowed foreign workers to view the core space while installing and 

replacing panels of the building’s curtain wall façade.464 The project director told Chairman 

Chaffetz that foreign workers completed this task in the core space because there was insufficient 

 

457 Bassi Tr. at 136. 

458 Heisey Tr. at 15 (“Q Any other issues that you identified? A And there was also an issue with a fireproofing 

type material that was applied over the beams. The requirement states that in core controlled access area, or CAA, 

that that type of work be done by secret cleared Americans. That work was done in this case by local employees 

under CSTs [construction surveillance technicians].”); Bassi Tr. at 141 (when asked whether foreign nationals are 

“applying fireproofing material in the CAA [space], both core and restricted,” the site security manger replied 

“[a]bsolutely”). 

459 Heisey Tr. at 18; see also id. (“Q So that was in contravention of both the CSP and 12 FAH[-]6? A The finish 

work that took place in the core CAA, yes.”). The site security manager noted there is some disagreement whether 

this is structural or finish work, but noted “[s]ecurity says it’s finish work” and therefore should not be applied by 

foreign workers. Bassi Tr. at 141 (“Q Is there any issue with foreign workers applying fireproofing material in the 

CAA, both core and restricted? A That’s an ongoing argument between architects and engineers and security 

types. . . . Security says it’s finish work, architects and engineers say it’s part of general construction.”). 

460 Bassi Tr. at 141-42 (describing why foreign national workers were involved with applying the fireproofing 

material: “A Because there wasn’t even a window up, because this stuff’s nasty and it spreads all over the place. 

So it was pure nothing, but there’s a vulnerability. And as this came up—and it was mitigated. There’s a mitigation 

process for this, it was mitigated. But my comment to everyone concerned was, okay, you need to stop the 

argument. Put it in the contract, put it in the book that you—that DS says it’s finish work, end of story. But right 

now, when there’s no reference to it, the engineers are defaulting to the industry.”) (emphasis added). 

461 Ashbery Tr. at 168 (“Q Okay. To your knowledge, why didn’t the project just have cleared Americans spray the 

fireproofing on? A I don’t know. Q Who would know? A I would presume that the on[-]site individuals would 

know what the rationale was. Q Misters Evans and Bassi? A Yes.”). 

462 Heisey Tr. at 18-19. 

463 Id. (“The standards require that that work be completed by minimum of secret cleared personnel because the 

systems include—they’re computer networked systems.”). 

464 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016); Bassi Tr. at 137-38 (“And the windows are considered finish work in every other 

project. In this project, they’re finish work, but they had to be put in because of the actual wall structure of the 

building, it’s the curtain wall. They had to be installed by Italian technicians from the company that designed the 

curtain wall. There’s a very specific engineering part that has to be done by them. Everyone agreed it had to be 

done by them or else the building—it wouldn’t work.”). 
93 

time, given the project schedule, to obtain cleared American workers to do the installation.465 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified an additional reason uncleared foreign workers 

were permitted to install curtain wall panels in the CAA space was because of concerns about 

voiding the manufacturer’s warranty.466 Recognizing the scope of the problem,467 DS approved 

an exception request for the foreign workers replacing damaged windows.468 

As with the issue of uncleared foreign persons onsite, there is a historical example of 

what can go wrong when the classified space is not protected adequately. On another project, 

work in the core space was completed by uncleared workers while under the watch of a 

construction surveillance team.469 After the issue was discovered, the Department “had to 

remove everything within that space and do max demolition and redo the space over.”470 “Max 

demolition” means “[e]verything comes out.”471 That was, one witness affirmed, “a big deal.”472 

She testified: 

Q Have you seen the issue of uncleared foreign nationals in the core space before? 

A Yes, we did have an issue. 

Q The one to which you referred earlier? 

A No. A different one. 

Q Different one. Do you recall where that was? 

A Djibouti. 

Q What was the issue? 

 

465 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016). 

466 Ashbery Tr. at 153 (“Q Describe that, if you would. A A piece of glass had been damaged on the curtain wall 

as part of installation and needed to be replaced. The construction security standards that applied to that specific 

location would have required that work to be done by cleared Americans. The work could not be done by cleared 

Americans for a variety of technical and warranty reasons. So a procedure on how to do the work using cleared 

Americans to surveil the curtain wall manufacturer’s installers while they were doing the installation was agreed 

upon, approved, and implemented. Q So I assume you’re referring to the CAA space? A Yes. Q So there was a 

concern that it would void the warranty if we didn’t have cleared Americans installing this? . . . A And if the 

manufacturer doesn’t do it, they won’t touch it. And given the concerns about water integrity and ensuring that that 

individual item didn’t get broken again during the installation process, it was deemed that the people who do it for a 

living were best suited to do that work.”). 

467 Heisey Tr. at 69 (“Q Okay. So did the glass have to be—I’m sorry. How did you find out that the glass had 

been installed by individuals who were non[-]cleared Americans? A The glass had not been installed yet. I was 

there and sitting in on the security planning brief with the site security manager when the plan came up. Q And did 

you say, you can’t do that? A Yes. Q And what kind of response did you get when you said that? A After 

explaining reasons why, they didn’t have a lot to say.”). 

468 Id. at 67-69; Cotterman at 109; Bassi Tr. at 140. 

469 Jones Tr. at 113-14. 

470 Id. at 114. 

471 Id.

472 Id.
94 

A The core space, the work was done by uncleared [workers] under CST [construction 

surveillance]. And that was caught during an inspection, I believe, by the tenant that 

was in— that came to visit that space. 

Q So it wasn’t security management who caught it, it was a tenant? 

A Yes. 

Q What was the remediation there? 

A They had to remove everything within that space and do max demolition and redo the 

space over. 

Q What is max demolition? 

A Everything comes out.473 

The witness recalled when it happened and agreed “it was a big deal,” and DS made the decision 

to remove the compromised material: 

Q Do you recall that happening in real time? 

A Yes. 

Q Is it fair to say it was a big deal? 

A Yes. 

* * * 

Q How long did it take to do the maximum demolition? 

A I don’t know. 

Q Who made the recommendation to do max demolition? 

A DS. 

Q Do you recall who at DS? 

A No. 

Q . . . To your knowledge, was the issue well known within OBO that there was a problem 

in Djibouti? 

A Yes.474 

 

473 Id. at 113-14. 

474 Id. at 114-15. 
95 

In remediating this issue on the earlier project, the Department did the right thing: it 

removed any compromised material and “relieve[d] both the site security manager and the 

project director on that project”:475 

[Committee Counsel]. We’re talking about Djibouti? 

[Witness]. Yes, sir. They did relieve both the site security manager and the project 

director on that project. 

[Committee Counsel]. Because of this issue? 

[Witness]. They were curtailed. 

* * * 

Q The phrase you used was “curtailed”? 

A Yes. They were curtailed. 

Q Is that a euphemism for they were removed? 

A [Nonverbal response.] 

* * * 

[Department Counsel]. That’s a defined personnel 

[Witness]. Yes. 

[Department Counsel]. —term in the FAM for the early— the posting back 

from an assignment before the original end date of the posting.476

That has not happened with the London NEC. One has to assume the reason is the time 

pressures associated with the London NEC project—including the penalty of tens of millions of 

dollars to the purchaser of the current embassy site in Grosvenor Square if the facility is not 

turned over—the fact that this is “the showpiece of OBO right now,” and one of the biggest 

projects OBO has ever undertaken,477 have presumably caused OBO and DS to stop short of 

“max demolition.” 

e. Failure to Ensure that a Cleared American Guard is Posted at One

of the Entry Points of the Classified Space

The inspection team also found the site team failed to ensure that one of the entry points 

to the CAA space had a guard present.478 The relevant security requirements mandate the 

 

475 Id. at 116; Cotterman Tr. at 163-64. 

476 Jones Tr. at 116. 

477 Cotterman Tr. at 165. 

478 OBO SM London Mem. at 2. 
96 

Department to “post a CAG, a cleared American guard, to control access within the CAA.”479 

The purpose for this requirement is to ensure “no one can go into the CAA without going 

through this individual,” and those entering the CAA space “sign in, they exchange a badge there 

so that we know, for accountability, as to who is in the space,” which is required “any time the 

CAA is accessed.”480

The issue raised by the inspection team concerns a one-time incident where the guard was 

dismissed while DS conducted particular inspection methods.481 The reason the inspection team 

raised this issue was because “the concern was the post may be left open, somebody’s not there 

to make sure the door gets locked,” and the guard is not there “to walk through and ensure sure 

that the ID swap is complete and there’s nobody hiding out in the CAA space.”482 The site 

security manager testified he reported it to Department leadership in advance.483 Although he 

was told not to proceed this way, he testified his reaction was: “‘Sorry. I’m doing it this way. 

Field decision, my decision.’”484 He stated: 

A So these are local calls made by the person on the ground who’s assessing the 

situation in realtime there, expressing it back to them. They [Security 

Management] didn’t want to hear that. Follow the SOP, and I said no. 

Q And when you said that to Washington, they said, follow the SOP— 

A That’s right. 

Q —you said no. 

A That’s right. 

Q What followed from that? 

A That [referring to the 2016 Inspection report].485

The witnesses who testified in transcribed interviews did not appear to be concerned 

about this issue going forward, deeming it to be a problem when it occurred, but unlikely to 

reoccur in the future. 

* * * 

 

479 Jones Tr. at 117. 

480 Id.

481 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 

London NEC (June 12, 2016); Jones Tr. at 117 (“Q So to make sure I have this right, the concern you have in your 

memo is that this post was unmanned? A Yes, while the DS CAT team [responsible for mitigation] was there doing 

their inspection.”); Ashbery Tr. at 115-16. 

482 Jones Tr. at 117-18. 

483 Bassi Tr. at 146. 

484 Id. at 147 (“Q In advance it was reported? A Yeah. Q Okay. A Yeah. And the answer was, ‘No. Do it this 

way.’ And I said, ‘Sorry. I’m doing it this way. Field decision, my decision.’ And in this case, to do it what the—

again, it’s the design of the building and the local condition.”). 

485 Id. at 149. 
97 

The Department is failing to adhere to some of the most basic security requirements for a 

project that will cost more than $1 billion. 

The Department’s attitude with respect to the security failures in London conjures 

memories of a situation in Moscow nearly three decades ago, where technical security personnel 

raised concerns about security issues and “[t]hey weren’t listened to.”486 Witnesses with the 

inspection team and above the team in the chain of command testified in agreement that these 

issues “would appear to be indicative of perhaps a larger issue with respect to the management of 

the site,” and Security Management recommended removal of the site security manager.487 OBO 

and DS management have disagreed with that recommendation.488 DS has the ultimate sign-off 

authority for certifying the facility is safe,489 and that final responsibility rests with DS. 

To the extent Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery’s agreement with the ad hoc security 

practices of the London NEC site team is the basis for disagreement, it raises a critical question: 

If there is indeed a disagreement on the proper interpretation of the Foreign Affairs Handbook, 

the London CSP, and its SOPs, why not amend those documents to conform with the site team’s 

approach? That would, of course, require someone within DS management to sign off on the 

revisions and agree to accept responsibility should there be any damage from these security 

failures. Although that is apparently underway,490 the Department should adhere to the existing 

requirements until any revisions are fully approved. These concerns are also underscored by the 

fact that the Department has seen similar failures before with compromised work and materials. 

As discussed above, in those instances, the Department undertook significant demolition and 

construction using uncompromised materials and workers. 

Given the fact the London NEC is “the showpiece of OBO right now,”491 there are multimillion dollar penalties should the Department fail to vacate the current embassy by early next 

 

486 Elaine Sciolino, The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1988), 

http://www nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/the-bugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong.html?pagewanted=all. 

(“‘We started getting technical security people saying, “Hey, guys, you have problems,’” said a State Department 

official who was in Moscow at the time. ‘They weren’t listened to.’”). 

487 Cotterman Tr. at 106 (“Q This seems like a big deal, and this would appear to be indicative of perhaps a larger 

issue with respect to the management of the site, would you agree with that? A I would agree with that.”). 

488 Id. at 106 (“Q Do you know whether, in addition to recommending mitigation or setting up the exceptions 

package, that you or anybody else in SM or anybody else in CFSM [the Construction, Facility, and Security 

Management branch of OBO] has made any larger recommendations about the management of the site? A Myself 

and my management recommended curtailment of the SSM. Q What does curtailment mean in this context? 

A Removal. Q Okay. Has that happened? A No. Q Do you know why that didn’t happen? A I was advised that 

DS—senior DS and OBO senior management decided that they would not be replacing staff . . . in London.”). 

489 12 FAM 312(b) (The Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s “Office of Physical Security Programs, Physical Security 

Division (DS/PSP/PSD) ensures that all new construction and major renovation design plans comply with SECCA 

requirements and OSPB [Overseas Security Policy Board] physical security standards when applicable.”); 12 FAM 

361 – 363 (outlining certification process). 

490 Ashbery Tr. at 93 (“Q Right. But if DS, as you say, is the policymaker. Why not change the FAH? You said 

these three employees have good faith disagreements? A Yes. Q Why not change the FAH? A I was going to say 

it is our intention to amend the FAH to provide that level of clarification. Q When do you intend do that? A It is in 

the process of being done. Q Do you have an ETA of completion? A I do not. I was going to say mostly because 

I— I cannot give an estimated completion on how long it takes to process a FAH change.”). 

491 Cotterman Tr. at 165 (“Q Okay. This is the showpiece of OBO right now, correct? A That’s what I hear.”). 

99 

ensure secure operations, including any personnel requirements for such 

purposes.494

That language tracks the statute.495

With this certification, the Department began what even it would concede is 

“construction” of the London NEC, notwithstanding the Department’s uncertainty that the 

building would survive a blast. The commencement of construction, however, followed precertification disagreements between DS and ODNI, on the one hand, and OBO on the other 

about the need for blast testing. 

This premature certification followed DS’s warnings to OBO approximately one year 

before that it would not certify the curtain wall as then designed: “In November 2012 and April 

2013, DS notified OBO of its concerns with the curtain wall design,” and DS “did not accept 

design completion packages submitted by OBO for certification review.”496 DS performed a 

number of tests of components of the curtain wall system. Some of those components failed, and 

DS required a full mock-up blast test.497 One DS R&D witness testified the particular design of 

the London NEC curtain wall “was something new to us,” noting DS “had never seen it,” and it 

was “[p]ushing the edge [of] . . . “[t]raditional blast design.”498 The reason OBO offered this 

design was “[i]t’s an extension of the architectural look that OBO wanted.”499

According to the Department’s OIG, after “DS notified OBO [between June and 

July 2013] that it would not certify the design for NEC London because it still had 

concerns with the curtain wall design,” ODNI likewise “notified DS that it could not 

concur with the design of NEC London” one week before the certification to Congress.500 

The day before the certification to Congress, Director Muniz sent an email to ODNI that 

the Department would nevertheless certify the building, and OBO has “assured DS, and now 

assure you, that if any revisions to the design or manufacture of the curtain wall system are 

required as a result of the FE/BR [forced entry/ballistic-resistant] and blast tests, they will be 

done to the satisfaction of DS before the final curtain wall system is installed.”501

 

494 Action Memo for Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of Management, U.S. Dep’t of State, from 

Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 16, 2013), Tab 4 

(emphasis added). 

495 Compare Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 160 (a), 101 Stat. 1356 (1987) (as amended). 

496 OIG London Rep. at 10-11. 

497 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (“Chairman Chaffetz. You had failures during these blast tests. Mr. Starr. No, sir. Chairman 

Chaffetz. You’re telling me there were no failures in these blast tests? Mr. Starr. I am telling you that. Chairman 

Chaffetz. No, were there any failures on these blast tests? Mr. Starr. Component tests, pieces of glass that we 

tested, including some that were less than what we were putting up, including some that were less, failed. Chairman 

Chaffetz. There you go.”); Norris Tr. at 86-90 (describing some of the reasons DS required a full-scale blast test). 

498 Norris Tr. at 49; see also id. at 74 (“Q Okay. How did you communicate your—strike that for just a moment. 

You’d said that this was different from a previous design? A This was different from any design that I had ever 

seen done in the Department of State.”). 

499 Id. at 77. 

500 OIG London Rep. at 11. 

501 Id.
100 

This promise from Director Muniz was confirmed in a memorandum from ODNI to 

DS,502 but that memorandum was never provided to Congress in the certification package.503 

Congress thus had no way to know the Department had yet to conduct blast testing on the curtain 

wall system and there were contingencies to ODNI’s apparent approval. Inspector General 

Linick recognized the problem with the lack of transparency with Congress. He testified: 

[W]hen Congress received the certification package in December, it’s not 

clear to me what Congress knew, it’s not clear to me that Congress realized 

that the Department was relying on an internal memorandum of 

understanding, which is not law. And, ultimately, we’ve got to rely on the 

laws and our official interpretations of them. That’s the problem, from our 

point of view.504

The blast testing did not even begin until three months after the certification, and 

it was not complete until more than six months after the onset of construction. The OIG 

report succinctly explained the concern. Inspector General Linick testified at the 

Committee’s hearing: 

OIG is also concerned that the Department certified the safety of the project 

without obtaining blast testing results. The blast testing was not completed 

until May of 2014, more than 6 months after certification. As early as 

November 2012, DS notified OBO of its concerns with the curtain wall 

design and reiterated that a full blast test needed to be completed to ensure 

that the wall met standards.505 

Assistant Secretary Starr called the certification “a promise to Congress” that, “in 

advance of starting the building of the building, that the facility resulting from the project 

is going to be safe and secure.”506 DS, however, had concerns about the safety of the 

building, but “changed course after the director of OBO [Director Muniz] provided a 

written assurance shortly before certification that it would address any issues should the 

 

502 Memorandum from J. Kevin Powers, Assistant Director, Center for Security Evaluation, Office of Director of 

National Intelligence, to O. Gentry Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 12, 2013) (noting that “[s]hould blast and FE/BR [relating to the strength of 

doors and windows] testing highlight weaknesses in the design, Director OBO has confirmed in writing that all 

necessary steps will be taken to rectify the issues and comply with blast and FE/BR requirements”). 

503 Email from Bureau of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Committee Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform (Dec. 9, 2015, 5:47 PM) (“During the December 8, 2015 HOGR hearing entitled, ‘Review of the New 

London Embassy Project,’ Representative Walker asked Diplomatic Security Assistant Secretary Greg Starr whether 

the ODNI Memo was included in the 2013 London certification package that was transmitted to Congress. The 

ODNI Memo was not included in the London certification package that was submitted to the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in December 2013.”). 

504 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (Inspector General Linick in response to a question from Rep. Hice). 

505 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

506 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (Assistant Secretary Starr in response to a question from Rep. Walker). 
101 

test fail.”507 Recognizing the blast testing was “a very high-profile, high-stakes test,” 

OBO sent its principal deputy director to New Mexico to witness the event.508

Congress should revise the certification requirements to ensure the Department 

explicitly states when there are any outstanding security-related contingencies. To its 

credit, DS may have learned its lesson and become self-regulating. With respect to the 

Beirut NEC, a DS memo notes: “The Congressional Certification process for the Beirut 

NEC project cannot proceed until the blast analysis and design is 100% complete for the 

project, along with completion of testing for all new FE/BR [forced entry/ballisticresistant] designs.”509

b. The Department Improperly Began Construction before the Blast

Testing was Complete and then Argued it Was not Construction

The Department flouted federal law and its own rules by awarding the contract for 

construction before certification to Congress,510 let alone beginning construction. 

 

507 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

508 Norris Tr. at 97. 

509 Memorandum from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Marcus Hebert, Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State, regarding Beirut NEC 60% Design Submission (Dec. 28, 2015) (CDP2016-00013-000022). 

510 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 
102 

This is what the London NEC site looked like two weeks before the December 13, 

2013 certification: 

Source: OBO Briefing to Committee Staff

The photo above shows a clear violation of the current statutory requirements. 

None of those vehicles of personnel should have been onsite. Inspector General Linick 

told the Committee: “The Department’s published interpretation and implementation of 

the statute is contained in the Foreign Affairs Manual,”511 which “states that ‘no contract 

should be awarded or construction undertaken’” before certification.512 

The practical effect of all of this, as Inspector General Linick told the Committee 

was that taxpayers were exposed to risk. Linick testified: 

 

511 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Inspector General Linick). 

512 OIG London Rep. at 6 (quoting 12 FAM 361.1). 
103 

By initiating construction without first completing the blast testing, the 

Department committed itself to constructing a building that could have 

required significant redesign, potentially placing the Department and 

taxpayers at financial risk.513 

The OIG report quantified that amount as potentially “hundreds of millions of taxpayer 

dollars.”514

Ignoring federal law515 and its own published certification process,516 the Department 

instead relied upon a draft 2003 memorandum between DS and OBO to guide the certification 

process and commencement of construction.517 That memorandum conflicts with the guidance 

in the Foreign Affairs Manual.

518 

Pursuant to the practice in the 2003 unpublished draft memorandum—in contravention of 

the Foreign Affairs Manual’s prohibition on even awarding a contract—the Department issues 

“limited [notices to proceed or NTPs] authorizing construction contractors to begin limited tasks 

(not including foundation work) prior to certification.”519 Making the point clear, OIG obtained 

slides prepared during its review noting “No certification = No foundation.”520 

Director Muniz nevertheless testified that the 2003 unpublished draft memorandum 

controls OBO’s decisions about when to begin construction. During a hearing, Muniz stated: 

Mr. Palmer. Before you go any further, are you saying this is the 

Department’s position, that setting the piles and doing the 

basic foundation work is not part of the construction? 

Ms. Muniz. The Department—what I explained is that the Department 

has allowed for years, since 2003, the construction of piles 

 

513 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Dep’t of State); see also OIG London Rep. at 9 (same). 

514 OIG London Rep. at 9. 

515 Id. at 5 & n.11 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-204, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 

1989, Section 160, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990 

and 1991, Section 135 (22 U.S.C. § 4851 note)). 

516 Id. at 6 n.12 (citing 12 FAM 360 and 12 FAM 362.1). 

517 Id. at 6; see also Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the 

Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“Notwithstanding [the Foreign Affairs Manual], since at least 2003 the 

Department has followed the practice of authorizing construction contractors to begin work prior to certification. In 

the case of the London compound, the contract award, site work, and construction began many months before the 

Department certified the project to Congress in December of 2013 as providing adequate security protection.”).

518 OIG London Rep. at 6 (noting that the 2003 draft memorandum “does not comply with 12 FAM 361.1, which 

states that ‘no contract should be awarded or construction undertaken until the proponent of a project has been 

notified by the Department that the appropriate certification action has been completed,’ or 12 FAM 361.3, which 

states that ‘[t]he chief of mission is responsible for ensuring that no project subject to...certification...is initiated 

without certification...approval.’”). 

519 Id.

520 Id. at 10 n.22. 
104 

up to pile caps in advance of certification. That has been 

common practice for over 10 years.521

Despite the prohibitions in the 2003 unpublished draft memorandum, the OIG report 

found the Department drove piles into the ground on the site of the London NEC more than a 

year before the Department certified the safety of the building to Congress.522 “[C]onstruction of 

the piling foundation,” the OIG’s report observed, is what an industry group called “the most 

common type of deep foundation.”523

The Department should not even have awarded a contract for construction before 

certifying to Congress that the facility would be safe for personnel and classified 

information. 

OBO itself was not certain the curtain wall would pass blast testing. A mere four 

days after the certification to Congress, “OBO tasked the design firm to develop solutions 

in the event that the curtain wall failed testing” and “to develop an ‘alternate curtain wall 

system.’”524 That work cost an additional approximately $1.7 million.525 That redesign 

work also occurred in December 2013 and continued into April 2014, well into the blasttesting period.526 

This is what the London NEC site looked like on May 3, 2014, before the 

required blast testing was complete: 

 

521 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015); see also id. (Director Muniz testifying “[s]o what we have argued is that it has been common 

practice in the Department to award a construction contract, I’ll be very clear about that, for years, award a 

construction contract and to allow the beginning of the construction of the piles to the pile cap.”). 

522 OIG London Rep. at 15 (“OBO, in concurrence with DS, approved early site work and construction of the piling 

foundation in November 2012; however, certification to Congress was not achieved until December 16, 2013, more 

than a year after certification was originally projected by OBO and a year after site work and foundation 

construction was approved.”) (footnote omitted). 

523 Id. at 15 n.33. 

524 Id. at 12. 

525 Briefing by Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of State, to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform staff 

on New London Embassy Report (Nov. 30, 2015). 

526 OIG London Rep. at 12. 
105 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Embassy London Flickr527 

Had the curtain wall failed blast testing, the Department potentially would have spent 

millions of dollars on a redesign. As the Inspector General told this Committee: “By initiating 

construction without first completing the blast testing, the Department committed itself to 

constructing a building that could have required significant redesign, potentially placing the 

Department and taxpayers at financial risk.”528

Given the confusion about when the Department can begin construction activities, it may 

be useful for Congress to craft a legislative solution. In his testimony before the Committee, 

Inspector General Linick agreed clarity on what construction is and exactly when blast testing, if 

required testing has to occur, is necessary.529 

5. The London NEC Contains Unnecessarily Expensive Features that

Will Do Little to Keep Employees Safe

The Department is using windows for the London NEC where “the glass is manufactured 

in Germany, is shipped to the United States for security reasons to be reassembled with the 

 

527 The image is available here: https://www flickr.com/photos/usembassylondon/14122930494/in/album72157635166293639/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 

528 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Steve Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

529 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015). 
106 

frames, which are manufactured here, and then shipped back” to London.530 While under 

construction in Germany, during assembly in the United States, and again during installation, the 

panels must remain under the surveillance of an American construction technician who holds a 

security clearance.531 As Under Secretary Kennedy remarked to the press when asked about 

these trans-Atlantic shipments: “Sometimes you have to move things, sometimes you don’t.”532 

Although true, it costs a significant amount of money and time to have cleared personnel 

watching these panels, to say nothing of the costs to ship and store the materials securely. All of 

that comes at a cost of more than three million dollars,533 and it comes out of the more than $1 

billion project budget for the London NEC.534

What Under Secretary Kennedy may fail to appreciate is the glass for the curtain wall 

system from level one of the NEC to the roof is more than $40.5 million.535 Even at that price, 

the Department does not know how the structural silicone will maintain its integrity over time, 

but it is likely less than the 50-year life cycle the Department projects with building 

embassies.536,537 The issue related to the structural silicone is described in greater detail below 

with respect to the Jakarta facility.

Adding to the millions spent on the curtain wall system, the Department spent “a little 

over $4 million” for art on the London NEC.538 OBO’s art funding requirements are found in an 

unpublished memorandum, in which OBO “provide[s] 0.5 percent of all of [its] construction 

contract amounts for art programs in our new buildings, new embassies and new consulates.”539 

With respect to London, “because of the 1 million pound requirement to add public arts, we 

added that, because all of that will be focused on the exterior of the embassy to get our 

 

530 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (Director Muniz); Bassi Tr. at 63 (describing manufacture and shipment of curtain wall 

panels). 

531 Cotterman Tr. at 151-53 (describing this process). 

532 Are modern U.S. embassies becoming too costly to build?, CBSNEWS.COM (June 4, 2014, 7:34 AM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/increased-cost-of-building-design-excellence-u-s-embassies/; see also Nancy 

Cordes, Shiny new U.S. embassies costing taxpayers millions, CBSNEWS.COM (June 6, 2014, 6:50 PM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shiny-new-u-s-embassies-costing-taxpayers-millions/. 

533 Cotterman Tr. at 156 (testifying that this surveillance costs “[o]n the order of three plus million dollars”). 

534 Id. at 153. 

535 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Director Lydia Muniz by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (1-16) 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform December 08, 2015, Resp. No. 3 (Jan. 29, 2016). 

536 Committee staff could not find a specific warranty period for the silicone for the London NEC’s curtain wall 

system, but it is likely that the period is similar to the 20-year period for the Jakarta NEC curtain wall system. In 

fact, the structural silicone for other elements of the London NEC contains a 20-year warranty period. U.S. Dep’t of 

State and KieranTimberlake, Embassy of the United States of America, London, United Kingdom, Specifications 

Construction Documents 100% Volume 1 § 057100 (July 2013) (CDP-2016-00001-0001856) (providing a five-year 

general warranty, a 10-year period for the “laminated glass,” and a 20-year period for the “cohesion/adhesion of 

structural silicone” “after the date stipulated in the Certificate for Substantial Completion”). 

537 H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Deposition of Stephen Siebert Tr. at 128 (May 26, 2016) [hereinafter 

Siebert Tr.] (“Q To your knowledge, what’s the estimated life cycle of the Jakarta NEC? A All of our buildings are 

designed for a 50 year lifespan.”); Capone Tr. at 145 (“Q . . . How long is the new embassy compound supposed to 

last? What’s its lifespan? A I believe they’re designed for a 50 year lifespan.”). 

538 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (OBO Director Muniz in response to a question from Chairman Chaffetz). 

539 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (OBO Director Muniz in response to a question from Chairman Chaffetz). 
107 

permits.”540 The interior of the London embassy will contain “six or seven” gardens, each of 

which represents a geographical region of the United States,541 and parts of which are 

responsible for some of the procurement issues discussed above.542

Moreover, and despite spending more than $45 million on design alone for the London 

NEC,543 there was a lack of agreement of the merits of the design chosen. The British judges on 

the design selection panel—two “of the biggest names in British art and design,” according to 

one publication—“are said to have thought the design was boring and ‘not good enough to 

represent one of the great nations in London,’ said sources familiar with the jury process.”544

When told by a former colleague, “[c]ongrats on being on time and on budget in 

London,” an executive of the project’s contractor, B.L. Harbert International, replied: “Let’s just 

say that we are on time. :)”545 That email exchange came in a string discussing this Committee’s 

July 2014 hearing on the Design Excellence program.546

 

540 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (OBO Director Muniz in response to a question from Chairman Chaffetz). 

541 Bassi Tr. at 170 (“Q . . . How many gardens are there in the— A Six or seven. Q Six or seven. Each in a 

region of the country? A The Everglades, there’s the Pacific Northwest, there’s the Southwest Prairie, and— 

 Q Potomac? A Potomac Gardens and—yeah. Yep.”). 

542 Id. at 120. 

543 London NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0002966) (showing “Design” budget of $45,695,547). 

544 Cliff Kuang, The British Hate Our New London-Embassy Design, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:30 AM), 

http://www fastcompany.com/1561455/british-hate-our-new-london-embassy-design. 

545 Email from President of B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Former Executive, B.L. Harbert Int’l (July 10, 2014, 12:25 PM) 

(BLHI_03963 (2016)). 

546 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014). 

109 

“[i]ncreased resource allocated to the project at off-site facilities” as a potential solution.551 The 

proposed cost of this is more than $25 million.552

Although one of the two project team members “at the top of the pyramid” onsite cannot 

say whether the project remains on schedule as of September 2016,553 the Committee has its 

doubts that the project remains on schedule. For the sake of the taxpayer, the Committee hopes 

that the government will not have to pay a penny more than the $1.023 billion budgeted for the 

new embassy, or that our personnel in London will have to remain in the current embassy any 

longer than necessary. 

B. Jakarta

 

551 Id. at 2 (BLHI_04068 (2016)). 

552 Id. at App’x A (BLHI_04071 (2016)). 

553 Bassi Tr. at 162-63 (“Q Sitting here today, does the project remain on schedule? A As far as I know. Q Would 

you know if it wasn’t? A Maybe not. Q Why not? You said you’re one of the two people at the top of the 

pyramid on the London project. A I don’t make the construction schedule timelines, nor do I have anything to do 

with all the other parts and components that have to go into determining whether they meet the timeline or not, and 

that’s commissioning, system—other systems. All of that goes into play.”). It seems odd that one of the top two 

members onsite could not confirm that the project remains on time. 
110 

Source: B.L. Harbert 

The U.S. government maintains an important presence in Indonesia, but Indonesia is also 

a place where Western interests have been targeted. In January 2016, the Islamic State 

conducted an attack approximately one-half mile from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta,554 resulting 

in a temporary closure of the embassy.555 

The diplomatic importance of Jakarta is underscored by the fact that it is the headquarters 

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),556 an organization to which the U.S. 

government sends an ambassador.557 The current embassy facility is outdated and in need of 

replacement. 

 

554 Joe Cochrane & Thomas Fuller, Jakarta Attack Raises Fears of ISIS’ Spread in Southeast Asia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 

13, 2016), http://www nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/asia/jakarta-explosion html?_r=0 (“The United States 

Embassy is a little over half a mile from the attack site, which is also near Indonesia’s National Monument and the 

presidential palace complex.”). 

555 U.S. Embassy to stay closed as a precaution after Jakarta blasts – statement, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2016, 9:06 AM), 

http://www reuters.com/article/uk-indonesia-blast-usa-diplomacy-idUKKCN0US1R920160114. 

556 ASEAN is a multi-lateral organization with aims of promoting economic growth and regional peace in Southeast 

Asia. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Overview, http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview/ (last visited Dec. 

2, 2016). 

557 U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, https://asean.usmission.gov/ourrelationship/nina-hachigian/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
111 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff
112 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff

The Department has embarked on designing and constructing a new facility in Jakarta 

with a budget of $497,774,000.558 That results in a per-desk cost of $674,490, as of April 2016, 

for the people doing the U.S. government’s diplomatic work. The curtain wall panels for the 

facility alone cost approximately $45 million,559 which does not include an additional $13.3 

 

558 Jakarta NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002912) (showing a “Total Project Cost” of $497,774,000 and 

738 desks). 

559 Capone Tr. at 149 (“Q Okay. And do you know how much the glass panels cost? A Numbers I’ve heard in the 

past. I couldn’t tell you specifically, but I believe it’s in the $45 million or so perhaps. Q Okay. It’s a little bit 

higher than what I thought. It’s a good bit higher than what I thought.”). 

114 

being complete and receiving an initial notice to proceed for design and mobilization in 

December 2012567 and construction beginning in May 2013,568 the Department did not give the 

contractor, B.L. Harbert International (BLHI or the Contractor), the final notice to proceed on the 

curtain wall system until February 2015.569

When asked about the reasons for the delay between the design and the final notice to 

proceed on the curtain wall system, one witness explained “OBO needed to give [the Contractor] 

direction on which curtain wall they were building.”570 Another witness agreed there was a lack 

of clarity by the Department of the curtain wall design: 

Q But you do admit that for a period of two and a half years, there was a 

lack of clarity within the State Department as to which curtain wall 

design would be utilized, correct? 

A Yes, I agree with that.571

The Jakarta project director confirmed that aesthetics were a primary consideration for 

the curtain wall design and the reason for the delay: 

Q I’ve been told in the course of these interviews that we have done, that 

aesthetics are the reason why you would choose an open edge system 

over a closed edge system. Is that your understanding? 

A That would be a primary reason, sure. 

Q Okay. Because you don’t want to see the supports in the window when 

you look out the window? 

A It would give you a cleaner look, yes.572 

OBO chose this open-edge design—with its attendant delays—even though DS was 

“comfortable”573 with the closed-edge system, even though that option “that did not subject the 

 

567 Patton Tr. at 46; Jakarta NEC PPR, Jan. 2013 (“Issued LNTP [limited notice to proceed] for design 12-5-2012.”). 

568 Capone Tr. at 72 (“Q Okay. All right. Thank you. When did construction begin on the Jakarta Embassy? 

A The contract was awarded September 2012. Notice to proceed for design and mobilization was issued December 

2012. Limited notice to proceed to initiate demolition and site work activities was May 10, 2013, so that would 

have been the start of actual construction. Q May 10, 2013? A Yes.”). 

569 Patton Tr. at 86-87. 

570 Id. at 87-88. 

571 Capone Tr. at 128-29. 

572 Id. at 113. 

573 Id. at 112 (“Q Okay. So didn’t you ask why it matters? What difference does it make whether we have—

because DS had actually said, and you indicated this before, they were comfortable with closed edge system, 

correct? A Yes. Q That had passed before. They were able to say that that was going to satisfy the security 

standards that, as you told [Ranking Member’s counsel], the glass curtain wall was going to meet? A Yes.”). 
115 

project to any risk of delay.”574 Deputy Assistant Ashbery recognized “[t]he execution has 

definitely been challenged in Jakarta.”575

OBO was aware of the potential cost of its indecision, particularly if DS required actual 

blast testing of the curtain wall system. In an August 2013 memorandum, two members of OBO 

management wrote to DS “OBO is concerned that at some future date, DS may decide that the 

Jakarta design [the open-edge curtain wall system] must be tested.”576 “OBO is under contract 

with” BLHI, the memorandum continued, “and delay in approval of the curtain wall design for 

testing purposes presents an unacceptable cost risk.”577

In the end, however, OBO returned to its original curtain wall system design.578 DS 

finally certified the design on January 23, 2015, even while recognizing that “the glazing 

elements of the curtain wall may not meet” the specific GSA performance level.579

The Department’s delay in choosing the curtain wall design will potentially cost millions 

of dollars. In fact, the Contractor filed an REA seeking more than $49 million, alleging that the 

Department’s indecision caused delays for which the contractor should be compensated.580 

Recent documents produced by the Department call this “a major REA” that is currently under 

consideration by the Department for resolution.581

 

574 Id. at 110. 575 Ashbery Tr. at 193 (“Q So would you agree that the attempt to innovate with the design embassies was a good 

thing in concept, whereas Jakarta and other, maybe, specific examples had failed at the execution? A The execution 

has definitely been challenged in Jakarta, yes, but I do think the goal of innovation and doing it better is laudable.”). 

576 Memorandum from Joseph W. Toussaint and Robert J. Browning, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, 

U.S. Department of State, to Charles D. Brandeis, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Aug. 30, 

2013) (CDP201500009-000005100). 

577 Id.

578 Email from Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l (Feb. 24, 2015, 3:24 

PM) (CDP201500009-000002006) (replying to a Feb. 19, 2015 Email in which BLHI notes it has been directed to 

revert to the original curtain wall system, noting “[y]our statement below is accurate. It is the Government’s intent 

to move forward with the Open-Edge Curtin [sic] Wall Design.”).

579 Information Memorandum from Greg Starr, Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 

Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 23, 2015) (CDP-2015-

00009000018946). 

580 B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C., Request for Equitable Adjustment for Project Delays (July 10, 2015) (CDP201500009-

000001624). 

581 Jakarta NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0002912) (“Project is red because of a major REA, review 

underway.”). 

117 

Despite Director Muniz’ testimony, the contractor filed its request for equitable adjustment the 

very next day, July 10, 2015.584 In it, the contractor sought approximately $49 million for delays 

associated with the Jakarta project, more than half of which related to alleged curtain wallrelated delays.585

The Committee’s review of thousands of pages of documents produced by the 

Department and the Contractor, as well as transcribed interviews of Department employees, 

showed the Department was on notice as early as November 2014 that the Contractor intended to 

request monies for delays related to the curtain wall.586 Due to a meeting she called with the 

Contractor to discuss the curtain-wall-related delays, Director Muniz was on direct notice no 

later than December 9, 2014, approximately eight months before the referenced statements to 

this Committee.587

Before a contractor may submit a request for equitable adjustment, the contractor is 

“required to provide a notification to the government that something has occurred that they 

believe is outside the contract for which they feel they should be compensated.”588 After this 

notification is received, the project team and people in OBO’s headquarters begin analyzing the 

potential claim.589

a. The Department was on Notice in November 2014 that the

Contractor Planned to Seek Compensation for Curtain Wall‐

Related Delays

The curtain wall-related delays became quantifiable in November 2014. During a 

deposition, a former construction executive for the Jakarta NEC project stated: 

Q And, Mr. Siebert, what I’d like to do is direct your attention to the line 

in the bottom right corner “potential exposure” on exhibit 4 [the October 

 

584 B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C., Request for Equitable Adjustment for Project Delays (July 10, 2015) (CDP201500009-

000001624). 

585 Id. at 29 (alleging a total of 1,023 days of delay, of which 519 days are attributed to “[a]lternating design changes 

to the [New Office Building] Curtain Wall System”). 

586 Patton Tr. at 40 (regarding a $67,840,000 “potential exposure,” Ms. Patton testified “the reason this number is so 

high is that B.L. Harbert had alerted us that there was a potential delay, and this was their cost, their delay cost per 

day for what B.L. Harbert reported to us”); see also Patton Tr., Ex. 3, Nov. 2014 Jakarta NEC PPR. Ms. Patton 

emphasized, however, that this is not a verified number at the time it is included in the PPR, “but it was reported to 

us that the contractor was saying you have this potential risk.” Patton Tr. at 40 

587 Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, Meeting Recap, 

Dec. 9, 2014 (CDP-201500009-000000238). 

588 Capone Tr. at 50 (“Q Could you walk me through a little bit more how that process might work? So what would 

be the first step? The contractor and OBO has [sic] a discussion about upcoming REA, or would it just be the 

submission of the REA? A No. There would be a discussion. They are required to provide a notification to the 

government that something has occurred that they believe is outside the contract for which they feel they should be 

compensated.”). 

589 Id. at 51 (“Q So when you do receive an REA, you said it was eventually passed to the contracting officer? 

A We would provide a technical analysis of that, yes. Q Who else within your office would participate in that 

process? A The principal analysis would be coordinated through the folks on site, myself, and my staff. We have 

got a consultant that we rely on. But within OBO, we have a—construction management office has a claims 

manager, Mr. Tansey, who provides advice and guidance. The Department has legal staff that we consult as 

needed.”). 
118 

2014 Jakarta Program Performance Review (PPR)]. Can you read that 

number for me, please? 

A Potential exposure, $28,772,769. 

Q And how about in exhibit 5 [the November 2014 Jakarta PPR]? 

A $67,840,000. 

Q Why the difference? 

A The amount on the October 2014 slide reflects the estimate of the cost 

of the domestic fabrication facility for the curtain wall. I believe that 

the one in November reflects the domestic—cost for the domestic 

fabrication facility and the expected cost for the revised design for the 

curtain wall. 

Q So the delta of 39 or so million dollars is a design cost? 

A Well, design and construction.

590

Another former Jakarta construction executive testified similarly: 

Q That next line, “Curtain wall blast analysis, required for certification, is 

due mid November 2014.” 

A Right. 

Q Did that play any role in the potential exposure? 

A Yeah. Yeah, because that was going to be used—that analysis was to

be—was to be a piece of technical data used in the final disposition of 

the design. And each design had a different delay.

591

Department witnesses told Committee staff that the setting of the potential exposure 

amount on internal project tracking slides is a “pretty objective exercise.”592 There also do not 

appear to be any incentives to underreporting the potential exposure. As one witness testified, 

there are not “any benefits to putting it for high potential exposure sort of setting expectations 

low and coming in and exceeding them.”593

 

590 Siebert Tr. at 68 (emphasis added); Capone Tr. at 64 (Jakarta NEC project director testifying he “would assume 

that [this difference in potential exposure is] just our running projections of what we thought the exposure might be 

on the curtain wall issues as well as the other open contract change issues on the project”). 

591 Patton Tr. at 41 (emphasis added). 

592 Siebert Tr. at 69; see also id. (“Q So this is a pretty objective exercise? A Yes.”). 

593 Id.
119 

b. Director Muniz Attended an Hour‐Plus Long Meeting in December

2014 to Discuss the Contractor’s Curtain Wall‐Related Delay REAs

and Additional Compensation

Even if she was not aware of the previous months’ PPRs, Director Muniz’ knowledge of 

the Contractor’s intention to submit an REA for the alleged curtain wall delays came no later 

than December 9, 2014. On that day, she participated in a meeting at OBO’s offices with the 

Contractor, at which the possibility of an REA for curtain wall delays was discussed. One 

witness even said he believed “the director [Ms. Muniz] requested the meeting,”594 and a 

memorandum memorializing the meeting notes the following as its title: “Meeting Called by 

Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options:”595 

 

594 Id. at 103. 

595 Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, Meeting Recap, 

Dec. 9, 2014 (CDP-201500009-000000238). 
120 

122 

While preparing for the meeting, the Contractor’s team prepared a number of documents 

outlining the curtain wall-related delays. In an email chain discussing OBO’s “flip flop between 

the various designs,” a BLHI executive noted “[t]hat history is an absolute debacle by the USG 

[U.S. Government].”596

At this December 2014 meeting, OBO and the Contractor discussed the design delays and 

OBO ultimately directed BLHI to use the original open-edge concept for the curtain wall.597 

Among other topics, OBO management, the OBO project team, and the Contractor discussed the 

contractor’s contention that “this delay is the result of not having a curtain wall system direction 

on 05DEC12 [December 5, 2012], (LNTP1 [the first limited notice to proceed]) and still not 

having direction two years later.”598

When asked to explain the delays mentioned in this sentence, one witness testified his 

“understanding of the sentence, based on [his] reading of it now and [his] recollection at the 

time, was that the Department had not provided direction on the curtain wall up until and 

including the time of this meeting.”599

The group present at this meeting—including Director Muniz600—did discuss increased 

costs related to the curtain wall system: 

Q Did you have any questions about the cost of the project at that meeting, 

to your recollection? 

A I have—consistent with the minutes prepared by B.L. Harbert, I have a 

recollection that we discussed the curtain wall system. I have a 

recollection that we had discussions about the modeling and I have 

recollection that we had a discussion about the increased cost 

associated with returning to the original design as well as other 

alternatives to modify the design.

601

The December 9 meeting lasted at least one hour,602 and the minutes of the meeting show 

that OBO and the Contractor discussed three different concepts, each of which had a different 

associated time delay and cost delay.603 During the meeting, the Contractor also said it would 

cost an estimated $1 million per floor in direct costs only to augment the curtain wall for one of 

 

596 Email from Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l (Dec. 6, 2014, 3:35 AM) 

(BLHI_06544 (2016)). 

597 Patton Tr. at 122 (“Q . . . Can you tell me what this is? A Yeah, it’s the meeting minutes from the December 

meeting where we—where the design was finalized to go to the open edge” curtain wall system.). 

598 Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, Meeting Recap, 

Dec. 9, 2014 (CDP-201500009-000000238). 

599 Siebert Tr. at 106 (emphasis added). 

600 Id. at 125 (“Q And Director Muniz was present for all of these discussions [at the December 9 meeting]? 

A Yes.”). 

601 Id. (emphasis added). 

602 Patton Tr. at 123; Siebert Tr. at 103 (noting that the meeting lasted “[a]t least” an hour). 

603 Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, Meeting Recap, 

Dec. 9, 2014 (CDP-201500009-000000238). 
123 

the designs under discussion.604 That estimate, however, did “not take into account the costs 

associated with delay to the project’s substantial completion date,” among other delay costs.605

The meeting minutes of the December 2014 meeting contain a chart showing costs 

relating to curtain wall delays alone. The chart shows a minimum of $22.2 million in cost delays 

and an additional 395 days of project duration (if OBO kept the original curtain wall design) to 

$50.6 million in cost delays and an additional 641 project days (if had OBO adopted one of the 

other designs).606

Source: Ex. 67, B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C., Request for Equitable Adjustment for Project Delays (July 10, 2015) 

(Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, 

Meeting Recap, Dec. 9, 2014)

 The Jakarta NEC project director testified that, during this meeting, “[t]here was an 

implicit understanding that there were costs and time associated with each of the varying design 

paths.”607 As the project director testified: 

Q Okay. But at that [December 9, 2014] meeting, BLHI indicated that 

they were asking for money on the factors of tens of millions of dollars 

to complete the curtain wall, correct? 

 Is that correct? 

A Yes, that’s correct.608

 

604 Id.

605 Id.

606 Id.

607 Capone Tr. at 129-30 (Q . . . Do you know if any of the information provided in that meeting would have 

informed or put any of the attendees on notice that B.L. Harbert was planning to submit an REA on July 10, 2015? 

A If I understand your question correctly, I mean, there’s no way of knowing something was coming on July 10, 

2015. Q I guess I’ll back up, so my understanding is that the B.L. Harbert REA did, in fact, come in on July 10, 

2015? A There was an implicit understanding that there were costs and time associated with each of the varying 

design paths, yeah.”) (emphasis added). 

608 Id. at 144 (“Q Okay. How about this, were you aware that BLHI was about to ask for a lot of additional money? 

A Yes. Q But you can’t say for certain whether Ms. Muniz knew that, or can you, on July 9, 2015? A I mean, 

other than that meeting I attended with her in December 2014, I have no personal knowledge of what she may or 
124 

A former construction executive for the Jakarta project testified that the numbers on the 

chart in the December 2014 meeting minutes “are the different costs that B.L. Harbert is 

projecting it will cost to do the different designs, the different curtain wall designs.”609

With respect to the chart, one witness told the Committee he had seen this information 

before the December 9, 2014 meeting. When asked whether he had “reported that [information 

on the chart] to [his] management,” he replied: “Yes.”610 The witness also agreed that, “because 

this showed up on the minutes of the meeting [,] . . . these delay issues and the cost issues were 

discussed” at the meeting.611 Although B.L. Harbert apparently did not use the terms “request 

for equitable adjustment” or “REA,” the witness testified that the contractor was “sort of setting 

the table for you then for what was going to be coming down the pike.”612

The December 9, 2014, meeting minutes further provided that these projected numbers 

for the delays were accurate “based on the assumption that BLHI receives clear written direction 

on which [the curtain wall system is] to proceed by” January 2, 2015.613 BLHI, however, did not 

receive the full notice to proceed on the curtain wall system until more than a month later, in 

February 2015.614

The Contractor, in a post-meeting email exchange, used a color-coded timeline at the 

meeting detailing the various design iterations and direction from OBO, “[b]asically, the 

executive summary of the REA in bar chart.”615 “When [Director Muniz] saw it,” the email 

continues, “she quickly changed the subject. . . .”616

c. Documents Produced by the Department Show that OBO, including

the Front Office, was Internally Tracking the Potential Exposure

The Committee obtained information from documents and transcribed interviews of 

Department personnel showing that the OBO Director and OBO Deputy Director participated in 

 

may not have been told. Q Okay. But at that meeting, BLHI indicated that they were asking for money on the 

factors of tens of millions of dollars to complete the curtain wall, correct? Is that correct? A Yes, that’s correct.”). 

609 Patton Tr. at 125-26. 

610 Siebert Tr. at 106. 

611 Id.

612 Patton Tr. at 127 (“Q Okay. So they were sort of setting the table for you then for what was going to be coming 

down the pike? A Right. And under contract, a contractor has to notify you if they believe—they have time 

window in which they have to notify you that there could be a potential increase in price. They can’t—they can’t 

say, ‘Oh, hey, 2 years ago, by the way, you owe us money.’ They have like I think it’s 30 days where they have to 

notify you, whether it comes to something or not. So you get a lot of those notifications.”). 

613 Meeting Called by Ms. Lydia Muniz to Discuss Curtainwall System (CWS) Design Options, Meeting Recap, 

Dec. 9, 2014 (CDP-201500009-000000238). 

614 Patton Tr. at 84 (noting February 2015 “is when they [the contractor] got the full notice to proceed” on the 

curtain wall system); see also Email from Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Vice President, B.L. Harbert 

Int’l (Feb. 24, 2015 3:24 PM) (CDP201500009-000002006) (specifying the Department’s choice of curtain wall 

system). 

615 Email from Project Engineer, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l (Dec. 15, 2014, 12:55 AM) 

(BLHI_06544 (2016)). 

616 Id.
125 

regular meetings to discuss each project.617 At these meetings, the participants reviewed PPR 

slides, which detailed the projected construction schedule, the budget, and lists of other topics of 

interest for OBO.618 Information is added monthly to a project’s PPR slide by a project’s 

construction executive, and PPRs are designed to provide a snapshot of issues with each 

project.619 The project team and supervisors review the draft slides, and “then have a meeting to 

go through and review all of the draft PPR slides for the office prior to sending them forward to 

the front office.”620

The principal purpose of the PPR meeting with the OBO front office was to give the front 

office “an opportunity . . . to get information about the projects that were going on.”621 OBO’s 

front office at one point went through the PPRs for each of the projects in one long meeting, but 

later—likely in 2014622—started dividing the PPR review into “each of the regions.”623 

Even after the front office deconsolidated the PPR review to allow each of the 

Department’s bureaus to provide separate presentations, “the front office would do a page turn of 

the entire [PPR slide] deck.”624 The recurring meeting occurs in OBO’s largest conference room, 

is attended by “30 to 50 people,” and “normally includes people—management from all of the 

offices within OBO.”625 The PPR slide for each project is “[p]resented up on a big screen” that 

is approximately “5 by 7 feet.”626 It was not difficult to see the PPR slide projected onto the 

screen. When one witness was asked “are people able to see what’s on that screen,” the witness 

agreed and testified “unless you had a visual impairment or the projector was broken, you could 

see the slide.”627

During these front office PPR meetings, the “only person routinely asking questions 

. . . was either the director [Director Muniz] or whoever was standing in for the director.”628 The 

 

617 Siebert Tr. at 29-30 (testifying about PPR meetings with the front office and noting “[t]hey happen every 

month”), 31 (noting some of these meetings began occurring “[p]erhaps” quarterly); Capone Tr. at 13, 47 (similar); 

Ekdawi Tr. at 27-28 (describing “meetings with upper management” to review the PPRs for each project). 

618 Capone Tr. at 15, 46 (discussions at the PPR meetings concerned “if the project was proceeding without any 

issues, everything’s on schedule, on budget, no concerns,” and,” if there are issues or concerns, then that may be 

discussed”). 

619 Ekdawi Tr. at 27 (“[F]or projects under construction we have what we call a PPR system online, and every 

project executive updates his project, you know, and we have meetings weekly or biweekly with division director 

for construction management who goes through the status of each project, if they’re falling behind, if there’s change 

order, if there’s problems with the project.”). 

620 Siebert Tr. at 25-26. 

621 Id. at 52-53. 

622 Id. at 29. 

623 Id. at 28-29. 

624 Id. at 29; see also id. at 51-52 (“Q Okay. So in the last—the first hour, we—you were discussing the PPR 

meetings that you would have? A Uh huh. Q Or they have OBO to discuss, I guess, the—all of the projects that 

are going on, correct? A Uh huh. Yes.”). 

625 Id. at 31. 

626 Id. at 32; Capone Tr. at 15 (describing PPR meetings from approximately 2010 in which the slide was displayed 

on “a large screen” “[b]ig enough for everybody in the room to see”). 

627 Siebert Tr. at 52. 

628 Id.
126 

director would sit “at the head of the table across the room and directly across the screen where 

the PPR slides were projected,”629 and would have “[a] direct view of the screen.”630

With respect to the Jakarta NEC, the March 2015 PPR, prepared by and reviewed 

by OBO, notes an “REA to be submitted by B.L. Harbert late spring for time delays.”631 

The border of this slide is red. A former Jakarta Construction Executive testified that in 

the case of a red slide, it is the job of the project team “to provide a concise explanation 

as to what the principle [sic] issues are on the project.”632 The witness was asked 

“[c]oncise yet thorough, I would imagine,” to which he replied “[a]lways.”633

The former Jakarta Construction Executive expanded on that:

Q Is it fair to say that a red slide is pretty concerning? If you need to have 

a concise, yet thorough explanation for leadership? 

A In a word, yes. 

Q So on a red slide, there is something you want to point out that 

somebody needs to take notice of. Is that correct? 

A Yes.634 

The current Jakarta Project Director explained the PPR coloring system as “just a visual indicator 

of the project status. Green means there’s no issues, no concerns. Red means there are some 

major concerns or issues.”635

In spring 2015—months before Director Muniz told the Committee that she did not “have 

any direct knowledge that [the Jakarta contractor was about to ask] for a lot of additional 

money”636—the PPRs showed millions of dollars of potential exposure for alleged curtain wall 

delays.637 The March 2015 PPR said explicitly, “REAs to be submitted by BLHI late spring for 

time delays.”638 

Given the PPR reviews, the facts disclosed at the December 2014 meeting, and other 

discussions, one witness told the Committee that Ms. Muniz’ testimony about the cost and 

 

629 Id. at 55-56; Capone Tr. at 15 (“Q Okay. And I assume the director sits up front so that she can see the screen 

well? A Yes. She used to sit at the end of the table looking directly at it, at the far end of the room, but we had a 

clear view.”). 

630 Siebert Tr. at 56. 

631 Jakarta NEC PPR, Mar. 2015 (CDP-2016-00016-0001734). 

632 Siebert Tr. at 33-34. 

633 Id. at 34. 

634 Id. 635 Capone Tr. at 82. 

636 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

637 In addition to the regular PPR reviews, there is a document-tracking program through which OBO personnel send 

Action Memoranda and similar documents for the attention of the front office. This system—called OBO Trac—

provides electronic reminders of items awaiting front office action. Ekdawi Tr. at 39. 

638 Jakarta NEC PPR, Mar. 2015 (CDP-201500009-000006646). 
127 

schedule, as well as about the REA, was “deceptive” because the witness believed Ms. Muniz 

“had information about a specific claim for additional money that had been previously presented 

to her by the contractor directly.”639

Q She [Director Muniz] was also asked whether she had direct 

knowledge that the contractor was about to ask for additional money. 

We’ve discussed the December 2014 meeting, I’ve showed you the 

spring PPRs. Do you believe that was an accurate statement that she 

didn’t have any knowledge the contractor was about to ask for 

additional money? 

* * * 

Q Okay. Same question. Do you believe that was an accurate statement? 

A I believe she—I do not believe that was an accurate statement. 

Q And why is that? 

A Because the project team had been in extended communications with 

the contractor regarding the status of the design and the schedule. 

Q And you have reason to believe that information made it to Director 

Muniz before she testified in July of 2015? 

A Yes.

640

Despite no fewer than 10 attempts to get the witness to retract that statement during his 

deposition, the witness reiterated his belief that Director Muniz’ testimony on this score was not 

accurate.641 Indeed, after the repeated inquiries, the witness plainly said “I believe that she 

deceived the committee.”642 Under questioning about the witness’ “basis to believe that 

Secretary Muniz [sic] was being deceitful, or deceiving the committee,” the witness replied as 

follows:

My opinion is based on my knowledge that on multiple occasions, she was 

provided information about the schedule and the budget difficulties on the 

project. And even accounting for the fact that our director is a busy person 

and that there are many projects, the Jakarta NEC, being the size of project 

that it is and being of particular importance in our drive towards 

constructing more aesthetically pleasing facilities overseas, the Jakarta 

Embassy, really second to London, was an important project. So it is—I—

it— 

 

639 Siebert Tr. at 145-46. 

640 Id. at 133-34 (emphasis added). 

641 Id. at 137-41. 

642 Id. at 141; see also id. at 148 (Q So just for the record, I want to clarify that you have categorized Secretary 

Muniz’s testimony as deceitful, deceiving Congress. Is that correct? A That is correct.”). 
128 

* * * 

So the number of briefings and the interest that she took in the project culminated 

for a time in the meeting that we had with the contractor and their blast consultant 

in December, as we’ve discussed. And at that meeting, the contractor clearly 

presented that all of the contemplated paths forward had additional costs to the 

project.

643

He further testified about Director Muniz’ testimony as follows: 

I believe [the testimony] to be deceptive, because Chairman Chaffetz asks 

specifically, so you are aware of any up—are you aware of any upcoming 

requests for additional money? And she replies that, we expect them 

through the life of the contract, as if there was nothing—well, and then 

Chairman Chaffetz responds. He says, No. I’m asking do you have any 

direct knowledge that there is about to be one for a lot of money? And while 

she—I believe she had—that she had information about a specific claim for 

additional money that had been previously presented to her by the contractor 

directly, that she indicated that she did not have any specific knowledge.644

That same witness elaborated that: 

To assume otherwise, in my opinion, would fail to give Director Muniz 

sufficient credit for understanding that if the project were incurring tens of 

millions of dollars of additional expense, that the contractor would not 

attempt to recover some of that expense, particularly when the contractor 

has stated previously in the meeting that there remains a lack of direction 

on a critical design element.645

With respect to whether the project is on time and on budget, the project’s former 

construction executive testified as follows:

Q Do you recall her discussing the Jakarta NEC project during that 

testimony? 

A I have a recollection of it. 

Q What do you recall her having said? 

A I have recollection that she indicated that the project was on schedule 

and budget. 

Q Is that an accurate statement? 

 

643 Id. at 142-43 (emphasis added). 

644 Id. at 145-46. 

645 Id. at 143. 
129 

A At the present time, no. 

Q How about at the time she said it? 

A I do not believe that the project was on budget or schedule at the time 

she made that statement.

646

When pressed about Director Muniz’ testimony, the witness said “it is my belief that she 

had knowledge that there was a request for equitable adjustment of a specific amount of money 

that would come from Harbert on the Jakarta project. And I believe that very specifically when 

asked about it, she said that she did not have any knowledge of that.”647

One witness interviewed by Committee staff who testified that Director Muniz did not lie 

to the Committee, calling this Committee’s investigation “a witch hunt.”648 With respect to 

Chairman Chaffetz’ questioning of Director Muniz on this point, the witness called it 

“hostile,”649 “unprofessional,”650 and “embarrassing.”651 Another witness testified he had no 

reason to believe Director Muniz was aware of the impending REA.

652 He testified Director 

Muniz “would not be aware of every specific request for equitable adjustment.”653 

For the reasons discussed above it is unlikely Director Muniz would not be aware of an 

REA that is approximately 10% of the total budget of the project, particularly where, at a 

minimum, she attended at least one meeting with the contractor where this was discussed.

d. The Contractor Sent a Letter to OBO Approximately One Month

before Director Muniz’ Testimony Stating it Would Submit an REA

In addition to the December 9, 2014 meeting attended by Director Muniz and the months 

of PPR slides detailing the potential exposure because of curtain wall delays, the Contractor sent 

a letter to OBO on June 11, 2015. The subject line of which notes “Pending Submission of REA 

for Contract Delays.”654 The letter advises OBO that the REA would be submitted on or before 

July 10, 2015. That is the day after Director Muniz’ testimony before the Committee at which 

she disclaimed any knowledge of an upcoming REA. The letter from B.L. Harbert’s Vice 

President states: 

As we had mentioned in email correspondence from Thursday, March 26, 

2015, BLHI’s initial goal was to submit the REA to the Government 

sometime this summer. Please be assured that the preparation and submittal 

of the delay REA, together with its prompt resolution, is a top priority of 

 

646 Id. at 133 (emphasis added). 

647 Id. at 147. 

648 Patton Tr. at 163. 

649 Id. at 164. 

650 Id.

651 Id.

652 Capone Tr. at 56. 

653 Id.

654 Letter from Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, re “NEC-Jakarta” and 

“Pending Submission of REA for Contract Delays” (June 11, 2015) (CDP201500009-000000144). 
130 

BLHI’s senior management. With that in mind, BLHI will be submitting its 

REA on or before July 10, 2015.

655

 

655 Letter from Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, re “NEC-Jakarta” and 

“Pending Submission of REA for Contract Delays” (June 11, 2015) (CDP201500009-000000144) (emphasis added). 

132 

BLHI also had internal discussions about presenting the REA to OBO and how, in the 

Contractor’s view, OBO will not be surprised by the submission. In a June 26, 2015 email, the 

Contractor discussed the December 9, 2014 meeting and, referring to the minutes of the meeting, 

notes “I believe the attached is what we showed [Director Muniz] in December 2014.”656 The 

group questioned whether “OBO legitimately can act surprised,” and “[w]e want to be able to 

respond that we’ve been telling OBO for a long time how big this delay is.”657

An email three weeks before the exchange above showed B.L. Harbert reiterating an 

earlier offer to “build this REA ‘under the eyes’ of OBO,” in an effort to “give OBO maximum 

visibility.”658 The email notes “OBO site nixed this idea,” and the Contractor asked the 

Department contracting officer “[c]an we go back to this?”659 The purpose was to permit OBO 

and the Contractor to “work together collaboratively to resolve this REA.”660

e. The Department Expresses Concern after Director Muniz’

Testimony

Approximately one month after Director Muniz’ testimony that she did not know the 

Jakarta contractor planned to request significant additional funds, the Department sent an 

unprompted letter to Chairman Chaffetz explaining why Director Muniz’ testimony was not 

inaccurate.661

The ostensible purpose of the letter was “to eliminate any confusion,” and the 

Department therein proceeded to defend her statements at the hearing. The letter further 

criticized Chairman Chaffetz for “not giv[ing] [Director Muniz] the opportunity to complete her 

statement.”662 

Notwithstanding Chairman Chaffetz’ question to Director Muniz whether she had “any 

direct knowledge that they [the contractor] are about to ask you [OBO] for a lot of additional 

money,” and her clear response, “I don’t,”663 the letter stated: “Consistent with the expectation 

that Director Muniz attempted to express at the hearing,”664 BLHI submitted an REA for nearly 

$50 million the next day.665

 

656 Email from Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, and Vice President, B.L. Harbert 

Int’l (June 26, 2015, 3:11 PM) (BLHI_06762 (2016)). 

657 Id.

658 Email from Vice President, B.L. Harbert Int’l, to Jakarta NEC Construction Executive, U.S. Dep’t of State (June 

3, 2015, 10:21 AM) (BLHI_06758 (2016)). 

659 Id.

660 Id.

661 Letter from Hon. Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hon. Jason 

Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 12, 2015). 

662 Id.

663 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

664 Letter from Hon. Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Hon. Jason 

Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Aug. 12, 2015). 

665 Letter from Vice President, B.L. Harbert International, to Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 10, 2015) 

(noting “VIA Express Courier (for delivery on July 10, 2015)”) (emphasis added) (on file with Committee staff). 
133 

135 

 The Committee began an investigation into the Jakarta NEC not long after Director 

Muniz’ testimony.666 On July 21, 2015, the Committee sent a letter to the Department, both 

requesting documents and highlighting portions of Director Muniz’ hearing testimony, including 

her statements regarding delays and that she had no knowledge of the contractor’s “upcoming 

requests for additional money to build and finish the Jakarta embassy.”667

Upon receiving the Committee’s letter requesting documents and information about the 

Jakarta NEC, Deputy Assistant Ashbery forwarded the Committee’s letter to one of his deputies 

“[t]his will not be pretty.”668 His deputy responded “[n]o indeed.”669 When asked why it would 

“not be pretty,” Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified: 

Q What did you write to Mr. Gibbons? 

A I said, “This will not be pretty.” 

Q Why did you say that? 

A Because there were issues related to the delay and certification of the 

Jakarta project that I assumed were not going to be a very pleasant 

discussion. 

Q What issues were those? 

A The ones that we discussed at the committee hearing which were related 

to the fact that there was, in fact, a significant delay in the certification 

of that project related both to the resolution of the issues related to the 

curtain wall and to the issues related to the compromise of the classified 

drawing set that resulted in the redesign of portions of that project. 

* * * 

Q And Mr. Gibbons replied “No indeed” to your email, “This will not be 

pretty.” 

Did you all have a conversation about this? 

A We probably had several conversations about this, including getting the 

specific information necessary to brief the committee. 

 

666 Letter from Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and Hon. Ron DeSantis, 

Chairman, Subcomm. on National Security, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Hon. John F. Kerry, Sec’y, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (July 21, 2015). 

667 Id. 668 Ashbery Tr., Ex. 7, Email from Wayne Ashbery, Deputy Assistant Secretary - Countermeasures, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Peter Gibbons, Office Director, Physical Security Programs, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 29, 2015, 4:17 PM) (CDP-2016-00009000019187). 

669 Id.
136 

Q Were you unhappy to get this letter? 

A I was going to say I’m always unhappy to have to come up to Capitol 

Hill and brief on bad news, yes. 

Q I won’t take that personally. 

A Not intended to be taken personally by anyone up here, but it is never 

good to come up and provide bad news. 

Q . . . So your email here, “This will not be pretty,” was related to 

statements made at the hearing on July 9? 

A Yes.670

 

670 Ashbery Tr. at 182-83. 
137 

 
138 

Source: Ashbery Tr., Ex. 7, Email from Peter Gibbons, Office Director, Physical Security Programs, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Wayne Ashbery, Deputy Assistant Secretary - Countermeasures, Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 29, 2015, 4:20 PM) (CDP-2016-00009000019187-88) 
139 

3. Use of a Curtain Wall System That Has not Been Sufficiently Tested

or Planned for Maintenance

Unlike the curtain wall for the London NEC, the curtain wall system for the Jakarta NEC 

was never subjected to a full blast test. Instead, DS used finite element modeling, which one 

witness described as the process by which “the blast engineers ran some supercomputer program 

to determine the requirements” of the curtain wall system.671 That is, DS’s blast engineer ran a 

series of mathematical calculations to ensure that the curtain wall system would hold in the event 

of a blast. However, Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified “a full-scale or final blast test 

would be the one that mattered in terms of evaluating the overall security of the blast wall.”672 

He nevertheless believes “the New Embassy Compound in Jakarta will meet the security 

requirements.”673 

Based on the mathematical modeling, as well as the blast test results of the London NEC 

curtain wall, DS approved the use of finite element modeling instead of actual blast testing.674 

Director Muniz explained to the Committee some of the similarities between the curtain walls at 

the London and Jakarta NECs, noting “the curtain wall used in Jakarta is not dissimilar to the 

curtain wall used in London to the degree that those are curtain walls that have what we call an 

open bite.”675 She continued: “But when you test . . . there are variations on the same system,” 

and “DS was comfortable that the open bite system, which has been used for years in private 

industry, but not to the security standards that the Department uses, when they were comfortable 

from the results of the London test that this solution worked, they accepted the calculations.”676 

Internal Department emails show that OBO was “scrambling now regarding the Jakarta 

curtain wall design as a direct result of London’s component blast tests.”677 The email also notes 

 

671 Patton Tr. at 94; see also id. at 95 (“This particular program was some super-smart people get together and say, 

hey, let’s model this this way. We want to model a blast in this particular way, and then we’re going to play with 

the data this way.”); Siebert Tr. at 95-96 (describing finite element modeling). 

672 Ashbery Tr. at 118 (“Q So a full scale or final blast test would be the one that mattered in terms of evaluating the 

overall security of the blast wall? A Yes.”). 

673 Id. at 119. 

674 Siebert Tr. at 101 (“Q Did Diplomatic Security permit the use solely of finite element modeling based on the 

London results, to your knowledge? A Yes.”); see also Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in 

Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (“Chairman 

Chaffetz. But it has been the practice to do an actual blast test on the facade that would be there in Jakarta? 

Mr. Starr. No. In that case, it was within the design engineering parameters that the blast engineers felt comfortable 

that looking and reviewing the drawings, they said: Yes, this meets the parameters. We did blast testing on the 

London design because these were very large and a different type of design, but the parameters on Jakarta fell within 

what the engineers were very comfortable with.”) . 

675 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

676 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

677 Email from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:35 PM) (CDP-2015-00009000019245); Capone Tr. at 131 (“Q After that, the London 

Embassy blast testing occurred, and the results from that blast testing were used in analysis for the Jakarta glass 

curtain wall. Is that correct? A They weren’t used in the analysis, but it was a similar enough system that it 

demonstrated that what was being proposed in Jakarta would also pass. Q So the successful testing of the London 

glass curtain wall gave Diplomatic Security enough confidence that the open edge system, in fact, was secure 
140 

that Director Muniz approved the curtain wall system redesign but never sent a contract 

modification, purportedly “because they were counting on a favorable London component tests 

[sic] which they would use to poke us (DS) in the eye and say we should then approve the noncaptured bite Jakarta design.”678 The email concludes “[b]esides the initial redesign costs, this is 

now going to cost them big $$$ in project delays.”679 

Given some of the concerns about the testing of the London curtain wall system, as 

discussed above, DS had concerns about the blast resistance of the Jakarta curtain wall system, 

as well.680 The Jakarta curtain wall system is different from the London curtain wall, which 

required additional and more expensive testing, because it required multiple modeling tests. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified about an email he wrote. He stated: 

Q I’d like to focus your attention on the last sentence of that, I guess 

second paragraph. “There is greater complications on this curtain wall 

design than there was in London, it is likely the corrective costs will be 

significantly higher.” 

What did you mean by that? 

A What I specifically meant by that is that there was a— one issue that 

was done differently in Jakarta that changed the calculations and related 

to the curtain wall design in that in London [specific testing information 

redacted]. 

That created complications because each of the calculations that were 

necessary to determine whether or not this facility met the glass 

requirement would have to be done multiple times.681 

Deputy Assistant Ashbery, in the same email string, noted the Jakarta curtain wall system 

“design is really pushing the analytical limits of the structural engineering community and its 

knowledge of some of the material properties,”682 and he was “concerned that the mitigation in 

this case may be much more expensive than London turned out to be and will result in increased 

 

enough to meet all the requirements? A Yes, it gave them, yes, much more confidence that it could achieve the 

performance requirements.”). 

678 Email from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:35 PM) (CDP-2015-00009000019245). 

679 Id. (emphasis added). 

680 Siebert Tr. at 109 (“Q Okay. So Diplomatic Security raised concerns about the curtain wall meeting its 

requirements for them to certify that aspect of the design? A That they did. Q Okay. And we do know a stop 

work order was put into place? A Correct. Q Okay. And we also know that that stop work order was put into 

place after those concerns were raised? A That is correct.”).

681 Ashbery Tr. at 171-72 (quoting Ashbery Tr., Ex. 5, Email from Wayne Ashbery, Deputy Assistant Secretary - 

Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:47 AM) (CDP-2016-00009000019223)). 

682 Ashbery Tr., Ex. 5, Email from Wayne Ashbery, Deputy Assistant Secretary - Countermeasures, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 8, 2014, 9:14 AM) (CDP-2016-00009000019223). 
141 

pressure later . . . . It is a case where the USG will be on the hook for the cost of the 

mitigation.”683

While the testing was occurring for the London curtain wall, DS stopped the certification 

package for the Jakarta NEC because of “this issue with the NLE [New London Embassy] 

crisis.”684 Indeed, a former construction executive for the Jakarta NEC told Committee staff 

those concerns were never fully allayed with respect to Jakarta.

685

According to this witness, who was privy to the relevant information in real time,686 DS 

R&D had concerns “whether or not in a blast event the windows would fall out of the 

building.”687 The witness described in some detail his understanding of DS R&D’s concerns.688

When asked “[h]ow . . . the [DS R&D] concerns . . . g[o]t resolved about the 

mathematical modeling,” the witness replied “I do not have a recollection that those concerns 

were ever adequately resolved.”689 When pressed, the witness was asked whether DS “would not 

certify an option if they did not believe it to be safe and secure,” and the witness said, “I don’t 

believe I could say that.”690 

The witness also testified “I believe that [DS] certified the building to Congress without 

having resolved the concerns of their experts.”691 One of those experts, who works in DS R&D, 

 

683 Ashbery Tr., Ex. 5, Email from Wayne Ashbery, Deputy Assistant Secretary - Countermeasures, Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 8, 2014, 9:05 AM) (CDP-2016-00009000019223). 

684 Email from Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep’t of 

State (July 25, 2013, 5:32 PM) (CDP-2015-00009000018996). 

685 Siebert Tr. at 84 (the witness testified that “[w]ithin Diplomatic Security, the research and development branch 

had unresolved concerns regarding the curtain wall performance,” including “[a]bout the performance of the curtain 

wall system in a blast event”). 

686 Id. at 112 (“Q . . . Are you privy to all of the reports and information that Diplomatic Security is evaluating? A 

With respect to the Jakarta curtain wall project? Q Yes. A At the time these decisions were made, yes. All of that 

information, either through my role as the construction executive or as part of the project team, I was—to the extent 

that there were discussions that I was aware of, everything that came from Weidlinger and Associates [the blast 

engineers] was responsive to the contract requirements, that contract being with OBO, and OBO passed all of the 

information that Diplomatic Security reviewed to them.”). 

687 Id. at 85. 

688 Id. at 85-86. 

689 Id. at 87. 

690 Id. at 111. This witness, although not a security expert, made clear that he was relying on “the outstanding 

concerns of their [DS’s] technical experts.” Siebert Tr. at 119; see also id. at 120 (“I’m simply expressing my 

personal concern that the reviewing experts’ at [DS] concerns were never adequately resolved on a technical 

basis.”). 

691 Id.; see also id. at 114 (“Q So you think they knew it was not safe and secure and they certified it anyway? A I 

believe that the technical experts reviewing the project had valid, unresolved concerns regarding the performance of 

the curtain wall system. Q What’s your basis for believing that they had valid concerns if you’re not a security 

expert? A Their representations that they had unresolved concerns.”). 
142 

testified that some of those concerns remain.692 When asked about “the standards for the 

windows,” the engineer testified “[t]hat has not been resolved.”693 

The DS R&D witness told Committee staff several of the panels of the mock-up for the 

London blast test fell out of the frames. When asked whether “that make[s] you concerned that 

they may fall out in the real world,” he replied “[y]es.”694 DS nevertheless certified the test for 

the London NEC curtain wall because, in its view, the way the panels fell “would not have been 

harmful to the occupants of the building, so as far as DS is concerned, that was a successful 

test.”695 The DS R&D witness told the Committee testing for the Jakarta NEC would likely have 

achieved the same outcome as the London NEC curtain wall system.

696 DS, however, did not do 

blast testing specific to the version of the open-bite curtain wall adopted for Jakarta,697 despite 

there being differences in the curtain wall panels.698 When asked “[s]hould there have been” 

testing relating to the version of the curtain wall adopted for the Jakarta NEC, the DS R&D 

witness replied: “I would say yes. I would say yes.”699 

 

692 Norris Tr. at 120; see also id. at 64 (“Q Okay. So then as of now, the concerns you had then have been resolved? 

A Largely, yes.”). 

693 Id. at 120; see also id. at 120-21 (“Q Okay. But there’s a concern that the glazing [glass panels] may come off? 

A Yes. Q And that concern remains today? A Yeah, I—well, we don’t know. I mean, we’ve seen compartmentlevel testing where it fell off. We did a full-on mockup where it stayed on, so it’s about 50/50 chance it will work 

because it is—the designs—these are so close to the edge of what structural silicone will do.”). 

694 Id. at 124. 

695 Id.

696 Id. at 137-38 (“I think you would have—at the end of the day, I think you would have had very much the same 

results [for the Jakarta NEC as with the London NEC]. It was the same—again, the same designer designing it at 

the same point in time using the same design philosophies and methodologies. So I think you would have had very 

comparable performance out of it.”). 

697 Id. at 140 (“Q Did you look at the analytical validation of both the open and the closed bite for Jakarta? 

A No. I don’t believe there was ever any look at the un-captured—the open bite for Jakarta,” which is the version 

OBO adopted.). 

698 Id. at 138 (noting there are “differences in the height and width of the windows” between the London and Jakarta 

NECs); Ashbery Tr. at 171-72 (describing additional differences). 

699 Norris Tr. at 140. 

144 

The process for replacing silicone is not a simple one. A former Jakarta NEC 

construction executive testified:

Q What is the process, if I—if one needed to replace the structural silicone 

on the curtain wall? 

A The silicone would be removed, cut out, and it would be replaced. I 

think if—well, that’s how it would have to be done. 

 In general, the silicone is considered a long-lived item. You wouldn’t 

replace the silicone in the curtain wall system wholesale unless you had 

some cause or reason to.707 

Documents produced by the Department and prepared by its curtain wall glass 

manufacturer show a similar process for replacing the glass, including “[p]erform[ing] a 

field adhesion test,” “[d]eglazing the area,” “[c]ut[ting] away the silicone” while taking 

care “not [to] damage the surface finish of the substrate,” “[c]lean[ing] the residual 

sealant” using a “‘two-cloth’ cleaning technique,” “[c]lean[ing] the new glass panel and 

set[ting it] in place,” “[f]ill[ing] the joint with a bead of fresh structural sealant,” and 

“[a]fter the sealant has fully cured, check[ing] that full adhesion has been achieved.”708

In interviews with Department personnel, the Committee has learned it does not appear 

that the Department has budgeted for eventual silicone replacement, an issue that will potentially 

impact the silicone holding each of the more than 2,800 curtain wall panels. Instead, the 

Department budgets only for first-year maintenance costs for new embassies and consulates: 

[W]ithin the project budget that OBO develops for all of our capital projects, 

we include first year maintenance costs, but after that, the presumption is is 

[sic] that the ongoing maintenance costs for the facility can be quantified 

and then it’s not considered part of the capital project.709 

The curtain wall for the Jakarta NEC is similar to the curtain wall at the London NEC.710 

As a result, the curtain wall system in London is likely to encounter similar issues.711

 

know if somebody else does that test? A I am not aware. I’m—it may be going on, but I’m not necessarily aware 

of it. Q Got it. A I—my sense is that people that sell silicone for a living probably do aging studies. You asked 

earlier about a warranty. You would want to know how long it’s going to last so you know your warranty is under 

that.”) (emphasis added). 

707 Siebert Tr. at 128-29; Norris Tr. at 42-43 (describing the same procedure); Capone Tr. at 146-47 (same). 

708 Letter from P.W.S. International to Senior Project Manager, B.L. Harbert International (Jan. 7, 2015) (CDP2015-00009000018953); Capone Tr. at 147 (agreeing these steps are required to replace the structural silicone). 

709 Siebert Tr. at 131. 

710 Norris Tr. at 37-38 (“A I would offer up that there are only a handful of structural silicones that are used in this 

space. Q Um-hum. A So it is all the same structural silicone. Q Got it. I assume there are only probably a 

selective number of manufacturers of this product? A That is correct.”); see also id. at 122 (the curtain wall system 

manufacturer “told us they were going to use the same silicone that they were going to use for London”). 

711 Siebert Tr. at 87-88 (“Q Did you hear any comparisons made between the Jakarta curtain wall system and the 

curtain wall system used at the London new embassy compound? A Yes. Q What similarities were there, that you 

heard? A I heard considerable amount of discussion relating to the performance of the silicone.”). 
145 

Blast and terrorism risks are not insignificant in Indonesia, which serves only to highlight 

the importance of properly testing and maintaining the curtain wall system. The Australian 

embassy in Jakarta was bombed, allegedly by an al Qaeda-linked group in 2004, killing nine.712 

In fact, the architect of the Jakarta NEC recognized the risk. In a presentation, the architect 

noted: “Of primary concern to the US Embassy project are a series of bombings aimed at 

Western targets in Jakarta and Bali. Beginning in 2002 with an attack in Bali that killed over 

200 people, several western-affiliated sites have been targeted, including the bombing of the 

Australian Embassy in 2004.”713 More recently, in January 2016, an attack for which Islamic 

State claimed responsibility that targeted Western interests in Jakarta—including a Starbucks 

coffee shop—killed two and wounded 24.714 

C. Beirut

 

712 Timothy Mapes, et al., Bomb in Jakarta Kills Nine Outside Australian Embassy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2004, 

12:01 AM EDT), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109470585484313350. 713 Davis Brody Bond, NEC Jakarta Draft Final Bridging Documents Submittal at 13 (Dec. 1, 2011) 

(CDP201500009-000005149). 

714 Greg Botelho, Kathy Quiano & Ivan Watson, ISIS militant ordered Jakarta attack from abroad, police chief says, 

CNN (Jan. 15, 2015, 8:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/14/asia/jakarta-gunfire-explosions/; see also id.

(noting other major attacks against Western interests in Jakarta, including a “2009 simultaneous attacks on the J.W. 

Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels, which left seven people dead”); Capone Tr. at 17 (“Q What is the current security 

environment in Jakarta? A It’s a high physical threat, high for terrorism and crime. Q What kind of terrorism do 

they have? A In the early 2000s they had some problems with bombings. Who the folks were affiliated with I 

don’t know. There was a recent episode earlier this year from a Muslim group of some sort.”). 

147 

unique design of the facility added at least nine (and as many as twelve) months to OBO’s 

projected construction schedule.716 

1. Our Personnel in Beirut are in Dangerous, Deteriorating, and

Dysfunctional Facilities, as Recognized by the Department’s OIG in

2012

Beirut is one of the most dangerous places in the world for U.S. personnel to serve. One 

need look no further than the two previous attacks against the U.S. Embassy there in 1983 and 

1984.717 In fact, the bombed-out shell of the building at the center of the 1984 attack remains on 

the current compound: 

 

I first learned about this project the project was 24 months in duration, and we’re at now 65 months. So I think they 

took a better look at what they needed. I don’t know. I don’t know. But it’s gone from that to where we are now.”). 

716 Shipman Tr. at 48 (“Our construction management team had a 55-month construction duration. Alpha [the thirdparty construction consultant] estimated 67” months.). 

717 Ass’n for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History, The Bombing of U.S. Embassy 

Beirut—April 18, 1983, http://adst.org/2013/04/the-bombing-of-u-s-embassy-beirut-april-18-1983/. 
148 

Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Staff 

The 1983 attack “was the deadliest attack on a U.S. diplomatic mission up to that point,” killing 

63 people, including 17 Americans.718 In addition to the two attacks on the embassy, militants 

later attacked U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. service personnel.719 Indeed, 

“[s]ecurity concerns have dictated diplomatic operations and embassy community life in 

Lebanon” since the embassy bombings.720 

 These dangers notwithstanding, the current embassy consists of what the OIG in 2012 

described as “deteriorating and dysfunctional facilities.”721 “Accelerating the construction of a 

new embassy compound also would reduce the need for investment in the current facility.”722 As 

the Department’s OIG reported then: “Although Embassy Beirut is on the Top 80 list for new 

compounds for FY 2019, the OIG team noted the compelling security and functional arguments 

 

718 Id.

719 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 19, 2015, 5:27 PM ET), 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-bombing-fast-facts/. 

720 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of the Embassy Beirut, Lebanon 2 (Feb. 2012), 

available at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/185574.pdf [hereinafter OIG Beirut Rep.]. 

721 Id. at 16. 

722 Id.
149 

for moving construction forward in the Department’s list of capital cost-sharing construction 

priorities.”723

More than four years after the OIG’s findings about the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the 

Department has not yet even broken ground on the NEC there. 

2. The Department Concluded that an Untested Architect and

Idiosyncratic Design is Appropriate for the New Embassy in Beirut

The Beirut NEC currently has a nearly $1.2 billion project budget for 298 desks, resulting 

in a cost of more than $3.9 million per desk.724 Of the NEC’s approximately $1.2 billion budget, 

more than $45 million is designated for design costs alone.725 The budget for the project has 

grown significantly in 2015 and 2016. As of April 2016, the budget for the Beirut NEC is almost 

$1.2 billion, significantly more than the Department’s January 2015 anticipated a total project 

budget of $994.2 million.726 

Congress required quarterly reporting from the Department on six elements of the Beirut 

NEC: (i) cost projections; (ii) cost containment efforts; (iii) project schedule and actual project 

status; and (iv) the impact of currency exchange rate fluctuations on project costs; (v) revenues 

derived from property sales in the area; and (vi) “options for modifying the scope of the project 

in the event that costs escalate above amounts justified to the Committees on Appropriations.”727

The $45 million in design costs are being paid to a California-based architecture firm that 

has never built a diplomatic facility or and appears never to have built a secure facility in a highthreat environment. As the Beirut NEC project manager testified: 

Q To your knowledge, has Morphosis done a diplomatic facility before? 

A This is their first. . . . 

Q Have they ever done anything in a high threat environment like Beirut, 

to your knowledge? 

A Not to my knowledge.728 

 

723 Id. (emphasis added). 

724 Beirut NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500013-000000016) (showing “Total Project Cost” of $1,167,067,000 and 

298 desks). 

725 Id. (showing “Total Project Cost” of $1,167,067,000 and “Design” as $45,286,000). 

726 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Beirut NEC (Dec. 8, 2015). 

Compare Beirut NEC PPR, Sept. 2015 (CDP-201500013-000000009) (showing “Total Project Cost” of 

$997,710,000), with Beirut NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-000003035) (showing “Total Project Cost” of 

$1,167,067,000).

727 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 7004(e)(2)(A)-(F), 129 Stat. 2241, 2734 (2015). 

728 Shipman Tr. at 35-36. It appears that Morphosis is working on a project in Beirut to design the BankMed 

Headquarters II project. Morphosis, BankMed II Headquarters, http://www.morphosis.com/architecture/211/ (last 

visited Dec. 2, 2016). The building does not appear to be a secure building. 
150 

The design for the Beirut NEC—with its cantilevers and outdoor dining areas—appears fitting, if 

at all, for a place far removed from the security challenges of Beirut, a city where terrorists have 

bombed U.S. embassies twice: 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State (CDP-2016-00013-000044) 
151 

Source: U.S. Dep’t of State (CDP-2016-00013-000051) 
152 

Source: Architectural Record 

One of the Beirut NEC’s architecture firm’s most significant government projects is a 

federal building in San Francisco, in which the elevators stop on every third floor and there is no 

heat or air conditioning.729 That building was completed under the General Services 

Administration’s architecture program, also called “Design Excellence.”730

In the architect’s telling, its work in the San Francisco federal building “physically 

democratizes the workplace as it enhances health and comfort and empowers its users with a 

sense of control over their surroundings.”731 

 

729 Morphosis, San Francisco Federal Building, Building a Model for Civic Sustainability, 

http://www morphosis.com/architecture/12/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) (“The Federal Building is the first office 

tower in the U.S. to forgo air-conditioning in favor of natural ventilation.”); see also id. (“Skip stop elevators, sky 

gardens, tea salons, large open stairs, flexible floor plans, and the elimination of corner offices endow the tower with 

a Jacobsian ‘sidewalk life’ of cross-sectional interactions.”).

730 Nicolai Ouroussoff, More Openness in Government (Offices, That Is), N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 14, 2007), 

http://www nytimes.com/2007/03/14/arts/design/14mayn html (“The building may one day be remembered as the 

crowning achievement of the General Services Administration’s Design Excellence program, founded more than a 

decade ago to remedy the atrocious architecture routinely commissioned for government offices.”). 

731 Morphosis, San Francisco Federal Building, Building a Model for Civic Sustainability, 

http://www morphosis.com/architecture/12/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
153 

3. The Architect’s Design Requires Personnel to Remain in Obsolete

Facilities for At Least Nine Months Longer than Necessary

The Committee’s investigation revealed that early in the project, OBO appeared to heed 

the OIG’s suggestion that a new facility be completed in Beirut quickly. Specifically, at one 

point in the planning phase for that project, there was a construction schedule for the Beirut NEC 

of 24 months,732 approximately what the duration of construction would have been under an 

SED: 

Q And has this design process been on schedule? 

A I believe so. I don’t know of anything that would be to the contrary. I 

know that the design itself changed over the course of several years. 

Initially when I first learned about this project the project was 24 months 

in duration, and we’re at now 65 months. So I think they took a better 

look at what they needed. I don’t know. I don’t know. But it’s gone 

from that to where we are now.733 

Notwithstanding the two-year schedule for completion, at some point, OBO switched to a 

new design concept, resulting in significant additional construction time. OBO’s own internal 

construction team estimated that the new design concept would take 55 months to complete.734 

That estimate was “based on historical knowledge of what other facilities and compounds of this 

size would take or has taken.”735

Once OBO received the design from the architect—which included cantilevers and other 

architectural features not often found in embassies—OBO hired a constructability contractor 

estimated that the design would take 67 months to build. As the Beirut NEC project manager 

testified: “Our construction management team had a 55-month construction duration. Alpha 

[the third-party construction consultant] estimated 67” months.736

After much discussion within OBO and pressure to reduce the estimated construction 

schedule, OBO and the constructability contractor agreed on a 64 month schedule.737 The only 

difference between the point at which the OBO team made its estimate and the constructability 

contractor’s estimate was actually having the design. The Beirut NEC Project Manager testified: 

Q Sorry. I guess I—maybe I’m a little confused. So 55 months was 

construction management’s initial recommendation or analysis you 

said before there were additional details to the design; is that correct? 

A Before the design was even developed. 

 

732 Luck Tr. at 80-81. 

733 Id. (emphasis added). 

734 Shipman Tr. at 48 (witness testifying OBO’s internal “construction management team had a 55-month 

construction duration”). 

735 Id. at 81. 

736 Id. at 48. 

737 Id. at 81 (“The current duration is a 64 months, to be exact.”). 
154 

Q Before the design was even developed. 

A Right. So their design—their [OBO’s internal team] construction 

duration was based on the program. We’ve got this many square feet, 

you’re building it on this site, it should take this long. Alpha’s [the 

constructability contractor’s] analysis of the schedule was based on 

building this project, this design on that site. 

Q So now that the design has been developed, would construction

management stick to their 55 month project or would they— 

A No. They have adjusted to 64.

738

Thus, at a minimum, the design requires personnel in Beirut to remain in “deteriorating 

and dysfunctional facilities” for nearly a year longer than is necessary. More than five years of 

construction739 will be needed to replace what, in 2012 were recognized as “deteriorating and 

dysfunctional facilities.”740

 

738 Id. at 160-61 (emphases added). 

739 Id. at 135 (after construction award “then five and a half years or so of construction? A Correct”). 

740 OIG Beirut Rep. at 16. 

156 

disputes that the current U.S. Embassy in Mexico City is crowded, outdated and needs to be 

replaced.”743

The Department bought a site for the Mexico City NEC in 2011 for $120 million.744 The 

site designated for the new facility was previously a former Colgate-Palmolive (Colgate) 

toothpaste and soap factory. Because of soil contamination, however, the site was handed over 

to the Department in September 2016, and construction has not yet begun. The Department 

knew when it bought the site that it was potentially contaminated, but the Department attempted 

to minimize the risk.745 As part of the agreement between Colgate and the Department, Colgate 

was required turn over a fully remediated site.746 Further, the remediation was required to be 

certified by Semarnat, the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.747 

Despite buying the site in 2011 with a requirement of a “ready to build site” by March 2015,748

as of September 2016, the site remains a dirt lot only recently handed over to the Department. 

Colgate represented to Committee staff that the Department does not have any recourse against 

the company should any contaminants remain on the site.749

The current budget for the Mexico City NEC is $943,065,000,750 making it “one of the 

most expensive U.S. embassies in the world.”751 At that budget, the per-desk cost for the 

facility’s contemplated 1,335 desks is $706,415.752 That cost, however, appears to be a moving 

target. Construction costs have risen from $577 million to a current total of $763 million.753 

Design costs alone are more than $56 million,754 up from a “Design Cost Estimate” of $35 

million in October 2013.755 Given the five-year delay in obtaining the site after remediation, it is 

not yet clear whether there will be additional costs to the Department in the way of revised 

designs or the like. Congress has required quarterly reporting from the Department on six 

elements related to the costs of the Mexico City NEC.756

 

743 Planned new U.S. Embassy in Mexico a “fiasco,” CBS NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:57 AM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-embassy-mexico-city-fiasco/. 

744 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). 

745 Id.

746 Id.

747 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and the 

Hon. Stacey Plaskett on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 24, 2015). 

748 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). 

749 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Sept. 14, 

2016). 

750 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). 

751 Planned new U.S. Embassy in Mexico a “fiasco,” CBS NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:57 AM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-embassy-mexico-city-fiasco/. 

752 U.S. State Dep’t Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 2015). 

753 Planned new U.S. Embassy in Mexico a “fiasco,” CBS NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:57 AM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-embassy-mexico-city-fiasco/. 

754 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). 

755 Mexico City PPR, Oct. 2013 (“Design Cost Estimate: $35M”) (on file with Committee staff). 

756 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113 § 7004(e)(2)(A)-(F), 129 Stat. 2241, 2734 (2015). 
157 

The timing of the project has likewise moved. As of April 2015, the Department 

anticipated awarding the construction contract in January 2016, with completion of the facility in 

July 2020.757 Because the site was only turned over to the Department in September 2016, no 

construction contract has been awarded. It therefore stands to reason that the July 2020 

completion date is likely unachievable. 

Chairman Chaffetz visited the site in April 2015. After walking the site, and meeting 

with Department and Colgate officials, he called the project “a bit of a fiasco.”758 

Approximately 10 months after Chairman Chaffetz’ visit, the remediation team reached the 

bottom of the remaining contaminated portion.759 In July 2016, the Mexican government finally 

certified that the site is clean enough for the Department to take possession.760 Five years after 

purchasing the site, the Department has not yet begun construction. 

Only now that the Department has the site will it be able to commence construction. It is 

unclear, however, whether the nearly-two-year-old design will need to be recertified by DS. 

E. Kabul

 

757 U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 9, 

2015). When Chairman Chaffetz traveled to Mexico City to inspect the site, the Department said it was hopeful that 

it could award a construction contract in December 2015. U.S. Dep’t of State Briefing to Hon. Jason Chaffetz, 

Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, and The Hon. Stacey Plaskett on Mexico City NEC (Apr. 24, 

2015). 

758 Planned new U.S. Embassy in Mexico a “fiasco,” CBS NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:57 AM), 

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-embassy-mexico-city-fiasco/. 

759 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Feb. 12, 

2016). 

760 Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Sept. 14, 

2016); Colgate-Palmolive Briefing to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Staff on Mexico City NEC (Oct. 3, 

2016). 

159 

2015, a bombing occurred a mere 500 yards from the U.S. Embassy,

768 and in January 2016, 

there was an attack near the embassy attack that, according to press reports, targeted “U.S. 

embassy guards.”769 In November 2016, a suicide bomber attack at a U.S. military base 30 miles 

north of Kabul resulted in “[t]he U.S. Embassy . . . shut[ting] down except for emergency 

services for the first time since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.”770 The embassy is part of the 

Department’s plans to make approximately $2.17 billion in infrastructure investments in Kabul, 

some of which has been disbursed.771

To meet growing facility requirements at the embassy compound, the Department 

awarded two construction contracts, which were originally worth a total of $625.4 million.772 

The first of the two contracts was awarded to Contractor 1 in September 2009 for an original 

value of $209.4 million.773 The second contract was awarded to Contractor 2 in September 2010 

for an original value of $416 million.774 In September 2011, the Department partially terminated 

elements of the first contract and transferred contract requirements for the permanent facilities 

not begun by Contractor 1 to Contractor 2’s contract scope.775 As of March 2015, the original 

value of the construction contracts ballooned from $625.4 million to $792.9 million, a 27 percent 

increase.776 

The budget for the facility is $967,900,000, and the per-desk cost is $1.27 million per 

desk for its 1,237 desks.777 

These reported costs will likely only increase, according to the GAO. For example, 

further construction and funding costs required to address unmet post facility needs were $394.9 

million in FY2015 and $124 million in FY2016.778 Further, as-yet unquantified investments are 

planned for FY2017.779 As the GAO witness told the Committee during the July 9, 2015

hearing: “The primary message of my testimony this morning is that costs have risen and 

 

768 Sayed Salahuddin & Daniela Deane, Suicide bomber attacks NATO convoy near U.S. Embassy in Kabul, WASH.

POST (June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/despite-growing-violence-afghan-president-sayscountry-will-not-fall-apart/2015/06/30/aba0d684-1efd-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story html?hpid=z4; see also

Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 

Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Chairman Chaffetz) (detailing attacks on the NATO 

convoy, as well as an attack on the Afghan Parliament). 769 Fazul Rahim & Sarah Burke, Attack Near Kabul Airport Targets U.S. Convoy, NBC News, (Jan. 4, 2016, 12:05 

PM), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/attack-near-kabul-airport-targets-u-s-convoy-n489816. 

770 Pamela Constable, Latest Afghan attack raises perplexing questions on security, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016, 

1:59 PM), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/latest-afghan-attack-raises-perplexingquestions-on-security/2016/11/13/735dbbda-a9bb-11e6-8f19-21a1c65d2043_story.html.

771 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Chairman Chaffetz); see also GAO Kabul Rep. at 

31. 

772 GAO Kabul Rep. at 4. 

773 Id.

774 Id. 775 Id. at 5. 

776 Id. at 10. 777 Kabul NOBX/Housing PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-2016-00016-0003783). Using GAO’s construction-only cost, and 

assuming the value of those contracts have not increased in the ensuing year, the construction-only portion works 

out to approximately $533,221 per desk. 

778 GAO Kabul Rep. at 31. 

779 Id.
160 

schedules have been extended significantly for [the] two construction contracts . . . , and further 

cost increases are likely.”780 According to the GAO, “as of March 2015, the Department has 

allocated $1.11 billion to cover the 2009 and 2010 contract costs, as well as the Department’s 

project costs outside the two contracts” (i.e., facilities off the grounds of the embassy 

compound).781 

1. The Committee’s Hearing and GAO’s Investigation and Report

These significant sums of money drew the attention of this Committee782 and the GAO,783

and both the Committee and GAO found deficiencies with the Department’s risk analysis and 

planning.784 The Committee held a hearing to discuss the GAO’s report on the Department’s 

practices in building the Kabul facility and other facilities around the world.785 The Committee’s 

hearing identified the following issues with the Department’s performance in Kabul:

 The Department failed to follow applicable value engineering and risk management 

practices;786

 The Kabul NEC is currently slated to cost 27 percent more than originally planned;787

 

780 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office). 

781 GAO Kabul Rep. at 10. 

782 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

783 GAO Kabul Rep. at 1.

784 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (statement of Chairman Chaffetz) (“The lack of planning by the State 

Department resulted in cost overruns and delays. Construction is now projected to come in at least 27 percent over 

budget and more than 3 years behind schedule.”); see also id. (opening statement of Ranking Member Cummings) 

(“State did not fully follow its cost and risk policies in part of the urgency of the Embassy’s facility needs, the 

security environment, and challenges supporting the surge and Embassy staffing that was occurring. Despite this 

urgency, however, GAO also found that the State Department could have and should have planned better. Could 

have and should have, but didn’t. According to GAO, the State Department contributed to construction delays and 

cost increases by failing to follow its own risk assessment and planning policies. There’s something awfully wrong 

with that picture.”). 

785 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

786 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office) (“State didn’t follow its own cost containment and risk assessment policies for those contracts, resulting in 

lost opportunities to mitigate risks.”); see also id. (Director Muniz) (“Ms. Muniz. . . . We’re [OBO] the ones 

responsible for conducting the value engineering studies. And as I mentioned in my testimony, we conduct those, 

they’re valuable. We did not conduct it in the 2009 project” in Kabul. Mr. Carter. But you agree they are valuable? 

Ms. Muniz. Yes, absolutely.”) (emphasis added). 

787 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office) (“My first point is that costs for the two construction contracts have increased by about 27 percent from 

about $625 million to almost $793 million.”). 
161 

 The original completion date estimates for the Kabul NEC are off by at least two 

years and most are off by more than three years;788

 OBO did not follow the Department’s “cost containment” and “risk assessment” 

policies in constructing the Kabul NEC;789

 The Department should have conducted four cost containment studies and six risk 

assessments.790 The Department instead completed one study that combined a cost 

containment and risk assessment;791 and 

 Despite having a policy in place at the time792 requiring a strategic facilities plan for 

facilities construction, the Department has not completed one since 2008.793 This 

failure led to some of the cost overruns and delays with the Kabul embassy 

construction project. 

a. Failure to Complete Required Cost Containment and Risk

Assessments Led to Higher Costs

The Department’s failure to complete required cost containment studies and risk 

assessments cost the government more than $100 million. As the GAO witness told the 

Committee: 

My first point is that costs for the two construction contracts have 

increased by about 27 percent from about $625 million to almost $793 

 

788 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office) (“The projected completion of these projects has been delayed by over 3 years and is now slated for the fall 

of 2017.”). 

789 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office) (“State didn’t follow its own cost containment and risk assessment policies for those contracts, resulting in 

lost opportunities to mitigate risks.”). 

790 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (“Chairman Chaffetz. To clarify, page 16 of the GAO report says, 

between the 2009 contract and the 2010 contract, State should have conducted four cost containment studies and six 

risk assessments. However, for the 2009 contract, State confirmed it did not conduct either types of assessment.”). 

791 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office) (testifying the Department “did do a risk assessment and cost containment study for the 2010 contract,” but 

not the 2009 contract). 

792 The Department rescinded this policy in 2013. 

793 GAO Kabul Rep. at 39-40 (“State documentation shows that between 2004 and 2008, OBO prepared 16 longrange facilities plans (strategic facility plans) for selected posts with challenging real property issues. In 2008, 

OBO’s then director also reported to State’s Undersecretary for Management that long-range facilities plans were 

essential precursors to the development of individual projects. However, OBO produced no long-range facilities 

plans after 2008.”). 
162 

million. The projected completion of these projects has been delayed by 

over 3 years and is now slated for the fall of 2017.794 

Office of Management and Budget policy requires federal agencies to use value 

engineering (also known as “cost containment”) in its projects.795 The Department generally 

implements this policy by requiring OBO to conduct two cost containment studies for each 

project costing more than $20 million: one study during the planning stage and one study no 

later than the completion of the design review.796

With respect to the Kabul NEC, the Department completed only one required cost 

containment study for the 2010 contract and combined it with a risk assessment.797 The 

Department “didn’t follow its own cost containment and risk assessment policies for those 

contracts, resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks,”798 both in time and money. As the 

GAO’s witness highlighted at the Committee’s hearing, because Kabul is such a challenging 

environment, conducting cost containment studies and rise assessments are even more important. 

The witness stated: 

Sure. Well, I would just first acknowledge that Kabul is indeed a very 

challenging environment. And there is no way to completely eliminate all 

risk, especially in a place like Afghanistan, and that is precisely why 

adequate cost containment and risk assessment is so important in a place 

like that, where the impact of the cost and schedule is so much greater when 

problems are encountered. 

And I think if State had followed its own policies earlier, for example, as 

part of the 2009 contract, it probably could have better managed risk. It 

may not have eliminated all of the risk, but it may have better managed 

some of it. And if they had done that earlier, it would at least have given 

State a chance to develop mitigation strategies prior to soliciting the 2010 

contract.799 

 

794 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office). 

795 GAO Kabul Rep. at 15; Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. 

Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, GAO) (“Mr. Carter. . . . 

Mr. Courts, I will start with you. In planning projects such as this on this scale, are value engineering studies 

important? Mr. Courts. Yes, they are. That is a very well established practice that both the Federal Government 

and the private sector have used for decades to reduce costs while still maintaining the quality in the performance of 

a project, and especially one of this size. It is also required by both OMB and by OBO itself.”). 

796 GAO Kabul Rep. at 15. 

797 Id. at 16. 

798 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office). 

799 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability Office, in response to 

question from Chairman Chaffetz). 
163 

At the hearing, Director Muniz “rejected the notion that more thorough assessments 

would have had a material impact on the Kabul Embassy project,” and “[i]nstead . . . argue[d] 

that they would have risked further delaying delivery of permanent facilities.”800 The 

Department took the position that the evolving conditions in Afghanistan were solely to blame 

for the cost and schedule overruns.801 While Director Muniz testified that “[i]t [was] unrealistic 

to expect the development of a static master plan capturing all requirements at the beginning of 

an 8 year project, as GAO advised,” GAO’s report criticized the Department for failing to 

conduct the cost containment studies and risk assessment even at appropriate intervals, when the 

Department could take into account evolving conditions. 

GAO’s representative testified that, when the Department did its cost containment/risk 

assessment hybrid—even though it was not done as frequently as it should have been nor were 

they separate documents as required—the Department “did identify a number of risks, some of 

which did indeed come to pass.”802 “So there were a number of things that were not 

unpredictable,” he continued, the Department “actually did predict those problems.”803 The 

Department did its study in 2010, but had it done one in 2009, “perhaps they would have had 

more time to try to develop some mitigation strategies” to those risks that came to pass.804 

At the Committee’s July 9, 2015 hearing, Rep. Steve Russell focused on the 

Department’s contention that master planning would not have worked. He stated: 

In fact, the GAO and the [O]IG agree, there’s not been this strategic master 

plan. And then we hear from Ms. Muniz, you said we can’t develop such a 

plan. My reply to that is, nonsense. Develop the plan and then adjust it. 

We do that all the time at State. We do it in the military. We do it in 

Congress even. I know that’s shocking to some people that we actually 

plan.

805

According to Department documents provided to GAO, the Department had originally 

planned to complete the entire Kabul construction project by summer 2014. The Department 

 

800 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

801 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas 

Buildings Operations, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

802 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability Office, in response to 

question from Chairman Chaffetz). 

803 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability Office, in response to 

question from Chairman Chaffetz). 

804 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability Office, in response to 

question from Chairman Chaffetz). 

805 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability Office, in response to 

question from Rep. Russell) (emphasis added). 
164 

estimated in May 2015 that the Kabul embassy project would be complete by no earlier than fall 

2017.806

GAO’s report contains the following chart detailing construction schedules for the Kabul 

NEC: 

With the increase in the value of construction contracts on the order of 27 percent, and 

the more-than-two-year delay, the Kabul facility is comparable to the increased construction 

costs for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. During the Committee’s July 2014 hearing on embassy 

construction, Ranking Member Cummings remarked that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad “was 

delayed 16 months and the cost to the United States taxpayer was $144 million more than 

originally projected.”807 The Kabul embassy project’s $167.5 million construction-only cost 

increase exceeds even Baghdad in construction cost overruns. As Chairman Chaffetz asked at 

the Committee’s hearing, “did we learn what we were supposed to learn when we were in Iraq? 

Evidently not.”808 

GAO made three related recommendations: (1) the Department adhere to its cost 

containment and risk assessment policies;809 (2) the Department develop a strategic facilities plan 

for Kabul;810 and (3) the Department clarify its strategic facilities and master planning policy.811 

The Department accepted all three of these recommendations.812

 

806 GAO Kabul Rep. at 12. 

807 Examining New Embassy Construction: Are New Administration Policies Putting Americans Overseas in 

Danger?, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (July 10, 2014). 

808 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Chairman Chaffetz). 

809 GAO Kabul Rep. at 42. 

810 Id.

811 Id.

812 Id.
165 

b. The Department’s Long‐Term Use of Temporary Facilities in Kabul

GAO made another recommendation that the Department also rejected, to “[c]onsider 

establishing minimum security standards or other guidance for the construction of temporary 

structures, especially those used in conflict environments.”813

Notwithstanding the significant security challenges in Kabul, the Department continues 

to house Kabul-based personnel in temporary facilities.814 At the time of an OIG inspection, 

“[a]pproximately 70 percent of the 800 U.S. Government employees and contract workers living 

on the U.S. compound were housed in temporary containerized housing units.”815 The 

Department has spent “over $100 million in temporary buildings to meet space needs” in Kabul, 

“but it has no security standards that are specifically tailored to these types of facilities.”816

“Temporary facilities” are described in OBO’s 2009 guidance as facilities that will be 

occupied for no more than five years “or until a permanent building is constructed, whichever is 

sooner.”817 The Department recognized the risks related to temporary facilities in its 2008 and 

2009 Supplemental Appropriations Justifications, including, as GAO found, “threats posed to 

temporary facilities from potential incoming weapons fire—amid increasing attacks around 

Kabul by the Taliban and al-Qaeda—and indicated that overhead protection was required to 

protect staff in the existing temporary facilities on-compound.”818

 The Department’s own standards in 2009 recognized that personnel should live and work 

in permanent, hardened facilities.819 DS reported, however, that the Department does not have a 

minimum set of security standards for temporary facilities it constructs.820 As GAO reported: 

“For practical purposes, DS officials stated that State’s physical security standards governing 

new construction—regardless of whether a facility is permanent or temporary—are standards 

that only permanent construction can meet.”821 If a certain facility does not meet the standards, 

the Department issue a waiver and propose mitigating solutions.822

 In the absence of consistent security standards or other guidance, the Department has 

inconsistently applied security measures to temporary facilities.823 As a result, there are 

 

813 Id.

814 Id. at 25. 

815 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Donald Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector 

General, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

816 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t Accountability 

Office). 

817 GAO Kabul Rep. at 20. 

818 Id. at 25. 

819 Id. 820 Id. at 26. 

821 Id.

822 Id.

823 Id. at 27. 
166 

ineffective levels of security.824 Correcting security disparities in temporary facilities has 

increased costs and extended the construction schedule.825

 The Department’s use of temporary facilities is expected to continue indefinitely.826 DS 

Assistant Secretary Starr testified to the Committee: 

We have not set an end-date for the use of temporary structures at Embassy 

Kabul. The use of these structures is dependent upon staffing levels at the 

embassy which are, in turn, dependent upon the evolving political and 

security situations on the ground, and as such have not been finally 

determined.827 

As a result, the Department plans to invest an additional $124 million in temporary facilities in 

Kabul.828

 Estimates as of May 2015 indicate that temporary facilities will likely constitute over a 

third of the available desks and beds at the compound, even after construction is completed.829 

The Department has taken some actions to improve temporary facilities, including assisting the 

Army in developing hardened trailers to provide ballistic protection.830 These hardened 

temporary facilities “provide[] an improved level of physical security protection, although not 

the level required for a conflict location such as Kabul, where rockets and mortars pose 

threats.”831

 DS and OBO had failed to communicate effectively regarding the use of temporary 

facilities in Kabul.832 The Department’s OIG noted, during its inspection of the Kabul facility, 

there was “considerable friction between DS and OBO” over these issues.833 The OIG identified 

the “the apparent inability of DS and OBO to work together to find immediate solutions to these 

and other security issues in Kabul.”834 In response, the OIG recommended that OBO work with 

DS and the post in Kabul “to develop and execute a master plan of all ongoing and planned 

 

824 Id.

825 Id.; see also Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on 

Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t 

Accountability Office) (“State subsequently took corrective action that increased cost and extended schedules. State 

likely paid more than it would have had the security requirements been included in the original contract.”).

826 GAO Kabul Rep. at 20. 

827 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary Gregory Starr by Rep. Jason Chaffetz, 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform July 9, 2015, Resp. No. 2 (Aug. 4, 2015). 

828 GAO Kabul Rep. at 24 & n.36 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Budget Justification). 

829 Id. at 23. 

830 Id. at 30. 

831 Id.

832 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Donald Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector 

General, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

833 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Donald Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector 

General, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

834 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Donald Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector 

General, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
167 

projects.”835 More than a year after the Committee’s hearing at which this was discussed, the 

Department closed this recommendation by providing “OIG with a summary of its master plan of 

ongoing and planned projects for Embassy Kabul, to include those funded by DS, for Embassy 

Kabul for FY 2016, FY 2017 and out years.”836 

Because of DS’s and OBO’s inability to communicate effectively, personnel in Kabul 

faced inconsistent protection between their homes and offices.837 When the Department awarded 

the contract to Contractor 1 in 2009, the Department “did not specify that overhead protection 

was required for either the temporary housing or temporary offices.”838 This was true, “even 

though State had previously expressed to Congress concerns about the threat posed from 

incoming weapons fire in its fiscal year 2008 justification.”839 In fact, “[t]he only security 

protection measure specified in the 2009 contract for the temporary housing was shatter-resistant 

window film.”840 Temporary offices, however, received forced-entry and ballistic resistant 

windows.841

 Apart from the safety concerns, DS’s and OBO’s failure to finalize security measures 

before awarding the 2009 contract with respect to temporary facilities “contribut[ed] to cost 

increases and schedule extensions.”842 After the award of the 2009 contract, the Department’s 

failures required contract modifications “to address the insufficient and different security 

requirements for the temporary housing and offices, which added cost and extended the project 

schedule to address this disparity.”843

 GAO concluded the Department “likely paid more than it would have had the security 

requirements been included in the original contract requirements.”844 The Department also did 

not accept GAO’s recommendation that the Department establish security standards for 

temporary facilities,845 notwithstanding “[s]everal DS and OBO officials reported that State 

 

835 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Donald Hays, Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector 

General, U.S. Dep’t of State). 

836 Email from Director of Congressional Affairs, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State, to Majority 

Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Sept. 15, 2016, 8:35 AM) (on file with Committee staff). 

837 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015); see also GAO Kabul Rep. at 27 (“DS officials we spoke with indicated 

that staff living on-compound should receive the same level of protection in their housing as in their offices.”). 

838 GAO Kabul Rep. at 27. 

839 Id.; see also Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on 

Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015) (opening statement of Michael J. Courts, Director, Gov’t 

Accountability Office) (“I would also note that in 2008 the State Department notified the Congress that they needed 

additional funds because the threat in Kabul required overhead cover for their temporary facilities. But in 2009 they 

contracted for temporary buildings that did not specify the need for overhead cover.”). 

840 GAO Kabul Rep. at 27. 

841 Id.

842 Id.

843 Id.

844 Id.

845 Id. at 50 (Appendix II, State’s response to GAO’s draft report). 
168 

needs documented minimal security standards for temporary facilities in a conflict 

environment.”846 

2. Electrical Current Problems at the Embassy Put Personnel at Risk

Even while in the process of spending more than $800 million on two buildings—the 

New Office Annex and Staff Diplomatic Apartments—OBO could not ensure that the electrical 

current at those facilities was properly adjusted.847 An April 2016 report by the Department’s 

Inspector General “identified life, health, and safety risks to building occupants due to a type of 

hazardous electrical current—known as objectionable current—in both the office and apartment 

building.”848

OIG observed that, at the compound, “multiple sources of objectionable current were 

identified throughout” the buildings,849 likely caused by “improperly installed wiring.”850 

“Objectionable current,” the OIG recognized, “can cause electrical shock, fires, interference with 

communications equipment, and damage to electrical appliances.”851

Like the Committee, the “OIG is . . . concerned with the safety and security of personnel 

living and working at the embassy and believes that it is paramount that the embassy takes 

actions to address the concerns.”852

Although OBO concurred that it should take immediate action,853 it did not concur with 

the OIG’s recommendation that OBO “determine what mitigation measures can be immediately 

taken to eliminate or reduce risk to personnel occupying the buildings.”854 OBO’s objection was 

based on its view, that the objectionable current was not hazardous because it was not in 

occupied areas and was limited to locked and restricted mechanical rooms.855

OBO agreed “that workers in the restricted electrical and mechanical rooms face a 

potential hazard,” and posted signs alerting personnel to the danger rather than fixing the 

acknowledged problem.856 OIG considers this recommendation unresolved.857

 

846 Id.

847 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Management Alert: Hazardous Electrical 

Current in Office and Residential Buildings Presents Life, Health, and Safety Risks at U.S. Embassy Kabul, 

Afghanistan (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter OIG Kabul Mgmt. Alert], available at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/ma-16-

01.pdf. 

848 OIG Kabul Mgmt. Alert at 1. Objectionable current “is electrical current occurring on the grounding wiring of a 

building” that “is often caused by improperly installed electrical wiring, equipment, and faulty electrical 

appliances.” Id. at 3. 

849 Id. at 3. 

850 Id.

851 Id.

852 Id. at 5. 

853 Id.

854 Id. at 6. 

855 Id. at 6, 13. 

856 Id. at 6. 

857 Id. at 7; see also Email from Director of Congressional Affairs, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

State, to Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Sept. 16, 2016, 9:26 AM) (on file with 

170 

Cameras at posts, however, are DS’s responsibility.864 During the Committee’s hearing 

on the London NEC, Assistant Secretary Starr testified that “[a]ll of our cameras have night 

vision capabilities.” Chairman Chaffetz immediately said “[t]hat is absolutely not true,” and 

“[t]his is the problem with you in this position. You cannot tell me that there is night vision 

capability at each of our embassies and consulates.”865 Assistant Secretary Starr and Chairman 

Chaffetz engaged in an extended colloquy on the issue. Assistant Secretary Starr testified: 

Mr. Starr. Sir, all of our cameras, even our lowest and oldest 

cameras, have enhanced resolution. 

Chairman Chaffetz. Do they have a night vision capability? 

Mr. Starr. They are capable of seeing what is going on in the

compound at night, sir. 

Chairman Chaffetz. In the dark? 

Mr. Starr. If—if—we lose all power and if we lose all 

generators, there are certain posts that will not be 

able to do that. But we have low light capability, and 

we’ve had that since the early ‘90s. 

Chairman Chaffetz. You are misrepresenting the facts, Mr. Starr. 

Mr. Starr. Sir, we have low light capability cameras, and we 

have engaged, since Benghazi, in an upgrade 

program starting with all of our— 

Chairman Chaffetz. It’s not complete. You’ve wanted us to believe, if I 

didn’t question you, that every one of our posts can 

see at night. They can’t. 

Mr. Starr. Sir— 

Chairman Chaffetz. And you don’t understand that. You are the assistant 

secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and you 

don’t know that our people can’t see at night. 

Mr. Starr. Our marines and our agents can see at night.866

 

864 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (“Chairman Chaffetz. Wait a second. Now, there’s individual goggles. Mr. Starr. Right. 

Chairman Chaffetz. But then there are cameras. Mr. Starr. Right, which is ours. All of our cameras have night 

vision capabilities.”). 

865 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015). 

866 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015). 
171 

In a transcribed interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures Ashbery 

agreed with Assistant Secretary Starr’s testimony,867 and Ashbery testified the Department uses 

“a variety of different cameras, depending on the environment and the threat levels. The most 

common camera that we use is a commercially available relatively standard camera that has 

very, very good low light capability and high resolution.”868 He also explained the difference 

between low-light cameras and infrared cameras: 

Q And what’s the functional difference between the low light and infrared 

camera? 

A I was going to say a low light camera will work when there is minimal 

light, like starlight or moonlight. An infrared camera will work when 

there is zero light. It works off the heat signature.869

 Deputy Assistant Secretary Ashbery testified that low-light cameras are sufficient for most 

Department facilities abroad. He testified: 

Q And is a low light camera— are low light cameras sufficient for most 

embassies or under what circumstances would an embassy require an 

infrared camera? 

A Low light cameras are absolutely sufficient for most of our usage, first 

and foremost because in addition to the camera systems, our embassies 

are required to have extensive lighting systems to allow the guards and 

security personnel to visually see what’s occurring. Those cameras will 

also work down to— if there’s sufficient light to see to walk, those 

cameras have good visibility. 

There are situations that occur where we feel we need to expand beyond 

that, either because of something within our vicinity or adjacent to our 

facility, where there is no lighting capability, there is no ambient 

lighting, or because there’s a particular scenario that we are 

uncomfortable with. In some locations we also need extended range to 

where we may need to see great distances, in which case we may utilize 

a different camera technology.870 

When asked whether “there are night vision cameras at every U.S. embassy,” like 

Assistant Secretary Starr, Ashbery testified “there are low light-capable cameras. There are 

cameras that are able to provide situational awareness during hours of darkness at all U.S. 

 

867 Ashbery Tr. at 68 (“Q So in this excerpt of Assistant Secretary Starr’s hearing testimony, did you read anything 

that you found to be inaccurate in his testimony? A No, I did not.”). 

868 Id. at 62. 

869 Id. at 63. 

870 Id.
172 

embassies.”871 He also testified he believes “there [are] adequate cameras to see at night across 

all U.S. embassies.”872

Chairman Chaffetz is not the only member of the Committee to express concerns about 

cameras at U.S. facilities worldwide. During the Committee’s hearing into problems with 

construction of the embassy in Kabul, Rep. John Mica noted he toured a number of facilities 

after the Benghazi attack “trying to avoid another Benghazi.”873 In that review, “one of the 

simple things we found was the lack of surveillance cameras and their ability to also have high 

definition and get those replaced” that do not.874 During his visit to “one of our major posts in 

Western Europe, [he] found that one of the facilities did not have those surveillance cameras.”875 

Congressman Mica asked one of the people at post about the lack of cameras and was told it was 

not resources, but rather “it was the bureaucratic acquisition process.”876

Assistant Secretary Starr’s testimony is not consistent with the Committee’s findings in 

the field. As Chairman Chaffetz stated: “I walk into every embassy I go into now and ask them 

if I can see at night. One of the most recent embassies I walked into, they said, ‘Well, if the 

lights are on.’ . . . I said, ‘Well, what happens if it’s dark, what happens if they shoot out the 

lights?’ ‘No, then we couldn’t see a thing. We’d be in the pitch dark.’”877

After this testimony and during a visit to a facility abroad, Chairman Chaffetz asked an 

agent in the field whether he could see in the dark, and the officer replied that, although the 

camera had “low light capability,” it was not able to see in the dark. 

United States embassies are targets anywhere in the world, even in countries viewed as 

safe.878 Our security personnel at these facilities should have the ability to see clearly at night. 

 

871 Id. at 64. 

872 Id.

873 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

874 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

875 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

876 Construction Costs and Delays at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & 

Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (July 9, 2015). 

877 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015). 

878 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and 

Personnel 1998-2013 at 13, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225846.pdf (listing attacks in 

London and Macedonia, for example). 

174 

 Tegucigalpa, Honduras NEC: $1,614,000.888 Honduras has a 2015 estimated per 

capita GDP of $5,100;889

 Nuevo Laredo, Mexico NCC: $515,919.890 Mexico has a 2015 estimated per capita 

GDP of $18,400;891

 Jakarta, Indonesia NEC: $1,363,000.892 Indonesia has a 2015 estimated per capita 

GDP of $11,100;893 

 Beirut, Lebanon NEC: $2,704,000.894 Lebanon has a 2015 estimated per capita GDP 

of $18,200;895 and 

 Islamabad, Pakistan NEC: $2,901,000.896 Pakistan has a 2015 estimated per capita 

GDP of $4,900.897

In order to better protect taxpayers, the Department should be required to rely on loaned 

or donated art, and Department’s budget for art—limited to insurance and transportation costs—

should be subject to a cap, rather than an arbitrary portion of the construction contract. 

OBO, AS STRUCTURED, IS NOT POSITIONED FOR SUCCESS

OBO plays a large and critical role within the Department. It is “the single real property 

manager for all U.S. Government diplomatic properties overseas.”898 In this role, “OBO 

manages the design, construction, acquisition, sale, and maintenance of the Department’s 

worldwide property portfolio.”899 Further, that “portfolio includes the property platform 

 

888 Tegucigalpa NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003144) (showing “Art” budget of $1,614,000). 

889 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, Central America & Caribbean: Honduras (last visited Dec. 

2, 2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html. 

890 Nuevo Laredo NCC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003071) (showing “Art” budget of $2,901,000). 

891 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, North America: Mexico (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx html. 

892 Jakarta NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0002912) (showing “Art” budget of $1,363,000). 

893 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, East & Southeast Asia: Indonesia (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id html. 

894 Beirut NEC PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003035) (showing “Art” budget of $2,704,000). 

895 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, Middle East: Lebanon (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html. 

896 Islamabad NEC and Housing PPR, Apr. 2016 (CDP-201500016-0003071) (showing “Art” budget of 

$2,901,000). 

897 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, South Asia: Pakistan (last visited Dec. 2, 2016), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html. 

898 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

899 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 
175 

supporting 275 missions in 190 countries and has over $14 billion in projects in design and 

construction.”900

Despite this responsibility, OBO appears to have taken an ad hoc approach to 

management. When the Department’s OIG found OBO had prematurely made certifications to 

Congress about the safety of the London NEC and begun construction before required blasttesting had been completed, OBO instead argued whether it had actually started 

“construction.”901 The OIG pointed to federal law and the FAM to demonstrate that OBO may 

not even award a contract—let alone begin construction—before certification.902 

 

900 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (opening statement of Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, U.S. 

Dep’t of State). 

901 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (“Chairman Chaffetz. Why did you start construction prior to the DS certification? 

Ms. Muniz. I would argue that we did not start construction. I would argue that we awarded a construction contract 

as the Department has done since— . . . for the last 10 years.”). 

902 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Construction Contract Award and Security 

Evaluation of the New Embassy Compound London at 6 (July 2015) (noting OBO’s practice “does not comply with 

12 FAM 361.1, which states that ‘no contract should be awarded or construction undertaken until the proponent of a 

project has been notified by the Department that the appropriate certification action has been completed,’ or 12 

FAM 361.3, which states that ‘[t]he chief of mission is responsible for ensuring that no project subject to . . . 

certification . . . is initiated without certification. . . approval.”), available at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/audcgi-15-31.pdf. 
176 

OBO, by contrast, pointed to a draft, unpublished 2003 memorandum between OBO and 

DS to support its position that it had not violated the law and policy.903 

In response to Committee questions, Director Muniz was unable to say clearly whether 

the FAM is binding. Her response states, in relevant part, that the FAM is “the published policy 

of the Department of State,” and “[a]lthough some sections of the FAM restate or incorporate 

binding obligations that are contained in statutes, regulations, or Executive Orders, others are 

policy statements intended to explain the purpose of and authority for a particular program.”904 

Her response appears to contrast with the Department’s own pronouncement that the FAM’s 

provisions “govern the operations of the State Department.”905 OBO’s reliance on an 

unpublished draft memorandum from 2003 to commence work on the London NEC, as opposed 

to the published FAM, flies in the face of this clear pronouncement. 

The Department’s webpage dedicated to the FAM and the Foreign Affairs Handbooks

describes those documents’ role. It states: 

The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and associated Handbooks (FAHs) are 

a single, comprehensive, and authoritative source for the Department’s 

organization structures, policies, and procedures that govern the 

operations of the State Department, the Foreign Service and, when 

applicable, other federal agencies. The FAM (generally policy) and the 

FAHs (generally procedures) together convey codified information to 

Department staff and contractors so they can carry out their responsibilities 

in accordance with statutory, executive and Department mandates.

906

In fact, OBO’s current structure flouts the requirements of the FAM. OBO was elevated 

to a formal bureau in the early 2000s, which yielded benefits to the projects. As the GAO 

recognized: 

The elevation of the former Office of Foreign Buildings Operations to the 

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations was one of the most important 

 

903 Review of the New London Embassy Project, Hearing before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015) (statement of Inspector General Linick) (“Notwithstanding this policy, since at least 2003 the 

Department has followed the practice of authorizing construction contractors to begin work prior to certification. In 

the case of the London compound, the contract award, site work, and construction began many months before the 

Department certified the project to Congress in December of 2013 as providing adequate security protection.”). 

904 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Director Lydia Muniz by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (1-16) 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform December 08, 2015, Resp. No. 14 (Jan. 14, 2016) (emphasis added). 

Director Muniz’ response provides in full: 

The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) is, as noted in the Office of Inspector General’s “Audit of the 

Construction Contract Award and Security Evaluation of the New Embassy Compound London,” the 

published policy of the Department of State. Although some sections of the FAM restate or 

incorporate binding obligations that are contained in statutes, regulations, or Executive Orders, others 

are policy statements intended to explain the purpose of and authority for a particular program. 

905 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual and Handbook, https://fam.state.gov/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2016) 

(emphasis added). 

906 Id. (emphasis added). 
177 

reforms made by [the Department] related to reducing project cycle times 

and limiting cost increases. Elevation to bureau status allowed OBO to 

become the equal of the regional bureaus, and resulted in OBO and the 

regional bureaus and overseas posts having more of a traditional clientservice provider type relationship.907

That coequal status—at least back in 2006—led OBO to “enforce a more disciplined 

process that discourages change orders that result in delays and cost increases.”908 In 

contrast to today’s OBO, the bureau operating the SED program “consider[ed] project 

budgets to be locked once project funds are requested from Congress, and OBO w[ould] 

not request additional funds from Congress for those projects.”909

To better control costs for construction of new facilities and maintenance of existing 

facilities, the FAM requires that OBO’s Director “[d]evelop a Long-Range Overseas Buildings 

Plan and Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan.” 910 OBO last published a Long-Range 

Overseas Buildings Plan and Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan in 2013.911 While a new 

plan is purportedly “under review,” there is no reported estimated release date for that 

document.912 In the more than four years that she has served as OBO Director, Muniz instead 

has failed to formally report planning for new facilities, as required by the FAM. Producing 

plans would aid the Department in appropriately allocating resources for new facilities and 

rehabilitation of existing facilities, as well as allow Congress to better track OBO’s contemplated 

expenditures. The issues with respect to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, discussed above, highlight 

the pitfalls the Department faces when it fails to plan in a methodical way. Even if Congress 

does not pass legislation reinforcing the notion that the FAM is binding upon the Department, it 

should pass legislation that the Department produce a Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan and 

Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan annually. That way, Congress would have greater 

visibility into the Department’s planning and spending. 

CONCLUSION

 The Committee and the Department share the goal of ensuring our men and women 

serving abroad work in secure and functional buildings. At the same time, the Department 

should ensure that taxpayers are not being asked to pay significant sums of money in the name of 

high-end architecture. As the documents and testimony in this investigation show, the 

Department’s desire to construct purpose-built facilities everywhere in the world—often 

designed by top-flight and expensive architects—takes more time to design and construct than in 

years past. This added time comes at the expense of our diplomats serving in often dangerous 

places. 

 

907 GAO SED Rep. at 19. 

908 Id.

909 Id.

910 1 FAM 281.1(11). 

911 Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Director Lydia Muniz by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (1-16) 

H. Comm. Oversight and Government Reform December 08, 2015, Resp. No. 15 (Jan. 14, 2016). 

912 Id.