Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DONALD E.C. LEICHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CHARLES THOMPSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 34A05-1211-CR-578

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Brant Parry, Judge

Cause No. 34D02-1207-FA-165

February 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge
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Case Summary and Issues

Charles Thompson appeals his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine as a 

Class A felony, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance as Class D 

felonies. Thompson raises two issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred in 

entering judgment of conviction on the charge of dealing in methamphetamine; and 2) 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence. Concluding 

that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

In April 2011 Officer Chad VanCamp with the Kokomo Police Department Drug 

Task Force went to Thompson’s residence to serve an arrest warrant for Thompson. 

Officer VanCamp saw a woman, Holly Patton, in Thompson’s driveway and asked her if 

Jim Smith was inside the house. She answered that he and Thompson were inside, and 

she went into the house, opening the front door just wide enough to squeeze through. 

When the door opened, Officer VanCamp detected a strong odor that he associated with 

the manufacturing of methamphetamine, having previously investigated more than one 

hundred methamphetamine labs. When Patton, Thompson, and Smith exited the house, 

VanCamp arrested all three of them. 

As Patton, Thompson, and Smith were exiting the house, Detective Shane Melton 

arrived on the scene and also noticed odors that he associated with methamphetamine 

labs. Detective Melton then requested and obtained a search warrant. Execution of the 

warrant revealed methamphetamine, an oxycodone pill, and an unopened fentanyl patch, 

inside a box stuffed into Thompson’s couch.
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The State charged Thompson with count I, dealing in methamphetamine as a Class 

A felony; count II, possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) as a Class D felony; 

and count III, possession of a controlled substance (oxycodone) as a Class D felony. The 

State subsequently filed an information for count IA, possession of methamphetamine as 

a Class C felony. Thompson was found guilty of all counts following a jury trial, and 

judgment of conviction was entered on all four charges. At sentencing, the court merged 

count IA into count I and sentenced Thompson to forty years with thirty-five years 

executed on count I, and three years executed for each of counts II and III, with all 

sentences to be run concurrently. This appeal followed. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Judgment of Conviction

Thompson first argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment of conviction 

on count I because the State had filed an information for count IA, which Thompson 

contends should have replaced count I. Thompson concedes that possession of 

methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of dealing in methamphetamine but argues 

that because the second information is titled as an “amended” information, it was 

intended to replace count I. However, nowhere in the chronological case summary or on 

the information itself do we see the word “amended.” Thompson does not argue that the 

later information was intended to entirely replace the original information and all three 

counts therein, but rather that it was intended to replace only count I.

The record, however, indicates that count IA was always treated as an additional 

charge. The court instructed the jury on each of the four counts (I, IA, II, III), and that 

Thompson was charged with four crimes. The jury also received guilty/not guilty forms 
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for each of the four charges. Thompson admits that he did not object when the court

treated the second information as an addition to—rather than a replacement of—the 

original count I. The failure to raise an issue at trial waives the issue on appeal. Wilson 

v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. 

While perhaps the more clear practice would have been for the State to file the 

second information as count IV rather than count IA, we see no indication in the 

information itself or in the behavior of either party at trial that indicates the second 

information was intended as anything but an addition to the original information. Rather, 

it seems that count IA was intended and treated as being an additional, fourth charge 

against Thompson—a lesser included offense of the dealing charge. The State notes that 

this is a common backup charging plan such that if the jury failed to find that Thompson 

had necessary mens rea to support a dealing charge, it could still find Thompson guilty of 

possessing the methamphetamine found at his house. The trial court did not err in 

entering judgment of conviction for Thompson on the dealing in methamphetamine 

charge.

II. Admission of Evidence 

A. Arrest Warrant

Thompson also argues that the arrest warrant was improper because it was not 

supported by probable cause. Thompson argues that therefore everything stemming from 

the arrest warrant—including the subsequent search warrant and fruits of that search—is 

inadmissible.

A valid arrest warrant must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. “Probable cause turns on a ‘practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
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circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability’ that the subject has 

committed a crime or evidence of a crime will be found.” Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 

719, 723 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). To establish 

probable cause, an affidavit in support of the warrant must do more than state the 

conclusion of the affiant, and a neutral and detached magistrate must draw his or her own 

conclusion as to whether probable cause exists. Id. A reviewing court gives substantial 

deference to the magistrate’s decision and must focus on whether reasonable inferences 

drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable cause. Id. 

In reviewing the execution of an arrest warrant, the focus is on a reasonable belief as to 

the residence and presence of the subject. Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ind. 2010). 

“Similarly, the reasonableness of an entry into a home to execute an arrest warrant 

requires a reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant, a reasonable belief that the 

residence is that of the suspect, and a reasonable belief that the suspect will be found in 

the home.” Id. 

The original arrest warrant was for dealing in methamphetamine, robbery, and 

intimidation. Two items were offered in support of the arrest warrant: a probable cause 

affidavit from December 2010, affirmed under penalty of perjury and signed by Detective 

Melton; and a police department supplementary report from April 2011, also signed by 

Detective Melton, but not affirmed under oath. 

The affidavit recounts a controlled buy in which a confidential informant met with 

Thompson at Thompson’s residence and exchanged money for a white powder 

represented to be methamphetamine. Shortly after the buy, the informant turned the 

powder over to Detective Melton, who field tested it for methamphetamine and found it 
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to be positive. Detective Melton notes that the informant was searched both shortly 

before and shortly after the transaction, and his vehicle was searched as well. No illegal 

drugs or contraband were found during the searches. Detective Melton also stated that he 

and/or fellow detectives maintained audio and/or visual surveillance on the informant 

while the informant was meeting with Thompson. 

The supplementary report recounts an attempted second controlled buy between 

the same confidential informant and Thompson. The informant was again searched prior 

to the buy, with no illegal drugs or contraband found. The informant was set up with 

surveillance equipment and went to Thompson’s house. Once inside Thompson’s house, 

the informant was confronted by Thompson and was beaten, kicked, and bitten by 

Thompson and a second person. At some point during the altercation, the money that the 

informant had brought for the buy was taken from him. Thompson threatened the 

informant by saying, “Do you want me to put a bullet in your head?” Defendant’s 

Exhibit A. The informant was able to exit the residence, and Detective Melton took 

photographs of his injuries. Detective Melton noted that the informant’s face was 

swollen and one eye was beginning to turn black, and the informant reported that he was 

in pain. The report also notes that the informant indicated that he was afraid he was 

going to die during the attack. 

We conclude that there was a sufficient basis presented from which a magistrate 

could make reasonable inferences supporting a determination that there was probable 

cause to believe that Thompson had committed the alleged crimes. Moreover, we note 

that Officer VanCamp did not enter Thompson’s house to execute the warrant, and that 
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there is no suggestion that he was acting on other than a reasonable belief that there was a 

valid arrest warrant.

When Detective Melton requested a search warrant for Thompson’s residence, 

after his arrest, that request was accompanied by a probable cause affidavit which 

Detective Melton affirmed under penalty of perjury. The affidavit noted the two 

controlled buys with a “confidential reliable informant”; Detective Melton’s knowledge 

of Jimmy Smith as a methamphetamine and prescription drug user and assistant in 

methamphetamine manufacture; the strong chemical odor associated with manufacturing 

methamphetamine that was coming from Thompson’s house, smelled by both Detective 

Melton and Officer VanCamp; and the inconsistent stories that Thompson and Smith told 

when asked to explain the smell. State’s Exhibit 1. We conclude that this was a 

sufficient basis to support a determination that probable cause existed for the search 

warrant.

When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of discretion. 

Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse of discretion 

involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court. Id. We consider the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there 

is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Id. 

Concluding that there was probable cause to support both the arrest and search 

warrants, we disagree that it was improper to admit evidence recovered during the search 
8

of Thompson’s home. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 

retrieved during the search of Thompson’s home. 

B. Fentanyl Patch

In addition to the challenge based on the arrest warrant, Thompson also, briefly, 

challenges the admission or sufficiency of the unopened fentanyl patch because it was not 

tested by a lab to confirm its contents.

However, the State correctly notes that our supreme court has held that the 

contents of unbroken and manufacturer-sealed packaging can be established by the label 

on that package, without needing to test the contents of the package. Reemer v. State, 

835 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (Ind. 2005) (“The fact that the tablets were in the original 

unbroken blister packs is sufficient to establish that the contents remained as the 

manufacturer packaged them. The labels clearly listed pseudoephedrine hydrochloride as 

one of the active ingredients in each tablet. The trial court properly admitted the nasal 

decongestant labels into evidence as proof of the contents, and therefore the blister packs 

in Reemer’s possession contained pseudoephedrine hydrochloride.”). We conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the fentanyl patch into evidence to 

prove possession without any further testing. 

Conclusion

Concluding that the trial court did not err in entering judgment of conviction on 

the dealing in methamphetamine count, and did not abuse its discretion in admission of 

any of the evidence, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.