### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 05 -00 438 -CR

Le opo ldo Sanc he z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 3040 628 , HO NORAB LE JO N N. WISSER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted a

ppellant Leo p o l d o Sanchez of attempted sexual assault, and the trial court se ntence d him to four y ear s’ imprisonment. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 15.01(a) (We st 2 00 3) , § 22 .0 11 (a )( 2) (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . On app eal , he argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is insufficient to support his conviction and that the tr ial court improper ly allo we d testimony

that bolstered the c omplainant’s testimony and commented on her c redibility . We affir m the judgme nt of convic tion.
F actual Summ ary

Ap pe lla nt i s th e un c le of D. S., the fi ft e e n- y e ar- old c omp la ina nt, and liv e d in th e same house with D.S., her pare nts, a nd her two y oung er siblings. D.S. te stified that as par t of her nor

mal
ro uti ne , s he he lpe d h e r b ro the r a nd sis te r g e t dr e sse d a

nd the n s ho we re d a

nd dr e sse d in

he r p are nts ’ room and the bathroom att ac h ed t o t h ei r bedr oom. On the morning of Mar ch 11, 2004, D.S.’sAlthough a ppellant fra

mes his issue as a challeng e to the denial of hi s motion for dire cted 1 verdic t, a leg al-suff

iciency point, se e Can ale

s v . S tate , 98 S.W .3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), he attac ks and we will review both the le g al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence
. 2 pa re nts le ft fo r w or k, and sh e he lpe d h e r s ibl ing s g e t dr e sse d b e fo re sta rt ingto g e t re a dy fo r s c ho ol. D.S. asked he r si ster to close the doors between the hallway and their pare nts’ room, and whe n she saw the door s were shut, she went to take a shower. Her siblings l eft while she wa s in the shower, leavingher a

nd appellant in the house. After her shower, she rea liz ed she had left her towel on her pare nts’ bed next to her clothes, so she wa lked into the room to dr y off and g et dre ssed. She noticed that th e be dr oo m do or s w e re op e n; h e r s ist e r t old he r l a te r t

hat he r b ro the r had op ened the d oo rs . D. S. saw a

pp e lla nt wa lk ou t of his ro om a

nd the n s tand

and sta re a t he r. D. S. r an in to t

he bathr oo m, g ra bb e d a bath ma t to c ov e r he rs e lf , an d shu t the do or s. She dr e sse d quic kly a nd sat on the be d to watch te levision, leaving the doors shut . Appellant ca me into the room, and whe n D.S. jumped up, he pushed he r onto the bed a nd straddled her, knee ling on he r rig ht leg with his left knee. He pinned her a rms above he r hea d with one hand and tried to unbutton her pants with the other. D.S. strug g led
u n t il she was able to push appellant off her, a nd he fe ll to the floor. Appellant fle d the house a nd drove a way in his truck, a

nd D.S. hurried out of the house, takingthe city bus to school, rather

than
wa iti ngfo r t

he sc ho ol b us . A t sc ho ol, D. S. t a lke d to a fr ie nd and the n de c ide d to c a ll he r m oth e r t o tell her a bout the attack. D.S., who was bruised on her thigh when appellant kne eled on he r, testified that she wa s frig htened a

nd that she believe d appellant intende d to rape her.

Suf fi ciency of the Evidence I n h is f ir st p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s that the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient to support the jury ’s ver dict. He a rg ues that althoug h t h e evide nce ma y be suff icient 13

to s ho w h e c omm itt e d a n a ssa ult , it do e s n ot s ho w h e int e nded or a tte mpt e d to
c omm it s e xua l a ssa

ult
. The jury , as finder

of fa ct, is the sole judg e of the weig ht and cr edibility to be g iven a witness’s tes t imony

and may acc ept or re

ject all or a

ny part of a witness’s testimony , draw
rea sonable infe renc es fr om the evidenc e, and r esolve a ny evide ntiary

conflicts. Ba rn es v . S

tate , 62 S.W .3d 288, 298 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d). In revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the
e vid e nc e , w e vie w al l the re le va nt e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he jur y ’s ve rd ic t and

a sk whether a rational trier o f fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the offe nse beyond a
rea sonable doubt. Can ale s v . S tate , 98 S.W .3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). I n re v i ew i ng fac tual sufficie n cy , we c onsider all the e vidence in a neutra l light and may reve rse only

if the supporting e vidence is so weak that the ve rdict is clea rly wrongor m anife stly unjust or if the verdic t is ag ains t t h e gre at weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. W

ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15, 417 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006).

Appellant ar g ues that bec ause D .S. testified that he did not undo any of the buttons
o nh er p an t s , re m o v e h er

s h i rt o r a n y

o t h er ar t i cl e o f h er

cl o t h i n g, re m o v e a n y o f hi s o wn cl o t h i n g,
or tou c h h e r b re a sts or

g e nit a ls, it is “c le ar fr om the re c or d that App e lla nt did no t atte mpt

to s e xua lly assault D.S .,” although he admits he “may have” committed assault with bodily injury . When the victim is a child, the elements of the offe nse of sexual assault are t hat t he assailant intentionally or knowing ly

penetr ates the c hild’s anus or sexual org an by any means, pe netrates or conta cts the child’s mouth with the assailant’s sexual org an or a nus, or cause s the child’s sexual org an or a nus to contact or

penetr ate the a ssailant’s sexua l o rg an, anus, or mouth. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 22.011(a )(2) . A per son commits attempted sexual a ssault if, with the specific intent4

to commit a sex ual assault, he doe s something “ amounting to more than mere prepa ration that tends but fails” to ac complish the assault. Se e id . § 15.0 1 (a ). T o b e guilty of an attempted offe nse, the d ef endant need not have acc omplished every act short of

actua l commission. Ha c k ba rth v . S tate , 617 S.W .2d 944, 946 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Ap pe lla nt p us he d o pe n th e be dr oo m do or s, e nte re d the ro om, pu sh e d D .S. do wn on to the bed, pinned her arms above her head, straddled her with his legs, a nd beg an to fumble with the buttons on her jeans be fore she wa s able to push him of f her and onto the g round, at whic h point he fled the house . The jury

could re asonably

have de termined that appellant was attempting to r emove D.S.’s pants with the intent to commit one of t he acts amounting to sexual assault of a child. I n other
w o r d s , th e ju

r y c o u ld h a v e d e c id e d th a t h is a c ts te n d e d , b u t f a il e d , to e f

f e c t th e c o mm is sion of an intentional sex ual assault. Se e id
. Although appellant rema ined clothed, did not gr o p e D .S.’s brea sts, and did not make a s t at em en t indicating his intent to sexually assault her , as the c ourt of criminal appe als stated in Ha c k ba rth , “Th e fa c t th a t a

pp e lla nt c ou ld h a ve take n f

ur the r a c tio ns , without actua lly committing t he offense of rape , does not act so as t o rende r his actions nothing more than mere prepa

ration.” Id
. The evidence is both leg ally and fa ctually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s verdic t. We overrule a

ppellant’s first point of er ror.

Adm iss ion of Ex pe r t T e st im ony I n h is s e c on d p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt c onten ds that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it
a llo we d A nn

Da vis , a ps y c ho the ra

pis t who wo rk e d with D. S. af te r the a tta c k, to t e sti fy . H e a sse rt s that she should not have be en allowe d to testify at the guilt/i nnocenc e phase but instead should have been tr eate d as a punishment-pha se witness only . He a rg ues that Davis’s testimony “supplanted the5

jury ’s dec ision” about D.S.’s truthfulness and that it is “cle ar from the rec ord that the testimony of Ms. Davis influence d the jury to find Appellant g uilty .” We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision on the a dmission or exclusion of evidence for a n abuse of discretion. W

e ath e rre d v. S

tate , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Ex pert te s ti mo n y is a dmi s s ib le if it w il l a s s is t th e f a c t- f in d e r . Schutz

v . S tate , 957 S.W .2d 52, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Howeve r, expert testimony “must aid—not supplant—the jury ’s dec ision,”
and it “ do e s n ot a ssi st the jur y if it c on sti tut e s ‘ a

dir e c t op ini on

on the tr uth fu lness’ of a ch ild complainant’s a lleg ations.” Id
. (q u o t i n g Y ou nt v . S tate , 8 72 S.W. 2d

70 6, 70 8 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1 9 9 3 ) )
. A p p e ll an t is c o r r e c t th a t an e xp e rt w it

n e s s ma y n o t te s ti f

y th a t s h e b e li e v es anothe r wi tne ss i s te lli ngthe tr

ut h or that th e oth e r w itn e ss b e lon g s to a c la ss o f p e rs on s w ho are tr uth fu l. S ee Y ount , 8 72 S.W. 2d

a t 71 2; Va sq ue

z v . S tate , 9 7 5 S. W. 2 d

4 1 5 , 4 1 7 ( T e x. A p p . —

A u s ti n1 9 9 8, pet. re f’d) . Howeve r, expert testimony that a child has exhibi ted behavior empirica lly shown to be common in children who have been sex ually abused is both releva nt and admissible. Hi tt v . S tate , 53 S.W. 3d

69 7, 70 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Vasquez , 975 S.W .2d at 417. Da vis te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d tr e a te d v ic tim s o f s e xua l a ssa ult and that sh e wo rk e d w ith D. S. f or a bo ut f ive mon ths , f

ro m sh or tly a ft e r t he a ssa ult thr ou g h Augus t 20 04 . Wh e n th e State asked D avis about the “ prese nting issue” that b r oug ht D.S. in for thera py , appellant objec ted, ar g uing that D a vis sh ou ld n ot b e he ard a t th e g uil t/i nn oc e nc e ph a se and in st e a d s ho uld be re se rv e d a s a punishment-phase w itness. The State re sponded that it intended to as k Davis whe ther in her experience and tra ining, D.S.’s e x perie nces “ wer e consistent wi t h those that are experience d by victims of sex ual assault.” A ppellant re plied, “[I ]f that’ s the purpose, that’s the ultimate question at issue which the jur

y is g oing to have to dec ide, not this lady .” The jury was e x cused to a llow the6

trial court to fully

consider the arguments, and appellant stated, “I believe that Ms. Davis .
. . doesn’t have a ny persona l knowledg e of the events in this case , whether or not an offense was committed. Simpl y her know ledg e is of the healing of the person who ha s been tra umatized by

some eve nt.” The State a sse rt e d th a t D a vis sh ou ld b e a ble to t e sti fy

a bo ut whe the r c hil d v ic tim s o f s e xua l a ssa ult sometimes delay

their re porting of the c rimes. Appellant noted that there was no delay in this case, and the State r esponded, “ Well, y ou know, we he ar c razy things fr om j u ri es all the time. ‘Why didn’t she ca ll 9-1-1 immediately ? Why didn’t she g o to her ne ighbor and ca ll 9-1-1? ’ . . . I have to a n ti c ip a te a ll th o s e k in d o f is s u e s . . . . ” A f te r c o n s id e r a

b le d is c u s s io n , th e c o u rt o v e r r u le d the ob je c tio n, bu t r

ule d th a t th e State c ou ld o nly a sk Da vis hy po the tic a l qu e sti on s a

bo ut h owpe op le
re a c t to tr a

umatic e ve nts and

c ou ld n ot a sk

he r a ny thi nga bo ut what sh e wa s to ld b y D. S. Befo re t h e jury , Davis testified that she took D.S.’s history and diag nosed her

as
su ff e ri ngfr om p os t- tr a

umatic str e ss d iso rd e r. She te sti fi e d in g e ne ra l a bo ut h owte e na g e rs de a l w ith trauma, sa

ying the y tend to worry

about how their f

amilies will be aff

ecte d, can f

eel more g uilt and shame, a nd have f ewe r “coping mecha

nisms” than adults. The State aske d Davis about be haviors and rea ctions of “victims of trauma and particula rly sexual ty

pes of trauma,” at times asking about likely rea ctions by

a tee nag ed fe male who is the victim of sex ual assault by a fa mily member. O ther than the ea

rly question about D.S.’s “pre senting issue,” to which the tr ial court sustained a ppellant’s ob je c tio n, and

Da vis ’s te sti mony

that sh e dia g no se d D .S. a s su ffer ingfr om p os t- tr a umatic str e ss dis or de r, Da

vis did no t te sti fy a

bo ut D. S. in pa

rt ic ula r, a bo ut wh a t D. S. t old

he r a bo ut t he a ssa ult , or a bo ut whe the r s he be lie ve d o r d isb e lie ve d D .S. ’s a lle g a tio ns .

I nitially , we address the St ate’ s contention that appe llant did not preserve this iss ue for our revie w. The State argues t hat because appellant di d not seek a running objection to Davis’s testimony , h e h a s w a iv e d h is c o mp la in t. I t mi g h t b e w is e r to s e e k a r u n n in g o b je c ti o n d u r ing an7

extensive line of objectionable que stioning. Se e Et hin gto n v. S tate , 819 S.W .2d 854, 859-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (objec tion to “continuing” testimony waived when def

ense c ounsel objecte d to first question but did not ask for running objection or “ hear ing out of the jury ’s pre sence so he would not have to constantly object”)
. Howeve r, appellant, the S tate, and the t rial court discussed the a dmi ssi bil ity of Da

vis ’s te sti mony a t len g th out sid e the jur y ’s pr e se nc e . We wi ll c on sid e r t his complaint related to Davis’s testimony , which wa s broug ht to the attention of and considere d by the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1(a)
.

Appellant does not c ontest Davis’s qualific ations to testify as an ex pert a

bout be havio rs c omm on ly

se e n in vic tim s o f s e xua l a ssa

ult . D a vis wa s no t a sk e d d ir e c tly wh e the r D .S. exhibi ted behaviors simil ar to those e x hibited by victims of sexual a buse, nor was she aske d whether sh e be lie ve d D .S. or

wh e the r D .S. a

pp e are d to be tr

uth fu l. S he wa s a sk e d to de sc ri be in g e ne ra l, hy pothetical ter

ms behaviors that mig ht be exhibit ed by a child who had been subje cted to tra uma, including se x ual assault by a fa mily memb er . The fa ct that the jury could dra

w a c omparison betwee n Davis’s hy

pothetical child and D .S. does not mean that Davis’s testimony amounted to a direc t comment on D.S.’s cre dibilit y . Davis’s testim ony about “anx iety behavior s” similar to D.S.’s be havio r w a s “ c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e that something traumatic ha ppened” to her, but the fact that

“ thi s e vid e nc e in s ome sma ll m e a sure c or ro bo rate s” D.S .’s tes tim ony “ do e s n ot m a ke it a

ny le ss
re le va nt— in fa c t, qu ite the op po sit e . Of c ours e , lik e a ll c or ro bo ratin g e vid e nc e , becaus e it is consistent with [D.S .]’s story , it also has a tendenc y to make [ her] testimony more plausible. But
we should not for that rea son exclude it.” Se e Coh n v . S tate , 849 S.W. 2d 81 7, 81 9- 20 (T e x. Cr im. A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ( c o n s id e r

o b je c ti o nto d o c to r ’ s te s ti mo n y u nder rule 4 0 3 o f

r u le s o f e v id e n c e )
. We
overr ule appe llant’s second point of e rror .We no te that wh e the r bo lst e ri ng is sti ll a pr op e r g ro un d f or ob je c tio n h a s b e e n c a lle d in to 2 question. Se e Coh n v . S tate , 849 S.W .2d 817, 8 2 1 (T ex . Crim. App. 1993) (Campbell, J., concurri n g) (“Iwrite sepa rate ly to express my

belief that a ‘bolstering ’ objec tion is no l ong er adequate to prese rve e rror for r eview conce rning the admission of evidenc e bec ause no suc h g round surv ive d th e Tex a s Ru le s o f C ri min a l E vid e nc e .” ); Mo nto y a v . S tate , 43 S.W .3d 568, 573 n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.). 8 Im pr ope r Bol st e r ing I n his third and final poi nt of error, a ppellant attac ks the trial cour t’s decision to allow Aus ti n Po lic e Of

fi c e r Jame s G uic e to t e sti fy a bo ut h is i nte rv ie w w ithD. S., c on te nd ingthat th is t e s t i m o n y a m o u n t e d

t o i mp r o p e r

b o l s t e r i n g o f

D
. S
. ’ s u n i mp e a c h e d

t e s t i m o n y. Of fi c e r Guic e te sti fi e d that he re sp on de d to a re po rt fr om D. S.’ s sc ho ol that a c hil d and her mother nee ded to speak to the police and descr ibed D.S.’s demea nor and behavior
. When he was asked what D.S. told him ha d happene d to he r, appellant objected that Guice’ s testimony was
n o t a dm i s s i b l e u n d e r

t h e e x c i t e d

- u t t e r an c e e x c e p t i o nt o t h e h e ar s ay r u l e an d w a s i m p ro p er b o l s t er i n g. The trial c ourt said, “The problem is if I think it’s outweighe d by the unfa ir prejudice , and I think if it’s fair prejudice —we’ ll overr ule t he objection.” Guice the n testified about D.S.’s desc ription of the assault, g iving a short summary that matched D.S.’s testimony about the attac k. He c oncluded his testimony

by descr ibing his ef

forts to g et information about a ppellant and stating that he re ported the alleg ations to Chil d Protective Servic es and to a child-abuse office r and called for a counselor to come spea

k to D.S. and her mother
. Vi e wi ngthe e vid e nc e in i ts e nti re ty , w e do no t be li eve th e tr ial c ourt a bu se d it s discretion and a cted outside the zone of rea sonable disagr eeme nt in overruling appellant’ s bolstering objection. See W

eatherred, 15 S.W .3d at 542. Howeve r, even if we a ssume it was err or to allow 2 Gu ic e to t e sti fy

a bo ut D.S .’s des cripti on

of the a ssa ult , w e mus t di sr e g ard

su c h a n e rr or un le ss i t aff ecte d appellant’ s substantial rig hts. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 44 .2 (b ); Po tie r v . S tate , 68 S.W .3d 657, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Er roneous e videntiary

ruling s rar ely

rise to the leve l of deny

ing the9

fundame ntal constitutional rights to prese nt a m ea n i ng ful defe nse.”) . We ag ree with the State’s char acte rization of the complained- of testimony as a “quick sy nopsis” of D.S.’s repor

t that did not comment on D.S.’s cr edibility . When the rec ord is viewed as a whole, we conclude that the challeng ed testimony , even if admitted in er ro r, did not harm appe llant’s substantial rig hts. See Ba rn es v . S

tate , 165 S.W .3d 75, 84 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (“ Given th e brevity of the complained- of testimony , appellant’ s own testimony , and the lack of any emphasis on this subject during argument, we c onclude that the admis sion of t he challeng ed testi mony , if err or, did not harm a substantial rig ht.”). We over rule a ppellant’s third and f

inal point of err or.

Conclusion Havingoverr

uled appe llant’s three points of error , we a ffirm the tria l court’s judgme nt of conviction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Jul y

19, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh