United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

HOMELAND 

DEFENSE 

Steps Have Been 

Taken to Improve U.S. 

Northern Command’s 

Coordination with 

States and the 

National Guard 

Bureau, but Gaps 

Remain 

April 2008 

 

GAO-08-252 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2008

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 

Command’s Coordination with States and the 

Highlights of GAO-08-252, a report to National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain 

congressional requesters 

In 2002, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) established U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) to 

conduct homeland defense and 

civil support missions in and 

around the United States. It is

important that NORTHCOM 

coordinate with the National Guard 

Bureau (NGB), because NGB has

experience dealing with state and 

local authorities during incidents 

and functions as NORTHCOM’s 

formal link to the states. GAO was 

asked to (1) determine the extent 

to which NORTHCOM has ongoing 

efforts to coordinate with the 

states and NGB in planning,

exercises and other preparedness 

activities and (2) identify the extent 

to which there are any gaps in this

coordination. To do this, GAO

surveyed the state adjutants 

general, the highest ranking 

guardsman in each state, and 

received a 100 percent response 

rate, and reviewed interagency

coordination plans and guidance. 

What GAO Recommends

To improve NORTHCOM’s 

coordination with the states, GAO 

recommends that NORTHCOM 

develop an established and 

thorough process to guide its 

coordination with the states. To

improve the command’s 

coordination with NGB, GAO 

recommends that NORTHCOM and 

NGB revise their agreement to

more fully and clearly define how

they will coordinate and the

responsibilities each will have. 

DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendations and suggested

ongoing and future efforts to 

satisfy the intent of the 

recommendations. 

NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the 

states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for 

civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM facilitates 

weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and federal emergency 

management officials, through which it has begun to build more productive 

relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-scale exercises and 

participated in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to 

help responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. In addition, 

NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans. 

We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and NGB 

in three areas. 

• NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development of 

its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent of the 

state adjutants general reported that they were involved in developing and 

reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM officials told us that 

they are reaching out directly to states to better understand states’ plans 

and capabilities, but for homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide 

states’ perspectives. 

• NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and 

has no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the 

state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was 

not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ emergency response 

plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that NORTHCOM does 

not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and 

interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on 

states’ plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will 

not be prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources to 

support civil authorities. 

• A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which 

NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s 

roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil 

support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has resulted 

in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example, as required in 

NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states’

homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM; 

however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor 

needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s and NGB’s responses to 

an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. 

Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning for 

catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that 

NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as 

effective as possible. To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-252. 

For more information, contact Davi M. 

D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 7

NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with 

the States and NGB in Planning for Its Missions 17 

Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM’s Coordination with the States and 

NGB 23

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendix I Questionnaire and Survey Results 38 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 43 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 46 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49 

 

Related GAO Products 50 

Tables 

Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises 18 

Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM’s Plans 24 

Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM’s Plan Development 24 

Table 4: NORTHCOM’s Familiarity with State Emergency Response 

Plans 27 

Figures 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility 8 

Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response 10 

Page i GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response 13 

Figure 4: FEMA Regions 22 

Abbreviations 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosive 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

TAG state adjutant general 

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Page ii GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

April 16, 2008

Congressional Requesters

The United States homeland continues to face an uncertain, complex 

security environment with the potential for terrorist incidents and natural 

disasters. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the President 

established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide and 

manage homeland defense and civil support. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) considers homeland defense to be NORTHCOM’s primary mission 

and defines it as the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression against the United States.1

 Civil support or defense support of 

civil authorities2

 includes the use of federal military forces, the 

department’s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD agency 

and component assets for domestic emergencies and for designated law 

enforcement and other activities.3

 DOD is not the primary federal agency 

for such missions (unless designated so by the President) and thus 

operates in support of civil authorities only when directed to do so by the 

President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 

for its homeland defense mission includes the contiguous United States, 

Alaska, Canada, and Mexico.4

 NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility for its 

civil support mission includes the contiguous United States, Alaska, and 

U.S. territorial waters.5

NORTHCOM faces the critical and unique challenge of preparing for its 

missions within the legal and historical limits of the constitutional federalstate structure that includes the 49 North American U.S. states and the 

District of Columbia. Numerous local, state, and federal agencies and 

 1

Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington,

D.C.: June 2005), 5.

2

DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with the National 

Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, GL-7.

3

Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5-6. 

4

Hawaii and Guam are under the area of responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command, and 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are under the area of responsibility of U.S. Southern

Command. 

5

NORTHCOM’s geographical boundaries for defense support of civil authorities do not 

include Canada and Mexico unless coordinated in advance with the State Department. 

Page 1 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
organizations, including the National Guard Bureau (NGB),6

 have 

jurisdiction over or can coordinate resources within the homeland and, 

therefore, may be involved in a response to an incident.7

 Because 

protecting and defending the homeland is a shared responsibility with 

states potentially requiring assistance from federal agencies and 

organizations, effective coordination and integrated planning across all 

levels are critical for an effective national response.8

 We have previously 

reported that to facilitate rapid and effective decision making during a 

crisis, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at 

all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, 

and well understood.9

 NORTHCOM also recognizes the importance of 

coordination with other federal agencies and states for its missions, 

especially in support of civil authorities, stating that such coordination will 

facilitate the creation and implementation of coordinated policies, 

collaborative plans, and unified operations.10 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, the 

uncoordinated national response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress and other 

organizations have emphasized the need to improve the national response 

 6

NGB is a joint activity of DOD. It coordinates the deployment of nonfederalized National 

Guard forces and provides NORTHCOM with situational awareness of National Guard

issues and activities, including capabilities and requirements. NGB does not have 

jurisdiction over resources. Nonfederalized or Title 32 forces are under the control of the 

governor of the state. During a presidential call-up, National Guard forces can be mobilized

under Title 10 and federalized. In this case, they are under the control of the President. 

7

An incident refers to a natural or man-made disaster, ranging from a hurricane to a 

terrorist attack, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to 

property and/or natural resources.

8

Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 2007). 

9

GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and 

Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations 

and Legislation, GAO-07-1142T (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007). A list of related products

is included at the end of this report. 

10U.S. Northern Command, State and Tribal Engagement Strategy, Draft (Colorado 

Springs, Colo., undated). 

Page 2 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
to an incident.11 For example, the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves found that reform is necessary to increase coordination among 

DOD entities and commands—including NGB and NORTHCOM—to 

ensure better national security outcomes.12 The relationship of 

NORTHCOM and NGB is even more important with Congress’s recent 

passing of legislation to elevate NGB to a joint activity of DOD and expand

NGB’s functions to include assisting the Secretary of Defense with 

coordinating the use of National Guard forces and resources with other 

federal agencies, the adjutants general of the states, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, and NORTHCOM for their use in operations conducted under 

Title 32 or in support of state missions.13 Although NGB is NORTHCOM’s 

formal channel of coordination with states for National Guard related 

matters, NORTHCOM also coordinates with the states through the state 

adjutants general, known as TAGs—the highest-ranking guardsman in 

each state. As the commander of the state’s National Guard units, the 

governor of each state commands the National Guard through the TAG. 

To better understand NORTHCOM’s efforts to effectively prepare for its 

homeland defense and civil support missions, we were asked to review 

NORTHCOM’s processes for planning for, coordinating, and executing its 

missions. For this report, our objectives were to (1) determine the extent 

to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states 

and NGB in planning exercises and other preparedness activities and 

(2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. We

prepared a separate report to address (1) the status of NORTHCOM’s 

plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, 

 11White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final 

Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 

Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006); U.S. Senate, Hurricane 

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006); and GAO, Hurricane

Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to 

Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-808T (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

12Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Strengthening America’s Defenses in

the New Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2007). 

13Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§ 1812 and 1813 (2008), which are codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 10501 and 

10503 (2007). 

Page 3 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
(2) the adequacy of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which 

NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies.14 

In conducting this review, we focused our scope on NORTHCOM’s 

coordination with the states and NGB in planning and preparing for its 

homeland defense and civil support missions. Our review focused on 

NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To 

determine the states’ perspectives on the extent to which NORTHCOM is 

coordinating with the states and identify any gaps, we surveyed the TAGs 

who are within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility.15 When we discuss 

NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we are primarily referring to

coordination with the TAGs. The survey questionnaire and results can be

found in appendix I. The survey was administered via electronic mail to 

the TAGs and their chiefs of staff, and responses were collected from April 

through September 2007; we had a 100 percent response rate. We also 

reviewed documents and conducted interviews with the TAGS from 

Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington. To augment the information 

we obtained from the TAGs, we reviewed documents and conducted 

interviews with officials from NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate 

commands, including Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force 

Headquarters National Capital Region, and Army Forces North, as well as 

officials from NGB headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard 

Office. In addition, we conducted interviews with officials from the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) interagency Incident Management Planning 

Team. We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. Appendix II is a detailed discussion of our 

scope and methodology. 

 14GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to

Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues, GAO-08-251 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

15This includes those in the 48 contiguous states as well as Alaska and the District of 

Columbia.

Page 4 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the 

states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for 

civil support. NORTHCOM’s strategic vision includes facilitating the 

synchronization of national, state, and local assets and capabilities to 

defend the nation and support civilian authorities.16 One of NORTHCOM’s 

ongoing efforts to improve coordination includes facilitating weekly 

hurricane conferences during hurricane season with a wide variety of 

relevant local, state, and federal emergency management officials. 

Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors wildfire activity and sets up 

teleconferences with the National Interagency Fire Center, which includes 

state emergency response officials, if it appears that NORTHCOM may 

need to assist in fighting the fires. NORTHCOM also conducts two largescale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield—and participates in 

over 30 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help all 

potential responders prepare for potential man-made and natural 

disasters. As a result of this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun

to build more productive and effective relationships with the participating 

states and agencies. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally 

including NGB in reviewing its plans, both in the early stages during 

concept development workshops as well as during final coordination. 

Results in Brief 

We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and 

NGB in three areas. 

• NORTHCOM officials minimally involve the states in the development of

NORTHCOM’s major homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 

25 percent of the TAGs reported that they were involved in developing and 

reviewing these plans. NORTHCOM officials told us that they are starting 

to reach out directly to states to obtain their perspectives on 

NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan, but for homeland 

defense, they rely on NGB to provide states’ perspectives. By only relying 

on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain awareness of the 

environment in which it may be operating, which is critical to fully 

carrying out its homeland defense mission. In either homeland defense or

civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the 

development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate 

intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall 

 16U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (Colorado Springs, Colo.: June 13, 2005).

Page 5 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions 

and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.17 

• NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans or 

capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining 

access to this information. Fifty-four percent of the TAGs reported that 

they believe that NORTHCOM is either slightly or not at all familiar with 

their states’ plans. This may be attributable in part to the fact that 

NORTHCOM does not have a plan for cooperating and interacting with the 

states. By not obtaining and using information on states’ plans and 

capabilities, it is difficult for NORTHCOM to plan in advance for the types, 

numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment) 

needed to actually conduct an operation either for homeland defense or 

for a civil support operation in support of another primary agency.18 

• A 2005 memorandum of agreement, which is intended to provide the 

procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not clearly 

define the responsibilities of the two entities for homeland defense and 

civil support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has 

resulted in confusion and duplicative or potentially wasted efforts 

between the two agencies. For example, as required in NORTHCOM’s 

homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states’ homeland defense plans 

and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners 

told us that they neither requested nor needed access to this information. 

Without clearly defined responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s 

and NGB’s responses to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. 

To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we are 

recommending that NORTHCOM develop an established and thorough 

process to guide its coordination with the states to (1) involve the states in

NORTHCOM’s planning processes, (2) obtain information on state 

emergency response plans and capabilities, and (3) use such information 

to improve the development and execution of its concept plans. To 

improve the command’s coordination with NGB, we are recommending 

that NORTHCOM and NGB revise their memorandum of agreement and 

 17Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and political boundaries, and 

these events require fully integrated intergovernmental actions. See Department of

Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 

2006). 

18GAO-08-251. 

Page 6 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
more fully and clearly define the roles and responsibilities that each will 

have. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with 

our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and planning to take

to address the recommendations. DOD’s comments are discussed in more

detail at the end of this report and are reproduced in full in appendix III. 

DOD and FEMA also provided us with technical comments, which have 

been incorporated where appropriate. 

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOD realized the need 

for a more integrated civilian and military response capability for any 

future attack on the United States. In response, DOD established 

NORTHCOM in October 200219 to provide command and control in 

homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil 

authorities within its area of responsibility (see fig. 1).20 

Background 

 19The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified Command Plan, 

which outlines the areas of responsibility for the combatant commands. 

20NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility for its homeland defense mission includes the 

contiguous United States, Alaska, U.S. territorial waters, and Canada and Mexico. 

NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility for its civil support mission includes the contiguous 

United States, Alaska, and U.S. territorial waters. 

Page 7 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Figure 1: NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility 

NORTHCOM’s mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil 

support. It is important to understand the relationships between 

NORTHCOM’s missions and homeland security. Homeland defense and 

homeland security are not synonymous. Homeland security is a concerted 

national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover 

Canada

United States

Mexico

Sources: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map).

Alaska falls within

NORTHCOM’s area of 

responsibility, but 

military forces in the 

state are assigned to 

U.S. Pacific Command.

Page 8 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
from attacks that do occur.21 The DHS is the primary federal agency for 

homeland security issues. DHS’s responsibilities extend beyond terrorism 

to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide 

range of matter domestic disasters and other emergencies. DOD 

contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas 

and homeland defense and civil support operations. 

While the terrorism portion of homeland security is concerned with 

preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD’s concerns 

include responding to conventional and unconventional attacks by any 

adversary as well as terrorists. When DOD is designated as the primary 

federal agency by the President or Secretary of Defense for conducting 

military missions to defend the people or territory of the homeland, it is 

considered to be homeland defense. Homeland defense is the protection of 

U.S territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical defense 

infrastructure against external threats and aggression. DOD activity in 

support of a National Response Framework primary or coordinating 

agency is considered to be civil support. Civil support is DOD support to 

U.S. civilian authorities, such as DHS, for domestic emergencies, both 

natural and man-made, and includes the use of DOD personnel—federal 

military forces and DOD’s career civilian and contractor personnel—and 

DOD agency and component resources.22 Because these missions are 

complex and interrelated, they require significant interagency

coordination. 

To carry out its homeland defense mission, NORTHCOM is to conduct 

operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at 

the United States. According to Joint Publication 3-27, DOD is the primary 

federal agency for homeland defense operations, and NORTHCOM is the 

combatant command responsible for commanding and coordinating a 

response to a homeland defense incident. In this case, the chain of 

command is relatively straightforward: other DOD commands and federal 

agencies provide support to NORTHCOM for homeland defense 

operations (see fig. 2). Although NORTHCOM has few forces assigned to 

its command, during an incident it requests forces through the Joint Staff.

NORTHCOM’s Homeland 

Defense Mission 

 21Homeland defense is considered DOD’s portion of the broader area of homeland security.

Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 3, and Department

of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. 

22Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5-6. 

Page 9 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
The Joint Staff will direct Joint Forces Command, which is DOD’s joint 

force provider, to assign appropriate and available forces to 

NORTHCOM.23 The President may decide to federalize National Guard 

units in order to provide these forces.24

Figure 2: Homeland Defense Response 

While the states do not have an operational role in homeland defense, 

Incident/attack 

occurs

DOD

As the lead federal agency, 

commands the operation

USNORTHCOM

Commands military efforts

President

May federalize National 

Guard troops

NGB

Coordinates use of

National Guard forces

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 

Corps Units and federalized 

Guard units assigned to 

NORTHCOM command

Other DOD 

commands/agencies

Support NORTHCOM 

operations

Source: GAO.

 23NORTHCOM and the other combatant commands transmit their force requirements 

(forces needed to execute their planned operations) to Joint Forces Command, and the

latter determines which mix of trained military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force and 

Marines) will provide the requested forces. Joint Forces Command assigns these forces to

combatant commanders when requested by the Joint Staff. See White House, Unified 

Command Plan (Washington, D.C., May 5, 2006) and Joint Pub. 5), Joint Operation 

Planning (Dec. 26, 2006), I-10. In addition, any other combatant command to which forces

have been assigned by DOD, such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to 

provide forces to NORTHCOM.

24During a presidential call-up, National Guard forces can be mobilized under Title 10 and 

federalized. In this case, they are under the control of the President. Nonfederalized or Title 

32 forces are under the control of the governor of the state. 

Page 10 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission includes protecting the territory 

or domestic population of the United States as well as the infrastructure or 

other assets determined by the Secretary of Defense to be critical to 

national security. In order to protect these critical assets, NORTHCOM 

must maintain awareness of the environment in which it may be operating, 

including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations. 

NORTHCOM’s second mission is civil support or defense support of civil 

authorities. Civil support missions include domestic disaster relief 

operations for incidents such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. 

Such support also includes counterdrug operations and management of 

the consequences of a terrorist incident employing a weapon of mass 

destruction. DOD is not the primary federal agency for such missions 

(unless so designated by the President) and thus provides defense support 

of civil authorities only when (1) state, local, and other federal resources 

are overwhelmed or unique military capabilities are required; 

(2) assistance is requested by the primary federal agency; and 

(3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of

Defense.25 

Civil support is based on a tiered response to an incident; that is, incidents 

must be managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by 

additional response capabilities when needed (see fig. 3). Local and 

county governments respond to emergencies daily using their own 

resources and rely on mutual aid agreements and other types of assistance 

agreements with neighboring governments when they need additional 

resources. For example, county and local authorities are likely to have the 

resources needed to adequately respond to a small-scale incident, such as 

a local flood, and therefore will not request additional resources. For 

larger-scale incidents, when resources are overwhelmed, local and county 

governments will request assistance from the state. States have 

capabilities, such as the National Guard, that can help communities 

respond and recover. If additional resources are required, the state may 

request assistance from other states through interstate mutual aid 

agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

NORTHCOM’s Civil 

Support Mission 

 25Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 14, 2007). 

Page 11 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
(EMAC).26 If an incident is beyond the community and state capabilities, 

the governor can seek federal assistance. The federal government has a 

wide array of capabilities and resources that can be made available to 

assist state and local agencies to respond to incidents. 

 26EMAC is a mutual aid agreement among member states and is administered by the

National Emergency Management Association. States affected by disasters have 

increasingly relied on EMAC as a means to access resources from other states, including

emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. GAO, Emergency

Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC’s Collaborative and Administrative 

Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 29, 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Figure 3: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response 

Overall coordination of federal incident management activities, other than 

those conducted for homeland defense, is generally the responsibility of 

DHS. Within DHS and as an executive agent for the National Preparedness 

System,27 FEMA is responsible for coordinating and integrating the 

preparedness of federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities. 

Incident 

occurs

President

Declares major disaster or 

emergency

FEMA

Recommends presidential 

declaration

Federal assistance

Provided by applicable 

agencies

NORTHCOM

Provides military assistance, if 

requested/required

State government

Assesses damage; 

requests presidential 

declaration

Local government

Requests mutual aid and state 

assistance

Local first responders

Arrive first on scene

Source: GAO.

 27The National Preparedness System (NPS) provides a tool to assist jurisdictions, agencies, 

and organizations at all levels to plan for, assess, and track capabilities in a shared 

environment. It integrates various efforts to provide the comprehensive picture of 

preparedness and progress toward achieving the goal. 

Page 13 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
In accordance with the National Response Framework28 and applicable 

laws including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency

Assistance Act (Stafford Act),29 various federal departments or agencies 

may play primary, coordinating, or supporting roles, based on their 

authorities and resources and the nature of the threat or incident. In some 

instances, national defense assets may be needed to assist FEMA or 

another agency in the national response to an incident. Defense resources 

are committed after approval by the Secretary of Defense or at the 

direction of the President. When deciding to commit defense resources, 

officials consider military readiness, appropriateness of the 

circumstances, and whether the response is in accordance with the law.30

For example, the Posse Comitatus Act31 allows military forces to provide 

civil support, but these forces generally cannot become directly involved 

in law enforcement. 

When it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate and is 

requested by FEMA, NORTHCOM is responsible for leading DOD’s 

response. In the same manner as is applicable to homeland defense, 

NORTHCOM generally operates through established joint task forces that 

are subordinate to the command. In most cases, support will be localized,

limited, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the 

point where the primary federal agency can again assume full control and 

management without military assistance, NORTHCOM will exit. 

 28The National Response Framework is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards 

incident response. It is built upon flexible, scalable, and adaptable coordinating structures

to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government

and private sector businesses and non-governmental organizations. Department of

Homeland Security, National Response Framework. 

29The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 

signed into law November 23, 1988, amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-

288. This act constitutes the statutory authority for most federal disaster response 

activities, especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs. 

30Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4, (Sept. 14, 2007). 

3118 U.S.C. § 1385 (2007). 

Page 14 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
In order to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, 

NORTHCOM has developed plans based on various incident scenarios, 

including 14 of DHS’s 15 national planning scenarios.32 NORTHCOM 

develops contingency plans to outline its role in potential disaster 

situations. NORTHCOM currently develops strategic-level concept plans 

rather than more detailed operational plans, because the potential threats 

that it is planning for are varied and nonspecific, ranging from terrorist 

threats to hurricanes and wildfires.33 NORTHCOM uses the adaptive 

planning process for developing its plans—that is, the joint capability to 

create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances 

require. Interagency coordination is a key part of the plan development 

process in adaptive planning. 

In each state, the National Guard plays a crucial role in preparing for both 

homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, in its dual roles 

as a national reserve force for the Army and Air Force and as a state 

militia. As the only military force shared by the states and the federal 

government, the National Guard provides a natural and effective bridge to

accomplish collaboration between NORTHCOM and key state partners. 

The National Guard’s federal mission is to provide trained units available 

for active duty in the armed forces, in the time of war or national 

emergency, and at such times as national security may require. 

NORTHCOM is responsible for the planning, exercising, and command and 

control of the National Guard for its federal missions conducted under the 

command and control of the President within its area of responsibility.34

NORTHCOM’s Planning for 

Homeland Defense and 

Support of Civil 

Authorities 

States’ and NGB’s Roles in 

Preparing for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support 

 32The federal interagency community developed 15 all-hazards planning scenarios—the 

national planning scenarios—for use in federal, state, and local homeland security 

preparedness activities. The scenarios are planning tools and are representative of the

range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and related impacts facing the 

United States, including nuclear detonation; biological, chemical, radiological, and 

explosive attacks; as well as a major hurricane or earthquake. NORTHCOM does not use 

the 15th scenario dealing with cyberattacks because this is in the area of responsibility of 

U.S. Strategic Command. 

33Generally, a contingency plan does not contain a list of specific forces needed to carry out 

missions, or even specific mission tasks. Instead, tools such as standing execute orders

match types of units on potential call for use to plans, but specific units usually are not 

identified. Recently approved national planning guidance may soon require DOD and other 

federal agencies to prepare more detailed plans. White House, National Planning, 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). 

34Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 8; Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-27, Homeland Defense, II-14-II-15, A-1-A-6, (Jul. 12, 2007); and 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, (Sep. 14, 2007), II-11-II-14. 

Page 15 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
As a state militia, the National Guard of each state responds to state 

emergencies, including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and acts of 

terrorism, and provides support to law enforcement in the war on drugs 

under the command and control of the state governor. The governor 

commands the National Guard through the TAG, who heads the joint force 

headquarters of the state. According to NGB officials, the state’s joint 

force headquarters’ mission is to maintain trained and equipped National 

Guard forces and to provide expertise and situational awareness to 

facilitate the integration of federal and state activities. 

NGB is a joint activity of DOD, with unique statutory, regulatory, and 

policy-based responsibilities and authorities, including serving as the 

official channel of communications between the Departments of the Army 

and the Air Force and the states on National Guard matters.35 NGB 

administers DOD, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air 

Force policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard matters 

and facilitates the integration of federal and state activities, including 

facilitating mutual support among the states. Although NGB does not 

command or control forces, it assists the states in the organization, 

maintenance, and operation of their Army National Guard and Air National 

Guard units located in the states and coordinates the movement of 

nonfederalized National Guard forces.36 NGB also maintains and provides 

information on National Guard matters affecting homeland defense and 

civil support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the combatant 

commands, including NORTHCOM; and others. During civil support 

missions, NGB provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard 

assistance to the TAGs. Because of their interrelated missions, 

coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB is critical in planning for 

homeland defense and civil support. 

 35This includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. possessions and territories. 

36Army Regulation 130-5/AFMD 10, Organization and Functions of National Guard Bureau

(Dec. 30, 2001). 

Page 16 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with 

NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing 

efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its 

missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. As part of 

NORTHCOM’s strategic vision, its goal is to facilitate the synchronization 

of national, state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation 

and support civilian authorities.37 We found six areas in which 

NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states 

and NGB, ranging from including states in its exercises to a new state 

engagement strategy for reaching out directly to state leaders. Some of 

these efforts are intended to help NORTHCOM plan for both of its 

missions, while others are intended to improve how it responds to 

requests for civil support. 

NORTHCOM conducts or participates in training exercises to improve 

planning for its missions and responses to requests for civil support. The 

command conducts two large-scale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant 

Shield—and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local 

exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for man-made and 

natural disasters. Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield alternate between 

emphasizing the homeland defense mission and the civil support mission. 

Each training event exercises one of the key missions while at the same 

time including elements of the other. Practicing and training for 

emergency responses together not only helps to identify problem areas or 

lessons learned, but also helps state responders to build relationships with 

NORTHCOM and improve coordination. One TAG told us that he did not 

have any communications with NORTHCOM prior to his state’s 

participation in Ardent Sentry, but has since developed a close working 

relationship with NORTHCOM officials. Table 1 shows the percentage of

states participating in Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield, or other events, 

according to our survey of TAGs. 

NORTHCOM Has 

Ongoing Efforts to 

Improve Coordination 

with the States and 

NGB in Planning for 

Its Missions 

States’ Participation in 

NORTHCOM’s Exercises 

Enhances Coordination 

 37U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations, 3-11. 

Page 17 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Table 1: State Participation in NORTHCOM Exercises 

Exercise States participating

Ardent Sentry 24 (49%)

Vigilant Shield 12 (25%)

Othera 16 (32%)

Source: GAO TAG survey responses. 

Note: Forty-nine TAGs responded to the Ardent Sentry question, 48 TAGs responded to the Vigilant 

Shield question, and all 50 responded to the question regarding “Other” exercises. 

a

Other includes field exercises, state-led exercises, and other federal exercises that involved 

NORTHCOM participation. 

NORTHCOM’s Training and Exercise Directorate continues to work with 

state and National Guard entities to plan and conduct exercises and to 

develop a robust Vigilant Guard regional exercise program. 

NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans, in 

the early stages, during concept development workshops, and during final 

coordination. NGB officials told us that regularly scheduled conferences 

between the planning directorates at NORTHCOM and NGB have greatly 

enhanced coordination over the past few months. In addition, NGB 

officials confirmed that NORTHCOM has been routinely providing its draft 

plans to them for comment/review to get the National Guard’s 

perspectives. This review process will be formalized in the next few 

months, when NGB becomes an officially recognized member of the Joint 

Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).38 JPEC coordinates DOD 

efforts and ensures unity in the planning and execution of joint operations,

and includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the

combatant commands and their component commands, sub-unified 

commands, joint task forces, and defense agencies. 

Including NGB in the 

Development of 

NORTHCOM’s Plans 

Provides National Guard 

Perspective 

 38The Chief of NGB initiated the inclusion of NGB as part of JPEC via a letter to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Page 18 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM has also established a Joint Force Orientation Program to 

improve the states’ knowledge on NORTHCOM’s role in response to 

requests for civil support. Several TAGs reported that their and their staffs’ 

involvement in this program enhanced coordination with NORTHCOM. 

The primary objectives of this program are to facilitate a mutual 

understanding of joint operational concepts and information sharing 

between NORTHCOM and the states to help clarify NORTHCOM’s 

supporting role to the states and to improve overall coordination. At the 

time of our audit, the Joint Force Orientation Program was organized into

three phases.

39 The first phase included an overall command briefing and

individual briefings from each NORTHCOM directorate, including 

discussions about NORTHCOM’s training and exercise programs. The 

second phase of the Joint Force Orientation Program discussed more indepth information about NORTHCOM, NGB, and the Joint Forces 

Command. This phase generally covers warfighter doctrine and 

operational application, including joint concepts and terminology, joint 

operational environment, command relationships, joint planning, and joint

logistics. The third phase of the program is designed to be state specific, 

where the process for requesting federal assistance is reviewed and 

issues—such as intelligence sharing and oversight, mobile 

communications, planning, and logistics—are discussed in more detail. 

NORTHCOM provided us with the most recent participation data, and we 

found that all of the states within NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 

have received the first phase of Joint Force Orientation Program training, 

46 states have received phase 2 training, and 19 states have received phase 

3 training.40 NORTHCOM told us that it is working toward providing phase 

3 training to the remaining states. The willingness of the TAGs to 

participate and send their staffs to this training shows how useful the 

information exchanged and relationships developed with NORTHCOM 

during the training are to them. 

Participation of TAGs and 

Their Staffs in Joint Force 

Orientation Program 

Provides Information on 

NORTHCOM’s Supporting 

Role to the States 

 39NORTHCOM merged the first two phases of the Joint Force Orientation Program in 

September 2007, so there are currently only two phases of this program. NORTHCOM’s

goal in merging these phases and scheduling the program over weekends is to save state 

officials travel and training expenses and enable guardsmen to take fewer days off from 

their civilian jobs.

40This updates the information we obtained in our survey on the numbers of TAGs and their

staff who have completed this training (44 TAGs reported that they or their staff had 

participated in the Joint Force Orientation Program). See app. I. The survey did not did not

break out the data by training phases. 

Page 19 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Other ongoing efforts include NORTHCOM’s weekly teleconferences 

throughout the hurricane season to coordinate with local, state, and 

federal partners and discuss potential storms; available resources, 

including EMAC;41 and potential needs or unique capabilities that DOD 

may be asked to provide. For instance, if a hurricane is projected to affect 

the mid-Atlantic states, officials in those states may inquire about 

resources potentially needed—such as helicopters, trucks, or other 

equipment—in advance of the incident, thereby helping affected states to 

more effectively plan their responses. Similarly, NORTHCOM monitors 

wildfire activity and sets up teleconferences with the National Interagency 

Fire Center—which includes state emergency response officials—if it 

appears NORTHCOM may need to assist in fighting the fires. As a result of 

this frequent interaction, NORTHCOM has begun to build more productive 

and effective relationships with the participating states and agencies. 

As part of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, NORTHCOM has 

placed a defense coordinating officer (DCO) in each of FEMA’s 10 regional 

offices and placed greater emphasis on the DCOs’ mission (see fig. 4).42

DCOs are senior-level military officers with joint experience and training 

on the National Response Framework, defense support to civil 

authorities, and DHS’s National Incident Management System.43 They are 

responsible for assisting civil authorities when requested by FEMA, 

providing liaison support and requirements validation, and serving as 

single points of contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that 

need DOD support. DCOs work closely with federal, state, and local 

officials to determine what unique DOD capabilities can be used to assist 

Hurricane and Wildfire 

Conferences Are 

Beginning to Build 

Effective Relationships 

between Participating 

Officials 

Locating Defense 

Coordinating Officers in 

the FEMA Regional Offices

Improves NORTHCOM’s

Relationship with State 

and Local Officials 

 41EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access resources from other

states, including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. In a 

major disaster requiring assistance from multiple states, EMAC will be a principal avenue

for requesting resources. GAO-07-854. 

42Prior to October 1, 2006, training support brigade commanders of the First and Fifth 

Continental U.S. Armies also served as DCOs whenever requested by FEMA or another 

federal agency. Upon establishment of Fifth U.S. Army as the Army component to

NORTHCOM, 10 full-time regional DCOs were established and located in the FEMA 

regional offices. 

43The National Incident Management System provides a consistent nationwide template to 

enable all government, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work together

to better respond to natural disasters and emergencies, including acts of terrorism. This 

system offers a unified approach to incidents and emphasizes standard command 

structures, preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. Training for this system is

administered by FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute. 

Page 20 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
in mitigating the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. According to 

TAGs, FEMA, and NORTHCOM officials, placing DCOs in all of the FEMA 

regional offices and emphasizing the DCOs’ mission has improved 

NORTHCOM’s relationships and coordination with state and local 

officials, as well as with FEMA in day-to-day planning and when an 

incident occurs. For example, in response to FEMA’s request during the 

California wildfires in October 2007, NORTHCOM’s subordinate command, 

Army Forces North, deployed the Region 9 DCO to support the Joint Field 

Office in Pasadena, California and assess and coordinate defense support 

of civil authorities with FEMA. Based on the requirements identified by

state and federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD and the 

National Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular Air 

Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting wildfires. 

Page 21 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Figure 4: FEMA Regions

WI

OH

GA

Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps).

Alaska

Guam

American

Samoa

Hawaii

Puerto Rico

U.S.

Virgin Islands

RI

NJ

DE

Northern

Mariana

Islands

2

Boston

New York

D.C.

Philadelphia

Atlanta

Chicago

Denton

Kansas City

Denver

Seattle

9

Oakland

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

9

10

NORTHCOM’s New State 

Engagement Strategy Is 

Intended to Build 

Relationships with States 

While NORTHCOM relies on NGB as its channel of communications for 

National Guard matters, NORTHCOM’s commander believes that 

developing relationships directly with states will contribute to success in 

saving lives, protecting infrastructure, and promoting a resilient society. 

NORTHCOM is currently developing a state engagement strategy to build 

relationships with appropriate state leadership, including governors, 

TAGs, state homeland security advisors, and emergency managers of 

major metropolitan areas. As part of this strategy, NORTHCOM’s 

Commander has personally met with several state governors and TAGs to 

discuss NORTHCOM’s roles and missions and determine how they can 

Page 22 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
coordinate when responding to an incident. For example, the Commander 

met with TAGs from the northeast region in November 2007 to discuss 

both military coordination and interagency coordination for regional 

domestic operations. The draft strategy also recognizes the importance of 

NORTHCOM working with the states in close coordination with the 

organizations such as NGB and DHS/FEMA, which are responsible for 

coordinating with the states regarding federal matters related to incident 

management. NGB officials told us that working with the states will 

provide NORTHCOM with a greater appreciation for the role and authority 

of the governor and sensitivity to the sovereignty and rights of states. 

While the strategy is designed to build the relationships needed for 

national planning and execution, it does not include established and 

thorough processes for involving states in the development of

NORTHCOM’s plans, obtaining state emergency response plans, or 

facilitating integrated intergovernmental planning. 

We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with the 

states and NGB. First, NORTHCOM officials involve the states minimally 

in the development of NORTHCOM’s major homeland defense and civil 

support plans, and they are not required to do so. Second, NORTHCOM 

generally was not familiar with state emergency response plans and 

capabilities and has no established and thorough process for gaining 

access to this information. Third, a 2005 memorandum of agreement, 

which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and 

NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s roles and

responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. 

Improvements in these areas may help to effectively align NORTHCOM’s 

efforts with other national efforts, as required by the new annex to 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national planning;44 help 

NORTHCOM to manage its overall risk; and better ensure that it will be 

able to fully respond when called upon to perform either of its missions. 

Although the majority of TAGs are familiar to varying degrees with 

NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities 

plans (see table 2), in our survey less than 25 percent reported that they

were involved in developing and reviewing these plans (see table 3). 

NORTHCOM is not required by DOD specifically to involve states in the 

Gaps Remain in 

NORTHCOM’s 

Coordination with the 

States and NGB

NORTHCOM Only 

Minimally Involves States 

in Planning 

 44White House, National Planning. 

Page 23 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
development and review of its homeland defense and support of civil 

authorities plans. However, its strategic vision set forth in its Concept of 

Operations and the recent annex to Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 8 emphasize that plans and capabilities should be synchronized 

at the national, state, and local levels.45 According to several TAGs, 

NORTHCOM should coordinate more with state and local organizations, 

particularly with the National Guard, to develop a good planning and 

operational relationship and to enhance the ability of all organizations to 

plan and respond rapidly in a crisis. We previously reported on the need to 

include state and local jurisdictions in the development of response plans 

because they are key stakeholders and would be on the front lines if an 

incident occurs.46 

Table 2: TAG Familiarity with NORTHCOM’s Plans 

Question Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Slightly 

familiar Not at all

How familiar are you with NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan? 10 (20%) 27 (55%) 9 (18%) 3 (6%)

How familiar are you with NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil 

authorities plan? 12 (24%) 20 (41%) 12 (24%) 5 (10%)

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

Table 3: TAG Involvement in NORTHCOM’s Plan Development 

Plan Planning process Yes No

Attend meetings 7 (14%) 43 (86%)

Comment on draft 12 (24%) 38 (76%)

Homeland defense

Comment on final 7 (14%) 43 (86%)

Attend meetings 7 (14%) 43 (86%)

Comment on draft 12 (24%) 38 (76%)

Defense support of civil authorities 

Comment on final 9 (18%) 41 (82%)

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

 45U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations; White House, Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); and 

White House, National Planning. 

46GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership Roles 

and Improve Pandemic Planning, GAO-07-1257T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2007). 

Page 24 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
In the case of homeland defense, NORTHCOM planners told us that, as the 

official channel of communication for National Guard related matters, 

NGB provides the states’ perspectives when commenting on 

NORTHCOM’s plans. The planners also said that further state involvement 

in the development of NORTHCOM’s plan is not required because (1) this 

is a strategic-level concept plan47 that does not require such detail and 

(2) NORTHCOM is the lead during a homeland defense incident. NGB 

officials told us that as requested in NORTHCOM homeland defense plan,

they have collected and reviewed states’ supporting homeland defense 

plans and, to the extent possible, have attempted to represent these 

perspectives when commenting on NORTHCOM’s homeland defense 

plan.48 However, an NGB planning official told us that the states have 

differing perspectives, and NORTHCOM could better learn about these 

differences by reviewing the individual state plans. In addition, while NGB 

provides information of National Guard capabilities, the states may have 

other capabilities and requirements that NORTHCOM should be aware of. 

By only relying on NGB, NORTHCOM may not be able to maintain 

awareness of the environment in which the command may be operating, 

including critical infrastructure locations relevant to its operations, which 

is important to fully carrying out its homeland defense mission. 

In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response 

Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal 

agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM 

officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to states to 

obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future revisions of 

NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan. In order to 

effectively develop a civil support plan, NORTHCOM needs to know what 

its requirements may be. DOD recognizes that these requirements are 

driven both by the capabilities gaps of the primary federal agencies and 

those of the state and local governments.49 In either homeland defense or 

 47Because NORTHCOM’s plans are broader concept plans rather than more detailed 

operational plans, they are not focused on specific scenarios and discrete sets of required 

capabilities needed to accomplish objectives. 

48NORTHCOM’s homeland defense concept plan specifically requested that NGB facilitate 

the states in providing supporting plans and forward these to NORTHCOM. NGB received 

no indication that these plans had been reviewed, and NORTHCOM officials were not clear 

about the status and completeness of these supporting plans. 

49As we reported separately, NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of 

its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with other federal agencies. 

However, NORTHCOM lacks formal guidance to coordinate its planning effort with its 

agency partners. GAO-08-251. 

Page 25 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the 

development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate 

intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall 

coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions 

and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.50 

NORTHCOM Lacks 

Familiarity with State 

Emergency Response 

Plans and May Not Be 

Aware of Capabilities and 

Potential Gaps 

We found that NORTHCOM generally was not familiar with state 

emergency response plans and has not obtained detailed information on 

states’ plans and capabilities to determine the specific challenges it may 

face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. 

According to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM 

is not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ plan (see table 4). In

written comments in our survey, several TAGs reported that NORTHCOM 

should be more familiar with state emergency response plans, and should 

determine how best to support the states’ plans and, where appropriate,

incorporate these plans to ensure a unified effort. Developing a 

synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of 

government is important for a coordinated national response to domestic 

incidents.51 In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with these plans 

because it has no established and thorough process regarding 

coordination with the states or for gaining access to emergency response 

plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to obtain information on 

state emergency response plans or determine state and local capabilities 

and potential resource gaps.52 NORTHCOM planners told us that they do

not need access to state emergency response plans because they are doing

strategic-level concept plans and this level of detail would be more 

appropriate for tactical level planning, such as planning done by 

 50Catastrophic incidents by their nature cut across geographic and political boundaries, and 

these events require fully integrated intergovernmental actions. Department of Homeland 

Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report. 

51The annex to the 2003 National Preparedness Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 

issued in December 2007, establishes a comprehensive approach to national planning for

homeland security and requires that the federal government more closely integrate federal,

state, local, and tribal plans with respect to capability assessments. White House, National 

Planning, 4. 

52DHS has compiled and reviewed the state emergency response plans. Department of

Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report. 

Page 26 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, like Army Forces North.53

However, NGB and FEMA officials told us that one of NORTHCOM’s 

biggest challenges is its current inability to anticipate the capabilities and 

requirements of state and local governments during a civil support 

incident because of the lack of advanced planning and coordination 

between NORTHCOM, states, and local governments. Furthermore, 

NORTHCOM officials told us that the complexity of the planning involved 

for a large-scale disaster is such that even if states can adequately plan for 

the resources they will need, they do not always have adequate multistate 

plans to integrate the state, local, federal, and nongovernmental responses. 

By not obtaining and using information on state plans and capabilities, 

NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be adequately prepared to 

respond to an incident with the needed resources, including the types, 

numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment). 

Table 4: NORTHCOM’s Familiarity with State Emergency Response Plans

Question Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Slightly 

familiar Not at all

How familiar, if at all, do you think NORTHCOM is with your state’s 

Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan? 1 (4%) 11 (42%) 12 (46%) 2 (8%)

Source: GAO analysis of TAG survey responses. 

Note: TAGs were asked to respond to this question if they had provided NORTHCOM with a copy of 

the state’s Homeland Security/Emergency Operations Plan, and 26 TAGs responded. 

One of NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, JTF-CS,54 has been 

collecting state emergency response plans so that if called upon to provide 

assistance in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosive (CBRNE) incident, its Commander will have as much advance 

information as possible regarding state plans, resources, and potential 

 53NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part

because DOD has required NORTHCOM to complete concept plans, which are more 

general plans that do not entail the assignment of specific forces. GAO-08-251. Recently

approved national planning guidance requires DOD and other federal agencies to prepare

more detailed plans. White House, National Planning. 

54JTF-CS is a subordinate command to NORTHCOM and is responsible for planning and 

integrating DOD support to states or other federal agencies following a CBRNE incident. 

JTF-CS facilitates the development of capability-based force packages and modules to meet 

various CBRNE incident management options. When directed by NORTHCOM to respond 

to an incident, JTF-CS will arrive on site to gain situational awareness and report back to

NORTHCOM for preparation of an estimate of what is needed from DOD. JTF-CS was 

performing this mission 3 years prior to NORTHCOM being established in 2002. 

Page 27 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
areas where assistance may be required. JTF-CS found that some state and

local governments are reluctant to share their plans because they fear that

DOD will “grade” their plans or that potential capability gaps will be made 

public, with an accompanying political cost. A NORTHCOM official told us 

that there will always be some tension between the states and DOD and 

other federal agencies as a result of the nation’s constitutional structure. 

JTF-CS is therefore extremely careful about how it shares its emergency 

plan analyses and has made progress in gaining access to these plans 

through DHS. 

DHS has collected and assessed state emergency response plans as part of

a nationwide plan review to determine the status of catastrophic planning

for states and 75 of the nation’s largest urban areas.55 Participation in the 

review was a prerequisite for receipt of fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland 

security grant funds. The review concluded that no individual plan or 

resource base can fully absorb and respond to a catastrophe and that 

unsystematic planning and the absence of an integrated planning system is 

a national operational vulnerability. The annex to Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 8, issued in December 2007, directs the 

establishment of a comprehensive approach to national planning through 

an integrated planning system.56 This system is to include, among other 

things, a description of the process that (1) links regional, state, local, and

tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to 

inform the development of federal plans and (2) fosters the integration of 

such plans and allows for state, local, and tribal capability assessments to 

feed into federal plans. DHS may, therefore, be one source from which 

NORTHCOM could obtain information on state emergency response plans 

and capabilities. 

Given its relationship with the states, NGB could also be a conduit for 

NORTHCOM to share its plans with states and obtain information on 

states plans and capabilities. In addition, NGB officials suggested that 

emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) could be a potential 

conduit for NORTHCOM and states to share plans. EPLOs are senior 

reserve officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who 

represent the federal military in each state and in each of the 10 FEMA 

regional offices. EPLOs coordinate the provision of military personnel, 

 55Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1 Report

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2006), and Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report. 

56White House, National Planning. 

Page 28 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
equipment, and supplies to support the emergency relief and cleanup

efforts of civil authorities. According to NGB officials, expanding the 

EPLO program to include sharing plans with states would provide a closer

link between NORTHCOM and the states without the sensitivity of state

sovereignty issues. The DCOs who are also located in FEMA’s 10 regional

offices could potentially serve as NORTHCOM’s points of contact for the 

EPLOs. 

NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its 

homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 

agencies.57 However, in its role either in support of other federal agencies 

or as the primary agency in homeland defense incidents, NORTHCOM 

does not have adequate information on states’ plans and capabilities. By 

minimally involving the states in its homeland defense and civil support 

plans and not becoming familiar with information on states’ emergency 

response plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may 

not be prepared with the needed resources to respond to an incident. 

These gaps may be attributable in part to the fact that NORTHCOM does 

not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and 

interacting with the states. One model of such a process is NORTHCOM’s 

security cooperation plans with Canada and Mexico, since the states are 

each separate governments within the federal system.58 For example, 

NORTHCOM’s cooperation plan with Canada and Mexico outlines a 

strategy for planning, assessing, and executing security objectives and 

other strategic priorities. These objectives include advancing common 

interests, reducing impediments to cooperation, encouraging improved 

capabilities and willingness to operate in coalition, and improving 

combined homeland defense capabilities. Without a similar kind of 

cooperation plan for the states within its area of responsibility, 

NORTHCOM cannot optimally involve the TAGs and other state or local 

officials in its planning activities and develop a process for obtaining and

using information on state emergency plans and capabilities. Moreover, 

without such a cooperation plan, NORTHCOM is not likely to reduce 

confusion, facilitate effective planning, and facilitate effective and efficient 

responses to incidents. 

 57GAO-08-251. 

58DOD requires combatant commanders to have security cooperation plans with foreign

governments. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 

2006), I-3, I-4, GL-21. 

Page 29 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
DHS’s National Response Framework and NORTHCOM’s Concept of 

Operations both emphasize that NORTHCOM should coordinate with 

federal, state, and local partners before, during, and after an incident.59

Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has 

experience working with state and local authorities during incidents and it 

functions as NORTHCOM’s formal link to the states. We previously 

reported that as with preparing for and responding to any type of disaster, 

leadership roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined, effectively 

communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective 

decision making. Furthermore, we reported that without clearly defined

roles and responsibilities, the potential remains for confusion and gaps or 

duplication by the combatant commands relative to other agencies.60 The 

National Strategy for Homeland Security also emphasizes that a lack of

clarity regarding roles and responsibilities across all levels of government 

can lead to gaps in the national response and delay the ability to provide 

life-saving support when needed.

61 

NORTHCOM and NGB 

Responsibilities for 

Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support Are Not 

Clearly Defined 

In July 2005, NORTHCOM and NGB signed a memorandum of agreement 

outlining their command and coordination relationship. This 

memorandum, which is intended to provide the procedures by which the 

two entities interact, broadly establishes that NORTHCOM and NGB “will 

coordinate on policy, program and planning actions related to missions 

and requirements affecting the National Guard.” The memorandum further 

provides for the location of a small NGB office at NORTHCOM to advise 

NORTHCOM’s Commander regarding National Guard-related issues.62 The 

mission of this office is to advise and assist NORTHCOM’s Commander on

all matters involving the National Guard, provide a conduit to NGB leaders 

and staff, and promote integration of National Guard priorities and 

capabilities into NORTHCOM’s plans and operations. The staff members of

 59Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, and U.S. Northern

Command, Concept of Operations. 

60GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts Could 

Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk Mitigation, GAO-07-696 

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to 

Disasters, GAO-07-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007); and Emergency Preparedness

and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents, 

GAO-06-467T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).

61Homeland Security council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 32.

62The memorandum limits the staff in the NGB liaison office to eight; there are currently 

four staff assigned to the office. 

Page 30 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
this office provide input to numerous requests for information from 

NORTHCOM. This office is not intended to serve as the only point of 

coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB. Officials told us that there is

no formal process in place for the NORTHCOM National Guard Office to

coordinate with NGB headquarters. Such a process could improve 

coordination between the NGB liaison office and NGB headquarters. 

Our analysis of the memorandum, NORTHCOM’s Concept of Operations, 

the regulation describing the organization and function of NGB, and other 

documents showed that there is no detailed guidance on NORTHCOM’s 

and NGB’s roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and defense 

support of civil authorities. Clearly defined responsibilities help to ensure 

unity of effort, prevent duplication, and enable efficient use of resources. 

As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities between 

NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances in which there was 

confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted efforts. For example, some 

TAGs survey responses indicated that because responsibilities are not 

clearly defined, both NGB and NORTHCOM are requesting the same 

information during an incident. In addition, NORTHCOM’s homeland 

defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland defense plans and 

make them available to NORTHCOM. NGB compiled and reviewed these 

plans from the states and territories within NORTHCOM’s area of 

responsibility and made them available to NORTHCOM on its Web portal.

However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that they did not request 

that NGB compile these plans and that, in fact, they do not have a need for 

state supporting plans because such plans will not affect how 

NORTHCOM’s strategic-level homeland defense concept plan is written. 

Nevertheless, NGB spent resources collecting information that has not 

been used by NORTHCOM. As discussed above, we believe NORTHCOM 

officials should be reviewing these plans to ensure that they have 

sufficient awareness of the environment in which they may be operating to 

fully carry out the command’s homeland defense mission. 

In addition, we found that NGB has developed a Joint Capabilities 

Database that includes all National Guard capabilities and has made this 

database available for NORTHCOM’s use. However, NORTHCOM officials 

told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB staff 

to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. NGB 

officials also told us that they have not encouraged NORTHCOM to use the 

database thus far because they are still finalizing the procedure for 

maintaining and updating the database with information from all states 

and territories. The officials said that they expect to have these issues 

worked out within the next few months in advance of the hurricane 

Page 31 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
season and to begin to encourage NORTHCOM to make use of the 

database. NGB’s goal with the database is to provide a national look at the 

National Guard’s capabilities. 

Without clearly defined lines of coordination and roles and responsibility, 

federal efforts may not be used in the most effective and efficient manner. 

This is increasingly important as DOD is currently developing a database 

of federal emergency response capabilities, including those for active and 

reserve DOD units and National Guard capabilities in each state,63 and 

FEMA is currently developing a list of organizations and functions within 

DOD that may be used to provide support to civil authorities during 

natural or man-made disasters.64 Coordinating all of these efforts will be 

critical to ensuring the efficient use of federal resources as well as to 

reduce the risk of potential capabilities gaps. 

An NGB official told us that NORTHCOM and NGB have not revised the 

2005 memorandum of agreement to more clearly define their 

responsibilities because they were waiting for the National Guard 

Empowerment Act,65 which was partially incorporated into the National 

Defense Authorization Act for 2008,66 to be signed into law and,

subsequently, for a new NGB charter to be developed and issued by the 

Secretary of Defense.67 The National Guard Empowerment Act includes 

provisions that may enhance the level of coordination between 

NORTHCOM and NGB. For example, the Secretary of Defense is required

to prepare a plan coordinating the use of the National Guard and members 

of the armed forces on active duty when responding to an incident and 

include protocols for DOD, NGB, and the governors of the states to carry 

out operations in coordination with one another.68 An NGB official told us 

that the process of preparing this plan will require more coordination 

between NORTHCOM and NGB. More important, NGB’s charter, which is 

currently undergoing revision based on the new act, potentially could 

resolve a number of ambiguities by more clearly defining the roles and 

 63Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1406 (2006). 

64Pub. L. No. 109-295 § 651 (2006). 

65Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1801 (2008). 

66Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§ 1811-1813 (2008). 

67This act was passed in January 2008, and NGB’s charter is currently being revised. 

68Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1814 (2008). 

Page 32 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
responsibilities of NGB and its relationships with other agencies, such as 

NORTHCOM. Further, the NGB official told us that the revised charter will 

greatly simplify negotiations of a revised memorandum between the two 

agencies. Without clearly defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and 

NGB, there is the potential for a lack of effective coordination between the 

two agencies and duplicative or wasted efforts. Clearly identifying roles 

and responsibilities is increasingly important because responding to a 

major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared 

responsibility of many agencies across all levels of government and cannot

be effectively accomplished by one agency.

69 Without effective interagency 

coordination and planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 

there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to 

respond to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in

the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.70 

Within the federal government, there is an increasing realization that the 

nation needs to integrate not just the response to an incident, but also the 

plans of many entities at all the levels involved in responding to such 

incidents. This planning integration will help ensure that when the federal

government responds, its response will be as effective as possible. 

NORTHCOM’s recent efforts to coordinate with states and NGB have 

helped address some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil

support planning process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to 

coordinate in the event of an actual incident. However, without an 

established and thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using 

information on state emergency plans and capabilities—whether from 

coordination with DHS or NGB or from direct interaction with states—

NORTHCOM may be missing opportunities to better plan its missions and 

manage its risk in a more informed manner. Moreover, NORTHCOM may 

not be fully prepared to support states, resulting in ineffective planning

and fragmented, uncoordinated responses to incidents. 

Conclusions 

Given that NORTHCOM and NGB both have increasingly important 

responsibilities for homeland defense and defense support of civil 

 69Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

70White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned; House of 

Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 

to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina; U.S. Senate, 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared; and GAO-06-808T. 

Page 33 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
authorities, it is imperative that these entities work together to effectively

prepare for DOD’s response to an incident. Without fully and clearly 

defined responsibilities for NORTHCOM and NGB, confusion and 

duplicative or potentially wasted efforts may result, causing an inefficient 

use of DOD resources during a time of increased military operations and a 

growing fiscal imbalance. Further, without clear guidance on their 

responsibilities, the risk is increased that these agencies’ responses to an 

incident may be ineffective and inefficient, potentially increasing response 

time and risking the safety of the U.S. population and infrastructure. 

To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM to develop an 

established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, 

including provisions for 

• involving the states in NORTHCOM’s planning processes, 

• obtaining information on state emergency response plans and capabilities, 

and 

• using such information to improve the development and execution of its 

concept plans. 

To improve NORTHCOM’s coordination with NGB, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct NORTHCOM and NGB to revise the 

memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to include 

fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for NORTHCOM, NGB, 

and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the 

intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and 

planning to take to address the recommendations. DOD and FEMA also 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report 

where appropriate. 

In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM develop an 

established and thorough process to guide its coordination with the states, 

DOD agreed that such a process should be developed to guide the 

coordination between local, state, and federal governments. Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1 requires that DHS develop an 

integrated planning system consisting of a synchronized system of plans 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 34 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
that integrates federal, state, and local operational capabilities to affect a 

coordinated national response. DOD told us that the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and NGB are currently in

coordination with DHS in developing the integrated planning system. We 

believe that developing this system would meet the intent of our 

recommendation if it provides NORTHCOM with an established and 

thorough process for requesting, obtaining, and using information on state 

emergency plans and capabilities and improves the development and 

execution of their concept plans, thereby helping NORTHCOM to manage 

its risk in a more informed manner. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM and NGB revise 

their memorandum of agreement or develop an alternate document to 

include fully and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for 

NORTHCOM, NGB, and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office and stated 

that a revision to the memorandum is currently being coordinated. We 

believe that providing clear guidance on roles and responsibilities will help 

to ensure that these agencies’ responses to an incident will be effective 

and efficient, potentially reducing response time and enhancing the safety

of the U.S. population and infrastructure. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other

interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 35 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

 and Management 

Page 36 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
List of Requesters 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Kit Bond 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

House of Representatives 

Page 37 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey 

Results 

Page 38 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results

Page 39 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results

Page 40 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results

Page 41 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Questionnaire and Survey Results

Page 42 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

In conducting this review, we focused our scope on U.S. Northern 

Command’s (NORTHCOM) coordination with the states and the National 

Guard Bureau (NGB). We excluded NORTHCOM’s coordination with other 

federal agencies and organizations and nongovernmental organizations 

because this is addressed in a companion report. Our review focused on 

NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts occurring since Hurricane Katrina in

2005. In addressing our objectives, we interviewed and obtained 

information and related documents from officials at the following 

locations: 

• NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, 

Colorado 

• Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

• The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

• U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas 

• Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair, 

Washington, D.C. 

• NGB, Arlington, Virginia 

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Washington, D.C. 

• U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C. 

We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the state 

adjutants general, also known as TAGs, from Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, 

and Washington. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the 

states, we surveyed the TAGs who are within NORTHCOM’s area of 

responsibility. We asked respondents about their familiarity and 

involvement in NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan and the defense 

support of civil authorities plan. We also asked about their experiences in

Page 43 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

working and communicating with NORTHCOM, including their 

participation in NORTHCOM exercises and involvement of NORTHCOM in 

their state exercises. The questionnaire and survey responses can be found 

in appendix I. We sent a questionnaire to TAGs of all 49 states in 

NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility and the District of Columbia.1

 

The self-administered electronic survey was sent via electronic mail to the 

TAGs and their chiefs of staff. More specifically, we sent the questionnaire 

by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents could 

return electronically after marking checkboxes or entering narrative 

responses into open answer boxes. Alternatively, respondents could 

return it by mail after printing the form and completing it by hand. We sent 

the original electronic questionnaire on April 4, 2007. We sent out 

reminder e-mail messages, with replacement surveys, at different time 

intervals to all nonrespondents in order to encourage a higher response 

rate. In addition, we made several courtesy telephone calls to 

nonrespondents to encourage their completion. All questionnaires were 

returned by September 19, 2007. We achieved a 100 percent response rate. 

The survey used was not a sample survey because it included the universe 

of respondents. Therefore, the survey has no sampling errors. However, 

the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 

commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in 

interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to 

respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can 

introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in 

developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to 

minimize such nonsampling errors. For example, social science survey 

specialists designed the questionnaire in collaboration with GAO staff who 

had subject matter expertise. In addition to an internal expert technical 

review by GAO’s Survey Coordination Group, we pretested the survey with 

two TAGs by telephone to ensure that the questions were relevant, clearly

stated, and easy to understand. Since there were relatively few changes 

based on the pretests and we were conducting surveys with the universe 

of respondents, we did not find it necessary to conduct additional pretests. 

Instead, changes to the content and format of the questionnaire were made 

after the pretests based on the feedback we received. When we analyzed

the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. All data 

 1

Since Hawaii falls under U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, it was not within 

the scope of this study. 

Page 44 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

were double keyed during the data-entry process, and GAO staff verified a 

sample of the resulting data to ensure accuracy. 

In addition to analyzing the frequency and distribution of marked 

checkbox survey responses, we also analyzed the open-ended narrative 

survey responses for trends and recurring themes. For instance, although 

we did not directly ask a question about the defense coordinating officers 

(DCO) now located in each FEMA region, the DCOs were cited several 

times by TAGs as improving their communications with NORTHCOM. 

When the TAGs were not in agreement or had different perspectives on 

issues, we also summarized conflicting responses to illustrate the 

complexity of NORTHCOM’s unique relationship with the states and any 

ongoing efforts to resolve these issues. For example, some TAGs believed 

that NGB should be the state’s primary channel of communication with 

NORTHCOM, but others disagreed. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM is coordinating with the 

states and NGB, we reviewed plans, guidance, and other documents, 

including the memorandum of agreement between NORTHCOM and NGB. 

In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials from 

NORTHCOM and several of its subordinate commands, including the Joint 

Task Force-Civil Support, Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol 

Region, and Army Forces North, as well as officials from NGB 

headquarters and the NORTHCOM National Guard Office. We also 

conducted interviews with the officials from FEMA and DHS’s interagency 

Incident Management Planning Team. Additionally, we observed a major 

exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May 

2007. 

We conducted our review from April 2007 to April 2008 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

Page 45 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 49 GAO-08-252 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagonstinod@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant 

Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Joanna Chan; Angela Jacobs; David Keefer; 

Joseph Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Erin Noel; Terry Richardson; and 

Jena Whitley made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Homeland Defense
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 

Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other

Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ 

Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact 

on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of 

Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. 

GAO-08-457T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private 

Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to 

Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion 

Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership

Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation

of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 18, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,

D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts 

Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 

Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic

Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2007. 

Page 50 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to 

Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated 

National Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for

21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 

2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery

Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 

Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-

498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T.

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Page 51 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
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Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 

November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally 

Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

(351091) Page 52 GAO-08-252 Homeland Defense
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