S. Hrg. 115–317 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: EXPLOITING 

VULNERABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 25, 2018 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–696 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. Hrg. 115–317 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: EXPLOITING 

VULNERABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 25, 2018 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

DOUG JONES, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BONNI DINERSTEIN, Hearing Clerk 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

ANDREW DOCKHAM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Minority Staff Director 

KATE KIELCESKI, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 5 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 9 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 22 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 32 

Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................................ 34 

Senator Daines ................................................................................................. 37 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 55 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 60 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2018 

Joseph P. Murphy, Chief, Internationl Postal Affairs, Office of Specialized 

and Technical Agencies, Bureau of International Organizations, U.S. Department of State ................................................................................................. 11 

Robert Cintron, Vice President, Network Operations Management, United 

States Postal Service; accompanied by Guy Cottrell, Chief Postal Inspector, 

United States Postal Service ............................................................................... 13 

Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 14 

William Siemer, Acting Deputy Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, United States Postal Service ...................................................................... 16 

Daniel D. Baldwin, Section Chief, Office of Global Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice .................................... 18 

Gregory Nevano, Deputy Assistant Director, Illicit Trade, Travel, and Finance 

Division, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ..................................... 20 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Baldwin, Daniel D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 90 

Cintron, Robert: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 

Murphy, Joseph P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65 

Nevano, Gregory: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96 

Owen, Todd C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Siemer, William: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 84 
Page

IV 

APPENDIX 

Staff Report .............................................................................................................. 105 

Exhibit A .................................................................................................................. 205

Statement from the National Treasury Employees Union ................................... 215 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Murphy ....................................................................................................... 219 

Mr. Cintron ....................................................................................................... 223 

Mr. Owen ........................................................................................................... 230 

Mr. Siemer ........................................................................................................ 267 

Mr. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... 269 
(1) 

1The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: 

EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES IN 

INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rob Portman, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Portman, Lankford, Daines, Johnson, Carper, 

Heitkamp, and Hassan. 

Also present: Senator Klobuchar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN1

Senator PORTMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

Thank you all for being here. Today’s hearing continues the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ work to combat the opioid 

epidemic that is gripping our communities around the country. 

Last Congress, the Subcommittee issued a bipartisan report on 

opioid-related fraud and abuse in the Medicare Part D program. 

This Congress, the Subcommittee held a hearing on the growing 

problem of individuals buying illicit opioids over the Internet and 

shipping them to the United States through the mail. 

The opioid crisis, sadly, continues to get worse, not better. Last 

month, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that more 

than 63,600 Americans died in 2016 from drug overdoses. Indications are that number increased in 2017. 

These overdose deaths are shocking. The number of deaths continue to grow. My own home State of Ohio, we were told recently, 

is now second in the country in terms of overdose deaths. 

It is heartbreaking, and increasingly, these overdoses are due to 

a synthetic heroin, illegal versions of fentanyl, a drug that is 50 to 

100 times stronger than heroin. In fact, in Ohio, fentanyl and its 

variations were involved in 60 percent of the overdose deaths last 

year. It has become the number one killer in Ohio. 

The vast majority of illegal fentanyl is purchased online from 

labs in China and then shipped to the United States through the 

mail. We will hear from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) today 
2 

1The Subcommittee report appears in the Appendix on page 105. 

about that, but I think it is shocking to people when they find out 

that this is coming through our U.S. mail system. 

Last night, the Subcommittee released its bipartisan report. I 

hope you all have seen it, how criminals exploit vulnerabilities in 

international mail and use the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to ship 

illicit opioids into our country. 

Without objection, I would move that the Subcommittee’s report 

be entered into the record.1

After our initial 2017 hearing, we set out to find out how easy 

it is to purchase fentanyl online and how it was shipped to the 

United States. What we discovered, of course, was it was 

shockingly easy to do so. All you had to do was search ‘‘fentanyl 

for sale.’’ That simple search returned hundreds of websites, many 

affiliated with Chinese labs, all openly advertising illegal drugs. 

The field was narrowed to just six websites, and we sent emails 

asking basic questions about how to purchase and ship fentanyl to 

the United States. 

These online sellers were quick to respond, unafraid of getting 

caught apparently, and ready to make a deal. You will see that in 

the report. They offered discounts for bulk purchases, even tried to 

up-sell us to carfentanil, a more powerful synthetic heroin that is 

so strong, it is used as an elephant tranquilizer. 

Ordering these drugs was as easy as buying any other product 

online. I must note our Subcommittee never completed a purchase 

of drugs online. It was just too dangerous to risk exposing someone 

to deadly fentanyl during delivery. But we did use the online seller’s payment information to determine if others were buying, and 

of course, we found out they were. Just from these six websites 

alone, we identified more than 500 payments to online sellers by 

more than 300 Americans, totaling $230,000, most of which occurred over the last two years. This is just a small sample, only 

six websites, and then, frankly, we used just one payment system 

to be able to identify some of these buyers. 

The 300 people, by the way, were located in 43 different States, 

with individuals from my home State of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 

Florida sending the most money to online sellers. 

The map that we have back here behind us shows the concentration of where most of the purchases were made. That is also in the 

report. 

We also asked how the online sellers would ship the drugs to us. 

Every single one of them preferred to use the U.S. Postal Service. 

They did not want to use the private carriers like Dalsey, Hillblom 

and Lynn (DHL), Federal Express (FedEx), United Parcel Service 

(UPS). They wanted to use the Postal Service. They told us they 

used the Postal Service because the chances of the drugs getting 

seized were so insignificant that delivery was essentially guaranteed. 

We were also able to track hundreds of packages related to these 

online purchases. We identified seven people out of the 300 who 

died from fentanyl-related overdoses after sending money to and 

receiving packages from these online sellers. 
3 

One of these individuals who died was a 49-year-old Ohioan from 

the Cleveland area who sent about $2,500 to an online seller, received 15 packages through the Postal Service over a 10-month period. His autopsy confirmed that he died from acute fentanyl intoxication just weeks after he received a package from this online seller. 

By analyzing more than 2 million lines of shipment data obtained in our investigation, we located three individuals in the 

United States who were likely distributing these drugs. We identified more than 120 instances of different people sending a payment 

to an online seller in China and then a day or two later receiving 

a package from one single Pennsylvania address. 

The person at this Pennsylvania address, by the way, was working with the online seller to domestically transship drug purchases. 

Shipping data reviewed during the course of the investigation 

also indicated other individuals who purchased items to make pills, 

including pill presses, chemical bonding agents, and empty pill casings. It is not surprising that people are ordering fentanyl online 

to sell. The profit margins are just staggering. 

Based on DEA estimates, the street value of the online transactions from just the six websites the Subcommittee investigated 

translates to about $760 million in fentanyl pills to sell on the 

streets of our communities. 

We are already working with law enforcement authorities to 

make sure these drug dealers can be brought to justice and will 

continue to do so after this hearing. 

But our findings today show the crucial role Advanced Electronic 

Data (AED) can play in protecting our country and fighting the 

opioid epidemic. 

We also need some legislative changes. Last year, the Postal 

Service only received advanced electronic data on about 36 percent 

of the more than 498 million international packages coming into 

our country, so about 500 million packages a year and only about 

36 percent of them have the advanced electronic data that allows 

law enforcement to identify these suspicious packages. This means 

that about 318 million international packages came here with no 

data; therefore, no ability for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

or other law enforcement we will hear from today to target these 

packages for screening. 

We did not know with regard to 318 million packages who sent 

it, where it was going, or what was in it, and this is a massive 

loophole that is undermining the safety and security of our country. 

In addition, the data we do get from foreign posts that we reviewed during our investigation appears to be of questionable quality, so it is only 36 percent, but even much of that data is not helpful. At times, the data was nothing more than illogical lines of letters and characters entered by someone who did not understand 

how to construct a standard American address. 

Even when CBP has the data and targets a package, the Postal 

Service fails to locate it about 20 percent of the time. Again, advanced electronic data, 36 percent, much of that data is not very 

helpful, and even when law enforcement says, ‘‘Aha. We have a 

package here that looks like it is suspicious. We would like to look 
4 

at it,’’ 20 percent of the time, they cannot find the package. It gets 

through. 

What we are left with is a Federal Government whose policies 

and procedures are wholly inadequate to prevent the use of international mail to ship illegal synthetic opioids into the United 

States. 

In contrast, our Postal Service provides data on about 90 percent 

of the packages that it ships to foreign posts. So about 90 percent 

of what we send out, we do provide that electronic data to foreign 

governments. 

After September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attacks on that day, 

collecting advanced electronic data was identified as a national priority for all the right reasons. 

In 2002, in fact, Congress required private carriers to collect this 

data, so UPS, FedEx, DHL, and others were required to collect it. 

It was left up to the discretion of the Postmaster General and the 

Treasury Department with regard to the Postal Service. They were 

encouraged to do it, encouraged to study it, but it was left up to 

their discretion. 

For more than a dozen years, nothing happened, essentially, 

leaving Customs and Border Protection to manually inspect targeted packages, which is the equivalent, of course, to finding a needle in a haystack, again, now 500 million packages. Then it was 

not that many, but hundreds of millions. 

To their credit, the Postal Service and CBP started a pilot program in late 2015 to target suspicious packages from China using 

advanced electronic data, but our investigation found a lack of 

planning, the different missions of the agencies, and personality 

conflicts hampered the success even of the pilot program that was 

started in 2015. 

That pilot program, by the way, started at John F. Kennedy 

(JFK) International Airport, and our investigators were able to see 

that in action. 

Despite these problems, the Postal Service’s head of Global Trade 

Compliance wrote that the pilot program allowed them to ‘‘put a 

positive spin’’ on stopping opioids. 

While both CBP and the Postal Service agreed the pilot should 

be rolled out to all international mail facilities, they only started 

that after this Subcommittee held its May 2017 hearing. We are 

glad they did it. We are glad the hearing encouraged them to do 

it. 

We learned that this process was conveniently completed just 

days in advance of this hearing, earlier this week. Again, I think 

this hearing probably motivated some action, which is good, but 

this should have been a priority without having to hold this hearing. It should not take a congressional investigation into the Postal 

Service and what is happening with international mail to get our 

government to do its job. 

One part of the solution is more data, and that is why we have 

introduced the Synthetic Trafficking and Overdose Prevention Act 

(STOP Act), which would require advanced electronic data on international packages shipped through the Postal Service. 
5 

1The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

We currently have 29 cosponsors on both sides of the aisle, and 

I know this report and hearing will put pressure on us here in the 

Senate to finally take some action. 

I really want to thank Senator Carper and his staff for working 

so closely with us on this investigation. There is a lot more to be 

done to turn the tide of the opioid epidemic, clearly, but stopping 

these deadly drugs from ever reaching our streets is certainly a 

good start. 

As the coauthor of the Comprehensive Addiction Recovery Act 

(CARA), I have focused most of my career, actually over the last 

20-some years, on prevention, treatment, and longer-term recovery. 

That is all important, but keeping this poison from coming into our 

communities is something we can and should do. 

Just in the past week near Toledo Ohio, five individuals 

overdosed and three died, fentanyl-related overdoses. It is so bad 

that officials issued an opioid advisory warning to the public begging them to stay away from what was clearly a ‘‘bad batch of 

opioids’’ in northwest Ohio. 

How many more people have to die before this poison stops coming into our communities, before we take the steps, the simple 

steps, to at least understand where the suspicious packages are 

and how to get them offline and not delivered to a post office box 

here in America? How many people have to die before this happens? 

Yes, the Postal Service is in desperate need of comprehensive reform, and nobody has been more involved with that than Senator 

Carper, but it is shocking that we are still so unprepared to police 

the mail arriving into our country. 

Again, I want to thank Senator Carper and his staff for working 

so closely with us. 

The Chairman of the full Committee has now joined us, Senator 

Johnson. I am going to ask him if he has any brief opening remarks. 

And I will turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER1

Senator CARPER. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want 

to thank you for your ongoing leadership on a really tough issue 

and an important challenge facing our Nation, delighted to be 

joined by our full Committee Chairman today too. 

I want to thank our staffs, Democratic and Republican staffs. 

There has been a fair amount of discussion of late about how we 

do not work together on this issue. We work together. We are one, 

and there is no space between us on this issue, and frankly, on a 

lot of others. 

I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today, for the work 

that you do, and for the work that is done by the people who are 

your colleagues. 

This is an oversight hearing, but this is also a result of an investigation. A big part of our job on the full Committee is to do oversight, and broadly over the Federal Government, this is oversight 

and investigation on something that we all care deeply about. 
6 

No State has been immune to the damage that these drugs have 

caused, including my home State of Delaware. I went to Ohio 

State, Navy ROTC midshipman, I used to think Delaware was a 

little town just north of Columbus, but it turned out to be a whole 

State. I have been fortunate to be able to represent them for a 

while. 

But whether it is Delaware, Ohio or the State of Delaware, this 

is an enormous challenge that we face, and it is an all-hands-ondeck moment, and it requires an all-the-above strategy. It is not 

enough just to deal with the symptoms of the problems, and we 

will be talking a lot about that today—but also the root cause of 

these problems. We have to do both. 

According to the Division of Forensic Science in my State, more 

and more Delawareans are dying from opioids every year. In 2014, 

we lost 222 people. In 2015, we lost 228 people. In 2016, we lost 

308 people. They are not just numbers. They are mothers and fathers. They are brothers and sisters. They are sons and daughters, 

aunts and uncles, grandparents, all the above. 

Just last month, it was reported that emergency responders in 

our largest county—we only have three, but our largest county 

where my wife and I live, raised our family, in New Castle County, 

were dispatched to a reported drug overdose every 80 minutes. By 

early November of last year, paramedics there had administered 

Naloxone, a drug that can block or reverse the effects of an opioid 

overdose. They had administered to nearly 600 patients. 

All told, opioids are now the leading cause of drug overdose 

deaths, killing more than 42,000 people nationwide in 2016. 

Last year, our Subcommittee set out to learn what the Federal 

Government is doing to stop these drugs from entering our country. 

In May, we heard testimony from officials from the Postal Service, from Customs and Border Protection, from the State Department in addition to several experts and first responders on the 

ground in Ohio, Delaware, and elsewhere who grapple every day 

with the impact opioids are having on our communities. They told 

us how opioids are getting into our communities through the mail 

and how they are working together to stop that. 

Unfortunately, I left that hearing very concerned that the Federal response was proving to be insufficient. Our investigation 

shows that progress has been made, but also that we have much 

more to do. In fact, our findings are, in a word, alarming. 

We found that fentanyl and other even stronger synthetic opioids 

are openly available for sale, as the Chairman has said, on the 

Internet, accessible to anyone who knows how to shop online. And 

once purchased, these drugs arrive primarily from China through 

the international mail system. While sellers often prefer the Postal 

Service, they offer shipment via private carriers like DHL, like 

FedEx, and UPS. 

Through our work, we obtained key payments and shipping data 

that enabled staff to link online sellers to fentanyl-related deaths 

and drug-related arrests all over the country. We even found what 

appears to be a major opioid distributor in Pennsylvania, where 

Delawareans reportedly get most of their drugs. 

It is CBP’s mission in partnership with the Postal Service and 

private shippers to keep these drugs from entering our country. 
7 

That mission has, unfortunately, become increasingly more difficult 

as the number of inbound international packages has skyrocketed. 

I would like to say—I think the Chairman mentioned ‘‘needle in 

a haystack.’’ When you are looking for a needle in a haystack, there 

is a couple of things we can do about it, and one is make the needles bigger or make the haystacks smaller. And we need to do both 

of those. 

But for the Postal Service alone, volume has nearly doubled, 

growing from about 150 million pieces in fiscal 2013 to nearly 500 

million pieces in calendar year 2017. 

Until recently, CBP was forced to sift through this massive number of packages from the Postal Service manually. Today, automation and the use of advanced electronic data has improved the targeting of packages that may contain illicit items, but the process 

is far from efficient and effective. 

Our investigation revealed that a 2015 joint Postal Service-CBP 

pilot project at JFK Airport suffered due to the agencies’ differing 

missions, a lack of coordination, and several interagency conflicts. 

As a result, the pilot’s full expansion to our four other international 

mail processing centers was delayed until just this week. 

In addition, despite the massive amounts of drugs coming into 

our country through the mail, the Postal Service and CBP only target a small number of packages each day. Meanwhile, as our report 

points out, our efforts to get CBP the data that it needs to better 

target suspicious mail items and intercept opioids and other contraband has also not kept pace with the volume of drugs that cross 

our borders. 

Unlike private carriers who control which packages enter their 

networks and have more freedom to turn away problem customers, 

the Postal Service is required to deliver all the mail it receives 

from foreign posts. This is due to our country’s membership in the 

Universal Postal Union (UPU), an international body that sets 

global mailing standards and ensures that Americans can send 

mail to friends, to family, and to business partners overseas. 

The State Department represents the United States at the UPU 

proceedings, and while the Postal Service has made some progress 

in obtaining better information on packages through bilateral 

agreements with foreign posts, the State Department has watched 

for more than a decade now as some of our foreign partners have 

successfully fought efforts requiring more information on international packages. 

Given the stakes, it is urgent that the Postal Service and CBP 

work together to continue ramping up their targeting and inspection efforts, and that the Postal Service and the State Department 

speed up international efforts to get CBP the data that it needs. 

At the same time, those of us in Congress need to ensure that 

the Postal Service has the resources that it needs to be a stronger 

partner in these efforts. 

As my colleagues are aware, protecting and improving the mail 

system in this country has been one of my biggest priorities on this 

Committee. The Postal Service is vital to our economy, and as our 

work illustrates, it plays an important role in our fight against the 

opioid epidemic as well, yet it faces insolvency if the Congress does 

not pass comprehensive postal reform this year. The enactment of 
8 

this legislation will free up billions of dollars that the Postal Service can use to not only invest for the future, provide better service, 

but also to shore up mail security. 

All of that said, if we only focus on chasing drug shipments after 

they have entered our mail system, we will only address the symptoms of this problem. We also need to focus on what I described 

earlier as the root causes. To truly do that, we must address our 

country’s considerable demand for drugs. 

As we know, health care plays a vital role in combatting the addiction that drives drug demand, and Medicaid is the country’s single largest payer for substance abuse disorder services. Many 

States with the highest opioid overdose death rates have used Medicaid to expand treatment access. Mine is one; Ohio is another. 

We need to focus even more on making sure that our health care 

system has the resources that it needs to provide quality treatment 

to those suffering from this epidemic. 

And as we consider root causes, it is also clear that we need to 

engage with China, the biggest source of illicit opioids entering our 

country, in order to successfully disrupt the supply of fentanyl and 

similar drugs. 

We did something like this during the Obama Administration 

through a high-level dialogue on cybersecurity and hacking, and 

given the success that bilateral partnership had, this administration should commit at higher levels to a similar effort to tackle this 

urgent public health crisis. 

With that in mind, I am reaching out to Terry Branstad as our 

Ambassador to China, former Governor from Iowa—we served together as Governors—to gauge the level of engagement of our embassy and our team in China toward working with the Chinese to 

say, ‘‘Hey, this is a problem. It is not just a problem for us, but 

someday, it is going to be a problem for you. And you need to get 

your act together in order to help us but ultimately to help you 

guys.’’ 

This reminds me, Mr. Chairman, of the importance of leadership 

in addressing complex challenges, like the ones we are discussing 

today. 

There is no silver bullet that can solve this problem, and none 

of the agencies represented before us can do it alone. We need leadership from the top. 

Last March, the President established the commission charged 

with studying the opioid epidemic and determining how to fight it, 

and then in October, he officially declared the crisis a public health 

emergency. 

Despite these high-profile moves, news reports suggest that only 

a few of the commission’s 56 recommendations have reportedly 

been implemented. We can do better than that. 

Further, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 

the entity charged with coordinating the Federal Government’s 

counter-drug response still does not have a permanent director. I 

will stay that again: still does not have a permanent director. 

Recent media reports indicate that the President’s upcoming 

budget will again propose a 95 percent cut in the budget of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. 
9 

On a day when we are going to be critical of some front-line 

agencies for what appears to be a lack of focus and a sense of urgency about a real crisis, I think it is only fair to call on the President for what appears to be a failure to make that crisis the priority that it should be. 

Let me just close with something we have in Delaware we call 

the three C’s: communicate, compromise, collaborate. And we have 

added a fourth C, civility. That is something in short supply 

around here but not on this Committee. 

We need to embrace something like the three C’s as we fight this 

epidemic, and one of those is to communicate, and we are doing 

that here today. Another is to collaborate with a little bit of civility, 

and if we do that, we will make some progress, and we certainly 

need to make that progress. 

Again, I will close by saying this is an all-hands-on-deck moment. 

This is an all-of-the-above strategy that is needed, and as well as 

we do our jobs, we always know we can do better. Our goal is perfection. We can do better here, and we need to in the spirit of cooperation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Senator, Carper. 

You mentioned the Christie commission, the Presidential commission on opioids, and the recommendations, one of the recommendations was enactment of the STOP Act that we talked 

about earlier to require this electronic data in advance. 

I have told my colleagues if you have a brief opening statement, 

I am happy to have you be heard now. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, do you have a statement? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you for your leadership on this. 

I think you are aware that my own nephew died of an overdose 

in January 2016. It has probably gotten to the point where there 

are very few Americans that have not been touched in a very personal way, pretty close connection with someone who has died of 

some kind of overdose. 

It is a very complex problem. I want to thank you and your staff, 

who have done an excellent job preparing this hearing and the 

briefing. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your service to this country. 

It is complex. I think one of the things we do need to do, in addition to what you are proposing here, is greater information. I have 

a bill stopping overdoses of fentanyl analogs. That is one of the real 

problems of scheduling these minute differences in terms of analog 

drugs and immediately scheduling those. 

There are so many things we need to address here, but it starts 

with identifying a problem, properly defining it, and highlighting 

it in hearings like this. 

So, again, I just want to thank everybody involved in this. It is 

not easy, but these are tragedies, and we all have talked to far too 

many parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters who have lost 

their beautiful sons and daughters, grandsons, granddaughters, 

brothers, and sisters. We have to do everything we can. 

Thank you for your leadership. 
10 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you for your passion and leadership. 

To the panel, thank you very much for being here. We will now 

turn to you. We have some real expertise here and some great public servants to talk through this issue and figure out how we begin 

to stop some of this poison coming into our communities. 

The first witness is Joseph Murphy. He is the U.S. Government 

lead for International Postal policy issues, heads the U.S. delegations to the meetings of the Universal Postal Unions, Postal Operations Council (POC) that we have spoken about previously. Mr. 

Murphy previously served for three years as the U.S. Permanent 

Representative in the United Nations office in Nairobi. 

Second, Robert Cintron is with us. He was named Vice President, 

Network Operations, in April 2016. In this position, he oversees the 

Postal Service’s distribution network, including overall network design, policies, and programs for processing sites, logistics that are 

required to move the mail, and maintenance policies and programs 

to support that network. Mr. Cintron began his postal career 33 

years ago as a clerk in Rochester, New York. 

Third, we have Todd Owen, who is the Assistant Commissioner, 

Office of Field Operations (OFO), Customs and Border Protection. 

He was named to that position in 2015. He oversees more than 

29,000 employees, including more than 24,000 CBP officers and 

CBP agriculture specialists. He manages operations of CBP’s ports 

of entry (POE) and numerous programs that support national security. Mr. Owen began his career with the U.S. Customs Service in 

1990 as an import specialist in Cleveland, Ohio, a great start. 

William Siemer is with us. He currently serves as the Acting 

Deputy Inspector General (IG) for the Postal Service’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). He joined the Inspector General’s office in 

2003. He previously served in both the United States Secret Service and in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations as a special 

agent. 

Daniel Baldwin currently serves as a section chief within the 

Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of Global Enforcement. 

In this role, he supports DEA’s global drug enforcement efforts in 

Africa and Asia. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Baldwin served as 

DEA’s country attache in Beijing, China, so he has good experience 

in China. In 1991, he received his bachelor of science degree in 

criminal justice from the University of Denver. 

Finally, Gregory Nevano is with us. Gregory serves as the Deputy Assistant Director for the Illicit Trade, Travel, and Finance Division within Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Mr. Nevano 

has oversight of all financial, narcotics, documents, and benefit 

fraud, criminal gang exploitation, as well as several targeting infusion centers. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Nevano served as Chief 

of Staff to the Deputy Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and has served in various key management positions within the agency. 

Gentlemen, under the rules of this Committee, we swear in all 

of our witnesses. At this time, I would ask you to please stand and 

raise your right hand. 

Do you swear the testimony you give before this Committee will 

be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you, God? 
11 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy appears in the Appendix on page 65. 

Mr. MURPHY. I do. 

Mr. CINTRON. I do. 

Mr. OWEN. I do. 

Mr. SIEMER. I do. 

Mr. BALDWIN. I do. 

Mr. NEVANO. I do. 

Senator PORTMAN. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

All of your written testimonies, gentlemen, will be placed in the 

record in its entirety, so I would ask you to limit your prepared remarks here this morning, your oral testimony, to 5 minutes. 

And, Mr. Murphy, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH P. MURPHY,1 CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL 

POSTAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF SPECIALIZED AND TECHNICAL 

AGENCIES, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Sir. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss our efforts to increase 

the availability of advanced electronic data for international mail 

items. 

The Universal Postal Union, is the principal international venue 

where the Department of State discharges its responsibilities related to international postal policy. My remarks will center on efforts under way within that body to expand the exchange of advanced electronic data. 

These efforts have a long history, a key moment of which was the 

decision of the UPU’s 2012 Congress to amend the UPU convention 

to require countries and their designated postal operators to adopt 

and implement security strategies that include the principle of 

complying with requirements for providing electronic advance data. 

Developing the implementation measures for this amendment 

has been a top priority for U.S. delegations at UPU meetings ever 

since. Our efforts, which include many hours of work by colleagues 

at USPS and the Department of Homeland Security, are now bearing fruit, and there has been recent rapid progress on this front. 

In February 2016, the UPU’s Postal Operations Council adopted 

regulations for the 2012 convention amendment and also a roadmap for the implementation of those regulations. The United 

States co-chairs with India the Postal Operations Council committee that oversees much of the work required to reach the roadmap’s milestones. These milestones include final adoption of the 

technical messaging standard for item-level data, and the POC met 

this goal when it approved an item attribute message standard at 

its most recent meeting last October. In combination, these two developments—the regulation and the standard—enabled UPU member countries to impose requirements for AED. UPU members must 

do so, however, in a manner that is consistent with the real-world 

capability of the global postal network. 

Accordingly, the focus is now on building capacity. At the global 

level, this entails building out other elements of the UPU’s mes-
12 

saging and data flows. This work is progressing well but will only 

have utility if postal operators develop the capability to collect the 

data and to use the tools available to them. 

The needed investment in skills and technology is happening, 

and it is being greatly accelerated by a sea change in attitudes 

among the UPU membership, which has come to understand that 

AED and other related data management and communications 

tools are essential to the future of the postal sector. 

Consequently, members have endorsed several initiatives aimed 

at positioning postal operators in developing countries to exchange 

AED. 

For example, over half of the UPU’s development and cooperation 

budget for the 2017–2020 period is devoted to a project that aims 

to make postal services in developing countries operationally ready 

for e-commerce. 

This project has as one of its key performance indicators the goal 

of supporting 80 postal operators to be exchanging AED for some 

portion of their flow by the end of 2020. 

In addition, the UPU is also implementing a second project focused narrowly on security, with an emphasis on capturing and 

transmitting AED. Participants in this project, all developing countries, are self-funding with money that was held in trust for them 

by the UPU. 

The Integrated Product Plan (IPP), which the most recent UPU 

Congress adopted in October 2016, with strong U.S. support, will 

also help accelerate AED exchange. The IPP’s goal is to modernize 

the UPU’s product offerings to better—— 

Senator CARPER. Can I ask a favor? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. I am not very good on acronyms. UPS, I am 

pretty good on that. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I 

am pretty good on that. Do not use so many acronyms. Actually say 

the words. 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. All right. 

Senator CARPER. That would be an admonition for everybody else 

as well, OK? 

Mr. MURPHY. The Integrated Product Plan—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Within your 5 minutes. 

Mr. MURPHY. What? 

Senator PORTMAN. Within your 5 minutes. [Laughter.] 

Universal Postal Union. 

Mr. MURPHY. The Integrated Product—can I use UPU? 

Senator PORTMAN. All right. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. 

The Integrated Product Plan’s goal is to modernize the UPU’s 

product offerings to better meet the changing needs of customers 

and supply chain partners, including customs authorities. Phase 1, 

which commenced on January 1 of this year, facilitates the exchange of AED since one of its provisions is a requirement for mail 

items containing goods to have a UPU standard bar code label. 

Important work is being done, but there is more to do, as Senator 

Carper mentioned in his opening statement. Although the UPU has 

the stated goal of having all postal services with the ability to exchange item-level data by the end of 2020, there is a difference be-
13 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cintron appears in the Appendix on page 69. 

tween the technical ability to exchange data and the realized ability to collect and enter it. 

There are many challenges, but we are optimistic and encouraged to see that there is real rapid progress at the country and the 

global levels. Although the work of enabling all countries to comprehensively exchange the full range of AED is a long-term undertaking, we are confident that by 2020, the United States will be receiving AED for most of the mail entering the country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your 

questions and those of other Members of the Subcommittee. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. Mr. Cintron. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT CINTRON,1 VICE PRESIDENT, NETWORK OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; ACCOMPANIED BY GUY COTTRELL, CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 

Mr. CINTRON. OK. Good morning, Chairman Portman, Ranking 

Member Carper, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you, 

Chairman Portman, for calling this hearing. 

My name is Robert Cintron. I am the Vice President, Network 

Operations, for the United States Postal Service. I oversee the 

Postal Service’s national distribution network, including its operations at the International Service Centers (ISCs). 

Last May, I testified before this Subcommittee on our effort to 

combat opioids in the mail, highlighting the collection and receipt 

of advanced electronic data. Together with our Federal agency partners, we are committed to aggressively an increasing AED for 

packages coming into the United States in order to improve the 

targeting of illicit drugs and other contraband. 

In the past 3 years, the Postal Service has gone from receiving 

almost no AED on inbound shipments to receiving more than 40 

percent, as of December 2017. We are now testing data that will 

allow us to target more package volume from China. This data will 

result in a significant increase in the amount of AED the Postal 

Service receives by the end of 2018. 

Since January 2017, the number of countries sending AED to the 

Postal Service has grown from 8 to 23, and includes China and 

other countries of interest. We have prioritized obtaining AED from 

the largest volume foreign postal operators (FPOs), which collectively account for over 90 percent of all inbound volume. 

We now require AED on packages where rates are established 

under bilaterally negotiated arrangements. We currently have bilateral agreements in place with postal operators in Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, and Korea. 

Additionally, other foreign posts have entered into voluntary 

data sharing agreements (DSAs) to facilitate the exchange of AED, 

bringing the total to 56 countries. While the Postal Service and 

CBP have distinct responsibilities at ISCs, these responsibilities 

complement our shared goal of fighting the importation of synthetic 

opioids. 

In September, the Postal Service and CBP completed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to solidify our interagency part-
14 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Owen appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

nership. Additionally, the program initiated at the New York ISC 

to use inbound AED to facilitate more advance targeting by CBP 

has been expanded to all ISCs. 

Over the last 6 months, the Postal Service has provided hundreds of thousands of records per day to CBP and expanded the 

number of countries and types of packages available for targeting. 

We have also implemented an automated process to identify targeted pieces requested by CBP. Additionally, we provided further 

training to ISC employees to reinforce proper processes, for handling and presenting mail in accordance with CBP requirements. 

As the Postal Service continues to advance mail-sorting technology, 

these successes will grow. 

To further improve the Federal Government’s coordination of 

oversight over inbound international items, the Postal Service, 

CBP, and the FDA formalized an interagency work group. The 

group is working on efforts to build capacity to provide AED, develop detection technology, continue information sharing, provide 

technical assistance for legislation, and improve physical and information technology (IT) infrastructure. 

We also continue to work in close collaboration with our law enforcement branch, the Inspection Service, which has seen significant improvements in its ability to seize fentanyl and synthetic 

opioids. 

From fiscal year (FY) 2016 through fiscal year 2017, the Inspection Service achieved a 375 percent increase in international parcel 

seizures and an 880 percent increase in domestic parcel seizures 

related to opioids. 

In conclusion, we share your concerns about illegal drugs and 

contraband entering the country through the mail and commercial 

carriers. The Postal Service is committed to taking all practical 

measures to ensure our Nation’s mail security and provide the 

American public the best, most efficient service possible. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cintron. Mr. Owen. 

TESTIMONY OF TODD C. OWEN,1 EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS 

AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. OWEN. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in combatting the flow of dangerous illicit drugs into 

our country. 

As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP 

plays a critical role in our Nation’s efforts to keep dangerous drugs 

from entering our communities. CBP interdicts drugs and other 

dangerous items at our ports of entry, including multiple mail and 

express courier facilities, by leveraging advanced electronic data, 

automated targeting systems and intelligent-driven strategies, and 

by using various types of detection technology, all as part of our 
15 

multilayered risk-based approach to enhance the security of our 

borders. 

Since I last appeared before this full Committee in April 2016, 

CBP, working collaboratively with the Postal Service and our law 

enforcement partners, has made strong progress in enhancing our 

enforcement capabilities and our effectiveness in the international 

mail and express courier environments, but more must be done. 

Recent bilateral agreements regarding advanced electronic data 

between the U.S. Postal Service and foreign postal operators have 

increased CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments. 

In April 2006, CBP was receiving advanced electronic data on a 

limited basis from only eight countries. Today, we are receiving advanced electronic data from 23 countries, with another six countries in testing. Currently, CBP receives AED on over 40 percent 

of all international mail shipments with goods, and work continues 

internationally to increase the volume and the accuracy of the AED 

provided to the Postal Service. 

As the Chairman acknowledged, the CBP has initiated pilot programs in the five mail gateways. Through these pilots, CBP has enhanced our automated targeting capabilities and has worked with 

the postal service to develop protocols to ensure that every shipment selected by CBP for examination is, in fact, presented for inspection. 

Last summer, CBP and the Postal Service signed a memorandum 

of understanding aimed at increasing the level of advanced electronic data while aligning inspection processes. 

In the past year, CBP has increased our staffing at the six main 

international mail facilities by 20 percent, and all CBP narcotic detection canines assigned to the mail facilities, express courier operations, and international airports have now been trained to detect 

fentanyl, adding another detection capability at our ports of entry. 

Once detected, these substances must be positively identified. In 

the past 18 months, CBP has deployed identification testing equipment so that officers can quickly determine what the unknown substances are. The average fentanyl seizure in the international mail 

enforcement is only 700 grams and arrives as an unknown powder. 

CBP officers must have the technology enabling them to quickly 

and safety identify these unknown substances. 

CBP has increased the availability of such testing equipment and 

is appreciative to Congress for the recently passed INTERDICT 

Act, which will allow us to add testing equipment and further 

strengthen our enforcement efforts. 

In the mail and express courier environments, the fentanyl detected primarily arrives from China and is over 90 percent pure. 

CBP has deployed the necessary personal protective equipment to 

safely inspect and process these narcotics. 

We have also deployed Naloxone or Narcan to our ports of entry 

so if our officers or our canines are accidentally exposed to these 

deadly substances, we can quickly administer these treatments to 

save their lives. 

And last, substantive and timely information sharing is critical 

to the targeting and interdicting shipments containing illicit drugs. 

CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC) collaborates with critical 

partners on a daily basis, including HSI, the DEA, FBI, members 
16 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Siemer appears in the Appendix on page 84. 

of the intelligence community (IC), and the U.S. Postal Inspection 

Service (USPIS). These investigative relationships are critical in 

delivering consequences to those trying to smuggle narcotics across 

our border. 

In closing, we are seeing an increase in interdiction as a result 

of the efforts that I have outlined. In fiscal year 2015, CBP seized 

50 pounds of fentanyl in the international mail and express courier 

environments. In 2016, 81 pounds of fentanyl were seized, and in 

fiscal year 2017, 335 pounds were seized. Already this fiscal year 

at our largest international mail facility at JFK Airport, CBP officers have made more fentanyl seizures in the first 31⁄2 months than 

they have in all of last year. 

Despite the success, much more still must be done. We must continue to increase the level and accuracy of the advanced electronic 

data being provided. We must further refine our targeting capabilities while working with the Postal Service to ensure that every 

parcel selected for examination is presented to CBP. 

We must find a technological solution which can quickly examine 

parcels for the presence of contraband without having to open the 

packages, and we must work with our law enforcement partners to 

identify and dismantle those criminal networks bringing these illicit narcotics into our communities and ensure criminal prosecution. 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Owen. Mr. Siemer. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM SIEMER,1 ACTING DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED 

STATES POSTAL SERVICE 

Mr. SIEMER. Good morning, Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, Chairman Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss our work on international 

mail security and keeping illicit drugs out of the mail. 

As background, our organization has conducted substantial audit 

work on inbound international mail operations and security. We 

have issued eight reports since September 2015 and made 21 recommendations to the Postal Service covering areas such as enhancing systems and processes, providing better employee training and 

oversight, and improving coordination with CBP, other agencies, 

and foreign posts. 

The Postal Service agreed with 18 of the recommendations and 

has already addressed 12 of them. 

We also have two ongoing projects focused on advanced electronic 

data and opioid safety preparedness at the Postal Service. 

In addition to this audit work, we are building our data analytics 

capacity to find and prevent drug trafficking through the mail. For 

years, law enforcement has used data to find criminals and expose 

their networks. Early efforts focused on financial crime due to its 

complexity and large datasets available. And just as criminals misused financial institutions to commit fraud, today’s drug traffickers 
17 

are misusing the U.S. mail to anonymously exchange money and 

deliver illegal drugs. 

The Postal Service faces a number of challenges that private 

companies do not when dealing with illicit narcotics in the mail. 

For instance, the Postal Service is obligated to deliver international 

parcels, even though it did not originally receive them from the 

customers. The Postal Service receives limited electronic data 

about many of these parcels, and the information it does receive is 

often incomplete or inaccurate. 

In addition, the sheer volume of inbound parcels the Postal Service handles far exceeds what other shippers manage. 

And finally, unlike private shippers, the law requires the Postal 

Service to obtain a warrant to inspect the contents of suspect parcels. The sanctity and privacy of the mail and its contents is a 

strong principle valued by the American public, but this principle 

is being exploited by the criminals. 

As e-commerce continues to expand dramatically, rapid growth of 

both domestic and international mail parcels is also occurring. The 

Postal Service must rely heavily on automation and electronic data 

to deliver more than 5 billion parcels a year to 157 million delivery 

points. That is more than 14 million parcels a day, and it is easy 

for illegal drug parcels to hide in all of that traffic. 

However, the data that the Postal Service uses to manage its 

network can also be used to sniff out suspicious parcels, and that 

is exactly what we have begun doing. 

This past September, our Acting Inspector General testified before the House about some of our work in this area. She described 

a case involving an international parcel containing fentanyl seized 

by CBP in New York. The investigation ultimately uncovered a 

postal employee who was facilitating the delivery of illicit narcotics 

in Florida. Our analytics work on the seized fentanyl parcel identified nearly 2,800 additional suspicious parcels that were also sent 

through the mail. 

Since that time, we have assisted other Federal investigations involving reshipping schemes and illicit international narcotics parcels. We identified a number of additional reshippers who were previously unknown to law enforcement and who were responsible for 

thousands of suspicious shipments. 

While supporting individual cases is useful, we are also dedicating resources to build tools to address narcotics issues more 

broadly. We recently completed the development of a tool to identify postal employees who may be stealing drug parcels from the 

mail or facilitating the delivery of drug parcels to criminal groups. 

Unlike legitimate customers who will tell us when their parcels 

do not arrive, we have yet to receive our first complaint from a 

drug dealer that their parcel was missing. 

Historically, we have had to rely on tips or cooperating defendants to provide us with information about postal employees who 

were assisting drug traffickers. Now we are analyzing Postal Service data and looking for various indicators to help us focus on carriers or routes where suspicious parcels are disappearing. Our initial use of this analytics tool has been very encouraging, and it may 

revolutionize the way we tackle these kinds of crimes. 
18 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Baldwin appears in the Appendix on page 90. 

We are also currently building a tool to identify inbound international parcels that are suspicious but have not yet arrived in the 

United States. Our hope is that we can share the insights gained 

from this tool with CBP to better assist efforts to identify shipments for inspection and reduce the number of narcotics parcels 

that enter the mail stream. We have shared some initial parcel information to test the accuracy of our model, and the results appear 

very promising. 

Combatting the shipment of illegal drugs is not a problem any 

one agency can solve by itself. Cross-agency collaboration and data 

sharing is critical. Ultimately, we need to identify and intercept 

these parcels before they are delivered, rather than continuing to 

focus on investigating after the fact. 

One part of the solution is using data effectively to uncover problems, but that is only half the battle. Resources to address the 

problems are also needed. For example, our tool to identify collusive employees identified hundreds of suspicious postal routes. Our 

agency is not staffed to address all of these investigations immediately, and the challenge is only going to get worse as our budget 

gets smaller. 

This challenge is not unique to our organization, but it highlights 

the need to strategically invest in the tools and people to combat 

this problem, since data alone is not enough. Yet, if we are successful, data analytics holds great promise to help government and law 

enforcement focus on the areas of greatest impact. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work, and I am 

happy to answer any questions. 

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Baldwin. 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL D. BALDWIN,1 SECTION CHIEF, OFFICE 

OF GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. BALDWIN. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Chairman 

Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and other Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Dan Baldwin. I am a special agent with the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, currently assigned to DEA 

headquarters where I provide operational support to offices in Asia 

and Africa. Prior to this, I was the country attache for the DEA office in Beijing, China. 

It is an honor to be here today to speak with you about international cooperation and DEA’s enforcement efforts to combat the 

opioid crisis. 

In addition to my written remarks, there are two things I would 

like to touch on this morning, the enormity of the problem and 

what we are doing to address the threat; first, the problem. Over 

the last several years, DEA has encountered a dangerous new 

trend—the convergence of the opioid epidemic and the synthetic 

drug threat from China. 

In 2016 alone, 42,000 Americans lost their lives due to an opioid 

overdose. We all likely know someone who has been affected. This 

is a national threat and public health emergency fueled by 

fentanyl, which is cheap to make, hard to detect, and dangerously 
19 

potent. A kilogram of fentanyl can be purchased for less than 

$5,000, and the potential profits from the sale of that kilo can exceed $1.5 million. 

It is often smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border or sent directly to the United States via postal or express mail from China. 

It is found in heroin, counterfeit prescription drugs, and other illicit 

substances. 

Two milligrams of this substance is potentially deadly. Oftentimes users do not even know they are taking this lethal drug. 

This leads me to my second point—countering the threat. DEA’s 

mission is to disrupt and dismantle the highest-priority drug-trafficking threats to the United States. For decades, we have maintained a worldwide presence to take the fight to the source, and in 

this case, China is the primary source of both fentanyl and the precursors used to make it. 

Over the past decade, our relationship with China has progressed. As recently as three years ago, many of the synthetic 

drugs we were encountering in the United States were not controlled in China, and they had no legal authority to assist us in our 

investigations. However, through continued engagement by DEA 

and the Department of Justice (DOJ), highlighting this deficiency, 

additional legislation was passed in 2015, which improved their 

ability to more effectively control newly identified harmful substances. 

China has now controlled 10 fentanyl class substances and 116 

other new psychoactive substances. The U.S. seizure data shows us 

that Chinese control has an immediate effect on the availability of 

these drugs in the United States. 

We are also encouraged by recent discussions with Chinese drug 

control officials and the prospect of scheduling fentanyl as a class. 

This would eliminate the need to control fentanyl-related substances one by one. 

U.S.-China collaboration on investigations has also seen some 

improvement. Of note, in 2017, the Department of Justice indicted 

two Chinese nationals responsible for manufacturing and distributing illicit fentanyl in the United States. These individuals have 

been designated as consolidated priority organization targets, 

which are deemed the most significant drug traffickers by the Department of Justice. 

In the United States, the DEA and the U.S. interagency utilized 

coordination and deconfliction center, such as DEA Special Operations Division (SOD) and CBP’s National Targeting Center, to enhance investigations and the sharing of information. One outcome 

of this enhanced collaboration was the recent takedown of 

AlphaBay in 2017, one of the largest known dark-net markets facilitating the purchase of illicit fentanyl. 

Going forward, the DEA anticipates the opening of the office in 

Guangzhou, China later this year. This office will facilitate greater 

collaboration with law enforcement counterparts along China’s 

Southern Border, where fentanyl and other illicit drugs leave 

China en route to the United States. 

DEA has seen some progress working with our Chinese counterparts, and we are hopeful that this relationship will continue to improve and develop. 
20 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Nevano appears in the Appendix on page 96. 

Here in the United States, the DEA and the law enforcement 

partners represented here at the table will continue our collaboration. We are passionate about our cause and driven by those families and individuals that have been directly impacted by this crisis. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your Committee 

on this important issue, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Baldwin. Mr. Nevano. 

TESTIMONY OF GREGORY NEVANO,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ILLICIT TRADE, TRAVEL, AND FINANCE DIVISION, 

HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION 

AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. NEVANO. Good morning, Chairman Portman, Chairman 

Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the opioid crisis in the United States and the efforts of U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security investigations to disrupt, dismantle, and bring to justice the criminal 

elements responsible for manufacturing, smuggling, and the distribution of dangerous opioids. 

As the largest investigative agency within the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, ICE Homeland Security Investigations investigates and enforces more than 400 Federal criminal statutes. 

ICE special agents use their authority to investigate all types of 

cross-border activity and work in close collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 

and the United States Postal Inspection Service in a unified effort 

with both domestic and international law enforcement partners to 

target transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that are supplying dangerous opioids to the United States. 

Today, I would like to highlight our efforts to combat international shipments of opioids, specifically fentanyl, coming into the 

United States through international mail facilities. 

Based on investigative efforts, United States law enforcement 

has identified China as a primary source of the U.S. illicit opioid 

threat, illicit fentanyl. Fentanyl analogs and their immediate precursors are most often produced in China. From China, these substances are shipped primarily through mail carriers directly to the 

United States or alternatively shipped directly to TCOs in Mexico. 

Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl or its analogs are prepared and mixed into the U.S. heroin supply domestically or 

pressed into pill form and then moved to the illicit U.S. market 

where demand for prescription opioids and heroin remains at epidemic proportions. 

Mexican transnational criminal organizations also receive shipments of fentanyl and its precursors directly from China to supply 

the illicit U.S. market. These sophisticated transnational criminal 

organizations utilize existing smuggling routes and the U.S.-based 

infrastructure to get fentanyl to the end users. Though fentanyl 

seizures made at land border ports of entry are higher in number 

and more voluminous, fentanyl seizures from mail facilities are 
21 

higher in purity levels and are often unadulterated. The majority 

of fentanyl in the international mail environment is shipped in purity concentrations of over 90 percent, whereas the majority of 

fentanyl in the land border environment is seized in purity concentrations of less than 10 percent. 

Purchasers can access open source and dark-net marketplaces to 

easily purchase illicit opioids like fentanyl online and have it 

shipped directly to their homes in the United States, no differently 

than any other e-commerce commodity. 

Trans-national criminal organizations recognize the vulnerability 

of the mail system and exploit the great volumes of mail transiting 

into the United States as a means to further their criminal activity. 

Recognizing the need to proactively target online fentanyl trafficking, the ICE Cyber Crime Center is identifying ongoing investigations facilitating the coordination of online undercover investigations. 

ICE is fully engaged with the DEA Special Operations Division, 

the CBP National Targeting Center, to identify shipment routes, to 

target parcels that may contain illicit opioids, precursors, and manufacturing materials, and to fully exploit financial and investigative intelligence. 

Our Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST), are ICE’s 

primary platform to investigate opioid smuggling. ICE currently 

operates BEST in 57 locations throughout the United States. 

In response to the opioid crisis, ICE, with significant participation from our colleagues at Customs and Border Protection, established a BEST in Memphis, Tennessee, which is embedded at an 

international mail and express consignment facility. The Memphis 

BEST targets opioid shipments on a daily basis and engages in 

control deliveries of seized illicit parcels as an effective means to 

identify end users and ultimately disrupt and dismantle regional 

smugglers. ICE will continue to expand the BEST platform to enhance our nationwide effort to interdict illicit opioids transiting 

through the mail system. 

ICE has made significant strides in fiscal year 2017 in combatting the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, as evidenced by a 

400 percent increase in fentanyl-related seizures. However, even 

with these advances, there is no single solution or government entity that can stop the flow of dangerous and illicit opioids like 

fentanyl into the United States or keep them from harming the 

American public. 

Tackling this complex threat involves a united, comprehensive, 

and aggressive approach across law enforcement interagency lines 

in collaboration with experts in the medical, science, and public 

health communities. ICE will continue to work with our Federal, 

State, and local partners to improve the efficiency of information 

sharing and operational coordination to address the challenges and 

threats posed by illicit narcotics smuggling in the international 

mail environment. 

In closing, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nevano, and thank you to all 

the witnesses. 
22 

We are going to have lots of questions for you. We have a number of Senators who are here who are not going to be able to stay 

for the entire time. I will be here for the entire time, so I am going 

to be very brief and then turn it over to them and have an opportunity to ask more of my questions later. 

But let me just say, to summarize what you are saying, Mr. 

Nevano talked about the need for this to be an aggressive approach, and I must say I have not seen the urgency over the past 

many years. We have talked about the State Department for 10 

years now, we have been talking about this with our international 

partners, and we have evidence that we were able to uncover in 

our investigation that it is still not going at the rate we would like. 

We can talk about that later. I will read you some of the emails 

talking about how we slowed to a crawl in our efforts, as an example. 

We know that there are over 300 million packages coming here 

without any data, and Mr. Owen has just told us he needs that 

data to be able to identify those packages. That was his number 

one thing he is looking to do to be able to stop it. 

My questions will be along those lines, just to give you the opportunity to think about it, and with that, I will turn it over to the 

Ranking Member, and we will give everybody an opportunity to ask 

questions. We will have as many rounds as we need to be able to 

get all the information out today. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask. Anybody here that has some urgency to be in two 

places at once, you would like to go ahead? No? 

Senator LANKFORD. I will at 11:15. 

Senator CARPER. Go ahead. 

Senator LANKFORD. It is all right with the Chair? Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Senator Lankford, who was here first. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. Gentlemen, I appreciate it very much, being 

here and for your testimony. Let me run through a couple different 

questions to be able to get some clarity on this. 

Mr. Murphy, you had mentioned by the end of 2020, the advanced electronic data, we should be capable of gathering that, but 

then you hesitated and said just because we are capable does not 

mean we are actually doing it, so help me understand the next 

level of that. When are we—not just capable by the end of 2020, 

when are we actually gathering that data? 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Senator. That is correct. What is happening in the UPU context is the tools are being put into place, and 

capacity is being built so that countries have the ability, if they 

have the data, to send and receive it. 

But the bottleneck is at the country level, is in collecting the 

data and entering it, and—— 

Senator LANKFORD. What is the timeframe for that? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that is yet to be determined. 

Senator LANKFORD. Is that 2025? Is that 2030? Help me understand that. 
23 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, countries are going to begin deploying requirements for AED, as they are now entitled to do. Those requirements need to be calibrated to the capabilities of the sending countries, but it is going to be a driver of further deployment. So there 

is not at this point a firm deadline by which every country must 

be able to send AED for all—— 

Senator LANKFORD. The deadline is the capability by 2020 but no 

deadline for when they actually have to do it? 

Mr. MURPHY. There is no deadline established at this time, Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. How do we get that? 

Mr. MURPHY. I think we need to be guided by our own information needs as we assess what it is we want to ask for and then tailor our requests around the capabilities of partners to ensure that 

we get Customs and Border Protection the information they are 

looking for in a timely way. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Nevano, this is a question for either of you. 

I am trying to work through the process of not just picking up not 

only the seller, which is exceptionally important to this, but also 

the buyer that this is headed toward. How do you start to be able 

to break out and say this is a very small amount of fentanyl, looks 

like a user, versus this is a larger amount and we need to track 

not only who the seller is but also who the buyer is because this 

could also be a street distributor as well? How do you balance that 

out, and how do you mean to work through the process of not only 

the interdiction but then the enforcement aspect? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, thank you for your question. 

In regards to identifying the different players in this process, we 

have our offices overseas that are working directly within the supply chain as far as the supply from China. We work here in the 

United States, and we have our agents identifying leads, either 

from CBP or Postal or from our own investigations. We then are 

providing those back to China. So we are identifying the entire 

chain. 

Of course, the goal is to identify the largest-level suppliers, the 

suppliers from China, so that if we have an individual who is sending multiple thousands of packages, that makes the work down at 

the end of the table much easier by eliminating the one shipment. 

Senator LANKFORD. It would seem like you would have—if they 

have ordering it online, you have got an Internet Protocol (IP) address. You probably have a city location or a region that this package is actually coming from when it was dropped off. There seems 

like there would be multiple markers—the financial transaction 

that occurs when the exchange happens. It seems like you would 

be able to narrow the focus somewhat of where it is coming from, 

but certainly you have the address of the person that is purchasing 

it here because that is where it is being delivered to. 

Mr. NEVANO. Senator, you hit on how I was going to respond. 

Relationships with financial institutions is key in being able to 

track the financial transactions, both on the receiving and the 

sending end. We have established relationships with financial institutions that allow us to track the flow of the funds going from the 
24 

purchaser to the person on the other end who is actually selling the 

illicit opioids, so that is key in our investigations. 

Senator LANKFORD. Do we have any incentives for other nations 

to be able to cooperate with us when we are trying to interdict 

this? I mean, it is millions and millions of dollars, obviously, that 

are in the transaction at times, and certainly for the larger dealers. 

Is there any incentive for those other nations to cooperate with us 

to be able to share that information? 

Mr. NEVANO. I would defer partly to that to DEA, but from the 

HSI perspective, Senator, we have tried to establish relationships 

in foreign countries with intelligence sharing and working with our 

law enforcement partners to establish mutual relationships to show 

the benefit of how establishing these relationships can interdict a 

package before it comes into the United States, and that is ultimately what our goal is. If we can push the borders further out to 

not have the package come into the United States, that would be 

our goal. 

Mr. BALDWIN. And just to follow up, Senator, to add some more 

to that answer, at least China has an interest in working with us 

to try to address some of the stuff coming out of China. There is 

a potential that these drugs certainly could be used by their own 

people. 

Senator LANKFORD. Right. 

Mr. BALDWIN. They are not necessarily seeing that right now, 

but they certainly are recognizing the potential of that. 

We have certain mechanisms within DEA and with the Department of Justice where we are engaging them on a regular basis to 

assist us in getting them to help us with this problem. Those are 

things we work on, on a daily basis and annually. We have meetings to try to push our asks to the Chinese in order to get them 

to come to the table to do more in regards to addressing this, these 

substances coming out of China. 

Senator LANKFORD. Can I switch countries for your real quick? 

Mexico, you have mentioned a couple of times as well that the precursors are actually coming to Mexico, but we also have Mexican 

production facilities now to where they are shortcutting China, instead of having it delivered from China, getting it straight to Mexico. What is the cooperation like with Mexico right now for that as 

well? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, in regards to DEA’s cooperation with 

Mexico, it is good. 

Within Mexico, we have seen this substance move into Mexico 

where it is being produced, but as it was said in the opening statements, the percentage and the purity of the substance coming over 

the border, on the Southern Border, is a lot less than it is coming 

through the mail service. 

We are also looking to try to bring both Mexico and China together to collaborate on this issue, to be able to deal with those 

substances, as you said, the precursors that are going to Mexico 

that are then coming into the United States. That is one of the 

things we are working on, but we do have a decent relationship 

with our folks in Mexico as well to be able to deal with this problem. 
25 

Obviously, we want to make sure that they are working with 

China to make sure that they address the threat that they have 

in their country as well. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Can I make one quick comment as well, Mr. Chairman, to be 

able to say this, not only thank you for allowing me to be able to 

go quickly on this to be able to get to the next meeting, but I also 

want to be able to highlight the Inspector General for the Postal 

Service, not only for the work that they have done and the reports 

that they have done. But many people may not know, Senator 

Heitkamp and I have worked on this for quite a while. 

The Postal Service Inspector General has worked with all Inspectors General to be able to pull together a website called Oversight.gov that is getting all the IG reports out for every single 

group, and though they are not named on that, their team was a 

major player on getting those reports out. And that is exceptionally 

helpful to all of us. 

So, just publicly, we come at you with questions a lot, but let me 

also say thank you for that. Now, that is not related to this hearing, but it is valuable to all of us, so thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Lankford, you remind me of a point. I 

made it earlier. Senator Heitkamp and I had a side-bar conversation just a moment ago about this. 

The Postal Service is not running out of money. They are out of 

money. They are heading for essentially what we call bankruptcy, 

and we have an obligation in this Committee and this Congress to 

enable them to be successful and not only provide legitimate service that is needed, but to better ensure that the delivery of fentanyl 

and these kind of narcotic drugs is diminished and hopefully eliminated. So it is just a timely reminder on another front. 

What I would like to do, I want to ask each of you, one by one. 

I will start with you, Mr. Murphy. One thing that we can do to 

help you and your folks do a better job, one thing we can do? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, at the—— 

Senator CARPER. It might be something we are doing, maybe 

something we need to do better. My dad used to say to my sister 

and I when we had chores to do, growing up in West Virginia, he 

would say, ‘‘A job worth doing is worth doing well,’’ and out of that, 

I took the idea that everything I do, I can do better. What can we 

do to enable you and your folks to do a better job? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, the attention that the issue has gotten domestically is something that is noticed internationally, and the 

higher profile of this issue is useful bureaucratically, certainly. And 

so I personally in my work appreciate the attention that the issue 

has received, so thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Cintron. 

Mr. CINTRON. Senator Carper, what we would be looking for is 

comprehensive postal reform. If we could get help there, that would 

be tremendous. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. OWEN. And, sir, again, with the exponential growth in e-commerce through the mail facilities, express courier facilities, additional staffing in these regards would help us, as well as the con-
26 

tinued support of the analytical work that we are doing at the national targeting center, as well as our laboratory and scientific 

services folks. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Siemer. 

Mr. SIEMER. Postal Governors. I think we have talked about how 

this is a strategic problem and it is something that requires a sense 

of urgency. I think having Governors on board for the Postal Service would bring both of those in addition to all of the leadership 

they are already receiving in the Postal Service. 

Senator CARPER. A timely point that you raise, there are no current Governors on the Postal Board of Governors, other than the 

Postmaster General and the Deputy Postmaster General. 

It is the second largest corporation. Imagine the second largest 

corporation in this country operating without a board of directors. 

That is essentially where we are, and it is just unconscionable. 

We have three nominees from the administration. We need another one. I am going to be meeting today with someone originally 

nominated by President Obama, who I think would be a very good 

candidate. If he is nominated, that will give us two Democrats and 

two Republicans, and at least he would have a quorum to go forward with. That is a wonderful point and a timely point. Thank 

you. 

All right. Mr. Baldwin. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Yes, Senator. DEA is always appreciative of any 

additional tools and authorities that are granted to us to address 

the opioid epidemic. 

Senator CARPER. Can you be more specific? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Specifically, well, our priorities are outlined in our 

2018 budget proposal, the administration’s budget proposal. So, as 

those are prioritized by people that are much smarter than me at 

DEA headquarters, that is what I would ask. We would prioritize 

those particular budget proposals. 

But in regards to the specific threat, we have a number of things 

in regards to scheduling, scheduling actions, schedule controls, 

those types of things that we would look at to be able to better address this threat as we see it. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Nevano? 

Mr. NEVANO. Senator, I want to thank you for the resources that 

Congress gives us both in budget as well as personnel, but with 

more, we can do more. So my answer would be resources. The more 

resources, the more special agents we have, the more staffing we 

have would allow us to do our job more effectively. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Several of you mentioned China. I think almost every one of you 

have mentioned China. About two or three years ago, the president 

of China was coming to the United States. He was going to meet 

with President Obama. I think they met in Washington State, and 

one of the things that was raised by President Obama, an issue we 

had raised with China a number of times before, and that was our 

unhappiness—actually anger with their allowing folks within 

China to launch these hacks and to come after our intellectual 
27 

property rights (IPR) and money and a number of other things of 

value. 

Every time we raised this with China, they would say nobody 

was responsible for it or was actually doing this, it is not the military, it is not the Chinese military. it is not part of our government, it is just happening, and different people are doing this stuff. 

We did not believe them, and when President Obama met with 

President Xi about two or three years ago in Washington State, he 

raised this issue with President Xi. President Xi said, ‘‘No, it is not 

us. It is rogue elements within our country that are doing this.’’ 

President Obama said, ‘‘This is who is doing it. This is where they 

are located it. These are their people, and if you do not do something about it, you are going to find it much more difficult to sell 

your goods and products and services in this country.’’ President Xi 

acknowledged that they could help, and they have. They have not 

stopped all the hacks from China, but it has slowed them down a 

whole lot. 

We had a similar experience with Iran. Iran for years and years 

was trying to shut down our banks. Get on their websites; shut 

them down. And literally, a week after we entered into the comprehensive agreement with Iran on not developing a nuclear weapon, guess what stopped? The attacks on our banks. 

When we think about root causes, it is not just working on the 

insatiable appetite we have for illegal drugs, like these opioids, but 

others as well. 

Let us focus on China. I said earlier I am going to reach out to 

Terry Branstad, now Ambassador to China, next week. I am hoping 

some of my colleagues can join us—to ask what they are doing at 

our embassy, what are you doing and what do we need to do to 

help address the root cause from your end, from where you are located. 

Mr. Baldwin, why is it important that we engage with China? 

Please give us an update on cooperative efforts with your counterparts in China to help identify the sources of fentanyl and other 

synthetic opioids. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, thank you for the question. 

Put quite simply, the reason we have to engage with China is because as anybody who has changed oil in their car, we know the 

big side of the funnel and the small side of the funnel. China is 

the small side of the funnel, meaning that is the place where 

things are originating. We need to get the packages before they get 

to the United States and branch out to a thousand different locations within the United States. 

We can try to track every package. We can try to address every 

threat, every trafficker within the United States, but if we can get 

to the small end of the funnel, attack some of those distributors 

within China that are sending tens of thousands of packages to the 

United States, we would have a greater impact. The importance of 

working with China is just that. We have the ability to do that 

with them, along with them, and that is fed by information from 

CBP, Postal, our partners at HSI. We identify packages here. We 

identify the shipping origin and take the head off the snakes. 
28 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks for that response, and when 

we have a second round, I am going to come back and revisit this 

with others of you on the panel. Thanks so much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Chairman Johnson. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is really for Mr. Baldwin or Mr. Nevano. I read an article. 

I do not think it has been covered in the hearing. It said that about 

$800 worth of precursor ingredients for fentanyl produces about 

$800,000 worth of street-value drug. Is that even close to true? 

Mr. NEVANO. Senator, I would say that that is an accurate assessment. We know that the profit margin in fentanyl is much 

higher than, let us say, heroin, so your statement is accurate. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, obviously, where there is a demand, it 

is going to be supplied with that kind of profit potential. 

I want to talk a little bit about the difference between—and I am 

not going to hold you to these figures at all, but can you give us 

some sort of sense? What percent of the fentanyl is coming in 

through Mexico, having been transshipped, and how much is coming in through directly through our postal system? 

I will talk about the purity differences later, but just give us a 

sense. 

Mr. NEVANO. I am not sure if my colleague at CBP might be able 

to answer that better, Senator. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, whoever can best answer these questions, hop right in. 

Mr. OWEN. Just based on our interdictions, just based on the seizures, we are seeing more larger seizures, of course, through the 

Southwest Border. Again, the purity, 90 percent pure, very small. 

The average shipment through the mail is only 700 grams. 

When we just look at our data for 2017, 854 pounds of fentanyl 

was seized in the land border; 335 pounds were seized in the express and mail environment. So much higher quantities but much 

lower purity. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Why the difference in the purity? Are they 

cutting it in Mexico to actually be used immediately, or is it just 

the practicality of you want to ship smaller quantities? 

Mr. OWEN. The seizures that we see, the fentanyl is mixed in 

with other narcotics, other hard narcotics, whereas in the mail environment, express environment, it is all just a single shipment of 

the fentanyl, that pure by itself. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So the stuff coming directly through the 

postal system, is that getting sent to other labs to be processed, cut 

further, so that you take that 100 percent purity fentanyl? 

Generally, when somebody is abusing fentanyl, what percent purity is in that tablet? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, I think you have hit on something that 

is crucially important. I think we have two really threat areas. We 

have the Southern Border threat, where precursors for making 

fentanyl are found in Mexico, and they are producing fentanyl 

there. It then is adulterated into other illegal drugs that are being 

pushed across the border. 

We then have the mail stream, as you said, that has a higher 

purity. Those then are being used at times within the United 
29 

States in what we call ‘‘pill mill operations,’’ where that fentanyl 

is pushed into a pill. It is a counterfeit pill. I mentioned counterfeit 

pills in my opening remarks. They look much like those same similar pills that drove the opioid crisis to begin with. The dosage 

amount in those pills is 1 milligram. So 1 milligram of fentanyl, if 

it is about 98 percent pure—1 milligram is one-thousandths of a 

gram. There is a thousand grams in a kilo. That means there is 

a million milligrams in a kilo. So that is how many pills could be 

made. That is in the pill mill operation process. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In the brief material, it almost sounded like 

there are just users directly buying that. Is that also the case, or 

is it almost 100 percent of the case where these things are really 

being shipped to some kind of pill mill? 

Mr. NEVANO. Senator, it is like any other e-commerce commodity 

right now. End users can actually sit in their living room and order 

these illicit opioids online for their—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. With 90 percent purity? 

Mr. NEVANO. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Will they be getting 90 percent purity? 

Mr. NEVANO. That is accurate, Senator. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Is that why they are dying so quick? 

Mr. NEVANO. That would be accurate, Senator. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Picking up on what Senator Carper was 

talking about, specifically what would you like to see China do? I 

mean specifically. Are they not investigating this? Are they turning 

a blind eye? I mean, specifically what would you like them to do? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Well, thank you for the question. Working in 

China, of course, has its challenges. There are things that China 

has done. Back in 2015, as I mentioned, they changed their law to 

where they were able to adapt to a threat in a third country. 

In the United States, if we have an abuse of a certain substance 

that is not controlled in China, their law is now adapted to where 

we can take that abuse data and provide it to China where they 

then can change their law. 

DEA has a mechanism that is set up within our chemical evaluation section within DEA headquarters where we are evaluating different substances, the harm and the effect that it is having on the 

American people, and we are providing that information directly 

back to China for their action. 

So when you ask what I want China to do, I would like them to 

continue down that road. They have taken it seriously—they have 

controlled a number of different fentanyls. We have prioritized 

fentanyl information, provided it to the Chinese, and they have actually controlled our top four asks. We want that dialogue to continue. We are hopeful it does. We want it to get better and better. 

We want our experts to meet on a regular basis and exchange this 

important information. 

Again, this is something that we can do to directly address those 

threats that are here in the United States with China. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So it was not a glaring omission. It is just 

a matter they are doing good things; they just need to do more of 

it. Is that—— 
30 

Mr. BALDWIN. Absolutely. I think that is one aspect of what they 

can do. It is one piece of the puzzle. Again, there is multiple problems here. There is multiple facets to this problem. 

Chairman JOHNSON. One of the problems really is that the 

analogs and our inability in our law, probably China’s law as well, 

is keeping up with the minute change in the chemistry of these 

things. 

That is why we introduced the Stopping Overdoses of Fentanyl 

Analogues (SOFA) Act. I know DEA has also tried to do that 

through its regulatory powers, but they are a little concerned they 

may be butting up against their own legal requirements. Can you 

talk about the need to actually codify that? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, thank you for that question. 

I am not familiar with all the details within the SOFA Act. I am 

aware of it. 

If we have another tool that is provided to DEA for us to deal 

with this problem and that is the act that gives us that too, we are 

happy—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. You are constrained right now in terms of 

rapidly scheduling one of these analogs, correct? 

Mr. BALDWIN. We have existing authorities to move forward and 

schedule substances. That is not something I am intimately familiar with. I am within the operations division. We have people like 

I said, the planning and evaluation folks, the people that are in the 

chemical section, that do this on a daily basis. 

However, if we have tools that are offered to us in whatever bill, 

we are happy to work with you to try to assist you in moving that 

bill forward. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Just real quick, because I was very pleased 

to hear that you have actually trained dogs in fentanyl, I thought 

if you did that, they would die. So that is very good news. 

How many more canine units do you need? I would ask you just 

in general. I think we are all very supportive of it on this Committee, but for this particular task, how many canine units could 

you use? 

Mr. OWEN. We can always increase the resources at these facilities. I think it is important when Congress has supported us before 

with canines that it also needs to come with the handler. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. A lot of times, the canine comes by itself. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I was going to say a unit. 

Mr. OWEN. A unit. Any support we can get on that would be 

helpful. 

We currently have just under 500 dogs working at our ports of 

entry. So any enhancement to that would increase our detection capabilities. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But again, they are detecting all kinds of 

things. Are they primarily drugs, and is it a specific dog for a specific drug? 

Mr. OWEN. Our dogs are generally two caliber, two types of dogs. 

We have the narcotics detector dogs that will interdict six types of 

narcotics, and then we have dogs that detect currency and firearms 

for our outbound threat. The dogs are split between those two. 
31 

Chairman JOHNSON. So you have been able to add fentanyl to 

that six? 

Mr. OWEN. We have added—yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. OWEN. Fentanyl is—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. That is impressive. Again, thanks for your 

service. 

Mr. OWEN. Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you. 

Let me just quickly follow-up on China, DEA and Justice recently indicted two Chinese nationals, as was widely publicized, 

and they indicted them because they were using the mail to ship 

large amounts of fentanyl to the United States. The question is, 

What can China do? 

It is fine to schedule these precursors, the things that go into 

making fentanyl. It is fine to schedule the analogs. This is a good 

idea, but it is about actually taking action and prosecutions. 

So let me ask you, Mr. Baldwin, about those two individuals who 

were indicted. The Justice Department and DEA were involved. 

Have they been prosecuted? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Thank you for the question. 

The current status, I am not absolutely certain where they are 

within the system within China. 

I do know this. I do know that the traffickers and the shippers 

of these substances from China are very creative. So if they have 

the ability—and you probably learned this with your own inside investigation—that if something is controlled in China, they usually 

divert to another substance that is not controlled and—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me just back up for a second. I understand the challenges—— 

Mr. BALDWIN. Yes. 

Senator PORTMAN [continuing]. And we have talked a lot about 

that. There is also a transshipment challenge and so on, but I 

asked you a specific question: Have those individuals been arrested? Have they been prosecuted? 

Mr. BALDWIN. I am—— 

Senator PORTMAN. The answer is no, unless you are going to correct me. 

Mr. BALDWIN. No, they are currently not in custody. 

Senator PORTMAN. OK. Well, that is the answer. The answer is 

no. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Yes. 

Senator PORTMAN. So to the Chairman’s good question about 

what could the Chinese do, how about prosecuting these two individuals who you all have indicted? I mean, two individuals out of 

the thousands of labs in China that are sending this poison into 

our communities, that would be a good step. 

Senator CARPER. If I could just have a moment. To follow up, the 

Chinese have to feel like they have a dog in this fight, and there 

are some in China who frankly would like to see us further weakened as a Nation. And our continued use, abuse, overuse of these 

harmful narcotics weakens us. There is enormous amounts of 

money to be made, and we are talking about money that is going 

to flow from this country to their country. 
32 

Somehow they have to be made to believe or understand that 

they have a dog in this fight. Partially, it is to say the customers 

for these drugs may be your people, not just ours. 

But also, when the President of the United States meets with the 

leader of China, it is important that this be at or near the top of 

the issues that are raised. 

Senator PORTMAN. Senator Heitkamp. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this is the third or fourth time we have been in this room 

talking about this, and I have to tell you this investigation reminds 

us that we are not doing everything and with a sense of urgency 

that we need to do. I recognize you are all working really hard on 

this, that you all want to see success, but we have to be more urgent about this. We can build a $20-billion wall, but if we do not solve this problem, we will not have solved the problem of interdicting drugs. If 

we simply focus on China, we will not solve the problem of interdicting these drugs. If we simply focus on Mexico—fentanyl in my 

State that killed kids, that led to a huge investigation. One of the 

first came from China to Canada to Portland, Oregon, to North Dakota. 

Last time we were here, we talked about treaties. We talked 

about the need to work government to government with authorities 

like Mr. Owen’s to try and see are the treaties stopping us from 

doing what we need to do. Are we on the right path? 

I want to expand this discussion because it is not just about drug 

interdiction, and, Mr. Owen, you have made such a great point 

about e-commerce. As e-commerce grows, this problem will get 

worse and worse, and it will not just be about illegal drugs. It is 

going to be about counterfeit goods. It is going to be about avoiding 

goods that may, in fact, injure from a consumer protection standpoint, whether it is lead paint and toys. Whatever it is, we need 

to have our laws enforced that protect the public safety. 

We are failing, and we are failing because we have understaffed 

and under-resourced the post office. I think it is pretty clear. We 

are failing because we have not worked in a government-to-government way to really close the loopholes, and this is not just about 

drugs. It is about all of e-commerce. 

As the States—and I think that the court probably will give the 

States the ability to collect sales tax. The States are going to have 

some skin in the game because it may drive some offshoring of ecommerce to avoid sales tax responsibilities in States, and so those 

of us who live on the border understand the complexities of working to make sure that we are not shutting down commerce, but 

that we are in fact protecting public health and safety. 

Now, Mr. Baldwin, one of the questions that I have, you have described the funnel, right? We want to get to that point, a lot of talk 

about China. How easy is it if we got 100 percent complete cooperation from China, we got extradition or we got prosecutions, whatever it might be, for that to be offshore and move someplace else? 

Given the high profit margin that Mr. Nevano described and Chairman Johnson described, how difficult is it? My point in asking that 
33 

is if we simply say we are going to focus all of our attention on that 

one point of development before it expands up to the points of entry 

into this country, how difficult is it to move that around the world? 

Mr. Baldwin. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Senator, thank you for your question, and the answer to that is it is very easy to do. There are multiple countries, 

I think, that stand and they are ready to try to take up where 

China would leave off. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Why not? I mean, if we are looking at that 

kind of profit margin. 

I think it is really important that we not spend all of our time 

here simply focused on China. We have to understand that because 

of what Chairman Johnson and at the time Chairman Carper continue to talk about the insatiable appetite for these kinds of drugs, 

we have to understand that while we are trying to deal with demand, we cannot let supply come in in the amount that it is because it has driven the street price down, and it has created an opportunity for transition from prescription drugs to illegal street 

drugs. 

I am glad you brought it up. We have seized these fake oxys that 

are fentanyl, and the people who are doing it do not have PhDs in 

chemistry, and they are putting amounts in there that is lethal, 

never mind the destruction that it does to the social safety net of 

this country. It is killing people. 

My request would be what are the strategies not just dealing 

with China, but what are the strategies to deal with these precursor problems, to deal with all of this, and how, Mr. Owen, do 

we need to do a better job to give you the tools to interdict at the 

points of entry? 

I just want to make one point about how pervasive this can be. 

When I was Attorney General, I ran the drug task forces. We knew 

we had a huge meth problem, a lot of attention paid to labs—90 

to 95 percent of all the meth that was consumed in North Dakota 

came in through Mexico. It was not homegrown. 

We got a tip that there was a package with meth. We lined it 

up, brought in the dogs. We had probably 10 packages. They hit 

on three. That is what we know. We know that we are just getting 

inundated, and so what can we do, working within our international cooperation, renegotiate the postal agreements that we 

have to avoid—that limit you from doing what you need to do, Mr. 

Owen, in terms of interdiction? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, again, having the advanced data so we can target not only from China, but as you mentioned, as the threats shift, 

as they try to transship. 

And you are absolutely right. In the e-commerce, CBP is looking 

at this space as an all-threats environment. We do have the narcotics interdictions, but we have trade compliance issue. We have 

public health and safety. 

The e-commerce growth, 1.4 million parcels a day cross our borders right now, and it is only going to continue to increase. 

Senator HEITKAMP. The reason why I ask this is because the last 

time we were here, we heard over and over again from the Postal 

Service that their treaties or their relationships, international contracts—I think they are probably treaties. The treaties that they 
34 

have with Canada, with other international groups, limit their ability to do interdiction. Is that still true? 

[No response.] 

Because we have been at this a long time, we were told we cannot use dogs by DEA last time because the fentanyl kills them. 

Now we are hearing you are using dogs. 

We were told last time that the postal agreements internationally limit our ability to do work. Now no one can answer that question. We have to get an urgency to this, and we have to deal with 

it not just about illegal drugs, but everything else that we expect 

to protect our borders. 

And so I want to thank you all. This is not the end of this. I want 

to thank the Chairman for the excellent work that was done here. 

I think that we did not reveal anything in this report that we did 

not know, and I want to point out that the two Chinese individuals 

who were indicted were indicted in North Dakota. 

Senator PORTMAN. We will hear later, more from Mr. Murphy, 

about the issue of the international treaties, as you rightly called 

them, and what the Universal Postal Union challenges are. 

But you are right. I do not think we have had the urgency, and 

we have spent 10 years going back and forth on this, and what we 

have to show for it is a bar code. That is fine. It is a sticker, but 

there is no information on the bar code for most countries, for most 

packages. We do have to accelerate this. 

As was said, this is an urgent problem, and we need to be more 

aggressive. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Mr. Chairman, the point that I want to make 

about e-commerce is that this is not just limited, and if we just 

simply focus on drug interdiction and on China, which is our immediate problem, we will miss the opportunity to fix the broader problem or at least provide a broader sweep in terms of what we need 

on all of e-commerce, whether it is counterfeit goods, whether it is 

things that violate public health and safety, whether it is, in fact, 

things that are happening to do tax evasion. 

Senator PORTMAN. Senator Klobuchar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KLOBUCHAR 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman and Senator Carper, for inviting me to join today. I 

think this report is incredibly important and shed some light on 

just what is going on here. 

I personally think, well, maybe some of this information has been 

out here. It is pretty stunning. 

And I also want to thank the Chairman. He and I are leading 

the bill to do something about this, the STOP Act, which would require shipments from foreign countries through our postal system 

to provide advanced electronic data before these shipments enter 

the United States. 

I got interested in this because, like so many other Senators, I 

saw what was happening in Minnesota—637 deaths from opioids 

and other drug overdoses in 2016. That is more than the number 

of car crashes and homicides combined in my State. Almost 100 of 

these deaths, 96 of them involve synthetics, a nearly 80 percent increase from the previous year, and 85 involved fentanyl. 
35 

And one of them was Prince. But it is not just celebrities that 

die from fentanyl. It is a lot of little kids in our State as well— 

high school kids, college kids, and we have to do something about 

this. 

So I guess I will start with you, Mr. Owen. As you know, this 

bill would show us where the package is coming from, who it is 

going to, where it is going, and what is in it. How would this sort 

of information help Customs and Border Protection detect and 

interdict shipments of illicit drugs like fentanyl? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, absolutely. When we look at the way the process 

works, it is that it is critical that we receive the advanced data on 

all cargo shipments, including what we are seeing in the mail, 

prior to the arrival of those shipments, so that we can use our analytical tools, our past seizure records, the connections that we make 

through our national targeting center, to make those connections, 

and then advise the Postal Service so that they can present the 

parcel before. 

I could give a real-life example from just last week at JFK as to 

the way this works. We had a shipment coming in from China. It 

was an ePacket, one of their express packets. The advanced information was provided through the Postal Service to us prior to arrival. We were able to target that shipment prior to arrival and 

placed it on hold. The Postal Service presented it. When we inspected it, we had 28 grams of an unknown white powder. Using 

the technology equipment that we now have deployed at the ports 

of entry, we were able to identify it as fentanyl. From there, we 

were able to work with our criminal investigative partners at ICE 

and DEA as well as the New York Police Department (NYPD), 

made a controlled delivery on that, and what we did was we were 

able to take down three additional individuals, make an arrest at 

that facility. The pill presses, all of the equipment to further manufacture and distribute was there, as well as two M4’s, so two highpowered weapons that were part of that. 

That is just one example, again, only 28 grams of fentanyl, but 

it all started with the advanced information provided prior to arrival of the cargo, allowed us to target based on some rules that 

we have in our systems, some connections to previous seizures, and 

allow us to deliver consequences with the criminal investigators to 

take people into custody. I think that is a great example just from 

last week initiated at JFK as to how this process should work. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly. So tell me the challenges, though, 

and why it is not working everywhere. 

Mr. OWEN. Well, the challenges, again, is the advanced information is what we need, and we need to have that advanced information prior to arrival. It needs to be accurate, and it needs to be 

timely. That is an area as you have heard this morning we are 

working on very closely. We have made strong progress, but there 

is still a lot of work to go in this regard. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Can you tell us about the trends that you 

have seen, the trends in terms of the amount of synthetic opioids, 

including fentanyl, that bad actors from overseas are shipping in? 

Mr. OWEN. Absolutely. This problem, as you know, came really 

to light a few years back. We continue to see increased interdictions both in the mail and the express environment. 
36 

Last year, of the 335 pounds that we did seize, 92 pounds were 

in the mail enforcement and 240 pounds were in the express environment. So it is a threat through both pathways, also through the 

Mexican border, again, less purity on the Mexican border, mixed in 

with other seizures of other hard narcotics. 

But the trends continue to go up. As all of the changes that we 

are putting in place are making us more effective, we will seize 

more in 2018 than we did in 2017, but really with that volume that 

we are seeing at the borders, interdiction can only be one small 

part of the solution because the volume is just too overwhelming 

to think we will stop this problem simply at the border. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And you and Mr. Cintron talked about the 

fact that 23 countries are now sharing this advanced electronic 

data with the United States. You said that we are now working to 

increase the number. How do you do that? What are your hopes of 

doing that? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes. One of the ways we do it is through collaboration. That has kind of been our focus. 

Right now, when you think of where we have been with AED, as 

we spoke before, from zero to 40 percent, we moved from 8 to 23 

countries. We have signed 56 data sharing agreements. So our 

focus has really been in focus on the top countries. You have heard 

us talk about that, as it represents 90 percent of the volume coming in. 

We have a big push this year in terms of AED. China is an example. Untracked volumes will yield a significant amount this year 

of that AED volume. Our target by the end of the year is to hit 

about 70 percent AED just by focusing on that data partner right 

now. 

So we are already seeing data coming over, but the focus really 

is the collaboration, collaboration also by the law enforcement 

agencies that help out and for us to focus on those countries. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I just think when we see these numbers 

coming in—and I am from the State that is known for doing a lot 

of treatment, and we think it is really important. That is part of 

the reason Senator Portman and I and two other Senators led the 

CARA Act, which helped to set a blueprint for our country. It is 

why I believe we need to get more funding in the budget upcoming 

for opioids, and it is also one of the reasons that I think we need 

to do a better job of policing what the drug companies have been 

doing in terms of getting people hooked on this. 

But this issue is something that is just getting worse and worse 

with fentanyl. It is up to 100 times more potent, as you know, than 

morphine. We are seeing an increase in carfentanil, 100 times more 

powerful. A dose the size of two grains of salt can be fatal. So I 

would just ask you to—especially the Postal Service as we go forward, we are trying to gather support for our bill because if we can 

stop some of this—I know it is not the only solution. You have to 

look at many prongs, as Senator Heitkamp pointed out, but this 

has to be part of this. 

And the one other thing I would add is something that Senator 

Graham and I are leading. It is in my bill, the SALT Act, to make 

it easier to prosecute the sale and distribution of synthetics because, as you know, these analogs, all our law enforcement people 
37 

know what goes on. They basically take a chemical makeup, change 

it a bit, and then it is not on our list. 

And so Senator Graham and I have a bill, which we have a number of supporters on, going through Judiciary to make it easier to 

go after those analogs and be as sophisticated as the people that 

are trying to get people hooked on drugs that ultimately kill them. 

So I just want to thank the Chairman for his great leadership 

on this, for this report, and I hope it moves all of us to more action. 

Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar, and thanks 

for your leadership on the STOP Act and more broadly on what we 

talked about earlier, which is the need for more prevention, certainly more treatment, and then longer-term recovery. That is all 

part of it, but if we can keep this poison from coming into our country in the first place, we need to do it. And we know we can, and 

what this report showed clearly is that we are not doing what we 

even can do within our current budget constraints. 

I appreciate the fact that in response to Senator Carper’s question, the answer almost universally was more funding. We will talk 

a little about this in a moment when I ask a question of you all. 

I want to let Senator Daines go, but I do not disagree with that. 

More funding is important, and we did just pass legislation to provide more funding to CBP to be able to have monitoring equipment 

to detect fentanyl. 

But we have other problems here, gentlemen. We are not coordinating well. We are not doing what we should be doing. 

Last year, we were able to get advanced electronic data on 36 

percent of mail. That was the number from last year. It was the 

same as the previous year, and even during the year, you have a 

chart in your report you can see. It was flat. 

We are not doing what Commissioner Owen has just told us he 

needs, which is finding these packages, to be able to pull them offline, test them, get rid of this poison so it does not come into our 

communities, and then go after the individuals who are sending 

them. Senator Daines. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES 

Senator DAINES. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for 

your leadership, for you and what your staff has done to produce 

this report. 

We are seeing this in Montana. Looking at the map up here, if 

you look at Montana, there is not a lot of color on it, but I will tell 

you, it is costing our State dearly. 

In fact, in 2015, 35 Montanans died. This opioid epidemic nationally continues to drain fiscal resources that could otherwise be 

spent on other services. 

In fact, I was struck by the Council of Economic Advisors issued 

a report last November, estimated economic losses are over half a 

trillion dollars in 2015 alone. 

So to what the chairman just mentioned, we need to better our 

efforts on intercepting these shipments so that the United States 

Postal Service and the CBP can prevent the distribution of opioids 

in the first place. 
38 

Mr. Baldwin, in my days with Procter & Gamble (P&G), I spent 

over 51⁄2 years actually working in China. I was one of the early 

pioneers who was sent over by P&G to develop and grow our business, to make great American brands and produce and ship those 

to the Chinese consumer. 

I understand a substantial amount of USPS shipments containing opioids originates from China. So it is not surprising you 

are here as a leading expert on China at the DEA. 

Could you share with the Committee China’s relationship with 

the DEA? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Certainly, Senator. Thank you for your question. 

DEA has had a presence in China beginning in Hong Kong back 

in the 1970s. We sent liaison officers up to Beijing on a regular 

basis to engage with the Chinese. That relationship, as you know, 

having spent time in China—a long-term relationship in China is 

much better than a short-term relationship in the sense that you 

build rapport and understanding. You have the ability to ask more. 

You have the ability to get more done. 

DEA’s presence in China is important, obviously, in regards to 

this threat. We have a direct liaison with the Narcotics Control Bureau, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, which is in 

China. They are a single-mission entity, much like DEA. So when 

we come into a room, there are a lot of political issues out there 

potentially that could cause some problems for us. 

We see eye to eye in the sense that, hey, we both have a common 

mission. At least we can start there, right? 

Now we have a country attache stationed, of course, full-time in 

Beijing. We have a number of different employees, and we are expanding our presence. If you spent time when you were in China 

down in Guangzhou, we are opening another office down in 

Guangzhou in order to expand into the province where we then 

would be able to have direct engagement with the provincial law 

enforcement authorities, who then are the ones who are actually 

doing the work. Our goal is to build on that rapport. We know our 

partners from HSI have presence there as well. 

We are looking to expand our connectivity with China. We are 

hopeful that that office in Guangzhou will be valuable for us getting additional information regarding the—— 

Senator DAINES. We actually lived in Guangzhou. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Oh, you did? 

Senator DAINES. Had two children born in Hong Kong, in fact. 

You talked about playing for the long view, it is interesting to go 

back in the history, the mid-1800s, the opium wars. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Yes. 

Senator DAINES. This is a problem that goes back a long ways 

and something that is not new. 

I have to commend the Chairman. I led a CODEL to China about 

a year ago, and Chairman Portman came with us to China. He was 

such a strong advocate in directly questioning the premier, the 

chairman there, about how do we reduce the source of fentanyl, 

carfentanil, occurring right there in China, being shipped directly 

in the United States. I am grateful for your leadership there, Senator Portman. 
39 

If you look at that map, just the devastation this is creating in 

Ohio and other places around this country, so I appreciate your 

work around the world as we are trying to get to the root cause 

in stopping the scourge on our Nation. 

Mr. Cintron, just last week in my home State, Montana, the 

Flathead Beacon reported that there was a couple employed there 

by the USPS in Polson, Montana, that was caught distributing 

methamphetamine through postal shipments, again, employees of 

the USPS. 

Now, a city like Polson, Montana, it is beautiful. It sits right in 

the south tip of Flathead Lake. It is in close proximity to Glacier 

National Park. Their population is less than 5,000 people. It is concerning that a half a pound of meth could be shipped directly into 

this small community. 

I will tell you I am grateful for our law enforcement officials. 

Their vigilance uncovered this operation, and we need to do more 

to stop the spread of this meth epidemic that is occurring in Montana. 

The question is, What detection and preventive measures is the 

USPS taking to combat the domestic shipment of meth in rural 

America? 

Mr. CINTRON. I am going to ask the Inspector to step up and answer that question. 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Senator. Thank you. Guy Cottrell. I was 

sworn in at the beginning of the hearing. I am our Chief Postal Inspector. 

As we have heard before, the challenges for domestic are just as 

challenging as it is for international, except the mail volume is 

even higher in the domestic arena. So we use our intelligence. We 

use our past seizure data. We use our intelligence from working 

with our law enforcement partners, both Federal, State, and local, 

as well as Postal Service business data and package history. 

And, of course, for employee cases, we work with our Office of Inspector General to partner closely, and Mr. Siemer spoke about 

some of their efforts as well. 

Senator DAINES. So while we still have you there—— 

Mr. COTTRELL. Sure. 

Senator DAINES [continuing]. I still do not understand how a couple that is employed by the USPS in Polson could be caught in part 

because it is a real small community. It is more difficult to hide. 

It is a close-knit community, and clearly we need to step up enforcement. 

What can we do in Congress? This might be a two-part question 

too as well. What can we do here that helps you in those efforts? 

Mr. COTTRELL. From my vantage point, the Postal Service has 

given the Inspection Service additional resources to combat narcotics in the mail. We have assembled a team of experts to both 

work on the international angle as well as the domestic angle, so 

I will speak from the Inspection Service side. Certainly, Mr. Siemer 

can cover the IG side. 

But from our vantage point, again, as we have said before, comprehensive postal reform to allow us to continue doing what we do 

with the Postal Service and postal operations. 
40 

But you are absolutely right. In the small communities, sometimes it is just criminal intelligence. Sometimes we get a tip from 

someone that will tell us about something, something like that, but 

comprehensive reform from my end. 

Mr. SIEMER. I will just speak for the Inspector General’s office. 

We receive our funding through the Postal Service, but we are 

treated through the appropriations process. So the Postal Service 

just cannot give us additional resources. It is up to Congress and 

the appropriations committees to give us additional funding and resources for these kinds of initiatives. 

Because we are appropriated, we are facing the same kind of reduction in government that all the administrations are facing. We 

are already facing a smaller budget environment, anyway, as this 

crisis is emerging. So additional resources for us would be very appreciated. 

Senator DAINES. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Senator Daines. Thanks for your 

leadership on this issue, and Senator Daines did mention our travels to China last year and the opportunity to speak with Chinese 

leadership about this issue. And he is correct. We raised it. We 

raised it in strong terms. 

One of the points that I made, as Senator Daines will recall, to 

Senator Carper’s point earlier, is the fact that in China—and, Mr. 

Baldwin, I think you would confirm this—they have a growing 

problem of opioid addiction. That is not surprising, given the fact 

that they are producing more and more of these opioids to send to 

this lucrative market here in the United States. There is leakage, 

and they do have an interest in this, I would hope, for a lot of reasons, including the number of overdose deaths here in this country 

and lives being taken off track but also because of their own internal issues. 

With regard to the testimony earlier, Mr. Owen, you said that it 

is really important to have this advanced electronic data, and as 

I said earlier, the fact that most of you have responded to the question and we just need more money, I would just make an obvious 

point. I do not disagree. More resources are important. That is why 

we just passed legislation to give you more resources on the monitoring equipment. But it is a lot more cost effective for you and 

your people to have advanced electronic data, isn’t it? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, it is. The manual process that is the alternative 

will just not meet the challenges that we face, having to take bags 

of mail and run it through the x-rays, run it through the dogs, or 

use the intuition of the officer. The volume is just too overwhelming. We have to employ a risk management approach that 

relies heavily on the data, the analytics that we do, the targeting 

work that we do. The data is the key. 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me just take this to the next level because 

there was a lot of information in this report that was not previously known. Some of this new information was that you had to 

say we need to target certain countries because of this manual inspection, and my understanding from our report and our investigation is that you actually were not able to include China among 

those target countries. Why? Because there were too many pack-
41 

1The Exhibit A document appears in the Appendix on page 205. 

ages from China. That is not responding to the threat, which we 

know is from China, but it is responding to the reality that we do 

not have this advanced electronic data to be able to target packages. 

You could not even look at any packages from China. Now you 

have some advanced electronic data from China. The 36 percent 

figure we talked about earlier, which leads to over 300 million 

packages unmonitored includes packages from China. We think 

about 50 percent of the packages from China are now including 

this advanced electronic data because of the ePacket agreement 

you have with China, and that is good. But we are still letting so 

much of this through. 

The other point that you make in your testimony is that even if 

you have advanced electronic data and you know this package is 

suspicious, 20 percent of the time, the post office cannot find the 

package to present to you to be able to check it. Is that accurate? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. When we started the program, the presentation 

rate was much less. The Postal Service has now put some new 

mechanisms in place, some software technologies and things of that 

nature. The increase and the presentation rate has gone up significantly, but 80 percent is not where we ultimately need to be. 

Senator PORTMAN. So 20 percent of these packages that are identified as suspicious are still getting through. I know you need more 

resources, that is fine, but this is a management challenge. To let 

these packages go requires better coordination with all of you, particularly with CBP and the Postal Service, and it requires, as you 

said earlier, accurate, timely information and then the presentation 

of those packages. 

Let me go back to the origins of our problem, which is the lack 

of information coming from these countries. 

Mr. Murphy, you talked earlier about where you are in terms of 

working with the other countries around the world. You talked 

about the rapid progress that has been made recently. As I have 

said, we have some email traffic indicating otherwise, but let me, 

if I could, go to another piece of information we were able to uncover in our investigation. 

If you look at Exhibit A in front of you,1 Exhibit A is an email 

from May 2017. This is a memo to Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State Nerissa Cook from Gregory Thome, and if you turn to page 

821 of this memo, you will see an unredacted section on the issue 

before us, the UPU issue, Universal Postal Union issue. 

In that section, it states that advanced electronic data is a topic 

‘‘of high interest on Capitol Hill’’—‘‘ostensibly because of the presumed contribution AED would make to preventing synthetic 

opioids from arriving in the United States through international 

mail.’’ 

The memo then goes on to state, ‘‘Despite its uncertain benefits 

for this purpose’’—its uncertain benefits for this purpose, that is 

opioids—‘‘accelerating the exchange of AED is one of our highest 

priorities at the UPU this congressional cycle because of its clear 

benefits for aviation security, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) enforcement, and expeditious mail handling.’’ 
42 

I guess the first question is, Were you part of this memo? Did 

you help to draft or contribute to this internal memo to Deputy Assistant Secretary Cook? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Senator. I drafted the language in question. 

Senator PORTMAN. OK. So is this what we believe? Again, resources are important, but if we have a government that thinks 

that this advanced electronic data could target counterfeit goods, a 

fake purse is more important than stopping a poison coming into 

our communities, I think we have a problem of priorities. 

I guess I would ask you. Is using advanced electronic data to target counterfeit goods and intellectual property rights violations a 

function of the State Department? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, the State Department does not use this 

data for any purpose. 

Senator PORTMAN. OK. So, no, that is not your job. 

What agency is responsible for using AED to target IPR violations? 

Mr. MURPHY. It would be CBP. 

Senator PORTMAN. So how did you determine that there was a 

clear benefit for using AED to target intellectual property but not 

opioids? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, first of all, let me clarify. As you pointed 

out, this is an internal memo from one office in a bureau of the 

State Department to the leadership of that bureau, so it does not 

reflect the views of the Department, per se. It is part of an internal 

discussion. 

But the use of advanced electronic data for aviation security, 

which I think you would agree is a concern on par with our other 

high-priority concerns, as well as for IPR enforcement and for expeditious mail handling, these are the uses for this data that are very 

well established that are familiar to people in the UPU environment that have been talked about for many years. 

The use of this data for specifically targeting synthetic opioids is 

no older than the crisis itself, and so it was less familiar and—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me just interrupt—— 

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. It reflects perhaps the novelty of it as 

much as anything else. 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me just interrupt you for a second. This 

memo was written last year, May 2017. Are you saying the State 

Department did not know that we had an issue with opioids in 

May 2017? 

Look, I am not trying to put you on the spot personally, but I 

think it reflects an attitude, and I think it reflects a lack of, as was 

said earlier by Mr. Nevano, the need for us to be aggressive. Instead, it is an attitude of trying to work with these countries for 

10 years. We have been doing it, with very little success. We do 

have the bar code now, which is great. We just need the information on the bar code, right? 

I hope it does not reflect a State Department attitude. I hope 

that after you heard from these individuals today and perhaps from 

some of the stories here that you have a different view of this now, 

that you understand that advanced electronic data is really important. 
43 

Again, it is not the silver bullet. There is no one silver bullet. We 

have to stop the demand in this country. We have to deal with the 

fact that our addiction rate is so high that we need more treatment 

and recovery. 

We have a lot of other things to do, but if we have an attitude 

in the government that this does not matter, we are going to continue to have this poison coming in through our mail system. And 

Commissioner Owen cannot do his job. He cannot find the stuff. 

I hope that one of the outcomes of this report that Senator Carper and I worked on and of the hearing today is to prioritize this 

issue, and instead of saying it is not as important as intellectual 

property, fake purses from China, to say it is more important—it 

is about people dying—and prioritize it. 

I thank you again for your service, and I just hope that you will 

go back to the UPU and to your partners around the world and 

talk about this as an urgent matter. 

Let me ask a couple of other questions, if I could. One of the 

issues that I think has not been properly explained today is the 

fact that there are a lot more overseas packages coming into America, and it might be helpful, Mr. Cintron, if you would just give us 

those numbers. We have them in the report. They may not be accurate, so I want to hear from you. When I talked about the fact that 

there are about 500 million packages coming into the United States 

today, that has doubled just in the last few years. 

Now that makes your job harder, but again, all the more important that we have this data to know what is coming in. Can you 

talk a little about that? 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes. Certainly, I can. 

We can probably provide you the specifics on the numbers, and 

certainly you are pretty close to that range. We have seen over a 

significant amount certainly increase over the last few years. 

A couple things that we are doing: In the last year, we have deployed a significant amount of processing equipment around the 

country, just based on these inbound cities. In the ISC cities—like 

up in the Pacific area of California, New York, Chicago—we have 

deployed equipment to be able to handle the influx of volume itself 

coming in, and so that is one piece. 

The other part is in working to get more AED, as I have said, 

we have increased those numbers. We are going to see a significant 

amount of AED we believe this year with our efforts around the 

untracked volume coming out of China, which we believe will put 

us at about 70 percent AED capture by the end of the year, a significant improvement for this year. 

What we have done subsequently on the equipment, not only do 

we have the five ISCs running, but what we have done is we have 

expanded that to 13 facilities attached to those ISCs, where we 

now have the ability to trap and capture. 

To the question of the 20 percent that is missing, our efforts 

right now are that expansion of equipment, capture before we get 

it downstream, and then further to that in the next several 

months, we are going to have the capability to deliver unit level to 

trap that piece. We certainly always have the Inspection Service, 

which at any time while they are embedded with these other agen-
44 

cies, themselves can intercept the package anywhere in the domestic mail stream. 

There is a lot of effort to get more AED this year, and the second 

part, really go after making sure that the 100 pieces we are asking 

for is the 100 pieces they are going to get, and we are laser focused 

to make sure that every piece that we can capture, before it gets 

out of the network itself, that we capture. 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, if I look at what happened in 2017, it 

was flat. You talk about 40 percent, I talk about 36 percent, because in December, it was 40 percent. But in November, it was less 

than 36 percent. W went up, down, and back up a little bit at the 

end. That is not a good trend, and 70 percent would be ambitious, 

and we are all for that. We want 100 percent, but we are going to 

have to change some of our methods and some of our management 

and some of our priorities in order to get there. 

We talked about the JFK program earlier. This is a program 

where, particularly with regard to China, you had an agreement on 

these ePackets. I think it is 4.4 pounds or less, packages. Here is 

a quote from one of the Customs and Border Protection officers on 

the ground working at JFK in an email, ‘‘There has been no meaningful improvement as the China ePacket pilot approaches its second year.’’ Now, that is one individual. 

Commissioner Owen, you may agree or disagree with that. I 

would like to hear from you on it, but I just do not think the evidence supports what you are saying in terms of this priority and 

of the significant ramping up, certainly not in the last year and 

certainly not with this kind of data. Do you have any thoughts on 

that, Commissioner Owen? Do you agree with that CBP officer? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, I would just say that I think we learned an 

awful lot from the JFK pilot as it was begun. It started with a very 

small amount of advanced electronic data coming both from China 

and from France. 

We had to train our officers on how to effectively target. We had 

to work with the Postal Service to make sure that the packages 

that we asked to be presented to were in fact presented. I think 

we learned a lot from that pilot. 

I think it was a slow road, which led to a delay in the expansion 

to the other international mail facilities, but I think we are on the 

right track now. I think there is a sense of the urgency behind this, 

and we will continue to move forward. 

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Cintron, are you planning to expand the 

targeting beyond the Chinese ePackets? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. Actually, that will be us, and we do plan to go 

beyond the packets. 

At JFK right now, we are targeting off eight different countries. 

When you look at the volume in the particular mail facilities as to 

what is coming from what part of the world, we basically perform 

a risk assessment and ask to see the packages, target specifically 

for one country that may be of greater concern than another at that 

specific international mail facility. 

Senator PORTMAN. Let me just ask a general question and then 

turn it over to Senator Carper. 

There has been a lot of discussion today about the need to focus 

on China, and of course, I agree with that. All the evidence is, from 
45 

DEA and elsewhere, that that is the source of most of this synthetic opioid coming into our country, and most of it comes through 

the mail. 

But we also know that, as Mr. Baldwin said earlier, this is a very 

lucrative trade, and there will be transshipments through other 

countries and other means to try to avoid whatever we come up 

with. 

Mr. Nevano, is it true that if we just focus on one country—and 

this kind of goes again to the State Department’s approach to dealing with these countries around the world—that we are likely to 

see transshipments to other countries? Therefore, having a universal application of this, in other words, telling all countries, ‘‘You 

want to do business with us, you have to provide this data,’’ is 

going to be required? 

Mr. NEVANO. Senator, thank you for your question, and I would 

agree with that. 

As we as law enforcement improve on our techniques and our 

abilities to seize and interdict packages, the nefarious actors who 

are involved in this process are only going to change their modus 

operandi. They are going to change the way they do business, as 

evidenced by packages being transshipped from China, let us say, 

to Hong Kong or other intermediary countries to try to avoid and 

evade law enforcement efforts. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you. 

I will turn to Senator Carper, and then I have a couple more 

questions. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

I do not know if anybody has ever heard of the name Willie Sutton before. Every now and then, we talk about Willie Sutton. He 

is a famous bank robber, long since died. But many decades ago, 

he was finally arrested and put in jail. They asked him at his trial. 

They said, ‘‘Mr. Sutton, why do you rob banks?’’ and he responded 

famously, ‘‘That is where the money is.’’ 

Why do we focus on China? Well, that is because that is where 

a lot of this stuff is coming from. Why do we focus on the Postal 

Service? That is how a lot of it is getting into this country. 

I am reminded of a game that is played at the boardwalk in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. We have a great place called Funland for 

our kids. It is a little amusement park and famous for years, and 

one of the favorite games is Whack-a-Mole. This is not a game. 

That is. This is not a game. But it is also a different version of 

Whack-a-Mole because as soon as we convince the Chinese to help 

us shut it down there, it will go someplace else. There is a lot of 

money to be made. 

One of the points that I have made—and I think we keep making—is this is a multilayered problem. We need a multilayered approach. I think we are doing that. This is an all-hands-on-deck moment, and I think we are starting to sense that urgency. 

There is plenty for us to do, and one of the things we talked 

about here is the U.S. Postal Service could use some Governors. 

They have none. The Postal Service could use some certain predictability and the ability to generate the revenues they need, and we 

need to do a better job on that. So there is work for all of us to 

do here. 
46 

I want to ask a couple of questions, maybe of Mr. Owen and Mr. 

Cintron, if I could. First, for Mr. Owen, the staffing level, let me 

just ask at the international service centers. Would you talk to us 

about the staffing levels? How have they changed over the last five 

years at each of the international service centers? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, in the last year, we have increased the CBP officers by 20 percent in direct response to this threat. Prior to that, 

I would say the staffing levels were pretty much stagnant for the 

past four or five years, but again, in the last year, we have added 

20 percent additional staff. 

Senator CARPER. There was much made of our need to tighten 

our borders for a variety of reasons—human trafficking, drugs, and 

other illicit activities. 

We focused a lot on border patrol agents. I think we have 20,000 

or more positions that are allocated. I am not sure that we are actually able to hire that many people. We have a number of vacancies, as I recall. Hundreds of positions are still vacant. Correct me 

if I am wrong. 

But I have heard for a number of years that Customs and Border 

Protection could use some additional people at the border crossing. 

We focus on the borders between border crossings, but we also need 

to focus on the proper staffing at the border crossings themselves, 

where all of this traffic, all of this commercial activity is coming 

through, and a lot of it is illegal, illicit. 

Would you just comment on that, Mr. Owen, please? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. Absolutely, sir. 

We have within CBP and the Office of Field Operations what is 

known as a workload staffing model, and what that model does is 

it measures the amount of work and the time it takes an officer 

to perform every task that we are required to do, so how long does 

it take to do a seven-point vehicle inspection, how long does it take 

to board a vessel and do immigration clearances, how long does it 

take to process a passenger at the airports. Then we look at how 

often we do those activities across the country throughout the year. 

The workload staffing model that has been submitted to Congress shows that we are understaffed in the officer ranks by 2,518, 

so that is 2,518—— 

Senator CARPER. Say that one more time. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 2,518 additional officers is what our workload 

staffing model that is provided to Congress shows is what we need 

to perform the duties at the ports of entry. Also, 631 additional agriculture specialists are needed to address the needs at the ports 

of entry. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Mr. Chairman, we need to take that 

to heart, right from the horse’s mouth. 

Mr. Cintron, I spoke in my opening statement about postal reform and the need to get the Postal Service the resources they need 

to make the kind of investments they need to be successful as a 

business and provide the service that we need. 

Can you tell us what you think the Postal Service needs both 

over the coming weeks and months and in the coming years to be 

able to properly handle international package volume and to facilitate CBP’s screening efforts? 
47 

Mr. CINTRON. Yes. I think the obvious, comprehensive postal reform goes a long way helping us financially, right? We are not necessarily waiting as it relates to the international volumes, as I 

talked about a minute ago. We are expanding the network itself to 

be able to handle any type of volume coming into the country. 

So from our perspective, we are doing those things. We are not 

waiting. Certainly, the comprehensive postal reform goes a long 

way in keeping us on that financial footing and allowing us to invest in it. 

As you said, very important to think about the data, the technology, what everybody on this panel is talking about, and where 

really investment should be made to make sure that we can zero 

in on what we are looking for. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. CINTRON. But reform will help us get there. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. 

Ms. Siemer, any comments you have on this front, please? 

Mr. SIEMER. I think the only comment I would make is that as 

they collect this advanced electronic data, we need to keep in mind 

the quality of the data. 

The data itself is only useful for analytics if it is structured for 

analytics, and when we started looking at it last summer, it really 

looks to us like someone is manually inputting this overseas. Someone is actually typing in the addresses. 

And to give you an example, just with our building’s address, 

1735 North Lynn Street, there are probably 20 different ways a 

human can type that. They can abbreviate ‘‘Street.’’ They can abbreviate ‘‘North.’’ They can put periods in there. They can add 

extra spaces. When you have humans entering the data and then 

that gets fed into the Postal Service and then that gets fed into targeting, it is almost impossible to start matching addresses and 

packages going to those addresses. It really takes a tremendous 

amount of cleanup effort to make it suitable for those kind of efforts. 

I think if there is any way that we could require the countries 

to structure that data a little bit better or collect it automatically 

in some respect would help tremendously, but in the meantime, 

some effort needs to be made to clean that up by somebody. 

We are doing it for our analytics, but I think there are probably 

other approaches to doing that so that we can all share the same 

dataset to do our analytics. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

I have another one for Mr. Cintron and Mr. Owen. The international mail facility at JFK receives, as we have heard, the bulk 

of our country’s inbound mail from other places. The Postal Service 

and CBP had this pilot program, JFK using advanced electronic 

data to target suspicious packages at JFK. It is designed to help 

us to manage the high package volumes while still hopefully preventing illegal items from entering our country. 

I have a question for Mr. Cintron, if I could. I trust the Postal 

Service appreciates its role in helping CBP to combat the flow of 

dangerous drugs in our communities. I believe you do. How does 

the Postal Service plan to address our findings and recommendations specific to your agency? I will say that again: How does the 
48 

Postal Service plan to address our findings and recommendations, 

which were released, specific to your agency? 

Mr. CINTRON. Well, we are certainly going to take all of the findings that are in the report and go back and address them. 

Certainly, key for us, as I brought up earlier, two things. One, 

working collaboratively to keep getting the percentages. While we 

had a bump for a couple of months, there were some technical 

issues. When we looked at the growth of AED, it is significant 

growth. We expect with our collaboration, it is going to be significantly higher this year. 

The other part is the holds, one key thing that we found in terms 

of finding that 20 percent, which is significantly important to us as 

well. 

So all the findings that we will get there, going to get priority 

to make sure that we are addressing every one of those issues and 

abate them as quickly as we can. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. Owen, I am convinced that you recognize the vital role that 

your agency plays in addressing this, but really the same question 

that I just asked for Mr. Cintron. Please discuss how CBP plans 

to address our findings and recommendations as they pertain to 

your agency. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. Similar to the Postal Service, the key is the advanced information, so we will continue to work with them on not 

only ensuring that the level is going up, but to Mr. Siemer’s point, 

the accuracy and the timeliness of that data, so we can be more 

effective with the targeting, and then as well, designing the protocols to make sure that every package we ask for inspection is presented to us for inspection. 

Senator CARPER. All right. A question for both you—and this is 

my last question—for both of you, Mr. Cintron and Mr. Owen. 

Have your agencies agreed to performance measurement system at 

least for trafficking the number of packages the Postal Service presents to CBP for inspection? And if yes, explain what you have 

agreed to, and if not, maybe you could explain why not. 

Do you want to go first, Mr. Owen? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. We are still in those discussions. Really the issue 

is the actionable holds versus the holds. When we place a shipment 

on hold, of course, we expect to see it. The challenge becomes as 

if the data was not provided prior to arrival or if the date targeting 

was not done until after the cargo arrived. Then we have a challenge for the Postal Service to retrieve that. 

So the ultimate end state and where we are going and where this 

is working is that, again, the data is presented prior to arrival. We 

target prior to arrival, and then the Postal Service will capture 

that. There is no disagreement in that. It is that gray space that 

what happens when the data came in late or the targeting was 

late, how do we account for that, so that is just the one area. 

But again, the ultimate objective here is to have that data prearrival, the targeting done pre-arrival, and then there is no disagreement that in those cases, those shipments would be presented 

to CBP. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Briefly, Mr. Cintron. 
49 

1The memo appears in the Appendix on page 205. 

Mr. CINTRON. Really, the only piece to add onto that are the 

other developments that we are doing to go beyond the ISC. If the 

timing is off and we have the ability to capture before we get it all 

the way to delivery, that is really where the focus is going to be. 

We are definitely in agreement and getting to those metrics that 

we can agree on. 

Senator CARPER. Good. 

I am going to close and just say, Mr. Chairman, thank you for 

your continued leadership on this front. It is vitally important, for 

the hats that you have worn in this fight. 

I want to thank your staffs on the kind of collaboration that they 

have demonstrated, I hope with our leadership, to help address this 

challenge and to bring a sense of urgency to it. 

The Chairman said earlier—he said there is no silver bullet, and 

that is obviously true. I like to say—and it is not just on this front, 

but with a lot of challenges, no silver bullet. A lot of silver BBs, 

and some of them are bigger than others. Today, we have identified 

some of those, and some of them are bigger than others. 

In Delaware, we are big on the letter ‘‘C.’’ I do not know why, 

but we are big on the letter ‘‘C.’’ But we call it the Delaware way, 

to communicate, compromise, collaborate, and the letter ‘‘C’’ actually can be really helpful here for all of us, you as well as us. And 

that is to communicate better, and I hope this hearing is helpful 

in that, to better coordinate and find other ways to collaborate. If 

we do those three things, we will be better off. 

This hearing started 21⁄2 hours ago. I am told that five people die 

every hour. Five people die every hour from this opioid epidemic, 

which means 12 or 13, people have died since we just started this 

hearing. They are somebody’s mom or dad, somebody’s brother or 

sister, somebody’s son or daughter, niece or nephew. They are real 

people, and just keep them in mind. Keep their faces in mind and 

their stories in mind as we put the pedal to the metal and move 

forward. 

Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper, thank you for not 

just cooperation on the report but your input on the report. You 

and your staff made this report not just bipartisan but nonpartisan, and we were able to dig much deeper, so thank you. 

Among the exhibits we talked about today was Exhibit 1. This 

was a State Department memo, so I would like to enter this into 

the record, without objection.1

We were talking a moment ago about the 20 percent, and that 

is a concern in terms of Customs and Border Protection having to 

finally find the data to be able to find the package and then having 

the package already delivered or otherwise unavailable. 

What is your experience with the FedExes, UPSs, and DHLs of 

the world, the so-called express consignment operators? Our report 

indicates that you do not have that slippage or that leakage in that 

case. Is that accurate? 
50 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, that is correct. The presentation rate from the 

express couriers is about 100 percent. I mean, they are very effective. 

What I think is important to note and to remember is that they 

have been at this since 2002 with the passage of the trade act of 

2002 that required the express courier operators to provide that advance data. 

I can tell you from my personal experience in those early years 

as they were ramping up to meet this new requirement, they struggled with a lot of the same issues, with having everybody providing 

the data, the data being accurate, being timely, and finding the 

parcels that customs was looking for to hold. 

When I look at the success the express couriers have had over 

the last 10, 12, or 15 years, I see that as a model that we can employ and we are employing in dealing with the Postal Service. 

They have come a long way. They are very effective at identifying or helping us to track down those shipments. I feel we will 

be just as confident in the near future with the Postal Service as 

well. 

Senator PORTMAN. I appreciate your confidence, and I hope that 

this hearing helps to focus on that issue because ultimately we 

want to make sure that data is usable, as Mr. Siemer has said. He 

has had to clean up a lot of data—to use his data analytics to be 

able to make this work, and I am sure you all have done the same 

thing. CBP has also had to clean up some data, as I understand 

it, so getting better data and then ensuring that once you have the 

data, it is actually used. That model that you have with these private couriers obviously is something we ought to be looking at, if 

it is working from a management point of view, more effectively to 

present those packages. 

The final thing I want to say is about a trip to Hong Kong that 

our staff made because Hong Kong is one of those transshipment 

points, and they were meeting with the Hong Kong customs officials. They talked about a few things I thought were interesting. 

One is that there had been a bust working with DEA and with, 

as I understand it, Department of Homeland Security as well, and 

that was a very successful bust in the sense that they were able 

to break up some kind of network going between China and Hong 

Kong, transshipping to the United States. 

But there has only been one, and also their attitude, I would tell 

you—and, Mr. Murphy, you will appreciate this. Their attitude was 

that, ‘‘Do not worry. It is under control.’’ That was the quote of the 

customs official, the most senior customs official that our staff was 

able to interview. Clearly not under control, but again, this goes to 

the attitude of some of our foreign partners. 

Finally, the fact that this advanced electronic data, as important 

as it is to Commissioner Owen, to finding this poison, getting it off 

track, it is also really important to your prosecutions. 

Mr. Nevano, maybe you can speak to that for a second. The 

Homeland Security Inspections, your special agents at facilities like 

the international service centers we have talked about here could 

be a lot more effective in their investigations and in dismantling 

some of these transnational criminal networks if they had the ad-
51 

vanced electronic data. Maybe you could just speak to that for a 

second. 

After Customs and Border Protection makes an opioid seizure at 

one of these international centers, how does the advanced data assist you and assist HSI in subsequent criminal investigations? 

Mr. NEVANO. Thank you for your question, Senator. 

The quicker we get the information, the higher probability that 

we have in conducting a successful prosecution. It also allows us, 

as Mr. Owen, I believe, stated earlier—to do like a link analysis 

or post-seizure analysis where you might be able to tie the links 

of a previous seizure, historical information that may tie a criminal 

network or transnational criminal organization. 

For example, we may have an organization or a previous seizure 

that was in California and this seizure in JFK and New York, but 

based on the historical data, we may be able to tie the organization 

together to develop a larger organization and take down a larger 

organization. 

It also helps us from an officer safety standpoint, Senator. Before 

our agents go into a home, it is helpful to know the person that 

may be inside that residence or business, what type of criminal history do they have, do they have weapons, how can we best prepare 

our special agents for their security and safety before they actually 

enact a law enforcement operation. That would be a significant concern that we would have, and I think that advanced data helps us 

in that aspect, Senator. 

Senator PORTMAN. I think that is also important for us to note 

today that this is not simply about identifying a package and taking it offline. It is about the follow-through and the prosecution. It 

is critical information to have. 

Thank you all for being here. We have many more questions, and 

I am sure we are going to be following up with some. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Could I have just another—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Maybe right now. 

Senator CARPER. Not a question. Just a comment. 

A thought has come to mind, Mr. Chairman, and for our witnesses: My last year as Governor of Delaware, I was chairman and 

vice chairman of the National Governors Association (NGA), today 

one of our dear friends, George Voinovich—but there had been a 

lawsuit between all 50 States and the tobacco industry. The lawsuit was an effort by the States collectively to get money from the 

tobacco industry to help cover health care costs States were incurring because of people’s addiction to tobacco, nicotine. 

The lawsuit was successful, and not only have the States received for, I think, 20 years now, a flow of revenues for mostly 

health-related issues, but also a foundation was created called the 

American Legacy Foundation. The American Legacy Foundation 

was created. I was to be the founding vice chairman, and what we 

did is we went to work with young people all over the country to 

figure out if there is a way we could mount a multimedia campaign, not just Internet, not just films, not just television, not just 

print media, but a multimedia campaign to reduce the incidence of 

tobacco use by young people. If they are using it, get them to stop. 
52 

If they had not started, to make sure that they did not start. It was 

hugely successful. 

And the key was hard hitting, direct messaging, right to the target audience, and we saw a dramatic drop in youth smoking, tobacco use, and it has actually persisted. It has actually persisted 

over the years. 

I always like to say find out what works, do more of that. If we 

are looking at a multilayered strategy, maybe part of that is just 

to do a better job messaging to the target audience, what is at risk 

here for them, for their lives and for their families, and we have 

something that actually works in doing just that. 

Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. So true. Thank you all again for being here, 

and again, we have some follow up questions we will be providing. 

We appreciate your responsiveness, not just today, but in the 

course of our investigation. 

We shared our report with all of you in advance, and we appreciate the fact that you made some edits that you thought were appropriate, including to be sure we were not providing information 

that was inappropriate, that in any way, even if it was not classified, sensitive information. 

But I just want you to know this has been a collaborative effort 

not just with Senator Carper and myself but with our partners in 

the Federal Government who have the job every day to try to protect us from this opioid epidemic. We need to continue to work together and work together in smarter ways. 

We are better than this. We can do a better job, and when you 

think about what is happening around our country today with 

40,000 Americans dying of overdoses—and that is the tip of the ice 

berg, frankly, as tragic as that is, that so many other lives are ruined, taken off track, and tremendous cost to our community and 

our families being broken apart. We have to do everything we can. 

Senator Carper talked earlier about all hands on deck. This is 

that time. This is that moment. We have to change the way we are 

operating to provide this information to be able to stop these packages. We have to be able to prosecute those who are perpetrating 

these acts on our citizens. We have to do much more in terms of 

the prevention side, as Senator Carper said, and getting people the 

treatment they need to stop this addiction. All of that is important, 

but here is one thing we know we can do, and that is to tighten 

up our own Postal Service to be able to stop some of this poison 

from coming in, as was said earlier, and have an immediate impact 

on the price on the street, because one of the reasons fentanyl is 

pushing out heroin in Ohio, I will tell you, is the cost. It is not just 

that it is more powerful, but it is less costly. 

I am proud of the staff who worked on this report. I want to particularly thank HSI Special Agent Mancuso for his work on this. 

I will tell you, Mr. Nevano, we are going to miss him when he 

goes back to HSI. His contributions were invaluable. 

I just want to thank all the staff who were involved, and, Senator 

Carper, I would like you to comment on your team who are involved, and I am going to comment on ours briefly. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. Thanks so much. 
53 

Our team led by John Kilvington, our staff director for our Subcommittee on the Democratic side—Portia, sitting right behind me, 

and, of course, we are grateful to you. Felicia Hawkins, Roberto 

Berrios, and thank you all, not just for the work that you have 

done but the collaboration and a sense of spirit and a team that 

we have seen demonstrated with our colleagues on the majority 

side. Thank you. 

Senator PORTMAN. And our team, I want to thank Andy 

Polesovsky for his work, Will Dargusch, Lenny Mancuso—I talked 

about earlier—and Patrick Warren. 

Andy, you did not put your name down there. 

I thank them for all their hard work on this report. 

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for any additional comments or questions of any of the Subcommittee Members, 

and again, thank you for your testimony today and for your service 

on behalf of our country. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 
56 

We discovered it is shockingly easy- all we had to do to was search "fentanyl for sale". 

That simple search returned hundreds ofwebsites, many affiliated with Chinese labs, all 

openly advertising illegal drugs. 

The field was narrowed to just six websites and we sent emails asking basic questions 

about how to purchase and ship fentanyl here. 

These online sellers were quick to respond, unafraid of getting caught, and ready to 

make a deal. 

They offered discounts for bulk purchases and even tried to up-sell us to carfentanil - a 

powerful synthetic opioid that is so strong it's used as an elephant tranquilizer. 

Ordering these drugs was as easy as buying any other product online. 

I must note our Subcommittee never completed a purchase of drugs online- it was 

just too dangerous to risk exposing someone to deadly fentanyl during delivery. 

But we did use the online sellers' payment information to determine if others were 

buying. 

Just from these six websites, we identified more than 500 payments to online sellers by 

more than 300 Americans totaling $230,000, most of which occurred over the last two 

years. 

These 300 people were located in 43 states, with individuals in my home state of Ohio, 

Pennsylvania, and Florida sending the most money to the online sellers. 

The map behind me shows the concentrations of where most of the purchases were 

made. 

We also asked how the online sellers would ship the drugs to us; they all preferred 

to use the Postal Service over private express carriers, like DHL, FedEx, and UPS. 

They told us they used the Postal Service because the chances of the drugs getting 

seized were so insignificant that delivery was essentially guaranteed. 

We were also able to track hundreds of packages related to the online purchases. 

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We identified seven people who died from fentanyl-related overdoses after sending 

money to and receiving packages from the online sellers. 

One of these individuals was a 49-year old Ohioan from the Cleveland area who sent 

about $2,500 to an online seller and received 15 packages through the Postal Service 

over a 10 month period. 

His autopsy confirmed he died from "acute fentanyl intoxication" just weeks after he 

received a package from an online seller. 

By analyzing more than two million lines of shipment data obtained in our 

investigation, we located three individuals in the United States who were likely 

distributing these drugs. 

We identified more than 120 instances of different people sending a payment to an 

online seller in China and then a day or two later receiving a package from one 

Pennsylvania address. 

The person at this Pennsylvania address was working with the online seller to 

domestically transship drug purchases. 

Shipping data reviewed during the course of the investigation also indicated two other 

individuals purchased items to make pills, including pill presses, chemical bonding 

agents, and empty pill casings. 

It is not surprising that people are ordering fentanyl online to sell; the profit margins are 

staggering. 

Based on DEA estimates, the street value of the online transactions from just the six 

websites the Subcommittee investigated translates to around $766 million in fentanyl 

pills to sell on the streets of our communities. 

We are already working with law enforcement authorities to make sure these drug 

dealers can be brought to justice and will continue to do so after this hearing. 

Our findings today show the crucial role advanced electronic data plays in 

protecting our country and fighting the opioid epidemic. 

And also the need for legislative change. 

Last year, the Postal Service only received advance electronic data on about 36 percent 

of the more than 498 million international packages coming in to our country. 
58 

That means last year the United States received more than 318 million international 

packages with no data, therefore no ability for CBP to target packages for screening. 

For 318 million packages we had no advanced data on who sent it, where it was going, 

or what was in it. 

This is a massive loophole that is undermining the safety and security of our country. 

In addition, the data we do get from foreign posts that we reviewed during our 

investigation appears to be of questionable quality. 

At times, this data was nothing more than illogical lines of! etters and characters entered 

by someone who did not understand how to construct a standard American address. 

Even when CBP has the data and targets a package, the Postal Service fails to locate it 

about 20 percent of the time. 

What we are left with is a federal government whose policies and procedures are wholly 

inadequate to prevent the use of the international mail system to ship illegal synthetic 

opioids into the United States. 

In contrast, the Postal Service provides data on over 90 percent of the packages that it 

ships to foreign posts. 

It is time for our foreign postal partners to start returning the favor and providing data 

for their packages. 

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, collecting advanced electronic data was 

identified as a national priority. 

In 2002, Congress required private carriers to collect this data but for the Postal Service, 

it was left up the discretion of the Postmaster General and the Treasury Department. 

For more than a dozen years, nothing happened, leaving CBP to manually inspect 

targeted packages, which is the equivalent to finding a needle in a haystack. 

To their credit, the Postal Service and CBP started a pilot program in late 2015 to 

target suspicious packages from China using advance electronic data. 

Hut our investigation found a lack of planning, the different missions of the agencies, 

and personality conflicts hampered the success of the pilot. 
59 

Despite these problems, the Postal Service's head of Global Trade Compliance wrote 

that the pilot program allowed them to "put a positive spin" on stopping opioids. 

While both CBP and the Postal Service agreed the pilot should be rolled out to all 

international mail facilities, they only started that after this Subcommittee held its May 

20 I 7 hearing. 

We learned that this process was conveniently completed just days in advance of this 

hearing. 

While this is a step in the right direction, it should not take a congressional investigation 

to get the Postal Service and CBP to do their jobs. 

One part of the solution is more data. 

That is why I introduced the Synthetic Trafficking & Overdose Prevention Act or STOP 

Act, which would require advanced electronic data on international packages shipped 

through the Postal Service. 

The STOP Act currently has 29 co-sponsors from both sides of the aisle and I know this 

report and hearing will force the Senate to take action. 

I want to thank Sen. Carper and his staff for working with us on this. 

There's a lot more that can be done to turn the tide of the opioid addiction-but 

stopping these deadly drugs from ever reaching our streets is a good start. 

Back home in Ohio, this is a matter oflife and death. 

lust in the past week, near Toledo, Ohio five individuals overdosed and three died. 

It's so bad that officials issued an "opiate advisory warning" to the public begging them 

to stay away from what was clearly a "bad batch of opioids." 

How many more people have to die before we keep this poison out of communities? 

Yes, the Postal Service is in desperate need of comprehensive reform, but it is shocking 

that we are still so unprepared to police the mail arriving in our country. 

I now turn to Sen. Carper for his opening remarks. 
60 

Statement of Ranking Member Tom Carper 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in 

International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

• Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today. I 

appreciate your continued leadership in responding to our country's opioid 

crisis. 

.. No state has been immune from the damage these drugs have caused, 

including my home state of Delaware. According to our Division of Forensic 

Science, more and more Delawareans are dying from opioids every year. In 

2014, we lost 222 people. In 2015, we lost 228. And in 2016, we lost 308. 

• Just last month, it was reported that emergency responders in our largest 

county, New Castle County, are dispatched to a reported drug overdose 

every 80 minutes. And by early November of last year, paramedics there 

had administered Naloxone, a drug that can block or reverse the effects of an 

opioid overdose, to nearly 600 patients. 

• All told, opioids are now the leading cause of drug overdose deaths, killing 

more than 42,000 people nationwide in 2016. 

• Last year, our Subcommittee set out to learn what the federal government is 

doing to stop these drugs from entering our country. In May, we heard 

testimony from officials with the Postal Service, Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), and the State Department, in addition to some experts and 

first responders on the ground in Ohio, Delaware, and elsewhere who 

grapple every day with the impact opioids are having on our communities. 

They told us how opioids are getting into our communities through the mail, 

and how they're working together to stop it. 

• Unfortunately, I left that hearing very concerned that the federal response 

was proving to be insufficient. Our investigation shows that progress has 

been made, but also that we have much, much more to do. In fact, our 

findings are simply alarming. 
61 

• We found that fentanyl and other even stronger synthetic opioids are openly 

available for sale on the Internet, accessible to anyone who knows how to 

shop online. Once purchased, the drugs arrive primarily from China through 

the international mail system. While sellers often prefer the Postal Service, 

they also offer shipment via private carriers like DHL, FedEx, and UPS. 

• Through our work, we obtained key payment and shipping data that enabled 

staff to link online sellers to fentanyl-related deaths and drug-related arrests 

all over the country. We even found what appears to be a major opioid 

distributor in Pennsylvania, where Delawareans reportedly get most of their 

drugs. 

• It's CBP's mission, in partnership with the Postal Service and private 

shippers, to keep these drugs from entering our country. That mission has, 

unfortunately, become increasingly more difficult as the number of inbound 

international packages has skyrocketed. 

• At the Postal Service alone, volume has nearly doubled, growing from about 

150 million pieces in fiscal year 2013 to nearly 500 million in calendar year 

2017. 

• Until recently, CBP was forced to sift through this massive number of 

packages from the Postal Service manually. Today, automation and the use 

of advanced electronic data has improved the targeting of packages that may 

contain illicit items, but the process is far from efficient and effective. 

• Our investigation revealed that a 2015 joint Postal Service-CBP pilot project 

at JFK airport suffered due to the agencies' differing missions, a lack of 

coordination, and several inter-agency conflicts. As a result, the pilot's full 

expansion to our four other international mail processing centers was 

delayed until just this week. 

• In addition, despite the massive amount of drugs coming into our country 

through the mail, the Postal Service and CBP only target a small number of 

packages each day. Meanwhile, as our report points out, efforts to get CBP 

the data it needs to better target suspicious mail items and intercept opioids 

and other contraband has also not kept pace with the volume of drugs that 

cross our borders. 

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62 

• Unlike private carriers who control which packages enter their networks and 

have more freedom to tum away problem customers, the Postal Service is 

required to deliver all of the mail it receives from foreign posts. This is due 

to our country's membership in the Universal Postal Union, or UPU, an 

international body that sets global mailing standards and ensures Americans 

can send mail to friends, family, and business partners overseas. 

• The State Department represents the United States at UPU proceedings. 

While the Postal Service has made some progress in obtaining better 

information on packages through bilateral agreements with foreign posts, thf 

State Department has watched for more than a decade now as some of our 

foreign partners have successfully fought efforts requiring more information 

on international packages. 

• Given the stakes, it is urgent that the Postal Service and CBP work together 

to continue ramping up their targeting and inspection efforts, and that the 

Postal Service and the State Department speed up international efforts to get 

CBP the data it needs. 

• At the same time, those of us in Congress need to ensure that the Postal 

Service has the resources it needs to be a stronger partner in these efforts. 

• As my colleagues are aware, protecting and improving the mail system in 

this country has been one of my biggest priorities on this committee. The 

Postal Service is vital to our economy. And as our work illustrates, it plays 

an important role in our fight against the opioid epidemic, as well. Yet it 

faces insolvency if Congress does not pass comprehensive postal reform. 

The enactment of this legislation will free up billions of dollars that the 

Postal Service can use to not only invest for the future, but also to shore up 

mail security. 

• All of that said, if we only focus on chasing drug shipments after they've 

entered our mail system, we'll only address the symptoms of this problem. 

We also need to focus on the root causes. To truly do that, we must address 

our country's considerable demand for drugs. 

• As we know, health care plays a pivotal role in combatting the addiction that 

drives drug demand, and Medicaid is the country's single largest payer for 

substance abuse disorder services. Many states with the highest opioid 

overdose death rates have used Medicaid to expand treatment access. 

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63 

• We need to focus even more on making sure that our health care system has 

the resources it needs to provide quality treatment to those suffering from 

this epidemic. 

• As we consider root causes, it's also clear that we need to engage with China 

-the biggest source of illicit opioids entering our country- in order to 

successfully disrupt the supply of fentanyl and similar drugs. 

• We did something like this during the Obama Administration through a 

high-level dialogue on cyber-crime and hacking. Given the success that 

bilateral partnership had, this Administration should commit, at the highest 

levels, to a similar effort to tackle this urgent public health crisis. 

• This reminds me, Mr. Chairman, ofthe importance of leadership in 

addressing complex challenges like the ones we're discussing today. 

There's no silver bullet that can solve this problem, and none of the agencies 

represented before us today can do it alone. We need leadership from the 

top. 

• Last March, the President established a commission charged with studying 

the opioid epidemic and determining how to fight it. And then in October, 

he officially declared the crisis a public health emergency. 

• Despite these high-profile moves, news reports suggest that only a couple of 

the commission's 56 recommendations have reportedly been implemented. 

• Further, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the entity 

charged with coordinating the federal government's counter-drug response, 

still does not have a permanent director. 

• And recent media reports indicate that the President's upcoming budget will 

again propose a 95 percent cut in ONDCP's budget. 

• On a day when we're going to be critical of some front-line agencies for 

what appears to be a lack of focus and sense of urgency about a real crisis, I 

think it's only fair to call out the President too for what appears to be a 

failure to make that crisis the priority it should be. 

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64 

• Going forward, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and our 

colleagues and learning what we can do now, both to stop drugs from being 

shipped here to our country and to address the underlying causes of the 

issues we uncovered in our investigation. 

• My thanks again to you and your staff. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses. 

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Testimony of Joseph Murphy 

Department of State, Bureau of International Organizations 

International Postal Policy Unit Chief 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

January 25, 2018 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the growing problem with fentanyl and 

other synthetic opioids and the abuse of the international mail as one of the ways these drugs 

enter the country. The Department of State takes all of the international aspects ofthe opioid 

crisis very seriously but, because of the specific focus oftoday's hearing, I will limit my 

statement to providing an account of our efforts to increase the availability of advance electronic 

data (AED) for international mail items. 

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) is the principal international venue where the 

Department discharges its responsibilities related to international postal policy. For this reason, 

my remarks center on efforts underway within that body to expand the exchange of AED. 

The UPU is an intergovernmental organization with a membership that comprises nearly 

all of the world's countries. It is the first multilateral body the United States joined, and the 

conference that led to its establishment was an initiative of the Lincoln Administration. The 

UPU's mission entails guaranteeing the free circulation of postal items over "a single postal 

territory composed of interconnected networks." The UPU is a compact between the world's 

nations that their postal services will deliver one another's mail according to common rules and 

on the basis of reciprocity. 

Advance electronic data is essentially a digital version of the postal customs declaration 

that is transmitted prior to the arrival of a physical postal item. U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) can, as the Subcommittee is aware, use this data to increase the efficiency of its 

screening of international mail but AED has multiple uses, including for aviation security. 

Consequently, efforts to promote its exchange through the UPU have a long history. A key 

moment in this history was the decision ofUPU member countries at their Doha Congress in 

20 12 to amend the UPU Convention to require countries and their designated postal operators to 

adopt and implement security strategies that" ... include the principle of complying with 

requirements for providing electronic advance data on postal items adopted by the Council of 

Administration and Postal Operations Council, in accordance with UPU technical messaging 

standards." Developing the implementation measures for this amendment has been a top priority 

for U.S. delegations at UPU meetings ever since. Our efforts, which include many hours of work 

by colleagues at the United States Postal Service (USPS) and the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, are now bearing fruit, and there has been recent rapid progress on this front. 

In February of2016, after several years of discussions, the UPU's Postal Operations 

Council (POC) adopted regulations to implement the advance electronic data provision of the 

2012 Convention amendment and a Roadmap for their implementation. The United States cochairs, with India, the Postal Operations Council (POC) committee that oversees much of the 

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66 

work required to reach the Roadmap's milestones. These milestones include final adoption of 

the technical messaging standard for item-level data-a goal that the POC achieved at its meeting 

last October. In combination, these two developments enable UPU member countries, in 

principle, to impose requirements for AED. UPU members must do so, however, in a manner 

that is consistent with the real-world capacity of the global postal network and the available 

infrastructure. They must also take into account whether all concerned parties in the 

international postal transport chain can meet the requirements for providing advance electronic 

data. In other words, before imposing AED requirements, UPU members must take account of 

the limitations and complexities of the network, including the significant challenge this presents 

to most postal operators to capture and provide it. 

Our focus, therefore, is now on overcoming those limitations and building the capacity of 

foreign postal services. At the global level, this entails building out other elements of the UPU's 

messaging and data flows, testing the suitability of messaging tools designed for other purposes 

and integrating them into a unified global postal model. This work is progressing but will only 

have utility if postal operators develop the capacity to collect the data and use the tools available 

to them. The needed investment in skills and technology is happening and is being greatly 

accelerated by a sea change in attitudes among UPU members, who now understand that AED 

and other, related data management and communications technology are essential to the future of 

the postal sector. Postal services increasingly appreciate that these investments enable expanded 

business and provide a means of overcoming the delays caused by customs processing, which is 

an impediment to growth in e-commerce-linked shipments. Exchange of AED is a means of 

addressing these delays, while the investments it requires enable solutions to other problems 

ranging from the return of merchandise subject to duty to interface with mailers and 

transportation companies. Consequently, members have endorsed several initiatives aimed at 

positioning postal operators in developing countries to exchange AED. 

Over half of the UPU's development cooperation budget for the 2017-2020 period is 

devoted to a project that aims to make postal services in developing countries operationally ready 

for e-commerce, which entails having the ability to meet customs authorities' requirements for 

AED. This project has as one of its key performance indicators supporting 80 postal operators to 

be exchanging AED for some portion of their flow by 2020. In addition, the UPU is also 

implementing a second project focused narrowly on security with an emphasis on capturing and 

transmitting AED. Participants in this project-all developing countries-elected to fund their 

own participation with money held in trust for them by the UPU from a surcharge on the 

payments they receive for delivering international mail (terminal dues). Notably, India is one of 

the countries taking part. This development is significant not only because of the growing 

volume of e-commerce linked mail from India but also because of its previous reluctance to 

endorse the imposition of AED requirements. We are also working through the regional postal 

organizations in our hemisphere to accelerate AED exchange through support of capacity 

building efforts and, most recently, through sponsorship of a measure adopted by the Postal 

Union of the Americas, Spain, and Portugal in November oflast year that aims at deploying 

technology supporting post-customs interface by the end of2019. 

In addition, the Integrated Product Plan (IPP), which the most recent UPU Congress 

adopted in Istanbul in October 2016, with strong U.S. support, will also accelerate AED 

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exchange. The IPP's goal is to modernize the UPU's product offerings to better meet the 

changing needs of customers and supply chain partners, including customs authorities. This 

modernization initiative has clear benefits for the customs processing of mail. Phase 1, which 

commenced on January 1 of this year, introduced a new classification of mail products into items 

containing documents and those containing goods. The IPP facilitates compliance with customs 

requirements, in particular provision of AED, since Phase 1 also entails a requirement for mail 

items containing goods to have a UPU standard bar code label, which is a critical enabling 

condition. Although there is no current regulation mandating a specific use for these bar codes, 

their application will support AED exchange. In addition, Phase 2 of the IPP is currently under 

development and could entail additional requirements supportive of AED exchange in 2020. 

Phase 2 development will be guided by the results of a recently conducted impact study of Phase 

1 implementation that POC members will review in March. 

Important work has been done but there is more to do. Although the UPU has the stated 

goal of all postal services having the capability to exchange item-level data by the end of2020, 

there is a difference between the technical ability to exchange data and the realized ability to 

collect and enter it for a significant part of the mail stream. Many post offices in parts of the 

developing world lack Internet connectivity and reliable sources of electricity, which complicates 

collection and transmission of data for the postal items they take in. (A 2014 survey undertaken 

by the UPU found that 23% of the 2,885 post offices in ten target African countries lacked a 

stable electricity supply, and 67% of them were not connected to the Internet.) Lack of 

preparedness for AED is not a problem confined to developing countries, however, and most 

postal services have been slow to make the needed investments in the infrastructure for itemlevel electronic data exchange--few, if any, countries currently have the ability to provide it for 

all of their mail requiring customs declarations. One notable exception to the prevailing lack of 

preparedness is China Post, which now supplies AED for a large portion of the mail that it sends 

us. 

In addition to the country-level challenges, there is also the challenge posed by the 

complexity of the global postal network and the logistics network that supports it. USPS 

dispatches and receives mail items from the more than 200 designated operators of the UPU's 

other 191 members, all of whom are highly dependent on independent air carriers, freight agents 

and ground handlers for the physical movement of the mail, which introduces formidable 

technical challenges in building out the global postal model for AED. 

Nevertheless, we are optimistic that real rapid progress is being made at both the country 

and the global level. Postal services around the world understand the need to incorporate 

advance electronic data into the fabric of global mail exchange, not only because the United 

States and other countries will begin to require it but also because it is essential to the evolution 

of international mail. This realization accounts, in part, for USPS's expanding network of pilot 

projects and its success in increasing the flow of AED for premium products. It also accounts for 

the emphasis placed on facilitating data exchange within the UPU's activities. Consequently, as 

work on the UPU Roadmap for AED progresses and IPP implementation proceeds, the number 

of countries able to provide data and the proportion oftheir mail stream that it covers will 

continue to grow. Although the work of making the global postal model a reality so that 

countries can comprehensively exchange the full range of AED is a long-term undertaking, we 

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are confident that the United States, by 2020, will be receiving AED for most of the mail 

entering the country. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions and those of other 

members of the Subcommittee. 

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69 

~ UNITEDfliJT/:::i l!iiiif POSTIJ.LSERVICE 

Statement of Robert Cintron 

Vice President, Network Operations 

United States Postal Service 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

United States Senate 

January 25, 2018 

Good morning, Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you, Chairman Portman, for your continued focus on the public 

health emergency addressing the opioid crisis. 

My name is Robert Cintron, Vice President, Network Operations, for the United States 

Postal Service. I oversee the Postal Service's national distribution network, including 

international operations. For international mail, Network Operations is responsible for the 

mail once it arrives at one of our International Service Centers {ISCs) and after it is 

cleared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), up until it has been sorted and 

transported and is ready to be sent out for delivery. 

On May 25, 2017, I testified before this Subcommittee on our efforts to combat opioids in 

the mail, highlighting advancements in the collection and receipt of customs advance 

electronic data {AED). Increasing the amount of AED, which includes fields such as the 

item identifier, sender's full name and address, recipient's full name and address, stated 

content description, unit of measure and quantity, weight, declared value, and date of 

mailing, has been and remains one of the highest priorities for the Postal Service. 

Together with our federal agency partners, we have committed to aggressively increasing 

data on inbound packages coming into the United States in order to improve the targeting 

of illicit drugs entering the country. 

Since the May hearing, the Postal Service, in collaboration with CBP, the U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service {Inspection Service), Department of State, and other federal agencies, 

has made significant strides to combat the flow of opioids, as detailed in this testimony. 

The Growth in AED 

Since May 2017, the United States and a number of other industrialized countries have 

improved technical capabilities to provide AED. In early summer 2017, the Postal Service 

improved its methodology for calculating AED percentages to reflect more accurately the 

types of mail being received. We have also improved the methodology for accounting for 

all received volume at the ISCs. We collect AED for more than 90 percent of outbound 

international mail and in the past three years, we have gone from receiving almost no 
70 

AED on inbound shipments to receiving more than 40 percent as of December 20171. 

Since last January, the number of countries sending AED to the Postal Service has grown 

from 8 to 23 countries. We currently receive data on a substantial amount of the overall 

inbound shipments, including a majority of those originating in China. We are testing data 

for untracked packets (lower value packages on which the sender has not paid to receive 

tracking information) received from China, which represent a substantial amount of 

inbound mail. Data for untracked packets from China are expected to be provided by the 

end of 2018. This will result in a significant increase in the amount of AED the Postal 

Service receives as a whole. Generally, the increase in the percentage of inbound items 

with AED is expected to continue to grow, especially as more countries develop their 

capacities. 

Bilateral and Multilateral AED-Sharing Agreements 

As noted in my May 2017 testimony, the Postal Service has prioritized obtaining AED 

from the largest volume foreign postal operators (FPOs), which collectively account for 

over 90 percent of all inbound volume. We have leveraged AED on outbound package 

shipments to incent FPOs to provide AED in bilateral and multilateral relationships. 

The Postal Service requires AED to accompany any package flows for which rates are 

established under bilaterally negotiated arrangements with FPOs. The Postal Service has 

entered into bilateral agreements with AED requirements for certain letter post, parcel 

post, and/or EMS (express) package flows with the FPOs of Australia, Canada, China, 

Hong Kong, and Korea; a few additional FPOs had agreed to furnish AED in connection 

with EMS shipments. The agreement with Canada Post was implemented since I last 

testified before this Subcommittee. Additionally, posts from other countries have entered 

into voluntary data sharing agreements (DSAs) with the Postal Service, which is the first 

step to providing AED. Since the May hearing, we've signed DSAs with 22 additional 

countries, bringing the total number to 56 countries. 

The Postal Service is also pursuing the exchange of AED through multilateral agreements 

and strategic alliances. The Kahala Posts Group (KPG) is an organization composed of 

several large volume postal operators, including China. Through that organization, the 

Postal Service has shared AED best practices, assisted in the development of a DSA, and 

encouraged members to commit to the collection of AED and set performance standards 

for themselves. As a result, KPG continues to prioritize AED efforts. Each of the 11 

members submitted AED 2018 targets and timelines to support those goals. The Postal 

Service continues to engage members to track progress on those project plans as well as 

monitor their performance. 

Actions Through the Universal Postal Union 

The Postal Service continues to work closely with the Department of State, which has 

lead responsibility for representing the United States Government in the Universal Postal 

Union (UPU), the 192-member international organization charged with facilitating the 

1 Volumes measured exclude letter- and flat-shaped letter post items and military mail. 

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exchange of mail among member countries through treaty agreements. At the UPU, 

United States initiatives are focused on advancing AED requirements which have resulted 

in mandatory barcodes on all packages, standardized AED electronic messaging, and 

contributing to capacity building efforts, to name a few. These initiatives have resulted in 

UPU members increasing their adoption and implementation of AED messaging and 

security standards. Since May, we have assisted foreign posts in regional UPU 

organizations to increase their capacity to collect AED. 

Ongoing Postal Service Efforts 

The Postal Service has been working collaboratively with several agencies to improve the 

targeting of illicit opioids. Ongoing efforts to date include the following: 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

The Postal Service has the responsibility to process and deliver inbound international 

mail, while CBP has the primary responsibility and authority to screen items at the first 

point of entry into the United States for security. These distinct responsibilities, however, 

complement our shared goal to fight the importation of synthetic opioids. To that end, a 

MOU between the Postal Service and CBP was completed on September 1, 2017. It 

defines the participants' roles and responsibilities in relation to their mutual cooperation, 

and provides guidelines for mail inspection. The MOU solidifies the ongoing interagency 

partnership between CBP and the Postal Service at exchange offices. 

Expansion of ISC Program 

The Postal Service began a pilot program in mid-2015 at the New York ISC to use 

inbound AED to facilitate more advance targeting by CBP. The Postal Service provides 

AED to CBP that can be used to review and target specific mail pieces prior to arrival at 

the ISC. CBP identifies the individual target items, and the Postal Service locates the 

target items within the inbound receptacles based on AED. Once located, the Postal 

Service presents the targeted items to CBP for inspection. 

We have now enabled targeting based on AED at aiiiSCs. With the lessons learned from 

the original pilot, the Postal Service and CBP expanded the program to an additional ISC 

in June 2017 and another in August 2017. The pilot was expanded to two other ISCs 

earlier this month. 

The Postal Service and the Inspection Service are continuing to coordinate with CBP to 

enhance operational processes at the ISCs. Over the last six months, the Postal Service 

has provided hundreds of thousands of records per day to CBP, expanded the countries 

and types of packages available for targeting, and advanced sorting from manual to 

automated processes. As the Postal Service continues to advance mail sorting 

technology, these successes will grow. 

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Enhanced Network Operations 

Since May, we have continued to work to enhance our operations: 

• Enhanced the automation process to identify mail requested by CBP by updating 

software and equipment. Software updates have been completed and an additional 

piece of equipment is scheduled to be installed this summer to automate and facilitate 

the selection of targeted pieces for CBP. 

• Ensured recurring training to ISC employees to reinforce proper processes for 

handling and presenting mail in accordance with CBP requirements. Training is 

provided on an on-going basis, both for new employees and as a refresher for current 

employees in the ISCs. 

• Deployed additional mobile scanners with augmented capability at the ISCs to capture 

the physical movement of packages and ensure it is streamlined for reliability. 

• Implemented the capability to intercept CBP holds at specific downstream processing 

facilities to improve the identification of AED target packages. 

Formalized Interagency Work Group (IWG) 

The Postal Service, CBP, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) formalized a 

tripartite working relationship on actions related to combatting opioids in the mail through 

establishing the IWG. The objective of the work group is to improve the federal 

government's coordination of oversight over inbound international items containing goods 

entered through international mail facilities, and to disrupt illegal supply chains that exploit 

the international mail environment, including illicit opioid/fentanyl shipments. 

The IWG is working on short and long-term efforts to build stakeholder capacity to provide 

AED, identify and develop detection technology, encourage information sharing in the 

international mail environment, provide technical assistance for legislation, and improve 

physical and IT infrastructure. 

The Role of the Inspection Service 

As suggested throughout this testimony, the Postal Service works in close collaboration 

with its law enforcement branch, the Inspection Service. While the Postal Service has 

the responsibility to process and deliver inbound international mail, the Inspection 

Service investigates mail-related crime and works closely with other law enforcement 

agencies, including CBP, to share intelligence, coordinate cases and conduct joint 

enforcement operations. Through enhanced investigative methods, deploying resources 

as needed, and strengthening strategic partnerships, the Inspection Service has seen 

significant improvements in its ability to seize fentanyl and synthetic opioids from the 

U.S. Mail. From fiscal year 2016 through 2017, the Inspection Service achieved a 375 

percent increase in international parcel seizures and an 880 percent increase in 

domestic parcel seizures related to opioids. 

4 
73 

Without disclosing sensitive law enforcement techniques, some of the current 

investigative approaches of the Inspection Service include: 

• Creating an internal team of cross-functional subject matter experts specifically 

focused on narcotics trafficking through the mail, both international and domestic. 

• Assigning full-time personnel at the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) 

International Organized Crime Center (IOC-2), the Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, the International Service Centers 

and the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC). Being embedded in these locations 

allows the Inspection Service to share intelligence, coordinate cases, and conduct joint 

enforcement operations domestically and internationally. 

• Partnering with High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Forces, OCDETF, 

and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to coordinate investigative 

information and real-time intelligence. These relationships strengthen cohesive 

communication and data sharing partnerships that enable the identification of criminal 

networks, which would not be possible without interagency cooperation. 

• Participating in the ONDCP Federal Law Enforcement Secure Conference Group, the 

Interagency Implementation Group, and the DEA's Heroin/Fentanyl Task Force to stay 

abreast of the latest trends in criminal activity and transnational threats. 

• Evaluating numerous pieces of technology in collaboration with CBP that will assist us 

with detecting narcotics in the mail. 

• Launching a Cyber and Analytics Unit to enhance investigative techniques, including 

expanded use of AED with historical seizure data and criminal intelligence to better 

forecast and target international parcels. 

• Working with Postal Service management to enhance operational processes and 

equipment that utilizes advanced technologies, which includes transitioning from 

manually sorting parcels to automated operations at the ISCs. 

Conclysion 

The Postal Service understands and continues to share the concerns about illegal drugs 

and contraband entering the U.S. through the mail and commercial carriers. As CBP 

Operations Support Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner Robert Perez indicated in 

his May 2017 testimony before this Subcommittee: "Interdicting illicit drugs, particularly 

synthetic opioids, is both challenging and complex. The majority of U.S. trafficked illicit 

fentanyl is produced in other countries such as China, and is principally smuggled through 

international mail facilities, express consignment carrier facilities (e.g., FedEx and UPS), 

or through Points of Entry (POEs) along the Southern land border." 

5 
74 

The Postal Service is committed to partnering with CBP and other federal agencies, as 

evidenced by initiatives to date to enhance CBP's ability to target synthetic opioids and 

other illicit drugs from entering the country. In collaboration with federal agencies and state 

and local law enforcement, improved investigative techniques have increased our ability to 

interdict opioids such as fentanyl. 

We have worked closely with CBP to complete the MOU, expand the ISC program, increase 

the countries and products for which AED is provided, and use technology to improve the 

process of intercepting hold items to present to CBP. 

As it has done throughout its history, the Postal Service is committed to taking all 

practicable measures to ensure our nation's mail security, and provide the American 

public the best, most efficient service possible. Again, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

### 

6 
75 

TESTIMONY OF 

TODD C. OWEN 

Executive Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Field Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

For a Hearing 

BEFORE THE 

United States Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

ON 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilites in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Washington, D.C. 
76 

Introduction 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) in combating the flow of dangerous illicit drugs, including synthetic opioids, 

into the United States, specifically through international mail and express consignment carrier 

(ECC) shipments. 

As America's unified border security agency, CBP plays a critical role in the Nation's efforts to 

keep dangerous drugs from harming the American public. CBP's Office of Field Operations 

(OFO) interdicts drugs at our ports of entry (POEs) and multiple mail and ECC facilities, 

leveraging targeting and intelligence-driven strategies, and working with our partners, including 

the United States Postal Service (USPS), to combat Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) as 

part of our multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our borders. This layered 

approach reduces our reliance on any single point or program and extends our zone of security 

outward, ensuring our physical border is not the first or last line of defense, but one of many. 

Illicit Drug Trends, Interdictions, and Challenges 

While most illicit drug smuggling attempts occur at Southwest Land POEs (LPOEs), the 

smuggling of illicit synthetic drugs in the mail and ECC environment poses a significant threat. 

Dozens of different types of illicit synthetic drugs, also called "designer drugs," are currently 

being sold and shipped to end-users in the United States, including synthetic opioids such as 

fentanyl and its analogues, synthetic cannabinoids, 1 and synthetic cathinones.2 CBP seizures of 

illicit fentanyl, the most frequently seized synthetic opioid,3 remain relatively small compared to 

other opioids such as heroin, 4 but are highly potent and have significantly increased over the past 

several years, from approximately two lbs. seized in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 to approximately 544 

lbs. seized in FY 2016,5 and approximately 1,476lbs. seized in FY 2017.6 

Illicit synthetic drugs are often purchased from foreign sellers through online transactions. The 

drugs are then shipped to the United States and delivered to domestic purchasers- DTOs and 

individuals- primarily via U.S. mail or ECC. DTOs and individual purchasers move synthetic 

drugs such as illicit fentanyl in small quantities, making detection and targeting a significant 

challenge. Follow-on investigations, which are conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs 

1 Synthetic cannabinoids are drugs that do not contain marijuana but are pharmacologically similar to 

tetrahydrocannabinol (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6527a2.htm). 2 Synthetic cathinones, more commonly known as "bath salts," are synthetic drugs chemically related to cathinone, a 

stimulant found in the khat plant (https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/synthetic-cathinones-bath-salts). 1 While illicit fentanyl is the most frequently-seized synthetic opioid, CBP has also encountered various types of 

fentanyl analogues, including acetylfentanyl, butyrylfentanyl, beta-hydroxythiofentanyl, para-fluorobutyrylfentanyl, 

pentanoylfentanyl, alpha-methyl acetylfentanyl, para-fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl, para-fluorofentanyl, carfentanil, 

furanylfentanyl, and most recently benzodioxolefentanyl, acrylfentanyl, and methoxyacetylfentanyl. Also, CBP's 

Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate (LSSD) has presumptively identified n-hexanoyl fentanyl and 

benzoyl fentanyl, and are working diligently to confirm these new substances. 

' In FY 2017, CBP officers and agents seized or disrupted over 1.9 million lbs of narcotics across the country, 

including over 60,000 lbs. of methamphetamine, over 330,000 lbs. of cocaine, and over 4,800 lbs. of heroin. 

'This includes approximately 440 lbs. seized at POEs (including mail and ECC facilities) and J04lbs. seized at U.S. 

Border Patrol checkpoints. 

' https://www .cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statisti cs-zy20 17. 

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Enforcement- Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI), are also challenging because these 

shippers are often not the hierarchically structured DTOs we usually encounter. 

In FY 2017, CBP made 118 seizures of illicit fentanyl totaling approximately 240 lbs. in the ECC 

environment and 227 seizures totaling approximately 92 lbs. of fentanyl in the international mail 

environment? CBP also made 65 seizures offentanyl at LPOEs totaling approximately 853 

lbs .. The majority of illicit fentanyl in the international mail and ECC environments is shipped in 

concentrations of over 90 percent, whereas the majority of fentanyl in the land border environment 

is seized in concentrations of less than 10 percent. Purchasers can also access open source and 

dark web marketplaces for the tools needed for the manufacturing of synthetic drugs. In the case 

offentanyl, powdered fentanyl, pill presses, and binding agents can be purchased online and then 

shipped into the United States.8 In FY 2014,24 seizures of pill press/tablet machines were made 

by OFO, and the number increased to 51 in FY 2015,58 in FY 2016 and 92 in FY 2017. 

International Mail and Express Consignment Carrier Operations 

In the ECC environment, shipments are processed at 25 established facilities located throughout 

the United States. Prior to arrival of the express parcels, CBP reviews the manifest information 

transmitted by the ECC operators and targets those high-risk packages requiring examination. All 

parcels presented to CBP for examination are subjected to Non-Intrusive Inspection (Nil) to 

include x-ray and gamma ray imaging. CBP operates in all 25 facilities nationwide. 

CBP also operates within nine International Mail Facilities (IMF), inspecting international mail 

arriving from more than 180 countries. Upon arrival in the United States, all international mail 

parcels are screened for radiological threats. International mail requested for inspection by CBP is 

then turned over to CBP by USPS. Subsequently, CBP x-rays all international mail packages 

presented by USPS and physically examines those deemed to be high-risk. 

CBP has seen a nearly 50 percent9 increase in express consignment shipments over the past five 

years. In FY 2013, CBP processed over 76 million express bills; in FY 2017, CBP processed 

approximately II 0 million bills. CBP has not only seen an increase in the express consignment 

environment, but also in international mail shipments, which have increased an astonishing 200 

percent over the past five years. In FY 2013, CBP and the USPS processed approximately 150 

million international mail shipments. By FY 2017 the number of international mail shipments had 

swelled to over 400 million shipments. 

The detection of illicit synthetic drugs remains challenging in the postal environment. However, 

recent bi-lateral agreements regarding advance electronic data (AED) between USPS and foreign 

postal operators have increased CBP's ability to target high-risk shipments. Currently, in the 

international mail environment, CBP receives AED on over 40 percent of all international mail 

shipments with goods. The lack of a mandate for advance manifest data on all parcels, as well as 

the sheer volume of mail and potentially hazardous nature of various types of illicit drugs, present 

challenges to CBP's interdiction efforts in the international mail environment. Illicit drug 

7 Additional Fentanyl was seized by OFO in the air passenger and sea transportation environments. 

'U.S. law enforcement suspects that there are also some clandestine fentanyl milling and production labs in Mexico. 

These labs likely obtain precursor chemicals and fentanyl for milling and tableting from China. 9 Total increase 45 percent 

Page 2 of& 
78 

manufacturers also seek to outpace the law by continually manufacturing new drug analogues, 

challenging CBP's targeting and detection capabilities. 

Although the processing of inbound international mail is primarily manual, requiring CBP officers 

to sort through large volumes of parcels, CBP officers utilize experience and training to identifY 

items that potentially pose a risk to homeland security and public safety while facilitating the 

movement of legitimate mail. For example, on August 26,2017, CBP officers assigned to the 

Memphis, Tennessee, Federal Express (FedEx) Hub selected a shipment for an enforcement 

examination based on a pre-arrival manifest review. The shipment originated from Canada and 

was destined for Massachusetts. Officers seized 4.70 grams of carfentanil from the shipment 

manifested as documents. The Memphis Border Enforcement Security Task Force, in 

coordination with ICE-HSI Boston, coordinated a successful controlled delivery resulting in 

arrests, seizure of additional narcotics to include cocaine, heroin, and carfentanil, as well as three 

high powered rifles with high capacity magazines. 

CBP Resources and Capabilities to Target, Detect, and Interdict Illicit Drugs 

Thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has made significant investments and improvements in 

our drug detection, identification, and targeting capabilities. These resources, along with 

enhanced information sharing and partnerships, are critical components of CBP' s ability to detect 

and deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in the international mail and ECC environments. 

Advance Information and Targeting 

An important element ofCBP's layered security strategy is obtaining advance information to help 

identifY shipments that are potentially at a higher risk of containing contraband. Under the 

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act or SAFE Port Act of 2006, (Pub. L. No. 109-34 7), 

CBP has the legal authority to collect key air and maritime cargo data elements provided by air, 

sea, and land commercial transport companies (carriers), including ECCs and importers. 10 This 

information is automatically fed into CBP's Automated Targeting System, a secure intranet-based 

enforcement and decision support system that compares cargo and conveyance information against 

intelligence and other enforcement data. 

At CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) advance data and access to law enforcement and 

intelligence records converge to facilitate the targeting of travelers and items of cargo that pose 

the highest risk to our security in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in large 

amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and subject matter expertise to analyze, 

10 49 U.S.C. 4490l(a) states: "The Under Secretary ofTransportation for Security shall provide for the screening of 

all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, 

that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft." Under 49 C.F.R. 1540.5, "Cargo means property tendered for air 

transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All accompanied commercial courier consignments whether or not 

accounted for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Aircraft operator security programs further define the 

terms 'cargo' and 'non-U.S. Mail'." Under TSA regulations, international mail destined for the United States is 

considered cargo and, as a result, is subject to all existing security controls. These security controls, which include 

screening for unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and other destructive substances or items in accordance with TSA 

regulations and security program requirements, are applied to international mail prior to transporting on aircraft at 

Last Point of Departure locations to the United States. These requirements are not dependent on advance electronic 

manifest data, as provided by ECC operators and other participants in the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot 

program. 

Page 3 of8 
79 

assess, and segment risk at every stage in the cargo/shipment and travel life cycles. As the focal 

point of that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement, commercial, and opensource information in unique, proactive ways to identity high-risk travelers and shipments at the 

earliest possible point prior to arrival in the United States. There are currently two full-time ICEHSI Special Agents embedded within the NTC Cargo (NTC-C) Narcotics Division. These Special 

Agents are assigned to NTC-Investigations (NTC-1) and are charged with serving as liaisons 

between the NTC and ICE-HSI personnel in both domestic and international posts. ICE-HSI 

investigative case data is fused with CBP targeting information to bolster investigations targeting 

illicit narcotics smuggling and trafficking organizations. 

Due to the complex tracking systems used by ECCs, when CBP identifies a high-risk shipment in 

the ECC environment, it has the ability to place an electronic hold and to notifY the carrier that a 

particular parcel needs to be presented to CBP for inspection. The major international air shipping 

carriers have a tracking number system that allows them to pull these parcels for inspection when 

they are scanned into the computer system upon arrival at an air hub. 

As mentioned above, in the international mail environment, there is no mandate for advance data 

and CBP is currently receiving less than 50 percent of AED on shipments with goods. USPS 

receives mail from more than 180 countries, the vast majority of which arrives via commercial air 

or surface transportation. Few foreign postal operators provide AED to USPS (which is then 

passed on to CBP). Hence, within the mail environment, CBP officers still rely on intelligence 

and physical or x-ray examinations to carry out their enforcement mission. 

CBP and the USPS have conducted an AED pilot on express mail and e-packets from select 

countries, which is now operational at five of our main IMPs to target high-risk shipments. The 

USPS is responsible for locating the shipments and delivering to CBP for examination. CBP and 

USPS continue to work with foreign postal operators to highlight the benefits of transmitting AED 

to the United States. For example, CBP and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) 

will jointly provide training at a Security Workshop we are conducting, as consultants of the 

Universal Postal Union (UPU), Postal Security Group (PSG), in Bangkok, Thailand, at the AsiaPacific Postal College the week of January 22, 2018. CBP will continue to work with USPS to 

address the issue of AED and, through its participation on U.S. delegations to meetings of the 

UPU, is working to expand the use of AED globally. 

Detection Technology and Canines 

CBP officers utilize NII, spectroscopic and chemical testing equipment, and narcotics detection 

canines to detect and presumptively identifY illicit drugs at international mail and ECC facilities. 

Canine operations are an invaluable component ofCBP's counternarcotic operations. CBP canine 

teams work at international mail and ECC facilities to examine millions of foreign mail shipments 

coming into the United States from all parts of the world. 

Synthetic opioids present unique challenges to canine teams due to the potency of the drug and the 

associated danger to the health and safety of the canines and their handlers. After assessing the 

feasibility of safely and effectively adding fentanyl as a trained odor to OFO's deployed narcotic 

Page 4 of8 
80 

detection canine teams, ll on June 23, 2017, CBP successfully completed its first Fentanyl 

Detection Canine Pilot Course. This added the odor of fentanyl and its analogues to six OFO 

canine handler teams in the international mail and ECC environments. As ofNovember 23, 2017, 

all OFO concealed human and narcotic detector dogs working in the international mail and ECC 

environments have been trained to detect fentanyl. As of December 20,2017,295 ofOFO's 474 

concealed human and narcotic detector dog teams have been trained to detect fentanyl across 

OFO's work environments, with the remaining teams scheduled to be trained by March of2018. 

On December 15,2017, seven new OFO concealed human and narcotic detector dog teams 

graduated from the Canine Center Front Royal as the first OFO canines to be fentanyl certified at 

initial certification. All future OFO concealed human and narcotic detector dog teams will 

graduate fentanyl certified. CBP continues to conduct special research to determine the detection 

and identification of signature odor profiles for fentanyl compounds to aid in our detection 

capabilities. 

As the narcotics seized through the mail and at ECC facilities usually have a very high purity, at 

IMFs and ECC facilities CBP officers use Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FT -IR), 

Gemini® Raman Spectroscopy, 12 and handheld narcotics analyzers to test suspect substances and 

obtain a presumptive result. Using CBP's Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate 

(LSSD) Field Triage Reachback Program, CBP officers transmit sample data directly to LSSD for 

scientific interpretation and identification.13 When any synthetic opioids are detected by the 

reachback program, LSSD notifies key CBP personnel at the NTC as well as the liaisons with 

Drug Enforcement Administration's (DBA) Special Operations Division, so they can generate 

near real-time intelligence. LSSD is working to expand the field testing program, along with the 

scientific assets and personnel who are able to provide real-time chemical composition 

determinations. 14 

In the fourth quarter ofFY 2016, OFO conducted a pilot with the San Diego Field Office and the 

LSSD Los Angeles Laboratory to evaluate new testing methods for the identification of fentanyl. 

The pilot tested four handheld tools along with a new reagent test kit to provide immediate 

presumptive testing for fentanyl. Of the four tested, the Gemini® Analyzer proved to be the most 

reliable instrument. The Gemini® system combines Raman with FT-IR technology and 

encompasses a software library. Based on the results of the pilot, OFO procured 12 Gemini® 

systems and assigned a Program Manager to provide a Fentanyl Safety Brief for the CBP officers 

across San Diego, Tucson, El Paso, and Laredo Field Offices. In the fourth quarter of FY 2017, 

OFO procured over 90 Gemini® handheld analyzers and the associated narcotic field drug test 

kits, and we are currently training staff and deploying the technology across our mail, ECC, and 

'

1 CBP offices involved in this assessment included OFO, the Office of Training and Development CBP Canine 

Training Program, LSSD, and the Office of Chief Council, Labor Employee Relations, and Occupational Safety and 

Health Divisions. 

'

2 Raman spectroscopy is a technique used in chemistry to provide a structural fingerprint by which molecules can be 

identified. 

13 At limited POEs, officers also use Gemini® Raman Spectroscopy and handheld narcotics analyzer equipment that 

have the ability to make identifications of illicit substances. However, detecting synthetic opioids that are mixed with 

cutting agents, such as lactose and dipyrone, which are regularly found at Southwest LPOEs, remain a challenge for 

the current technology. 14 LSSD has provided triage on 5,299 submissions during FY 2015, and 8,384 submissions for FY 2016. Since the 

inception ofthe program, LSSD has triaged 20,158 submissions within a business day and has contributed to many 

controlled deliveries because of the rapid turnaround. 

Page 5of8 
81 

LPOEs on the Southwest border. Utilization of the handheld analyzers and test kits improves 

officer safety, and provides a near real-time capability to increase narcotic interdiction and 

increase the number ofiCE-HSI and DEA controlled deliveries resulting in arrests and additional 

contraband seized. Currently, OFO is working to procure more than 60 additional handheld 

analyzers, test kits, and the necessary protective equipment to conduct non-contact sampling onsite. The systems will be deployed in international mail and ECC facilities and at POEs on the 

Southwest border. CBP will prioritize procurement and deployment plans of additional devices 

based on the availability of funds and analysis of synthetic drug interdiction rates. 

Technology and canine detection capabilities are critical components of CBP's security operations 

at mail and ECC cargo facilities. These capabilities are used in conjunction with advance 

information and targeting capabilities to effectively and efficiently detect and interdict dangerous 

illicit drugs. 

Workforce Protection 

CBP' s frontline operations, including drug interdiction activities, are extremely hands-on. The 

potential for contact with dangerous substances - especially illicit synthetic opioids - is a very real 

health and safety risk to law enforcement personnel and canines. For example, in its pure powder 

form, fentanyl is approximately 50-I 00 times more potent in its intensity, speed of action, and 

effect on organs than morphine, and, at first glance, it is often mistaken for other drugs, which 

appear as white powders such as cocaine or heroin. Due to the risk of unintentional exposure and 

subsequent hazardous drug absorption and/or inhalation, the confirmatory testing for the presence 

of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and its analogues is best executed in a laboratory by trained 

scientists and technicians. 15 

Explicit instructions, including guidance to canine handlers, have been distributed to the field 

regarding the safe handling of fentanyl. Additionally, in response to increased seizures at LPOEs 

and the upsurge in the use of heroin (which is increasingly cut with fentanyl) across the Nation, in 

October 2015 CBP completed Phase I of a pilot program to train and equip CBP officers with 

naloxone, a potentially life-saving drug for the treatment of opioid exposure. During Phase I, CBP 

officers, at seven participating POEs 16 received training on recognizing the signs and symptoms of 

opioid exposure, administering naloxone, and were certified as CPR instructors. In February 

2016, CBP initiated Phase II of the Naloxone Initiative Pilot Program, expanding the pilot to an 

additional eight POEs and deploying 602 dual-dose Narcan Nasal Spray® kits to the field. 17 To 

date, OFO has deployed I, 119 two-dose boxes of naloxone to the field. Additional naloxone is 

being deployed to field offices upon request, as additional personnel are trained in its 

administration. A procurement of 720 two-dose boxes ofNarcan® Nasal Spray from FY 2017 

funding is due to be shipped, to replace the lot which expires in April of 2018. The naloxone 

" Expedited analysis can have a turnaround time of a day or two; the turnaround time for non-expedited samples can 

he up to two months. Routine samples are treated as non-expedited. Samples that are treated as expedited are 

samples that are destined for controlled deliveries, have an impending court date, person or persons under arrest or 

detention, or are otherwise deemed a priority. 16 Phase I Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include El Paso; Laredo; Fort Lauderdale International Airport; John K. 

Kennedy International Airport; San Luis: San Ysidro; and Seattle/Blaine. 17 Phase 2 Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include Miami lnt'I/Miami Seaport; Boston; Buffalo; Detroit; Newark; 

Chicago; Houston lnt'I/Houston Seaport; and Dallas. 

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82 

program has also expanded to LSSD to help protect its scientists in both its main and satellite 

laboratories. CBP was the first Federal law enforcement agency to implement such a program. 

Information Sharing and Operational Coordination 

Substantive and timely information sharing is critical to targeting and interdicting shipments 

containing illicit drugs. CBP contributes to the whole-of-government effort to identity and disrupt 

sophisticated routes and networks used by DTOs for the smuggling of illicit drugs by sharing 

critical information on individuals and cargo with investigative and intelligence partner agencies. 

To bolster its targeting mission in the international mail and ECC environments, the NTC 

collaborates with critical partners on a daily basis, including ICE-HSI, DEA, the Federal Bureau 

oflnvestigation, the Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations (FDA/OCI), 

other members of the Intelligence Community, and USPIS. CBP is sharing information with these 

agencies and conducting joint enforcement initiatives, including intelligence-driven operations 

designed to identity and disrupt drug smuggling. As of April20 17, the NTC has two permanent 

USPIS employees working at the NTC assisting and collaborating for narcotic targeting under a 

recent Memorandum of Understanding. Moreover, NTC works in close coordination with several 

pertinent task forces including the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, as well as the Department of Homeland Security's Joint Task 

Force--West and Joint Task Force--Investigations. 

The OFO Tactical Operations Division directs special enforcement operations, in concert with 

ICE-HSI and other law enforcement partners, to identity and disrupt drug smuggling at targeted 

POEs, IMFs, and ECC facilities. These operations involve Nil technology, canine enforcement 

teams, Antiterrorism-Contraband Enforcement Teams, Special Response Teams, and other law 

enforcement partner resources. For example, in January 2017, CBP officers at the John F. 

Kennedy (JFK) International Airport IMF partnered with ICE-HSI, DEA, FDA, U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission to launch a five-day joint 

operation to target and interdict illicit fentanyl and other narcotic shipments that posed a health 

and safety risk to consumers. The operation focused on mail packages originating in China and 

Hong Kong. This successful operation resulted in the seizure of 5.31 lbs. of fentanyl and 134 

other controlled substances. It also resulted in the seizure of 1,297 non-compliant imports and 

provided law enforcement officers with the opportunity to conduct eight controlled deliveries to 

unsuspecting drug smugglers. 

CBP is also conducting other special enforcement operations, such as "Operation Crush" at the 

ECC facilities in Cincinnati, Louisville, and Memphis, to seize narcotics such as fentanyl. 

Operation Crush effected 77 seizures of narcotics and precursor chemicals in Memphis, 24 in 

Louisville, and 24 in Cincinnati. This operation also resulted in the additional seizure of three 

assault rifles, one handgun, a l 00-round ammunition drum and other high-capacity magazines, and 

$7,028 in United States currency, as well as cocaine and heroin. One subject was arrested after 

carfentanil was seized in Memphis. From this seizure, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives matched one of the firearms to an unsolved June 2017 shooting in the Brockton, 

Massachusetts area. 

CBP is a key partner in the implementation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's 

(ONDCP) Heroin Availability Reduction Plan (HARP). CBP also utilizes the Department of 

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83 

Justice's Nationwide Deconfliction System operated by the DEA, conducting interagency 

deconfliction and coordination, and is working with the Heroin and Fentanyl Working Group at 

the DEA Special Operations Division, alongside ICE-HSI. 

Conclusion 

There is no single entity or single solution that can stop the flow of dangerous illicit drugs into the 

United States or keep them from harming the American public. Tackling this complex threat 

involves a united, comprehensive strategy and an aggressive approach by multiple entities across 

all levels of government. With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our 

partners, will continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and 

interdiction capabilities to combat transnational threats and the entry of dangerous illicit drugs into 

the United States. 

CBP will continue to work with our government and private-sector partners to improve the 

efficiency of information sharing and operational coordination to address the challenges and 

threats posed by illicit narcotic smuggling in the international mail environment. CBP will also 

continue to work with USPS and USPIS to improve interdiction in the mail environment through 

improved advanced data, and other security best practices at the Nation's IMFs. 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Page 8 of8 
84 

Hearing before the 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Written Statement 

Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in 

International Mail 

January 25, 2018 

William Siemer 

Acting Deputy Inspector General 

United States Postal Service 
85 

Good morning, Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss our work to improve 

international mail security and keep illicit drugs out of the mail. 

First, let me describe our recent audit work on inbound international mail 

operations and security. We have issued eight reports in this area since 

September 2015. Much of our work has focused on the Postal Service's 

procedures for presenting mail for inspection to U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP). We examined operations at the International Service Centers 

(ISCs), the main entry points for international mail, as well as at smaller 

exchange offices. We also evaluated the Postal Service's pilot with CBP, which 

uses the available advance electronic data provided by foreign posts to better 

target parcels for inspection. In addition, we conducted related work on delayed 

inbound international mail and the Postal Service's processes for handling 

nonmailable inbound shipments such as cigarettes. 

We found problems in several areas. For example, at ISCs, the Postal Service 

sometimes failed to present items to CBP for inspection when requested and 

instead processed the parcels directly into the mailstream. In addition, inaccurate 

scan data into and out of customs meant that the Postal Service could not always 

determine whether a parcel was in CBP's custody or its own. These failures 

occurred for several reasons including human error and electronic system 

problems. Another factor was that the Postal Service and CBP did not have a 

formal written agreement regarding the appropriate procedures. They have since 

established a national Memorandum of Understanding. Our audit work also found 

instances in the past where the Postal Service had not requested advance 

electronic data as part of its bilateral agreements with foreign posts. 

In all, we have issued 21 recommendations to the Postal Service covering areas 

such as enhancing systems and processes, providing better employee training 

and oversight, and improving coordination with CBP, other agencies, and foreign 
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posts. The Postal Service agreed with 18 of the recommendations and has 

already addressed 12. The remaining six open recommendations are primarily 

related to improving data and operational systems and coordinating with federal 

agencies and foreign posts. The Postal Service expects to complete these 

recommendations in 2018. We also have two ongoing audit projects focused on 

advance electronic data and opioid safety preparedness at the Postal Service. 

In addition to this audit activity, we are building our data analytics capacity to find 

and prevent drug trafficking in the mail. For years, law enforcement has used 

data to find criminals and expose their networks. Early efforts focused on 

financial crime, due to its complexity and the large datasets available. And just as 

criminals misused financial institutions to commit fraud, today's drug traffickers 

are misusing trusted distribution networks like the U.S. mail to anonymously 

exchange money and deliver illegal drugs. 

The Postal Service faces a number of challenges that private companies do not 

when dealing with illicit narcotics in the mail. For instance, the Postal Service is 

obligated to deliver international parcels even though it did not originally receive 

them from the customer. The Postal Service receives limited electronic data 

about many of these parcels, and the information it does receive is often 

incomplete or inaccurate. In addition, the sheer volume of inbound parcels the 

Postal Service handles far exceeds what other shippers manage. Finally, unlike 

private shippers, the law requires the Postal Service to obtain a warrant to 

inspect the contents of suspect parcels. The sanctity and privacy of the mail and 

its contents is a strong principle valued by the American public, but this principle 

is being exploited by criminals. 

As ecommerce continues to expand dramatically, rapid growth of both domestic 

and international mail parcels is also occurring. The Postal Service must rely 

heavily on automation and electronic data to deliver more than 5 billion parcels a 

year to 157 million delivery points. That's more than 14 million parcels a day, and 

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it's easy for illegal drug parcels to hide in all of that traffic. However, the data that 

the Postal Service uses to manage its network can also be used to sniff out 

suspicious parcels, and that is exactly what we have started to do using 

analytics. 

This past September, our Acting Inspector General testified about some of our 

work in this area before the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform. She described a case involving an international parcel containing 

fentanyl seized by CBP personnel in New York. The investigation ultimately 

uncovered a postal employee who was facilitating the delivery of illicit narcotics in 

Florida. Our analytics work on the seized fentanyl parcel identified nearly 2,800 

additional suspicious parcels that had been sent through the mail. Since that 

time, we have assisted other federal investigations involving reshipping schemes 

and illicit international narcotics parcels. We identified a number of additional 

reshippers who were previously unknown to law enforcement and who were 

responsible for thousands of suspicious shipments. 

While supporting specific cases is useful, we are also dedicating resources to 

build tools to address narcotics issues more broadly. We recently completed the 

development of a tool to identify postal employees who may be stealing drug 

parcels from the mail or facilitating the delivery of illicit narcotics parcels to 

criminal groups. Unlike legitimate customers who will tell us when their parcels 

do not arrive, we have yet to receive our first complaint from a drug dealer that 

their parcel was missing. Historically, we have had to rely on tips or cooperating 

defendants to provide us with information about postal employees who were 

assisting drug traffickers. Now, we are analyzing Postal Service data and looking 

for various indicators to help us focus on employees or routes where suspicious 

parcels are disappearing. Our initial use of this analytics tool has been very 

encouraging, and it may revolutionize the way we tackle these kinds of crimes. 

While this tool searches for criminal activity that happened in the past, we think 

looking forward in the data can have an even greater impact. 

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We are also currently building a tool to identify inbound international parcels that 

are suspicious but have not yet arrived in the United States. Our hope is that we 

can share the insights gained from this tool with CBP to better assist efforts to 

identify parcels for inspection and reduce the number of narcotics parcels that 

enter the mail stream. We have shared some initial parcel information to test the 

accuracy of our model, and the results appear very promising. 

Combatting the shipment of illegal drugs is not a problem any one agency can 

solve by itself. Cross-agency collaboration and data sharing is critical. Ultimately, 

we need to identify and intercept these parcels before they are delivered, rather 

than continuing to focus on investigating after the fact. One part of the solution is 

using data effectively to uncover problems, but that is only half the battle. 

Resources to address the problems are also needed. For example, our tool to 

identify collusive employees identified hundreds of suspicious postal routes. Our 

agency is not staffed to address all of these investigations immediately, and the 

situation is only going to get worse as our budget gets smaller. This issue is not 

unique to our organization, but it highlights the need to strategically invest in the 

tools and people to combat this problem, since data alone is not enough. 

To conclude, we believe data analytics provides an excellent opportunity to better 

investigate drug trafficking through the mail, but there are also a number of 

challenges ahead: 

• More resources are needed to capitalize on data analytics techniques, 

including more data experts and tools to generate leads and more 

assistance from law enforcement to follow them up. 

• Improving the data available for inbound international parcels is 

important. Although the amount of international advance electronic data is 

growing, it is not yet available for all inbound parcels. 

• Legal barriers to opening parcels prevent the Postal Service from 

proactively ensuring the safety of the mail and may hinder investigations 

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given the volume of suspect parcels. Additionally, specific enhanced 

criminal penalties for shipping drugs through the mail may be needed to 

create a stronger deterrent to drug trafficking. 

• Finally, and most importantly, the successful use of analytics requires 

moving beyond traditional case-by-case, parcel-by-parcel investigative 

practices and instituting a high-level strategic, collaborative approach to 

stop drug trafficking through the mail. 

If these challenges can be solved, data analytics promises to help government 

and law enforcement focus on the areas of greatest impact in order to prevent 

our mail system from being misused to distribute narcotics in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work. I am happy to answer any 

questions. 

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ileparlment of Justite 

STATEMENT OF 

DANIEL D. BALDWIN 

SECTION CHIEF, OFFICE OF GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT 

ASIA & AFRICA 

OPERATIONS DIVISION 

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

BEFORE THE 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

FOR A HEARING ENTITLED 

"COMBATING THE OPIOID CRISIS: EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES 

IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL" 

PRESENTED 

JANUARY 25, 2018 
91 

Statement of 

Daniel D. Baldwin 

Section Chief, Office of Global Enforcement, Asia and Africa 

Operations Division 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Before the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

U.S. Senate 

For a Hearing Entitled 

"Combating the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25,2018 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Subcommittee: on 

behalf of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and in particular the approximately 9,000 employees 

of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), thank you for the opportunity to discuss current 

law enforcement cooperation between the United States and China with regards to drug 

enforcement. 

Drug overdoses, suffered by family, friends, neighbors, and colleagues, are now the 

leading cause of injury-related death in the United States, eclipsing deaths from motor vehicle 

crashes or firearms. 1 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), there 

were 63,632 overdose deaths in 2016, or approximately 174 per day. Over 42,000 (66 percent) 

of these deaths were caused by opioids. The sharpest increase in drug overdose deaths from 

2015 to 2016 was fueled by a surge in fentanyl and fentanyl analogue (synthetic opioid) 

overdoses. 2 

Under U.S. federal law, fentanyl is a Schedule II controlled substance lawfully produced 

in the United States and used widely in medicine. It is an extremely potent analgesic widely 

used for anesthesia and also pain control in people with serious pain problems and, in such cases, 

it is indicated only for use in people who have high opioid tolerance. Illicit fentanyl, fentanyl 

analogues, and their immediate precursors are often produced in China. From China, these 

substances are shipped primarily through express consignment carriers or international mail 

directly to the United States or alternatively shipped directly to transnational criminal 

organization's (TCO) in Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean. Once in the Western Hemisphere, 

fentanyl or its analogues are prepared to be mixed into the heroin supply, or pressed into a pill 

form, and then moved into the illicit U.S. market where demand for prescription opioids and 

1 Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell, & R. Matthew Gladden. Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths -United States, 2000-

2014 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 2016;64:1378-1382. 2 CDC WONDER data, retrieved from the National Institute of Health website; htto://www drugabuse.gov as reported on NIDA's website. 

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heroin remain at epidemic proportions. In some instances, drug trafficking organizations have 

industrial pill presses shipped directly into the United States from China and operate fentanyl pill 

press mills domestically. Mexican TCOs have seized upon this business opportunity because of 

the profit potential of synthetic opioids, and have invested in growing their share of this market. 

Because of its low dosage range and potency, one kilogram of fentanyl purchased in China for 

$3,000- $5,000 can generate upwards of$1.5 million in revenue on the illicit market. 

DOJ INTERACTIONS Wim CHINESE COUNTERPARTS 

China: Government Action and Cooperation 

Combatting illicit fentanyl is a top priority of this Administration. Recognizing that a 

significant amount of illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and their immediate precursors are 

manufactured in China, Attorney General Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein 

both requested that China take action in meetings with then-State Councilor Guo Shengkun of 

the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein met with Guo in 

Beijing, China on September 25, 2017, followed by a meeting with the Attorney General in 

Washington, D.C. on October 3 and October 4, 2017. 

The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General's efforts are built on longstanding working-level engagements with the Chinese on a number oflevels. For example, 

DEA has maintained a liaison presence in the People's Republic of China, with an office in 

Beijing for the last three decades. DEA is currently working to staff a second office to be 

located in Guangzhou. DEA's office in Beijing has direct engagement with drug control 

officials from China's Ministry of Public Security, Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). DEA's 

well-established relationship with Chinese drug control authorities is the primary significant bilateral conduit to address the threat resulting from the shipment of illicit fentanyls, their 

precursors, and other synthetic drugs to the United States and elsewhere. 

The DEA and the NCB share drug-related intelligence and trends through the Bilateral 

Drug Intelligence Working Group (BDIWG) led by DEA's Intelligence Division. This annual 

engagement was established through a memorandum of agreement between the DEA and the 

NCB in2002. 

At a higher policy level, the United States Government has also engaged China through 

an interagency working forum that operates under the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group (JLG). 

The JLG is chaired by the Department of Justice, the Department of State's Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Department of Homeland 

Security. DEA and the NCB participate in the Counter Narcotics Working Group (CNWG) and 

the BDIWG within the JLG framework that are chaired, respectively, by the Department of 

Justice and the DEA on the U.S. side and the Ministry of Public Security on the Chinese side. 

Engagement in the efforts mentioned above has resulted in positive actions by the 

Government of China over the last year. These actions are a step in the right direction, but more 

can be done. 

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Since 2014, the DOJ, DEA, and Chinese officials have met regularly to discuss bilateral 

efforts to counter the threat to the United States from fentanyl class substances. For the past four 

years, representatives from China's National Narcotics Laboratory have met with DEA experts 

to exchange information on emerging substances, trafficking trends, and drug sampling 

standards. This dialogue fosters information exchange about new substances of abuse in the 

United States to be considered for control in China. A larger and more formal bilateral exchange 

between legal and (especially) scientific experts took place in Beijing in May 2017. Plans are 

underway for DEA to welcome its scientific counterparts to Washington in early spring 2018. 

A key moment in enhanced cooperation on synthetic drugs came in October 2015, when, 

following similar discussions, China implemented domestic control on 116 New Psychoactive 

Substances (NPS), including a number of fentanyl analogues, and streamlined its procedures to 

control additional substances. In total, China has scheduled 138 different NPS. 

On March I, 2017, China's National Narcotics Control Commission announced 

scheduling controls against four fentanyl-class substances: carfentanil; furanyl fentanyl; valery! 

fentanyl; and, aery! fentanyl. This announcement was the culmination of ongoing collaboration 

between DOJ and the Government of China, and reaffirms an expanding collaborative 

commitment to countering illicit fentanyl. On July I, 2017, China controlled U-47700. While 

not a fentanyl class substance, U-47700 is a powerful synthetic opioid that has been trafficked 

and abused in the United States. 

After requests by Administration officials, including the Attorney General and Deputy 

Attorney General, and in accordance with its obligations under the 1988 UN Convention, on 

December 28, 2017, China's Ministry of Public Security announced scheduling controls on two 

fentanyl precursor chemicals, NPP and 4ANPP. The scheduling controls will take effect on 

February I, 2018. Chinese control of these substances, and the effect that prior control efforts 

have had on the availability of these substances in the United States, is encouraging and affirms 

the need for the continued collaborative commitment between the DEA and the NCB. 

In 2018, DEA will continue to engage the Chinese on the control of emerging fentanyl 

analogues and other NPS. We are further encouraged that the Chinese are willing to engage in 

discussions and technical exchanges with DEA regarding scheduling fentanyl as a class. 

Officials from the NCB indicated that their scheduling process is long and complicated, that 

China has always scheduled one drug at a time, pursuant to its law, and that any change in that 

process would be groundbreaking for China. In spite of the complexity of this process, and the 

fact that domestic abuse of fentanyl and related substances has not been a problem in China, they 

have continued to show an understanding of the problem and a willingness to listen and at least 

discuss class scheduling. 

As the opioid threat continues, DOl and DEA are committed to working with Chinese 

officials through its well-established bilateral efforts, including: liaison presence; the 

JLG/CNWG; the BDIWG; and enhancing collaboration with DEA's interagency partners 

stationed abroad and in the United States. 

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SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 

Heroin Fentanyl Task Force 

The DEA Special Operations Division (SOD) Heroin/Fentanyl Task Force (HFTF) 

working group consists of several agencies using a joint "whole of government" approach to 

counter the fentanyl/opioid epidemic in the United States. The HFTF consists of personnel from 

DEA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP); supplemented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. HFTF utilizes every resource available, including support 

from the Department of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), 

OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC) and the Criminal Division, the Department of Defense (DOD), 

the Intelligence Community (IC) and other government entities, and provides field offices (all 

agencies) with valuable support in their respective investigations. 

The HFTF mission aims to: 

IdentifY, target, and dismantle command and control networks of national and 

international fentanyl and NPS trafficking organizations. 

Provide case coordination and de-confliction on all domestic and foreign investigations to 

ensure that multi-jurisdictional, multi-national, and multi-agency investigations and 

prosecutions have the greatest impact on targeted organizations. 

Provide direct and dynamic operational and investigative support for domestic and foreign 

field offices for all agencies. 

IdentifY new foreign and domestic trafficking, manufacturing, importation, production and 

financial trends utilized by criminal enterprises. 

Analyze raw intelligence and documented evidence from multiple resources to develop 

actionable leads on viable target(s) involved in possible illicit pill production and/or 

distribution networks. 

Educate overall awareness, handling, trafficking trends, investigative techniques and 

safety to domestic and foreign field offices for all law enforcement, DOD, IC and 

governmental agencies. 

Facilitate, coordinate, and educate judicial districts during prosecutions of fentanyl and 

other NPS related cases. 

Close interagency cooperation via the HFTF have led to several large enforcement 

actions, including the first-ever indictment, in two separate OCDETF cases, of two Chinese 

nationals responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of illicit fentanyl in the United 

States in October 2017. On October 17, the Deputy Attorney General and the DEA Acting 

Administrator announced the indictments of the Chinese nationals, who were the first 

manufacturers and distributors of fentanyl and other opiate substances to be designated as 

Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs). CPOT designations are of those who have 

"command and control" elements of the most prolific international drug trafficking and money 

laundering organizations operating in the world. 

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In addition, SOD's HFTF played an integral role in the July 2017 seizure and shutting down of 

the largest criminal marketplace on the Internet, AlphaBay. As outlined by the Attorney General 

and the DEA Acting Principal Deputy Administrator in July, AlphaBay operated for over two 

years on the dark web and was used to sell deadly illegal drugs, stolen and fraudulent 

identification documents and access devices, counterfeit goods, malware and other computer 

hacking tools, firearms, and toxic chemicals throughout the world. The international operation to 

seize AlphaBay's infrastructure was led by the United States and involved cooperation and 

efforts by law enforcement authorities in Thailand, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Canada, the 

United Kingdom, and France, as well as the European law enforcement agency Europol. 

Multiple interagency OCDETF investigations into AlphaBay revealed that numerous vendors, 

including many in China, sold illicit fentanyl and heroin on the site, and that there have been a 

substantial number of overdose deaths across the country attributed to such purchases. 

CONCLUSION 

DEA will continue to engage the Government of China in our efforts to stem the flow of 

fentanyl and fentanyl precursors, which are fueling the national opioid epidemic, as well as other 

NPS. DEA is further committed to working with the interagency and foreign partners in 

targeting, indicting, and arresting leadership of criminal networks. 

We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to find solutions necessary to 

address the threats posed by controlled prescription drugs, heroin, and fentanyl. 

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U.S. Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement 

STATEMENT 

OF 

GREGORY C. NEVANO 

DEPU1Y ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

ILLICIT TRADE, TRAVEL, AND FINANCE DIVISION 

HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS 

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

REGARDING A HEARING ON 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

Thursday, January 25, 2018 

342 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
97 

Chairman ~;?rtman, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished members: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the crisis of heroin 

and illicit fentanyl in the United States and the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) to target, investigate, disrupt, dismantle and bring to justice the criminal 

elements responsible for the manufacturing, smuggling, and distribution of dangerous opioids. 

As the largest investigative agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) investigates and enforces more than 400 

federal criminal statutes including those contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (Title 

8), U.S. customs laws (Title 19), general federal criminal code (Title 18), and the Controlled 

Substances Act (Title 21 ). HSI special agents use this authority to investigate all types of crossborder criminal activity and work in close coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), as 

well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in a unified effort, to target 

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that are supplying heroin and illicit fentanyl to the 

United States. 

Today, I would like to highlight our efforts to combat international shipments of opioids, 

especially fentanyl, coming into the United States through international mail facilities. 

Introduction to Fentanyl 

The United States is in the midst of an illicit fentanyl epidemic that is multi-faceted and 

deadly. Fentanyl is a Schedule II synthetic opioid, used medically for severe pain relief in 

patients that are already opioid tolerant, and it is 50-100 times more potent than morphine. For 

reference, as little as two milligrams of pure fentanyl can be fatal. Based on investigative efforts, 

United States law enforcement has identified China as a primary source of the U.S. illicit 

fentanyl threat. 

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Illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and their immediate precursors are most often 

produced in China. From China, these substances are shipped primarily through mail carriers 

directly to the United States or alternatively shipped directly to TCOs in Mexico, Canada, and 

the Caribbean. Once in the Western Hemisphere, fentanyl or its analogues are prepared and 

mixed into the U.S. heroin supply domestically, or pressed into pill form, and then moved to the 

illicit U.S. market where demand for prescription opioids and heroin remain at epidemic 

proportions. In some cases, traffickers have industrial pill presses shipped into the United States 

directly from China to operate fentanyl pill press mills domestically. Mexican TCOs also 

receive shipments of fentanyl and its precursors directly from China where it is usually. 

adulterated with heroin or other powdered forms of narcotics such as dipyrone. There is strong 

evidence that large quantities of fentanyl are shipped from China to Mexico and are not opened 

until they are within the United States. Mexican cartels have seized upon this business 

opportunity because of the profit potential of synthetic opioids, and have invested in growing 

their share of this market. Because of its low dosage range and potency, one kilogram of 

fentanyl purchased in China for $3,000 - $5,000 can generate upwards of $1.5 million in revenue 

on the illicit market. 

Fentanyl shipments through mail facilities 

Seizures of illicit fentanyl and other opioids at international mail facilities have increased 

over the last few years. Though fentanyl seizures made at land crossings are higher in number 

and larger in volume, the fentanyl seizures from mail and express consignment carrier (ECC) 

facilities are more potent. The majority of illicit fentanyl in the international mail and ECC 

environments is shipped in concentrations of over 90 percent, whereas the majority offentanyl in 

the land border environment is seized in concentrations ofless than I 0 percent. Purchasers can 

also access op.en source and dark web marketplaces for synthetic drugs, like fentanyl, where they 

can be easily purchased online and then shipped into the United States, sometimes directly to the 

end user. TCOs have long realized the vulnerability of the mail system and express consignment 

and exploit the great volumes of mail entering the United States as a means to further their 

criminal activity. In an effort to combat opioid trafficking, ICE is targeting supply chain 

networks, coordinating with domestic and international partners, and providing field training to 

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highlight officer safety, trends, and collaboration benefits with partners such as CBP and the 

US PIS. In support of the detection and analysis effort, ICE is fully engaged with the DEA 

Special Operations Division (SOD) and the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC), to identify 

shipment routes, target parcels that may contain heroin, illicit fentanyl, fentanyl-related 

substances and manufacturing materials, and fully exploit financial and investigative analyses. 

While this is a good start, we recognize much more needs to be done. 

ICE's Lines of Effort 

Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST} 

Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST) are ICE's primary platform to 

investigate opioid smuggling domestically. ICE currently operates BESTs in 57 locations 

throughout the United States, an increase of30 percent in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 in response to 

the President's Executive Order on TCOs. BESTs leverage the participation of more than 1,000 

federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agents and officers representing over I 00 law 

enforcement agencies to target opioid smuggling. 

In response to the opioid crisis, ICE, with significant participation with CBP, established 

a BEST in Memphis, TN, embedded at an express consignment carrier facility, which 

specifically targets opioid shipments on a daily basis. With the support of the Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Force of the Department of Justice, identification of fentanyl analogues, 

interdictions, and investigative leads are being maximized. Because we still are working to 

identify the full extent of the smuggling operations that ship fentanyl through the mail, one of the 

primary tools used by the Memphis BEST is controlled deliveries of intercepted packages that 

contain fentanyl or other illicit substances. Controlled deliveries are highly effective means of 

identifying end-users, establishing probable cause, and ultimately disrupting and dismantling 

domestic and regional smugglers and distributors. 

In FY17, HSI Memphis BEST initiated approximately 282 controlled deliveries to HSI 

offices throughout the world. One example of these cases occurred in August 2017, when the 

Memphis BEST seized 4. 7 grams of highly potent carfentanil destined for Brockton, MA. HSI 

Memphis BEST collaborated with HSI Boston who accepted the package and substituted sham 

product for controlled delivery purposes. Subsequent to the sham delivery, special agents 

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executed a search warrant resulting in the seizure of multiple firearms, cocaine and heroin. One 

of the seized firearms was matched to an unsolved shooting in the Brockton, MA, area 

Because we recognize the need for greater action, ICE, CBP, and the USPIS are 

collaborating in the development of a more robust, nationwide effort to interdict fentanyl 

transiting through mail facilities. The expansion of BEST at these mail facilities is expected to 

help disrupt the movement of illicit fentanyl transiting through the mail by placing trained 

investigators at the facilities seeking to conduct long term, complex, criminal investigations into 

such activities, with a high probability for significant seizures and arrests. Additionally, the 

anticipated arrests and dismantling of distribution networks could impact overdose deaths in the 

United States. 

National Targeting Center- Investigations (NTC-1) 

ICE participates at CBP's NTC through the National Targeting Center- Investigations 

(NTC-I) program, which leverages intelligence gathered during ICE investigations and exploits it 

using CBP holdings to target the flow of drugs into the United States. The NTC-I works to share 

information between CBP and ICE entities world-wide. 

ICE-HSI has assigned special agents to work within the NTC Cargo (NTC-C) Narcotics 

Division. These Special Agents are charged with serving as liaisons between the NTC and ICE 

personnel in both domestic and international posts. HSI investigative case data is fused with 

CBP targeting information to bolster investigations targeting illicit opioid smuggling and 

trafficking organizations. 

NTC-I conducts post-seizure analysis based on ICE seizures in the field and CBP 

seizures at the ports of entry. The analysis is critical to identifying networks that transport heroin 

and illicit fentanyl-related substances into and throughout the United States. A key component 

of the post-seizure analysis is the financial investigation. The NTC-I focuses on the financial 

element of the smuggling organization by exploiting information gathered from multiple 

financial databases. 

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The NTC-1 works closely with CBP to target illicit shipments imported into the United 

States from abroad for interdiction at international mail and ECC facilities. CBP works to target 

parcels based on numerous characteristics and provides investigative information on past 

seizures and active smuggling networks to aid in the targeting effort. Partnering with express 

consignment carriers has proven valuable in identifying additional data sets for targeting and 

exploitation. 

The USPIS is a valued partner within the cargo/narcotics targeting division at the NTC. 

The USPIS resources provide significant value to targeting efforts in pre-existing investigations. 

The USPIS is able to leverage its agency specific databases to provide information previously 

unavailable to ICE and CBP at the NTC. Fusing information from the USPIS databases with 

currently available CBP and ICE targeting, trade, and investigative data has been instrumental in 

identifying illicit opioid importation and distribution conspiracies throughout the nation. 

Additionally, this partnership has allowed joint CBP, ICE, and USPIS enforcement "blitzes" to 

function much more smoothly, with the NTC serving as the central hub for all targeting data 

aero ss the three agencies. 

Cyber Crimes Division 

The ICE Cyber Crimes Division provides support and assistance to field cyber 

investigations targeting dark net illicit marketplaces, where fentanyl and chemical precursors 

proliferate. As criminal activity, and especially the trade of illicit opioids, continues to migrate 

to the online world, ICE faces growing demand for cyber investigative assistance. For example, 

in 2014, HSI conducted only 37 cybercrime investigations (not including child exploitation 

violations). By 2015, that number approached 100 such investigations. Today, HSI has over 

600 open cybercrime investigations, including over I 00 specifically targeting dark net illicit 

markets- most of which involve narcotics smuggling. In the last year alone, the Cyber Division 

has observed a 500 percent increase in requests for field support. Recognizing the need to 

proactively target online fentanyl trafficking, the ICE Cyber Division is identifying ongoing 

investigations and facilitating the coordination of online undercover operations conducted in 

furtherance of dark net illicit marketplaces. Additionally, the Cyber Division is providing 

assistance with the development and management of online undercover personas in furtherance 

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of online undercover operations and collaborates with joint agency strategies in taking down 

online sources of opioids. 

Special Operations Division (SOD) 

The DEA's Special Operations Division (SOD) Heroin and Fentanyl Task Force (HFTF) 

is supported by ICE, CBP, DEA, USPIS and several other federal agencies. The SOD-led, 

interagency task force exploits electronic communications to proactively identify, disrupt, and 

dismantle the production, transportation, and financial networks behind the heroin and illicit 

fentanyl distribution organizations that impact the United States. 

The HFTF focuses on the collaborative authorities and efforts of each invested agency's 

resources, in order to better share and deconflict information. The HFTF works together to 

target international and domestic organizations by proactively working with field office. The 

taskforce also assists in coordinating and linking investigations from the street level dealer to the 

international supply source. 

ICE supports field investigations related to heroin and illicit fentanyl and the overdoses 

that occur as a result of use. ICE and the HFTF are currently coordinating with the Department 

of Justice's Organized. Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program, its Fusion 

Center and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) taskforces to exploit communication data and social media 

information that are associated with reports of overdoses within a geographical area. This is in 

direct support of the OCDETF National Heroin Strategy. Coordination with OCDETF and 

HIDTA has proven helpful in multi-jurisdictional investigations and in their successful 

prosecutions. 

Financial Division 

Identifying, analyzing and investigating the payment systems that facilitate the purchase 

and smuggling of fentanyl is critical to the disruption and dismantlement of networks that 

smuggle fentanyl and other illicit opioids into the United States. ICE conducts proactive 

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investigations that focus on the two key payment systems which support illicit procurement of 

opioids: money service businesses (MSBs) and cryptocurrencies. Generally, illicit opioids that 

are purchased on the "indexed" internet are paid for through licensed mainstream MSBs. On 

dark net marketplaces and other "unindexed" websites, purchases are often paid for with 

cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Monero, among many others. In support of its diverse 

financial investigative efforts ICE uses undercover techniques to infiltrate and exploit peer-topeer cryptocurrency exchangers who typically launder proceeds for criminal networks engaged 

in or supporting dark net marketplaces. Furthermore, ICE leverages complex Blockchain 

technology exploitation tools to analyze the digital currency transactions and identifY transactors. 

To continue long term strategies to dismantle TCOs, ICE trains investigators from 

national and international agencies in cryptocurrency investigations in an effort to deter 

organizations from laundering proceeds or using cryptocurrencies to fund the purchase of 

fentanyllopioids or other narcotics. Also, ICE created the Money Service Business Initiative to 

enable the application of advanced data analytics across large amounts of MSB data in order to 

isolate criminal networks, highlight suspicious transactions indicative of illicit activity, and 

provide predictive intelligence. The power of this type of advanced analytics truly shines when 

MSB data is integrated with additional government data holdings, open source and social media 

information, and communication records such as phone toll records, Internet Protocol (IP) 

address activity records, email search warrants, and Title III wire intercepts. 

Successful Collaboration 

There is no single entity or solution that can stop the flow of dangerous illicit drugs like 

fentanyl into the United States or keep them from harming the American public. Tackling this 

complex threat involves a united, comprehensive strategy and an aggressive approach by 

multiple entities across all levels of government. ICE will continue to work with our federal, 

state and local partners to improve the efficiency of information sharing and operational 

coordination to address the challenges and threats posed by illicit narcotic smuggling in the 

international mail environment. To that end, I wanted to share a recent successful investigation 

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that highlights the collaboration just mentioned. In early March 2017, HSI Houston, NTC-I and 

US PIS developed an initial target list of parcels containing suspected illicit substances enroute to 

U.S.-based recipients. The initial target list was shared with other cooperating agencies for 

potential interception and the execution of controlled deliveries, which resulted in the seizure of 

72 parcels, all of which contained some form of illicit substances including fentanyl. Based on 

the contents of the 72 parcels seized in the U.S., HSI Houston further collaborated with the 

NTC-I, SOD, USPIS, CBP and HSI Attache Office Hong Kong and identified a specific link in 

the flow of these illicit drugs to the United States. The HSI Attache Office Hong Kong requested 

assistance from the Hong Kong Customs & Excise Department (HKCE). HKCE began a fourday operation during March 201 7 targeting and intercepting parcels from a Chinese freight 

forwarding company. During their operation, an additional 130 parcels were seized within Hong 

Kong mail facilities. All of these 130 parcels were identified as containing some form of illicit 

substances including fentanyl and subsequently destroyed before reaching their intended 

recipients. 

CONCLUSION 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued 

support ofiCE and its law enforcement mission. ICE is committed to battling the U.S. opioid 

and illicit fentanyl crisis through the various efforts I have discussed today. I would like to 

reiterate that this problem is an epidemic that demands urgent and immediate action across 

various law enforcement agencies and in conjunction with experts in the scientific, medical, and 

public health communities. I appreciate your interest in this important issue and look forward to 

your questions. 

9 
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United States Senate 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Rob Portman, Chairman 

Tom Carper, Ranking Member 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: 

EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES 

IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

STAFF REPORT 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 
106 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: 

EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES 

IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 1 

A. The Subcommittee's Investigation .................................................................. 7 

B. Findings of Fact and Recommendations ......................................................... 8 

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 13 

A. The Opioid Epidemic ...................................................................................... 14 

1. Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids .................................................................... 15 

2. The Impact on State and Local Governments ............................................... 16 

B. How Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids Enter the United States ................... 17 

1. Sources of Fentanyl ........................................................................................ 17 

2. Convenience of Purchasing on the Internet .................................................. 18 

3. The Growth of E-Commerce ........................................................................... 19 

4. The International Mail System ...................................................................... 21 

C. Preventing Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids from Entering the United 

States ........................................................................................................................ 23 

1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection ............................................................. 23 

2. Advanced Electronic Data and International Mail Acceptance .................... 23 

III. ONLINE SELLERS OF SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS OPERATE OPENLY USING 

COMMON SHIPPING AND PAYMENT METHODS ................................................ 26 

A. Methodology for IdentifYing and Communicating with Online Opioid Sellers 

27 

B. Online Sellers Responded Within Minutes ................................................... 28 

C. Online Sellers Monitor Drug "Scheduling" ................................................... 30 

1. Online Sellers Offered Discounts and Comparable Opioids ......................... 32 

D. Online Sellers Prefer Bitcoin ......................................................................... 35 

E. Online Sellers Prefer Shipping Drugs with Government-Run Postal 

Operators .................................................................................................................. 37 
107 

IV. IDENTIFYING U.S. INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING SUSPECTED DRUG 

PACKAGES FROM CHINA ........................................................................................ 42 

A. Methodology for Locating Likely Purchasers of Illegal Opioids ................... 43 

B. The Subcommittee Identified a Likely U.S.-Based Distributor for Chinese 

Produced Fentanyl and Other Deadly Synthetic Opioids ....................................... 44 

C. The Subcommittee Identified Seven Individuals Who Wired Money to 

Online Sellers and Later Died of Drug Overdoses .................................................. 45 

D. The Subcommittee Identified 18 Individuals Who Wired Money to Online 

Sellers Who Were Arrested or Convicted of Serious Drug-Related Offenses ........ 48 

E. The Subcommittee Identified Two Individuals Likely Engaged in the 

Distribution of Synthetic Opioids ............................................................................ 49 

V. CBP AND THE POSTAL SERVICE ARE ONLY MAKING LIMITED USE OF 

ADVANCED ELECTRONIC DATA TO IDENTIFY, TARGET, AND SEIZE ILLICIT 

INTERNATIONAL PACKAGES OF SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS ................................... 51 

A. Rapid Growth ofinbound International Mail Presents Challenges for 

Effective Screening and Inspection ......................................................................... 51 

B. The Postal Service and CBP Started a Pilot Program to Target Packages for 

Inspection Using AED .............................................................................................. 52 

C. The Postal Service and CBP Did Not Make Timely Improvements to the 

Pilot Program ............................................................................................................ 54 

D. The Postal Service and CBP Still Do Not Agree on How to Measure the Pilot 

Program's Success .................................................................................................... 56 

E. The Postal Service and CBP Officials Did Not Expand the JFK Pilot 

Program until after the Subcommittee's May 2017 Hearing on International Mail 

Security and the Importation of Deadly Drugs ....................................................... 59 

VI. THE UNITED STATES IS A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL 

UNION, WHICH GOVERNS THE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL MAIL ............... 66 

A. The Complicated Structure of the UPU Creates Confusion Regarding 

Priorities and Responsibilities ................................................................................. 68 

B. For a Decade, the UPU has Struggled to Require Member Countries to 

Collect and Share AED for International Mail ....................................................... 69 

C. The 2008 UPU Congress Considered the First-Ever Proposal Regarding the 

Use of AED Offered by the United States ............................................................... 70 
108 

D. AED was used to Thwart anAl Qaeda Attempt to Ship Explosives in UPS 

and FedEx Packages ................................................................................................ 71 

E. To Protect its own National Security, the European Union Attempted to 

Require AED for all Packages by May 1, 2016 ........................................................ 75 

F. The UPU's Senior Leadership Lobbied its Members Against the European 

Union's UCC Implementation Date for Providing AED ......................................... 77 

G. The European Union Postponed the Start Date of the UCC to 2020 ........... 79 

H. The 2016 UPU Congress in Istanbul Initiated a Proposal for AED through 

the Integrated Product Plan .................................................................................... 79 

I. Countries Again Argued Against Any UPU Requirements to Provide AED; 

the United States Distanced Itself from the Proposal.. .......................................... 80 

J. Multiple AED Proposals at the UPU Led to Confusion Regarding Member 

Countries Requirements and Efforts have "Slowed Down to a Crawl" .................. 81 

K. The UPU Takes Notice of Posts being used to Ship Illicit Drugs ................ 82 

VII.EXPRESS CARRIERS USE ADVANCED ELECTRONIC DATA TO LOCATE 

PACKAGES TARGETED BY CBP ............................................................................. 83 

A. Congress Mandated Express Consignment Operators to Provide CBP with 

AED on all Packages ................................................................................................ 84 

1. The Trade Act Required ECOs to Collect AED to Provide to CBP .............. 85 

B. Congress Delegated the Decision to Require Postal Service to Provide 

AED ......................................................................................................................... 86 

C. ECOs use AED to Track Packages Throughout Their Networks ................. 87 

1. ECOs Control Packages from Drop-Off to Delivery ...................................... 87 

D. ECOs Require Customers to Provide Information Mandated by the Trade 

Act ............................................................................................................................... 88 

E. Automated Systems Assist ECOs in Tracking Packages ............................. 92 

F. ECOs Do Not Share Information Related to Shippers of Illegal Items ....... 94 

G. ECOs Provide Almost All Targeted Packages to CBP for Inspection .......... 95 
109 

COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: 

EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES 

IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The number of Americans dying due to opioid overdose is staggering. 

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), more than 

63,600 Americans died from drug overdoses in 2016.1 Sixty-six percent of those 

deaths were caused by opioids, including fentanyl and its many analogues. 2 The 

source of most illicit fentanyl is well known. According to the Drug Enforcement 

Administration ("DEA''), China is the primary source of supply for fentanyl and its 

underlying chemical substances (or precursors) headed for the United States. a It is 

widely known how illicit fentanyl enters the United States. According to the DEA, 

"[c]ustomers can purchase fentanyl products from Chinese laboratories online" and 

"powdered fentanyls and pill presses" arc shipped via mail services." 

The Subcommittee learned just how easy it is to find fentanyl advertised 

online, pay for it using digital currency or other means, and have it shipped to the 

United States through international mail. As such, the Subcommittee conducted an 

investigation into measures used to prevent illicit fentanyl from entering the United 

States by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), the U.S. Postal Service 

("Postal Service"), and the U.S. Department of State ("State Department"). The 

Subcommittee also reviewed efforts taken by the three largest express consignment 

operators ("ECOs") operating in the United States, DHL Express U.S. ("DHL"), 

FedEx Corporation ("FedEx"), and United Parcel Service ("UPS"). Highlights of the 

Subcommittee's investigative results, including findings and recommendations, are 

provided below. 

Online Fentanyl Sellers. The Subcommittee sought to determine how easy it 

is to purchase fentanyl from an online seller and arrange to have it delivered to the 

United States. A simple Coogle search of"fentanyl for sale" returned a number of 

potential sellers. Over the course of three months, the Subcommittee 

communicated with representatives from six online sellers, posing as a first-time 

fentanyl purchaser. All of the online sellers actively sought to induce a purchase of 

fentanyl or other illicit opioid. Their sales pitches made it sound easy to purchase 

1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health and Statistics, Drug 

Overdoses in the United States, 1999-2016 (Dec. 2017), 

https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db294.htm. 

2Jd. 

"Drug Enforcement Administration, lJ.S. Dep't of Justice, DEA-DCT-DIB-021-16, Counterfeit 

Prescription Pills Containing Fentanyls: A Global Threat 2 (July 2016). 

'Id. 
110 

fentanyl, and each preferred to ship any purchases to the United States through the 

international arm of the Postal Service. The online sellers preferred to be paid 

through cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which offers a certain level of anonymity. 

They also accepted other common payment options, such as Western Union, 

MoneyGram, Pay Pal, credit cards, and prepaid gift cards. The online sellers 

actively negotiated with the Subcommittee to complete a deal by offering flash sales 

on certain illicit opioids and discounted prices for bulk purchases. When the 

Subcommittee failed to immediately respond to an offer, the online sellers 

proactively followed up, sometimes offering deeper discounts to entice a sale. 

While the Subcommittee posed as a first-time online purchaser of fentanyl, it 

never finalized an order or provided payment. Rather, the Subcommittee used 

information the online sellers provided-such as payment information and shipping 

addresses-to investigate the extent to which other persons in the United States 

were conducting business with the online sellers. 

Americans Buy Fentanyl Online and Receive it in the Mail. The 

Subcommittee's investigation confirmed that many Americans are purchasing 

fentanyl and other illicit opioids online and having them shipped here through the 

international mail system. The preferred method of the international online sellers 

is Express Mail Service ("EMS"), a global delivery service for documents and 

merchandise contained in letters and packages. The EMS network delivers letters 

and packages worldwide through each member country's postal operations, 

including the Postal Service in the United States. Through payment information, 

the Subcommittee identified more than 500 financial transactions by more than 300 

U.S.-based individuals totaling $230,000 to the six online sellers. These 300 

individuals were located in 43 states, with those in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida 

making the highest number of purchases. 

Through shipment data, the Subcommittee tracked many shipments to 

individuals who sent money to the six online sellers. This review led to several 

alarming findings. Most troubling, the Subcommittee identified seven individuals 

who died from fentanyl-related overdoses after sending money and receiving 

packages from one of the online sellers. One such individual was a 49-year-old 

Ohioan who sent roughly $2,500 to an online seller over the course of 10 monthsfrom May 2016 to February 2017. Over that time period, he received 15 packages 

through the Postal Service on dates that closely corresponded to payments he made 

to an online seller. He died in early 2017 from "acute fentanyl intoxication." He 

had received a package from an online seller just 30 days before his death. The 

Subcommittee further identified 18 individuals who were arrested for drug-related 

offenses and also made purchases and received packages from the online sellers. 

2 
111 

The Subcommittee also identified a likely distributor for one of the online 

sellers based in Pennsylvania. The Subcommittee identified 120 instances of an 

individual sending a payment to an online seller and then receiving a package 

within one-to-two days from the Pennsylvania address. The Ohioan identified 

above, for example, received seven packages from the Pennsylvania address, 

including the package he received a month prior to his death. 

Analysis of payment and shipping information further identified two 

additional individuals who were likely distributing illicit opioids. They each made 

payments to an online seller and l'eceived a package from the Pennsylvania address 

identified by the Subcommittee. These individuals also received other suspect 

packages with descriptions of items used to mass produce narcotics for distribution, 

including pill presses, chemical bonding agents, empty plastic pill casings, and 

chemicals used to dye pills a marketable color. Because these items were shipped 

through an ECO the sender was required to provide a description of the package 

contents as further explained below. The Postal Service is not required to collect 

this information. Under treaty obligations, the Postal Service must rely on foreign 

posts to collect and transmit data on inbound international mail items, including 

information on package contents. 

Inbound International Mail Volume. The Subcommittee also examined the 

federal agencies' and private shippers' response to the country's opioid crisis. CBP 

is the federal agency responsible for identifying suspicious packages sent through 

the international mail stream that contain illegal items, including fentanyl and 

other illicit drugs. The Postal Service and ECOs are required to support CBP's 

efforts by locating and physically handing over or presenting targeted packages to 

CBP for inspection. This process is known as "presentment." 

The volume difference for inbound international packages handled by the 

Postal Service compared to ECOs is staggering. The three major ECOs examined 

by the Subcommittee together handled approximately 65.7 million international 

packages in 2016, while the Postal Service alone handled more than 275 million in 

the same year, over four times the amount handled by the ECOs. The Postal 

Service's inbound international mail volume increased by 232 percent between 

fiscal year 2013 and calendar year 2017. However, the Postal Service failed to 

forecast this growth in inbound international mail volume, which could have helped 

to ensure some operational measures were in place to handle the growth. 

Interdicting Illicit Opioids and Other Contraband in International Mail. 

International mail packages shipped through the Postal Service primarily enter the 

United States through one offive International Service Centers ("ISC") located at 

the following airports: John F. Kennedy International Airport ("JFK") in New York; 

O'Hare International Airport in Chicago ("ORD"); Los Angeles International Airport 

3 
112 

("LAX"); San Francisco International Airport ("SFO"), and Miami International 

Airport ("MIA"). In years past, CBP would locate suspicious packages at the ISCs 

by providing the Postal Service with a list of "countries of interest." The Postal 

Service would then present all the packages from those countries to CBP. CBP 

would then manually sort through and inspect millions of packages looking for 

illegal items-the proverbial "needle in a haystack." Although both agencies agreed 

that the process was inefficient and sought ways to improve it, they are guided by 

different missions that hinder those efforts. The Postal Service's mission is the 

speedy processing and delivery of the mail, while CBP's mission is to protect the 

U.S. border and prevent illicit items from entering the United States. 

CBP and Postal Service Pilot Program. More than two years ago, in 

November 2015, CBP and the Postal Service implemented a pilot program to 

improve the identification, inspection, and interdiction process for international 

packages arriving in the United States. The pilot program leveraged advanced 

electronic data ("AED") that the Postal Service received from certain foreign postal 

operators. AED is provided by the shipper at the time of package drop-off and 

includes data such as sender and recipient name and address, as well as a 

description of the package contents. Prior to the package entering the United 

States, the Postal Service forwards the AED to CBP. CBP analyzes the AED to 

identify suspicious packages. Under the pilot program, CBP would use the data to 

specifically target small packages under 4.4 pounds (called "ePackets") coming from 

China through the JFK ISC. The Postal Service would then be responsible for 

locating and presenting the targeted packages to CBP. The JFK ISC receives about 

half of the Postal Service's international volume. 

In December 2016, the Postal Service Office of Inspector General ("OIG") 

audited the pilot program. The OIG found the Postal Service only presented around 

80 percent of the packages targeted by CBP. This was due to a number of problems, 

including CBP sending hold requests for packages that went to another ISC, the 

Postal Service not receiving some hold requests until the package had left the JFK 

ISC, or Postal Service employees missing the package. 

The pilot p1·ogram was a positive development, but its execution suffered 

from a lack of forethought and cooperation, conflicting missions, and interagency 

personality conflicts. Before the first package was targeted, the agencies never 

agreed on specific metrics or goals for the pilot, including how they would measure 

success. CBP asserted it was entitled to receive every package it targeted for 

inspection, while the Postal Service explained it was impossible to present packages 

that were diverted to one of the other ISCs or left the JFK ISC before it was 

targeted. As of this report, the agencies still have not agreed on common 

performance measures. 

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At the same time, the relationship between CBP and the Postal Service was 

strained. The two agencies were focused on different missions. While CBP sought 

to protect the border from illicit drugs and other illegal items, the Postal Service 

needed to move the mail. Moreover, two top officials for the respective agencies at 

JFK struggled to cooperate. In an effort to increase cooperation at JFK, CBP 

reassigned a senior official in an attempt to improve the relationship with the JFK 

Postal Service Plant Manager. 

The JFK pilot improved through efforts initiated in 2017 by the Postal 

Inspection Service, the law enforcement arm of the Postal Service, to automate the 

process of identifying targeted packages. CBP refused, however, to agree with the 

Postal Service's suggestion to expand the pilot to the other four ISCs unless the 

Postal Service was able to present nearly all the targeted packages to CBP. It was 

not until the Subcommittee held a hearing on May 25, 2017, on the shipment of 

illicit opioids, that CBP agreed with the Postal Service to expand the pilot to other 

ISCs. Now, in addition to JFK, the pilot is currently active in Los Angeles and 

Miami. Three days before the Subcommittee released this report, CBP started 

targeting packages at the remaining ISCs. 

The Universal Postal Union. International mail delivery is governed by a 

treaty signed in 1874 that created the Universal Postal Union ("UPU"). The United 

States is one of the 192 members of the UPU, which convenes its Congress every 

four years to adopt the plans for the international postal community for the next 

four years. UPU member countries agree to a universal service obligation that 

mandates the acceptance of packages and other mail items from each other through 

a network offoreign postal operators. This obligation includes the EMS global 

network described above. The Postal Service is the designated postal operator for 

the United States, obligating it to receive, process, and deliver international mail 

from UPU member countries. For example, a person living in China can ship a 

package to the United States through China Post- the Chinese equivalent of the 

Postal Service. When that package reaches the United States, it passes through an 

ISC and is delivered by the Postal Service. 

For close to a decade, the United States (through the State Department) 

advocated that UPU members adopt the requirement of collecting and exchanging 

AED for all packages, but little progress has been made. Despite the benefits of 

using AED to identify suspicious packages, the international postal community has 

failed to meaningfully adopt its use. In addition, the State Department took a 

"hands-off' approach to this issue due to concerns about some countries resisting 

the implementation of AED solely because it is a prerogative of the United States. 

In 2008, the United States offered a resolution at the UPU Congress that 

encouraged the collection of AED to "enhance the efficiency and speed of customs 

5 
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clearance." This resolution did not require member countries to provide AED, but 

instead to begin developing a plan for AED implementation. While the resolution 

was adopted, the original language was altered to remove any requirement for a 

deadline for implementation, essentially rendering it meaningless. 

International events in 2010 highlighted the importance of AED when it was 

successfully used by law enforcement to thwart a terrorist attack involving 

explosives packed into printer toner cartridges sent from Yemen to the United 

States through ECOs. At the next UPU Congress in 2012, the UPU adopted 

language to develop a strategy for countries to exchange AED on packages. 

However, the language was qualified to make clear the strategy must be 

proportionate to the identified risk. This was a way for countries opposed to 

requiring AED to point out that the United States was a greater target than other 

countries. Therefore, the United States should not expect other countries to take on 

as much of the security burden. 

The UPU's strategy involved member countries electronically providing the 

same information currently required on certain customs declaration forms that 

must be affixed to every package. This information included sender name and 

address, recipient name and address, and a description of the contents. The UPU 

has also adopted the use of barcodes to track packages for business purposes 

referred to as the Integrated Product Plan ("IPP"). While barcodes are required to 

be on all packages as of January 1, 2018, no AED or other information is required to 

be loaded onto them. Instead, the goal of the IPP is to require AED on the barcode 

by 2020, but that date was recently indefinitely delayed due to push-back from 

certain UPU members. 

The amount of AED currently transmitted to the Postal Service on 

international packages is low. From January 2017 through the end of 2017, only 36 

percent (on average) of packages sent to the United States included AED. During 

that time, the Postal Service received 498,268,405 packages, which means 

3Hl,891, 780 packages had no AED about who sent the package, where the package 

was going, or what was in the package. The number of packages with AED is not 

likely to increase anytime soon. 

Express Consignment Operators. In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress required 

ECOs to collect certain information on all packages shipped through their networks 

for security purposes following the September 11 terrorist attacks. As a result, all 

packages shipped by ECOs have AED, including sender name and address, 

recipient name and address, and a description of the item contained in the package. 

CBP uses this information to target suspicious packages shipped through the ECOs, 

just as it uses the AED in the JFK pilot program with the Postal Service. ECOs 

created proprietary systems that allow customers to track packages, and they also 

6 
115 

allow ECOs to identify and present the packages CBP targets. According to CBP 

statistics, due to AED, ECOs present almost all targeted packages to CBP. 

While ECOs are highly efficient at using AED to provide CBP with targeted 

packages, differences exists between the ECOs and the Postal Service. ECOs 

control packages in their networks from acceptance to delivery, even for 

international packages. In contrast, the Postal Service must rely on foreign postal 

operators to collect AED on internationally shipped packages that are delivered 

domestically by the Postal Service. ECOs also handle fewer packages than the 

Postal Service. 

A. The Subcommittee's Investigation 

The Subcommittee began its review of the opioid crisis during the 114th 

Congress when it examined the efforts undertaken by the federal government and 

its main program integrity contractor, the Medicare Drug Integrity Contractor 

(MEDIC), to address opioid-related fraud and abuse in Medicare Part D. That 

program serves nearly 35 million senior citizens and seven million Social Security 

disability benefit recipients. In connection with that review, the Subcommittee also 

examined the anti-opioid abuse efforts of six of the nation's largest health insurance 

co-mpanies-both in their commercial insurance business and in their role as 

Medicare Part D plan sponsors. That investigation resulted in a bipartisan report 

titled Combatting the Opioid Epidemic: A Review of Anti-Abuse Efforts in Medicare 

and Private Health Insurance Systems. 

During the current 115th Congress, the Subcommittee expanded its review of 

the opioid crisis by examining the role that illicit opioids, specifically fentanyl, play 

in the current national crisis. As previously mentioned, to better understand how 

illicit opioids enter the United States, the Subcommittee held an initial oversight 

hearing on May 25, 2017, titled Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: 

Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs. Representatives from the Postal 

Service, the Postal Service OIG, the State Department, CBP, and UPS testified at 

that hearing. As part of this investigation, the Subcommittee reviewed over 60,000 

pages of documents from the Postal Service, CBP, the State Department, DHL, 

FedEx, and UPS. The Subcommittee also analyzed over two million lines of AED 

and money transfer information from the Postal Service, CBP, ECOs, Western 

Union, MoneyGram, and Pay Pal. The Subcommittee also conducted interviews of 

key personnel from CBP, the Postal Service, and the State Department. All entities 

cooperated with the Subcommittee's requests for information. In addition, the 

Subcommittee traveled to and met with relevant foreign customs and law 

enforcement officials in Hong Kong and Singapore. 

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116 

Based on this investigation, the Subcommittee concludes that the federal 

government's policies and procedures arc inadequate to prevent the use of the 

international mail system to ship illegal synthetic opioids into the United States. 

B. Findings of Fact and Recommendations 

Findings of Fact 

(1) Fentanyl Sellers Operate Openly on the Internet. From May 

2017 to June 2017, simple internet searches for "fentanyl for sale" 

identified websites openly advertising synthetic opioids for purchase. 

The Subcommittee corresponded with representatives from six 

websites who actively sought to induce a purchase offentanyl and 

other synthetic opioids. 

(2) Online Sellers Preferred to Ship Through Express Mail 

Service/Postal Service. All international online sellers indicated 

they preferred to ship purchases through EMS. One online seller's 

website explained the default shipping method was EMS. Another 

website only guaranteed delivery if EMS was used, and encouraged its 

use through free EMS shipping for orders over $100. Upon the 

Subcommittee's request, however, the online sellers offered other 

shipping options, including DHL, FcdEx, and UPS. 

(3) Online Sellers Transshipped Purchases Through Other 

Countries To Reduce Risk oflnterdiction. To avoid heightened 

targeting by CBP of packages from China, online sellers stated that 

they would divert packages through other countries first before the 

package ultimately arrived in the United States. This practice is 

known as transshipment. The online sellers asserted transshipping 

through these countries reduced the risk of a package containing illicit 

opioids from being identified and seized by customs officials. 

(4) Cryptocurrency Preferred. Bitcoin was the preferred payment 

method for all online sellers. Other methods to make a purchase were 

also accepted, including Western Union, Pay Pal, bank transfers, credit 

cards, and prepaid gift cards. 

(5) Online Sellers Linked to Fentanyl Related Deaths. Tragically, 

through the review of payment information and AED, the 

Subcommittee was able to link the online sellers to seven confirmed 

synthetic opioid-related deaths. 

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117 

(6) Arrests for Drug-Related Offenses. The Subcommittee was also 

able to link the online sellers to 18 arrests for drug-related offenses. 

(7) Active Domestic Illicit Opioid Distributors. Through payment 

information and shipment data, the Subcommittee located an address 

in Pennsylvania that is likely transshipping purchases made through 

an online seller located in China. The Subcommittee also identified 

two other individuals who may be preparing to distribute illicit opioids. 

These two individuals sent payments to the online sellers and also 

received packages containing pill presses and other items commonly 

used in the mass production of narcotics for distribution, including 

chemical bonding agents to make pills, empty pill casings, and pill 

coloring agents. 

(8) The Postal Service and CBP Failed to Recognize and Prepare 

for the Increase in International Shipments. The Postal Service 

and CBP were not prepared for the recent rapid growth of inbound 

international mail packages. In just the last three years, international 

package volume for the Postal Service has almost doubled, going from 

150 million packages in fiscal year 2013 to 275 million in fiscal year 

2016. The number of international packages reached more than 498 

million in calendar year 2017, a staggering increase from previous 

years. 

(9) CBP Manually Targeted Packages. To interdict illegal items 

entering the United States through the Postal Service, CBP identified 

"countries of interest." The Postal Service then sent all packages from 

those countries of interest to CBP for inspection. This resulted in CBP 

manually searching through packages to attempt to locate illegal 

items. At times, CBP did not list China as a country of interest due to 

the high volume of packages China shipped to the United States, 

which would have been too difficult to manage. 

(10) Lack of Coordination. A pilot program established by the Postal 

Service and CBP in November 2015 at the JFK ISC, using AED to 

target and present small packages from China, lacked effective 

coordination between the agencies. The two agencies failed to 

establish any performance metrics or even define what would be 

considered a success for the pilot. While the Postal Service initially 

only presented around 80 percent of packages requested by CBP, that 

number has improved. As of the publication of this report, however, 

the agencies still disagree how to calculate the percentage of packages 

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targeted by CBP that the Postal Service presented for inspection 

("presentment rate"). 

(11) CBP Has Not Studied the Effectiveness of Using AED to Target 

Packages. Although CBP promotes the utility of AED for targeting 

purposes and insists on receiving evety targeted package, CBP has yet 

to analyze the effectiveness of using AED to target and interdict drugs 

or other prohibited items. 

(12) Postal Service and CBP Did Not Make Timely Improvements 

and Expansions to the Pilot Program. Despite widespread 

concerns by CBP and the Postal Service about requiring the manual 

targeting of packages, the Postal Service did not improve its 

presentment rate through automation until two years after the pilot 

began. Further, the agencies did not expand the pilot to other ISCs 

until the Subcommittee held a hearing about the issue on May 25, 

2017. In fact, CBP informed the Subcommittee that it would begin 

targeting packages using AED at the ISCs in Chicago and San 

Francisco on January 21 and 22, respectively-just days before the 

release of this report and a scheduled Subcommittee hearing to 

examine its findings. 

(13) International Delay. Since 2008, the State Department advocated 

for the UPU to require its members to adopt the use of AED. Recently, 

the UPU took steps to adopt AED for business-related purposes and to 

modernize the international postal service with the expectation posts 

would provide AED on all packages by 2020. Those efforts, like others 

in the past, are delayed due to requests for studies on how AED 

requirements will affect countries whose UPU representatives have 

raised concerns about their posts' ability to collect and exchange 

sender information. 

(14) The Postal Service Receives AED on about 36 Percent of All 

International Packages. Despite the current lack of requirements 

for the Postal Service to collect AED from foreign postal operators, the 

Postal Service does receive AED from some foreign postal operators, 

including Hongkong Post and China Post. China is capable of 

providing AED on its packages and currently only docs so for about 

half of the packages it ships to the United States. The AED from 

China Post pertains to ePackets and includes tracking and delivery 

confirmation information. 

10 
119 

(15) The Majority of International Packages Have No Associated 

AED. The Postal Service received 498,268,405 packages from foreign 

posts in 2017; 36 percent of those packages had AED associated with 

them. Therefore, 318,891,780 packages entered the United States with 

no associated AED on the sender's name and address, the recipient's 

name and address, or the contents of the package. With no AED, CBP 

was unable to target any of these packages for further inspection 

before they entered the United States. 

(16) Low Quality Data. The AED the Postal Service receives from foreign 

postal operators is oflow quality. The data reviewed by the 

Subcommittee did not contain standard fields or address constructions. 

Sender name and address were rarely provided. At times, the data 

was a long line of illogical letters and characters. 

(17) ECOs Presented Nearly All Targeted Packages to CBP. 

Congress mandated that ECOs provide AED on all packages in 2002. 

Using AED, ECOs present almost 100 percent of packages targeted by 

CBP for inspection. Unlike the Postal Service, ECOs control packages 

from acceptance to delivery and manage a significantly lower volume of 

packages. 

(18) ECOs Do Not Share Information on Problem Shippers. While 

FedEx and UPS maintain lists of individuals and entities that are not 

allowed to ship packages through their networks, they do not share 

these lists with CBP, the Postal Service, or other ECOs. DHL does not 

maintain such a list. 

Recommendations 

(1) Require AED on All International Packages. The State 

Department and Postal Service should work together to take steps to 

prioritize the enactment and implementation of requirements that 

UPU member countries collect and exchange AED for all international 

packages. Congress should pass any legislation necessary to facilitate 

the agencies' efforts. 

(2) The Postal Service Should Include Provisions in All Bilateral 

and Multilateral Agreements to Collect and Exchange 

Additional and Better Quality AED. Any agreement between the 

Postal Service and one or more foreign posts for express package 

delivery should include provisions requiring the foreign posts to 

provide the Postal Service with quality AED for all packages. 

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(3) Proactively Improve the Quality of AED. The Postal Service 

should initiate processes to improve the quality of the data received 

from foreign posts. This should include the consideration of 

standardized fields to avoid confusion by foreign nationals in 

constructing an American address. The State Department should also 

work to improve the quality of data collected internationally. 

(4) Increase Targeting. CBP should continue to increase the number of 

packages targeted for inspection through the Pilot Programs at ISCs 

with an emphasis on locating illicit drugs. This should include a 

dedicated CBP employee at the National Targeting Center responsible 

for all mail and package targeting efforts. 

(5) Automated Identification of Targeted Packages. The Postal 

Service should fully automate the process of identifYing packages 

targeted for inspection by CBP at all of the ISCs. 

(6) Targeting Analysis. CBP should conduct a thorough analysis of the 

effectiveness of its targeting and interdiction efforts under the AED 

pilot program. 

(7) Agreement on Success Metrics. CBP and the Postal Service should 

come to agreement on the methodology used for measuring the Postal 

Service's presentment rate-the success rate of presenting targeted 

packages to CBP. 

(8) CBP and Postal Service Resources. CBP and the Postal Service 

should deploy sufficient personnel and resources at all of the ISCs to 

handle the growing volume of international mail and corresponding 

increase in shipments of illicit drugs. Both agencies should act swiftly 

to inform Congress of the staffing and technological resources needed 

to effectively expand their efforts. Congress should pass any 

legislation necessary to ensure both agencies are capable of 

maintaining an effective, automated process for targeting and 

interdicting illicit packages. 

(9) Deepen Cooperation with the Chinese Government to End 

Opioid Smuggling, including through Online Sellers. Executive 

agencies should continue leveraging the high-level partnerships with 

Chinese officials established through the U.S.-China Law Enforcement 

and Cybersecurity Dialogue to combat the shipment of illicit opioids to 

the United States. These efforts should include both scheduling 

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additional illicit opioids as illegal and shutting down smuggling routes 

and methods, including online sellers located in China. 

(10) Improve Information Sharing. The Postal Service, CBP, and ECOs 

should form an Information Sharing and Analysis Center ("!SAC") to 

share information about best practices and known shippers of illegal 

items. It may also be beneficial to include representatives from 

entities like Western Union, MoneyGram, Pay Pal, and other peer-topeer payment platforms. 

(11) Improve Presentment Metrics. ECOs should track their 

presentment rate for all targeted packages requested by CBP. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The United States is in the midst of an opioid epidemic. Synthetic opioids, 

such as fentanyl and its variations, known as analogues, are causing drug overdoses 

and deaths at an unparalleled rate in communities across our nation. Drug 

overdoses are now the leading cause of injury-related death in the United States, 

outnumbering both automobile crashes and gun-related deaths.5 

Although synthetic opioids enter the country through various streams of 

commerce, China is the primary source of fentanyl in the United States.6 These 

drugs are available for purchase on the Internet. And the rapid growth of 

international mail packages arriving in the United States has provided cover for 

bad actors seeking to ship these drugs through the global mail system. 

A host of federal agencies are tasked with w01·king together to stop synthetic 

opioids and other illicit drugs from entering the country. Chief among them is U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), which has authority and responsibility for 

screening both persons and goods entering the country. CBP works closely with the 

U.S. Postal Service ("Postal Service") and express consignment operators ("ECOs"), 

such as FedEx Corporation ("FedEx"), United Parcel Service ("UPS"), and DHL 

Express U.S. ("DHL") to target and interdict shipments of contraband. CBP's 

targeting efforts benefit from the advance receipt of specific data about inbound 

international packages and shipments. 

5 Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 5, 2017), 

https://www .nytimes. com/interactive/20] 7/06/05/upshot/opioid ~epidcmic·drug·overdose-dea ths-arerising-faster-than-ever.html. 

6 U.S.·CIIINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, FEKTANYL: CH!l\A'S DEADLY EXPORT TO 

THE UNITED STATES 3 (2017). 

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122 

The opioid epidemic prompted the Subcommittee to launch an investigation 

of the federal government's strategy to stop the shipment of synthetic opioids into 

the United States. The Subcommittee sought to determine whether synthetic 

opioids are entering the country due to a lack of resources or legal authorities 

needed to stop these shipments, insufficient coordination among the relevant 

stakeholders, or other issues. The Subcommittee reviewed the efforts of CBP, the 

Postal Service, the U.S. Department of State ("State Department"), FedEx, UPS, 

and DHL to identify, interdict, and prevent these shipments from entering the 

United States. As part of this investigation, the Subcommittee also visited ports of 

entry in Baltimore and Long Beach/Los Angeles, as well as the International 

Service Centers ("ISCs") located in New York at the John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) 

and in California at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). The Subcommittee 

also visited and interviewed customs officials and law enforcement counterparts in 

Hong Kong and Singapore. The Subcommittee reviewed over 60,000 pages of 

documents, two million lines of payment information and shipping data, and 

conducted a number of interviews and briefings. 

A. The Opioid Epidemic 

Americans are overdosing and dying from fentanyl and other synthetic 

opioids at rates that far exceed peak death rates from automobile accidents, gunrelated deaths, and AIDS 7 No age group, race, gender, or region of the country has 

been immune to this epidemic8 The opioid epidemic has devastated communities 

across the nation and has forced state and local officials to devote an unsustainable 

level of resources to combat it on a daily basis.9 

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), based 

on a review of 2016 statistics, nearly 63,600 people died from drug overdoses, and 

66 percent of those deaths were a result of opioids, including fentanyl and its many 

analogues.IO In 2015, 63 percent of drug overdose deaths were a result of opioid 

7 Josh Katz, The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 

2, 20 17), https://www .nytirnes.com/interactive/20 17/09/02/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdosedeaths.html. 

8 t.:.S. CENTERS FOR DISK\SE CONTROL Al'lD PREV<lNTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, DRUG 0V<lRDOSB DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES (DEC. 2017), 

https:i/www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf (hereinafter "2016 CDC Opioid Statistics 

Report"). 

9 Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Warning to Police and Public: 

Fentanyl Exposure Kills (Jun. 10, 2016). 10 2016 CDC Overdose Statistics Report. 

14 
123 

overdoses, which have quadrupled since 1999.11 The chart below depicts the total 

number of overdose deaths compared to opioid-related deaths from 1999 to 2016. 

1. Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids 

Fentanyl is a synthetic chemical compound that mimics many of the effects of 

opiates, such as morphine and heroin.13 It is a powerful synthetic painkiller that is 

50 times more potent than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine. 14 

Physicians currently prescribe fentanyl fo1· pain management in various forms, 

including transdermal patches, lollipops, and lozenges. 15 Small doses of fentanyl 

have a high potency and, as a fine-grained powder, it is easy to mix into other illicit 

ll U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTIO>I, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, MORBIDITY A>ID MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 65 (50-51), INCREASES IN DRUG AND OPIOTDlNVOLVED OVERDOSE DEATHS- U>IITED STATES, 2010-2015 (2016). 

12 Opioid Overdose Deaths and Opioid Overdose Deaths as a Percent of All Drug Overdose Deaths, 

Kaiser Family Foundation (2015), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/opioid-overdosedcaths/?currcnt'fimcframe=O&sortlviodel=%7B%22colld%22:%22Location%22, %22sort%22:%22asc% 

22%7D. 

!3 U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CO>ITROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEAJ:rH AND HUMA.'l 

SERVICES, WHAT IS FE>ITANYL?, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyLhtmL 

H NATIONAL INSTTTUTE ON DRUGAllUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMA.'l SERVICES, WHAT IS 

FENTA!\'YL?, https://www .drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/fentanyl~ Fentanyl, Drug 

Enforcement AdministTation, U.S. Dep't of Justice (2016). 

h ttps :/ /www .deadiversion. usdoj. gov/drug_ chem~info/fen tanyl. pdf. 

n U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL Al':D PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, Will\T TS FENTANYl.?, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdosc/opioids/fentanyl.html. 

15 
124 

drugs such as heroin, marijuana, and cocaine, making those drugs even more 

potent.16 Counterfeit versions of other narcotics like OxyContin and Percocet also 

contain fentanyl as a key ingredient. ' 7 Fentanyl affects the area of the brain that 

controls breathing, and high doses can cause breathing to stop completely, which 

can lead to death. 18 Overdose can occur when users unknowingly take fentanyl or 

are not aware of its potency.I9 

The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA'') designated fentanyl and its 

analogues as Schedule II substances, determining that they have a high potential 

for abuse and could lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. Several 

precursors-the chemical substances or compounds used to manufacture fentanylare now included on the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs list of illicit 

substances.2° According to the United Nations, scheduling substances enables 

greater control and monitoring of the precursor chemicals, ensuring a concerted 

international approach.21 

2. The Impact on State and Local Governments 

The opioid epidemic has placed an unsustainable strain on state and local 

governments. Communities across the country arc overextending their financial 

resources and personnel in an effort to save the lives of opioid overdose victims on a 

daily basis. 22 According to the DEA, fentanyl is not only dangerous for the d1·ug's 

users, but also for law enforcement, public health workers, and first responders who 

may .unknowingly come into contact with the drug in its different forms.23 The DEA 

has issued safety precautions for first responders and law enforcement officers 

because fentanyl can be accidentally absorbed through the skin and inhaled 

through the nasal passages.24 Because of the drug's lethality, even in small 

16/d. 

17 Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, DEA.DCT.DIB·021·16, Cou.nte1jeit 

Prescription Pills Containing Fentanyls: A Global Threat (July 2016). 

18 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, lJ.S. DEP'T OP HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: WHAT IS 

FE NT A. '\JYL?, https:/ /www .drugabuse. gov/publications/ drugfacts/fentany l. 19 OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, NATIONAL FORENSIC LABORATORY INFORMATION SYSTEM, DRUG 

ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: OPIATES AND REI~\TI:D 

DRUGS REPORTED IN NFLIS, 2009·2014 (2017). 

20 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL SMART UPDATE, VoL. 17, FENTANYL AND ITS 

ANALOGUES- 50 YEARS ON (20 17); INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, PRECURSORS AND 

CHEMICALS FREQUENTLY USED IN THE ILLICIT MA:-IL:FACTURE OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC 

SUBSTANCES (2016). 

21 !d. 

22 Elizabeth Kneebone and Scott W. Allard, A Nation in Overdose Peril: Pinpointing the Most 

Impacted Communities and the Local Gaps in Care, BROOKINGS (Sept. 25, 2017), 

https:/ /www. brookings.edu/research/pinpointing~opioid ~in~ most~im pacted *communities. 23 DRL:G ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FENTANYL: A BRIEFING GUIDE FOR 

FIRST RESPONDERS (20 17). 

21/d. 

16 
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quantities, law enforcement, first responders, hospitals, and drug treatment 

facilities now maintain a supply of Naloxone, a medication used to block the effects 

of opioids, especially in overdose situations, by quickly restoring normal respiration 

and breathing.25 Overdose deaths related to opioids such as heroin, oxycodone, 

hydrocodone, codeine, fentanyl, and morphine can occur within one to three hours of 

ingestion but arc reversible, during that time period, with the use of Naloxone.2G 

B. How Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids Enter the United States 

Synthetic opioids like fentanyl are openly available for purchase on the 

Internet and primarily trafficked in packages through the international mail 

stream.27 The rise of e-commerce has significantly increased the volume of 

international mail parcels and packages. The increased volume provides cover for 

criminals to abuse the international mail system to traffic and distribute illegal 

substances. 

1. Sources of Fentanyl 

China is the largest exporter offentanyl to the United States.28 The majority 

of illicit fentanyl smuggled into the United States originates in China, sometimes in 

the form of precursors that are shipped to Mexico or Canada and mixed with other 

narcotics before being sent across the border into the United States. Until recently, 

the production of fentanyl was unregulated in China.29 Over the course of 2017, 

China banned several fentanyl-derivatives including both carfentanil, a lethal 

opioid 100 times more potent than fentanyl, and U-47700, a synthetic opioid also 

known as "pink."30 

25 NATIONAL]NSTITUTE 0:.! DRUG ABUSE, U.S. D<:P'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, What is 

Naloxone?, https://www .drugabuse.gov/related~topics/opioid~overdose·reversal·naloxone·narcan· 

evzio. 

26 ]:.!SYS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ]NC., JOJNT MEETING OF THE ANESTm;TIC AND ANALGESIC DRUG 

PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITT;;E (AADPAC) AND THE DRCG SAFETY AND RISK MANAm;MENT 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE (DSARM), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMI1-!ISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN S<:R\~CES, ":-IALOXONE FOR TREATMENT OF 0PIOID0 OVERDOSE, ADVISORY Co~IM!TTEE OF 

OCTOBER 5, 2016,", 

https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/Anesthetic 

And.AnalgesicDrugProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UC:M522690.pdf. 

27 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC ""'-~D SECURITY REVIEW COM~1!SSION, FENTANYL: CHINA'S DEADLY EXPORT TO 

THE UNITED STATES 3 (2017); lJ.N. Off. on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Executive 

Summary (2017). 

28Jd. 

29 Erika Kinetz and Desmond Butler, Chemical Weapon for Sale: China's Unregulated Narcotic, AP 

NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016), https://apnews.com/7c85cda5658e46f3a3be95a367f727e6. 

30 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISS!ON, FENTfu'IYL: CHINA'S DEADLY EXPORT TO 

THI; UNITED STATES 10 (2017). 

17 
126 

The DEA and Chinese officials have met regularly to discuss the threat from 

fentanyl class substances.31 To improve cooperative efforts between the United 

States and China, the DEA plans to open a third office in Guangzhou, China, in 

addition to offices currently in Beijing and Hong Kong. 32 In addition, the U.S. 

Department of Justice ("Justice Department") recently handed down several 

fentanyl-related indictments, including two against Chinese nationals who owned 

and operated several fentanyl laboratories in China.a3 The labs' North Americabased traffickers and distributors are also under indictment for separate 

conspiracies to distribute large quantities offentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other 

opiate substances in the United States-"4 The Justice Department similarly 

indicted another Chinese national for distribution of opioids and other drugs 

ordered on Chinese websites and shipped from China to the United States.35 

2, Convenience of Purchasing on the Internet 

The Internet has significantly increased the availability of deadly synthetic 

opioids in the United States.a6 Because illicit drug dealers and distributors can 

remain anonymous online, these virtual marketplaces significantly reduce the risk 

of detection associated with purchasing fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. The 

illicit market of all drugs for sale online is growing. A 2015 study estimated that 

revenues from online illicit drug sales increased from between $15-17 million in 

2012 to $150-$180 million in 2015.37 It is not difficult to find illegal drugs such as 

synthetic opioids advertised for sale on both the open web, and the dark web-a 

collection of thousands of wcbsites that are publicly visible but use anonymity tools 

to hide Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses. The dark web is one of the largest 

marketplaces to purchase illegal drugs and is also the hardest marketplace to 

police. as Today, many individuals still use the dark web as a legitimate means to 

3l Press Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, China Announces Scheduling Controls of New 

Psychoactive Substances/Fentanyl-Class Substances (Jun. 19, 2017). 

' 2 Erika Kinetz, DEA Opens Shop in China to Help Fight Synthetic Drug Trade, AP NEWS, (Jan. 6, 

20 17). https://www .apnews.com/36300 50cef27 4653a54cb 70e46c4f'72a. 

3a Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces First Ever Indictments against 

Designated Chinese Mmwfactu.rers of Deadly Fentanyl and Other Opiate Substances (Oct. 17, 2017). 

'"ld. 

35 Press Release, Northern Dist. of Ohio, U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Dcp't of Justice, Chinese 

National Living in Massachusetts Arrested and Charged with Distributing Opioids that Were 

Shipped from China to the U.S. and Ultimately to Ohio (Jul. 24, 2017). 36 U.S.~CHJNA ECONOMIC AND SECUIUTY REVIEW COMMISSION, FENTANYL: CHINA'S DEADLY EXPORT TO 

THE UNITED STATES 3 (2017). 

37 Kyle Soska and Nicolas Christin, Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous 

Marketplace Ecosystem, Carnegie Mellon University (Aug. 13, 20!5), 

httP://www. usinex.org/conference/usinexsecurity 15/technical·sessions/presenta tion/soska. 38 Eric Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity, and Online Policing, Paper Series: No 21, 

Centre for International Governance Innovation, Global Commission on Internet Governance (Sep. 

2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.2l.pdf; U.S. NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, 

U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, :-ffiL RELEAS~~ :'-!mmER 03-1221.1-2602, TOR: THE SECOND-GWERAT!ON 

18 
127 

ensure secure everyday Internet usage; however, a host of dark web merchants arc 

increasingly using the anonymity offered by the dark web to sell illicit drugs, 

dangerous weapons, counterfeit documents, and even human trafficking victims on 

various online marketplaces. 

Online fentanyl sellers engage in sophisticated sales techniques to offer 

exclusive products and discounts for bulk orders. Accepted payment methods 

include cryptocurrcncies such as bitcoin, bank transfers, mobile payment services, 

and money Ol'ders. Bitcoin is "completely digital money" and "the first decentralized 

peer-to-peer payment network."39 Bitcoin describes itself as "cash for the 

Internet."40 In addition to anonymity, using bitcoin can be cheaper than processing 

f11nds through more traditional means. According to the Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network, a user of virtual currency is not a Money Services Business 

("MSB") and is therefore not subject to registration, reporting, and recordkeeping 

regulations with U.S. financial regulators, making detection by law enforcement 

more challenging41 

3. The Growth ofE-Commerce 

The growth of cross-border e-commerce has dramatically increased the 

volume of international parcels and packages arriving into the United States. In 

fact, the chart below shows e-commerce sales worldwide may reach $4.4 trillion by 

2021, primarily due to global internet connectivity and the growing shift towards 

the convenience of online shopping.42 North America is the largest regional parcels 

market by value; however, the Asia-Pacific parcels market has experienced doubledigit growth with China accounting for 4 7 percent of the regional total;t3 Chinese 

parcels volume has increased rapidly from 1.2 billion in 2007 to 20.6 billion in 2015 

and it now sends more parcels than the United States.44 

ONION ROUTER (2004) (The dark web is an outgrowth of software tools developed by the U.S. Naval 

Research Laboratory in the 1990s. It was initially intended as a means of secure communication and 

open source intelligence gathering.). 3!l What is Bitcoin?, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what·is~bitcoin. 

40Jd. 

41 FIN,\NCL\L CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, 

APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS, AD~ITNISTEHll-:G, EXCHANGING, DR USING 

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (20 13). 42 VVorldwide Retail and Ecommerce Sales: eMarketer's Estimates for 2016-2021, eMarketer (JuL 

2017), 

h ttps://www .emarketer .com/Report/World wide~ Retail~ Ecommerce~Sales-eMarketers-Estimates~ 

2016202112002090. 

13 Global Parcel Market Insight Report 2017, Apex Insight (Jan. 2017), https://www.apexinsigh t.com/prod uct/global-parcel-delivery -market-insight-report-2017. 

"Id. 

19 
128 

Growth of Retail E-Commerce Sales Worldwide 

2016-2021 (In Trillions)15 

2016 20l7 2H1R 2019 202.{) 2021 

As a result, there has been a tremendous increase in inbound international 

parcel volume. In 2011, the Postal Service launched a new product and service 

commonly known as an "ePacket" with Hongkong Post, which includes add tracking 

and delivery confirmation on certain packages. ePackets are package shipments 

that weigh less than 4.4 pounds. 46 This facilitated the shipping of lightweight goods 

and merchandise ordered by consumers in the United States from Hong Kong 

merchants. 

45 Worldwide Retail and Ecommerce Sales: eMarketer's Estimates for 20!6-2021, eMarketer (July 

20!7), 

https://www.emarketer.com/Report/Wor1dwide-Retail-Ecommerce-Salcs-eMarketers-Estimates20 162021/2002090. 46 Press Release, U.S. Postal Service, Postal Service Initiates cPacket Service with Hongkong Post 

(Apr. 20, 2011). 

20 
129 

Growth of Inbound International Mail Volume 

Aptif 2011, the Postal Service begins 

2Pack.et 5ervice with Hongkong Post 

4. The International Mail System 

The Universal Postal Union ("UPU") is the primary forum for cooperation 

between postal operators around the world. It sets the rules for international mail 

exchanges and makes recommendations intended to stimulate growth in mail and 

parcel volumes and improve quality of service.18 Of the 195 countries in the world, 

the UPU has 192 members. The United States has been a member since the UPU's 

founding in 187 4.19 

The UPU's universal service obligation requires its members to accept and 

deliver mail from all member foreign postal operators. As a result, the Postal 

Service, as the designated postal operator on behalf of the United States is required 

to accept all international mail from other UPU members under the UPU treaty. 

Mail from foreign postal operators arrives in the United States via commercial 

airline carriers at an airport with a Postal Service ISC. 

The State Department represents U.S. interests at the UPU, in coordination 

with the Postal Service. The State Department, as the country's representative at 

·"United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (May 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommlttee). 

4' Annual Report, Universal Postal Union (2013), 

http://news.upu.int/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Reports/annual_report_2013.pdf. 

19 CONSTITUTION GENERAL REGULATIONS: RULES OF PROCEDURE, LEGAL STATUS OF THE UPU, LIST OF 

RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS, International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union (Bern 2014). 

21 
130 

the UPU, is responsible for the formulation, coordination, and oversight offoreign 

policy related to international postal services and other international delivery 

services. 50 

The Postal Service's primary mission is to accept, process, and deliver the 

mail within an agreed timeframe, which is typically defined by the type of mail 

product. Mail products include letters, express mail service ("EMS"), and parcels, 

all of which have different delivery requirements. To receive and process the 

international mail, the Postal Service primarily relies on five ISCs in the United 

States located at the airports in New York ("JFK"), Miami ("MIA"), Chicago 

("ORD"), Los Angeles ("LAX"), and San Francisco ("SF0").51 Once offloaded from 

the commercial airline caniers, the mail then moves to the ISC where the Postal 

Service sorts it. 

During the Postal Service's initial sorting process, the Postal Service 

identifies and presents any packages targeted by CBP for screening and inspection. 

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service ("Postal Inspection Service") also provides 

assistance with identifying and retrieving packages targeted by CBP, either at the 

ISCs or in the domestic mail stream.52 After receiving clearance from CBP, the 

Postal Service transports mail to processing and distribution plants around the 

country. 

ECOs such as DHL, FedEx, and UPS also accept and deliver parcels and 

packages bound for the United States from customers in foreign countries. These 

companies have agreements and package acceptance operations in hundreds of 

countries around the world. Unlike the Postal Service, ECOs own and operate 

airplanes used to transport international cargo. These airplanes similarly arrive at 

private mail processing facilities across the United States. 53 Private express parcels 

and packages also undergo x-ray screening to ensure they do not contain dangerous 

or hazardous materials. Like the Postal Service, ECOs are required to 

accommodate CBP officials at their facilities to allow for screening and inspection 

before international mail officially enters the U.S. mail stream. 54 

50 39 u.s. c.§§ 407(b)(l), (b)(2)(D) (2016). 

51 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, 2010 COMPRfmENSIVE STATEMENT ON POSTAL OPERATIONS 31 (2010). 

" 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (2016). 

53 DHL Key Facts: United States, http:llwww.dhl-usa.com/enlcountry_profilelkey_facts.html; About 

FedEx, bttp:llabout.van.fedex.com/our-storylglobal-rcach/; UPS Air Operation Facts, 

https://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsVie\ver.page?ConceptType=FactSheets&id 

= 1426321563773-779. 

54 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Con g. (20 17) (testimony of Norman Schenk, Vice President of 

Global Customs Policy and Public Mfairs, United Parcel Service). 

22 
131 

C. Preventing Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids from Entering the 

United States 

CBP, in collaboration with the Postal Service and ECOs, is tasked with 

preventing international mail shipments containing illicit drugs from entering the 

United States. As previously indicated, CBP officials are located at Postal Service 

!SCs and ECO facilities. The use of advanced electronic data ("AED") linked to each 

package from shipment manifests enhances CBP's ability to target individual 

packages potentially containing contraband, including illicit drugs such as fentanyl. 

1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CBP is among the primary federal agencies responsible for securing 

America's borders, "while facilitating lawful international travel and trade."55 CBP 

has authority to screen shipments from foreign postal operators and ECOs for 

contraband including illegal drugs or counterfeit goods. 56 CBP monitors 

international shipments arriving in the United States at airports, maritime ports of 

entry, and through land borders in the north and south. 57 CBP has enforcement 

authority to open and inspect all inbound international mail and cm·go to ensure 

compliance with U.S. trade and safety laws, rules. and regulations. 58 The Postal 

Service and ECOs support CBP's mission to prevent illegal items from entering the 

United States by providing CBP with targeted packages, parcels, and shipments 

that will undergo inspection. 

2. Advanced Electronic Data and International Mail Acceptance 

The growing volume of international mail poses challenges for both the 

Postal Service and CBP. 59 International mail package volume has more than 

doubled since 2013, and the Postal Service can receive as many as one million 

packages each day.Go More than half of all inbound international packages arrive at 

New York's JFK airport, one of the country's five ISCs. 6 l CBP uses intelligence and 

55 About CBP, https://www.cbp.gov/about. 56 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (2017): see also generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.3-162.7 (2017). 

57Jd. 

5BJd. 

59 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat fllicit Dru.gs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on lnvestigatT:ons of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, ]15th Cong. (2017) (statement of Robert E. Perez, Executive Assistant 

Commissioner in Office of Operations Support, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 50 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Tammy Whitcomb, Acting Inspector 

General, U.S. Postal Service Office oflnspector General). 61 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy ta Combat Illicit Drugs: 

Ilearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Secun:ty 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman, Chairman, S. 

23 
132 

on-the-ground experience to target specific packages for further inspection.62 AED 

from shipment manifests, in part, aids CBP's targeting efforts.63 

AED typically includes sender and recipient information such as names, 

addresses, and package content. 64 Foreign postal operators such as Hongkong Post, 

China Post, and Australia Post collect and provide AED to the Postal Service for 

international mail shipments. 65 The Postal Service transmits any AED it receives 

from foreign postal operators to CBP.GG There is presently no requirement for 

foreign postal operators to provide AED to the Postal Service,G7 although some 

bilateral agreements executed by the Postal Service with foreign postal operators do 

contain such a requirement. However, ECOs require AED as a condition of 

accepting any shipment in every country where they choose to do business, and they 

also transmit any AED they receive to CBP.GB Congress mandated the collection 

and transmission of AED by ECOs in the Trade Act of 2002. That legislation did 

not apply to the Postal Service and instead permits the Secretary of the Treasury 

and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Postmaster 

General, to determine whether the Postal Service must collect AED. As of the 

publishing of this report, no such decision has been made. 

Although not required to collect AED from foreign postal operators, the 

Postal Service does receive AED from a number of countries. In total, in 2017 the 

Postal Service received AED on 36 percent of all inbound international mail 

volume.69 The chart on the next page shows the percentage of AED the Postal 

Service receives from foreign posts on inbound international packages. 

Permanent Subcomm. on Investigatlons of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs). 

62 See Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat fllicit 

Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Cornm. on Homeland 

Security and Got>ernmental Affairs, ll5th Cong. (2017). 

"Id. 

64 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Dmgs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (20 17) (statements of Tammy Whitcomb, Acting Inspector 

General, U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General and Robert Cintron, Vice President of 

Ketwork Operations, U.S. Postal Service). 65 See Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit 

Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Perrnanent Subconun. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017). 

66/d. 

"Id. 

Gs 19 C.F.R. § 122.48a (2017). 

'"United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Jan. 12, 2018) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

24 
133 

The Percent of AED Received for Inbound International Packages70 

In the interim, the Postal Service has already entered into bilateral and 

multilateral agreements with certain foreign postal operators and international 

alliances, such as the Kahala Posts Group and the International Post Corporation.71 

Some of these agreements include provisions requiring the foreign postal operator 

to share AED on packages bound for the United States. 

The UPU has also implemented initiatives to increase the amount of AED 

provided to the Postal Service from foreign postal operators.72 Most recently, the 

UPU approved a roadmap for the implementation of AED-sharing between posts, 

customs agencies, and air carriers to facilitate the safe and efficient delivery of 

international maiJ.73 According to the UPU, this roadmap will be an essential 

component to ensuring that all posts are able to exchange AED by 2020.74 In 

conjunction with the UPU's development of an Integrated Product Plan ("'PP"), the 

UPU now requires that barcodes be placed on all international packages containing 

70 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Jan, 12, 2018) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

71 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Robert Cintron, Vice President of 

Network Operations, U.S. Postal Service). 72 Postal Development on the Move, Universal Postal Union, (Aug. 2017), 

http://news. upu.int/fileadminlmagazine/20 17/en/UPU-34 I 4_ UPU0217 _EN _Final_ Web. pdf. 

13Jd. 

74Jd. 

25 
134 

goods. Although there is no requirement for the barcodes to contain data, their 

placement on all packages is considered a first step in requiring AED. 

III. ONLINE SELLERS OF SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS OPERATE OPENLY 

USING COMMON SHIPPING AND PAYMENT METHODS 

The Internet has significantly contributed to the increased availability of deadly 

synthetic opioids in the United States 75 It is not difficult to find illegal drugs such 

as synthetic opioids advertised for sale on both the open web and the dark web. 

And since operators and distributors 

can remain anonymous online, these 

online marketplaces significantly 

reduce the risk of detection 

associated with purchasing fentanyl 

and other synthetic opioids. 

The Subcommittee set out to 

determine just how easy it is to find 

synthetic opioids advertised and 

available for sale online. It found a 

number of online sellers willing to openly discuss how they could ship illegal 

synthetic opioids to the United States. The Subcommittee initially used common 

Internet search tools to discover websites offering drugs for sale on the open web 

and then searched the dark web with more advanced tools. Over the course of just 

one month, the Subcommittee identified dozens of web sites offering synthetic 

opioids for sale, the overt techniques used by online sellers to communicate with 

prospective buyers of illegal drugs, and various forms of readily available payment 

and shipping methods for use. As shown above, online sellers openly advertise 

dangerous and deadly synthetic opioids for purchase 76 

The results are alarming and illustrative of how illegal drug sales brazenly 

take place online. This section summarizes the Subcommittee's findings and details 

case studies of the Subcommittee's communications with the websites. First, the 

75 Briefing with the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations (July 13, 

2017); Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs 

Before Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, 115th Cong. 24 (2017) (testimony of Gregory D. Thome, 

Director, Office of Specialized and Technical Agencies, Bureau of Int'l Org. Affairs, l_;_S_ Dep't of 

State) ("In addition to shipments that find their way into the United States from across our land 

borders and through express delivery services, illicit fentanyl and other illicit drugs also enter the 

country through international mail, typically in small shipments purchased online by individual 

customers."). 

76 Screenshot (June 20, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); Screenshot of Website D (June 13, 

2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

26 
135 

Subcommittee 

communicated with 

numerous websites 

offering synthetic 

opioids for sale. 

Representatives for 

these websites 

responded quicklysometimes within 

minutes-and 

engaged in 

sophisticated sales 

techniques to offer 

exclusive products and discounts for bulk orders. Second, the sellers expressed a 

preference for cryptocunencies such as bitcoin; but also conveyed a willingness to 

accept bank transfers, mobile payment services, and money orders. Third, the 

sellers offered various shipment options, but uniformly preferred tho United States 

Postal Service. 

A. Methodology for Identifying and Communicating with Online 

Opioid Sellers 

To locate online sellers offering to ship synthetic opioids to the United States, 

the Subcommittee posed as a first-time drug purchaser, relying on readily available 

online tools and search engines. The intent was to mimic an average Internet user 

by searching common fentanyl-related terms and asking the sellers straightforward 

questions about their products and available payment and shipping methods. From 

May 8, 2017 to June 12, 2017, the Subcommittee searched Coogle using basic search 

terms to identify websites advertising synthetic opioids for sale, as shown in the 

previous screenshot. These search terms included "fentanyl for sale," "buy fentanyl 

online," "fentanyl available online," and "buy research chemicals."77 The 

Subcommittee identified 24 web sites (the "online sellers") offering synthetic opioids 

for purchase, including fentanyl and carfentanil. 

To contact the online sellers, the Subcommittee created an online persona 

and email address for all drug-related communication with web sites offering the 

sale of synthetic opioids--on both the open web and dark web. The Subcommittee 

either sent email messages or filled in contact forms on the websites to initiate 

communication. Five websitos appeared to no longer be functional at the time the 

Subcommittee attempted initial contact. Additionally, some email addresses 

bounced back as no longer valid, and others never replied. 

77 Scrcenshot of google.com search "buy fentanyl online" (Nov. 17, 20 17) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

27 
136 

Six websites the 

Subcommittee contacted were 

active and responded to the 

Subcommittee's email 

requests. These websites 

offered potential buyers the 

opportunity to communicate 

directly with customer service 

representatives regarding 

questions or other concerns. 

For approximately two 

months, the Subcommittee 

communicated directly with 

several of these customer 

service representatives for 

websites offering synthetic 

opioids and other illicit drugs 

for sale and shipment to the 

United States. The 

Subcommittee focused on 

these six online sellers who 

responded in a reasonable time frame and advertised synthetic opioids for sale: 

Website A 

WebsiteB 

Website C 

Website D 

Website E 

Website F 

While the Subcommittee engaged in prolonged discussions with individuals 

associated with the above-listed websites, at no time did the Subcommittee agree to 

make a purchase, send any payment, or receive any shipments of drugs. 

Communications with the websites related only to quantity and type of drugs 

available for purchase, payment methods, and shipping details. Additionally, in 

order to provide actionable leads to appropriate law enforcement authorities, the 

Subcommittee is not including the names of tho websites in this public report. 

B. Online Sellers Responded Within Minutes 

Numerous online sellers were eager to engage in communications with the 

Subcommittee and answer any questions needed to complete a sale. 

Communicating with the online sellers was critical to learning more about their 

identity, shipping concealment methods, transit routes, and other information not 

28 
137 

posted publicly on the websites. The representatives generally responded quickly, 

offering fentanyl and other, more powerful, drugs for sale. In many instances, the 

public websites lacked the specific information detailed below that was later 

communicated to the Subcommittee in emails by representatives for the online 

sellers. 

The Subcommittee sent the same initial request message to all of the online 

sellers advertising fentanyl for sale. The message requested information regarding 

the purported quality of the product, which drugs were being offered, drug prices, 

preferred shipping method, country of origin, payment method, and how the online 

seller would attempt to evade law enforcement or customs seizures. None of the 

online sellers attempted to disguise the drug products for sale, and all 

communicated openly via email. 

The online sellers responded with substantive answers to the Subcommittee's 

questions. For example, as shown below, Website F responded within six minutes 

to the Subcommittee's request to purchase fentanyl and even offered to up sell to 

carfentanil,78 an even stronger and more dangerous synthetic opioid79 

78 Carfentanil is a synthetic opioid with a potency 100 times greater than fentanyl, and 10,000 times 

greater than morphine. Under the Controlled Substances Act, carfentanil is classified as a Schedule 

II narcotic which is customarily used as a tranquilizing agent for elephants and other large animals. 

Press Release, DEA Issues Cnrfentanil Warning to Police and Public, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug 

Enforcement Administration (Sept. 22, 2016), 

https:l/www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2016/hq092216.shtml. 

79 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0285). 

29 
138 

Subject: [buv r~search chemicals online] Your message has been corrE"Ctly sent llct363 fftc:d6Vphztn3XZ8 

Your me~sage to buy res.earch chemicals online Customer Service 

Your message has been sent suc:tessfu!ly. 

Message: H~llo, 

I am interested in purchasing fentanyl from your webS-ite. Can yoJ please provide more information 

about your fentanyl products and how !order? I am a little concerned with the quality of the product 

and shipping to the U.S. What is tt1e best way to ship it? ThJni::s.. 

Regards, 

leo 

OrderlD: · 

Attached file:-

We will answer as soon as possible, 

buy resedfct1 c:hemicak online powered by Prest<~ Shop'" 

Frnm:--

To:--

Date: TilU, Jun 15, 2017 at 6:44PM 

Subject: Re: (buy research chemicals onhne] Message from conta:t form jno_syncl 

Hello •• our fentanyl is verv good and our client love the quality, we also have poNerful opioid like 

carlentanil, our product quality is 99.8% of purity. and we sale at a very affordable price. we ship fro'll 

our branch ill .. so delivery is discrete and secured. what qua11tity do you pl<~n to order? 

Waiting for your response, 

Best regard~ 

80 

Of the five other online sellers contacted by the Subcommittee, four 

responded within an hour of receiving the Subcommittee's offer to buy fentanyl and 

the fifth seller responded in less than 13 hours. 

C. Online Sellers Monitor Drug "Scheduling" 

Online sellers showed a high level of sophistication, demonstrating 

knowledge of recent U.S. and Chinese efforts to combat illicit drug sales. According 

to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, because fentanyl is 

not widely used as a recreational drug in China, authorities there historically 

placed little emphasis on controlling its production and saleB1 However, the 

Chinese government recently announced several scheduling control orders for 

80Jd. 

81 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, FENTANYL: CHINA'S DEADLY EXPORT TO 

THr•: UNITED STATES 2 (2017) ("According to U.S. law enforcement and drug investigators, China is 

the main supplier of fentanyl to the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Because illicit fentanyl is 

not widely used in China, authorities place 1ittle emphasis on controlling its production and 

export."). 

30 
139 

fentanyl and related 

substances. 82 This resulted in 

both challenges and 

opportunities for online sellers 

based in China. 

For example, one 

commonly abused fentanyl 

product, often referred to by its 

chemical pseudonym ofU47700, was scheduled and 

banned by the DEA in 

September 2016.83 On June 19, 2017, China added the drug to its list of controlled 

substances, effective July 1, 2017.84 Website A apparently viewed China's 

scheduling ofU-47700 as a unique business opportunity. On June 25, 2017, 

Website A notified the Subcommittee that the company was only selling U-47700 

until July 1, 201785 The online seller's website publicly advertised this as a "hot 

sale," even allowing buyers to make offers on the remaining product.BG 

JUNE SPECIAL OFFER 

last 250g of u47, The product is. gonna get discontinued and all must go tilll of July. We are accepting 

offers for our remaining stock. 

Hurry up, is a hot sa~! 

~----------------------------------------------~ 87 

On October 6, 2017, Website A informed the Subcommittee that U-47700 was 

now discontinued. However, U-48800, another fentanyl analog, was available for 

purchase, as shown in the screenshot below.BB 

8'2 Press Release, China announces scheduling controls of new psychoactive substances/ fentanyl-class 

substances, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, (June 19, 2017), 

https://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2017/hq061917.shtml. 

83 List of Controlled Substances, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 17, 

2017), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedulcs/orangebook/c_cs_alpha.pdf; Executive Order 

2016-01K, Office of the Governor of Ohio (May 3, 2016), 

http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/pdf/executive0rders/Executive%200rder%202016·01K.pdf. 

,~~ 4 Press Release, China announces scheduling controls of new psychoactive substances/ fentanyl-class 

substances, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep"t of Justice (June 19, 2017), 

https://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2017/hq061917.shtml. 

85 Email communication (June 25, 2017) (App. 0260). 

8Gfd. 

87 Id. 

88 Email communication (Oct. 6, 2017) (App. 0262). 

31 
140 

Hello 1 

Yes we still have U48800 for sale, 

The U47700 is discontinued, 

Regards 

As of this report, U-48800 is not currently scheduled in either the United 

States or China. The DEA recently announced it plans to publish a notice of intent 

to temporarily schedule all fentanyl-related substances on an emergency basis. 

According to the DEA, the temporary measure will make it easier to prosecute 

traffickers of all forms of fentanyl-related substances and will be effective for up to 

two years, with the possibility of a one-year extension.B9 

1. Online Sellers Offered Discounts and Comparable Opioids 

The online sellers also routinely offered discounts and other opioid products 

comparable to fentanyl in an attempt to increase sales and profit. Website A 

offered the most refined bulk order discount. As shown below, discounts were based 

on quantity ordered, payment method, and if the customer wanted a guaranteed 

shipment-"0 The online seller explained that a guaranteed shipment was essentially 

an insurance policy-providing the customer with a replacement shipment if the 

original was seized.91 

89 Press Release, Department of elustice announces significant tool in prosecuting opioid traffickers in 

emergency schednling of all fentanyl's, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, (Nov, 

9, 2017), https://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2017/hq110917.shtml. 90 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0261). 

91 ld, 

32 
141 

Subject: Re: Hesearch Chemicals For Sale USA Contact: Order Help 

Weight Western Bitcoin + Western Bitcoin 

Union+ incl. Reship Union -no 

in d. guarantee no Reship 

Reship Reship 

gurantee 

2g 145$ 133$ 78$ 71$ 

lOg 232$ 213$ 143$ 131$ 

25g 394$ 362$ 265$ 243$ 

50g 665$ 611$ 467$ 429$ 

lOOg 1206$ 1109$ 873$ 803$ 

250g 2829$ 2602$ 2091$ 1923$ 

500g 5535$ 5092$ 4120$ 3815$ 

lOOOg 10949$ 10073$ 7573$ 7524$ 

92 

Website B offered to send another package to the Subcommittee if the 

original order of fentanyl was held by customs authorities for more than 14 days.93 

If a package was held for more than three weeks, Website Coffered to send a 

replacement package. However, Website Conly offered reshipment if Express Mail 

Service ("EMS"), a product offered by many UPU member postal operators, 

including China Post, was used and would not guarantee other shipping methods. 

The term "EMS" is generally synonymous with a country's government-run 

shipping service. As an example, "China Post" and "EMS," both refer to China's 

official postal delivery service. The same is true for the Postal Service; it, too, could 

accurately be called "EMS."94 In addition to reshipment, Website Coffered a full 

refund within two business days to customers who did not want to have a package 

reshipped, as shown below.D5 

n Id. 

""Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0257). 94 What is EMS?, Universal Postal Union (2017), http://www.ems.postlwhat_is_ems, 95 Screenshot of Website C (Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

33 
142 

Can ! get a full refund tf l dent want resend? 

Another online seller, Website D, offered the Subcommittee a 20 percent 

discount on fentanyl orders over one kilogram.96 Finally, Website C, as shown 

below, offered several alternative drugs when the requested fentanyl product was 

out of stock. 

From:--

To: ----------------------------- Date: Fri,Jun 16,2017 atl:Sl AM 

Subject: Welcome to-.com 

Hi leo, 

Glad to hear from you! 

As the fentanyl product, FUF is out of stock now, but we have its analog of methoxyacetyl-f, we do not 

have experience about it, but many customers like it and continually purchase it. And the replacement 

of 2.-methyl·maf, it is very strong., only a small dose is enough. U-47700 and U-48800 is also the popular 

product in our website. All our product are surely of standard quality and received many good 

feedbacks. 

You can place the order in our webiste or place over this email directly. We usually take EMS to ship to 

the USA, the shipment is s.<~fe and fast. 

look forward to doing business with you. 

Have a good day! 

Best Regards, 

._--------------------------~~------------.. ~~----------· 97 

The online sellers also expressed confidence that their products would be 

delivered as ordered. Website A, Website B, and Website Call offered reshipment 

guarantees and agreed to resend products if the package was held by Customs. 98 

Website A required an additional fee for a reshipment guarantee and provided an 

incentive to order more drugs to save on potential reshipping costs. Website A's 

minimum order for two grams of fentanyl with a reshipment guarantee cost $145, 

versus $78 without a guarantee, for a savings of 7.6 percent if the first shipment 

96 Email communication (June 13, 2017) (App. 0275). 97 Email communication (June 16, 2017) (App. 0273). 98 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 00931); Screenshot of Website C (June 20, 2017) (on 

file with the Subcommittee). 

34 
143 

was seized.99 Website A's order of one kilogram of fentanyl with a reshipment 

guarantee cost $10,949, versus $7,573 without a guarantee, at a savings of 38.3 

percent if the initial shipment is seized.l 00 Website D did not offer reshipment, but 

did offer the Subcommittee a full refund if a purchase was not deliveredlOl 

D. Online Sellers Prefer Bitcoin 

All of the online sellers accepted payment in the form of bitcoin, which was 

their preferred payment method. Bitcoin is "completely digital money" and "the 

first decentralized peer-to-peer payment network."Joz Bitcoin is described as "cash 

for the Internet."I03 Some of the online sellers contacted by the Subcommittee 

offered substantial discounts ifbitcoin was used for payment.1°4 Website F initially 

offered bitcoin as the only available form of payment before the Subcommittee 

requested other payment methods. 105 Website C described bitcoin as the "most 

convenient" payment method, as shown below.Io6 

Ta: From:--

Date: Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 2:08AM 

Subject: Welcome to-.com 

Hi leo, 

Glad to hear from you! 

The product made in India and shlp from China, it usually takes about 8*21 days to take for you, and the 

shipping option we usually used are EMS, UPS, hongkong post, DHL and fedel(, we accpet the payment 

method of Bitcoin, western union and bank-transder. Bitcoin i:s the most convenient one. 

All the best 

Have a good dayl 

Best Regards, 

In addition to anonymity, using bitcoin can be cheaper than processing funds 

through more traditional means, such as wire transfers and money orders. For 

90 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0261). 

lOOJd. 

101 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0278). 102 Bitcoin.org, Frequently Asked Questions, https:/!bitcoin.org/en/faq#what~is~bitcoin. 

lO'' I d. 101 Screenshot of Website E (Nov. 14, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); Email communication 

(June 25, 2017) (App. 0260). 10' Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0282). 

lOG Email communication (,June 20, 2017) (App. 0269). 

35 
144 

example, Western Union enforces a $500 per transaction limit and a $1,000 

monthly sending limit-and there are fees associated with sending money.J07 

Bitcoin, by contrast, does not have these transactional limits. According to the 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a user of virtual currency is not a Money 

Services Business (MSB) and is therefore not subject to registration, reporting, and 

recordkeeping regulations with U.S. financial regulators JOB 

While bitcoin was the preferred payment option, the online sellers contacted 

by the Subcommittee accepted various other payment forms, including Western 

Union transfers, MoneyGram, Pay Pal, credit card, gift card, and even direct bank 

transfer. For example, Website D offered the Subcommittee numerous payment 

options including credit card, Visa/MasterCard gift card, bank transfer, and bitcoin. 

The website's shipping time even varied depending on the payment method: 

"Discreet shipping within 30 minutes are [sic] only available for VISA/ 

l\1.ASTERCARD Gift Cards payments. For Credit Card and Bitcoin payments, it 

will take 1-2 hours before order can be ship [sic) since payment is not instant." 109 

The Subcommittee's investigation further revealed that there is risk for 

purchasers relying on a traditional MSB, or money remitter,llO as opposed to the 

more anonymous cryptocurrencies. On July 21, 2017, the Subcommittee requested 

payment information from Western Union related to various online seller accounts. 

Shortly thereafter, Western Union notified the Subcommittee that they were closing 

the accounts at issue in the Subcommittee's request. As a result of having their 

Western Union accounts closed, at least two of the websites formally changed their 

payment policies and began only accepting bitcoin. Specifically, on July 26, 2017, 

Website A sent the following email on July 26, 2017, stating it no longer accepted 

Western Union and would only accept bitcoin: 

107 Western Union, Frequently Asked Qttestions, https://www.westernunion.com/us/enlcustomer· 

care/cc· faq s.h tmL 

108 Application ofFinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual 

Currencies, FIN-2013-GOO!, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FfNANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT 

NETWOHI< (Mar. 18, 2013); Money Services Business Definition, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 

FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/money-servicesbusiness-definition. 

JOO Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0275). 

JJO A money remitter is any individual who engages in the business of transferring funds abroad 

through remittance transfer providers such as banks, credit unions, and other financial services 

companies. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.ll(uu)(5)(B) (2017): CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, What is a 

Remittance Transfer? (2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-remittancetransfer-en-11611. 

36 
145 

From:----

To:-----

Da te: Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:35 PM 

Subject: Re: Research Chemicals For Sale USA Contact: Order Help 

hello, 

we stop the WU. we use only bitcoins right now as a form of payment. 

Warm Regards 

111 

Website A provided the Subcommittee with its bitcoin wallet address, which 

received bitcoins totaling approximately $500,000.112 

Additionally, Website C sent the following email after the Subcommittee 

requested financial rec01·ds: 

From:--

To: 

Date: Thu, Ju! 27, 2017 at 1:08 .A.M 

Hi leo, 

Glad to hear frmn you! 

Sorry to tell you .about that our western union is not available now, W01.J!d you m.nd to pay usingbitcoln 

or bank transfer? 

Look forward to doing business with you, 

Have a good night! 

Best Regards, 

113 

E. Online Sellers Prefer Shipping Drugs with Government-Run 

Postal Operators 

All of the international online sellers who corresponded with the 

Subcommittee expressed confidence that the drug products they advertised would 

get delivered to the United States and not be seized by any customs authorities. 

The shipping methods used by the online sellers varied. After extensive 

n: Email communication (July 26, 2017) (App. 0263). 

n2 Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

113 Email communication (July 27, 2017) (App. 0272). 

37 
146 

communications, it became clear that three main shipping routes were used by the 

websites: (1) shipment directly from China to a U.S.-based address; (2) 

transshipment from China through another country to a U.S. address; or, (3) 

shipment from China to a U.S.-based distributor and then to a U.S. address. 

There was one common thread among all three shipping routes: All of the 

international websites preferred to use the government-operated postal service 

EMS, a cooperative run by members of the Universal Postal Union, which is 

discussed in more detail in the background section of this report. Other shipping 

options were offered when the Subcommittee requested additional information. 

Website C suggested a purchaser only use EMS and discouraged use of 

ECOs, such as DHL, FedEx, and UPS: 

Q: What is th-e best Sh4pping meth-od ? 

!11 

Website A's shipping section, as shown below, states that orders are shipped 

within one to two days of packing and lists EMS as the default shipping option. The 

same website also guaranteed delivery for all countries it ships to, including the 

United States, as long as the purchaser used EMS as the shipping option. 

]]5 

Additionally, as shown below, Website C guaranteed delivery only if EMS was used 

and offered free EMS shipping for orders over $100. 

114 Screenshot of Website C (Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 115 Screenshot of Website A (May 9, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

38 
147 

<l.F~ee '>htppmg Jnd Gunranteed Dehv!!ry 

When your order !S more than S100, youw1tt get the ~rE'e Shlppmg services vla EM'5. 

~uardntl.!'ed dehw1yon1yv1a ~MS, O[her stl!ppmg rnemods wll1 not be guaranteed. WMn your package 

v1a fM5 has been kept m {he custom for mure than 3 weeks. we would resrnd your order soon and you neE'd to cont.act 

us about tt (nottce a gam: onlyvta EMS could f)e Guaranteed), 8TW, packages to some coootnes cant be Guaranteed all 

now, you could check t11e- 1nfo 10 the Item of "'Guaranteed Dehvery". 

Warn: All the produ:ts are pro'V!Cled as ttle soence research,not used lor any other purposes. 

While all of the international online sellers contacted by the Subcommittee 

preferred to use EMS, the actual shipment route differed. Below are three 

examples of the shipment routes the sellers described. 

Direct from China to the United States. Three of the six sellers indicated 

that they would ship the product directly from China to the final destination in the 

United States. For example, Website E offered to sell the Subcommittee a 99 

percent pure fentanyl analog shipped directly from China using EMS: 

To: Fro-: 

Date: Tu1e •• J.un112

1

0

11, 2jj01ill7ilat.5:48 PM Subject: 

This is the······· we ship from China but all our payments are made to 

Hungary,Budapest 

We will ship out yoilujirlipilacilkaiigiielullsi1n,g EMS delivery service and this is tracking number of a package that 

we just delivered • 

We look forward to your respond. 

Best regards, 

1" Screenshot of Website C (June 20, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

39 

117 
148 

Website E also provided several tracking numbers to prove they were 

capable of delivering their productllB The tracking numbers all indicated recent 

packages successfully shipped from China to various locations throughout the 

United States. 

Transshinment. As mentioned previously, transshipment is the process of 

shipping goods through a second country, port, or territory before they arrive at 

their final destination.ll9 Investigators with the Department of Homeland 

Security's Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI") reported seeing packages 

"purposefully" diverted through various countries as transshipment points to avoid 

both Chinese and U.S. customs authorities.12o Additionally, CBP officials indicated 

that transshipment is a "hugo problem" as packages containing illicit goods are 

being routed through countries with less scrutiny.121 

One online seller relied on transshipment as a way to give potential buyers 

confidence that the illegal drugs would arrive without incident. Website B stated, 

below, they would ship fentanyl to the United States via EMS. Although the 

fentanyl was manufactured in China, the dealer indicated it would be transshipped 

through a European country, which was described as a "low risky [sic] country." 122 

117 Email communication (June 20, 2017) (App. 0281). As a reminder, the Subcommittee did not 

complete any purchases: Website E provided a tracking number solely as evidence that it 

successfully shipped packages directly from China to the United States. 

118 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0280); Email communication (June 20, 2017) (App. 

0281), 

119 U.S. CUSTOMS & BoRDER PROTECTJO;)!, CSMS #98-000243, Textile Transshipment Report (1998). 120 Briefing with the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigations (July 13, 

2017). 

121 Briefing with U.S. Dep't. of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (Aug. 21, 2017); 

Briefing with the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 21, 2017). 

122 Email communication (June 19, 2017) (App. 0259). 

40 
149 

To:-

Fro~ 

Subject: Date: Mon, Re: Jun New 19, Message 2017 at From 6:02·P·M······ 

Thanks for your reply and to answer to your question, your order will be shipped from- since it 

is a low risky country. 

With that been sald,i will use····· to ship your order. 

looking forward to do business with you. 

Best Regards 

123 

U.S.-Based Distributor. As an alternative to transshipment, two of the 

sellers indicated that the drugs would be shipped from China to a "U.S. branch," 

and then to the U.S.· 

based recipient. 

Website F advertised 

"99.8 percent" pure 

fentanyl shipped from 

their Texas branch via 

ECOs and the Postal 

Service. 121 

When Subcommittee 

staff mentioned that 

they were shopping 

around for fentanyl, the dealer even offered a $20 discount and additional payment 

options in an attempt to close the deaJ.l25 

Finally, most of the online sellers used the terms "stealth," "discrete [sic]," 

and "unmarked" to describe how the seller would conceal the drugs from detection 

during the shipping process. Website D advertised the most elaborate packaging 

description, labeled "100% Safe and Secure Stealth Discreet Packaging:" 126 

123Jd. 

124 Email communication (June 15, 2017) (App. 0285). 

125 Email communication (June 21, 2017) (App. 0284). 126 Email communication (June 13. 2017) (App. 0276). 

41 
150 

Your order comes in a "100'/o Safe and Secure Stealth Di&creet Padaging" and will be ship discreetly ever 

to you via one of our long time m~t tru&ted courier partners (i.e DHL, TNT or Fed Ex) on a 100% discreet 

caurier overnight flight which is definitely the saf~st means to get tour package over to you withaut 

keeping ;my trace. Your order comes in Stealth Pack, Vacuum Sealed in thick plastic &nd An Aluminum 

Foil Gnp Bag, covered in Extra li!yer of MYLAR seal, Candle Wax, B;bble Wrapped and will be specia!lt 

delivered to you dS a gift in a Complete Unmarked Envelope (with no brands name CJr !al>els). just the 

company logo and terms of use. Our pi!ckaging follo-...'5 a privacy policy of all our customers, thefefore 

no indications of the package contents wit! be displayed this is to ensure the postman, colleag\Jes or 

anyone ehe at that addre~ will not know that you have placed an order for such product. Delivery does 

not require signature and we can deliver to Post Box. We pride ourselves on our fast and secretive 

ordering process for our products. 

127 

IV. IDENTIFYING U.S. INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING SUSPECTED DRUG 

PACKAGES FROM CHINA 

After extended conversations with the online sellers, the Subcommittee 

sought to uncover the identity and motives of U.S. individuals who were either 

associated with the online sellers or likely purchasers of illegal and deadly synthetic 

opioids. The Subcommittee reviewed detailed shipment data and financial records 

linked to the six previously identified online sellers. 

The Subcommittee's review revealed four alarming findings. First, the 

Subcommittee identified a likely distributor of deadly synthetic opioids from China 

based in the United States. Second, the Subcommittee identified seven individuals 

in the United States who tragically died from synthetic opioid overdose soon after 

they wired money to accounts controlled by the online sellers. Third, the 

Subcommittee identified at least 18 individuals from 11 states who sent money to 

the online sellers' accounts who were either arrested or convicted of serious drug 

related offenses. Fourth, the Subcommittee identified at least two more U.S. 

individuals who are likely engaged in the mass distribution of synthetic opioids. 

To provide appropriate law enforcement authorities with actionable leads on 

potential ongoing criminal activity, the Subcommittee is not revealing in this public 

report the identity of either the online sellers or any individuals likely associated 

with the websites. A confidential report and related records containing 

comprehensive information about the online sellers and any U.S.-based individuals 

will be provided, as appropriate and in a manner consistent with U.S. Senate rules, 

to local and federal law enforcement authorities. 

''' Id. 

42 
151 

A. Methodology for Locating Likely Purchasers of Illegal Opioids 

To locate likely purchasers of illegal opioids and their suspected associates, 

the Subcommittee examined financial and shipment information linked to the six 

online sellers discussed in the preceding section. U.S. individuals in 43 states 

completed over 500 financial transactions totaling nearly $230,000 to accounts 

linked to four of the six online sellers 1 2B Individuals in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New 

York, and Florida had the most financial transactions linked to the online sellers. 

In just those four states, there were over 200 transactions totaling roughly 

$100,000.129 The map below illustrates every U.S. location linked to a payment to 

the online sellers offering fentanyl and other deadly synthetic opioids for sale130 

Locations in red indicate the most transactions. 

After identifying over 300 individuals who sent money to the online sellers, 

the Subcommittee requested shipment data linked to those individuals from the 

Postal Service, CBP, and three ECOs. The goal was to determine which packages 

likely contained drugs based on payment dates and identified drug sources, both 

domestic and international, to uncover trends and patterns of how drugs actually 

make their way into the United States. 

128 The Western Union Company production to the Subcommittee (Aug. 9, 2017) (on file with 

Subcommittee); The Western Union Company production to the Subcommittee (Sept. 29, 2017) (on 

file with Subcommittee) (hereinafter "\Vestern Union Productions"). 129 Id. IJO Id. 

13 
152 

Subcommittee staff examined over two million lines of shipment data 

produced by the Postal Service, CBP, and the three ECOs. The shipment data 

examined typically included unique identifiers associated with specific individuals, 

including the receiver's name, address, and the date of shipping. The Postal 

Service's international data sometimes lacked sender information, which could have 

allowed the Subcommittee to determine a common drug shipper or a common 

pattern of activity to assist with shipment targeting. The Subcommittee searched 

multiple datasets several different ways by limiting information and conducting a 

manual review to determine address matches. 

Additionally, the Postal Service does not always require a return shipping 

address. This information was excluded in much of the domestic shipment data 

reviewed. And even when the return address information was present, some 

shipments still lacked a definitive house or apartment number or street name. 

However, the Subcommittee conducted an expanded search of Postal Service records 

to identify the source location of the suspected drug shipments. 

Despite these limitations, the Subcommittee had significant success tracking 

shipments to individuals in the United States who also sent international money 

wires within approximately one week of the shipment. This examination led to the 

Subcommittee's findings discussed below. 

Finally, in examining the data, the Subcommittee observed another 

limitation that impacts the Postal Service or law enforcement's ability to monitor 

suspicious packages entering the United States. Much of the data the 

Subcommittee received was not provided as AED to CBP or the Postal Service prior 

to the package arriving in the United States. Rather, as the package traveled 

through the domestic mail stream for delivery, Postal Service systems generated 

the data. At delivery, the data for Postal Service packages mirrored the data 

collected by the ECOs when they take possession of a package from a customer. 

B. The Subcommittee Identified a Likely U.S.-Based Distributor for 

Chinese Produced Fentanyl and Other Deadly Synthetic Opioids 

The buyers identified by the Subcommittee lived in more than three dozen 

states and seemingly had no connection except for making purchases from a 

common online seller. However, another common thread that emerged is that one 

Pennsylvania address was used to send more than 120 packages tied to payments to 

an online seller during a two-month period in early 2017_131 The Subcommittee 

found a compelling connection between the timing of the payment data and the 

shipment data. Oftentimes, shipments were sent within one day of the receipt of 

"'United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

44 
153 

payment. The chart below shows a sampling of the more than 120 shipments that 

followed payments sent to an online seller advertising opioids for sale.'32 

Payment Sent Package Sent 

Payment to Online fromPA 

Amount Seller Address 

$154.00 11/8/2016 11/10/2016 

$276.00 1/8/2017 1/9/2017 

$341.00 1/11/2017 1/12/2017 

$82.00 1/11/2017 1/13/2017 

$212.50 1/12/2017 1/13/2017 

$334.00 1/19/2017 1/20/2017 

$199.00 1/19/2017 1/20/2017 

$290.00 1/20/2017 1/23/2017 

$322.02 1/21/2017 1/23/2017 

$96.20 1/23/2017 1/24/2017 

$659.56 1/23/2017 1/25/2017 

$133.40 1/28/2017 1/31/2017 

$310.00 2/1/2017 2/1/2017 

$76.20 2/2/2017 2/6/2017 

$232.50 2/4/2017 217/2017 

$114.60 2/4/2017 217/2017 

$221.00 2/4/2017 217/2017 

$104.80 2/6/2017 217/2017 

In addition, upon further examination of these shipments, the Subcommittee 

found numerous instances of shipments that went to individuals who (1) were 

arrested for drug offenses; (2) tragically died from drug overdoses; or (3) were active 

payers to the online sellers, as further described below. 

Based on these findings, it is likely that an active drug distributor in 

Pennsylvania is acting as a distributor for an internationally-based website that 

advertises synthetic opioids for sale on the open web. 

C. The Subcommittee Identified Seven Individuals Who Wired 

Money to Online Sellers and Later Died of Drug Overdoses 

The Subcommittee's investigation further confirmed the deadly nature of the 

opioid epidemic. Of the more than 300 individuals identified in the data, the 

132 Western Union Productions; Lnited States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 

9, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

45 
154 

Subcommittee identified seven deceased individuals who died from a fentanyl or 

other synthetic opioid overdose who wired money to accounts linked to the online 

sellers identified in this report. The Subcommittee also identified shipments 

received by those deceased individuals that correspond with the dates when money 

was wired to the websites. In fact, in one example discussed below, an individual 

received a package the day before his death. 

One such individual identified by the Subcommittee was a 49-year-old Ohio 

man who paid roughly $2,500 to an online seller over the course of 10 months from 

May 2016 to February 2017. Over that time period, he received 18 packages 

through the Postal Service that closely corresponded with the dates he wired money 

to an online seller. For example, on May 14, 2016 and October 27, 2016, he sent 

$134 and $310 respectively, and on both occasions packages bound for his address 

entered the international mail system on the same days he made payments. Nearly 

all of the other payments coincided closely with the dates a package was sent 

through the Postal Service. Five international packages sent to this Ohioan 

~oincided with foreign wire payments made to one of the online sellers_l33 At least 

one of these packages came directly from China and the ISC in Chicago processed it. 

According to publicly available tracking information, both packages spent less than 

24 hours processing through CBP in Chicago_134 And, as shown below, one of the 

packages spent roughly an hour in customs before being processed through for 

delivery. 

U 3 Western Union Productions; United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 

9, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

131 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

46 
155 

June 9, 2016,7:54 am 

AJTi\iEtC a: USPS Reg:or~a! Facd,ty 

CLEVELAr\D OH D~STR!BUT!Of-~ CEt·HER 

June 8, 2016,3:41 pm 

Arr \';?G nt USPS R2g;o~.a.! F ac;ll,ty 

CHiCAGO -L !NTER1\AT!ONN. OISThlSUT!Or>.: CEi\TER 

June 8, 2016, 9:50 am 

!r:bound O;.;t of Custor:1s 

June 8, 2016, 8:41 am 

P1 ocessE-d F:rough F ae"!t:y 

tSC CHiCAGO tl (USPS! 

June 4, 2016, 11:35 pm 

Processed T;,rough Fac;h:y 

SHA~GHAI E:}S. CHIN.~ 

At the time of these shipments, the Chicago ISC did not participate in the 

Postal Service pilot program designed to let CBP target suspected drug packages 

with AED, as discussed in more detail in the following section.l35 This individual 

also received seven packages from the likely Pennsylvania distributor identified in 

the previous section.l3G One of the packages was delivered from Pennsylvania two 

weeks before he passed away. 137 According to autopsy records provided to the 

Subcommittee, the cause of death was "acute fentanyl intoxication."l3B 

In a similar case, the Subcommittee identified a 25-year-old man from 

Michigan who sent $543 over the course of three months to an online seller. All 

three payments colTesponded with the dates packages were sent to him through the 

Postal Service 1 39 On November 2, 2016, he sent $341 to an online seller, and on 

l35 See Section V. 

UG United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

""Id. 

J:5a Autopsy records on file with the Subcommittee. 

n9 Western Union Productions; United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 

9, 20 17) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

47 
156 

November 3, 2016, a package was sent to him from the suspected Pennsylvaniabased distributor. On February 6, 2017, he sent $104.80 and had a package mailed 

to him from the suspected Pennsylvania-based address on February 7, 2017.11° Five 

months later, he died on July 16, 2017 from a fentanyl overdose.l4l 

Finally, another Michigan man sent roughly $400 dollars to an online seller 

in late 2016.142 On November 25, 2016, he wired more than $200 to an 

international online seller and, on December 2, 2016, he received a package linked 

to the Pennsylvania-based distributor.1'

1" Public records indicate that just one day 

later, he died of an accidental overdose of multiple drugs, including a fentanyl 

analogue144 Over the course of a year before his death, he received at least five 

additional packages linked to the Pennsylvania-based distributor_l45 

D. The Subcommittee Identified 18 Individuals Who Wired Money 

to Online Sellers Who Were Arrested or Convicted of Serious 

Drug-Related Offenses 

The Subcommittee identified 18 individuals who were arrested or convicted of 

serious drug-related offenses who also sent money to online sellers. Ten of these 

individuals previously had an arrest or conviction for possession or possession with 

intent to distribute drugs and later sent money to an online seller and received a 

package. Tho remaining eight wore arrested after they sent money and received a 

package. Arrests took place in states including Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, New 

York, and Massachusetts. Criminal charges for the individuals ranged from intent 

to distribute, to endangering the welfare of a child, to possession of controlled 

substances. 

For example, one individual from Ohio was indicted in early 2017 for 

possession with intent to distribute nearly three pounds of fentany].146 The 

Subcommittee identified ono payment to an online seller in mid-2016 of more than 

ono thousand dollars.l 47 Although the individual used a fake name to receive 

international packages containing large quantities of fentanyl, law enforcement 

authorities were able to identify him and conducted a controlled delivery.l48 

140 ld. 

141 Autopsy records on file with the Subcommittee. 

142 Western Union Productions. 14·

3 Western Union Productions; United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 

9, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 144 Autopsy records on file with the Subcommittee. 

'"United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

U 6 Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

147 Western Union Productions. 14B ld.; Seen ring the Maritime Border: The Future of CBP Air and Marine Before the Subcomm. on 

Border and Maritime Secu,rity of the II. Comm. on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony 

48 
157 

According to publicly available information, this individual told law enforcement he 

ordered the fentanyl online from China after a family member showed him how to 

do it. "'9 Under the current sentencing guidelines, this individual is facing a 

minimum prison sentence of ten years.150 

Another individual, also from Ohio, sent more than $3,500 over a two-month 

span in mid-2016 to an online seller located in China.151 He received four 

international packages with tracking details indicating they originated in China.152 

According to publicly available information, this individual was charged with intent 

to distribute fentanyl that would ultimately cause the death of another 

individua]153 He was later sentenced to more than 15 years in prison.l54 

Finally, one man from New York was arrested and charged with one count of 

conspiracy to distribute large quantities offentanyl.'55 According to payment 

records reviewed by the Subcommittee, he sent at least one payment in mid-2016 to 

an online seller located in China worth more than $1,500.J5G In publicly available 

documents, he was accused of receiving several kilograms of fentanyl and 

repackaging the drugs into smaller quantities for resale.157 

E. The Subcommittee Identified Two Individuals Likely Engaged in 

the Distribution of Synthetic Opioids 

The Subcommittee identified at least two additional individuals who are 

likely engaged in tho online purchase and distribution of synthetic opioids, 

including fentanyl. One individual in Kansas wired nearly $2,500 to an online 

seller over a two-month period in late 2016.158 The day after wiring one of those 

payments, the suspected Pennsylvania-based distributor sent the individual a 

package. 159 Further, this same individual received more than 30 suspect 

international packages from ECOs and the Postal Service containing supplies and 

of Randolph D. Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection) (A controlled delivery is a technique whereby a smuggling suspect agrees to accept and 

open a package known tD contain illegal goods, but is under observation by law enforcement.). 

Hfl Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

150 ld. 

151 Western Union Productions. 152 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

153 Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

154 ld. 

155 !d. 

156 Western Union Productions. 157 Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

l5f! Western Union Productions. 159 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

49 
158 

other materials typically used to produce mass quantities of pills for distribution.H'0 

The package description information submitted to CBP included pill presses used to 

compress powders into tablets. 1G1 This individual also ordered chemical bonding 

agents commonly used in the mass production of tablets and pills. 1" 2 Finally, at 

least one chemical listed on shipment records for merchandise purchased by this 

individual is commonly used to create a distinctive and marketable color for tablets 

and pills.l63 

Finally, a different individual in Ohio sent more than $3,000 to an online 

seller over a four month period from late 2016 to early 2017.164 He received 

international packages-three from China and one from Hong Kong. 165 He also 

received three additional suspect packages containing items commonly used in the 

mass production of pills and tablets.166 The shipment data indicated the packages 

contained chemicals, such as coloring agents, and empty plastic casings commonly 

used to create tablets and pills.lG7 And one chemical listed on the shipment data is 

known to be used specifically for synthetic opioid production,l68 

160 Id.; Clll' production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 26, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); FedEx 

Corporation production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); FedEx 

Corporation production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 14, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); United 

Parcel Service, Inc. production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 6, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); 

DHL Express U.S. production to the Subcommittee (;:.lov. 3, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

!Gl Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, DEA-DCT-DIB-021-16, Counterfeit 

Prescription Pills Containing Fentanyls: A Global Threat 2 (July 2016) ("Clandestine pill press 

operations also occur in the United States. Traffickers usually purchase powdered fentanyls and pill 

p·re·sses from China to create counterfeit pills to supply illicit U.S. drug markets. Under U.S. law, 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) must be notified of the importation of a pil1 press. 

However, foreign pill press vendors often mislabel the equipment or send it disassembled to avoid 

law enforcement detection."). 162 CBP production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 26, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee); DHL 

Express U.S. production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 3, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

wa. FedEx Corporation production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommlttee). 

16,1 Western Union Productions. 

165 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 9, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

166 CDP production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 26, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

t67 Jd. 

HiS Records on file with the Subcommittee. 

50 
159 

V. CBP AND THE POSTAL SERVICE ARE ONLY MAKING LIMITED USE 

OF ADVANCED ELECTRONIC DATA TO IDENTIFY, TARGET, AND 

SEIZE ILLICIT INTERNATIONAL PACKAGES OF SYNTHETIC 

OPIOIDS 

CBP uses AED to identify international packages that might contain illicit 

items. To assist in this effort, the Postal Service has made strides to increase the 

amount of AED it collects through various bilateral agreements with foreign postal 

operators. Effectively using the data to identify, target, and seize illicit 

international packages, however, remains a significant challenge. Before June 

2017, CBP used AED to target suspect packages at only one of the Postal Service's 

ISCs through a pilot program. The Subcommittee's investigation found that the 

pilot program was in considerable disarray and disorganization, which hampered 

the efficient usc of AED to target packages. 

This section discusses the development and operation of the pilot program, its 

inefficiencies, and the decision by the Postal Service and CBP to delay a nationwide 

expansion. 

A. Rapid Growth oflnbound International Mail Presents 

Challenges for Effective Screening and Inspection 

The rapid growth of inbound international mail packages presents challenges 

for CBP's effective screening and inspection. The inbound international mail 

processed by the Postal Service and inspected by CBP has experienced double digit 

percentage growth over each of the last three years.1G9 This growth has been 

disproportionate at the JFK ISC in New York because it is the largest of the five 

major facilities that the Postal Service uses to receive and process inbound 

international mail. According to the most recent data available, the Postal Service 

recorded inbound international mail volume of more than 275 million packages_l70 

Nearly half of this volume arrived at the JFK ISC.I7I 

CBP and the Postal Service did not adequately plan for this rapid growth of 

inbound international mail. According to both CBP and Postal Service officials, the 

recent increase in inbound international mail-specifically ePackets f1·om Chinatook officials by "surprise" and led to struggles in processing and inspecting the 

160 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Oct. 23, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

170 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee CV!ay 22. 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

171 !d. 

51 
160 

mai[.l72 This growth also introduced unique operational and technical challenges 

for CBP and the Postal Service, especially at the JFK ISC.l73 

For example, before November 2015, CBP did not have the ability to target 

and inspect individual pieces of mail using AED. Instead, CBP inspected 

international mail from specific countries determined by the agency to be a "country 

of interest" or "country of concern." CBP officers then manually inspected all of the 

mail the Postal Service received from those targeted countries. CBP officers told 

the Subcommittee that the targeted countries periodically changed based on CBP 

officers' experience, knowledge, and threat assessment.l74 At times, however, CBP 

did not list China on its country of interest list solely because the incoming volume 

was-too great.m CBP also did not consistently inspect ePackets shipped from 

China until the pilot program began at the JFK ISC in November 2015.17G 

B. The Postal Service and CBP Started a Pilot Program to Target 

Packages for Inspection Using AED 

The Postal Service and CBP recognized the significant challenge of 

processing and screening hundreds of thousands of international mail packages 

172 Interview with Charles Conti, United States Postal Service, Plant lVIanager, John F. Kennedy 

International Airport, International Service Center (Oct. 26, 2017) (hereinafter Conti Interview (Oct. 

26, 2017)); Interview with Quanla Owens, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, former Program 

11anager, Internationall\1ail and Express Consignment Facilities, ~ew York Field Office (Nov. 20, 

2017) (hereinafter Owens Interview (Nov. 20, 2017)); Interview with Manuel Garza, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, Director, Manifest & Conveyance Security (Nov. 1, 2017) (here£nafter Garza 

Interview (Nov. I, 2017)); CBP-PSI-000075 (App. 0002) (A Postal Service email on May 5, 2015 to 

CBP officials stated that the Postal Service did "not have a project growth rate for ePackets over the 

next year at this time.'' The Postal Service official indicated CBP could examine historic growth rate 

patterns instead of a prediction} 173 USPS-PSI-00009844 (App. 0053) ("The growing inbound volume has outgrown the facility and is 

causing congestion at the tTFK ISC, which overloads the operations. In order to alleviate the issues 

caused by the growing inbound volume, the JFK ISC is interested in a one~year pilot test to move 

some of the handling of Chinese inbound ePacket mail to a new Annex facility near the JFK airport, 

provided by the supplier."); see also Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, 

MS-AR-17-003, Inbound Internat1:onal Mail Operations 1 (Dec. 30, 2016). 174 Subcommittee staff visit to JFK ISC (Sept. 14, 2017); Subcommittee staff visit to LAX ISC (Aug. 

22, 2017). 175 CBP-PSI-000083 (App. 0008) ("When we were out at the LA IMF they were working off of a [sic] 

Enforcement Countries Jist for July which consisted of 22 countries. China was not one of the 

countries on the list."); Interview with Leon Hayward, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Acting 

Director, New York Field Operations (Oct. 31, 2017) (hereinafter Hayward Interview (Oct. 31, 2017)) 

(indicating that at some points China was "excluded" from the country of interest list because of the 

volume). 

176 Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, MS-AR-17-003, Inbound 

International Mail Operations 6 (Dec. 30, 2016) ("Specifically, CBP does not inspect all mailpieces 

and often requests that only certain samples or mailpieces be presented by Postal Service employees 

for inspection. For example, CBP did not typically inspect ePackets from China at the JFK ISC prior 

to November 2015."). 

52 
161 

arriving in the United States each and every day.m It is important to note that the 

two agencies' very different missions added to the complications that came with the 

increased volume of packages. The Postal Service accepts all international mail 

from foreign postal operators and delivers that mail within certain timeframes to its 

intended recipient. CBP, meanwhile, has a national security mission to review 

suspect international cargo, including packages, without concern for speedy 

delivery. This tension contributed to difficulties between the two agencies over the 

course of the pilot program. 

To better handle the growing international mail volume, the Postal Service 

and CBP collaborated on a pilot program at the JFK ISC designed to limit the 

overall number of packages CBP manually screened_l7B In January 2014, senior 

Postal Service and CBP officials circulated an early draft work plan for "[i]nbound 

pilot proccdures." 179 According to this document, "[A]n advance system will allow 

CBP to move away from a primarily manual method of targeting inbound mail to a 

more selective processing approach." 18° The plan would also allow "for a more 

systematic enforcement effort by CBP while at the same time enabling the USPS to 

facilitate the mail through its process in a more expeditious manner."lRl Postal 

Service and CBP officials told the Subcommittee that the pilot program started at 

the JFK ISC because it receives the majority of inbound international maiJ182 

However, those same officials later admitted that the pilot program would have 

been more effective had it started at an ISC receiving less volume-'83 

Originally, the pilot program reviewed AED for packages from France and 

China.l84 The Postal Service provided CBP with AED, which CBP then analyzes to 

identify packages for the Postal Service to "hold" for inspection.185 CBP then 

entered a "hold 1·equest" that is transmitted electronically to Postal Service 

employees at the ISC. When Postal Service employees conducted initial verification 

177 Conti Interview (Oct. 26, 2017); Owens Interview (Nov. 20, 2017); Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017). 

!78 USPS-PSI-00006720 (App. 0042) ("The sheer volumes of this mail and the risk profiles need to be 

assessed."); USPS-PSI-00009217 (App. 0048) ("[B]y leveraging the data, USPS can improve the 

efficiency of mail processing."). 1

" USPS-PSI-00001983 (App. 0038). 

IBOJd. 

l81Jd. 

182 Interview with Freemont Rigel, United States Postal Service, Executive Director, International 

Strategy and Business Development G'Jov. 2, 2017) (hereinafter Rigel Interview (Nov. 2, 2017)); 

Hayward Interview (Oct. 31, 2017). 

lR:l Conti Interview (Oct. 26, 2017). 1" USPS-PSI-25256 (App. 0074) (Postal Service Power Point detailing the full data elements in 

1Tiv1ATI message: Item ID, Sender Receiver 1\ame and Address, Description of Contents, Content 

Type, Quantity, Weight, Value, Harmonized Tariff code, Country of Origin, License Numbers, 

Insurance Value, and Postage). 

IB5 Subcommittee staff visit to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center 

(Sept. 12, 2017). 

53 
162 

scans of inbound international mailings, they received notice if a package is 

targeted for hold by CBPJgG Initially, CBP limited targeting to only ten packages a 

day-a numbe1· that at least one CBP officer indicated was "just scratching the 

[surface]" of the threat of illicit, dangerous goods entering the country via the 

maiJ.187 

The act of locating and providing a package to CBP for inspection is formally 

known as "presentment."l88 At the beginning of the pilot program in November 

2015, once the Postal Service was informed that a package had been targeted by 

CBP, Postal Service employees would then locate and present either the package or 

the full sack of mail believed to contain the package to CBP for inspection. While 

the Postal Service eventually automated the presentment process, for most of the 

pilot program's operation, Postal Service employees or CBP officers located the 

targeted package by manually sorting through large sacks of mail containing 

hundreds of individual packages. This "resource intensive"l89 process required 

searching through hundreds of international packages to find the targeted 

package-the proverbial "needle in a haystack" according to one CBP officer 

working at the JFK ISC.I90 

C. The Postal Service and CBP Did Not Make Timely Improvements 

to the Pilot Program 

While both agencies recognized the inefficiencies of the manual process to 

identify and present packages, just months after the pilot program began, it took 

more than a year before the issues were resolved1 91 As the CBP Program Manager 

for the New York Field Office bluntly wrote in an email, "There has been no 

meaningful improvement as the China ePacket Pilot approaches its second year."I92 

The most significant shortcoming of the pilot program, according to internal Postal 

IBG The Postal Service Inspector General issued a ''management alert" to Wfr. Conti in his capacity as 

JFK ISC plant manager in January 2016 detailing concerns regarding this scanning and verification 

process al both the JFK and LAX ISCs. The Inspector General found that the Postal Service was not 

consistently complying with its verification scanning processes of inbound international maiL See 

Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, .Y!R-MT-16-001, Management Alert: 

International Inbound Mail Verification 2 (Jan. 28, 2016); Mr. Conti would later tell the 

Subcommittee that while he signed the Postal Service's formal response to the Inspector General as 

a "Responsible Official," he did not write or read the Jetter before signing it. Conti Interview (Oct. 

26, 2017). 

"' CBP-PS!-000078 (App. 0003). 

'"Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, MS-AR-17-003, Inbound 

Internatt:onal Mail Operations 7 (Dec. 30, 2016). 

'" CBP-PSI-000078 (App. 0003). 190 Subcommittee staff visit to ,JFK ISC (Sept. 14, 2017). 

"' CBP-PS!-000095 (App. 0014). 

'"' CBP-PS!-000!14 (App. 0020). 

54 
163 

Service and CBP emails and documents, was that the Postal Service did not 

consistently present 100 percent of targeted packages to CBP. 

In a June 2016 email, CBP's Internal Mail Security Director acknowledged 

the program's shortcomings, stating that "[t]he lack of consistency with the pilot is 

the issue. [The Postal Service's JFK Plant Manager] continues to cite human error 

whenever targeted mail is not presented to CBP for inspection. Full bags of mail 

with possible targets continue to take additional resources, as you know CBP has to 

look for each target in a bag of mail."l93 In an interview with the Subcommittee, the 

plant manager for the Postal Service's JFK ISC explained that the human error 

mentioned in the email referred to the manual process of searching through large 

bags of mail for an individual parcel. He indicated that if tho process had been 

automated sooner, the pilot could have been more efficient and accurate-'94 

The Postal Service did have plans in place to automate and present 

individual packages to CBP in 2016. According to the Postal Service's Assistant 

Director for Global Trade Compliance, Cheri DeMoss, "[e]nhanced functionality" to 

allow the Postal Service to provide CBP with the individual targeted piece rather 

than the entire bag of mail was set to be in place by September of that year_I95 

According to the Postal Service, the automation did not begin then because of 

required software updates. 196 Additionally, one Postal Service official claimed that 

CBP continued to request entire bags of mail rather than individual targeted 

packages until late 2016, rendering automation by the Postal Service unnecessary 

at that time.l97 

The two agencies did not begin working together to make meaningful 

improvements to the pilot until March 2017 when the program moved away from 

manual sorting to automation. Automation improved the Postal Service's 

presentment rate. 198 Below is an image of the machine Postal Service installed, the 

"Automated Parcel and Bundler Sorter." The machine relies on imaging and 

barcode technology to automatically sort large volumes of packages. This 

193 CBP-PSl-000264 (App. 0130). 

194 Conti Interview (Oct. 26, 2017). 

"' USPS-PSI-00017312 (App. 0058). 196 Interview with Cheri DeMoss, United States Postal Service, 1\-1anager, Trade Systems and 

Analysis (Oct. 25, 2017) (hereinafter DeMoss Interview (Oct. 25, 2017). 

l97Jd. 

ws CBP-PSI-000486 (App. 0026) (Ms. DeMoss wrote in an email to CBP officials detailing the 

anticipated improvement after automation was installed: "Yes JFK is placing ATS advance holds on 

China epacket and French Express Mail items. USPS is working to improve the success rate and 

implementing the ability to sort out China epackct hold bags on automated equipment. The testing 

on automated equipment is in progress and we expect this to improve the success rate."); CBP~PSI000116 (App. 0022) (Mr. Garza wrote in an email on June 6, 2017 that his supervisor "would like to 

spend a few hours at the mail facilities to see the package sort automation and success that the 

adjustments on the machine have had."). 

55 
164 

equipment is now in place at the JFK ISC, as shown below during a Subcommittee 

site visit to the facility. 

D. The Postal Service and CBP Still Do Not Agree on How to 

Measure the Pilot Program's Success 

The Postal Service and CBP have not developed an agreed upon 

measurement of success for the pilot program. When asked if the AED pilot 

program is successful, both agencies gave different responses. As a result, the 

program's expansion to other ISCs around the country faced continual delays. 

As previously described, the program was effectively simple in design. After 

analyzing AED provided by the Postal Service, CBP targeted particular packages it 

believed contained illicit goods. The Postal Service then located and presented that 

package to CBP for additional inspection and possible seizure. 

During the JFK pilot program, CBP and the Postal Service collected 

performance data on the percentage of targeted packages the Postal Service 

presented to CBP for inspection, which is the "presentment rate." The number of 

packages that slip through the cracks and are not presented to CBP is an important 

statistic to determine the success of targeting and intercepting packages. However, 

the Postal Service and CBP still have not agreed on specific goals for the pilot and 

how to measure those goals. As a result, they differ on what the Postal Service's 

presentment rate is and how success should be defined in the program. 199 

109 CBP-PSI-000114 (App. 0020) (As one CBP officer working closely on the pilot program stated, 

"The measurement of holds are not consistent between CBP and the USPS."). 

56 
165 

According to one CBP official, "CBP simply reports the total amount of Holds 

that we place compared to how many holds USPS presents to us for inspection. If 

CBP views the target in the ATS [Automated Targeting] system, our impression is 

that a hold may be placed on it."2°0 However, the Postal Service uses different 

metrics. It measures what it refers to as "actionable holds"-meaning items the 

Postal Service is actually capable of intercepting. This measure exempts any holds 

that are deemed not actionable. For example, the Postal Service exempts any 

package that has already left the ISC prior to CBP's request for a hold, is diverted 

and delivered to a different ISC, or never arrived in the United States. Exempting 

these packages boosts the Postal Service's presentment rate, showing what appears 

to be greater success at locating and presenting packages to CBP. 

The difference in how the Postal Service and CBP measure success is 

significant. Below is a chart that shows the percentage of holds presented for 

inspection as identified by both CBP and the Postal Service. In 13 of tho 19 months 

since tho start of the pilot program, the Postal Service calculated a higher 

presentment rate than CBP. On average, as shown below, the Postal Service and 

CBP had a 17 percent difference in reported success rates over the last 20 months: 

CBP China ePackets Pilot 

90% 

80% 

70% 

60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

20% 

10% 

0% 

Percentage Presented-CBP Percentage Presented- USPS 

Last year, however, both CBP and the Postal Service realized they need to 

agree on how to measure success for the good of tho program. A summary of a 

"USPS/CBP Executive Meeting" held at CBP Headquarters on June 8, 2017, 

zoo CBP-PSI-0000246 (App. 0024). 

201 

201 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Oct. 18, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee); CBP production to the Subcommittee (July 7, 2017) (on ftle with the Subcommittee). 

57 
166 

summarizes discussions about these concerns. CBP indicated that the Postal 

Service's presentment rate at JFK was "at+/- 70%."202 But a Postal Service 

representative claimed that it has a higher success rate on actionable holds because 

a target piece of mail may arrive at an alternate ISC or was never sent.203 At this 

meeting CBP agr·eed that the agencies needed "to determine one source of 

measurement used by both agencies."2°4 

Unfortunately, despite this recognition, as of the release of this report, the 

agencies still rely on different performance measurements. In fact, a September 1, 

2017 Memorandum of Understanding between the Postal Service and CBP 

concerning the expansion of the pilot program to the other ISCs failed to articulate 

a definable standard of success. The Memorandum of Understanding states, 

As it relates to electronic advance data, [the agencies would] worh to 

develop a measurable performance goal for the presentation of 

packages targeted by CBP for examination, including a corresponding 

mutually agreed upon performance goal in each local SOP, and provide 

periodic status reports to each other regarding their progress in 

meeting such goal,20G 

When asked why the agencies still have not resolved this longstanding issue, 

one CBP official told the Subcommittee that the issue was the topic of regular 

conversation throughout the course of the pilot, both internally and with the Postal 

Service and that a meeting was scheduled between the agencies to discuss how to 

come to an agreement on measuring success. 206 This meeting was scheduled for 

early November 2017, two years after the start of the pilot program. 

Given this debate, the program's effectiveness and ability to expand suffered. 

As the U.S. Government Accountability Office found in August 2017, "Because 

USPS and CBP have not agreed to specific performance goals or targets, it is 

difficult to make well-informed decisions regarding the possible expansion ofthese 

pilots in the future."207 While there have been efforts to increase the Postal 

Service's presentment rate using automated sorting, packages still slip through the 

cracks and ultimately get delivered.208 This remains a problem. CBP spends time 

and resources to target specific packages it believes contain illicit goods-including 

2oz USPS-PSI-00047061 (App. 0121). 

203Jd. 

204 Id. 200 United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Oct. 11, 2017) (App. 0163) 

(emphasis added). 

206 Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017). 207 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-17-606, Costs and Benefits of Using Electronic Data to 

Screen Mail Need to Be Assessed 23 (2014). 208 Subcommittee staff visit to JFK ISC (Sept. 14, 2017). 

58 
167 

synthetic narcotics such as fentanyJ.209 The Postal Service is bound by federal 

regulations210 to make all mail available to CBP and must present all inbound 

international mail that CBP requests.ZJJ 

E. The Postal Service and CBP Officials Did Not Expand the JFK 

Pilot Program until after the Subcommittee's May 2017 Hearing 

on International Mail Security and the Importation of Deadly 

Drugs 

While both the Postal Service and CBP discussed expanding the pilot 

program to other ISCs, both agencies routinely missed their own internal deadlines 

over the last year and a half. It was not until after the Subcommittee's hearing in 

May 2017 that both the Postal Service and CBP formally agreed to expand to the 

othel' four ISCs. CBP began targeting some packages at the remaining ISCs three 

days before this report was released.212 

Not expanding tho program to the other ISCs limited the success of CBP's 

targeting efforts using AED. CBP was only targeting packages arriving from China 

at the JFK ISC, which constitutes l'oughly 50 percent of inbound international mail 

volume. Additionally, suspect mail packages tal'geted by CBP destined for the JFK 

ISC would not get inspected if they were rel'outed to a different ISC. 2 13 In those 

instances, tho packages wel'e delivered to tho addressee. 

Recognizing these and other issues, nearly one yeal' after the pilot progmm 

began at JFK, CBP and the Postal Service discussed expanding to othel' ISCs-most 

notably, the ISC located near the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). In 2016, 

the LAX lSC received the third highest volume of inbound international mail 

(behind JFK and Chicago).214 Postal Service officials indicated that they were l'eady 

to "start the same type of pilot" at LAX in October 2016.215 Fl'eomont Rigel, tho 

Postal Sel'vice's Director of Global Trade Compliance wrote in an email that the 

JFK pilot program allowed the Postal Service to "put a positive spin" on steps taken 

zoo Clll'-PSI-000246 (App. 0024). 

ZJo 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (2017). 211 Office of the Inspector General, United States Postal Service, MS-AR-17 -003, Inbound 

International Mail Operations 8 (Dec. 30, 2016). 212 U.S. Customs and Border Protection email to the Subcommittee (Jan. 19, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

21 3Interview with Abby Martin, United States Postal Service, Director, Global Trade Compliance 

(Oct. 24, 2017) (hereinafter Martin Interview (Oct. 24, 2017)); USPS-PSI-00019360 (App. 0067) (In a 

November 2016 email, Mr. Rigel wrote to CBP officials concerning the expansion: "But based on the 

sheer volume- they also see the value to both USPS and CllP if we can get [the pilot] in place ASAP 

at all locations [ ]."). 2H United States Postal Service production to the Subcommittee (Nlay 22, 2017) (on file with the 

Subcommittee). 

215 USPS-PS!-00017730 (App. 0062). 

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168 

to combat illicit drug trafficking in the mail systcm.216 Mr. Rigel continued that the 

Postal Service was "ready to start [the] same type of pilot in LA.X-another good 

news pro-active USPS International ops." 2 17 

Around the same time in late 2016, Postal Service officials started urging 

CBP to expand the pilot program to LAX. Ms. DeMoss, the Postal Service's 

Assistant Director for Global Trade Compliance, sent an email to Mr. Manuel 

Garza, CBP's Director of the Manifest and Conveyance Security Division, stating 

"[w]ith all of the attention on advance data and the drugs found in the mail we arc 

getting pressure to expand the ATS targeting at the other ISCs."218 Ms. DeMoss 

explained further, "[w]ith the extreme volumes of China epacket for peak and the 

attention on the drugs I think we need to move quickly on this. The last time we 

discussed getting this in place by November [2016]. We have the capability to 

expand to all ISCs and the advance data on China epacket is now at 97%."219 

However, CBP officials expressed concern that, contrary to Postal Service 

employees' emails, the Postal Service was actually not prepared to handle 

additional locations. Mr. Garza argued that the presentment rate was roughly 65 

percent at the JFK ISC and that CBP officials believed "USPS had agreed to a much 

higher success rate for delivering targeted epackcts than they have been able to 

achieve."220 Mr. Garza later explained to the Subcommittee that the program did 

not have any formal, written targets or goals, but that the overall sentiment was 

that the Postal Service would have a 90 percent presentment rate.221 According to 

Mr. Garza, the fact that this pilot did not "identify goals early on" was different 

than other CBP programs that outlined specific goals at the start,222 

Additionally, Ms. Owens, CBP's then-Program Manager for International 

Mail and Express Consignment Facilities in the New York Field Office, surveyed 

CBP employees on the ground and compiled the following internal feedback about 

the problems with the pilot to date regarding why the Postal Service was not ready 

to expand:22:l 

!<!lflJd. 

211 Jd. 

218 USPS-PSI-00019351 (App. 0061). 

21' Jd. 

zzo CBP-PSI-000102 (App. 0016). 

" 1 Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017). 

zzz Id. 

"' CBP-PSJ-000114 (App. 0020). 

60 
169 

!.,~Cicl> 

TilC!! :,,,, \•~Oil ll•' Hl~C•Hll!~t10iiU1)'h'HH\Cll1 ·"1h( ( illl\.1 t·f'"d.¢! 1'1l<>t ~)1'H'A~h' ,,, IQC,\!1J;~." 

Qu:tnla A. Owt>Jh 

CBP officials also cited personnel issues at the JFK ISC as a reason the pilot 

was not ready to be expanded. Leon Hayward, CBP's Acting Director of Field 

Operations at the New York Field Office, wrote in an email that CBP went "to great 

lengths to enhance our local relationship and to develop the capabilities necessary 

to target and examine ePackets expeditiously. We have seen no real reciprocation 

from USPS at ,JFK."224 Mr. Hayward would later explain to the Subcommittee this 

meant that a senior CBP officer at the JFK ISC did "not like progress" and was not 

in favor of expanding the pilot, so CBP management made the decision to transfer 

this official in order to move forward. Mr. Hayward also explained that there was a 

strong personality conflict between the Postal Service JFK Plant manager and the 

former CBP Deputy Chief Officer.225 

As a result of these performance and personnel challenges, the program did 

not expand in 2016. In early November 2016, a Postal Service official stated that 

the plan to expand to the LAX ISC was delayed to allow for the improvement of the 

presentment rate and to have the other ISCs running no later than March 2017.226 

In an email Mr. Rigel stated, "So we will start in February and complete by end of 

March--<Jne site at a time since they will also have a HQ CBP presence at each site 

as it comes up (ORD, LAX, SFO, MIA). CBP has to train their personnel on the new 

process-how to identify holds, etc."227 

In late February 2017, the Postal Se!'Vice again sought to expand the pilot in 

an effort to address mail processing backlogs in customs it was experiencing at LAX 

due to the transfer of CBP officers to border protection duty. 228 The LAX ISC Plant 

221 CBP-PSI-000487 (App. 0027). 

225 Hayward Interview (Oct. 31, 2017). 

' 26 TJSPS-PS!-00021004 (App. 0071). 

227 USPS-PSI-00021005 (App. 0072). 

" 8 USPS-PS!-00031818 (App. 0036) ("'n our discussions, they communicated heavy resources being 

diverted to border [ ]."). 

61 
170 

Manager advised senior Postal Service officials that the plant was "experiencing a 

backlog/delay at LA ISC Customs Facility. CBP has advised they are unable to 

staff all the belts under current operating conditions."229 Abby Martin, the Postal 

Service's Director of Global Trade Compliance, responded that the Postal Service 

could activate the targeting program to help with the backlog: "One path to pursue 

is asking CBP HQ to allow us to turn on the Advanced Targeting in LAX (expanding 

the JFK pilot, essentially), as that would cut down on the volume needing to go 

through customs. We could be ready to do that within a day or two if that is agreed 

to by all parties."2:Jo The LAX ISC Plant Manager also stated that "[t]his is a perfect 

opportunity for [the] advanced data pilot for L..t\."2:ll 

However, Mr. Raines responded that the Postal Service was not "ready to 

expand and certainly not at the piece level."232 In an interview with the 

Subcommittee, Ms. Martin stated that while the Postal Service was looking to 

decrease the backlog, Mr. Raines believed that the automated sorting system was 

still being tested at the JFK ISC and that he did not believe it was ready to be 

implemented at LAX.233 

In mid-March 2017, it was clear the expansions were not going to be finalized 

and officials set a new deadline for the following month. Ms. DeMoss explained in 

an email, "We are on track to expand the capability to place holds in all ISC's [sic] 

by April 2017."234 However, that "target date" came and went.23; And as of midMay, neither the Postal Service nor CBP had a timeline for expansion.23G Ms. 

DeMoss wrote that, "So far CBP has agreed to getting LAX going by the end of 

May," but there was no timeline for any other ISCs.2:l7 And a May 12, 2017 

Power Point, as shown below, was shared internally within the Postal Service, but 

lacked a target date: 

''' USPS-PSI-00031818 (App. 0234). 

23o USPS-PS!-00031817 (App. 0233). 

231 USPS-PSI-00032309 (App. 0077). 

232 USPS-PSI-00031817 (App. 0233). 2 "' Martin Interview (Oct. 24, 20 17). 

'" USPS-PSI-00036254 (App. 0080). 235 USPS-PSI-00039877 (App. 0081) ("We had a milestone to emulate the Customs JFK pilot to all4 

lSCs. The target date was May 1."). 

236 USPS-PSI-000•10144 (App. 0084). 

''' USPS-PSI-00040207 (App. 0087). 

62 
171 

238 

It was not until the Subcommittee's May 25, 2017, hearing, Stopping the 

Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs 

that both the Postal Service and CBP appeared to develop a new sense of 

urgoncy.239 The pilot program was a critical topic discussed at tho hearing. The 

Acting Inspector General for the United States Postal Service Office ofinspector 

General, Tammy Whitcomb, testified that "expanding that pilot quickly across the 

country to the other International Service Centers" was vital "so that the data that 

is being received from these countries can be used to target specific and dangerous 

packages."240 According to internal Postal Service documents, Postal Service and 

CBP officials watching the hearing quickly realized that expanding the program to 

the other ISCs needed to be a priority. 

While there was a discussion of a "kickoff meeting" regarding expanding to 

the LAX ISC, that meeting was not scheduled prior to the Subcommittee's hearing. 

As detailed below, it is clear from internal Postal Service documents that the 

Subcommittee's oversight hearing changed the timeline of the pilot program 

expansion. Ms. Martin sent the following email to Robert Woods, CBP's Program 

Manager for International Mail, during the Subcommittee's hearing about the 

expansion: 

'" USPS-PSI-00041584 (App. 0092). 239 See Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit 

Drugs Before Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, ll5th Cong. 45-46 (2017). 240 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Ouersight of U.S. Strategy to Combat nlicit Drugs 

Before Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, !15th Cong. 60 (2017) (testimony of Tammy Whitcomb, 

Acting Inspector General, United States Postal Service). 

63 
172 

241 

Mr. Woods promptly replied back: 

242 

According to Ms. Martin, before the hearing, the effort to expand the pilot 

was stalled by CBP; however, the discussion about the pilot program at the hearing 

"really lit a fire" under both the Postal Service and CBP.243 Mr. Garza also told the 

f41 USPS-PSI-00045215 (App. 0104). 

242 USPS-PST-00045213-45214 (App. 0145-0146). 

243 Martin Interview (Oct. 24, 2017). 

64 
173 

Subcommittee that after the hearing, CBP officials decided it was appropriate to 

expand.244 The Postal Service and CBP also started having weekly meetings to 

discuss both the pilot expansion and the use of AED generally-something that had 

not taken place before. 245 

In the hours after the Subcommittee's hearing, concern about the lack of 

progress in expanding the pilot program rose to the highest ranks of the Postal 

Service. According to Ronald Stroman, the Deputy Postmaster General, the 

Postmaster General asked him to "convey her request that [the Postal Service] 

develop a project plan, including [a] timeline, to expand the JFK Pilot to all of our 

ISCs as soon as possible."246 Robert Raines, the Executive Director of International 

Operations for the Postal Service, wrote to Ms. Martin, "We will need to develop 

[the project plan] quickly."247 

Other Postal Service and CBP officials also initiated internal email 

exchanges on the same day as the Subcommittee hearing to address the failure to 

expand the pilot program. For example, Robert Cintron, the Postal Service's 

witness at the hearing and the Vice President of Network of Operations, wrote to 

his senior staff the same day as the Subcommittee's hearing that the JFK expansion 

was one "[k]ey thing" to "focus on and accelerate."248 

One week after the Subcommittee's hearing, the Postal Service and CBP 

finally agreed to start the pilot program at the Los Angeles ISC ("LA..X ISC") on 

June 19, 2017.249 According to internal documents reviewed by the Subcommittee, 

the Postal Service was then ready to expand the pilot program to the other ISCs by 

June 30, 2017.250 While the technical components and equipment were in place to 

expand beyond the JFK ISC, CBP needed to train its employees at the other ISCs, 

and the two agencies needed to work out additional details. At a planning meeting 

held on June 8, 2017, CBP still could not provide a specific number of parcels they 

planned to target at the other ISCs.25l And in mid-June, CBP was not able to 

provide substantive updates to the Postal Service concerning expansion beyond JFK 

244 Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017). 245 Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017); CBP-PSI-000501 (App. 0033) ("With all of the activity going on 

with the JFK pilot expansion and the STOP Act, I would like to propose setting up a weekly touch 

point with your team, USPIS fsic] and us to ensure that we have time to share updates, discuss 

progress and next steps, and in general keep appraised of what each group is doing."). 

2-1o USPS-PSI-00045225 (App. 0112). 

2t1 CSPS-PSI-00045224 (App. 0113). 

248 USPS-PSI-00045135 (App. 0101). 249 USPS-PSI-00045541 (App. 0117) (June 1, 2017 email indicating the start date for the LA.,'( ISC is 

June 19, 2017). 

"' USPS-PSI-00046680 (App. 01!8). 

251 USPS-PSI-00047061 (App. 0121). 

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174 

and LAX. 252 As of publication of this report, the pilot program is in place at the 

TSCs located at JFK, LAX, and MIA.253 Below is a photograph of the bins used to 

process targeted mail taken during a Subcommittee visit to the LAX ISC:254 

The Postal Service told the Subcommittee that the capability is in place to 

expand the program to the remaining ISCs, and three days before the 

Subcommittee released this report CBP officials began targeting at the remaining 

ISCs.255 

VI. THE UNITED STATES IS A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSAL POSTAL 

UNION, WHICH GOVERNS THE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

As a signatory to the Universal Postal Union ("UPU") treaty, the designated 

operator for the United States, the Postal Service, is required to accept and deliver 

any packages shipped from other member countries' designated operators. While 

this arrangement provides for global delivery of the mail, it is currently 

compromising the U.S.'s ability to fully monitor international shipments coming 

252 USPS-PSI-00047829 (App. 0122) (Ms. Martin wrote in an email: "We have no idea when CBP is 

going to be ready or willing to expand beyond LA and JFK. Today is just working with the plants to 

'inake sure they understand what they need to do to be ready to go by June 30."). 

z,;a Martin Interview (Oct. 24, 2017); DeMoss Interview (Oct. 25, 2017); Conti Interview (Oct. 26, 

2017); Hayward Interview (Oct. 31, 2017); Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017); Rigel Interview (Nov. 2, 

2017). 

254 Subcommittee staff visit to LAX ISC (Aug. 22, 2017). 255 Martin Interview (Oct. 24, 2017); Garza Interview (Nov. 1, 2017). 

66 
175 

into the country through the Postal Service. This is due, in part, to the lack of an 

international requirement for all countries to provide AED for packages. While 

many of the U.S.'s largest trading partners have the ability to collect and provide 

AED on packages, the majority of packages have no AED associated with them. 

Other countries assert they do not have the capability to provide AED on packages, 

either at all or in certain rural areas. 

The majority of proposals the UPU considered requiring countries to collect 

and share AED were designed to address aviation security following a thwarted 

terrorist attack in 2010. More recently, AED has taken on a new importance as 

part of the effort to interdict shipments of synthetic opioids. While CBP, the agency 

primarily responsible for protecting our borders, asserts that AED is of the utmost 

importance in locating and interdicting these illicit drugs, the State Department 

maintains there is a lack of worldwide consensus on this issue. 256 

Currently, there is no international requirement to provide AED, but the 

UPU has made some strides over the past decade since the United States first 

introduced the idea of exchanging AED for packages in 2008. Starting January 1, 

2018, all packages must display a barcode, regardless of whether AED is loaded 

onto the barcode. The original expectation was for AED to be loaded on the barcode 

by 2020. However, the requirement that data be loaded onto the barcode by 2020 

has been delayed, as countries are requesting studies on the impact the 

requirement would have on designated operators and mail delivery. According to 

Joseph Murphy, the State Department representative to the UPU, a country can 

currently require AED from another member country if that country has the ability 

to provide AED. For example, the United States could require countries like China, 

which provides AED on around 50 percent of packages already,257 to provide AED 

on all packages. 

In the interim, the Postal Service recently started pursuing bilateral and 

multilateral agreements with foreign posts that would require the transmission of 

AED for certain postal products. 

This section explains the complicated structure of the UPU through the 

entity's decade-long consideration of requiring AED on international packages. 

This section also includes a discussion of an attempt by the European Union to 

protect its own national security by requiring AED on all packages. Finally, the 

section highlights the hands-off approach taken by the United States at the UPU 

with regard to AED. 

256 Interview with Joseph Murphy, U.S. Department of State, Chief, International Postal Affairs 

(Nov. 9, 2017) (hereinafter Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 257 App. 0256. (Stating China provides AED on 48.4 percent of packages and Hong Kong on 0.7 

percent of packages); see also CBP-PSI-000506 (App. 0225) (stating as of March 2017,53 percent of 

products from China had AED). 

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176 

A. The Complicated Structure of the UPU Creates Confusion 

Regarding Priorities and Responsibilities 

Headquartered in Bern, Switzerland, the UPU is an international 

organization established in 1874 comprised of 192 participating members, including 

the United States.258 As a condition of membership in the UPU, all members agree 

to accept and deliver packages from all other designated operators. According to 

the UPU, this "helps to ensure a truly universal network of up-to-date products and 

serviccs."259 While the Postal Service is the designated operator for the United 

States, the State Department represents the interests of the United States before 

the UPU, as provided in the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006.260 

The UPU is divided into four bodies: (1) the Congress; (2) the Council of 

Administration; (3) the Postal Operations Council ("POC"); and (4) the Internal 

Bureau. The POC is the "technical and operational mind of the UPU and consists of 

40 member countries, elected during Congress."2G1 The POC is tasked with "helping 

Posts modernize and upgrade their postal products and services."262 It is also 

responsible for making "recommendations to member countries on standards for 

technological, operational or other processes ... where uniform practices are 

necessary."263 Given these responsibilities, the POC has, and continues, to play a 

major role in globalizing the use of AED. 

The POC is comprised of 40 member countries, including the United States, 

Great Britain, China, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan.ZG-1 There is a robust 

and complex structure within the POC to divide and consider the issues under its 

jurisdiction. The United States currently serves, with India, as the Co-Chair of 

Committee 1 on Supply Chain Integration. 265 The POC also writes the Acts of the 

258 The UPU, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.intien/the-upulthe-upu.html. 

259 Jd. 

200 Postal Accountability & Enhancement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 407, 39 U.S.C. § 407 

(2016). 

261 About Postal Operations Council, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/enltheupu/postal-operations~council/about-poc.html. 

262 [d. 

2G3 Id . 

. 

264 See Postal Operations Council member countries, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, 

http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/postal-operations-councillmember-countries.html (detailing a full list 

of countries that are part of the POC). 265 Under Committee 1 there are a number of other Committees and Groups, including: (1) 

Standards Board; (2) Operations and Accounting Review Group: (3) Customs Group; (4) UPU-WCO 

Contact Committee; (5) Transport Group; (6) UPU-IATA Contact Committee; (7) Postal Security 

Group; (8) UPU~ICAO Contact Committee. This list does not include ad hoc subcommittees created 

for certain issues. See Postal Operations Council key documents, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, 

http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/postal-operations-council/key-documents.html. 

68 
177 

Union, "which are tho rules of the road for international mail exchango."266 Each of 

the committees, subcommittees, and working groups meet at various times 

throughout tho year. These meetings are opportunities for member countries to 

travel to Bern and voice concerns or support for UPU proposals regarding 

international mail. With regard to AED, however, these meetings have resulted in 

considerable discussion, but only incremental progress. 

B. For a Decade, the UPU has Struggled to Require Member 

Countries to Collect and Share AED for International Mail 

The consideration of AED at the UPU has been a protracted process. Many 

member countries resist adopting requirements related to exchanging AED for 

international mail. There are several reasons for this resistance including a lack of 

infrastructural capability for some developing countries to collect AED. Indeed, at 

the May 25 Hearing, Mr. Gregory Thome of the State Department testified: 

The technical ability to exchange [AED] does not, however, translate 

directly into the ability to collect and enter it. Many post offices in 

rural areas of the developing world do not have Internet connectivity 

or even reliable sources of electricity, which makes collection and 

transmission of data for postal items extremely difficult. Even in 

developed countries, some postal services have been slow to invest in 

the needed infrastructure for item-level electronic data exchange- and 

few, if any, countries now have the ability to provide it for 100 percent 

of their mail requiring customs declarations.267 

While advancements were made at the UPU over the last decade, there is still no 

global requirement to provide AED on international mail packages. As Mr. Thome 

explained: 

Regulations approved by the [UPU] last February will allow members 

to impose requirements for· [AED] on items containing goods, provided 

they take into account whether the requirements they are imposing 

can be met by those to whom they apply. The thinking behind the 

regulation was that demanding something that is impossible as a 

condition for delivering another's country's mail is the same as 

2" Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat fllicit Drugs 

Before the S. Perm. S!Lbcomm. on Investigations, !15th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Gregory D. Thome, 

Director, Office of Specialized and Technical Agencies, Bureau of International Organization Mfairs, 

Department of State). 

:t67 Id. 

69 
178 

refusing to receive it at all. Such requirements would undermine the 

reciprocity that is at the heart of the UPU.26B 

The Postal Service and CBP have struggled to adapt to the current 

international package environment, but the international community has only 

started to understand the utility of using AED to stop shipments of illicit drugs. 

C. The 2008 UPU Congress Considered the First-Ever Proposal 

Regarding the Use of AED Offered by the United States 

The UPU's consideration of AED first began at the 2008 UPU Congress when 

the United States offered a resolution to expand the use of AED. 269 The proposal 

focused on "enhanc[ing) the efficiency and speed of customs clearance" to allow posts 

to compete with the express consignment operators.270 Specifically, the resolution 

required three things: 

(1) [D]evelop and maintain standards for UPU-Customs [AED] 

messaging, through the Standards Board, in cooperation with the 

World Customs Organization; 

(2) [P]romote, in cooperation with the World Customs Organization, 

the use of [AED] transmission among postal administrations and 

from postal administrations to local customs authorities for the 

clearance of postal items; and 

(3) [D]raw up a plan with deadlines for the implementation of 

transmission of [AED] customs messages on postal items in a 

phased-in manner, starting with required transmissions by 

developed countries by a date or dates to be determined after 

appropriate study.zn 

According to Joseph Murphy,272 the resolution was referred to a working 

group where it was amended and then adopted by consensus.273 The adopted 

268Jd. 

2G9 See PSI-UPU-01-00003-4 (App. 0350-0351). The UPU Congress meets every four years in a 

designated host country. The other UPU bodies meet more frequently, usually at the "GPU 

headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. 

270 !d. 

271 App. 0351. 

272 Mr. Murphy's title is currently Chief, International Postal Policy and Executive Director, 

Advisory Committee on International Postal and Delivery Services at the Department of State. 27' Email from Patricia X. Mc:-lerney (Dec. 01, 2017) (clarifying Mr. Murphy's testimony during his 

Subcommittee Interview on Nov. 9, 2017). During his interview, Mr. Murphy inaccurately reported 

the resolution was defeated because other countries viewed the measure as something the United 

States was trying to push on the rest of the world. Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

70 
179 

version of the resolution removed all references to any deadline for providing AED 

as follows: 

(3) [D]raw up a plan involving the relevant POC groups and in 

consultation with the UPU-WCO Contact Committee with 

Eleaaliaes for the implementation of transmission of [AED] customs 

messages on postal items in a phased-in manner, sta1·tiag with 

1·equired transmissioas by ElevelopeEI eouatries by a date or dates to 

be determined after appropriate study. including identifying 

products, types of mail impacted, customer and operator 

capabilities. operational impacts, and performance measures.27•l 

While the AED measure contained no planned date for implementation, 

subsequent events that occurred before the next Congress in 2012 would 

highlight the value of AED. 

D. AED was used to Thwart an AI Qaeda Attempt to Ship Explosives 

in UPS and FedEx Packages 

In October 2010, foreign officials interdicted two packages containing 

explosives packed into printer toner cartridges.275 The explosives were rigged with 

a remote cell phone trigger and shipped via two express consignment operators, 

UPS and FedEx2 7G Intelligence from Saudi Arabia helped locate the two packages 

through the use of AED in the form of tracking numbers. 277 The tracking 

information indicated the packages were sent from Yemen and bound for delivery in 

the United States.278 The express carriers were able to track the packages and 

locate one at East Midlands Airport in the United Kingdom and the other in Dubai 

after traveling on two Qatar Airways passenger jets.279 AI Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) ultimately claimed responsibility for the thwarted attack. 280 In 

its statement, AQAP claimed they "intend[ed] to spread the idea to our mujahedeen 

brothers in the world and enlarge the circle of its application to include civilian 

aircraft in the West as well as cargo aircraft." 2Sl 

274 App. 0461. 

no CDP-2017-00015--00941 (App. 0326). 276 Yemen pa.rcel bomb "was 17 minutes from exploding," BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2017), 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe·l1692942. 

277 Jd. 

278Jd. 

279Jd. 

zso CNN Wire Staff, Yemen-based al Qaeda group claims responsib,:/ity for parcel bomb plot, CNN 

(Nov. 6, 20 10), http://edition.cnn.com/20 1 O/WORLD/meast/11/05/yemcn.security.concern/?hpt=T2. 

2Rl Id. 

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180 

The international mail community took notice. Mr. Murphy explained, 

"everything changed in 2010 with the printer cartridge bombs in courier shipments, 

because people realized that mail had the same vulnerabilities."282 As a result, a 

great deal of international mail delivery shut down for four months after the 

thwarted attack. 28:l 

The United States began to work with European allies to develop a strategy 

for the UPU to adopt the use of AED.2B4 The goal was to include an article in the 

2012 UPU convention document for the UPU Congress scheduled to meet in Doha, 

Qatar.285 The focus of the proposed article would be the use of AED for security 

purposes, similar to how it was used to locate the explosives in the two express 

carrier packages. This marked a shift from past AED considerations, which 

primarily focused on clearing packages through the customs process.2BB Twenty of 

the twenty-seven European Union countries in the UPU proposed language that 

"would add text to state that the security strategy should include complying with 

the legal requirements for providing electronic advance data in accordance with 

UPU technical messaging standards."287 To reduce the burden on some members, 

the proposal would rely on "a phased-in approach and the use of pilots to ease the 

transition to providing advance data."28B 

Ultimately, the 2012 Doha Congress adopted the following language as 

Article 9 of its Convention document: 

Article 9 

Postal security 

1. Member countries and their designated operators shall observe 

the security requirements defined in the UPU security standards and 

shall adopt and implement a proactive security strategy at all levels of 

postal operations to maintain and enhance the confidence of the 

general public in the postal services, in the interests of all officials 

involved. This strategy shall, in particular, include the principle of 

complying with requirements for providing electronic advance data on 

postal items identified in implementing provisions (including the type 

282 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

28JJd. 

284Jd. 

Z85Jd. 

286 See CDP-20017-00015-01114 (App. 0349) ("Resolution C 56, adopted by the 2008 UPU Congress, 

called for intensified efforts in providing advance electronic information on international postal 

packages for customs purposes."). 

287 CDP-2017-00015-01413 (App. 0348) (The 20 countries included: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungry, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Ll.Lxernburg, 

Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain.). 

"' Id. 

72 
181 

of, and criteria for, postal items) adopted by the Council of 

Administration and Postal Operations Council, in accordance with 

UPU technical messaging standards. The strategy shall also include 

the exchange of information on maintaining the safe and secure 

transport and transit of mails between member countries and their 

designated operators. 

2. Any security measures applied in the international postal 

transport chain must be commensurate with the risks or threats that 

they seek to address, and must be implemented without hampering 

worldwide mail flows or trade by taking into consideration the 

specificities of the mail network. Security measures that have a 

potential global impact on postal operations must be implemented in 

an internationally coordinated and balanced manner, with the 

involvement of the relevant stakeholders. 289 

Mr. Murphy explained that the Article 9.2language was directed at the United 

States, given its higher risk as an international terrorism target.290 Therefore, 

since the United States was considered to be susceptible to higher risk, it was 

expected to do more. 

As mandated by Article 9, the POC began working on adopting the security 

standards for AED, which resulted in the "Roadmap for Implementing the UPU 

Electronic Data Global Postal Model ("Roadmap")."291 Mr. Murphy explained that 

the United States as the Co-Chair (with India) of POC Committee 1 on Supply 

Chain Integration, took an active l'Dle in ensuring the Roadmap was an operational 

document.292 As such, the Roadmap "provides an overview of the proposed way 

forward for UPU designated operators, the International Bureau, and other 

relevant stakeholders involved with postal supply chain security to meet emerging 

requirements in the postal sector for the provision of electronic advance data."293 

Further, the Roadmap intended to "clarify the roles, goals, and time lines that the 

UPU will be pursuing over the next several ycars."294 

The Roadmap focused on the "capture, exchange, and use of electronic-item 

content" for eight data elements "sent by the origin Post, through the destination 

289 Decisions of the 2012 Doha Congress, Universal Postal Union 122 (final texts of the Acts signed at 

Doha and of the Decisions other than those amending the Acts), 

http://www.jcampbell.com/UPU/Acts_2012/CPU_2012_0_CongressActs_20130517_Published.pdf. 

290 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

291 CDP-2017-00015-00939 (App. 0324). 

202 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 29:J CDP-2017-00015-00941 (App. 0326). 

294Jd. 

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182 

Post, to the destination authorities for every relevant itom."295 These eight data 

elements include: 

(1) Sender's name 

(2) Sender's address 

(3) Addressee's name 

(4) Addressee's address 

(5) Detailed content description 

(6) Gross weight 

(7) Number of packages (one by default) 

(8) Item ID29G 

Many of these data elements were already required on customs declaration 

forms CN22 and CN23,297 which some posts were already exchanging electronically 

through "item level exchanges of attributes" or "ITMATT."298 Overall, the Roadmap 

was a stop forward in advancing the uso of AED for security purposes, but it was 

not absolute. As Mr. Murphy explained, the Roadmap only requires countries to 

provide AED to the extent of their capability to provide it.299 Despite its limitations, 

the Roadmap gives the United States the immediate ability to require AED from 

additional countries who have the capability to share it. 

The Roadmap focuses on aviation security, as opposed to the interdiction of 

contraband such as illegal drugs. It specifically states, "items that contain 

prohibited substances like drugs are not targeted by [AED]."300 Mr. Murphy 

downplayed this statement and explained, "nothing is targeted by [AED], it's just 

data. The targeting is done by the recipients of the data."30t He also noted that the 

United States is the only country whose designated operator has a law enforcement 

component, the Postal Inspection Service, which informs the United States' view 

that data can be used to target illicit drugs and other prohibited items. 302 

'"' CDP-2017-00015-00942 (App. 0327). 

296Jd. 

297 Forms CN22 and CN23 are customs declaration forms required to be affixed to all international 

packages under the Acts of the UPU. The form requires the sender to provide the following fields of 

information: sender name and address; recipient name and address; a detailed description of the 

contents; quantity; wejght; value; tariff; and country of origin. See Universal Postal Union, WCO~ 

UPU Postal Customs Guide (June 2014), 

https://www.icao.int/1vleetings/AirCargoDevelopmentForum~Togo/DocumentsfWCOUPU_Fosta!CustomsGuide-June2014.pdf. 

298[d. 

299 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

3oo CDP-2017-00015·00942 (App. 0327). 

301 Murphy Interview (:-lov. 9, 2017). 

302Jd. 

74 
183 

E. To Protect its own National Security, the European Union 

Attempted to Require AED for all Packages by May 1, 2016 

As the UPU wrestled with how to implement AED requirements, the 

European Union passed a law in direct response to the 2010 printer cartridges 

incident to protect its security.303 In October 2013, the EU adopted the Uniform 

Customs Code ("UCC") which required AED on all packages entering the EU by 

May 2016.3°4 As reported: "One of the major items [of the UCC] covered the quality 

and availability of [AED] for goods entering the EU customs territory, including 

postal flows to the EU transported under the UPU Acts.".305 Under the UCC, AED 

was required before the parcel was assigned to a bag for transport.306 "The source 

for the data to be used would be the UPU CN 23."307 The UCC would take effect on 

May 1, 2016, but would be a "phased-in implementation" starting with EMS and 

parcels, and "other postal products would be implemented at a later stage."308 

Several countries raised concerns about the UCC requirement as a whole, but 

they primarily expressed concerns over meeting the May 1, 2016 implementation 

date, since they likely could not meet the deadline. For example, when the 

European Union representative presented on the UCC at the Council of 

Administration, "an intense debate of the issues" followed.309 The delegate from 

France expressed strong views on the European Union's requirements and instead 

argued for "the need to take coordinated action in Berne" as well as "the need to 

adopt a global standard."3lO France also made clear "the EU was not alone in 

wanting to implement such requirements- other countries were preparing similar 

legislation."311 Mr. Murphy confirmed this was a reference to the United States and 

potentially Australia.312 

Other countries followed France in protest of the law and raised a number of 

specific issues with the UCC. Japan, for example, "expressed its strong concerns, 

particularly regarding the following two factors: the implementation date set by the 

EU and privacy and data protection when using CN 23 data for security 

purposes."313 Greece, Great Britain, and Germany expressed similar concerns.314 

China "was also concerned about the confidentiality of data in the context of the 

:Jo3 CDP-2017-00015-00659-663 (App. 0313-0317). 

:304 Commission Regulation 952/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 269) I. 

3os CDP-2017-00015-00659 (App. 0313). 

:m6 Id. 

:Jo7 CDP-2017-00015-00660 (App. 0314). 

308Jd. 

309 CDP-2017-00015-00661 (App. 0315). 

CHO CDP-2017-00015-00662 (App. 0316). 

iH1JJ. 

312 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

3t3 CDP-2017-00015-00662 (App. 0316). 

3t1 CDP-2017-00015-00663 (App. 0317). 

75 
184 

transfer of data to third countries."3l5 India and South Korea "also expressed a 

variety of concerns, similar to those that had already been voiced, particularly in 

terms of implementation deadlines, privacy concerns and the permanence of the 

exemption for letter post items."316 India further asserted "the data required could 

not be captured at all post offices in a large country, and that advance data was not 

particularly effective as a security measure; physical inspection was the only sure 

way to keep the mail safe."3I7 

The United States decided, however, to publicly take a hands-off approach.3I8 

In response to the specific concerns raised above, "the United States stressed the 

UPU's commitment to the development of the exchange of electronic data and was 

of the opinion that its provision enhanced security of the mail stream and air 

car!l'o."319 After the meeting, Mr. Murphy wrote: 

Over-all we are, of course, supportive of what the EU is trying to do 

but its timetable is, in fact, unrealistic and its approach a bit highhanded. The reaction in [Committee 1] to the EC presenter is a 

function of these factors, and I judged that there was little benefit in 

trying to deflect the well-earned ire of the Indian and other delegations 

or in associating the U.S. with the EU's ham-handed approach at that 

juncture, particularly given that we had laid out our overarching 

position in [Committee 1]'s Customs Group. 

I should add that, in addition to reiterating our view of EU data 

privacy concerns ... the very brief U.S. [Committee 1] intervention on 

this issue also took exception to India's assertion that [AED] offered no 

security benefits and re-iterated the importance to posts, especially in 

the context of e-commerce, of moving forward. 320 

Mr. Murphy continued that he planned to convey to the group that "although 

[AED] implementation by posts cannot be rushed and haphazard, too slow an 

i.mplementation could impede the continued expansion in use of the mail for 

international e-commerce shipments."3ZI Further, Mr. Murphy made clear that "[i]f 

a postal item contains an item requiring a customs form, there should be [AED] for 

it."322 He also planned to assuage any privacy concerns by highlighting "that no 

more data is being provided through [AED] than is already provided on the 

315Jd. 

316Jd. 

317 Jd. 

318 :vlurphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

'" CDP-2017-00015-00663 (App. 0317). 

320 CDP-2017-00015-00696 (App. 0354). 

s21 CDP-2017-00015-01114 (App. 0341). 

322 CDP-2017-00015-01115 (App. 0312). 

76 
185 

[handwritten] customs declaration."323 By providing the data, posts are 

"accelerating the submission to customs authorities in the receiving country of data 

provided by customers for that express purpose."324 

The European Union felt the backlash for the legislation from a number of 

UPU members. For example, following a briefing by the European Union on the 

new requirements Mr. Murphy noted there was a "palpable sense of hostility in the 

room toward the EU rep, not least from France but also from India and Japan, 

which both pretty much said they won't comply."325 Japan continued to raise 

privacy concerns after the European Union presentation and wrote Mr. Murphy to 

thank him "for supporting [Japan]'s concern on [AED] privacy."32H In response, Mr. 

Murphy sent his talking points to the UPU representative from Japan regarding 

these issues and explained "although [AED] implementation by posts cannot be 

rushed and haphazard, too slow an implementation could impede the continued 

expansion in use of the mail for international e-commcrce shipments."327 With 

regard to any privacy concerns, Mr. Murphy explained: 

[W]hile it must be acknowledged that packaging data electronically 

does heighten privacy concerns by making data more accessible, it is 

worth highlighting the memorandum's observation that no more data 

is being provided through [AED] than is already pmvided on the 

customs declaration. 

In this sense, posts are not so much exchanging personal data through 

[AED] as they arc accelerating the submission to customs authorities 

in the receiving country of data provided by customers for that express 

purpose-"28 

F. The UPU's Senior Leadership Lobbied its Members Against the 

European Union's UCC Implementation Date for Providing AED 

As concerns about the UCC mounted, the UPU took action and formally 

requested that the European Union extend the implementation date of the law and 

its requirements. On December 11, 2014, Pascal Clivaz, the Deputy Director 

General of the UPU, wrote to Pierre Moscovici, the European Union Commissioner 

of Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs "to communicate [the 

UPU] members' concerns about the implementation of the Union Customs Code, 

323Jd. 

"" Id. '" CDP-2017-00015-01174 (App. O:J45). 326 CDP-2017-00015-01113 (App. 0340). 

327 CDP-2017-00015-01114 (App, 0341). 

328 CDP-2017-00015-01115 (App. 0342). 

77 
186 

and tho adoption of 1 May 2016 as the implementation date for non-EU countries to 

provide pre-advice of postal traffic in advance of import into the EU for risk 

assessment purposes."329 Deputy Director General Clivaz continued: 

Briefly, many UPU members arc concerned that tho deadline of 1 May 

2016 does not allow enough time for tho consultations needed in order 

for a globally acceptable consensus model to evolve. It is also felt that 

this deadline does not allow enough time for all stakeholders to put the 

necessary technical and regulatory infrastructures in place.330 

He also pointed out that the UPU, under Article 9, was tasked with 

"developing the relevant security requirements and implementing provisions on 

advance electronic information [AED] for postal items."33l Given the UPU concerns, 

Deputy Director General Clivaz requested the European Union "take full account of 

tho comments and concerns of UPU member countries" and suggested that 

"extending the deadline for consultations ... would allow further discussions and 

enable solutions to be reached that suit the needs of, and arc able to be 

implemented by all parties."332 

In its continued attempt to convince the European Union to postpone the 

UCC implementation date, UPU senior leadership lobbied its members. On 

December 15, 2014, Deputy Director Clivaz wrote to all UPU members reminding 

them the Postal Operations Council was working to enact requirements for advance 

electronic information for postal items.333 However, "the 1 May 2016 deadline for 

the provision of such information in the European Union approaches rapidly."334 He 

made clear the "deadline will have an effect on mail exchange with Europe for all 

other UPU member designated operators."335 According to the Deputy Director, "It 

is imperative that a single global solution be developed for advance electronic 

information for customs and for security purposcs."33G The Deputy Director urged 

members to take action by contacting the European Commission and expressing 

this view. 337 

'" CDP-2017-00015-00679 (App. 0318). 

330Jd. 

"" Id. ''' CDP-2017-00015-00680 (App. 0313). 

"" CDP-2017-00015-00658 (App. 0312). 

:134 Jd. 

C!:35Jd. 

3 " Id. 3:37Jd. 

78 
187 

G. The European Union Postponed the Start Date of the UCC to 

2020 

Ultimately, the European Union postponed the start date for mandatory use 

of AED on postal packages. At a presentation during a UPU Standing Group 

Meeting in February 2017, the European Commission reported the new target date 

was 2020, which aligned with the UPU roadmap.3:l8 Providing AED would no longer 

be mandatory, but instead would start on a voluntary basis. Further, there would 

be a grace period for implementation of mandatory compliance until 2023, with no 

penalties before that date. 

Ms. Cheri DeMoss of the Postal Service represented the United States at the 

February 2017 UPU meeting. Ms. DeMoss felt the European Union's legislation 

was needed to speed the process of other countries preparing to provide AED. She 

believed the delay of the UCC and lack of penalties until2023 would extend the 

time other countries would take to develop the capacity to comply and 

simultaneously "delay implementation of [AED] from posts." 339 

H. The 2016 UPU Congress in Istanbul Initiated a Proposal for AED 

through the Integrated Product Plan 

While tho Roadmap from the 2012 Congress in Doha focused on the 

operational side of providing AED for international mail, the 2016 Congress in 

Istanbul worked to develop a business-centric strategy to modernize international 

mail called the Integrated Product Plan ("IPP"). While the IPP was not focused on 

AED, it had certain implications for the exchange of AED between posts. For 

purposes of AED, the IPP is broken into two steps. The first step requires all 

designated operators "to apply S10 barcodes to small packets" by January 1, 

2018.340 Designated operators would ultimately use the barcode to track the 

package. No information, however, is initially required to be loaded on to the 

barcode. The IPP explains that "by proposing the obligatory application of S10 

barcodes on small packets containing goods in 2018 already, we are acting 

pragmatically by driving behaviour so that we are aligned in advance ofthe 2020 

supply chain requirements."341 By 2020, the IPP expected- but did not require - all 

posts would be able to load AED onto the barcode, which is Step 2. 

While Step 1 requiring barcodes was implemented at the beginning of 2018, 

the goal of implementing Step 2 by 2020 is no longer considered possible. In his 

338 CDP-2017-00015-01078 (App. 0293) (U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, 2017 UPU Standing Group Meetings 

Report, Postal Operations Council (Feb. 20, 2017)). 

339 DeMoss Interview (Oct. 25, 2017); See also U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, 2017 UPU Standing Group 

Meetings Report, Postal Operations Council (Feb. 20, 2017). 

"'" CDP-2017-00015-00214 (App. 0302). 

'"!d. 

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188 

interview with the Subcommittee, Mr. Murphy explained such a delay was likely, 

given that the implementation date of 2020 now "seems ambitious." Instead, there 

is discussion of adding several steps before requiring that data to be loaded onto the 

barcode.342 

I. Countries Again Argued Against Any UPU Requirements to 

Provide AED; the United States Distanced Itself from the 

Proposal 

Some UPU countries responded strongly to the IPP. In an ad hoc group of 

Committee 3, a number of countries pushed back. For example, India requested "a 

thorough, comprehensive impact study should be carried out, including all the UPU 

member countries before implementing Step 1."343 India also asserted that 

"applying barcodes on small packages should not be made mandatory."344 Several 

othe1· countries, including Botswana, Japan, South Korea, and China, raised the 

issue that no impact study was conducted prior to implementation_315 

The international view of the value of AED, however, has clearly changed. 

Not all countries responded negatively to the IPP and some even took a proactive 

and positive stance. Australia asserted "step 1 is a good first step," noting posts 

"must address our customers' needs."34G Denmark requested that the IPP "move 

swiftly forward."347 

Once again, the United States took a decidedly understated public role in the 

advancement of the IPP. A memo described the State Department's position with 

regard to the IPP: 

The US is strongly supportive of the IPP, although it has concerns with 

the pace of its implementation (which may not successfully meet the 

electronic customs manifesting deadlines set by the European 

commission). However, US concerns on the 'need for speed: must also 

be weighed against the greatest 'need for adoption' of the IPP plan. 

Many countries have already expressed their concerns with the IPP, 

and more aggressive timelines might scare away those countries 

currently supporting this IPP concept. 

Consequently, the US is taking a 'supportive' role in this matter and 

letting the POC Physical Services Co-Chairs (UK and Canada) take 

312 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

'" CDP-2017-00015-00218 (App. 0306). 

344Jd. 

345Jd. 

34GJd. 

347 CDP-2017-00015-00219 (App. 0307). 

80 
189 

the lead in the campaign to have this IPP adopted. While the US sees 

several areas that need fine-tuning, to avoid creating doubts on the 

IPP package, US will only make minimal suggestions for change - in 

cases there were clear drafting errors. Once the IPP is adopted, the 

US can then turn to achieving better versions of the definitions at the 

mini-Congress in 2018.348 

J. Multiple AED Proposals at the UPU Led to Confusion Regarding 

Member Countries Requirements and Efforts have "Slowed 

Down to a Crawl" 

As the UPU closes in on almost a decade of considering AED, there appear to 

be several proposals regarding AED, but none that require all Posts to exchange 

AED. While Mr. Murphy explained that the Roadmap and IPP are designed to 

operate concm·rently,349 neither proposal has resulted in the global exchange of 

AED by designated operators. In fact, there appears to be confusion as to which 

document governs and what is required. On September 2, 2016, Peter Chandler, 

the Manager of UPU Relations at the Postal Service, was asked in an email "is 

there a specific proposal on advance electronic customs data for the [20 16] UPU 

Congress?"350 He explained: 

There is no single proposal that directly says ... by some date you shall 

be providing electronic customs information on your items .... The 

February 2016 POC adopted a Road Map to advance work on electronic 

advanced data for security purposes [AED] but it never overtly said it 

was mandatory for everyone also. I've also noted a couple of recent 

country proposals to Congress that touch upon customs [AED]. 

There was supposed to be a progress report to Congress on the road 

map for [AED]-however, things have slowed down to crawl on this at 

the International Bureau after a change in management of this 

program.:3i'il 

Mr. Murphy stated that this email addressed the fact that there were no proposals 

regarding AED at the 2016 Istanbul Congress, since the Roadmap was in response 

to the addition of Article 9 at the 2012 Doha Congress.352 However, it seems clear 

from the above exchange that UPU members do not consider the sharing of AED 

mandatory. Notably, as indicated above, a change in UPU personnel has resulted 

in efforts surrounding AED at the UPU to slow dramatically. 

'"'8 CDP-2017-00015-00401 (App. 0311) (emphasis in original). 

349 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

JOo CDP-2017-00015-00341-342 (App.0309-0310). 

351 ld. 

352 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

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190 

K. The UPU Takes Notice of Posts being used to Ship Illicit Drugs 

While the international community initially focused on AED for security 

purposes and expediting customs, the conversation has since shifted to targeting 

illicit drugs. On February 23, 2017, the POC Postal Security Group met in Bern, 

Switzerland to discuss the issue of using posts to ship illicit drugs. During that 

meeting, the use of posts to ship synthetic opioids was discussed: 

The [Postal Security Group] Secretariat provided information that was 

presented to the Council of Europe on the rise of the Dark web and 

cryptomarkets, and the use of covert internet means which enables 

illicit drug producers to directly market to users. This business model 

shift has resulted in an increased volume of illegal drugs in the letter 

mail rather than parcels, which c1·eates additional challenges for posts. 

In addition, new highly potent forms of synthetic opioids and other 

toxic chemicals are being transported in the post. These chemicals are 

deadly in minute quantities, and pose a risk to postal employees. It is 

imperative for posts to be prepared to appropriately respond to 

inadvertent exposure to toxic chemicals to protect employees and the 

postal supply chain. 353 

While CBP has asserted that it relies heavily on AED to target packages 

containing illicit drugs, the State Department maintains there is a lack of 

worldwide consensus on this assertion. The State Department has internally 

questioned whether AED is helpful in targeting packages containing illicit drugs. A 

February 1, 2017 internal State Department memoranda to Deputy Assistant 

Secretary (DAS) Nerissa Cook questioned the impact AED would have on targeting 

packages containing illicit drugs. In explaining the IPP, the memorandum stated: 

One component of this modernization is expanding the collection and 

transmission of [AED] for individual mail items-a topic of high 

interest on the Hill, ostensibly because of the presumed 

contribution [AED] would make to preventing synthetic opioids 

from arriving in the United States through the international 

mail. Because of its clear benefits for aviation security, customs 

operations and expeditious handling, accelerating the use of [AED] is 

one of our highest priorities at the UPU this Congress cycle. (We will 

also soon initiate interagency consultations on ways to accelerate 

[AED] exchange through bilateral engagement. )3M 

35:l CDP-2017-00015-01073 (App. 0335). 354 CDP-2017-00015-00811 (App. 0321) (emphasis added). 

82 
191 

The State Department's skepticism with regard to the utility of AED continued to 

increase. A May 9, 2017 memorandum again updating Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Nerissa Cook on the implementation of AED in the IPP noted: 

This topic is of high interest on the Hill, ostensibly because of the 

presumed contribution [AED] would make to preventing synthetic 

opioids from arriving in the United States through the international 

maiL Despite its uncertain benefits for this purpose, accelerating 

the exchange of [AED] is one of our highest priorities at the UPU this 

Congress cycle because of its clear benefits for aviation security, IPR 

enforcement and expeditious mail handling. 355 

Mr. Murphy explained he drafted these updates on behalf of his supervisor, 

Mr. Gregory Thome. When questioned whether he believed AED aided CBP in 

targeting packages, he explained there was a perception in the global postal 

community that the benefits of AED for targeting packages were uncertain.35G He 

continued "from a policy standpoint, it does not matter why we want it, we just 

want it."357 Mr. Murphy took the position that foreign posts need to exchange AED 

for purposes of modernization858 

VII. EXPRESS CARRIERS USE ADVANCED ELECTRONIC DATA TO 

LOCATE PACKAGES TARGETED BY CBP 

Unlike the Postal Service, Express Consignment Operators (ECOs) are 

mandated under the Trade Act of 2002 to collect AED on all packages and provide 

that information to CBP. The ECOs examined by the Subcommittee were DHL, 

FedEx, and UPS. While those three ECOs maintain they present all packages 

targeted by CBP for inspection, the volume handled by ECOs is much less than that 

delivered by the Postal Service. Further, ECOs are able to control a package from 

the time it is accepted to delivery. This is unlike the Postal Service, which has no 

control of international packages at their point of origin and is obligated under the 

UPU treaty to accept and deliver packages it receives from foreign posts. A number 

of items, however, a1·e prohibited from being shipped under the UPU treaty, 

including "narcotics and psychotropic substances ... or other illicit drugs which are 

prohibited in the country of destination." 359 

355 CDP-2017-00015-00821 (App. 0359) (emphasis added). 

356 Murphy Interview (Nov. 9, 2017). 

357 ld. 

:158Jd, 

:

159 Universal Posta] Union, Universal Postal Convention, Article 18, "Items not admitted. 

Prohibitions," 

83 
192 

Drug traffickers also use ECOs to ship illicit opioids. According to an August 

2017 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 30 percent (92,878 

items out of 308,360) of CBP's seizures of all inbound international shipments from 

2012-2016 came from ECOs.3Go Of the total seizures (both Postal Service and 

ECOs), 4 7 percent (or 144,117 items) were illegal or inadmissible drugs while the 

rePl aining seizures were merchandise. 361 

For example, earlier this year, CBP seized 83 DHL shipments containing 36 

pounds of fentanyl at Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport. A CBP 

press release reported that the shipments were from China and "were addressed to 

individuals in multiple locations throughout seventeen U.S. states and Canada."3G2 

The shippers attempted to disguise the contents by mislabeling packages with 

descriptions of "silicone resin, hardware nuts, snap hooks, plastic sheet sample, and 

nano hydrophobic coatings."3G:l 

This section explains how Congress mandated ECOs to collect AED on all 

international packages entering the United States following the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001. In response, the ECOs developed proprietary systems to 

transmit AED. This has resulted in ECOs identifying and presenting almost all of 

the packages targeted and requested by CBP for inspection. 

A. Congress Mandated Express Consignment Operators to Provide 

CBP with AED on all Packages 

Congress passed the Trade Act of 2002 following the terrorist attacks against 

the United States on September 11, 2001. The Trade Act required ECOs to collect 

certain information for all international packages.3G4 However, as discussed below, 

Congress did not mandate the collection of AED on Postal Service packages. 

http://www.upu.int/uploads/tx sbdownloader/universalPostalConventionArticle18ltemsNotAdmitted 

ProhibitionsEn.pdf. 

" 0 U.S. Gov'T Accoc:-~TAiliLITY OFF., GA0-17-606, INTERNATIONAL MAn. SEcURITY: CosTs AND 

BENEFITS OF USING ELECTRONIC DATA TO SCREEN MAIL NEED TO DE ASSESSED 8 (2017), 

https://www .gao.gov/ assets/690/686 377. pdf. 361 Id . 

.162 Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Cincinnati CBP Seizes 290 Pounds of 

Designer Drugs (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local~media·release/cincinnati·cbp· 

seizes·290·pounds·designer-drugs. 

363/d. 

36< 19 U.S. C. § 2071 (note), Mandatory Advanced Electronic Information for Cargo and Other 

Improved Customs Reporting Procedures (2016). 

84 
193 

1. The Trade Act Required ECOs to Collect AED to Provide to 

CBP 

Trade Act regulations state that the ECOs must provide CBP with AED on 

all incoming foreign shipments prior to arriving in the United States at a 

designated port of entry.3G5 The data elements ECOs must provide electronically to 

CBP include: 

Country of origin for the merchandise 

Shipper name, address and country 

Ultimate consignee name and address 

Specific description of the merchandise 

Quantity 

Shipping Weight 

• Value.3GG 

Regulations explain "CBP must receive the required cargo information no 

later than 4 hours prior [to] the arrival of the [package] in the United States.":l67 

ECOs that fail to provide the required AED are subject to civil penalties "in a 

monetary amount up to the value of the cargo, or the actual cost of the 

transportation, whichever is greater."368 Each year the ECOs pay penalties to CBP 

for failing to provide AED as reflected in the chart below. In contrast, the Postal 

Service is not required to pay penalties for failing to provide AED on any of its 

international packages. 

In addition to penalties, the Trade Act imposed certain costs on the ECOs 

regarding CBP's inspection of their packages. Specifically, Trade Act regulations 

require each ECO to "provide, without cost to the Government, adequate office 

space, equipment, furnishings, supplies and security as per CBP's specifications."370 

This is in addition to the requirement that ECOs pay CBP a fee of one dollar for 

each international package valued at $2,500 or less shipped through the EC0.371 

'"' 19 C.F.R. § 128.21 (2017). 

366Jd. 

367 19 C.F.R. § 122.48a (201 7). 3" 19 lJ.S.C. § 2071 (note), Mandatory Advanced Electronic Information for Cargo and Other 

Improved Customs Reporting Procedures (2016). 

:JG9 These figures represent aggregated information for the three ECOs reviewed by the 

Subcommittee. 

no ! 9 C.F.R § 128.21 (2017). 

371 19 C.F.R § 24.23(b)(1)(i) (2017). 

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194 

This fee is related to processing the package by CBP and clearing it through U.S. 

customs .. 372 That fee results in significant amounts paid to CBP each yea1· by the 

ECOs: 

ECOs have the option of passing the one-dollar-per-package-fee and the CBPassociated costs on to consumers by building tho fees into the shipping costs. 374 In 

contrast, the Postal Service does not pay CBP one-dollar-per-package to process 

international packages sent through its network. 

It is important to note that the package volume carried by the ECOs is 

significantly less than the Postal Service's volume. However, ECOs also 

experienced growth over the past five years. 

B. Congress Delegated the Decision to Require Postal Service to 

ProvideAED 

While the Trade Act of 2002 statutorily mandated that the ECOs provide 

CBP AED on packages in their networks, Congress did not impose the same 

requirements on the Postal Service. In fact, Congress left the decision up to the 

Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 

the Postmaster Gonera[.37G Specifically, the Trade Act states: 

372Jd. 

With respect to the requirements imposed on the carriers, the 

Secretary, in consultation with the Postmaster General, shall 

3n These figures represent aggregated information for the three ECOs reviewed by the 

Subcommittee. 

374 For example, UPS explained it includes the one~dollar~per·package fee and other costs in the 

amount it charges customers to ship a package through its network. Briefing with UPS (l\.1ay 5, 

2017). 

375 These figures represent aggregated information for the three ECOs reviewed by the 

Subcommittee. 

" 76 19 U.S.C. § 2071 (note), Mandatory Advanced Electronic Information for Cargo and Other 

Improved Customs Reporting Procedures (2016). 

86 
195 

determine whether it is appropriate to impose the same or similar 

requirements on shipments by the United States Postal Service. If the 

Secretary determines that such requirements are appropriate, then 

they shall be set forth in regulations. 377 

To date, the requirement to provide AED has not been imposed on the Postal 

Service because no decision has been made by the Secretaries or Postmaster 

GeneraL 

C. ECOs use AED to Track Packages Throughout Their Networks 

Pursuant to Trade Act requirements, ECOs provide AED to CBP on all 

packages delivered to the United States. Each ECO has extensive practices and 

procedures for accepting delivery of a package.378 

1. ECOs Control Packages from Drop-Off to Delivery 

From the time a package is dropped off by the customer until it is delivered to 

the final address, it is controlled and tracked by an ECO. DHL noted that packages 

are booked by a DHL customer service employee through proprietary systems while 

"Pick Up includes ... picking up and accepting the shipments from the Customer."379 

FedEx policy includes the following: 

FedEx's responsibility for a package begins when an employee accepts 

it. All packages must be prepared and packed by the customer for safe 

transportation with ordinary care in handling. Customers may use 

packaging supplied by FedEx Express, or they may use their own 

packaging if it meets standards set by FedEx Express. 

FedEx reserves the right to refuse to do business with parties 

suspected of using FedEx services for illegal or unethical purposes. All 

FedEx employees are required to report senders they suspect of 

abusive, illegal, or unethical activities to Customer Service or the 

Operations Manager at their location. The Operations Manager must 

inform Security, Legal, and Marketing groups in the affected region. 380 

FedEx also retains the ability to open any package being shipped through its 

network. FedEx policies indicate "all items offered or accepted for shipment are 

subject to inspection. If a complete description of the contents of any international 

'" Id . . J78Jd. 

''' DHL_pSI00000075·78 (App. 0360·0362). 

38o FDXPSI0000187 (App. 0455). 

87 
196 

shipment is not available, FedEx has the option of opening and inspecting the 

shipment to verify the description of its contents."3BJ 

In his testimony before the Subcommittee at the May 25 hearing, Norm 

Schenk, UPS Vice President of Global Customs Policy and Public Affairs explained 

UPS "picked up [packages] from foreign customers bound for the U.S."382 He also 

testified, "We even require [AED] through subcontractors in countries where we 

work, if we do not have a physical presence there, as a high-risk package can be 

sent from anywhere at any time.''383 

D. ECOs Require Customers to Provide Information Mandated by 

the Trade Act 

The three ECOs examined by the Subcommittee require customers to provide 

certain information in order to ship a package through their networks. The 

information requested aligns with the fields of information required under Trade 

Act regulations.3B4 

1. DHL 

DHL policy requires shippers to include certain information in the form of an 

Air Waybill during the processing of any shipment.385 DHL international shipping 

requirements include providing the following fields of information: 

Address (including city name) 

Country (where pickup will be made) 

Company name (if not residential) 

Location/Specific floor/ room number 

Contact name 

Phone number 

Ready time 

381 FDXPSI0000086 (App. 0456). 

382 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Oversight of U.S. Strategy to Combat illicit Drugs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, !15th Con g. (201 7) (testimony of Norman Schenk, Vice President of 

Global Customs Policy and Public Mfairs, United Parcel Service). 

""!d. 

"" 19 C.F.R. § 128.21 (2017). 

385 DHL_pS!_00000076 (App. 0360). An Air Waybill is the customer's receipt for their shipment that 

ensures delivery. The Air Waybill information is provided by the customer and "details the basic 

information about [the] shipment, including where it's being sent from and to, the weight, 0 a brief 

description of the goods, ... where [the] shipment is going, what service (is] required, and how [the 

customer] intends to pay." The Air Waybill also includes "the terms and conditions upon which 

[DHL] will provide service." DHL, Shipping Documentation, DHL (Jan. 10, 2018), 

https://dhlguide.co.uklgoing~global/customs/carrier~documentation/. 

88 
197 

Close time (if morning pickup request for break time hours) 

Special instructions (supplies/packing material) 

Payment method 

Account number 

Destination 

Special Handling Requests 

Product 

Paperwork confirmation 

Weight (if known) 

Dimensions (if known) 

Total number of pieces38G 

2. FedEx 

FedEx policy states that it "requires every package to be properly identified, 

marked and labeled to ensure a smooth customs clearance and on-time delivery, as 

well as reduced missorts and lost revenue."387 FedEx gathers certain information 

and "[e]ach package must display the following unique identification and labels that 

allow FedEx Express to handle it with the greatest possible efficiency,"3BB in part: 

The sender's name and complete address 

The recipient's name and complete, deliverable address on all pieces 

A completed international air waybill 

Where available, an air waybill peel-off tracking number label (placed 

on the commercial invoice) 

Backup tracking number 

Other appropriate service or handling labels such as Fragile, Actual & 

Dim, Perishable, Heavy, and Dangerous Goods:l89 

For international shipments, FedEx policy states "[d]ocumentation is 

required for every international shipment" and "[t]he International Waybill is 

required for all express shipments."390 The FedEx International Waybill is "a legal 

document for shipping, manifesting, customs clearance, tracking, and billing," and 

serves as "a contract between the sender and carrier to transport international 

cargo."391 Information collected on the International Air Waybill by FedEx includes: 

(1) description and quantity of the goods; (2) value of the shipment; (3) number of 

'" DHL_PSI_00000076 (App. 0360). 

387 FDXPSI0000146 (App. 0396). 

368 Id. 

389 Id. 

soo FDXPSI0000124 (App. 0394). 

:Jot Id. 

89 
198 

pieces (packages) in the shipment; ( 4) weight of the shipment; (5) type of mail 

service requested; and (6) type of payment (freight, duty, and taxes). 392 

FedEx policy states the VISA MANIFEST System exists to: (1) expedite the 

customs clearance process; (2) track international shipments; (3) invoice 

international shipments; (4) prevent overages and shortages; (5) support customer 

service/customer inquiries; (6) allow regulatory agencies to select and hold 

shipments for examination; (7) provide screens and reports that allow users to 

ensure an accurate manifest is provided for customs clearance; and (8) capture 

export proof of reporting for regulatory agencies.393 

On the day of the shipment, FedEx enters shipment information into an 

electronic record of shipment information called VISA MANIFEST System. In total, 

information for all international shipments on a VISA MANIFEST Report includes: 

Sender's account information 

Reference Information 

Origin 

Destination 

Recipient's account number, phone number, name, address, city, state, 

province, country, and postal code 

Broker's name, city, country, phone number, and postal code 

Service type 

Special handling codes (Hold at Location, Saturday Delivery, and 

Dangerous goods) 

Billing information 

Account number 

Country code 

Weight 

Manufacturing code 

Currency type 

Carriage value 

Customs value 

Exporter's license 

Description 

MPS (Multiple Piece Shipment) information394 

'" Id. at App. 0394-0395. 

"' FDXPSI0000312-313 (App. 0398-0399). 394 FedEx Ship Manager Server Transactions Guide, FcdEx Corporate Services, Inc. 2013-2014. 

Generating FedJI~x Shipping Forms and Reports, FedEx Express International Reports, International 

Visa Manifest Rcport-FedEx Express, 17.6.5. 

https ://www .fedex.com/us/developer/W ebHelp/fsms/140 1/d vg/DVGWcbHelp/index.htm#l_Introduction_to_FedEx_Ship_Manager_Server.htm. 

90 
199 

FedEx indicated that the VISA MANIFEST System is an electronic record of 

shipment information that begins the clearance process of an international 

shipment before it arrives at its destination. It also serves as a legal document that 

describes the cargo being transported, allowing "orib>in, transit, and destination 

locations to print a manifest."395 For further verification of accuracy, personnel at 

the origin, transit, and destination locations are responsible for changing the 

manifest as needed. This would occur, for example, when a flight is delayed, 

rerouted, or cancelled. 396 

3. UPS 

To ship a package with UPS, a customer is required to provide certain 

information submitted in the form of an International Air Waybill (IA WE), which 

serves as the "contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier."397 As Mr. 

Schenk of UPS testified at the May 25th hearing, UPS has "been using electronic 

data for years, even before it was required by the Trade Act of 2002, to provide CBP 

with item-level detail about every shipment entering the country." These data 

consist of seven data points: 

The sender's name and address 

The recipient's name and address 

The value of the contents 

A description of the contents and 

The piece count for the shipment:l98 

Mr. Schenk continued "this not only helps [UPS] reduce the potential for 

dangerous goods entering the United States through our system, but also aids in 

meeting manifesting and compliance requirements, ensuring payment of duties and 

fees and expediting clearance through customs."399 

UPS uses an electronic database called the UPS WorldShip System, which 

collects and enters data provided almost entirely by the customer.4DO In locations 

where customers submit shipments with hard copies of the shipment data, a UPS 

395 FDXPSI00003!2 (App. 0398). 

'" FDXPSI0000102 (App. 0393). 

:m App. 0404-0405; see also UPS Air Freight Terms and Conditions of Contract For UPS Air Freight 

Services in the United States, Canada, and International, Effective July 10, 2017, 3·4, 

https:l /www. ups.com/assets/resources/media/en~ US/ AirFreight~ Tand C. pdf. 

398 Stopping the Shipment of Synthetic Opioids: Ouersight of U.S. Strategy to Combat Illicit Drugs: 

Hearing Before the S. Permanent Su.bcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony on-lorman Schenk, Vice President of 

Global Customs Policy and Public Affairs, United Parcel Service). 

'" Id. 400 In locations where customers submit shipments with hard copies of the shipment data, a UPS 

employee would enter the data into the WorldShip System. PSI-lJPS-01-000002 (App. 00622). 

91 
200 

employee enters the data into the WorldShip System. The system requires the 

shipper to provide: 

A valid UPS account number 

Contents of the shipment 

Contact name and telephone number for the shipper 

A consignee contact name, telephone number, address, and zip/postal 

code 

Accurate dimensions and weight of the shipment4DI 

E. Automated Systems Assist ECOs in Tracking Packages 

Policies and procedures from each ECO described proprietary systems used to 

track packages throughout each carrier's network. 

1. DHL 

DHL policies state a number of requirements for international shipments 

throughout the DHL express global network, including validation of shipment 

information to ensure delivery through the DHL network.402 This includes 

r~Jviewing the data entered for each package for errors and ensuring any missing 

information is included403 DHL also reviews the description of goods to ensure that 

information is accurate.404 

When CBP or law enforcement seizes a shipment at a DHL facility, the DHL 

facility staff must take note of: (1) the Air Waybill number; (2) the agency taking 

possession of the shipment; (3) the name of the representative of the agency and; (4) 

the commodity contained within the shipment.405 The DHL facility manager is then 

required by policy to enter the seizure/intercept information into the appropriate 

DHL database. 406 

DHL has taken further steps to partner with DHS regarding the shipment of 

drugs through the DHL network. In January 2014, DHL entered into a 

Memorandum of Understanding with HSI and CBP regarding narcotics 

401 App. 0404-0405; UPS Air Freight Terms and Conditions of Contract For UPS Air Freight Services 

iiJ- the United States, Canada, and International, effective July 10, 2017, 3-4, 

https://www.ups.com/assets/resources/media/en_US/AirFreight_TandC.pdf. 

402 DHL_PSI_OOOOOOSO (App. 0363). 

"·' DHL_FSI_00000160 (App. 0379). 

1o1 DHL_PSI_00000160-165 (App. 0379-0384). 

'"' DHL_FSI_00000142 (App. 0377). 

406 I d. 

92 
201 

enforcement at DHL facilities in an effort to reduce drugs being smuggled into the 

country through the DHL network.'"' 

2. FedEx 

FedEx policy states the Global Enterprise Network for the Entry of Shipment 

Information at the Source ("GENESIS") is used to enter manifest data for all 

international shipments. Document images are also digitally stored in the 

GENESIS Global Document Archive for future use, and manifest information is 

uploaded to the VISA MANIFEST System where the manifest can be viewed, 

printed, or electronically sent to customs, the broker, within FedEx, or to other 

government agencies. 

FedEx policies also state that "[a]ll shipments offered to or accepted by FedEx 

are subject to inspection," and that "[c]orporate [s]ecurity may open and inspect any 

package (except diplomatic bags and military shipments) at any time for safety 

and/or security reasons."408 Further, "[o]perations management may open 

shipments in order to obtain a better address or description of the contents."409 

However, FedEx Security does not have consolidated tracking or logging of illegal 

items found in shipments.4l0 

Based on the originating location of the package, FedEx provided countryspecific procedures for accepting a package for delivery. For example, because India 

requires shippers to know their customers, FedEx created the "Unknown Shipper 

Authentication Program" for India.m FedEx policy states these procedures 

"capture the mandatory information of every walk in customer who books his 

shipments at the FedEx counters using cash."4J2 An unknown shipper is required to 

provide proof of identification, such as a passport or driving license. 413 

Further, FedEx employees are advised to look fo1· certain specific signs in 

identifying a suspicious package.414 Other countries where FedEx accepts packages 

for delivery also have specific policies and procedures, including China, Colombia, 

Dominican Republic, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. 4 l5 

407 DHL_PSI-00000094-101 (App. 0376). 

1oa FDXPSI0000170 (App. 0397). 

409Jd. 

uo Email from llrian Heberlig, counsel for FedEx, to the Subcommittee (Nov. 28, 2017). 4 11 FDXPSI0002510-2512 (App. 0451-454). 

mId. at App. 0453. 

413Jd. 

414Jd. 

415 Letter from Brian Heberlig & Jason Weinstein, counsel for FcdEx, to the Subcommittee (Sept. 29, 

2017). 

93 
202 

3. UPS 

UPS produced a number of policies and procedures regarding proprietary 

systems used to track packages using AED. UPS explained how it interacts with 

CBP at its facilities: "UPS express and hub facilities have sophisticated automation 

and scanning procedures, and routinely present packages to CBP, whose officers are 

stationed at these facilities."4lG 

Manuals for the UPS operating system ("OPSYS") international data system 

appear to allow an employee to run a number of queries and reports to track a 

package at any point during the delivery process." 7 The OPSYS system also allows 

UPS employees to access the data associated with a specific package and to locate a 

specific package by searching for the shipper's name. 418 

F. ECOs Do Not Share Information Related to Shippers of Illegal 

Items 

While the ECOs work to maintain the integrity of their networks, there is 

eurrently no coordinated effort to share information regarding shippers of illegal 

items among the ECOs or with CBP. 

1. DHL 

DHL reported that it does not accept packages from individuals or entities 

appearing on denied parties' lists, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury Office 

of Foreign Assets Control, but does not have a DHL-generated denied shipper list. 

Instead, "DHL relies on its robust communications from across the DHL global 

network to cancel problematic customer accounts."419 DHL explained this is the 

current course of action because it found "customers will continually change 

shipping names and other contact information making any DHL-generated list 

insufficient to be relied upon."420 

2. FedEx 

FedEx also provided a "list of parties from which FedEx refuses to accept 

packages, or from whom FedEx only accepts certain types of packages, because the 

party failed to comply with FedEx policies for shipping Dangerous Goods." 421 The 

nndated list consisted of 116 entries, including 100 domestic shippers and 16 

foreign shippers, with several located in China. Most of the listed entities have 

names indicative of a business, some of which are household names. The list 

contained no individuals, unless that person was associated with a business. From 

416 Letter from Laura Lane, President, CPS Global Affairs, to the Subcommittee (Nov. 21, 2017). 

"' PSI-UPS-01-000002 (App. 0389). 418 UPS Production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 21, 2017). 

94 
203 

a review of the businesses on the list by Subcommittee staff, none of them appeared 

related to openly selling illicit drugs. FedEx stated it does not share its list with 

other ECOs or CBP.422 

3. UPS 

UPS stated that it "regularly works to update its systems to ensure that it 

does not do business with customers who traffic in illegal merchandise. When UPS 

identifies such customers, it works to block that person from shipping through the 

UPS network." 423 UPS provided a list of individuals and entities from which it no 

longer accepts packages.424 However, UPS indicated it does not share its internal 

lists of these individuals with other ECOs. 425 

G. ECOs Provide Almost All Targeted Packages to CBP for 

Inspection 

According to statistics provided by CBP, as depicted below, the ECOs provide 

almost all of the packages targeted for inspection. 

419 Letter from Matt Miner, counsel for DHL, to the Subcommittee (Nov. 16, 2017). 

120 Id. 421 See also Letter from Brian Heberlig & Jason \',!einstein, counsel for FedEx, to the Subcommittee 

(Sept. 13, 2017). Dangerous Goods is the international equivalent of"Hazardous Materials," defined 

in 49 CFR 171.8 as "a substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined is 

capable of posting an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in 

commerce, and has designated as hazardous under section 5103 of Federal hazardous materials 

transportation law (49 U.S.C §5103)." These substances may be lawfully shipped by customers and 

transported by ECOs provided they are appropriately marked, labelled, packaged, and documented. 422 Email from Brian Heberlig, counsel for FedEx, to the Subcommittee (Nov. 13, 2017). 42' Letter from Laura Lane, President, UPS Global Mfairs, to the Subcommittee (Oct. 11, 2017). 

•24 UPS Production to the Subcommittee (Nov. 21, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

425 Letter from Laura Lane, President, UPS Global Mfairs, to the Subcommittee (Nov. 21, 2017). 426 CBP Production to the Subcommittee (Dec. 7, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

95 
204 

Both FedEx and UPS internally tracked the number of packages targeted by 

CBP and provided presentment rates, along with statistics regarding packages that 

were targeted, inspected, and seized by CBP. For 2012, FedEx's presentment rate 

was 98.9 percent:l27 From 2013 to the present, FedEx has presented more than 99 

percent of the packages CBP targeted for inspection.42B UPS also reported rates of 

providing targeted packages to CBP for inspection, which have improved over the 

past five years, as depicted below:429 

Year 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 13 

2016 13 

2017 4 

DHL reported it "neither keeps track nor maintains records sufficient to 

report the number of DHL packages: (1) identified or targeted by CBP for 

inspection; (2) interdicted by CBP; or (3) with a 'deny shipment' order placed by 

CBP."430 DHL did state it "has processes in place to X-ray and otherwise screen for 

potential threats."43l Later, DHL provided specific statistics on exams and 

detentions by CBP for years 2016 and 2017 and reported it had the ability to 

provide the same statistics for 2013-2015, but not prior to the release of this 

report."32 

427 FedEx Production to the Subcommittee (Sept. 6, 2017) (on file with the Subcommittee). 

'"' Id. m UPS Production to the Subcommittee (Dec. 4, 2017) (on flle with the Subcommittee). 

430 DHL was originally unable to provide statistics regarding the number of packages presented to 

CBP for inspection. Letter from Matt Miner. counsel for DHL, to the Subcommittee (Oct. 13, 2017). 

431 Id. 432 Email from Matt Miner, counsel for DHL, to the Subcommittee (January 23, 2018). 

96 
205 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

To: DAS Nerissa Cook 

From: Gregory D. Thome, IO/STA 

Date: May9,2017 

Subject: IO/STA- A Look Ahead for May to July 2017 

(U) IAEA: 

• 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE· PRODUCED TO PSI 
206 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE- PRODUCED TO PSI 
207 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

jlJ) UNESCO: 

• 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S, DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRODUCED TO PSI 
208 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE· PRODUCED TO PSI 
209 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE- PRODUCED TO PSI 
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NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

(U) UPU: Work is well underway within the UPU' s Postal Operations Council 

(POC) to implement Phase I of the Integrated Product Plan (IPP) to modernize 

international mail product offerings and to elaborate the requirements for Phase 2, 

which will be considered at an Extraordinary Congress in Addis Ababa in 

September 2018. TI1e lPP's goal is to better meet the needs of customers and 

supply chain partners, including customs authorities, as the composition of the 

mail stream continues its rapid shift from traditional items of correspondence to ecomrnerce goods. It has broad implications for mailers, and we are reaching out 

to stakeholders through our advisory committee and through industry associations 

to obtain private sector views. The most important initial aspect of the IPP is the 

Phase 1 division of Letter Post, which includes flats and small packets up to 2 

kilograms, into items containing documents and those containing goods. Another 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE· PRODUCED TO PSI 
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NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

component of the IPP involves placing standard bar codes onto items containing 

goods, which will facilitate the collection and transmission of Advance Electronic 

Infonnation (AEI) for individual mail items. This topic is of high interest on the 

Hill, ostensibly because of the presumed contribution AEI would make to 

preventing synthetic opioids from arriving in the United States through the 

international maiL Despite its uncertain benefits for this purpose, accelerating 

the exchange of AEI is one of our highest priorities at the UPU this Congress 

cycle because of its clear benefits for aviation security, IPR enforcement and 

expeditious mail handling. U.S. co-chairmanship of the POC Committee on 

Supply Chain Integration and chairmanship of that Committee's Standing Group 

on Security positions us well to advance this issue at the UPU. (Apart from our 

efforts at the UPU, we have also initiated interagency consultations on increasing 

AEI exchange through bilateral engagement) 

(U) In addition to the IPP and AEI, we are participating in processes that address 

important UPU institutional issues, including possible restructuring of the 

Organization's governing bodies, financing arrangements, implementation of an 

Istanbul Congress decision to establish a UPU-administered assistance program 

funded from a surcharge on some mail flows, and re-capitalization of the UPU's 

pension fund. (State Department Comptroller Flaggs chairs the pension fund task 

force.) 

(U) No formal meetings ofUPU bodies are scheduled this quarter but a cluster of 

standing group and task force meetings in Bern in June will maintain the 

momentum from the highly productive POC and Council of Administration 

meetings held in Bern March 27-April 7. 

(U) The USPS OIG issued its long-awaited report on Extraterritorial Offices of 

Exchange (ETOEs) on April6. The repori, issued as a white paper, did not make 

any recommendations but pointed to a number of concerns about the lack of 

transparency and oversight ofETOEs in the U.S. This report and Istanbul 

Congress decisions on ETOEs point to the need to review our ETOE policy, and 

we are initiating that process. 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE· PRODUCED TO PSI 
212 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

(U) ENVIRONMENT 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE- PRODUCED TO PSI 
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NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

May 3-5 3rd Meeting, CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation 

(Geneva) 

May 8-9 (TBC) IAEA Program and Budget Committee (Vienna) 

May 8-12 20Th Session of the CSTD (Geneva) 

May 8-17 WMO Financial Advisory and Executive 

Council (Geneva) 

May 15-19 Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and 

Law of the Sea (ICP-18) (New York) 

May 15-24 ITU Council (Geneva) 

May 22-26 UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 

(Vienna) 

May 22-24 13'h IRENA Cmmcil (Abu Dhabi) 

May 23-25 52nd of the GEF Council Meeting (Washington) 

May 25 4th Meeting of the High Level Panel on Water (HLPW) 

(Cancun) 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE- PRODUCED TO PSI 
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MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE PROPRIETARY, PRIVACY, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DATA 

May 31-June 1 

June 5-9 

June 5-9 

June 7-9 

June 7-16 

June 7-16 

June 12-16 

June 19-23 

July 10-21 

July 10-14 

July 11-14 

July 17-19 

July 18-21 

July 24-28 

IAEA Conference on Technical Cooperation (Vienna) 

IAEA Board of Governors (Vienna) 

UN Ocean Conference (New York) 

ITU-hosted AI for Good Global Summit (Geneva) 

IMO Maritime Safety Committee (London) 

UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

(Vienna) 

WSIS Forum (Geneva) 

4th and Final Meeting of the 2016/2017 UN Group of 

Govemment Experts (GGE) on cybersecurity (New York) 

BBNJ PrepCom 4 (New York) 

WIPO Program and Budget Committee (PBC) (Geneva) 

Montreal Protocol OEWG 39 (Bangkok) 

IMO Technical Cooperation Committee Meeting (London) 

CITES Animals and Plants Committees (Geneva) 

IMO Council Meeting (London) 

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE- PRODUCED TO PSI 
215 

NTEU 

The National Treasury Employees Union 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY M. REARDON 

NATIONAL PRESIDENT 

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION 

ON COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS 

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

JANUARY 25, 2018 

Chairman Portman, Ranking Member Carper, distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony. As President of the 

National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents 

over 25,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers, Agriculture Specialists and trade 

enforcement personnel stationed at 328 land, sea and air ports of entry (POE) across the United 

States (U.S.) and 16 Preclearance stations currently in Ireland, the Caribbean, Canada and United 

Arab Emirates airports. 

In addition to CBP's trade and travel security, processing and facilitation mission, CBP 

employees at the ports of entry are the second largest source of revenue collection for the U.S. 

government. In 2016, CBP processed more than $2.2 trillion in imports and collected more than 

$44 billion in duties, taxes, and other fees. On behalf ofNTEU CBP members, I want to thank 

you for this opportunity to address CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) staffing and other 

issues that affect CBP's interdiction of synthetic opioids at ports of entry. 

CBP and Synthetic Opioid Interdiction: 

CBP plays a major role in addressing the nation's opioid epidemic--a crisis that is getting 

worse, as the deadly chemical fentanyl is being manufactured in China and is either funneled 

through Mexico or sent by mail and express consignment operators directly to addresses in the 

U.S. Under the Trade Act of2002 as amended, Congress required all cargo, including express 

cargo, but not including inbound international mail, subject to requirements for electronic 

advance data (EAD). For cargo arriving by aircraft, express consignment operators are required 

to provide EAD to CBP prior to the scheduled arrival of express cargo in the U.S. Express 

consignment operators accept items for delivery to the U.S. at points of sale in foreign countries 

and maintain control of items until they are delivered to the addressees. 

Analysis of EAD is one of the tools that helps CBP identify threats in inbound 

international express cargo items and includes the sender's name and address, 
216 

rccipient's/consignee's name and address, contents' description, number of pieces, and total 

weight. Express consignment operators found in violation of these requirements are subject to a 

penalty. EAD requirements were to be implemented by CBP in three phases. 

Phase 1 required electronic manifests to CBP for international travel four hours prior to 

arrival and for Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, parts of Central and South America at "wheels 

up." However, every day these manifests are inaccurate with countless "overages." An overage 

is a shipment that is not included on the manifest. In other words, an overage is an UTImanifested, unknown shipment which is in violation of the law. A manifested shipment may 

have 1 or 500 overages, but the highest penalty for "overages" is $5,000 and these penalties are 

routinely mitigated to $50 for a first violation and $100 for subsequent violations. 

Phase 2 required express consignment operators to provide quality shipper/consignee 

data. These addresses should show that the packages are received from legitimate 

businesses/addresses and are delivered to legitimate businesses/addresses. If not, the express 

consignment operator is subject to a penalty. 

In 2007, CBP drafted the phase 3 implementation plan, but to date has not implemented 

it. Phase 3 would allow CBP Officers to impose a monetary penalty for incorrect manifest 

descriptions. Without implementation of Phase 3, CBP Officers cannot penalize carriers for 

bringing in items manifested as one thing that turn out to be another. Many of these shipments 

are not concealed well and are often simply mislabeled. For example, narcotic chemicals may be 

labeled "car parts" or "supplement powder", and CBP cannot impose a penalty for this type of 

mislabeling. 

GAO reports that express consignment operators say that "they arc able to individually 

scan each item upon arrival, providing an opportunity to identify and set aside express cargo 

targeted for CBP inspection based on EAD." (GA0-17-606, page 29) However, CBP Officers 

tell NTEU that this is not the case for "overages" that arrive unmanifested or for mislabeled 

packages. They tell me that too many people rely on electronic manifests to be accurate when 

they frequently are not. 

Also, according to GAO, "although CBP has been using EAD to target express cargo for 

inspection since approximately 2004, it has not evaluated whether this method results in benefits 

relative to other methods of choosing express cargo ... for inspection" (GA0-17-606, page 28.) 

For these reasons, NTEU recommends that Congress direct CBP to provide a report on an 

annual basis on the individuals and companies that violate the Trade Act to the Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The annual report would require 

the violator's name; the violation committed; the port of entry/location through which the items 

entered; an inventory of the items seized including description of the item and quantity; place of 

origination including address of the violator; the amount in penalties assessed by CBP for each 

violation by violator name and port of entry/location; the amount of penalties that CBP could 

have levied for each violation by violator name and port of entry/location and the rationale for 

negotiating down the penalty for each violation by violator name and port of entry/location. 
217 

Congress, by requiring CBP to report this useful information on violators and violator 

penalty assessments, would enhance CBP's interdiction of prohibited items from entering the 

U.S. through express consignment operators. 

CBP Staffing at Express Consignment Hubs: 

NTEU is also extremely concerned with the staffing at express consignment hubs. For 

example, at the Federal Express hub in Memphis there were a minimum of70 million 

international shipments over the past year. Y ct, there are less than 25 CBP Officers on duty each 

day screening these shipments--not per shift, but total. 

There are, on average, about 15 CBP Officers on the main overnight Federal Express 'sort' 

shift. Considering the volume there, NTEU members tell me that the port should require a 

minimum of 60 CBP Officers to increase the legitimate flow of freight and ensure successful 

interdiction of synthetic chemicals and other illegal cargo. NTEU does commend CBP Memphis 

for outfitting a new 2-person chemical team there with laser equipment that can detect dangerous 

synthetic drugs, thereby reducing the number of dangerous chemical shipments that the CBP 

Officers must handle. However, these dangerous chemicals arc still handled nightly by CBP 

Officers. 

The Cincinnati Hub is just as understaffed. There are approximately 17 CBP Officers 

covering two shifts. That is 9 to 11 Officers on the night shift responsible for screening 

approximately 46 million import shipments at the Cincinnati hub in fiscal year 2017. NTEU 

members tell me that CBP Officer staffing there should be doubled, and a request to that effect is 

awaiting action by CBP hcadqumiers. I have heard similar stories of CBP Officer staffing 

shortages at other hubs and at international mail centers. 

CBP Officer staffing shortages are not just confined to ports of entry with international mail 

centers or express consignment hubs. There is an existing vacancy rate of nearly 1,200 funded 

CBP Officers and, according to CBP's analytic workload staffing model, an additional 2,500 

CBP Officers and 731 Agriculture Specialists need to be funded and hired in order to meet 2018 

staffing needs. With the existing vacancy of 1,200 funded CBP Officers this adds up to a total 

CBP Officer staffing shortage of3,700 today. 

The economic cost of the CBP OFO staffing shortage is staggering. According to the Joint 

Economic Committee (JEC), every day 1.1 million people and $5.9 billion in goods legally enter 

and exit through the ports of entry. The volume of commerce crossing our borders has more than 

tripled in the past 25 years. Long wait times lead to delays and travel time tmcertainty, which 

can increase supply chain and transportation costs. According to the Department of Commerce, 

border delays result in losses to output, wages, jobs and tax revenue due to decreases in spending 

by companies, suppliers and consumers. JEC research finds border delays cost the U.S. 

economy between $90 million and $5.8 billion each year. 

But, even with additional CBP Officer staffing, without accurate EAD violation information 

and stricter penalty enforcement, interdiction efforts will continue to be hobbled. NTEU 

requests that Congress provide funding for more CBP OFO personnel, and require CBP to 
218 

annually report Trade Act EAD violators and violators' penalty assessments. 

Thank you for the opportunity to bring these issues before the Committee. 
219 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Joseph P. Murphy 

International Postal Policy Unit Chief 

U.S. Department of State 

From Chairman Rob Portman and Ranking Member Thomas R. Carper 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Question 1: 

Please provide information about any current or planned studies regarding the ability to collect 

and share electronic package data between postal operators of UPU members, as well as the 

utility of collecting and sharing such data. When will any such studies begin and end? 

Answer 1: 

The UPU International Bureau is analyzing the results of a survey on the state of 

members' preparedness to exchange advance electronic data. We anticipate that Postal 

Operations Council members will hear a presentation on results during their next meeting in midApril. 

In addition, to measure progress toward various UPU Business Plan and capacitybuilding project goals, the International Bureau constantly monitors designated postal operators' 

installation and use of systems to exchange advance electronic data. Periodic updates from the 

International Bureau provide the most comprehensive picture of designated postal operators' 

ability to collect and share advance electronic data. The established Business Plan and project 

implementation metrics will measure progress over the 2017-2021 period. We are not aware of 

any past or planned study of the utility of collecting or sharing advance electronic data. 

Question 2: 

How does the State Department plan to address data quality issues associated with advanced 

electronic data? 

Answer: 2 

The Department's focus has been on UPU activities aimed at building the capacity of the 

global postal network for the exchange of advance electronic data to enable postal operators to 

meet future requirements. If data quality issues arise after the implementation of such 

requirements, we would initially attempt to resolve them through bilateral consultations. 

Currently, most of the advance electronic data that the United States receives is provided 

pursuant to bilateral or other commercial agreements between USPS and foreign postal 

operators. As such, for questions about improving the quality of the data the United States 

receives, we refer you to the USPS. 
220 

Question 3: 

Please detail the steps the State Department has taken and plans to take to foster and leverage 

high-level partnerships with Chinese officials to combat the shipment of illicit opioids to the 

United States. 

Answer 3: 

The Department plans to build upon the successes of President Trump's November 2017 

meeting with President Xi in which the United States and China agreed to explore opportunities 

to deepen existing bilateral counternarcotics cooperation. Further engagement includes 

discussing the possibility of China broadening its domestic legislation to control fentanyl-related 

substances as a "class" (as opposed to individually), which would dramatically enhance law 

enforcement's power to curtail trade in these dangerous drugs. 

The Department will also continue cooperation through bilateral dialogues with China, 

such as the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation (JLG) and the 

U.S-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (LECD). Already, China has taken 

action to domestically control 143 substances since 2015, including carfentanil and four other 

key fentanyl analogues at the United States' request. 

As part of this bilateral cooperation, the Department is exploring opportunities to expand 

U.S.-China collaboration aimed at addressing the new drug trafficking paradigm of synthetic 

opioids being sold online and trafficked into the United States through international mail and 

express shipments. One early example of this collaboration is the participation of a Chinese 

official, along with a representative of the Universal Postal Union, in a side event that the United 

States sponsored on this topic on March 12 at the 61" Session of the UN Commission on 

Narcotic Drugs. 

The Department continues to support Mission China's priority to combat drug trafficking 

by funding the DOJ Resident Legal Advisor position at Embassy Beijing and by providing 

resources to DEA Beijing to travel in-country for consultations and to deliver training. 

2 
221 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Joseph P. Murphy 

International Postal Policy Unit Chief 

Bureau of International Organazations 

U.S. Department of State 

From Senator Heidi Heitkamp 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Question 1: 

The focus ofthis hearing was clearly on the opioid epidemic and how some of the current 

challenges with the international mail system contribute to the epidemic. But I wanted to ask one 

related question that is not about opioids: 

• Do the general problems with the international mail system -lack of cooperation, 

lack of consistent Advance Electronic Data- also occur when it comes to the 

shipping of counterfeit goods? Is that also a problem? 

Answer 1: 

Most international mail items containing goods currently lack advance electronic data, 

which means that this tool is not consistently available to assist U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection in its efforts to detect counterfeit goods. We would not, however, attribute this 

situation to a lack of cooperation, since we receive large amounts of data from countries that are 

able to provide it. The biggest problem is capacity, and efforts are currently underway to address 

the existing limitations ofthe system that are inhibiting data exchange, including the very limited 

ability of many foreign postal operators to collect and transmit electronic data for individual 

items. 

Question 2: 

One of the witness testimonies stated that there is no mandate for Ad vance Electronic Data 

(AED) in the international mail environment and that CBP is currently receiving less than 50 

percent of AED on shipments with goods. I also understand from the PSI report that CBP has yet 

to analyze the effectiveness of using AED to target and interdict drugs or other prohibited items: 

• Would an analysis of AED's effectiveness make a difference in terms of having 

concrete evidence that would persuade folks-including other members of the 

UPU-about why AED is valuable? 

Why has this not already been done? 

• Are there plans to do this in the future? 
222 

Answer: 2 

Until recently, discussions about advance electronic data at the Universal Postal Union 

have been predicated on its use as a tool for aviation security. Since the United States is now 

expanding the scope of the rationale for requiring this data to include law enforcement 

applications, an analysis of its utility for such purposes, in particular for the detection of items 

containing dangerous illicit goods such as synthetic opioids, could help us to make our case 

internationally. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection would be best able to explain the current status of 

analysis and whether there are plans for future studies. 

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223 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Mr. Robert Cintron 

Vice President, Network Operations 

U.S. Postal Service 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

From Chairman Rob Portman (R-OH) and Ranking Member Thomas R. Carper {D-DE) 

l. How many bilateral agreements does the United States Postal Service have in place with 

foreign posts that impose mutual data-sharing requirements? 

Response: 

The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) requires advance electronic data (AED) to accompany the mail 

streams for which rates are established under bilaterally negotiated arrangements with the 

Foreign Postal Operators (FPOs) of Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, and Korea. 

Additionally, 19 other FPOs are sending AED for some of their package volume. 

2. What percentage of the United States' inbound international package mail volume is 

represented by the countries that are party to those bilateral agreements? 

Response: 

Th-e response to this question contains information subject to Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) Exemption 3 coupled with 39 U.S. C.§ 410(c)(2) and FOIA Exemption 4) and is on file 

with the subcommittee. 

3. Please describe the ways the Postal Service is working with foreign postal operators to 

improve the quality of advanced electronic data it receives? 

Response: 

While FPOs are responsible for ensuring the quality of the data they provide, the USPS 

monitors inbound AED files and contacts FPOs if there are data quality issues, including 

invalid characters, non-English characters, extraneous punctuation marks, and duplicate 

records. 

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224 

4. It is unclear, based on the Subcommittee's findings, how much information private shippers 

share with each other, the Postal Service, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), on 

issues such as problem shippers and drug smuggling tactics, in order to better combat the 

kind of smuggling operations our investigation uncovered. One of the recommendations in 

the report called for the formation of an Information Sharing and Analysis Center between 

the Postal Service, express consignment operators, and CBP for the purpose of sharing 

information about best practices and the identities of known shippers of illegal items. Please 

describe the level of information sharing that currently occurs among the Postal Service, 

private shippers, and CBP and how a more formal process might be beneficial. 

Response: 

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) recently embedded full-time personnel at CBP's 

National Targeting Center (NTC). Being embedded at the NTC, as well as other intelligence 

sharing centers, allows the Inspection Service to share intelligence, coordinate cases, and 

conduct joint enforcement operations domestically and internationally. At the NTC, the Postal 

Inspection Service and private shippers currently work together alongside CBP to identify 

inbound suspect parcels as they are processed at the International Service Centers (ISCs). CBP 

and US PIS have direct access to information provided by private shippers to use in targeting and 

enforcement operations. Additionally, due to newly enhanced capabilities, CBP is now also able 

to provide USPIS information about suspect parcels that were already processed at the ISCs and 

are now in the domestic mail stream, further enhancing our joint investigative ability. 

5. The Postal Service's 2018 capital plan calls for commitments of$2.1 billion, to include 19.1 

percent ($400 million) on mail processing equipment and 28.6 percent ($600 million) on 

information technology. 

a. How much of these planned commitments will be used to improve the International 

Service Centers (ISCs), and are these planned amounts sufficient to fully automate 

the ISCs and handle the inbound volume of international mail? Please explain. 

Response: 

The Postal Service is currently deploying $44.3 million in new capital investments for 

additional package processing equipment to plants that support inbound international 

volumes from ISCs. This includes a High Throughput Package Sorter at our Queens 

Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC). By way of further information, because the 

ISC's are leased facilities on airport property that have limited footprints and space 

limitations for new automation equipment, we instead deploy that equipment at 

downstream facilities that support ISC mail processing operations. 

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225 

In addition, in that regard, capital investments totaling $51.7 million have been made 

over the past two years for the deployment of Small Package Sorting Systems to either 

ISCs or processing operations that support ISCs. All of these investments are in addition 

to our ongoing nationwide programs that provide enhancements to mail processing 

equipment. 

Further, the Postal Service is investing over $7 million in security enhancements and 

equipment to support the United States Postal Inspection Service and postal employees in 

their duties and in support of processing inbound operations at the ISCs. 

We believe that USPS' capital plan is sufficient for current volume levels. As volume 

continues to grow in the future, we will evaluate and adjust the capital commitments to 

meet the increased demand. 

Further response to this question contains information subject to FOIA Exemption 7(E) 

and is on file with the subcommittee. 

b. The 2018 capital plan also calls for another commitment of 28.6 percent ($600 

million) for facilities. Does the Postal Service plan to use any of that $600 million 

expenditure to make facility upgrades or changes to the ISCs? Please explain. 

Response: 

For fiscal year (FY) 2018, there are no major repair or alteration projects scheduled for 

any ofthe ISCs. Through February of2018, approximately $585,000 in capital has been 

spent on mail handling equipment and minor repairs within the ISCs. 

c. How can Congress assist the Postal Service in any of these efforts? 

Response: 

Congress can assist the Postal Service by enacting comprehensive postal reform 

legislation that provides financial stability and operational flexibility. This will permit 

the USPS to continue to make needed investments in international processing. 

6. What operational changes has the Postal Service implemented, or proposed, to accommodate 

the projected growth of e-commerce? How much ofthe Fiscal Year 2018 capital plan funds 

will be used to assist with implementing these efforts? 

Response: 

Over the past several years the Postal Service has invested in bundle and package handling 

equipment, scanning devices, systems, security, advanced analytics capabilities, upgraded 

product tracking, improved customer notification, and improved delivery options including 

Sunday delivery and parcel lockers. The combined effect of these investments has helped the 

3 
226 

Postal Service to handle a sustained growth in package volume (and has improved our ability 

to provide service more generally for all customers). In FY 2018, our capital plan anticipates 

investing over $190 million on new package handling equipment, software applications, 

scanning devices, tracking, and customer service applications that support our continued 

ability to provide high-quality service for all customers, including e-commerce customers. 

7. What plans or current efforts does the Postal Service have in place to ensure appropriate 

staffing levels to handle the growth of inbound international packages at the ISCs? How can 

Congress assist the Postal Service to ensure it is capable of maintaining an effective staffing 

level that will assist CBP with interdicting illicit packages? 

Response: 

Operational complement is managed to ensure staffing levels are in alignment with workload, 

including at the ISCs. Congress can assist the Postal Service by providing comprehensive postal 

reform legislation that provides financial stability and operational flexibility. 

8. Another of our report's recommendations was for the Postal Service and CBP to deploy 

sufficient personnel resources at each of the ISCs to handle the growing volume of 

international mail and corresponding increase in shipments of illicit drugs. Is the Postal 

Service currently sufficiently staffed to handle this increase? If not, please explain. 

Response: 

As noted above, we continually evaluate and adjust staffing levels to match volume fluctuations 

and changes. We believe USPS is currently sufficiently staffed for current volume levels. As 

volume changes in the future, we will evaluate and adjust the staffing needs to meet the demand 

as appropriate. 

4 
227 

From Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) 

USPS Accepting Packages with Incomplete Data 

I. Does the Postal Service reject all packages with incomplete or incorrect information? If not, 

why not? 

Response: 

USPS does not reject all packages based on incomplete or incorrect information, provided that 

the address information is complete and legible. CBP has the authority to direct USPS to return 

a package for insufficient customs declaration. If the address information is insufficient to 

enable delivery, USPS will return packages to the foreign post. 

2. What criteria does the Postal Service use to determine when to reject a package with 

incomplete shipping information? 

Response: 

As noted above, if the address information is insufficient to enable delivery, or if CBP instructs 

us to do so, USPS will return packages to the foreign post. 

Insider Threats 

I understand that the Postal Service Office oflnspector General (OIG), using data analytics and 

targeting, has dramatically increased arrests of postal employees alleged to be involved in 

trafficking fentanyl and other narcotics. According to the Postal Service OIG, the number of 

narcotics-related internal investigations has doubled from 92 in FY 2012 to 183 in FY 2017, and 

the number of narcotics-related arrests has more than tripled from 37 in FY 2012 to 115 in FY 

2017. 

3. Does the Postal Service or the Postal Inspection Service have any formal "insider threat" 

program to systematically target and identifY potential bad actors within the Postal Service 

who may be aiding and abetting drug traffickers? If not, does the Postal Service plan to 

implement such a program, and if so, what is the timcline on when we can expect such a 

program to be implemented? 

Response: 

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service's mission includes the investigation and apprehension of 

those who misuse the U.S. Mail to facilitate drug trafficking. The Postal Service Office of 

Inspector General has jurisdiction over matters related to employee misconduct, including U.S. 

Postal Service employees engaged in drug trafficking through the U.S. Mail. When a Postal 

Inspection Service investigation reveals employee misconduct or criminality, the Postal 

Inspection Service alerts the Postal Service OIG. If appropriate, the Postal Inspection Service 

and the Postal Service OIG jointly investigate the matter. 

5 
228 

From Senator Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) 

1. The focus of this hearing was clearly on the opioid epidemic and how some of the current 

challenges with the international mail system contribute to the epidemic. But I wanted to ask 

one related question that is not about opioids. 

• Do the general problems with the international mail system -lack of cooperation, 

lack of consistent Advanced Electronic Data- also occur when it comes to the 

shipping of counterfeit goods? Is that also a problem? 

Response: 

USPS currently has a good working relationship with CBP. CBP decides what 

contraband to target based on various techniques, including through its use of AED. 

USPS is working to provide every targeted item that CBP requests. 

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service partners with various federal and state law 

enforcement agencies, including CBP, to combat illegal items entering the U.S. Mail 

stream. When illegal items are identified and intercepted by either the Postal Service or 

our law enforcement partners, the Postal Inspection Service investigates the crime and 

presents its findings to federal or state prosecutors if appropriate. The Inspection Service 

and our partners utilize a broad array of investigative techniques in order to identify and 

intercept illegal items in the U.S. Mail which the Inspection Service considers to be law 

enforcement sensitive. To protect the integrity of the investigations, the Inspection 

Service would prefer not to disclose investigative techniques in an open record. The U.S. 

Postal Inspection Service would be happy to provide that information in a closed setting. 

2. One of the witness testimonies made a point about "the need to strategically invest in tools 

and people to combat this problem, since data is not enough." What is really being discussed 

is resources, and how essential they are for the success of any agency involved in combatting 

this problem. 

Would solving the Postal Service's larger financial issues help in terms of their 

capacity to focus on the opioid epidemic, and specifically, its growing shipment 

through the Postal Service? 

Response: 

Yes, it would. The Postal Service has made combatting opioids a top priority and we are 

currently doing everything within our power to assist in the national effort to combat the 

opioid epidemic. 

• How would fixing their broader financial situation make a difference? 

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229 

Response: 

Resolving the Postal Service's financial situation would provide financial stability, 

eliminate an ongoing distraction, improve our ability to perform our universal service 

obligations and enhance our ability to meet all of our duties and responsibilities, 

including our efforts to partner with law enforcement agencies like Customs and Border 

Protection to help ensure the security of the mail. 

7 
230 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Mr. Todd C. Owen 

Executive Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Field Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Question#: I 

Topic: Staffing Model 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The opioid epidemic that is gripping this country is being fueled by drugs that 

are produced outside the United States. CBP Officers are the last line of defense in 

stopping these illegal substances from entering the United States, but they are 

overworked and understaffed. CBP's own staffing model indicates that you need almost 

3,600 more officers. 

What is your plan to meet CBP's needs based on its own staffing model? 

Response: This response contains information deemed For Official Use Only and is on 

file with the subcommittee. 
231 

Question#: 2 

Topic: CBP Officers 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The Administration has called for hiring 10,000 new ICE agents and 5,000 

new Border Patrol agents, but has not proposed increasing the authorized number of CBP 

Officers. 

In your opinion, does it make sense to increase border security by hiring only ICE and 

Border Patrol agents, but not CBP Officers? 

Response: CBP remains focused on having the right mix of resources at and between our 

nation's POEs. As the CBP mission continues to evolve to meet the threat to the nation 

and facilitate legitimate trade and travel, we must continually assess personnel staffing 

requirement. CBP utilizes its Workload Staffing Model (WSM) to ensure CBPO staffing 

resources are aligned within the existing threat environments, while maximizing cost 

efficiencies. 

The President's Budget reflects the addition of 328 CBPO's for ports of entry. 
232 

Question#: 3 

Topic: Missing Detection 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: How much do you think that this understaffing is contributing to missing the 

detection of some drugs? 

Response: OFO maximizes enforcement with our available resources by employing a 

layered enforcement strategy at our ports of entry to include strategic and tactical 

intelligence along with advanced targeting. While staffing remains a critical component 

to intercepting illegal narcotics and dangerous goods, CBP remains committed to 

working with industry to incorporate emerging and existing technology into its operations 

to maximize interception capabilities and facilitate legitimate international trade. 

Question: Are there any estimates of the quantity of illicit narcotics that CBP is not 

catching, and if so, how are those estimates arrived at? 

Response: CBP does not have a method to estimate the quantity of illicit narcotics that 

are not intercepted at the border and at international mail facilities. Similarly, other 

federal, state and local law enforcement agencies can only report the quantities of 

narcotics that are interdicted. 
233 

Question#: 4 

Topic: Temporary Details 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: To make up for staffing shortfalls, CBP Officers on many occasions have been 

temporarily detailed to other ports to fill staffing needs. These temporary details are 

going to the ports of entry that see some of the highest numbers of drug seizures in the 

United States. I am concerned that we are compromising security and our ability to 

strategically stop drugs at these busiest ports of entry, not to mention compromising 

staffing levels at the ports that these officers are coming from. 

What effect are these details having on the security of the ports of entry that the officers 

are detailed from? 

Response: Beginning in 2015, CBP's Office of Field Operations initiated 90-day 

rotational temporary duty assignments, for a limited number of CBP officers depending 

on seasonal workload. The rotational officers are used for processing immigration cases 

and augmenting passenger processing, in an attempt to minimize the impacts on the 

facilitation oflegitimate trade and travel. CBP Officers will return to their home ports 

with exposure to a different environment, which will enhance their decision making skills 

and strengthen the enforcement posture at the home ports of entry. This temporary duty 

assignment also exposes CBP Officers to the diversity of CBP operations. 

In addition, CBP has determined that an influx of additional personnel from Field Offices 

across the country is required to meet mission requirements during FY 2018. One of 

those requirements is to assist with the increasing influx of Credible Fear (CF) claims in 

San Diego and Tucson. Increased CF numbers tremendously affect available resources 

and ultimately gives rise to detention issues that quickly exceed infrastructure capacity 

and result in potential humanitarian concerns. 

Without necessary staffing at San Diego Field Office and Tucson Field Office ports of 

entry, wait times will increase, service to the public and trade will be reduced, completion 

of required training may be hampered, and enforcement posture will be diminished. 

Question: What factors does CBP use to determine which ports have sufficient capacity 

from which to detail someone? 

Response: OFO selects large ports that have the highest "on board to authorized staffing" 

ratios. These ports generally experience the least disruption from detailing officers to 

locations with pronounced personnel shortages. 
234 

Question: Please provide a list of ports from which CBP Officers are being detailed, the 

number of CBP Officers being detailed from each port, and a list of the ports to which 

CBP Officers have been detailed and the number of officers that they received. 

Response: This response contains information deemed For Official Use Only and is on 

file with the subcommittee. 
235 

Question#: 5 

Topic: Mail Facilities Staffing 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The vast majority of drugs, especially opioids, come to the United States 

through our ports of entry including our mail facilities. Sadly, the Office of Field 

Operations has been grossly understaffed for years and, based on your own projections, 

our ports of entry are currently almost 3,600 officers short. 

How many CBP Officers does CBP employ at international mail and express carrier 

facilities across the United States? Please provide a breakdown of permanent staff and 

details at each facility. 

Response: This response contains information deemed For Official Use Only and is on 

file with the subcommittee. 

Question: At the Cincinnati express mail facility, for example, only 17 CBP Officers 

cover two shifts. These 17 officers alone are responsible for screening almost 46 million 

import shipments in one year. 

Based on CBP's staffing model, how many CBP Officers should ideally be stationed at 

each international USPS and express shipper mail facilities? 

Response: We are working to refine the analysis specific to the international mail 

facilities and express consignment locations in the Workload Staffing Model. Additional 

CBP Officers working at the international mail facility would likely result in an increase 

in interdictions for fentanyl, other opioids, and other enforcement actions. 

Question: Is CBP inspecting every suspicious package at the facility, or would CBP 

increase inspections for fentanyl if it had more CBP Officers and support personnel? 

Response: CBP is inspecting and/or screening all shipments that are determined to be of 

high risk when they are presented to CBP by the USPS. For those shipments with 

associated advance electronic data (AED), CBP places a hold on them in our Automated 

Targeting System (ATS) and the United States Postal Service (USPS) has the 

responsibility for locating and presenting the shipments to CBP. For shipments without 

AED, most are screened through x-ray systems and/or through the use of the narcotics 

detector canines. Additional assets in terms of both CBPOs and scanning technology 

would support increasing inspections for fentanyl and other opioids. 
236 

If CBP had more officers working at the international mail facilities, would likely lead to 

an increase in interdictions of fentanyl and other opioids. 
237 

--· Question#: 6 

Topic: Postal Service Holds 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURJTY (SENATE) 

Question: When the JFK pilot was first getting started, the Postal Service was only stopping 

about half of the packages CBP was requesting to be stopped for a variety of reasons. I 

understand that has improved. 

Of the packages that CBP is asking the Postal Service to hold for further inspection, what 

percentage is the Postal Service actually holding now? 

Response: LA- 67 percent from July 2017 to Jan 2018 

JFK 83 percent from Oct 2017 through Dec 2017 

Miami 47 percent from July 2017 to Jan 2018 

Question: What is the average hit rate on those packages - how many actually contain opioids? 

Response: LA- 17 percent hit rate and 12 opioid seizures based on advance data. 

JFK- 16 percent hit rate and 79 opioid seizures based on advance data. 

Miami- 4 percent hit rate and 0 opioid seizures based on advance data. Additionally, Miami has 

indicated they have made seizures ofN-Ethylpentylone, 3-Methoxy PCP, 5F-ADB and anabolic 

steroids as a result of advance data. 

While the hit rate is currently low, CBP is only using this data for narcotics targeting at this time. 

We are not using the data for other enforcement activities such as IPR. As CBP Officers 

continue to improve targeting effectiveness, CBP expects this rate to increase in the future. 
238 

Question#: 7 

Topic: Success Measurement 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: This committee held a hearing on this issue in May 2017, and I was troubled by some 

of the responses I received in follow up questions for the record. For example, I asked what are 

the goals of the pilot program and how does CBP measure success? CBP responded that the 

ultimate goals ofthe pilot are "to successfully receive AED from the USPS," and "incrementally 

increase the number of targeted shipments." 

Should the measure of success include interdicting more narcotics? 

Response: CBP began the pilot at JFK as an attempt to receive AED from the USPS for certain 

mail packages and CBP was successful in receiving some data elements. Once CBP and USPS 

were able to exchange AED and target for high risk shipments, the next phase was for CBP to 

place holds on those high-risk shipments. The measure of success utilized for that phase was the 

holds placed by CBP and how many were actually delivered to CBP by the USPS. 

Now that CBP and USPS can exchange data and USPS has refined their process for locating 

targeted high-risk shipments, the next phase is to incorporate additional measures of success and 

expanding to other locations. CBP is working with the USPS to certify the criteria for success 

for the pilot locations. An overarching measure of success for the pilot program continues to be 

"Increase in the interdiction of illicit goods due to AED." 

Question: How much fentanyl was interdicted at the JFK service center in the year before the 

pilot program was implemented, and how much has been interdicted in subsequent years? 

Response: 
239 

f\d\;~;\ Consignment 

Mail 233 44.61 

FYI7 Totals 437 587.94 

: < ~J Land border 41 195.40 

r·~~~~,~t Express 44 27.71 Consignment 

I c·•·\·'·········· Mail 224 50.12 

I FY18TD Totals 309 273.23 

Total Number of Incidents 862 

TOTA.L(Kg) 1;069.42 

Source: Borders/at 

Source Dates: I 0/1/2015- 1131/2018 

PPAE ERDS, OFO 1ACOPS, CCS-Fl'&F 
240 

Question#: 8 

Topic: Pilot Program Cost 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Please describe any cost-benefit analysis conducted by CBP to determine that the 

pilot program, and its potential expansion, is increasing interdiction enough to justify the costs. 

Response: GA0-17-606 included a recommendation to CBP to evaluate the relative costs and 

benefits of collecting electronic advance data for targeting mail for inspection in comparison to 

other methods. CBP is working to develop a response to this recommendation. 

Question: How much have CBP and the USPS spent implementing the pilot program? 

Response: CBP has spent an estimated $20,000 on travel/training for the CBP Officers on the 

use of A TS and on travel for the oversite of the international mail program. The Office of 

Information and Technology (OIT) within CBP developed the mechanism to accept the advance 

electronic data from USPS and transfer it into a viewable format in ATS. 

Question: How much fentanyl was interdicted at the JFK service center in the year before the 

pilot program was implemented, and how much has been interdicted in subsequent years? 

Response: 
241 

Que~tion: What is the timeline for expanding this pilot program and implementing it in all 

International Service Centers? 

Response: CBP has expanded the pilot to the five main international mail facilities where CBP 

operates. These are JFK, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and San Francisco. CBP and the USPS 

are still in discussion on expanding to the remaining four international mail facilities (i.e. 

Newark, Honolulu, San Juan and St. Thomas). Expansion would first be to Newark and 

Honolulu, followed by San Juan and St. Thomas. These latter facilities represent a small portion 

of the total volume of international mail. Newark and Honolulu should be operational by the end 

ofFY 2018. As a result of the damage to the facilities caused by the 2017 hurricanes, the 

timelines for expanding the pilot program to San Juan and St. Thomas are yet to be determined. 
242 

Question#: 9 

Topic: Other Tools 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

C• 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: More data is generally better than less, but data alone may not be sufficient. I 

understand that the Chinese have been very helpful in scheduling fentanyl and fentanyl analogs, 

making production and shipment more difficult. To get around Chinese restrictions, there is 

some concern that manufacturers are now trucking the fentanyl to Hong Kong and putting it in 

the mail in Hong Kong, where it gets aggregated with other shipments destined for the U.S. and 

the shipper and manufacturer information can get disguised more easily. 

What tools or information besides advanced electronic data would be helpful to better identify, 

target and interdict suspicious packages? 

Response: CBP recognizes the value of establishing and enhancing information sharing 

partnerships to combat opioids. Substantive, standardized and timely information sharing is 

critical in targeting and interdicting shipments as well as individuals who move drugs and illicit 

merchandise from the ports of entry to their destinations throughout the United States. In 

~orJunction with CBP's many other initiatives, advancements in cargo and conveyance screening 

technology provide CBP with a significant capacity to detect dangerous materials and other 

contraband and continue to be a cornerstone of CBP's multilayered security strategy. CBP 

continues to collaborate and strengthen ties with our partners from the U.S. Postal Inspection 

Service (US PIS) and private sector partners to identify and disrupt drug smuggling. This effort 

also encourages global partners to enhance regulations concerning the manufacturing of finished 

pharmaceutical products regarding fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. CBP will also 

collaborate with the USPS and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) to standardize certain 

technology, which will enhance targeting efforts and operations for UPU member countries and 

their postal operators. The U.S. Government will provide best practices and training to those 

who request it. 

Information sharing among the express consignment community, the Postal Service, and CBP 

occurs at both the national and local level through partnerships and engagement at CBP's 

National Targeting Center, and through local partnerships and collaboration within the 

International Mail Facilities and ports of entry. In April2017, two (2) US PIS staff were 

embedded into the National Targeting Center and in February 2018, an Investigator with US PIS 

was assigned to CBP's National Targeting Center with specific focus on the targeting of illicit 

narcotics entering the U.S. via the postal supply chain. Additionally, there are plans in place to 

assign two (2) US PIS analysts to CBP's National Targeting Center with similar focus. 
243 

CBP is engaged with industry partners to enhance private industry partnerships and information 

sharing initiatives to further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and interdiction 

capabilities to combat transnational threats and the entry of opioids and other illicit drugs into the 

United States. CBP is exploring technology that could be utilized in the U.S. express 

consignment and international mail facilities to detect chemicals such as synthetic opioids and 

other illicit chemicals and would be open to receiving any assistance in this effort. 
244 

Question#: 10 

Topic: Cooperation from USPS 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: In 2016, the Postal Service received 620 million total pieces of international mail. By 

comparison, FedEx handled about 215 million packages. Of that 620 million, the Postal Service 

handled 275 million international packages. 

How many packages is CBP receiving advanced electronic data on from the USPS? 

Response: Since CBP began receiving advance electronic data in 2015, we have received over 

389 million postal bills with advance data. It should be noted that in the first five months of 

FYI8, CBP received almost 99 million of the 389 million postal bills. 

Question: How many packages on average is CBP now flagging per day for USPS for further 

inspection? 

Response: CBP Officers placed 14,400 international mail shipments on hold during the period of 

January 6, 2018 through February 2, 2018. That equates to an average of 514 holds per day, 

based on a seven day work week. 

Question: If the Postal Service could effectively hold more packages, about how many do you 

think CBP would ideally be asking to hold on a daily basis based on available data? 

Response: CBP is focused on generating holds that are based on effective and proven targeting · 

techniques, and working with USPS to ensure that each of those holds are presented for the 

required inspection by CBP Officers. Rather than pinpointing a specific number of holds, it 

would be more helpful to continue examining the percentage of holds, based on AED, which are 

presented for inspection and subsequently result in an enforcement action. This information will 

be critical in refining CBP targeting related to opioids, illicit drugs (in general) and all manner of 

regulations enforced by CBP. 
245 

Question#: II 

Topic: 3D Screening Technology 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: I understand that CBP is in the process of procuring new 30 screening technology for 

use in some Postal Service international service centers. As I understand it, these screening 

machines will be able to use algorithms to effectively "read" imaging scans and detect anomalies 

that could be fentanyl. This sounds very promising. 

How much closer would this technology allow us to get to I 00% package screening? 

Response: Currently CBP uses x-ray technology at international mail and express facilities that 

requires officers to look at every image to determine if they can see some type of anomaly. This 

is a tedious and time consuming process. The new dual-energy computed tomography (CT) 

systems uses algorithms that measure both density and atomic number of the contents within a 

bag or package. 

Using this CT technology, algorithms can be developed to detect fentanyl and other dangerous 

narcotics. The CT system, with narcotic algorithms, will allow CBP to scan a greater number of 

packages for fentanyl and other illegal substances without impact to the facilitation process. 

The time required to scan I 00 percent of arriving packages would depend on the infrastructure of 

the facilities, total volume of packages arriving at each facility, and the manpower at each 

location. In order to be effective, these CT systems would need to be incorporated into the 

mail/express mail handling process. 

Question: What would it take from a financial and logistical perspective to reengineer the USPS 

international service centers so that every package is put on a conveyor belt and screened by 

these 3D scanners? 

Response: CBP would need to work with USPS to complete an operational assessment to 

determine the efficiency and effectiveness of placing every package at each USPS location on a 

conveyor belt. The assessment would need to include a site survey for the sites to identify 

infrastructure requirements, analysis of the volume for the locations to inform the scan speed 

requirements, and an assessment of manpower resources. From there, the cost, benefits, and 

logistical needs can be determined. 

Question: How many of these machines is CBP planning to buy in 2018? 

Response: During FY 2018, CBP plans to procure up to I 0 units for the purpose of assessing the 

baggage system's ability to localize opioids within baggage parcel. As part of this effort, CBP 
246 

will work with vendors to develop an algorithm for the system to detect chemical substances of 

CBP concern. 

Question: How long will it take to deploy these machines at all five international service 

centers? 

Response: Deployments take place approximately 12 months after the date of procurement. 
247 

Question#: 12 

Topic: Fines 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The Trade Act of2002 applied to private express shippers like FedEx and UPS. It 

required express shippers to provide advanced manifest information or face stiff fines. 

Does CBP issue fines for all un-manifested merchandise, even if it does not always collect the 

full amount? If not, why not and what criteria does CBP use to determine who gets fined? 

Response: The penalty statute for un-manifested merchandise is 19 USC 1584, which is not 

included in the Trade Act of2002. However, penalties under the Trade Act of2002 for failure to 

file a manifest are issued in all instances when a manifest is not transmitted to CBP prior to 

lading of merchandise at the foreign port. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1436, penalties are assessed 

against the arriving vessel, and air and rail carriers for failing to provide the required advance 

electronic cargo information to CBP. 

Question: From 2014 through 2016, CBP issued almost $27 million in fines for violations of 

arrival, reporting, entry and clearance requirements, but only collected just over $4 million. This 

amounts to a collection rate of only 15%. 

What factors are used to determine whether to accept an amount that is less than the maximum 

allowable fine? 

Response: Information provided in the violator's petition along with mitigating and aggravating 

factors are used to make the determination. 
248 

Question#: 13 

Topic: Repeat Offenders 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: From 2014 through 2016, CBP issued 5,006 penalties. 

How many of those penalties were assessed to a company or individual that had been previously 

assessed a fine at least once before? How many of those were negotiated down from the 

assessed amount? 

Response: Of the 5,006 violators, 3,201 violators had more than one penalty previously assessed 

against them for the violation. There were 3,201 penalties that were mitigated ("negotiated 

down") below the assessed amount. 

Question: Of those fines that were assessed to a company that had been previously assessed at 

least one fine, what was the total amount assessed and collected? 

Response: The total assessed amount was $16,810,031 and the total amount collected was 

$2,822,229. 
249 

Question#: 14 

Topic: Trade Act of 2002 Implementation 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Phase 3 of implementation of the Trade Act was supposed to include penalties for bad 

descriptions of package contents. After the May 2017 hearing, I asked if phase 3 had been fully 

implemented, and the response I received stated both that "The Trade Act of 2002 has been 

implemented," and also that, "DHS and the USPS remain in consultation regarding full 

implementation" of that particular section of the Trade Act. 

Has the Trade Act of 2002 been fully implemented? If not, what is left to implement, and what 

are the reasons for the delay? 

Response: The Trade Act of 2002 has been fully implemented. The Act includes a penalty 

provision for bad description of package contents for all modes of transportation. Section 

343(a)(3)(K) of the Trade Act of2002 also allows the Secretary ofDHS, in consultation with the 

Postmaster General, to determine whether it is appropriate to impose advance data requirement 

on shipments by the USPS through regulatory action. DHS and the USPS remain in consultation 

regarding this section of the Act and are jointly supportive of expanding AED requirements to a 

greater percentage of incoming mail packages. 
250 

Question#: 15 

Topic: Metrics 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: After the May 2017 hearing, I asked whether CBP had ways to measure success ofthe 

requirements of the Trade Act, and CBP responded that they did not. 

How does CBP or Congress know if all of these requirements are effective without any metrics? 

Response: The requirements of the Trade Act could be considered successful because CBP now 

receives shipment information earlier in the supply chain, which significantly improves its 

targeting, mitigation, and prevention efforts. 

In the ocean environment, cargo data must be submitted to CBP 24 hours prior to loading on a 

cargo ship destined to the United States. In the air environment, cargo data must be submitted to 

CBP at wheels up or four hours prior to arrival depending on the last point of departure. For 

cargo arriving via truck, the data must be transmitted one hour prior to arrival and cargo arriving 

via rail must be transmitted two hours in advance of arrival. 
251 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Mr. Todd C. Owen 

Executive Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Field Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

From Chairman Rob Portman and Ranking Member Thomas R. Carper 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Question#: 16 

Topic: Pilot Program Success 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced that the joint CBPUnited States Postal Service pilot program, using advanced electronic data to target 

suspicious inbound international packages, expanded to International Service Centers in 

Chicago, Illinois, and San Francisco, California. Have CBP and the Postal Service 

agreed on how each agency will determine the success of the pilot program at each of 

these locations? 

Response: CBP began the pilot in JFK as an attempt to receive AED from the USPS. 

The measure of success was that CBP was able to receive the data. Once CBP and USPS 

were able to exchange AED, the next phase was for CBP to place holds on high-risk 

shipments. The measure of success utilized for that phase was, of the holds placed by 

CBP, how many were delivered to CBP by the USPS. 

Now that CBP and USPS can exchange data and USPS has identified the process for 

locating targeted high-risk shipments, the next phase is to incorporate additional 

measures of success for the new locations. CBP is working with the USPS to certify the 

criteria for success for the pilot locations. 
252 

Question#: 17 

Topic: MOU 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Have the agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the pilot 

program at Chicago and San Francisco? 

Response: The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between CBP and 

the USPS on September l, 2017. 
253 

Question#: 18 

Topic: Information Sharing 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: It is unclear based on the Subcommittee's findings how much information 

private shippers share with each other, the Postal Service, and CBP, on issues such as 

problem shippers and drug smuggling tactics, in order to better combat the kind of 

smuggling operations our investigation uncovered. One of the recommendations in the 

report called for the formation of an Information Sharing and Analysis Center between 

the Postal Service, express consignment operators, and CBP to share information about 

best practices and the identities of known shippers of illegal items. Please describe the 

level of information sharing that currently occurs among the Postal Service, private 

shippers and CBP and how a more formal process might be beneficial. 

Response: Information sharing among the express consignment community, the Postal 

Service and CBP occurs at both the national and local level through partnerships and 

engagement at CBP's National Targeting Center and through local partnerships and 

collaboration within the International Mail Facilities and ports of entry. In April2017, 

two (2) USPIS staff were embedded into the National Targeting Center and in February 

2018, an Investigator with USPIS was assigned to CBP's National Targeting Center with 

specific focus on the targeting of illicit narcotics entering the U.S. via the postal supply 

chain. Additionally, there are plans in place to assign two (2) USPIS analysts to CBP's 

National Targeting Center with similar focus. CBP is also a member of the air industry 

partnership monthly meetings, including a variety of private industry partners (such as 

consolidators, freight forwarders, and transporters). During the meetings, CBP and its 

partners discuss risk factors and mitigation methods in the air environment, which 

fneludes international mail. 
254 

Question#: 19 

Topic: Adequate Resources 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: During a visit to the International Service Center (ISC) at John F. Kennedy 

Airport, PSI staff discussed with CBP staff the importance of using the latest advances in 

technology as part of CBP's screening processes, and expressed a desire for certain key 

pieces of equipment. Since our visit, Congress passed legislation (the International 

Narcotics Trafficking Emergency Response by Detecting Incoming Contraband with 

Technology Act, or INTERDICT Act) that authorizes the deployment of additional 

screening devices and personnel. Does CBP currently have adequate resources to 

effectively target and inspect packages that might contain illicit drugs? Specifically, does 

CBP staff at each of the ISCs have all of the technological aides necessary to properly 

screen packages? 

Response: In the fourth quarter ofFY 2017, CBP procured over 90 presumptive testing 

devices and the associated narcotic field drug test kits, and we are currently training staff 

and deploying the technology across the IMF, Express Consignment Carriers (ECCs), 

and Southern land border ports. 
255 

Question#: 20 

Topic: Automated Sorting Process 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Has the sorting process used to identify packages targeted by CBP been 

automated at all five International Service Centers? 

Response: DHS defers this question to the USPS. 
256 

Question#: 21 

Topic: Funding Cuts 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Rob Portman 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Public reports suggest that the President may propose a cut in funding for the 

Office of Field Operations (OFO), the component of CBP that searches for illicit drugs 

and other contraband at our ports of entry to include the United States-Mexico land 

border. I believe a cut to OFO would be extremely counter-productive given that opioids 

entering our country come through ports of entry as well. At our hearing, Mr. Owens 

stated that, according to CBP's workload staffing model, it is currently understaffed by 

2,518 officers and 631 agricultural specialists needed to perform specific duties at the 

ports of entry. How would any funding cuts to this office impact CBP's efforts to identify 

and interdict shipments of synthetic opioids? 

Response: The President's 2019 Budget for CBP OFO provides $14.2 billion in 

discretionary funding and $2.3 in mandatory funding. This results in a total increase of 

$2 over 2017 Enacted, and $304 over 2018 Enacted. 

If Congress does not fully fund the President's Budget for CBP/OFO, it would 

significantly impact CBP's efforts to detect, identify, and interdict shipments of synthetic 

opioids, as well as limit CBP's ability to protect its personnel or respond to exposure of 

its personnel. 
257 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Mr. Todd C. Owen 

Executive Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Field Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

From Senator Heidi Heitkamp 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Question#: 22 

Topic: Counterfeit Goods 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: The focus of this hearing was clearly on the opioid epidemic and how some of 

the current challenges with the international mail system contribute to the epidemic. But I 

wanted to ask one related question that is not about opioids. 

Do the general problems with the international mail system - lack of cooperation, lack of 

consistent Advanced Electronic Data - also occur when it comes to the shipping of 

counterfeit goods? Is that also a problem? 

Response: With the rise of e-commerce, by FY 2017 the number of international mail 

shipments had increased to over 400 million shipments from just 150 million mail 

shipments in FY20 13. With regard to counterfeit goods enforcement, nearly 3 0 percent 

of the 34,000 seizures of counterfeit and pirated goods made in FY 2017 by CBP and 

ICE-HSI, worth an estimated manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) of$1.35 

billion, were in the international mail environment. 

In FY 2017, during a "small package" blitz operation at the international mail facility in 

New York, 43 percent of the packages inspected were non-compliant. In total, CBP 

seized over five pounds of fentanyl along with almost 1,300 other non-compliant imports, 

including 800 counterfeit goods, as well as additional controlled substances. ECommerce shipments pose the same health, safety, and economic security risks as 

containerized shipments, but the volume is higher and growing. Transnational criminal 

organizations are shipping illicit goods to the United States via small packages due to a 

low cost of shipping, perceived lower interdiction risk, and less severe consequences if 

the package is interdicted. 

To correct this vulnerability, as outlined in CBP's recently released e-commercc strategy, 

CBP has been actively engaging with stakeholders including online marketplaces, 

consumers, partner government agencies including the USPS, and in international forums 
258 

Question#: 22 

Topic: Counterfeit Goods 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

to better address the challenges in innovative ways. Specifically, CBP is working on new 

protocols that allow for effective identification, enforcement, and deterrence of trade 

violations in the e-commerce environment. 
259 

Question#: 23 

Topic: AED Analysis 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Mr. Owen, in your testimony you state that there is no mandate for 

Advanced Electronic Data (AED) in the international mail environment and that CBP is 

currently receiving less than 50 percent of AED on shipments with goods. I also 

understand from the PSI report that CBP has yet to analyze the effectiveness of using 

AED to target and interdict drugs or other prohibited items. 

Would an analysis of AED's effectiveness make a difference in terms of having concrete 

evidence that would persuade folks-including other members of the UPU-about why 

AED is valuable? 

Response: CBP believes that advance data is critical, especially when there is a known 

bad party. Advance data provides CBP with an opportunity to automatically hold all 

international mail shipments from a known supplier of fentanyl. If it were not for the 

advance data, CBP may not have been able to stop those shipments. GA0-17 -606 

included a recommendation to CBP to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of 

collecting electronic advance data for targeting mail for inspection in comparison to other 

methods. CBP is working to develop a response to this recommendation. 

Question: Why has this not already been done? Are there plans to do this in the future? 

Response: CBP is working to develop a response to the GAO recommendation. 
260 

Question#: 24 

Topic: Recruit and Retain 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: As you know, I am incredibly passionate about recruitment and retention 

issues for CBP-especially on the Northern Border. Strong coordination between CBP 

and the Postal Service is crucial in combatting the opioid crisis, as are recruiting and 

retaining effective employees. CBP plays a vital role in this process, and you note in 

your testimony that CBP operates within 9 International Mail Facilities, inspecting 

international mail arriving from over 180 countries. That is a big job. 

Are you able to effectively recruit AND retain the CBP staff you need in these facilities? 

Response: CBP experiences unique challenges in recruiting and retaining employees in 

remote Northern Border locations. OFO has effectively used recruitment incentives to 

encourage applicants to accept CBP Officer positions at exceptionally hard-to-fill/retain 

ports along the Northern Border; however, OFO has had limited success with the use of 

retention incentives due to OPM regulations. CBP has been working with OPM to 

identify opportunities to mitigate issues related to retention incentives. 

Question: What would help you in your recruitment and retention efforts? 

Response: CBP is working with OPM to increase the recruitment incentive for the 

Arizona border and Calexico, CA from 25 percent to 33 percent is expected to help 

staffing on the AZ border and Calexico. In regard to retention, OFO will continue to use 

available pay flexibilities, to include retention incentives in remote geographic locations. 
261 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Border Enforcement Security Taskforces 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Mr. Nevano, in your testimony you talk about the utilization of Border 

Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST) - taskforces that seem to be one of our best 

weapons in tracking and shutting down opioid smuggling and trafficking operations 

domestically. 

Can you help me understand a little better how a BEST operates in terms of structure and 

leadership and why this has made such a difference in domestic investigations and 

arrests? 

I notice that there are no BEST locations from Wisconsin west until Blaine, Seattle- is 

there a reason there is not a location in state like North Dakota? Can a BEST be 

downsized or reconfigured to meet the challenges of smaller ports, more remote 

locations, and different traffic flow? 

You mention that you are looking to expand BEST locations at additional facilities 

throughout the country - what is the current plan to do so in terms of ultimate goals 

regarding number of locations AND what is the incremental plan to achieve that goal? 

Response: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognized U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) BEST initiative as a DHS task 

force in order to leverage federal, state, local, tribal, and international law 

enforcement and information sharing efforts against Transnational Criminal 

Organizations (TCOs) and provide enhanced border security. BEST is codified at 

6 U.S.C. § 240. DHS designated ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) as 

the executive agency for the development, establishment, and management of the 

BEST program. In this capacity, ICE leads a collaborative campaign to manage 

and establish these investigative task forces in locations most affected by 

transnational organized crime. BESTs comprise of over I ,000 law enforcement 

officers who collectively represent over I 00 federal, state, local, and international 

law enforcement partners. BESTs are located along the Southwest Border, the 

Northern Border, in major international airports and at strategic seaports. BESTs 

work in conjunction with other investigative, analytic, and information sharing 

entities and programs including High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, Organized 

Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces, state and metropolitan area fusion 

centers, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. BESTs allow for information sharing 

and collaboration among its partners as they identify, disrupt, and dismantle TCOs 

posing significant threats to the nation's international borders. 
262 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Border Enforcement Security Taskforces 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURJTY (SENATE) 

The two guiding pillars of BESTs are: 

1) Co-location. Co-location means all members of a BEST (federal, state, local, 

tribal, and international) work side-by-side on a daily basis under ICE HSI 

supervision in a single location. It is the goal ofiCE HSI to have BEST 

members in the same workspace to achieve maximum cohesion and 

collaboration. 

2) Designation. Customs officer authorities may be delegated by ICE under 19 

U.S.C. § 1401(i) to other federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to 

investigate and enforce customs laws. This designation is often referred to as 

"cross-designation" because the designated law enforcement officer is already 

empowered with the authorities granted by their parent agency. Crossdesignation enhances the ability of BESTs to investigate a wide range of 

complex criminal investigations to include other federal, state, local, tribal, 

and international crimes. The employment ofthe full range of available law 

enforcement resources and authorities is a force multiplier to combat TCOs. 

Question: I notice that there arc no BEST locations from Wisconsin west until Blaine, 

Seattle - is there a reason there is not a location in state like North Dakota? Can a BEST 

be downsized or reconfigured to meet the challenges of smaller ports, more remote 

locations, and different traffic flow? 

Response: The Special Agent in Charge of each HSI geographical area conducts a 

threat assessment and resource allocation assessment in order to determine in which 

locations to situate BESTs. BEST units employ a threat-based/risk mitigation 

investigative task force model that recognizes the unique resources and capabilities of all 

participating law enforcement partners. This partnership enables each unit to apply a 

comprehensive approach to combating transnational criminal organizations, while 

recognizing the distinctive circumstances and threats facing the various border 

environments. Not all areas have the resources and infrastructure available to 

establish BESTs. 

Question: You mention that you are looking to expand BEST locations at additional 

facilities throughout the country - what is the current plan to do so in terms of ultimate 

goals regarding number of locations AND what is the incremental plan to achieve that 

goal? 
263 

Question#: 25 

Topic: Border Enforcement Security Taskforces 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Response: BESTs are HSI's primary platform to investigate opioid smuggling 

domestically. HSI currently operates BESTs in 58 locations throughout the United 

States, having grown by 30 percent in FY 2017 through realignment of resources and 

expansion of partner participation in response to the President's Executive Order on 

TCOs. HSI will continue to explore opportunities to expand the number of BESTs. 

Efforts are ongoing to explore opportunities to create new BESTs at international mail 

facilities to further target illicit fentanyl shipments entering the United States. 
264 

Question#: 26 

Topic: Technological/Data Needs 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Corn m ittee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Mr. Nevano, you discuss the information provided by USPIS databasespreviously unavailable to ICE and CBP- as "instrumental in identifying illicit opioid 

importation and distribution conspiracies throughout the nation". 

Why was this information previously unavailable to ICE and CBP? How has the 

availability of this information changed the way you investigate these crimes- and how 

much of an increase have you seen in investigations/arrests directly related to the 

availability of this information? 

Are there other technological or data needs- or lack of sharing of information between 

agencies -that you believe would further increase ICE and CBP's investigatory 

capabilities? If so, what are they and how do we make sure we get you these resources 

and access to this information? 

Response: The United States Postal Service (USPS) continues to improve on its 

capability to track Advanced Electronic Data (AED). As stated during the hearing, USPS 

has faced challenges with obtaining AED information from foreign postal services in the 

past. The USPS is receiving AED, as part of a pilot program with certain foreign postal 

services, allowing law enforcement to more effectively target and locate packages that 

may contain illicit substances such as opioids. USPS has now assigned resources to the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), National Targeting Center and these 

resources allow for better information sharing and access to data. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) understands that the USPS is able to 

track 40 percent of international mail through AED and ICE is receiving investigative 

leads as a result. ICE does not have specific information on the number of its 

investigations/arrests directly attributable to the availability of the AED information. 

However, from Fiscal Year (FY) 16 to FY 17, ICE has seenover a 400 percent increase 

in the number of fentanyl seizures and over a 300 percent increase in pounds of fentanyl 

seized. 

ICE will continue to work with USPS to identify opportunities for improvements. 
265 

Question#: 27 

Topic: Dark Net Sales 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

Question: Mr. Nevano, in your testimony you discuss the migration of illicit opioid sales 

online to the Dark Net. 

How big is this problem in terms of these sales gravitating to the Dark Net? And how 

much harder is it to investigate and track dealers and buyers on the Dark Net? Why? 

How does the ICE Cyber Crimes Division interact with DEA and other agencies to 

conduct investigations on the Dark Net? 

What additional resources in terms of personnel, technology, and training are needed 

just by ICE Cyber Crimes- to address the growing problem of Dark Net illicit opioid 

sales? 

Response: Currently, across the top three dark web marketplaces, there are over 4,000 

opioid listings. The identification of vendors and buyers on the dark net is far more 

challenging than identification in traditional investigations. Dark nets (or the overlay 

networks that facilitate connectivity to dark web) are designed to afford users with 

anonymity and encryption and thus hinder investigators' ability to identify vendors and 

buyers on dark net marketplaces where opioids and a number of other illegal items are 

sold and purchased. By design, no information about a connecting computer user is 

shared with the server hosting the marketplace and no information about the server or its 

location is shared with the connecting computer user. Additionally, cryptocurrencies are 

the preferred mechanism for payment on these marketplaces, which further complicates 

identification of individuals responsible for illicit transactions. 

Question: How does the ICE Cyber Crimes Division interact with DEA and other 

agencies to conduct investigations on the Dark Net? 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Cyber Crimes Division 

works with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through ICE Homeland 

;security Investigations (HSI) personnel assigned to DEA Special Operations Division 

and also through joint investigative efforts throughout the United States. ICE Cyber 

Division, in conjunction with the HSI Illicit Financial Proceeds of Crime Unit, also 

provides cyber training to federal, state, and local partners to help develop an 

understanding of the technical fundamentals of investigations involving the dark net and 

cryptocurrencies. 

Question: What additional resources in terms of personnel, technology, and training are 
266 

Question#: 27 

Topic: Dark Net Sales 

Hearing: Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail 

Primary: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

needed- just by ICE Cyber Crimes- to address the growing problem of Dark Net illicit 

opioid sales? 

Response: ICE Cyber Crimes Division recognizes the need for specialized skillsets and 

technology when investigating sales of illicit opioids and other illegal items via the dark 

net as well as other criminal activities facilitated through the use of cyber technologies. 

These include hiring criminal investigators and non-agent personnel with information 

technology, computer science, programming, data analytics or cyber investigations 

backgrounds, advanced technical capabilities and software licenses necessary for online 

investigations and data capture, and the development of advanced training to provide 

field agents the skills necessary for investigations in a virtual environment. 
267 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Mr. William Siemer 

Acting Deputy Inspector General 

Office ofthe Inspector General 

United States Postal Service 

From Senator Heidi Heitkamp 

"Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

I) The focus of this hearing was clearly on the opioid epidemic and how some of the current 

challenges with the international mail system contribute to the epidemic. But I wanted to ask 

one related question that is not about opioids. 

• Do the general problems with the international mail system lack of cooperation, lack of 

consistent Advanced Electronic Data- also occur when it comes to the shipping of 

counterfeit goods? Is that also a problem? 

Response: 

·We have not done much work around the shipment of counterfeit goods. However, we 

imagine that many of the same control issues that we see in the international shipment of 

illegal drugs and other prohibited items (such as cigarettes and prescription drugs) 1 are also 

present in the mailing of counterfeit goods. For reasons of safety and security, we have 

focused our recent analytics efforts on trying to identify outliers in the available data that 

point to illegal drug shipments. 

2) Mr. Siemer, thank you for all the USPS OIG has done to combat the shipment of illegal 

drugs, and especially for your cross-agency work. You make a critical point in your 

testimony about "the need to strategically invest in tools and people to combat this problem, 

since data is not enough." What you are really talking about is resources, and how essential 

they are for any agency involved in combatting this problem to be successful. 

Would solving the Postal Service's larger financial issues help in terms of their capacity 

to focus on the opioid epidemic, and specifically, its growing shipment through the 

Postal Service? 

• How would fixing their broader financial situation make a difference? 

Response: 

Resources are indeed critical and may be part of the overall solution. The Postal Service 

must first fully define the scope of the problem and formulate a strategy to address the 

growing concern that illegal drug shipments pose to its employees, network and brand. As 

1 On July 18, 2017, we issued an audit report titled FrollihUed fnhound lnternationa!J\4a;!imzs, Report Number 

!I:'L'i:l\_&-17-00X, which evaluated the Postal Service's processes for handling prohibited inbound international 

mailings such as cigarettes and prescription drugs, but not illegal drugs, and its coordination with U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) at the Postal Service's International Service Centers (JSCs). 
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we mentioned at the hearing, having a fully functioning Board of Governors for the Postal 

Service could assist management with the strategic direction and sense of urgency for these 

challenges. Once strategic decisions are made, the resource needs will be more evident. 

At the OIG, we are seeing a dramatic increase in the number of employees involved in the 

trafficking of narcotics through the mail system. Additional resources for our office to help 

detect and investigate drug trafficking by employees is key. In particular, we are seeking 

additional funding in FY 19 to hire more agents to focus exclusively on narcotics 

investigations, as well as additional analysts to connect to the Customs and Border 

Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC) on a full-time basis. 
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Questions for the Record 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

At a Hearing Entitled, "Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in 

International Mail" 

January 25, 2018 

Questions from Chairman Portman and Ranking Member Carper 

1) Please provide a status on the recent indictments by the Department of Justice of 

two Chinese manufacturers, in the Southern District of Mississippi and the District 

of North Dakota, of fentanyl and other opiates. 

Response: The Department of Justice (Department), including the relevant U.S. Attorney 

Offices, continues to seek cooperation from and consult with our Chinese counterparts in the 

Ministry of Justice with regard to these matters. 

On April27, 2018, one of these indicted persons, Jian Zhang, four other Chinese 

nationals, and Zaron Bio-Tech (Asia) Limited, an entity registered in Hong Kong and owned or 

controlled by Jian Zhang, were added to the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (OFAC)'s list of"Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs" pursuant to the 

Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. OFAC administers and enforces economic and 

trade sanctions, based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals, against targeting 

foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and other threats to 

national security, foreign policy, or the economy of the United States. 1 Any assets that 

designated persons or entities have an interest in, located in the United States or in the possession 

or control of a U.S. citizen, are blocked. OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by 

U.S. citizens that involve any property or interests in property of designated persons or entities. 

This designation, combined with the Department's actions, disrupt the flow of fentanyl and other 

synthetic opioids into the United States, and serve as a warning that the Departments of Justice 

and Treasury will continue to target those who deal in illicit opioids. These actions will also help 

deter and disrupt the money laundering activities of other Chinese Transnational Criminal 

Organizations. 

2) On the day of our hearing, China stated it stands ready to work with the United 

States to enhance anti-drug coordination. 

• In regards to question one, please provide a status on any actions taken or 

investigations conducted by China into the two Chinese nationals indicted by the 

Department of Justice for manufacturing and shipping fentanyl and other 

opiates into the United States. 

1 U.S. Department of Treasury Office's Office ofForeignAssets Control: h.ttps://www.treasury.gov/resource~center/sanctions/SDNListiPages/defau1t.aspx retrieved July 5, 2018. 

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Response: The Department continues to seek cooperation from and consult with its Chinese 

counterparts in Ministry of Justice with regard to these matters. 

3) Is the effort by the Drug Enforcement Administration to open a second China-based 

office, in Guangzhou, on track for completion this year? 

Response: The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) office in Guangzhou, China, is 

estimated to open in early 2019, and will allow for the enhanced sharing of case related 

information with the Ministry of Public Security officials in Southern China. The province of 

Guangdong, China is home to a number of large shipping ports where seizures of illicit drugs 

occur frequently. The Chinese Ministry of Public Security's willingness to allow DEA to 

expand its engagement in China is a step forward in our overall bilateral relationship and shows 

China's overall willingness to address the opioid crisis affecting the United States. 

• Please provide some specifics on how the new office will increase the 

effectiveness of the DEA's presence in China and its partnership with Chinese 

officials. 

Response: DEA's presence in Guangzhou will allow DEA personnel to react quickly to 

operational requirements and support counterparts in post-seizure investigation and analysis. 

This will allow DEA to further develop intelligence gathering and investigative programs 

targeting the most significant transnational drug traffickers utilizing China as a source for 

synthetic drugs (new psychoactive substances (NPSs) and fentanyl class substances), drug 

precursor chemicals, and money laundering activities. Furthermore, DEA's presence in 

Guangzhou will substantially improve engagement with investigators, allowing for increased 

coordination, as opposed to only having access to investigators through Beijing. 

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Questions from Senator Heitkamp 

4) The focus ofthis hearing was clearly on the opioid epidemic and how some of the 

current challenges with the international mail system contribute to the epidemic. 

But I wanted to ask one related question that is not about opioids. 

• Do the general problems with the international mail system -lack of 

cooperation, lack of consistent Advanced Electronic Data- also occur when it 

comes to the shipping of counterfeit goods? Is that also a problem? 

Response: The availability of Advance Electronic Data (AED) is useful in addressing and 

identifying shipments of any type to include targeting packages of counterfeit goods. The ability 

of law enforcement to identify shippers of illicit items and then target the shipments through the 

use of AED in the furtherance of investigations is an important piece in addressing these 

shipments to the United States. However, investigations can be developed after the seizure at a 

port without initial AED. Once the shipper is identified, AED can be helpful in identifying 

additional packages from the same shipper. 

5) Mr. Baldwin, you discussed China's National Narcotics Laboratory working with 

DEA to exchange information on emerging substances, trafficking trends, and drug 

sampling standards. 

• Given the constant adjustments by labs in China to develop new fentanyl 

analogues to avoid enforcement in China or other countries- how quickly has 

the Chinese National Lab identified and reported these new analogues to DEA? 

Response: Because the fentanyl analogs that are sent to the United States are not usually 

intended for use and consumption in China, it is necessary to identify these substances in the 

United States and provide that information to our counterparts in China. It is also necessary to 

identify the specific hann these substances pose to U.S. citizens in order for the Chinese 

goverrunent to take action. 

DEA shares information on emerging substances with China's National Narcotics 

Laboratory through the Expert's Exchange meeting with China's Narcotics Control Bureau 

(NCB) when new substances are identified and seized in the United States. This process is now 

well established and is an important part ofDEA's cooperation with the Chinese. 

Since March of 2015, DEA and the NCB have exchanged information on a number of 

fentanyl related substances, 10 of which have been placed under control within China. Once a 

new substance of abuse is identified, and there is no known medical use of that substance in 

China, the Chinese NCB has indicated that they can control that substance in as little as nine 

months. 

6) Mr. Baldwin, you discussed an increased awareness and willingness by Chinese 

authorities to announce scheduling controls on various fentanyl-class substances 

and analogues. 

• How firm is China's commitment to these controls and in following through on 

enforcement on those labs, distributors, and others that violate these controls? 

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Response: Once a substance has been identified and evidence of abuse provided, the Chinese 

have demonstrated the ability to move quickly to regulate that particular substance. Laboratory 

analysis of U.S. seizures show a direct and nearly immediate impact on the availability of those 

analogues in the United States. China is committed to supporting the enforcement of its own 

laws and controls when evidence demonstrates that Chinese law has been violated. 

In the case of controlled drugs trafficked from China to the United States, the Chinese 

require: l) a lab report of the substance seized in the United States claiming it originated from 

China, and 2) confirmation that the substance carne from China, via shipping label or tracking 

documents. Due to laboratory processing backlogs and regulatory challenges in the Chinese 

shipping industry, this evidence is not always readily available and does not always yield 

immediate enforcement action. 

• Does scheduling by the Chinese authorities- or UNITED STATES intel about 

scheduling violations by Chinese manufacturers or distributors -lead to the 

shut-down oflabs or other manufacturing facilities and distributors and the 

arrest of individuals involved in those enterprises? 

Response: The Chinese treat the violation of their drug laws as a very serious offense. When 

requisite evidence has been presented and confirmed that a lab in China is making a controlled 

substance, the Chinese have been successful at dismantling the facility. One of the most difficult 

challenges is identifying the individuals manufacturing, distributing, and shipping the controlled 

substances to the United States. 

• If not shut down initially, do subsequent violations or a pattern of 

producing/distributing new analogues that are subsequently scheduled lead to 

shut-downs and arrests? 

Response: Individuals who manufacture, distribute, and traffick controlled substances in 

violation of Chinese law will be arrested and the laboratory will be shut down. Currently, 

according to Chinese law, manufacturing new analogues is not a violation of any laws in China. 

Even if subsequently scheduled, as long as traffickers continue to sell only formulations or 

analogues are considered legal, there will be no enforcement action taken. 

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Questions from Senator McCaskill 

As you may know, I introduced legislation last year to repeal the Ensuring Patient Access 

and Effective Drug Enforcement Act (EPAEDEA), which the Washington Post has 

described as, quote, "the crowning achievement of a multifaceted campaign by the drug 

industry to weaken aggressive DEA enforcement efforts against drug distribution 

companies." 

This change came at a time when it was more critical than ever to bring aggressive 

enforcement actions against opioid distributors. As I noted in document requests to the 

three major drug distributors last year, at least 13 distributors "knew or should have 

known that hundreds of millions of pills were ending up on the black market." 

At a December 2017 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, DEA Acting Assistant 

Administrator Demetra Ashley stated that, quote, "the new standard [under the law] does 

make it more difficult to issue an [immediate suspension order] to non-compliant 

manufacturers and distributors." 

7) Can you elaborate on how the new standard under the Ensuring Patient Access and 

Effective Drug Enforcement Act has made issuing an immediate suspension order 

(or ISO) more difficult? 

Response: The Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act (EP AEDA) did 

not have the effect of eliminating DEA's authority. However, it has altered the circumstances 

under which DEA pursues Immediate Suspension Orders (ISOs). Pursuant to the law, DEA will 

pursue an ISO in those circumstances when it can make a finding that demonstrates that "[d]ue to 

the failure of the registrant to ... comply with the obligations of a registrant under this title ... 

there is a substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that death, serious bodily harm, or abuse 

of a controlled substance will occur in the absence of an immediate suspension of the 

Registration." 

8) Can you point to recent examples of cases in which DEA wanted to issue an ISO but 

was unable to meet the new standard? 

Response: The ISO standard within EP AEDEA has not prevented DEA from enforcing existing 

law and using its wide array of tools to ensure the more than 1.7 million registrants are in 

compliance with the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). These include administrative actions, 

civil penalties, and criminal charges. 

9) Do you consider ISOs to be a credible threat against distributors following the 2016 

law? 

Response: While EP AEDEA certainly did not make it easier for DEA to obtain ISOs against 

distributors, DEA believes that ISOs remain a credible threat to non-compliant registrants whose 

actions pose an "imminent danger" to public health or safety within the meaning of 

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EPAEDEA. DEA will continue to use ISOs where appropriate against non-compliant registrants 

throughout the supply chain. 

At the December 12, 2017 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ms. Ashley 

fUrther stated that, "DEA supports changing the Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug 

Enforcement Act, to allow DEA to more effectively stop bad actors from engaging in opioid 

diversion." 

10) Can you elaborate on how the law should be changed, if not repealed entirely? 

Response: DEA supports amending EP AEDEA and continues to work with the House and Senate 

on any potential legislation. 

11) Ms. Ashley also noted that corrective action plans (or CAPs}-which DEA must now 

consider before issuing a show cause order-were not necessary, given that the agency 

already engages in extensive conversations with registrants regarding planned 

improvements in compliance. 

• Do you agree that the procedure for submitting CAPs created in the 20161aw 

was unnecessary given existing DEA procedures? 

Response: Allowing a formal process by which a registrant who is subject to an Order to Show 

Cause (OTSC) may submit a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to DEA is duplicative. Registrants 

have always had the opportunity to present mitigating factors and evidence of corrective action 

as part of any administrative proceeding. 

12) Has the procedure for reviewing and analyzing CAPs slowed DEA enforcement in a 

meaningful way? 

Response: The CAP provision adds an additional layer to the OTSC proceedings, causes 

unnecessary delays and commitment of further agency resources. Since the enactment of 

EP AEDA in April 2016, a small percentage (roughly 10 percent) of registrants served with an 

OTSC have submitted a CAP. To date, no CAP has resulted in DEA discontinuing or deferring 

administrative proceedings pursuant to an OTSC. 

13) Has the review of a CAP led the DEA to change course in any particular 

enforcement action-to decline to pursue an order to show cause, for example? 

Response: The CAP provision has not prevented DEA from pursuing an OTSC. 

14)Former agency officials noted at my roundtable in November 2017 that distributors 

had even started to prepare CAPs in advance of DEA enforcement actions. 

• Is this true, in your experience? 

Response: While this may be possible, since the enactment of EP AEDA in April 2016, a small 

percentage (roughly 10 percent) of registrants served with an OTSC have submitted a CAP. To 

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date, no CAP has resulted in DEA discontinuing or deferring administrative proceedings 

pursuant to an OTSC. 

15) The argument has been made, in the Washington Post and elsewhere, that 

enforcement efforts at DEA slowed down long before the 2016law, due to the 

revolving door between DEA and the industry and lobbying efforts by former topranking officials. The 2016law, in this view, merely codified a softer approach that 

DEA had already pursued against distributors. 

• Is this narrative supported by the facts? Does this ring true based on your 

experiences? 

Response: DEA has and continues to use all available tools to ensure the more than I. 7 million 

registrants are in compliance with the CSA. These include administrative actions, civil penalties, 

and criminal charges. For instance, the below table highlights DEA's actions leading to 

registration revocation, which include OTSCs, ISOs, and voluntary surrenders. Upon a registrant 

surrendering his/her registration for cause, or DEA obtaining a suspension/revocation of the 

registration, the registrant can no longer dispense, prescribe, or administer controlled substances. 

DEA deems this to be a success. As indicated in the chart below, DEA's collective use of the 

tools at its disposal has allowed it to take action against a significant number of registrants over 

the last I 0 fiscal years. Over the last five fiscal years, these combined actions result in an 

average of roughly 980 registration revocations per year. Additionally, combined ISO and 

OTSC actions in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 have more than doubled since FY 2014. 

Actions Leading to Registration Revocation 

Fiscal Year Orders to Immediate Voluntary Totals 

Show Cause Suspension Surrenders 

Filed Orders Filed 

2007 53 23 358 434 

2008 52 17 812 881 

2009 73 28 772 873 

2010 67 38 696 801 

2011 66 58 839 963 

2012 54 46 979 1,079 

2013 43 16 1,047 1,106 

2014 32 8 922 962 

2015 62 5 972 1,039 

2016 57 9 786 852 

2017 79 6 776 861 

In addition, DEA has pursued civil action against some of the nation's largest drug 

distributors. In FY 2017, more than $194 million in civil penalties were levied, which is more 

than the previous seven fiscal years combined (close to $148 million). Finally, DEA has 

aggressively pursued criminal investigations initiated by our tactical diversion squads (TDS). 

Since FY 2011, DEA's TDS have assumed a greater role in diversion enforcement. DEA now 

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Æ 

has 77 operational TDS groups across the United States, a significant increase over the 46 groups 

DEA had in FY 2012. In addition, DEA established two mobile TDS groups that can deploy 

quickly to "hot spots" in furtherance of the Diversion Control Divison's mission. TDS groups 

focus primarily on criminal enforcement and the results of their work often lead DEA registrants 

to surrender their DEA registration for cause. Over the last seven fiscal years, DEA has initiated 

an average of more than 1,500 cases per year and made an average of more than 2,000 arrests per 

year. 

16) Is the revolving door between DEA diversion control and the distribution industry a 

factor affecting the nature of DEA enforcement against distributors? 

Response: Please see response above. 

9