UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ABRAHAM PAUL KOROTKI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS, RONALD & COOPER, P.A., a

Maryland Professional Association,

Defendant-Appellee,

ATTORNEY SERVICES CORPORATION,

Defendant & Third-Party PlaintiffAppellee,

No. 96-1877

v.

DANIEL V. SCHMITT,

Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

US PUBLIC INTEREST; BANKCARD

HOLDERS OF AMERICA,

Amici Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Frank A. Kaufman, Senior District Judge.

(CA-94-1212-K)

Argued: September 29, 1997

Decided: December 5, 1997

Before WILKINS, Circuit Judge, PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge,

and THORNBURG, United States District Court Judge for the

Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Irwin Raphael Kramer, THE LAW OFFICES OF IRWIN

R. KRAMER, Owings Mills, Maryland, for Appellant. Terri Lynn

Goldberg, ECCLESTON & WOLF, Baltimore, Maryland; Benjamin

Lipsitz, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: S. Todd

Willson, ECCLESTON & WOLF, Baltimore, Maryland; Joel C.

Richmond, OFFICE OF JOEL C. RICHMOND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Ronald B. Katz, Owings Mills, Maryland, for

Amicus Curiae.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The appellant, Abraham Korotki, appeals from the district court's

grant of summary judgment dismissing his action. For the reasons

hereafter set forth, we affirm.

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and judgment for the moving party is warranted as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the record de novo

and in doing so view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

party opposing summary judgment. Sony Corp. of America v. Bank

One, West Virginia, Huntington, N.A., 85 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir.

1996). From this review, we must determine whether a genuine issue

exists from which a reasonable jury considering the evidence could

return a verdict for plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud , 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th

Cir.) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 814 (1994). A mere scintilla of

evidence is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Korotki is in the business of real estate development and construction. In October 1991, he entered into a public works agreement with

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Baltimore County for construction of public improvements at Old

Court Village. Korotki requested Angelozzi Brothers, Inc.

(Angelozzi) to provide full trench compaction at a cost estimate of

$12,000 and agreed to pay this amount for compaction or, in the alternative, to give Angelozzi a car in lieu of cash. Pursuant to this oral

contract, Angelozzi completed the trench compaction and billed

Korotki for $6,000, one-half the original cost estimate. After repeated

demands for payment which were refused by Korotki, Angelozzi

sought a mechanics lien against the development property and

retained the services of attorneys Thomas, Ronald & Cooper, P.A.,

and Daniel B. Schmitt, now third-party defendants, to collect the

indebtedness. The attorneys then hired defendant Attorney Services

Corporation to serve notice of the lien on appellant and his development company. This service was sought on appellant as owner of the

real estate on which Old Court Village was located and as the president and only principal of APK Development. Maryland law required

service of the notice of intent to lien on the landowner. Md. Real

Prop. Code Annot. § 9-104.

From September through December 1993, unsuccessful efforts

were made to serve Korotki in a variety of ways from registered mail

to personal service to posting of notice on the gate of Korotki's house.

All of the efforts having failed, Attorney Services Corporation

obtained a copy of Korotki's credit report from Equifax Credit Information Services, a licensed collection agency in the State of Maryland, for the purpose of obtaining a new service address for Korotki.

No helpful information was obtained from the report; no further use

was made of the report, and a breach of contract action was finally

filed in state court for collection of the indebtedness.

Thereafter, Korotki learned that the credit document had been

obtained without his permission and filed the action now before this

Court. Appellant alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (FCRA), and pendant state claims under the

Maryland Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (MCCRAA).

This Court addresses the defendants' summary judgment motion

under the assumption that the report is a consumer report and, therefore, that the FCRA applies to its use.

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The term "consumer report" means any written, oral, or

other communication of any information by a consumer

reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness

. . . which is used or expected to be used or collected in

whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in

establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household

purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other purposes

authorized under section 1681b of this title. . . .

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1988); see also Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1273-75 (9th Cir. 1990).

Title 15, United States Code, Section 1681(b) permits a consumer

reporting agency to furnish a report without the consumer's authorization:

(3) to a person which it has reason to believe

 (A) intends to use the information with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to

be furnished and involving . . . collection of an account of,

the consumer; or . . .

 (E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving

the consumer.

While this language might arguably apply only to consumer agencies, we conclude that the wording is equally applicable to a user.

Under § 1681(b), a user may only obtain a consumer report for a permissible purpose therein enumerated. Yohay v. City of Alexandria

Employees' Credit Union, Inc., 827 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987)

(citing Hanson v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Appellant has made no showing that the report was obtained for an

impermissible purpose. We experience no difficulty under the facts of

this case in concluding that seeking to obtain an alternate address at

which to serve appellant was "a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the [appel-

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lant]," § 1681(b)(3)(E); and, therefore, a permissible purpose for its

use. And, Angelozzi was seeking to collect an account owed by the

consumer, § 1681(b)(3)(A), likewise a permissible purpose. Korotki

admitted requesting Angelozzi to perform certain compaction services

whether or not these services were already included in Angelozzi's

contract with the county. He also agreed that if the county was not

required to pay for the services, he would tender his car as payment.

Obviously, these admitted facts created a business relationship

between the parties, and Angelozzi correctly believed this to be true.

The terms "legitimate business need" and "in connection with" refer

to the needs and objections of the individual to whom the report is

furnished, not the needs of the person about whom the report is furnished. Zeller v. Samia, 758 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D. Mass 1991). In that

context, it was not necessary for Angelozzi to wait until his disputed

claim had been reduced to judgment before obtaining a consumer

report. See Baker v. Bronx-Westchester Investigations, Inc., 850 F.

Supp. 260, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). It is likewise immaterial that a

person other than defendant himself received the report for a permissible use. Id., at 262.

Appellant also seeks similar relief under the MCCRAA. Inasmuch

as the FCRA and the MCCRAA are virtually identical, we conclude,

as did the district court, that the defendants violated neither statute.

Cambridge Title Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp.

1263, 1278 (D. Md. 1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 491 (4th Cir. 1993).

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth by the court

below, the district court's judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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