U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES TO HURRICANE 

RECOVERY IN PUERTO RICO 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 22, 2018 

Serial No. 115–74 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Jimmy Gomez, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA General Counsel 

SHARON ESHELMAN, Subcommittee on National Security Staff Director 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

Vacancy 

Vacancy 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 22, 2018 ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michael Byrne, Assistant Administrator for Field Operations, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Mr. William Parks, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Department of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Mr. Peter Lopez, Regional Administrator, Region 2, U.S Environmental Protection Agency 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Mr. Scott Aaronson, Vice President, Security and Preparedness, Edison Electric Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 32 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

SSG Johnathan Sutton (Ret.), Former U.S. Army, 82nd Airborne Division, 

Puerto Rico Volunteer 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 45 

APPENDIX 

Statement for the Record from the American Public Power Association, submitted by Chairman DeSantis ............................................................................ 70 

Letter from Ranking Member Cummings and Ms. Plaskett to Chairman 

Gowdy, submitted by Ms. Plaskett ..................................................................... 75 

Letter from Ms. Gonzalez-Colon to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, submitted by Ms. Gonzalez-Colon ............................................................................ 82 

Observations on the Federal Response to Maria in Puerto Rico, submitted 

by Ranking Member Lynch ................................................................................. 84 

Questions for the Record, submitted by Members of the Committee .................. 89 


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BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES TO 

HURRICANE RECOVERY IN PUERTO RICO 

Thursday, March 22, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Hice, Lynch, and Welch. 

Also Present: Resident Commissioner Gonzalez-Colon and Delegate Plaskett. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

We’re here today to talk about the bureaucratic challenges to recovery after one of the most devastating hurricane seasons in history. Exactly 6 months ago yesterday, Hurricane Maria, a monster 

of a storm, struck our fellow Americans in Puerto Rico. The island 

sustained deadly 155-mile-an-hour winds and 20 to 30 inches of 

rainfall in a period of just 24 hours. Sadly, lives were lost as a result. 

Now, the President took action by deploying the full weight of 

the United States Government. Within 6 days of Maria’s landfall, 

more than 10,000 Federal employees were deployed to aid in the 

recovery. 

Puerto Rico’s residents were completely without electricity. Thousands of homes and businesses were destroyed. Individuals found 

themselves with no power, no water, no way to communicate with 

one another. Emergency response crews have operated around the 

clock to restore these critical services ever since, but there’s still 

more to do. 

Thanks to the hard work and generosity of countless people, 

thousands of meals and gallons of water have been distributed, 

children are back in school, and the most vulnerable again have access to medical care. 

But we need to do more. As of last week, there were still as 

many 150,000 people without power across the island. Interruptions due to overloads or equipment failures still happen virtually 

weekly. 

Additionally, 96 percent of the island now has access to potable 

drinking water, but when you look at the different regions, you see, 


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for example, that 17 percent of the population in the western portion of the island are still lacking their own safe water supply. 

Eighty-eight percent of the gas stations are up and running, 92 

percent of grocery stores are open, but two-fifths of the roadways 

are still either closed or impassable. And more than 890 generators 

are still the primary source of power for some key facilities, including the wastewater treatment plants and the San Juan financial 

district. 

In the aftermath, over 6 months, due to the lack of basic services, 

hundreds of thousands of citizens in Puerto Rico found themselves 

making the hard choice to relocate due to the need to find jobs because their workplaces were out of business, so they could send 

their kids to school and care for their elders. They have moved to 

many States. One of the many points of entry has been my State 

of Florida where there’s been a major effort to offer relocation assistance. 

Many of these citizens await normalization to return to the island, while others are surely staying for the long-term, but all of 

them want to know when will their hometowns and their families 

be able to fully stand back on their feet. They do not forget Puerto 

Rico, and neither do we. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead coordinator on all things disaster-related, overseeing the historic interagency effort underway in Puerto Rico. We want to hear FEMA’s 

perspective on what went right and what could have been done better and what still needs to be done. 

Mr. Michael Byrne, the assistant administrator for field operations, is joining us here today to shed some light on FEMA’s role 

in the recovery. 

While we have heard a lot about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ role in the effort to restore power to Puerto Rico, the Department of Energy is actually the lead agency for Emergency Support 

Function #12, the Energy Annex. The Department is responsible 

for facilitating the restoration of damaged energy systems and components, which was certainly needed in Puerto Rico. 

We have a representative here today from Energy’s Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability to discuss the progress 

being made on the ground and the work yet to be done. So I want 

to thank Mr. Parks for being here. 

These two officials will help us shed light on what it will take 

to get the power fully restored, and we will want to know what it 

will take to make the part of the task so that the effort is continued without interruptions. 

Another critical element of restoring Puerto Rico is the access to 

safe, drinkable water and the removal of solid waste. Mr. Peter 

Lopez from the Environmental Protection Agency is here to testify 

about EPA’s role in ensuring the residents of Puerto Rico can and 

will have access to safe drinking water, and what the Federal, 

State, and local authorities need to do to ensure this in the future. 

We also have Scott Aaronson from the Edison Electric Institute. 

EEI represents all U.S. investor-owned electric companies. In response to a request for assistance, EEI coordinated with its members to deploy incident management teams in support of power restoration efforts across the island. Through this agreement, industry 


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efforts coordinate with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 

and the Army Corps to restore power to the people of Puerto Rico. 

All told, almost 6,700 Federal personnel, civilian and military, 

are currently supporting the recovery and restoration efforts in 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Thousands more from 

nongovernment and charitable organizations have come forward to 

help get Puerto Rico back on its feet. 

So we want to discuss what lessons we’ve learned from this devastation before the next hurricane season is upon us. We also want 

to hear what changes are being made to ensure we do better going 

forward and that the lessons learned to help the Nation be better 

prepared for such catastrophic events. 

And Puerto Rico, I mean, they’re going to face another hurricane 

season here in just a few months, and I think it’s important we 

solve all these problems by then. 

So I want to thank you for your efforts to date and for coming 

to answer our questions. 

And with that, I will yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. 

Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you 

for convening this hearing to examine the progress of Federal hurricane relief and recovery efforts in Puerto Rico. 

I’d also like to thank our witnesses for your willingness to help 

the subcommittee with its work. 

It is the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

also known as FEMA, to, quote, ‘‘lead America to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters with a vision of a Nation prepared,’’ close quote. 

The critical role of FEMA as our Nation’s coordinating Federal 

entity in response to all domestic disasters demands that the agency operate at maximum efficiency in order to mitigate the devastating effects of national emergencies on the safety and security 

of the American people. 

In the aftermath of the landfall of two Category 5 hurricanes, 

Irma and Maria, just 2 weeks apart on Puerto Rico in September 

of 2017, FEMA has led Federal relief and recovery efforts to provide emergency food and water, temporary housing, healthcare, 

power grid restoration, and other basic services to the survivors of 

this continuing humanitarian crisis. 

Regrettably, however, the Agency’s mission has been greatly impaired by many of the same oversight challenges that undermined 

the failed Federal response to Hurricane Katrina back in 2005. 

Puerto Rico and its 3.5 million American citizens deserves better. 

I think we all agree on that. 

As reported by the Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina in 2006, FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, 

and sustained provision of commodities—that was the finding—to 

affected Gulf residents. 

The Agency did not have advance contracts in place that anticipated what supplies would be needed in the wake of a hurricane. 

According to the Select Committee, this, quote, ‘‘led to chaos and 

the potential for waste and fraud as acquisitions were made in 

haste,’’ close quote. 


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Our own committee hearings into Katrina contracting in 2006 revealed instances where debris removal contractors would arrive at 

a Federal dumpsite, check in, and then drive away, only to return 

later with the same truckload of debris and receive double payment. 

The Federal Government also spent millions of dollars on contracts with companies to install temporary blue plastic sheeting on 

damaged homes. These blue roofs were billed to the American taxpayer but never installed. 

Despite the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina more than 

a decade ago, we are once again receiving a similar report of waste, 

fraud, and abuse in Federal contracting relating to the Puerto 

Rican relief effort. 

Nearly 1 month after the hurricane hit the island, FEMA award- ed $156 million contract to a one-person company owned by Tiffany 

Brown, Tribute Contracting LLC, to provide 30 million emergency 

meals. 

Ms. Brown received a contract despite her failure to fulfill at 

least five previous and much smaller Federal contracts. This is one 

woman. Those previous contracts included a 27,000 Federal Prison 

system contract that was canceled because she could not deliver 

the required beans, flour, and spaghetti, and other food. 

As the sole employee of her company, Ms. Brown sought help in 

fulfilling her new FEMA contract and hired a wedding caterer with 

11 employees to freeze dry meals. 

In a letter sent to FEMA last month, members of the Senate 

Government Affairs Committee also underscored that Ms. Brown’s 

initial nine-page bid appeared to be plagiarized from several readily available sources on the Internet. 

While FEMA eventually canceled the contract after Ms. Brown 

could only deliver 50,000 of the required 30 million meals, the residents of Puerto Rico, the American taxpayer, and this committee 

are left asking how FEMA could have awarded the contract in the 

first place. 

Similarly, in October of 2017 the Agency awarded two contracts, 

totaling $30 million, to a newly formed Florida company, Bronze 

Star, LLC, to provide emergency tarps and plastic sheeting for repairs in Puerto Rico. The company was owned by Richard and 

Kayon Jones, two brothers operating out of a single-family house. 

They had never received a Federal contract or delivered these materials before. FEMA also eventually canceled the contracts in November and admitted that it had not performed due diligence. 

President Trump has graded the Federal relief and recovery effort in Puerto Rico as, quote, ‘‘great,’’ close quote, ‘‘amazing,’’ close 

quote, ‘‘tremendous,’’ and ‘‘a 10 out of 10.’’ I don’t think so. It may 

have been a 10 for Tiffany Brown and the Jones brothers, but it 

surely hasn’t been a 10 for the people of Puerto Rico or for the U.S. 

taxpayer. 

In light of these and other reports, congressional oversight will 

serve an even more critical role in ensuring that our massive recovery effort will not be further impeded by a failure to properly vet 

Federal contractors. 

I strongly urge the Agency to comply with this committee’s request for documents pertaining to the Federal preparedness and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:47 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\30943.TXT APRIL

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sponse to Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands. This includes a bipartisan document request by our 

full committee chairman, Chairman Gowdy, and Ranking Member 

Cummings over 5 months ago. 

I would also urge the leadership of this committee to organize a 

bipartisan oversight delegation to the damaged areas, as we did in 

2005 following Hurricane Katrina. I know that the Massachusetts 

delegation, led by Senator Elizabeth Warren, were there in January and brought back a very informative report. That would allow 

us to conduct direct oversight of Federal recovery efforts, receive 

firsthand accounts from the affected people, and hopefully get this 

right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really do appreciate you holding this 

hearing. And I look forward to discuss these and other issues with 

our witnesses. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair notes the presence of our colleague from Puerto Rico, 

Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon. And without objection, I move that she 

be recognized and allowed to participate in today’s hearing. 

There being none, I would like to take this opportunity to actually recognize her for an opening statement. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with 

that, I want to begin this saying thank you to you, Chairman 

DeSantis and Ranking Member Lynch, for agreeing to have this 

very important hearing on Puerto Rico and agreeing to have this 

meeting on the challenge of the recovery process on the island. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, particularly on behalf 

of my 3.4 million American citizens living in Puerto Rico, because 

of your steadfast leadership and support in the aftermath of the 

Hurricanes Irma and Maria, not only for the residents of the island, but also for the hundreds of thousands who have since the 

hurricane been forced to move to your home State of Florida. 

And one of the main issues we still face on the island is the great 

anxiety and the frustration among all the citizens in the island 

over the time it has taken to get the power being restored. 

One of the main issues is in the private sector, the individuals 

and businesses had to rely on generators at high cost and environmental impact. It has caused considerable business losses from closures, limited hours, and cost overruns. 

Specifically, the people with medication pumps, respirators, and 

the like, it has caused considerable situations. They are in municipalities where no resident had power until late January. And we 

are talking about more than 100,000 people still without power. 

And that’s one thing. 

I want to say, also, that I want to thank the witnesses that are 

here today to give us some light about that recovery process. And 

with that, I want to say thank you to Mr. Byrne. He has always 

been available to all my calls in all that recovery process. 

And I want to thank you, because I know you’ve been away from 

home many hours, and your people from FEMA. And I know you’re 

doing your job. 

We still need more. And I hope this hearing will help us out to 

establish what is needed from Congress, what is needed from the 

Federal Government. 


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Same thing to the rest of the Federal agencies. Over the last 3 

weeks, residents of the island have been subject to great stress and 

worry upon learning that many repair and construction crews have 

ended in terms of their contracts or are being relocated to higherpriority locations. 

There is some shock on the island and dismay at the impression 

that the mission is winding down before the job is finished and the 

apparent lack of a concerted effort to explain what is happening. 

A rural working family without electricity for 6 months does not 

want to hear of standard protocols or contract restrictions. They 

want to see full effort directed to reconnecting every remaining 

home everywhere. 

And we’re talking about everywhere in the island, not just the 

metropolitan area on the northern side of the island. We’re talking 

about the central part or the towns where the hurricane made 

landfall. 

I stated in another hearing last week, and I will say it again, I 

just want you to imagine if your own hometown here in the mainland will be without electricity for 2 months, 3, 4, 6 months, without power, with also failing communications, with the only assurance that, ‘‘We are working on it.’’ 

What will happen? The people of Puerto Rico have been admirably patient, but are justifiably tired. If we were a State having 

five congressional district and two Senators, who will not leave a 

State, nobody will leave a State without power for 6 months. 

And now we’re facing the next hurricane season in 3 months. So 

that’s the biggest challenge that we’re facing. That’s the reason this 

hearing is so important for us. 

We are now over 90 percent capacity online, but still less 80 percent of transmission and distribution lines at a full load. That 

means that the Corps of Engineers estimated that 95 percent of the 

capacity will be up by the end of March, but that does not necessarily mean that the 100,000 people will have power in their 

houses by the end of August of this year. 

So that’s my biggest challenge, and that’s the reason we need to 

know the reality. That’s the reason we need to know what do we 

need to have a 30-day timeframe in terms of FEMA, Corps of Engineers, all the Federal agencies to make that happen. If it’s assigning money, if it’s amending the rules, if it’s amending the resources 

in terms of another CR, what do we need to make that happen? 

For that, we need to bear in mind that rebuilding needs to be 

done in such a manner as to consider the possibility of such a catastrophic event happening again. Hurricane season starts, as we already said, in 3 months, and we have presented with other colleagues from both sides of the aisle amendments to open up the 

Stafford Act limits so we can be more flexible and not just patch 

up what is broken, but rebuild to update standards, Section 20601 

of last month’s CR. 

There is also $2 billion in that continuing resolution specifically 

meant for improvement of the power grid. We also know that that’s 

not even close to what we need. But at least that’s a start, and we 

must maintain the sense of urgency that sometimes is missing. 

With that, I will yield back the balance of my time. I will save 

the rest for the questions. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. I thank my friend from Puerto Rico. 

Now, you just heard that votes have been called. I’ve got five of 

you to give opening statements. So I think it’s probably wise that 

we just briefly recess this. We’ll go vote. It’s probably going to be 

a 30-minute evolution. Probably no earlier than 10:45. 

And so I appreciate the witnesses’ indulgence on this. Any time 

you do these hearings, if we did it 2 o’clock yesterday, we would 

have had votes then. 

So the subcommittee will recess at the call of the chair. We plan 

to return immediately at the conclusion of votes. 

So the committee stands in recess. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I appreciate the indulgence of the witnesses as we tackle the ominous omnibus bill. 

It’s my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. We have Michael 

Byrne, Assistant Administrator for Field Operations at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency; William Park, Senior Advisor to 

Assistant Secretary at the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability at the U.S. Department of Energy; Mr. Peter Lopez, Regional Administrator for Region 2 at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Mr. Scott Aaronson, Vice President for Security and 

Preparedness at EEI; and Staff Sergeant Johnathan Sutton, U.S. 

Army, retired, a volunteer in Puerto Rico during this recovery effort. 

Welcome to you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. Please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you’re about to give 

is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 

Okay. Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part of 

the record. 

As a reminder, the clock in front of you shows the remaining 

time. During your opening statement, the light will turn yellow 

when you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. 

Please also remember to press the button to turn your microphone on before speaking. 

And with that, I would like to recognize Mr. Byrne for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BYRNE 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman DeSantis, 

Ranking Member Lynch, Representative Gonzalez-Colon, and members of the subcommittee. 

My name is Mike Byrne, and I’m the Federal coordinating officer 

in Puerto Rico. Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

In the emergency management community, we talk about needing to be prepared for the big one. Last fall, Puerto Rico experienced the catastrophic impacts that we train our entire careers for. 


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Hurricane Maria is the fifth-strongest storm, and it’s the strongest 

storm to strike Puerto Rico in nearly a century. The storm left 

nearly all of Puerto Rico’s 3.5 million people without power, and 

the lack of backup generators shut down other critical infrastructure, like water treatment plants and hospitals. 

Communications were decimated, hindering initial operations. 

Seaports, airstrips were severely damaged, resulting in limited initial access to bring in commodities. Roads and bridges were washed 

away, cutting off isolated, hard-to-reach communities. 

Following the devastation of this catastrophic storm, FEMA and 

the Commonwealth and our other Federal partners took immediate 

action. We established the largest domestic sea bridge operation in 

U.S. history, delivering more than a billion dollars in commodities 

such as food, water, tarps, and construction materials. These commodities were delivered by air, off-road vehicles, and often by foot, 

making it the largest and longest commodity delivery mission in 

FEMA’s history, and it is still going on. 

Also, one of the largest medical response missions. More than 

4,700 medical personnel deployed and cared for more than 38,000 

survivors. FEMA mission-assigned 80 Federal agencies with more 

than 700 distinct mission assignments, supporting power restoration, temporary power, debris removal, et cetera, all of the different 

response functions that we do. 

At the height of the response, there were nearly 19,000 Federal 

personnel deployed to Puerto Rico working around the clock with 

territory and local officials. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, mission-assigned by FEMA, 

installed more than 1,900 emergency generators. To put that context, previously the most installed was 310 during Katrina. We still 

have over 800 of those still working. 

While there’s lots of work to be done, we have seen significant 

signs of progress. More than 90 percent of the power has been restored, with crews working around the clock in treacherous, mountainous terrain to work on lines as quickly and safely as possible. 

PRASA reports nearly 99 percent of their customers have water 

restored. More than 6.4 million cubic yards of debris has been removed. All 68 hospitals are back in operation and have been since 

mid-November. More than $10 billion has already been spent, between FEMA and SBA assistance programs, that has been approved for the response and recovery efforts. 

We are also committed to identifying solutions around housing, 

from direct financial assistance to direct repairs. We’re working 

every avenue possible to restore housing. 

In order to meet the long-term recovery needs and move into recovery, FEMA and our partners are implementing the structure 

and functions of the National Disaster Recovery Framework in 

Puerto Rico. We’ve established 12 sectors to holistically address the 

magnitude of the damage across these systems and how we can 

combine and leverage resources to more effectively and efficiently 

restore these systems. 

Thanks to authorities given to us by Congress in the Bipartisan 

Budget Act last month, we can now provide assistance funding to 

Puerto Rico for critical services to replace or restore infrastructure 

to industry standards without regard to their pre-disaster condiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:47 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\30943.TXT APRIL

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tions. We can also replace or restore components not damaged by 

the disaster when it is necessary to restore the entire system to industry standards. These new authorities are critical to ensuring we 

help build back a more resilient Puerto Rico. 

We’re also greeting ready for the 2018 hurricane season. We’ve 

already hired over 1,500 local hires on the island, Puerto Ricans. 

It is actually 52 percent of my workforce right now, and I plan to 

get to 90 percent by the 1-year anniversary. 

We’re also doing training. We’re also resupplying our warehouses 

with stockpiles, adjusting our national-level contracts. We’re also 

going to be doing a significant amount of training and exercises. In 

fact, we have three major exercises scheduled before the end of 

June. 

Hurricanes Irma and Maria, along with all the other 2017 disasters, highlight the importance of preparing for the worst. As Administrator Long unveiled last week, FEMA’s strategic plan includes the goal of building a culture of preparedness and readying 

the Nation for catastrophic disasters. 

I encourage Congress and Americans across the country to partner with us as we look to get the Nation more prepared. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Byrne follows:] 


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3.9.18-FEMA Cleared 

STATEMENT 

OF 

MICHAEL BYRNE 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BEFORE 

THE 

COMMlTTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOVERNMENT REFORM 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

"Bureaucratic Challenges to Response and Recovery in Puerto Rico·· 

Submitted 

By 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

500 C Street, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20472 

March 21,2018 
11 


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Introduction 

Good morning, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the 

Subcommittee, l am Michael Byrne, the Assistant Administrator for the Field Operations 

Directorate within the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Office of Response 

and Recovery and the Federal Coordinating Officer for the Hurricane Irma and Maria response 

and recovery in Puerto Rico. On behalf of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Secretary Nielsen and FEMA Administrator Long, thank you for the opportunity to discuss DHS 

and FEMA's response and recovery efforts in Puerto Rico following the devastating hurricanes 

in 2017. 

2017 Hurricane Season 

Last year's historic hurricane season was a true test of the Nation's ability to respond to and 

recover from multiple concurrent disasters. Three major hurricanes-Harvey, Irma, and Mariamade landfall along the Gulf Coast, in the Southeast, and in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands. The impacts of these events were substantial. Approximately 26 million people live in 

counties and municipalities that received disaster declarations as a result of these three storms 

roughly eight percent of the entire U.S. population. With the addition of the Wildfires in 

California, this was FEMA's most demanding year in its 40 year history. 

In order to deliver disaster assistance to such a large and dispersed number of survivors, FEMA 

has worked in concert with our federal partner agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments; and also non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector to ensure a 

unity of effort that serves the needs of disaster survivors. 

Unity of eftort is required tor disaster response and recovery on any scale. It has been-·and will 

continue to be-especially crucial during response and recovery efforts following last year's 

hurricane season. All levels of government, non-profit organizations, private sector businesses, 

and even survivors--each drawing upon their unique skills and capabilities-will need to work 

together to meet the needs of disaster survivors. 

Hurricanes Irma and Maria: Impacts and Federal Response 

Hurricane Irma 

On September 6, 2017, the eye of Hurricane Irma made landfall in the British Virgin Islands, just 

north of the US VI, as a catastrophic Category 5 hurricane. Extreme winds and heavy rainfall 

ravaged the USVl, particularly St. Thomas and St. John. Hurricane Irma then continued on its 

path of destruction, passing just north of Puerto Rico on September 7-still as a Category 5 

storm-leaving more than one million customers without power. 

President Trump approved an emergency declaration for Puerto Rico on September 5, making 

available Federal assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures. The 

President approved a major disaster declaration tor Puerto Rico on September I 0, making 

available Federal assistance through FEMA's Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs. 

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FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) was activated to a Level! (the highest 

level of activation, with all Emergency Support Functions activated) prior to Hurricane Irma's 

impacts on the USVI and Puerto Rico. Federal personnel were also pre-positioned in Puerto 

Rico to coordinate with territorial and municipal officials. This included FEMA staff that 

operate out of the Caribbean Area Division office located in San Juan, regional personnel from 

FEMA's Region ll (which has responsibility for both Puerto Rico and the USVI). as well as 

Incident Management Assistance Teams (!MATs) that were deployed to the territory. Additional 

federal resources and personnel were strategically staged just outside of the storm's path, 

including ships from the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense. Once the storm had 

passed, these additional federal resources and personnel flowed into the territories as part of a 

unified federal response. 

Hurricane Maria 

On September 19--only two weeks after Hurricane Irma hit- the eye of Hurricane Maria 

passed just south of the USV! on its way to making landfall in Puerto Rico on September 20. 

The Commonwealth was devastated by Hurricane Maria's powerful winds and heavy rainfall, 

which severely damaged communications and power grids, destroyed homes, and downed trees 

across both islands. In its wake, Hurricane Maria-the fifth-strongest storm ever to impact the 

United States and territories, and the strongest storm to strike Puerto Rico in nearly a centuryleft nearly all of Puerto Rico's 3.5 million people without power or communications. 

President Trump approved an emergency declaration for Puerto Rico on September 18, making 

available Federal assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures. President 

Trump approved a major disaster declaration for Puerto Rico on September 20, making available 

Federal assistance through FEMA's Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard 

Mitigation Grant Programs. The federal government also immediately launched a massive and 

unified response and recovery operation, building on efforts from Hurricane Irma. 

One day after Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico, there were already more than 2,000 federal 

staff on the ground in Puerto Rico supporting response and recovery operations. These included 

a National Incident Management Assistance Team (N-IMA T), Disaster Medical Assistance 

Teams (DMATs) and FEMA Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) taskforces that vvere 

prepositioned to operate immediately following the storm's landfall. At the height of the 

response efforts, more than 19,000 federal staff from 80 federal agencies (including 

approximately 3,000 FEMA personnel) were deployed in support of Puerto Rico working around 

the clock with territorial and local officials to stabilize the situation. 

Helping Survivors Recover 

FEMA and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico established the largest domestic sea-bridge 

operation in U.S. history, delivering more than a billion dollars in commodities, such as food, 

water, tarps, and construction materials, to Puerto Rico in support of disaster survivors. These 

commodities were delivered by air, off-road vehicles and on foot, making it the largest and 

longest commodity delivery mission in FEMA 's history. 

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ln one of the largest medical response missions ever, more than 4, 700 medical personnel 

deployed and cared for more than 38,000 survivors. 

In total, FEMA has approved almost $10 billion in response and recovery efforts, in addition to 

the more than $1 billion approved and dispersed to disaster survivors by the U.S. Small Business 

Administration. 

FEMA mission-assigned 80 federal agencies with more than 700 mission assignments, 

supporting power restoration, including temporary power and transmission and distribution line 

repair, debris removal, temporary roofing, response operations, oil and hazardous material cleanup, disaster case management, and technical expertise and support. 

More than $ L2 billion in FEMA grants are in the hands of homeowners and renters. Survivors 

are receiving funds for rental assistance or to repair their homes, and to cover other needs such as 

eligible medical expenses and loss of personal property. 

Power Restoration Efforts 

Temporary Power 

Power restoration has been a top priority for FEMA following Irma and Maria. On September 

22, 2017, FEMA mission assigned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to provide 

emergency power generation to the Commonwealth. Since beginning the temporary power 

mission, USACE has installed more than 1,900 emergency generators in Puerto Rico. The 

Hurricane Maria temporary power mission is the largest disaster generator mission in U.S. 

history. 

FEMA, along with its federal and NGO partners, has also worked closely with the Governor and 

agencies in Puerto Rico to ensure that temporary power support continues to be prioritized tor 

critical facilities such as hospitals, police and fire stations, communications facilities, and water 

treatment plants. 

Emergency Power Grid Repairs 

ln order to provide a stable power solution for survivors, FEMA has also supported restoration of 

the electrical power grid on Puerto Rico. On September 28, FEMA issued a mission assignment 

to USACE to assist the Pue1to Rico Electric Power Authority (PREP A) with interim repairs to 

segments of the electrical grid to allow temporary restoration across the island. Specifically, 

USACE was tasked to help restore temporary power and "lead planning, coordination and 

integration efforts in preparation to execute electrical power grid restoration in Puerto Rico due 

to impacts caused by Hurricane Maria" and to "develop and execute applicable temporary repairs 

to the electrical grid to allow interim restoration of system segments as directed by FEMA until 

the full electrical grid restoration can be implemented.'' 

As assigned by FEMA, USACE leads the federal effort to repair the hurricane-damaged 

electrical power grid in support of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. USACE is partnering with 

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PREP A, the Department of Energy (DOE), and FEMA to restore safe and reliable power to the 

people of Puerto Rico. 

Puerto Rico has 2,400 miles of transmission lines across the island and 30,000 miles of 

distribution lines with more than 300 sub-stations. As of March 7, PREP A r~tports more than 91 

percent or approximately 1.35 of the 1.4 7 million pre-storm customers who are able to receive 

electric power have their service restored. 

In addition to USACE, FEMA has also mission-assigned the DOE to assist with power grid 

restoration. The DOE is providing subject matter expertise and technical assistance in support of 

power grid damage assessments and power restoration efforts in Puerto Rico, in coordination 

with USACE. Additionally, the DOE is also working to identifY various options for the longterm restoration and resilience of Puerto Rico's electric grid. 

The Road to Recovery: Delivering FEMA's Infrastructure Assistance Programs 

Public Assistance in Support of Power Restoration 

PREP A is ultimately responsible for the permanent repair of power generation, transmission, and 

distribution infrastructure. However, FEMA and its federal partners (including USACE and 

DOE) are closely supporting their efforts. 

FEMA is primarily supporting the restoration of the Puerto Rico power grid through its Public 

Assistance program. As of March 9, FEMA has approved nearly $1.3 billion in Public 

Assistance emergency work for Puerto Rico. 

FEMA is also working with Puerto Rico on the development and execution of Public Assistance 

permanent work projects, which will include the restoration of utilities-including power. As of 

March 9, $245 million dollars in federal assistance has been obligated for emergency repairs 

related to electrical utilities in Puerto Rico. 

On February 9, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of2018. Under 

authorities given to FEMA in this law, FEMA may provide Public Assistance funding for critical 

services to replace or restore the function of a facility or system to industry standards without 

restrictions based on their pre-disaster condition. The law further allows FEMA to provide 

assistance for critical services to replace or restore components of the facility or system that are 

not damaged by the disaster when it is necessary to fully effectuate the replacement or 

restoration of disaster-damaged components to restore the fimction of the facility or system to 

industry standards. 

FEMA will continue to work with our partners to effectively integrate and implement all of our 

disaster assistance programs in support of power restoration efforts in Puerto Rico to include 

working with the U.S. Department ofl-lousing and Urban Development on its authority under 

the Bipartisan Budget Act of20 18 to provide up to $2 billion in funding for enhanced or 

improved electrical power systems. 

Public Assistance Alternative Procedures in Puerto Rico 

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On October 30,2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico elected to use Public Assistance 

Alternative Procedures for all large project Public Assistance funding for permanent work 

pursuant to section 428 of the Stafford Act. Under authorities granted to FEMA in the Sandy 

Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA), Public Assistance Alternative Procedures allow applicants 

to request and obtain funding based on certified cost estimates to repair, restore, or replace a 

damaged facility. Once FEMA and the applicant agree on the damage assessment, scope of 

work, and estimated costs, a Public Assistance grant can be obligated. Prior to Alternative 

Procedures, a grantee would have to fund the project and seek reimbursement upon completion 

of established milestones. Alternative Procedures is a good option for governments that may not 

have the ability to pay for these projects up front. 

The goals of the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures are to reduce costs, increase flexibility 

in the administration of assistance, expedite the delivery of assistance, and provide financial 

incentives for the timely and cost-effective completion of Public Assistance projects. The 

alternative procedures also allow Public Assistance applicants to retain funding when there are 

cost underruns and utilize those funds for eligible additional hazard mitigation measures and for 

activities that improve future Public Assistance program permanent work operations. 

Pursuant to the Governor's election of section 428, FEMA will administer Public Assistance 

permanent work projects in Puerto Rico using the Alternative Procedures. As a condition of 

receiving funding under these procedures, the President required that the Commonwealth 

establish a grant oversight authority supported by third-party experts to perform the 

responsibilities of the grant recipient. On October 23, 2017, the Governor of Puerto Rico 

ordered the creation of the Central Recovery and Reconstruction Ofiice (CRRO) of Puerto Rico. 

The CRRO will provide the required grant oversight authority. FEMA will also require that any 

cost estimate over a pre-determined amount will be reviewed by a third-party independent 

expert. 

Long-Term Recovery 

Puerto Rico faces a challenging road to recovery. These devastating hurricanes struck after a 

decade of economic and fiscal crisis that had already led to the exodus of more than I 0 percent 

of Puerto Rico's population, and that exodus has only accelerated since the hurricanes. The 

long-term recovery of Puerto Rico depends on addressing the causes of Puerto Rico's extremely 

low labor force participation rate and related fiscal crisis. A vital first step is the hurricane 

recovery mission. 

As both the Federal Coordinating Officer and the Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for 

Puerto Rico, I continue to work closely with the government of Puerto Rico and tederal response 

leadership to facilitate disaster recovery coordination and collaboration between federaL 

territorial and municipal governments, private sector entities, and voluntary, faith-based, and 

otherNGOs. 

In order to meet the long-term recovery needs of Puerto Rico, FEMA has fully implemented the 

structure and functions of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) to ensure that 

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federal recovery efforts remain coordinated and effective across all six Recovery Support 

Functions (RSFs). For this disaster, FEMA created a strategic solutions-based sector approach to 

recovery, expanding upon the six RSFs to bring together support for key areas of impact. 

In particular, FEMA has leveraged the NDRF and the Recovery Support Function Leadership 

group to support the Infrastructure Systems RSF, which is led by USACE. In Puerto Rico, the 

Infrastructure Systems RSF has been subdivided into five sectors in order to address the 

magnitude of damage across multiple infrastructure systems. These sectors are: Energy/Power; 

Public Buildings; Water; Transportation; Communications/IT. 

Each of the remaining RSFs, Housing, Economic Recovery, Health and Social Services, Natural 

and Cultural Resources and Community Planning and Capacity Building, coordinates support for 

its corresponding sector. In addition, there is an overarching sector tor municipalities, which 

includes resources and support from all six RSFs. 

Conclusion 

Within one month's time, FEMA was responding to three major hurricanes, two of which hit 

Puerto Rico within two weeks. By the end of2017, FEMA registered more than4.7 million 

survivors for individual assistance -more registrations than for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, 

and Sandy combined. The Agency has also distributed more than $2 billion in individual 

assistance to survivors, processeD !33,000 flood insurance claims, and paid out more than $6.3 

billion to policyholders across the country. 

In addition to providing financial support, FEMA also deployed thousands of our employees, 

mission assigned nearly 14,000 staff and service members from various offices of the 

Department of Defense, and-for the first time ever-the Secretary of Homeland Security 

extended the DHS Surge Capacity Force to all federal agencies in order to deploy approximately 

4,000 employees from across 36 federal departments and agencies. We have also welcomed 

hundreds of new FEMA Local Hire and Reservist employees to assist with recovery efforts. I 

cannot recall a more challenging hurricane season, nor a more impressive whole community 

response, in my history of emergency management. 

The road to recovery will be a long one, but FEMA will continue to work with its Federal, state, 

territorial, tribal, and local partners, as well as Congress, throughout the recovery process, 

Though the power grid in Puerto Rico was significantly damaged, we continue to see progress in 

power restoration every day. We will also be in the impacted communities for as long as we are 

needed. 

l am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this important mission, 

and I am happy to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may have at this time. Thank you. 

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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Parks, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PARKS 

Mr. PARKS. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, Representative Gonzalez-Colon, and other members, thank you for the 

opportunity to be here today. 

The mission of DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability is to develop innovative solutions to ensure that our Nation’s energy infrastructure remains reliable, affordable, and resilient. In order to fulfill this mission, we leverage the technical capabilities of the national laboratories, the power marketing authorities, and partnership with the private sector. 

Our organization is the lead for providing energy-related expertise to FEMA, interagency partners, and the administration emergency response activities. We’re the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function 12 under the National Response Framework and the sector-specific agency for energy under Presidential 

Directive 21. 

In addition, we’re the primary agency for infrastructure systems 

recovery support function under the National Disaster Recovery 

Framework. 

The impacts of these hurricanes, as mentioned, adding to their 

pre-existing conditions of the grid in Puerto Rico has led to an unprecedented restoration period. The significant damage done to the 

electricity sector and the complicated nature of an island response 

created major logistical challenges, as mentioned by Mr. Byrne. In the wake of these, DOE has received $17 million in mission 

assignments from FEMA to provide technical assistance for hurricane response and recovery. In addition, we received $13 million in 

the supplemental funding for response and recovery activities. This 

gives us the opportunity to help the Commonwealth incorporate resilience and reliability into the new Puerto Rico grid. 

The hurricane season of 2017 serves to highlight the need for a 

continued and adaptive focus on energy system resilience. The 

presence of responders at utility operations and early engagement 

with utilities is crucial, especially in the presence of Federal and 

State emergency operation centers. 

The administration has conveyed in numerous hearings that 

Congress should revisit the Stafford Act, and recovery efforts would 

focus on resilience and investments that will mitigate further damage. As mentioned, having the flexibility to do more than just restore back to pre-existing conditions in a situation like Puerto Rico 

is crucial. 

We also brought in the power marketing authorities with their 

knowledge of building systems. Long-term deployments have really 

stressed our capacity, as this has been the longest deployment that 

we’ve ever had, at 6 months. 

We are working on a plan to develop Puerto Rico’s grid, listing 

actions and options for building in greater resiliency, power quality, and reliability. It will include developing a power flow model 

for Puerto Rico that allows better both grid planning and grid operations. This will inform FEMA’s overarching comprehensive plan 

as required in the supplemental funding legislation. 


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DOE has also engaged in Southern States Energy Board to provide support to the Puerto Rico Governor on territorial regulatory 

and policy issues to set up the best structure for going forward in 

the future. 

I am grateful for and impressed by the hard work of the emergency responders and recovery experts during this hurricane season. 

Over the next several months, our primary focus in Puerto Rico 

will be working with our partners to support the ability of the 

power grid and the critical infrastructure to withstand future 

events in a reliable, resilient, and affordable manner. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Parks follows:] 


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Written Testimony of William Parks, Senior Technical Advisor 

Office of Electricity Delivery and 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Reliability 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

March 21, 2018 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, 

I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the challenges to hurricane response and recovery 

efforts in Puerto Rico 

Upon being sworn into his current position as head of the Office of Electricity Delivery and 

Energy Reliability (OE) last fall, Assistant Secretary Bruce Walker's first order of business was 

to travel to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). Arriving on October 23'". he spent 

the next two weeks assisting with the response and recovery efforts. !twas imperative for our 

office to see firsthand the destruction wrought by Hurricanes Irma and Maria and to understand 

how the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department) could continue to best assist our 

fellow Americans. 

The mission ofOE is to develop innovative, cutting-edge solutions to ensure that our Nation's 

energy infrastructure remains reliable, affordable, and resilient. ln order to fulfill this mission, 

DOE leverages the technical capabilities of the National Laboratories and partnerships with key 

private sector stakeholders to focus on early-stage research and transformative projects. 

Our organization is also the lead for providing energy-related expertise to the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), interagency partners, and the Administration as part of DOE's 

emergency response activities. DOE serves as the coordinating agency f(x Emergency Support 

Function #12- Energy (ESF-12) under the National Response Framework and as the SectorSpecific Agency (SSA) for Energy under Presidential Policy Directive 21. ln addition, DOE is a 

primary agency for the Infrastructure Systems Recovery Suppott Function under the National 

Disaster Recovery Framework (NRDF). As the lead for ESF-12, DOE is responsible for 

providing information and analysis about energy disruptions and for helping to facilitate the 

restoration of damaged energy infrastructure. 
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Hurricanes Irma and Maria Response 

In early September, Hurricane Irma, the second major hurricane to make landfall in the United 

States last year, swept through the Caribbean and into the southeast United States, causing 

billions of dollars in estimated damages, millions of customer power outages, and tragically, 

numerous fatalities. 

Just two weeks later, before Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands had recovered from Irma, 

Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a dangerous Category 4 hurricane, bringing 

powerful winds and major flooding that rendered much of the Commonwealth's transmission and 

distribution infrastructure inoperable and left virtually all 1.5 million electricity customers on the 

island without power. 

ln Puerto Rico, restoration efforts continue, and as of March 19, 93% of customers have been 

restored and all 78 municipalities are at least partially energized. 1 In the U.S. Virgin Islands, 

restoration efforts are nearing completion, with 99% of eligible customers restored and a "No 

Customer Left Behind'' campaign underway to ensure restoration of all customers impacted by 

the storms. 

The significant damage to the energy sector caused by these hurricanes in Puerto Rico and the 

USV! and the complicated nature of an island response created significant logistical challenges 

as well as a response and recovery timeline that is longer than a Continental United States 

(CONUS) event. In a CONUS event, the electricity sector has well established mechanisms to 

provide mutual assistance, as demonstrated during Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. This highlights 

the need for power system operators to carry out robust pre-event planning and coordination. 

The movement of crews and equipment to non-contiguous parts ofthe United States, in this case 

Puerto Rico and the USVL is far more challenging. At the height of the response to these 

territories, 1,500 mainland mutual assistance crews and support personnel were deployed, along 

with 5.000 contractors under U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Further, the near-total loss of 

power after Hurricanes Irma and Maria made communications on the island quite difficult. 

ln the wake of these catastrophic events, DOE has received $!7 million in mission assignments 

from FEMA to provide technical assistance for hurricane response and recovery (Irma: 6 mission 

assignments, $2.3 million; Maria: 11 mission assignments, $14.7 million). Additionally, DOE 

has received $13 million in supplemental funding from Congress for response and recovery 

activities already conducted, as well as for funding project activities to assist Puerto Rico as they 

rebuild their energy infrastructure. This provides DOE the opportunity to help the 

Commonwealth incorporate increased resilience and reliability into the new Puerto Rico electric 

grid through the utilization of current OE programs and activities. 

Over the course of the 2017 hurricane season, the Department provided personnel to support the 

National Response Coordination Center and several Regional Response Coordination Centers in 

support ofFEMA response operations. This included bilingual public information personnel to 

' http://status.pr/Home 

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provide life safety and life sustaining communications, subject matter experts as part of FEMA's 

Incident Management Assistance Teams, as well as technical advisors in electrical distribution, 

transmission, generation, energy efficiency, renewable energy, and related topics to advise the 

United States Army Corps of Engineers (US ACE) on the assessment, planning, and 

reconstruction of the electrical grid in Puerto Rico. 

During the response to Hurricane Maria. DOE has deployed 94 responders and recovery efforts 

in Puerto Rico are still underway. DOE continues to maintain close coordination with FEMA 

and ten subject matter experts from the Power Marketing Administrations remain deployed to 

provide technical support to USACE with restoration planning, cost estimates, validation, and 

quality assurance. DOE has also deployed a responder under the NDRF to support FEMA 

recovery activities and continues to coordinate with industry to facilitate additional mutual 

assistance. 

ESF-12 responders deployed to both the USVI and Puerto Rico came from DOE sites across the 

country, including available personnel from both the Western Area Power Administration 

(WAPA) and the Bonneville Power Administration. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, DOE deployed 

ESF-!2 responders to both St. Croix and St. Thomas to support FEMA, as well as 25 personnel 

and J 0 line-trucks from W APA, to provide mutual assistance through multiple DOE mission 

assignments from FEMA. The crews from WAP A were tasked with supporting the restoration 

of the transmission system on St. Thomas, which was completed in November 2017, and the 

ESF-12 responders on the USV! were demobilized in January 2018. 

A team from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory was also deployed to the USV! to 

perform a power generation assessment under a FEMA mission assignment. DOE worked 

with the US VI and private sector partners to facilitate additional mutual assistance from 

industry. 

Additionally, through DOE-funded projects, we are leveraging the expertise of our National 

Laboratories to develop potential long-term solutions to improve the resiliency of the Puerto 

Rican infrastructure. l want to assure the Subcommittee that DOE will continue to support the 

work needed to restore power to Puerto Rico. I'd also like to thank all of the utility crews and 

responders for their dedication and hard work in restoring power. 

With every event, industry is the front line. The Department's activities as part of our SSA, 

ESF-12, and responsibilities include coordinating the response, exchange of information, waiver 

facilitation, and identification of unmet needs. Our goal is a safe, effective, and efficient 

response and recovery. Hurricanes and similar events have well established and exercised roles 

and responsibilities for electric sector coordination between industry and DOE. 

It is also important to recognize industry's unwavering support of the American citizens in 

Puerto Rico and the US VI, in addition to their recovery efforts. Our coordination, with the 

Subsector Coordinating Councils--especially the Electric Subsector CEO coordination-has been 

very effective. Our work with state, local, and territorial governments, the Oil and Natural Gas 

Subsector Coordinating Council, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, and the 

Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center has been critical to the response and 

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recovery efforts. These partnerships have demonstrated success in coordination after Hurricane 

Harvey and Irma and with respect to Hurricane Maria, there were tough lessons that we are still 

learning from this response and recovery. 

Lessons Learned from 2017 Hurricane Season 

The hurricane season of20 17 serves to highlight the need for a continued and adaptive focus on 

energy system resilience. The recent severe weather events, changing resource mix, and 

dynamic nature of grid technologies-including changes on the demand side---are bringing grid 

resilience to a new, more prominent place in the national dialogue. Specifically, as we keep one 

eye on day-to-day reliability and resource adequacy, we must also do better to incorporate 

resilience into the discussion. 

The Department is finalizing a 2017 response season after action report and preliminary findings 

indicate the presence of responders at utility operation centers and early engagement with 

utilities is critical, in addition to presence at the Federal and state emergency operations centers. 

For oil and natural gas critical infrastructure, the biggest challenges are issues around anti-trust 

and information sharing, e.g., the Department utilized GasBuddy and other public tools for 

gasoline station status and refinery status information was obtained by the Energy Information 

Administration per the National Petroleum Council Report. 

Specifically as relates to the USV!, direct support by the Power Marketing Administrations was 

important to response efforts. Island response efforts highlighted the challenges of movement of 

equipment and crews outside CONUS. Additionally, long term deployments stressed the 

Department's capability to support recovery efforts and the issue of dedicated staff versus 

volunteers should be revisited. 

The Department continues to assist the territories as they work to rebuild their energy 

infrastructure. We are working to consolidate the various plans for rebuilding Puerto Rico's grid 

and providing input into one overarching, comprehensive plan, per the supplemental funding 

legislation. DOE will continue to provide advice and counsel to Puerto Rico as they work 

toward a more reliable and resilient grid. Such efforts have enormous long term benefits, as we 

have seen with other utilities in other jurisdictions. 

Resilience 

As part of a comprehensive effort to reduce the impact of severe weather events, utilities in three 

hurricane-prone regions invested hundreds of millions of dollars over the last several years to 

improve their systems, including advanced communicating technologies across their 

transmission, distribution, and customer systems to mitigate and recover from grid disturbances. 

In Florida, while it's difficult to compare storms, during Hurricane Wilma in 2005, more than 

11,000 Florida Power and Light poles fell or snapped, and 24! substations experienced major 

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damage while close to J 00 transmission structures were damaged. However, grid hardening 

since Wilma limited the damage to less than !,500 toppled poles. no major damage to 

substations, and no damage to transmission structures during Hurricane Irma. 

In mid-to-late August 2017 in Houston, at the peak of outages, 306,000 customers were without 

power in Texas and Louisiana from Hurricane Harvey, whereas when Hurricane Ike hit Houston 

in 2008, 2.l million customers were knocked of!line. Some of this dramatic reduction was due 

to CenterPoint Energy's enhanced physical and remote operational protections to prevent 

damage at the vast majority of their 250 substations. CenterPoint's investment also built out 

their capability to safely reroute power around damaged grid equipment to maintain connections 

for more customers. 

The immense challenges that New Orleans faced in the aftermath of Katrina were intensified by 

electric grid failures. System-wide power outages made it difficult to resume essential recovery 

activities such as t1ood control operations, water supply and treatment, transportation, emergency 

response, and banking. Even Memorial Medical Center had its backup generator fail 48 hours 

after the stom1. 

ln January 2016, researchers at Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories teamed up with 

the City of New Orleans and other partners through DOE's Grid Modernization Laboratory 

Consortium to identify grid modernization priorities to minimize the negative consequences to 

particularly vulnerable communities. The analysis identified the lifeline services that receive 

greatest benefit from improved power resilience, and subsequently, identified clusters of highimpact infrastructure in those areas that can be served by advanced micro grids. 

As a result of this research, the City of New Orleans is now equipped with a prioritization and 

implementation plan, developed in conjunction with the local utility and community 

stakeholders, to protect the grid that serves areas of most critical need. 

Conclusion 

I am grateful for the hard work of DOE's emergency responders during the 2017 hurricane 

season. We have made progress, but there is still more to do. Over the next several months, 

DOE's primary focus in Puerto Rico will be working with our partners to support the mission of 

restoring the power grid and critical infrastructure. 

Secretary Perry and our DOE team look forward to a thoughtful conversation focused on our 

response to this season's hurricanes, and on the reliability, affordability, and resilience of the 

electricity system from hurricanes, as well as other extreme weather events. 

Thank you, and !look forward to your questions. 

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24 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lopez, you’re up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PETER LOPEZ 

Mr. LOPEZ. Thank you, Chairman. And in the interest of time, 

I will try to consolidate my remarks. You have the full testimony 

in front of you. 

So good morning, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, 

Representative Gonzalez Colon, members of the subcommittee. 

My name is Pete Lopez. I’m the Regional Administrator for Region 2, which comprises New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, U.S. 

Virgin Islands, and eight federally recognized Indian nations. 

Mr. LOPEZ. So I’m very pleased to be part of this assemblage 

today. 

Just to put it in perspective, my experience in New York State, 

as a State assembly member, gave me the opportunity to be involved in intense storm-related recovery. In my region, Northern 

Appalachian, we were impacted by Hurricane Irene and Tropical 

Storm Lee. And just to put it in perspective, my family was homeless, my parents homeless. We struggled with many of the similar 

issues impacting Puerto Rico. 

The challenge, of course, of geographic isolation and the socioeconomic conditions also gave me a sensitivity and an understanding of how complicated it can be to respond when you have 

an isolated and economically disadvantaged community. So, effectively, the more disadvantaged, the slower and more painful the recovery. 

On a personal note, I also have family on the island. And I can 

tell you, as I work with my colleagues, and I’m very pleased with 

their engagement, we take this personally. 

Mr. LOPEZ. We are galvanized by their struggles, and we are 

working intensely to provide results. 

I traveled to the islands last fall. Actually, I took off in October 

just as the storms were hitting. We made our initial visit. And the 

issue there was to focus not just on structure and function, but also 

on coordinating and seeking problem-solving opportunities, be creative with our problem solving. 

I plan to go back in the next few weeks to engage as we transfer 

between response and recovery, each being a little bit different. So 

with that said, we have been very pleased to work with FEMA, 

Army Corps, other colleagues, our State and Federal partners, our 

local partners. We realize that the work is not complete and that 

this will be a long time—a long journey, just to sum it up. 

So in terms of our actions, we have spent roughly $69 million. 

We have other funds that we are working to engage with as we 

move into recovery. You will see a listing of all the work that we 

have done, a sampling of it. Just in highlighting, we have addressed chemical and hazardous waste facilities, Superfund and oil 

sites. We have addressed water treatment plants, sewer treatment 

plants, ambient air monitoring, hazardous waste, hazardous household waste, vegetative debris. The list goes on. Coast Guard, 

partnering with them to remove oil and hazardous substances. We 

are very focused, and we will remain committed. 


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25 

So as we move forward, we are very pleased to be part of the response protocol under FEMA. We are actively engaged, and are not 

lead on issues, but we are helping support, almost like wing men. 

I guess that is the best way to describe us. We are tucked right 

in there and working collectively. 

So the other thing that is of note as we move forward is that 

there are very serious issues, and I just want to highlight this 

quickly. As we rebuild, we also want to make sure there is capacity 

from the local governments to be sustainable as well. So in terms 

of their management structure, their organizational structure, the 

financing of solid waste landfill, maintenance over time, those are 

serious issues to us, and we will be helping to support that as well. 

So in sum, our success depends on our communication, our integration, State, Federal, local level, and our creative thinking. So we 

thank Congress for the resources, and we are doing our best. We 

will continue. Public safety, health of the environment matters, and 

we are right there. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Lopez follows:] 


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Testimony of 

Peter D. Lopez, Regional Administrator 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2 

before the 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

March 21, 2018 

Good morning Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch and members of the 

Subcommittee. lam Pete Lopez, Regional Administrator for U.S. EPA's Region 2. which covers 

New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and eight federally-recognized 

Indian Nations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss EPA's important role in 

helping Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to !lowing Hurricanes Irma and Maria. 

EXPERIENCE WITH fRENE AND LEE: 

ln my years of experience as a New York State Legislator, I was intensely involved in a 

response to a devastating storm like Irma and Maria. In 20 II, upstate New York was hit by 

Hurricane ]rene and Tropical Storm Lee. Here. my parents and family members were left 

homeless and six out of seven counties in my district were placed in states of emergency. My 

region was devastated by these storms, which was particularly challenging given the 

geographically isolated areas and socioeconomic conditions. Throughout my experience with 

Irene and Lee, I developed an understanding of how complicated it can be for isolated areas to 

recover, and I learned that the more disadvantaged the community, the slower and more painful 

the recovery. 
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HURRICANES IRMA, MARIA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 

Let me tum to EPA's response and the continued recovery efforts in Puerto Rico and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands. I traveled to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands last October and plan to 

return next month. The focus of the trip was not to simply observe EPA's work, but to also 

strengthen relationships with the Commonwealth, Territory and local officials and find creative 

solutions to pressing local problems. 

Responding to hurricanes in the Caribbean presents some unique challenges. The 

logistical challenges of the island setting and pre-existing weaknesses in the state of the 

infrastructure in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, along with economic struggles of both 

governments, have been greatly exacerbated by these two hurricanes. EPA has worked closely 

with the local governments and with FEMA, the U.S. Corps of Engineers and others to make 

systems operational. This effort has been largely successful, but the work is not complete and 

there is much to be done. 

I am proud of EPA's etrorts in the Caribbean. Over the past seven months, EPA has 

deployed more than 730 people to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and spent more than 

$53 million on our efforts. Some of the work that EPA has accomplished includes: 

Assessing a total of 300 chemical and hazardous waste facilities 177 in Puerto Rico 

and 123 in U.S. Virgin Islands as well as a 32 Superfund and oil sites in Puerto Rico 

and four in the U.S. Virgin Islands; 

o Rehabilitating the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (PREQB) Analytical 

Laboratory in Monacil!o in order to restore it to its fully operational capacity; 

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Here, we completed infrastructure, equipment and training needs evaluations 

and have ordered necessary lab equipment, supplies, and services, including a 

permanent backup generator which, once installed, will be critical in ensuring 

the conduct of important Jab operations. The lab is scheduled to be back 

online in late May. 

o EPA, working with Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands governments, completed 

more than 200 wastewater treatment plant and pump station assessments in Puerto 

Rico and more than 30 in the U.S. Virgin Islands; 

o EPA also worked with the Puerto Rico government to help assess all 114 drinking 

water plants in Puerto Rico and assessed more than 500 small drinking water systems, 

many of them cistern systems, in the U.S. Virgin Islands; 

o EPA took approximately 240 samples from drinking water systems in Puerto Rico in 

coordination with the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) and 

sampled 228 water systems not run by PRASA. EPA also completed assessments of 

237 non-PRASA systems. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, EPA took about 2,400 drinking 

water samples, mostly from cisterns; 

o EPA also performed curb-side pick-up and established 40 household hazardous waste 

and debris collections centers in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Under the 

household hazardous waste program, EPA collected over 173,000 items in Puerto 

Rico and over 135,000 items in the U.S. Virgin Islands, and much of this includes 

hard to dispose of electronic waste; 

o Working with the government of Puerto Rico, EPA has assessed 19 ambient air 

monitoring sites in Puerto Rico that were shut down as a result of the hurricanes; 

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o Working with the Commonwealth and Territory, we developed a list of damaged 

equipment, identified replacement needs, and prepared cost analyses to rebuild and 

restart the networks. PREQB has restarted several of its monitors and requested a 

FEMA mission assignment to restore its remaining sites. The equipment is in the 

process of being ordered; 

o EPA worked with the U.S. Coast Guard to remove oil and hazardous substances from 

327 of the total 377 sunken vessels. 

MOVING FORWARD TO RECOVERY: 

As the agency now turns its full focus to recovery in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands, we recognize that there are deeper economic challenges than most states in mainland 

United States, so capacity building and measurable positive environmental outcomes are our 

main goals as we begin our recovery work. To that end, the EPA is developing a Hurricanes 

Irma and Maria Recovery Frameworkfor Puerto Rico and the US. Virgin Islands that will 

complement the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) led interagency effort to 

compile a comprehensive recovery strategy for rebuilding from the storm events. 

Moving forward, EPA is already working jointly with FEMA, the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) and other partners to further assess disaster recovery needs and develop a 

joint 180-Day Plan tor Puerto Rico and a joint Recovery Support Strategy for the U.S. Virgin 

Islands. Building on our response work under specific mission assignments from FEMA, our 

collective recovery efforts moving forward are focused on such critical sectors as: 

o PRASA and non-PRASA drinking water facilities in Puerto Rico; 

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o PRASA's Wastewater facilities in Puerto Rico; 

o U,S, Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (WAPA) facilities; 

o U,S, Virgin Islands Waste Management Authority's wastewater facilities; 

o Impaired stormwater infrastructure in Puerto Rico; and 

o Open dumps and landfills in both Puerto Rico and U,S, Virgin Islands, including 

operations and capacities assessments, 

ln addition, EPA is collaborating with the Department of Energy (DOE) providing 

technical assistance to determine the viability of solar energy projects in both Puerto Rico and 

U ,S, Virgin Islands, This will include assessing whether Brownfields, closed landfills, Superfund 

sites and other open areas have any potential for solar power, Here, we will be reaching out to 

the government of Puerto Rico and local government and communities to determine whether the 

islands ofCulebra and Vieques would be good candidates for a potential microgrid pilot 

Access to clean drinking water and the support of wastewater infrastructure will remain a 

top priority, Among the initiatives already identified, we are helping to develop and implement 

resilience strategies for drinking water and wastewater facilities in both Puerto Rico and the U.S, 

Virgin Islands, including a strategy to reduce the clogging of drinking water intakes during 

heavy rain events, especially in Puerto Rico. We will also look into the viability of connecting 

schools that do not have sewers to PRASA wastewater systems, as well as aiding smaller. nonPRASA drinking water systems to sustainably get them back on their feet. 

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EPA has been focused on strengthening solid waste infrastructure and closing open 

dumps for years, and we will continue to do so. Key to improving the solid waste crises in both 

the U.S. Virgin Islands and in Puerto Rico is to help those governments develop and implement 

solid waste management plans and local disaster debris management plans. We also want to 

encourage the reduction of waste by helping to implement composting pilot projects and 

recycling capabilities for both Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands. EPA wants to do what we 

can to equip Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands with resilient and sustainable energy 

sources. 

Recovery will be a long road, and the funding and process associated with recovery is 

very different from the funding tor response. The viability of EPA's recovery plan relies heavily 

on our strong partnership with FEMA and fellow agencies, as well as with the relationships we 

have with the governments ofPucrto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, local communities, nongovernmental organizations, and professionals. lt is our goal to fully engage with our partners to 

make the recovery of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands successful, impactful, and long 

lasting. 

These collaborative efforts will enable all of us to better safeguard the health and safety 

of the people of Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands while helping them sustainably protect their 

natural resources. Thank you again for the opportunity to testifY today. I look forward to any 

questions the Subcommittee might have on EPA's important role in emergency response and 

recovery efforts. 

6 
32 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. Mr. Aaronson, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT AARONSON 

Mr. AARONSON. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, Representative Gonzalez-Colon, and members of the 

subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here to discuss power restoration in Puerto Rico. And I will also abbreviate my remarks as best 

I can in the interest of time. I will also direct you to the pictures 

that we are going to have rolling. Pictures really are worth 1,000 

words to understand the level of devastation and the amount of 

restoration work that is going on. 

I am here today testifying on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute member companies, which is all the Nation’s investor-owned 

electric companies. 

When duty calls, EEI’s companies, crews, and contractors bring 

decades of experience and unique capabilities to restore power for 

those affected by natural disasters. That spirt of mutual assistance 

is a hallmark of our industry and was on full display throughout 

the historic 2017 hurricane season as all segments of the industry 

worked closely with our Federal partners in response to Hurricanes 

Harvey, Irma, and Nate, as well as the wildfires ravaged the Western United States. And that coordination continues today in support of the people of Puerto Rico. 

As has been noted, 2 days ago, we marked the 6-month anniversary of the day Hurricane Marie made landfall. This devastating 

category 4 hurricane impacted all critical infrastructure on the island, including the energy grid. The magnitude of destruction to 

the grid is unlike anything we have ever seen on the U.S. mainland, making this power restoration mission more difficult than 

other missions. As of today, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, or PREPA, reports that more than 93 percent of the 1.47 million customers who can receive electricity, have had their power restored. It is important to note that one customer is equal to one 

electric meter, but that one meter may serve several people. 

That progress could not have been made without the partnership 

of PREPA, FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors, and the many mutual assistance crews who worked tirelessly to restore power for the people of Puerto Rico. And while 

there has been significant progress, nobody deserves to be without 

power for this long. EEI, our member companies, and the rest of 

the industry, remain committed to this mission in helping our fellow citizens on the island. 

To that end, I would like to explain our industry’s role and the 

challenges we had faced in supporting power restoration. PREPA 

made its initial ask for mutual assistance from the mainland industry on October 31. Since then, nearly 60 investor-owned electric 

companies and public power utilities have committed personnel, 

equipment, and materials to the efforts. 

Within days of receiving the request for mutual assistance, two 

industry storm bosses, or incident response experts, were deployed 

to Puerto Rico to assess the situation on the ground and develop 

a comprehensive restoration plan. It should be noted that a contingent of industry crews from New York, including EEI member 


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crews, has been on the island since October from agreement between Governors Rossello and Cuomo. 

Our November 22, Governor Rossello appointed Carlos Torres, 

who is formerly of Con Edison, as the power restoration coordinator 

to oversee the multi-pronged restoration effort, and to align the 

work of industry, PREPA, the Army Corps, and others committed 

to the mission. This unified command has been instrumental in 

managing the large complex restoration safely, while ensuring 

crews, capabilities, and materials are being used effectively. It really is a shared effort that has embodied the motto one team, one 

mission. 

Applying lessons learned on the mainland, an incident command 

structure was created for PREPA that include an incident command staff in San Juan, and seven incident management teams, or 

IMTs. The arrival of crews from mainland electric companies was 

the culmination of months of critical, but much less visible work, 

necessary to make this effort a success. 

In most deployments, workers load their equipment into their 

trucks and set out on the roads to help. In this case, nearly 20 

barges were needed to get trucks and equipment to Puerto Rico. 

And workers had to be flown to the island. All told, more than 

3,000 workers from the mainland industry have been a part of this 

mission. Companies from across the mainland also had sent stocks 

of critical materials, including poles, transformers, insulators, wire, 

and other necessities to ensure crews had equipment and material 

compatible with the island system. It is important to understand 

that companies committed to this mutual assistance effort are 

doing so at cost, on a not-for-profit basis. 

As of today, about 900 mutual assistance workers remain on the 

island. In every single restoration, a point is reached where a substantial amount of work is completed, and the amount and type of 

workers needed to complete the job is reassessed. 

The restoration plan ensures that crews will now converge into 

the hardest-hit areas, and that the right number of workers remain 

actively engaged and continue to work safely and as quickly as possible. This deliberate rightsizing of the workforce is typical. As is 

the case with all restorations, the final customers will be the most 

difficult and time-consuming to restore. 

In this case, the terrain on the island is a recurring challenge. 

While the response in Texas and Florida to Hurricanes Harvey and 

Irma were extremely efficient, we were reluctant to compare 

storms, as each has unique challenges. It is natural to suggest the 

response in Puerto Rico should have been executed as it was on the 

mainland, but there are significant differences that made the situation on the island unique. For one, you cannot preposition crews on 

the island for fear that responders would become victims. Then 

there is the challenge of getting people and equipment to the island. 

Finally, material availability is imperative. We stockpile equipment on the mainland and made as much available to PREPA as 

possible. But their energy grid had some unique components, and 

their stockpiles were diminished. 

Our industry’s mantra is to be better today than we were yesterday, and better tomorrow than we are today. While it is difficult 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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to extrapolate too much from such an anomalous event, we will be 

undertaking a full after-action study to ensure we glean lessons 

that can help preparations on the mainland, and to prevent a similar long-term recovery should Puerto Rico be impacted by another 

catastrophic hurricane. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here and for the subcommittee’s interest in this important topic. And I look forward to 

your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Aaronson follows:] 


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"Bureaucratic Challenges to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto Rico" 

Scott Aaronson 

Vice President, Security and Preparedness 

Edison Electric Institute 

March 21, 2018 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify. My name is Scott Aaronson, and I am Vice President for Security and 

Preparedness at the Edison Electric Institute (EEl). EEl is the association that represents all U.S. 

investor-owned electric companies. Our members provide electricity for 220 million Americans 

and operate in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The electric power industry-which 

includes investor-owned electric companies, public power utilities. and electric coop,eraJives--

supports more than 7 million American jobs and contributes $880 billion annually to U.S. gross 

domestic product, about 5 percent of the total. 

Yesterday marked the six-month anniversary of the day Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto 

Rico. On September 20, 2017, this devastating Category 4 hurricane swept over the island, 

impae!ing all critical infrastructure, including the energy grid. Puerto Rico has 2,400 miles of 

transmission lines across the island and 30,000 miles of distribution lines with 300 substations. lt 

is estimated that at least 80 percent of the grid was atTected by the storm. 

As of March 18, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREP A) reports that 93 percent of 

customers-or approximately 1.37 million out of 1.47 million customers-who can receive 

electricity have had their power restored. 1 While significant progress has been made to restore 

power, nobody deserves to be without electricity for this long, and EEl and our member 

companies remain committed to helping our fellow citizens in Puerto Rico. 

The Unified Command, consisting of PREP A, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the island's Power Restoration 

Coordinator, estimate the date to restore electricity to 95 percent of customers across the island 

to be March 31; the 90-percent milestone was reached on March 8. Reaching 95 percent 

restoration in remote areas with mountainous terrain, like Arecibo and Caguas, will take until 

mid-April and late-May respectively. 

The damage caused by Hurricane Maria is unlike anything we have ever seen on the mainland 

United States, and this power restoration mission is more difficult than other restoration eft(Jrts. 

Hurricane Maria caused historic damage to Puerto Rico's infrastructure, creating considerable 

logistical challenges that complicated how crews, equipment, and materials were mobilized. 

1 It is remember that there will be some customers who will not be able to receive power due to the 

severity to their homes and businesses. As of March !7, PREPA reported that current load was 9!.6 

percent of the average pre-stonn load. 
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My testimony seeks to explain the role that EEl member companies and the industry on the 

mainland have played in the power restoration mission; enumerate the complexities and 

challenges on the island; and identify lessons that can be gleaned from this extraordinary event. 

Mutual Assistance Is in Our Industry's DNA 

Mutual assistance is a cornerstone of electric company operations during emergencies and is 

essential to contingency planning. Electric companies affected by significant outages often tum 

to the mutual assistance network-a voluntary partnership of electric companies from across the 

country and Canada-to help speed restoration whenever and wherever assistance is needed, 

when it is safe to do so. 

Typically, when major natural disasters occur, electric companies utilize the mutual assistance 

process to increase their workforce. Crews do not arrive automatically; a formal request for 

mutual assistance must be made by the affected electricity provider. The recipient of the aid pays 

for it, and companies providing mutual assistance are compensated, at cost, for providing 

service. 

Each segment of the industry-investor-owned, cooperative, and public power-has a mutual 

assistance network of crews and contactors. This shared responsibility and cooperative spirit are 

hallmarks of our industry and were on display throughout the historic 20 17 hurricane season. All 

three networks work together to ensure customers, regardless of their electric company's 

ownership type, have their power restored as quickly as possible. 

While there is an understandable urge to compare storms, the reality is that each storm is 

different and has its own set of unique circumstances and challenges. ln this case, juxtaposing 

the responses to hurricanes Harvey and Irma with the response to Maria in Puerto Rico illustrates 

the value of mutual assistance and how preparation enables effective restoration. It also 

demonstrates the need for resilient infrastructure and ongoing investments in the energy grid, the 

importance of having a plan in place for response and recovery, and the value of a strong 

industry-government partnership. 

Hurricane Harvey 

Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, was the first major hurricane to make landfall in the United 

States since Hurricane Wilma in 2005. The storm brought historic flooding to southeastern 

Texas, including nearly 52 inehes ofrain in some locations, and strong winds in places not 

impacted by t1ooding. The daily peak outages during Harvey were around 350,000 customers. 

However. an estimated 1.4 million restorations occurred throughout Texas and Louisiana due to 

flooding and the slow-moving nature of the storm. 

More than l 0,000 electric power industry workers from at least 21 states mobilized to restore 

power to customers impacted by Harvey. Throughout the storm, affected electric companies 

coordinated closely with federal, state, and local governments to assess damage and to expedite 

power restoration, where it was safe to do so. The CEO-led Electricity Subsector Coordinating 

Council (ESCC)2 also held daily coordination calls for industry and government to ensure unity 

of effort and unity of message around the storm and associated restoration activities. 

2 The ESCC is discussed in more detail later in this testimony. 

2 
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During Hurricane Harvey, electric company investments in smart grid technologies helped 

companies respond faster to major outages. Digital infrastructure, including smart meters, helped 

companies to identify where outages were occurring. Drones were deployed by companies to 

speed damage assessment, and real-time water monitors in substations provided an advanced 

warning of flood threats, which helped to mitigate damage to the energy grid. 

Hurricane lrma 

Irma, a Category 4 hurricane when it made landfall in Florida, was the most intense storm to hit 

the United States since Hurricane Katrina. More than 7.8 million customers were impacted in 

Florida, Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and North Carolina at the peak on September ll, 

2017. (Before hitting the mainland, Irma skirted Puerto Rico on September 6. leaving more than 

1 million people without power.) 

More than 60,000 workers were involved in the restoration, coming from more than 250 electric 

companies across the United States and Canada. This was one of the largest power restoration 

efforts in U.S. history. That effort resulted in 95 percent of customers being restored within one 

week. The speed of the recovery was noted by the U.S. Energy Infonnation Administration: 

"About 15% of customers were without power at noon on September 10, and power 

outages peaked at 3:00p.m. on September ! I, affecting 64% of customers. In contrast, 

Hurricane Wilma moved quickly across the southern part of the state, knocking out 

power to 36% of customers in Florida. Although the percentage of Florida customers 

without power during Irma was significantly higher than during Wilma, the rate of 

electric service restoration has been more rapid. Five days after Irma· s landfall, the share 

of customers without power had fallen from a peak of 64% down to 18% (a recovery rate 

of about 9% of customers per day). Power outages during Wilma declined from 36% of 

customers to !6% by the fifth day after landfall (an average recovery rate of about 4% of 

customers per day) .... Since 2005, Florida Power & Light and other utilities in the state 

have made significant investments to improve their hurricane preparedness. These 

utilities have upgraded electric infrastructure, including replacing wooden utility poles 

with concrete poles. Utilities have also deployed smart grid technologies. which provide 

more timely and more accurate information about outages and can help utilities better 

target restoration efforts." 3 

As was the case throughout Hurricane Harvey, EEl and the industry worked through the ESCC 

to coordinate with the federal govemment, other segments of the industry, and critical 

infrastructure operators. 

Hurricane Maria 

Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 4 hurricane with maximum sustained winds of 

155 mph. Soon after landfall, President Trump signed a major disaster declaration for Puerto 

Rico to provide federal assistance with the storm response and recovery efforts. On September 

26, the President announced that the federal government would cover l 00 percent of the costs 

associated with debris removal and various emergency protective measures in Puerto Rico for 

the first 180 days of the response mission. On February 23, the President extended the l 00-

3 
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percent cost share for emergency protective measures, including emergency power restoration, 

an additional 60 days. 

In the initial days and weeks after Maria, the government's focus was on damage assessments, 

life-saving rescues, and medical missions, as well as providing emergency support, temporary 

power, food, water, and other commodities for devastated communities. At the same time, Puerto 

Rico Governor Ricardo Rossell6 entered into intergovernmental agreements with the governors 

of New York and Florida, which led to electric power industry subject matter experts, damage 

assessors, and crews from New York and Florida being deployed to Puerto Rico to conduct 

damage assessments and assist with the initial response efforts. 

PREP A did not make an official request for mutual assistance until October 31, when EEl and 

the American Public Power Association (APPA) received a letter for support on the 

island. On November 4, PREP A expanded its aid request to include the National Rural Electric 

Cooperative Association (NRECA). 

Since then, EEl, APPA, and NRECA have been working together and with our member 

companies, PREP A, and federal government partners to support this mission. Companies from 

across the country have responded to the call for help. Nearly 60 investor-owned electric 

companies and public power utilities have committed crews, equipment, and/or materials to the 

emergency power restoration mission. 

Following is a brieftimeline of the mutual assistance response. 

November-December 2017 

Within days of receiving the request for mutual assistance, two incident response experts from 

the electric power industry were deployed to Puerto Rico to assess the situation on the ground. 

Carlos Torres, who retired from Con Edison in late October as the Vice President of Emergency 

Preparedness & Business Resiliency, and Manny Miranda, Senior Vice President for Power 

Delivery at Florida Power & Light Company, arrived in Puerto Rico on November 3. They 

began assessing storm damage; met with officials from PREP A, FEMA, and USACE; and 

started to formulate a comprehensive restoration plan for the island. 

On November 22, Torres was appointed by Governor Rossell6 to serve as the Power Restoration 

Coordinator to oversee the multi-pronged restoration effort. As a first step, an incident command 

structure was created that included a command staff based in San Juan. An incident command 

structure did not exist at PREP A prior to Maria. Incident command structures commonly are 

used to manage large restoration efforts on the mainland and are essential to effective, efficient, 

and safe power restoration. 

Because mutual assistance plans were not in place in Puerto Rico as were in Houston and 

Florida (during Hurricanes Harvey and Irma), the command staff team had to build 

operating infrastructure-logistics, coordination, supply chains, housing and food, etc.-before 

deploying crews. Applying lessons learned on the mainland, the team recommended that PREP A 

create seven regional incident management teams (IMTs) to expedite the restoration. These 

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lMTs (see map) arrived in December and continue to work with PREP A to coordinate and 

support the restoration effort. 

This first wave of mutual assistance was designed to enhance the organizational structure and to 

get needed equipment and materials to the island. 

January-March 2018 

With the incident command structure and regional lMTs in place and fully staffed, the industry 

deployed additional crews, equipment, and materials in January to accelerate the ongoing power 

restoration efforts across the island. Nearly 1,500 additional restoration workers and support 

personnel from investor-owned electric companies were deployed to the island to work under the 

direction of the seven lMTs; public power utilities also sent mutual assistance crews.4 Nearly 20 

barges carried more than 1,000 trucks and other equipment. The arrival of crews from mainland 

electric companies was the culmination of months of critical-but much less visible-work 

necessary to make this effort a success. 

In addition to sending crews, trucks, and equipment, companies also identified and shipped from 

their stocks critical materials, including wood and concrete poles, transformers, insulators, wire, 

and other hard-to-manufacture components. It is important to note that some of the material 

needed on island was time-consuming to manufacture and the availability of some supplies and 

materials was strained due to the earlier hurricanes and the wildfires on the mainland. 

The deployment of additional crews represented the next phase in the mutual assistance 

response. With this new wave, the power restoration workforce grew to more than 5,500 and 

included the resources already working on the island from PREP A's own crews, the contingent 

of crews from New York who were working as part of the agreement, and 

crews mobilized under contracts awarded by USACE. 

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As of March ! 8, 93 percent of customers across the island had their power restored, and we 

believe that the resources, equipment, and people put in place under the organizational structure 

helped to accelerate the restoration process and time line. 

The deployment of mutual assistance crews was facilitated by a memorandum of understanding 

(MOO) agreement that was developed by APPA, EEl, and NRECA. The MOO is structured on 

existing mutual assistance agreements and allows electric companies on the mainland (that are 

members of APPA, EEl, or NRECA) to enter into agreements to provide resources 

and workers to PREP A on a not-tor-profit basis. The MOO by PREP A and the companies 

providing mutual assistance also requires that this assistance be provided on a not-for-profit 

basis. 

As of this writing, some mutual assistance crews have finished their mission and have returned to 

the mainland, while others continue to work to restore power to the people of Puerto Rico. As of 

March !6, about 900 mutual assistance workers remained on the island. lt is common in any 

restoration effort (in Puerto Rico or on the mainland) for mutual assistance crews to be released 

at this point in the restoration. The restoration plan ensures that crews now will converge into the 

hardest-hit areas and that the right number of crews/workers remain actively engaged and 

continue to work safely and as quickly as possible. 

In every single restoration, a point is reached where a substantial amount of work is completed 

and the amount and type of workers needed to complete the job are reassessed. ln many cases, 

more people simply does not mean that work gets completed taster. This is especially true in 

Puerto Rico's mountainous regions with their narrow roads, where only so many trucks and so 

many workers can fit into one space at a time. Access to materials, not the size of the workforce, 

at times has slowed the restoration, but we have seen a steady improvement in materials being 

delivered to the island, and the remaining crews are well-positioned to continue making progress. 

Again, this deliberate right-sizing of the workforce is typical, and companies continue to rotate in 

fresh crews from the mainland electric companies. As is the case with all restorations, the final 

customers are the most difficult and time-consuming to restore; in this case, the terrain on the 

island is a recurring challenge. 

Partnerships: Key to Restoration 

A restoration of this complexity and magnitude demands a response to match it. The partnership 

among our industry, PREP A, and the government has been critical. This is truly one team with 

one mission, and we are unified in our effort. So, if there is one message that I leave the 

Subcommittee with today, it is that strong partnerships result in strong response and recovery. 

EEl and the industry appreciate the Administration's ongoing support throughout the emergency 

response mission. ln particular, President Trump's extension of the 100-percent cost share 

allowed crews already on the island to continue working without interruption. 

One of our key partners, the Department of Energy (DOE), is the presidentially and 

congressionally directed Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the energy sector. DOE has been a 

6 
41 


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partner with us at every step, and we thank the agency for its role in ensuring unity of effort 

across government and industry responders. 

A key reason for our strong industry-government partnership is the threat to energy grid security 

and our shared responsibility to protect infrastructure critical to the life, health, and safety of 

Americans, as well as to our national and economic security. As noted earlier, the ESCC was 

integral to the effective restoration following Harvey and Irma; it also was essential in the effort 

to get crews from industry on the mainland to Puerto Rico. 

The ESCC is comprised of the chief executive officers of22 electric companies and nine major 

industry trade associations, including EEl, APPA, and NRECA. This group-which includes all 

segments of the industry, representing the full scope of electric generation, transmission, and 

distribution in the United States and Canada-serves as the principal liaison between the federal 

government and the electric power sector, with the mission of coordinating efforts to prepare for, 

and respond to, national-level incidents or threats to critical infrastructure. 

The ESCC meets three times a year with senior government officials to identify emerging 

security issues and to develop plans to mitigate those threats. Those "blue sky'' meetings help to 

prepare the industry and government for response efforts. 

Future Storms: Lessons Learned 

ln our industry, our mantra is that we want to be better today than we were yesterday, and better 

tomorrow than we are today. This means that, after storms, we compile lessons learned and 

create strategies to close gaps and identify areas for improvement. 

The industry routinely drills and exercises for all threats as they constantly strive to apply lessons 

learned and to enhance their response and recovery capabilities for the benefit of customers. As 

an example, since Superstorm Sandy, the industry has worked even more closely together and 

with government partners to apply lessons learned from that significant storm, to streamline 

restoration efforts, and to improve how the industry prepares and responds safely to large-scale 

major events that cause significant outages. 

Companies also continue to make significant investments to harden the energy grid and to make 

energy infrastructure more resilient. Since Supcrstorm Sandy in 2012, investor-owned electric 

companies have invested more than $230 billion in transmission and distribution systems. 

While it is too early to launch a formal examination into lessons learned from Hurricane Maria, 

there are a few practices on the mainland that could have allowed for a more efficient restoration 

in Puerto Rico. 

Assessments: Knowing specilically what part of the energy grid is damaged, and where that 

equipment is located, is the t1rst step in any restoration. Damage assessments allow crews to 

know where to work and to prioritize more eftectively. The damage assessment process was 

hampered in Puerto Rico, first because of impassable roads and other logistical challenges, then 

because different organizations did their own assessments in their own ways. The creation of the 

''unified command," bringing together the Power Restoration Coordinator, PREP A, FEMA, 

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USACE and its contractors, and mainland crews, was a critical step to achieving a common 

understanding of the damage and, thus, to developing a master plan to fix the system. 

Pre-positioning of Crews: Hurricanes, while devastating, typically are forecast in advance and 

give electric companies time to plan. When responding to Irma in Florida, for example, crews 

mobilized days in advance and were pre-positioned just outside the impact zone to go to work 

once the storm cleared. While pre-positioning is a profound challenge in an island situationcompanies do not want crews to become victims-it is a key element to initiating a quick 

restoration process. 

Access to Equipment and Materials: Having access to materials is critical to any restoration. 

There were limited equipment reserves (e.g., poles, wire, transformers, etc.) in place in Puerto 

Rico prior to Maria and certainly not enough to support an emergency power restoration effort of 

this magnitude. This dearth of materials on the island, combined with the strong demand for 

material on the mainland and the fact that materials t!·om the mainland had to be t1own or barged 

to Puerto Rico, made everything more time-consuming. Companies on the mainland, particularly 

those in hurricane-prone areas, stockpile as much material as possible so that mutual assistance 

crews have what they need to support the recovery. Again, this was not the case in Puerto Rico. 

Investments in Grid Hardening: As noted, investments in grid hardening and smart meters in 

Texas and Florida reduced the number of outages and expedited restoration eflbrts following 

Harvey and lrma. There were no such investments made in Puerto Rico, and vegetation 

management had not been done in years. 

While there are many conversations underway about the future of Puerto Rico and the structure 

of its electric company, we are focused on the short-term emergency power restoration and on 

restoring power to those customers still in the dark. 

Thank you again for having me here today, for the Committee's interest in Puerto Rico, and for 

your support of the restoration. !look forward to your questions. 

8 
43 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. Staff Sergeant Sutton, you are up, 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHNATHAN SUTTON 

Mr. SUTTON. Good morning, Chairman, ranking members, Miss 

Gonzalez, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I initially 

flew over to Puerto Rico on the 26th of September, and I stayed all 

the way until December 2 of 2017. From getting over there, I pretty 

much—you know, I went on my own accord. I was actually living 

in Maui, Hawaii, at the time. Never heard anything about anything 

on the news about the devastation, what is going on, you know, 

how bad this actually was. I ended up getting ahold of a few military members that I knew were already over there, and they went 

ahead and sent me current active photos, videos, and anything that 

I could possibly get my hands on over there. 

I went on my own accord. Touched down. As soon as I got in the 

airport, I honestly felt like I was the only person coming into Puerto Rico trying to bring aid, you know, just as a regular person. My 

flight, you know, obviously can fit over 400 people, but, you know, 

there was 10. 

I came in. As soon as I touched down, I found the, you know, 

FBI. Located homeland security. You know, identified myself.You 

know, let they know, Hey, I have a, you know, security clearance 

with DOD. You know, I am retired military. I was working with 

82nd Airborne Division, working alongside with Special Forces 

groups and have been deployed multiple times. And I am here to 

volunteer, whatever you need. You know, told them my capabilities 

of being able to rebuild homes, provide power, AC. Anything you 

need, I can make it happen. 

They said they didn’t need any help. Apply online. So I said, 

Okay. 

I went on my own accord. Went throughout Puerto Rico. You 

know, ran into a few police officers. Their big advice was,you know, 

You need to be really careful because you are not from around 

here. 

Right now, there is no communications outside the airport, period. Our communications are just here. The moment you leave the 

airport, I can’t tell you what is going to happen to you. There was 

obviously looting. People being killed over the small amount of dollars they do have in their pockets. And moving around the city was 

practically impossible. Curfews were in place. Limited supplies, 

limited fuels, and people are very desperate. 

There was multiple times that I would go throughout Puerto 

Rico, and, you know, it is just a mad house. You know, people 

would either rush your car, rush your vehicle,you know, just trying 

to get whatever supplies you got on you. 

There is multiple times I would go out with, you know, people. 

And, honestly, it would be, like, too late. A lot of people, you would 

show up, say, Hey, I heard you had an elderly member or a child 

here. We are here to help you out. And, unfortunately, they passed 

away the night prior with dehydration, malnutrition, and a lot of 

people throughout the months became more devastated to the point 

where they took their own lives by either jumping off mountains 

or cliffs because they knew nobody was going to come. Nobody was 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
44 

coming. It had been months. And to be without power, being without water, being without food, it was honestly probably harder than 

any deployment I have ever been on in my life to see the amount 

of, you know, suffering, human suffering. 

And, you know, we were all looking for answers. I myself, you 

know, moved into a church member’s home in Dorado. To paint a 

little better picture for you for Dorado and Bayamon, that is probably the—probably one of the worst side you could probably go in. 

Probably one of worst rough areas of D.C. you could ever think of, 

New York, L.A., wherever you want to think of. And being a guy 

that is not from the island, obviously it is not very safe for myself. 

I took the chance, took the risk, because I knew these people were 

in need, and they definitely needed some assistance. 

Throughout the months, you know, I did everything I could from 

getting medical supplies, getting food to people in hard-to-reach 

areas. And every single time I would go out, I would be the first 

person that anyone would ever see. They would let me know, hey, 

I haven’t seen the mayor. I haven’t seen FEMA. I haven’t seen Red 

Cross. Can you help me? 

And, you know, I would definitely go out of my way, working 

with local hospitals, working with local organizations. Honestly, I 

did it all myself. I tried helping out with FEMA. I would work with 

them to try to deliver their supplies for them. And a lot of the responses that I would get would be, There is a lot of political things 

happening here, and I can’t make this happen. Can you do it for 

me? And they would give me addresses, the locations, and I would 

go to them and make that happen for anybody on Puerto Rico. 

I would even, you know, take messages from random people over 

the internet, say, Hey, this is my address. My grandfather, you 

know, hasn’t seen anybody. He is a retired veteran. Can you help 

me out? And I would go out of my way to make that happen. And 

honestly, the 3 months that I was there, I mean, I have no words 

to really describe, you know, the devastation that is currently out 

there. And that is still currently going on, so—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. SUTTON. Thank you for your time. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Sutton follows:] 


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March 20,2018 

To whom it may concern, 

in the concern of how Puerto Ricans and residents in Puerto Rico are 

Federal and the overall actions and assistance 

nrrmu1£>n from 26th September 20 I 7 to 02 December 20 l 7 that I observed 

while on for a non profit to provide humanitarian relief 

e!Iorts the island of Puerto Rico. 

I flew in from Maui, Hawaii after I saw the hurricanes hit the island and did not hear 

auvuuu" on the news or news feeds about the current conditions of the island of Puerto 

volunteered on the FEMA, and Red Team Rubicon, \Nounded 

\Varrior Project websites but did not get selected or asked to go to Puerto Rico to assist 

with relief eflorts even when I emailed them and told them I was on 

out in Puerto Rico and have no 

orl;arnz;ltH)n, if were not in Puerto Rico yet. I would 

out in Texas. 

So I called a friend of mine in the Puerto Rico National Guard to see what the conditions 

were out on island. He advised me "not to come,Johnathan it is very bad, if you do not 

have to come don't!" I said to him "I will see you in 72 hours, I need to square a few 

away and I need to withdraw as much money as I can to have it on hand and rent 

a satellite phone and have the to me before I fly out to Puerto Rico, 

and I'll be there soon" 

So I bought my own ticket and paid over $250 in fees that United Airline would 

not wave for me ;vithout an official letter I was to Puerto Rico and I 

I was going to Puerto Rico and showed them all my hurricane supplies like 

of water and other supplies to bring with me to the island as it was not my first 

,A Ju<u"~' with hurricanes since I have li\'ed in Virginia Beach, all my life before 

the and have been through Hurricane Floyd, and a few other hurricanes in the 

1990's, and on the 26th of September I flew from Maui to Puerto Rico. 

powet~ no 

hundreds of 

on bare minimum 

forces were in the and 

out of Puerto Rico. I felt like my 

After getting my I found Homeland Federal Bureau of 1nve:;t1~~attor1s 

and Red Cross at the sectioned off portion of the 

I identified as a retired veteran with a clearance to a few 

members of the teams out there asking them if needed any assistance, I am here to 

volunteer. told me no, and a few spoke to me and advised me that there were zero 

communication outside of the and it was very out on this 

island as there was killing, and the island is out of control, and very unsafe for a 
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person like me and "I need to keep my head on swiveL" did not have any answers 

for me or the island as it was six days after the hurricane had hit the island. 

told also told me "be carefiJ! because you stick out and are killed over 

the few dollars do have in their pockets." 

I spent the next few hours to find a friends family in Aricebo with all the money I had in 

my pockets get out there to hand them a satellite that I brought with me to 

communicate throughout the island. 

I then went on my personal mission to find any or group on to 

volunteer for them, for an undetermined amount of time. I knew there would not be any 

out of Puerto Rico for sometime and was used to these conditions of not 

vvith the military and knew the I was 

iu a disabled veteran who has multiple disabilities to include Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder chronic depression and many injuries from 

airborne operations while on and knew that I had to 

that would last me November. 

I was well aware of my medical conditions but had to put them aside to others 

because when I spent over 48 hours on I knew no help was coming soon 

and there were thousands who were without running water and U)od, and all 

and food that was available and or not was stolen or eaten very 

as I also knew became hectic on island and for life 

to run out. 

I spent the first two in Aricebo at my friend's families house after them in 

contact with members in the the upper states who were concerned of their families 

well Aricebo was as I visited Puerto Rico the year 

in july and all around the island and the ride into Aricebo looked like a tornado 

came the island and there was no on any of the trees, mudslides were 

evident and remittances of the water levels and power winds, and trees were 

down and or on the side of the road just for cars to pass and 

it was an absolute disaster zone on island. I did not where I was 

was very difficult and dangerous to travel into the Aricebo area, as I had to avoid many 

tree limbs, and trunks get in and even running over a few to get into the area where 

my friend's lived. 

All lines were down or rlP•<tn>w'rl and houses were and or the floor 

frame was all that was left and appliances were left in were 

spentlmg all in line to get only lO 

dollars of gas and to get water to drink it was another all miSSIOn get whatever 

water bottles and jugs filled. There was a cwfcw in as well to try to prevent 

and to try to safe. 

friend's brother in law was a officc1; he briefed me that the are able to 

full up their tanks, as well as military but the citizens could not. could also the 

whole line and fill up whenever wanted to. But there were also officials taking 

and around the island for themselves and their families. Not 

about it honest with me. He was no like that, he only used his fuel 
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and he was on a on 24 hours on shift, and off duty for 12 hours and came 

back to Aricebo when he could to his wife and his new board baby, and every other 

he went to the country side to check on his mother. 

48 hours later, lleft Ariccbo to go back into Carolina, Puerto Rico where my friend in the 

Puerto Rico :">lational Guard was living to devise a to get with any non or 

government organization, as I held a clearance and had the of how to 

power with a power mechanic, rebuild homes, provide dean living 

conditions and to do all I can to bring aid to even if it meant door 

to door to food, water and supplies. I would stay until I conld not be of 

assistance anymore on island or until I felt like there was no more that I could do. 

There was no cell service, or internet, or power and with limited fuel and basic 

necessities many people were not doing well and being for any help, or 

very fast. I knew I had to do because it was clear no one was there that was 

to help or had the skills l knew and or to for answers until 

found them. 

friend lived next to the Intercontinental Hotel at the Coral Beach 

all federal, FEMA, Homeland Security and anyone who was flown into were 

Their parking lot were full of all SUV's were all reserved and 

rented out the them. I conld not find one jeep on island for But the odd note is 

most were at the Intercontinental hotel overflow lot with their agency 

decal on the windshield in the parking lot. All the nice hotels, and resorts 24 hour 

were all booked all federal to house their PnmlnvPr>c 

After every agency turned me away said "apply online", I found a non profit 

that was on island called the Tree of Life Counseling & Care foundation 

out of Orlando, Florida, just by luck in a line to get coffee at a shop in Carolina, 

and told the director my story about to the island to a friend and that 

I was for an to volunteer for since no """"'~"'"''",.,,, onr<uuzwLH 

would take me on or was able to respond back to me or 

hurricane hit Texas and that was also the agencies ft)CUS as well but a week without out 

is vital to anyone children, and I knew most 

living on Puerto Rico were not well off and were to put food on the 

table and pay their bills as it was, because as the economy there is not all that great from 

the h<'<nn·nin<Y. 

So adding two hurricanes to hit the island would devastate the whole island. It dPh~ntlv 

did. I was a new volunteer with that non profit and was on my first 

volunteers on island. So I did, I did not know much and did not know what areas 

were safe or not. I was told to go to Bayamon, ]ba Baja, 1oa Alta to find volunteers. 

Little did I know where I was is a very unsafe area and up on all the of not 

in a area that would be safe for a non resident or non Puerto Rican, white 

American, who did not know Spanish other than basic 

I ran into a young man in 'loa Baja who knew I meant no harm and 

to find help to bring aid to the of Puerto Rico. I told him who I was and 

who I was for and he took me to his youth pastor in Dorado. It took over two 
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hours to make it it takes 10 minutes to get to Dorado from Toa The 

roads were flooded and hard to and most roads were closed in due to the 

water levels that flowed over the main into Dorado. 

I made it to this young man's house. The pastor was from the New 

York, Chicago area in the upper states and knew English, so I was in luck. l knew I was in 

another part of Puerto Rico that was not a very safe area to be in. I told him my story 

about coming to the island and meeting up with this non and what I 

was able to and all I needed was volunteers and my non 

was for has three containers of food, water and on 

the way from jacksonville, Florida. 

He was amazed with my story, a saw it as a that I arrived as the church was 

to help out the island in a bigger way but they did not know how or what 

could do more to more aid because did not have to as 

much as they wanted to. So he called the Pastor of the church over to his house and 

cx1;'"''ucu "he might want to come because their prayers have been heard and 

answered" 

a few hours later the pastor showed up to his home and he explained in 

I told him as the pastor and his wife showed up (they are both so 

both did not well to speak it so he interpreted for me. 

The pastor uuw•cuJ.auc1y looked at me and knew I meant well and said "what do you need, 

The man interpreted for me and told me the 

pastors were 

The pastors went ahead and explained had a church full of and he knew 

more pastors and more churches full of people ready to volunteer. lf I needed I could 

have over 50 care packages, and preparing of and 

deliver it all. He would even open his church to me as a storage 

inside the containers. He told me he would do whatever it takes to help me with what I 

needed to be successfi!l. 

those weeks preparing the church lor thf' delivery of the 

out all the burros who were in the need and people 

who did not have anything. Each time we went somewhere new on the island and each 

time the citizens would say "You are the first to arrive", "\Ve have yet to see anyone, not 

FEMA, not the mayors, not Red Cross, no one." :\1ost homes were unlivable, missing 

roof, washed downside the mountains, left in the homes, water level 

marks to the you could tell that there were mud slides that come into these 

homes, mud level marks on curtains, and in their homes and 

owned were outside on the curb for trash to come take it away because it was 

cv''u'-"'-'·cn ue:;rnJVea these citizens were left with nothing and had lost Pv,,n,,thin 

ovvncd inside their homes and even their cars were ,.,.,,mn.IPtc-hc ,.,,,,,.n"'"" 

l was mind no one had come out to these areas and I made it a point to go to the 

and burros where mayors and or funds do not go to, because I knew that 

where would need the most help. I even went and spent all trips on top 

of the mountains in Corozal, Utuado, Cominero, where were trapped up there 
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with no way to remove trees, mudslides and other hurricane rubbish to see if there was 

anyone alive up there. Surprisingly were still alive. Most people made ti down the 

mountains with their own citizens to aid. I 

and my would go out to to pull, cut, and removed trees out of the roads so 

could get out of their neighborhoods. 'Weeks would go and trash and hurricane 

mbbish would just be piling up in neighborhoods and around Puerto Rico and the trash 

co:mp,anres were not or anything up. Most do not know how to or 

had the means to clear all the trees out of the It was not like the rest of 

America where companies would remove all that like in Texas or Virginia or 

else. I would conduct interviews with people and recorded several interviews and all said 

the same things. "You are the first I have seen, not FEl\;lA, not Red Cross, no one has 

come f(Jr " Their homes vvere and uaw.,g<:u. 

the TOL's containers arrived and were delivered to the church. It was 

a to see this and ·we were all grateful to see a container that could feed over 

1,500 families arrive. As everyone outside of SanJuan were without power, watet; food, 

and basic to live and have been since 20th of 2017. It was now 

October 15th. in the church came with the money that did have 

to to one another and the and the church was over 20 

who have lost their homes. 

To paint a better this was Bayamon. It is the of 

DC, Philadelphia, Los and any other where most people 

are working hard for less than 1 0 dollars an hour. It is not safe to be there if you are 

"white" or "not Puerto Rican" These people didn't have much but came 

told everyone my story and knew I was came to help. were amazed and 

me from day one and we arc still in contact and I check on them 

\Ve download the containers and then mapped out all the 

visited each burro of Puerto Rico and delivered, arrange food drives 

and had a team of over 40 plus volunteers from church members from Fe y Gracia in 

v~.v~w<Ju, Puerto Rico. \Ve as a team came on the 30th of of 2017 

to do so with their had and with the containers that arrived 

only two made it. One of them were stolen a company called "Godfather m 

Puerto Rico and the owner stole the and kept it for himself [ do not know the 

whole story of the third container was not delivered. Please contact TOL to find the 

reason for that. 

So we then out all the hard hit areas, and we would spend countless hours and 

delivering food, water and all over the island. From ;\Jorth, South, East, and 

\Vest. \Ve delivered over 300 of food to different burros Puerto 

Rico. The project manager and the other members of TOL had to return to Orlando to 

go fundraise more, ask for more donations and left me in of all 

Puerto Rico. So I took and kept missions daily until we ran out of 

and many people would have the same story, these citizens 

saw me and my church members come to their area hand 

and a case of water because have been without. The 

around the island could not feed nor was there food and ·water for 
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everyone many people went without food, many times I arrived to places and 

morning because their loved ones away from malnutrition, or 

and children passed away during the months of October, and November because 

were these people and not helping. Not going to these hard hit areas 

or properly disturbing the throughout the island. I would go to places in Corozal 

and many people committed suicide because were and it had been 

before saw us. I still live \Vith these stories today in my heart and haunt me 

with everything I had vvithin the from my deployments. 

people came to me and my pastor and said they did not know what to do anymore 

and wanted to kill themselves because know the Puerto Rico mayors, and governors 

would not do anything but help thl'mselves to the that would come in and not 

care for their citizens. 

were right. mayors would have a collection for the but 

somehovi those supplies never made it to the burros that were not well off, or areas that 

hold citizens that do not vote often. Not to be political but it was on trend that the 

or not so nice off areas where not reach all over the island. l would go inside their 

homes and talk to them and of course started up on and had a church 

member interpret for me. was in these citizens homes had to use 

bottles of water to try to clean their homes from the mud slides. 

like SanJuan had power, food, running water, ready for tourist to arrive and 

were fine. They had all bars, restaurants, and all tourist areas 

clean, cut lawns, streets were clean and looking well taken care of like a hurricane never 

hit Puerto Rico. But the rest of Puerto Rico like Aricebo, Salinas, Utuado, 

Comerio, Toa Baja, Toa Alta, Bayamon looked like a tornado ripped 

there and it was a third world country and trash piling up and trees and shrubs 

power lines no water; kids in what didn't 

know was contaminated water. vVhere was the balance? vVhere was the mayors 

other 'Where was the help to make other places look like SanJuan, where power 

was restored and or back to normal? and I 

that. was the mayor of SanJuan not other mayors and cons1:antly 

on commercials and in ·washington DC when other needt'd and was yet to be 

done in Puerto Rico? out there to to the island is no where close to 

done. 

I would go to stores, it would take over two hours to get in and there was a time 

limit to get in and get what you needed and you had to leave and it was cash The 

stores were not stocked at all and did not have supplies or food to teed 

everyone. 

Throughout the weeks FEMA and Red Cross ;vould start noticeable around the 

island but this was now November. I had already been all over the island three times and 

ran out of my supplies before made it close the hard hit areas. 

The supply points would be come to us" only and 

have any money or cars or means to come into Sanjuan, or to the collection or 

road were or had huge holes in them like in 
51 


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Corozal, and Utuado where brides and or washed away and or had 

in them where a bull dozer or tank wouldn't be able to cross and it was almost 1mno"'lhl<' 

for many to make it down the mountain being trapped up there or it wouldjust be simply 

too much to come to the collection 

had lost their cars due to the floods. ;\fud was on the roof of the cars, tmcks and 

SUV's, how were these people going to come FE,\1A, or Red Cross? Poor execution on all 

for these citizens. 

I went to Utuado several times and the bridge was missing to an area called "the 

where a galvanized cable and zip line was placed the army to get 

supplies to them and there was no way off that section bccanse the bridge gave way and 

'""·""'Jo,.u and washed away. There were still sticks and trees under the remaining 

The river waters of the Rio Grande raised so high I think it was a miracle those 

were still alive, mud slides were all over Utuado. 

I quickly became known as "the Puerto Rican Gringo" yes you may or think it was 

but I held that name and title with pride because I felt and many Puerto Ricans felt 

like I. \vas the one or few out there who gave a damn and was out there to help the 

and wanted nothing in return, no money, fame, nothing just wanted to serve the 

lord and the people of Puerto Rico and to those who needed the most and never took 

and just gave until I couldn't give anymore. I started doing Face book Lives and 

interviews with Fox 5 news in Washington DC via Skype and on Telemundo 

to try to awareness and raise donations and to try to get more containers of 

of "REAL FOOD" out to Puerto Rico because what supplies that were out 

were Meals Ready to Eat military food or the meals in a box called a "care 

with beans and non Puerto Rican food that the people of Puerto Rico eat, and I 

would never feed my kids or my parents or anyone I know. It looked like someone 

went to gas station and put random items into the boxes and called it a "care 

but to me it was a in the face" to the people of Puerto Rico. 

The saddest part was when cell phone services came back around the island we would all 

see how Hurricane Harvey and Texans were being cared for and that was "first class" 

to how Puerto Ricans were treated. 

moYed in with my now in Puerto Rico on the 30th of in 

Dorado and we took showers out of a water bucket we would fill up with garden water if 

it was running and take a cold shower in the dark with a "red solo or cup to 

hold tl1c water over our heads. \Ve would have to ration the use of fuel for generators and 

food was what we could find. I ate what they ate. [ slept on the floor on an air mattress for 

over 70 Eventually Costco was supplies and that was rationed, like 

two cases of vvater per card member and were to get better sort of 

around Thanksgiving. More generators were coming available but then people are so 

used to without power or vvater didn't care to them. 

I saw many drink and fill their buckets and water containers full of mountain water but 

were not and were so desperate for water did not realized many 

dead animals, humans, and human waste have contaminated the water. There was not 

any filtration systems use until about November and then a company called "Veterans 4" 
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another feUow retired around the water 

through a filtration system. took the chance to drink the water as is and I ran 

into several who did not care and were sick from the v\iater, because had to and didn't 

have the means to clean the water or boil it or knew about putting bleach in the water to 

sanitize it. They were not and there was not beach tablets for 

everyone. 

"the Puerto Rican Gringo" and would "rush" or run up to me and many would rnn 

up to my car and I would be done with out supplies within seconds. I have videos 

to show the lines where would be lined up at supply as they would wait f(x 

over ij hours and just be told "we arc out for today, we cannot had out more supplies or 

there is so much we can hand out, or ran out I saw people jump out of 

their cars while stiU in motion get a case of water from my car because there was 

not at any of the collection on the west side of the island in many 

like Cabo Rojo, Yauco, Anasco, As I would visit those 

cities the level of and lack of supplies these had were like no other, 

did have anything and there wasn't anyone but these non profit and 

citizens to the island to aid to 

Doing way more that FEMA, Red Cross or the local mayors were 

In Salinas, and Santa Isabel, the stores vvould not be able to get shipments of 

like rice, water; beans or that was a usual Puerto Rican's usually consume 

on a bases would be common to live. I would visit several 

homes in that area where flood levels were and most communities down there were 

would hug the cases of water I would deliver because it had 

since have seen or had dean drinking water and vvere a risk by 

the water from water pumped out of the wells in their I 

boiled and put a little bit of bleach into the water and had to do so because in the 

that is what you do with water when you do not haw tablets to sanitize the water. 

Most homes had military MRE's and that is all the food could get on the west side of 

the island. So when 1 showed up with common supplies like beans, rice, 

canned foods, peauut butter; water bread from the markets, cheese, and a case of water I 

was helping out. I would visit the emergency command center in l'tuado and I 

would speak to the EMT team and FEMA directors out there and never left the 

command center no matter what time I arrived were in that RV where that was the 

only on island that had internet. Most that were of any that 

could out, were there and would stay there all day and not leave but yet did not have 

any communications the island besides a little bit of a here and 

there but cell service in November was non existent in these vital areas where any 

rain that would come would start a small landslide and flood and tl1ese 

government officials did not have an answer to when any f(lrm of communication, radio's 

or cell services would come back on or even when there will be more 

had a room somewhat full of supplies but my one container would 

exceed their and me if I could find them where more 

h)fmula, adult diapers, or real filod to help stock them up. I was blown 
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away by FEMA asking me for when arc the ones with all the funds, capabilities 

to contracts, or could respond back to DC to explain the situation 

out in Puerto Rico was not as easy as it seems or sounds and could ask for additional 

or aid from other to properly assist the citizens of Puerto Rico. But didn't. 

There was even a cases where I had several citizens who were in desperate needs of 

medical supplies and I was able to get my hands on diabetic medications via 

donations, and working with local hospitals and doctors out there and medical 

to people who were not able to get medical aid. l even had a an extreme case 

where a woman was in need of an oxygen tank to be filled due to been 

agent orange years prior and was on 24 hour oxygen and had extreme issues 

hr"'~'·hinrr on her own and was on a ventilator and needed a air purifier because her's was 

rlf':strrwerl by the flooding up in Utuado and she lived less than five minutes from the 

emergency command center in that village" and she was visited several times 

FEMA, and all sorts of 1Nho "said" could get her an air purifier or 

get her oxygen tank filled and she kept a log of all numbers, names and what their 

was or title was and over 30 people with left her and 

never returned. 

I was able to get her an air from Costco with donations and worked with San 

to get her oxygen tank filled and returned the tank to her within a 

very that citizens were left with a lot of but no one or government 

agency seemed to be out there to truly I am just a retired veteran and another 

American citizen with no means other than donations and a heart and believer in 

the lord, but I was able to be more affective than that have the 

and are paid to bring aid to devastated like 

tailed to do their job. I know in the if I failed to do my 

at that level, or in this of power or rank, I wonld demoted, and or held 

and held accountable for my of duties, court marshaled and relived 

of all my duties. 

The overall failures out there cost many citizens their lives, or drove people to a 

little or no and even there are still no answer of when the island will be 

back to a somewhat normal state before the hurricanes hit the island. This could 

handled better. There was a lot of issues 1Ni.th the jones Act, FEMA not 

from the ports, food spoiling because didn't do thing right at the 

ports and they held on to all income containers. There were citizen and many 

officials on ground did about it, time and time I was used to deliver 

for FEMA or Red Cross as would tell me "I cannot deliver these supplies to this area, 

but you can, it is too and I have too much red tape to get an approval to 

rn;ml'n'"' the island. \Ve cannot handle or deliver to everyone." 

That needs to change immediately and there needs to still be aid out in Puerto Rico and 

start for rebuilding projects out there and with electric to 

create a real power grid where it is easy to restore power out there and of course the 

water supply system needs to be fixed as well. I have seen where human waste is 

into the ocean and with my background and within Environmental 

Sciences this most and Environmental Protection violation and 
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not safe or okay and or 

work it's way down. 

need to change and I know it starts at the top and 

I am also suggesting that the mayors to be looked at and or because their all 

around of duties to their citizens whom swore to protect and provide aid and 

put their needs before theirs own. They did not and provided aid to their 

their friends, and honestly there is and was not one citizen that trust their local mayor or 

any mayor in Puerto Rico, due to \vhat seems to me is a common thing stated and clear 

evidence of corruption on. have seen or watched to include myself, mayors 

miss use their positions and take FEMA supplies, and off at their homes 

and citizens would be without. mayors like the mayor Corozal would be very 

well when their neighbors were not, and many were and told me 

well into October and even in November that had not seen any maym; guver·nrne1:1ta 

official, and would say FEMA and Red Cross have yet to come or help. 

I would ask the mayors about these situations and of course introduce and what 

~"'""'Jw.uLo, explain my background and what supplies I and asked what I 

could do for them to help them and their citizens out more and they would state, 

are and we have seen everyone, and everyone is So I would this and 

the same day I asked the mayor of Corozal and several other mayors I would go to the 

mountain tops or around their districts and that not the case. I was invited into their 

homes and there were no water, no power still, and no trash or food 

wrappers of any kind that would match the supplies had at their collection 

I was sadden to see how things are not right in Puerto Rico, and these are official 

l"'omuuo, or FEMA directors, and Red Cross directors, 

their citizens and bring aid to swore to protect and to 

in a time like this when you have to look outside your own issues or 

or what you and your are v.-ithout and to the people. But until 

you cannot no more. Go to congress, go to DC and knock on senators, 

law makers, who can make a and or to these 

lives, even go to the presidents office and or write letters to to these 

These are American citizens, and "we" (FEMA, other citizens, mayors out there in Puerto 

Rico, Puerto Rico governmental officials, power and electric people 

responsible for making- contracts, and many more out there or involved with 

and aid to Puerto have failed these American citizens in Puerto 

Rico, not to mention several veterans that live out in Puerto Rico that 

or died for the country that I love 

We have to fix this and bring to the island that are long term solutions and 

excuses of or how something did not get done or corrected and take care 

our fellow citizens and be able to say "we did all we could do and we took care of our 

fellow American citizens in Puerto Rico." 

and 
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These are my concerns, what I observed and this is my official testimony, and my 

experiences while I was in Puerto Rico. 

Johnathan Sutton 

Staff 

82nd Airborne Division 

1·th Brigade Combat Team 

782nd 

Senior 
56 

Mr. DESANTIS. I appreciate it. Thanks a lot. 

The chair is now going to recognize my colleague from Puerto 

Rico for the first round of questions. So you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you all members, the panel. I will try to be brief. 

The first question will jump directly to Mr. Mike Byrne. 

What do we need to complete the restoration of power in 30 

days? 

Mr. BYRNE. I think where we are at right now in power is, if it 

was easy, it got done already. And even the easy part was hard in 

Puerto Rico because of the challenges of the terrain and challenges 

of the conditions. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. I know that part. And I know also—I 

just got 4 minutes now. But what do we need? Is it money? Is it 

resources? 

I do know you reimbursed the government—I mean, PREPA for 

the resources and the contracts they are doing with the mutual assistance agreement. We know the Corps of Engineers is going to 

continue to have some conflicts until April 7. My concern is that 

that higher end process will take some time. And you still got a lot 

of those contractors on the island until April 7. And we got still a 

lot of municipalities in the center part of the island, and we don’t 

have all the materials on the island yet. And although Corp of Engineers is saying that the island will be 100 percent recover, in 

May or June, the reality is that when I sat with those personnel, 

they were saying July, they say in August, and maybe more than 

that. And I don’t want to, you know, lie to my people back home. 

I know you do neither, you know. What do we need to make a plan 

for a 30-day re-powering of the island? 

Mr. BYRNE. I, quite frankly, have the trust in the unified command that has been in place for the last 6 months. They have been 

able to do difficult things. And they are—have a plan now. And, 

again, in fact, talking to Carlos Torres, that we both know and respect and the work he is doing there. He said, Mike, the hard part 

to do is the stuff we are doing now, and it is like working on a car 

engine. You can bring in lots more mechanics, but you can only get 

so many hands into the vehicle at one time. 

So we are focused on that. And if the smart people at PREPA or 

at the Corps or any of those contractors can come up with a way 

or—to do this faster, you know we are going to support it. I am 

going to support it 1,000 percent. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. What about the materials? 

Mr. BYRNE. We are going to continue to provide materials and 

get them in. As you know, we had challenges with material. There 

was other disasters going on. There was—you know, we were making material, and 30 days later it was getting put to use in terms 

of things. But, again, we are not going to let up until we get all 

the material we need and get that last mile. You know, as we have 

talked about, some of these houses are up a road that got washed 

out that are, you know, way in the back that—where we have to 

get to. But, again, we are not going to stop until we get to that. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. I will ask you to have, again, another 

meeting with the Corp of Engineers and new people from FEMA, 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
57 

and the people from PREPA, to see how we can maybe cut some 

red tape in terms of knowing if we can make a plan of—you know, 

cut those long months and days and have actually, you know, a 

final expectation, how long it will take to the people. People don’t 

know how long they need to wait to actually have power again in 

their homes. And you know that. I mean, you are living on the island. You know how it has been living there. 

My next question will be, because I am running out of time. 

What deadlines have passed or are approaching to such things as 

aid applications, or 100 percent Federal funding? And those terms 

are statutory or administrative. I know, and I want to thank the 

people from EPA for answering my letter in terms of 100 percent 

Federal assistance in the removal of debris, and thanking the 

President for allowing the new waiver for 60 days and making that 

happen. Thanking the administration for that. And I just received 

the letter on the 19 of March. That is one of the questions. 

The second one would be for the whole panel in terms of the Department of Energy. I know you are helping the Government of 

Puerto Rico, specifically PREPA. One thing is patching up what we 

have. Is the system going to be strong enough to resist even a tropical storm in August, or even to face another hurricane season in 

3 months? Are we rebuilding? Are we patching up? I mean, what 

is the next step to re-powering the island and make a better system? 

Mr. PARKS. So the first job was to get restoration, and that is 

what Mike has been talking about. We are looking at both shortterm and longer-term things that are needed to really get that resiliency built into it. And as you saw, the San Juan blackout a couple weeks ago as an indication that some of this equipment has 

probably been—has a life expectancy that is reduced as a function 

of going through it. 

So the teams, Army Corps, FEMA, our people on the ground, are 

putting up as much as they can the best systems with the equipment they have and everything. But some of those things over the 

next few years may fail prematurely. And part of what we want to 

do is make sure that we are constantly increasing things, like inspection schedules and all of these routine maintenance things that 

are accelerated so we can predict and understand how fast we need 

to replace things relative to their normal life. 

Those are the kind of things that need to happen. We need to 

make sure that there are contract paths for getting things like 

microgrids in place. There are clear ideas of how to best serve some 

of the rural communities and that they understand options, and 

those decisions can be made. 

So those are the kind of things you need to think about. I think 

the key is vigilance now, and vigilance as we go forward and not— 

even if there is not another major event this summer, you want to 

continue to work toward making sure you have that resiliency and 

those things like the maintenance schedules set up and in place 

and operating. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 


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58 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses again. 

Staff Sergeant Sutton, thank you for your service to your country, and also for your willingness to pitch in at your own expense. 

And I just think that your involvement here was heroic, and we 

really appreciate it. I am sure the families of Puerto Rico appreciate that as well. 

Mike Byrne, let’s talk about the decision of FEMA to award the 

contract for providing 30 million meals to victims in Puerto Rico to 

Tiffany Brown, a single person. She had a little LLC that she set 

up. So we got all these people without food, without water. 

A month after the storm, so 30 days out. They have already have been without food for a month. And we award $156 million contract 

to Tiffany Brown. And she is already on the website, on your 

website, as having defaulted on a previous small contract for 

$27,000 to provide beans and rice and spaghetti. She has already 

bellied up on that one. She is on the website in default. She can’t 

do that. So we give her a contract for $156 million. How does that 

happen? How does that happen? 

Mr. BYRNE. So we went through our normal contracting. We 

went through—followed the Federal procurement practices. 

Mr. LYNCH. That was anything but normal. That has to be abnormal, right? 

Mr. BYRNE. You know, we issued about just under 2,000 contracts during that period of time. And the block that that particular contract was in, we did end up awarding six other contracts 

to other suppliers, so we were able to meet the demand. Didn’t 

really impact our demand. And we also held this individual and 

this company accountable. We did not pay them $156 million, we 

only paid them for what they delivered—50,000. 

Mr. LYNCH. You hired them and you didn’t hire somebody else 

who could do the job, so I don’t want to gloss over that. But, I 

mean, my point is that she should not have got that contract in the 

first place. One, for capacity. Just one person. She hired a wedding 

caterer, you know. You know, this was a disaster. So there was a 

sense of urgency that I don’t think is being shared by FEMA, to 

be honest with you. And then she has got a prior history here. 

So here is what I am thinking. I mean, we have companies that 

provide meals ready to eat to our military, and they do a good job. 

Now, we don’t need meals ready to eat because, you know, they are 

more expensive because they have got to last for 5 years. However, 

we got companies that do that type of thing. 

Why wouldn’t we reach out to one of those companies, have them 

bid, or just, you know, buy the stuff or arrange for acquisition 

through one of those companies, and then we will replace it later 

if we have to. But the thing is, we shouldn’t have waited 30 days 

to get the bid out. And then once it got out, we shouldn’t have 

given it to Tiffany Brown. And, you know, I am not even mentioning the Jones Brothers who got the contract for plastic roofing. 

Mr. BYRNE. So we did distribute over 63 million meals. And even 

this week, we are still distributing every day, tens of thousands of 

meals out there. But, look, we are all about getting better. And if 

there is anything we can do to improve and make sure that we are 

doing better and we don’t even let even one of our 2,000 contracts 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
59 

slip through the cracks and not be effective, then we will do that. 

We will certainly work to get better at that. 

Mr. LYNCH. Let me just say.You know, my background is construction management. I was an ironworker for 20 years. That is 

what I got my degree in. And we usually had a list of qualified bidders, people that had a history and a record and a reputation for 

doing the right thing and doing it effectively and so that when the 

job came up, we had a pool of people that we could actually reach 

out to that we could rely upon. And you don’t operate that way. 

And, you know, we also have performance bonds where we have 

the contractor post a performance bond where if they go belly up, 

we just grab their bond, and we go on to the next person. I don’t 

see that going on at FEMA. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, we dealt with this contract quickly and effectively. And we—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Effectively? 

Mr. BYRNE. We did away with it, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Are you kidding me? 

Mr. BYRNE. We stopped the contract. 

Mr. LYNCH. No, no. Firing the person is not handling the contract effectively. Having them go belly up and non perform and 

then you fire them, that is not effectively. Picking a good contractor 

that provides the relief that the taxpayer paid for, that is efficiently, right? 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, we did manage to do that for the vast majority 

of the—again—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Except for this $156 million contract. I don’t know. 

I am not hearing what I thought I would be hearing after seeing 

what is going on here. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Byrne, with this new language about allowing the rebuilding 

to go up to industry standards, not necessarily just the status quo 

anti, is that going to be a benefit for Puerto Rico specifically? Because wasn’t their infrastructure really degraded? And so, yeah, it 

was a very bad storm. But because some of it wasn’t up to industry 

standards, the damage was that much worse? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. This language that you guys 

give us really is going to streamline our process and enable us to 

do the right thing. I mean, just imagine the discussions we would 

have of ‘‘he said, she said,’’ of what was the condition before, what 

wasn’t, what was old, what was new. We now don’t have to worry 

about that. We are just focused on doing the right thing. 

And there was one other thing that you called for in the legislation for us to develop a plan, with the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, to bring in the best and the brightest to design the right solution, not just project by project, but what is the right solution for 

the whole infrastructure system? And we are going to—we have 

180 days to put that together, and we are going to let that be our 

guide as to how we build this back better and stronger. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So they needed attention on the infrastructure 

even before the storm. And so having to go through as painful as 

this has been, on the back side, is it your expectation that we will 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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a much stronger infrastructure system there in terms of the electricity and the water than we had previous to the storm? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes. That is exactly the opportunity that is in front 

of us. We are going to be vigilant. We are going to be direct. We 

are going to make sure that we use, when we bring in, some of the 

experts, my colleagues on the panel with me, to get their advice 

from their smart people so that—you know, we are not the experts 

in power. We are going to rely on the experts in power to tell us 

what the right thing to do. And we are going to use the authorities 

you gave us to end, and the funding you gave us, to make sure it 

happens. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Good. Well, we want to see that put to use. And 

we want the folks back on their feet. 

I am going to yield the remaining time I have to my friend Jennifer, and so I will recognize her now. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, another question is regarding the deeds or titles of the 

home—of the owners of those homes, and that, you know, Mr. 

Byrne. That is one of the major problems we got on the island. The 

people have having a lot of difficulties applying for housing and individual assistance as they cannot command their home values, or 

even the homeowners, because they are leaving and—lands that 

were family owned or living there from a lot of years. And I actually filed a bill with Congressman Espaillat that addressed this 

issue. I just want to know if FEMA is willing to sit with me and 

HUD Department. Actually I already did that with Deputy Secretary of HUD trying to address this issue that has been there for 

many years. 

Are you willing to do that? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes. Absolutely. There is nothing more heartbreaking than to see somebody lose their home, and then have paperwork get in the way. We encourage those families to go to the 

disaster recovery centers. We have got 64 of them set up throughout the island. However you can get back on the phone with us, 

we will find a way to work that. And I look forward with you on 

it. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. I am glad to hear that, because that is 

one the biggest situation in the island even—I know that even locally, the construction code grandfather a lot of those informal kind 

of living. And actually the hurricane just spotlighted the situation 

on the island. I know the situation, and I will—this will be to EPA. 

How has this situation, hurricane, affected the status of the landfills in Puerto Rico? Because I know the debris and the proposals 

made it for alternative debris disposal has been increasing after 

the hurricane. And we already got a problem with a lot of landfills 

before the hurricane. 

And the third question, because I know I am going to run out 

of time, Mr. Byrne, is regarding—you know that PREPA is under 

the bankruptcy situation. So one of the main problems we got is 

PREPA don’t got the money to buy the materials, in the first place, 

the liquidity to buy the materials and then got the reimbursement 

from FEMA to make that happen. 

So that will, you know, make longer the process of the recovery. 

So that is one of the reasons I know the Department of Energy and 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
61 

the Corps of Engineers were involved in the process. How can we 

make that process a faster one, and with your leadership there 

helping us out through your—faster situation. 

Mr. LOPEZ. Thank you, Miss Colon. 

So in regards to landfills, we share your urgent concern. And to 

answer your question, the storms have just made a situation that 

was difficult, and really a crisis situation, worse. So we have 

worked hard with FEMA and our colleagues to intercept waste before it is put into the landfill. So whether it is household waste, 

hazardous waste, vegetative debris, any number of potential additions to the landfills we are working to intercept it and then manage it. In some cases, shipping it off island for proper assessment. 

The issue, of course, is the long-term. And we are very dedicated 

to working with the Commonwealth and USVI, because they have 

the same problem on their islands to get them to a point where 

they have landfills that are secure. We know that many of the 

landfills, none of them, are in full compliance. We have 11 that we 

have—13 that we have orders against because they are potentially 

contaminating groundwater, they could be hazards to the community. 

Our challenge is that the ultimate responsibility lies with the 

Commonwealth in terms of managing and operating. So our goal, 

and we have developed a strategic plan in region 2 with EPA, we 

would like to reach out to the Commonwealth, bring all the stakeholders together, and begin looking at how do we address solid 

waste universally? 

How do we reduce the amount of waste going to landfills? What 

do we do for source separation, recycling. We like to be part of that 

process. How do we drive funding towards the island which the island will control to put in secure landfills with proper liners, proper leachate collection, to make ones that are unsafe, close them 

down. So we are very much united with you. The term ‘‘crisis’’ applies, and we are addressing this very urgently. We share your concern. 

Mr. BYRNE. As to—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. Let me—the time is up. I am going to recognize— 

because we are going to have the vote called, so if there is time on 

the back end, I would love to give you an opportunity. 

Before I recognize our friend from the Virgin Islands, I have a 

statement from the American Public Power Association. I would 

ask unanimous consent that this be made part of the record. And 

without objection, it will be made part of the record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The chair does note the presence of Ms. Plaskett 

from the Virgin Islands. I ask unanimous consent that she be 

waived in and be allowed to participate. Without objection, so ordered. 

And then I now would like to recognize her for 5 minutes. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, ranking 

member, for holding this hearing, and thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here this morning. 

Part of the oversight and government reform purpose is to oversee and ensure that operations of the government are working 

smoothly and efficiently. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
62 

In October, bipartisan members of this committee sent a letter 

to DHS and have been requesting from FEMA response for that 

letter related to these hurricanes. We have not, to date, received 

the documents from that. And that is something that is very, very 

unnerving, and, potentially, very problematic in our ability to continue to do our work. 

In the course of our own investigation in this committee, one of 

the things that we have recognized is, in the response, potentially 

some communications problem between agencies, and how are 

agencies working getting supplies to the people that are affected by 

these hurricanes. 

One of the instances we found out were surrounding Walmart 

and emergency food. We have emails and text messages between 

Walmart and government officials, and Congress and Puerto Rico 

who discuss the desperate need for fuel at the Walmart stores to 

be able to sustain the food that was there. In one, on September 

23 and 24, a Walmart official wrote to the Puerto Rico official saying: Walmart, any word on the fuel situation on the island? Puerto 

Rico, there is some redaction, no word yet. I put in numerous requests with FEMA and haven’t heard from anything. Because of 

your issue, I put in a request to be imbedded into FEMA headquarters tomorrow which will allow me to get this sorted out directly. I will let you know if anything happens. 

So our committee then issued to both myself and Ranking Member Cummings sent a letter to Trey Gowdy, which I would ask 

unanimous consent to be put into the record, which is a request regarding our bipartisan investigation of the response to the hurricanes and requesting information and outlining what we found out 

from the investigation and Walmart. 

So, Mr. Byrne, how was Walmart’s emergency request for a generator fuel handled by FEMA? 

First, is there any objection? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Byrne, what was Walmart’s emergency request for generator 

fuel handled by FEMA? 

Mr. BYRNE. At that point, I don’t think I was at the response, 

but I am familiar with the issue and the—at that point in time in 

a response, we are focused—we have to prioritize where we are 

going to get emergency fuel to, and our focus was on hospitals, you 

know, dialysis centers, and community health centers and public 

safety buildings. 

Ms. PLASKETT. How many generators were brought down to 

Puerto Rico? 

Mr. BYRNE. A total of about 1,900. 

Ms. PLASKETT. 1,900. And is there a protocol to have generators 

in places where food is being stored for food to be able—is that 

within the purview of FEMA to get generators to those locations? 

Mr. BYRNE. We do. But with the issue of private sector companies, you know, I think we have to be cautious here. You know, this 

really is—you know, if we are going to rely on FEMA to be the single source for both private sector—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. I guess the question is—the question is are 

you—have protocols to be able to do it? 


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I understand the issue with private sector. But we heard earlier 

in the testimony that there was issues in contracting for emergency 

food to be brought down. So when you have food there on the 

ground, does it then become a priority to make sure that that food 

supply doesn’t become perishable? 

Mr. BYRNE. We certainly take responsibility for everything we 

bring in. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. But one of the things I wanted to get back 

to with regard to the documents that we requested in October, do 

you have a date when you are going to respond to the letter that 

was sent by Chairman Gowdy and Ranking Member Cummings requesting the information from DHS? 

Mr. BYRNE. This is the first that I have been made aware of that, 

but I am sure that I will take that back and we will make sure 

we respond. 

Ms. PLASKETT. This is the first time that you heard about the letter that we requested information through FEMA from DHS? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, ma’am. My role is to be the leader of the response in Puerto Rico. I am not really involved in the aspects that 

you just described. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Okay. So will you get the message to get Brock 

Long for us? 

Mr. BYRNE. I will carry it forward personally. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you. 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And do you know, Mr. Byrne, if FEMA has a plan 

for getting fuel to food storage generators in the event of another 

hurricane if it is being knocked out. 

Mr. BYRNE. We are developing plans right now to have 

prepositioned a lot of fuel and generators on the island. We haven’t 

worked out any details. But, again, I think we are going to—we are 

going to ask the private sector to also make plans, because this has 

got to be a whole community and not just us that is supplying all 

the emergency—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. I agree completely. 

So as my colleague, Jennifer Gonzalez-Colon, said, we are now 

several months before hurricane season again. Predictions are that 

this hurricane season should be the same level of activity as last 

year’s. 

Are we prepared for a hurricane in the Virgin Islands and Puerto 

Rico, or one or two? 

Mr. Parks, is the Department—is your department prepared for 

that? 

Mr. PARKS. We have—we prepare every year for—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. Are you prepared for the level of hurricanes happening in the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico that occurred. That 

is a yes or no. 

Are you prepared for it? 

Mr. PARKS. Well, our role—the simple answer is, I would say we 

are not, because we are not—that is not our function. 

Ms. PLASKETT. If you are called upon, are you saying that you 

have no role to play in that when—— 

Mr. PARKS. No, ma’am. I didn’t say that. You asked for a yes-orno answer. 


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Mr. PLASKETT. Is your agency prepared when called upon by 

FEMA to support that? 

Mr. PARKS. Absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And, Mr. Byrne, does FEMA have in place 

prioritization for the hurricane season that is coming knowing the 

compromised state that the Caribbean Americans are in right now? 

Mr. BYRNE. We are going to take extraordinary steps to make 

sure we have stuff in place. But I would have to be honest, it is 

going to be a rough year. There is a fragile, you know, stability 

that we built, and we are going to need to take extra steps to make 

sure we have extra on the island, and we are doing that. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlelady yields back. 

With that, I don’t see any additional members. 

Would you like to do another round? 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if you don’t 

mind, to introduce into the record a letter I sent to the Corps of 

Engineers on the 13 of March of this year about the power restoration, to the record, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Lynch, you have something for the record? 

Mr. LYNCH. I just have one quick question, but I also have observations on Federal response to Maria in Puerto Rico. I would like 

to have this accepted into the record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

And the question I had is, so, Mr. Byrne, I realize you did—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, hold on. Let me just see. 

Do you have any questions? 

Let me recognize her. 

Mr. LYNCH. Oh, I am sorry. Sure. I thought she yielded. No problem. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This question will be to Edison Energy. My question will be how 

stable or reliable is the repair grid right now? 

Mr. AARONSON. Thank you, Representative Gonzalez-Colon. 

So I want to point to some of the things that were said by Mr. 

Parks and Mr. Byrne. While the grid before Hurricane Maria made 

landfall was certainly—had—in disrepair, I think the fact that we 

have the ability to not just repair and replace, as FEMA rules 

would dictate, but repair and replace to code is going to give us a 

leg up on a little bit more stability and resilience from the grid. I’d 

also note the quality of work under the unified command from the 

mutual assistance crews, from the Army Corps of Engineers and its 

associated contractors, and certainly from PREPA, is cause for 

some confidence that we are going to be in a better spot. 

And then the last thing I would say is, and this is true of the 

entire hurricane season. Mother Nature did one heck of a housecleaning, and took out a lot of the debris and vegetation that obviously can interfere with the safe transmission and distribution of 

electricity. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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So while I think to the points that were just made, we need to 

be vigilant and we need to continue to do the work. We are in a 

more resilient situation than we were prior to the 2017 season. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. You just brought me a question to 

FEMA, and that is that some of the people from the Corps of Engineers were telling me that they never got the mission for FEMA 

to rebuild in a new way because they just got the provision of repair. And I just want to put in the record that we managed to include an amendment during the separate supplemental and the 

Budget Act, an amendment to Section 2601, the administrator of 

the Federal Emergency Management may provide assistance pursuant to the Section 428 of the Robert T. Stafford Act for critical 

services to replace or restore the function of a facility or assistance 

industry standard without regard to the pre-disaster condition of 

the facility or system, to replace or restore components of the facility not damaged by the disaster where necessary to fully effecuate 

the replacement or restoration of the disaster-damaged component. 

So that provision was included because precisely all of the restrictions your office told me during that process, during the hearings, during the codels that were on the island. So that is included 

in the amendment this Congress passed. And I think you already 

got the provisions and laws, so there is no excuse now to say that 

the Army Corps, or FEMA, don’t got a provision to make that happen. 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes. Definitely. I mean, there is nothing that we are 

more excited about than that, and the ability to actually do the 

right thing. But the Corps was accurate. The mission assignment 

we get was for emergency work, not permanent work. And, really, 

now is the part where we got to be deliberate. We have to take 

time to take a look and figure out what the right thing to do is 

going forward, because we have got an extraordinary chance, as 

you said. It did wipe things clean, destroyed 80 percent of the infrastructure. Now we get a chance. You know, the bad news is people have suffered, and we feel for that. But the good news is, is we 

are going to be able to—we have an opportunity to build this back 

the right way. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Mr. Byrne, another question regarding 

the Army Corps and the mayors is about how long it takes the reimbursement process? And during the last hearing from the homeland security, most of the mayors were—even Mr. Long is saying 

that you are dealing with a lot of requests from many States, but 

without the resources to manage a lot of those requests. Are you 

saying that you don’t have enough people to manage the request 

of many of the reclamation from the municipalities? 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, we are in the—you know, as far as the payback, you know, we recognize we want to move faster with the 

mayors and the documentation process that we have got in place. 

I think in any disaster that I have worked, the initial part is usually a little bumpy, but I think we will smooth that out. 

But as far as more people, my plan is to hire more people. Hire 

more people on Puerto Rico. As I said, I have 52 percent of my 

workforce is Puerto Ricans right now. I am going to try to get to 

90 percent by the 1-year anniversary. And we are going bring on 


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as many people as we need to provide the level of service that you 

are looking for. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. And, Mr. Chairman, one last question, 

and I will ask Mr. Byrne to file that on record for the committee, 

and it will be regarding the community disaster loan that I know 

the FEMA and the Treasury Department—actually, the Secretary 

of the Treasury is on the island today. Can you submit to this committee information regarding the status of the CDL for the municipalities and the State government regarding that during the next 

5 days? 

Mr. BYRNE. Sure. 

Miss GONZALEZ-COLON. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlelady yields back. 

Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Just a follow-up. 

Mr. Byrne, we also—following up on Ms. Plaskett’s request, we 

also have a request in for documents regarding the Tribute Contracting, LLC, documents. And so we would like to have those documents provided by Tiffany Brown in order to get that contract. As 

you know, she is suing FEMA. She is seeking a $70 million settlement. And the wedding caterer is also suing to get their money 

from her. And so these documents will be made available in the 

core proceedings. We are going to get them anyway, but it would 

be a sign of good faith if FEMA provided those documents rather 

than us have to go to the court and get those documents from 

them. Okay? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yes, sir. I will take that back. 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

I want to thank you. The votes—do you want to yield her the 

rest of your time? 

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. Sure. Sorry. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Sutton, thank you, again, as so many of my colleagues have 

thanked you, and all of the people who came to volunteer in Puerto 

Rico and the Virgin Islands during the tragedies and the issues 

that we had after the hurricanes. 

You arrived, you said, about a week after Hurricane Maria hit 

Puerto Rico. What was your visual account? And what do you know 

about the food shortages that were going on there? 

Mr. SUTTON. Well, the, you know, visual account, I mean, the island looked like a—not just a hurricane, a tornado hit. I mean, you 

are talking from power lines, houses. I mean, all that was left was 

the frame of a house, not a house. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Sure. Because there are tornadoes inside hurricanes. 

Mr. SUTTON. Oh, pretty much. I mean, this one, yeah, I would 

almost believe it the way it looked. I went there the year prior. 

And, you know, Puerto Rico is beautiful. 

Ms. PLASKETT. So what about the food storage? Because I don’t 

have a lot of time. 

Food shortages. Did you see any? 


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Mr. SUTTON. Oh, yeah. You know, most of the food that was 

there was available. You know, you are talking about San Juan 

being in immaculate shape. But outside of San Juan, nobody had 

food. No one had abilities to get that food either. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And did you see any, or were you witness to anyone who lost their life during this time, not from injuries from the 

hurricane but potentially from food shortages? 

Mr. SUTTON. Yes, ma’am. There were several elderly, young children under the age of 5. People who, you know, died of dehydration, died of malnutrition. And it is just, honestly, because the lack 

of supply of food and ability to get to the food. And a lot of those 

collection points for FEMA were ‘‘You come to us. We don’t come 

to you.’’ 

And the hard part is people lost their cars and buildings, and 

they live up on the mountains or—— 

Ms. PLASKETT. Right. Jeffrey Parks, who is a key member of the 

joint task force of Katrina, arrived in Puerto Rico around September 30 and stayed for 10 days. In his statement for the record, 

he concludes that the lack of communications in the aftermath of 

Hurricane Marie was, quote, ‘‘the single largest response failure.’’ 

Mr. Sutton, do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. SUTTON. I completely agree with that. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And why do you say that? 

Mr. SUTTON. I mean, there was no communications. When I landed in the airport, the only communications were inside the airport. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Right. 

Mr. SUTTON. Even 15, 20 days after, the only forms of communication were inside of an RV in Eswado (ph). Outside of that, no 

communications. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Byrne, I know that just trying to operate in 

the Virgin Islands right after the storm, I remember Jennifer and 

I were able to text a couple of times in between. But you found people congregating in one small area because the communications 

had gone out. 

Do you have communications in place? What are the plans if 

something like this happens again to get emergency communication 

out to the critical areas? 

Mr. BYRNE. Yeah. We have taken steps. We have actually given 

satellite phones to all 78 mayors. But we are going to do more. We 

are trying to restore, get as much back of the existing system and 

strengthen it before the season starts. There is a huge effort under 

way for that. And that is really a public-private partnership, because the normal communication companies are also engaged in 

helping us get the powers and the towers back. 

Ms. PLASKETT. And what about—you talk about the towers. The 

same Jeffrey Parks says that he wrote to us, that he did not see 

a single temporary cell tower in the 10 days that he was in Puerto 

Rico. 

How many temporary cell towers were installed within a month 

after Maria? And what is the plans in terms of temporary cell towers in the next instance? 

Mr. BYRNE. I would have to get back to you with the numbers 

for that first month of how many temporary cell towers. But we are 

getting together. We have a summit where we are going to sit 


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down with all the parts, the municipalities, the mayors, the governor’s staff, and to come up with additional plans to make sure 

that we—no stone is left unturned in terms of being as ready as 

we can to get through, as I said earlier, what is going to be a— 

potentially a risky season. 

Ms. PLASKETT. Mr. Chairman, I just am really grateful for you 

for having this hearing. I think it is really important for us to do 

these assessments now as we are coming up to the hurricane season. My concern is we have heard from the witnesses with regard 

to do we have microgrids in place? Will they be in place in time 

for us to be able to power back up as quickly as possible to get 

things going. 

You know, I worry about the people who were—areas where—especially devastated and people are living in marginal lives right 

now. People in Anna’s Hope on St. Thomas and Coral Bay on St. 

Johns, Awim (ph) and White Lady on St. Croix, Vieques. People 

who live in Eduardo. Those are places that were completely obliterated after the hurricanes, and they are living on the edge as it 

stands. And my great concern is that this commit does what it 

needs to do to hold the Federal Government accountable, give them 

the tools that they need, the support and financing that is going 

to allow them to be on the ground if, God forbid, this should happen again. 

So thank you so much, gentlemen, for being here and being open 

and honest with us and getting this information back so that we 

can all do our own part to ensure that American lives are not lost 

and that the economy is continually moving. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

I want to thank the witnesses again for appearing before us 

today. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any 

member to submit a written opening statement or questions for the 

record. 

If there is no further business, without objection, the Subcommittee on National Security stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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AMEIUCAN 

ASSOCIATION 

Statement ofthe American Public Power Association 

Submitted to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee's 

Subcommittee on National Security 

For the March 21, 2018, Hearing on 

(Submitted Marcl120, 2018) 

The American Public Power Association CAPPA or Association) welcomes the opportunity to submit 

this statement for the record in relation to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee's 

Subcommittee on National Security hearing on '"Bureaucratic Challenges to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto 

Rico." APPA is the national service organization representing the interests of over 2,000 communityowned, not-for-profit electric utilities. These utilities include state public power agencies, municipal 

electric utilities, and special utility districts that provide low-cost. reliable electricity and other services to 

over 49 million Americans. 

Hurricanes Harvey, lrma, and Maria caused widespread damage and impacted millions of Americans 

throughout the South and in the Caribbean. Public power utilities and their customers were impacted by 

all three storms. but particularly by Hurricanes lnna and Maria. Hun·icane lnna caused widespread 

damage to the islands of St. Thomas and St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) and Key West. 

Florida. All 63 counties of Florida and large parts of Georgia, as well as Puerto Rico, were also impacted 

by the storm. Irma was soon followed by Hurricane Maria, which caused significant damage to St. Croix 

in USV! and Puerto Rico. Mutual aid played an important role in helping restore power to many 

impacted communities and is ongoing in the efforts to restore power to Puerto Rico. 

The Mutual Aid Process 

In the aftermath of these devastating storms, APP A received a lot of questions about mutual aid. 

Common questions include what is mutual aid? How does it work? How is mutual aid invoked? Who 

pays for mutual aid assistance? Given the many questions we have received, we thought it would be 

helpful to provide an overview on the mutual aid process. 

Mutual aid is when utilities help one another in times of need. The Association, together with state 

and regional public power utilities and organizations, coordinate the mutual aid program (MAP) for the 

nation's public power utilities. More than 1,100 public power utilities across the country participate. 
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Utilities that want to give and get help for power restoration after a disaster voluntarily sign up for this 

national network. The network participants also maintain lists of independent contractors that may be 

available when extra help is needed. 

When (and even before) a major disaster hits a utility's service territory and the utility knows that its 

own crews and equipment will not be enough to restore power quickly, the requesting utility or MAP 

network coordinator calls for mutual aid. It provides its best estimates of how many lineworkcrs and the 

types of equipment the requesting utility needs and what type of skills the responding l ineworkers should 

have. The requesting utility also specifies any specialized equipment and/or materials needs. Other 

utilities in the national mutual aid network respond with what they can offer. The requesting utility also 

utilizes agreements with contractors to supplement the responding utility crews. 

The actual dispatch and movement of crews from different utilities and contractors is coordinated by 

utility and public power association personnel who volunteer as regional and national mutual aid network 

coordinators. Such efforts require substantial logistics management. The utility that is requesting mutual 

aid generally arranges to house, feed, and care for the crews that come in from other utilities, and 

provides them the necessary work and safety briefings to do their jobs effectively. Requesting utilities 

generally assist the visiting crews to prioritize circuit restoration, ensure safe work procedures, and 

understand the terrain because the responding employees are typically unfamiliar with the requesting 

utilities' electric system. 

Public power utilities requesting mutual aid pay utilities and contractors that provide help. Rates are 

determined through agreements entered into by the utilities. As units of state and local government, 

public power utilities are eligible for partial reimbursement of restoration expenses by the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), if all relevant conditions and requirements are met. 

In addition to helping public power utilities in need, public power utilities also provide mutual aid to 

cooperatives and investor-owned utilities when requested and have also received assistance from 

cooperatives and lOlls when needed. In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the entire industry has 

worked more closely on restoration efforts with the goal of bringing back power to all customers as soon 

as possible. The lessons learned trom previous hurricanes and Superstorm Sandy were evident in the 

industry's restoration efforts following the active hurricane season in 2017. 

The Role of Mutual Aid Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria 

When llurricane Harvey hit the Gulf Coast in September, most public power utilities were spared the 

worst, but did provide mutual aid to others directly impacted by the storm. Approximately 160,000 

public power customers in Texas lost power and service was restored to nearly all ofthem within three 

days. Robstown, Texas, which is near Corpus Christi, suffered wind damage, but restored power to 95 

percent of its customers within two days. Some public power utilities in East Texas lost power due to 

transmission outages in the area, but their distribution systems did not incur substantial damage. Walt 

Baum, the Executive Director of the Texas Public Power Association, an APPA member, testified before 

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the House Science, Space, & Technology Committee on October 3, 2017, on recovery efforts in Texas 

after Hurricane Harvey and the industry's efforts to maintain a reliable and resilient grid, including the 

importance of mutual aid to resiliency. APPA encourages the National Security Subcommittee to review 

Mr. Bamn's insightful testimony to the Science Committee, which is available 

Hurricane Irma impacted public power utilities in USVI, Puerto Rico, Florida, South Carolina, and 

Georgia. The hurricane inflicted significant damage to the islands of St. Thomas and St John in USVL 

Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (USV! WAPA) requested mutual aid after Irma and the 

Western Area Power Administration, as well as public power utilities from New England, responded by 

sending crews and equipment to assist in the recovery efforts. Given the extensive damage done by the 

hurricane, USV! requested additional mutual aid through APPA. ln addition to 23 public utilities from 

New England, 22 public power utilities tl·om Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska. Oklahoma, South 

Carolina, and Wisconsin, joined contractor crews and assisted US VI W APA in its recovery efforts. 

Power was restored to all USVl customers that could accept power by March 8, 2018. 

Puerto Rico was also hit by Irma, knocking out power to a majority of the island, The Puerto Rico 

Electric Power Authority (PREP A), an APPA member, had restored power to most of its customers 

before being devastated by Hurricane Maria just over a week later. 

APPA member Keys Energy Services in Key West, Florida, was directly hit by Hurricane Irma, 

which took down most of its distribution and transmission facilities. As the storm moved up through 

Florida, it impacted every single public power utility in the state. More than 800,000 public power 

customers in Florida were without power at the height of the outages, but 98 percent of them had their 

power restored within seven days. In addition, there were significant outages among some of our Georgia 

members. 

Mutual aid played a key role in restoring the power quickly in the Southeast. Public power utilities 

aided one another in the restoration efforts. They also aided !OUs, and lOUs assisted public power 

utilities with needed materials. The Florida Municipal Electric Association, an APPA memher, played a 

central role in coordinating mutual aid for the utilities impacted by the hurricane in the state and 

coordinated municipal aid crews from 26 states. The restoration e!Iort after Irma was one of the largest 

ones in U.S. history and the speed of the recovery was acknowledged by the U.S. Energy Information 

Administration. 

Hurricane Maria knocked out power to St. Croix in USVI, the one island not suhstantially impacted 

by Hurricane Irma, and ali of Puerto Rico. APPA member New York Power Authority (NYPA) sent 

technical subject matter experts and drones down to Puerto Rico as part of a state-led mission initiated by 

New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, at the request of Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello. NYPA 's 

personnel worked with PREP A on damage assessments of specific PREP A generation, transmission, and 

substation facilities. 

ln addition, FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and Department of Energy (DOE) 

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sent personnel to Puerto Rico. In early October, FEMA put USACE in charge of the mission to restore 

power. USACE selected contractors to assist in the recovery efforts. Four public power utilities from 

Florida also went to Puerto Rico in October to assist PREP A in the recovery efforts as subcontractors to 

one of PREP A's own contractors. They completed their assigned work and returned to the mainland by 

Thanksgiving. 

On October 3 l, 2017, PREP A requested mutual aid from APP A and the Edison Electric Institute 

(EEl). This request was updated in early November to include the National Rural Electric Cooperative 

Association. Since receiving this request, the Association has worked with PREP A, our government 

partners and their contractors, and the industry to support the power restoration process. Public power 

utilities from Arizona, Connecticut, California, Indiana, Texas, and the Commonwealth of the Northem 

Mariana Islands traveled to Puerto Rico to assist in the joint recovery efforts. The testimony of Mr. Scott 

Aaronson of EEl, who is testifying at today's hearing, provides a timeline of the mutual assistance 

response by the industry and some of the challenges faced during the recovery efforts. 

The Challenge of Providing Mutual Aid to Islands 

APPA has a long history of facilitating mutual aid to our members in the U.S. territories. Public 

power utilities have helped restore power to the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 and 

Hurricane Hugo in 1989. The main difficulty with providing mutual aid to islands hit by natural disasters 

is the logistics of getting crews and supplies to them. When a natural disaster is expected to hit a region 

in the continental U.S., utilities can request mutual assistance ahead of being struck by a storm, as well as 

enter into contracts with private contractors. Once a stonn has passed, mutual aid crews can drive from 

across the country to restore power in a short period oftimc and supplies can be trucked in. When a 

natural disaster strikes an island that is uot connected to the continental U.S., crews and supplies must 

either rely on planes or ships to get them to such locations. 

For example, after Hurricane Marilyn hit US VI in 1989, crews and equipment were flown dowu and 

back via military aircraft. In 1995, utility equipment was flown down and barged back to the mainland 

after power was restored. 

For the restoration efforts in Puerto Rico, trucks and equipment were sent via barge, which is less 

expensive, but takes more time to arrive thau if they were sent via plane. APPA worked with the industry 

and our federal government partners to identifY locations where barges would pick up equipment for 

shipment dowu to Puerto Rico. Crews drove trucks to specific ports and then flew down to San Juan to 

arrive just ahead ofthe equipment arriving. Should a future hurricane hit Puerto Rico or USVl, early 

designation of pm1s for transportation of equipment will facilitate mutual aid efforts. 

Lessons Learned from the 2017 Hurricane Season 

Mr. Aaronson in his testimony discusses some of the lessons leamed from the 2017 hurricane season. 

APPA concurs in his discussion, and welcomes the opportunity to discuss with our government partners 

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at FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security, and DOE how to incorporate the lessons we all have 

learned to improve recovery elTorts in the future. 

APPA appreciates the opportunity to submit this statement for the record to the National Security 

Subcommittee and provide background on the mutual aid process for public power utilities. Thank you 

for holding this important hearing on bureaucratic challenges to hurricane recovery in Puerto Rico. 

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ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

tbe ltniteb 

~oll5t of i\epresmtatillc!i 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Chairman 

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE 8U!LO!NG 

WASHINGTON. DC 2051!Hl143 

March20,2018 

Committee on Oversight and Govennnent Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Our Committee has been conducting a bipartisan investigation of the Tromp 

Administrstion's response to the hurricanes in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands since last 

October. Although we sent a joint letter to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

requesting documents from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the 

Department has been stonewalling the Committee for the past five montha, has failed to produce 

key documents we requested, and has not produced a single email relating to the hurricanes in 

Puerto Rico. 

Despite this obstruction, Democrats have been able to conduct our own proactive 

investigation of the Tnunp Administration's response, fucusing specifically on its deficient 

effurts to provide emergency food. We have spoken with numerous govermnent officials, 

business owners, whistleblowers, and private citizens involved with these efforts. 

On February 6, 2018, we provided you with documents we obtained indicating that 

FEMA failed to deliver tens of millions of emergency meals because it inexplicably awarded a 

contract to deliver 30 million emergency meals worth approximately $156 million to a tiny, oneperson comp!!lly with a history of struggling with much smaller contracts. 1 Twenty days later, 

FEMA terminated the contrsct "for cause" after having accepted only 50,000 meals-29 million 

meals short of their goal. 

Although we asked you in our February letter to issue a subpoena to compel DHS to 

produce the documents we requested last October, you refused to do so. The Department still 

1 Letter from Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings and Rep. Stacey Plaskett to Cbainnan Trey Gowdy, 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Refom1 (Feb. 6, 2018) (online at https:Jtdemocrats~ 

oversighthouse.gov/sites/democrats.-oversight.house.gov/files/2018-02~ 

06.EEC%20%26%20Plaskell%20!o%20Gowdy%20re.FEMA-Tiibute%20Conlracting.pdf). 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Page2 

has not produced the documents we requested, despite the fact that these documents fall squarely 

within the bipartisan document request we made more than five months ago. 

Despite DHS's failure to cooperate, we have pressed forward with our investigation by 

speaking with numerous government employees, corporate officials, and private citizens. As 

part of our ongoing efforts, today we are providing new documents we have obtained indicating 

that FEMA also failed to respond to multiple emergency requests from major supermarkets 

seeking fuel to run generators to help prevent food from spoiling in the days immediately 

following Hurricane Maria-including tons of fresh produce, dairy, and other perishable 

products that were desperately needed by these American citi7..ens. 

These new documents show that senior officials at Walmart took extraordinary measures 

to try to convey their emergency requests to FEMA. They enlisted congressional offices and 

officials from the government of Puerto Rico to try to communicate with FBMA. They 

explained repeatedly that they had emergency generators already in place with enough fuel to · 

preserve food stocks for a matter of days, but that they needed FEMA' s help to obtain additional 

emergency fuel to keep their food from spoiling after that. 

These new documents show that the government of Puerto Rico communicated these 

emergency requests directly to FEMA, including repeatedly conveying them in person and in 

writing. The documents also show that by September 27, 2017--a full week after the borricane 

struck-FEMA failed to supply emergency fuel to save these perishable rood supplies. 

Documents show that FEMA did not respond to requests for fuel as tons of desperately 

needed food went bad. It is unclear whether FEMA had a plan to distribute emergency fuel that 

it failed to execute, or whether FEMA had no plan at all. 

For all of these reasons, today we reiterate our request that you issue a subpoena to 

compel DHS to produce all ofthe documents we originally requested on a bipartisan basis on 

October 11, 2017. We also renew ourrequest to expand the date range of our original document 

requests. lf you choose not to issue this subpoena yourself, then we request that you place this 

matter on the agenda for our next regularly scheduled business meeting so all Committee 

Members have the opportunity to vote on this motion. 

New Documents Show FEMA Failed to Respond to 

Emergency Requests for Fuel to Preserve Food 

Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico on Wednesday, September 20,2017, levellng San 

Juan and leaving millions of people without access to food and water. 

On Friday, September 22, at 4:55p.m. EST, a senior Walmart official emailed Rep. Luis 

Gutierrez' office with an urgent request: 

We're trying to keep the lights on and the food refrigerated in the few stores we've 

been able to get back up and running on the island. The problem is we're running 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Page3 

out of generator fuel and need help getting the Governor's approval for me (as I 

understand it. As you know, the communications situation is terrible). 

Have you guys been in touch with anyone from FEMA that we can contuct to help? 

We want to keep this food fresh for people. 

At 6:01p.m., Rep. Gutierrez' office forwarded this email to a Puerto Rican government 

official, writing: 

Do you have any suggestions/Ideas for !Walmartj? We are reaching out to FEMA, 

too, but just in case you have ideas. Thanks. 

At 6:13 p.m., the Puerto Rican government official responded that he was meeting with 

FEMA at that moment and was relaying the request directly: 

FYI I'm sitting with the FEMA rep right now so we are taking care of this. 

At 7:13p.m., Walmartofficials sent a priority list with the top Walmart stores that 

needed fuel to keep perishable food from spoiling. It read: 

As we discussed, we have 48 facilities on the island (46 stores, 1 home office, 1 

distribution center). All have generators on site. Fuel at this point Is becomtug a 

key concern as we are less than 24 hours left in maintaining power in most facilities. 

Currently we have already opened 3 facilities to support !be public and have plans 

to bring more on line. Key to doing this Is ensuring that we have power to run the 

operation and reestablish our supply chain,· While we have need for aU facilities, 

our facilities are prioritized in the attached list to the top 12 stores, pl~s distribution 

center and home office. 

Further prioritization would be the following to serve the largest populations: · 

• Distribution Center 6087- Catano 

• Sam's Club 4866, Kennedy Av, San Juan 

• Sam's Club 6543, Carolina 

• Walmart Supercenter 2449 Caguas 

• Walmart Supercenter 5803 San Juan (RH Todd) 

• Walmart Supercenter 2346, Toa Baja 

• Walmart Supercenter 5802, Canovanas 

You can reach me directly on my mobile at [Redacted! or contact onr 2417 

Emergency Operations Center at Walmart at [Redacted]. · 

Thank you for your asslstunce on this matter. 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Page4 

At 7:36 p.m., the Puerto Rican government official forwarded this infonnation directly to 

a FEMA official in an email titled "Walmart Stores Priority List." He wrote: 

I have copy and pasted an email I received from Walmart regarding their priority 

list of stores. They have identified 12 specific outfits of their 48 stores that are top 

priority. If FEMA doesn't have the Ci'paclty of all12 stores as priority sites 

requiring fuel, I have a list of 6 stores that are "super" priority for Walmart. 

Essentially, the fuel issue from my understanding is that FEMA needs to designate 

these Walmart sites as top priority. The gentlemen on the phone explained to me 

that they are very concerned about the food being thrown out due to spoiling due to 

the lack of food. Furthermore, he signaled that be would be willing to donate the 

food if FEMA cannot authorize fuel deliveries to these stores and is wondering If 

FEMA or the Puerto Rico agency for emergency would be the point of contact 

regarding these donations. 

Please let me know If you need anything else from me on this. I can be reached 

through cell at [Redacted]. Also, if you receive any updates on this issue, please let 

me know so I can reach out to Walmart. 

At 7:43 p.m., the Puerto Rican government official sent an email back toW almart 

officials confirming that FEMA had been alerted. He wrote: 

I have passed it along to FEMA. I will keep you all in the loop moving forward. 

The next day, Saturday, September 23, 2017, at 9:39a.m., a Walmart official sent an 

email to the Puerto Rican government official pressing for any information from FEMA on the 

urgent request. He wrote: 

[T]hanks very much for your help so far. Checking in to see if you've learned 

anything about the fuel situation. 

That Sunday evening, September 24, 2017, starting at 9:01 p.m. the Walmart official tried 

again to obtain infonnation about the emergency request for fuel. He had the following text 

message exchange with the Puerto Rican government official: 

Walmart: Any word on the fuel situation on the island? 

Puerto Rico: [Redactedj, no word yet. I've put in numerous requests with FEMA 

and haven't heard anything. Because of ur Issue, I've put In a request 

to be embedded into FEMA headquarters tomorrow, which will allow 

me to get this sorted out directly. I'll let you know if an~ihlng 

happens 

Walmart: You're a good man. Thank you. Did the hospitals get fuel? 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

PageS 

Puerto Rlco: I think so. But I can't be sure. Our communication with FEMA on 

the specifics of certain things has been less than desired. I appreciate 

your concern though 

On Monday, September 25, 20!7, starting at9:56 a.m., they had another text message 

exchange: 

Puerto Rlco: I've reachCd out t PREMA and told them about ur situation. 

Walmart: 

Hopefully they can bel 

Help* 

Our chief concern right now is with our distribution center. We 

might have 2 days worth of fuel left. It is critical that we keep that 

going in order to preserve our fresh inventory. If that goes down It 

could take weeks to replenish which would have a big negative Impact 

on the island. 

Puerto Rlco: Noted 

Walmart: Thanks. Anything else we need to be doing? We're pushing FEMA 

from multiple angles. 

Puerto Rlco: Nothing that I can think of. 

I have a complete list of their employees and I'm going down it trying 

to contact the right person. 

I do not know what is going on with communication in FEMA right 

now 

On Wednesday, September 27, 2017, a government official sent an email infonning 

FBMA that, since efforts to obtain emergency fuel had been unsuccessful for five days, Puerto 

Rican Governor Rossell6 had personally intervened with FEMA to again request emergency fuel 

for grocery stores to maintain perishable food supplies: 

I wanted you to know so you could share with NRCC/team that this morning, 

because of immediate threat to public health and safety, the Governor asked John 

Rabin [FEMA's Acting Regional Administrator for Region II] at 8:10am this 

morning to have FEMA deliver fuel to all grocery and large retail Immediately. 

It is unclear how many tons of perishable meat, dairy, and produce were lost Based on 

reports from a Walmart employee, a Wa!mart in San Juan was able to open within three to five 

days, but it was forced to throw out fresh meat and dairy products that spoiled because W almart 

did not have fue emergency fuel to keep its generators running. Additionally, the Walmart 

employee ccnfinned that stores in Humacao, Carolina, and Canovanas were forced to throw out 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Page6 

even more, including all perishable food products, as the result of a lack of emergency fuel. 

Other Supermarkets in Puerto Rico Also Threw Out Food Due to Lack of Fuel 

Representatives from local supermarkets throughout Puerto Rico have reported that they 

also received no emergency fuel and were forced to dispose of thousands of dollars' worth of 

fresh meat, dairy, and vegetables in the immediate aftermath ofHurricane Maria. 

For example, Manuel Reyes, the Executive Vice President of the Puerto Rico Chamber 

for the Marketing and Distribution of the Food Industry, an organization that represents grocers, 

food distributors, and food manufacturers in Puerto Rico, reported that he was not aware of 

FEMA providing emergency fuel to any grocery stores, despite numerous requests. He also 

reported that grocers and other private businesses eventually established an independent network 

to obtain and distribute fuel on their own. 

Joeyleen Quifiones, the General Manager for Selectos Supermarket stores in San Juan, 

confirmed that generators for two stores-Levittown and Los Palacios-became inoperable due 

to a lack of fuel and were forced to throw out thousands of dollars' worth of food. Selectos is the 

second-largest co-op in Puerto Rico. According to Ms. Quifiones, Selectos Los Palacios, 45 

minutes outside of San Juan, threw away enough meat, fruit, vegetables, and dairy to fill a 

twenty cubic yard container valued at approximately $50,000. Coca Cola, which has an office 

nearby, eventually provided emergency fuel to stores managed by Ms. Quifiones. She described 

great demand for fuod in the week following Hljrricane Maria, reporting that hundreds of people 

stood in line outside her store and inany went hungry. 

Request for Subpoena 

On October 11,2017, the Committee sent a bipartisan letterrequesting documents from 

the Department of Homeland Security relating to FEMA's preparation for and response to 

Hurricanes lnna and Maria in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands? 

For the reasons set forth above, we request that you issue a subpoena, by March 29,2018, 

to compel the Department to produce all of the documents in our October request, including the 

following subset of documents which should have been produced in response to our original 

request: 

(!) all documents and communications referring or relating to requests for fuel from 

Walmart and other food retailers; 

(2) all documents and communications referring or relating to retailer decisions to 

close for any period of time due to a lack of fuel or power; and 

2 Letter from Chairman Trey Gowdy and Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, to Acting Secretary Elaine C. Duke, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(Oct. 11, 2017) (online at https:l/overnight.house.govlwp-contentluploads/2017/10/2017-10-li·TG-EEC-to-Duke· 

DHS-Hurricane-Document·Request.pdl). 
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The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Page7 

(3) all documents and communications referring or relating to retailers throwing away 

perishable or nonperishable products after Hurricane Maria. 

Due to the gravity of these matters, we also request that the Committee expand the date 

range of our October l !, 2017, document requests to encompass the period from September 20, 

2017, to December!, 2017. If you choose not to issue this subpoena yourself, then we request 

that you place this matter on the agenda for our next regularly scheduled business meeting so that 

all Committee Members will have the opportunity to vote on a motion to issue this subpoena. 

Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

Sincerely, 
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JENNIFFER GONzAlEZ-COL6N 

""""'""" 

March 13, 2018 

LTG Todd Semionite 

llton~tt~~ of f!je mnttt'b ~tatt5 

~o~t of 31:\tprfilentatil:it!.! 

~lngton, lBIIt 20515-5400 

COL Jason A. Kirk 

COMM!TI'!.!llllk 

NATURAl. RESOURCES 

SMALL BUSINESS 

VETERANS' AfFAIRS 

Commanding General and Chief of Engineers 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

441 G St. NW 

District Commander 

JacksonviHe District, USACE 

PO Box4970 

Washington DC 20314·1000 Jacksonville fl32232·019 

RE: POWER RESTORATION MlSSION IN PUERTO RICO 

Dear Lieutenant General Semlonite and Coronel Kirk, 

Restoring electrical pi>wer to Puerto Rico has been our collective priority since the day 

Hurricane Maria exited· the Island. Without power, our economy could not move; 

without power, water could not be distributed; without power, our fellow citizens were 

left in the dark. 

Puerto Rico' s critical need for power restoration in the aftermath of disasters has been 

a test for all of us who have been involved. USACE has been an invaluable resource in 

this moment of great need and it is vital to see to the full completion of the maintain 

good lines of communication between the team addressing the relief and rebuilding 

missions in Puerto Rico. 

As of today, we are officially at the 90% generation capacity mark. However, the 

observation on the field makes it evident that electrical generation does not correlate 

with electrical service to homes across Puerto Rico. Only six out of 78 municipalities 

have reported 100% power restoration, knowing full well that the fragility of the system 

can erase these gains In the blink of an eye. There are still municipalities in the central 

mountainous region with less than 60% restoration of service, with power restored 

mainly in the towns and commercial areas, leaving vast rural areas left in the dark. The 

movement of crews from areas with a high restoration rate to address the lagging areas only causes distress in the former communities, who feel that they are being abandoned 

without the job being completed. With well over a hundred thousand customers still 

tacking service, that is distressing. 

USACE's contracts with Flour Corporation and Power Secure are set to expire on 

March 19th and April 7th, respectively. Personnel from these companies have been 

working for the past five· months in the municipalities that compose the mountain 
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Hon. Jennlffer Gonzalez-Colon 

Puerto Rico Power Restoration- page 2 

March 13, 2018 

region-such as Cayey, Lares, Ciales, Morovis, and Utuado, to name a few examplesand, due to the difficulty of the terrain and the immensity of the devastation, they 

have not concluded their task; they should not leave until they do so. 

Raising camp and leaving PREPA to finish the job is not an option. PREP A's contracting 

process to substitute USACE's personnel wiU take time, delaying relief for people who 

have already spent more than six months without power. Moreover, last week's winter 

storm Riley further highlights the uncertainty that would be caused if Flour and Power 

Secure were to leave, when personnel working under PREPA's mutual aid agreement 

were recalled to attend to natural disasters In their own jurisdictions. After 6 months 

of no power or unreliable service, the average citizen on the street In those 

communities cannot tolerate even the perception that at this point we will begin to 

wind down the urgent relief mission and that the process of finishing the job will slow 

down. 

in the strongest terms to maintain the intensity of effort; to extend 

as required, to maintain the presence of crews at a higher level than 

to address the areas where the job is not finished; to inform and advise the 

authorities and the public of what are the tlmelines and keep the communications 

lines open; to assist In supplying PREP A with materials and technical assistance if and 

as necessary. The goal must be to have near 100% restoration-not generation- of 

power Within a month and for the people in Puerto Rico to have Visible evidence of this 

being pursued with a sense of urgency. 

I wish to impress on the Corps leadership the importance of taking this need of the 

American citizens tlvlng in Puerto Rico into consideration in the making of decisions 

about the power restoration mission, and I am ready to bring before my colleagues in 

Congress any need for additional appropriations or for statutory language that vvill move 

this forward. 

Again, l must thank all the men and women both military and clvilian in USACE who 

have helped so much in the effort of Puerto Rico's recovery. Our mission is not 

complete. We must act quickly so that this project may retain its priority position. I 

look forward to an effective communication with the USACE team to make sure that 

Puerto Rico's needs are addressed. 
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Observations on the Federal Response to 

Maria in Puerto Rico 

Submitted Jeffrey A. Parks, 

President/Founder AVERT SDS, LLC Disaster and Security Services Provider 

WWW.AVERTSDS.COM 

Background: 

Five days after Maria came ashore in Puerto Rico I was contacted (via a 3'd party) by a Fortune 500 

company which operates a chemical plant in the area of Sabana Grande Puerto Rico. At that time, they 

had NO contact with their plant or it's nearly 200 employees. During my discussion with the corporate 

chief of security, it became clear the company had not anticipated the potential for and impact of a total 

loss of communications from Puerto Rico, which is what had occurred. 

In 2005 I was serving in the Army and assigned to US First Army as the Executive Officer to LTG 

Russel Honore as we tracked Katrina's path across Florida and to it's the second landfall at the mouth of 

Mississippi River. As LTG Honore and the Forward Operating Command from what would become Joint 

Task Force Katrina made their way south from Atlanta to Camp Shelby Mississippi LTG Honore called via 

SAT phone and reported no communications for power south of south of Route 10 in Mississippi. 

Redundant communications had been the number llesson learned from Katrina and the first of many 

Katrina Lessons Learned which I saw had not been adopted for the response to Maria. 

My observations are based on my over 20 years' experience and a lift time of observations in 

storm response and military support to civil authorities. I am a native of the Eastern Shore of Virginia 

and veteran of life under the threat of coastal storms. For my work as a key leader and part of the 

Command Group of JOINT TASK FORCE KATRINA, I received 4 decoration, assisted in compiling and 

contributed to the JTF-K lessons learned, The Commanders Testimony to Congress and the GAO. In his 

"'"-"-'lli-""'"""'C!.~=e..s.DL'"-'""=!.L!""" (Author), E.Q_IJ..!Yl.ill!it (Author) LTG Honore (now retired) sites 

me as knowing more about the Katrina response than anyone alive. In my opinion and based on my 

experience and observations what I experienced in Puerto Rico was the antithesis of the lessons learned, 

regulations and doctrine developed after Katrina at such a huge cost in treasure and lives to the United 

States. 

I arrived in San Juan Airport in the lead of a 3 person team from Atlanta's Hartfield Jackson Airport on 

Sept 30th, 2017. We departed Puerto Rico via corporate jet on Oct 10. My team included an 

Operations/Security Expert who is a certified IT professional, an EMT/Drone Operator and myself. 

Critical Observations from Maria. From San Juan, the team drove west for 120 miles to Mayaguez before 

seeing a working traffic light. The next day we drove south-east to Ponce via Sabana Grande. We 

eventually departed Puerto Rico from Aguadilla. I submit the following key points that must be 

addressed before the next CAT 3 or above storm strikes. 
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Key Observations: 

1. leadership/ Command and Control: On September 30th I observed almost no Federal 

Government support or semblance to an Incident Command Structure from San Juan to 

Mayaguez where I met with the FEMA incident director for "COE Mayaquez".The Director "Paul" 

was struggling to get information on his assigned in an environment were electronic 

communications were practically nonexistent. When I met him, he was picking up additional 

America Corps. Volunteers (I am not sure of their official status) and my understanding was 

these volunteers were assisting in the response effort usually by providing area assessments. 

Assisting my client in interacting with Incident Command Structure was part of my charter. In 

the area of Sabana Grande, there was no ICS other than the local mayor and his team who were 

isolated, frustrated and had little tangible assistance. Sabana Grande fell under COE Mayaquez 

for support. I had spoken with and shared information the FEMA lead for COE Mayaquez and he 

struggled to get information from the locals. Citizens of Sabana Grande expressed to me 

repeatedly their feeling of abandonment by the "Government There was no DOD presence 

other than then hospitals which were rumored to be full of bodies which the government was 

hiding and the occasional escort offuel. (The hospital rumors seemed to stem from the DOD 

presence at the hospitals and the security protocols there which were preventing people from 

entering the building unescorted or to see family members.) There was no power or 

communications across most of the Island, long lines for fuel and the early and dwindling 

supplies of bottled water while rumors abounded that the municipal water was contaminated. 

They saw little happening. I did not see a military vehicle outside of San Juan until driving by the 

National Guard and FEMA compound in Mayaguez named "COE Mayaquez". The National Guard 

was not opening or operating Points of Distribution as they have traditionally done. The people 

of PR saw little outside support or efforts to come to their relief and what they did see did not 

seem to benefit them. 

local authorities were simply overwhelmed. On October 10'", there were still dead animal 

carcasses on major roads and debris filled the drainage systems. This became critical as flash 

floods continued around Mayaquez and there was nowhere for the water to drain. The 

carcasses and debris were contributing to the contamination of the water supplies which were 

running on generator power. 

On or around October 4'h, I met with the Mayor of Sabana Grande. The rumors of the water 

contamination were expanding and no bottled water was available in stores. 

The Mayor handed myself and my local representative a list which he had copies made to 

distribute to local businesses. The list was of types of generators he needed to keep the water 

purification plant operating. I asked if he provided it to FEMA and received a scowl in response. 

He explained to me that the purification plant was operating, but could not keep up due to the 

reduced capacity as a result of generator power and the strain from increased contamination of 

the water supplies. The only other water coming into the city of 30,000 was a military pallet of 
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bottled water which was transported by him and armed escorts daily from Aguadilla. On at least 

one occasion there was an attempt to steal the pickup and its water. He was also requesting 

assistance to off load palletized water when and if a regular flow started from FEMA or the 

gvernemtn, since the city did not have an off road fork lift. We were able to come up with a plan 

using a local private business until another capability could be found. 

4 days later the generators at the water plant failed. I attempted to assist the mayor in how to 

request assistance via the FEMA and DOD but the system just didn't seem to be in place. 

In my opinion, the decision to not follow U.S. Army Doctrine for Civil Support Operations as 

outlined in Army Field Manual FM 3-28 (published in June 2010) was a critical failure. This JTF, in 

support ofthe Lead Federal Agency, would have had a Commander and provided a leadership 

presence to the people of Puerto Rico as well as provided qualified personnel to assess the 

potential critical infrastructure issues which swept Puerto Rico as demonstrated by the water 

plant in Sabana Grande. The US DOD could have easily provided the necessary generator 

support to maintain the water purification systems as well as water purification experts to assist 

in keeping potable water flowing. 

A JTF Commander would have also provided the local and Federal authorities a mentor and 

problem solver to assist in identifying potential problems and solutions. During Maria, my 

experience was that local authorities were not getting assistance in identifying available 

capabilities and coaching in what to ask for in order to keep the situation from worsening. These 

people were still in shock 2 weeks later and needed help that the government did not provide. 

2. Communications: Communications was the single largest response failure. When you can't 

communicate it's a crisis and there were almost no communications on Puerto Rico two weeks 

after the storm. Temporary communications networks would have assisted in assessing this 

issue and provided information to the people as well as enabled problem solving and 

collaboration. Following Katrina, the private sector companies were installed temporary cell 

towers which I thought were part of the response package for contemporary disasters. We did 

not see any of these in PR. If they had been deployed it would have likely allowed the sharing of 

information such as the Ponce Airport, which was believed closed by everyone CONUS was open 

and had been since 2 days after the storm. The mayor of Ponce even sent out a Press Release 

trying to inform authorities that the airport was open. This occurred on October S'h. 

3. Diesel Fuel and Cash Economy: During my meeting with FEMA on October 1'', I learned that 

"there was no diesel fuel" and they were struggling to keep the hospital generators running. 

However 2 days later I witnessed a delivery of 10,000 gallons of diesel to a private company. 

When I asked a local manager where the fuel came from, I learned that the fuel distributors 

were delivering to their paying customers (likely cash since cash was now the only currency 

accepted on PR) and that they knew the local government would not pay them. Gasoline lines 

persisted, but I found diesel to be readily available if you could pay or had good credit which the 

government of PR has neither. FEMA failed to understand the issue and could have easily 

purchased fuel without the threat seizing it and further alienating the local businesses. The 
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environment called for flexibility in purchasing and cash. Credit cards were of no use on the 

island because of the loss of connectivity. 

4. National Guard Hotel Survey Team: On October 9'" I flagged down a National Guard vehicle near 

our hotel in Lejas. This was the first National Guard vehicle I had seen in the area away from the 

main highway or urban areas. I suspected they were conducing health and welfare assessments. 

The Sergeant First Class in charge informed me that they were assessing hotel capacity for 

housing FEMA and other government personnel. He also shared with me his disappointment 

that the National Guard was not being used in its traditional roles of establishing distribution 

points or assessing local conditions. He described a "FOB Mentality" working directly for FEMA. 

He stated this was different than all of his other storm response experiences on Puerto Rico. I 

gave him recommendations for POD sites in and around Sabana Grande and the surrounding 

areas and shared out observations including contact info for the local mayor's assistants. He 

stated that they were hoping to establish POD's soon. 

5. FEMA Delays Deploying Personnel: FEMA personnel I spoke with upon my arrival in Puerto Rico 

informed me that they were waiting weeks to fly from Atlanta to Puerto Rico. One FEMA leader 

had managed to be manifested on an air force aircraft carrying equipment out of Dobbins ARB, 

in Atlanta after waiting a week for a flight. I heard repeated reports of FEMA's inability to get 

people into Puerto Rico. 

I had booked my teams tickets 4 days before travelling on Delta Airlines for $1,800 and the flight 

was just over half full. All FEMA staff were going in to San Juan to await assignment or 

transportation for days and some said up to a week. 

6. The Ponce Airport: Ponce is the major city on the south side of Puerto Rico. Initially following 

Maria's landfall access to Ponce was blocked across the interior of the island. The status of the 

major airport in Ponce was a mystery with reports of extensive damage. My contacts at Delta 

airlines were not sure of the status of the airport in Ponce as late as September 28th. 

After my meeting with the mayor of Sabena Grande around October 4th, it was clear that water 

was becoming the new top commodity in Puerto Rico. My client asked me via satellite phone 

what humanitarian relief supplies they could send down via the corporate jet for their 

employees. My answer was water. We planned to send in as much bottled water as possible 

with the corporate jet and attempt to utilize the Ponce airport. The aircrew was not sure if they 

could land at Ponce until hours before the flight because of the lack of information and reports 

in Florida that the Ponce airport was not operational. 

Around the 5th of October, my team and I with a local guide drove to Ponce to meet the aircraft. 

Storm damage was readily visible, including the loss of historic ancient trees. Traffic lights were 

out and police were directing traffic where ever possible. However, we found a very operational 

airport including a U.S. Marine Air Traffic Control and USAF Logistics Team, but very little air 

traffic. I asked for the airport manager who was attempting to communicate with 2 young 

women who didn't speak Spanish. They were with FEMA and supporting the Mayor of Ponce 
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who had asked them to come to the airport to find out the status and what type of aircraft 

could be supported. The Mayor was drafting a letter or fax on the status in an effort to tell the 

outside world that the airport was open. The airport manager said the airport had been fully 

operational except for the radar 2 days after the storm but all aircraft were being controlled via 

San Juan. I assisted the 2 young ladies, who were not being taken very seriously in my opinion in 

getting the information for the mayor. The 2 FEMA representatives had no background and little 

understanding of aircraft or airport operations. The airport could receive military aircraft up to C 

17 I believe and civilian aircraft up to 747. There were no aircraft there that I recall with the 

although a military flight had dropped supplies earlier in the day. 
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 

APR 3 0 2018 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL 

AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 

The Honorable Ron DeSantis 

Chainnan 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chainnan DeSantis: 

Enclosed please find the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's responses to the 

Subcommittee's Questions for the Record following the March 22, 2018, hearing titled 

"Bureaucratic Challenges to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto Rico'' 

I hope this infonnation is helpful to you and the members of the Subcommittee. If you have 

further questions, please contact me or your staff may contact Carolyn Levine in my office at 

levine.carolyn@epa.gov or (202) 564-1859. 

Associate Administrator 

Enclosure 

Internet Address (URL) • http://www,epa.gov 

ReeyelediReeyelable •Printed with Vegetabte Oil Based fnks on Recycled Paper (Minimum 50% Postt:<mSumer content} 
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Responses to Questions for the Record 

for Mr. Peter Lopez 

Hearing on "Bureaucratic Challenges to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto Rico" 

before the 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

March 22, 2018 

Submitted by Chairman Ron DeSantis: 

Question: Puerto Rico is home to a number of pharmaceuticals and other hazmat generating 

industries. EPA was responsible for conducting assessments of these facilities in the aftermath 

of the storm. What did they find? ls there any ongoing risk to the residents of Puerto Rico? 

Response: ln the aftennath of Hurricanes lrma and Maria, EPA conducted assessments of about 

300 regulated facilities in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, including facilities that 

hazardous waste, pharmaceuticals, as we!! as facilities that store chemicals and oils in 

EPA also assessed 32 superfund sites and 233 wastewater facilities in Puerto Rico. EPA 

found no major leaks or releases from any ofthe facilities nor any situations where nearby 

residents were at risk from a release from a facility. EPA did respond to several minor spills and 

collected over 326,000 drums and containers of household hazardous waste in Puerto Rico as of 

April 22, 20 !8. 
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Submitted by Representative .Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon: 

Question: How has this situation affected the status of the landfills in Puerto Rico? Have there 

been proposals submitted for alternate debris disposal efforts? Complaints about dit1iculty? 

Response: The hurricanes made the already extremely dit1icult situation of the solid waste crisis 

in Puerto Rico, with many open dumps that do not meet basic landfills standards, worse. The 

storms generated approximately 3.85 million cubic yards. according to the US Army Corp of 

Engineers (USACE). There was also an increase in illegal dumping following the hurricanes. 

EPA, in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USACE, 

has assessed over 150 illegal dumps that appeared after the hurricane and we have been 

collecting hazardous waste from across the island. In addition, EPA is beginning work with the 

Puerto Rico government and local municipalities to help them assess landfill capacity as a first 

step towards making improvements to programs to handle solid waste. 

Debris collection was specifically a USACE lead. It is EPA's understanding that vegetative 

debris was chipped and mulched; construction and demolition debris was managed through 

grinding operations, and of course, EPA assisted with any items that could be hazardous. EPA 

also provided air monitoring during the grinding operations of construction and demolition 

debris conducted by the U.S. Virgin Islands government and the USACE. EPA was not 

requested to provide air monitoring support for any grinding operations in Puerto Rico. 
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Question: It is the Committee's understanding that PREP A has not yet submitted 

Whitefish Energy's invoices to FEMA for reimbursement, but that FEMA has already 

approved of the Cobra contract, and FEMA been reimbursing PREP A for the work 

performed by Cobra. We also understand that the terms and conditions of the Whitefish 

Energy contract are very similar to Cobra's contract with PREP A. What is causing the 

delay in FEMA's approval of the Whitefish contract? 

Response: FEMA does not approve recipient and subrecipient contracts, but rather 

reviews them for compliance with federal grunt requirements, including procurement 

requirements, to assess eligibility for federal assistance. Accordingly, FEMA reviewed 

PREP A's Whitefish and Cobra contracts for compliance with federal requirements and 

advised PREP A of the noncompliance issues with each of those contracts. While PREP A 

amended the Cobra contract's terms and conditions to address the procurement issues 

identified by FEMA and brought the Cobra contract into compliance, it did not amend the 

Whitefish contract. FEMA has not yet received an amended Whitefish contract that 

addresses the procurement issues identified nor has it received any invoices for 

reimbursement under PREP A's contract with Whitefish. 
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Question: Once PREP A submits Whitefish Energy's invoices to FEMA for 

reimbursement, how quickly will FEMA reimburse PREP A for the work performed by 

Whitefish and its subcontractors? 

What is the typicaltimeframe between FEMA's receipt of invoices from PREP A for its 

contractors and FEMA's release of payment to PREP A for those contractors? 

Response: FEMA reimbursement is dependent upon the applicant meeting all federal 

requirements, including those for procurements under federal grants, and documentation 

requirements in Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations and FEMA's Public 

Assistance Program and Policy Guide. Adhering to these requirements is essential to 

ensure, among other things, that the cost of work performed is reasonable. Once PREP A 

and the Commonwealth submit the Whitefish invoices and supporting documentation to 

FEMA, including certifications regarding procurement under the federal grant and project 

completion, FEMA will make every effort to ensure a thorough and timely review of the 

package to determine eligible costs, if any. 
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Question: It is the Committee's understanding that, by the date of the hearing, PREP A 

had authorized the dispatch of only 5 out of a total250 megawatts (MWs) of renewable 

energy available through independent power producers (IPPs ), even though 90 percent of 

the IPPs were operational by that time. Given these projects represent huudreds of 

millions of dollars in private investment and create hundreds of jobs, please provide an 

update on the dispatch of renewable energy since February 22, 2018. Also, please 

explain the steps FEMA has taken to work \Vith both PREP A and the IPPs to get these 

important sources of power back online. 

Response: Questions related to renewable energy generation should be directed to 

PREP A, which has the responsibility for all generation. FEMA is not working with 

private generation facilities in emergency work, nor does FEMA have authority over 

PREP A generation decisions. FEMA's task has been to stabilize generation (with 

generators) and support repairs to the transmission and distribution system. 
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Primary: The Honorable Ron Desantis 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & 

Question: In his testimony, Mr. Byrne mentioned that more than 4. 7 million survivors 

had registered with FEMA for individual assistance during 2017, total. How many of 

these registrations arc from residents of Puerto Rico? 

Response: In 2017, FEMA received 1, 108,166 registrations from individuals and 

households for Individual Assistance as a result of the impacts of Hurricanes Irma and 

Maria in Puerto Rico. 

Question: Of the registrations from residents in Puerto Rico, how many of these 

survivors have received the assistance they applied for? Once a survivor receives the 

assistance, is the case dosed? If so, how many cases have been closed to-date? 

Response: As of April27, 2018, l, 135,149 individuals and households in Puerto Rico 

have registered for Individual Assistance. Eligibility criteria for FEMA assistance is the 

same for all survivors in all disasters. Any figure from the average grant amount to the 

number of survivors approved for the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) does 

not indicate the level of assistance any one survivor or family can expect. Every disaster 

is different and the needs of each survivor are considered individually. 

The table below details the number of survivors in Puerto Rico who have registered with 

FEMA and the amount of assistance approved under the IHP as ofApril27, 2018. 

Registrations refers to the number of individuals and households that applied for 

assistance with FEMA. Valid registrations are those registrations where FEMA has 

verified that the reported damage was sustained within a declared county, the date 

reported for when the damages occurred to the home and /or personal property is within 

the incident period (time frame declared for the incident), the damage reported is the 

same as the incident type declared (e.g. water damage due to flood), and that the 

registration was submitted before the tiling deadline. Referrals are the number of valid 

registrations referred to the IHP t(lr potential approval. To be referred to the IHP for 

possible assistance, survivors must meet the four conditions of general eligibility: 

" The applicant must be a U.S. citizen, non-citizen national, or qualified alien. 

• FEMA must be able to verify the applicant's identity. 

• The applicant's insurance, or other forms of disaster assistance received, cannot 

meet their disaster-caused needs. 

• The applicant's necessary expenses and serious needs are directly caused by a 

declared disaster. 
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Approved is the number of referrals approved for UIP assistance. The approved amount 

is the amount of assistance given to approved registrations. By law, FEMA can only 

approve one registration per household and individuals registered must live in the area 

designated in the disaster declaration. 

Hurricane 

Maria 

Total 

1,118,388 

1,135,149 

1,117,821 887.815 

1,123,339 891,439 

Once a survivor receives assistance, their case is not necessarily "closed." Survivors may 

disagree with FEMA's initial detem1ination of eligibility or the amount of assistance 

provided, in which case survivors have 60 days from the date on the FEMA 

determination letter to appeal. Survivors may also be able to provide additional 

documentation or information that could potentially change their eligibility status. 

Survivors with insurance have one year to submit their insurance documentation so 

FEMA can make a determination on assistance to help cover uninsured or under-insured 

eligible losses. To ensure survivors receive all the federal assistance for which they are 

eligible, FEMA strongly advises survivors to keep FEMA updated on their situation by 

visiting a Disaster Recovery Center or by calling the FEMA Helpline. The Agency also 

coordinates with whole community partners to address remaining unmet needs once an 

applicant has received all federal assistance for which they are eligible. 
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Question: If the USACE ends its contracts and hands over to PREP A the final and 

hardest 5 percent of distribution and customer connection, how much of a delay does this 

represent in continuity of effort does this not mean having to restart the contracting 

process and wasting as much as a month to restart the effort? 

Response: As of June 14, 2018, power restoration is at 99. 58 percent with 0.43 %of or 

just over 6,224 customers remaining without power. Crews continue working to restore 

power in the remaining, hardest-hit and most logistically challenging areas where 

equipment, materials, and sometimes even workers, must be t1ovm into the work sites. 

On May 18 USACE concluded its Mission Assignment for emergency power restoration. 

With most utilities 95 percent restored, PREP A plans to manage the final repairs. Other 

power-related USACE mission assignments have been extended for generators, logistics, 

and materials management. The current plan includes the use of PREP A's contractors, 

contractor oversight services, and logistics capability. As with any transition, there is a 

hand off that occurs and we expect to experience no more than a week of reduced crew 

count in some areas. Working through the Joint Field Office (JFO) and the Unified 

Command Group, which includes PREP A, FEMA will continue to provide the means 

necessary to provide stable power to the people of Puerto Rico. FEMA, in coordination 

with the Government of Puerto Rico, will continue to assess mission assignments and 

amend as necessary. 
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Question: What would have been needed, in hindsight, to have made the effort more 

efficient; what processes and resources should have been in place and should be in place 

before it happens again? What procedures of the USACE, FEMA, and otber agencies 

need to be adjusted? What aspects of statutory or regulatory mandates or limitations may 

the Congress need to reimagine, amend or waive. 

Response: Our goal is to help residents prepare for hurricane season. To date, we held an 

Energy Sector Summit on May 10 and dedicated a session on lessons learned with 

industry contractors and PREP A and captured actions to be taken before next hurricane 

season. ln addition, we have scheduled a Summit with the Governor of Puerto Rico and 

have scheduled three preparedness exercises at the end of May. We're also supporting all 

oftbe municipalities in developing or updating their local preparedness plans. 

Based on lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA re-evaluated 

stockpiling of commodities in Puerto Rico. FEMA is increasing the amount of 

commodities stocked in Puerto Rico ahead of the 2018 hurricane season. Since last year, 

Puerto Rico warehouse capacity has more than tripled. As of the end of April, FEMA has 

over 700 generators installed in public facilities, as per State priority determination. 

We must also build a culture of preparedness in every segment of our society; from 

individual to government, industry to philanthropy, we must encourage and empower 

everyone with information to prepare for the inevitable impacts of future disasters. 

We have to ready the nation for catastrophic disasters. FEMA will work with our partners 

across all levels of government to strengthen partnerships and access new sources of 

scalable capabilities to quickly meet the needs of overwhelming incidents. 

And finally, we need to reduce the complexity ofFEMA. We must continue to be 

responsible stewards of the resources we're entrusted to administer. We must also do 

everything that we can to leverage data to drive decision-making, and reduce the 

administrative and bureaucratic burdens that impede impacted individuals and 

communities from quickly receiving the assistance they need. 

Question: USACE says some rural areas will not be done until the end of May. What 

would it take so NOBODY must wait that long? If it's not impossible, why not do it? 

Cost? Production lead-in times? Need to hold resources to use in case there is another 

emergency? 
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Response: The magnitude of destruction to the island and power grid caused by 

Hurricane Maria was unprecedented. The governor set an aggressive timeline, but we 

know it will take significant time to restore power to the remaining customers due to the 

challenges of terrain, the condition of the grid system before the storn1s, and the extensive 

damage caused by the hurricanes. 

The logistical challenges presented in the hardest-hit areas where the remaining one 

percent of work is taking place cannot be avoided given the system's pre-storm design. 

Equipment, materials, and sometimes even workers, have to be flo'IVTI into these remote, 

mountainous areas where the remaining work is occurring. In addition, there is significant 

helicopter work required and only so many helicopters can operate in the same vicinity. 

In addition, there are FAA requirements for work over "congested areas" that require 

advance approvaL and weather delays are becoming more of a factor with rain and high 

winds in the mountains this time of year. PREP A is also looking at alternatives for the 

hardest-to-reach customers, such as solar generators, to support those cnstomers until 

their power is restored. We are working closely with PREP A to support the restoration 

mission in rural areas as quickly as possible in manner that also ensures the safety of 

workers carrying ont this critical mission. DOE is working with the national labs to 

develop a model that will infom1 plarn1ing and operational decisions to improve energy 

system resilience. 
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Question: Do we have an active effort to inform the people of Puerto Rico of the pace of 

restoration work and the time frame to be realistically expected? 

Response: We remain committed to achieving our goal of restoring electricity to 

customers on the island. 

PREP A is best suited to provide updates on restoration of power. PREP A has been 

providing a daily update on generation, that is, the electricity that is available tor 

consumption by clients. The percent of clients restored reflects the number of users that 

can take that electricity and have service to their home or business restored. 

PREP A has a customer service line that runs 24/7 and they have created an online portal 

that provides a four week schedule for specific areas. 

FEMA's External Affairs team, along with our partners at USACE, provide regular 

updates on recovery progress to internal and external stakeholders through social media, 

traditional media, talking points, graphics and reports. Additionally, FEMA, through its 

Intergovernmental A±Jairs Division, provided satellite phones to every mayor on the 

island in the early days of response a first in FEMA's history. 

Due to the communication challenges early in the disaster, Intergovernmental Affairs 

worked across the federal government and deployed close to !60 federal family staff 

from over 15 federal agencies, through mission assignments and surge capacity force, to 

support engagements with the 78 Mayors. This historic IGA effort resulted in Mayors 

having face to face engagement two to three times per week and ensured they were 

receiving accurate and timely information regarding disaster resources, and that \Ve were 

receiving reports on their needs. 

That connection and coordination with the municipalities has continued to this day. Our 

IGA staff provides regular reports and advisories to, and meets with, the municipalities to 

provide updates on recovery efforts and help answer questions, facilitate operational 

requests, and resolve any issues as they arise. 
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Question: What improvements would be needed to really make it a pem1anent 

rebuilding, with upgrades when necessary to bring it to standard; and do we have a 

reliable notion of the cost of doing so'? 

Response: The condition of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREP A) power 

grid over the past decade has been well-documented. Deferred maintenance, antiquated 

materials on the system, and lack of oversight and regulations made for a degraded and 

fragile system before the storrn. 

The generation infrastructure is old (28+ years older than industry average) and 

unreliable. Prior to the 2017 hurricanes, Puerto Rico sustained frequent power plant 

outages (12 times more than the mainland); had a high dependence on fuel oil; and the 

principal power generation was located far from demand centers. 

Transmission and Distribution infrastructure was not adequately maintained, further 

contributing to outages, losses, and poor quality service; and there were no funds allotted 

to storrn hardening or resilience. The transmission and distribution system was highly 

vulnerable to catastrophic events further impacting delivery of electric service. 

PREP A's infrastructure was fragile prior to the hurricanes due to the poor maintenance of 

the power grid and liquidity issues. Emergency work is being completed as quickly as 

possible to bring power up across the island. The emergency repairs completed thus far 

on the grid in some places have left the grid in a better condition than it was (i.e, steel 

poles instead of wood, new guy wires and bolts) and in other places, tor example, the 

wire was reused and may have limited life. So the system will continue to be fragile even 

with emergency repairs. 

However, as we move to permanent work, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico PREP A 

and its Federal partners, including FEMA and DOE are working together on 

how best to stabilize the grid, and to make sure it is modernized, resilient, and 

On Feb. 9, the President signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of2018. Section 

20601 of the Act allows FEMA to provide: 

• Public Assistance funding for critical services to replace or restore the function of 

a facility or system to industry standards without regard to their pre-disaster 

condition; 
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• Public Assistance funding for critical services to replace or restore components of 

the facility or system that are not damaged by the disaster when it is necessary to 

fully effectuate the replacement or restoration of disaster-damaged components to 

restore the function of the facility or system to industry standards; 

for the following disaster declarations: DR-4336-PR, DR-4339-PR, DR-4340-USVI, and 

DR-4335-USV!. With the authorities given in the Bipartisan Budget Act, federal funds 

can be used to help permanently rebuild and replace PREP A systems with a more 

resilient grid system. 
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'< 10 

Topic: Deadlines 

Hearing: mem•cmti, "h"llenb :to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto Rico 

Primary: The Honorable Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: What deadlines have passed or are approaching for such things as aid 

applications. or 100 percent federal funding? Are those terms statutory or 

administrative? 

Response: The deadline to register for FEMAs Individual and Household Assistance 

program and the Small Business Administration's Physical Damage and Economic Injury 

Loans is June 18,2018. 

The deadline for submitting a Request for Public Assistance (RP A) has passed. 

Regulation requires a State, Territorial, Tribal, or local government entity or private nonprofit that wishes to seek Public Assistance funding, to submit an RP A to FEMA, through 

the Recipient, within 30 days of the respective area being designated in the declaration. 

FEMA approved a time extension to this deadline through April3, 2018. 

Regulation requires subrecipients to identify and report all of its disaster-related damage, 

Emergency Work activities, and debris quantities to FEMA within 60 days of the Kickoff 

Meeting. The deadline for identifying and reporting damage has passed for some 

subrecipients. 

Lastly, as of May !8, 2018 FEMA announced additional disaster assistance is available to 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. This assistance allows for additional funding at a 100 

percent federal cost share for limited emergency protective measures. This includes a 90-

day extension for emergency power restoration (August 16,2018 for a total of330 

and a 120-day exte11sion for emergency temporary power support and the Sheltering 

Temporary Essential Power program (September, 15, 2018 for a total of 360 days). This 

decision was administrative. 
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Question: The vulnerability of the national power grid has been brought up in other 

contexts - has the agency used the experience in Puerto Rico to learn about how to handle 

the scenario oflarge parts of the US power grid going completely offline? 

Response: Recognizing the electrical power grid is vulnerable to threats including 

hurricanes and other natural disasters, space weather, large near-earth objects, accidents, 

terrorist attacks such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or significant cyber incidents, in 

March 2015, FEMA began planning efforts to describe the Federal Government's 

strategy for providing support in responding to, and recovering from, large scale long 

duration power outages. Regardless of the cause, a large-scale power outage will result in 

cascading impacts across the 16 critical infrastmcture sectors, all of which rely on grid 

FEMA published the Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA): Managing the 

m.''"''"'"Impacts ji·om a Long-Term Power Outage in June 2017, just three months 

before Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico. The POIA includes the Federal 

Government's concept of operations and unified coordination structures required to 

execute survivor-centric response and recovery operations in the wake of a long-term 

power outage. It outlines the types of federal support available to critical infrastructure 

(CI) stakeholders in restoration activities and responsibilities of industry stakeholders. 

The devastation to the power grid in Puerto Rico, along with widespread outages in 

Florida and Texas caused by hurricanes Harvey and Irma, have provided ample 

opportunities to validate our approach and improve consequence management following 

significant outage events. 

Many of the major challenges in Puerto Rico validated the assumptions in the POIA. 

However, the major discrepancy was the assumption in the POTA that "restoration of 

power is the responsibility of electric companies, the Federal Government may be 

requested to provide services to enable the power restoration process, as well as the 

delivery of essential services, through the facilitation of policy decisions and resource 

prioritization." However, the local power grid, managed by the Puerto Rico Electric 

Power Authority (PREP A), was an already troubled system both financially and in terms 

of quality of infrastructure. The impacts of the storm greatly impeded existing state 

capabilities to respond to the incident, whereas FEMA' s response mechanisms assume a 

viable state/territorial government that the Agency can support. 

While many of the obstacles faced in the Puerto Rico restoration etiort are unique, the 

challenges related to supporting survivors, maintaining critical infrastructure and 
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providing basic support to allow the continuation of commerce are relevant to any 

widespread and long term outage. Some key takeaways from recent outages: 

• Power restoration is the responsibility of the power provider. The skills, 

manpower and materiel required to repair the grid post event are housed, almost 

entirely, within the industry. 

• The normal restoration process depends upon a capable and competent utility 

provider, an effective preventive maintenance and capital investment program, 

access to sut1icient quantities of manpower, equipment, and material, investment 

in pre disaster mitigation investment, and coordination with government officials 

to facilitate the process. 

• Mutual aid and other reciprocal support exchange programs are critical to the 

restoration process. 

" The Federal Government may be called upon to facilitate movement and 

procurement of manpower, equipment, and materiel in large scale events. This is 

particularly likely when responding to events located outside of the contiguous 

United States (OCONUS), or if normal transportation routes and supporting 

infrastructure are compromised. 

• Power is essential to all 16 critical infrastructure sectors. Immediate impacts to 

Public Safety, Communications, and Healthcare must be mitigated. 

Generators, while not a replacement for the grid, may be the only viable option 

for providing power to critical nodes. Large scale generator missions create 

enormous logistics challenges. 

• Providing opportunities to re-establish normal private sector operations is critical 

to sustaining survivor support operations. 

The development of the POIA prior to the 2017 hurricanes strengthened FEMA's and its 

Federal partners' understanding of the cascading impacts that a long-term power outage 

poses across other lifeline infrastructure sectors. After-action efforts from the 2017 

hurricane season include better integration with the 16 Critical Infrastructure and Key 

Resources (CIKR) sector-specific agencies to promote better information sharing 

between emergency managers and critical infrastructure owners and operators. FEMA 
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continues to make strides to. learn from previous disasters, improve processes, and build 

readiness to respond to and recover from catastrophic disasters. 

The National Level Exercise 2018 scenario included major hurricane that makes landfall 

causing severe damage to residences, businesses, and critical infrastructure throughout 

the Mid-Atlantic region. The scenario included power outages and cascading effects to 

critical infrastructure systems, including impacts to communications. The NLE 2018 

examined and validated the capabilities of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments to support the energy sector and synchronize efforts to manage the 

consequences of long-duration power outages and critical interdependencies. 

Further, FEMA believes that ciTorts to invest in the ongoing modernization of the power 

grid to make it more redundant and resilient will reduce the likelihood or duration of a 

significant power outage in tbe future. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for 

Emergency Support Function 12 (Energy) under the National Response Framework and 

coordinates Federal response efforts to restore power. It is also the Sector Specit!c 

Agency in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, charged with serving as the day-today interface with private and public sector partners and infrastructure operators to 

protect and prevent disruptions to tbe nation's energy infrastructure. As such, FEMA 

would defer to the Department of Energy for additional information regarding the 

vulnerability of the nation's power grid. 
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Question: What would it have taken to put us where we are now, but two or three months 

earlier? USACE says 95 percent restored by end of March, what are the challenges 

getting to that last 5 percent? 

Response: Power restoration has been and continues to be a top priority for FEMA and 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico experienced a disaster that is 

unprecedented in our history. Nearly all of Puerto Rico's 3.5 million people were without 

power or communications. 

Unique circumstances presented significant challenges to power restoration. 

• Puerto Rico has 2,400 miles of transmission lines across the island and 30.000 

miles of distribution lines with over 300 sub-stations. 

• The power grid, which was already in a state of disrepair, suffered upwards of 80 

percent damage. 

" The transmission system is in treacherous, mountainous ten-ain, requiring 

specialized equipment and experienced crews. 

• The damages that occurred in Texas, Florida and elsewhere in the Caribbean 

during the historic 2017 hun-icane season also resulted in severe shortages of 

poles, conductors, insulators, transformers, and other resources that have 

impacted our ability to restore power. The lead times on some of the matetials are 

weeks to months, and the transportation time by sea has averaged seven to eight 

days. 

• Materials had to be manufactured (in some cases), mobilized, loaded, floated or 

flown, offloaded, and then distributed across the island. 

• PREP A's liquidity issues made it more difficult to enter into contracts and obtain 

supplies. 

• Initial lack of communication methods slowed dmvn initial assessment reports. 

But that's not to say we haven't made significant progress regarding power restoration 
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Primary: The Honorable 

Committee: 

• As of June 14, 2018, power restoration is at 99.58 percent with 0.43 percent of or 

just over 6,224 customers remaining without power In Puerto Rico, USACE has 

installed more than 1,900 generators to sustain critical activities, many of which 

have been running tor months. For context. during many disaster responses, 

USACE installs 40 to 50 temporary generators to provide power for a few weeks 

until the grid is back up. 

• As of early March, USACE has received nearly 40,000 poles and 3,200 miles of 

conductor wire, with more continuing to arrive. 

• Assessments and repairs continue to reveal new challenges that must be addressed 

for operational or safety reasons, which has also resulted in delays. The Unified 

Command Group and staff assess daily the remaining work in order to meet the 

goal of restoring electricity barring any additional challenges, achieving I 00 

percent restoration in areas with complex terrain, like Arecibo and Caguas, will 

take until late-May. 

The last 5% of any power restoration is always the hardest. We are at the point where 

additional teams will not expedite the process. We have the experts and specialized 

equipment we need. 
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Question#: 13 

Committee: OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE) 

Question: With an all-out no-holds-barred effort, could we have had 99 percent recovery 

before now? 

Response: Power restoration has been and continues to be a top priority for FEMA and 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico experienced a disaster that is 

unprecedented in our history. Nearly all of Puerto Rico's 3.5 million people were without 

power or communications. 

Unique circumstances presented significant challenges to power restoration. 

• Puerto Rico has 2,400 miles of transmission lines across the island and 30,000 

miles of distribution lines with over 300 sub-stations. 

• The power grid, which was already in a state of disrepair, suffered upwards of 80 

percent damage. 

• The transmission system is in treacherous, mountainous terrain, requiring 

specialized equipment and experienced crews. 

• The damages that occurred in Texas, Florida and elsewhere in the Caribbean 

during the historic 2017 hurricane season also resulted in severe shortages of 

poles, conductors, insulators, transformers, and other resources that have 

impacted our ability to restore power. The lead times on some of the materials are 

weeks to months, and the transportation time by sea has averaged seven to eight 

days. 

• Materials had to be manufactured (in some cases), mobilized, loaded, floated or 

flovm, offloaded, and then distributed across the island. 

• PREP A's liquidity issues made it more difticult to enter into contracts and obtain 

supplies. 

• Initial lack of communication methods slowed down initial assessment reports 

But that's not to say we haven't made significant progress regarding power restoration. 
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• As of June 14,2018, power restoration is at 99.58 percent with 0.43 percent of or 

just over 6,224 customers remaining without power In Puerto Rico, USACE has 

installed more than 1, 900 generators to sustain critical activities, many of which 

have been running for months. For context, during many disaster responses, 

USACE installs 40 to 50 temporary generators to provide power for a few weeks 

until the grid is back up. 

• As of early March, USACE has received nearly 40,000 poles and 3,200 miles of 

conductor vvire, with more continuing to an-ive. 

• Assessments and repairs continue to reveal new challenges that must be addressed 

for operational or safety reasons, which has also resulted in delays. The Unified 

Command Group and staff assess daily the remaining work in order to meet the 

goal of restoring electricity barring any additional challenges, achieving 100 

percent restoration in areas with complex ten-ain, like Arecibo and Caguas, will 

take until late-May. 

The last 5% of any power restoration is always the hardest. We are at the point where 

additional teams will not expedite the process. We have the experts and specialized 

equipment we need, but it is similar to trying to fix a broken car and having more 

mechanics get under the hood; additional teams will not help. 
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Question: Once we have the supplies necessary at hand, is it not better to have MORE 

crews on the street than fewer? 

Can we maintain the standard of safety, with enough crews on the street, to be tlnished in 

30 days rather than in 90? 

Response: Our priority is to safely and urgently restore reliable power to the people of 

Puerto Rico as quickly as possible. We are committed to a unified cffmt until the mission 

is complete and power is restored for all. Having more crews on the street would not have 

made the process move faster. As of May 22,2018, power restoration is at 99.04 percent, 

'0.ith 0.96% o£ or just over 14,200, customers located in remote areas among 

mountainous terrain with limited access. To address these logistical challenges, 

equipment, materials and even workers are f1own into the worksites where the restoration 

continues. A majority of the remaining customers are concentrated in two PREP A 

Regions (Arecibo and Caguas). You can only put so many crews on a circuit at any 

given time, and you can only fly so many helicopters and heavy lift drones in the same 

area. The last 5 percent of any power restoration is always the hardest. Based on the 

guidance from the Unitled Command Group we arc at the point where large numbers of 

additional teams won't help, but we have secured the experts and specialized equipment 

we need. 
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Question: Under the provisions of PL 115-72, the Additional Supplemental 

Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act oflast October 2017, there is an 

authorization for issuance of up to $4.9 Billion in Community Disaster Loans for the 

locations affected by hurricanes, to compensate for lost revenue and extraordinary 

expenditures. There have been questions raised about disbursement. To the best of your 

knowledge: 

\Vbat is the stage of the process to have communities, states and tenitories apply for these 

loans, and specifically where does Puerto Rico stand right now? 

Response: Applicants have the fiscal year of the disaster or the fiscal year immediately 

following to apply for Community Disasters Loans. 

On 0 l/09/18 the Community Disaster Loan Program was authorized for the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Government of Puerto Rico decided to delay their 

application for a Community Disaster Loan until a future date. 

Commonwealth Status 

FEMA, in consultation with Treasury, is working closely with Puerto Rico leadership to 

finalize a credit agreement for a loan to the Commonwealth. All parties are working 

closely to ensure that the loan terms are mutually beneficial. A date to finalize the 

agreement has not been set. 

Municipality Status: As of 4/20/18, 12 municipal loans have been approved and 18 are 

pending approval tor the municipal legislature and/or mayor's signature. 

Approved 

Municipal Loan 

Loan Number MUNICIPALITY Loan Amount Legislature effective 

A roved date 

Yabucoa $ 4,936,305.00 Yes 04/03/18 ' 

Bavam6n 5,000,000.00 Yes 

Humacao 5,000 000.00 Yes 
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Another 22 mtmicipal applicants arc in quality control. Eleven arc in the initial review 

stage and FEMA is awaiting the application of 15 more. 
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Question: Have you been advised of any Congressional intent to have the Treasury or 

DHS process these loan requests from local authorities with a process for evaluating and 

rating each case, including analyzing what was the revenue loss, what was the extra 

expenditure and if there is local liquidity to cover it, that is specific to the characteristics 

of each location, or would it be uniform? Or of there being any jurisdiction where such 

requirement is to be waived? 

Have you been advised of any Congressional intent, or one from Treasury or DHS, that a 

specific part of this credit be offered to one particular state or territory, or is it something 

that is to be available to all those communities in need and will be subject to evaluation 

and rating in each case? 

Response: Under CDL authorities, FEMA in consultation with Treasury, conducts a 

detailed evaluation of each applicant's financial situation to determine liquidity needs. 

Each loan process is specific to fhe characteristics of each applicant (US Virgin Islands 

Government, Puerto Rico Government. US Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority, 

etc.). However, for expedience sake, FEMA utilized the traditional loan process capped at 

$5 million for municipalities in Puerto Rico (which is a uniform process). For those 

municipalities requiring more than $5 million, they are provided the first loan to address 

the immediate need, then they work with FEMA and the Treasury to identify and secure 

funding for the remaining unmet need. Loan authority is available to all communities 

and is subject to the evaluation of their needs. 
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hal1enges to Hurricane Recovery in Puerto Rko 

Question: Following HmTicanes Irma and Maria, Walmart asked FEMA to prioritize 

generator fuel distribution to its stores in Puerto Rico. What other competing priorities 

existed at that time that may have prevented FEMA trom fulfilling Walmart's request? 

Response: The protection oflife and safety is our first priority in any response. Fuel 

deliveries to Puerto Rico began on September 22, 20 !7--with priority given to critical 

infrastructure and life-safety operations (hospitals, dialysis centers, other medical 

facilities, communications, etc.). The number one fuel priority, as set by the government 

of Puerto Rico, was for medical facilities providing life-safety operations. However, to 

support these lite-safety operations, priority also has to be given to water and waste water 

facilities. Without power to these facilities, hospitals and other life-safety centers cannot 

operate. These infrastructure interdependencies on electricity have to be considered 

when prioritizing recovery efforts. 
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Question: Is it FEMA' s practice to distribute commodities directly to private businesses 

request? Please explain how FEMA handles such requests, since the Agency' s 

responsibility is to coordinate with state, territorial, tribal, and local 

govemments. 

Response: lt is not FEMA's practice to distribute commodities directly to private 

businesses upon request. 

The Stafford Act and its implementing regulations do not authorize FEMA to provide 

direct federal assistance to private for-profit entities in response to a request, nor does it 

authorize federal assistance exclusively for economic recovery. In limited circumstances, 

private commercial entities may be indirect or incidental beneficiaries of direct federal 

assistance. To address an immediate threat to the community at large that is beyond state 

and local capability, FEMA may provide direct federal assistance through a private 

organization. For example, FEMA could provide a generator to a for-profit hospital, if 

necessary, to ensure the community has adequate emergency medical care. By contrast, 

direct federal assistance would not be appropriate in situations where assistance is 

requested for certain businesses or industries based on a perceived importance of the 

asset to the state or local economy. 

The impacts of Hurricanes Irma and MaTia brought the economy of Puerto Rico to a 

virtual standstill. In the weeks following, business communities across the island teamed 

up with the Government of Puerto Rico, FEMA, and other federal agencies to revitalize 

local commerce and get people back to work. In this context, the joint FEMA-Puerto 

Rico Business Emergency Operations Center was launched to bring together govemment, 

business, and industry leaders to identify challenges and develop unique solutions toward 

sector recovery. Working groups were established to coordinate on major 

1mtwt"1Vf'' including restoring the supply of oxygen to hospitals, stabilizing the food 

supply chain, revitalizing the travel and tourism sector, and addressing fuel and diesel 

shortages. Many of these efforts focused on identifying bottlenecks and increasing 

shipping capacity to restore supply chains, which in turn resulted in increased availability 

of critical commodities to the economy as a whole. 
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Question: Did FEMA follow all applicable federal procurement laws and regulations 

with respect to the contract for meals with Tribute Contracting? 

Response: Yes. 

Question: Did Tribute Contracting receive any special consideration under federal 

contracting laws, regulations, or programs that favor certain businesses, such as Small 

Disadvantaged Businesses, Women-Owned Small Businesses, or Service-Disabled 

Veteran-Ov.med Small Businesses? 

Response: No. This acquisition was not set aside for exclusive participation for any small 

business concern. The solicitation was posted on the Federal Business Opportunities 

website for the general public to submit a proposal. 
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Mr. Scott Aaronson 

Vice President, Security and Preparedness 

Edison Electric Institute 

Submitted by Chaimmn Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

l. Are you concerned at all by reports that the contractors who were the first to assist in the 

emergency repair work in PR are owed over $1OOM and that may have an impact on the 

industry's response to future storms and deter contractors from taking on such work? 

Answer: As I noted in my testimony, mutual assistance in in our industry's DNA. When a 

request is made for assistance, electric companies answer the call. To your specific 

question, EEI does not represent electric contractors, so we can't speak to whether this 

issue will deter them from disaster recovery work in the future. 
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Mr. Scott Aaronson 

Vice President, Security and Preparedness 

Edison Electric Institute 

Submitted by Representative Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon 

Thank you for your questions, Rep. Gonzalez-Colon, and for your tireless work on behalf 

of your constituents. Following the Oversight and Government Reform bearing, my 

colleague, Carlos Torres, testified before the Energy and Commerce Committee on this 

same topic. 1 I know you were present at that bearing but, for the benefit of the other 

Committee members, I will refer frequently to Carlos' testimony. He is the foremost expert 

on this restoration, serving as the Power Restoration Coordinator in Puerto Rico since 

November 2017. Furthermore, his experience includes a 30+ year career in New York 

managing emergency and storm restoration efforts for Consolidated Edison- so his insight 

on these issues is unparalleled. 

1. What would it have taken to put us where we are now, but two or three months earlier? 

USACE says 95 percent restored by end of March, what are the challenges getting to that 

last 5 percent? 

2. With an all-out no-holds-barred effort, could we have had 99 percent recovery before now? 

Answer: There's no doubt that an earlier request for mutual assistance from PREP A to the 

industry on the mainland would have accelerated the restoration- the formal request did 

not come until October 31. Likewise, had many ofthe other challenges faced by the 

restoration crews -a lack of materials, underinvestment in the energy grid before the 

storm, etc. been different, the restoration timeline would have been accelerated. 

As of this writing, power has been restored to more than 98 percent of customers, including 

nearly 90 percent of customers in the hardest-hit Caguas region. Restoration to the 

remaining customers remains challenging, as it is both labor- and time-intensive work iu 

the hardest-hit and most remote parts of the island. 

3. Once we have the supplies necessary at hand, is it not better to have MORE crews on the 

street than fewer? 

Answer: Quoting Carlos Torres' testimony: 

"In every single restoration effort, a point is reached where a substantial amount of work is 

completed and the amount and type of workers needed to complete the job are reassessed. 

ln many cases, more people simply does not mean that work gets completed faster. This is 

especially true in Puerto Rico's mountainous regions with their narrow roads, where only 

so many trucks and so many workers can fit into one space at a time. Access to materials, 

not tlte size of the workforce, at times It as slowed the restoration, but we It ave seen a steady 

improvement in materials being delivered to tile island, and tlte remaining crews are well 

positioned to continue making progress. Again, this deliberate right-sizing of the workforce 
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is typical and necessary. As is the case with all restorations, tile final customers are the most 

difficult and time-consuming to restore; in this case, the terrain on the island is a recurring 

challenge. " 

4. Can we maintain the standard of safety, with enough crews on the street, to be finished in 

30 days rather than in 90° 

Answer: The timeframe to complete work is not an issue of enough crews, or of safety 

practices, it is one of access. Safety is of the utmost importance to our industry. Quoting 

again from the Torres testimony: 

"A restoration of this complexity and magnitude demands a response to match it. It also 

requires an unwavering commitment to safety. I camwt overemphasize the focus tllat I 

and my team llave placed on safety throughout the entire restoration effort. My goal 

was--and continues to be-to ensure that everyone involved in power restoration gets 

flo me safely at tile end of each day and at the end of this mission." 
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No response received to the Questions for the Record. 

Questions for the Record for Mr. William Parks 

Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary 

Oftice of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Submitted by Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

l. Please describe the pre-storm condition of Puerto Rico's power grid, particularly in 

comparison to typical power grids on the mainland. 

2. Please explain how Puerto Rico's electric transmission and distribution system differs from 

mainland systems, including the use of any unique or obsolete parts or equipment that were not 

readily available following the hurricanes. 
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No response received to the Questions for the Record. 

Questions for the Record for Mr. William Parks 

Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Submitted by Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

!. It is the Committee's understanding that there are a significant number of independent 

energy producers on the Island. By the date of the hearing, the Committee was informed 

that PREP A had only authorized the dispatch of 5 out of a total 250 megawatts (MWs) of 

renewable energy from independent power producer (lPP) projects, even though 90 percent 

of all lPPs were operational by that time. Given these projects represent hundreds of 

millions of dollars in private investment and create hundreds of jobs, please an 

update on the dispatch of renewable energy since February 22, 20!8. Also, please explain 

the steps DOE has taken to work with PREP A and the lPPs to get these important sources 

of power back online. 

2. Are you concerned at all by reports that the contractors who were the first to assist in the 

emergency repair work in PR are owed over $1OOM and that may have an impact on the 

industry's response to future storms and deter contractors from taking on such work'~ 
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Questions for the Record for Mr. William Parks 

Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Submitted by Representative Jennifier Gonzalez-Colon 

1. If the Army Corps of Engineers ends its contracts and hands over to PREP A the final and 

hardest 5 percent of distribution and customer connection, how much of a delay does this 

represent in continuity of effort does this not mean having to restart the contracting process 

and wasting as much as a month to restart the effort? 

2. What would have been needed, in hindsight, to have made the effort more efficient; what 

processes and resources should have been in place and should be in place before it happens 

again. What procedures of the USACE, FEMA, and other agencies need to be adjusted? 

What aspects of statutory or regulatory mandates or limitations may the Congress need to 

reimagine, amend or waive. 

3. USACE says some rural areas will not be done until the end 

so NOBODY must wait that long? If it's not impossible, why not Cost0 Production 

lead-in times? Need to hold resources to use in ease there is another emergency? 

4. Do we have an active effort to inform the people of Puerto Rico of the pace of restoration 

work and the time frame to be realistically expected0 

5. What improvements would be needed to really make it a perman<~nt rebuilding, with 

upgrades when necessary to bring it to standard; and do we a reliable notion of the 

cost of doing so? 

6. What deadlines have passed or arc approaching for such things as aid applications, or 100 

federal funding? Arc those terms statutory or administrative? 

7. vulnerability of the national power grid has been brought up in other contexts - has 

the agency used the experience in Puerto Rico to learn about how to handle the scenario 

of large parts of the US power grid going completely offline? 

8. What would it have taken to put us where we are now, but two or three months earlier? 

USACE says 95 percent restored by end of March, what are the challenges getting to that 

last 5 percent"' 

9. With an all-out no-holds-barred efiort, could we have had 99 percent recovery before 

now? 

10. Once we have the supplies necessary at hand, is it not better to have MORE crews on the 

street than fewer? 

11. Can we maintain the standard of safety, with enough crews on the street, to be finished in 

30 days rather than in 90?