NO. COA13-1088

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Forsyth County

Nos. 11 CRS 51776, 6612, 13553

CHRISTOPHER LEON BLAKNEY,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 February 2013 

by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr., in Forsyth County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 February 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General James M. Stanley, Jr., for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 

Defender Kathleen M. Joyce, for defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where the State presents sufficient evidence of each 

element of an offense, a motion to dismiss is properly denied. 

Where defendant can show no prejudice from irrelevant evidence 

admitted during an habitual felon proceeding, any error 

therefrom is harmless.

On 23 February 2011, Officer Neff of the Winston-Salem 

Police Department observed a car speeding and crossing the 
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double-yellow center line while driving on Silas Creek Parkway 

around 10:00 p.m. Officer Neff initiated a traffic stop of the 

car and noticed that the driver, defendant Christopher Leon 

Blakney, smelled of alcohol and had glassy, bloodshot eyes. 

Officer Neff arrested defendant under suspicion of driving while 

impaired and called for assistance; Officer Allen responded. 

While searching defendant’s car, Officer Allen found 

marijuana under the center armrest. A large amount of cash was 

found on the car’s front floorboard along with a glass Mason jar 

containing marijuana residue. A digital scale and batteries 

were also found underneath the front seats. A white shopping 

bag containing a box of sandwich baggies and a glass Mason jar 

of marijuana was found in the trunk, along with a second bag 

containing additional marijuana packaging supplies. Four “dime 

bags” of marijuana were also found in the trunk.1 A total of 

84.8 grams (2.99 ounces) of marijuana was recovered from 

defendant’s car.

 

1 When asked to clarify what he meant when he said “dime bag,” 

Officer Allen testified that a “dime bag” is “a small plastic 

bag often used in the packaging for sale of illegal narcotics. 

So those who sell these -- sell narcotics break their product 

down to get it -- they get it in large shipments and break it 

down into the smaller sellable items, packages for easy 

transactions, very small scale and discrete transactions.” 
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On 16 May 2011, a Forsyth County Grand Jury indicted 

defendant for possession with intent to sell or deliver 

marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving while 

impaired, and driving while license revoked. Defendant was also 

indicted as an habitual felon. 

On 13 February 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of 

possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, possession 

of drug paraphernalia, and driving while license revoked. 

Defendant was found not guilty of driving while impaired. The 

jury also found defendant guilty of having attained the status 

of an habitual felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to 88 

to 115 months in prison. Defendant appeals.

____________________________

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in:

(I) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss; and (II) admitting 

evidence of an additional felony conviction during defendant’s 

habitual felon proceeding.

I.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. 

We disagree.

We review the trial court's denial of a 

motion to dismiss de novo. A motion to 
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dismiss for insufficient evidence is 

properly denied if there is substantial 

evidence (1) of each essential element of 

the offense charged, or of a lesser offense 

included therein, and (2) of defendant's 

being the perpetrator of such offense. 

Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion. All 

evidence, both competent and incompetent, 

and any reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, must be considered in the light 

most favorable to the State. Additionally, 

circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss when a 

reasonable inference of defendant's guilt 

may be drawn from the circumstances. If so, 

it is the jury's duty to determine if the 

defendant is actually guilty. 

State v. Burton, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 400, 404 

(2012) (citations and quotations omitted). “The State is 

entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from the 

evidence. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant 

dismissal of the case; rather, they are for the jury to resolve. 

Defendant's evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to 

be taken into consideration.” State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 

172, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787 (1990) (citations omitted).

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss because the State failed to prove that 

defendant intended to sell or deliver marijuana. Specifically, 

defendant contends the State failed to prove defendant’s intent 
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to sell or deliver marijuana because the amount of marijuana 

found in defendant’s car was too small to be the “substantial 

amount” required for a possession with intent to sell or deliver

marijuana conviction. 

Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 90-95, 

the offense of possession with intent to sell or deliver has 

three elements: (1) possession; (2) of a controlled substance; 

with (3) the intent to sell or deliver that controlled 

substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) (2013). The State may 

demonstrate intent through direct or circumstantial evidence. 

State v. Jackson, 145 N.C. App. 86, 89—90, 550 S.E.2d 225, 229 

(2001). Although the "quantity of the controlled substance 

alone may suffice to support the inference of an intent to 

transfer, sell or deliver," it must be a substantial amount. 

State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 659—60, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835—36 

(1991). "[T]he intent to sell or distribute may be inferred 

from (1) the packaging, labeling, and storage of the controlled 

substance, (2) the defendant's activities, (3) the quantity 

found, and (4) the presence of cash or drug paraphernalia." 

State v. Nettles, 170 N.C. App. 100, 106, 612 S.E.2d 172, 176

(2005).
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The State concedes that lab testing was not completed on 

the marijuana collected from defendant’s car. Defendant argues 

that because no testing was done, the total amount of marijuana 

collected (84.8 grams) is not accurate because this weight 

included marijuana seeds, stems, and other material that should 

have been excluded before weighing. Defendant further argues 

that even if the weight of the marijuana (84.8 grams) is 

accurate, such a small amount is consistent with personal use, 

rather than for sale or delivery. Defendant cites State v. 

Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 235 S.E.2d 265 (1977), and State v. 

Wilkins, 208 N.C. App. 729, 703 S.E.2d 807 (2010), in support of 

his argument.

In Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of possession with 

intent to sell or deliver marijuana after a total of 215.5 grams 

of marijuana was found growing in and around his home. This 

Court found that “this quantity alone, without some additional 

evidence, is not sufficient to raise an inference that the 

marijuana was for the purpose of distribution.” Wiggins, 33 

N.C. App. at 294—95, 235 S.E.2d at 268 (citations omitted). 

In Wilkins, the defendant was stopped and arrested on 

several outstanding warrants. During a pat-down of the 

defendant, officers found three small bags of marijuana weighing 
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a total of 1.89 grams and $1264.00 cash in small denominations. 

The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or 

deliver marijuana and manufacturing marijuana. On appeal, this 

Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession with 

intent to sell or deliver marijuana, noting that “[t]he evidence 

in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 

indicates that defendant was a drug user, not a drug seller.” 

Wilkins, 208 N.C. App. at 733, 703 S.E.2d at 811. 

We find Wiggins and Wilkins to be inapposite to the instant 

case. The State presented evidence that defendant’s car 

contained a total of 84.8 grams of marijuana found in the body 

and trunk of the car, and the marijuana was found in multiple 

containers including two “previously vacuum sealed bags,” two 

sandwich bags, four “dime bags,” and five other types of bags. 

Marijuana was also found in two glass Mason jars. A box of 

sandwich bags was found in the trunk, and digital scales were 

found underneath the front seats of the car. This evidence 

showed not only a significant quantity of marijuana, but the 

manner in which the marijuana was packaged (such as four “dime 

bags”) raised more than an inference that defendant intended to 

sell or deliver the marijuana. Further, the presence of items 

commonly used in packaging and weighing drugs for sale — a box 
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of sandwich bags and digital scales — along with a large 

quantity of cash in small denominations provided additional 

evidence that defendant intended to sell or deliver marijuana, 

as opposed to merely possessing it for his own personal use as 

was determined to be the case in Wiggins and Wilkins. 

Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, sufficient evidence of possession with intent to sell 

or deliver marijuana was presented to survive defendant’s motion 

to dismiss. See State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 

696, 698 (1974) (“The jury could reasonably infer an intent to 

distribute from the amount of the substance found, the manner in 

which it was packaged and the presence of other packaging 

materials.”), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. 

Childers, 41 N.C. App. 729, 255 S.E.2d 654 (1979). Defendant’s 

argument is overruled.

II.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence of an additional felony conviction at

defendant’s habitual felon proceeding. Specifically, defendant 

contends that by not redacting a second consolidated felony 

offense contained within a judgment offered into evidence by the 
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State, the trial court committed error pursuant to Rules 401, 

403, 404(b), and 609. We disagree.

On appeal, in reviewing a trial court’s rulings under Rule 

401 and 403, this Court has held that:

Although the trial court's rulings on 

relevancy technically are not discretionary 

and therefore are not reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard applicable to 

Rule 403, such rulings are given great 

deference on appeal. Because the trial court 

is better situated to evaluate whether a 

particular piece of evidence tends to make 

the existence of a fact of consequence more 

or less probable, the appropriate standard 

of review for a trial court's ruling on 

relevancy pursuant to Rule 401 is not as 

deferential as the 'abuse of discretion' 

standard which applies to rulings made 

pursuant to Rule 403.

State v. Tadeja, 191 N.C. App. 439, 444, 664 S.E.2d 402, 407 

(2008) (citation omitted). Evidence is relevant if it has "any 

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence." N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2013). "[E]vidence is relevant if it 

has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in 

issue in the case." State v. Hannah, 312 N.C. 286, 294, 322 

S.E.2d 148, 154 (1984) (citation omitted). "Although relevant, 

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2013). 

North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-7.1, states 

that a person may be charged as an habitual felon if he “has 

been convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2013). For an habitual felon charge, 

the prior felony convictions of a defendant may be proven by 

“stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified 

copy of the court record of the prior [felony] conviction

[pursuant to] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4.” State v. Gant, 153 

N.C. App. 136, 143, 568 S.E.2d 909, 913 (2002). "[T]he 

preferred method for proving a prior conviction includes the 

introduction of the judgment itself into evidence." State v. 

Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 26, 316 S.E.2d 197, 211 (1984) (citation 

omitted).

The State, in prosecuting the habitual felon charge against 

defendant, introduced into evidence certified copies of three 

prior judgments: judgment for possession with intent to 

sell/deliver cocaine entered on 8 May 1997; judgment for

possession with intent to manufacture, sell and deliver cocaine 
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entered on 8 October 1998; and judgment for possession with 

intent to sell or deliver marijuana entered on 8 May 2003. Each 

judgment included a copy of the corresponding plea transcript. 

The judgment which defendant challenges, entered 8 May 1997,

involved two felony convictions, each for possession with intent 

to sell or deliver cocaine, which had been consolidated into one

judgment. Defendant argues that the trial court’s refusal to 

redact one of the two felony convictions attached to the 

judgment was highly prejudicial to him. We disagree. While the 

additional felony conviction was irrelevant in determining 

whether defendant was an habitual felon, defendant has not 

demonstrated how this evidence prejudiced him. 

Defendant bears the burden of proving the 

testimony was erroneously admitted and he 

was prejudiced by the erroneous admission. 

The admission of evidence which is 

technically inadmissible will be treated as 

harmless unless prejudice is shown such that 

a different result likely would have ensued 

had the evidence been excluded.

State v. Moses, 350 N.C. 741, 762, 517 S.E.2d 853, 867 (1999)

(citations and quotation omitted).

In admitting the judgments into evidence, the trial court 

denied defendant’s redaction request as to the consolidated 

judgment, noting that “[defendant] pled to whatever he pled to. 

It was just consolidated.” The trial court then gave jury 
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instructions as to the habitual felon charge which directed and 

limited the jury’s consideration of the evidence to three 

specific felony convictions only. As such, the record reflects 

nothing to indicate that defendant was prejudiced by the 

inclusion of the additional conviction. Moreover, defendant has 

not challenged the validity of the prior convictions, the plea 

transcripts, or the resulting judgments. “Given the 

overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence of the three felony

convictions, there is essentially no likelihood that a different 

result . . . would have ensued if the trial court had redacted 

[the additional conviction].” State v. Ross, 207 N.C. App. 379, 

400, 700 S.E.2d 412, 426 (2010) (citation, quotation and bracket

omitted). Accordingly, defendant’s argument is overruled. 

No error. 

Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.