#26055-a-DG

2012 S.D. 36

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

TRENT DANIELSON, Defendant and Appellant.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE RANDALL L. MACY

Judge

* * * *

MARTY J. JACKLEY

Attorney General

FRANK GEAGHAN

Assistant Attorney General

Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff

and appellee.

ERIC D. WHITCHER

Lawrence County Public

 Defender’s Office

Deadwood, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant

and appellant.

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS

ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012

OPINION FILED 05/16/12
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice

[¶1.] A jury found Trent Danielson guilty of perjury. Danielson appeals, 

arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for a court-appointed private investigator, and the court 

erred in denying a motion in limine and admitting used transmission parts into 

evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.] Rocket Lube of Spearfish, South Dakota, hired Danielson as a 

mechanic and automobile painter in 2003. Rocket Lube fired Danielson in 2006, 

claiming that Danielson stole auto parts and did not remit checks for work done by 

Danielson on vehicles belonging to Dr. Tom Cox. 

[¶3.] Danielson was indicted on one count of grand theft and the case 

proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, the State argued that the checks from Dr. 

Cox were property of Rocket Lube. Danielson testified that he and Dr. Cox had a 

private agreement and that the checks belonged to him. According to Danielson’s 

testimony, Dr. Cox felt that Rocket Lube was taking advantage of Dr. Cox and thus, 

Dr. Cox asked Danielson to work on Dr. Cox’s vehicles in Danielson’s spare time to 

save expenses. Danielson testified that he replaced a front clutch pack in the 

automatic transmission of Dr. Cox’s 1950 Studebaker. Dr. Cox admitted that he felt 

that Rocket Lube was overcharging him, but he testified that he thought that 

Danielson was still acting as an agent of Rocket Lube when performing the work on 

Dr. Cox’s vehicles. The jury found Danielson not guilty of grand theft. 
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[¶4.] Then, in October 2008, a grand jury indicted Danielson on one count of 

perjury during a felony trial. The indictment alleged that Danielson committed 

perjury during the grand theft jury trial by testifying falsely that “he had replaced 

parts inside the transmission of Dr. Tom Cox’s 1950 Studebaker pick-up truck.” 

The indictment further alleged that Danielson did not actually perform this work. 

[¶5.] Danielson moved to dismiss the perjury indictment as a violation of the 

constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, arguing that the jury acquittal 

was a final determination that he did perform the work in question. The trial court 

agreed and granted Danielson’s motion to dismiss. This Court reversed and 

remanded on appeal, holding that “Danielson has failed to satisfy his burden of 

demonstrating that the jury’s not guilty verdict necessarily included an implicit 

factual finding that he performed the work on the 1950 Studebaker.” State v. 

Danielson, 2010 S.D. 58, ¶¶ 11-12, 786 N.W.2d 354, 358.

[¶6.] On remand, the perjury case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found 

Danielson guilty of perjury. Danielson appeals.

[¶7.] The issues on appeal are:

1. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find Danielson guilty of 

perjury. 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Danielson’s 

request for a court-appointed private investigator.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting used 

transmission parts into evidence.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Danielson’s

motion to dismiss based on the destruction of evidence.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8.] Danielson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of 

acquittal. “We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal as a question 

of law under the de novo standard.” State v. Overbey, 2010 S.D. 78, ¶ 12, 790 

N.W.2d 35, 40. “On appeal, the question before this Court is whether the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain the convictions.” Id. “In measuring the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Stark, 2011 S.D. 46, ¶ 21, 802 

N.W.2d 165, 172. “We accept the evidence and the most favorable inferences fairly 

drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.” Id. In addition, “the jury is the 

exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” 

Id. “This Court will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the credibility of 

witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Id.

[¶9.] Danielson also appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion for the 

appointment of a private investigator, a motion in limine, and a motion to dismiss 

based on the destruction of evidence. “The appointment of an expert is in the 

discretion of the trial court.” In re E.L. and R.L., 2005 S.D. 124, ¶ 22, 707 N.W.2d 

841, 847. This Court also reviews a “trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss 

[based on the destruction of evidence] under an abuse of discretion standard.” State 

v. Williams, 2008 S.D. 29, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d 435, 442. In addition, we review “a 

trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. 

Fisher, 2011 S.D. 74, ¶ 32, 805 N.W.2d 571, 578. “An abuse of discretion refers to a 
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discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason 

and evidence.” Id. Furthermore, “[e]ven if a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is 

erroneous, the error must be prejudicial in nature before we will overturn the 

ruling.” Id. “Error is prejudicial when, in all probability . . . it produced some effect 

upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it.” Id.

ANALYSIS

[¶10.] 1. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find 

Danielson guilty of perjury.

[¶11.] Danielson argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find 

him guilty of perjury. Danielson specifically challenges materiality and mens rea. 

Danielson argues that whether certain repair work was done or not done was not 

material to the grand theft trial, and thus, any alleged false statement does not 

constitute perjury under SDCL 22-29-1. Danielson also argues that the State did 

not prove that he intentionally misled the jury in making any alleged false 

statement. Danielson asserts that the alleged false statement could have been a 

result of faulty memory or mistake.

[¶12.] The State responds that materiality is an issue for the jury to decide. 

The State contends that Danielson’s testimony about repair work was material to 

the grand theft trial because it bolstered and affected Danielson’s credibility and his 

claim of right defense. The State further asserts that perjury is a general intent 

crime and alternatively argues that even if perjury is a specific intent crime, the 

State established that Danielson had the specific intent to make a false statement 

of material fact.
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[¶13.] Perjury is codified in SDCL Chapter 22-29. Under SDCL 22-29-1, 

Any person who, having taken an oath to testify, declare, 

depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, officer, or 

person, in any state or federal proceeding or action in which 

such an oath may by law be administered, states, intentionally 

and contrary to the oath, any material matter which the person 

knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.

“It is sufficient for a [perjury] conviction . . . that a finding of guilty is based upon 

admissible evidence.” SDCL 22-29-18.

[¶14.] Regarding materiality, “[i]t is no defense to a prosecution for perjury 

that the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement, or that the 

false statement did not in fact affect the proceeding in or for which the false 

statement was made.” SDCL 22-29-4. “It is sufficient that the false statement was 

material and might have been used to affect such proceeding.” Id. Furthermore, 

“[a] statement is sufficient to support a charge of perjury ‘if it is material to any 

proper matter of inquiry, and if, furthermore, it is calculated and intended to bolster 

the testimony of a witness on some material point, or to support or attack the 

credibility of a witness.’” State v. Maves, 358 N.W.2d 805, 810 (S.D. 1984) (quoting 

State v. Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d 307, 310 (S.D. 1982)). “A statement made by a 

witness during the course of a trial is also material if it ‘has a legitimate tendency 

to prove or disprove some relevant fact irrespective of the main fact at issue, or . . . 

is capable of influencing the court, officer, tribunal, or other body created by law on 

any proper matter of inquiry.’” Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d at 310 (quoting State v. 

Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1972)). The materiality element is an issue for 

the jury to decide. State v. Pechan, 1996 S.D. 123, ¶¶ 9-12, 554 N.W.2d 663, 664-65.
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[¶15.] In this case, the State presented several witnesses, including three 

expert witnesses. The State’s experts generally opined that the 1950 Studebaker’s 

transmission had not been disassembled recently and that it contained mostly 

original, manufacturer-issued parts. The State introduced a partial transcript of 

the grand theft trial, which included all of Danielson’s testimony in that trial. After 

the State’s case-in-chief, Danielson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that 

the State did not establish materiality because the State only introduced a partial 

transcript from the grand theft trial which did not include the State’s case-in-chief 

and also because the State did not introduce the grand theft indictment. The State 

responded that materiality is established through Danielson’s claim of right defense 

in the grand theft trial which is asserted in Danielson’s testimony, eliminating the 

need to introduce the rest of the grand theft trial transcript. The trial court denied 

Danielson’s judgment of acquittal motion, noting that materiality is a jury issue and 

finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. 

[¶16.] It is no defense to perjury that Danielson did not recognize the 

materiality of his grand theft trial testimony or that the testimony did not in fact 

affect the grand theft proceeding. Under SDCL 22-29-4, it is sufficient that 

Danielson’s testimony might have been used by the grand theft jury. Furthermore, 

the perjury jury could have reasonably concluded that Danielson’s testimony about 

the repair work in the grand theft trial was calculated and intended to bolster 

Danielson’s testimony on his claim of right defense, a material point, or to support 

or attack the credibility of Danielson as a witness during the grand theft trial. 

Because Danielson’s testimony had a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove a 
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relevant fact irrespective of the main fact at issue, we find that the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that Danielson’s testimony in the grand theft trial was 

material. 

[¶17.] In addition, the State’s failure to introduce the entire grand theft trial 

transcript was not fatal to the materiality element. The grand theft trial transcript 

included three volumes. Volume Three contained all of Danielson’s testimony. The 

State offered and the court received Volume Three during the State’s case-in-chief 

at the perjury trial. Then, while the first defense witness was on the stand, 

Danielson offered Volume Two. The court received Volume Two, overruling a 

relevancy objection by the State. During cross-examination of the same defense 

witness, the State offered Volume One. Danielson objected because the first few 

pages of Volume One appeared to be missing. The court sustained this objection 

and Volume One was not admitted as an exhibit. In the end, Volume Two and 

Volume Three of the grand theft trial transcript were admitted as exhibits in the 

perjury trial, and Danielson’s claim that the entire transcript was not before the 

perjury jury is somewhat disingenuous because it was Danielson that objected to 

the admission of Volume One. Moreover, Volume Three contained Danielson’s 

testimony, including his claim of right defense, and provided sufficient evidence for 

the jury to determine materiality in the perjury trial.

[¶18.] The facts relating to materiality in this case are analogous to the facts 

in Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d 307. In Lachowitzer, a jury found the defendant notguilty of theft by deception after the defendant testified and asserted a claim of 

right defense. Id. at 309. The defendant was subsequently charged with perjury for 
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testimony he gave at the theft trial. Id. A jury found the defendant guilty of 

perjury. Id. at 308. On appeal, the defendant argued that “the evidence introduced 

at his perjury trial was insufficient to support a finding that the perjured testimony 

was material to the issues at the [theft] trial.” Id. at 310. This Court affirmed, 

finding that “[the d]efendant’s testimony may not be directly material to the 

principal issue of whether he obtained the repair work with [the] intent to defraud 

Midas Muffler by creating a false impression, but it is material to [the] defendant’s 

claim of right defense.” Id. 

[¶19.] Here, like the defendant in Lachowitzer, Danielson testified and 

asserted a claim of right defense during the grand theft trial. Also like the 

defendant in Lachowitzer, Danielson argues that the State did not establish 

materiality for perjury. However, like the perjured statements in Lachowitzer, 

Danielson’s alleged false statements bolstered his credibility and supported his 

claim of right defense. Therefore, as this Court concluded in Lachowitzer, the 

evidence introduced at Danielson’s perjury trial was sufficient to support a finding 

that Danielson’s testimony was material to the grand theft proceeding.1

 

1. Danielson claims that Lachowitzer is materially distinguishable because both 

the petty theft information and a claim of right jury instruction were read to 

the perjury jury in that case. Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d at 310. Danielson 

notes that, in contrast, neither the grand theft indictment nor a claim of right 

jury instruction were read to the perjury jury in this case. While the grand 

theft indictment and a claim of right jury instruction may have assisted the 

perjury jury in determining materiality, the State’s failure to introduce these 

documents is not fatal to its case. The perjury jury was instructed on the 

elements of perjury and the meaning of materiality and also had Danielson’s 

grand theft trial testimony before it. Therefore, even without the grand theft 

indictment and a claim of right jury instruction, the perjury jury in this case 

(continued . . .)
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[¶20.] In addition to materiality, Danielson also claims that the State did not 

establish mens rea, arguing that perjury requires the specific intent to mislead the 

jury and relying on the legislature’s use of the word “intentionally” in SDCL 22-29-

1. We have not previously addressed the mens rea requirement of SDCL 22-29-1.2 

“However, we have addressed the dichotomy of specific intent/general intent crimes 

several times under other statutes.” State v. Schouten, 2005 S.D. 122, ¶ 11, 707 

N.W.2d 820, 823 (citations omitted). “The use of the terms ‘intentionally’ or 

‘knowingly’ merely designate that the culpability required is something more than 

negligence or recklessness.” State v. Taecker, 2003 S.D. 43, ¶ 25, 661 N.W.2d 712, 

718. “Mere use of that term (intentionally) does not designate an additional mental 

state beyond that accompanying act.” Id. “Whether or not a crime is a general 

intent or specific intent crime depends upon its legislative enactment.” Id. “Specific 

intent has been defined as meaning some intent in addition to the intent to do the 

physical act which the crime requires, while general intent means an intent to do 

the physical act—or, perhaps, recklessly doing the physical act—which the crime 

requires.” Id.

[¶21.] Contrary to Danielson’s arguments, nothing in SDCL 22-29-1 requires 

the specific intent to mislead a party or fact finder. Certainly, the legislature’s use 

_____________________________

(. . . continued)

could have reasonably concluded that Danielson’s testimony was material to 

the grand theft trial.

2. We previously addressed the mens rea requirement for the crime of false 

statements as perjury under SDCL 4-9-4. State v. Shilvock-Havird, 472 

N.W.2d 773, 776-77 (S.D. 1991). However, as we noted in the ShilvockHavird opinion, that crime differs from general perjury under SDCL 22-29-1. 

See id.
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of the term “intentionally” alone does not produce that result. A review of the 

record demonstrates that there was sufficient evidence for the perjury jury to 

reasonably conclude that Danielson, intentionally and contrary to oath, stated a 

material matter which Danielson knew to be false. Therefore, the trial court did not 

err in denying Danielson’s motion for judgment of acquittal and we affirm on this 

issue.

[¶22.] 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Danielson’s request for a court-appointed

private investigator. 

[¶23.] Danielson argues that the court erred in denying his motion for the 

appointment of a private investigator. In “determining [whether] court-appointed 

experts are essential to an adequate defense[,]” we consider the following 

guidelines:

1) The request must be made in good faith; 2) the request must 

be reasonable in all respects; 3) the request[ ] must be timely 

and set forth reasons which seem to make such services needed 

or necessary to the defendant; and 4) the request must specify 

that the defendant is financially unable to obtain the required 

service himself and that such services would otherwise be 

justifiably obtained if the defendant were financially able.

E.L. and R.L., 2005 S.D. 124, ¶ 22, 707 N.W.2d at 847-48. “Trial courts should 

scrutinize a defense request for an expert to insure that an indigent defendant may 

procure any reasonable defense, and, when in doubt, lean toward the appointment 

of such an expert.” State v. Stuck, 434 N.W.2d 43, 51 (S.D. 1988). However, “if the 

request is frivolous, unreasonable, unnecessary for an adequate defense, or without 

underlying factual support, the appointment need not be made.” E.L. and R.L., 

2005 S.D. 124, ¶ 22, 707 N.W.2d at 848. We apply these concepts regarding 
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appointment of experts to requests for appointments of private investigators. See 

State v. Goodroad, 1997 S.D. 46, ¶¶ 42-50, 563 N.W.2d 126, 135-36.

[¶24.] Here, Danielson, an indigent defendant, moved for appointment of 

both an expert witness and a private investigator. Danielson argued that a private 

investigator was necessary because the case was complex, had been ongoing for 

many years, and because the 1950 Studebaker had been possessed by multiple 

mechanics and people before the transmission parts were seized for the perjury 

trial. The court granted Danielson’s request for an expert witness but denied 

Danielson’s motion for appointment of a private investigator. In doing so, the court 

stated that “I will allow [Danielson’s] expert who’s going to review parts to also 

inquire as to the possession of the transmission from the date that it’s alleged that 

Mr. Danielson worked on the vehicle. I think that would cover your concern.” Upon 

this record, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Danielson’s motion for appointment of a private investigator. 

[¶25.] 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting used transmission parts into evidence.

[¶26.] Danielson argues that the trial court erred in admitting used 

transmission parts into evidence. Danielson challenges this ruling on three 

grounds: relevancy, chain of custody, and destruction of evidence. Because the 

chain of custody challenge relates to a motion in limine and the destruction of 

evidence challenge relates to a motion to dismiss, we separately review these 

claims.
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[¶27.] During the pretrial motions stage of the perjury proceeding, Danielson 

moved to exclude the 1950 Studebaker clutch and any testimony about the clutch 

because “the object lack[ed] sufficient chain of custody for such evidence to be 

admissible.” The court denied Danielson’s motion in limine regarding the chain of 

custody, stating that the State could establish chain of custody at trial. During the 

trial, Danielson objected to the admission of the used transmission parts on 

foundation grounds. 

[¶28.] First, we question whether Danielson’s relevancy challenge was 

properly preserved for appeal. “We generally do not reverse trial courts for reasons 

not argued before them.” Rogen v. Monson, 2000 S.D. 51, ¶ 15, 609 N.W.2d 456, 

459. “Generally, parties must object to specific court action and state the reason 

underlying their objection so that the circuit court has an opportunity to correct any 

error.” State v. Johnson, 2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 16, 771 N.W.2d 360, 367. This Court has 

permitted some flexibility in this rule. See id. (finding that a Sixth Amendment 

confrontation rights challenge was preserved for appeal when a motion in limine 

merely argued that the defendant would not have an opportunity to cross-examine a 

witness). However, a defendant’s motion or objection must at least “make the 

[lower] court aware of his [or her] concerns[.]” Id. Furthermore, we recognize that 

“[t]he objection of ‘lack of foundation’ has no single defined meaning, and an 

objection of ‘lack of foundation’ generally is of little or no use to a trial judge.” 

Rogen, 2000 S.D. 51, ¶ 15, 609 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting Tolver v. State, 269 Ga. 530, 

500 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1998)). 
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[¶29.] Here, Danielson did not challenge the relevancy of the used 

transmission parts at the lower court level. Danielson’s motion in limine regarding 

the used transmission parts challenged the evidence on chain of custody grounds 

and Danielson objected at trial citing lack of foundation. Thus, the trial court did 

not have an opportunity to rule on the relevancy of the transmission parts under 

SDCL 19-12-1 and -2 or on Danielson’s claim that the evidence should have been 

excluded under SDCL 19-12-3. Danielson’s relevancy argument was not preserved 

for appeal.

[¶30.] Regarding chain of custody, “[t]rial courts have broad discretion in 

determining the competency of chain of custody evidence.” State v. Reay, 2009 S.D. 

10, ¶ 22, 762 N.W.2d 356, 363. “In considering the admissibility of demonstrative 

evidence, the trial judge must be satisfied in reasonable probability that the object 

sought to be admitted is the one involved in the case, and that it has not changed in 

important respects.” Id. “The ‘chain of custody’ rule, requiring the prosecution to 

account for the whereabouts of physical evidence connected with a crime from the 

time of its seizure to its offer at trial is to ensure that the real evidence offered is 

that object which was involved in the transaction, and that the object is in a 

substantially unchanged condition.” Id. ¶ 25. In addition, 

where the offered object is not readily identifiable or 

distinguishable, or is susceptible to alteration by mistake in 

substitution, tampering[,] or contamination, a proper foundation 

requires testimony tracing the chain of custody of the object with 

sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original 

item has been so altered.

State v. Brings Plenty, 490 N.W.2d 261, 265 (S.D. 1992).
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[¶31.] “It is not necessary for the State to establish an absolutely perfect 

chain of custody, but the testimony must at least strongly suggest the exact 

whereabouts of the exhibit at all times.” Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, 

“[m]ere suspicion or speculation is insufficient to establish a break in the chain of 

custody.” Id. ¶ 26. 

[¶32.] In this case, Danielson challenges the whereabouts of the 1950 

Studebaker between 2006 and 2008. Danielson claims that the location of the 

vehicle prior to 2008 is relevant because he allegedly replaced the clutch parts in 

2006. The record demonstrates that the State seized the transmission parts in 

October 2008. The State demonstrated with reasonable probability that no 

tampering or substitution had occurred after October 2008 by having the evidence 

custodians testify at trial. In addition, the mechanics who examined and 

dismantled the transmission also testified at trial. Danielson merely speculates 

that the evidence was altered or tampered with. Danielson has not only failed to 

show that the challenged evidence was in some way altered or tampered with, but 

Danielson has also failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s rulings regarding the 

chain of custody constitute prejudicial error. Furthermore, unlike drugs or blood, 

used transmission parts from a 1950 Studebaker are arguably readily identifiable, 

distinguishable, and not easily susceptible to alteration by mistake in substitution, 

tampering, or contamination. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Danielson’s motion in limine regarding the used 

transmission parts.
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[¶33.] 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Danielson’s motion to dismiss based on the 

destruction of evidence.

[¶34.] Danielson argues that the State removed and discarded certain parts 

from the 1950 Studebaker, including the transmission filter. Danielson claims that 

the discarded parts would have demonstrated the transmission’s age and usage, 

making it significant and exculpatory evidence. Danielson notes that one of the 

State’s experts testified that the transmission pan and filter were newer than the 

rest of the transmission parts, “thereby demonstrating that someone had altered 

the evidence[,]” according to Danielson.3 Thus, Danielson claims that the trial court 

should have granted Danielson’s motion to dismiss, or, at the very least, excluded 

the other used transmission parts from evidence. 

[¶35.] The State responds that the trial court denied Danielson’s motion to 

dismiss based on destruction of evidence because the trial judge “[hadn’t] seen any 

activity by the State with regard to the evidence that would warrant dismissal 

based on the destruction of evidence.” The State also argues that Danielson’s 

destruction of evidence claim focuses on the transmission pan and filter. The State 

notes that the perjury charge did not relate to whether Danielson changed the pan 

and filter (the State conceded that Danielson did that work), but rather related to 

 

3. From the record and appellate briefs, it is somewhat unclear whether 

Danielson believes that the transmission pan and filter would have shown 

that he changed the pan and filter himself (thus, creating the presumption 

that he also worked on the transmission clutch) or whether Danielson 

believes that the discarded parts would have shown that someone else 

changed the pan and filter (thus, suggesting that the evidence was tampered 

with sometime before the perjury trial). This argument seems to suggest the 

latter.
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whether Danielson replaced the clutch or clutch pack, a separate transmission part. 

Thus, the State argues, the discarded evidence would not have played a significant 

role in the perjury trial. The State also contends that any discarded evidence was

not destroyed in bad faith.

[¶36.] “The State’s duty to preserve the evidence is limited to evidence that 

might be expected to play a significant role in a suspect’s defense.” Williams, 2008 

S.D. 29, ¶ 23, 748 N.W.2d at 442. “Evidence plays a ‘significant role’ where the 

evidence possessed ‘an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 

destroyed, and [was] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain 

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’” Moeller v. Weber, 2004 

S.D. 110, ¶ 15, 689 N.W.2d 1, 7 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-

89, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984)). “The State’s destruction of 

evidence favorable to the defense is a violation of due process if the evidence 

requested by the defense and destroyed by the State is material either to guilt or 

punishment.” State v. Bousum, 2003 S.D. 58, ¶ 15, 663 N.W.2d 257, 262. 

[¶37.] “Additionally, the defense must show that the State acted in bad faith 

in releasing the evidence.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. 

Ct. 333, 337, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 289 (1981)). Indeed, “mere negligence in the loss or 

destruction of evidence does not result in a constitutional violation.” Id. 

Bad faith, as used in cases involving destroyed evidence or 

statements, means that the state deliberately destroyed the 

evidence with the intent to deprive the defense of information; 

that is, that the evidence was destroyed by, or at the direction 

of, a state agent who intended to thwart the defense.

Id. (citing State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 613 (N.D. 1993)).
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[¶38.] Here, Danielson has failed to demonstrate that the State, in bad faith, 

destroyed evidence that would have played a significant role in his defense. While 

the State failed to preserve the transmission pan and filter, the perjury charge 

centered on whether Danielson replaced the clutches or clutch packs. Even if the 

transmission pan and filter had some evidentiary value, Danielson has not 

demonstrated that these parts would have played a significant role in his defense. 

In addition, the record is devoid of any indication that the State deliberately 

destroyed evidence with the intent to deprive Danielson of the information. The 

State readily admitted that the pan and filter were newer than the other 

transmission parts and offered that information to Danielson. The State and its 

experts believed that the transmission pan and filter were immaterial to the perjury 

charge because the State believed that Danielson did, in fact, remove and replace 

those parts. Upon this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied Danielson’s motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

[¶39.] The record demonstrates that when viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt and there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict. Furthermore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Danielson’s motion for appointment of a private 

investigator, motion in limine to exclude the transmission parts, and motion to 

dismiss for the destruction of evidence. 

[¶40.] Affirmed.
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[¶41.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.