Current Research and Development in Battle Staff Training

The Army is conducting research and development (R&D) in
innovative training for battle staffs. Some of these R&D efforts
involve training in staff reasoning, and others involve training
in the entire gamut of tasks and processes that staffs must
perform. The R&D in staff reasoning skills will be discussed
first, followed by R&D in a variety of individual and collective
staff tasks and processes.

Training in Critical Thinking

The Fort Leavenworth Research Unit of ARI is conducting
research to develop and refine a course in practical thinking for
field grade officers who may serve as battle staff members of
battalion, brigade and division staffs (Fallesen, Michel, Lussier
& Pounds, 1996). ‘This course focuses on improving performance in
tactical decision making.

The current decision making process, as outlined in Staff
Organization and Operations (FM 101-5, DA, 1996b) involves
developing several alternative courses of action (COA),
independently evaluating each COA, comparing the outcomes and
choosing one COA. The process starts with mission analysis,
which involves identifying the tasks to be performed based on the
mission assigned by higher headquarters, the purpose of
performing those tasks, and any constraints on the unit’s
actions. Based on the mission analysis, the restated mission,
which includes tasks to be accomplished and the purposes of those
tasks (i.e., the commander’s intent), is issued. Planning
guidance is then issued to the staff. Planning guidance consists
of any factors the commander wants the staff to specifically
consider in preparation of staff estimates (e.g., avoiding a
piece of terrain). Each staff section then prepares a staff
estimate, which is a recommendation to the commander on how to
accomplish the mission. These estimates must be coordinated
among staff sections, and COAs developed. The COAs are then war
gamed. This involves forecasting probable enemy responses to
each COA, and potential reactions to the enemy responses.

Results of each COA are then compared on key factors (e.g., use
of terrain) and a single COA is chosen. Based on the COA, orders
are prepared, approved, issued, rehearsed and executed.

Research suggested that the current tactical decision making
process (TDMP) could be improved. Fallesen et al. (1996)
detailed several potential shortcomings of the current TDMP. The
process assumes that all good options are readily identifiable.
The process does not recognize the amount of uncertainty present
in real tactical decision making (e.g., it assumes COAs can be
precisely evaluated). The process assumes that there is one best

12



Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically Achieved
through Simulation (COBRAS)

The COBRAS research and development effort (Campbell,
Graves, Deter & Quinkert, 1998; Jenkins, Graves & Quinkert, in
preparation) involved brigade level vignettes, brigade staff
exercises (BSE) and brigade and battalion staff exercises (BBSE).
This effort was designed for home station training for all .
mission phases.

Vignettes. The COBRAS vignettes were 24 short, self-
contained training activities that focused on specific staff
process events and on selected members and groupings of the
staff. Vignettes are shown in Table 4. These vignettes were
structured training events in that they provided all the
necessary components to implement and conduct training. Each
vignette was designed to provide practice and feedback on
explicit objectives and tasks. The TSP for a vignette defined
the objectives, outcomes and limits of the training experience.
The structure also included the tactical scenario that provided
the framework for the required activities. Four of the vignettes
used constructive simulation (Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation
[BBS] or Janus) to generate event scenarios, while the rest were
conducted “live” or without simulation system support. Duration
of vignettes ranges from four hours to eight hours.

BSE. The COBRAS BSE training program components included
integrated scenarios covering the planning, preparation, and
execution-consolidation-reorganization phases of battle. The BSE
gives the brigade commander and selected staff an opportunity to
practice and refine staff processes. The target audience is
shown in Table 5. The BSE can be used for several purposes. It
serves as a training tool when a new commander takes over or
other major changes in the Brigade Combat Team's (BCT's) leaders
or staff occur. The exercise allowed the commander to
communicate his decision making process to the BCT and refine the
standing operating procedure (SOP) necessary to carry out that
process. The BSE could also serve as a sustainment tool to
further practice and refine those procedures.

33



were opened, whether messages were routed to those (and only
those) who needed the information, and speed in accomplishing
these functions. Information collected by OCs included more
subjective matters such as whether information was analyzed
correctly and if information and actions were properly
coordinated and integrated among staff sections.

A formative evaluation, consisting of a pilot and trial run
with a group of SMEs as staff, was conducted for the SGT. Some
of the major challenges uncovered were the complexity of the
orders, difficulty of the computer software, and problems with
AAR materials.

Additional R&D on SGT was performed to address these
challenges. The new prototype program was designed at brigade
level only, as a proof of principle. Section level, small group
(e.g., fire coordination cell) and main CP modules were
developed, with only one exercise per module. One mission
(defense in sector) was used, versus the three in the prior
program. Major changes in the program involved simplifying the
orders materials needed to execute the mission, improving ease of
use of training equipment, and better AAR feedback.

Tactical materials provided to the staff were greatly
abbreviated. Computer assisted training was designed to help to
ensure that the section members understood the tactical materials
prior to running an exercise. Most of the information needed for
the exercise was in the synchronization matrix, decision support
template and commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIR) .

The interface to the training equipment was improved to
provide ease of use; to avoid the equipment interfering with the
training. Placing unit locations on maps was made faster and
easier, so that workstation operators did not have to choose
between updating maps, opening messages, or typing messages.
Equipment to make the interactors’ (i.e., white cell) job easier,
such as touch screens and voice recognition software was
explored.

Performance feedback was improved. More computer generated
feedback was available for each section. This feedback included
what information was sent to a specific address (e.g., division
operations section) and when it was sent, compared to the
information that should have been sent to that source at that
time (e.g., window of opportunity). The observer checklists were
improved by specifying expected inter-staff behaviors clearly
enough that observers could easily determine whether or not they
occurred. Also, observer checklists were put on a personal data
assistant (PDA), with an alarm alerting the OC to when a critical

29



The selected topics, called performance objectives, provided
the specific training objectives for the exercise. They can best
be categorized as collective commander and staff skills that
allowed the brigade to enter its next level of operations or
training at a higher level. In the case of an NTC rotation,
these skills would help units prepare to get the most from an
upcoming full-up live training experience. These performance
objectives focused the exercise by providing topics for the
scheduled and impromptu feedback sessions with the training
audience. Feedback was provided by peer observers from other
units and was designed for the commanders and staffs of the
brigade and maneuver task forces.

The entire exercise was supported by a complete TSP which
included all the instructions, materials, orders and simulation
materials necessary to execute the training with minimal
preparation.

Research that focused on a variant of the BBSE involved a
synthetic theater of war (STOW) exercise. In the STOW variant
subordinate leaders of one battalion were trained in virtual
simulation (SIMNET); and their staff, plus other battalion staffs
trained in a constructive simulation (BBS). The brigade staff
was also in a constructive environment (BBS). This training
followed the same principles and design outlined above, except
that subordinate commanders came from the training unit and the
materials provided them little external guidance outside of the
operations order. These exercises introduce more “fog of war”
for the staff to work through.

A major goal in the design of the entire COBRAS training
program was that it be designed for execution without a dedicated
oc team. A thorough train-the-trainer package was included so
that a division could prepare for and conduct training for a
brigade at home station (provided BBS is available). This
development should aid exportability, since a full time OC team
does not have to be provided.

The COBRAS program has been used in the field. A version of
COBRAS was recently tested with the 3d Bde 2ID at Fort Lewis,
Washington. The training was used to prepare the relatively new
brigade staff for an NTC rotation. In addition to this work, the
Force XXI Training Program’s Implementation Support Assessment
Team (ISAT) is using COBRAS vignettes, BSE and BBSE, along with
BSTS at Fort Riley Kansas.

38



According to Rosenberger (1995), the causes of this lack of
synchronization were deficits in both individual and collective
staff skills. Rosenberger stated: “As an Army, we have not
identified the individual and team tasks every staff officer must
perform during the planning, preparation and execution of
operations” (1995, p 14). He expounded on this statement by
indicating that “the current MTPs, Army Training and Evaluation
Program (ARTEP) MTP 71-2 [DA, 1988a] and ARTEP MTP 71-3 (DA,
1988b] (battalion and brigade Army Training and Evaluation Plans)
are completely inadequate” (1995, p 15). If one has not
identified the tasks, then it follows that they cannot be
intentionally trained.

Although Rosenberger (1995) does not use the term, an
important reason why commanders and staffs cannot synchronize
combat power was because they have not been trained to form
“mental models” of the battlefield. According to Rosenberger,
commanders and staffs could not “see” (visualize) the terrain,
the enemy or themselves. By seeing the terrain, he meant that
they could not conceptualize how the terrain would affect the
operation. They could not see the enemy in the sense that they
could not imagine how the enemy commander would fight the battle,
so they could not know what they must do to plan inside the OPFOR
decision cycle. Commanders and staffs could not see themselves
in the sense in that they did not understand the capabilities and
limitations of their own assets, and how these capabilities and
limitations affected the operation. Also, the commander and
staff failed to appreciate how the OPFOR “saw” them and expected
them to operate.

Finally, Rosenberger (1995) stated that commanders did not
effectively state their intent. He contended that commanders
must state their intent in terms of effects they intend the force
to achieve and use clearly understood doctrinal terms.

Rosenberger’s (1995) articles also discussed solutions to
the problems raised. He stated that one must first identify the
critical individual and collective staff tasks, train the tasks
in the branch schools and sustain the skills in the field. He
further stated the only way to sustain staff skills was through
simulations, built around a concept of structured versus
free play training. This direction is discussed in more detail
later in this paper.

Rosenberger (1995) ended his article on an ominous note. He
stated that if we cannot develop sufficient synchronization with
known equipment to defeat an enemy using known force structure
and known tactics, how can we hope to operate successfully in the
future? The future will be digital, with many new information
systems which staffs will need to understand how to use (not just



Table B-2 (Continued)

Decision making The ability to gather and integrate
information, use sound judgment ,
identify alternatives, select the best
solution, and evaluate the consequences
(in team context, emphasizes skill in
pooling information and resources in
support of a response choice)

to develop a positive team climate) and team self correction
training (team-led feedback).

Summary of Team Dimensions or Processes

These methods of training represent the techniques of
training, but for the most part, not the content. Concerning
content, what to train seems to come back to team processes.
Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes and Salas (1986) describe two
distinguishable tracks of team activity: Task work and teamwork.
Task work involves the operations-related activities, which for
staffs includes analyzing information, making decisions, and
communicating orders. Perhaps the best behavioral definition of
task work processes for TMD teams is provided by Olmstead (1992).
His battle staff integration processes, developed for TDM teams,
are listed in Table B-3. Teamwork, on the other hand, involves
interpersonal activities designed to enhance communications,
social relationships and interaction patterns. Possibly the most
inclusive list of team work dimensions are the team work skill
dimensions of Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995), also listed in Table
B-1.

A truly good TDM team training program would integrate
effective team training techniques with empirically developed
team processes. Thus, an effective TDM team training program
would use techniques of information presentation (e.g. lecture),
demonstration, role-playing, cross-training, training simulation
and behavioral feedback (i.e. guided practice) to train both task
work and team work team processes.

Techniques demonstrated in the above research will be seen
in the discussion of current research and development in Army
staff training. Some of the techniques used by these research
efforts are: defining staff performance in terms of TDM team
dimensions or processes; using guided self-practice in
simulations to provide feedback on how well these processes were
performed; and providing staff members with feedback on expert
behavior in the scenario they just ran.



Elliott, G. S., Sanders, W. R., & Quinkert, K. A. (1996).
Training in a digitized battalion task force: Lessons
learned and implications for future training (ARI Research
Report 1695). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Entin, E., Serfaty, D., & Deckert, J. C. (1994). Team adaptation
and coordination training (Technical Report 648-1).
Burlington, MA: AlphaTech, Inc.

Fallesen, J. J., Michel, R. R., Lussier, J. W., & Pounds, J.
(1996). Practical thinking: Innovation in battle command
instruction (Technical Report 1037). Alexandria, VA: U.S.
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Fowlkes, J. E., Lane, N. E., Salas, E., Franz, T., & Oser, R.
(1994). Improving the measurement of team performance: The
TARGETs methodology. Military Psychology, 6, 47-61.

Freeman, J. T., Cohen, M. S., Serfaty, D., Bresnick, T., &
Thompson, B. (1998). Information management in the
digital Army: Concepts for simulator-based training and
performance measurement (Technical Report 1073). Alexandria,
VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences.

Hoffman, R. G., Graves, C. R., Koger, M. E., Flynn, M. R., &
Sever, R. S. (1995). Developing the RCVTP: History and
lessons learned (ARI Research Report 1675). Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making. New York: The
Free Press.

Jenkins, S. N., Graves, C. R., & Quinkert, K. A. (in
preparation). Development of the Combined arms operations
at brigade level, realistically achieved through simulation
Til (COBRAS III) performance objectives for the brigade and
battalion staff exercise (Research Product) Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Johnston, J. H., Smith-Jentsch, K. A., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A.
(1997). Performance measurement tools for enhancing team
decision making training. In M. T. Brannick, E. Salas & C.
Prince (Eds.), Team performance assessment and measurement:
Theory, methods, and applications (pp 311-330). Mahway, Nu:
Lawrence Erlbaum.

47



Cohen, M. S., Freeman, J. T., Fallesen, J. J., Marvin, F. F., &
Bresnick, T. A. (1996). Training critical thinking skills
for battlefield situation assessment: An experimental test
(Technical Report 1050). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Department of the Army (1988a). Mission training plan for the
tank and mechanized infantry battalion task force (ARTEP
71-2 MTP). Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army.

Department of the Army (1988b). Mission training plan for the
heavy brigade command group and staff (ARTEP 71-3 MTP).
Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army.

Department of the Army (1995). Training development management,
process, and products (TRADOC Reg 350-70). Fort Monroe, VA:
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Department of the Army (1996a). National Training Center priority
trends: 4QFY94 through 2QFY96. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Department of the Army (1996b). Staff organization and operations
(FM 101-5). Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army.

Department of the Army (1997a). Combat Training Center (CTC)
trends (97-9): National Training Center 3d & 4th quarters
FY96. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Department of the Army (1997b). Combat Training Center (CTC)
trends (97-6): Joint Readiness Training Center 4QFY96 &
1QFY97. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons
Learned.

Department of the Army (1998). Army Battle Command System
capstone requirements document. Ft. Leavenworth, KS:
TRADOC Program Integration Office.

Duncan, P. C., Rouse, W. B., Johnston, J. H., Cannon-Bowers, J.
A., Salas, E., & Burns, J. (1996). Training teams working in
complex systems: A mental model-based approach. In W. B.
Rouse (Ed.) Human/technology interaction in complex systems,
(Vol 8, pp 173-231).

46



ADCOORD

B2C2
B2S2TP

BARS
BBS
BBSE
BC
BCT
Bde
BF
BMO
Bn
BOS
BSA
BSE
BSTS

c2
CALL
CAS
CBI
CBT
CCF
CCIR
CDR
CEWI
cGsc
CHEM
CHEMO
cic
COA
COBRAS

cP
CPX
cs
css

Appendix A
Acronyms and Abbreviations

After-Action Review

Air Defense Artillery

Air Defense Coordinator

Air Defense Officer

Armored Forces Research Unit
Air Liaison Officer

Armor Officer Advanced Course
Army Research Institute

Army Training and Evaluation Program
All Sources Analysis System
Aviation

Brigade and Battalion Command and Control System
Battalion and Brigade Simulations Staff Training
Program

Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale

Brigade Battle Simulator

Brigade and Battalion Staff Exercise

Battle Captain

Brigade Combat Team

Brigade

Battlefield Function

Battalion Maintenance Officer

Battalion

Battlefield Operating System

Brigade Support Area

Brigade Staff Exercise

Battle Staff Training System

Command and Control

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Close Air Support

Computer Based Instruction

Computer-Based Training

Critical Combat Function

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
Commander

Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence
Command and General Staff College
Chemical

Chemical Officer

Combat Information Center

Course of Action

Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level,
Realistically Achieved Through Simulation
Command Post

Command Post Exercise

Combat Support

Combat Service Support



Appendix B

Empirical Research on Tactical Decision Making (TDM) Teams
and Their Training

Behavioral research literature relevant to battle staffs and
their training exists. This literature addresses TDM teams that
assist the commander in obtaining situation awareness, making
decisions and implementing decisions (McIntyre & Salas, 1995).
These TDM teams gather, filter, process and communicate relevant
information, often making recommendations to other team members
or leaders (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993).

Research on Team Dimensions

The literature in TDM teams is a subset of team research
literature. Much of recent team research involves defining
distinct team dimensions or team processes (Brannick, Prince,
Prince, & Salas, 1995; Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz, & Oser, 1994;
Johnston, Smith-Jentsch, & Cannon-Bowers, 1997; Logan, Hanson,
Hedge, Bruskiewicz, & Borman, 1996; Olmstead, 1992; Orasanu,
1990; Oser, McCallum, Salas, & Morgan, 1989). All the above
research except Logan et al. (1996) used training simulators to
Measure team dimensions or processes; the latter study used an
interview technique. Table B-1 shows the team dimensions or
processes identified in these studies, plus two review articles
featuring composites of teamwork dimensions drawn from empirical
studies (McIntyre & Salas, 1995; Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum,
Salas, & Volpe 1995). In addition, many of these same studies
demonstrated a relationship between these team processes and team
outcome measures (Brannick et al., 1995; Olmstead, 1992; Orasanu,
1990; Oser et al., 1989). That is, teams that performed more
behaviors indicative of effective team processes (e.g., back-up
behavior) performed assigned tasks more effectively. Of these
studies, only the Olmstead (1992) and Oser et al. (1989) work is
with TDM teams. These two studies are reviewed in detail in
Appendix C.

Research on training interventions to improve team process
and outcome measures seems to fall into four areas. The first,
and most frequent is training or feedback on the team dimensions
(or processes) identified in the research cited above. A second
is cross-training. A third is training teams to adapt to their
situation and the final is the explicit training of team mental
models.

Research on Training or Feedback on Team Dimensions

Several studies focus on the effects of training on team
processes. Fowlkes et al. (1994) showed that air crews given



efficiently. Digital, scripted exercises for CPs or the entire
staff could be developed to instruct the mental models, decision
making techniques or situation awareness techniques in the
context of a specific mission.

Further, the structured training packages reviewed above are
primarily designed to train specific tasks and task related
skills. While task related skills are crucial to staff success,
interpersonal or teamwork related skills are also important, as
the research by Oser, McCallum, Salas, and Morgan (1989)
demonstrates. Perhaps tools for OCs to record and provide
feedback on teamwork related skills, for both digital and
conventional communication, are needed.

Summary and Conclusions

This report demonstrated the need for, and examples of,
innovative training for brigade and battalion staffs. The report
documented staff deficiencies, and discussed methods that
military subject matter experts have suggested for dealing with
these deficiencies. Examples of R&D prototype training programs
for training individual staff members (cognitive and specific
skills training), small staff groups and larger more complex
staff aggregates were presented. Future R&D trends in staff
training were also discussed.

As the U.S. Army continues to evolve to meet the changing
needs of the nation and to leverage new technologies, training
must continue to evolve as well. Training has been and will
continue to be the glue that holds units together under the
stresses of combat.

44



identifying incomplete information the crystal ball repeatedly
asks: There is a critical piece of information about this
situation missing; what is it? To assess unreliable (or hidden)
assumptions the crystal ball repeatedly states: Your assumption
that x will (or will not) happen is wrong; why? To resolve
conflicting information the crystal ball repeats: Even with the
conflicting information, the assumption that x will (or will not)
happen is still true; why?

The answers generated in response to the crystal ball help
to reduce uncertainty. The information gaps identified reveal
areas in which more intelligence is needed. Concerning hidden
assumptions, the reasons given for why x will not (or will)
happen must be assessed. If any are deemed reasonable, data must
be gathered to check these hypotheses or the current plan and
interpretation of the situation may have to be changed.
Concerning conflicting information, the reasons for why x still
will (or will not) occur must be assessed. If all are
disconfirmed or rejected as unreasonable, the current plan or
interpretation may have to be changed.

Critical thinking skills are especially useful under certain
conditions. Critical thinking should be used when time is
available, the consequences are serious and the situation is
novel or unfamiliar.

The value of critical thinking was evaluated by research
with U.S. Army officers. One group of the officers received 90
minutes of critical thinking training. Another group of the
officers, who served as controls received 90 minutes of pseudo
training. Both trained and untrained officers were given a pre-
test and post test.

Officers were given 14 problems overall, counter-balanced
for order. Each problem consisted of two parts. On the first
part, they were given information concerning a particular
scenario and a situation assessment. Then they were provided
with additional information. Some of this additional information
was neutral, some was consistent with the assessment and some
conflicted with it. After each part of the problem, the officers
were asked to write an evaluation of the assessment and then
indicate agreement or disagreement on a five point scale.

Results tended to support the value of the training.
Trained officers generated significantly more disconfirming
arguments and significantly fewer neutral arguments on the post
test than did the controls. Also, the trained officers’
agreement ratings were significantly closer than the untrained
officers’ ratings were to those of subject matter experts (i.e.,
more accurate) on two problems. There were no significant

16



Table 4

COBRAS Brigade Staff Vignettes

Event Participants
Plan for dislocated civilians S1, S2, S4
Plan for refuel on the move (ROM) s4, FSB Cdr
Develop concept of service support Sil, S4
Develop recon and surveillance S2, S3

plan

Conduct target development
Develop air defense concept
Develop contingency plan

Conduct mission analysis
Develop courses of action
Conduct course of action analysis

Conduct special staff rehearsal

Develop reconnaissance order

Plan NBC defense operations
Plan deliberate smoke operations

Identify and resolve airspace
conflicts

Develop a COA branch
Plan brigade rear battle

Conduct a brigade rehearsal

Plan CSS rehearsal

Conduct accelerated decision
making process

Coordinate mission operations
(Janus)

Coordination mission transition--
offense to defense (BBS)

Conduct parallel planning (BBS)

Prepare and execute FRAGO (Janus)

XO, S2, S3, FSO
$2, S3, ADCOORD
82, $3, FSO, ENG

XO, Sl, S2, S3, S4, ENG, FSO,
ADCOORD

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, ENG, FSO,
ADCOORD

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, ENG, FSO,
ADCOORD

XO, S2, S3, ENG, FSO, ADCOORD

$2, S3, ADCOORD, CHEMO, FSO, MI Co
Cdr, ENG, SIGO, S4

$2, $3, CHEMO
S2, S3, CHEMO, FSO

$3, S3-Air, ADCOORD, ALO, Avn LNO,
FSO

$3, FSO, Avn LNO, ENG
$2, S3, FSO

Bde Cdr, XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO,
FSCOORD, ENG, ADCOORD, CHEMO, Bn
TFs/Cdrs

S1, S4, FSB Cdr

Bde Cdr, XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, ENG,
FSO, FSCOORD, SIGO, ALO, CHEMO,
ADCOORD, MI Co Cdr

XO, S2, S3, ENG, FSO, ADCOORD

XO, Sl, S2, $3, S4, FSB Cdr, ENG,
FSO, ADCOORD

Bde Cdr, XO, FSB Cdr, S1, S2, S3,
S4, ADCOORD, CHEMO, ENG, FSO, MI
Co Cdr

Bde Cdr, FSCOORD, XO, S2, S3,
ADCOORD, CHEMO, ENG, FSO (JANUS)

Note.

Acronyms are defined in Appendix A.

34



Table B-2

Teamwork Skill Dimensions (from Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995)

Adaptability

The process by which a team is able to
use information gathered from the task
environment to adjust strategies through
the use of compensatory behavior and
reallocation of intrateam resources

Shared situational
awareness

The process by which team members
develop compatible models of the team’s
internal and external environment;
includes skill in arriving at a common
understanding of the situation and
applying appropriate task strategies

Performance monitoring
and feedback

The ability of team members to give,
seek, and receive task-clarifying
feedback; includes the ability to
accurately monitor the performance of
teammates, provide constructive feedback
regarding errors, and offer advice for
improving performance

Leadership/team

The ability to direct and coordinate the
activities of other team members, assess
team performance, assign tasks, motivate
team members, plan and organize, and
establish a positive atmosphere

Interpersonal relations

The ability to optimize the quality of
team members’ interactions through
resolution of dissent, utilization of
cooperative behaviors, or use of
motivational reinforcing statements

Coordination

The process by which team resources,
activities, and responses are organized
to ensure that tasks are integrated,
synchronized, and completed within
established temporal constraints

Communication

The process by which information is
clearly and accurately exchanged between
two or more team members in the
prescribed manner and with proper
terminology; the ability to clarify or
acknowledge the receipt of information

(table continues)



FOREWORD

The Future Battlefield Conditions Team of the Armored Forces
Research Unit, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences (ARI), is conducting research and development
for work package (2228) FASTRAIN: Force XXI Training Methods and
Strategies. These research and development (R&D) efforts
leverage simulation to increase training opportunities and reduce
unit time required to prepare for training. The focus of these
R&D efforts is to develop and demonstrate prototype training and
assessment methods to improve performance. Many of the new R&D
efforts that are the subject of this report focus on training
brigade and battalion staffs.

This report documents current Army challenges in staff
training, and ways in which the Army is attempting to meet those
challenges. Current training methods as well as innovative
strategies under development are discussed here. The intent of
this report is to provide the reader with a current view of
brigade and battalion staff training.

Several audiences may find this report useful. Army
trainers can use the report to gain an understanding of the most
recent directions in staff training. Researchers and training
developers can also use the results of this report to focus
future efforts concerning battle staff training.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Technical Director



Table B-3 (Continued)

Communicating
Implementation

Those activities through which decisions
and requirements resulting from decisions
are communicated to those individuals or
units who must implement the decisions.
Includes: (1) transmission of orders or
instruction and (2) discussion and
interpretation--those communications
through which clarification is achieved
and implications for actions are
discussed. Includes all communication
links between decision maker and final
implementer of decision.

Coping Actions

The process of executing actions against
target environments. Primarily concerned
with execution and with how actions are
carried out.

Feedback

Activities that assist the organization
to evaluate the effectiveness of its
actions and that provide information upon
which adjustments and future actions can
be based.



Table B-3

Organizational Processes (from Olmstead, 1992)

Sensing The act of acquiring information from or
concerning any environment of the
organization. Includes processing and
storage of information.

Communicating Those activities through which

Information information which has been sensed by some

member of the organization is made
available to those who must act on it or
make decisions about it.

Decision Making

Deliberative activities of one or more
persons leading to a conclusion that some
action will, should, or should not, be
taken by the organization. Usually
evidenced by the initial communication of
the decision by the decision maker. The
communication may take the forms of
announcement of the decision, a command,
an order, or instructions. Decisions may
lead to Active Sensing, Formal Sensing
Actions, Stabilizing Actions, Coping
Actions, or Feedback Actions. Decision
making includes decisions to rescind
decisions. Decision making is not
limited to commanders, it may include all
players.

Stabilizing

Actions intended to adjust internal
operations, maintain internal stability
or unit integrity, or prevent disruptions
and negative side effects, as a
consequence of coping actions. All
actions intended to prevent potential
negative effects to the organization
which might occur because of Coping
Actions, or to enhance integration.

(table continues)



designed to stimulate specific actions. For example, a situation
report might indicate that a subordinate unit was not where it
was supposed to be according to the operations order. One group
of military experts developed a list of all possible outcomes
resulting from each probe. The staff might not respond to the
report at all, request verification of the report, inform the
unit that its position was incorrect, inform other staff members
that the unit was out of position or direct the unit to the
correct position. Each outcome was assigned a rating on a five
point scale ranging from highly satisfactory to highly
unsatisfactory. This procedure is essentially a behaviorally
anchored rating scale, or BARS (Casico, 1978). An independent
military expert observer matched the probe outcome produced (how
the staff actually responded to the probe) to the list of
possible outcomes, giving each staff response a score of one to
five. The combat effectiveness (performance) score achieved by
the staff was the sum of scores on all probes. There were 128
probes in all.

The measure of organizational competence (staff processes)
was highly correlated with the measure of combat effectiveness
(performance). The Pearson correlation between total
organizational competence and effectiveness for the 10 battalion
staffs was .93. Thus, staffs demonstrating more organizational
competence also achieved better combat effectiveness. This
finding suggests that how staffs interact and process information
is related to actions that can affect the course of battle.

Keesling, Ford and Harrison (1994) also found battle staff
operations correlated with unit performance at the National
Training Center (NTC). They derived 37 items, measuring various
aspects of staff performance, from structured interviews
developed by officers at Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).
They grouped these items into seven constructs: Staff standing
operating procedures (SOP) and training, organization of tactical
operations center (TOC), orders process, order quality, staff
monitoring, subordinate commander’s implementation, and
integration. Definitions for these constructs are given in Table
c-1.

After the NTC rotation, staff members rated their
performance on the 37 items designed to measure these seven
constructs of staff operations. Scores for these constructs were
the sum of the average ratings on the relevant items for the task
force commander and his primary staff.

Observer controllers also provided ratings of force on force
success for NTC missions. These ratings were averaged over all
missions to produce an overall force on force success rating for
each unit.



Staff Group Trainer
Training Program

Staff ] ] Table
Section cp c2 Level

1 / Module Level Y i 1

Level

Figure 6. Project description: SGT training program.
Note. Acronyms are defined in Appendix A.

other staff sections. Staff members received information at
computer workstations from external sources (e.g., subordinate
units), posted it to electronic maps and analyzed the
information. The staff section tables used only the movement to
contact mission.

The CP table was the next level for both battalion and
brigade TSPs. The CP table trained the combat trains command
post (CTCP) (S1/S4, medical platoon leader and BMO) and main CP
(XO or battle captain [BC], S2, $3, FSO, engineer) at battalion
level. At brigade level the CP table trained rear CP (S4, S1
with medical representative and support operations section), main
CP (XO, battle captain, $2, $3, FSE, engineer and assistant S4
representative) and tactical command post (TAC) (S3, S2, FSE).

There were separate modules for each CP for both battalion
and brigade TSPs. The exercises in these modules focused on
training the staff processes of communicate, coordinate,
integrate and recommend. Since earlier processes must be
performed prior to these processes, they also received some
training. Staff sections within a given CP interacted in these

27



answer, versus a variety of possible solutions. Perhaps most
importantly, the authors stated that process does not reflect how
most people think. If people develop several possible solutions
at all, they are more likely to choose elements from among the
solutions than to choose one intact.

The Leavenworth Research Unit of ARI has recently developed
a course in practical thinking to address the shortcomings in
tactical decision making. A trial version of the course was
implemented as part of the Battle Command curriculum of Command
and General Staff College (CGSC), but is not presently being
offered. The course consisted of 12 hours of instruction
presented in six blocks. These blocks consisted of:

* A course overview

* Instruction in multiple perspectives
« Adapting to the situation

* Finding hidden assumptions

* Developing practical reasoning

* Developing integrative thinking

The multiple perspectives block involved looking at a
situation from more than one frame of reference, or “thinking
outside the box.” Examples of a lack of multiple perspectives
given by Fallesen et al. (1996) were the French Maginot Line and
the U.S Navy’s behavior prior to Pearl Harbor. The French could
not conceive of any defense beyond a static, fixed point defense
and believed that if Germany attacked, it would attack directly
from German soil. The U.S. Navy could not believe that Japan
would really attack the Pacific Fleet.

The multiple perspectives block of instruction covered
conditions fostering a narrow perspective. One such condition
was called groupthink (Janis & Mann, 1977). Groupthink occurs
when people focus in on only one alternative, even though there
is ample evidence that the alternative is not particularly good.
A commonly used example is the Bay of Pigs disaster. Janis and
Mann stated that there are four antecedent conditions for
groupthink. One is high group cohesiveness (so that individuals
do not want to pose ideas antagonistic to supposed group
opinion). A second is insulation of the group from ideas or
criticism outside of the group. A third is directive leadership,
which was generally viewed as being in favor of the group’s
current opinion. The fourth antecedent is high stress, with a
low degree of hope of finding a better solution. All these
factors mitigate against other alternatives being considered.

The multiple perspectives block of instruction also

presented how to identify narrow perspective. The developers
posited that one symptom of groupthink, leading to a narrow

13



predominantly focused on maneuver training for armored forces
platoons, companies and battalion task forces. The definition of
structured training used in this research and development effort
is given in Figure 2. More recently, however, ARI has undertaken
additional research and development in structured training
focusing particularly on staffs. This innovative structured
training for staffs will be examined.

The ARI Armored Forces Research Unit (AFRU) is developing
experimental R&D training programs for brigade and battalion
staffs, under the FXXITP. These programs are designed to train
individual staff member skills, and collective staff skills.
Collective staff skills are trained for both small staff groups
(i.e., targeting cell) and more complex, larger staff
aggregations, such as numerous members of the brigade staff. The
FXXITP is the means for determining how the Army will transition
from training forces today to training forces in the future. The
goals of the FXXITP are to: use simulation to enhance the
quality of training; provide improvements to conserve resources;
accelerate force development activities; strive to determine the
optimal mix of simulation and field training necessary to
maintain high levels of unit combat readiness; and develop a
strategy that provides the basis for the evolution and inclusion
of virtual, constructive and live simulation. The immediate
goals of the ARI R&D are to identify the critical tasks for
battle staffs, develop innovative individual staff training and
develop structured training in simulations for staff sections,
small groups and the entire staff.

One such R&D effort was called Innovative Tools and
Techniques for Brigade and Below Staff Training (ITTBBST) (ARI,
1996). This effort involved identifying critical battle staff
tasks (through BFs), developing individual staff training (BSTS)
and developing training in simulations for staff sections and
small groups (SGT).

Battlefield Functions

The BFs? (Lewman, Mullen & Root, 1994) were defined by
TRADOC as processes or activities occurring over time that must
be performed to accomplish a mission or supporting critical
tasks. The seven battlefield operating systems (BOSs) were the
basis for the BFs. The BOSs were (a) intelligence/electronic
warfare, (b) maneuver, (c) combat service support, (d) fire
support, (e) mobility/countermobility/survivability, (f) air

1 The BFs were originally known as Critical Combat Functions (CCFs).

19



The fifth block of instruction on practical reasoning
involved methods to avoid reasoning errors. This instruction
discussed characteristics of practical reasoning, standards of
reasoning, avoiding reasoning errors and fallacies, psychological
and attitudinal pitfalls, and guidelines for practical reasoning.
Standards for practical reasoning given by the authors were
fairness, relevance, evidence, clarity and consistency. An
example of irrelevant reasoning given by the authors was assuming
an enemy would use chemical munitions in a withdrawal because
they used smoke aggressively in the attack. The authors covered
numerous reasoning fallacies. One example given was reasoning
from lack of knowledge. That is, just because there were no
reports of enemy activity in an area does not mean that there
were no enemy in the area. Perhaps there has been no
reconnaissance or intelligence gathering in the area.

The sixth block of instruction on integrative thinking
involved understanding the relationships among events or objects
that are not obvious to the inexperienced observer. One example
given by the authors was that an expert may look at a terrain map
and intuitively choose a good avenue of approach without
conscious thought, whereas a novice might spend considerable time
and effort on this problem. This block of instruction discussed
ways to improve integrative thinking, shortcomings of experts and
levels of integrative thinking. Examples given concerning how to
develop integrative thinking included resolving uncertainties
(e.g., gaining deeper knowledge of subject matter), looking
before you leap and practicing patience.

Assessment of Critical Thinking

Subjective assessments of the practical thinking course were
basically positive. Student ratings showed an improvement in
practical thinking skills in all five content areas. Also, 80%
stated that the course should be included in the CGSC curriculum.
Besides CGSC, other places suggested for the course were service
academies, Army War College, School of Advanced Military Studies
and officer basic courses. A 20 hour version of the course,
using nine sessions has been proposed for CGSC.

An empirical assessment of part of the practical thinking
training was recently performed by Cohen, Freeman, Fallesen,
Marvin and Bresnick (1996). This research concentrated on
critical thinking skills. Critical thinking involved determining
sources of uncertainty in a situation. Uncertainty can come from
incomplete information, hidden (and perhaps unreliable)
assumptions or conflicting information.

Each of these aspects of uncertainty could be addressed by a
variant on the crystal ball technique discussed earlier. For

15



modules, but no live interaction between CPs occured. That is,
if information needed to pass between CPs, an interactor was used
to role-play the individual(s) in the other CP. The CP tables
used only the deliberate attack mission.

The C2 table was the final table for both battalion and
brigade TSPs. The C2 table trained interactions between CPs.
Due to the lack of workstations at brigade level, all three CPs
were not used at any one time. There are separate modules for
each mission; movement to contact, attack and defend. These
missions were taken from SIMBART (to be discussed later), and
used the NTC data base. Here the staff processes of disseminate,
synchronize and direct were emphasized, although all previous
processes were of necessity performed as well. In the exercises
in these modules, interaction between CPs occurred.

Each of the modules in all tables consisted of several
exercises varying in level of difficulty. Difficulty was
determined by message speed and relevance. The least difficult
exercises in a module had message speed slower than real time
and a higher percentage of relevant messages.

There were two types of AARs, end of exercise AARs and end
of module AARs. The end of exercise AARs were held within staff
sections only. The end of module AARs involved the entire CP
(for the CP table) or entire staff for the C2 table.

In exercises involving the full staff, the commander
personally assisted in training the staff. Discussion focused on
staff integration and what decisions the commander made and why.
This led into discussion of what the commander knew or what the
staff told the commander at certain times. The provided teaching
points centered around the concept that the staff built the
commander's situation awareness by what information they provided
to each other and to the commander at certain times. Therefore
if the commander or other staff members failed to get
information, got incorrect information, or got correct
information too late, poor decisions may have resulted.

The concept of the window of opportunity for certain
information was introduced. That is, staff sections and CPs had
only a certain amount of time to provide information to those who
needed it. The earlier in that window the information was
provided, the more useful the information was. At some point
that information was overtaken by events and became useless.

Feedback provided in these AARs was a mixture of automated
and OC collected feedback. Automated feedback included
information concerning effective message handling. Examples of
such feedback included whether relevant (and irrelevant) messages

28



TASK
Evacuate battle damaged
vehicles from battlefield
CONDITION
Fully equipped Forward
Support Battalion (FSB)
STANDARD
All battle damaged
vehicles removed within
two hours of damage

ee

Measure of Performance
Percentage of battle damaged
vehicles removed within two
hours of damage

AAR

e MOP achieved compared
to unit standard

e If standard not met,
oc discusses S4 behavior
contributing to shortfall

Figure 1. Training Built Around AAR.

groups and the entire staff.
difficulty, from “crawl” to “walk” to

Cue

S4 notified of

battle damaged vehicles
and location within X
minutes of damage

Staff Behavior

(Observed by OC)

® Does S4 notify FSB?

e How soon?

e Accurate location of
damaged vehicles reported?

Interactor Behavior

e If/when notified and
given accurate locations
“removes” battle damaged
vehicle within Y minutes
of notification

Automated Data Collection
Records if/when

battle damaged vehicles
removed

Tables should increase in
“run.”

This design enables

both repetition of the identical mission for staffs performing
poorly, and growth for those performing well on the first

iteration.

Some tables should involve execution, while others

should focus on planning, preparation and execution.

Observer controllers are also needed for this training.

While automated data collection can provide MOE,

it cannot

explain why performance concerning an MOE was successful or not.
For instance, was failure to accomplish a certain action due to a
staff section that did not correctly interpret the information
received, did not coordinate with other staff sections, or some

other reason? Only a human observer,
procedures, can supply that feedback.

10

familiar with staff



Appendix C
Empirical Studies Linking Staff Processes and Unit Performance

Empirical research supports the proposition that battle
staff competence affects unit performance. Studies in the Army
and Navy show that staff competence relates to organizational
performance measures.

There are at least two methods of assessing staff
competence. One method, illustrated by Thompson, Pleban and
Valentine (1994), is to measure staff performance on specific
Mission Training Plan (MTP) tasks. Since each task is broken
into numerous sub-tasks, staff competence could be measured to
the sub-task level. Measuring staff sub-task performance
approaches measuring specific staff behaviors. Another method is
to measure the staff's competence in terms of how it performs
higher level staff processes (e.g., communicate information).
Generally, staffs are actually assessed on specific behaviors,
but these behaviors are then grouped to represent staff
processes. Studies illustrating this second method are described
below.

Olmstead (1992) developed a model of seven organizational
processes. These processes included sensing (acquiring
information), communicating information, decision making,
stabilizing (making adjustments to the organization in view of
external circumstances), communicating implementation
(communicating decisions and plans to those who must implement
them), coping actions (executing decisions and plans) and
feedback.

He then tested this model by constructing 10 battalion level
staffs of 12 experienced officers each. Each staff executed a
scenario via a live simulation resembling a highly scripted
Command Post Exercise (CPX). All staff communication was
recorded, including face to face, written and radio. One group
of military experts with staff experience categorized each
communication element into the appropriate organizational
process. Then another military expert rated the effectiveness of
each communication element on a four point scale ranging from
poor to excellent. These scores were summed over all
communication elements within each process to produce a total
score for each process. Overall organizational (staff)
competence was the total of the process scores for all process
categories.

Relating organizational (staff) competence to performance

requires a measure of unit performance. In order to develop a
measure of performance, staffs experienced a series of probes

c-1



oc

OJT
OPFOR
OPNS
OPORD

PDA

R&D
ROM

s5

Sct

SIG
SIGO
SIMBART
SIMNET
SIMUTA

SIMUTA-B
SIMUTA-D

SME

SOP
SPT
STARTEX
STOW

T

TAA
TAC
TAC CP
TACAIR
TACT
TADSS
TARGET

TDM
TDMP
TEWT

THP
TOC

TRADOC
TSP

Observer Controller
Organizational Effectiveness
On-the-Job Training
Opposing Force

Operations

Operation Order

Needs Practice
Personal Data Assistant

Research and Development
Refuel on the Move

Personnel Officer

Intelligence Officer

Operations Officer

Logistics Officer

Civil Affairs Officer

Staff Group Trainer

Signal

Signal Officer

Simulation-Based Mounted Brigade Training Program
Simulation Network

Simulation-Based Multiechelon Training Program for
Armor Units

Simulation-Based Multiechelon Training Program for
Armor Units - Battalion Exercise Expansion
Simulation-Based Multiechelon Training Program for
Armor Units-Digital

Subject Matter Expert

Standing Operating Procedure

Support

Start of Exercise

Synthetic Theater of War

Trained

Tactical Assembly Area

Tactical

Tactical Command Post

Tactical Air

Team Adaptation and Coordination Training
Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations
Targeted Acceptable Responses to Generated Events
or Tasks

Tactical Decision Making

Tactical Decision Making Process

Tactical Exercise Without Troops

Task Force

Take Home Package

Team Model Trainer

Tactical Operations Center

Training and Doctrine Command

Training Support Package

A-3



Thompson et al.’s (1994) data collection efforts examined
staff performance of battalion staffs at the JRTC. Observer
controllers (OCs) rated battalion staffs on a three point scale
ranging from fully trained (T), through needs practice (P) to
untrained (U) on ten battle staff mission training plan (MTP)
tasks. These tasks, listed in Table 1, involved command and
control, personnel, intelligence, logistics, fire support,
engineer and combat service support commander and staff
functions.

The findings of Thompson et al.’s (1994) research indicated
that staffs had considerable difficulty performing MTP tasks at
the JRTC. Less than a quarter of the ratings on any of the ten
tasks were “T’s.” On seven of the ten tasks, at least half the
Oc ratings were “U's.” These data reinforced the findings of the
five studies reviewed by Thompson et al. in the same report. The
findings demonstrated that staffs arrive at CTCs unable to
perform important tasks, suggesting pervasive weaknesses in staff
training.

Recent trends reported by OCs at CTCs (DA, 1996a; 1997a;
1997b) provided more specific information on staff deficiencies.
These trends included problems in battle tracking, which resulted
in an unclear picture of the battlefield. Further, staff
sections were reported to have difficulties in integrating the
information received and disseminating the information to other
staff sections. Also, OCs stated that staffs do not consistently
analyze the information acquired, thus failing to provide the
commander with situation awareness, predictive analyses, and
recommendations for future actions. Instead, staffs frequently
saw their main role as relaying information to higher
headquarters. Thus staffs experienced problems with information
management, from obtaining and recording information, through
integration and communication to analysis.

The above trends have not been quickly reversed. Nearly
identical problems were reported in trends at the National
Training Center (NTC) for the fourth quarter, Fiscal Year (FY) 94
through second quarter, FY96 (DA, 1996a) as well as third and
fourth quarters FY96 (DA, 1997a). Similar trends were also
observed at the JRTC for the fourth quarter FY96 through first
quarter FY97 (DA, 1997b).

Reasons for Staff Deficiencies

Survey results from Thompson et al.’s (1994) findings were
useful in further illuminating reasons for these problems. The
survey data demonstrated inadequacies in both individual and



Table 2

SGT Training Objectives

Training Objectives

Description

Monitor unit
operations

Sections actively seek information about higher,
adjacent, supporting and subordinate units.
Sections acquire information by listening to
reports and asking units to provide needed
information.

Process information
and messages

Each section collates, transforms, and organizes
information. Each section stores information on
maps, situation boards, journals, and files so
that it can be retrieved and used.

Analyze/evaluate
information

Each staff section attaches meaning, either
speculative or confirmed, to information that has
been acquired.

Communicate mission

Each staff section transmits information or

critical intelligence to those who must make decisions

information about or act on it. This includes initial
transmittal by those who have sensed information;
relaying by intervening levels; and disseminating
throughout the staff, CP, subordinate units, and
higher headquarters.

Coordinate Sections exchange and discuss information and

information and intelligence in an attempt to clarify its meaning

intelligence and discern its implications.

Integrate staff
input

The XO/battle captain (BC) combines information
and intelligence from all sections, puts it into
a useable format, and passes it to the commander
to facilitate his battlefield awareness.
Additionally, the X0/BC identifies areas
requiring sections to combine their efforts to
support the commander’s intent.

Recommend a course
of action to

The XO/BC and staff develop and analyze courses
of action. Based upon this analysis, the X0/BC

commander recommends a course of action to the commander.
Disseminate The staff prepares and issues orders or
commander ’s fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) informing units and
decision staff of the commander’s decision.

Synchronize the
activities of

subordinate and
supporting units

The XO/BC and staff monitor unit and BOS assets
to ensure their efforts are aligned to execute
the commander's intent or direction.

Direct BOS assets
to support
commander’s intent

Sections and XO/BC track activities of BOS assets
and intervene, if required, to ensure their
activities support the commander's intent.

25



authors argued that teams need to alter their mutual (team)
mental models and concomitant actions according to the level of
stress.

Therefore, Entin et al. (1994) taught TDM teams to recognize
and adapt to signs of stress. Team members were taught to
recognize signs of stress in the external environment,
individuals, and the team. Then they were taught five adaptive
strategies to deal with the stress: preplanning, use of idle
periods, use of information versus tasking communications in high
stress periods, anticipation of information needs (implicit
communication) and redistribution of team workload.

The teams were also given assistance in adapting their
situational mental model. In one condition, called TACT+, the
leader was taught to provide periodic situation updates, giving
his current priorities and perception of the situation. This
aids team members in filtering information; i.e., determining
which information they are receiving is currently most important.
This training is critical to the work of the team, since
determining what information is acquired influences the entire
information management process. Only information acquired can be
analyzed, communicated, used in decision making, etc.

Training in TACT (or TACT+) consisted of passive
instruction, demonstration, practice with the techniques and
behavioral feedback on how well the techniques had been
performed.

The training was successful in improving measures of
teamwork, communication and team performance. Teamwork ratings,
by SMEs blind to the training conditions, improved significantly
from pre to post training for the TACT and TACT+ groups, but not
for controls. Concerning communication, anticipation ratio
(ratio of information provided to information requests) showed
that team members “pushed” more information in the TACT and TACT+
than control conditions. The SME ratings of team performance
again showed significant improvement for TACT and TACT+ groups
from pre to post training, but not for controls. In all three
areas of teamwork, communication and team performance, the TACT+
group was superior to the TACT group, but differences were not
statistically significant.

Research on Team Mental Models

Before discussing training in mental models, a brief
explanation of mental models is in order. Three major functions
of mental models are description, explanation and prediction
(Rouse, Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1992). Description involves
knowing the system’s form (what a system looks like).

B-6



model knowledge: description (what), explanation (how) and |
prediction (why). Under description, there was training on roles
of team members, relationships among team members and temporal
patterns of team performance. Under explanation, training was
available on functioning of team members (how a team member
performs his job), co-functioning of team members (how members
perform together) and overall mechanism of team performance (how
performance is accomplished). Under prediction there was
training on requirements fulfilled (why the team member is
needed), objectives supported (why the team is needed), and
behavioral principles applicable to teams.

In the simulation mode, TDM team members could choose any
position. They could choose to simply watch the scenario from
that position or actually play that position. If they chose to
play the position, all other positions were played by the
computer. They received information and voice messages from the
other positions. Team members could relate messages or request
action by using pull down menus. Team members could stop and
replay the scenario or portions of it at any time. In the
feedback mode, members received automated feedback on their
actions taken in the scenario versus actions taken by experts.

Several studies have been performed using the TMT. One
showed that while individual process measures of (control) teams
not receiving TMT training did not improve from pre to post test
on a full team simulator, trained teams did improve on measures
of individual process performance. Another showed that teams
trained on the TMT improved in team process measures from pre to
post test on a full team simulator. This latter study also
showed that volume of team communications decreased from pre to
post test for TMT trained teams, but not for control teams.
Further analysis of the communications showed that the decline in
communications for TMT trained teams was due to decline in number
of questions asked by team members. This latter finding suggests
that TMT training increased information “push” versus “pull.”
Finally, TMT training improved team members’ knowledge of team
communications (i.e., to whom in the CIC they would provide
information and from whom in the CIC they would expect
information). These findings suggest that training in mental
models, particularly team mental models, can improve team process
performance.

The authors describe the current TMT as focusing mainly on
team communications skills. They state that the TMT could focus
just as easily on situation assessment, team coordination,
decision making or team leadership skills. These skills sound
very much like the team processes or dimensions outlined in the
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995) review.



In addition to the empirical research on team training cited
above, recent theoretical articles by Cannon-Bowers et al.
(1995) and Stout et al. (1996/1997) discuss team training
applicable to TDM teams.

Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995) define four categories of team
competencies, using the two dimensions of whether the competency
is or is not specific to a particular team and whether a
competency is or is not specific to a particular task. Thus, a
competency can be both task and team specific (context driven),
only task specific (task contingent), only team specific (team
contingent) or neither team nor task specific (transportable).

The authors further hypothesize that different knowledge,
skill and attitude competencies are required for the four
categories. Mental models of both the team and the task figure
heavily in discussions of team and task knowledge competencies.
Team skill competencies are defined in terms of teamwork
dimensions or processes (see Table B-2). Team attitude
competencies are defined as attitudes toward teamwork, team
concept, collective orientation, collective efficacy, cohesion,
mutual trust and shared vision.

Finally, different methods of training are required to match
the different types of competencies needed. Methods of training
for both task and team competencies include lecture, passive
demonstration, role playing, cross-training, task simulation, and
guided practice (i.e. behavioral feedback). All these methods
are illustrated in the empirical research on team training
discussed above. .

Stout et al. (1996/1997) review studies demonstrating that
better shared mental models and situational awareness are
associated with better team processes and team outcomes (task
performance). They argue that shared mental models enhance team
situational awareness, which in turn improves team outcome
(performance) .

The authors then review a number of training techniques to
improve shared mental models and situational awareness. These
include: direct information presentation, positional knowledge
training (a kind of cross-training where one learns about the
tasks, responsibilities and interdependencies of team members),
demonstration/modeling, concept learning (how to generalize
knowledge), computer animation, task simulation, cross-training
(actually performing another team member’s role), guided task
practice, cognitive apprenticeship (coaching), communication
training (learning to use proper terminology), training in
planning (e.g., time management), team leader training (e.g., how



Battle Staff Training System

The original BSTS provided training for individual staff
positions at both battalion and brigade level (André, Wampler &
Olney, 1997). This training was developed in response to the
problems with individual staff member performance uncovered by
Thompson et al. (1994) at the CTCs. The research cited earlier
found that most staff members have not received formal training
in their staff positions prior to assuming a staff position. The
BSTS was an attempt to consolidate materials for individual staff
training so that staff members could train for their jobs, on the
job. Of course, it could also be used as institutional training.

In the BSTS, there were courses covering common core,
commander, XO, $1, S2, S3, S3-Air, S4, Civil Affairs Officer (S5,
brigade only), FSO, engineer, ADO, signal officer, chemical
officer and chaplain. Figure 4 provides a model course outline
for BSTS. These courses were based on Army doctrine, lessons
from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and current trends
occurring at CTCs. Each course was composed of subjects and each
subject composed of lessons. Lessons took one to two hours to
complete and were composed of topics. Material included both
paper and computer based instruction.

Individuals completed a course by completing subjects.
Individuals took a computer based pre-test on each subject, which
diagnoses their current knowledge level. If the staff member
passed the pre-test, then the staff member passed the subject
without further effort. Passing was defined as answering 80% of
the (multiple choice) items correctly. An example test item from
the Brigade Common Core course was: “The is
responsible for the security, positioning, and operation of the
brigade support area (BSA) within the brigade rear area.”
Alternatives are: Brigade $3; Forward Support Battalion (FSB)
commander; Division; and Corps. The correct answer is FSB
commander. After studying the relevant lesson(s), the staff
member could take a computer based exam on the lesson(s) or
proceed to the subject post-test. Staff members repeated the
pattern until they passed the post-test. Then they moved on to
the next subject, until finished with the course. Records of
individual training progress could be maintained by a network
administrator, for use by the commander or an appointed staff
member. Situation based comprehensive assessments, designed to
measure ability to use, versus merely recall, information learned
in the course were developed. Current versions of BSTS have been
used in the Armor Officer Advanced Course (AOAC), members of the
3d Brigade (Bde), 2d Infantry Division, and by members of the
Experimental Force (EXFOR) at Fort Hood, Texas.

22



Table C-3

Significant Correlations of Behavior Frequencies with Final
Exercise Scores (Adapted from Oser, McCallum, Salas, & Morgan,
1989, p. 24)

Behavior Correlation*
Helped another member who was having difficulty 67
with a task.

Made positive statements to motivate the team. ~54
Assisted another member when the latter had a 49

difficult task to perform.

Praised another member for doing well on a task. ~59
Made negative comment about the team or training. -.70
(I)

Suggested to another that he recheck his work so 54
that he could find his own mistake.

Raised his voice when correcting another member. ~-.60
(I)

Thanked another member for catching his mistake. 60
Coordinated gathering of information in an -50

effective manner.

Provided suggestions on the best way to locate an 49
error.

*

p<.05, 1-tailed test
Ineffective behaviors, the remainder were effective behaviors



REVIEW OF BATTLE STAFF TRAINING RESEARCH AT BRIGADE AND
BATTALION LEVELS

CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 2.0... cece ccc eee ee ee eee eee eee eter ee eenes 1
BATTLE STAFF PERFORMANCE AT COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS ......... 1
Documenting Individual and Collective Staff
Deficiencies........ see w enc eeeeeene 1
Reasons for Staff Deficiencies 2
Recommendations for Ameliorating Staff Deficiencies 5
THEORETICAL ARTICLES ON BATTLE STAFF TRAINING ...........-.-- 5
Training Support Packages (TSPS) ........ eee eee eee eee eens 11
CURRENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN BATTLE STAFF TRAINING ... 12
Training in Critical Thinking........... ce eee eee cece eee ~. 12
Assessment of Critical Thinking............ eee e cece reece 15
Introduction to ARI Research on Structured Staff
Training...............0-- 18
Battlefield Functions 19
Battle Staff Training System 22
Staff Group Trainer . 24
Janus Mediated Staff Exercises (JMSE)..... . 30
Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level,
Realistically Achieved through Simulation (COBRAS)..... 33
A Proposed Stepping Stone Training Approach : 39
FUTURE BATTLE STAFF TRAINING ...... 2. eee cece eee eee ee eens 42

Simulation-Based Multiechelon Training Program for Armor
Units-Digital (SIMUTA-D) ....... 2... cece eee eee eee eee 42

Strategy for the Development of Future Training 42
REFERENCES ..... air) 45
APPENDIX A. Acronyms and Abbreviations ............------- ». AL

B. Empirical Research on Tactical Decision Making

(TDM) Teams and Their Training .............+05- B-1
Cc. Empirical Studies Linking Staff Processes and

Unit Performance ............. eee e eee sees eeee c-1

ix



REVIEW OF BATTLE STAFF TRAINING RESEARCH AT BRIGADE AND
BATTALION LEVELS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The battle staff is a critical factor in unit combat
effectiveness. Well-trained individuals, crews, platoons and
subordinate units cannot compensate for a poorly trained battle
staff. This report documents the current challenges in battle
staff training and the Army’s attempts to meet these challenges,
laying the foundation for future research and development on
battle staff training.

Procedure:

This report is divided into four sections. First, material
discussing research on battle staff performance at combat
training centers (CTCs) is reviewed. Problems in staff
performance are documented. Second, military articles pertaining
to how to train staffs are reviewed. Third, current research on
innovative programs to train battle staffs is discussed.

Finally, future research directions in battle staff training are
examined.

Findings:

This report provides a foundation for future research and
development on battle staff training by providing examples of
structured training programs for the battle staff. Critical
deficiencies in battle staff training are highlighted for both
individual and collective skills. Reviews are performed for (1)
military articles on how to improve battle staff performance,
centering on use of simulations in a structured training program,
and (2) research and development programs to improve battle staff
training. The latter programs were designed using structured
training principles and increase in difficulty and complexity
(crawl, walk, run). Possible future directions in battle staff
training are also discussed.

Utilization of Findings:

This report can assist future developers of battle staff
training. The report presents the current state of battle staff
training at brigade and battalion level. Current and future
research and development efforts to improve battle staff training
are discussed.

vii



As the name implies, the OCs have two roles. First, during
training they must control training. If necessary, they provide
direction or input to ensure the tasks that the staff should
receive feedback on in the AAR are actually trained. Second, OCs
observe training in order to provide feedback for the AAR.

Two types of training personnel are needed to provide the
AAR. After having observed and guided staff training, one type
of OC reviews performance on the MOPs and MOEs with the staff,
while other personnel trained in organizational effectiveness
(OEs) review staff processes, using Olmstead’s (1992) model.

Brown (1992) recommended that this training take place both
in institutions (branch schools) and in units. Institutional
training would primarily be at the staff section level, whereas
home station training might be at any level (e.g., training of a
newly assigned staff officer to training of the entire staff).
Regardless of whether training for units is centralized or at
home station, units must prepare at home station to perform the
tables.

Training Support Packages (TSPs)

In order to conduct structured training, TSPs must be
developed. These TSPs include all the materials necessary for
both OCs and the staff in order to conduct the training.
According to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Regulation 350-70 (DA, 1995), a TSP includes five categories of
materials: unit preparation materials, simulation materials,
tactical materials, administrative data, and trainer materials.
Unit preparation materials include a description of the training
sequence, training objectives, training and evaluation outline,
MOP/MOEs, a description of the target audience and a description
of the equipment package necessary to perform the training.
Simulation materials include a description of the duration of
training, unit start of exercise (STARTEX) status, and training
aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS) requirements.
Tactical materials include scenarios, execution matrix, operation
orders (OPORDs), maps and overlays, and a “road to war.”
Administrative data include direct support required, personnel
support required, communications and other equipment (other than
TADSS) support required. Trainer materials include OC support
packages, tables, exercises and drills, OPFOR support packages,
train-the-trainer guides, exercise directive support materials,
rules of engagement, standard operating procedures, AAR
frameworks and take home package (THP) construction guides. For
a more thorough review of Army training development doctrine, see
TRADOC Regulation 350-70 (DA, 1995).

11



REVIEW OF BATTLE STAFF TRAINING RESEARCH AT BRIGADE AND BATTALION
LEVELS

Introduction

The work of the battle staff is critical to the success of
military operations. According to military publications, the
major purpose of the staff is to assist the commander in the
control of assigned forces (Department of the Army [DA], 1996b).
Research literature defines the staff as a decision making team
that assists the commander in obtaining situation awareness,
making decisions and implementing decisions (McIntyre & Salas,
1995). As such, the role of the staff is unique. Even though
individuals, crews, platoons and company/teams are superbly
trained, without direction they will have little, if any, effect
in an operation. No other element in the unit can compensate for
an ineffective staff. An oft-quoted Army aphorism is that a
staff cannot win the battle for you, but it can lose it.

This paper will discuss battle staff training at brigade and
battalion levels in the U.S. Army today. The paper has four
major foci. These include:

« Identifying problems in battle staff performance at combat
training centers (CTCs).

¢ Examining military articles concerning battle staffs and
their training.

* Detailing current research on innovative programs to train
battle staffs.

*« Discussing future research directions in battle staff
training.

Battle Staff Performance at Combat Training Centers

Documenting Individual and Collective Staff Deficiencies

Because of the importance of staffs, the Army needs to know
whether staffs can properly perform their functions. Thompson,
Pleban and Valentine (1994) reviewed five studies documenting
performance of battalion level staffs at the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC). They found weaknesses by both staff
position and overall commander and staff functions. Weaknesses
by staff position included personnel (S1), intelligence (S2),
operations (S3), logistics (S4), fire support (FSO), engineer,
aviation (air liaison officer [ALO]) and air defense (ADO).
Weaknesses by overall commander and staff functions included
command and control and synchronization.



accuracy differences on any other problems. Ratings of training
(taken in the experimental group only) were generally positive,
with only two participants stating that they would not apply the
training in the field.

Freeman, Cohen, Serfaty, Bresnick and Thompson (1998)
attempted to apply critical thinking training to battalion level
staff officers. The critical thinking training outlined above
was adapted using examples relevant to battalion level staff.
The acronym for this training was IDEA; Identifying gaps in
information, De-conflicting arguments, Evaluating hidden
assumptions and taking Action (i.e., recommendations based on the
above analyses, including recommendations for gathering more
information in a certain area). Training was also presented in
when to use critical thinking (basically when stakes are high,
enough time is available and the situation is unfamiliar).
Another feature added was that personnel receiving critical
thinking training also received periodic message updates from the
commander telling them what information he needed. A computer
interface was designed to both promote use of the training and
help provide feedback on its effectiveness. After receiving the
training (or pseudo training, for controls), personnel acted as
the $3 in an armor battalion during a defense in sector.
Participants received messages over a computer interface.
Periodically, they responded to a request for information or a
request for a recommendation from the battalion commander, based
on the message stream just received. Trained participants
responded using software designed to prod their use of critical
thinking techniques, while untrained personnel respond in free
text.

Initial results suggested that the training was effective.
With a sample of only 11 (seven in the experimental group) the
statistical power was very small, so results could only be viewed
as trends. Nonetheless, performance of the experimental group
was better in several areas.

Trained participants tended to make more accurate
conclusions. For instance, concerning the commander’s query
about enemy echelon that the battalion was currently facing, the
actual “ground truth” (based on a Janus run) was that they were
currently facing the forward security element. Reasonable
analysis of the message traffic would have revealed that.
Participants’ answers were rated by a subject matter expert (SME)
blind to the participant’s condition. Participants were given
one point for each correct answer and zero points for any other
answer. Trained participants received higher scores.

Trained participants also made stronger arguments. In
addition to reaching a conclusion concerning each question from

17



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1730

Review of Battle Staff Training Research at Brigade and

(pmse quaLes *

Battalion Levels

Bruce S. Sterling and Kathleen A. Quinkert
U.S. Army Research Institute

2STED December 1998
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

£11 92106661


Next, complex battle staff exercises train the staff and
subordinate commanders in the full gamut of skills necessary to
help the commander command and control operations, first in the
execution phase (virtual training program, e.g., SIMBART) and
then in the plan, prepare and execute-consolidate-reorganize
phases (COBRAS brigade staff exercises). Commanders make, and
staffs must implement decisions that will influence the flow of
battle.

Finally, subordinate unit staffs are involved in all mission
phases. In STOW the leaders from platoon and above in one
battalion are trained in a virtual simulation; and only company
commanders and staff are trained in a constructive simulation for
the other two battalions. The brigade staff is also ina
constructive environment.

40



collective staff training. Concerning individual training,
survey results showed that most officers received training
relevant for battalion and brigade level staff positions (i.e.
officer advanced courses) only after they had held staff
positions. Hence officers had to learn how to perform their
staff assignments while working in them in garrison (on-the- job
training [OJT]).

There were several problems with learning staff skills
through OUT. First, staff duties in garrison had little
relationship to staff duties in combat or at a CTC, so simply

performing staff garrison duties provided little training for the
CTC experience. Second, most staff jobs were quite demanding,
leaving little time for individual study. Third, {until
recently) few succinct materials teaching staff skills for
specific positions were available. Staff members would have to
delve through generic materials (such as Staff Organization and
Operation, Field Manual [FM] 101-5, DA 1996b) and their
references, to piece together how to perform their specific
duties. Thus, it was unlikely that OJT would prepare many staff
officers for a CTC rotation.

Survey data also suggested deficiencies in collective staff
training. Survey results showed that staff members perceived
their preparation for a CTC rotation as inadequate only at the
end, not the beginning, of the rotation. The authors concluded
from this that home station collective staff training such as
command post exercises (CPXs), map exercises (MAPEXs), or
tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) seemed to provide
training, but when held up to the CTC experience, were found to
be inadequate preparation for the Army’s capstone training
experience.

Perhaps the types of skills stressed in a CPX (e.g.,
establishing the main command post [CP], performing radio checks)
were not the same types of skills most important in staff
operations at a CTC (e.g., command and control the task force).
Due to the lack of maneuver space in local training areas, units
could not conduct “on the ground” command and control (C2)
training at home station. A scripted CPx, while perhaps seeming
realistic, did not present the challenges of C2 that units
encountered at a CTC.

Another problem the authors surfaced was the lack of
stability in battle staffs. In the units surveyed, staff members
had an average of about 13 months in their position, but less
than five months together (commander, executive officer [X0] and
$3). Since current staff home station training exercises may
only occur annually, many staffs may never have trained as a team
prior to a CTC rotation. One aspect of teamwork involves



Table 1

Battle Staff Performance on Selected MTP Tasks at JRTC (Adapted
from Thompson, Pleban, & Valentine [1994], pp. 202-204)

Command and Control Task Performance

TASK 600: Develop & Communicate A Plan Based on the Mission (Battalion)

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 4 4 11 2* 21
Percentage 21 21 58 9 --
TASK 602: Prepare for Combat Operation (Battalion)

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 3 4 12 0 19
Percentage 15 22 63 0 --
TASK 603: Command and Control Operations

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 4 2 13 0 19
Percentage 21 11 68 0 --

Primary Battalion Staff Performance
TASK 452: Perform Personnel Actions

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 0 3 3 4 10
Percentage (0) 50 50 40 --
TASK 1100: Establish Priority Intel Requirements & Intel Requirements

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 1 6 4 11 22
Percentage 9 55 36 50 --
TASK 453: Perform Logistical Support

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 0 6 0 4 10
Percentage 0 100 0 40 --

Slice Element Performance
TASK 626: Plan, Develop, and Communicate a Tentative and Final Task
Force Fire Support Plan (Battalion)

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 0 9 13 1 23
Percentage 0 41 59 4 --
TASK 627: Prepare Initial Fire Support Plan in Support of Maneuver Plan

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 0 7 15 0 22
Percentage 0 32 68 0 --
TASK 750: Plan Maneuver/Countermaneuver/Security Operations

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 1 5 17 0 23
Percentage 4 22 74 0 --
TASK 1025: Develop and Communicate a Combat Service Support Plan

Trained Needs Practice Untrained Missing Total
Number 6 15 5 5 31
Percentage 19 58 23 16 --

* Number and percentage of total missing cases not included in TPU% breakdown

3



cTc
CTCP

DA
DAK
DIS

ENGR
EXFOR

FA

FAC
FITE
FM
FRAGO
FSB
FSCOORD
FSE
FSO
FXXITP
FY

IDEA

IFSAS
INFO
INTEL
IPB
ISAT
ITTBBST

IviIs

JAAT
JMSE
JRTC

LNO
LTC

MAPEX
MDMP
METL
MI
MOE
MOP
MP
MTC
MTP

NBC
NCO
NTC

Combat Training Center
Combat Trains Command Post

Department of the Army
Deliberate Attack
Distributed Interactive Simulation

Engineer
Experimental Force

Field Artillery

Forward Air Controller
Familiarity, Importance, Time, and Effort
Field Manual

Fragmentary Order

Forward Support Battalion
Fire Support Coordinator
Fire Support Element

Fire Support Officer

Force XXI Training Program
Fiscal Year

Identifying gaps in information, De-conflicting
arguments, Evaluating hidden assumption, and
taking Action

Improved Fire Support Automated System
Information

Intelligence

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Implementation Support Assessment Team
Innovative Tools and Techniques for Brigade and
Below Staff Training

Intervehicular Information System

Joint Air Attack Mission
Janus Mediated Staff Exercises
Joint Readiness Training Center

Liaison Officer
Lieutenant Colonel

Map Exercise

Military Decision Making Process
Mission Essential Task List
Military Intelligence

Measure of Effectiveness
Measure of Performance

Military Police

Mission Training Plan

Mission Training Plan

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

Noncommissioned Officer
National Training Center

A-2



In preparation for the exercise, all members of the primary
training audience received a list of the tasks they would perform
during each of the missions. The exercise conditions were
designed so that the tasks would be cued and would contribute to
the unit’s success.

Performance feedback was provided to the primary training
audience in three ways. First, observers were assigned to
monitor individual members of the brigade staff. As the exercise
was conducted they were available for discussion and suggestions
on how various aspects of the staff member’s job should be
performed, how products should be generated, and which of the
other staff members should be involved. Second, observers also
conducted informal feedback for small groups of other staff
members as needed. Third, the senior observers conducted AARs at
specified points in the exercise. The AARs focused on staff
processes required during the just completed segment of the
exercise. The method for attaining that focus was a process of
examining and discussing staff products and other process
outcomes. The AARs occurred approximately every six hours.

The TSP for BSE also contained brigade staff preparation
materials and guidance; simulation system electronic files and
documentation; instructions for interactors and role players;
materials and guidance to support observation and feedback; and
complete details for exercise conduct and control. The majority
of the work provided from this research effort focused on
selected groups of brigade commander and staff members, as shown
in Table 5.

BBSE. The BBSE was designed for a staff that has already
defined and practiced its procedures for using the MDMP and made
them a part of its SOP. The training audience for the BBSE is
shown in Table 6. After the staff has progressed to this level
the BBSE provided a training environment where the staff can:
train on critical collective tasks; experience an intense battle
rhythm with concurrent handling of multiple missions; and
practice planning in parallel with subordinate units ina
continuous, uncertain battlefield environment.

36



Staff Group Trainer

The SGT served as a bridge between the individual staff
skills, and those collective skills taught in more complex
constructive and virtual staff simulations (see Figure 5). It
was useful for inexperienced staffs or experienced staffs with
newly assigned personnel. The SGT research and development
effort was designed to train staff sections or small staff groups
at battalion and brigade level in basic, collective mission
execution skills (Koger, et al. 1998). Analysis of the BFs
suggested that collective staff behaviors required to perform
battlefield functions could be grouped into ten staff processes.
These processes are listed and defined, in order of complexity,
in Table 2. The SGT program was designed to train these
processes in a progression from simple to complex or crawl, walk,
run. The SGT assumed that staff members had acquired sufficient
knowledge to perform their individual staff functions.

Constructive
and Virtual
Training
in Simulations

STAFF GROUP

TRAINER COMMAND

AND CONTROL
TABLES

SECTION
TABLES

Individual

Training

Figure 5. SGT as bridge to higher level simulation training.

24



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students by Blickensderfer, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1997) showed
that TDM teams trained in staff processes and receiving
behavioral feedback improved in terms of team process performance
(communication) more than did untrained teams. These TDM teams
also showed greater shared expectations of team communications
(how and when information is passed among the team), suggesting
that training and feedback in staff processes can enhance TDM
team mental models.

Research on Team Cross-Training

Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Spector (1996) demonstrated
that cross-training can improve team process, communication and
performance. The authors used undergraduates to form two person
air crews. Crew members were given an explanation (lecture)
written instructions, demonstration and practice on either only
their own crew position or both crew positions. Practice time
was held constant over both cross-trained and non cross-trained
crews. Cross-trained crews scored higher on ratings of teamwork
process and objective measures of crew performance (e.g. number
of enemy aircraft destroyed). Further, cross- ~trained crews
volunteered more information to each other than did non cross-
trained crews. This latter measure is often described as an
indication of a shared mental model, in that it demonstrates that
crew members intuitively understand information required by other
team members.

Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Blickensderfer and Bowers (1998)
replicated the value of cross-training for TDM teams. Three
person teams of naval personnel participated in a TDM command and
control simulation. All personnel received training and practice
in at least their own position, while cross-trained teams
received training and practice in all three positions. However,
total training time was held constant across groups. Cross-
trained teams scored higher on objective and subjective measures
of inter-positional knowledge and volunteered more information
than did non cross-trained teams. Under high workload (stress),
cross-trained teams scored higher on objective measures of team
performance than did non cross-trained teams. Also, unlike non
cross-trained teams, cross-trained teams showed no degradation of
team process measures under high workload.

Research on Team Adaptation

Entin, Serfaty and Deckert (1994) used a technique called
team adaptation and coordination training (TACT) to improve
performance of TDM teams. The authors hypothesized that high
performing teams adapt to the situation. A salient component of
the situation in which most TDM teams work is level of stress,
defined in terms of workload and ambiguity of information. The

B-5



CONTENTS (continued)

Table 1.

Figure 1.
2.

3.

Page
LIST OF TABLES
Battle Staff Performance on Selected MTP
Tasks at JRTC 2... ccc cece eee ee eee eee eens 3
SGT Training Objectives 1... cece eee cee eee 25
SIMBART Training Audience .......... ec eee eee eee 32
COBRAS Brigade Staff Vignettes .............. weeee 34
BSE Training Audience ........ cece eee eee eee eee 35
BBSE Training Audience .......... ccc eee eee eee eens 37
LIST OF FIGURES

Training Built Around AAR ........e cece cece e eee 10
What is Structured Training? .............5-- eee ee 20
Structured Training for Individuals and
Staff Groups .............- cece ee ee ee eee eee eee e ee 21
Model Course Outline for BSTS 23
SGT as Bridge to Higher Level Simulation
Training ..... cece eect eee eee e eee e eens 24
Project Description: SGT Training Program ....... 27
Battalion and Brigade Simulations Staff Training
Program (B2S2TP) ..... cece cece e eee eee eee teens 41



perspective, was selective bias in processing of information. An
example of this symptom was failure to give adequate
consideration to any information that ran counter to a currently
favored alternative.

The block of instruction covering multiple perspectives also
presented techniques, guidelines and attitudes to foster taking
multiple perspectives, as well as a practical exercise. An
example of a technique to foster multiple perspectives given by
the authors was reversal. Fallesen et al. (1996) used the
example of thinking about how to increase fratricides to provide
insights into how to reduce them.

The third block of instruction on adapting to situations
provided insights on thinking about how to think, or
metacognition. Staff members not only need to decide, but also
determine if, what, when and how to decide. This block of
instruction provided techniques for adapting one’s thinking to
situations and guidelines on when to use them. One technique
given by the authors for determining if and what to decide was
called FITE. It involved judging how Familiar one is with the
situation, the Importance of the outcome, the Time available and
the Effort required to solve the problem. Obviously, different
combinations of answers to these questions determine whether the
individual decides, seeks help in deciding, relegates the
decision to someone else or dismisses the issue altogether.

The fourth block of instruction concerned hidden
assumptions. Assumptions could easily be present in our decision
making as beliefs for which there is no evidence. This block of
instruction presented techniques for finding hidden assumptions
and handling unexpected events (e.g., information disconfirming a
current assessment). Fallesen et al. (1996) discussed one
technique for finding hidden assumptions. First the officer
identified a course of action he or she was certain would be
taken. An example the authors gave was that the enemy would
cross a river at the only available bridge. Then one imagined a
crystal ball that states this COA was wrong. One then identified
reasons why the COA was wrong. Some reasons might be that as the
enemy has bridging assets we are not aware of, there are places
that the enemy could ford the river, or the enemy does not intend
to cross the river. After each reason, the crystal ball told the
officer that particular reason is not correct, until the officer
had identified all the reasons that could be thought of. These
reasons were the hidden assumptions. Each hidden assumption was
evaluated, and, if necessary, information to confirm or
discomfirm was sought. If any of the reasons uncovered seemed
valid, the original COA might have been modified.

14



Rouse, W. B., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (1992). The role
of mental models in team performance in complex systems.
IEEE transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics, 6, 1297-
1308.

Smith-Jentsch, K. A., Payne, S. C., & Johnston, J. H. (1996).
Guided team self-correction: A methodology for enhancing
experiential team training. In K. A. Smith-Jentsch, (Chair),
When, how and why does practice make perfect? Paper
presented at the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Society
for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, San Diego, CA.

Stout, R. J., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (1996/1997). The
Role of shared mental models in developing team situational
awareness: Implications for Training. Training Research
Journal, 2, 85-116.

Thompson, T. J., Pleban, R. J., & Valentine, P. J. (1994).
Battle staff training and synchronization: The integration
of functions critical to combat operations. In R. F. Holz,
dg. H. Hiller & H. H. McFann (Eds), Determinants of effective
unit performance. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (pp 179-
230).

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences (1996). Innovative tools and techniques for brigade
and below staff training (ITTBBST) (Statement of Work). Fort
Knox, KY: Author.

Volpe, C. E., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., Salas, E., & Spector, P. E.
(1996). The impact of cross-training on team functioning:
An empirical investigation. Human Factors, 38, 87-100.

Winsch, B. J., Garth, T. H., Ainslie, F. M., & Castleberry, J. D.
(1996). The development of structured simulation-based
training for digital forces: Initial battalion staff-level
efforts (Research Product 96-08). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

50



Table B-1 (Continued)

Definition of teamwork (Naval fire support teams) - Oser et al.
(1989)

Communication

Cooperation

Team spirit and morale

Giving suggestions or criticism
Acceptance of suggestions or criticism
Coordination

Adaptability

Essential teamwork behaviors (Tactical decision making teams) -
McIntyre and Salas (1995)

Performance monitoring
Feedback

Closed loop communication
Back-up behaviors

Teamwork skill dimensions (composite teams) - Cannon-Bowers et
al. (1995)

Adaptability

Shared situational awareness
Performance monitoring and feedback
Leadership/team management
Interpersonal relations
Coordination

Communication

Decision making

Battle staff integration (battalion staff) - Olmstead (1992)

Communicating information
Decision making

Stabilizing

Communicating implementation
Coping actions

Feedback

Staff training objectives (battalion/brigade staff) - ARI/BDM
(1997)

Monitor
Process
Analyze
Communicate
Coordinate
Integrate
Recommend
Disseminate
Synchronize
Direct



provide no (or incorrect) information about battlefield events,
and could incorrectly execute orders from the staff. In other
words, these exercises introduced more “fog of war” for the staff
to work through.

Higher level structured training in simulation was also
developed for the brigade staff. These research and development
efforts were named Simulation Based Mounted Brigade Training
Program (SIMBART) and Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level,
Realistically Achieved through Simulation (COBRAS) .

Simulation Based Mounted Brigade Training Program. The
SIMBART program (Koger, et al. 1996) focused on training the
brigade staff in the execution stage of the mission. The
contract had three objectives. The first objective was to
produce behavioral cues that trigger specific staff actions. The
second objective was to train collective (staff sections, CPs and
the entire staff) versus individual staff behaviors. The third
objective was to provide a high likelihood of mission
accomplishment. The rationale for the latter objective was that
if staffs failed to accomplish the mission, staff behavior in the
AAR would likely focus on face saving behavior, such as
denigrating the simulation or the OPORD they were to execute.
This would interfere with discussion of actual staff behavior on
tasks the simulation was designed to train.

Table 3 gives the training audience for SIMBART. In the
Tactical Command Post (TAC CP), the training audience consisted
of the commander, members of the S2 section, $3 and members of
the S3 section, fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and ALO. In
the main CP, training audience consisted of the XO, S2 and
members of the S2 section, members of the S3 section, members of
the fire support section, engineer section and the chemical or
nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) officer. In the rear CP, the
training audience included $1 and S4, plus members of their
sections.

The missions were brigade movement to contact, area defense
and deliberate attack. The simulation used for mission execution
was Janus. These missions also used the NTC data base common to
the SIMUTA battalion missions. Because of the seamless nature of
these missions, it may be possible in the future, through
distributed interactive simulation (DIS), to train battalion
staffs and the brigade staff simultaneously in constructive
simulation or virtual and constructive simulation (Simulation
Network [SIMNET]-Janus) .

The conduct of the training was similar to that described

under SIMUTA. That is, the staff executed an existing OPORD
designed to train specific collective tasks. An extensive OC

31



Table C-1

Definitions of Staff Operations Constructs

e Staff SOP and Training: Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)
and exercises prior to NTC.

e Organization of TOC shifts. Use and monitoring of staff
action matrix, and TOC shifts.

e Orders Process: Troop leading procedures, decision making
process, clarity and checking of commander’s intent, and “war
gaming.”

e Order Quality: Soundness and timeliness of orders.

e Staff Monitoring: Staff rehearsals, tracking battles, and
modifying orders.

e Subordinate Commanders’ Implementation: Back-briefs,
rehearsals, and keeping staff informed.

e Integration: Integration of slice representatives; obtaining,
sharing, and interpreting information; and cooperation.

Statistically significant correlations were found between
ratings of force on force performance and SOP/training, staff
integration and orders quality (see Table C-2). Task forces
having staffs with better SOPs and prior training, higher quality
orders and better staff integration exhibited better force on
force performance, as rated by NTC OCs. Of course, one other
possible explanation for the findings is that units performing
better at the NTC rated their staff functions higher, while units
performing poorly at the NTC denigrated their staff functions.

The above studies linking staff processes and combat
effectiveness define staff processes in terms of task work versus
team work (Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes & Salas, 1986).
Task work involves the operations-related activities, which for
staffs includes analyzing information, making decisions, and
communicating orders. Team work, on the other hand, involves
interpersonal activities designed to enhance communications,
social relationships and interaction patterns. Staff team work
may also relate to combat effectiveness.



team provided role players for subordinate units (i.e., battalion
for four battalions) adjacent units and higher headquarters, as
well as observers for each CP.

Table 3

SIMBART Training Audience

Tactical command post
(TAC CP)

Main command post

Rear command post

Brigade Commander’

s3'

Assistant S3
Operations Sergeant
Operations Assistant

Assistant S2
Intelligence Sergeant
Intelligence Analyst

Fire Support Coordinator
(FSCOORD)'

Air Liaison Officer (ALO)'

Executive Officer

Assistant S3 or S3 Air
Operations Sergeant
Operations Assistant

$3 Plans Officer

$3 Plans Assistant Officer

s2

Intelligence Sergeant
Intelligence Analyst
$2 Plan Officer

Brigade Fire Support Officer
Fire Support Targeting Officer
Fire Support NCO

Fire Support Specialist (2)

Engineer Officer
Engineer Sergeant

Chemical Officer or NBC NCO

S4
Supply Sergeant
Supply Specialist

Si
Personnel Services NCO
Personnel Admin Specialist

' Location is optional, preferably with the Command Group, but can be located in the TAC CP.

32



Elliott, G. S., Sanders, W. R., & Quinkert, K. A. (1996).
Training in a digitized battalion task force: Lessons
learned and implications for future training (ARI Research
Report 1695). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Entin, E., Serfaty, D., & Deckert, J. C. (1994). Team adaptation
and coordination training (Technical Report 648-1).
Burlington, MA: AlphaTech, Inc.

Fallesen, J. J., Michel, R. R., Lussier, J. W., & Pounds, J.
(1996). Practical thinking: Innovation in battle command
instruction (Technical Report 1037). Alexandria, VA: U.S.
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Fowlkes, J. E., Lane, N. E., Salas, E., Franz, T., & Oser, R.
(1994). Improving the measurement of team performance: The
TARGETs methodology. Military Psychology, 6, 47-61.

Freeman, J. T., Cohen, M. S., Serfaty, D., Bresnick, T., &
Thompson, B. (1998). Information management in the
digital Army: Concepts for simulator-based training and
performance measurement (Technical Report 1073). Alexandria,
VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences.

Hoffman, R. G., Graves, C. R., Koger, M. E., Flynn, M. R., &
Sever, R. S. (1995). Developing the RCVTP: History and
lessons learned (ARI Research Report 1675). Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making. New York: The
Free Press.

Jenkins, S. N., Graves, C. R., & Quinkert, K. A. (in
preparation). Development of the combined arms operations
at brigade level, realistically achieved through simulation
III (COBRAS III) performance objectives for the brigade and
battalion staff exercise (Research Product) Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences.

Johnston, J. H., Smith-Jentsch, K. A., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A.
(1997). Performance measurement tools for enhancing team
decision making training. In M. T. Brannick, E. Salas & C.
Prince (Eds.), Team performance assessment and measurement:
Theory, methods, and applications (pp 311-330). Mahway, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.

47



Structured training is the deliberate design of training so that
certain events will occur and cues will be provided
to cause a specific training audience to perform

particular (critical) tasks, subtasks, or actions.

Scenario

AAR

FEED BACK

Guides

Training Critical Tasks
Objectives Ti1 T2 T3
Monitored Performance [/-——__

Facilitates
observation
of tasks

Figure 2. What is structured training?

defense and (g) command and control. The BFs divided each BOS
into functions (currently 39 BFs). While three of these directly
concerned battle staffs (BF 18, 19 and 20; command and control
during mission planning, preparation and execution, respectively)
battle staff work was contained in every BF in some form (e.g.,
intelligence, otherwise known as BF 4).

Analysis of the 39 functions differed from the usual method
of specifying tasks for units to train. Traditionally, the Army
has used ARTEP MTPs to identify tasks for training. The Army
developed these MTPs for specific types of units (e.g., infantry
platoon, heavy brigade). As such, the tasks were not developed
in a larger context of overarching functions. Thus, one could
easily overlook the fact that a task was duplicated in other
functions. In addition, the tasks may not have included actions
that involved cross walks with other types of units. As such,
the MTP tasks may not have reflected the synchronization
necessary for success on the battlefield.

The work on BFs began with analyses identifying the tasks
constituting the general functions that units must perform, and
the operational linkages of these tasks across BOSs (horizontal
links) and across echelons (vertical links). They then fleshed

20



Macgregor, D. A. (1995). Setting the terms of future battles for
Force XXI (Land Warfare Paper No. 21). Alexandria VA:
Association of the United States Army, Institute for Land
Warfare.

Martin, W. (1995). Training in the 21%* century: The Force XXI
Training Program. Armor, (May-June), 40-41.

McIntyre, R. M. & Salas, E. (1995). Measuring and managing for
team performance: Emerging principles from complex
environments. In R. A. Guzzo & E. Salas (Eds) Team
effectiveness and decision making in organizations. San
Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers (pp 9-45).

Morgan, B. B., Jr., Glickman, A. S., Woodard, E. A., Blaiwes, A.
& Salas, E. (1986). Measurement of team behaviors in a Navy
Environment (NTSC Report No. 86-014). Orlando FL: Naval
Training Systems Center.

Olmstead, J. A. (1992). Battle staff integration (IDA-P-2560).
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis.

Orasanu, J. M. (1990). Shared mental models and crew decision
making (CSL Report 46). Princeton, NJ: Cognitive Science
Laboratory.

Oser, R., McCallum, G. A., Salas, E., & Morgan, B. B. (1989).
Toward a definition of teamwork: An analysis of critical
team behaviors. Orlando, FL: Human Factors Division, Naval
Training Systems Center.

Oser, R. L., Dwyer, D. J., & Fowlkes, J. E. (1995). Team
performance in multi-service distributed interactive
simulation exercises: Initial results. Proceedings of the
17th Interservice/Industry Training Systems and Education
Conference (pp 163-171). Arlington, VA: American Defense
Preparedness Association.

Pleban, R. J., Thompson, T. J., & Valentine, P. J. (1993). The
commander battle staff handbook: An introduction to staff
functional duties for new battalion staff officers (Research
Product 94-02). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Rosenberger, J. D (1995). The burden our soldiers bear:
Observations of a senior trainer. Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army
War College.

Rosenberger, J. D. (1996). Training battle command: Coaching the
art of battle command. Military Review, (May-June), 27-38.

49



training including lecture, demonstration and role playing, based
on the identified team skill areas (Targeted Acceptable Responses
to Generated Events or Tasks [TARGET]), performed better than
untrained crews in these skill areas. Leedom and Simon (1995)
demonstrate that air crews given classroom discussion and
simulator training based on behavioral dimensions of team
coordination show improved performance on these dimensions and in
mission accomplishment. Lassiter, Vaughn, Smaltz, Morgan and
Salas (1990) conducted an experiment examining three types of
team training. Two person teams of college students ran a
scenario in an attack helicopter simulation. Before running the
simulation the crews were shown one of three training videos:
knowledge based training on eight team communication behaviors
(i.e., lecture), demonstration (i.e., behavioral modeling) of the
communication behaviors or control (i.e., two people performing a
task in the simulation). The behavioral modeling tape included a
description and highlighting of eight communication behaviors
being modeled. Behavioral ratings of team process behaviors in
the simulation showed that the crews given demonstration
(behavioral modeling) training performed better on team
communication than teams given knowledge based training or no
training.

A study by Oser, Dwyer and Fowlkes (1995) using the TARGETs
methodology demonstrated the effects of feedback on team
behaviors in an inter-service (i.e., Joint) task, using
distributed interactive simulation (DIS). The task involved
close air support (CAS), with a team including a Marine forward
air controller (FAC) in a simulated vehicle on an electronic
battlefield, an Air Force ALO and Army FSO in a tactical
operations center (TOC), and Air Force pilots in F-16 simulators.
Observers collected behavioral ratings of the targeted team
behaviors on each exercise, and provided feedback in the context
of an after action review (AAR). Results showed that performance
on the targeted behaviors improved over exercises.

Other studies examine the effects of training and feedback
on team processes. Smith-Jentsch, Payne and Johnston (1996)
describe a study where a TDM team was trained and provided
behavioral feedback on the teamwork processes outlined by
Johnston et al. (1997). Compared to control TDM teams not
trained and provided behavioral feedback (called guided team
self-correction), the trained team improved in overall
performance in a TDM simulation. Also, the trained team improved
over trials on specific process behaviors targeted for
improvement. Team self ratings on team processes became closer
to ratings of external raters (instructors) over trials. This
latter finding suggests that the feedback improved the accuracy
of TDM team self perceptions of team process behaviors. An
experimental study of an air defense simulation using college

B-4



Research Report 1730

Review of Battle Staff Training Research at Brigade and
Battalion Levels

Bruce S. Sterling and Kathleen A. Quinkert
U.S. Army Research Institute

Armored Forces Research Unit
Barbara A. Black, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

December 1998

i

Army Project Number Education and Training Technology
20262785A791

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


In summary, the Army is aware of and attempting to correct
the current deficiencies in battle staff performance and their
potential effects. The ARI is executing the FXXITP in order to
develop ways to provide training to ameliorate these
deficiencies. These research and development efforts already
performed included a project to identify critical battle staff
functions and tasks for training (BFs). Another effort involved
developing training for individual staff members (BSTS). Yet
another provided fundamental training for staff sections and
small groups (SGT). Other programs trained the entire battalion
or brigade staff on mission execution tasks (SIMUTA, SIMBART).
Finally, efforts to train battalion and brigade staff in all
mission phases (COBRAS) have been undertaken.

These were recent research and development efforts. A
version of BSTS, as well as versions of SIMUTA (JMSE), SIMBART
and COBRAS are available for use by staffs today. These products
offer promise for effective training of staffs in the Army of the
future.

A Proposed Stepping Stone Training Approach

Figure 7 shows how the innovative training efforts could fit
together in a training program for battalion and brigade staff.
This one dimensional figure is somewhat oversimplified in that
any training approach should consider at least the two dimensions
of complexity of training (ranging from individual, small group,
single staff and brigade plus subordinate staffs) and mission
phase (i.e., plan, prepare, and execute, consolidate, re-
organize). Some TSPs may be designed to train all mission phases
for a given level of complexity. For instance COBRAS BSE trains
all mission phases for the brigade staff. Other TSPs train only
a single mission phase for a given level of complexity. For
example SGT trains only the execute phase for small staff groups.

Both the battalion and brigade training starts out with the
training of individual staff skills (i.e., BSTS), such as
training the $2 to produce an intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB). The BSTS concentrates primarily on the plan
and prepare mission phases.

Then the training progresses to training small staff group
processes such as analyzing information, communicating and
coordinating with each other and providing recommendations to the
commander. Small group skills are trained first in the execution
phase (i.e., SGT) and then in the plan and prepare phases (COBRAS
vignettes). These vignettes could also help prepare a brigade
staff for multiechelon training.

39



Table 6

BBSE Training Audience

Brigade level

Brigade commander Brigade FSO and FSE

Brigade XO Brigade fire support coordinator
Brigade S1 and section Air defense artillery (ADA)
Brigade S2 and section coordinator and section

Brigade $3 and section FSB commander and support

Brigade $4 and section operations section

Chemical officer and section Military intelligence (MI) company
Brigade engineer and section commander and headquarters
Brigade signal officer section

Military police (MP) platoon
leader and platoon sergeant

Army aviation liaison officer

U.S. Air Force (USAF) ALO

Observed battalion task force (TF) level

TF commander TF S3 and section Signal officer

TF xO TF S4 and section TF FSO and FSE

TF S1 and section Chemical officer and TF ADA platoon leader

TF S2 and section section TF liaison officer
(LNO)

The scenario was designed to generate the demanding
conditions for continuous operations. The BCT staff and all
supporting elements were exercised for 24 hour operations. The
BCT headquarters and its maneuver task forces operated from their
CPs, which were linked to a simulation center with BBS as the
exercise driver. Because this exercise was designed to generate
a training environment that in intensity and rhythm was similar
to actual operations, units were encouraged to set up the CPs as
they would in field conditions. This applied to the TAC, main
and rear CPs of the brigade and to the command group, main CP and
CTCP of the task forces. This configuration allowed the staffs
to train with the assets that were available in the field and to
determine how their organization and arrangement contribute to or
detract from the staff process.

A tactical scenario was presented to the BCT that caused the
targeted training audience of commanders and staffs of the
brigade and maneuver task forces to plan, prepare and execute a
series of missions. While all actions associated with those
mission phases occurred and were practiced, feedback was focused
on a limited number of topics selected at the start of the
exercise.

37



Explanation means understanding the system’s function (how a
system operates) and state (what the system is doing now).
Prediction involves knowing a system’s future state, and why the
system exists.

There seem to be several types of mental models applicable
to teams. Rouse et al. (1992) postulate that there are mental
models of the equipment, task and team. Entin et al. (1994)
state that there are situational mental models of the task
environment and mutual mental models of the team.

Mental models are generally used as a concept to explain
results, rather than manipulated as an independent variable
(Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993). For instance, Kalisetty, Kleinman,
Serfaty and Entin (1993) developed an upward anticipatory ratio
that measured the ratio of information requests by superiors to
information provided by subordinates. A higher ratio indicates
that staffs are “pushing” information forward without waiting to
be specifically asked for it, while lower ratios indicate that
superiors must acquire information by “pulling” it from the
staff. Results show that higher performing staffs pushed
information more than lower performing staffs. The authors argue
that this is an indication of better implicit understanding of
information requirements or a better shared team mental model in
higher performing staffs.

However, Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) believe that training
specific mental models of the task and team is possible and
Stout, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1996/1997) argue that shared
mental models enhance team situational awareness, which in turn
improves team outcome (performance) .

In fact, Duncan et al. (1996) describe a study involving
training mental models. Interviews with instructors and Combat
Information Center (CIC) team members suggested six types of
mental models: equipment model, task model, defense system
model, ship model, team model and situation model. Observations
of training revealed that the team model received the least
training. An analysis of team performance errors demonstrated
that the largest percentage of errors were due to team
communications problems. Expert models of team communication
were developed (i.e., information expected from team members and
information provided to team members, as well as other sources of
information available to the team). :

Using this information, a computerized team model trainer
(TMT) was developed. The TMT had three parts: training,
simulation and feedback. It contained training on all six mental
models, but the most detailed was the team model. Training on
the team mental model followed the three categories of mental

B-7



operate). Also in operations other than war, the enemy, enemy
structure and tactics are all potential unknowns. Rosenberger
states “In an era of potential conflict against information,
industrial, or agrarian opponents, whose doctrine and tactics are
far less predictable, what then? The difficulties of
synchronizing the combined arms team under these conditions jumps
an order of magnitude” (1995, p. 20).

Another military writer who has recently examined battle
staff training and its deficiencies is Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)
John Antal. Unlike Rosenberger, whose focus is on
synchronization of combat power, Antal (1995) concentrated on
problems in the tactical decision making process as a major
shortfall of battle staffs. Antal stated that a major weakness
of battle staffs is rapid decision making. He indicated that the
future battlefield would require increasingly rapid decision
making and a speedy decision cycle. Antal stated that current
training, both in the schoolhouse and at the CTCs, emphasizes
extensive planning and preparation, resulting in a detailed
operations order, at the expense of a quick decision cycle.

Antal (1995) outlined a strategy to train the battle staff
in rapid decision making. He stated that basic staff processes
may be trained through a series of tactical discussions, staff
rides, war games, and maneuvers. Tactical discussions are
detailed tactical analyses of historical battles. Staff rides
are similar to tactical terrain walks or TEWTS. They may involve
going over the ground of historical battles or potential future
operations. War games are board games, map exercises, sand table
exercises, simple computer games and similar training designed to
train staff decision making. Maneuvers are large-scale
exercises, generally involving troops. Exercises at the CTCs are
the best examples of this type of training. However, Antal
indicated that effective training for the staff can now also be
performed using the right mix of live, constructive and virtual
simulations. This training strategy, using progressively more
complex training (crawl, walk, run), is similar to the research
and development strategy described later in this report.

To achieve a rapid decision making cycle, Antal (1995)
stated, the staff must train frequently against a live, thinking
opponent in real time. Antal suggested that commercially
available board games or simple computer games can serve this
purpose if sophisticated simulations are not available. The key,
according to Antal, is competition with a live opponent in real
time. This training will force staffs to adopt, refine and
perfect a rapid decision cycle.

LTC Douglas Macgregor also examined how changes in
technology will, or should, impact on future military operations.



Kalisetty, S., Kleinman, D. L., Serfaty, D., & Entin, E. E.
(1993). Coordination in hierarchical information processing
structures (CHIPS). Proceedings of the 1993 JDL Command and
Control Research Symposium, Washington DC: Fort McNair.

Keesling, W., Ford, P., & Harrison, K. (1994). Application of the
principles of training in armor and mechanized infantry
units. In R. F. Holz, J. H. Hiller & H. H. McFann (Eds),
Determinants of effective unit performance. Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences (pp 137-178).

Koger, M., Long, D. L., Britt, D. B., Sanders, J. J., Broadwater,
T. W., & Brewer, J. D. (1996). Simulation-based_ mounted
brigade training (SIMBART) program: History and lessons
learned (Research Report 1689). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Koger, M. E., Quensel, S. L., Sawyer, A. R., Sanders, J. L.,
Crumley, K. A., Brewer, J. D., & Sterling, B. S. (1998).
Staff group trainer: Development of a computer driven,
structured, staff training environment (Research Report
1718). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Lassiter, D. L., Vaughn, J. S., Smaltz, V. E., Morgan Jr., B. B.,
& Salas, E. (1990). A comparison of two types of training
interventions on team communication performance.
Proceedings of the Human Factors, Society 34th Annual
Meeting (pp 1372-1376). Santa Monica, CA: The Human Factors
Society, Inc.

Leedom, D. K., & Simon, R. (1995). Improving team coordination:

A case for behavior based training. Military Psychology, 7,
109-122.

Lewman, T., Mullen, W. J. III, & Root, J. (1994). A conceptual
framework for measuring unit performance. In R. F. Holz, J.
H. Hiller & H. H. McFann (Eds), Determinants of effective
unit performance. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (pp 17-38).

Logan, K. K., Hanson, M., A., Hedge, J. W., Bruskiewicz, K. T., &
Borman, W. C. (1996). Application of the critical incident
technique to enhance crew resource management training.
Paper presented at the Fifteenth Applied Behavioral Sciences
Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO: United States Air Force
Academy.

48



TTP

USAF
VTP

XO

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
Untrained

United States Air Force

Virtual Training Program

Executive Officer



synchronization and rapid decision making. Brown, however,
delved into the details of how to train commanders and staffs.

Brown (1992) proposed simulation based training designed to
ameliorate the deficiencies in battle staff performance. He
started with the premise that simulation allows for training
opportunities impossible with field training. Simulations allow
recording of performance for use in after action reviews (AARs)
and cost effective multiple runs of the same exercise (or even
parts of the exercise).

He recommended a staff training program built around the

AAR. “The AAR is the critical training event. Design the
context, preparation and the training event itself (table and
module) to support AAR training” (Brown, 1992, p. S-2). Figure 1

provides an example of a training event built around the AAR, in
accordance with Brown's concept. First, one must select the
tasks on which one wants the staff to train. With these tasks
come conditions and standards, from which one can develop
measures of performance (MOP) or measures of effectiveness (MOE).
For example, a task might be to perform combat service support
operations. The conditions would be that the task force has a
fully equipped forward support battalion for coordination. A
standard might be that all non-operational combat vehicles are
evacuated from the battlefield within two hours of damage. The
MOP would be the percentage of combat vehicles evacuated within
two hours of damage.

Exercises, to be conducted in simulation, involving
structured missions are then developed around the AAR. Since the
missions are pre-determined, units can be provided with orders,
graphics and other materials. These orders, graphics and
materials represent “a way” of executing the mission (e.g., the
method used by a highly competent unit to achieve the objective).
As part of the AAR, staffs can be shown a preview (demonstration)
of a highly competent unit demonstrating “a way” of executing the
mission. A comparison is then made between “a way” of executing
the mission and “your way” (i.e., the training unit’s way) of
executing the mission. Thus training emphasizes mission
execution versus planning and preparation. The exercise presents
cues that elicit behavior from the staff relevant to the MOPs.
For instance, the S4 is informed of battle damaged vehicles.

This cue should stimulate performance for the MOP “percentage of
damaged vehicles removed within two hours of damage.”

Individual training exercises are then grouped into tables.
A table is a group of exercises designed to train a certain
audience to a certain level of task complexity. For instance,
tables should be developed for individual staff sections, small



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)
December 1998

9, DATES COVERED (from... . to)
September 1997 - June 1998

4, TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Review of Battle Staff Training Research at Brigade and Battalion
Levels

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
0602785A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Bruce S. Sterling and Kathleen A. Quinkert

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
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14, ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

directions for battle staff training were discussed.

‘This report provides a foundation for future research and development on batlle staff training by providing examples of structured
training programs for the battle staff. Critical deficiencies in battle staff training were highlighted for both individual and collective
skills, Reviews were performed for (1) military articles on how to improve battle staff performance, centering on use of simulations in
a structured training program, and (2) research and development programs to improve battle staff training. Also, possible future

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Battle Staff Battle Staff Training Tactical Decision Making Team
TDM Team Training _ Force XXI Force XXI Training Program
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event was occurring. Improved train-the-trainer materials were
developed to help observers run effective AARs.

Janus Mediated Staff Exercises (JMSE)

SIMUTA. Once individual staff members, staff sections and
small staff groups have received training in fundamental staff
skills, they should be ready for more intense training as a
staff. The VTP, resulting from a series of ARI contracted
efforts included such training (Hoffman, Graves, Koger, Flynn &
Sever, 1995). One part of the VTP centered on battalion staff
training for the primary staff.

The SIMUTA portion of the JMSE also followed the structured
training model. Each mission was designed to require certain
staff actions on specific MTP tasks. Materials furnished
included OPORDs from battalion and brigade, maps and overlays.
The training focused on execution of an operational plan already
developed, although (unlike SGT) the commander had some real
decision making capability. Materials provided a script of
communication from higher and adjacent units. Subordinate (e.g.,
company) commanders could be drawn from the training unit or from
the OC team. Regardless, training materials provided them with
general guidelines for actions and reporting, although not actual
verbatim scripts. The training materials also provided the OPFOR
with general guidance. A given mission played out somewhat
differently each time, but the cues eliciting staff actions were
generally the same. There were three missions. These were:
movement to contact, deliberate attack and defend, which used the
NTC data base. These were the same missions executed at the NTC:
movement to contact, attack and defend. These missions also used
the NTC terrain data base.

A group of OCs assisted with the training. The OCs ensured
that both the staff being trained and OPFOR stayed within bounds
of executing the mission so that the exercise met training
objectives. They also observed training in order to lead the
AAR. In the AAR, the group discussed the tasks that the exercise
trained. The OCs noted tasks performed to standard as well as
reasons for deficiencies in tasks not executed to standard.
Whether the unit lost or won the battle was immaterial, except to
prompt discussion concerning why certain actions, positive or
negative, happened.

After constructive, structured, staff training in Janus,
battalion staffs could proceed to virtual training in SIMNET.
This training followed the same principles and design outlined
above, except that subordinate commanders came from the training
unit and the materials provided them little external guidance
outside of the OPORD. That is, subordinate commanders could

30



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the commander, participants were told to support the conclusion.
Again, ratings by a blind SME showed that trained participants
were rated as making stronger arguments.

Trained participants had better quality arguments. The
blind SME identified the number of statements in each argument
that fell into the categories of supporting evidence, conflicting
evidence, deconflicting evidence, identified gaps, hidden
assumptions and recommended actions. Trained participants
averaged more statements in all categories except recommended
actions, but the effects were particularly strong for supporting
evidence and identified gaps.

Furthermore, trained participants also tended to process
information differently than did untrained participants. They
were more egalitarian in ratings of message importance versus
rating message importance based on the message source. They
tended to compress information (i.e., lower message output to
input ratio). Trained participants had more of a tendency to
communicate processed information (i.e., created messages) versus
just forwarding messages. Finally, they tended to push
information not specifically requested versus just respond to
queries. This latter finding suggests that the commander’s
updates were effective in communicating the type of information
the commander wanted.

Introduction to ARI Research on Structured Staff Training

The Army is attempting to correct the current deficiencies
in battle staff training and performance. The ARI is executing
the Force XXI Training Program (FXXITP) in order to develop
methods to provide better staff training. Research and
development efforts performed to date include a project to
identify critical battle staff functions and tasks for training
(Battlefield Functions [BFs]). Another effort involved
developing training for individual staff members (Battle Staff
Training System [BSTS]). A third provided training for staff
sections and small groups (Staff Group Trainer [SGT]). Other
programs have been developed to train the entire battalion or
brigade staff on mission execution tasks (Simulation-Based
Multiechelon Training Program for Armor Units [SIMUTA],
Simulation-Based Mounted Brigade Training Program [SIMBART]) .
Finally, R&D to train battalion and brigade staff in all mission
phases (Combined Arms Operations at Brigade Level, Realistically
Achieved Through Simulation [COBRAS]) has been performed.

The ARI is involved in developing innovative staff training
using Brown’s (1992) concept of structured training. The concept
was first implemented in 1994 with ARI’s Virtual Training Program
(VTP) for (originally) reserve component units. This training

18



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

a

——
- Technical review by

James Lussier
Dorothy L. Finley

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.



Future Battle Staff Training

The R&D efforts discussed above, as parts of the FXXITP, are
based on conventional operations. Staffs must become proficient
in the staff processes listed in Table B-3 regardless of whether
they are using conventional or digital communications. Once
staffs can master the collective tasks necessary to synchronize
combat power, training to transfer these skills to a digital
environment can be profitably undertaken.

Simulation-Based Multiechelon Training Program for Armor Units-
Digital (SIMUTA-D)

Some R&D on staff training in a digital environment has been
performed. One excursion of SIMUTA, called SIMUTA-D, was
designed to provide digital training to battalion staffs (Winsch,
Garth, Ainslie & Castleberry, 1996). The SIMUTA-D program used
the SIMUTA scenarios for movement to contact, deliberate attack
and defense in sector as a baseline. Then a front end analysis
was performed to determine how the training requirements would be
affected by the introduction of digital systems. The specific
digital systems used in SIMUTA-D were legacy, versus current,
digital systems: the Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS),
brigade and battalion command and control system (B2C2), the All
Sources Analysis System (ASAS) and the Improved Fire Support
Automated System (IFSAS). Then TSPs supporting structured
training were developed around these modified scenarios.

Several lessons were learned from SIMUTA-D. Adequate
training of OCs and battle staff on digital systems must take
place prior to the SIMUTA-D training. More detailed tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) for digitally equipped staffs
are needed. Automated data collection techniques are needed to
provide feedback for a digital staff. That is, behaviors that
could be monitored over operational radio nets are unobservable
to OCs when digital systems are used in training. Some method of
capturing these behaviors in a digital environment is needed.
The Army must develop structured training programs using the
emerging digital systems in order to meet future training needs.
One current effort is to adapt conventional Simulation-Based
Multiechelon Training Program for Armor Units—Battalion Exercise
Expansion (SIMUTA-B) and SIMBART TSPs for use by units currently
equipped with digital communications systems (i.e., the EXFOR at
Fort Hood).

Strategy for the Development of Future Training

Lessons learned from the Focused Dispatch digital battalion
level Army Warfighting Experiment (Elliott, Sanders & Quinkert,
1996) suggest areas for future research and development in battle

42



The purpose of the SGT was to train staff members in
fundamental collective skills needed in mission execution. All
message input from subordinate elements, adjacent units and
higher headquarters was scripted. After receiving a multimedia
overview of the mission, staff sections operated computer
workstations and routed messages, posted information to their
situation maps, and extracted information for the purpose of
coordination with other staff members, consolidation and
reporting to the commander or higher headquarters. A data
logging system recorded staff responses such as opening, closing
and forwarding messages with or without comment. The system used
these data, along with OC observations, in the AAR.

The training audience was slightly different at the
battalion and brigade levels. The training audience at battalion
level was the XO or battle captain, personnel section,
intelligence section, operations section, logistics section, fire
support element (FSE), engineer element, battalion maintenance
officer (BMO) and medical platoon leader. At the brigade level,
the training audience was the XO, personnel section (with medical
representative), intelligence section, operations section,
logistics section, fire support section, and engineer section.

Within each section at both levels, three types of unit
personnel were involved. A specialist was trained to operate the
computer workstation to open messages, post them to the map, etc.
A Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) acted to direct the specialist
and call the attention of the principal staff officer to
important messages. The principal staff officer was primarily
responsible for performing the higher staff processes (analysis,
communication, coordination, etc.). The principle staff officer
was the main training audience, with the NCO also receiving
training in his or her actual duties. The specialist was mostly
a training aid, although the specialist gained an understanding
of how staffs operate. Unit commanders acted as trainers. This
latter point will be discussed below.

The SGT training program, as outlined in Figure 6, was
designed for staff members to progress from staff section to
small group to larger group. In each of the two training support
packages (one for battalion and one for brigade) that comprise
the entire program, staff members progressed from staff section
to CP to command and control tables.

The staff section table for both brigade and battalion
trained the S$1/S4, S2, S3, FSO and engineer staff sections
separately. There was a separate module for each staff section.
These modules contained exercises that trained the staff section
in very basic staff processes, such as monitoring, processing and
analyzing. In these exercises there was no interaction with

26



Table 5

BSE Training Audience

Commander

xO

sl

S2

s3

s4

FSO

ENG

FSCOORD

FSB Commander
ADCOORD

MI Company Commander
Aviation LNO
CHEMO

MP Platoon Leader
SIGO

The strength of the BSE lay in its focus on the workings of
the brigade staff. The emphasis was on the interactive tasks
which occurred between various sections or individuals. There
were four performance-oriented training goals for the brigade
staff. First, performance of the full mission requirements was
trained, including all mission phases. Second, sequential
performance of the military decision making process (MDMP) ,
performed both without time pressure, and under constrained time
conditions, was trained. Third, complete production of planning
and preparation products, including interim products and inputs
was trained. Finally the training included integration of
selected combat support and combat service support functions into
the staff processes.

Within those four goals, the training placed special
emphasis on CSS, planning and the decision making process. The
Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) was used to generate
the information, cues and simulated operations that allowed CSS
to be a major consideration. This required CSS-directed staff
actions during all phases of the exercise. The exercise also
covered the full array of staff activities. An integral part was
the requirement to conduct the full planning process. The
exercise addressed both the MDMP and an accelerated version of
the process at different points. Two of the missions provided
the needed time for the brigade staff to use the MDMP to develop
its plan: movement to contact and deliberate attack. Limited
time was available in the area defense mission, requiring the
brigade to use an accelerated process.

35



out the tasks and, ultimately, behaviors that units must execute
to carry out these functions, regardless of type of unit.
Therefore BFs also helped identify observable behavioral and
mission outcomes, such as the MOPs and MOEs discussed by Brown
(1992). Many BFs, in fact, contained an assessment package
listing MOPs and MOEs for the tasks defined in the analyses.

Another advantage of BFs was that they helped training
developers organize specific tasks within a larger context of the
general function of these tasks. In future development efforts,
this should help create a more integrated training program.

The functions and tasks relevant to battle staffs that’ were
identified by the BFs were the basis of the continued
developmental staff training (André, Wampler & Olney, 1997;
Koger, et al. 1998). Progression from the training assessment
and determining the tasks to be trained, through individual staff
training to staff group training, is shown in Figure 3 taken from
Martin (1995).

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAM
Si STAFFTNG = By
S2 GRAPHICS
$3 WPNS EFFECT INDIV STAFF GROUP
s4 FUNDAMENTALS, es |
FSO me SIMPLE COMPLEX
TEST (TABLE 1, EX 1, gaste 50, EX 100,
= INDIVIDUAL ASSEMBLE TF YNCH RO}
= STAFF

COMPETENCE

omrura

COLLECTIVE
STAFF
CERTIFIED TNG
AS AN S1, S2, S3, $4, ETC.,
IN INDIVIDUAL/STAFF/GROUP SKILLS
AND STAFF IS CERTIFIED AS A GROUP

Figure 3. Structured training for individuals and staff groups.

(Adapted from Martin, 1995).
Note. Acronyms are defined in Appendix A.

21



learning to depend on one another and to back each other up
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995). Such behaviors are acquired only after
extensive experience. Thus it is likely that many staffs at CTCs
were not able to display the teamwork and synchronization
necessary to function as an effective staff.

Given this situation, it was likely that many staffs arrived
at a CTC lacking both the individual and collective training
necessary for success at a CTC. Since the intense, realistic
training at a CTC was very demanding and unforgiving of mistakes,
one could expect deficiencies in staff performance that would
affect the entire unit.

Recommendations for Ameliorating Staff Deficiencies

As a result of these findings, Thompson et al. (1994)
recommended changes in both individual and collective staff
training. The authors developed and published a Commander's
Battle Staff Handbook that outlined the basic functional area
duties for each member of the battalion task force staff (Pleban,
Thompson, & Valentine, 1993). The authors recommended
development of computer based training (CBT) to instruct
individual staff members in skills and knowledge necessary for
them to perform their tasks. Also, the authors recommended
constructive and virtual simulations to provide regular
collective training for staffs.

Empirical research concerning the training of various
tactical decision making (TDM) teams has also been performed. A
detailed review of this research, involving military and civilian
air crews, Navy fire support teams, Navy combat information
center (CIC) personnel and Army staffs, is presented in Appendix
B. More detailed reviews of the relationship between TDM team
processes and staff performance are provided in Appendix C.

Theoretical Articles on Battle Staff Training

Several military authors have recognized the importance of
battle staffs and their training deficiencies. These authors
typically based their comments on observations at CTCs. They
also offered proposals on how these deficiencies can be
corrected.

Colonel John Rosenberger (1995; 1996) identified
deficiencies in battle staff performance based on experience as a
senior OC at the NTC. He cited the historically poor record of
units against the opposing force (OPFOR) at the NTC. Rosenberger
attributed the failure to defeat the OPFOR primarily to a lack of
synchronization, or failure to apply the capabilities of the
combined arms team against the OPFOR at the right place and time.



Table B-1

Dimensions of Team Behavior

Team (aircrew) processes - Brannick et al. (1995)

Assertiveness
Decision making
Adaptability
Situation awareness
Leadership
Communication

TARGETS (aircrews) - Fowlkes et al. (1994)

Mission analysis
Adaptability/flexibility
Leadership

Decision making
Assertiveness

Situation awareness
Communication

Cognitive components of decision making (aircrews) - Orasnau,
1990

Situation assessment
Metacognition (planning)
Shared mental models
Resource management

Cockpit Resource Management (aircrews) - Logan et al. (1996)

Maintaining an atmosphere facilitating teamwork
Backing each other up

Coordination

Group problem solving

Information flow

Performance measurement for team decision making training Combat
Information Center (CIC) - Johnston et al. (1997)

Situation assessment
Communication

Supporting behavior

Team initiative/leadership

(table continues)



Oser, McCallum, Salas and Morgan (1989) examined the
relationship between team work-like staff behaviors and
performance in a naval gunfire support environment. The Critical
Team Behaviors Form was developed based on interviews at three
sites with naval instructors (roughly equivalent to Army OCs at
Combat Training Centers [CTC]) concerning what constitutes
effective team work. The form includes 68 specific behaviors (34
positive and 34 negative) divided into seven behavioral
dimensions. These dimensions were communication, cooperation,
team spirit and morale, giving suggestions and criticism,
accepting suggestions and criticism, coordination and
adaptability.

Observers collected data on teamwork and staff performance
in a simulated naval gunfire exercise. Observers monitored 13
staffs during four day simulation exercises and recorded the
frequency with which specific behaviors on these dimensions
occurred. On the fifth day observers evaluated staffs’
performance in a standard (i.e., scripted) simulation exercise,
on a standardized scoring protocol (the same for all staffs),
with a maximum of 100 points possible. Although this exercise
was conducted in a simulator, it appears to be a valid measure of
combat effectiveness. Performance scores in this simulation were
significantly correlated with later performance of the same
staffs in live fire exercises.

Results of the simulation exercise demonstrated a
relationship between team work behaviors exhibited by the staff
and measures of combat effectiveness. Data demonstrated that the
frequency with which staff members performed certain teamwork
behaviors related to simulation performance. Each behavior was
coded as 1, 2 or 3, depending on the frequency with which it
occurred during the four days in which observers recorded staff
behaviors. Behaviors occurring three to eight times were coded
as 3, those occurring one or two times as 2 and those not
occurring at all were coded as 1. Ten behaviors, listed in Table
C-3, were found to correlate significantly with final exercise
score. These items involved monitoring other’s performance,
providing feedback, verifying communications and backing each
other up.

Similar findings were also obtained in naval antisubmarine
warfare and guided missile training (McIntyre & Salas, 1995). In
addition, effective staffs saw themselves as interdependent,
fostered that interdependence (i.e., depended on each other’s
performance), exhibited flexibility (altering behavior as the
situation dictates) and developed over time.



staff training. Staff members lacked procedural skills in using
digital equipment effectively. This deficit impacted on staff .
members acquiring, analyzing and communicating information under
conditions of heavy message traffic. Also, problems existed in
information management (e.g., information overload). If staff
members have difficulty in quickly distinguishing important from
trivial information this can also impact on the timely
availability of information necessary to make critical decisions.

Finally, staff synchronization was lacking. When staff
members do not know what information others need, communication
and coordination of information among the staff is impaired.
This, in turn, can decrease situation awareness and the ability
to make correct decisions, especially in a timely manner. Future
research plans should focus on each of these areas. Individual
staff members need training on how to effectively operate digital
equipment. Staff members also need training on information
management techniques. Finally, the staff as a whole needs
training in how to function as a team.

Future training should address skills needed to effectively
operate digital equipment. Current training on digital equipment
for procedural skills stresses step by step actions. Anecdotal
reports suggest these skills decay very rapidly without
additional training. A prototype program using a more cognitive
approach, such as menu-navigation may be useful. This approach
could be compared to the current training used to determine its
relative effectiveness. Eventually, multi-media training using
such an approach may be developed and tested.

Future training should enhance information management
skills. With the increase in volume and speed of information
generated by digital communication, managing and processing this
information will be a challenge. One possible solution is
training in cognitive strategies for information management such
as techniques ‘to filter, sort or group, prioritize and interpret
incoming information. A digital, scripted information management
exercise could be developed to teach staff sections these
strategies in the context of a specific mission (DA, 1998).
Feedback could be automated to facilitate training at home
station without a dedicated OC team.

Also, digital staffs must have ways to integrate the
information received in order to synchronize actions. Training
in shared mental models, group decision making and situation
awareness may help staffs synchronize actions. For example, if
each staff member has an idea of what decisions or actions other
staff members need to take, what information they need in order
to do so, when they need that information and who has the
information, communication can be pushed and pulled more

43



References

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training system in support of Force XXI training program:
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Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Antal, J. F. (1995). Training the command-staff team for battle
command and rapid decision making (Landpower Essay Series
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Army, Institute of Land Warfare.

Blickensderfer, E., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (1997).
Training teams to self-correct: An empirical investigation.
Paper presented at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Society
for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, St. Louis MO.

Brannick, M. T., Prince, A., Prince, C., & Salas, E. (1995). The
measurement of team process. Human Factors, 37, 641-651.

Brown, F. J. (1992). Battle command staff training (IDA-P-2785).
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis.

Campbell, C. H., Graves, C. R., Deter, D. E., & Quinkert, K. A.
(1998). Combined arms operations at brigade level,
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Cannon-Bowers, J. A., Salas, E., Blickensderfer, E., & Bowers, C.
A. (1998). The impact of cross-training and workload on team
functioning: A replication and extension of initial
findings. Human Factors, 40, 92-101.

Cannon-Bowers, J. A., Salas, E., & Converse S. A. (1993). Shared
mental models in expert team decision making. InN. J.
Castellan, Jr. (Ed.), Current issues in individual and group
decision making (pp. 221-246). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.

Cannon-Bowers, J. A., Tannenbaum, S. I., Salas, E., & Volpe, C.
E. (1995). Defining competencies and establishing team
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Team effectiveness and decision making in organizations. San
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Casico, W. F. (1978). Applied psychology in personnel management.
Reston, VA: Reston Publishing Company, Incorporated.

45



Macgregor (1995) posited two major changes in technology that can
affect future combat. One of these changes is improved weapons
capability in the areas of range, precision and lethality. The
other is the improvement in information technology. Macgregor
contended, however, that neither trend would result in improved
combat effectiveness unless our methods of operation are changed
to incorporate these improved weapon and information
capabilities.

Macgregor (1995) criticized certain aspects of current Army
tactics at battalion and brigade levels. He stated that prepared
defenses, massing troops for fires, and centralized command and
control need to give way to mobility, using dispersed assets to
mass fires (not forces), and initiative of subordinates. Instead
of conducting frontal assaults, Macgregor recommended that
tactics need to stress use of rocket artillery with air assault,
using armor units to attack the enemy flanks and rear. He stated
that these tactics will take advantage of the technological
improvements in weapon and information systems.

Macgregor (1995) also echoed Antal’s (1995) call to train
the staff for rapid adaptation to changes in plans during mission
execution. He stated that in order to take full advantage of
information technologies, command and control must be
decentralized. He proposed that instead of emphasizing
laborious, detailed planning and preparation, training needs to
teach simple, quick planning and preparation, and the ability to
quickly change plans to exploit emerging opportunities during
mission execution. “In the world of Force XXI, the task force
commander must exercise judgment as part of the cognitive
planning process and reclaim responsibility for decision making
that has been increasingly absorbed by battalion and brigade
staffs” (Macgregor, 1995, p. 11).

The latter quote perhaps indicates a difference between
Antal (1995) and Macgregor’s (1995) thinking. Antal clearly
recommended training the entire primary staff in rapid decision
making. Macgregor seemed to emphasize the role of the commander
in rapid decision making, implying that often the staff must be
by-passed to react quickly to changes in the tactical situation.
In this view, perhaps, the staff is part of the problem, not the
solution.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Frederic Brown, also has
recognized problem areas in commander and staff performance and
training for the future battlefield. In conjunction with ARI,
Brown (1992) has made detailed recommendations for developing a
battle staff training program to address problems in battle staff
performance observed at the CTCs. The three military writers
already discussed have generic proposals to enhance staff