NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. AARON WRIGHT, AKA Aaron Michael Wright,
Defendant

- Appellant. No. 20

- 10403
D.C. Nos. 2:09

- cr - 00241

- SMB

- 1 2:09

- cr - 00241

- SMB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 10, 202 1 San Francisco, California Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. After pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, Aaron Wright was sentenced to 66 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release. Wright moved to terminate his supervised release sent ence, and Wright’s probation officer sought modification of his supervised release conditions

. T he district court denied Wright’s termination motion and granted several requested modifications. Wright

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

DEC 21 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

appeal s both orders

. R eviewing for abuse of discreti on, see United States v. Cate , 971 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Nixon , 839 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) , we affirm.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright’s
motion to terminate supervised release

. “The court may, after considering the
factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § ] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) [,] terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the
defendant re leased at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised
release

. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)

. D enying Wright’s termination motion, t he
district court provided “an explanation [that was] sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate re view, and [to] state the court's reasons for rejecting nonfrivolous arguments.” United States v. Emmett , 749 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
The district court adequately tied its denial of Wright’s termination motion

to the § 3553(a) factors

. By basing its decision on the nature of Wright’s crime as detailed in the original presentencing report, the district court considered “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court also expressed concern about Wright’s need for future correctional treatment , especially given that he only recently completed treatment and there was no polygraph condition or other tool in3

place to neutrally assess his progress . T hus , the court considered the need “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D )

. The district court also stated its reasons for rejecting Wright’s “ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of termination

. ” See Emmett , 749 F.3d at 821 (cleaned up)

. The district court acknowledged Wright’s impressive rehabilitative effor ts and progress to date , but f

ound that Wright had completed treatment too recently to warrant terminating his sentence. Similarly, the court found that “the people [Wright] work [s] with, [his] family members, all have glowing things to say about [him] , b ut that is not unusual in these types of cases.” Thus, the district court address ed Wright’s key arguments in favor of termination , provide d its reason s for denying the termination motion , and left open the possibility of termination at a
later date.
2. Nor did t he district court abuse its discretion by modifying the terms of Wright’s supervised release. A district court “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised releas e, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release , ” after considering the same § 3553(a) statutory factors that the court considers for termination decisions. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2 ). Wright challenges three of his su pervised release conditions: his drug testing condition, treatment condition, and polygraph condition.4

Wright contends that his drug testing condition constitutes an improper delegation of sentencing authority to the probation officer, and is improper g iven Wright’s lack of a history of drug use
. We disagree. R ead ing the recent 2020 drug testing modification condition together with the drug testing condition originally imposed in 2010, it is clear that the district court ordered the maximum number of
d rug tests not to exceed t wo per year
. Thus, the district court did not improperly delegate sentencing authority to the probation officer, and instead satisfied the requirement to “set the maximum number of non

- treatment program drug tests to which [Wright] may be subjected

. ” See United States v. Stephens , 424 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover , even where there is no demonstrated history of drug use, a senten cing court may nonetheless require drug testing

. Cf. United
States v. Jeremiah , 493 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding condition requiring eight drug tests per month for defendant without demonstrated history of drug use)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sex offender treatment condition on Wright. To justify this modification, the district court referenced Wright’s potential for relapse, his potential need for future treatment,
and the fact that Wright will likely st ruggle with fantasies for years

. Th is condition
is thus connected to the need to “protect the public from further crimes,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C); the need to provide “other correctional treatment in the most5

effective manner,” i d. § 3553(a)( 2 ) (D) ; and the “the nature and circumstances of [Wright’s] offense,” i d. § 3553(a)(1). Therefore , this “condition of supervised release meant to address [Wright’s] history of sexual misconduct” is not unduly burdensome and is “reasonably necessary to accomplis h one of the legitimate goals of supervised release.” See United States v. Hohag , 893 F.3d 1 1 90, 1193 (9th Cir. 2018). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a polygraph condition on Wright. The polygraph condition is a neu tral means of determining Wright’s compliance with treatment as well as Wright’s truthfulness with his probation officer. Thus, the condition is adequately connected to the need “to provide [Wright] with needed

. . . correctional treatment in the most eff ective

manner
. ” S

ee 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D )

. 1
AFFIRMED.

1 Because this disposition does not rely on the documents that Wright would have us strike in his motion to strike, Dkt. No. 30, we deny his motion as moot.