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Filed 4/11/22 P. v. Runnels CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JASON HOWARD RUNNELS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E076647

(Super.Ct.No. RIF148790)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Anthony Da 

Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant Jason Howard Runnels appeals the Riverside County 

Superior Court’s summary denial of his petition for resentencing made pursuant to 

section 1170.95 of the Penal Code.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. The circumstances leading to defendant’s conviction

The background leading up to defendant’s petition for resentencing is taken from 

the record on appeal and our opinion issued on his appeal from the judgment. (People v. 

Runnels (Apr. 3, 2014, E055824) [nonpub. opn.] (Runnels I).)

On December 31, 2008, defendant and his girlfriend, codefendant Lucia Martinez

(Martinez), were staying in their cabin in Poppet Flats with a guest (the witness). 

Defendant telephoned the victim and invited him to come over and celebrate the New 

Year. After the victim arrived, the group went out together to purchase liquor. When 

they returned to the cabin, the group (except, perhaps, the witness) began drinking. At 

one point, when defendant was in the kitchen, the victim tried to dance with Martinez by 

putting his hands on her hips. She pushed him away and went into the kitchen. 

Two minutes later, defendant and Martinez came out of the kitchen and defendant 

took the victim into the bedroom and closed the door. They were joined several minutes 

later by Martinez, who did not stay in the bedroom the entire time. The witness heard 

thumping noises coming from the bedroom and, not long afterwards, defendant dragged 

the victim’s lifeless beaten body into the living room. Defendant and Martinez took 

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 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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possession of the witness’s cell phone and told her she could not leave or make phone 

calls on threat that they would “take the closest one to her.” The witness assumed they 

were referring to her four-year-old son. 

Over the next two days, while defendant went to work, Martinez and the witness

tried to clean up the blood in the bedroom. In the night of the second day, together with 

defendant, they drove to a lake and dropped the victim’s body into it. His body was 

found two months later. He had suffered a fracture of his sternum and 26 fractures of his

ribs. His liver and one of his lungs were lacerated by broken ribs. Defendant and 

Martinez were eventually apprehended and charged with the premeditated, deliberate, 

killing of the victim with malice aforethought (count 1, §187, subd. (a)). 

During the trial, defendant testified he killed the victim. A jury found him guilty. 

The court sentenced him to a term of 25 years to life, plus an enhancement of a year each 

for two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) stemming from unspecified offenses, to run 

consecutively to the term imposed for count 1. Defendant appealed. 

On appeal, we rejected defendant’s arguments, which included the claims that the 

jury should have been instructed on the theory of heat of passion, that he had no motive 

to kill the victim, and he could not be convicted of murder because he had used his fists. 

We ordered the trial court to amend the sentencing minutes and abstract of judgment to 

reflect the restitution order for defendant is joint and severable with the codefendants. 

We otherwise affirmed the judgments. (Runnels I, supra, E055824.) 
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2. Defendant’s petition for resentencing

In February 2021, defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 1170.95 seeking to 

vacate his conviction and be resentenced in accordance with the ameliorative 

amendments to section 188 (which defines malice) and section 189 (which defines

degrees of murder and liability therefor) that became effective in January 2019. He was 

not present but was represented by counsel at the status hearing on his petition. The court 

dismissed the petition upon a finding that our opinion in Runnels I made clear defendant 

was the actual killer. Defendant appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred in two respects: (i) his petition complied 

with the statutory pleading requirements set forth in subdivision (b) of section 1170.95 

and, therefore, his right to due process was violated because he was not afforded the 

opportunity to file a brief in support of his petition and, (ii) the court erred when it relied 

on this court’s opinion when it summarily denied his petition. 

1. Senate Bill No. 1437 limited the scope of the felony-murder rule and provides a 

procedure for recall of certain sentences

In 2018, the Legislature eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for 

murder and narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule by passage of Senate Bill 

No. 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, pp. 6673-6676.) The bill 

substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to ensure liability for murder would be 

limited to persons who (i) are the actual killer, (ii) are not the actual killer but, with the 
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intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or 

assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree, or (iii) are a 

major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 

life as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

952, 957 (Lewis).)

The bill also added section 1170.95. (Added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4 (Sen. 

Bill No. 1437), effective January 1, 2019; amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2 (Sen. Bill 

No. 775), effective January 1, 2022.) That provision established the procedure for 

persons convicted of murder prior to January 1, 2019 to petition to vacate their sentence 

and to be resentenced for any remaining counts if they could not be convicted under 

sections 188 and 189 as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 959.) 

To obtain relief, a petitioner must file a petition in the sentencing court and 

include the following averments: (i) the complaint, information, or indictment filed 

against the petitioner allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,

murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under 

which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a 

crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequence doctrine; (ii) the 

petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter after a trial or 

after accepting a plea offer in lieu of a trial in which the petitioner could have been 

convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (iii) the changes made by Senate Bill No. 
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1437 to sections 188 and 189 would now foreclose petitioner from being convicted of 

murder or attempted murder. (§ 1170.95, subds. (a) & (b)(1); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal 5th at 

pp. 959-960.) 

If the petition complies with the aforementioned requirements, the court must 

appoint counsel if the petitioner has requested one. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(C) & (b)(3); 

Lewis, supra, 11 Cal 5th at pp. 962-963.) The prosecutor is to file and serve a response to 

the petition within 60 days after the petition was served, and the petitioner may file and 

serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor’s response is filed. (§ 1170.95, subd. 

(c); Lewis, at p. 961.) If the court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie 

showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing 

to decide whether it should proceed to vacate the conviction and recall petitioner’s 

sentence for resentencing. (Lewis, at p. 961.) If the court declines to issue an order to 

show cause, it is to provide a statement fully setting forth its reason for doing so. 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)

The court’s determination will necessarily be informed by the record of 

conviction, allowing it to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are 

clearly lacking in merit. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) Although the court 

may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or exercise of its 

discretion, it may consider the record of conviction, including the court’s own documents 

and the reviewing court’s opinion if an appeal was taken from the judgment. (Id. at 

pp. 971-972.) If the record of conviction contains facts refuting the petition’s allegations, 
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then the court is justified in making a finding that the petition does not pass prima facie 

muster. (Id. at p. 971.)

We review a trial court’s determination whether a petition has made a prima facie 

showing using a de novo standard because it is predominately a legal question, requiring 

us to apply the section 1170.95, subdivision (c) standard governing prima facie 

entitlement to relief. (People v. Arias (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 987, 999, review granted 

Sept. 29, 2021, S270555.)2 In applying that standard here, we accept the petition’s facts 

as true but evaluate them in light of facts readily ascertainable from the record of 

conviction, including our opinion in Runnels I, supra, E055824. (Arias, at p. 999.)

2. Defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law 

Defendant argues the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because it not 

only relied on this court’s opinion to find he was the actual killer, but also denied him his 

due process right to submit briefing in an effort to establish the insufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury’s finding that the was guilty of murder. We disagree and 

affirm.

As explained ante, persons who were convicted of first degree murder are not 

eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170.95 unless (i) the information filed against them 

allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder due to 

natural and probable consequences, or any other theory under which malice is imputed to 

a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, and (ii) the changes made 

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 Rule 8.1115(e)(1) of California Rules of Court permits us to rely on appellate 

opinions as persuasive authority while review by the Supreme Court is pending. 
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by Senate Bill No. 1437 to sections 188 and 189 would now foreclose them from being 

convicted of first degree murder. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 

959-960.) Those requirements are not met here. 

Contrary to the averment in defendant’s petition, he was not charged and 

convicted of murder under a theory set forth in subdivision (a) of section 1170.95. The 

complaint and information set forth a single count that did not include an allegation that 

would permit prosecution under either the felony-murder rule, a natural and probable 

consequences theory, or any other theory under which malice was imputed to defendant 

solely on his participation in a crime. Rather, defendant was charged with, and convicted 

by a jury of, killing the victim with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought. 

As such, he is not eligible for relief under section 1170.95. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a); People 

v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 866-867 (Mancilla).)

Nor does defendant meet the requirement that he could not now be convicted of 

first degree murder on account of Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments to sections 188 or 

189. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) The current statute provides, as it did at the time of 

defendant’s conviction, that a person’s willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of 

another is murder in the first degree. (§ 189, subd. (a).) 

Because defendant does not meet the requirements set forth in section 1170.95, he 

is ineligible as a matter of law to have his conviction vacated and be resentenced. 

Accordingly, to the extent the sentencing court erred in not requiring the People to submit 

an opposition to defendant’s petition pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 1170.95, 
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thereby triggering an opportunity for defendant to respond, the error was harmless. 

(Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 859 [when record of conviction establishes a 

defendant is ineligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, then any errors 

committed by the trial court are harmless].) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

J.

SLOUGH

J.