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Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025

Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Section I - Vision

Chapter 1 Marine Corps Vision 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Chapter 2 Marine Corps Values, Philosophy, Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

and Competencies

Section II - Strategy

Chapter 3 National Security Planning, Future Security Environment, . . . . .11

and Threats and Challenges

Chapter 4 Strategy Statement and Objectives for 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Chapter 5 Force Implications for 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Chapter 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Annex

A Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-1

B Strategic Crosswalk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B-1
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Foreword

Our Nation faces challenges that are global in reach

and scope. While today’s Marines are performing

superbly in every clime and place, our institution must

also devote attention to tomorrow’s threats and

opportunities.

It is our obligation to subsequent generations of

Marines, and to our Nation, to always have an eye to the

future — to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges today.

This Vision and Strategy document confirms who we are,

what we believe, and what we do. It establishes the

foundation for our operational concepts and identifies the

critical steps needed to shape our Corps for an

increasingly volatile and uncertain future. It is grounded

firmly in our legislated role as the Nation’s “force in

readiness,” and it will guide our Service so that we are

properly organized, trained, equipped, and prepared for tomorrow’s challenges.

With little warning, our Nation calls its Corps of Marines front and center during its

most challenging times. Responding rapidly to crisis and strategic surprise is an integral

part of our history as a Corps. In the South Pacific after Pearl Harbor, in Korea after the

communist invasion in 1950, in the jungle outposts of Viet Nam, in the deserts of

Southwest Asia, and in the mountains of Afghanistan — Marines have distinguished

themselves as an expeditionary, multicapable force able to respond and win battles for

our Nation.

We have been prepared in the past because we understood that a force in readiness

must be well-trained, broadly educated, and properly equipped for employment across all

forms of warfare. We believe the individual Marine is the most formidable weapon on

today’s battlefield and will remain so tomorrow. Whatever the future holds, our emphasis

on making Marines will not change.
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Expeditionary excellence requires Marines who are morally, physically, and mentally

tough. Marines must be agile, capable of transitioning seamlessly between fighting,

training, advising, and assisting — or performing all of these tasks simultaneously.

Though our Corps has recently proven itself in “sustained operations ashore,” future

operational environments will place a premium on agile expeditionary forces, able to act

with unprecedented speed and versatility in austere conditions against a wide range of

adversaries. We must be a two fisted fighter — able to destroy enemy formations with

our scalable air-ground-logistics teams in major contingencies, but equally able to employ

our hard earned irregular warfare skills honed over decades of conflict. Our Corps must

serve credibly as a persistently engaged and multicapable force, able to draw upon

contributions from our Total Force, in order to address the full range of contingencies the

future will undoubtedly present. In short, we must be prepared to move with speed, “live

hard,” and accomplish any mission.

This document details my vision of the future Corps and a plan for creating the Marine

Corps of 2025. The future Marine Corps will fulfill its unique role and extend its legacy

as the world’s premier expeditionary fighting force. To enhance its operational utility to

combatant commanders, the Corps will be preventative in approach, leaner in equipment,

versatile in capabilities, innovative in mindset, and increasingly reliant on naval deployment.

Marines are a breed apart — born of epic battles and tempered in the ultimate crucible

of combat. We will carry our rich legacy forward and continue to honorably serve our

Nation. The Marine Corps is committed to providing the Nation its expeditionary “Force

of Choice” for tomorrow’s challenges.

James T. Conway

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps
4 Figure 1. Vision and Strategy: Hierarchy and Connectivity

Purpose

The purpose of the vision and strategy document is to inform all Marines where we intend to take our

Corps, to give combatant commanders a concept of how we might best be employed, and to provide our

civilian leadership a reference point as to how we see Marine Corps contributions to national defense in the

coming years and decades. This document is grounded in the Marine Corps’ identity, ethos, values, and

competencies. It serves as the principal strategic planning document for our Corps and reflects our

legislated roles, functions, and composition. Derived from strategic guidance at the national and

departmental levels, it illustrates our utility and value within the joint warfighting community.

The vision section describes a Marine Corps adapting to fulfill our role in the Nation’s defense in an

inherently unpredictable future. It is founded on our enduring characteristics and capabilities, but also

reflects shifts in posture and practice designed to enhance today's Corps for tomorrow's challenges. The

strategy section lays out a strategy statement as well as a set of institutional objectives to realize the vision

and meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Our Service capstone concept and supporting operating concepts will flow from the vision and strategy,

as will the more detailed plans of the deputy commandants and subordinate commanders. The development

of these plans will be directed by the Implementation Planning Guidance which will be published in

subsequent documents. The relationships between this vision and strategy, higher guidance, and our

capabilities development and resource allocation are depicted in the following chart.
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and retain the best Marines possible. Young men and

women will join our Corps confident in our ability to

train and lead them well and employ them in ways that

make a difference. Our Battle Colors have been passed

to a new generation of Marines who are shouldering

them with the same grit and determination as

generations past. They are part of a great legacy of

Marines that will someday pass our Battle Colors to yet

another generation.

b. Prepared to “live hard” in uncertain, chaotic, and

austere environments. Marine Corps forces must be

organized, trained, equipped, and deployed with the

expectation of operating in inhospitable conditions against

committed and competent foes. We will maintain an

expeditionary mindset in our air and ground elements and in

all we do — emphasizing speed of execution, agility, and

flexibility.

c. Deployed forward with relevant and timely

capabilities. Marine Corps forces will bring proven

capabilities to combatant commanders to accomplish a wide range of tasks. We will —

1. Operate forward with a regional focus, yet be globally capable.

2. Execute persistent forward engagement and security cooperation activities.

3. Respond swiftly, with little warning, to emerging crises.

4. Maximize speed and freedom of action through seabasing, while minimizing footprint ashore.

5. Conduct joint forcible entry operations from the sea.

6. Engage in sustained operations ashore, as required.

d. Forged to be lean, agile, and adaptable as

individuals and as an institution. We will practice a selfdisciplined approach to force design and development.

These efforts will strike a balance between being heavy

enough to sustain expeditionary warfare and light enough

to facilitate rapid deployment. We will apply lessons

learned from current operations to maintain an edge

against ever-adapting opponents.

Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025

Section I - Vision

Chapter 1

Marine Corps Vision 2025

The Marine Corps of the future will be the Nation’s expeditionary force of choice. It will be:

a. Dedicated to making Marines imbued with the

ideal of selfless service to the Nation. Our success as a

Corps depends directly on our ability to recruit, train,
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e. Focused on executing sustainable expeditionary operations. We will ensure that we maintain the

ability to sustain ourselves in operations through the use of either a sea base or an initial lodgment

ashore. The organic sustainability of our Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) is a unique and

critical force enabler in such conditions, particularly early in an operation. We must remain committed

to fielding sustainable forces, exploiting joint capabilities, and leveraging the advantages of seabasing.

f. Trained and equipped to lead joint and

multinational operations and enable interagency

activities. Marines take pride in being “first to fight,”

and historically have a record of being the first to

respond to many emergencies and disasters. As first

responders, we have experience integrating many

organizations with different levels of capability into an

effective team. In the future, Marine Corps forces may

be required to remain actively engaged for longer

periods alongside our joint, multinational, and

interagency partners.

g. Educated and trained to understand and defeat adversaries

in complex conflicts. We will go to greater lengths to understand

our enemies and the range of cultural, societal, and political factors

affecting all with whom we interact.

Our training and education

programs will provide skills that

enable civil-military and combat

operations and are particularly

important in complex environments.

The ability to conduct both types of

operations, simultaneously, is the essence of the force as a “two-fisted

fighter” — capable of offering an open hand to people in need or a

precise jab to an adversary in an irregular warfare environment; while at

the same time, ready to wield a closed fist in the event of major combat

operations.

h. Committed to taking care of Marines and their families. While

the ideals of service to Corps and Country have not changed, the

conditions of service are constantly changing, as are the needs and

wants of Marine families. Marines have reasonable expectations

regarding housing, schools, and family support, and it is incumbent upon us to support our Marines in

these key areas.

Vision Statement

The Marine Corps of 2025 will fight and win our Nation’s battles with multicapable MAGTFs, either

from the sea or in sustained operations ashore. Our unique role as the Nation’s force in readiness,

along with our values, enduring ethos, and core competencies, will ensure we remain highly

responsive to the needs of combatant commanders in an uncertain environment and against irregular

threats. Our future Corps will be increasingly reliant on naval deployment, preventative in approach,

leaner in equipment, versatile in capabilities, and innovative in mindset. In an evolving and complex

world, we will excel as the Nation’s expeditionary “force of choice.”
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Chapter 2

Marine Corps Values, Philosophy, Principles, and Competencies

This chapter describes our values, philosophy, principles, and competencies. These

capture who we are, how we fight, what we believe, and what we do.

a. Core Values. Our values reflect those of the American people and define who we

are. We are men and women who hold true to our Core Values of Honor, Courage, and

Commitment. These values serve as our touchstones in times of peril and adversity. They

guide the actions of every individual who has earned the title ...“Marine.”

b. Warfighting Philosophy. We

operate in the spirit of, and are guided

by, the tenets of maneuver warfare. These

tenets describe how we fight. We

recognize that war is ultimately a violent

clash of human wills with an enduring

nature characterized by friction,

uncertainty, disorder, and complexity. We

seek victory by shattering the cohesion

and will of the enemy, not just through

sheer physical attrition of his means to

resist. We combine maneuver with

firepower to produce a violent and lethal

outcome for the adversary. We seek to

concentrate our strength against enemy

weakness, exploiting his critical

vulnerabilities while minimizing and

protecting our own. We believe our

decision cycle is faster than the enemy’s,

allowing us to exploit the advantages of

speed, focus, tempo, shock, and surprise.

We believe that the human dimension of

war is the most critical element, and that

boldness, creativity, intelligence, and the

warrior spirit are prime attributes. This

philosophy applies across the full range

of military operations. 

c. Enduring Principles. Principles define fundamental beliefs that form the

foundation from which Marines derive their ethos and basic operating instincts.

The following principles help to further define the cultural identity of Marines in

the most basic terms — they express what we believe:
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Every Marine a Rifleman. Every Marine — regardless of military

occupational specialty — is first and foremost a disciplined warrior.

Expeditionary Naval Force. Marines are “soldiers of the sea,” an integral

part of the naval Services — lean, versatile, flexible, and ready. We are

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct naval campaigns and operate on and

from naval platforms, or to fight in protracted campaigns ashore.

Combined Arms Organization. In 1952, Congress directed the Marine Corps’

composition as an air-ground combined arms force. This integrated force, known

as the MAGTF, has unique and incomparable warfighting capabilities. Our

MAGTF contains organic air, ground, and logistics elements under a single

command element, making it an effective and integrated combined arms force.

Ready and Forward Deployed. Congress’ intent that the Marine Corps serve

as the “force in readiness” was founded on a recognized national need for a

force capable of rapid response to emerging crises. This requirement mandates

high standards of readiness across the force. We are routinely forward deployed

around the globe and stand prepared to respond quickly in times of crisis.

Agile and Adaptable. The Marine Corps’ agility is based on its expeditionary

mindset and flexible structure, able to operate either from the sea or in sustained

operations ashore. We can adapt quickly with unparalleled speed across an

extraordinary range of military operations. Our organizational design and training

facilitate a seamless transition between these operations,

providing the necessary capability to operate effectively.

Marines Take Care of Their Own. We are stewards

of the most important resource entrusted to us — our

Nation’s sons and daughters. We make Marines, imbue

them with our Core Values, and offer them the

opportunity to serve a cause greater than themselves.

Marines live up to the motto, Semper Fidelis. We are

faithful to those who fall and we care for our wounded

Marines and their families.
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d. Core Competencies. Core competencies reflect our particular skill sets and thus

describe what we do. They provide the basis for the level of expertise and effectiveness of

Marine Corps forces. They are our fundamental contribution to our Nation’s defense.

Though enduring, they are not static; as necessary, new competencies must be developed

and honed to meet emerging challenges. These challenges are assessed by each

Commandant of the Marine Corps. Currently, Marine Corps forces have six core

competencies. The first four represent enduring core competencies and reflect legislative

direction and are codified in public law. The latter two reflect demonstrated skill sets that

have to be raised to a higher level given the Nation’s strategy, defense planning priorities,

and our understanding of the emerging security environment.

1. The Corps conducts persistent forward naval engagement and is always

prepared to respond as the Nation’s force in readiness. The Marine Corps is

devoted to an expeditionary way of life. We

understand that true readiness means much more

than being deployable. It requires a force that is

deployed with our Navy shipmates and engaged in

the littorals, shaping the operational environment,

and contributing to the prevention of conflict. This

agile force can react rapidly across the range of

military operations and must prevail, even thrive,

in the uncertainty and chaos of emerging crises.

2. The Corps employs integrated combined

arms across the range of military operations, and can operate as part of a joint or

multinational force. Our MAGTFs blend the art and science of executing combined

arms operations from air, land, and sea. Marine employment and integration of airand ground-based capabilities reflects our

innovative approach to warfighting. History

has shown that this approach can be applied

with effect in missions that range from security

cooperation to major combat operations. Our

MAGTFs are task-organized for each mission

and can be employed independently, or as part

of a joint or multinational force.

3. The Corps provides forces and

specialized detachments for service aboard naval ships, on stations, and for

operations ashore. The Marine Corps and the Navy

share a common heritage. Marines have served

aboard Navy ships as marksmen, as embarked

MAGTFs, as naval aviators, and as specialized

detachments afloat. This heritage is reflected in our

doctrine and in how we design our equipment and

weapons systems. Our modernization programs for

the future are being designed to allow Marine Corps

forces to seamlessly deploy, project power, and fight

from naval vessels or austere expeditionary bases, or

any combination thereof. Our close association with

the Navy continues today, along with a growing

interaction with the Coast Guard. The new maritime

strategy articulates a renewed emphasis on integrated

naval capabilities and capacities.

“There is little that will sober an

enemy more surely than the

knowledge that somewhere, just

over the horizon, lies a force of

well-trained,well-equipped

Marines in competently manned

ships capable of delivering a

stunning amphibious blow at a

point and time of their 

own choosing.”

Lieutenant General 

Victor Krulak,

United States Marine Corps
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4. The Corps conducts joint forcible entry

operations from the sea and develops amphibious

landing force capabilities and doctrine. When access

to critical regions or allies is denied or in jeopardy,

forward deployed, rapidly employable Marine Corps

forces are trained and ready to execute amphibious

operations to overcome enemy defenses. Together, the

Navy and Marine Corps provide the Nation with its

primary capability to swiftly project and sustain combat

power ashore in the face of armed opposition. We

leverage available joint and naval capabilities, project sustainable combat power ashore,

and secure entry for follow-on forces. Our sea based MAGTFs provide the Nation with

expeditionary forces to conduct initial operations independent of local infrastructure, or in

undeveloped, austere areas. This capability enables the accomplishment of amphibious

joint forcible entry operations as well as various missions across the range of military

operations. These strategic capabilities require focused amphibious resources and doctrine.

5. The Corps conducts complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals and

other challenging environments. The Marine Corps’ historical ability to conduct

expeditionary operations, such as irregular warfare, against emerging threats in complex

environments is well documented. These operations include counterinsurgency;

counterterrorism; train, advise, and assist activities; and stability tasks. The complexity of

these missions has increased due to the presence of

large numbers of noncombatants, urbanization in the

littorals, and the dynamics of the information

environment. Marines are specifically trained and

broadly educated to understand cultures and

populations, to thrive in chaotic environments, and

to recognize and respond creatively to demanding

situations.

6. The Corps leads joint and multinational

operations and enables interagency activities. The complex nature of existing security

challenges demands capabilities that harness the strengths of all the instruments of national

power. Marines are well qualified to enable the introduction of follow-on forces and

facilitate the integration of military and interagency efforts. This interoperability mandates

the establishment of enduring relationships and

the orchestration of diverse capabilities,

organizations, and cultural awareness across all

aspects of an operation.
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Section II - Strategy

Chapter 3

National Security Planning, Future Security Environment, and 

Threats and Challenges

As we prepare for an unpredictable future, we must continue to adapt to the ever-changing character and

conduct of warfare, while remaining cognizant of its fundamentally unchanging nature. What Congress

described as “fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components” — known

today as MAGTFs — provides the primary means through which we engage with partners, assist victims,

or strike with determination against our foes. Our future remains true to the idea that a Corps of Marines —

who are well-trained, equipped, and educated in the art and science of war — can leverage the great

advantages of seapower through rapid and decisive action in and around the littorals.

a. National Strategic Planning Guidance. The larger purpose and goals underlying our national

strategic planning have remained remarkably consistent. Our government, throughout the post Cold War

period, has outlined broadly accepted, enduring national interests:

1. Defend the homeland from attack.

2. Prevent the emergence of a hostile regional power.

3. Ensure the stability of the global system.

4. Ensure key allies’ survival and active cooperation.

5. Prevent or respond to major disasters and disturbances.

The United States is a maritime nation. Its enduring national interests clearly necessitate a balanced

and integrated foreign policy supported by naval forces that are routinely overseas and prepared to

engage and/or respond with speed and decisiveness.

b. Maritime Strategic Imperatives. Based upon these enduring interests, the Marine Corps, Navy,

and Coast Guard recently identified six strategic imperatives. These imperatives, articulated in A

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, define the tasks that our maritime Services will

contribute to in the future. It directs these Services to —

1. Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.

2. Deter major power war.

3. Win our Nation’s wars.

4. Contribute to homeland defense in depth.

5. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners.

6. Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.

The inherent global reach, presence, and operational flexibility of naval expeditionary forces are

critical to meeting these imperatives. 

c. Future Security Environment. The Marine Corps recently conducted a comprehensive strategic

assessment to better understand the security context of 2025. Our assessment was informed by a number

of studies such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, National Intelligence Council assessments, the

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Operational Environment, and the Marine

Corps Intelligence Activity mid- and long-range threat estimates. This assessment serves as a baseline

for our strategic planning, tempered by our understanding of history, and the limits of our ability to

predict, much less control, the future.
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The world of 2025 will be more populated than today’s by more than 30 percent and more heavily

concentrated within the littorals. More than 60 percent of the Earth’s population will live in urban

areas in 2025. Urban population growth will be most dramatic in Asia and Africa. The developed

world’s population will be older, with many native populations declining. As a result, their older native

populations will be supported by smaller working forces or larger immigrant populations, straining

government resources. Developing world populations, on the other hand, will grow significantly. Most

growth will occur in urban areas where good governance, jobs, services, food, potable water, and

sanitation will be challenged if not completely lacking. Youth bulges in key countries will produce

large numbers of underemployed adolescents with seemingly limited opportunities.

Globalization will continue, increasing the velocity and degree of interaction between societies.

This interaction promotes economic prosperity, but also increases vulnerability to disruption.

Globalization has helped raise hundreds of millions out of poverty, but more than a billion people

still live in extreme poverty. Almost three billion people live on less than $2 per day. These social

inequities have been and will continue to be exploited by extremists or identity-based movements to

foment violence.

Globalization induces a greater demand for resources. Global consumption of oil is expected to

rise 50 percent by 2035, and most of the increase will be in the developing world, especially China

and India. Technological solutions or alternative fuels may not mitigate the challenge in the near

term. The scarcity of fresh water and food could be an even greater concern. Today, more than a

billion people are without access to an improved water supply. Almost three billion people, many in

Africa and Asia, have no form of improved sanitation services. By 2025, more than half the global

population will live under water stressed or water scarce conditions.

d. Threats and Challenges. Trends point to shifts in the character and forms of future warfare.

Many states will improve their conventional capabilities, and states and non-state actors alike will be

able to acquire lethal capabilities. A significant trend is the blurring of what was previously thought

to be distinct forms of war or conflict — conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and

criminality — into what can be described as hybrid challenges.

This blurring character of conflict is illustrated by

combinations of various approaches including conventional

capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, and

criminal disorder. Hybrid challenges can be created by states,

proxy forces, or some armed groups. Hybrid warfare can be

conducted by separate entities, or even by the same unit, to

achieve effects against more traditional state forces. The

purpose of these operations will be to impose excessive

political, human, and materiel costs in order to undermine their

adversary’s resolve and commitment. The ability to employ selected next generation weapons

systems or to exploit the information networks of modern societies with computer network attacks

can also be anticipated.

Hybrid conflicts are assessed as the most likely form of conflict facing the United States. Few

states, if any, are capable of matching America’s overwhelming conventional military combat power.

Because of our conventional superiority, adversaries will seek more indirect forms of conflict. We

expect opponents to blend different approaches and integrate various weapons (lethal and nonlethal),

tactics, and technologies to deny us access and freedom of action. They will be particularly effective

in the information environment, exploiting both modern media and cybertechnology.

“The first feature we can predict

with confidence is that there is

going to be a blurring, a further

blurring, of warfare categories.”

Colin S. Gray,

Another Bloody Century:

Future Warfare
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Further complicating the task of preparing for the future is the nature of the operational environment,

which we judge to be more complex. The most likely operational environment will be more densely

populated and urbanized. It will be rife with interdependent power, service, and information systems.

Operating in these urban complexes will pose extraordinary challenges. As difficult as the physical

aspect of operations in this environment will be, the cultural terrain will be more complicated to

navigate. The ability to comprehend and effectively “maneuver” in the cognitive and cultural dimension

of the modern battlespace is paramount.

While the threat of state-on-state warfare featuring the destructive capabilities of major powers has

declined, it remains a distinct possibility. It must still be regarded as the most dangerous threat to the

Nation. The expected proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons among

states reinforces this assessment. The potential use of such weapons is ever present and compels us to

devote substantial resources to countermeasures.

Non-state actors will also press to acquire weapons of mass destruction and other advanced military

technologies. These technologies will be employed to target key operating systems such as those

supporting US power projection capabilities. Dramatic increases in global information access,

breakthroughs in the biological and material sciences, and our increasing reliance on cybertechnology

will enable the diffusion of destructive power to smaller and smaller groups.

The dilemma facing the Marine Corps is that it must maintain the ability to wage successful

campaigns against large conventionally-armed states and their militaries, against widely dispersed

terrorists, and everything in between — generally at great distance from our shores. It must be prepared

to respond to this broad range of operations without extensive warning time and respond consistent with

the Nation’s values and commitments. On this uneven playing field, we will be confronted by enemies

who adhere to no rules, while many of our actions or inactions may have strategic consequences.

Accordingly, the Marine Corps cannot be wedded to a particular method or mode of war. It cannot

assume there will be technological silver bullets or doctrinal formulas that ensure military success.

Our Nation’s global interests, the international community’s need for stability, and the range of

missions that must be fulfilled demand a discriminating, multicapable force. This force must be highly

trained and educated to function in both current and emerging operational environments against

evolving foes. The Nation requires very capable forces, covering the greatest range of tasks, at an

affordable cost that can minimize the risks inherent in an unforeseeable future. Civilian and military

leadership must always acknowledge that weather, terrain, and the enemy still “get a vote” in the

conduct of warfare. Truly expeditionary forces must have the ability to engage rapidly and in all

conditions against enemies that adapt weapons or tactics to fight us asymmetrically. For the Corps, we

must continue to prepare for the challenges that loom on the horizon. We are by law, and will continue

to be, the Nation’s force in readiness — “most ready when the Nation is least ready.”
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Chapter 4

Strategy Statement and Objectives for 2025

The following strategy statement and prioritized objectives reflect the Marine Corps’ concept to

implement our Service vision.

a. Strategy Statement.

The Marine Corps’ unique contribution to national defense is its role as the Nation’s force in

readiness, able to respond rapidly and decisively to crises anywhere in the world. The Corps will

continue to fulfill that role – while improving its combat capability to prevail against emerging 

threats in complex environments.

The Corps will be:

1. Organized to execute operations with lethal and lean MAGTFs that are mission tailored

and able to operate as part of a naval and joint team.

2. Optimized to conduct naval expeditionary operations while retaining the institutional

agility, battlefield flexibility, and initiative to meet constantly changing conditions of war.

3. Modernized with equipment and logistics that expand expeditionary capability and

preserve our ability to operate from the sea.

4. Postured to prevent or respond to crises with forward positioned MAGTFs — both afloat

and ashore — that are engaged and ready to act decisively in response to combatant

commanders’ requirements.

These methods will be employed in order to provide the Nation unmatched strategic freedom

of maneuver and operational flexibility throughout the 21st century.

b. Objectives. The Marine Corps will achieve the following objectives: 

1. Focus on the Individual Marine. The individual

Marine will remain our most important warfighting asset.

The recruitment, training, professional education, and

retention of high-quality, disciplined warriors imbued with

our core values is paramount to our mission. We will

continue to exploit technology to enhance the performance

of the individual warrior. Marines at all levels must be

prepared to excel in ambiguous and dangerous conditions,

operate from a commander’s intent, and with minimal direct

supervision.

2. Improve Training and Education for Fog, Friction,

and Uncertainty. Our realistic training and education

system will prepare Marines for complex conditions and to

counter the unexpected. It will provide small unit leaders

the tactical acumen and knowledge to develop and assess

these conditions in order to make sound decisions, and the proficiency to employ supporting

intelligence, fires, and information resources. Our noncommissioned and junior officers will be

prepared for greater responsibility in an increasingly complex environment while potentially

operating in a decentralized manner.
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3. Expand Persistent Forward Presence and Engagement.

The Marine Corps will develop a plan to provide a tailored,

persistently engaged, contingency-capable MAGTF in five

prioritized regions:

a) East and Southeast Asia Littorals (US Pacific 

Command).

b) Red Sea, Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea Littorals (US 

Central Command [USCENTCOM]).

c) East and West Africa Littorals (USCENTCOM, US 

Africa Command [USAFRICOM]).

d) Latin American and the Caribbean Basin (US Southern 

Command).

e) Mediterranean Sea/North Africa Littorals (US European

Command and USAFRICOM).

Marines will be consistently deployed in the littoral areas of

these regions and deliberately engaged per the campaign plans of

the respective combatant commanders. First, this includes the routine, rotational deployment of

Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) to traditional Pacific, Indian, Arabian, and Mediterranean

waters in the role of theater “first responders.” Second, the routine, rotational deployment of

special purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) employed in missions such as training and advising,

stability, humanitarian support, and other theater security cooperation activities. Lastly, it requires

an advisory group capacity within each Marine expeditionary force (MEF).

We will look for opportunities to increase the number of Marines assigned to government and

military assistance organizations, including country teams. At the conclusion of these tours, we

will assign them to follow-on duties that apply their experience to regionally-focused operating,

advisory, and security forces. We will institutionalize training and advisory duties as legitimate,

normal career activities for all Marines, and ensure promotion policies reflect appropriate

consideration of these duties.

4. Posture for Hybrid Threats in Complex Environments. Without sacrificing its conventional

capabilities, the Corps will prepare to conduct operations against hybrid threats in complex

environments; such as urbanized littorals, mountainous terrain, and dense jungles. We must

successfully identify, engage, and operate against ever evolving opponents who will exploit

irregular approaches with modern lethal capabilities and advanced cybertechnology. Robust

intelligence capabilities will support all levels of command awareness and decisionmaking.

Advancements in secure communicatons

will extend the commander’s operational

reach and enhance force protection. Our

approach to problem solving and

organization, our maneuver warfare

philosophy, and our combined arms skills

will continue to serve us well in these

chaotic environments.
16

5. Reinforce Naval Relationships. We share

with the Navy a remarkable heritage and a

common perspective on the fundamental

necessity of maintaining the ability to operate

freely in the littorals. This underwrites our

ability to maintain access to foreign markets,

provide humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief, conduct theater security cooperation, and

protect our national interests. To maintain this

ability, we need the capability to conduct robust

forcible entry operations from the sea, maritime

interception operations (MIO), and other naval

expeditionary force tasks. This operational

capability requires the constant maintenance of relationships and skills developed through years

of side-by-side service with the fleet. The demands of the past few years have reduced those

side-by-side service opportunities. The Corps will place renewed emphasis on such training and

deployments in order to reinvigorate that capability.

Our Navy colleagues have embraced a posture of persistent presence and engagement. They

routinely operate and “show the flag” in dangerous places, but must keep a constant watch for

terrorist attacks. Well-trained Marines can help significantly deter and aggressively defend

against those threats. We will work with the Navy to provide embarked SPMAGTFs to Navy

commands — when required. Their operational focus will include the following capabilities:

providing security ashore, manning boarding parties in support of MIOs, supporting

noncombatant evacuation operations, and conducting security cooperation activities and

training.

6. Ensure Amphibious Force Levels Meet Strategic Requirements. We are resolved to

maintain the requisite capacity of modern amphibious lift to support the Nation’s ability to

execute forcible entry operations from the sea and other combatant commander missions.

The Nation’s amphibious lift requirement has two primary drivers. The first is the capacity to

support joint forcible entry operations. This is a MEF-level requirement, defined as the total

shipping needed to lift a MEF command element and the assault echelon of two Marine

expeditionary brigade (MEB) equivalents, reinforced by a third MEB equivalent through the

use of the maritime prepositioning force (future) (MPF[F]). The ability to overcome challenges

to access and to project power ashore is a basis of our combat credibility and conventional

deterrent.

The second driver is the combatant commanders’ needs for theater security cooperation,

presence, and crisis response forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of these

missions and other amphibious operations has

doubled due to increased requirements for

crisis response and flexible, persistent presence

options for theater security initiatives.

Given a need to balance a forcible entry

capability and increased sea based persistent

presence, the minimum force of operationally

available amphibious ships must be

continuously assessed. This assessment will be
17

conducted in conjunction with the Navy. We will evaluate the number and composition of ships

required to maintain an effective sea-based MEF-level warfighting capability as well as other seabased forward presence requirements.

7. Create Joint Seabasing Capabilities. We will improve our ability to cross wide expanses of

ocean and remain persistently offshore at the place and time of our choosing. Joint force

commanders depend upon the sea as both maneuver space and as a secure base of operations to

overcome antiaccess capabilities. Our approach to both challenges is called seabasing. Seabasing

provides an initial port and airfield afloat in the area of operations that minimizes the reliance on

ports and airfields ashore. Though the sea base must be protected, it is the ideal method for

projecting influence and power ashore in either a discrete or overt manner. This can be done in

support of security cooperation activities, humanitarian assistance, adversary deterrence, or while

executing major combat operations.

Our MPF(F) program, amphibious ships, and other seabasing initiatives expand joint

operational capabilities and offer tremendous flexibility to joint force commanders. Seabasing

will achieve a robust capability to support joint operations ashore in an era of antiaccess and area

denial constraints. The ability to project power from sovereign bases and minimize the footprint

of our joint forces ashore provides numerous benefits. The ability to conduct at-sea transfer of

resources, for both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore purposes,

is a key enabler for deploying, employing, and sustaining

joint forces from the sea.

8. Lead Joint/Multinational Operations and Enable

Interagency Activities. A clearly changing characteristic in

the modern battlespace is the shift from a primarily military

focus to one that achieves a greater degree of operational

integration of all instruments of national power. Accordingly,

we will extend our combined arms approach and add a

“combined actions” orientation. We will better integrate

interagency capabilities into our training, education, campaign planning, and operations while

also improving our own capabilities to lead joint task forces. We will offer training and

educational venues to joint, multinational, and interagency personnel. This will assist our

preparation for contingencies and build the relationships needed when the Nation calls on the

Corps to lead or enable a joint, multinational, or interagency effort.

9. Maintain a Ready and Sustainable Reserve. We will employ a total force approach to meet

the Marine Corps’ force generation requirements. We will

pursue policies and operational practices to better develop

and access the skill, knowledge, and expertise of Marines in

the Reserve Component. This approach will provide the most

effective warfighting solution for the Marine Corps’ total

force manpower requirements. The Marine Corps will

optimize the use of its Reserve Component as an operational

as well as a strategic force provider.
18

10. Build and Deploy Multicapable MAGTFs. Our

MAGTFs will be decisive across the range of military

operations with their capacity tailored to combatant

commanders’ requirements. They will be optimized to operate

as an integrated system through the air, land, and maritime

domains, and the information environment. In order to reduce

strategic and operational risks and provide our Nation’s

leadership with the capabilities and right capacity to execute the

missions we are

assigned, we must be

properly sized.

Operational experience

confirms Congress’

decision to define the composition of the Corps as

a combined arms team with a specified structure.

We will man, train, and sustain three balanced and

modernized MEFs in the Active Component.
19

Chapter 5

Force Implications for 2025

To remain the Nation’s force in readiness, the Marine Corps must continuously innovate. This

requires that we look across the entire institution and identify areas that need improvement and effect

positive change. The following implications are drawn from the strategy and reflect the direction our

institution is taking in order to fulfill its role within the Nation’s security establishment.

a. Operating Force Structure. The operational effectiveness of the Corps is founded upon the

MAGTF construct—not the separate MAGTF elements. The operational and tactical synergy of the

MAGTF is what makes it a flexible, effective, and feared force on the battlefield. Improving this

synergy requires concrete steps that cut across the MAGTF; namely, developing capabilities to better

operate in complex terrain, in a decentralized manner, and in the information environment.

First, the MAGTF’s effectiveness in

complex terrain must be qualitatively

improved. This requires enhanced small unit

training and situational awareness, and the

reduction of gaps in ground tactical mobility

and assault support. We will pursue means to

deliver personnel and logistics in complex

terrain with precision. The application of

unmanned systems has to be more

aggressively explored, as well as integrated

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) across the MAGTF. Lightening the load

of the individual Marine while enhancing

protection is a Service imperative.

Second, the MAGTF’s ability to operate in a decentralized manner will be enhanced through

improved training and assignment policies for our junior leaders. The emerging operational environment

will place unprecedented demands on our small unit leaders. This reality demands that we take their

training to a new level. To this end, our doctrine, organization, training, and manpower models and

assignment policies must identify ways of realizing this goal. Key to this is the alignment of progressive

predeployment training cycles for all MAGTF elements as early as possible in the training phase in

order to build cohesive teams.

Third, we will develop the necessary capability and capacity to effectively operate in the information

environment. This is a critical warfighting requirement that must be integrated across the MAGTF in

complex and media-intensive operational environments. Those capabilities that are unique to our

operational role and warfighting approach must be identified and built. We shall leverage joint and

government resources to the maximum extent possible and develop specific organic capabilities as

required. We must train and educate Marines at all levels on the challenges and opportunities presented

by the Information Age so that it becomes inherent in everything we do. Just as every Marine is a

collector of tactical information, every Marine must also understand how their actions contribute to our

information activities.

These implications cut across each element of the MAGTF and require specific improvements to

provide the required capabilities and necessary capacity demanded by the future security environment.
20

1. Command Element (CE). The organic

capabilities of our MEFs provide the MEF or

joint force commander the ability to employ

expeditionary headquarters in a timely manner.

As needed, these headquarters range in size from

a MEU, to a MEB, or even a MEF-sized

command element. We will continue our

initiatives, as evidenced in the Pacific, to

establish brigade-sized forces, tailored around

our existing aviation, ground, and logistics

subordinate commands and augmented by

additional capabilities as required. The CEs of

these forces will be optimized for amphibious

and contingency operations and be properly equipped with modern and secure command and

control (C2), intelligence, communications, and networking systems. They will be prepared to

lead joint and multinational operations, and to enable interagency activities.

The intelligence systems used by the CEs must give Marines the ability to understand the

specific environment, detect and find the threat, and provide useful and timely intelligence to

planning and decisionmaking at all levels. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for

disseminating high-value, actionable intelligence down to the lowest tactical level in support

of operational maneuver and precision engagements must be further refined. Equally

important will be further investment in areas such as language proficiency and cultural

intelligence to prepare forces for the expanded interaction with local populations.

We must develop the ability to provide persistent surveillance over an extended but densely

complex operational environment. To this end, we must pursue development of advanced ISR

sensors that are linked to users at all echelons. Marine units need enhanced intelligence

sections augmented by multicapable teams and specialized equipment from MAGTF

intelligence units. They also need high-bandwidth communications to connect national-level

sources to the tactical user.

The Marine Corps will integrate C2 and ISR capabilities down to the squad level. The

emerging operational environment requires that we increase the shared situational awareness

of small unit leaders to support decentralized decisionmaking. This investment not only

enhances the capabilities of these small units, but also increases the quality and quantity of

shared situational awareness across echelons. In environments where human intelligence and

tactical information reign supreme, we must acquire and convey information rapidly and

accurately to facilitate timely decisionmaking. Over the past decade, we have made great

strides in enhancing C2 and ISR at the battalion/squadron level and above. We need now to

make similar strides from the battalion down to the squad while recognizing that “the last

hundred yards” of this challenge is exponentially harder. To this end, we will aggressively

pursue integrated microtechnologies, such as a secure communications personal data

apparatus that communicates via the spoken word, data, and imagery without adding to an

already heavy combat load. 

Most importantly, the entire MAGTF’s communications infrastructure must be resilient and

protected from cyber attack.

2. Ground Combat Element (GCE). We will improve the effectiveness of Marine ground

forces. One important enhancement will focus on our small unit leaders – providing them the

training and equipment to credibly perform as “strategic” noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
21

On the increasingly decentralized and lethal battlefield that characterizes current and future

conflict, these leaders cannot be developed in a single two- to three-year operational tour.

Rather, we must provide further incentives for those who demonstrate the greatest potential in

small unit leadership roles to continue to

serve in operational billets. We must

tailor our training to develop cohesive

units, critical reasoning, and ethical

decisionmaking in scenarios spanning the

full range of military operations.

Recognizing the critical importance of

capable, mature, and responsible junior

leaders is simply not enough. Our

personnel assignment, training, and

education policies must support the

imperative of creating and sustaining

these superb small unit leaders.

Recent combat has confirmed the need

to improve the essential fires and

maneuver capabilities of Marine ground

forces, especially within complex urban

terrain. Schemes of maneuver in future operations will often necessitate coordinated, precise

fires from ground, air, and naval surface fire support platforms. These fires must be available

24 hours a day, 7 days a week under all weather conditions and they must be able to rapidly

and precisely engage the fleeting opportunities often found in irregular warfare. We must

develop complementary nonlethal systems such as those used to control crowds or secure

critical facilities where the use of lethal force would be counterproductive. Discrimination in

the application of violence will be consistent with the threat, and minimizing collateral

damage will be an important consideration.

Ground mobility is a shortfall that must be remedied. As Marines, we are always aware of

the size and weight limits that we live with to remain both operationally deployable by sea

and tactically effective ashore. Every decision in this area must be carefully reconciled with

these two considerations. A third factor is now equally important — we must provide

adequate protection for our tactical mobility systems. Our goal is to provide a mix of

survivable tactical vehicles that are compatible with expeditionary and amphibious

deployment means. 

3. Aviation Combat Element (ACE). In the increasingly complex and asymmetrical

operating environments of the future, our Corps will continue to demonstrate the importance

of integrating combat capabilities across the air, land, and maritime domains, and the

information environment. Our integrated, combined

arms doctrine will prove as relevant in future

contingencies as it has throughout our history.

Marine aviation will continue to provide six

functions to the MAGTF — assault support, antiair

warfare, offensive air support, electronic warfare,

control of aircraft and missiles, and aerial

reconnaissance. These functions will not change,

but they will evolve as technology advances and

the battlefield or enemy changes.
22

Marine aviation is in the midst of a significant

modernization effort that will replace every major

aircraft type in our inventory with next-generation

capabilities. Tilt-rotor and short take off and vertical

landing aircraft (STOVL) capabilities bring

revolutionary enhancements to the battlefield. The

greater range, speed, and agility that tilt-rotor

technology brings are driving new concepts of

operation to the MAGTF. Enhanced STOVL

capabilities will enable flexible distributed

shipboard and expeditionary airfield basing, rapid

response to crises, high sortie generation rates, a small footprint, and improved survivability.

In every case, our modernization efforts focus on making the future joint force more effective

across the range of military operations. Specifically, our STOVL assets will improve the

agility and utility of the ACE and its contribution to the joint fight.

We will pursue developments with unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) to widen the forcemultiplying capabilities that these enhanced, multispectral systems bring to the fight. Newly

emergent concepts for UAS employment will continue to enhance and extend the lethal and

nonlethal capability of the MAGTF and joint force commander to new levels, fostering

transformational advancements in battlespace command and situational awareness.

Central to enabling the enhanced capabilities of our aviation platforms will be an aviation

C2 family of systems that will fuse C2, sensor, weapons data, and information to provide a

true common operational picture. This fused

information will be distributed throughout the

battlespace — from multifunctional C2 centers, to the

cockpit, down to our distributed ground maneuver

forces at the squad level — allowing for a level of

awareness and decisionmaking never before achieved

and facilitating MAGTF and joint force integration,

coordination, and employment. In the future, the ACE

will be secure, network-enabled, and digitally

interoperable to ensure it is responsive, persistent,

lethal, and adaptive.

The Marine Corps’ aviation modernization is designed to improve the warfighting

effectiveness, strategic agility, and striking power of the MAGTF and the joint force

commander.

4. Logistics Combat Element (LCE). The emerging security environment generates hard

requirements for lighter and leaner forces, capable of being effectively sustained over a

greater distance. The LCE will adapt to complex operating environments, and increase its

ability to operate in urban areas and deliver critical support to engaged maneuver units

without drawing on combat units for force protection. The logistics community shall establish

habitual relationships with GCE units where feasible.

Our efforts to modernize logistics must focus on a markedly improved ability to sense

what is needed and respond accordingly. To that end, an integrated and secure logistics

operational architecture that identifies the people, processes, and capabilities required to
23

support deployed MAGTFs is fundamental to

logistics modernization. To realize the benefits of

this architecture, we will continue to enhance our

ability to conduct battlefield sustainment. Innovative

efforts, such as unmanned cargo delivery systems,

shall be pursued to meet this end.

In addition to modernization, we will pursue other

initiatives to increase the readiness of our operating

forces. We will adopt a cradle-to-grave approach to

equipment readiness, ensuring that logistics support commences with the development of

capabilities, evolves throughout systems acquisition and fielding, continues with sustainment in

the operating forces and maintenance depots, and remains through the disposal process. It is

critical that equipment be designed based on how it will be maintained and sustained. These

equipment systems must be lighter, easier to maintain, and consume

less power than current systems. As a critical part of the logistics

chain, we need our equipment to be able to sense and transmit

pertinent systems information, initiating a timely and coordinated

maintenance response at the optimal time. The integration of the naval

logistics communities must continue in order to move beyond

interoperability and seek integrated naval logistics support to deployed

forces (both afloat and ashore).

Our expeditionary Marine Corps requires a logistics capability that

is leaner, lighter, and less energy-intensive than the past.

b. Supporting Force Structure. Our supporting establishment directly

supports our deployed Marines as we continue to fight in Iraq, Afghanistan,

and elsewhere. Changing requirements, technological advances in

communications and collaborative capabilities, and innovative thinking

have evolved the roles of existing organizations and led to creation of new

ones to provide new and enhanced capabilities to deployed forces. Our Civilian Marine workforce is

crucial to the successful operation of our supporting structure.

1. Training and Education Command. The future postulated in this document will require a

first-class training and education system. Creating this will require dedicated investments.

From recruit training through senior staff NCO professional military education (PME)

and from Officer Candidates School through our Senior Leader Development Program, we

must continue to build thinking, decisive, innovative Marines, imbued with initiative and

empowered to act within the construct of commander’s intent and in the face of potentially

confusing, chaotic and unclear situations.

Training and education must accurately reflect the situations, environments, and peoples

Marines will face. Future operational environments demand ever more capable junior

Marines and experienced, mature leaders. They must be fully prepared to make the right

decisions in often ambiguous and demanding situations where failure to act properly may

have far-reaching strategic consequences. We shall prepare our Marines realistically for

complex conditions — by providing small unit leaders the tactical acumen and knowledge to

assess these conditions and the proficiency to employ supporting intelligence, fires, and

information resources often associated with higher echelons.
24

To that end, we will not just ensure “Every

Marine is a Rifleman,” we will emphasize combat

leadership, knowledge, and proficiency throughout

the continuum of training and education for our

NCOs and staff NCOs, in addition to their military

occupational specialty (MOS). We must ensure both

PME and MOS skill development are modernized

and designed to reach our entire officer population,

regardless of opportunity to attend resident

education, and the core knowledge and abilities are adequately acquired in any venue. Our

language and cultural communication skills require

considerable enhancement and must become integral to our

training and education programs.

In support of increased training requirements, the Marine

Corps must sustain, upgrade, and modernize our training

ranges and areas. Our bases, stations, and training areas must

be viewed as institutional assets. With an eye towards future

operational environments, we will enhance live-fire combined

arms training capabilities at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat

Center, 29 Palms, CA. These facilities must be capable of

supporting large-scale scenarios and combined arms exercises

that support retaining our unique core capabilities. We must

ensure we remain proficient at expeditionary operations,

particularly from the sea, and retain our ability to operate

throughout the world’s littorals. Our units and leaders must be

proficient and comfortable operating in the joint environment

and with interagency partners at every level, from small unit

leaders through MAGTF staff.

Our training and education must ensure sound, rapid decisionmaking, as well as

proficiency at applying the capabilities of the MAGTF. We must be fully integrated in our

approach, individual and collective, training and education,

individual unit through task organized elements of the

MAGTF, and the MAGTF itself, regardless of mission,

condition, or environment. 

In addition to its orientation on Service specific needs,

the training and education system must build innovative

capabilities in order to augment our efforts to engage friends

and partners throughout the world. Security needs in many

countries go far beyond the capabilities envisioned in the

operating forces, particularly those needs that are long term

institution building in nature. We must devise efficient,

effective, regionally and country-oriented capabilities that

target high priority security cooperation objectives of the combatant commands, in

conjunction with the Marine Corps forces component supporting plans.

We must continue to promote PME as a career-long activity and it must become

increasingly focused on junior Marines. To this end, the Marine Corps University shall

expand PME and leadership training through resident and distance education programs to

prepare leaders to meet the challenges of future national security environments. We will
25

actively support the Marine Corps University’s continued expansion of its faculty, facilities,

and resources, encompassing its mission to educate the entire force, regardless of venue. As

the Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study observed, this

challenge “cannot be deferred, and must be met, if the Marine Corps is to maintain its

heritage of service to the Nation.”

2. Operating Force Bases and Stations. Marine Corps bases and stations are a critical

component of the supporting establishment that constitutes the MAGTF’s “fifth element.”

They are irreplaceable national assets. They are fundamental to combat readiness providing

essential training and support the launch,

sustainment, and reconstitution of Marine

operating forces. They are also integral to the

quality of life of Marines, Sailors, and their

families.

The ability to train as a MAGTF is a

fundamental requirement of readiness and a

primary role for installations. Our ability to

train together gives us the ability to effectively

aggregate into a collective whole when needed

in complex expeditionary operations. We will

work to assure unimpeded access to our ranges, airspace, and training areas to support this

expeditionary readiness. This initiative will focus on individual and unit training and include

naval expeditionary considerations. This will be accomplished through encroachment control

using federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental partnerships to reduce

incompatible urban growth near our installations. Also, the Marine Corps will remain

responsible stewards of the natural and cultural resources aboard our installations through

positive and effective environmental management. Our bases will follow best practices to

ensure effectiveness and efficiency. To this end, energy conservation will be a matter of

focus to reflect innovative Marine Corps environmental stewardship. 

3. Logistics Command. Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC) will orchestrate

logistics solutions, aligning strategically positioned support to reduce customer wait time for

supplies and maintenance, while actively engaging with the warfighter to exponentially

improve Marine Corps logistics agility.

MCLC shall develop support concepts complementing the full range of tactical

operations to support rapid redeployment of equipment and the ability to reconstitute

equipment readiness in complex environments. Logistics agility is paramount in supporting

and sustaining multiple contingencies

simultaneously. Furthermore, the ability to

anticipate accelerated equipment rotations and

increased demand requires greater flexibility.

MCLC will provide agile logistics solutions

through employment of multiple distribution

channels, integrated supply chains, and mobile

maintenance capabilities.

4. Operational Reachback Support. A

number of organizations in the supporting

establishment have assumed significant roles in

providing operational reachback support to
26

deployed forces. Changing requirements, technological advances in communications and

collaboration tools, and innovative thinking have evolved the roles of existing organizations

like the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and

led to creation of new organizations such as the Marine Corps Network Operations Security

Center and the Marine Corps Information Operations Center. These organizations package

expertise and resources that cannot be replicated within the operating forces. The breadth

and complexity of challenges facing deployed Marine Corps Forces necessitates further

development of these centers, building sophisticated capabilities, robust networks to link

them to deployed force, and refinement of tactics and concepts integrating them into

deployed force operations.

c. Marine Corps Special Operations Force Structure. The US Marine Corps Forces,

Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is the Marine Corps’ contribution to US Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM). In the

future, MARSOC will continue to work as our

bridge to forge closer interoperability between

the Marine Corps, USSOCOM, and the special

operations community. We will work closely

with USSOCOM and USJFCOM to determine

our involvement in advisory and training team

requirements. MARSOC’s challenge will be to

ensure the training and education of its Marines

and Sailors to succeed in future special

operations even as it returns highly qualified

Marines to other tours of duty in the Marine

Corps.

d. Marine Corps Security Force Structure. In today’s security environment, virtually

every US Navy ship is a capital ship in terms of capability and cost. Protecting naval ships and

facilities is completely consistent with our history and our naval character. We will help protect

key operational forces and supporting facilities against terrorism and other irregular warfare

tactics, while providing relevant support to the US Navy.
27

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This vision and supporting strategy establish a direction of advance and specific objectives for our

institution. This effort is founded on our Congressionally-mandated functions, exploits our legacy and ethos

as Marines, and responds to anticipated future challenges. As we prepare for 2025 and beyond, the Marine

Corps must pay heed to combat-proven truths that have served the Nation well both in times of peril and in

times of peace. It must also continue to refine its capabilities for a challenging future. Our assessment

concludes that —

a. Individual Marines are our most potent weapons

and where we should continue to place our greatest

emphasis. They are empowered by technology, but

technology by itself is not a substitute for rigorously

trained, highly disciplined, and well led warriors who

are shaped by our core values and the Nation’s ideals.

b. Being truly expeditionary is based upon an

institutional and individual mindset, not simply the

ability to deploy overseas. We will focus on traveling

fast, being lean, and functioning effectively in austere

conditions.

c. Naval forces are a valuable rheostat for the

President and Secretary of Defense due to their sovereign status, speed of employment, strategic mobility,

and ability to conduct sustained operations for extended periods of time. They give joint force commanders

extraordinarily versatile assets that can respond to tomorrow’s challenges. 

d. To prevent problems and dampen instability, there is no effective substitute for ready and flexible

forces, forward deployed, persistently engaged “on station” in crisis-prone regions.

e. MAGTFs — and the amphibious ships that enable them to operate and act with decision and dispatch

in the littorals — are prudent and cost effective investments.

f. More than ever, the Nation requires an expeditionary force in readiness. 

We see the future imposing significant expectations

for a broadening set of missions. Security cooperation

efforts, training and advising foreign military forces,

deterring aggression, defeating hybrid threats, and

preparing for large-scale conventional wars pose a

wide range of requirements. This will result in a

greater premium for multicapable forces that

successfully perform various missions in more than

one domain.

In a world of dynamic change, some constants

remain. The superior performance of the Marine

Corps, in every environment, is one of those constants.

Our creative and innovative mindset ensures that we

are agile — adept at anticipating and preparing for events in an increasingly dangerous world. This agility

is another constant. Whether in the littorals, where we are most comfortable, or in the mountains of a landlocked nation – Marines will adapt and prevail. We are, and will remain, prepared to fight and win when

and where our Nation calls.

A-1

Glossary

Part I 

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACE aviation combat element

C2 command and control

CE command element

CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities

GCE ground combat element

GDF Guidance for the Development of the Force

GEF Guidance for the Employment of the Force

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JPG Joint Planning Guidance

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

LCE logistics combat element

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MARSOC United States Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command

MCLC Marine Corps Logistics Command

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MIO maritime interception operations

MOS military occupational specialty

MPF(F) maritime prepositioning force (future)
A-2

NCO noncommissioned officer

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PME professional military education

SPMAGTF special purpose Marine air-ground task force

STOVL short take-off and vertical landing aircraft

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UCP Unified Command Plan

USAFRICOM United States Africa Command

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
A-3

Glossary

Part II 

Terms & Definitions

amphibious shipping — Organic Navy ships specifically designed to transport, land, and support landing

forces in amphibious assault operations and capable of being loaded or unloaded by naval personnel

without external assistance in the amphibious objective area. (JP 1-02)

antiair warfare — That action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and

missile threat. Antiair warfare integrates all offensive and defensive actions against enemy aircraft, surfaceto-air weapons, and theater missiles into a singular, indivisible set of operations. It is one of the six

functions of Marine aviation. Also called AAW. (MCRP 5-12C)

assault echelon — In amphibious operations, the element of a force comprised of tailored untis and

aircraft assigned to conduct the initial assault on the operational area. (JP1-02)

assault follow-on echelon — In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles,

aircraft, equipment, and supplies that, though not needed to initiate the assault, is required to support and

sustain the assault. In order to accomplish its purpose, it is normally required in the objective area no later

than five days after commencement of the assault landing. Also called AFOE. (JP 1-02)

assault support — The use of aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistic support for the Marine airground task force, the movement of high priority cargo and personnel within the immediate area of

operations, in-flight refueling, and the evacuation of personnel and cargo. Assault support is one of the six

functions of Marine aviation. (MCRP 5-12C)

aviation combat element — The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is taskorganized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation combat element (ACE) provides all or a portion of

the six functions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. These functions are

antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of

aircraft and missiles. The ACE is usually composed of an aviation unit headquarters and various other

aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachment of specifically

required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. In a joint or multinational environment, the ACE

may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The ACE itself is

not a formal command. Also called ACE. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace — All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum that

encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

civil-military operations — The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit

relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and

authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate

military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local,

regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other

military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military

operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of

civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)
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combatant command — A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single

commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the

advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have

geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander — A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands

established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02)

combat power — The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation

can apply against the opponent at a given time. (JP 1-02)

command element — The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is the

headquarters. The command element (CE) is composed of the commander, general or executive and special

staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications support, intelligence, and reconnaissance

forces, necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The CE provides command and control,

intelligence, and other support essential for effective planning and execution of operations by the other

elements of the MAGTF. The CE varies in size and composition; and, in a joint or multinational

environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also

called CE. (MCRP 5-12C)

control of aircraft and missiles — The coordinated employment of facilities, equipment, communications,

procedures, and personnel that allows the aviation combat element (ACE) commander to plan, direct, and

control the efforts of the ACE to support the accomplishment of the Marine air-ground task force mission.

Control of aircraft and missiles is one of the six functions of Marine aviation. (MCRP 5-12C)

conventional forces — 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2.

Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions

taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

crisis — An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces,

possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,

political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to

achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare — Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control

the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions:

electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called EW. (JP 1-02) 

expeditionary force — An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.

(JP 1-02)

forcible entry — Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. See also

lodgment. (JP 1-02)

ground combat element — The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is taskorganized to conduct ground operations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organization but can

vary in size from a small ground unit of any type to one or more Marine divisions that can be
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independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF commander. It includes appropriate ground

combat and combat support forces, and in a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other

Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The ground combat element itself is

not a formal command. Also called GCE. (MCRP 5-12C)

instruments of national power — All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national

objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. 

(JP 1-02)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance — An activity that synchronizes and integrates the

planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct

support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also

called ISR. (JP 1-02)

interagency — United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of

Defense. See also interagency coordination. (JP 1-02)

irregular challenges — Challenges posed by those employing unconventional methods to counter the

traditional advantages of stronger opponents. (NDS)

irregular warfare — A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over

the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may

employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence,

and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

joint — Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military

Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force — A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of

two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force

commander. (JP 1-02)

littoral — The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to

the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the

shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (JP 1-02)

logistics combat element — The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is taskorganized to provide the combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The

logistics combat element varies in size from a small detachment to one or more Marine logistics groups. It

provides supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and a variety of other

services to the MAGTF. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or

multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The logistics combat element itself is not a formal

command. Also called LCE. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver — 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the

enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3.

The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of

forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of

advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)
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maneuver warfare — A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a

variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation

with which the enemy cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air-ground task force — The Marine Corps’ principal organization for all missions across the

range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of

responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground

task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation

combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element. The four core elements are

categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the

number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission

dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to

be assigned. In a joint or multinational environment, other Service or multinational forces may be assigned

or attached. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine aviation functions — The six functions (antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support,

electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles) performed by Marine aviation in

support of the Marine air-ground task force. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary brigade — Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around a

reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and acombat logistics regiment. The

Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the

requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the

Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine

expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full

range of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or

multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEB. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force — The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the Marine Corps’

principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized

around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine

aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across

the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any

environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, it

may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called

MEF. (MCRP5-12C)

Marine expeditionary unit — A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an

infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It

normally fulfills Marine Corps’ forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit

provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. In a

joint or multinational environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to

the MAGTF. Also called MEU. (MCRP 5-12C)

maritime interception operations — Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in

international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United Nations

Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. Also called MIO. (JP 1-02) 
maritime prepositioning force — A task organization of units under one commander formed for the

purpose of introducing a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and its associated equipment and supplies

into a secure area. The maritime prepositioning force is composed of a command element, a maritime

prepositioning ships squadron, a MAGTF, and a Navy support element. Also called MPF. (MCRP 5-12C)

multicapable — Operationally decisive across the range of military operations with a capacity tailored to

combatant commanders’ requirements; optimized to operate as an integrated system through the air, land,

and maritime domains. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of MCRP 5-12C)

multinational — Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP

1-02)

multinational force — A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or

coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations — Operations directed by the Department of State or other

appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are

evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to

safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization — A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to

alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development,

environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of

democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

offensive air support — Those air operations conducted against enemy installations, facilities, and

personnel to directly assist the attainment of MAGTF objectives by the destruction of enemy resources or

the isolation of the enemy’s military forces. Offensive air support is one of the six functions of Marine

aviation. Also called OAS. (MCRP 5-12C)

overseas — All locations, including Alaska and Hawaii, outside the continental United States. (JP 1-02)

professional military education — The systematic instruction of professionals in subjects that will

enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. Also called PME. (MCRP 5-12C)

sea base — An inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms that

enables the global power projection of offensive and defensive forces from the sea and includes the ability

to assemble, equip, project, support, and sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the joint

operations area. (NTRP 1-02)

seabasing — A national capability and overarching transformational operating concept for projecting and

sustaining naval power and joint forces, which assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver

of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea. (MCRP 5-12C)

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security cooperation — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to

build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military

capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and

contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation activity — Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the

operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military

conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty

partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander's theater

strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 1-02)

supporting establishment — Those personnel, bases, and activities that support the Marine Corps

operating forces. (Excerpt from MCDP 1-0)

terrorism — The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear;

intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally

political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction — Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being

used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be highyield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of

transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.

Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
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Glossary References

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington

DC, Department of Defense, 12 April, 2001)

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, June

1997)

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, (Washington DC: United States Marine

Corps, Sept 2001)

Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, July 1998)

National Defense Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 1, 2005)

Navy Tactical Reference Publication 1-02, Navy Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Term, (Washington DC: United States Navy, August 2006)

Navy Warfighting Publication 4-01, Naval Transportation, (Washington DC: United States Navy, May

2007)
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NOTES