IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01246-COA RONNIE ALI APPELLANT

v. AMY KAYE TOWNSEND ALI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/17/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES B. PERSONS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DEAN HOLLEMAN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: EARL L. DENHAM PHILLIP LANE NORW OOD MATTHEW PAUL PAVLOV NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DIVORCE AW ARDED; ALIMONY, VISITATION ORDERED DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART: 06/13/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Dr. Ronnie Ali, 49, and nurse practitioner Am y Ali, 27, were m arried in 2003 and had

a c h ild together a f

ew m onths l ater. They separated af ter alm o st seven y ears of m arriage, and
Am y f iled f o r divorce. ¶2. Over the next several y ears they f iled m ore than two hundred plea d i n g s , w i th Am y f iling the lion’s share. The trial was bif urcated due to com

plex f inancial issues, especially th o s e r e lating to several “urgent care” m edical clinics owned by the couple. On March 7,2013, Am y was granted a divo r c e o n h abitual cruel and i nhum an treatm ent grounds. The

rem aining issues were tried over twelve day s i n February and March of 2014. A y ear later the chancellor entered a detailed twenty -six-page decision, dividing the parties’ property and awarding Am y

custody of the m inor child, child support, and alim ony . ¶3. Ronnie states in h is brief that t h o u gh he f e e ls the chancellor erred in the equitable distribution, he “chooses” not to challenge i t. Visitation, child support, alim ony , attorney ’s f ees, and lif

e i n surance rem ain a t issue on appeal. W e conclude t hat the chancellor applied the c orrect legal s t andards a nd acted within his discretion i n awarding child s upport, alim ony , and attorney ’s f

ees. Those awards m

ust be af f irm ed. W e rem and, however, on the issues of visitation and insurance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶4. “ W

hen [ an appellate court] reviews a chancellor’s decision in a c a se i nvolv i n g d i v o r c e and all related i ssues, [ t he court’s] scope of r eview is lim ited by t he s u bstantial evidence/m anif

est error r ule.” Y elverton v. Y

elverton , 961 So. 2d 19, 24 (¶6) (Miss. 2007).
A chancellor’s f

actual f indings will not be d i s t u r b e d unless m anif e stly wrong or clearly

erroneou s , o r a n e r r oneous l egal standard was applied. Carambat v. Carambat , 72 So. 3d 505, 510-11 (¶24) (Miss. 2011). As long as substantial evidence supports the chancellor’s
f indings, an appellate c ourt i s w ithout authority to disturb t hem , even if it would have f ound otherwise as an original m a tter. Joel v. Joel , 43 So. 3d 424 , 4 2 9 ( ¶ 1 4 ) ( Miss. 2010). Additionally , if the c hancellor has m ade no specif ic f i ndings of f

act, we generally “proceed

2on the assum p tion that he resolved all such f a c t i ssues in f

avor of t he appellee.” Ferrara v. W alters , 919 So. 2d 876, 881 (¶8) (Miss. 2005) (citation om itted). Questions of law, on the other hand, are r eviewed de novo . Irving v. Irving , 67 So. 3d 7 76, 7 78 ( ¶11) (Miss. 2011).
DISCUSSION
1. Visitation ¶5. The chancellor’s f

inal judgm ent contained no express order f or perm anent holiday

or

sum m er visitation, though it at tim es appears to p r e s u p pose they had been a warded. 1 On appeal, Ronnie contends this was error; and Am y concedes that it appears to be an oversight tha t should be clarif

ied on rem and to the chancery court. As this issue is conceded, we

rem and to the chancery

court to clarif

y the visitation order.
2. Alim ony ¶6. Ronnie subm its in his brief that the periodic alim ony a ward, $5,500 per m onth, is not appropriate in t his case because “there was absolutely no disparity i n Am y ’s f inancial position as c om

pared t o Ronnie’s horrif

ic f i nancial position” af

ter the equ i t a b l e d ivision.
W h ile he d oes not directly challenge the division, he nevertheless urges that, in m athem atical

term s, Am y received m o r e value in the property division (approxim ately $390,000) than the

net value of the m arital estate (approxim ately $280,000), and signif icantly m o re t han his net

1 F o r ex a m

p l e, t h e j u d g m en t sp ecif

ies an ex ch an g e p o in t f

o r “w eek en d an d h o l id ay v isitatio n .” In ad d itio n , a d e tailed v isitatio n o rd er f o r b o t h w e ek en d a n d h o lid ay v isitatio n w a s en tered o n Ju n e 1 4 , 2 0 1 3 , ex p an d in g an d p ro v id in g d e tails set o u t i n a n earlier v isitatio n o rd er. 3def

icit af ter property divisi o n , attorney ’s f ees, and litigation expenses (which he puts at $417,000). Ronnie also points to A m y ’s incom e of $6,000 per m onth as a nurse practitioner prior to the m arriage, as well as incom e she could expect as owner of an urgent c are clinic awarded to her i n equitable division. R onnie s ubm its that Am y i s capa b l e of s u pporting herself

. ¶7. The chancery court has b r oad discretion in deciding whether to award a lim ony and in what am ount. Pearson v. Pearson , 761 So. 2d 157, 165 ( ¶25) (Miss. 2000). “[ A ppellate courts] will not disturb the award on appeal unless it i s f ound to be against the overwhelm ing weight of the evidence or m anif

estly in error.” Id. ¶8. Ronnie a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e i s s u e s o f p r o p e r t y d i v i sion and a lim ony are “intertwined.” M

cKissack v. M

cKiss a c k , 4 5 S o . 3d 716, 723 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2010). “All property

division, lum

p sum or periodic alim ony pay m ent, and m

utual obligations f

or child support should be considered together. Alim ony and equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they com m and the entire f ield of f i n a n c ial settlem ent of divorce. Theref ore, where one expands, the other m ust recede.” Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994) (citation and internal quotation m a r ks om itted). ¶9. I n t h e e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n , Am y ’s award m o stly consisted of t he m arital home (approxim ately $187,000 i n equity ), household f urnishings, three vehicles ($27,000), about $18,000 in checking and savings accounts, a $28,000 IRA, and o ne o f the urgent care clinics owned by the p a rties ($111,000). Ronnie received the other f unctioning urgent c are clinic,

4another one that was apparently def unct, a bout $62,000 in gold coins and savings accounts, his personal corporation ($32,000), and other p ersonal assets – f o r a grand total of $266,000. Ronnie’s claim s o f a l a r g e net def icit in total awards are prem ised on his c om paring his distribution of the m arital assets w ith the m arital debt ($376,500, of whic h $ 3 5 8 , 000 was delinquent taxes and p e nalties the chancellor attributed to Ronnie’s m isconduct) and litigation e xpenses, including his a nd the half of Am y ’s attorney ’s f e es h e was ordered to pay . ¶10. The m arital estate was disproportionately sm all com p ared to Ronnie’s incom e. His

a d j u sted g ross incom e on his Unif orm Chancery C ourt Rule 8 .05 f inancial statem ent w a s $ 4 1 , 4 6 3

. 0 0 per m onth af t er d educting f

ederal and s tate incom e taxes of $19,668.76 p e r

m onth ( 32.17%). At trial, Ronnie boasted he could earn $ 900,000 per y ear when he needed the m oney . Am y , on the other hand, had worked l ittle s ince the m arriage, dividing her t im e between caring f

or the child a nd m anaging the parties’ urgent care clinics. The clinics were
not particularly v aluable or prof itable, despite the energy and m oney the parties had invested in them

. The chancellor noted that he would have pref e rr e d t o a w a r d A m y both of the

rem aining clinics, but Ronnie h ad entangled one w ith another business owned by his f am ily

. The chancellor also f

ound that R o n n ie had sy stem atically v iolated “court orders regarding child and spousal s upport, pay m ent of t he m ortgage, taxes, and insurance associated with the

m arital hom e as well as the transition of clinic m anagem ent to [ Amy ]

. . . [ a n d] the use of clinic f unds without [ Am y ’s] approval or court order,” which had resulted in Am y ’s f iling a plethora of

contem pt pleadings.

5¶11. Following a detailed discussion of the Armstrong 2 f a c t o r s , t h e chancellor awarded
Am y $5,500 per m o nth in periodic alim ony . On appeal, Ronnie contends that the chancellor erred i n f inding a def

icit f ollowing t h e property division a nd f ailed to consider Am y ’s earning potential and Ronnie’s reasonable expenses. ¶12. The question o f a def icit is “with respect to having suf f icient resources and assets to

m eet

. . . n eeds a nd living e xpenses.” Layton v
. Layton , 181 So. 3d 275, 282 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Jackson v
. Jackson , 1 14 So. 3d 768, 777 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)).
As the M ississippi Suprem e Court has said, “a f inancially independent s p ouse m ay be required to s upport the f

inancially dependent spouse i n the m a nner in which the d ependent spouse was supported during the m arriage, subject t o a m aterial change in circum stances.” Rogillio v. Rogillio , 57 So. 3d 1246, 1250 (¶11) (Miss. 2011). ¶13. Ronnie undoubtedly supported Am y during the m arriage, but he contends on appeal that the chancellor f

ailed to consider A m y ’s ability to earn incom e as a nurse practitioner, as well as the earnings f

rom the urgent care clinic she was awarded. But, in f act, the chancellor addressed both directly in h is opinion and judgm ent; h e concluded that Am y ’s prospects were

uncer t a in af

ter a long hiatus f

rom paid em

ploy m ent, and that s he “will b e lef t with a signif icant def icit even if she were to eventually obtain em ploy m e n t as a nurse practitioner.” ¶14. W e also f

ind no m e rit t o Ronnie’s claim s t h a t t h e r e w as n o disparity f ollowing the property division – although it is true that A m y r e c e i v e d m uch of the m arital property , the

2 A rm stro n g

v. A rm stro n g , 6 1 8 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 8 , 1 2 8 0 (M i ss. 1 9 9 3 ). 6m arital e state was i l l iquid, relatively s m all, and c ould n ot produce incom e suf f icient to support Am y a s she was s upported during the m arriage. W e are likewise unim pressed with Ronnie’s c ontentions regarding the chancellor’s f indings of his m i sconduct and dissipation of m arital assets; h i s argum ent is perf u nctory and his contentions are of ten disingenuous or contradicted by other e v i dence in the record. As a n exam ple, Ronnie argues that the chancellor erred in f

inding that he had sy stem atically violated t he tem porary order to pay the

m ortgage on the m a rital hom e by pointing out that he d id, in f act, pay the m ortgage – but it would be m ore accurate to say that Ronnie event u a l l y paid the m ortgage, as m any of the
pay m ents were l ate. S im ilarly , Ronnie claim s t hat the delinquent taxes were a result of an

error by his preparer, but the only record eviden c e h e c i t e s i n support of this claim is testim o ny f rom a dif f erent accountant that the taxes were done incorrectly

. R onnie f ails to

m ention that his accountant f rom the relevant tim e also testif ied a t trial – that Ronnie had instructed her to stop m aking t he tax pay m ents, that she had resisted, and t h a t s h e had

con s i d e r e d h erself t erm inated f ollowing the disagreem ent. Finally , Ronnie points out that the chancellor never e ntered an order f inding him in contem

pt, but he d oes not explain how that is relevant to the chancellor’s ultim ate f i ndings. ¶15. Ronnie also suggests t hat the alim ony award denies h im suf f icient incom e to m aintain

a reasonab l e s t a n dard of living, b ut he p rovides no substantive a r gum ent in support. His claim ed m onthly expenses – approxim ately $43,000 – c onsist larg ely of the tem porary support awards and short-term debt serv i c e , particularly the d elinquent taxes, which by

7them selves accounted f or alm ost one-third o f Ronnie’s claim e d m onthly expenses. It would be grossly inequitable to allow R onnie to avoid pay ing alimo n y b y w rongf ully incurring

tem porary obligations. It is also worth noting that the chancellor’s order allows Ronnie to deduct the alim ony f

r om h is annual taxable incom e of $733,584. Thus a m onthly alim ony
pay m ent of $5,500 will actually cost him no m ore than $ 3 , 5 38. Am y m ust pay the taxes, though at a lesser rate than Ronnie. ¶16. The chancery c ourt h a s broad discretion i n determ i ning w hether to award a lim ony and in what am ount. Ronnie has f ailed to show an abuse of that discretion here.
3. Attorney ’ s Fees ¶17. Next, R onnie c h a l l e n g e s t h e c h ancellor’s order requiring him to p ay one-half of
Am y ’s attorney ’ s f

ees, which a m ounted to a

pproxim ately $ 144,500. Ronnie argues at length that Am y was able to pay her own f ees, but his e f

f o rts are m isdirected – while the chancellor did f ind that A m y could not p ay her own a ttorney ’ s f ees, the award was c l e a r l y based on R o n n i e ’ s m isconduct, not on Am y ’s inability to pay . On this point, Ronnie presents little
argum ent and no authority

. “The appellant’s f ailure to cite re l e v a n t a u t hority o bviates the appellate court’s obligation t o review such issues.” Jones v. State , 203 S o. 3 d 600, 605 n.1 (Miss. 2016).
4. Child Support ¶18. The chancellor awarded Am y $ 5,000 per m onth in c h ild support f o r the single child, who was eleven y e ars of a ge a t the tim e of the judgm ent. T he a w ard was a pproxim ately 12%

8of

Ronnie’s adjusted gross m onthly incom e . ¶19. On appeal, Ronnie bases his argum ent on an incorrect reading of Mississippi’s child support guidelines. He seem s to assum e t hat the presum ptively correct child support am ount f or one c h i l d i s 14% o f the f irst $100,000 per y ear in a d justed gross i ncom e, o r roughly $1,167 per m onth – period. But t hat is s i m ply not what the statute provides. Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(4) (Rev. 2015) states, in relevant part:
In c ases in which the adjusted gross incom e as def ined in this section is m ore than O ne Hundred T housand Dollars ( $100,000.00)

. . . , the court shall m ake a written f

inding in the record a s to whether or not the a p p l i c a t i on of the guidelines established in this section is reasonable.
If the “ 14% of all n e t incom e f or o ne child” guideline was b lindly applied to all of Ronnie’s
8.05 net i ncom e, the m onthly am ount of

support to be p aid to Am y f or his one child would b e $ 5 , 8 1 0 per m o nth. See id. § 4 3-19-101(1). Thus, if the chancellor deviated f r o m t h e guideline, it was to reduce Ronnie’s obligation rather than increase i t. But t he chancellor did not deviate f

rom the guideline; he f

ound it inapplicable. ¶20. In the chancellor ’ s w ritten judgm ent, h e expressly noted that the guidelines did not
presum ptively appl y t o h i g h e r incom es and that the court was required to m ake a written
f inding as to whether their application was reasonable. The court then noted approxim ately $2,000 p er m onth had b een spent on schooling, tutoring, and various other a ctivities f or the child, bef ore s etting m o n thly child support f rom R o n n i e at $5,000 per m onth. Again, this was approxim a tely

12% of Ronnie’s adjusted gross incom e. ¶21. On appeal, Ronnie c l a i ms t h a t t h i s f i g u r e is u nreasonable, b ut h e provides no

9convi n c i ng argum ent. “In determ ining child support, chancellors m ay consider, inter alia,

the health, incom e , and e arning capacity of b oth parents, the reasonable needs of the child, and the necessary l i v i n g e x p enses of t he noncustodial parent.” Barnes v. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 42 So. 3d 10, 18 (¶32) ( Miss. 2010) (W aller, C.J., concurring in part and in the result) (citation om itted). Ronnie’s principal argum e nt i s t hat the am o unt is excessive to provide the child with “reasonable” support. H e notes that m any children – indeed m any f a m ilies – m ake do with less, though t his f lies i n the f

ace of Ronnie’s testim o ny at trial a s to how he believed the child should be s upported a nd his claim ed expenses relating to the child; on h is Rule 8.05 f inancial statem e nt, h e c laim ed expenses of $ 1,000 per m onth just f or entertaining the child during visitation. W e r eject the argum ent that equates r easonable support with subsistence and instead agree with the chancellor that th e “ r e a s o n a ble n eeds” o f the child ought to be viewed at least a s broadly as the reasonable needs o f a wif e s eeking alim ony . I t i s not an abuse of discretion f

or the chancellor to consider t he standard of living t o which the child is

accustom e d in deciding what a m o unt of support is r easonable. See Moulds v. Bradley , 791
So. 2d 22 0 , 228-29 (¶24) (Miss. 2001) (Diaz, J., concurring). The chancellor thoroughly considered this issue and provided sound reasons f or his decision. W e can f ind no abuse of discretion in the am ount of the award.
5. Insurance ¶22. The chancellor ordere d R o n n i e t o m a i n t a i n a lif e insurance policy valued at $2

m illion, with Am y to receive $1.5 m illion and the m i nor daughter to r eceive $500,000 in the

1 0event of Ronnie’s death. O n appeal, Ronnie argues that the policy am o unts required f or Am y are excessive in light of the perm issible purposes of such awards. W e agree. ¶23. In Coggins v. Coggins , 132 So. 3d 636, 644-45 (¶¶35-37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), this Court explained:
An ali mo n y pay or “m ay be required to m aintain l if e insurance in an am ount suf f icient to satisf

y p a y m ent of alim ony obligations that survive the pay or’s death

. ” [ D e b orah H .] Bell, Mississippi Family L aw § 9.08[ 4][ c] [ (2005)] ( citing In re Estate of H odges , 807 So. 2d 438, 4 42-44 (¶¶14-2 3 ) ( M i s s . 2002)). The key phrase is “alim ony obligations that survive t he pay or’s death.” Periodic alim ony is an o b l i g ation that “term inates autom atically ” upon the pay or’s death and cannot be im posed upon the pay or’s es t a t e , a bsent an express agree me n t. Armstrong [ v. Armstrong , 618 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1993)]; see I

n re Hodges , 8 07 S o. 2d a t 443 (¶19). W hile lum p-sum alim ony f ully vests at the tim e of the divorce judgm e nt, periodic alim ony o nly v ests on the date each p ay

m ent b e com es due. In re Hodges , 807 S o. 2d at 442 (¶17). So when the pay or dies, the only alimo n y o b l i gations that s urvive—and the only obligations that m ay be insured— a r e unpaid lum p -sum alim ony and unpaid periodic-alim ony

pay m ents that have already

vested. Recognizing the possibility that an alim ony p ay or m ay f a ll behind in perio d i c -alim ony pay

m ents and then die leaving those vested pay m ents unsatisf ied, t his court has acknowledged the chancellor’s authority to require the alim ony pay or t o m aintain a lif e-insurance p olicy to protect the recipient spouse against such a contingency

. [ Johnson v. P ogue , 716 So. 2d 1123, 1134 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)]; see also Beezley v. Beezley , 917 So. 2d 803, 8 08 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). But in P o gue , this court f ound that requiring the pay or to m aintain a $75,000 lif e-insurance policy to protect a g a inst the potential f

ailure to m ake $ 500-per-m o nth a lim ony pay m ents was “ excessive.” Pogue , 716 So. 2d at 1134 (¶41). ¶24. Given the standard we have just recited, it is im possible to say that a l if

e insurance policy of $1.5 m illion is necessary to g u a r d against t he p otential f ailure to m ake $5,500

m onthly a lim ony pay

me n t s a n d to repay approxim ately $376,500 in m arital debt. On

1 1rem and, the chancery court should determ ine an appropriate award i n light o f the authorities

we have just discussed. ¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF T HE CHANCERY COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY, FIRST JUDICIAL DIS T R I C T , IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND R EVERSED AND REMANDED I N P ART FOR F U R T HER PROCEEDINGS C ONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. A LL C OSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. GRIF F I S, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCU R . W I L S O N, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITT E N OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., C ONCURS IN PART W I T HOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. LEE, C.J., CONCURS IN P A R T AN D D I S SENTS IN P ART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY IRVING, P.J., AND WESTBROOKS, J. LEE, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶26. Because I f

ind that the chancellor abused his d iscretion in awarding periodic alim ony
to Am y , I respectf

ully dissent in part. In light of the length o f the m arriage and Am y ’s ability

to earn a living, the chancellor’s al i mo n y a w a r d w as e xcessive. I do concur with the

m ajority ’s decision to af

f irm on the issues concerning attorney ’s f ees and child support and

to rem and on the issues concerning visitation and insurance. ¶27. First, the award of a lim ony was excessive, and the chancellor did not give adequate consideration to Ronnie’s m onthly expenses. In determ ining t he am ount of support pay able

to the wif e, a chancellor m

ust consider not only the reasonable n eeds of the wif e b ut also the right of the h usband to lead a s norm al a lif e as reasonably possible. Davis v. Davis, 832 So. 2d 492, 497 (¶19) (Miss. 2002) ( c i t a tion om itted). H ere, Ronnie’s m o nthly expenses, including his current support obli g a t i o n s to Am y , exceed his m onthly gross incom e by

1 2approxim a tely $2,400. The chancellor did not consider the a p propriateness of the award in relation to Ronnie’s p ay

m ents f or child support and all m arital debts and liens, which were assessed solely to him

. The c hancellor should have considered Ronnie’s “other f inancial obligations and h is ability to m aintain a decent standard o f living.” Ewing v
. Ewing , 203 So. 3d 707, 716 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Because Ronnie’s m onthly expenses, including his support obligations, exceed his gross m onthly i ncom e, the chancellor’s alim ony award was “per se unreasonable.” Brooks v. Brooks , 652 So. 2d 1113, 1122 (Miss. 1995). ¶28. Further, t he p a rties were only m arried f or seven y e ars b ef

ore Am y f

iled f or divorce. This Court and the Mississippi Suprem e C o urt have classif ied m arriages of m

uch long er duration as “m id-term ” and “m oderate-leng th” rather than long-term in the context of alim ony a w ards. See Layton v. Layton , 181 So. 3d 275, 296-97 (¶72) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (Jam es, J., concurring in part a n d d i s s e nting i n p art); Amacker v. Amacker , 33 So. 3d 493,
498 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2009); Ericson v. T ullos , 876 So. 2d 1038, 1039, 1041 (¶¶5, 11-12) (Miss. C t. App. 2004); Mabus v. Mabus , 890 So. 2 d 8 06, 823 (¶68) ( Miss. 2003). Alim ony is n ot a bounty to which Am y b e cam e entitled to receive indef initely sim

ply because, at one tim e, she was m arried to Ronnie. Beacham v. Beacham , 383 So. 2d 146, 148 (Miss. 1980). Here, the length of

the m arriage did not f

avor awarding Am y

periodic alim ony . ¶29. Finally , Am y ’s po t e n t i a l earning capacity should have weighed against an alim ony award. Am y is a licensed nurse p ractitioner and, p r i o r t o the parties’ separation, m anaged

an urgent c are clinic f

or y ears. But the chancellor concluded t hat Am y ’ s earning capacity as

1 3a nurse practitioner was “uncertain” as she had n ot worked as a n urse practitioner f or approxim a tely ten y ears, and theref ore awarded h er periodic alim o ny in the a m ount of $5,500
per m onth. However, the record dem onstrates that Am y ’s earning capacity is e nough to m eet her reasonable needs. Perhaps an award of rehabilitati v e a l im ony would have been m ore appropriate since Am y

had not worked as a nurse practitioner f or ten y ears. IRVING, P.J., AND WESTBROOKS, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

1 4