U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31–273 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NUCLEAR 

AGREEMENT WITH IRAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 6, 2018 

Serial No. 115–84 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Jimmy Gomez, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

ARI WISCH, Professional Staff Member 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

Vacancy 

Vacancy 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 6, 2018 ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Richard Goldberg, Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 21 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Mr. Michael Pregent, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 37 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 40 

Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of technology 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 45 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 47 

Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 66 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 68 


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PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: 

ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN 

Wednesday, June 6, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Amash, Hice, Comer, 

and Welch. 

Also Present: Representatives Zeldin and Donovan. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

May 8, 2018, President Trump made one of the most momentous 

decisions of his Presidency by terminating the United States’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, 

better known as the Iran deal, and he decided to immediately begin 

reimposing sanctions on Iran. 

The President made the right decision. He saw this deal for what 

it was, calling it, quote, ‘‘one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into,’’ end quote. 

The Iran deal has empowered the Iranian regime and has fueled 

Iran’s ambitions for regional dominance. It’s not hard to see why. 

The deal provided Iran with billions upon billions of dollars in upfront sanctions relief, including airlifting $1.7 billion in cash, effectively to the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

To obtain this financial windfall, Iran agreed to a temporary set 

of restrictions on its nuclear program that sunset after 10 and, in 

some cases, 15 years. But by allowing Iran a vast nuclear infrastructure and allowing Iran to reduce its breakout time to almost 

zero, the deal paved the way for Iran to have a bomb. And the 

deal’s fundamentally flawed inspection regime allows Iran to block 

inspectors from accessing military sites, leaving the IAEA incapable of verifying if Iran is even complying with the deal. 

The agreement did nothing to stop Iran’s ballistic missile program or its support for terrorism. Now Tehran is using the financial windfall from the deal to spread money to terrorists and insurgents throughout the Middle East. 


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Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are firing rockets into Israel, propping up the Assad government and its butchery 

in Syria, supporting anti-American Shiite militias in Iraq, bolstering Hezbollah to unprecedented levels of strength in Lebanon, 

arming Houthi rebels in Yemen, and backing the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

And thanks to Israeli intelligence revealed recently by Prime 

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, we now know without question that 

the Iran deal was built on lies. As part of the deal, Iran’s leaders 

promised never to build a nuclear weapon and to come clean to the 

IAEA about their past nuclear activities. 

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, said, Iran, quote, ‘‘didn’t 

have any program to develop nuclear weapons,’’ and considered 

them, quote, ‘‘both irrational as well as immoral,’’ end quote. 

But the documents obtained by Israel proved that Iran had a nuclear weapons programs, that Iran brazenly lied by denying it. And 

then, even after entering the JCPOA, Iran kept a secret archive of 

tens of thousands of files on its nuclear weapons program. 

Now, when the Iran deal was first announced, President 

Obama’s advisor, Ben Rhodes, drew on his MFA in writing to create a, quote, ‘‘echo chamber of false narratives to try to sell the 

agreement.’’ And in spite overwhelming evidence that the deal 

wasn’t working and Iran was acting in bad faith, the foreign policy 

establishment and the enablers in the press are again spinning a 

web of deception to try to undermine President Trump’s decision. 

They claim, his critics, that he, quote, violated the JCPOA by 

withdrawing. In reality, the Obama State Department admitted in 

a letter to then-Congressman Mike Pompeo that, quote, ‘‘the 

JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement and is not a 

signed document.’’ 

The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran the 

P5+1 and the EU. The deal would never have been ratified as a 

binding treaty because it was opposed by bipartisan majorities of 

both the House and Senate, including Senator Chuck Schumer and 

the Democratic ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

The Iran deal was effectively of a nonbinding commitment between President Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei, which imposes 

no obligation upon a successor President to follow it. 

As Harvard’s Jack Goldsmith writes, ‘‘You don’t get to make an 

enormously consequential international deal in the face of opposition from Congress,’’ and from the public, I might add, ‘‘and skirt 

the need for congressional consent by making the agreement nonbinding under domestic and international law and then complain 

about a subsequent withdrawal,’’ end quote. 

President Trump’s opponents claim his decision was reckless and 

leaves America isolated. The truth is that the administration conducted a lengthy review of the JCPOA, held extensive negotiations 

with European allies to try to correct its many flaws, and set a 

clear deadline for results. 

Now, Secretary Pompeo has presented a new strategy in which 

he specified the conditions for a new agreement, including a complete stop to uranium enrichment, a full accounting of past nuclear 

activity, unqualified access for IAEA inspectors, halting ballistic 


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missile activity, ending support for terrorism, and releasing all hostages. 

The door remains open for Europe to work with the U.S. to reach 

a better deal that addresses these issues, but instead of reaping the 

spoils of the sanctions relief, Iran will now face unprecedented financial pressure from U.S. sanctions, and companies around the 

globe will have to decide whether they would rather do business 

with the world’s biggest economy or the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism. 

In contrast to the narrative that withdrawing from the deal 

leaves America isolated, many countries in the Middle East strongly support President Trump’s approach, including Israel, Saudi 

Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. They are the ones who are most at 

risk from Iranian misconduct. 

By ending U.S. participation in the Iran deal, President Trump 

demonstrated that American strength and leadership are back 

again. We should all be thankful that the President kept his word. 

He campaigned on this being a bad deal, said he would terminate 

it if they couldn’t get better terms, and he followed through on 

that. 

And I would also like to point out, since I did these remarks, 

there has been reports about whether or not Iran was in fact able 

to access the U.S. financial system. That was supposed to be a nogo. 

We had testimony during the pendency and when the deal was 

agreed to from the Obama administration saying that that was not 

going to happen. This committee obviously is going to want to investigate what happened there because that is a really big deal. 

But I thank the witnesses for being here. I look forward to your 

testimony. And it is my pleasure, in lieu of my friend from Massachusetts, I recognize for his opening statement, my friend from 

Vermont, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. WELCH. Welch. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Welch. I knew that. 

Mr. WELCH. You were wishing. And we all are. We miss Congressman Lynch. But thank you, and I thank the witnesses. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for having this very important hearing. And I just want to say at the outset, I listened very carefully 

to your statement, and I know that it reflects not just your views 

but the views of many people who oppose the agreement from the 

beginning. 

What I did not hear in your statement was what’s next. What is 

the Trump plan? The President has not laid that out. And he is 

playing a game of very high stakes poker with American national 

security, with our relationships with our allies. 

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear 

agreement, painstakingly negotiated with our best allies—the 

United Kingdom, France, Germany, and even China and Russia, 

who I wouldn’t classify as our best friends; they are frenemies, in 

this case, but they cooperated with us to get this agreement—in my 

view and the views of many, undermines national security, and it 

inflames tensions in war zones like Syria Lebanon and Yemen. 

While the Iran nuclear agreement did not address many of the 

issues that you expressed and for which I share concern, it did adVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Sep 20, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31273.TXT APRIL

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dress one. It required Iran to cease and desist from active development of nuclear weapons. That is a huge strategic achievement. 

Within the four corners of the document, its sole purpose was to 

ensure, quote, ‘‘under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.’’ And it did also set forth 

a system of third-party verification. This was no ‘‘trust but verify.’’ 

This was distrust, verify, distrust, verify immediately. 

Based on the robust on-the-ground inspections and verification 

regime mandated by the agreement, the IAEA has continually reported that Iran has abided by the significant constraints on its nuclear program. And I don’t believe the President really challenged 

that. According to the IAEA’s most recent monitoring report, Iran 

has refrained from producing or retaining uranium enriched at levels greater than 3.67 percent, far less than the approximately 90 

percent enrichment level of weapons grade uranium and 20 percent 

level of the uranium that Iran had previously stockpiled. 

The IAEA has also verified that, in compliance with the agreement, there are no more than 5,060 centrifuges at Natanz fuel enrichment plant, and that is in accordance with Iran’s commitment 

to dismantle two-thirds of the centrifuges to enrich uranium. 

So essentially we have got a situation here where all of the experts are in agreement that as far of the four corners of the 

verification program and compliance with the agreement, Iran has 

been in compliance. None other than Defense Secretary Mattis, 

widely respected on both sides of the aisle, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April of this year that the Iran 

nuclear agreement, and I quote, ‘‘is written almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat,’’ that Iran would try to 

cheat. 

There is no trust on the side of the U.S. It is all about 

verification. So the verification, he said, what is in there, is actually pretty robust. 

If President Trump were to get a similar agreement and similar 

results in his meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un later this 

month, it would make the world safer. In my view, I hope he is successful. We will see. But based on his public position and statements, President Trump would likely walk away from such a deal. 

The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal has, in my view, 

and the view of many others, has made the world less safe and 

probably increased the likelihood of military conflict with Iran. 

Iran has indicated it will enhance its uranium enrichment capacity. And just yesterday, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization announced that Iran has completed a new centrifuge assembly center 

at the Natanz plant and would increase its capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride to supply its centrifuges. 

Our allies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are trying 

to uphold the Iran nuclear agreement without us, but they face the 

Hobson’s Choice, as you said, Mr. Chairman. And the potential of 

U.S. sanctions has significant potential to hurt our closest allies. 

My view, not a good thing. 

In the meantime, the President has not provided the American 

people or Congress with any information suggesting he has a realistic plan to replace the Iran nuclear agreement that he just ripped 

up. And I will be very interested in hearing from the witnesses as 


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to whether you are aware of a plan to proceed in the absence of 

the one we just ripped up. 

However, the words and actions of his closest advisors, President 

Trump’s closest advisors, give us a clue as to the President’s ultimate goal. And it is a fair question. Regime change. 

In January 2018, prior to becoming the President’s National Security Advisor, Mr. Bolton, during an interview on FOX News, said 

that, quote, ‘‘our goal should be regime change in Iran.’’ That’s 

what he said. 

On May 5th, just 3 days before the United States withdrew the 

Iran nuclear deal, Rudy Giuliani, the President’s lawyer confirmed 

that the President is, quote, ‘‘is as committed to regime change as 

we are.’’ 

If regime change is the intended goal of the Trump administration, I will give them this: That is a clear policy. Reckless, but 

clear. Is that their policy? 

And I would be interested in hearing from witnesses as to your 

view on that. 

It’s imperative that the administration change its direction and 

work with Congress, along with our European partners, to mitigate 

the very destabilizing consequences of our withdrawal from the 

Iran nuclear agreement. 

I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman from Vermont. 

I am pleased to introduce our witnesses today. We have Rich 

Goldberg, senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. We’ve got David Albright, president of the Institute for 

Science and International Security; Michael Pregent, senior fellow 

at the Hudson Institute; Dr. Jim Walsh, senior research associate 

at MIT’s Security Studies Program; and Dr. Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome to you 

all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you can please rise and raise your right 

hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Please be seated. 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

for 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made a part 

of the record. As a reminder, the clock in front of you shows your 

remaining time. The light will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. If you hear me banging 

this a little softly, that means wrap it up. 

Please also remember to press the button to turn on your microphone before speaking. 

And, with that, I will recognize Mr. Goldberg for 5 minutes. 


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WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD GOLDBERG 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member thank you 

so much. It’s a real honor to be here. It was just a few years ago 

that I was sitting behind the dais behind Members advising them 

on how to grill people like me, so go easy. 

I’ll start off basically summarizing my initial remarks, and I 

would really like to get to recommendations. But I will say this. 

For many, many years, we worked in an incredibly bipartisan way 

to advance Iran policy in the Congress, in the House and the Senate. 

Bills moved in overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion to not only 

stop the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic but to 

help the people of Iran pursue human rights, dignity, democracy 

inside their country, to ensure that Iran no longer was a state 

sponsor of terror, and to defend our allies from Iran’s proliferation, 

from their missile development, and from their terrorism. 

The idea that this has become very partisan and that things that 

I might say or that others might say during the hearing become 

partisan is a more recent phenomenon. And it is my hope that, in 

this post-JCPOA environment, while it might take a little time, 

that we find ways to come together bipartisanly to move things forward for the good of the American people, for our country, and for 

our allies. 

As for the JCPOA, I would say that the JCPOA, the decision to 

move away from the Iran deal to withdraw by the President was 

both legally justified and necessary from a national security perspective. Legally justified. 

Mr. Chairman, you summarized it well. Many legal scholars at 

the time made it very clear that the JCPOA was a political commitment, not an executive agreement, certainly not a treaty. A political commitment is politically binding but not legally binding. This 

was confirmed just a couple weeks ago on a panel where Jake Sullivan was speaking, a former senior official during the previous administration and a key member of the negotiating team that led to 

the JCPOA. 

Now, some might say, well, that is true, but there was a U.N. 

Security Council resolution, 2231, that referenced the JCPOA and, 

therefore, made this international law, made this legally binding 

for the United States. 

That, again, is not true. If you really read the resolution, and 

this was noted at the time, again, by many legal scholars, I note 

in my testimony, it uses words like ‘‘endorses,’’ ‘‘urges,’’ ‘‘calls 

upon.’’ These are nonbinding words for the U.N. Security Council. 

Truly the only thing that was very proactive in one of its clauses, 

No. 27, it decides that as the council decides that the JCPOA is not 

a matter of international law. 

And so this is a political commitment. You might disagree with 

the decision of the President to withdraw, but from a legal perspective, domestically and internationally, this was simply a political 

commitment. And when we have a change in leadership in our democracy, many times we see a change in our policies. 


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If you recall back in 2009 when President Obama in his first 

year in office decided to change our foreign policy, our national security policy, with respect to two European allies, Poland and the 

Czech Republic. 

Just the previous year, his predecessor, President Bush, had 

signed executive agreements with those two countries. Those two 

countries had staked their politics domestically and lot of their security risks on a strategy for missile defense in Europe. 

President Obama came in. His team had a different direction 

that he wanted to pursue, and they did so. They withdrew from an 

executive agreement, something that had carried more weight than 

the JCPOA. 

Now, at the time, Brussels wasn’t screaming and protesting. 

There weren’t EU Council resolutions deciding, how do we stop the 

Obama administration from changing the missile defense policy of 

Europe? 

There was outcry of Republicans in the Congress. I remember 

there were attempts in Appropriations and Armed Services to pass 

amendments to stop what President Obama was doing. The Republicans did not hold the majority at the time. Those efforts failed, 

and we moved on. And we moved on together, and together we 

have continued to do as best we can in bipartisan efforts on missile 

defense. 

From a national security perspective, the JCPOA failed in many 

ways, well beyond those that we talk about. We talked about the 

three elements that were the elements that the President was trying to negotiate with the E3, the so-called fix to the JCPOA. We 

talked about the fact that the agreement never covered ballistic 

missiles, the delivery systems to carry nuclear weapons. 

How do you have an agreement that is supposed to stop the advancement of a nuclear weapons program without covering ballistic 

missiles? We have talked about that ad nauseam. 

We talked about the sunsets. Mr. Chairman, you referenced 

them. Temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. We gave 

away our toughest sanctions for, in some cases, temporary restrictions on the nuclear program. 

And, of course, as my colleague to the left of me will probably 

touch on—or could—he has written extensively on it, we have 

talked about the lack of inspections in military sites, the inability 

by the IAEA to verify Section T of the agreement that has to do 

with weaponization activities. 

Even though, as Mr. Ranking Member, you referenced, the IAEA 

would say that on the technical levels of some of the concessions 

that Iran made, Iran was in agreement with those, was in compliance, he could not say with confidence that the IAEA was capable 

of verifying Section T. That was an issue that Ambassador Haley 

had raised several times. 

But those three issues, though they were the bulk of what was 

being negotiated between the United States and the E3, that 

wasn’t the fundamental flaw of the deal. 

The fundamental flaw was that we handcuffed ourselves from 

dealing in a nonmilitary way with all of the rest of Iran’s illicit activities. 


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The idea that we were allowed to impose nonnuclear sanctions, 

that nothing in the deal would prohibit us from imposing nonnuclear sanctions was a myth. 

Think about it. The banks that were helping Bashar al-Assad, 

loaned money, credit lines, never were we allowed to impose sanctions on them again. They were in Annex 2 of the JCPOA. Total 

immunity for Iranian banks to finance Bashar al-Assad. Total immunity for Iran to finance Hezbollah and continue the war in 

Syria. Total immunity for Iran to set up bases in Syria and Lebanon and to start converting rockets of Hezbollah into precisionguided munitions to target our allies in Israel. Total immunity to 

continue to arm the Houthis in Yemen with ballistic missiles that 

could target Saudi Arabia or even commercial merchant vessels 

that are transiting. This was really the fatal flaw. We handcuffed 

ourselves because to do any of these sort of nonnuclear sanctions 

to touch Annex 2, the Europeans would say, would drive the Iranians out of the deal. 

And so, in some ways, Mr. Ranking Member, I disagree with 

your statement. The JCPOA was making war more likely, not less. 

We had a limited our nonlethal options. We had taken our coercive 

economic options off the table. All we were left with was military 

deterrence. And that’s why, leading up to the decision of the President, there were so many reports about the need to use military 

force in Syria, elsewhere, and beyond. 

I will say: I have a number of recommendations for the way 

ahead. I hope that we have time to discuss them today, Mr. Chairman. They have to do with the strategy which is threefold, political 

warfare, economic warfare, and strong military deterrence. And I 

hope we can do that in a bipartisan fashion. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Goldberg follows:] 


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Richard Goldberg June 6. 2018 

Chairman DeSantis. Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. 

thank you for the opportunity to address you today on this important issue. 

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 multi-national political commitment related 

to Iran's nuclear program. My testimony will explain why the president's decision was both 

justified and necessary and, in the wake of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's May 20 speech. 

discuss the way ahead tor both the administration and Congress. 

Before I begin, I want to note that having worked for many years as a staffer both here in the House 

and in the Senate, I had the privilege to work with many talented people - Democrats and 

Republicans- who shared a passion for keeping America and our allies safe from the long list of 

threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Together, we put forward numerous bipartisan bills 

to increase the pressure on Iran. While my views regarding the president's decision to exit the 

JCPOA may differ from some of those held by members of the subcommittee, it is my sincere 

hope that we can find a way to resuscitate the bipartisan spirit that once infused this important 

national security issue. 

Legally Justified 

On July 14, 2015, President Obama announced that the United States, along with the permanent 

members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. had ·'achieved" a "comprehensive 

long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon."' Under the 

agreement, the United States committed to suspend nearly all the economic and financial sanctions 

imposed on the Islamic Republic in exchange for Iran's commitment to suspend certain nuclear 

activities for certain periods of time. 

This "deal," as President Obama described it, was not a treaty. It was not even an executive 

agreement. It was merely a political commitment.' From a legal perspective, that made the JCPOA 

non-binding and subject to change at any time 3 

In July 2015, just after the JCPOA was established. John Bellinger, the former legal advisor for 

both the State Department and the National Security Council, wrote:' 

The next president will have the legal right under both domestic and international law to 

scrap the JCPOA and reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions on Iran. Such an action would be 

inconsistent with political commitments made by the Obama administration, but it would 

1 Michad Gordon and David Sanger, ''Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with 

Time," The New York Times, July 14, 2015. (https:l/\\ \\'\\ .m timcs.com/2015107/15/woddimidd!ccast/iran~nuclear~ 

dcal-is-reached-after-long-ncuotiations.html) 

2 Jack Goldsmith, "The Trump Administration Reaps What the Obama Administration Sowed in the Iran Deal,'' 

Laufare, May 9, 2018. (https: i/Juwfar~blou..com/trump~admlnlstration~rcaps-'' hat~ohama-adm ini stration-SO\\ ediran~dca!) 

3 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, .. Presidential Control over International Law," 1-!armrd Law RevieH'. March 

2018. (https:ilhan.. ardlawre\ iew.oru1\\ p-content!upl0ads/20 18/0J/ 1201-1297 BradleY-Goldsmith Online.odt) 4 "How Binding is the fran DeaL .. Council on Foreign Relations, Jul; 23,2015. (https;/iw\n\.di".org/interviewihowhlrding-iran-dcal) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddcmocracy.org 
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Richard Goldberg June 6, 2018 

not constitute a violation of international law, because the JCPOA is not legally binding. 

Nor would it constitute a violation of the new UNSCR. 

He also noted that under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which referenced the 

JCPOA, "the United States would not be legally required to lift U.S. sanctions on lran."5 

Indeed, this view was later confirmed by the Obama administration. In a letter from the State 

Department to then-Representative Mike Pompeo, the administration wrote: 6 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an executive 

agreement, and is not a signed document The JCPOA reflects political commitments 

between Iran, the P5+ I (the United States. the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, 

China) and the European Union. 

During an appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late July 2015, thenSecretary of State John Kerry was asked why the JCPOA was not negotiated as a treaty to be 

submitted to the Senate for ratification. His response: "I spent quite a few years trying to get a lot 

of treaties through the United States Senate. and it has become physically impossible."' 

Kerry was not only wrong about the impossibility of the Senate ratifying a treaty (e.g. last year the 

Senate ratified a non-controversial protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession 

of Montenegro by a vote of 97-2), 8 he was also wrong about the impossibility of the Senate 

ratifying the JCPOA with certain changes. As my FDD colleague Orde Kittrie wrote at the time 

in the Wall Street Journa/: 9 

In the case of treaties, as the Senate website explains, the Senate may "make its approval 

conditional" by including in the resolution of ratification amendments, reservations, 

declarations, and understandings (statements that clarify or elaborate agreement provisions 

but do not alter them). ''The president and the other countries involved must then decide 

whether to accept the conditions in the legislation, renegotiate the provisions, or 

abandon the treaty." 

Indeed, as Professor Ki!lrie pointed out, the Senate has used this tool of approving treaties or 

amendments to treaties with conditions many times, including approval of the Threshold Test Ban 

Treaty. the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention. and a 1997 

5 John Bclllnger, ·'The }.;e\v tJNSCR on Iran: Does it Bind the United States (and fUture Presidents)?" Lawfare, July 

18. 20 15. ( https;/l\\ W\\ .Ia\\ filrcbJog.com, DC\~-unscr-iran-does-it -bi nd-united-statcs-and-future-presidents) 6 Mattht:\V Wcybrecht, ''State Department Affirms That Iran Deal Is Only a Political Commitment,'' Lawfare. 

November 28, 2015. (https://\i \\\\ .Jm, farcblog.com/st\j.Jc-department-affirms-iran-dea!-on!y-political-commitrnent) 7 Tim Hains. ''John Kerry Explains Why Iran Deal !s Not Legally a Treaty: 'You Can't Pass A Treaty Anymore."' 

Real Clear Politics. July 29.2015. 

Kittric, ··congress Can Rewrite the Iran Deal," lhe Wall Street Journal. August 12.2015. 

/wwv.. '' sj ,c()_ryvarticles/congrc~s-_pn~rc\\ ritc-thc-i ran~dcal-!43 94 I 91_~_4_) 

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modification to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Obama administration 

itself had already successlully renegotiated a nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE at the 

request ofthc House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman in early 2009. By May, Professor Kittrie 

noted, the UAE made concessions and the agreement was finalized. 

While politically expedient at the time, the Obama administration's decision to pursue the JCPOA 

as a political commitment rather than a treaty made President Trump's decision to end America's 

participation and re-impose U.S. sanctions on Iran both predictable and legally justified. Indeed, 

the international community was put on notice that such an event might occur, months before the 

JCPOA was finalized. In a March 2015 open letter to Iranian leaders, 47U.S. Senators wrote: 10 

[Wje will consider any agreement regarding your nuclear-weapons program that is not 

approved by the Congress as nothing more than an executive agreement between President 

Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei. The next president could revoke such an executive 

agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of the 

agreement at any time. 

National Security Imperative 

It is important to keep in mind that President Trump's decision was not only legally justified, it 

was also necessary for the national security of the United States. To understand this better, let us 

first review how the JCPOA was constructed. 

From 20 I 0-2012, Congress enacted a series oflaws that imposed crippling sanctions on the Islamic 

Republic in response to a wide range of illicit conduct by the regime, including ballistic missile 

development, nuclear activities, and the sponsorship of terrorism. In 2010, Congress enacted the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), 11 which required 

the Treasury Department to prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintaining in 

the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by any foreign financial 

institution that facilitates a significant transaction for any bank designated in connection with 

Iranian proliferation or terrorism. In effect, Congress leveraged the U.S. financial system against 

banks around the world and put them to a choice: do business with designated Iranian banks or do 

business in the United States, but you cannot do both. 

In December 2011, the Senate passed an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense 

Authorization Act, which applied the same basic CISADA concept to banks that facilitate 

transactions with the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). 12 That law not only sent shockwaves through the 

Iranian financial system and destabilized the Iranian currency, 13 it also forced countries that 

10 Oflice of Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), Press Release. '"Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the 

Leaders of the Islamic Repub!ic of Iran;· ~1arch 9, 2015. (https:/i\\W\\ .cotton.scnatc.l!<w/?p'""press n.::lease&id""120) 11 Comprehensive iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of20 10, Pub. 1.. lll-195. 124 Stat. 131 L 

codified as amended at 22 U.S.C §§8501-8551. (https://\\ \\'W.treasurY.!lo\·lresourccccntcrisanctions/Documcnts/hr2194.pdf) 

12 National Defense Authorization Act tOr Fiscal Year 2012. Pub. L 112-81. 125 Stat. 1297. codified as amended at 

112 U.S.C. (https:rr,, \\\\.trcasur\ .Qm irc~ourcc-ccnter/sanctions/Programs/Documcnts/ndaa puh\aw.p90 13 John Allen Gay. "'Iran Loses the Economic Battle," The National Interest. October 4, 2012. 

(Iilln.JLnationali nterest.orgicommentan. 'i ran-loscs-its-cconomic-battlc-75 52) 

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imported Iranian crude to reduce their purchases. 14 In the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 

Rights Act of 20 I 2, Congress improved the effectiveness of the CBI sanctions by requiring that 

money used to buy Iranian oil had to be deposited into escrow accounts inside the purchaser's 

country-held in local currency and only used for Iran to buy goods from that purchasing country. 15 

Two other Congressional initiatives in 2012 accelerated Iran's financial crisis. In February. the 

Senate Banking Committee passed an amendment authorizing the president to impose sanctions 

on the Brussels-based SWIFT secure financial messaging service if it did not disconnect the 

Central Bank of Iran and all other designated Iranian banks. 16 By March, at SWIFT's urging, the 

European Union ordered the cooperative to comply. 17 Removing Iran's banks from SWIFT meant 

that rogue actors could no longer use the system to quietly evade U.S. sanctions. It closed a gaping 

loophole in the financial sanctions architecture. 

In December 2012, the Senate passed an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act18 the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act- which closed additional 

loopholes and increased our sanctions pressure to near-maximum levels. The law prohibited the 

provision of precious metals to Iran - directly confronting the Turkish-Iranian gold trade - and 

blacklisted the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, and port sectors of Iran. It threatened insurers and 

banks with sanctions if they conducted business with any of those sectors or with entities on 

Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals list. 

As both President Obama 19 and Secretary Kerry"0 acknowledged, these crippling sanctions brought 

Iran to the negotiating table seeking relief. By 2013, Iran was facing an imminent balance-ofpayments crisis.21 The regime needed a deal before it faced a financial collapse and internal unrest 

so it invented the myth of a new "moderate" Iranian president capable of changing Iran's 

behavior. The Obama administration embraced the narrative and jumped into negotiations. 

From a negotiating perspective, securing a nuclear deal that would prevent Iran from ever having 

the capability to build a nuclear weapon was doomed from the start. Rather than keeping maximum 

pressure in place during negotiations to extract maximum concessions from the Iranian regime, 

the Obama administration provided up-front sanctions relief under the interim Joint Plan of 

14 t_,'.S. Energy infOrmation Administration. ''Under sanctions, Iran"s crude oil exports ]BYe nearly halved in three 

years, .. June 24,2015. (https://w\\\\.eia.uovitodavincncn.n/dctail.php'?id=21792) 15 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of2012, Pub. L. 112-158. 126 Stat. 1213. codified as 

amended at 112 lJ.S.C. (https://www.treasun .go" lresourct>ccntcr·'sanctionsiDocumcnts/hr 1905 p! 112 158.ndD 16 Rick Gladstone. ·'Senate Panel Approves Potentially Toughest Penalty Yet Against Iran's Wallet The .Vew York 

Times. February 2. 2012. (https:, /'\\ W\\ .nvti mcs.C\)m/20 12/02/0:i/\\or!d/midd!ccast/tough-i ran-pcnaltY-clcars-senateba!']king-ranel.htm!'! r-3&ref world&) 17 ·'Payments system SWIFT to cut offlranian banks.'· Reuters. March 15,2012. (https://uk.rcutcrs.com·anic!e.lukcu-iran-sanction::.mm· mcnts-svstcm-s wi tl-to-cut-off-iranian-banks-idU K l3 RE82EO V li20 1203 15) 18 National DefCnse Authorization Act fOr Fiscal Year 2013. Pub. L. 112-239. 126 Stat. 1631. codified as amended 

at I !2 U.S.C. (ht!PJ>:-'/wv,v\ .trcasun .0 o\lr£.?.illJ.rcc-ccntcr/sanctionsfPrograms/Documcnts!plll2 239.pdf) 19 Jordan Fabian. "Obama: Sanctions were only way to bring Iran to table,·· The Hill. August 10,2015. 

(http:/ithchill.com/po!icviinternational/250723-obama-sanctions-were-onlv-\\a\-lO-bring-iran-to-table) 

:w C'NN. "Kerry: Sanctions Brought Iran to the Table," You Tube. July 14.2015. 

{httrs://\\W\\. \ outubc.comiwatch?\ "'·02:\ vjd7:--.i5bg) 21 .. Highlights from Foreign Podicy Podcast Interview: ''The Future of the Iran Deal''- Part 1," MarkDuhowit:.Org. 

March 29. 2018. (https; 1rmarkdubowit7.orui20 18i03/foreign-podiC\'-iran-nuclcar-Jcal-l/) 

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Action.22 When a group of bipartisan Senators came forward with legislation to support the 

negotiations" - by establishing prospective sanctions if the Iranians refused to meet key 

benchmarks in a final agreement- the White House unleashed a firestorm of attacks aimed at 

quashing legitimate dissention about the deal.24 By spring 2014, one thing was clear: Obama and 

Kerry were willing to accept any deal, even one whose terms did not prevent Iran from preserving 

and enhancing its nuclear capabilities. 

The final deal did not include basic requirements to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear 

weapon.25 Longstanding international and Congressional demands that Iran halt all uranium 

enrichment were abandoned while longstanding demands that Iran halt its development of ballistic 

missiles and sponsorship of terrorism were left unaddressed. Iran was given the right to enrich 

uranium on its own soil, keep its nuclear infrastructure largely intact, and keep its missile program 

moving forward. The deal did nothing to stop Iran from sponsoring terrorism or expanding its 

presence throughout the Middle East. The narrow restrictions put on Iran's nuclear program were 

reversible and, in many cases, temporary26 In exchange, the United States suspended all the tough 

sanctions Congress had enacted between 2010 and 2012 even though the sanctions had been 

enacted to address issues beyond just Iran's nuclear program. 

The deal, as critics had predicted, did not advance the national security goals we set out to achieve 

with the deaL Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles continued unabated, with at 

least 23 tests following the JCPOA's establishment. 27 In testimony before this subcommittee, 

David Albright from the Institute for Science and International Security pointed to a series of 

Iranian compliance issues that were never addressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 

or the Joint Commission issues relating to heavy water, suspicious procurement, research and 

development of advanced centrifuges, denial of access to research and military sites, and the 

inability to verify Section T of the JCPOA with respect to nuclear weaponization activities. 28 All 

along, as we learned from the recent Israeli intelligence bonanza, Iran was hiding a secret nuclear 

22 U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of State. ·'Guidance Relating to the Provision of Certain 

Temporary Sanctions Relief in Order to Implement the Joint Plan of Action Reached on November 24, 2013. 

Bet\veen the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran:· January 20. 2014. (https://w\\W.treasun.goy/resourcecentcr/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jpoa guidancc.pdl) 

n "Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of2013, S. 1881. JlJlh Congress (2013). (http~:!/\\W\\ .congre:,.:-,,gm/bi!!/IIJthconrrress/senate-bi!l/ 1881 /cosponsors) 

:.>.-1 Ryan Grim. ''White House Dares Democratic Senators Pushing Iran Sanctions to Want War." The 

Hu.ffington Post. Januar)' 9. 2014. (hl!ll§.C.~~Jlli.ffillWJ!lli~;QIT!G.(lJ.±ill!:Q2:~il£:hill!'&lrilll: 

\\ar n 4572003.htm!) 2

" Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Vienna. July 14,2015. 

(https:/iww\\· .statc.gov/documents/onz.aniLntion/2453 17 .pd0 

:.>.6 Mark Dubmvitz. "Assessing the Iran Deal:· Testimony before the House Oversight and Gm•ernment Reform 

Commillee. Apri\5. 2017. 

(http;l/v. \\\\ .Jefcnddemocracv .orglcontcntiuploads/dot:uments/40517 !\:fD Tcstimon\ .pdi) 

:.>.7 Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Iranian Ballistic Missile Tests Since the Nuclear Deal ~ 2.0:· Foundation for Defense <~f 

Democracies. January 25. 20! 8. 

(http:/1'.\\V\\.detenddcmocracv .oroicontent/uploadsidocumcnts/lranfiallistictvtissileResearchMcmo.pdt) 28 David Albright. ''Assessing the Iran Deal: Examining Iranian Non-Compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action and United Nations Security Council Resolution 223l." Testimony before the House Oversight and 

Government Reform ('ommittee. April 5. 2017. (lmps:/iovcrsight.housc.govr'wp-content/uploads/2017'04/AlbrightStatement-l ran-V iolations-4--5 .pdJ) 

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weapons archivc.29 Iran had misled the IAEA with respect to the military dimensions of its nuclear 

program- a violation of the JCPOA in and of itself- and was preserving the knowledge necessary 

to restart a nuclear weapons program. 

Meanwhile, as Iran's missile program accelerated and its nuclear weapons program was on 

standby, America was effectively hand-cuffed from using economic coercion to respond as Iran 

established weapons factories in Syria,30 shipped ballistic missiles to Yemen, 31 and spent roughly 

$15 billion a year to prop up Bashar al-Assad. 32 In Syria, Iran established a base from which to 

attack Israel on its northern border. We saw the first hint of their increased capability earlier this 

year when an Iranian UA V flew into Israeli airspace. 

The era of the JCPOA was essentially an era of American detente with Iran. The deal 

fundamentally changed America's strategic approach to Iran in the Middle East. The Drug 

Enforcement Agency, for example, was reportedly pressured to back off pursuing key Hezbollahrelated invcstigations. 33 Even recently under President Trump- before the decision to withdraw 

from the JCPOA- the Defense Department insisted that countering Iranian influence in Syria was 

not its mission. 34 Just as the Soviets used the cover of detente to expand their global reach and 

cheat on agreements with the West, so too Iran used the cover of the JCPOA to establish its socalled Shiite Crescent stretching from Yemen all the way to the Lebanese coast. 

Most damningly- and truly the demonstration of the deal's fatal flaw- despite being told by the 

Obama administration repeatedly that the JCPOA would not prevent the United States from 

imposing sanctions on Iran for non-nuclear reasons, not a single entity listed in Annex II of the 

JCPOA- that is, the annex outlining the U.S. sanctions relief- was ever designated for terrorism, 

missiles, or human rights abuses during the entirety of America's participation in the deal. When 

entities were found to be involved in these illicit activities, the U.S. refrained from taking action. 

Sure, we designated other entities of lesser importance to the regime. But nothing happened to the 

banks we knew were financing the Quds Force, providing lines of credit to Assad, or supporting 

other illicit activities. Nothing happened to the supreme leader's business empire despite his 

ongoing abuse of human rights. Why? For fear that Iran with Europe's echo would cry foul 

and leave the deal. 

This status quo was unsustainable. With increasing concerns over Iranian precision-guided 

munitions in Syria and Lebanon, Iranian bases expanding in Syria, and Iranian ballistic missiles 

29 Eliott McLaughlin, ''Netanyahu says he has proof of secret Iranian nuclear program." C"'/N, May L 2018. 

(https:/;\vww .cnn.com/20 l8/04/30imiddlccast/nctam ahu-lran-nuclear-program/index.html) 30 Isabel Kershner, ''Iran Building Weapons Factories in Lebanon and Syria, Israel Says;• The New York lfmes, 

August 29, 2017. (https://w,.vw.mtimes.com/20 l7i08[29/wor!d/midd!ecast!iran~missl\es·lebanon~israel-.htm!) 

31 Callum Paton. "Iran's Secret Missile Shipments in Yemen Confirmed by U.N.:· Newsweek. January 16.2018. 

(http: 1 /'<\ \\\\- .ne\VS\\cck.com/irans-secrct -missile-shipments-\ cmen·coniirmed-un-tensions-us-782236) 32 David Ades.nik. ''Iran Spends $16 Billion Annually to Support Terrorists and Rogue Regimes," Foundationfor 

Defense of Democracies, January 10,2018. (http:/!wwvv.dcfcnddcmocracv.org/mcdia-hitldm id-adesnik-iran-spends16·bi 11 ion-annual!\ -to-~mpport -tcrrori sts-and-roguc-rc£i mcs.') 

33 Josh Meyer. ''The secret baekstory of hov.· Obama let Hezbollah off the hook," Politico. December 18. 2017. 

{https:/1 \VWw.po!itico.com/interacti\'CSI 20 I 7/obama-hezbollah-dru~r -trafficking-i nvestieation/) 14 Rebecca Khecl, ·'Top general: Countering Iran in Syria not a US military mission,'' The Hill, February 27.2018. 

{http::'/thch i! l.comlpol ic\ -'dg!Cnse/3 7 57 89-tor-gcncral-countcring-i ran-in-sYria-not -a-us-mi llJar\ ·missiot1) 

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raining down on Saudi Arabia, the United States could no longer stay inside a deal that handcuffed 

its ability to respond. President Trump's decision was indeed justified and necessary. 

What Do We Do Now? 

Just as President Reagan reversed American policy toward the Soviet Union-turning from detente 

to rollback we too must now turn from the era of the JCPOA to a comprehensive rollback of 

Iran's malign activities. That requires three primary lines of effort: political and ideological 

warfare: maximum economic and financial warfare: and military activities, both overt and covert, 

that remove Iranian forces from Syria and Yemen and demonstrate a willingness to use military 

force if the regime decides to race toward a nuclear weapon. 

This is a maximum pressure strategy, which requires a broad interagency effort tightly 

coordinated by a senior official at the National Security Council or an agency empowered by the 

president to take the lead. In his recent Heritage Foundation address, Secretary Pompeo helped the 

U.S. and, indeed, the world understand the goal of this effort: force the Iranian regime to choose 

between fundamental behavior changes or certain collapse from within. 

The secretary laid out 12 conditions for any future arrangement where the United States pulls back 

on its maximum pressure strategy. As he pointed out, these 12 issues are the bare minimum of 

what we could consider to be a normal country in the community of nations -one that does not 

sponsor terrorism, seek to threaten its neighbors, or enable grave crimes against humanity. If Iran's 

leaders want normalization of trade and diplomatic relations, they must first normalize their own 

behavior. 

Without a doubt, this strategy requires a no-holds-barred, pedal-to-the-metal approach to succeed. 

The Trump administration will have its hands full with the diplomacy and enforcement that comes 

with a maximum sanctions approach- particularly in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf. The complexities 

involved in rolling back Iran's presence in Syria will require careful planning by our military 

leaders in close coordination with our allies. New personnel, programs, and instruments of 

strategic communications may be needed to fully execute a political warfare strategy of a Cold 

War-style scale. 

But Congress. as it always has, can and should play a critical role. Historically, the issue of Iran 

was never a partisan issue. The hyper-partisanship surrounding American policy toward Iran is a 

phenomenon that emerged in early 20I4 and later spiraled out of control in the run-up to, and 

aftermath of. the 2016 presidential election. Whether you agreed with the president's decision to 

exit the JCPOA or not, Congress should find a way to return to its long-standing bipartisan 

commitment to stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, end the regime's sponsorship of terrorism, 

stand with Iranian dissidents and persecuted minorities, and defend our allies from Iranian 

terrorism. weapons. and aggression. 

These are a few initial recommendations: 

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Recommendation #l: Establish regular briefing schedules for members and staff by senior 

administration officials to ensure Congress fully exercises its sanctions enforcement oversight 

responsibilities and uses its existing authorities to maximum effect. This should include: 

1) Regular briefings by State Department officials to ensure countries receiving "exceptions"' 

under FY 12 NOAA Sec. 1245 have actually "significantly reduced"' their imports of 

Iranian oil to an extent that should merit an exception from sanctions being granted. These 

briefings should also include key Treasury Department officials to ensure such importing 

countries are complying with the escrow account requirements under that Act (i.e. 

requirements that countries importing Iranian oil deposit their payments in a locally held 

escrow account so that Iran can only use the money to buy goods from that country using 

the local currency). 

2) Regular briefings by Treasury Department officials related to all other sanctions 

enforcement issues. providing members and staff an opportunity to raise questions about 

open-source reporting on alleged sanctions violators. While l have full confidence Treasury 

officials will be doing their utmost to hold any would-be sanctions evaders accountable, 

Congress has played an imported role for many years in holding both Republican and 

Democratic administrations accountable for enforcement. 

3) Regular briefings by Commerce Department officials related to the enforcement of export 

control laws. providing members and staff an opportunity to raise questions about opensource reporting on alleged violations. 

4) Regular briefings by Treasury Department officials to review potential sanctions targets, 

including companies owned or controlled by the IRGC and lran·s defense industry (which 

represent 20 percent of the total market capitalization of the Tehran Stock Exchange) and 

the supreme leader•s $200-billion business conglomerate, including ElKO and the bonyads 

(charitable trusts) where the mullahs store their money. 

Recommendation #2: A critical element of a maximum pressure strategy that closes all loopholes 

that the regime might exploit is disconnecting the Central Bank of Iran and all other re-designated 

Iranian llnancial institutions from the SWIFT financial messaging service. While SWIFT. a 

Brussels-based cooperative. claims it is "only the messenger," we know thaL in the modern-age, 

transactions get done by moving ones and zeros, That is where SWIFT plays a role in facilitating 

illicit transactions despite the imposition of sanctions targeting financial transactions. SWIFT's 

own corporate rules state clearly that users can be suspended if they "demonstrate a conduct which 

is not in line with generally accepted business conduct principles." One would think financing the 

Quds Force. among other illicit activities, would offer such a demonstration. As the United States 

re-imposes all of its sanctions by November. Congress should do everything possible to ensure 

SWIFT disconnects from the Central Bank of Iran and all other re-designated Iranian financial 

institutions. Pressing SWIFT to take these merited actions could include: 

I) Urging the president to use his authority under Section 220 of the Iran Threat Reduction 

and Syria J Iuman Rights Act of2012 to impose sanctions on board members of SWIFT if 

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Richard Goldberg June 6. 2018 

the cooperative does not disconnect all designated Iranian banks, including the Central 

Bank of Iran, by November 4, 2018. Board members of SWIFT are financial institutions 

represented by individuals- both the companies and people should be subject to sanctions. 

2) Changing Section 220( c)( 1) from permissive to mandatory-substituting "shall" for "may" 

where appropriate. 

3) Asking the board members of SWIFT to appear before committees of oversight to state 

whether or not they will comply with U.S. sanctions law. Ensure they fully understand the 

financial consequences - both personally and for the corporation - if they are found to be 

knowingly providing specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran 

and other re-designated Iranian financial institutions. 

Rerommendation #3: Expand congressional sanctions against !ran to include: 

1) Enacting H.R. 5132, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Economic Exclusion Act, 

which would significantly expand U.S. sanctions to target companies in which the IRGC 

owns at least a 33-percent share. Our sanctions should target the IRGC wherever it 

operates. 

2) Reconciling H.R. 3329, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Amendments 

Act of 2017, with its Senate counterpart, S. 1595. By adopting the broadest language 

possible, Congress can help cut off Hezbollah from the international financial system, 

while helping the administration crack down on the group's fundraising, recruitment, 

narcotics trafficking, and other transnational criminal activities. 

3) Expanding the sectoral sanctions in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act to 

include Iran's mining. engineering, and construction sectors and any other sector the 

president determines is of strategic importance to the regime. This idea was included in 

bipartisan Senate legislation introduced prior to the JCPOA's establishment. 

Recommendation #4: Establish key goals for the Department of State, Department of the 

Treasury, and Broadcasting Board of Governors, and then provide adequate resources to achieve 

those goals: 

I) The Treasury Department should be asked to conduct a maximum enforcement campaign, 

investing time and people into investigations. traveL and coordination of enforcement 

actions. This will undoubtedly require additional staffing. Between Iran and North Korea 

alone. Treasury's sanctions enforcers are already stretched thin. The Department should be 

asked for a realistic estimate of additional staff it might need to hire to sustain long-term 

maximum pressure campaigns- and the necessary funds should be appropriated. 

2) The Department of State should be asked to conduct robust daily political and ideological 

warfare against the Islamic Republic. design strategies to expand access to information and 

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secure communication for the Iranian people, and support Iranian dissidents and persecuted 

minorities. Funds provided by Congress to Near East Regional Democracy (which should 

be once again called the Iran Democracy program) should be used to support this effort, 

including the cost of stall; technology, travel, and programming. 

3) The Voice of America Persian service and Radio Farda should be asked to expand their 

coverage to prioritize: 

a. Fact-checking statements made by Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister 

Javad Zarif, and providing the Iranian people with infonnation they can use to 

counter Iranian propaganda; 

b. Reporting on Iran's illicit activities outside its borders, including Syria and Yemen, 

and the amount of money these efforts arc costing the Iranian people; 

c. Reporting on corruption inside the Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard 

Corps; 

d. Reporting on the hypocrisy of Iranian officials who preach hatred against America 

and the West but send their families abroad for school, vacations, or long-term 

living; 

e. Reporting on political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, including interviews 

with their families; and 

f. Reporting on pro-U.S., anti-regime figures inside Iran rather than anti-U.S. socalled reformists tied to the Islamic Republic. 

Other recommendations put forward recently by the American Foreign Policy Council should 

be implemented as well35 Recent news that Voice of America will begin a new 24/7 Farsilanguage channel is encouraging, but continuous oversight of content and market 

competitiveness will be necessary. 

Recommendation #5: Establish U.S. policy and then hold senior officials accountable to a 

political and military strategy- closely coordinated with our allies- that rolls back Iran throughout 

the Middle East. 

l) Establish that it is the policy of the United States to achieve an end-state in Syria that is 

free of IRGC forces, bases, weapons, missile production facilities, and free of Iraniansponsored Shiite militias. That will demand close intelligence and operational coordination 

with Israel and clear messages describing U.S. policy delivered to Moscow. 

2) Congress should continue its longstanding support for U.S.-Israel missile defense 

cooperation, particularly as we could see an escalation on Israel's northern border. The 

U.S. and Israel should look to new and innovative ways to combat salvos of precisionguided missiles and increase our bilateral cooperation in cyber warfare activities. 

35 "U.S. Persian Media Study- Final Synthesis Report.'' American Foreign Policy Council, October 6, 2017. 

(https://wwv,-.bbc.gov!v.;r-contcnt/mcdia/20 ll Ill /AFPC Persian-Language-Broadcasting-Study svnthesisreport.pdJ) 

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3) Our military strategy in Syria cannot be decoupled !rom our policies toward Lebanon and 

Iraq. The border between Syria and Lebanon cannot remain porous- nor can U.S. policy 

allow further Iranian transfers of advanced weapons or precision-guided munition 

conversion kits to Lebanon from Syria. Congress should consider tying future assistance 

to the Lebanese Armed Forces to full-faith enforcement of United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 170 I, including interdictions of weapons transfers coming across the border 

tram Syria. A continued U.S. presence along the Iraq-Syria border will remain critical until 

the IRGC and Iran-backed militias withdraw from Syria and a reliable Iraqi border force is 

established. 

4) Bahrain is home to the U.S. Navy's Central Command and is at the forefi'ont of the 

movement to normalize Arab-Israeli relations. We cannot allow Iran to destabilize the 

Bahraini government. Congress should encourage the Defense Department to work with 

GCC partners and other allied forces to target Iranian arms smuggling into Bahrain, while 

strengthening U.S.-Bahraini counterintelligence cooperation. 

5) With on-the-ground training and provision of weapons and ballistic missiles, Iran is slowly 

turning the Yemeni Houthis into Yemeni Hezbollah. This not only poses a threat to Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE, it also threatens military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The 

Defense Department should consider providing 24/7 ISR coverage for Saudi forces 

targeting IRGC personnel and weapons. We should also target Iran's supply routes in the 

Gulf of Oman and overland through Oman. 

Conclusion 

These recommendations arc by no means exhaustive, but they are important steps Congress could 

take to help increase the pressure on Iran, hold the administration accountable, and ensure the 

administration's strategy succeeds. On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I 

thank you again for inviting me to testify and I look forward to addressing your questions. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 11 www.defenddcmocracy.org 
21 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. Your time is expired. 

Mr. Albright, you are up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis and Ranking 

Member Welch and other members of the committee for holding 

this hearing and inviting me to testify. 

Although the administration in the E3, Germany and Britain 

and France, could not agree on a document to fix the deficiencies 

of the Iran nuclear deal, they did agree on many issues. Rather 

quickly in the negotiations, the E3 and the Trump administration 

reached agreements on the need for the IAEA to improve its inspections in Iran, particularly visiting military sites associated 

with past nuclear weapons work and centrifuge work and implementing Section T. 

The U.S. and the E3 also agreed that an Iranian ICBM is intrinsically tied to the nuclear deal, and its development would be sufficient to justify the reimposition of draconian sanctions by the U.S. 

and the European Union. 

However, as we all know, they could not agree on the sunset 

issue and how to structure the reimposition of sanctions if Iran 

augmented its enrichment program. However, the E3 did agree 

that the growth of Iran’s enrichment program was a grave security 

threat. 

Overall, the negotiationshelped clarify many transatlantic areas 

of agreement on the future of the underlying issues of the JCPOA. 

The partial agreements can be a basis for ongoing collaborative 

work with Europe as the Trump administration builds its coalition 

against Iran’s most threatening behaviors. 

One development that confirmed the E3 U.S. agreement on the 

need to improve inspections in Iran was Israel’s dramatic revelation on April 30 about Iran’s hidden nuclear weapons archive. The 

project, the work, the archive mostly focused on the AMAD Project 

and showed that it was indeed halted in 2003 or 2004, but it carried on. Iran carried on in a more research-oriented fashion afterwards aimed at eliminating scientific and engineering bottlenecks 

in developing nuclear weapons and increasing know-how about 

them. 

The new information makes the sunsets far deadlier, as the document show that Iran’s nuclear weapons program is both more organized and more advanced than previously thought, allowing a faster dash to the bomb. 

What is new in the archive? I have had two briefings by Israeli 

intelligence officials as of today, certainly read the public information. I would like to just list some of the information that’s new 

that was not known before. 

The number and kilotons of nuclear weapons sought by Iran, the 

specific amount of highly enriched uranium and nuclear explosives 

to that design: that information was not available to the IAEA previously. Blueprints for the production of all the components of nuclear weapons; the location of planned nuclear weapons test sites: 

there was some information on that, but it was more conceptual 

than concrete. Details about a second building at the Parchin site 

involved in high-explosive work related to nuclear weapons in an 


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explosive chamber; it is called the Taleghan 2 site. Taleghan 1 is 

the site where we know well, where the explosive bunker is that 

the IAEA visited. Taleghan 2 has not been visited by the inspectors. 

There’s much more detail about Iran’s massive work on uranium 

metallurgy, including ample evidence of Iran having all the equipment for all the work needed in a nuclear weapon’s uranium metallurgy program. 

The information also shows that Iran made all the uranium 

metal components with surrogate materials. Iran did do small scale 

uranium processing for a neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon. 

That was also not known. 

There is now direct evidence that the secret Fordow enrichment 

site, which was exposed in 2009, was being built to make weapongrade uranium. 

There’s an image of a device to assemble the central core of a nuclear explosive using a surrogate metal material, and the 

Netanyahu briefing showed an animation of that. Subsequently, 

the Israelis investigating the archive found a picture of the actual 

assembly device. 

There is additional equipment that Iran must potentially collar 

under Section T of the Iran nuclear deal, and I could go on. And 

I am only representing a small fraction of the information in there 

because much of the information would be considered highly classified and not subject to public release by myself or—and certainly 

not by the Israelis. 

And so the new information adds most of the missing pieces to 

the puzzle of Iran’s past nuclear weapons program and raises troubling assessments about Iran’s intention to use this archive to 

build nuclear weapons in the future. 

The conditions of the existence of this archive and the extent of 

the information in it suggests that Iran has been violating the 

JCPOA and the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Under the NPT, Iran should be rigorously challenged why it possesses and maintains such an archive while simultaneously refusing to allow the IAEA to visit military sites and personnel named 

in the archive. The new information makes it more urgent to fix 

IAEA inspections in Iran even if the JCPOA falters. 

Iran is a still of a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty and its 

comprehensive safeguards agreement requires Iran to cooperate 

with the IAEA over determining whether its program is purely 

peaceful. 

The United States should work with its allies, and I think they 

would find willing partners in Europe, to raise the issue of Iran’s 

past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons program at the IAEA 

Board of Governors. 

The new information argues for putting much more pressure on 

Iran to allow the IAEA to do its job under both the JCPOA and 

the comprehensive safeguards agreement. 

If Iran refuses, then the JCPOA should be discarded by all and 

the world should unite and return to a pressure campaign, including the reimposition of all sanctions. 

Thank you. I am sorry for going over. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:] 


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Testimony of David Albright, 

President of the 

Institute for Science and International Security, 

before the House Subcommittee on National Security, 

Committee of Oversight and Government Reform 

Hearing title: Protecting America From a Bad Deal: 

Ending U.S. Participation in the Nuclear Agreement with Iran 

June 6, 2018 

After several months of intense negotiations with Britain, France, and Germany (the E3), 

President Trump decided on May 8, 2018 that the weaknesses in the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action (JCPOA) could not be remedied sufficiently to justifY the United States from ceasing 

to further participate in the agreement and re-impose the full suite of U.S. nuclear-related Iran 

sanctions. The weaknesses of the JCPOA are well known, namely inadequate inspections, 

sunsets in nuclear limitations, and lack of treatment of intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs). 

Significantly, the administration did not remain a member to the agreement while invoking the 

snap-back clause in the JCPOA, which it could have justifiably done based on the new Iranian 

nuclear weapons information discovered by Israel in a dramatic seizure in early 2018. As a 

result, the administration did not end the JCPOA and snap back United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC) sanctions on Iran, adopting the stance tor now that it is not excluding others' continued 

participation in the JCPOA. It is unclear how long the JCPOA will continue as the United States 

gradually re-imposes nuclear sanctions on Iran. However, it would need to involve Iran 

withdrawing from the agreement. If Iran ignores the nuclear limitations, one would expect the 

re-imposition of the UNSC sanctions and Europe to snap back its own sanctions. 

Iran's refusal to allow access to its military sites or honestly address allegations about its past 

nuclear weapons work is also well documented. Rather quickly in the negotiations on a 

supplementary agreement, the E3 and the Trump administration reached agreements on fixing 

this weakness of the JCPOA. They agreed on the need for the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) to improve its inspections in Iran, particularly visiting military sites associated 

with past nuclear weapons and centrifuge work and implementing Section T. This section is a 

part of the JCPOA that bans certain work related to nuclear weapons development and subjects 

certain related activities to Joint Commission approval and IAEA monitoring. So far, Section T 

has not been implemented or adequately verified due to Iranian resistance. The IAEA appears 

more cognizant of the inspection problem, having recently stated in its latest quarterly report on 
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Iran that "'timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing [complementary] access would 

facilitate implementation of the Additional Protocol and enhance confidence." 1 

The United States and E3 also agreed that an Iranian ICBM is intrinsically tied to the JCPOA, 

and its development would be sufficient to justify the re-imposition of draconian sanctions by the 

United States and the European Union. 

However, they could not agree on the sunset issue and how to structure the re-imposition of 

sanctions iflran augmented its enrichment program. The E3 did agree that the growth of Iran's 

enrichment program was a grave security threat. Nonetheless, they refused to accept the U.S. 

condition that sanctions would be re-imposed if Iran's breakout timeline dropped below 12 

months. In practice, the 12-month criterion had evolved into a set of conditions that marked 

when Iran would physically increase its gas centrifuge program. Based on Iran's voluntary 

enrichment plant submitted as part of the JCPOA, an example would be Iran deploying an 

increasing number of advanced centrifuges after the tenth year of the agreement, roughly seven 

and half years from now. In draft Senate legislation, this number was taken as 100 advanced 

centrifuges. 

Instead of the 12-month criterion, the E3 were proposing another approach that involved 

definitions of a peaceful nuclear program and what constituted a military nuclear program 

inconsistent with the JCPOA. The Europeans proposed that if the peaceful use oflran's nuclear 

program could not be established, they would agree to consider returning to the pressure track 

and sanctions, according to an administration official. However, this language was not enough 

to convince the administration. There was discussion of trying to quantify such a condition, but 

from what I understand, those discussions were not sufficiently robust for the administration. 

The E3 also argued that the sunset condition proposed by the administration would be a violation 

of the JCPOA, once enacted, and would lead Iran to withdraw from the JCPOA. The 

administration rejected this view and assessed instead that Iran would not leave the JCPOA over 

this issue; Iran would likely choose to remain in the deal at least until the first sunset involving 

an increase in numbers of centrifuges, which would occur in about seven years. 

The problem of how to re-impose sanctions was debated in the context of a proposed Senate Iran 

Nuclear Agreement Review Act of2015 (INARA) amendment by creating "'off-ramps" that 

would not make the re-imposition of nuclear sanctions automatic. The intent of the legislation, 

and an E3/US agreement, was to create conditions that would encourage Iran to renegotiate the 

sunset conditions while avoiding automatic snapback of U.S. nuclear sanctions. 

Negotiations proceeded well on five of six parallel regional issues raised by the Trump 

administration, for example dealing more broadly with the activities of the Iran Revolutionary 

Guards Corps (IRGC), human rights, and Iran's ballistic missiles. The E3 and the United States 

had reached tentative agreement on the need to act collectively in these five areas. The issue of 

1 !Af:J! Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. June 4. 2018. 

https:/ /wYv\v. iaea.org/ncwsccntcr!statcments/iaca -director-general s-i ntroductorv-~tatemcnt -to-the-board-ofQ.Overnors-4-iunc-2018 

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designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization was unsettled. In addition, the E3 negotiators 

expressed increasing interest in a coalition being built by the United States to counter Iran's 

malign activities in the region. 

With lack of agreement on the sunset issue, it was inevitable that President Trump would end 

U.S. participation in the deal. It is unfortunate that the parties could not reach a compromise, 

given their fundamental agreement that the sunset issue of the JCPOA would have to be fixed 

and their agreement on the other two critical issues of inspections and ICBMs. None of the 

parties directly engaged in the negotiations argued that Iran's increase of its centrifuge program 

was an inevitable outcome of the JCPOA or that it would be anything but a grave security 

challenge. Some outside the negotiations, including several non-E3 EU member states, have 

argued that we should welcome Iran's increase in its enrichment program and that the JCPOA 

legitimizes that expansion. The E3 and the United States did not accept that attitude. 

The negotiations overall helped clarify many transatlantic areas of agreement on the future of the 

underlying issues of the JCPOA. The partial agreements can be a basis for on-going 

collaborative work with Europe, as the Trump administration builds its coalition against Iran's 

most threatening behaviors. In the short term, however, further negotiations with the E3 appear 

too complicated to pursue, as the E3 is focused on trying to salvage the JCPOA and warding off 

expected secondary sanctions on its companies and banks. The administration's return to 

opposing any enrichment in Iran further complicates resuming discussions with the E3 in the 

short term. 

It should be pointed out, however, that this new no-enrichment position eases the 

administration's task of pressing Saudi Arabia to accept the Gold Standard in a 123 agreement 

with the United States. It also strengthens the administration's hand in negotiating with North 

Korea, which no longer can use a precedent of the JCPOA to argue for keeping its own uranium 

enrichment program. With recent evidence of a secret uranium enrichment plant, often called 

Kangsong, outside the Y ongbyon nuclear site able to continue making weapon-grade uranium, 

this is no time to consider the idea of allowing North Korea to keep any of its uranium 

enrichment program.2 Any deal can easily provide a guaranteed outside supply of the relatively 

small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) North Korea might need for its civil nuclear 

program. 

Like in the case of Iran, North Korea has no economic justification for its enrichment program. 

Given the technical limitations of both of their centrifuge programs, these two countries will 

always be able to buy LEU more cheaply from abroad than they can produce it domestically. So, 

if North Korea makes a denuclearization deal, it will be able to obtain LEU from abroad for its 

relatively small reactors. Certainly, the United States should not accept continued enrichment in 

' David Albright, "On the Question of Another North Korean Centrifuge Plant and the Suspect Kangsong Plant," 

Institute for Science and International Security, May 25,2018. 

http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/on-the-guestion-of-another-north-korcan-ccntrifuge-plant-and-the-suspectkl!; See also Joby Warrick, "Summit collapse foils chance to press North Korea on suspicious sites ... The 

Washington Post! May 25, 2018. https://\V\\·w.washingtonpost.com/v:orldlnational-securitv/summit-co!lapse-foilschance-to-prcss-north-korea-on-suspicious-sites/20 J 8/05/25/dSa 14044-602d-l J e8-9ee3-

49d6d4814c4c ston.html''utm term-.733fl074dfllc 

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in any nuclear deal with North Korea. Similarly, it no longer makes sense to legitimize Iran's 

uranium enrichment programs. 

Iran's Nuclear Archive 

One development that confirmed the E3/US agreement on the need to improve inspections in 

Iran was Israel's dramatic revelation on April30'h about Iran's hidden "nuclear weapons 

archive." The archive holds some I 00,000 documents and files, or a half ton of documents, CDs, 

and other materials, reportedly containing vital information about Iran's past nuclear weaponsrelated effort, in particular the work of the AMAD program. This program's structured work on 

developing the nuclear weapon itself was largely halted in 2003 or 2004 but carried on in a more 

research-oriented fashion afterwards, aimed at eliminating scientific and engineering bottlenecks 

in developing nuclear weapons and increasing know-how about them. 

These revelations highlight the fundamental mistake made by the JCPOA negotiators not to 

settle the issue of Iran's past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons program prior to the 

implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016. Because this issue is so fundamental to 

preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the decision to sweep this issue under the 

carpet served to not only weaken the JCPOA, but with this new information, serves to call into 

question its very purpose. 

The new information makes the sunsets far deadlier, as the documents show that Iran's nuclear 

weapons program is both more organized and more advanced than previously thought, allowing 

a faster dash to a bomb. As reported on June 3'd in the London Times, "'What Iran told the 

International Atomic Energy Agency about its capacities was almost comical compared to what 

we have here,' said an Israeli intelligence expert who has studied the documents. 'Iran said there 

had only been feasibility and scientific studies but what we see is that Iran ran a fully fledged 

nuclear weapons programme and that it followed directions from the politicallevels."'3 

According to the Israelis, this archive was not gathering dust but was part of an on-going 

stewardship program meant to enable Iran to reincarnate its nuclear weapons program on short 

order. It was being kept in a secret location and maintained under the authority of an Iranian 

military organization, Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, or SPND, by the 

Persian acronym. The SPND's head is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the former head of the AMAD 

program. He is assisted by other former members of AMAD, according to the Israelis who have 

analyzed the nuclear archive. In short, Iran is maintaining and nurturing a reconstitution kit 

ready for use to build nuclear weapons. 

The conditions of its existence of this archive and the extent of the information in it suggest that 

Iran has been violating the JCPOA and the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under 

the JCPOA, Iran agreed that "under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire 

nuclear weapons."4 Under the NPT, Iran should be rigorously challenged why it possesses and 

3 David Charter, Berlin I Roger Boyes, "Secret files prove Iran is trying to build bomb, claims Israel,'' The Times, 

June 4. 2018. https://ww\v.thetimes.co.uk/articlc/sccret-tiles-prove-iran-is-trving-to-build-bomb-02qxs8mpc 4 Joint Comprehensive Plan ofAction. Preface, Vienna, July 14, 2015. 

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maintains such an archive while simultaneously refusing to allow the IAEA to visit military sites 

and personnel named in the archive. 

The Israelis are right to criticize the failure to ensure that Iran has come clean about its past 

nuclear weapons program and to permit inspectors to monitor those facilities and individuals 

involved in past activities. The IAEA knows how to do this type of work. if the country 

cooperates, and has made many visits to nuclear weapons-related sites in both South Africa and 

Taiwan after those nations ended their nuclear weapons programs. The lack of Iranian 

cooperation reinforces the view that Iran is merely hiding its nuclear weapons program, awaiting 

the right moment for it to re-emerge. At a minimum, the archive requires a much tougher 

approach on inspections in Iran. 

The new information makes it more urgent to fix IAEA inspections in Iran, even if the JCPOA 

falters. Iran is still a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its comprehensive 

safeguards agreement requires cooperation with the IAEA over determining whether its program 

is purely peaceful. Iran has a binding legal obligation to grant the IAEA inspectors access to 

sites materials, equipment, documents, and personnel to resolve outstanding questions about the 

military dimensions of its past nuclear activities. The IAEA has an obligation to investigate 

completely the personnel, sites, equipment, and activities described in the Nuclear Archive 

discovered by Israel, including gaining access to military sites. If Iran refuses, then it is in 

violation of its safeguards obligations. As discussed above, the IAEA appears to be more 

determined to better address its inability to conduct adequate inspections of military sites. 

With an abundance of detailed information now in hand, the IAEA can ask for greater access in 

Iran with better justification than before. The United States should work with its allies in Europe 

and elsewhere to raise this issue at the IAEA Board of Governors. Working together, they 

should ensure that the IAEA inspectors carry out their responsibilities under the NPT and 

comprehensive safeguards agreement. The United States, the European Union, and other 

members of the IAEA Board of Governors have a responsibility to ensure that Iran reveals its 

past nuclear weapons programs and is in compliance with its safeguards agreement. 

The E3 should be expected to play a critical role in the JCPOA ensuring that inspections in Iran 

are improved. Preserving the JCPOA should not become an excuse to allow Iran to back slide on 

compliance and avoid allowing the IAEA access to military sites or effectively implementing 

Section T of the JCPOA. 

The new information argues for putting much more pressure on Iran to allow the IAEA to do its 

job both under the JCPOA and the comprehensive safeguards agreement. If Iran refuses, then 

the JCPOA should be discarded and the world should return to a pressure campaign and the 

universal re-imposition of sanctions. 

What is new? 

The Nuclear Archive contains much new information not previously available to the IAEA or 

Western governments. I have reviewed much of the information gathered by the IAEA about 

Iran's past nuclear weapons programs and it is compelling, but this information has many gaps 

5 
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and is unable to lead to conclusions about the current program and its intentions. The archive 

fills in many of these holes, and overall, according to the Israelis, it presents a much more 

complete picture of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts than previously available. 

What was missing from the previously existing information? The new information includes: the 

number and kilotons of nuclear weapons sought by Iran, the location of planned nuclear weapons 

test sites, other nuclear weapons related sites and activities, uranium metallurgy work, military 

uranium enrichment activities, additional equipment that Iran must potentially declare today 

under Section T, information about calculations, and simulations captured in videos. This new 

information adds many key missing pieces to the puzzle of Iran's past and possibly on-going 

nuclear weapons program. 

Fordow Enrichment Plant 

A new archive document released by Israel is a draft contract signed by the Atomic Energy 

Organization of Iran (AEOJ), then headed by Rcza Aghazadeh and the Iranian Defense Ministry, 

headed then by Ali Shamkhari. The document orders the transfer of responsibility, and required 

information, methods, and budget, to the Defense Ministry for the task of further enriching 

uranium hexafluoride from three percent to over 90 percent, or weapon-grade. The AEOI would 

have produced the three percent enriched uranium, likely in its secret Natanz enrichment plant, 

and the onward enrichment would have been accomplished in a military facility. There is no 

date on the paper but the Israelis have assessed that it is likely from 2001. 

The onward enrichment to weapon-grade, a sure sign of intended use in nuclear weapons, would 

have been slated for Project Ghadir, an underground facility for the AMAD program. This 

facility was built in secret by Iran in the mid-2000s after the official end of the AMAD program 

and publicly exposed by Britain, France, and the United States in 2009. After its exposure, Iran 

re-purposed the underground halls for the production of uranium enriched less than five percent 

and allowed IAEA inspections. It was first known publicly as the Qom site and then later called 

the Fordow uranium enrichment site. 

This document parallels my understanding of Iran's decision to build the Fordow underground 

enrichment plant that I assessed a few years ago was likely designed to make weapon-grade 

uranium from low enriched uranium, based in large part on inspector findings when they first 

visited the plant. At the time, based on available information, the Iranian nuelear weapons 

program could not be directly linked to a plant to make weapon-grade uranium. The link had to 

be inferred. Today, the new documents from the archive directly link Fordow to the planned 

production of weapon-grade uranium as late as 2009, when Iran was caught building this secret 

plant. 

The Iranian agreement translated into English follows on the next page. 

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Agreement from the Nuclear Archive Obtained by Israel in Tehran and provided recently to 

journalists in Europe 

Agreement 

This agreement was drafted on , between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 

(AEOI), represented by engineer Reza Aghazadeh, which will be referred to in this agreement as 

the Organization, and the Ministry of Defense, represented by Amir Daryaban Ali Shamkhani, 

for the following subjects: 

Article I) Subject of the agreement 

According to this agreement, the Organization is transferring to the Ministry of Defense its task 

of enriching UF6 by centrifuges from 3% to over 90%. 

Article 2) Responsibilities of the parties: 

2. I. The responsibilities of the Organization: 

2.1.1. Tran~'forring to the Ministry ofDefense a copy of all the schematics, scientific and 

professional documents and original samples relating to the project. 

2.1.2. Cooperating and helping making accessible the information, work performed and 

methods used by the Organization. 

2.1.3. Tran.~ferring the required budget to the Ministry of Defense. 

2.1.4. Preparing and supplying UF6 enriched to 3%, and transferring it to the Ministry 

of Defense in accordance with the time line and quantities agreed upon. 

2.2. The responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense: 

2.2.1. Preparing the project ·s timeline and assessing the required budget. 

2.2.2. Drafting a progress report for the project and delivering it to the relevant 

officials. 

2.2.3. Ensuring the project is classified top secret. 

Article 3) The budget: 

It has been agreed that the estimated budget of the project will be deposited directly, in 

coordination with the president, into the Ministry of Defense's account, through the Management 

and Planning Organization. 

Article 4) Delivery bellVeen the parties: 

This agreement has four articles, and it was drafted in fl.Vo identical copies and delivered to the 

parties. 

Ministry of Defense-Ali Shamkhani Head of the AEOI-Reza Aghazadeh 

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This document supplements a schematic from the nuclear archive released by Israel on April 

30'h, which my organization subsequently compared to the Fordow centrifuge plant. We overlaid 

this schematic from the AMAD archive on the Qom, now called the Fordow, deeply buried 

enrichment plant (see figure). 5 

• The schematic matches the entrances and expected layout of the deeply buried Qom 

uranium enrichment plant. 

• The schematic is an AMAD document, showing that the origin of this plant was in the 

Iranian nuclear weapons program, a fact we have long assessed but is now proven. 

• We and others assessed that the Qom plant was likely intended to make weapon-grade 

uranium for nuclear weapons. The new document from the archive establishes this point. 

• The site· s public revelation in 2009 by Britain, France, and the United States derailed 

Iran's ability to make weapon-grade uranium at this secret site. Locating the site was not 

easy for Western intelligence agencies. 

• Iran was building this plant at a time when U.S. intelligence agencies were stating that 

Iran's nuclear weapons program had ended. The linkage of this facility to the AMAD 

program provides new evidence that in 2009 Iran was creating a facility in secret to make 

the raw ingredient for nuclear weapons, namely weapon-grade uranium. 

Underground Nuclear Testing 

The Nuclear Archive contains more details about Iran's plans to conduct underground testing of 

a nuclear device. Previously, there was no direct information about Iran's underground nuclear 

testing plans in the AMAD plan. An excerpt from one of our earlier reports on the status of the 

IAEA's information on an underground nuclear test site, citing an IAEA report and using 

information obtained by interviewing officials knowledgeable about the underlying information 

follows below.6 However, the information does not state that the information is about the testing 

of a nuclear explosive device; that conclusion is inferred. 

The IAEA received a schematic diagram for an underground testing site that is 400 

meters deep with a control unit 10 kilometers away. The diagram shows the placement of 

a high voltage power generator. The information shows the development of a remote 

systemfor.firing an object in the 400 meter-deep shaft. Text accompanying the diagram 

callsfor the simultaneous remote firing of two spark gap detonators. Although EBWs are 

safer, both methods would work Is this related to the two EBWs needed to set off the two 

halves ofthe R265 system? According to the November 2011 safeguards report, the JAEA 

has been informed by another member state that these arrangements directly reflect those 

which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon states. !AEA 

officiaL~ assessed that this information is most likely related to testing a nuclear explosive 

5 Albright and Frank Pabian, "It Fits! Qom Site Layout," Institute for Science and International Security, May I, 

2018, http:/lisis-onlinc.orgiisis-reports/dctail/it-fits-qom-site-layout/8 6 David Albright. Paul Brannan, Mark Gorwitz and Andrea Stricker. "ISIS Analysis of !AEA Iran Safeguards 

Report: Part ll- fran·s Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon, .. 

Institute for Science and International Security, November 14, 2011. http:/lisis-onlinc.org/isis-reports/detail/iranswork-and-foreign-assistance-on-a-multipoint-initiation-system-for-a-n/8 

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device, although it reflects the conceptual development of a test rather than representing 

an engineering drawing or plan. 

On April 30'\ Israel revealed information from the archive on five sites Iran was considering for 

conducting a nuclear test. It stated that the archives contained many more documents on 

underground testing. 

Prior to obtaining the archive, the information on underground nuclear testing was indirect and 

inferred, and based on few sources. Afterwards, the information includes the sites Iran was 

evaluating as underground nuclear test sites and other specific information about nuclear testing 

as well. The information in the archive goes well beyond just an inferred, rather simple, 

conceptual development of an underground nuclear test. 

Recommendations 

The new Nuclear Archive information calls for the IAEA to redouble its efforts to get to the 

bottom of Iran's past military nuclear activities and provide a full accounting for them to ensure 

those efforts have ended. With more site and individuals identified, the IAEA can ask for greater 

access in Iran with better justification than before. Iflran refuses, then it is in violation of its 

safeguards obligations as well as the JCPOA. 

The United States should work with its allies in Europe and elsewhere to raise this issue at the 

IAEA Board of Governors. Working together, they should ensure that the IAEA inspectors carry 

out their responsibilities under the NPT and comprehensive safeguards agreement. 

The E3 should ensure that inspections in Iran are improved under the JCPOA. Preserving the 

JCPOA should not become an excuse to allow Iran to back slide on compliance and avoid 

allowing the IAEA access to military sites or effectively implementing Section T of the JCPOA. 

Overall, the new information justifies putting much more pressure on Iran to allow robust 

inspections. If Iran continues refusing to answer honestly the IAEA 's questions and allow broad 

access, then the JCPOA should be abandoned by all and the international community should 

return to an intense pressure campaign and the universal re-imposition of sanctions. 

So far, the administration has been ambivalent about the JCPOA continuing without its 

participation. It needs to clarify its intent. If it will tolerate the continuance of the JCPOA, and 

Europe's continued participation (meaning the United States will not seek UN sanctions 

snapback), it should waive sanctions on certain activities on-going under the JCPOA. These 

include the modification of the Arak reactor and perhaps non-nuclear, stable isotope separation 

work in the centrifuges at the underground Fordow site. These are useful limitations to keep in 

effect from a nonproliferation standpoint. 

The fate of the Iran nuclear deal is still yet to be determined. Iran may decide to stay within the 

constraints of the JCPOA, and in effect, try waiting out President Trump's first term in the hope 

that he will not be re-elected. European governments have indicated that this may be a preferred 

strategy for both Iran and Europe. The E3 have also reportedly warned Iran not to surpass the 

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JCPOA limits or it will be forced to snap back sanctions. In this case, in the medium term, the 

proliferation aspect may stay contained and the Trump administration will be able to 

significantly increase a range of sanctions against Iran. 

However, over the next several months, Iran may face leadership and internal pressures to start 

to withdraw from the JCPOA, deploy more centrifuges, and resume higher levels of enrichment. 

Iran's Supreme Leader stated on June 4th that the "Iranian nation & government will not stand 

being under both sanctions & nuclear restrictions." He continued, the AEOI "must immediately 

make the preparations for achieving 190K S WU [separative work units, an enrichment term used 

here incorrectly to express a large enrichment program]-for now within the JCPOA-starting 

tomorrow."7 This warning appears to indicate that the Supreme Leader may want to try use his 

own pressure by threatening the Europeans to do Iran's bidding or the nuclear restrictions under 

the JCPOA. The Ayatollah may have decided that Europe is unlikely to be able to provide Iran 

with the economic benefits envisioned under the JCPOA in the face of the threat of resumed U.S. 

sanctions and secondary sanctions against European businesses and banks. 

However, Iran must be aware that if it violates the conditions of the JCPOA, it will grow the U.S. 

coalition against it and lead to the imposition of more sanctions, including possibly EU and 

UNSC sanctions. The administration is now free to re-impose the nuclear sanctions that were in 

a straightjacket under the Iran deal and effectively unusable even against Iranian terrorism, 

ballistic missiles, or other malign activities. During the next several months, the future of the 

Iran nuclear deal will become clearer, as well as the administration's deployment of its new 

strategy to pressure Iran to abandon enrichment and reprocessing and deter it from scaling up its 

nuclear weapons capabilities. 

7 Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei on Twitter. June 4. 2018, 

https://twitter.eom/khamenei ir/status/1003660784403!8976! 

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Figure. Qom Site with overlay of AMAD schematic, showing location of underground 

enrichment site by matching it with the tunnel entrances. Source: http://isisonline.org/uploads/isisreports/documents/Qom Site Schematic Overlav May 2018 final.pdf 

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From the Iranian Nuclear Archive Seized in 2018 in Tehran by 

Israel: 

Images and information relevant to the Parchin site and the 

development of nuclear weapons. 

Supplement to Written Testimony of David Albright before the 

House Subcommittee on National Security, 

Committee of Oversight and Government Reform 

June 6, 2018 
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The top image is a Google Earth commercial satellite image showing the Parchin complex that 

was involved in nuclear weapons high explosive testing work in the AMAD project. This site has 

been extensively sanitized by Iran. The Nuclear Archive discusses this site, including the two 

main facilities which Iran calls in the documents Talaghan 1 and 2. Talaghan I contains the high 

explosive test chamber often discussed publicly and by the IAEA. European journalists recently 

received from senior Israeli intelligence officials an image from the archive of a Marx generator 

in Talaghan 2, which is a building on the north end of the site (see second image). According to 

the Israelis, the Marx generator produced a high voltage pulse for a flash x-ray used inside 

Talaghan 2 to examine small-scale tests of hemispherical high explosives components tor the 

AMAD project in a small, elongated chamber. The Nuclear Archive shows that Iran conducted 

many more high explosive tests related to nuclear weapons development than previously known. 

The IAEA has not visited the Talaghan 2 building. Source: Senior Israeli intelligence officials 
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An assembly device for the central portion of a nuclear explosive, where a surrogate metal would 

be used instead of highly enriched uranium. It contains what the Israelis call the "flyer" of the 

inner part of a nuclear device and a core made of a surrogate material instead of highly enriched 

uranium (inner core not visible in the image but see below). The external hemisphere is 

apparently the flyer; one of which can be seen in the background on the left of the image. This 

device can be recognized in a simulation in the video of Prime Minister Netanyahu presenting 

the nuclear archive on April 30, 2018 at about 6:45/19:48. The animation shows the device in 

action assembling an actual nuclear weapon. It is significant that Iran built this assembly, which 

appears in this case for use with a surrogate metal core of material, not an actual nuclear weapon. 

It is unclear if it is a full-size assembly device. Source of image and text: Senior Israeli 

intelligence officials. The video can be found at 

https:Uwww .voutu be .com/watch ?v=pkihrV4cZLE 
37 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Pregent for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT 

Mr. PREGENT. Thank you. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member 

Welch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security. On behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored 

to testify before you today. 

I just want to say upfront, there would be an Iran deal in place 

today if the Iranian regime wasn’t so blatant in its violations of existing U.N. Security Council resolutions, violations fueled by the 

JCPOA. 

There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the regime 

hadn’t continued and accelerated its illegal ballistic missile program, a violation of existing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

There would still be an Iran deal in place if the regime didn’t use 

commercial aircraft to deploy Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

Quds Force advisors in its militias to Syria, another violation of existing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. 

There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the regime 

stopped providing funds and lethal aid to Hamas, the Houthis, and 

Hezbollah—again, a violation. 

There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the regime 

hadn’t empowered and increased the lethal and financial aid to existing IRGC Quds Force militias and created new ones that threaten Americans in Iraq and Syria. 

The regime’s maligned activities are the reason the JCPOA is no 

longer in place. The regime’s actions continuously demonstrated a 

willingness to cheat out in the open on existing U.N. Security 

Council resolutions while defenders of the regime and defenders of 

the Iran deal said they were complying in the shadows with the 

JCPOA. 

We would have to believe that the regime is good when no one 

is looking and somehow dismiss its cheating behavior on the international stage and disregard it as an indicator of the regime’s actual intentions. 

Critics will argue that the Iran deal was not meant to curb Iran’s 

regional destabilizing activities and that it was simply an arms 

control agreement. The problem with that argument is Iran saw 

the Iran deal as a vehicle to reactivate its destabilizing terror logistics and operations networks. 

The JCPOA giveaways and Annex 2, that Rich mentioned, enabled, fueled, and allowed the regime to accelerate its destabilizing 

activities. Annex 2 delisted banks that fund terrorism. Annex 2 

delisted shipping lines that moved weapons to terrorist organizations. Annex 2 delisted Qasem Soleimani and other individuals 

that train, arm, and direct terrorist groups and build new terrorist 

organizations. 

Critics of the JCPOA were not surprised to see the regime step 

up its destabilizing activities. All you had to do was look at Annex 

2 and see what the regime asked for and received. 

The regime saw the Iran deal as a way to fuel its regional destabilizing strategy, become an economic powerhouse, become the preVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Sep 20, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31273.TXT APRIL

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mier conventional military threat in the Middle East, and, at the 

end of the sunset clauses, become a weaponized nuclear power. 

Critics argue that walking away from the Iran deal would cause 

Iran to increase its destabilizing activities and rush to a bomb. Not 

only did the regime increase its activities under the protections of 

the Iran deal, it expanded its reach into Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, 

and cemented its reach and influence in Iraq and Syria. 

Iran has been doing for years what critics say the regime will do 

if the U.S. walked away from the JCPOA. Iran became more dangerous under the protections of the JCPOA. 

Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the IRGC Quds Force 

has amassed upwards of 50,000 militia members in Syria, from 

Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are there at the direction of 

the IRGC Quds Force to shore up Assad and threaten and U.S. and 

Israel. 

Iran has increased Hezbollah’s capability to target Israel with 

more advanced and precision-guided rockets and missiles. 

Hezbollah is now operating at the brigade level. They are able to 

do combined operations in this theater because of the IRGC Quds 

Force. 

The IRGC Quds Force along with Lebanese Hezbollah have introduced lethal capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen that threaten 

international shipping lanes and Saudi Arabia with missile and 

rocket attacks. 

Iran has increased funding and lethal capability of IRGC Quds 

Force militias that have killed Americans in the past and pledged 

to do so again. 

Since the implementation of the JCPOA in 2015, the IRGC Quds 

Force has created additional militias, ones that are being sanctioned now by the House and by the Senate, Kataib Imam Ali and 

Harakat Nujaba. 

The IRGC has increased lethal aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan 

and is behind fomenting the internal sectarian divisions with U.S. 

Arab allies. 

The IRGC is fomenting sectarian strife in the Shia enclaves of 

Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. And if Iran rushes to a bomb, they lose 

Europe; they lose Russia; they simply lose. Russia will not tolerate 

a nuclear regime on its border. The U.S., Israel, and our Sunni regional allies will not allow Iran to rush to the bomb. But wait. 

In the preamble of the JCPOA, you have to go down three sections, and you will see this promise by Iran. Iran reaffirms that 

under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any 

nuclear weapon. So, basically, you just have to go to the preamble, 

three references down, to see that Iran deal itself was based on a 

lie. 

Iran’s currency has lost 60 percent of its value since 2015 in the 

JCPOA because they squandered the windfall of cash to promote 

destabilizing activities instead of focusing on its economy. 

Critics argue that Europe will pick Iran over the United States. 

Every day, we see European banks and businesses withdrawing 

from deals with the regime. Itis simple. They are picking the $20 

trillion economy over a shrinking $400 billion economy. 


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Iran is now asking for more concessions and promises of investment from Europe to no avail, without making any concessions on 

its ballistic missiles, sunset clauses and adventurism. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:] 


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Testimony of 

Michael Pregent 

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

on 

11Protecting America from a Bad Deal: Ending U.S. 

Participation in the Nuclear Agreement with Iran" 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Wednesday, June 61

h, 2018 

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Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee 

on National Security, on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored to testify before you 

today on walking away from a bad deal. 

There would be an Iran Deal in place today if the Iranian regime wasn't so blatant in its 

violations of existing United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place today if the regime hadn't continued and accelerated 

its illegal ballistic missile program- a violation of existing UNSCRs. 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place today if the regime hadn't detained 10 Sailors and 

filmed them for propaganda purposes- a violation of the Geneva Convention. 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place if the regime didn't use commercial aircraft to deploy 

the IRGC-QF and its militias to Syria another violation of existing UNSCRs. 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place if the regime stopped providing funds and lethal aid to 

Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah- again, a violation. 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place if the Regime hadn't empowered and increased lethal 

aid to existing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -Quds (Jerusalem) Force (IRGC-QF) militias 

and created new ones that threaten Americans in Iraq and Syria. 

There would still be an Iran Deal in place if the Regime had not squandered upwards of 150 

billion dollars on adventurism, instead of using the windfall of funds to focus on its domestic 

economy. No one is louder here than the Iranian protesters on this failure by the regime. 

The regime's malign activities are the reason the JCPOA is no longer in place. The regime's 

actions continuously demonstrated a willingness to cheat out in the open on existing UNSCRs 

while defenders of the regime, and the Iran Deal, said they were complying in the shadows with 

the JCPOA. We would have to believe that the regime is good when no one is looking, and 

somehow dismiss its cheating behavior on the international stage and disregard it as an 

indicator of the regime's actual intentions. 

Iran's destabilizing activities were fueled by the JCPOA -the Iran Deal -and the regime's 

malign activities accelerated under the protections of the JCPOA. Ending the U.S. 

participation in the Iran Deal ends the constraints on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 

and puts the U.S. back in a position of strength to curtail the regime's malign activities. 

The Regime is weaker and more constrained with the U.S. out of the JCPOA. 

Critics argue that the Iran Deal was not meant to curb Iran's regional destabilizing activities, and 

that is was simply an arms control agreement. The problem with that argument is Iran saw the 

Iran Deal as a vehicle to protect its nuclear program, reap the economic benefits from a deal, 

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but more importantly, reactivate its destabilizing terror logistics and operations networks. The 

JCPOA giveaways in Annex II enabled, fueled, and allowed the regime to accelerate its 

destabilizing activities. 

Annex II delisted banks that fund terrorism, Annex II de listed shipping lines that moved 

weapons to terrorist organizations, Annex II delisted Qassem Soleimani and other individuals 

that train, arm, and direct terrorist groups and build new terrorist organizations. Critics of the 

JCPOA were not surprised to see the regime step up its destabilizing activities, all you had to do 

was look at what the regime asked for and received in Annex II. 

The regime saw the Iran Deal as a way to fuel its regional destabilizing strategy, become an 

economic powerhouse, become the premiere conventional military threat in the Middle East, 

and at the end of the sunset clauses- become a weaponized nuclear power. All the while 

waiting to call the U.S. in breach of the Iran Deal for countering any of the regime's malign 

activity. 

Critics argue that walking away from the Iran Deal will cause Iran to increase its destabilizing 

activities and rush to a bomb. Not only did the regime increase its activities under the 

protections of the Iran Deal, it expanded its reach into Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen, and 

cemented its reach and influence in Iraq and Syria. 

Iran's destabilizing activities accelerated under the protections of the JCPOA. 

Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the IRGC-QF has amassed upwards of 50,000 militia 

members in Syria from Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. All there at the direction of the IRGCQF to shore up Assad and threaten the U.S. and lsrael.1 

We saw increased lethal and financial aid to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, and as 

Representative Brad Sherman said, "those are just the ones that begin with the letter H." 2 

Iran increased Hezbollah's capability to target Israel with more advanced and precision guided 

rockets and missiles. 

Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah have introduced 

lethal capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen that threaten international shipping lanes and Saudi 

Arabia with missile and rocket attacks. 

1 11an Berman, "New Report: Iran's Influence in Syria Far Broader Than Commonly Understood" May 31, 2018. 

http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/263288/new-report-irans-influence-in-syria-far-broader-than-commonlyWilliam Booth, "Iran's post-sanctions windfall may not benefit Hamas", The Washington Post, August 31, 2015 

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/will-irans-post-sanctions-windfall-benefit-hamas-maybenot/2015/08/30/08d0c62c-481e-11e5-9f53-dle3ddfd0cda story.html?utm term-.Oe3cf2f7ba7e) 

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Iran increased funding and the lethal capabilities of IRGC-QF militias that have killed Americans 

in the past and pledge to do so again. Since the implementation of the JCPOA in 2015, the 

IRGC-QF created at least two additional Iraqi militias: Kataib Imam Ali and Harakat Nujababoth have threatened Americans in Iraq and Syria. The IRGC now deploys these very same 

militias to prop up Assad in Syria and move against our Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish allies in 

Iraq. 

The IRGC increased lethal aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and is behind fomenting internal 

sectarian divisions with U.S. regional Arab allies. 

The IRGC-QF is fomenting sectarian strife in the Shia enclaves of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 

Iran has been doing for years what critics say the regime will do if the U.S. walked away from 

the JCPOA. The JCPOA arguably made Iran more dangerous- Iran became more dangerous 

under the protections of the JCPOA. 

And If Iran rushes to a bomb- they lose Europe, they lose Russia, they simply lose. Russia will 

not tolerate a nuclear regime on its border. Russia is distancing itself from Iran in a post JCPOA 

world. The U.S., Israel, and our Sunni regional allies will not allow Iran to rush to the bomb. 

With the U.S. in the JCPOA, Iran remained 6 months away from breakout if they cheated, and 

10 years away from being a nuclear North Korea if all parties complied with the agreement. 

With the US out of the JCPOA, Iran is 6 months away from breakout with this exception: The US 

is no longer constrained from taking economic and military actions. And again, a rush to the 

bomb loses European support and justifies military intervention. 3 

Again, under the protections of the JCPOA, in 10 years, the regime would have become an 

economic power, an advanced conventional military threat, an intercontinental ballistic missile 

threat, and a militarized nuclear power. That is no longer the case. 

The regime is weaker now and running out of friends. 

Iran's currency has lost 60% of its value since 2015 under the JCPOA. The Iranian Toman was 

3000:1 in 2015, it is now 8000:1 in 2018. European companies are walking away, European 

supporters of the JCPOA are calling for Iran to make concessions on its ballistic missile program 

and to end its destabilizing activities. Russia is sitting on its hands and allowing Israel to strike 

IRGC-QF targets with impunity, and China is pouring billions into the Iranian economy to 

compensate for the lack of European investment and risking US sanctions for doing so. The 

3 "Iran Supreme leader Ali Khamenei orders country's atomic energy body to prepare for uranium enrichment 

capacity upgrade" June 4, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-nuclear-dealuranium-enrichment-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei-atomic-energy-trump-a8383076.html 

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regime is weaker today and constrained by the definite consequences it would face from any 

aggressive actions taken. 

Critics argue that Europe will pick Iran over the United States. Everyday we see European banks 

and businesses withdrawing from deals with the Regime. 4 5 It's simple, they are picking a 20 

trillion-dollar economy over a shrinking 400 billion-dollar one, where their investments are 

subject to US secondary sanctions- it's simply not worth it. 

Iran is now asking for more concessions and promises of investment from Europe to no availwithout making any concessions on its ballistic missiles, sunset clauses, and adventurism. 6 

Iran is weaker now than ever, Russia is starting to see Iran as a problem in Syria and has even 

went so far as to demand IRGC-QF advisors, their troops, and their proxies exit Syria. Russia is 

sitting on its hands while Israel sets back Qassem Soleimani's terrorist infrastructure in Syria 3 

years- the time spent building up offensive capabilities since the implementation of the JCPOA 

in 201S. 

Critics say walking away from the Iran Deal would hurt us with North Korea- walking away 

gave us leverage day one, and the release of 3 captive Americans is proof that a negotiating 

team can set conditions before sitting down at the table to negotiate a nuclear deal. 

Kim Jong-Un stepped up his missile launches and nuclear activity after the JCPOA went into 

effect. Kim Jong-Un accelerated his activities in the last year of the Obama administration in 

hope of getting a JCPOA like deal- one where he put his nuclear program on hold, one that was 

heavily laden with incentives based on promises, and one with weak enforcement. Kim Jong Un 

will not get that in a post JCPOA world. If the JCPOA was still in place, he would certainly expect 

to get all Iran received. 

Walking away from the Iran Deal was the right thing to do, if all parties adhered to the JCPOA, 

the Iranian regime would have become an advanced conventional military threat, an 

intercontinental ballistic missile threat, and a militarized nuclear power. Again, that is no longer 

the case. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. 

Michael Pregent 

4 Bloomberg, "Trump's Iran Sanctions Have Already Convinced One Oil Company to Leave the Country" May 17, 

2018. http://fortune.com/2018/05/17 /trump-iran-sanctions-total-oil-leave-country/ 5 Reuters Staff, "France's PSA suspends joint ventures in Iran to avoid U.S. sanctions" June 4, 2018. 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-peugeot/frances-psa-suspends-joint-ventures-in-iran-to-avoid-us-sanctions-idUSKCN1J026R 

6 Tom DiChristopher, "Iran's Supreme Leader just made 5 tough demands for Europe to save the nuclear deal" May 

24, 2018 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/iran-apos-supreme-leader-iust-153800317.html 

s 
45 

Mr. DESANTIS. We’ll let you put that for the record. We are just 

running over, so I want to make sure we get everyone in. So 

thanks for that and we’ll—— 

Mr. PREGENT. Sure, sure, sure. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So, Dr. Walsh, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D. 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, 

and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear again before your committee. 

In written testimony, I address a number of different issues, including the ones raised by my colleagues. But in oral testimony, I 

want to focus on the negative consequences of violating the agreement for U.S. national security and America’s standing in the 

world. 

My summary judgment is the JCPOA successfully address the 

single most important American national security interest in the 

Gulf, namely preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. By 

violating the agreement and having no real strategy to replace it, 

the administration has increased the risk of nuclear proliferation 

in the Middle East, raised the probability of military conflict between the U.S. and Iran, undermined America’s single most important national security alliance, and likely worsened the very problems the administration said it was trying to solve. Iran’s regional 

activities, its ballistic program, missile program, et cetera. 

There are good reasons why Secretary of Defense Mattis and 

CENTCOM Commander Votel, who is responsible for Iran in that 

region, men who may have to respond to what happens next, have 

both argued for staying in the JCPOA as have Chairman Royce 

and Chairman Thornberry. 

Number one, the decision was poorly thought out, leaving the 

U.S. no strategy and unprepared for what would come next. British 

Foreign Secretary Johnson lamented that, quote, ‘‘plan B does not 

seem well developed at this stage.’’ He said that the day before the 

President’s announcement. 

For his part, the President admitted that if he were the Iranians, 

he probably wouldn’t negotiate with the U.S. under these circumstances. That was President Trump who said that in his announcement. 

The U.S. has gone from being part of the strongest multilateral 

nonproliferation agreement in nuclear history to no strategy, few 

friends, no timetable for achieving objectives, and Iran now free to 

advance its civilian nuclear program. 

Indeed, more than one observer has suggested that scuttling the 

JCPOA would, quote, ‘‘mainly help Iran.’’ 

Number two, it increases the risk of war and proliferation in the 

Middle East. By attacking the JCPOA, the administration has both 

improved Iran’s capability to pursue nuclear weapons by removing 

restrictions and has created conditions that might very well lead to 

that outcome. 

The President’s decision has allowed Iran out of its nuclear box, 

and now threatening Iran making demands that no country would 

ever agree to and loose talk that sounds like regime change inVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Sep 20, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31273.TXT APRIL

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creases the pressure on Iran to consider its nuclear options, the 

very opposite of what is in U.S. national security interest. 

Now, if Iran begins taking steps, reintroducing centrifuges, reducing IAEA access, there would be an immediate public outcry. 

And many of those who advocating ditching the JCPOA will be the 

very same people demanding military action, despite the fact that 

it was their policies that got us here in the first place. 

Number there, undermines European alliances. Americans 

fought and died in World War I and World War II, wars that resulted in millions of deaths and the destruction of Europe. Coming 

out of the ashes of World War II, the Atlantic and European alliances have been the single most important instrument for America’s national security. 

The administration not only ignored requests of our allies to stay 

in the JCPOA, it is now threatening sanctions against European 

firms if they continue to abide by the agreement. Let me repeat 

that. The United States of America is threatening to punish our 

European allies if they refuse to violate the agreement. 

There was a time when America was the leader of the free world. 

Leadership is when you take action and are followed by others who 

share your views and have confidence in your leadership. Leadership is not walking away from commitments and then threatening 

your friends if they don’t do the same. 

Not a single country followed us out of the JCPOA, not one. That 

is not leadership. That is not making America great. That is making America isolated. 

Number four, the problems of Iranian military spending, ballistic 

missiles, regional activities, human rights will be worse, not better, 

as a result of this decision. Will Iran, in the aftermath of U.S. actions, feel more threatened or less threatened? It would seem likely 

that it will feel more threatened for the reasons discussed above. 

That appears to be the President’s objective. 

Now research and scholarship and security studies would predict 

that, on average, as countries feel more threatened, they are more 

likely, not less likely, to spend money on their military and to develop weapons like missiles. They are more likely, not less likely, 

to hold their allies close in anticipation of a conflict and more likely 

to undermine their adversaries to prepare for coming conflict. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, 

I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 

on a topic of utmost importance for U.S. national security and the 

security of our friends and allies. 

The JCPOA was a singular nonproliferation achievement that 

was years in the making. In 1 day, the President has undercut it. 

Letting Iran out of its nuclear box and setting off a series of events 

that could bring war and nuclear proliferation to a region that 

needs neither. 

These developments will pose new challenges for America’s national security, and the American people will hold Congress accountable for those results. 

I remain committed to working with you to protect the American 

people and our friends abroad. I look forward to conversations 

about those dangers and challenges that lie ahead. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:] 


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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

"Protecting America from a Bad Deal: Ending US Participation in the Nuclear 

Agreement with Iran" 

June 6, 2018 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee: 

It is an honor to appear again before your committee, this time to discuss the 

consequences of the Trump Administration's decision to unilaterally abrogate the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international nuclear agreement 

with Iran and our P5+ 1 partners. 1 Congress will face difficult but critical decisions 

going forward as a result of this decision, and so I laud the committee for 

beginning to prepare for the future ahead. 

I come to today's hearing as someone who has provided assessments to Republican 

and Democratic presidents, as well as to Republican and Democratic Members of 

Congress, as they have wrestled with these policy challenges. I have studied Iran, 

its nuclear program, its role in the region, sanctions, and terrorism for more than 15 

years. I have written extensively on Iran and its foreign policy, and have had the 

honor to share my views in testimony before Congress on a number of occasions. 2 

1 I would like to thank the many people who suggested thoughts or otherwise supported my 

testimony, including Angela Nichols, Max Walsh, Corie Walsh, Bill Luers, Kathryn Grant, Paul 

Pillar, George Lopez, Adam Weinstein, David Wade, Paul Barker, and others. My testimony and 

comments are mine alone, however, and are not intended to represent the views of the MIT 

Security Studies Program or individuals that have contributed to the preparation of this 

testimony. 

2 See, for example, Jim Walsh "Rivals, Adversaries, and Partners: Iran and Iraq in the Middle 

East," In Iran and Its Neighbors, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; Jim Walsh, editor, 

Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control, Vols. 37-41, Dobbs Ferry, N. Y: 

Oceana Law Publications; Jim Walsh, "Nuclear Regimes and Nuclear Terrorism," Testimony 

before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the 

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Multilateral Non-proliferation Regimes, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Technologies and the War on Terrorism. February 12, 2002, pp. 1-12; Jim 

Walsh, "Evaluating Key Components of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action With Iran," 

Written statement for the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States 

Senate, June 25, 2015, Washington, DC: US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-26; "Assessing the Iran 
48 


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2 

In my testimony today, I want to directly address four issues raised by this hearing. 

1) The domestic and international reaction to the President's decision 

2) An accounting of what had been accomplished by the nuclear agreement 

3) A review of various criticisms of the JCPOA 

4) The negative consequences of violating the agreement for US national 

security and America's standing in the world 

My summary judgment is that the JCPOA was successfully addressing the single 

most important American national security interest in the Gulf, namely, preventing 

Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. By violating the agreement and having no 

real strategy to replace it, the Administration has increased the risk of nuclear 

proliferation in the Middle East, raised the probability of military conflict between 

the US and Iran, undermined America's single most important national security 

alliance, and likely worsened the very problems the Administration said it was 

trying to solve, e.g., Iran's regional activities and its ballistic missile program. 

1) The domestic and international reaction to the President's action 

Deal." Written Testimony. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on 

National Security, U.S. House of Representatives. AprilS, 2017. 

<https://oversight.house.gov /wp-content/uploads/20 I 7/04/Walsh-Statement-Iran-Violations-4-

5.pdf>; "Special Economic Measures Act and the Freezing of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act." 

Written testimony. Hearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign 

Affairs and International Development. November 30, 2016: "Iran Terror Financing and the Tax 

Code." Written statement for the House Committee on Ways and Means. Oversight 

Subcommittee. United States House of Representatives. 4 November 2015. Washington, DC: 

US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-10: "Comments on the Recently the Recently Negotiated Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action,'' Invited comments for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

United States Senate. I August 2015. Washington, DC: US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-6; "The IranNorth Korea Strategic Alliance." Written statement for the joint hearing before the 

Subcommittees on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade; Asia and the Pacific; and Middle 

East and North Africa. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States House of 

Representatives. 28 July 2015. Washington. DC: US Congress. 2015, pp. 1-18, 

<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/F A 18/20150728/1 03824/HHRG-114-FA 18-Wstate-WalshJ20 150728.pdf> 
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A long list of government officials and nuclear experts had urged the President to 

comply with the agreement, including many who had previously criticized the 

JCPOA as well as important national security officials in the Trump 

Administration and in the US military. Secretary of Defense Mattis, Chairman of 

the Joint Chief~ Dunford, and CENTCOM Commander Vote!, men who may have 

to respond to the consequences of this decision, both argued for staying in the 

JCPOA.3 While serving in office, Secretary of State Tillerson and National 

Security Advisor McMaster had also argued for remaining in the agreement.4 

Similarly, in the US House of Representatives, the chairs of the two committees 

most directly involved in these issues, Chairman Royce of Foreign Affairs and 

Chairman Thornberry of House Armed Services, urged the President not to break 

the agreement.5 In addition, more than 40 former officials and nuclear experts 

cautioned against undermining the JCPOA.6 

Internationally, America's closest and most important allies --Britain, France, and 

Germany-- pleaded with the President to not violate the deal. Conservative British 

Foreign Secretary Johnson said breaking the agreement would be a "mistake," and 

3 

3 Ellen Mitchel, "Mattis defends Iran deal as Trump considers withdrawal," The Hill, April26. 

2018, <http://thchiii.com/policy/defcnse/385094-mattis-defcnds-iran-deal-as-trump-considcrswithdrawal>; Paul McLeary, "Trump's Top General Says Iran Honoring Nuke Deal. Foreign 

Policy, September 26, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/26/trumps-top-general-says-iranhonoring-nuke-deal/>; 

Daniel Cebul, "CENTCOM chief backs Iran deal as Trump chooses critic for top diplomacy 

job," Defense News, March 14,2018, 

<https://www .defensenews.com/ con gress/20 18/0 3/14/ centcom-chie f-backs-iran-deal-as-trumpchooses-critic-for-top-diplomacy-job/>. 

4 Elizabeth McLaughlin, "Tillerson's support for Iran deal helped get him fired, but Mattis shares 

his views," ABC News, March 13, 2018, < ht1ps://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tillersons-supportiran-deal-helped-fired-mattis-shares/story?id=S 3 712207>; A sa win Suebsaeng, Spencer 

Ackerman, Sam Stein, "McMaster Wants to Save the Iran Deal by Hiding It From Trump, The 

Daily Beast, October 12, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/mcmaster-wants-to-save-theiran-deal-by-hiding-it-from-trump>. 

5 "Republican House Armed Service chair warns Trump against leaving Iran deal," Reuters, May 

6, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclcar-usa-thornberry/republican-housearmed-service-chair-warns-trump-against-leaving-iran-deal-idUSKBNII70Q3>; Rep. Edward 

Royce, "Remarks: Chairman Royce on Iran," House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 8, 2018, 

https ://foreignaffairs. house. go v /press-release/remarks-chairman-royce-on-iran-2>. 6 See the document signed by 47 national security leaders, "Statement on a Comprehensive 

Policy to Constrain Iran," Iran Project, Fall 2017, < 

https://www.scribd.com/document/355867352/lran-Letter-lranPolicy080817#https://www .scribd.com/document/3 5 586 73 52/Iran-Letter-[ranPolicy-080817>. 
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that "every alternative is worse." 7 Echoing those views were the UN Secretary 

General and also the President of the European Commission, who warned that it 

would constitute "a major threat to security in the region."8 

Less well appreciated were concerns emanating from Israel. Prime Minister 

Netanyahu's views received extensive press coverage, but not former Prime 

Minster Euhud Barak, who had been a critic of the agreement and who at various 

points while in office had considered a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. 

He pointed to the "logic in maintaining" the JCPOA. 9 He is not alone. Maj. Gen. 

Amos Gil ad, the former research chief at Military Intelligence, also a critic of the 

agreement, expressed a similar view as did others in Israel's professional military 

and intelligence community. 10 

4 

In short, an overwhelming consensus, including central figures serving in the 

current administration, cautioned against violating the deal. As with the decision 

to withdraw from the Paris Climate accord, the President ignored his own advisers, 

America's allies, and members of his own Congressional leadership and tore up the 

agreement. 

2) An accounting of what had been accomplished by the JCPOA 

In the course of over four years, the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and the JCPOA 

produced a number of nonproliferation milestones. Under the agreement, Iran: 

1) Removed 98% of its stockpile of low enriched uranium 

7 Boris Johnson, "Don't Scuttle the Iran Nuclear Deal," New York Times, May 6, 2018, 

https://www.nytimes.com/20 18/05/06/opinion/boris-johnson-trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>. 

8 Jones Hayden, "Ending Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be Major Security Threat, EU Says," 

Bloomberg, May 16, 2018, <https://www .bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 18-05-16/eu-readiesmeasures-to-protect-firms-from-u-s-sanction s-on-iran>. 9 Neri Zilber, "Israel's Ex-Prime Minister Ehud Barak Says Keep the Iran Nuclear Deal," Daily 

Beast, May 7, 2018, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/israels-ex-prime-minister-ehud-barak-sayskeep-the-iran-nuclear-deal>. 

10Amos Hare!, "U.S. Exit From Nuclear Deal Would Help Iran, Former Israeli General Says," 

Haaretz, May 6, 2018, 

<https://www.haaretz.com/amp/isracl-news/.premium-israeli-ex-intel-official-u-s-exit-fromnuclear-deal-would-help-iran-1.6055374?_twitter_impression=true>. See also, Allison Kaplan 

Sommer, "Top Brass vs. Netanyahu's Government: Where Israel Stands on Nixing Nuke Iran 

Deal," Haaretz, May 08,2018, 

<https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-where-israel-s-leaders-stand-on-the-irannuclear-deal-1.6070237>. 
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2) Dismantled two-thirds of its centrifuges 

3) Destroyed the calandria of the Arak heavy water reactor 

4) Capped its level of enrichment to 3.67% 

5) Converted the Fordow underground facility 

6) Submitted to 24/7 IAEA inspection of its sensitive facilities 

7) Did not reprocess plutonium 

The IAEA has formal access not only to traditionally safeguarded facilities but also 

up the fuel cycle covering the production of rotors and centrifuges, as well as 

uranmm mmes. 

At no point in the nuclear age has any country submitted to as intrusive a level of 

inspection and verification as was provided for under the JCPOA. 

3) Criticisms of the JCPOA 

Critics of the agreement ginned up a wide variety of claims and criticisms from 

2013 to 2015, but few of them have been sustained. Over time, governments have 

increasingly recognized that the JCPOA is the strongest multilateral 

nonproliferation agreement in history .II As a consequence, critics largely conceded 

the debate on the nuclear merits, and shifted the discussion to non-nuclear aspects 

like Iran's regional behavior. 

More recently, with the Administration's move to break the agreement and the need 

to defend this action in the face of broad criticism, a handful a of proliferationrelated claims have been reasserted. These criticisms include: 1) Iran is not in 

compliance with the agreement, 2) the so-called "sunset" provisions are a fatal 

flaw, 3) the IAEA has insufficient powers or alternatively lacks the will to carry 

out the required verification regime, and 4) the JCPOA is a "mere" agreement, not 

a treaty. 

Let's consider each claim. 

Compliance 

There is broad consensus that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA. In testimony 

before the US Congress, officials from the Department of Defense, the State 

Department, and the US intelligence community have stated that Iran is abiding by 

11 See, for example, Walsh, "Comments on the Recently the Recently Negotiated Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action;" Walsh, '"Iran Terror Financing and the Tax Code." 
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its nuclear obligations. 12 Indeed, the Administration is obliged by law to report to 

Congress on Iran's compliance under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 

2015. As recently as April of this year, one month before the President's 

announcement, the State Department noted that: 

6 

... on three occasions during the reporting period the Secretary of State 

certified to Congress that: Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully 

implementing the JCPOA; has not committed a material breach with respect 

to the JCPOA; has not taken any action during the reporting period, 

including covert activities ... Y 

This finding is consistent with more than a dozen IAEA reports on Iran's nuclear 

program and with assessments made by Britain, France, and Germany. 14 Former 

Israeli Prime Minister Euhud Barak insists that Iran has "kept the letter of the 

agreement quite systematically ... "15 

Some critics have cited Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's May, 2018 press 

conference and his claim --made days before the President's announcement-- that a 

pilfered store oflranian nuclear documents proved that Iran had "lied." Danny 

Yatom, the Prime Minister's former Mossad Director commented, "This is no 

smoking gun. The gun smoked many years ago. The information could have once 

been a smoking gun but is irrelevant today." 16 General Gilad, the former research 

chief at Military Intelligence, pointed out that the material did not, in fact, prove 

that Iran was violating the JCPOA. 17 Former Prime Minister Barak observed that... 

12 See footnote 3 and 13. See also, Daniel R. Coats, "Worldwide Threat Assessment," February 

13, 2018, p. 7, < https://www.dni.gov/tiles/documents/Ncwsroomffestimonics/20 18-ATA---

Unclassified-SSC!.pdf>; Michael Hayden, "Our intelligence chiefs just want to tell the truth 

about national security,: The Hill, February 15, 2018, < http://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity /3 73 991 -dont -knock -our-inte II igen ce-ch iefs-for-being-part-of-the-deep-state>. 13 Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control. Nonproliferation, and 

Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance 

Bureau, April2018, p. 23, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/280774.pdf 14 Press Release, "Joint statement from Prime Minister May, Chancellor Merkel and President 

Macron following President Trump's statement on Iran," Prime Minister's Office, May 8, 2018, 

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statemcnt-from-prime-minister-may-chancellormerke l-and-president -macron-fo I lowing-president-trumps-statement -on-iran>. 15 Zilber, "Israel's Ex-Prime Minister Ehud Barak Says Keep the Iran Nuclear Deal." 16 Martin Indyk, @Martin_Indyk, May 2, 2018, 

https://twitter.com/Martin Indyk/status/99l615959298342913?s=l9 17 Hare!, "U.S. Exit From Nuclear Deal Would Help Iran, Former Israeli General Says." 
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.. .it was a truly remarkable intelligence achievement... and there was lots of 

material [there], but nothing that's new. Nothing substantive about what they 

did and didn't do that wasn't already known to intelligence for years now. 

Not one new item. 18 

It is worth noting that the Israeli government informed Washington about the cache 

of documents in January, and that Prime Minister Netanyahu brought the subject 

up in March. Yet there was no change in US assessments oflranian compliance. 19 

Sunset provisions 

Many arms control and nonproliferation agreements end after a certain period of 

time if not extended by the signatories, e.g., the US-Russian New Start Treaty and 

the original NPT. The JCPOA does not end at a point in the future, though some 

provisions are phased out over many years. Several oflran's obligations are 

permanent. Iran is obliged to forgo nuclear weapons in perpetuity. The Additional 

Protocol also remains in force. Iran destroyed the heart of its heavy water reactor, 

and so would have to build a new reactor -- a major and visible undertaking 

requiring many years. 

The more fundamental point, however, is the "sunset" argument does not make any 

sense. It contends that at the end of 10 or 15 years, important restrictions on Iran's 

behavior are lifted, and when that happens, terrible events will follow. So now, 

with the President's decision, we are brought to that point immediately rather than 

15 years from now. 

Imagine I go to the doctor and tell her that an illness is threatening my life, and that 

I will soon die. She says to me, "I have a pill that can keep you alive for 15 years, 

but since it does not last forever, I'm not going to give it to you." You would fire 

that doctor. 

Strong access and verification 

Some have suggested that IAEA lacks the ability or will to carry out inspections. 

But as former Secretary Moniz points out, the JCPOA represents the "most 

intrusive inspection regime in world," and that "the agreement is what gives the 

18 Zilber, "Israel's Ex-Prime Minister Ehud Barak Says Keep the Iran Nuclear Deal." 19 "Mossad Discovered Iranian Nuclear Archive in 2016 and Smuggled It to Israel in January, 

Official Says," Haaretz, May 0 I, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/iran/mossad-smugglcd-iranian-nuclear-archivc-to-israel-in-january-l.6045870>; Brian 

Bennett, "White House Has Known for Weeks About Israel's Stolen Iran Documents," Time, 

May 2, 2018, <http:/ltime.com/5262076/white-house-iran-israel-stolen-documents/>. 
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international inspectors the tools to go anywhere in Iran and have access. "20 The 

agency itself, contrary to assertions by agreement critics, reports that it has, in fact, 

been carrying out inspections under the Additional Protocol. According to the 

IAEA, "The Agency ... has conducted complementary accesses under the 

Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to 

visit...."21 Among other things, the Additional Protocol entitles the IAEA to visit 

military sites, if it has cause to believe that there are prohibited materials or 

activities at that site. What is does not authorize is fishing expeditions ordered at 

the whim of member government. 

In its report, the agency says that it has had access to sites, but that Iran should 

provide more "timely and proactive cooperation.'m This speaks both to the value 

and the efficacy ofiAEA verification. If the agency begins to lose access, say to 

centrifuge production facilities or other provisions that relate specifically to the 

JCPOA and not its general safeguards obligations or Additional Protocol 

responsibilities, the world will know less, not more, about Iran's nuclear program. 

Moreover, it will be difficult to publicly call on Iran to explain its behavior or even 

discrepancies in its account, if it cannot gather the information in the first place. 

The JCPOA is "just" an agreement, not a treaty 

The notion that the JCPOA is a "mere" agreement and therefore not important is 

factually wrong and of dubious logic. The JCPOA is a multi-lateral agreement 

between sovereign governments, but it is also anchored in a UN Security Council 

resolution, and as such constitutes international law. That is certainly the view of 

Britain, France, Germany -- who described it as "the. binding international legal 

framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian nuclear 

programme." This view is shared by the other parties to the agreement and by the 

overwhelming majority of member states of the UN more generally. 23 

Moreover, the notion that just because an agreement is not a treaty, it cannot be 

important or effective strains credulity. A commitment by the United States of 

America is a commitment by the United States of America. Trying to explain away 

20 Ernest Moniz, "U.S. leaving Iran nuclear deal would be 'tragic,"' PBS Newshour, 

May 2, 2018, https://www .pbs.org/video/deal-or-no-deal-1525300673/>. 21 Francois Murphy, "Iran complying with nuclear deal, but could do better: IAEA," Reuters, 

May 23, 2018, <https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-staying-withinnuclear-deals-restrictions-iaea-report -idU SKCN I IP2IR>. 22 IBID. 23 Press Release, "Joint statement from Prime Minister May, Chancellor Merkel and President 

Macron following President Trump's statement on !ran." 
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a violation of those commitments by saying the JCPOA is not a treaty misses the 

point. Americans expect their government to keep its word. Period. It does not 

want Washington to arbitrarily violate an agreement with no cause and without a 

Plan B. In addition, the US government has employed similar agreements for 

decades in service to solving all kinds of problems. In the arena of 

nonproliferation, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) began as a 

voluntary, multi-national arrangement. Does anyone say that PSI is not important 

or that walking out on it would be a good thing? No. No one says that. 

Countries in the region (Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Emirates) supported the 

Administration's decision. 

There is no evidence to suggest that Oman, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, or 

Afghanistan, among others, supported the decision to violate the agreement. 

The King of Saudi Arabia and Prime Minister Netanyahu lobbied the President to 

abrogate the agreement, but it is worth remembering that they were also vocal 

advocates of the 2003 Iraq War-- a calamitous and costly mistake that made the 

region even more dangerous for those that live there. Just because a particular 

leader in the region supports a policy does not make it a good idea. 

As regards Israel in particular, one might want to be more precise. Certainly Prime 

Minister Netanyahu encouraged the US to violate the agreement, but he is not the 

only voice in Israel. Former Prime Minister Barak and significant figures in the 

active and retired corps oflsracli defense, intelligence, and nuclear officials 

supported the agreement, and many of those who had previously been critics have 

since objected to the idea of unilaterally killing the agreement.24 

Particularly interesting are statements by the Israeli Chief of the General Staff, 

Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, who commands the Israeli Defense Forces 

(IDF). He suggested that the JCPOA had a positive effect on Israel's security and 

thus resulted in a reordering Israel's defense priorities, a result reflected in Israel's 

2016 National Intelligence Estimate. Indeed, a report by the RAND Corporation 

observed that "Israeli analysts who favored the nuclear agreement and those who 

opposed it largely assess the prospects for Iranian compliance with the JCPOA to 

be high."25 

24 See footnotes 9 and I 0. 25 See Graham Allison, ''Is Iran Still Israel's Top Threat0 ,'' The Atlantic, March 8, 2016. 

https:/ /www. theatlantic.com/international/arch ive/20 16/03/iran -nuclear-deal-israel/4 727 6 7 />: Dalia Dassa Kaye, 

"Israel's Iran Policies After the Nuclear Deal," Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation. 2016, p. 7. 

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE207.html>. 
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Iran does bad things (regional activities, human rights, etc.) 

As I have indicated in previous testimony, "The JCPOA is a nuclear agreement. It 

is not an agreement on regional relations, human rights, or other issues. And it is a 

nuclear agreement for a good reason: denying Iran nuclear weapons is the 

uncontested, single most important American objective in the Gulf. Iran supports 

policies that run contrary to American interests and the interests of our allies, but 

the only thing worse than an Iran that does bad things is an Iran that does bad 

things and has nuclear weapons." 

4. The negative consequences of violating the agreement for US national 

security and America's standing in the world 

A. The decision was poorly thought out, leaving the US with no strategy and 

unprepared for what will come next. 

Speaking the day before the President's announcement on his trip to Washington, 

British Foreign Secretary Johnson --representing America's closest alley--

lamented on Fox and Friends that "plan B does not seem, to me, to be particularly 

well developed at this stage." 26 Similarly, Israel's General Gilad had advised that 

the if the US was going to break the agreement, then they should "prepare for 

alternatives, and I don't see this being done."27 

Here in the US, following the President's announcement and Secretary Pompeo's 

speech describing the Administration's new approach, many observers were 

dismayed by the lack of a real strategy. It appeared as if the President ripped up 

the agreement with no thought or preparation for what would come next. Writing 

in the Washington Post, Josh Rogin, a frequent critic of President Obama's Iran 

26 "Don't 'Junk' The Iran Nuclear Deal, Boris Johnson Says On 'Fox & Friends,'" NPR, May 7, 

2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/07/609025517/dont-junk-the-irannuc lear-deal-boris-johnson-says-on-fox-friends>. 27 Amos Hare!, "U.S. Exit From Nuclear Deal Would Help Iran, Former Israeli General Says," 

Haaretz, June 5, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/amp/israel-news/.premium-israeli-ex-intelofficial-u-s-exit-from-nuclear-deal-would-help-iran-1.6055374? _twitter_ impression=true>. 
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policy, was incredulous that the "strategy speech lacked a strategy." 28 The is no 

"Plan B," concluded Daniel Dresner from Georgetown. 29 

11 

In the Secretary of State's Pompeo's presentation, he provided a laundry list of 

complaints about Iran from corruption to environmental mismanagement, 

suggesting that all were reasons to break the agreement, even as he conceded that 

the nuclear issue "presents the largest, most severe threat for sure." 30 He listed 12 

"demands" that Iran must meet --including that it abandon its own allies-- before a 

formal treaty would be submitted to the Senate. How long would this take? He did 

not say. 

For his part, the President admitted that if he were the Iranians, he probably would 

not negotiate with the US under these circumstances: "I'd probably say the same 

thing ifi was in their position."31 Here the President would seem to be correct. It is 

rare when one country violates an agreement, threatens the other country, demands 

that it capitulate in every possible way and then the accused country responds with 

enthusiasm for returning to the bargaining table. This is even more so in the case 

with lran, a proud nation whose distrust ofWashington goes back to 1953 and the 

US-sponsored coup that brought the Shah to power. Why, the Iranians will say, 

would we negotiate an agreement when you just tore up an agreement that took 

three years to negotiate, and when your real intention is regime change? 

So what is supposed to produce this unlikely outcome of a new nuclear agreement? 

Sanctions, of course. Secretary Pompeo's "strategy" is an economic war against 

Iran. Sanctions arc one of several useful options at the disposal of the US, but 

sanctions arc a tool, not a strategy. 32 Moreover, the conditions necessary for 

28 Josh Rogin, "Pompeo's Iran strategy speech lacked a strategy," Washington Post, May 2I, 

2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/20 18/05/21 /pompeos-iranstrategy-spccch-Iacked -a-real-strategy /?utm _term= .e9b04ba6b29c>. 29 Daniel Dresner, The Trump administration still has no Plan Bon Iran," Washington Post, May 

22, 2018, <https://www .washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/20 18/05/22/the-trumpadm i nistration -sti 11-has-no-plan -b-on-iran/?utm _term=. 3 59 564d20d5 b>. 30 Mike Pompeo. "After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy," Remarks delivered at the Heritage 

Foundation, May 21, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/secrctary/remarks/20 18/05/28230 l.htm>. 31 Donald J. Trump, "Full transcript of Trump's speech pulling U.S. out oflran nuclear deal," 

Cox Media Group (National Content Desk), May 08, 2018, 

,https://www.ajc.com/news/national/full-transcript-trump-specch-pulling-out-iran-nucleardcal/htdRdre Vy4 HqnRE Dh08n30/>. 32 George Lopez, "America should take caution with maximum pressure Iran sanctions," The 

Hill, May 22, 2018,, http://thehill.com/opinion/intcrnational/388757-america-should-becautious-with-maximum-pressure-iran-sanctions>. 
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effective sanctions (e.g., the support and cooperation of other countries) are not 

present in this instanceY Even during the JCPOA, the US had maintained its own 

national sanctions, so it remains less than obvious how simply doing more of what 

the US has been doing on its own for 20 years will persuade Iran to wave a white 

flag and surrender to its perceived adversary. If anything, the Iranians-- having 

been humiliated-- will likely dig in deeper. 

The US has gone from being part of the strongest multi-lateral nonproliferation 

agreement in nuclear history to no strategy, few friends, no timetable for achieving 

our objectives, and an Iran now free to advance its civilian nuclear program. 

Indeed, more than one observer has suggested that the scuttling the JCPOA "would 

mainly help Iran. "34 

B. It increases risk of proliferation in Middle East 

America's most important national security objective in the Middle East is to 

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an objective that now has been discarded in 

favor of other concerns. Given the US violation, Iran can, unfortunately, respond 

in kind. The core of the JCPOA was its restriction ofiran's nuclear activities in 

return for sanctions relief. If Iran does not receive the relief it was promised, it 

will see no need to abide by the restrictions. 

This is partly a matter of domestic politics. Recent polling suggests that the 

Iranian people --the very people that the President and Secretary Pompeo say they 

want to help-- are upset with the President's actions and primarily hold the US 

responsible for diminished economic gains from the JCPOA. Only 5% of the 

Iranians interviewed thought that the United States would keep its word, and 67% 

of respondents said that Iran should retaliate against the United States, if it violates 

the agreement. Just 31 percent thought that Iran should stay in the agreement under 

those circumstances.35 

33 IBID. 34 Amos Hare!, "U.S. Exit From Nuclear Deal Would Help Iran, Former Israeli General Says." 35 Amir Farmanesh, "Iranian Attitudes on JCPOA pre-Trump Announcement," IranPoll, May 

2018, <https://static !.squarespace.com/static/5525d83l e4b09596848428f2/t/5afl c7d9f950b779a 

9d71636/1525794781666/lranPoll+exclusive+Apr+20 18+results+2018-5-8.pdl>. See also, Ali 

Arouzi and Saphora Smith "Iranians fear the future after Trump exits Iran nuclear deal," NBC 

News, May I 0, 2018, 

<https:/ /www. n bcnews. com/news/world/iranian s-fear-future-after-trump-exits-iran-nuclear-dealn872931>. 
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The Iranian system is part authoritarian, part republic. Public opinion is an 

important consideration for the country's decision-makers. More importantly, the 

US violation of the JCPOA has placed the Rohani government in a precarious 

position, in which it must simultaneously attempt to sustain the JCPOA with 

Europe while conceding to hardliner demands for a more provocative response. 

The decision has strengthened the hands of hardliners, who on Iranian social media 

and public forums extoll the value of"weapons" over "agreements." In short, the 

Trump Administration's decision to leave the agreement has given the hardliner 

interpretation greater credibility within the Iranian government. This week, we 

may have witnessed the first evidence of these dynamics: Iran's announcement to 

the IAEA that it plans to expand its production of uranium feedstock. 36 

To be clear, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has assessed that Iran 

halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has not yet made a decision to 

build a bomb, and the potential end of the JCPOA is unlikely to change that fact in 

the near term. Presently, Iran is more likely to expand its civilian program rather 

than initiate a new weapons program. 

But by ending the JCPOA, the Administration has both improved Iran's capability 

to pursue such a course and has created conditions that might lead to that outcome. 

Threatening Iran --after they had submitted to an agreement-- making demands 

that no country would ever agree to (and thus making it look like there is no real 

intention to negotiate), and loose talk that sounds like "regime change," increases 

the pressure on Iran to consider its nuclear options-- the very opposite of what is 

in US security interests. 

And Iran is not the only country watching. Others in the region sec that the 

restrictions of the JCPOA have been undercut, and they may worry that Iran will 

go for the bomb, the DNI notwithstanding. If so, then they may conclude that they 

need to take steps as well. Iflran responds to the US moves by resuming some of 

its prior nuclear activities, some actors may see this not as political tit-for-tat, but 

as signaling an interest in nuclear weapons, one that might require that they 

explore their own nuclear weapons options. 

At a minimum, Saudi Arabia may demand greater latitude for its civilian nuclear 

program. The Trump administration is demanding Riyadh pledge to uphold the 

36 ;;Iran tells IAEA it plans to produce feedstock tor centrifuges," Reuters, June 5, 2018, 

<https:/ /www. reuters .com/ artie I e/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-te lis-iaea-it-plans-to-producefeedstock-for-centrifuges-idUSKCN IJ llZO>. 
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14 

"Gold Standard" of no enrichment. If, because ofthe collapse ofthe JCPOA, Iran 

advances its civilian nuclear program, Riyadh is unlikely to bend to US pressure 

for the gold standard.37 

The single biggest potential, near-term cause of proliferation in the Middle East 

concerns what might happen in the wake of a US or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear 

facilities. As I have written elsewhere, there are good reasons to believe --based 

on history and on Iran's particular profile-- that following such an attack, Iran will 

make the bomb decision it had not yet made. At that point, following a military 

strike and an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons, the region will be teetering 

on the edge, and the world will be a very dangerous place -- for American troops 

deployed to the region and for America's interests. 

But is the US or Israeli likely to strike Iran? That question is the focus of the next 

section. 

C. Increases risk of war 

There are two main paths to war with Iran in the coming months and years. One is 

the that US backs into a war it did not intend, and the other is that it deliberately 

chooses war in the name of regime change. It is difficult to estimate whether the 

Administration has adopted a regime change strategy or might in the future, though 

as discussed below, there are certainly signs that suggest that. On the other hand, it 

is not difficult at all to imagine how violating the JCPOA sets off a series of events 

that leads to the use of military force. 

As suggested above, there will be strong domestic political pressure in Iran to 

respond to the President's words and actions. This pressure will come from the 

top, that is, political elites seeking to undermine Rouhani and his centrist camp and 

to play the nationalism card for their own political gain. There will also be 

pressure from the bottom up, as average Iranians demand that their government 

stand up to what they will see as American bullying and perfidy. 

37 Nicholas Miller and Tristan Volpe, "Geostrategic Nuclear Exports: The Competition For 

Influence in Saudi Arabia," War on the Rocks, February 7, 2018, < 

https ://warontherocks.com/2 0 1 8/02/ geostratc gic-n uc lear-exports-competition-influence-saudiarabia/>. 
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15 

lflran begins to take steps -- reintroducing centrifuges, reducing IAEA access, 

uranium enrichment at Fordow, enriching to 20% --there will be an immediate 

public outcry. Many of those who advocated ditching the JCPOA will be the very 

same people demanding military action -- despite the fact that it was their behavior 

that got us here in the first place. The US media, not well versed in nuclear issues, 

will characterize it as Iran resuming its nuclear weapons program, not its civilian 

nuclear program. Both the President and Secretary Pompeo, have publicly 

threatened Iran with punishment, if it resumes its prior nuclear activities, preJCPOA. 

In any case there will be strong pressure to do something, and with the US having 

thrown away all its options except for military strikes, the chances of a conflict will 

certainly increase. 

There is also a possibility that the Administration will adopt a regime change 

strategy. I have my doubts that the President has any strategy at all or is himself 

strategic in orientation, but others point out that the President himself and many in 

his administration --from Mr. Bolton to Secretary Pompeo-- have advocated 

regime change in the past.38 Many of these same officials were architects of the 

disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003.39 But it may not simply be the advisers. Mr. 

Giuliani recently assured an audience that the President is "as committed to regime 

change as we are."40 

38 John R. Bolton, "To Stop Iran's Bomb, Bomb Iran," New York Times, 

March 26, 2015, <https://www .ny1imes.com/20 15/03/26/opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bombiran.html?>. 

39 Eric Lutz, "Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran Deal echoes the lead-up to the Iraq War," 

Mic, May 9, 2018, <https://mic.com/articles/189304/trumps-decision-to-pull-out-of-the-irandeal-echoes-the-lead-up-to-the-iraq-war#.46hRRIGkJ; See also Farced Zakaria, "Trump's only 

possible Iran strategy is a fantasy," Washington Post, May I 0, 2018, 

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-only-possible-iran-strategyis-a-fantasy/20 18/05/1 0/52626b4e-5494-ll e8-a551-

5b648abe29ef_ story.html?utm_term=. 915bac7414df>. 40 Brent D. Griffiths, "Giuliani: Trump is 'committed to' regime change in Iran," Politico, May 

5th, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/story/20 18/05/05/giuliani-trump-iran-regime-change570744>. 
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Other have warned that a military strike is very much in line with Likud Prime 

Minister Netanyahu's objectives,41 and that he may push the President in this 

direction. 42 

I am in no position to judge the President's motives. I can say with confidence, 

however, that by violating the JCPOA, the President has created conditions that 

could result in a military conflict, whether that result is by design or by error. 

D. Undermines the European alliance 

16 

Americans fought and died in World War I and World War II, wars that resulted in 

millions of deaths and the destruction of Europe. The US paid that terrible price 

for one reason, the threat to Europe was a direct threat to the future security of the 

United States. Had Europe fallen to the Nazi's or the Soviets, the US would have 

faced a terrible enemy alone. Coming out of the ashes ofWWII, the Atlantic and 

European alliances have been the single most important instrument for America's 

national security. 

The President has shown little interest in the European alliance or Europe for that 

matter. With the US withdrawal from the Paris climate accord over the objections 

of our allies, the imposition of tariffs, and other actions, this Administration has 

steadily chipped away at the political relationships at the core of the alliance. 

So it was not a good situation to begin with, and now the President has unilaterally 

withdrawn from an international agreement to which our European allies are key 

members, despite every effort by Britain, France, and Germany to accommodate 

the President's demands. Adding insult to injury, the Administration not only 

ignored their requests to stay in the JCPOA, it is now threatening sanctions against 

European firms, if they continue to abide by the JCPOA and the accompanying UN 

Security Council resolution. The requires repeating: The United States of 

America is threatening to punish our European allies, if they refuse to violate the 

41 Amos Hare!, "Israel Hopes Trump Scrapping Nuclear Deal Could Ultimately Lead to Iran 

Regime Change," Haaretz, May 6, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-hopestrump-exiting-nuclear-deal-may-lead-to-iran-regime-change-1.6054152>. 

42 Graham Allison, "On Iran: Don't Let Bibi Sell Us Another War," National Interest, May 7, 

2018, <http:/lnationalinterest.org/feature/iran-dont-let-bibi-sell-us-another-war-25729>; Bruce 

Reidel, "Don't let Israel and Saudi Arabia drag the U.S. into another war," Brookings, May 15, 

20 18, <https://www .brookings.edu/b log/order-from-chaos/20 18/05/15/dont-let-israel-and-saudiarabia-drag-the-u-s-into-another-war/ 
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agreement. As Josh Rogin opined, the state of affairs should "shock those who 

care about the transatlantic alliance."43 

Not surprisingly, Europe is confused and angry. French President Macon called 

the US policy "insane."44 Writing in the Financial Times, Philip Stevens literally 

says "enough": "How has the US managed so comprehensively to isolate itself 

among friends and allies and thus empower its adversaries? Enough really is 

enough."45 

17 

Sadly, critics of the JCPOA have responded to Europe's concerns --they are 

physically closer to Iran and the region than the US-- by impugning their integrity, 

saying that all the Europeans care about is money. They apparently have forgotten 

the British soldiers who died fighting in Iraq and NATO casualties suffered in 

Afghanistan. 

There was a time when America was the "leader offhe free world." Leadership is 

when you take action and are followed by others who share your views and have 

confidence in your leadership. Leadership is not walking away from commitments 

and then threatening your friends, if they do no do the same. Not a single country 

followed the US out of the JCPOA. Not one. That is not leadership. That is not 

making America great. It is making America isolated. 

4. Makes the problems oflranian military spending, ballistic missiles, regional 

activities, human rights worse, not better 

The administration has cited a number of areas of concern about Iran, including its 

regional behavior, military expenditures, missile program, human rights record, 

and role in Afghanistan46, among others. These are real concerns, though in some 

43 Josh Rogin, "Pompeo's Iran strategy speech lacked a strategy." 44 Julian Borger, Donald Trump likely to scrap Iran deal amid 'insane' changes of stance, says 

Macron, The Guardian, April26, 2018, 

<https :/ /www. the guard ian. com/world/20 18/ apr /2 5 /macron -goes-against-trump-on-paris-climatedeal-and-iran-nuclear-accord>. 

45 Philip Stephens, "How Europe should react to Donald Trump," 

The Financial Times, May II, 2018. 46 Iran is the single largest source of Afghan imports and is among its top five trading partners. A 

re-imposition of sanctions threatens the India backed Chabahar port project in Iran that is largely 

funded by India. The Chabahar port complex in Iran will offer a new route for supplies into 

Afghanistan that circumvents the violent Afghanistan-Pakistan border, providing Afghanistan 

with millions of dollars in potential new trade. However, multiple contracts have already been 

delayed due to fears that companies and banks could face secondary sanctions in connection to 
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cases as I have written elsewhere, the concerns are exaggerated or without 

context.47 

18 

Regarding regional affairs for example, many object to Iranian meddling, but Saudi 

Arabia essentially kidnapped the Lebanese Prime Minister and forced him to resign 

on TV from Riyadh (a move he later reversed once home), ignored demands from 

the UN Secretary General that it allow humanitarian relief into Yemen which was 

facing a cholera epidemic, and blockaded Qatar-- a US ally that host the largest 

US military base in the region. This is meddling in the region, a practice that many 

of the states of the Middle East have engaged in for decades. (Similarly, Saudi 

Arabia receives a lower human rights rating than Iran by Freedom House.) 

In any case, there are real and serious concerns about Iranian behavior. The 

question at issue, however, is whether violating the JCPOA and declaring 

economic war on Iran will mitigate or exacerbate those problems. 

I begin with the premise that a state's number one priority is to defend itself against 

threats, as it perceives them, and that any country will make the necessary 

sacrifices to assure its own security. So will Iran, in the aftermath of US actions, 

feel more threatened or less threatened? It would seem likely that they will feel 

more threatened for reasons discussed above. Indeed, it appears as if the 

President's "strategy" is to make Iran feel more threatened, and certainly the 

appearance of a regime change strategy would reinforce that perception. 

Research and scholarship in security studies would predict that, on average, as 

countries feel more threatened they are more likely, not less likely, to spend money 

on their military and develop weapons, e.g., missiles. They arc more likely, not 

less likely, to hold their allies close in anticipation of a conflict, and more likely to 

attempt undermine their adversaries to prepare for a coming war. 

the project. If Washington fails to provide exemptions for this project it will alienate New Delhi 

and Kabul, reinforce Afghanistan's illicit economy, and undermine its own efforts to compel 

Pakistan to cease its clandestine support of armed terrorist organizations like the Haqqani 

Network. This is because that strategy hinges on Afghanistan's ability to diversify its trading 

partners. "Afghanistan Trade Summary 2016 Data," World Integrated Trade Solution, June 5, 

2018, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/ AFGN ear/L TST/Summary>; 

Jonathan Landay and Rupam Jain, "U.S. sanctions on Iran threaten vital Afghanistan trade 

project," Reuters, May 20, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-afghanistananal ysis/us-sancti ons-on-iran-threaten-vital-afghani stan -trade-project-id U SK CN 11 L04G>. 47 See, for example, Walsh, "Comments on the Recently the Recently Negotiated Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action;" Walsh, ''Iran Terror Financing and the Tax Code." 
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19 

The prospects for democracy and human rights will be similarly, adversely 

affected. Iranians who object to the social police, corruption, or a poor economy 

will nevertheless rally around their country, if they view it as under attack. And as 

I pointed out earlier, the Iranian people are already angry with the US for violating 

the agreement, as well as for the "Muslim ban" and other policies. The specter of a 

outside threat also provides the state with an easy excuse to crack down on dissent 

and to accuse any opposition as being beholden to a foreign power. It reduces the 

chances that those already arrested will be released and makes any engagement 

with Iranian civil society more difficult, if not impossible. 

Such a response is not particular to Iran, though one might be tempted to say that 

the effects may be even more pronounced in the case of Iran given its history and 

its sense of pride. But this is not an Iranian dynamic. It applies to virtually any 

government under threat by an outside power, and all the more so, when the 

outside power's "demands" are essentially nonnegotiable. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and members of the Committee, I want to thank 

you again for the opportunity to appear before you on a topic of the utmost 

importance for US national security and the security of our friends and allies. The 

JCPOA was a singular nonproliferation achievement that was years in the making. 

In one day, the President has undercut it, letting Iran out of its nuclear box and 

setting off a series of events that could bring war and nuclear proliferation to a 

region that needs neither. We have angered our allies and the Iranian people for 

whom we profess concern. We have acted without a strategy, without a back up 

plan, and with no preparation for what will come next. Important concerns such as 

Iran's regional behavior or ballistic missiles are more likely to get worse as a 

consequence, not better. 

These developments will pose new challenges for American national security, and 

American people will hold Congress accountable for the results, as it should in a 

democracy. I remain committed to working with you to protect the American 

people and our friends abroad. I look forward to future conversations about the 

dangers and challenges that lie ahead. 
66 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr.Rubin, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D. 

Mr. RUBIN. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Welch, honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

My written testimony goes into considerable detail, but in the interest of time, let me just highlight a few points. 

One, the JCPOA considerably eroded counterproliferation precedent set by both South Africa and Libya. 

Two, while some might argue that sunset clauses exists in some 

other treaties, what makes the JCPOA different is that it left Iran 

with an industrial scale nuclear program and more centrifuges at 

its disposal than Pakistan had when it built, not a bomb, by an arsenal. 

Three, what Hassan Rouhani has said in Persian about motivation and strategy contradicts what Iranian diplomats often say in 

English. I should also note that it was during the so-called dialogue 

of civilization that Iran built the covert aspects and worked on a 

nuclear warhead design, not at a time when it was under threat. 

And this is something which Hassan Rouhani openly bragged about 

in Persian. 

The JCPOA was never meant to be a get-out-of-jail-free card on 

other Iranian malfeasance. It is a sense of impunity in Tehran that 

has sparked Iranian aggression and heightened the risk of 

war.There are three major components to a nuclear weapons program: enrichment, warhead design, and delivery. 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 reversed precedent on ballistic missiles. It is imperative that the United States stop that program. The precedent for unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions 

was set by the Clinton administration in multiple executive orders 

and by Congress with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The same ‘‘sky 

is falling’’ arguments were voiced then as now, and, happily, they 

are just as false. 

As I detail in my written testimony, there are cases where Iran 

succumbed to pressure to cease rogue behavior. There is no reason 

the goals outlined by Secretary of State Pompeo should not be embraced in a bipartisan fashion. There is no reason to rationalize 

Iranian terrorism or regional aggression, for example. 

The JCPOA unleashed a cascade of proliferation as regional 

states recognize that the agreement did not achieve its stated 

goals. It is counterfactual to argue that withdrawal from the 

JCPOA is what motivates Saudi Arabia to pursue a nuclear option. 

It is silly and an affront to the constitutional process to suggest 

that the JCPOA is a treaty. 

Don’t trust me on that. Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of 

State for Legislative Affairs under Secretary of State John Kerry, 

said it was unsigned, and I quote, ‘‘neither a treaty nor an executive agreement.’’ 

To suggest any U.N. Security Council Resolution becomes a treaty equal to Senate ratification is dangerous given the tendency of 

the U.N. to indulge in the base’s anti-Americanism. 

Look, democracy is the best system out there, but the democratic 

process can be messy. It is misanalysis to fail to understand in a 


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system like Israel’s that some people are motivated by personal 

animus towards Israel’s leaders and their own internal partisan 

battles, nor is it wise to assume that every person who has held 

a position is qualified to end debate. 

Take for example Danny Yatom. His tenure at Mossad ended in 

2001. Likewise, when I lived in Iran, the Iranian press constantly 

brought up former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s condemnation of U.S. policies. That he was a former high-level official 

didn’t necessarily imbue him with great expert judgment. 

Here is the point. We can debate whether or not Trump should 

have walked away from the JCPOA, but regardless, whether he did 

so or not, it would have been necessary to focus on the future and 

develop a strategy that confronts the challenge that Iran still poses 

on a number of fronts and fill the loopholes left by the JCPOA. 

The U.S. should not get sucked into a Riyadh versus Tehran debate but rather should counter the ideological export of extremism, 

whether it comes in a Sunni form or whether it comes in a Shiite 

form. 

I should note, however, that the problem here is that both the 

Iranian constitution and the founding statutes of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps define the purpose of Iran to export revolution, which in a very public debate in Persian back in 2008 was 

concluded to mean a more violent kinetic aspect as opposed to a 

soft power aspect of export of resolution. Basically, it meant supporting terrorist groups. 

Now, when it comes to recommendations, I outline these in considerable detail as to a broader strategy. And any strategy should 

have diplomatic, informational, military, and economic components. 

But in addition to some of the technical issues in the JCPOA, we 

could do much more, for example, to support independent trade 

union movements inside Iran. I do think the Bush administration 

missed a Lech Walesa moment back in 2005 when Iranian bus 

drivers created the first independent trade union there. 

We could also invest a great deal in anticensorship technologies 

which Tiananmen Square refugees have created, and we can remove U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf to make them invulnerable to Iranian swarming small boats while at the same time 

maintaining the ability to reach out at Iran should they engage in 

hostile behavior. 

And, with that, let me thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:] 


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Statement before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Nation Security 

AMERICAN 

ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 

On "Protecting America from a Bad Deal: Ending U.S. Participation in the Nuclear 

Agreement with Iran" 

Putting American Security First in 

the Post-JCPOA Order 

Michael Rubin 

Resident Scholar 

June 6, 2018 

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit. 501(c)(3) educational 

organi?ation and does not take institutional positions on any issCJes. The views expressed in this testimony are 

those of the author. 
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Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and Honorable Members, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today about the impact of President Donald Trump's decision to end U.S. 

participation in thejoint Comprehensive Plan of Action OCPOA) on the threat posed by the Islamic 

Republic of Iran's nuclear ambitions. 

The JCPOA was a complex agreement that the Obama administration and its supporters said cut 

off all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear bomb. Given the reality of JCPOA controls and only limited 

access to potential Iranian nuclear sites, such claims were an exaggeration. While there remains 

ample room for diplomacy, protecting American security and that of our regional allies requires 

dealing with the reality of Iranian behavior, rather than a public relations whitewash of it. To do 

anything other than addressing JCPOA flaws head-on would be national security malpractice. 

Did the JCPOA ensure "unprecedented verification"? 

One of the greatest misconceptions of the JCPOA revolved around the ability to confirm Iranian 

compliance. Contrary to the Obama administration's insistence that the JCPOA ensured 

"unprecedented verification" to guarantee Iran had no secret nuclear program, the JCPOA 

reversed decades of nonproliferation precedent. 

The Apartheid regime in South Africa, for example, maintained a covert nuclear weapons program 

throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As President Frederik Willem de Klerk steered South Africa 

toward a post-Apartheid future, he decided to come clean about South Africa's program and join 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed both to dismantle the six nuclear warheads South Africa had 

built and to confirm and then certify South Africa's compliance with the NPT. Despite a fully 

compliant South African government welcoming inspections anywhere and anytime and its 

granting of full access to its covert nuclear archives and their complete transfer to inspectors, it still 

took the IAEA 19 years to certify South Africa's compliance as complete. 

Likewise, when, on December 19, 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Oadhafi agreed to forfeit his 

nuclear program, the international community required Libya to dismantle physically its nuclear 

infrastructure. On January 18, 2004, for example, Donald Mahley, deputy assistant secretary of 

State for Arms Control, led a team of experts to Libya to inventory Libya's nuclear program 

components. Nine days later, the U.S. airlifted 27 tons of documents and components relating to 

Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. They took no chances and rushed, knowing that the 

mercurial Oadhafi might reverse course at any time. On March 6, 2004, a U.S. tanker sailed from 

Tripoli removing additional equipment and SCUD missiles that North Korea had sold Libya, and, 

two days later, U.S., British, and IAEA officials arranged to fly 13 kilograms of highly enriched 

uranium to Russia.' 

The JCPOA, however, not only allowed Iran to keep its base nuclear infrastructure intact but also 

permitted the Islamic Republic to sidestep ratification of the Additional Protocol, a protocol to 

enable greater verification of states' compliance with their safeguards agreements. The origin of 

the Additional Protocol lay in IAEA failure. Between 1980 and 1990, the IAEA had given Saddam 

Hussein's Iraq 11 clean bills of health certifying that Baghdad was not working on a covert nuclear 

program. But, documents seized during the 1991 Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent 

defection of Saddam's own son-in-law revealed that Iraq had fooled IAEA inspectors. As a result 

and to plug the loopholes that Saddam Hussein had exploited, the IAEA created the Additional 

Protocol in which states would accept more rigorous inspections in exchange for more generous 

1 Douglas Frantz and josh Meyer, '"The Deal to Disarm Kadafi," Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005. 
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technology sharing. Unlike 129 other states, Iran has refused to ratify the Additional Protocol, the 

necessary precursor to its inspection regime. Rather than demand ratification, JCPOA negotiators 

settled for an Iranian promise to abide by its terms without locking them in. 

Alas, this played into the hands of those in the Iranian regime who wished to benefit from the 

perception of cooperation without actually committing to long-term cooperation. On October 21, 

2003, for example, European foreign ministers announced an agreement for Iran to ratify the 

Additional Protocol with Hassan Rouhani, at the time secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security 

Council and the regime's chief nuclear negotiator. 2 The next day, however, Rouhani declared, "As 

long as Iran thinks this suspension is beneficial, it will continue, and whenever we don'twant it, we 

will end it. "3 While supporters of the JCPOA argue that the Iranian leadership's pledge to abide by 

the Additional Protocol is as good as formal ratification, Rouhani's refusal to lock Iran into 

permanent compliance had long precedent. 

Rouhani, for example, has bragged about how he used diplomacy with the West to run the clock 

down as Iran created what is now known to have been a nuclear weapons capability. "When I was 

entrusted with this portfolio, we had no production in Isfahan," he explained, saying that he 

succeeded in then building not only Iran's major uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz but also its 

plutonium-producing heavy-water plant in Arak. "The Islamic Republicactedverywisely in my view 

and did not allow the United States to succeed," he added.4 Indeed, as Rouhani stepped down 

from his long tenure as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he credited Iran's 

ability to progress in the face of commitments to the West to a doctrine of surprise. "The actions of 

the regime took the world by surprise and they were usually unpredictable .... [The world does] 

not knowwhatwewill do a month from now," heexplained. 5 Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the former 

spokesman of President Mohammad Khatami, confirmed such deceit. "We had an overt policy, 

which was one of negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was 

continuation of the activities," he explained 6 

One major JCPOA flaw seldom discussed in various assessments is the problem of off-site work. 

While it is difficult to hide centrifuge cascades (although Iran has done just this in the past) and 

sanitize illicit enrichment sites ahead of inspections, the same is not true for facilities in which 

warhead design and mathematical modeling might occur; these are more mobile and more easily 

sanitized. Too often, there is an assumption that countries like Iran that have involved themselves 

in illicit weapons work limit such work to within their own territory. But, there have long been 

military links between North Korea and Iran. There is hardly a missile test in North Korea in which 

Iranian scientists are not also present and vice versa. It is not a huge leap to question whether North 

Korea might provide Iranian scientists space to continue work that would be subject to inspections 

inside Iran itself. In such a scenario, the JCPOA provides no inspection or verification authority. 

Did the JCPOA end the missile threat? 

2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Agreed Statement at the End of a Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the 

Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Germany," October 21, 2003. 3 BBC News, "Iran Agrees to Key Nuclear Demands," October 21, 2003, 

http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3210574.stm. 4 Etemaad, Nagoftaha-ye Hassan Rowhani as diplomasi hasteh-ye dureh eslahat az europa qol vatave tareh-i Amrika 

ra gerefteh budam," October 24, 2011. 5 Hassan Rouhani, "Iran's Measures Rob the Americans for Foresight" (speech, Ferdowsi University Hall, February 9, 

2005) Rahbord Qournal ofthe Expediency Council's Center for Strategic Studies, Tehran), Spring 2005. 6 Fars News Agency (Tehran), "Ramezanzadeh: Siyasat·e Post Perdeh Dawlat-e Khatami Adameh-e Fa'liyatha-ye 

Hasteha-ye Bud," june 14, 2008. 
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One of the greatest problems with the JCPOA has been its erosion of prohibitions on Iranian 

ballistic missiles. A nuclear weapons program has three basic components: enrichment, warhead 

design, and delivery systems. Iran's covert efforts regarding the former contributed to the IAEA's 

2005 decisions to find Iran in noncompliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards 

Agreement and to refer the Iranian file to the United Nations.7 The 2003 and 2007 National 

Intelligence Estimates, the IAEA's November 2011 catalogue of Possible Military Dimensions to 

Iran's nuclear program, and the Iranian nuclear archives exposed publicly by Israeli Prime Minister 

Benjamin Netanyahu make clear that Iranian work on warheads is well advanced, and, even if it has 

since been shelved, Iranian authorities have taken steps to preserve the knowledge. 

The last major aspect of a nuclear weapons program, therefore, is delivery. UN Security Council 

Resolution 1929 stated that the Security Council "decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity 

related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons." However, to conclude the 

JCPOA, the Iranian government demanded to change that language. Instead of outright 

prohibiting work on such ballistic missiles, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 "called upon [Iran] 

not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering 

nuclear weapons." Iranian authorities have subsequently tested more than two dozen ballistic 

missiles, but they argue that they are designed for other purposes and that, even if they are capable 

of carrying nuclear warheads, they are allowed. Given official Iranian government and IRGC 

rhetoric both promoting genocide and the eradication of the State of Israel and threatening peace 

and stability for U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, it is crucial to address Iran's 

burgeoning ballistic missile threat head-on. 

Did sanctions relief benefit ordinary Iranians? 

Part of the U.S. logic driving initial negotiations was the belief that engaging with and allowing 

Iranian regime reformers to better the economy would privilege them against hardliners. What 

seemed sophisticated in Washington, however, looked transparent in Tehran. Speaking on the 

30th anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy on November 4, 2009, Supreme leader Ali 

Khamenei declared, "[Reformists] can't roll out the red carpet for the United States in our country. 

They should know this. The Iranian nation resists." Perhaps a greater flaw in the U.S. strategy, 

however, was the presumption that reformers were more sincere than engaged in a game of good 

cop-bad cop. In reality, Rouhani had always been the regime's "Mr. Fix-it," and reformists more 

broadly were committed to retaining Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's vision of clerical rule. 

Rouhani's main objective in the run-up to the JCPOA was financial relief. According to official 

Iranian statistics, in the year before the beginning of negotiations, Iran's economy had shrunk 5.4 

percent, and inflation on staples such as bread, meat, and milk had increased between 30 and 50 

percent. 8 Rather than use its financial leverage to force greater Iranian concessions, the Obama 

administration promised sanctions relief. Estimates of the windfall amount range from the tens of 

billions of dollars to $100 billion. In order to create a disincentive for President Obama' s successor 

to abandon the deal, the JCPOA awarded Iran such relief upfront rather than calibrated to 

compliance. While some cash ended up with creditors and not in Iran itself, even the high-end 

estimates of Iranian benefits from the deal fail to account for additional investment. 

7 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 

the Islamic Republic of Iran," September 24, 2005, GOV /2005/77. 8 /nternationallran Times, "Economy Shrank 5.4% Last Year," September 13, 2013; and MehrNews.cam,"Narkh-e 

Tavarram 31 Dar Sad Shod I jodul-e Garani-ha Dar Sal92" [Inflation Rate Was 31 Percent/Table of Expenses for Year 

2012-2013],june 3, 2013. 
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Alas, there is no evidence that any of this money benefited ordinary Iranians; quite the contrary, 

the money that has flowed into Iran in the post-jCPOA period appears to have disproportionately 

filled the coffers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Here, the problem is structural. 

The IRGC rose to prominence during the 1980-SSiran-lraq War. At the conclusion of the fighting, 

they did not want simply to return to the barracks and subordinate themselves to politicians who 

they believed had lived the soft life during the war. Instead, they decided to establish an 

independent stream of funding. Their engineering and manufacturing unit formed Gharargah 

Sazandegi-ye Khatam ai-Anbiya (Construction Base of the Seal of the Prophets). 

Fast forward three decades, and Khatam ai-Anbiya dominates the Iranian economy, controlling by 

some estimates up to 40 percent of Iranian GDP. Today, it controls dam building, highway and 

road construction, tunnel drilling, pipelines, and water systems. In addition, IRGC companies build 

cars, computers, telephones, scanners, and SIM cards. Add into the mix supermarket chains, 

shipping, and oil, and the stranglehold is complete. Over the past decade, Khatam ai-Anbiya has 

reaped tens of billions of dollars in no-bid contracts, further privileging the IRGC over the ordinary 

economy.9 

European companies and oil firms may claim due diligence in avoiding IRGC investment, but it is 

near impossible to avoid IRGC shell companies. When the French automobile manufacturer 

Peugeot, for example, partners with Iran Khodro Group, they are essentially partnering with an 

IRGC subsidiary company. The same is true with the relationship between Japanese companies 

Yamaha and Mazda and the Bah man Group. Iranian workers seldom benefit from foreign direct 

investment in IRGC-Iinked companies, as Khatam ai-Anbiya uses its privileged status to skirt basic 

labor laws and often defaults on wages. Indeed, demand for back wages fuels Iran's trade union 

movement. 

Nor have other Iranian commercial deals signed in the wake ofthe JCPOA and ostensibly meant to 

benefit ordinary Iranians really had that purpose. One of the highest-profile post-JCPOA deals has 

been Iran Air's efforts to purchase up to 100 Boeing aircraft and a similar number of Airbus plans. 10 

Deal proponents say that the sale will help Iran reverse a poor commuter ftight safety record, but a 

quick survey of the planes that Iran Air has sought to buy or lease suggest the acquisition of new 

aircraft is not solely for civilian purposes. After all, Iran Air's pre-JCPOA fteet totaled just 43 planes, 

more than one-third of which were relatively small 100-seaters. To suggest that Tehran's only 

interest in ordering new Boeings was passenger safety is to accept that the Iranian government 

wanted Iran Air to be larger and to carry more passengers than japan Airlines, Qatar Airlines, and 

Singapore Airlines. Simply put, if Iran's intention were safe air travel at current capacity, they could 

achieve their aims with an order one-fifth as large. Already, reports that the IRGC is using new 

aircraft to ferry troops, militiamen, and arms into Syria belie the notion that the Iranian government 

sought to use the lifting of sanctions and new possibilities of investment to better the lives of 

ordinary Iranians. 

9 Abrar(Tehran), "Vagozari-ye 850 Melyoun Dolar Prozhehpye jadid-e Nafti Be Khatam ai-Anbia" [$850 Million New 

Oil Project Given to Khatam ai-Anbia], March 16, 2010; Abrar(Tehran), "Gharargah-e Khatam ai-Anbia jaygozin-e 

Torkiyeh Dar 3 Faz-e Pars-€ jonoubi Mishavad" [Khatam ai-Anbia Base to Replace Turkey in Three Phases of the South 

Pars], April19, 2010; Pol (Tehran), "jaygozinan-e Dakheli-ye Shell va Repsol Dar Pars-€ jonoubi" [Domestic 

Replacements for Shell and Repsol in South Pars], june 5, 2010; and Mehr (Tehran), "Vagazari bidun nashrifat 2 

pirouzeh-i nafti beh qirargah Khatam ai-Anbia" [No-Bid Contracts for Two Oil Projects Awarded to Khatam ai-Anbia], 

February 26, 2011. 10 Robert Wall, "Boeing Signs Deal to Sell jets to Iran's State Airline," Wall Street journal, june 21, 2016; and Rick 

Gladstone, "Delays Threaten to Unravel Iranian Plans to Buy 200 jetliners," New York Times, july 22, 2016. 
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Also belying the notion that the Iranian government has used sanctions relief to benefit the lives of 

ordinary Iranians is the senior regime officials' shopping spree in the post-]CPOA period. In 

November 2015, Iranian Air Force commander Hassan Shah-Safi took an extended tour of Chinese 

state companies that are manufacturing aircraft and air defense hardware with a view toward future 

purchases. 11 Not long after, the Iranian Defense Ministry announced the purchase of new sniper 

rifles from Russia.'2 Tehran and Moscow subsequently entered into talks for a $10 billion arms 

deal.13 In April 2018, for example, Behzad Etemadi, the deputy head of Iran's Industrial 

Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO), announced an agreement between the IDRO 

and Russian Helicopters to manufacture two helicopter models inside lran. 14 1ran's official defense 

budget continues to rise, and that does not take into account off-books IRGC profits. 15 

Does unilateralism work? 

It is easy to point out flaws in the JCPOA, but rehashing past debates is ultimately not useful unless 

there is a strategy to address some of the agreement's weaknesses. Two of the most trenchant 

criticisms about President Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA have been (l) that 

abandoning the agreement erodes the meaning of America's word and (2) that it will fail to bring 

Iran to heel because European partners, let alone Russia and China, will not abide by U.S. unilateral 

sanctions. 

While European leaders might complain about Trump's decision to step away from the JCPOA, 

the president was within his legal rights to do so. In a November 20151etter, julia Frifield, assistant 

secretary of State for legislative affairs under Secretary of State John Kerry, explained that the 

]CPOA was neither "a treaty [n]or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document" and 

instead only "reflects political commitments." 16 Had Kerry sought to treat the JCPOA as a treaty 

subject to Senate ratification, not only would it likely have survived shifting political winds, but also 

he might have used the necessity to negotiate a stronger agreement, more consistent with 

nonproliferation and verification precedent. 

While multilateralism brings theoretical legitimacy to international dealings, criticism of 

unilateral ism often falls flat because it ignores that unilateral measures are often more effective than 

multilateral ones and because there is ample precedent of European states, Russia, and China 

abiding by unilateral U.S. measures with which they disagreed. In 1995, for example, as Tehran's 

terror sponsorship and nuclear program accelerated, Clinton issued two Executive Orders in 

1995, the first targeting Iran's oil industry and the second banning most American trade with and 

investment in lran.17 Many companies initially sought to bypass U.S. sanctions by shifting 

operations to European subsidiaries. Congress addressed this the following years with the IranLibya Sanctions Act, which empowered the United States to act against private companies 

investing in Iran. In 1997, Clinton tightened financial restrictions to close loopholes in which 

11 Fars News Agency, "Didar va Goftegu-ye Farmandehan-e Niru-ye Hava-ye Artesh-e Iran va Chin dar Peken" 

[Meeting and Conversation Between the Air Force Commanders of Iran and China in Beijing], November 2, 2015. 12 Defa Press, "'Moshkhasat AK-103: Aslahah Polermeri"' [Profile: AK-103, Plastic Gun], August 7, 2016. 13 Reuters, "Russia and Iran in Talks over $10 Billion Arms Deal: RIA,"' November 14, 2016. 14 Parsine.com, "Iran ba Komak-e Rusha Balgerd Misazad"' [Iran to Build Helicopters with the Help of Russians], April 

24,2018. 

15 1ranian Student News Agency, "'Sehom Bish az 400 Trilyon Riali Nehadha-ye Nizami az Budgeh 97" [Share of 

Military in 2018 Budget More Than 400 Trillion Rials], December 10, 2017; and "Budgeh-e Defa'e 145 dar sad 

nesbat beh Agaz Dawlet Rashad Dashteh Ast" [Defense Budget Grew 145% Since the Beginning of Administration], 

Iran, April19, 2017. 16 julie Frifield, assistant secretary of state, letter to the Hon. Mike Pompeo, U.S. House of Representatives, 

November 19,2015. 17 Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995); and Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995). 
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companies exported American goods to Iran through third countries. 18 European companiesand European diplomats-complained about the U.S. position, but reality required acquiescence: 

They simply were unwilling to sacrifice access to the U.S. market and multibillion-dollar penalties 

to trade with Iran. 

The Clinton administration also faced resistance to its punitive efforts from prominent officials of 

both parties. Former National Security Advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, for 

example, argued that a strategy swapping sanctions with incentives would more likely moderate 

Iran's behavior. 19 The idea to flip rogues with trade may sound good in theory, but there is little 

evidence to suggest that it works in reality. Proponents of a moneyed embrace often cite China 

but ignore that, decades after the Nixon administration began its engagement of the People's 

Republic, China remains a one-party dictatorship and a potent military threat to U.S. interests. 

Before the JCPOA, European powers tried to modify Iranian behavior and bolster the prospects of 

Iranian reformists through trade. Between 1998 and 2005, European Union trade almost tripled 

with the Islamic Republic, and, at the same time, the price of oil nearlyquintupled.lmportantly, this 

wasatthe time Rouhani was in charge of iran's security policy and also coincided with the so-called 

"Dialogue of Civilizations." While Khatami sought to charm the West, Rouhani invested the bulk of 

the hard currency windfall in its ballistic missile program, its then-covert nuclear enrichment 

facilities, and its nuclear warhead program. To suggest, as some proponents of the jCPOA have, 

that removing impediments to trade enabled the deal but that George W. Bush-era coercion 

backfired as the Islamic Republic expanded its enrichment program ignores that the exponential 

increase in Iranian centrifuge operation occurred against the backdrop of this increase in trade. 

Indeed, there is ample evidence that pressure works. Twice in the Islamic Republic's history, 

revolutionary authorities have sworn no surrender on core positions. In 1979, revolutionary leader 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said Iran would not release their American hostages until Washington 

met his demands. He subsequently said he would accept no end to the Iran-Iraq War until the 

Islamic Republic achieved its top aims: the ouster and capture ofSaddam Hussein. In both cases, 

however, pressure coupled with isolation caused the Islamic Republic to stand down: The 1980 

Iraqi invasion of Iran made the international isolation suffered as a result of Iran's hostage taking too 

great to bear. 20 And, after rebuffing ceasefire proposals in 1982, Khomeini agreed to the same 

ceasefire six years later, likening his decision to" drinking a chalice of poison," but a necessary one 

in order to enable the Islamic Republic to suNive. 

And while the Obama administration initially opposed unilateral measures directed toward Iranian 

banks, the Senate passed them anyway, lOQ-0. The Obama administration subsequently 

acknowledged that it was those sanctions that brought Iran to the table. 21 

How does walking away from the JCPOA affect broad strategy? 

Too often, U.S. administrations craft bilateral strategies as if policy unfolds in a controlled 

environment in which outside issues or alternative precedents cannot penetrate. The world is not 

so sterile, however. As the Trump administration walks away from the JCPOA, it simultaneously 

seeks to negotiate a new denuclearization deal with North Korea. 

18 Executive Order 13059 (August 19, 1997). 1

9 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Affairs, 

May/June 1997. 20 PeterW. Rodman, "The Hostage Crisis: How Not to Negotiate," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1981. 21 )ordan Fabian, "Obama: SanctionsWereOnlyWayto Bring Iran to Table," Hill, August 10, 2015. 
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While many critics of the current administration argue that walking away from the JCPOA undercuts 

the U.S. ability to negotiate with North Korea, the opposite may actually be true. North Korea has 

failed over the decades to uphold its agreements, always calculating that desperation to keep 

them at the table would lead officials in Washington to turn a blind eye toward cheating and to 

prioritize process. Trump's rnove on the JCPOA suggests to Pyongyang that rhetoric and sleightof-hand will not substitute for substance. 

Negotiations with North Korea will be fraught and unlikely to succeed for a number of reasons, 

which my American Enterprise Institute colleague Nick Eberstadt has chronicled in the New York 

Times. 22 Far more important to the calculations of rogue rulers considering negotiations with the 

United States has been the fate of libyan dictator Muarnmar Qadhafi. The United States turned on 

Qadhafi after, in the wake of the Arab Spring, he engaged in massive human rights abuses. While 

the United States was under no obligation to protect Qadhafi against the popular uprising that 

ultimately killed him, there is widespread perception among other governments and diplomats 

that forfeiting nuclear program was a fatal mistake for the mercurial late libyan leader. 

In many ways, the debate surrounding Trump's decision to exit the JCPOA misses a broader point: 

Even ifTrurnp had continued to adhere to his predecessor's political agreement, sunset clauses 

mandate consideration of a post-JCPOA future. When gauging Iranian sincerity, Obama placed 

much faith in an anti-nuclear weapons fatwa supposedly issued by Supreme leader Khamenei. 

Putting aside the fact that this fatwa does not appear in collections of Khamenei' s other fatwas, 

the ailing Khamenei's death would open the door for any successor to reconsider an anti-nuclear 

stance. In short, it pays to be proactive and prepared. 

Here, the Trump administration's apparent willingness to wage economic warfare against the 

Iranian leadership is wise. The price of oil is sharply on the upswing, meaning that not only 

Khamenei but also the IRGC stand to reap a windfall if they can conduct business openly. To 

sanction Iranian activities now is to prevent Tehran from channeling tens of billions of dollars in oil 

sales and investment income into an increasingly lethal array of ballistic missiles and UAVs, proxies 

waging war across the region, and perhaps even renewed nuclear weapons work on the many 

military bases in practice left uninspected in the post-jCPOA order. Importantly, the Iranian public 

has seldom blamed the United States or other outside powers for Iran's economic woes; rather, 

they recognize the fault is their leaders' mismanagement and corruption. While regime 

propagandists seek to blarne Washington and sanctions for supposed shortfalls in medicine, for 

example, the Iranian public sees that there is no shortage of money among regime bureaucrats to 

import luxury automobiles and other extravagant goods. 

A broader post-JCPOA strategy, however, would not simply be limited to sanctions and the denial 

of oil profits to Tehran. Every comprehensive strategy should have diplomatic, informational, 

economic, and military components. While both Democratic and Republican administrations tend 

to sequence these elements, they should instead be applied simultaneously; the whole is greater 

than the sum of the parts. 

Consider other economic strategies beyond sanctions: It is ironic that many European leaders and 

some on the American left support organized labor elsewhere in the world but give Iran a free 

pass. After all, every dollar the Iranian government is forced to direct toward back wages and 

22 Nicholas Eberstadt, "North Korea's Phony Peace Ploy," New York Times, April25, 2018. 
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better working conditions is money that Tehran cannot spend in Yemen, Lebanon, or Syria, or on 

ballistic missiles. 

The United States traditionally falls short with information strategies. Even 39 years after the Islamic 

Revolution, the Iranian regime continues to struggle with questions of basic legitimacy in the eyes 

of its public. Both the White House and State Department, as well as Radio Farda and Voice of 

America-Persian Service, should systematically attack the legitimacy of Iran's ruling class by 

exposing the rampant corruption of its leaders. According to Mohammad Reza Pour-Ebrahimi, 

head of the Iranian parliament's Economic Affairs Committee, there has been an unexplained 

capital flow of $30 billion out of Iran in just the first two months of 2018.23 Taking such items from 

the Iranian press and amplifying them back to a broader Iranian audience undercuts the Iranian 

government's ability to simply dismiss U.S. pronouncements as propaganda. Other informational 

strategies could include raising the cost of internal Iranian attempts at censorship. In the past, 

firewall bypassing technologies and VPNs such as Ultrasurf developed by Tiananmen Square 

refugees have been limited only by a lack of capacity in servers. 

Military strategies do not necessarily mean bombing. While it might seem counterintuitive, 

removing U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf would also increase pressure on Iran 

significantly: The Persian Gulf is both shallow and narrow, limiting maneuverability of carriers. If 

those same carriers were deployed in the northern Arabian Sea, then U.S. aircraft could strike at 

Iran while rendering ineffective the Iranian strategy of swarming with small boats. 

The Iranian threat remains real, and the JCPOA did little to remove permanently the threat posed 

by Iran's nuclear and missile programs. To strive to close loopholes left open by the JCPOA is 

common sense, and to prepare for the post-JCPOA future is responsible policy. 

Thank you. 

23 Sa ham News, ''Cheh Kasani 30 miliard dolar sarmayeh ra az Keshvar Kharej Kardand?" [Who Took $30 Billion out 

of the Country?], May 24, 2018. 
77 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Is there any disagreement, I mean other—maybe, perhaps 

Dr.Walsh, but the rest of the witnesses, do you all agree that, regardless of whether you think the President should have withdrawn or not, that it was not binding on him. It was not a treaty. 

It was not U.S. law and effectively it was a political agreement that 

he could withdraw from, correct? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You don’t believe that Dr.Walsh? You think it was 

binding? 

Mr. WALSH. I don’t think it was binding. I think—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. You said he violated it. So the question is, and 

I know you believe that it was good policy to stay in it, but do you 

have a qualm with us saying: Look, he had a right to do it. We live 

in a representative government. We have a treaty provision. We 

have executive agreements that could be read. That choice was not 

taken. And when you live by that sword, you die by that sword. 

Mr. WALSH. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, when I testified last time, I hope you got the message I passed on to your staff, 

which I very much appreciated in these difficult times how I was 

treated in our last hearing. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Oh, sure. 

Mr. WALSH. And we really looked forward to returning. 

I would say a couple of things very briefly. 

If you ignore the U.N. Security Council Resolution part about 

that, and we can have a legal argument about that, if we ignore 

that part, which I am willing to do, I would say, sure, there’s a difference between a treaty and a political agreement, but we have 

done a lot. You know, PSI was a similar agreement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, look, I get that. And I am going to probe 

you a little bit about that, but I just want to lay that out there because there was a lot of criticism saying: Oh, my gosh, we are violating an agreement. 

It was not an agreement that was binding. We had that debate 

in Congress. It should have been submitted as treaty. At a minimum, it should have been an executive agreement, and it wasn’t. 

Let me ask you this, Dr.Walsh: You’ve made the claim that the 

withdrawal increases the likelihood of proliferation. Why, though, 

do you think that the people in the region were so opposed to the 

deal—Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the Israelis—and that they 

cheered the President because I think that they want to see more 

tougher economic sanctions? They think that will make Iran less 

able to dominate the region. 

So I know the Europeans, I think your point is well taken. Obviously, they agree with you. 

Mr. WALSH. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But how would you respond to the people in the 

Middle East, in that neighborhood—— 

Mr. WALSH. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. —who think it was a bad deal and are glad the 

President took the action they took. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, first of all, I would disagree, not all the Emirates. And, secondly, I think there are more countries in the region 


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than Israel and Saudi Arabia, although that’s what we tend to pay 

attention to. 

I think, clearly, Saudi Arabia is in a death struggle with Iran. 

There is this giant rivalry, and obviously, the same thing is going 

on with, you know, there’s a big rivalry there with Israel. 

Those countries wanted sanctions. They didn’t care as much 

about the nuclear issue as weakening Iran, making it as weak as 

possible and as vulnerable as possible. And I understand that it is 

a strategy, but the other states in the region, Europe, us, the rest 

of the world, the international community, all thought it would 

be—despite Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s problems with Iran but taking a larger view—it is not about whether they are sanctioned or 

not sanctioned; it is about whether they have a nuclear weapon or 

not. That is obviously—— 

Mr. DESANTIS. I think they all care about that, obviously. 

Well, Dr. Rubin, the Middle Eastern countries, can you speak to 

their view of this deal and their view of the President’s action? 

Mr. RUBIN. Without exception, or let me say, every moderate regime or U.S. ally was very much opposed to the Joint Conference 

Plan of Action. They very much resented that they were not consulted to give their expertise on closing some of the loopholes. That 

was a missed opportunity on the part of the previous administration. There were regimes out there, for example, the Syrian regime 

of Bashar al-Assad, which was much more interested and much 

more favorable to the JCPOA, as was some of the more harder line 

Shiite elements inside the Iraqi Government. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Goldberg, my friend from Vermont mentioned, you know, like regime change as if—I mean, I don’t think— 

I have not heard anyone say: Go in there and forcibly remove the 

Iranian regime. 

On the other hand, there are vast swaths of Iranian society that 

are dissatisfied with living under an Islamist tyranny. And those 

are people, I think, that are probably pro-Western and that are 

people that we should have common cause with. 

So dealing with the sanctions element, cutting off the money but 

then trying to empower, whether it’s through social networks or 

other things, those people, isn’t that a good policy? I mean, don’t 

we want this regime to being weakened? It is not representative of 

the society. And there are people there that are trying to stand up 

to it, and we should have their back. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Mr. Chairman, it’s not just good policy; it is U.S. 

policy, as voted on by bipartisan majorities in both Chambers over 

many years. We have legislation in law. We have sense of Congress 

language. We have sanctions for these issues. We have funding for 

these issues in the Appropriations Committees. This has been our 

policy. 

The term regime change has become a loaded political term. Let’s 

just get that out of the way. We know that. This is in a post-Iraq 

war environment, and the words ‘‘regime change’’ are try to get 

some sort of gotcha moment of, do you want to invade? Do you 

want this to be like the war in Iraq? 

There is no one, I believe, on this panel and certainly in the administration, who is coming anywhere near such a policy. That is 

not the policy. We need to look more sort of a Cold War era policy. 


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What was the Reagan administration’s victory policy, rollback policy towards the Soviets? We definitely wanted behavioral change. 

We wanted to roll them back throughout the world. We want to see 

the same sort of behavioral change out of this regime, but we will 

also benefit greatly if one day internally, peacefully, the people of 

Iran, people who are out in the streets, the people who are screaming out for freedom for some sort of government that represents 

them, that makes their lives better, the government that doesn’t 

spend money in Syria or Yemen but spends money on them to get 

them jobs and higher incomes. If that happens peacefully through 

our policies, that’s great; that’s good for U.S. 

Mr. DESANTIS. My time is expired. Let me wave in, I would like 

to recognize Mr. Zeldin and Mr. Donovan, both of New York. And 

I ask unanimous consent that, though they’re not on the committee, that they be able to participate in the proceedings. 

And, without objection, so ordered. 

And it is now my pleasure to recognize my friend from Vermont, 

Mr. Welch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Goldberg, let me just start with you on this 

question of getting this regime change issue off the table because 

no one seriously is talking about that. 

Have you ever heard of Josh Bolton? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Josh Bolton? 

Mr. WELCH. Or Mr. Bolton. What is his name? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. John or Josh? 

Mr. WELCH. John, John. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. The former chief of staff for the White House or 

the National Security Advisor—John Bolton, yes. 

Mr. WELCH. And on FOX News, he said that our goal should be 

regime change in Iran. Should I take him seriously or you seriously? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Again—— 

Mr. WELCH. No, this is a serious question. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. No, it is a very—— 

Mr. WELCH. You just waved it away. He is the National Security 

Advisor for the President. He said to the American people that our 

goal should be regime change in Iran. Now, you just want to blow 

him away and say that he didn’t mean it. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. No, Congressman I would say multiple things in 

response. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. What about Rudy Giuliani? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Did you want a response? 

Mr. WELCH. Look, I am asking you to respond whether we should 

take Mr. Bolton and now Mr. Giuliani seriously. 

Mr. Giuliani said that the President is as committed to regime 

change as we are. Do I take Mr. Giuliani seriously? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Congressman, are you for repression of the Iranian people? Yes or no? No, I am asking a serious question. Are 

you for the repression and torture of people—— 

Mr. WELCH. There is no one in this Congress, no one in this 

country that condones repression anywhere by any dictator in any 

country. And you know that. 


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I am asking the questions here. Rudy Giuliani or Goldberg? Who 

do we listen to about regime change? And you don’t have to answer 

it because—— 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I would listen to the President of the United 

States—— 

Mr. WELCH. Let me ask—— 

Mr. GOLDBERG. —Secretary Pompeo and those who are empowered by the President right now. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. Now does anyone seriously think that 

trust on the American side of Iran had anything to do with this 

agreement, that President Obama or Secretary Kerry, quote, 

‘‘trusted the Iranians’’? Or do they believe that Secretary Mattis 

was right, that there was no basis for trust? That is why there had 

to be very strong verifiable inspections. Anyone disagree with that? 

Mr. RUBIN. I disagree. 

Mr. PREGENT. I disagree. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. So you disagree, Mr. Albright and Mr. 

Pregent, you disagree? 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WELCH. So you think this is based on trust? 

Mr. RUBIN. I can cite President Obama on this. 

Mr. WELCH. Sir, I am just asking—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I disagree that if President Obama did that, he— 

one of the problems in the JCPOA that developed was the Obama 

administration became an advocate for Iranian noncompliance. 

They would try to—— 

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Albright, here is the question: There is nobody 

here—and I was in favor of all of the Iranian sanctions, by the 

way, all of the Iranian sanctions, and I was in favor of this agreement, not that it was perfect, but it got rid of the nuclear weapons. 

Let me ask you a question about this: Under the agreement that 

has been now torn up, Iran has the choice to resume its nuclear 

activities. Let me ask this question: What is the option for the 

United States should Iran aggressively restart its activities towards building a nuclear weapon? 

Who on the panel would favor the use of military action at that 

point? Just raise your hands. 

You would. 

Mr. PREGENT. Absolutely. 

Mr. WELCH. Dr. Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. As I detail in my written testimony, there are episodes of overwhelming pressure that have caused Iran to back 

down. That’s what led to the release of the hostages in 1981. That’s 

what led to the end of the Iran-Iraq war. I will let history be the 

precedent on this, Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. WELCH. The President—let me just finish a minute. The 

President has tweeted that it’s time for change in Iran, and the 

Secretary of State wrote that Congress must act to change the Iranian behavior and, ultimately, the Iranian regime. And you, 

Dr.Rubin, I understand have written that regime change is the 

only strategy short of military strikes that will deny Iran a nuclear 

bomb. 


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So this question about what the implications are of a torn up 

deal are not idle questions. They are real. We are heading in a different direction. That is what’s happening. 

Mr. RUBIN. Are you—— 

Mr. WELCH. Now, here is the other question. I understand you 

think assassination is a tool as well, in your writing, and you were 

for that before it became, quote—— 

Mr. RUBIN. That’s woefully imprecise to what I said, Mr. Ranking Member. Would you care to say? I know the article you are referring to. Would you like to specify a specific example? 

Mr. WELCH. My time is running out. 

Mr. RUBIN. Okay. Then be accurate. 

Mr. WELCH. Let me ask this question. I know many of you have 

recommendations about what our policy should be. Do any of you 

know what our policy is? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Yes. 

Mr. WELCH. And it is what? Where is it? How come I don’t know? 

How come the chairman doesn’t know? 

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Ranking Member, I have heard most of my colleagues talk about why they don’t like Iran and why don’t they like 

the deal. That is fine. I am sympathetic to many of the things they 

say. I have not heard anyone talk about the fact that we don’t have 

a strategy and that this puts us on a path to warfare, either by design, regime change, or we back into it as we respond to them beginning to reinstall their nuclear program. 

I would like to hear a lot more from my friends about how we 

will deal with that in the future because that is what General 

Mattis, that is what General Votel and the others fear and have 

to prepare for. And talking about why I don’t like Iran isn’t really 

going to get us anywhere. 

Mr. WELCH. That is a straw man. 

Mr. WALSH. By the way, and on this issue of the Iranians, who 

everyone professes such great concern for, the Iranian people are 

not happy with us. 

Muslim ban, number one. 

Number two, a poll came out last month that asked the Iranian 

people—this was a private poll, not a government poll—how should 

we respond to the U.S. pulling out? This was a prospective poll. 

Sixty-seven percent of the Iranians said that Iran should retaliate? 

Why? Because they are rallying around their flag. They may not 

like the corruption. They may not like the economy, but if you 

threaten to attack their country, we are going to help the 

hardliners. We are not going to strike a blow for democracy. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time—— 

Mr. WELCH. I thank the witnesses, and I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the 

subcommittee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses for being here today. 

Shortly after the Iran deal was concluded, President Obama, his 

administration, made repeated statements that Iran would be, 

quote, ‘‘denied access to the world’s largest financial and economic 

markets,’’ end quote. 


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Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew reinforced this policy. Another Treasury official had stated that Iran would be, quote, ‘‘unable to deal in the world’s most important currencies.’’ That was 

Adam Szubin. 

Earlier today, America learned through a Senate investigation 

that President Obama’s administration issued a license to deal in 

U.S. currency conversion of Omani rials at a bank in Muscat, that 

they could convert these billions of rials into billions of dollars and 

then euros, giving blanket access and providing key Iranian flow of 

funds that could be used for funding extremism and other troubling 

activity. 

Fortunately, no U.S. bank wished to comply with such an authorization. They were fearing fallout, not only in the financial industry, but they were fearing violation of current U.S. sanctions law. 

I guess my question, as we debate this handshake agreement, that 

was not an agreement with the American people—it was not done 

through a treaty; it was not done through consent of Congress 

when we had bipartisan and overwhelming resistance to the Iran 

deal—I guess my question would be this: First, to Dr.Walsh, a series of basic questions to frame up activity of Iran, I think, is important here. Should we curtail proliferation of terrorism or promote it? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, considering, Mr. Vice Chair, that I have spent 

virtually all my professional career working to prevent the spread 

of nuclear weapons and to undermine terrorism, I think my answer 

is pretty obvious on that one. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I am guessing, then, by your answer, it 

would be to curtail it then. 

Mr. WALSH. Absolutely. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And having been a soldier most of my life and seeing Iran kill United States soldiers, including some of my colleagues, I would be in agreement. 

Mr. WALSH. As to General Mattis, who was CENTCOM Commander during that period and General Votel—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. But should we encourage nuclear cooperation with 

North Korea and Iran, or should we curtail that? 

Mr. WALSH. To my knowledge, and I have testified before the 

Congress on this, there was missile cooperation between North 

Korea and Iran, but not nuclear cooperation. There are lots of 

media reports, but the DNI has never said it. The IAEA has never 

said it. Congressional Research Services never said it. And I was 

unable in a survey of 1,000 media stories—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, should we encourage this cooperation or deny 

it? We do know that—— 

Mr. WALSH. What cooperation I guess is what I am saying? 

Mr. RUSSELL. —North Korea, Iran, and Syria, I think that there 

is overwhelming evidence that there was cooperation, not only missile technology—— 

Mr. WALSH. Nuclear, nuclear cooperation. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Sure, we can talk offline. 

Should we strengthen the ability of the Iranian Republican 

Guard Corps to destabilize Iran’s neighbors, or should we curtail 

that? 

Mr. WALSH. Absolutely curtail that. 


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Mr. RUSSELL. Absolutely. Despite Section 2, which had, by the 

way, 52 players that I identified and put on a deck of cards, and 

we were able to work with President Obama’s Treasury administration to restore some of these back to the sanctions list. However, 

listening to all of the pundits for this agreement, they stated that 

there was no problem giving Soleimani and many of these industries and others sanctions relief. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, the intelligence community has said that sanctions relief did not go in large measure to the—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Oh, we know that they used it for peaceful purposes. My last question would be—— 

Mr. WALSH. Well, that wasn’t my point but—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. —should we waive international and national financial standards on monetary exchange regarding these sanctions? Or should we maintain the strength of sanctions rather than 

creating the licenses to undermine financial markets? 

Mr. WALSH. Here is what I think: I think, of all the things you 

listed, only one is the most important. It is called the priority. 

That’s denying Iran the ability to acquire a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I see. So and all of the other things notwithstanding, we should undermine the credibility and our record on 

human rights. We should undermine the credibility of the United 

States when it comes to standing up for other people. We should 

undermine our allies. And worse, we should undermine American 

soldiers who had continued to—— 

Mr. WALSH. Well, we are undermining allies now. 

Mr. RUSSELL. If I may, reclaiming my time. One thing is crystal 

clear. When you make an agreement that the American people are 

overwhelmingly against—we are talking 60 percent plus. How I do 

know this? Just by numbers on the board through elected Representatives in Congress. 

This was a bad deal. It made us less secure, and we hear testimony after testimony with our neighbors, our allies and others, and 

yet we are led to believe that we are making the world less secure. 

Having the United States’ credibility undermined makes the 

world less secure. 

Mr. WALSH. Which is what—— 

Mr. RUSSELL. I am sorry. I am out of time. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to associate myself with your remarks earlier. 

I completely agree that President Trump made the right decision 

in this. The Iran deal was flawed from the start. We needed a better agreement in 2015. We need a stronger agreement now. And we 

cannot idly sit by while Iran continues to build up its ballistic missiles and all the things that you have mentioned here today. 

Dr. Rubin, let me start with you with this. What kind of threat 

does Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard pose to 

Israel? 

Mr. RUBIN. It poses an overwhelming threat. 


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The deputy secretary of Hezbollah has said that he welcomes the 

opportunity for all the Jews in the world to relocate to Israel because it would save them the trouble of hunting them down and 

killing them elsewhere. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So we have a serious threat. What can the 

U.S. do to support Israel against this threat? 

Mr. RUBIN. The Iranian strategy, as voiced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, tried to overwhelm Israel missile defenses 

just by sheer number of the missiles, which are in Hezbollah or 

perhaps Hamas’ hands. 

The preventive action would be to continue to support the interdiction of any missiles or missile parts. When it came to the aircraft deal, I should note that Iran, if you calculate the number of 

seats that Iran Air has and you compare it to the Boeing and Airbus deal, Airbus and Boeing were prepared to give Iran more than 

three times the annual capacity of Iranian flights putting them on 

scale of Qatar airlines or Korean Air. So, clearly, it wasn’t in that 

case about passenger safety, which is why encouraging companies 

to scale back aid which could go to the Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps is wise if our goal is to constrain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Mr. HICE. All right. You mentioned the air. What about the 

naval aggression of Iran? What should be our role there? 

Mr. RUBIN. With regard to the naval aggression, our presence 

matters. Now, I differentiate between our presence in general and 

our aircraft carrier presence, but when President Obama, for very 

good reasons, talked about a pivot to Asia, what many people in 

the Persian Gulf heard was a pivot away from us. And so, psychologically, there is a sense of abandonment among some of our GCC 

allies. 

Now, the reason I talk about taking aircraft carriers and pushing 

them more into the Arabian Sea is just to neutralize the threat 

posed by Iranian small boat swarming tactics where we can reach 

them from the Arabian Sea; they can’t retaliate against us. 

Mr. HICE. So a stronger presence, be it our carriers or whatever, 

am I hearing you saying that would be a change from the Obama 

administration’s approach? 

Mr. RUBIN. Between 2003 and 2011, we had on average one carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf. I am sorry, between 1991 and 

2003, we had one. Between 2003 and 2011, we had, on average, 

two. 

What I am saying is we should continue with the destroyers and 

cruisers and amphibian LHDs in the Persian Gulf, but the aircraft 

carrier should remain outside. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Goldberg, let me go to you. In your written testimony, you describe a maximum pressure strategy using multiple 

lines of effort there. What further sanctions do we need, in your 

opinion, and how do we know that these sanctions, financial sanctions, are working. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Well, I appreciate the question, Congressman. 

And thank you all for your leadership on this in the past. It is 

going to be very important for this subcommittee and for other 

Members to conduct oversight over our enforcement to make sure 


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that we actually do have a maximum pressure campaign that succeeds. 

We need to measure this by the liquidity crisis in Iran, the access of the regime to cash to hard dollars to hard euros. What we 

saw in the lead-up to the JCPOA, really the lead-up to the JPOA 

deal, the interim deal, was that, under the central bank sanctions, 

the disconnection of Iranian banks from the SWIFT, the sectorial 

sanctions that Congress enacted, we saw enormous pressure and 

stress of the regime, a balance of payments crisis emerging and a 

liquidity crisis. 

Because the mullahs have so mishandled their economy, even 

under the sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA, the economy is 

already in crisis. Really, the timing of the reimposition of sanctions 

for a maximum measure campaign couldn’t be better. The rial is 

in free fall in Iran. 

And so, as we cut off banks from doing business with Iranian 

banks, as we pressure SWIFT to ensure that they disconnect Iranian banks as well, as all the sanctions come back on line, it will 

be very important for Congress to conduct oversight over that to 

make sure they are being enforced properly. 

Mr. HICE. So has the withdrawal of this deal had any effect on 

other European companies doing business with Iran? 

Mr. GOLDBERG. Absolutely. We have seen pretty much on a daily 

basis more and more companies, the large ones, getting out. 

You may have seen today, there is a lot of news reports of oil, 

imports from Europe going to be canceled due to our return of the 

oil sanctions. We have seen that the European Investment Bank, 

the Europeans were talking about maybe using the European Investment Bank as a replacement for private institutions to provide 

financing for those companies that wanted continue in Iran. 

Those leaders said, you know what? We don’t want any part of 

that. Iran is too risky. Sanctions are too risky. We don’t want to 

touch that. 

And I would point everyone to yesterday’s speech by our Under 

Secretary for TFI at Treasury. She gave a great speech that really 

was an indictment of the Iranian regime’s financial system, not because of the nuclear deal but because of the practices, the behavior 

of this regime. That is why most banks and most companies don’t 

want to do business there anyway, and now with the return of U.S. 

sanctions and our oversight from Congress to make sure that it is 

properly implemented, the Iranian regime is going to be under 

enormous stress. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our panelists. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

New York, Mr. Zeldin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for the invitation to today’s hearing. 

We obviously have a diverse group of speakers today. And I think 

it is important for us to learn lessons from what happened with the 

negotiation, with understanding the text of the deal and moving 

forward with, I am sure all five are, you know, concerned with the 

need to protect America’s security at home and abroad. There 

might be a diversity of how to get there. And if you don’t mind, I 


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guess I will start with Dr.Walsh. And I just want to get some other 

perspectives in this. 

I understand that you are supportive of the deal. What in the 

deal have you identified as needing to get fixed? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I agree that several of the provisions, the ideal 

case would be, had things worked out a different way, for us to 

have then, after a year or whatever, enter into negotiations for 

Iran for a follow-on agreement. That’s a very common practice in 

international affairs; you have a temporary agreement. I mean, the 

NPT was that way. There are lots of agreements that way. 

You have an agreement, and then you build trust between the 

parties. You know, they see that we follow through on our promises. We see that they follow through on their promises. And then 

that become the basis for—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. I have a limited time. 

Mr. WALSH. —follow-on agreements. 

Mr. ZELDIN. What would you want to see in there? 

Mr. WALSH. Pardon me? 

Mr. ZELDIN. What would you want to see in the follow-on agreement? 

Mr. WALSH. In the follow-on agreements? I would have like to 

see some longer—I am happy to take 15 years on the sunsets, but 

I wouldn’t have objected to longer periods before some of the obligations came off. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Anything with regards to the verification? 

Mr. WALSH. I think, you know, Dave and I are good friends. He 

and I disagree slightly. When you read what the IAEA says, they 

say they are performing complimentary access inspections. That is 

what they said in their most recent statement. And so they are performing these inspections. 

Can we get better access? I would be all in favor of that. But 

they are reporting to the international community that they are 

able to do their job. But, of course, you would always want more 

and better inspection, if you can. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Yeah, I think, you know, two very important aspects 

that we just touched on is with regards to the sunset provision, 

whether you are the most passionate supporter the nuclear deal or 

you are one of the most vocal opponents of it, the sunset provisions 

are very problematic. 

The verification agreement on top of what was said, I mean, the 

Iranians have said before, during, and after this negotiation that 

we will not have access to their military sites. AP reported—— 

Mr. WALSH. And yet we do have. We do. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, actually, that’s not true. So, at Parchin, we 

went there. We found particles that required a followup. And the 

Iranians said that the IAEA would not be able to go back to 

Parchin to inspect those particles further. The Iranians have said 

that we will not have access to the nuclear—— 

Mr. WALSH. We didn’t have the additional protocol then—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. We have not gone to any military site. The Iranians 

are saying: You are not allowed to gain access to our military sites. 

And we have not gained access to any of their military sites. I 

am sorry. You are shaking your head. 

Mr. WALSH. Let me just say—— 


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Mr. ZELDIN. What military sites have we been to? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I can’t name them, but all I know is—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, are you saying that we have been to military 

sites? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, because I am not, you know, the IAEA 

doesn’t—some of the stuff is done confidentially. 

My point is the agency works on cause. If they have reason—if 

they have suspicions about a site, they have full authority under 

the additional protocol to demand an inspection. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Right. But they are not. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, no, they say that they have had access to all 

the sites they wanted to have. That is their language, not mine. 

And on sunsets, I would simply very quickly say—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. Yeah, with regard—you are not referring to military 

sites? 

Mr. WALSH. Yes, I am. Yes. Yes, I am. 

Mr. ZELDIN. The Iranians have said—— 

Mr. WALSH. I know they say stuff, but when it comes down to 

implementation, they have to follow the additional protocol like everyone else. 

Super quickly—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. But where can I go to source that? 

Mr. WALSH. I can give you the documents. 

Mr. ZELDIN. You are saying that there’s something that details 

all the military sites that IAEA has been able to access—— 

Mr. WALSH. I can give you—— 

Mr. ZELDIN. —since implementation? 

Mr. WALSH. —today the statement by the IAEA that it has had 

access to every site that it has requested access to and that, additionally, it is under the additional protocol legally entitled to visit 

any military site. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But they also, the inspector general just a couple 

days ago—and it was also on the latest safeguards report—said it 

would certainly be nice if Iran started allowing for access. 

Mr. ZELDIN. They did. That’s right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think they got the message from the E3 U.S. negotiations they are not doing enough. 

They told Ambassador Haley they had 50 sites of concern; they 

had 200 to 300 sites of interest. They have not visited all those 

sites, by any means. They have not visited any of the sites that 

have been named in the nuclear archive that was recently discovered and unknown to the IAEA, and probably Western intelligence. 

So there’s many sites they have not visited. They have pulled their 

punches, and now it is time that they stop. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Is there anything on the verification front that you 

all, the other four, Dr.Walsh, who have had a chance to talk for a 

while. Anything anybody else would like to add as far as improvements that need to get made with regards to the verification? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, one is that it is not true that JCPOA was 

fully verified. I mean, a lot of these things happened behind the 

scenes; the IAEA doesn’t tell the whole story. One of the issues has 

been Section T, which is a ban on nuclear weapons development activities that is still not verified. I mean, there are conditions in 

there that involve equipment, dual-use equipment that is known to 


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exist in Iran. Additional dual-use equipment has been identified in 

the nuclear archive that’s subject to Section T. It should be declared by Iran, subject to joint commission approval, and monitored 

by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that is not happening. 

So I think to say that somehow this deal is fully verified, it is 

the best deal in the world, the best verified deal, is simply not true. 

And I think it is time to end this kind of simplistic talking point 

of the JCPOA proponents and get down to, how are we going to fix 

this situation now? 

Mr. ZELDIN. I appreciate that. We can go on a lot further here 

with regards to the verification. I still, as a Member of Congress, 

we have not received copies of the verification agreement that was 

between the IAEA and Iran. We have read Associated Press reports 

that talk about Iran collecting some of their own soil samples, inspecting some of their own nuclear sites. But I think, with regards 

to verification as well as, you know, the conversation on the sunset 

provisions, we have some improvements need to get made. And, 

hopefully, all five of you would be able to agree that we can make 

this better. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the 

opportunity to ask questions at this hearing today regarding protecting America from a bad deal, ending U.S. participation in the 

nuclear agreement with Iran. 

There are a few facts I would like to highlight as a preface to 

my question. 

Fact, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, according to the 

Obama administration, was a political commitment, not a treaty. 

As such, the Iran deal imposed no international legal obligation, 

nor has any president after President Obama including President 

Trump, legally bound by the Iran deal because it was a political 

agreement, not a legal agreement. 

Fact two, under the JCPOA, Iran has gone on a shopping spree, 

spending money, not on its own domestic needs but instead on supporting terrorists and dictators. 

Iran has particularly focused its attention on Iraq, Syria, and 

Lebanon. What do Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon hold in common for 

Iran? Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon together represent a geographic 

land bridge for Iran that gives it a clear direct path to Israel. 

Fact three, the Iran regime wants to destroy Israel. At every 

turn, the Iran regime has only fanned the flames of violence in the 

Middle East to serve its own hateful tremulous agenda. 

Ayatollah Khamenei, just this past Sunday, stated on Twitter 

that, quote, ‘‘Israel is a malignant, cancerous tumor in the West 

Asian region that has to be removed and eradicated; it is possible, 

and it will happen,’’ end quote. 

President Trump’s Administration has laid out 12 imminently 

reasonable requirements for a new deal with Iran, which include 

Iran ending its support for terrorist organizations and ending its 

threat against Israel and other nations in the Middle East. 

There are certainly differences in our political beliefs here today. 

However, I, my Republican colleagues, the Trump administration, 


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and many of my Democratic colleagues have at least one thing in 

common: strong support for our ally Israel. 

Congressman Sarbanes stated that, quote, ‘‘Israel is one of our 

closest and most important allies,’’ end quote. 

Congresswoman Demings said, quote, ‘‘Israel’s security is essential for the future of the Jewish people and the security of the 

United States,’’ end quote. 

Congressman Lynch stated that, quote, ‘‘the state of Israel is one 

of our most important allies,’’ end quote. 

Congressman Engel agrees that the biggest danger in Israel’s security is Iran. He stated, quote, ‘‘Today, the most serious danger 

Israel must confront emanates from Iran. It is simply unacceptable 

that a country with a history of supporting terrorism and calling 

for the destruction of Israel could have a nuclear weapon,’’ end 

quote. 

Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has noted that, quote, ‘‘there is no 

greater political accomplishment in the 20th Century than the establishment of the state of Israel,’’ end quote. 

As you could see, across the aisle, we all want to see Israel survive and thrive, and agree that Iran’s aspirations to annihilate 

Israel are not acceptable. 

Mr. Pregent, given that the large bipartisan support for Israel, 

how does the United States withdrawing from the Iran deal enhance Israel and the United States’ national security, if you may? 

Mr. PREGENT. Well, thank you for the question. I think what’s 

important is to see what Russia is actually doing and not doing in 

Syria. 

Since our withdrawal from the Iran deal, we have seen Russia 

sit on its hands while Israel was able to conduct 4- to 6-hour airstrikes against the infrastructure that Qasem Soleimani put in 

place in Syria as an offensive capability against Israel, doing that 

under the protections of the JCPOA. 

Doing that, putting those systems in place over the last 3 years, 

that Israeli airstrike that took place between 4 to 6 hours set back 

Qasem Soleimani offensive capabilities in Syria 3 years, and it 

demonstrated that in a post-JCPOA world, Iran is shedding support. 

We are looking at what Russia is doing in Syria. We are looking 

at what the World Bank and the IMF are telling private sector 

businesses from Europe and the United States to not do business 

in Iraq because that is where Iran is looking to offset U.S. sanctions by penetrating Iraqi economic sectors. 

Walking away from the Iran deal has actually made the Middle 

East less dangerous. I argue that if Iran takes an aggressive 

stance, if they start increasing their activities, they will lose European support. If they rush to a bomb, they are going to lose Russian support. Russia does not want the Islamic Republic to have a 

nuclear weapon on its border. 

To your question about the regime change. I would ask the Iranian people what they think about regime change. The Iranian people have said that the regime has squandered the economic benefits of the Iran deal: $150 billion spent on adventurism, spent on 

destabilizing the Middle East and trying to develop an offensive caVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:27 Sep 20, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\31273.TXT APRIL

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pability against Israel instead of focusing it on their domestic economy. 

The regime is in free fall. This began under the protections of the 

JCPOA. We are now out of it. Iran is in a weaker position. We now 

have leverage, and our European allies are going to pick the U.S. 

especially Israel—correction—Iran takes aggressive actions in the 

region. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much for your insight. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before us today. 

The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any member 

to submit a written opening statement or questions for the record. 

And if there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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