www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 84 1 

American leadership in science, technology, and innovation (ST&I) has 

been the foundation of U.S. national security for decades. Advanced 

technology, along with America’s ability to operationalize it into 

transformational capabilities, has long given us a military advantage. This advantage has provided superiority on the battlefield and for our broader national 

security apparatus. Today, however, our technological superiority is increasingly 

being challenged by near-peer and asymmetric competitors. Globalization of 

science and technology, emerging and unpredictable threats (both manmade and 

natural), conventional and emerging weapons of mass destruction, and an inversion of technology flow from the private to public sectors all present challenges 

to our national security.

To meet these challenges, the United States must develop a clear, synchronized, and actionable national strategy that drives advances in science, technology, and innovation in all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber) to assure our 

economic and national security.While maintaining military technology overmatch remains a key national security objective, promoting technology development by the private sector at home and around the world and then harnessing 

that development in ingenious ways will be increasingly important for economic 

prosperity as well as for national security. The recently released National Security 

Strategy of the United States also points to research, technology, invention, and 

innovation as key elements of our national power.1 The Trump administration 

has a historic opportunity now to re-invent the U.S. Government’s relationship 

with the private sector and the international community to retain our country’s 

technological dominance throughout the 21st century.

Technology and National 

Security: The United States 

at a Critical Crossroads

by James Kadtke and John Wharton

DEFENSE HORIZONS

National Defense University

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

About the Authors

Dr. James Kadtke is an Expert 

Consultant on emerging technologies 

in the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies (INSS) at the National Defense 

University. Major General John 

Wharton, USA (Ret.), is a Visiting 

Senior Research Fellow in INSS for 

Science and Technology.

Key Points

◆ Rapid globalization of science and 

technology (S&T) capacity presents 

a serious and long-term risk to the 

military and economic security of 

the United States.

◆ To maintain U.S. preeminence, our 

domestic science and technology 

enterprise requires a new paradigm to make it more agile, synchronized, and globally engaged.

◆ U.S. technological competitiveness 

depends not only on research but 

also on legal, economic, regulatory, ethical, moral, and social 

frameworks, and therefore requires the vision and cooperation 

of our political, corporate, and civil 

society leadership.

◆ Re-organizing our domestic S&T 

enterprise will be a complex task, 

but recommendations presented in 

this paper could be first steps on 

the path to maintaining our future 

technological security.

March 2018
2 DH No. 84 www.ndu.edu/inss

Our national security ST&I enterprise must be able 

to meet rapidly evolving threats, establish and maintain 

strategic partnerships, employ swiftly changing technologies, cope with diminishing resources, and benefit from 

accelerating globalization. The U.S. national security 

ST&I enterprise derives its strength from Federal agencies in collaboration with academia, industry, and global 

partners. If we are to continue to maintain technological 

preeminence and ensure our national security, we must 

evolve and adapt to meet these emerging threats and 

challenges. The United States must think strategically, 

and in fact geostrategically,

2

 to manage and enhance its 

national ST&I resources.

America is at a critical crossroads. New generations 

of advanced technologies are on the verge of dramatically changing global society.3

 Many other nations are 

now investing heavily in research and commercialization 

capabilities to create or exploit these new advances. At 

the same time, the United States has often been de-investing in many technology areas over the last decade or 

more and is on a path to losing its global competitive advantage. This will have dire consequences for the future 

of our economy, military, and society at large. However, 

with a firm recommitment to enhanced and strategic 

investments in science (research), technology (commercialization), and innovation (cultural change), the United 

States can retain international leadership for decades to 

come.

The Global Technology Revolution

For decades, advanced ST&I activities were mostly 

conducted by a handful of wealthy nations. Today, however, there is a radical change happening in how and 

where science and technology development are being 

conducted. The commercialization and globalization of 

the internet, which has led to tremendous innovation 

in social interaction and commerce over the last two 

decades,4 is also now creating a global scientific enterprise. 

Scientists the world over can easily collaborate and share 

data and analytic tools. Technology communities from 

different disciplines are cross-fertilizing to create new 

disciplines (for example, nano-robotics). Multinational 

research companies move ideas, people, and resources 

across national boundaries with ease to maximize efficiency. A growing community of “do-it-yourself ” scientists who can conduct fundamental research in their own 

homes are appearing worldwide. And most importantly, 

a growing number of countries are investing heavily in 

science, technology, and commercialization activities as a 

path to high-value economic growth and increased military capabilities.

The result of these trends is that the rate of innovation today in science, technology, and high-tech product 

development is unprecedented in history and continues 

to accelerate.5

 New generations of highly advanced technologies are already being deployed throughout global 

society and they will dramatically alter our way of life, 

as well as our economic systems and military capabilities. Nations, corporations, universities, and tech-based 

consortia are pushing hard to develop and deploy these 

advanced technologies since the financial and economic 

returns are potentially enormous. Some of the revolutionary technologies that will appear within the next 

decade include:

◆ A continued buildout of information and communication technology infrastructure (WiFi, satellites, 

mobile devices) will provide cheap or free internet access to virtually everyone around the globe. A June 2017 

globalization of science and 

technology, emerging and 

unpredictable threats, conventional 

and emerging weapons of mass 

destruction, and an inversion of 

technology flow from the private to 

public sectors all present challenges 

to our national security
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 84 3 

report by the U.S. Army War College has warned of the 

“coming age of unbridled hyper-connectivity.”6

◆ Human–machine interfaces where mobile devices 

will be replaced first by wearables, then embeddables, 

and eventually devices directly interfaced to the brain, 

raising serious new privacy and security issues.7

◆ Using synthetic biology and gene editing, scientists will be able to create entirely new life forms that can 

perform a variety of radically novel tasks but at the same 

time, pose unknown risks.8

◆ Artificial intelligence and advanced robotic devices 

will become highly functional and cheap, and personal 

robots and autonomous infrastructure (such as driverless 

cars) will be common but may create dangerous new cybersecurity vulnerabilities.9

◆ Production and distribution facilities will become 

largely autonomous and seamlessly interfaced globally 

(that is, the Industrial Internet of Things), creating a 

mega-infrastructure for industry potentially not controlled by any one nation, which could displace millions 

of workers worldwide.10

◆ Commercial nanotechnology companies will create completely new kinds of materials and products 

that will make obsolete many existing product lines, for 

example, smart materials that automatically heat, cool, 

change optical properties, or never wear out, as well as 

nano-machines. These creations, however, may raise serious environmental and military risks.11

◆ Facilitated by nanotechnology and synthetic biology, new generations of renewable energy technologies 

will be deployed, for example, highly efficient solar cells 

or energy harvesting technologies, which may disrupt 

the current global economics of energy.

◆ Enabled by cheap launch capabilities (for example, 

by SpaceX), commercial space companies may by 2020 

begin mining asteroids and the moon and fabricating 

products in space, but widely available space access may 

also facilitate wholly new mechanisms for malicious actions by rogue states or terrorists.12

Many, if not most, of these disruptive technologies 

are the direct result of decades of research investment by 

the U.S. Government and private sector. However, because of a variety of factors, the next generation of new 

technologies may likely be commercialized and produced 

outside of the United States, which will create a strategic 

and long-term threat to our nation’s well-being.

America’s Strategic Technology 

Challenges

The United States has become a great power in part 

because it has historically fostered creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation. After World War II, because 

of the vision of President Roosevelt’s science advisor 

Vannevar Bush, the United States created the first S&T 

enterprise, a formal collaboration between the Federal 

Government, corporations, and academia. Funding investments in this enterprise are widely credited with creating over half our growth in GDP since World War II 

and have enabled one of the most powerful militaries in 

the world. Yet today, the dominance of our S&T enterprise is on the verge of being overshadowed by international competition. This is due to multiple factors both 

domestic and foreign.

Many countries are now dramatically increasing 

their investments in science, technology, and commercialization, particularly in Asia, and including many 

nontraditional players such as Vietnam and Singapore. 

A May 2016 report by the National Science and Technology Council pointed out the “dramatically increased 

capacity for science and technology around the world.”13

At the same time, U.S. government funding (in constant 

dollars) has remained roughly flat over the last couple of 

decades and has even gone down since 2013. Moreover, 

the fraction of U.S. investments in the global S&T enterprise has dropped from about 39 percent in the late 

1990s to about 31 percent by 2015.14 The trend therefore 

is that the U.S. S&T enterprise will be a progressively 
4 DH No. 84 www.ndu.edu/inss

smaller part of the global S&T enterprise, and the United States will produce a progressively smaller fraction of 

scientific breakthroughs and high-tech products in the 

future. This portends a future in which the United States 

will be driven into economic decline, and our military 

strength will be compromised because we no longer have 

the technology dominance we have depended on since 

the 1940s (see figure).

In addition to funding, many common practices by 

foreign powers are undercutting the U.S. technology base. 

This includes strategic and coordinated cyber-theft of intellectual property, unfair or asymmetric access to technology markets and trade, aggressive foreign acquisition 

of small U.S. tech companies, poaching of intellectual talent, lax or non-existent foreign environmental and health 

regulations, and corporate espionage, among others. The 

U.S. Government has often turned a blind eye to many 

of these issues over the years, and this has compromised 

our leadership in several critical technology areas (for example, aerodynamic and hydrodynamic design).15

Within the United States, we have been witnessing the slow degradation of the competitiveness of our 

own domestic S&T enterprise. Decreased or inconsistent funding of S&T programs or target disciplines is a 

key factor and, more broadly, the lack of clear national 

strategic technology plans, as well as political support for 

Figure.

Copyright R&D Magazine, 2016 Global R&D Funding Forecast
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 84 5 

research investments and commercialization frameworks. 

Other factors affecting the health of our national S&T 

enterprise include burdensome regulation of tech companies, regulatory uncertainty in emerging technology areas, 

inconsistent research tax incentives, the complex Federal 

contracting and acquisition process, poor public-private 

sector cooperation in many areas, and the technological literacy of our workforce. All these factors affect or degrade 

the efficiency and profitability of our S&T enterprise and 

make us progressively less competitive in the globalizing 

technology landscape.

From a grand strategic perspective, one might observe that in the decades to come, in a world dominated 

by pervasive advanced technologies, the countries that 

are most able to create, acquire, and utilize these disruptive technologies will lead the world. This technological 

capacity will be one of, if not the, most important global 

resources.16 Technological capacity will become the new oil.

Organizing for Future U.S. 

Technological Leadership

Our future well-being and security as a nation depends on us maintaining technological preeminence 

throughout the coming decades. Our national political 

leadership, working in concert with U.S. corporate leaders and academia, have a historic opportunity to change 

our national trajectory to ensure this future. This will 

require more than the occasional Federal technology 

initiative, political photo op, or unfunded mandates that 

have characterized many U.S. ST&I commitments over 

the last decade. It will require a re-thinking of the framework for our national ST&I enterprise and developing 

a new paradigm for public-private coordination with a 

commitment to shared goals. Fortunately, the issue of 

maintaining U.S. technological leadership has been increasingly debated in public policy circles, and there is 

growing political support to act now.17

From a grand strategic perspective, a new competitive ST&I paradigm should be based on enhancing 

the speed and efficacy of our national decision cycles, 

improving our Whole-of-Government planning and 

investments, fostering Whole-of-Society partnerships 

by reducing barriers to public-private cooperation, and 

creating international strategies to succeed in a multiactor, hypercompetitive globalized society. In short, the 

United States can prevail in this future environment 

by making better decisions faster and building an ST&I 

enterprise that is more agile, synchronized, and globally 

engaged.

Implementing such a national strategic re-organization for ST&I will be a complex task and require time 

and careful planning. However, many key steps could be 

taken now to begin this process. Some of these key recommendations are discussed below.

Strategic Technology Decision 

Support for Leadership

The President should consider creating, by Executive Order, an overarching National Security Technology 

Initiative (NSTI), which will define the goals, authorities, and government elements responsible for re-organizing the U.S. ST&I enterprise. To help facilitate the 

NSTI, he should also convene a public-private National 

Security Strategic Innovation Council to study, plan for, 

and help oversee innovative reforms to our ST&I enterprise. It should include senior Federal agency staff, Clevel corporate leaders, experts from academia and think 

tanks, and perhaps a White House lead.18

The President should also consider incorporating 

strategic technology issues into the responsibilities of the 

National Security Council, either through a dedicated 

staff member or as part of the Strategic Planning desk. 

The President should also make full use of the President’s 

Science Advisor and his staff to help fully implement 

this technological capacity will be 

one of, if not the, most important 

global resources—technological 

capacity will become the new oil
6 DH No. 84 www.ndu.edu/inss

these strategic initiatives and to coordinate across government agencies and with the private sector.

Whole-of-Government Initiatives

Proposed Federal initiatives should require that Science and Technology Strategic Plans be created by each 

agency—and for the government as a whole—which are 

timely, realistic, actionable, and regularly updated. Toplevel funding should be increased for ST&I programs 

across the government, and, in particular, focused crossagency technology initiatives should be created in technology areas that are critical and rapidly evolving (for 

example, autonomous infrastructure). Recent Government Accountability Office recommendations on managing emerging technologies should be reviewed,19 and 

an oversight council should be established to analyze 

government ST&I spending aimed at reducing stovepiping, duplication of effort, and obsolete programs as 

well as to re-direct valuable resources to make the ST&I 

enterprise more efficient. Additionally, mechanisms and 

incentives should be created to foster and reward innovation by Federal ST&I personnel, speed acquisition 

actions, and make it easier for private sector individuals to spend time in or collaborate with government offices. Finally, the government should institutionalize the 

use of foresight and futures-enabled strategic planning 

across Federal agencies because these capabilities will be 

increasingly critical in creating informed decisions and 

plans in a global environment whose transformation will 

continue to accelerate.20

Whole-of-Society Initiatives

A key goal of these initiatives should be to reduce 

the complexity of the Federal Government in partnering with the private sector. Government contracting 

regulations should be streamlined so they are simpler, 

more flexible, and reduce burdensome regulation of 

technology businesses and new technology products, 

especially for small research companies. Another goal 

should be to expand the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) among the Federal Government, state and 

local governments, companies, universities, and nongovernmental organizations, particularly for regional 

tech-based economic development initiatives and targeted technology areas (for example, autonomous vehicles or commercial space).

Federal programs and PPPs to promote entrepreneurship and startup creation should also be expanded, for example for Government Strategic Investment 

initiatives,

21 or other mechanisms such as those proposed in the Startup Act introduced in the U.S. Congress 

in September of 2017. Another key initiative should be 

to expand Federal support and partnerships for Science, 

Technology, Engineering, and Math education, as well 

as workforce training and lifelong learning—including 

programs with national security relevance—to enhance 

the technical literacy of the U.S. workforce.

International Engagement

On the international front, an important action 

would be to enhance and integrate various government 

functions for technological intelligence, foster the field of 

geo-innovation,

22 and provide accurate and comprehensive analysis of global technology developments for national leadership. The Federal Government should also 

help to aggressively engage with International Technology Standards Organizations to help influence emerging 

the government should 

institutionalize the use of foresight 

and futures-enabled strategic 

planning across Federal agencies 

because these capabilities will be 

increasingly critical in creating 

informed decisions and plans 

in a global environment whose 

transformation will continue to 

accelerate
www.ndu.edu/inss DH No. 84 7 

technology markets and improve U.S. long-term competitiveness. Science diplomacy should be enhanced as a tool 

for U.S. soft power and international security cooperation 

and to address unfair trade and asymmetric market access 

for U.S. technology products. 23 Finally, better frameworks 

and programs should be developed for the U.S. Government and companies to help harvest intellectual property, 

resources, and talent from the global S&T enterprise, 

including sensitive technologies, and to incentivize U.S. 

ST&I resources to remain in the United States.

Conclusions

The science and technology enterprise of the United 

States is still the best and most productive in the world. 

It also has the greatest capacity to create rapid economic 

growth and unparalleled military capability. Yet its global 

competitiveness is increasingly hampered by inefficiencies, vulnerabilities, and the lack of a clear, synchronized, 

and actionable national strategy that leads in all domains 

to assure our economic, homeland, and national security. 

Our competitive advantage may therefore rapidly evaporate in the face of burgeoning international competition. 

Our once near-unilateral dominance in ST&I may soon 

be replaced by an era of contested equality.

24

What is often not appreciated outside of the ST&I 

community is that development and commercialization 

of advanced technologies involves far more than funding. 

A vigorous ST&I enterprise involves a complex ecology 

of factors including legal, economic, regulatory, ethical, 

moral, and social frameworks. The legacy U.S. ST&I enterprise, combined with a burdensome Federal acquisition process, has increasingly evolved gaps, redundancies, 

inefficiencies, and many “valleys of death,” which make 

it less efficient than many countries and nonstate actors 

with newer, smaller, or more monolithic ST&I systems. 

In this regard, we will need the vision and cooperation 

of our political, corporate, and civil society leadership to 

create new organizational models and mechanisms to reinvigorate our national ST&I enterprise. These actions 

will become even more important in a time of diminishing resources.

In addition to these factors, the U.S. national security community faces even more profound challenges. The 

global deployment in civil society of new generations of 

advanced technologies, many of which can be dual use, 

will mean pervasive technological surprise and the appearance of new vectors for malicious action, such as commercial drones, the Internet of Things, and even misinformation and “fake news.” The Trump administration, 

however, has a historic opportunity now to change our 

national trajectory by re-inventing the relationship between the Federal Government, the private sector, and 

international entities. In this regard, and because of its 

enormous resources, expertise, and its critical requirements, the Department of Defense and other national 

and homeland security agencies can potentially take the 

lead in developing a new paradigm to maintain our ST&I 

preeminence. In that way, the United States can maintain 

its technological security for the coming decades.

Notes 1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America

(Washington, DC: The White House, December 18, 2017, 20, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>.

2 By geostrategically, we imply that our national science, technology, and innovation (ST&I) strategies should account for the global 

landscape of geopolitical and other resource factors, of which foreign 

technology development is of increasing importance.

3 For a holistic analysis of how emerging technologies may 

change the future global operational environment, see The Operational 

Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare (Fort 

Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July 2017), 

available at <www.tradoc.army.mil/watch/OperationalEnvironment_

ChangingCharacter_FutureWarfare.pdf>.

4 For an overview, see Stephen Ezell, “Information and Communication Technologies and the New Globalization,” Information 

Technology and Innovation Foundation, June 2017, available at 

<www.itif.org/publications/2017/06/26/information-and-communications-technologies-and-new-globalization>.

5 For data and trends on technological acceleration, see Alison E. 

Berman and Jason Dorrier, “Technology Feels Like It’s Accelerating 

Because It Actually Is,” Singularity Hub, March 22, 2016, available at 

<https://singularityhub.com/2016/03/22/technology-feels-like-itsaccelerating-because-it-actually-is/>.

6 Nathan P. Freier, “Speed Kills: Enter an Age of Unbridled 

Hyperconnectivity,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2017, available at <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/SpeedKills/2017/06/09>.

7 For examples, see Josh Constine, “Facebook Is Building BrainComputer Interfaces for Typing and Skin Hearing,” TechCrunch.

com, April 2017, available at <https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/19/

facebook-brain-interface/>.
8 DH No. 84 www.ndu.edu/inss

8 “The DoD and Synthetic Biology Milestones,” GlobalBiodefense.com, April 12, 2016, available at <https://globalbiodefense.

com/2016/04/12/dod-synthetic-biology-milestones/>.

9 Keith Naughton, “Human Drivers Are Afraid to Hand the 

Wheel to Robots,” Bloomberg.com, June 15, 2017, available at <www.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-15/autonomous-cars-biggestroadblock-are-drivers-afraid-to-let-go>.

10 See, for example, the Industrial Internet Consortium landing 

page available at <www.iiconsortium.org/>.

11 Margaret E. Kosal, Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic Security (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate 

School Center for Contemporary Conflict, December 2014, available 

at <www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=767053>.

12 For example, see Rich Haridy, “Moon Express to Begin Commercially Harvesting Lunar Rocks in 2020,” NewAtlas.

com, July 2017, available at <https://newatlas.com/moon-express2020-launch/50473/?utm_source=Gizmag+Subscribers&utm_

campaign=bf165b25b5-UA-2235360-4&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=0_65b67362bd-bf165b25b5-90180885>.

<?> A 21st-Century Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy for 

America’s National Security (Washington, DC: Committee on Homeland and National Security of the National Science and Technology 

Counsel, 2016), available at <www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/

resources/National_Security_ST_Strategy_2016_FINAL.PDF>.

13 Data quoted from “Startup Act,” Offices of Senator Jerry 

Moran and Mark Warner, available at <www.moran.senate.gov/

public/_cache/files/5/5/55502dd4-0561-4e9e-ada1-6b277787a684/

BBAD330F4DEE934CB73B852970AD75CA.startup-act-2017-onepager.pdf>.

14 Jeff Daniels, “Chinese Theft of Sensitive U.S. Military Technology is Still a ‘Huge Problem,’ Says Defense Analyst,” Yahoo Finance, 

November 2017, available at <https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/

chinese-theft-sensitive-us-military-032600386.html>.

15 See, for example, Matthew Bey, “Between Geopolitics and 

Technology,” Stratfor.com, September 27, 2016, available at <www.

stratfor.com/weekly/between-geopolitics-and-technology>.

16 Issues surrounding reform of the U.S. national security S&T 

enterprise have, in fact, been debated for many years; however, many of 

these problems still persist. For example, see William Berry et al., Reform of the National Security Science and Technology Enterprise, Defense 

and Technology Paper 56 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, October 2008), available at <http://ctnsp.

dodlive.mil/2008/10/01/dtp-056-reform-of-the-national-securityscience-and-technology-enterprise/>.

17 A dedicated staff or committee lead could conceivably be 

appointed within the Office of Science and Technology Policy or the 

National Science and Technology Council.

18 For example, see Data and Analytics Innovation: Emerging 

Opportunities and Challenges (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2016), available at <www.gao.gov/

assets/680/679903.pdf>.

19 For an overview of how foresight methods and organizations 

could help the national security community plan for rapid technological change, see James Kadtke and Lin Wells, Policy Challenges of 

Accelerating Technological Change, Defense and Technology Paper 106 

(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy, September 2014), section 2.1.1, available at <http://ctnsp.

dodlive.mil/2014/09/12/dtp-106-policy-challenges-of-acceleratingtechnological-change-security-policy-and-strategy-implications-ofparallel-scientific-revolutions/>.

<?> For an overview of Government Strategic Investment initiatives, see Andrew Mara, Maximizing the Return of Government Venture 

Capital Programs, Defense and Technology Paper 71 (Washington, 

DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, January 

2011), available at <http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/2011/01/01/dh-071-maximizing-the-returns-of-government-venture-capital-programs/>.

20 Geo-innovation would be a generalization of geo-economics, 

by incorporating the effects and distribution of technological capacity 

as a precursor to high-tech economic growth. See Kadtke and Wells, 

section 2.1.2.

21 The natural Federal agency lead for science diplomacy would be 

the Office of the Science Advisor at the Department of State.

22 See The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of 

Future Warfare.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

helps national security decisionmakers and their staffs understand emerging impacts of technology and integrate 

them effectively into policies through research, teaching, 

and outreach. CTNSP supports the Department of Defense 

leadership and Congress while also encouraging wholeof-government and public-private collaboration.

The Defense Horizons series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Philip J. Stockdale

Acting Director

CTNSP

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Laura J. Junor

Director

INSS