Avoiding the Trap:

U.S. Strategy and Policy

for Competing in the Asia-Pacific

Beyond the Rebalance

Project Editors:

David Lai

John F. Troxell

Frederick J. Gellert

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Strategic Studies Institute

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

AVOIDING THE TRAP:

U.S. STRATEGY AND POLICY FOR COMPETING

IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC BEYOND

THE REBALANCE

David Lai 

John F. Troxell 

Frederick J. Gellert 

Project Editors

February 2018

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ISBN 1-58487-776-6
vii

CONTENTS

Foreword.......................................................................... ix

Acknowledgements ........................................................ xi

Summary ........................................................................xiii

Part I: Introduction............................................................1

1. Forward From the Rebalance: Competing 

in the Asia-Pacific..................................................3

David Lai, John F. Troxell, and 

Frederick J. Gellert

Part II: Regional Overview ............................................27

2. China’s Rise: What Does It Mean for the 

United States? ......................................................29

William P. Donnelly 

3. Developing a U.S.-led Multilateral Security 

Architecture for the Asia-Pacific.......................43

Eric W. Young 

4. The Largest Tiger: India in the U.S. Policy 

toward Indo-Asia-Pacific ...................................83

Todd D. Carroll 

5. Japan’s Strategic Renaissance: Implications 

for U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pacific ...................107

Neil J. Owens 

6. Curtail, Cooperate, or Compel in the South 

China Sea? ..........................................................153

Robert R. Arnold, Jr. 

7. Philippine Ambivalence Toward the United 

States: Lessons Learned....................................189

Romeo S. Brawner, Jr. 
8. The United States and China in the Cyber 

Domain: Stop the Downward Spiral..............215

Steven M. Pierce 

Part III: Economic Instrument of Power....................255

9. U.S. Economic Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 

Region: Is it Still Possible? ...............................257

Jeffrey M. Zaiser 

Part IV: Military Instrument of Power.......................285

10. A New U.S. Indo-Asia-Pacific Security 

Strategy...............................................................287

Ryan M. Finn and David B. Moore 

11. A Diplomatic Solution to the North Korea 

Problem...............................................................331

Frazariel I. Castro 

12. Korean Peninsula: Upgrading the 

Denuclearization Status Quo...........................361

James L. Conner 

Part V: Soft Power Considerations .............................377

13. People-Focused Activities: A Measure to 

Preserve American Strength............................379

Joel M. Buenaflor 

14. Diplomacy Under The Strategic 

Rebalance and a Look Forward ......................411

Sandra Minkel 

About the Contributors ................................................445

viii
ix

FOREWORD

This book is the product of a U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Integrated Research Project (IRP). It 

addresses a Chief of Staff, Army priority research topic 

and was sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and the 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate 

of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (HQDA G-35). The book 

resulted from a whole-of-War College effort. Core 

curriculum and regional elective studies augmented 

student research and facilitated analysis. Faculty 

from across the USAWC supported analytical discussions, mentored student participants, and reviewed 

the written contributions. Students and faculty met 

with Asia-Pacific policy experts in the U.S. Government from the Department of State, the Office of the 

U.S. Trade Representative, and the National Security 

Council. Researchers also traveled to the Asia-Pacific 

to meet with senior military leaders and security analysts in Japan and China, as well as the major U.S. 

military commands in Hawaii, to explore issues and 

develop recommendations on regional issues. Students, along with leading think tank subject matter 

experts from the Washington, DC, area, presented 

selected topics from this book at a round-table organized in conjunction with the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies.

In 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton provided a framework for the U.S. Government 

to refocus the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—toward 

the Asia-Pacific. She explained the importance of 

Asia-Pacific regional growth to the United States 

in the short-lived “pivot,” and in 2012 former President Barack Obama formalized the U.S. Government 

effort with a commitment to “rebalance,” which 

included negotiating a multilateral trade agreement, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other 

nations, committing a larger portion of U.S. military 

forces to the region, and improving security agreements with allies and partners. However, President 

Donald Trump, shortly after taking office in January 

2017, withdrew the United States from the TPP, and in 

March, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs publicly declared the 

rebalance was over.

This book explores the validity of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific; analyzes the ends, ways, and 

means of the strategy to meet U.S. and regional partner security objectives; and considers the effectiveness 

of the U.S. Government effort. This book focuses on 

the impact of China’s increasing national power on 

U.S. objectives and those of Asia-Pacific nations. The 

instruments of national power are assessed to include 

hard power, economic, military, and diplomatic, along 

with providing recommendations for the United 

States’ use of soft power. In addition to China, country 

specific chapters include an analysis and security recommendations concerning issues related to North and 

South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Analysis and 

recommendations in this book may provide insights 

for Trump’s NSS and subsequent security documents 

and will inform security professionals across the U.S. 

Government, outside of government, and foreign 

governments as they modify their approaches to this 

critical region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

x
xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the product of an Integrated Research 

Project with 3 principal faculty advisors and 18 students. We would particularly like to recognize three 

International Fellows for their contributions to this 

project: Colonels Romeo S. Brawner, Jr., the Republic 

of the Philippines; Shigemi Sugimura, Japan; and Shuwei Yang, Taiwan. While this faculty-student study 

team conducted the primary research and analysis, 

a number of other faculty members at the U.S. Army 

War College have also provided invaluable support, 

especially in advising the students on the writing 

of their individual chapters. We extend our sincere 

thanks to U.S. Army Colonel David W. DeTata, Professors Albert F. Lord and Grace Stettenbauer, U.S. 

Navy Captain Wade Turvold, and U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel James V. Dicrocco III. Special thanks 

go to Ambassador Daniel Shields for his extensive 

engagement in this research project and his valuable 

insights in Asia-Pacific affairs.

During our research, we have also received tremendous support from a number of government and 

private institutions. We would like to extend our gratitude to the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs of 

the State Department, the Asia-Pacific Branch of the 

National Security Council, the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the 

U.S. Army Pacific.

We are extremely grateful to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for its support 

to our project. We want to thank the subject matter 

experts there for helping with our student researchers 

and improving their reports. We also want to thank 

CSIS for organizing the roundtable for us to discuss 
xii

our research results with noted analysts. We would 

like to thank in particular CSIS Senior Vice President 

Kathleen H. Hicks and Senior Advisor on Asia Bonnie 

S. Glaser for their whole-hearted support.

Finally, we want to thank the U.S. Army Attachés 

in Beijing, China, and the Defense Liaison Office in 

Shanghai for their support to our China field study 

group and the China Foreign Affairs University, the 

China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, the Shanghai American Chamber of Commerce, 

the Shanghai Institute of International Relations of 

the Shanghai Social Sciences Academy, and Fudan 

University for hosting our roundtable discussions.
xiii

SUMMARY

The pivot to Asia is over, suggested Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, on the eve of Secretary of 

State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to Asia on March 14, 

2017.1 This statement, though expected, begs many 

questions: Is this just a repeal of the bumper sticker 

“Strategic Rebalance,” typical of administration 

change? If so, what is its replacement? Moreover, if 

this change is just in name but not in substance, will 

President Donald Trump stay the course? If not, what 

will be Trump’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific? What 

should be the new focus and priorities? In short, given 

the enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, what 

should be a sound and forward-looking U.S. strategy 

toward this region?

This research project began with two questions 

on the future of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: Was it the right thing to do, and have we done 

it right? Given the enormous expected growth in the 

region and thus the expected impacts in the world, 

the answer to the first question is a resounding yes. 

The answer to the second question is less clear. On 

the one hand, there have been several successes, not 

the least of which was the public pronouncement of 

the Obama administration’s directive to pivot attention to the region and increase significant travel and 

engagement in the region by former President Obama 

and his senior officials. On the other hand, there have 

been limited effects in world affairs and murky plans 

for future U.S. endeavors in the region, complicated 

by growing financial and political challenges inside 

the United States. Perhaps the best answer to the 

second question is that there was a great start with 
xiv

an unclear follow-up. With the Trump administration 

now guiding U.S. foreign policy, it is time to move forward from the rebalance to a revitalized strategy and 

approach to the Asia-Pacific for the third decade of the 

21st century.

The challenge now for the U.S. administration, 

and for policy experts writ large, is to build an effective strategy for whole-of-U.S. Government action in 

moving forward from the rebalance. In order to offer 

useful recommendations on the development of an 

effective U.S. strategy to address those challenges in 

the region, it is useful to establish an overarching concept with which to describe the wide-ranging strategic 

recommendations of the researchers in this project. To 

that end, we posit: 

• Strategic Goal: Ensure American leadership, 

security, and prosperity. 

• Strategic Task: Accommodate China’s rise 

through competition without conflict.

• Strategic Vision: Economy by priority; enabled 

by military power; tempered by diplomacy. 

The strategic goal has long been a foundation of 

American national policy. While it focuses on U.S. 

interests first, this does not mean to the exclusion of all 

others. American leadership will promote democratic 

values and preserve the successful international order. 

Partner nations want U.S. leadership in the region as a 

counter to China’s rising power. 

Long-range success in the Asia-Pacific region will 

only come from effective international cooperation. 

This cooperation must include China. In keeping with 

the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, we confirm the 

U.S. position to “welcome the rise of a stable, peaceful, 

and prosperous China.”2 To that end, the overarching 
xv

strategic task for the United States is how to accommodate China’s rise. America must not constrain the 

responsible rise of China in the region and globally, 

but at the same time should provide a check on Chinese power by protecting U.S. and partner national 

interests. This check will come through the effective 

use of a rules-based international order, but ultimately 

it will be empowered by a position of U.S. strength 

across the elements of national power. 

Strategic change must have a vision to paint the 

picture of success but also to motivate and guide the 

efforts to achieve that success. The vision statement is 

intended to highlight the three strategic instruments 

the United States must use to lead in the region. The 

highest priority of effort must be economic, therefore 

the detailed American strategy for the region will need 

to chart a course for the future centered on economic 

cooperation and growth. Despite the primacy of economic considerations, the stark reality of the region 

is one of significant security concerns. Therefore, the 

strategy by necessity will require a strong, comprehensive plan for ensuring regional security through 

a revamped regional security architecture and military agreements and the interactions of capable, well 

trained, and professional armed forces to keep the 

peace. Finally, robust diplomatic efforts will enable the 

United States to resolve the many regional challenges 

without resorting to economic or armed conflict. This 

strategic concept frames the detailed recommendations of the project’s researchers.

The subsequent chapters in this book, written by 

student researchers during their year at the U.S. Army 

War College, provide information and recommendations on topics regarding the instruments of national 

power, regional affairs, and key Asia-Pacific countries. 
xvi

The key findings of this project can be distilled into 

four primary recommendations for the United States: 

• Create a comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to 

guide whole-of-U.S. Government action plans.

• Improve U.S. national power across the instruments of national power to ensure the resources 

and capability exist to achieve the strategic 

goals. 

• Create a “post-Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP) 

trade initiative as the cornerstone of the economic element of strategy.

• Create and lead a new Asia-Pacific regional 

security architecture that includes China; and 

modernize current alliances and partnerships.

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. Ankit Panda, “Straight From the US State Department: The ‘Pivot’ to Asia Is Over,” The Diplomat, March 

14, 2017, available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/

straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/.

2. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: 

The White House, February 2015, p. 24.
1

PART I: 

INTRODUCTION

3

CHAPTER 1

FORWARD FROM THE REBALANCE:

 COMPETING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

David Lai, John F. Troxell, and Frederick J. Gellert

The pivot to Asia is over, suggested Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, on the eve of Secretary of 

State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to Asia on March 14, 

2017.1 This statement, though expected, begs many 

questions: Is this just a repeal of the bumper sticker 

“Strategic Rebalance,” typical of administration 

change? If so, what is its replacement? Moreover, if 

this change is just in name but not in substance, will 

President Donald Trump stay the course? If not, what 

will be Trump’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific? What 

should be the new focus and priorities? In short, given 

the enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, what 

should be a sound and forward-looking U.S. strategy 

toward this region?

STRATEGIC REBALANCE: THE RIGHT THING 

TO DO

The most significant foreign policy undertaking of 

the Obama administration was the strategic rebalance 

toward the Asia-Pacific. Although it came as a surprise to many at a time when the nation was exhausted 

from the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and getting 

hard-hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, the strategic 

rebalance, officially announced in 2011, was the right 

thing for the United States to do.
4

The rise of China is the most significant event in the 

world in the last 20 years and probably for many years 

to come. According to former Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton:

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global 

politics. . . . It boasts almost half the world’s population. It 

includes many of the key engines of the global economy, 

as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is 

home to several of our key allies and important emerging 

powers like China, India, and Indonesia. . . . One of the 

most important tasks of American statecraft over the 

next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially 

increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, 

and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.2

The United States needed to focus more attention 

on this historic development and increasingly critical region. After all, the rise of China is not simply a 

change of national power distribution, but a phenomenon that influences the future of international relations. 

Concerning this necessary policy shift, Kurt Campbell, 

former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, recalls: 

The central tenet of this bold policy shift is that the United 

States will need to do more with and in the Asia-Pacific to 

spur domestic revival and renovation as well as to keep 

the peace in the world’s most dynamic region. If the larger 

Middle East can be described as the ‘arc of instability,’ 

then the region stretching from Japan through China and 

Southeast Asia to India can be seen as representing an 

‘arc of ascendance,’ Asia’s march on the future. American 

policy must heed this unrelenting feature of the future: 

that the lion’s share of the history of the twenty-first 

century will be written in the Asia-Pacific region.3

It is former President Barack Obama who put the 

most significant touch on this huge undertaking: 
5

U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably 

linked to developments in the arc extending from the 

Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region 

and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges 

and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military 

will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of 

necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region [italics in 

original].4

STRATEGIC REBALANCE: NOT QUITE DONE 

RIGHT

Doing the right thing does not guarantee getting it 

done right. In retrospect, many of the Obama administration’s approaches did not lead to the desired result. 

The United States wants to see China rise peacefully 

and become a responsible stakeholder; however, the 

rebalance to a large extent has driven China in the 

opposite direction. According to recent testimony from 

Secretary of Defense James Mattis, “a rising, more confident, and assertive China, places the international 

order under assault.”5

Questionable Strategic Assumptions

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted several Department of Defense 

(DoD)-commissioned studies on the strategic rebalance. All of them categorically pointed out that the 

strategic rebalance lacks “a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, particularly 

when it comes to managing China’s rise.”6

Several questionable assumptions underlying U.S. 

policy toward the Asia-Pacific contributed to the lack 

of a coherent strategy. First, the rebalance builds upon 
6

an unwritten, yet long-held, U.S. foreign policy principle, put best by Kurt Campbell:

a consistent feature of American Asia strategy has been to 

use diplomatic, economic, and military means to prevent 

the emergence of a dominating hegemon in Asia, thereby 

making the region safe for American pursuits like trade 

promotion, faith advocacy, democracy support, and 

territorial security.7

China’s relentless rise, however, calls this principle into 

question. If the United States welcomes (or at least recognizes) the rise of China,8

 then it will need to accept 

this changing geostrategic reality and prepare to deal 

with an Asian hegemon. The nuance becomes reconciling acceptable degrees and understanding of “dominating regional hegemon.” The focus should now 

be on preventing the emergence of a hostile regional 

hegemon.

Second, key architects of the rebalance, and many 

in the United States, opine that China is a threat. For 

example, General Mark Milley, U.S. Army Chief of 

Staff, in recent Congressional testimony identified 

China as a threat within the 4+1 threat construct.9

However, China should not be viewed as a threat to 

the United States in the same vein as radical Islamic 

terrorists or even Russia. A heightened threat perception leads to over-militarizing the relationship with 

the tendency to generate spiraling security dilemmas 

and fulfilling Thucydides’s Trap prophecies. Given 

the extensive economic interdependencies developed 

between these two powers, the United States should 

continue to deal with China mostly in diplomatic, economic, and sociocultural terms.

Finally, the designers of the strategic rebalance 

appeared to have argued against the centrality of China. 
7

In Kurt Campbell’s words, “China is the big story, no 

doubt. But for us to be successful, we’re going to have to 

work with others more effectively. We’ve got to embed 

our China policy in a larger Asia strategy.”10 With this 

view came the repeated talking point: “It is not about 

China.” Many in the Asia-Pacific understand that the 

rebalance is mainly, if not only, about China. After all, 

which other nation in the Asia-Pacific deserves such 

attention and effort from the superpower? The Obama 

administration’s refusal to address the “elephant in 

the room” publicly as the main challenge resulted in 

a strategy that was not focused on the central issue of 

the rise of China.

Be that as it may, the rebalance, as Kurt Campbell 

puts it: 

would require bolstering alliances with states like 

Australia and Japan, working with new partners like India 

and Vietnam, strengthening our military and economic 

tools of statecraft, engaging multilateral institutions, and 

maintaining our democratic values, all while intensively 

engaging Beijing and seeking to shape the contours of 

China’s rise.11

Despite the inherent soundness of each of these 

approaches, the problem is that when the United 

States does not focus its policy on China; no matter 

how much the United States has tried to shore up support from the other Asian nations; it is not enough to 

get China to behave in accordance with the existing 

rules-based international order. As a result, while it is 

good to strengthen relations with the allies and recruit 

more partners in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration’s effort was not effective.
8

REVISITING THE POWER TRANSITION 

THEORY

Many in the United States are now aware of the 

Thucydides Trap and the danger of power transition 

between great powers. The Thucydides Trap is based 

on the ancient Greek historian’s (Thucydides) account 

of the Peloponnesian War, in which he argues the inevitability of that war because of Sparta’s fear of a rising 

Athens. The potential for conflict between the United 

States and China reflects a similar dynamic within the 

international system. Kenneth Organski, who first put 

forward the power transition theory, notes that accommodation is an alternative to the deadly Thucydides 

Trap. Indeed, in a power transition, the contending 

great powers, namely the extant stakeholders and the 

upstart, have basically two options: fight or accommodate. Organski suggests that if the rising power is 

unstoppable, accommodation should be the prudent 

policy.12

Figure 1-1 puts the power transition theory between 

the United States and China in perspective. Power 

transition between China and the United States has 

already passed the first stage where China has gone 

through the initial taking-off period. The transition is 

now in the initial part of the second stage where China 

continues to narrow its national power inferiority gap 

to that of the United States.13
9

Figure 1-1. U.S.-China Power Transition.14

At this time, fear is no longer the defining factor. 

How the United States and China come to terms with 

the emerging realities in the two nations’ relations is 

much more significant.

We can observe some typical behaviors at this stage 

of the power transition. The status quo leader is becoming more concerned as the rising power approaches 

parity with it in the two nations’ national power capabilities. There is the temptation and danger of the 

status quo power launching a preventative attack to 

short-circuit the rising power. The rising power, on the 

other hand, emboldened by its growing power, can 

challenge the status quo power. Becoming more assertive is the typical recourse of the upstart.

In many respects, the relationship between the two 

in power transition is similar to a parent and teenager. 

The teenager has become a more independent actor 

and expects greater responsibility and control; yet the 

parent may not realize in time the changes and continues to demand acceptance of previous constraints and 

Great-Power-War-Free-Zone War-Prone-Zone Great-Power-War-Free-Zone
10

limitations. Holding firm to the rules and demanding 

obedience are typical on the parent side. The United 

States has been demanding that China behave in the 

rules-based order and become a responsible stakeholder. China, on the other hand, challenges U.S. rules 

and presses for changes.15 The U.S. strategic rebalance 

is a typical act at this stage of the power transition. China’s responses also fit many of the descriptions.16

There is widespread debate in the United States 

between the hawks and doves over what the United 

States should do about China. The hawks argue that 

the United States should stand firm and punish China 

for every wrongdoing, while the doves suggest accommodation should come into play in the U.S. policy 

toward China. Accommodation is by no means easy 

for the United States, especially at a time when it still 

enjoys a substantial upper hand in hard power. Yet it 

is not too early to prepare for it. Accommodation does 

not imply appeasement. In the case of China, such an 

approach would recognize a greater leadership role in 

international institutions and accept various Chinese 

initiatives, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment 

Bank, but also insist that China adheres to reasonable 

boundaries as represented by the existing rules-based 

international order.

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

On January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump was sworn in 

as the 45th President of the United States. Determined 

to fix America’s perceived domestic and international 

troubles, the new President put forward his policies: 

For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the 

expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of 

other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion 
11

of our military. We’ve defended other nations’ borders 

while refusing to defend our own.

We assembled here today issuing a new decree to be 

heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every 

hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will 

govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going to be 

America first.17

Domestic issues aside, the President’s call signaled 

a return to the realism of Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson and the populist nationalism of President Andrew Jackson, from the idealism of 

President Woodrow Wilson that has been guiding U.S. 

foreign policy for much of the last 100 years. Under 

Trump, national interest—principally focused on the 

security and economic well-being of the American 

people—but not ideology will be the guiding principle 

for U.S. foreign policy.

Many find the President’s call objectionable—

because those Americans believe the liberal international order led by the United States shaping 

international institutions has significantly benefited 

U.S. economic development, national security, and 

international influence. Realists who focus on nationalism, such as Trump, argue that the United States 

must pursue a foreign policy with a viewpoint that 

anarchy is an enduring feature of the international 

system, with no permanent friends or enemies, but 

permanent interests; interactions tend to be conflictual because states compete for power and security.18

Some argue this realist foreign policy vision is what 

the United States needs now. This is especially significant with respect to America’s relations with China 

and the Asia-Pacific.
12

AN ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGY BY DESIGN

This research project began with two questions 

on the future of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: Was it the right thing to do, and have we done 

it right? Given the enormous expected growth in the 

region and thus the expected impacts in the world, 

the answer to the first question is a resounding yes. 

The answer to the second question is less clear. On 

the one hand, there have been several successes, not 

the least of which was the public pronouncement of 

the Obama administration’s directive to pivot attention to the region and increase significant travel and 

engagement in the region by former President Obama 

and his senior officials. On the other hand, there have 

been limited effects in world affairs and murky plans 

for future U.S. endeavors in the region, complicated by 

growing financial and political challenges inside the 

United States. Perhaps the best answer to the second 

question is that there was a great start with an unclear 

follow-up. With the Trump administration now guiding U.S. foreign policy, it is time to move forward from 

the rebalance to a revitalized strategy and approach to 

the Asia-Pacific for the 3rd decade of the 21st century.

Despite Trump’s espoused “America First” priority, current reality for the Trump administration is dictating more, not less engagement for the United States 

in the Asia-Pacific region. Of note, the first trips by 

senior U.S. defense officials and diplomats in the new 

administration were to China and Northeast Asia. The 

first head of state visit received by Trump was from 

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Whether deliberately, or by circumstance, the Trump administration 

signaled the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific 

region to the world. The challenge now for the U.S. 
13

administration, and for policy experts writ large, is to 

build an effective strategy for whole-of-U.S. Government action in moving forward from the rebalance.

The Asia-Pacific region is fundamentally a set of 

diverse, complex challenges. In order to offer useful 

recommendations on the development of an effective 

U.S. strategy to address those challenges in the region, 

it is useful to establish an overarching concept with 

which to describe the wide-ranging strategic recommendations of the researchers in this project. To that 

end, we posit: 

• Strategic Goal: Ensure American leadership, 

security, and prosperity.

• Strategic Task: Accommodate China’s rise 

through competition without conflict.

• Strategic Vision: Economy by priority, diplomacy by necessity, enabled by military.

The strategic goal is straightforward and has long 

been a foundation of American national policy. While 

it focuses on U.S. interests first, this does not mean to 

the exclusion of all others. American leadership will 

promote democratic values and preserve the successful international order. Partner nations want U.S. 

leadership in the region as a counter to China’s rising 

power. The United States is a Pacific nation with enormous power to do good works in the region. Longrange success in the Asia-Pacific region will only come 

from effective international cooperation.

This cooperation must include China. In keeping 

with the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, we confirm the U.S. position to “[welcome] the rise of a stable, 

peaceful, and prosperous China.”19 To that end, the 

overarching strategic task for the United States is how 

to accommodate China’s rise. America must allow 
14

China to rise in the region and globally, but at the same 

time provide a check on Chinese power by protecting 

U.S. and partner national interests. This check will 

come through the effective use of a rules-based international order, but ultimately it will be empowered 

by a position of U.S. strength across the elements of 

national power. Whether China rises through peaceful 

competition or through military and economic conflict 

may be determined solely by the fair and effective use 

of international rules.

Strategic change must have a vision to paint the picture of success and to motivate and guide the efforts to 

achieve that success. The vision statement here highlights the three strategic instruments the United States 

must use to lead in the region. The highest priority of 

effort must be economic, and therefore the detailed 

American strategy for the region will need to chart a 

course for the future centered on economic cooperation and growth. Despite the primacy of economic 

considerations for the region, the stark reality of the 

region is one of significant security concerns. Therefore, the strategy by necessity will require a strong, 

comprehensive plan for ensuring regional security 

through a revamped regional security architecture and 

military agreements and the interactions of capable, 

well trained, and professional armed forces to keep the 

peace. Finally, robust diplomatic efforts will enable the 

United States to resolve the many regional challenges 

without resorting to economic or armed conflict. This 

strategic concept then frames the detailed recommendations of the project’s researchers.

The subsequent chapters in this book, written by 

student researchers during their year at the U.S. Army 

War College, provide information and recommendations on topics regarding the instruments of national 
15

power, regional affairs, and key Asia-Pacific countries. 

A summary of those chapters is presented here and 

can be distilled into four primary recommendations 

for the United States:

• Create a comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to 

guide whole-of-U.S. Government action plans.

• Improve U.S. national power across the instruments of national power to ensure the resources 

and capability exist to achieve the strategic 

goals.

• Create a “post-Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP)

trade initiative as the cornerstone of the economic element of strategy.

• Create and lead a new Asia-Pacific regional 

security architecture that includes China; and 

modernize current alliances and partnerships.

Regional Overview

In Chapter 2, William Donnelly analyzes how the 

United States can get it right with China. First among 

U.S. strategic tasks is managing China’s rise by understanding China’s goals and intentions. A key will be 

to address China’s concerns about containment. Thus, 

U.S.-China communication and cooperation must be 

robust and effective, including the difficult issue of 

military-to-military engagements.

A key for the future of relations in the region will 

be multilateral organizations. In Chapter 3, Eric Young 

discusses the need for a U.S.-led multilateral security architecture (MLSA). America must lead in the 

region while building multinational institutions. No 

other nation in the region can do so now or in the foreseeable future. While some nations may look to the 

United States as the ultimate protector in the region, 
16

the best long-term solution will be an effective multilateral security architecture of Asia-Pacific nations that 

includes China. This must not become a counter-China 

organization. Today, the largest and best-known multilateral organization in the Asia-Pacific is the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN).

ASEAN expanded its initial writ of focusing on 

political and economic issues with the establishment 

of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993 as the 

“first region-wide Asia-Pacific multilateral forum for 

official consultations on peace and security issues.”20

It has since added the annual ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and regularly convenes the 

East Asian Summit (EAS). All of these entities are 

designed to address regional security challenges, but 

growing tensions in the region require moving beyond 

dialogue-based institutional arrangements to a MLSA 

that can actually resolve regional security issues. The 

MLSA must be able to respond quickly to military 

provocations and include enforcement mechanisms. 

The existing hub-and-spoke architecture for U.S. 

mutual defense treaties has served well as a deterrent 

for armed conflict. The challenge in the future will be to 

maintain security in a complex region, with emerging 

powers and gray zone actors, short of traditional war. 

A multilateral organization will offer the best method 

to address real challenges, manage competition, and 

avoid conflict.

Besides managing China’s rise, the United States 

will need to manage the positive growth of other rising 

regional powers, notably India and Japan, as well as 

work with other Asia-Pacific nations in navigating difficult challenges such as the ongoing disputes in the 

South China Sea (SCS). Todd Carroll analyzes India in 

Chapter 4. India will likely have the largest population 
17

in the world by 2028 and an economy larger than 

the United States by 2050. This will require the U.S. 

strategy to include detailed goals and increased 

engagement with India in military, commercial, and 

diplomatic areas. Neil Owens analyzes Japan in Chapter 5. Japan is the world’s third largest national economy and has embarked on a “strategic renaissance,” 

seeking to assume a greater international leadership 

role, improve its bilateral and multilateral relationships, and increase its defense deterrent capabilities. 

These Japanese activities are strategically beneficial 

for the United States and should be encouraged. The 

Trump administration can assist Japan by encouraging 

its policy, facilitating a more cooperative Japan-South 

Korea relationship, deepening economic ties, reexamining the U.S.-Japan Base Realignment Plan, and 

encouraging continued public discussion on Japan’s 

future international role.

Regarding the SCS, in Chapter 6, Robert Arnold, 

Jr., examines U.S.-China interactions in this volatile 

sub-region. Reviewing the U.S. options to curtail U.S. 

actions in the SCS, to cooperate with China in the SCS, 

or to compel China to change its activities within the 

SCS, his recommendation to cooperate with China is 

the most productive method to secure U.S. interests in 

the long term. Cooperation would focus on multilayered collaboration with China by building upon current U.S.-China military-to-military engagement and 

would necessitate the employment of all of the instruments of U.S. national power.

The Philippines is a key player in the SCS and in 

Chapter 7, Romeo Brawner, Jr., of the Philippine Army 

analyzes the current ambivalence of the Philippine 

leadership toward the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. interactions with Asia-Pacific 
18

nations from a unique third-country perspective. 

Because of its central geographic location, cooperation 

with the Philippines must remain a top priority for 

U.S. strategy. A key will be to acknowledge Philippine 

autonomy while meeting mutual needs in security, 

diplomacy, and economic realms.

An area of increasing importance in military and 

civilian domains is cyber. In Chapter 8, Steven Pierce 

finds cyber activities, good and bad, have the potential 

to enable or disrupt strategic goals, as what happens in 

the cyber domain increasingly does not stay solely in the 

cyber domain. Cyber cuts across diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments in ways that 

we are only now beginning to understand. As nations 

interact and compete, cyber is becoming the ubiquitous 

medium through which all information flows. Without 

protected, resilient, and sufficient cyber-based capabilities, all strategic-level interactions become more difficult to conduct and less trustworthy. Because of the 

cyber domain’s increasing power and influence at the 

national and international level, the U.S. strategy must 

produce effective U.S.-China cooperation regarding 

cyber activities. As a start, the United States and China 

should improve ongoing cooperation by developing 

actionable measures in the areas of commercial uses, 

intellectual property protection, and counter cybercrime activities. This cooperation can then expand to 

other nations in the region and globally.

The Economic Instrument of Power

In Chapter 9, Jeffrey Zaiser argues that the top 

agenda item for U.S. economic strategy must be to 

seek a second best option to replace the TPP. As the 

former cornerstone to the U.S. economic strategy for 
19

the region, the TPP served as the instrument for U.S. 

economic leadership. Since the announcement of U.S. 

withdrawal from the agreement, the United States 

lacks a specified economic strategy for its participation 

in this critical economic region. The existing piecemeal 

system of trade agreements among the Asia-Pacific 

nations will not be sufficient to sustain and manage the 

significant economic growth in the coming decades. 

However, one key goal is to negotiate a free-trade 

agreement with Japan, thus recouping some of the 

effort put into the TPP negotiations. The United States 

should also consider formally joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A key lesson from 

the recent AIIB experience is that the United States 

cannot prevent nations from joining non-U.S. initiatives, and should not be seen as obstructing Chinese 

initiatives that meet legitimate needs and operate 

transparently within accepted international standards.

The Military Instrument of Power

Chapter 10 addresses the comprehensive military 

aspects of a future U.S. strategy. Ryan Finn and David 

Moore consider the transregional, multi-domain, and 

multifunctional (TMM) threats of today and make 

several recommendations. The United States should 

create a cohesive joint strategy for military forces in 

the region to impose multiple strategic dilemmas for 

China’s growing military power. This will include 

maintaining the technological advantage, involving 

partner nations, and developing responses to gray 

zone activities.

Chinese military capabilities are a longer-term challenge for U.S. strategy. While China will take the path 

of least resistance as it seeks increasing hegemony, 
20

China increasingly signals its willingness to showcase 

its growing military might. The United States must be 

open and direct with China to create a shared vision 

for the region. This vision must ensure that China, and 

the other 35 nations of the region, can only succeed by 

remaining inside the rules-based international order. 

The list of regional challenges and confrontations is 

long and growing, especially those involving resources 

such as in the SCS. Without strong encouragement and 

enforcement to settle disputes peacefully, the United 

States risks military involvement in conflicts not of its 

choosing. Thus, the United States, along with willing 

partners, will need to respond effectively and aggressively to negative behaviors by China, other states, and 

nonstate actors on American terms. There is a growing need to develop and conduct counter gray zone 

activities in whatever form or location they occur. This 

will require the United States to create a formal, written, and detailed whole-of-government strategy with 

supporting plans that can meet the growing variety of 

subtle and difficult challenges in the region.

The United States must seek frank dialogue with 

Chinese military and civilian leaders to foster transparency on both sides and avoid conflict by minimizing misunderstanding and miscalculation. A key 

component of frank dialogue will be effective engagements between Chinese and American military forces. 

Expanding Sino-American military exchanges, as part 

of the larger military engagement plans for the region, 

should be a part of the future U.S. strategy. Though 

constrained under the fiscal year (FY) 2000 National 

Defense Authorization Act, there remains much the 

two countries can do in furthering military exchanges. 

These partnerships foster transparency, legitimacy, 

expertise, partner capacity, and engage stakeholders. 
21

This will result in negotiations that are more constructive during peace and improved mutual responses 

during crises.

Regarding U.S. military posture in the region, U.S. 

military forces and capabilities, currently centered in 

the Northeast Asia sub-region, should be redistributed 

across the whole region. This will transform the Cold 

War U.S. posture to current requirements in which 

security threats are more dispersed, military capabilities cover greater ranges, and challenges involve more 

nations than at any time in the past.

North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development is the key imminent security problem 

for the United States in the region. In Chapters 11 and 

12, Frazariel Castro and James Connor, respectively, 

review the history and current situation on the Korean 

Peninsula and offer their recommendations for U.S. 

steps to combat a belligerent North Korea. Ensuring 

viable U.S. and partner military options are available to 

counter North Korean threats will continue to be essential. Castro argues that the international community 

has not succeeded, and will not succeed, in influencing 

Kim Jong Un to comply with United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions (UNSCR) to abandon completely, 

verifiably, and irreversibly North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons and ballistic missile programs. As a counter-proposal, he posits that regional peace will best be 

achieved by the United States establishing diplomatic 

relations with North Korea without the pre-condition 

of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. The United States should then take nascent steps 

to limit Kim Jong Un’s nuclear aims while maintaining 

U.S. military superiority as a deterrent against North 

Korean provocative actions.
22

Connor argues that the United States must persuade China to take a tougher stance with its policies toward North Korea to influence the country to 

comply with the UNSCRs regarding nuclear weapons 

and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the United 

States and South Korea should accelerate the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from a 

U.S. lead to South Korean lead, and the international 

community must do more to stop the illicit flow of foreign currency into North Korea. Both sets of options 

generate significant counter arguments for further 

study. The first option of the United States establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea will raise 

concerns about the U.S. commitment to international 

institutions such as the UN Security Council and its 

resolutions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, North Korea has a solid track record of violating 

bilateral and multilateral agreements. Through several 

multilateral diplomatic initiatives since the early 1990s, 

the United States has provided security commitments 

and economic incentives to North Korea with the U.S. 

assurance to normalize diplomatic relations if North 

Korea abandons nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 

development activities. North Korea agreed to these 

initiatives and then violated the agreements on every 

occasion. The second option of pressuring China to 

do more to influence North Korea to comply with the 

UNSCRs also has been unsuccessful, and might generate second- and third-order effects that would harm 

the China-North Korea relationship in ways that could 

increase instability on the peninsula.
23

Soft Power Considerations

An often under-appreciated power for U.S. influence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is through people-to-people exchanges for scientific research, policy analysis, 

social and economic development, and education. Joel 

Buenaflor looks at people-focused activities in Chapter 13 and finds that people-focused activities provide 

tangible assurance of the benefits from a partnership 

with the United States. The U.S. strategy for the region 

should include methods and resources for a variety of 

people-focused activities throughout the various U.S. 

Government agencies. Commerce, agriculture, education, health, legal, energy, transportation, finance, 

and even military expertise are all areas in which the 

United States can exert enormous influence and build 

long-term good will. Proposed deep-cuts to funding 

for the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) programs should 

be reversed. A robust program of education and development exchanges can provide significant results over 

the long term for relatively low cost.

In Chapter 14, Sandra Minkel reviews the major 

U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region as part of the rebalance and offers some lessons learned. The presence of 

senior U.S. officials, including the President, at highlevel summits, dialogues, and forums has been very 

helpful in advancing U.S. plans in the region. A key 

diplomatic shortcoming was the long-delayed conclusion of the TPP agreement and the choice not to participate in the AIIB. The need to relay a consistent U.S. 

policy for the region through the numerous security, 

economic, and diplomatic forums will be critical to 

moving forward from the rebalance strategy. Finally, 

given the complex and long-range efforts that will be 
24

necessary in the region to achieve U.S. goals through a 

whole-of-government approach, there will be a need 

to maintain sufficient budgetary resources for Department of State and USAID activities.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Ankit Panda, “Straight From the US State Department: The ‘Pivot’ to Asia Is Over,” The Diplomat, March 

14, 2017, available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/

straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/.

2. Hillary Clinton, “The American Century,” Foreign Policy, 

October 2011.

3. Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in 

Asia, New York: Twelve Hachette Book Group, 2016, p. 1.

4. Barack H. Obama, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Washington, DC: The White 

House, January 3, 2012.

5. James Mattis, Written Statement for the Record, testimony 

to the Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, June 

13, 2017.

6. Michael Green et al., “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships,” Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Report, January 2016, 

p. 4.

7. Campbell, The Pivot, p. 8.

8. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: 

The White House, February 2015, p. 24.

9. General Mark A. Milley, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

Washington, DC, April 7, 2016, available from https://www.

armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-40_4-07-16.pdf. See also 

General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Serves Committee, 
25

Washington, DC, June 13, 2017, available from https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_06-13-17.pdf. General 

Dunford identified the following major challenges: “In today’s 

strategic environment, five key challenges—Russia, China, Iran, 

North Korea, and Violent Extremist Organizations—most clearly 

represent the challenges facing the U.S. military.”

10. Hillary Clinton as quoted in Campbell, The Pivot.

11. Campbell, The Pivot, p. 12.

12. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2dEd., New York: Alfred 

A. Knopf, 1969. For additional information on power transition as 

it relates to the U.S.-China relations, refer to David Lai, The United 

States and China in Power Transition, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011.

13. United States DoD doctrine identifies the instruments of 

national power as: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, pp. I-11−I-14.

14. Figure from Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, p. 7.

15. David Lai and Fred Gellert, “Parenting China, the Teenage Power,” The Diplomat, July 16, 2016.

16. David Lai, “The U.S.-China Power Transition: Stage II,” 

The Diplomat, June 30, 2016.

17. President Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address, January 

20, 2017, Washington, DC, available from https://www.whitehouse.

gov/inaugural-address.

18. See for example, H. R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, 

“America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone,” The Wall Street 

Journal, May 30, 2017. “The president embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a ‘global 

community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors 

and businesses engage and compete for advantage.”

19. Obama, National Security Strategy, p. 24.
26

20. Chung-in Moon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 7, 2001, available from https://www.

britannica.com/topic/ASEAN-Regional-Forum, accessed January 15, 

2017.
27

PART II: 

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

29

CHAPTER 2

CHINA’S RISE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN 

FOR THE UNITED STATES?

William P. Donnelly 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

China clearly wants to restore its rightful place as a 

world power. Its official statements confirm the desire 

to become a strong, economically prosperous society 

by 2049, and that it wishes to achieve this development 

peacefully. China will take the path of least resistance 

to achieve this and to protect its non-negotiable core 

interests, which include maintaining the Communist 

Party of China’s (CPC) power. China will work within 

the rules-based international order when doing so furthers its aims. However, China will not accept being 

contained and will challenge the United States and the 

existing rules of the international order if it feels they 

are threatening its core interests. Increasingly, China 

questions the U.S.-led rules-based international order. 

What are the rules? Are they fair? Should the rules be 

modified and reformed? China’s views and actions 

over South China Sea (SCS) issues and contests with 

the United States in those troubled waters have clearly 

borne this new Chinese character out. China clearly 

perceives the U.S. rebalance as a containment strategy.

U.S.-China communication and cooperation must 

continue, including military-to-military engagement 

when allowable, but the United States should be open 
30

and direct with its concerns about China’s intentions. 

The United States must recognize that although China 

will pursue the path of least resistance, it will use 

whatever means necessary to achieve its goals, and the 

United States should be prepared to challenge China’s 

statements and actions if they threaten U.S. or allied 

interests. The United States should do this constructively and from a position of strength―while there 

is still an opportunity to influence the relationship 

positively.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, numerous studies 

have attempted to decipher the strategic intentions of 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yet questions 

about this issue continue to emerge. The United States 

and its allies consistently express concerns about China’s uncertain future.

What does China want? What does the rise of China 

mean for the United States and the world? Does the 

PRC desire to surpass the United States and replace the 

international order with one more favorable to China? 

Will China pursue its goals peacefully as promised or 

will it use force if necessary? What will it do if its goals 

are challenged? Has the United States correctly read 

China’s strategic intentions―and can America still 

influence China and shape future U.S.-China relations?

In simple terms, China wants to return to what it 

perceives to be its rightful, historic place as a world 

power through growth, development, and modernization. China will take the path of least resistance 

to achieve this objective and to protect its core interests. In a 2011 National White Paper, titled “China’s 

Peaceful Development,” China identified its core 

interests as:
31

state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity 

and national reunification, China’s political system 

established by the Constitution and overall social 

stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable 

economic and social development.1

The White Paper also expressed China’s respect for 

other nations’ rights and interests, and China’s unwillingness to gain at the expense of another nation. However, China’s actions reveal that it will not accept being 

contained and will challenge the United States and the 

rules-based international order if it feels its path to 

development is threatened.

Although U.S. intent is not to contain China 

directly, the Chinese perception is that most of the U.S. 

rebalance to the Asia-Pacific appears to be designed 

to encircle China. U.S. policy toward China over the 

past several decades has generally relied on a “principled position of strength.”2

 However, because of China’s development, the nature of U.S.-China relations 

has changed. The United States needs to adjust its 

approach toward China as well. It is important that the 

United States does this constructively and develops 

a shared vision with China about the future of U.S.-

China relations―while the opportunity to influence 

the relationship positively still exists.

OPPOSING VIEWS ON CHINA’S INTENTION

There are numerous schools of thought on China’s intentions, too many to examine in a study of this 

scope. However, two prominent opposing views are of 

particular significance. The first is the “Hundred-Year 

Marathon” approach advocated by Michael Pillsbury, 

a China observer with decades of experience in both 

government and professional research organizations.3
32

Pillsbury asserts that China’s growth, ambitions, and 

intentions are based on a premeditated plan to surpass the United States and become the world’s leading superpower by 2049. He argues that this has been 

China’s intent all along, begun in earnest with Communist leader Mao Zedong and rooted in centuries of 

Chinese history. Deception is key to this strategy, and 

China uses it today as it did in centuries past. Now 

that the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to China’s ascendancy as a world power, China is focused 

on the United States and will use deception and whatever else is necessary to surpass it as the world’s only 

superpower.

Pillsbury notes that the very use of the term “strong 

nation dream” by President Xi in one of his first 

speeches on the Chinese Dream is itself remarkable. 

He argues that no Chinese leader has ever used this 

type of language before and that it was a deliberate 

choice, specifically linked to Chinese publications that 

espouse China’s intent to replace the United States as 

the world’s leading superpower.4 Pillsbury believes 

that China will reshape the world order in its image, 

to support its growth and expansion. He also suggests 

that the United States does not realize that this is happening and is behind in responding to this threat.

China’s lack of transparency and recent aggressive 

actions certainly lend support to Pillsbury’s argument. 

However, an opposing view of China’s strategic intentions is articulated by Dr. David Lai, a professor and 

China expert at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) 

in Carlisle, PA. Dr. Lai was born and raised in China 

and possesses a deep understanding of Chinese culture and history. Lai agrees that China has ambitions to 

become a world power, but disagrees with Pillsbury’s 

primary thesis and argues that China’s perceived 
33

aggressive expansion, including military activity, 

is simply a natural outgrowth of its incredibly rapid 

economic and increasing national power and capabilities. China is modernizing and growing at a rate that 

even Chinese leaders are struggling to grasp, and it 

must expand as a nation to meet the demands that this 

growth has put on its economy, resources, and population. This expansion naturally causes concern for 

China’s immediate neighbors in the region, the international community, and the United States. However, 

Lai believes that China’s actions cannot be ignored, 

and how the United States and the world respond to 

China directly affects future Chinese strategic actions.5

Dr. Lai notes that within the context of both of these 

viewpoints, there is a relevant axiom to consider―that a 

nation’s strategic intentions depend on its capabilities.6

In the same way that Carl von Clausewitz described an 

enemy’s power of resistance as a product of the means 

at his disposal and the strength of his will, a nation’s 

strategic intentions depend on its capabilities (means) 

and will to employ them (will)―and therefore naturally increase as capabilities increase.7

 This axiom can 

be applied to China’s growth over the past 35 years. 

When China began to modernize in the 1970s under the 

leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the nation was underdeveloped and economically weak. Deng’s modernization focused on four major areas: agriculture, industry, 

technology, and the military, with a goal of overall economic and social development.8

 Initially, the military 

had to accept being a lower priority in this development plan since the Chinese economy did not yet have 

the economic and technological engine to support it. It 

naturally follows that less ambitious Chinese strategic 
34

intentions accompanied this lack of economic and military capability. China’s recent explosive growth has 

changed this dynamic.

If Pillsbury is correct that China desires to replace 

America as the world’s most powerful superpower 

and will continue to use deception to carry out its strategy, then his thesis presents a worst-case scenario. Dr. 

Lai’s premise is more optimistic. This book argues that 

both Pillsbury and Lai are partially correct. First and 

foremost, China’s goals are to be a world power led by 

the CPC, maintain Chinese socialism, and ensure the 

betterment of the Chinese people. This is factual and 

openly stated by official Chinese documents and leaders. Next, China will achieve this by taking the path 

of least resistance (with the least amount of strategic 

risk), but will meet any resistance it encounters with 

whatever means necessary to overcome it. China will 

not accept being contained or encircled and will ensure 

that the CPC maintains its status and legitimate control of the PRC. China’s statements and actions support this concept.

Does China harbor conscious intentions to replace 

the United States forcibly as a superpower and rewrite 

the international order in a manner favorable to China? 

China does not need an entirely new world order 

favoring its way of doing business. The level of effort 

involved with replacing the rules-based international 

order and the cost of the conflicts it might induce could 

actually arrest China’s growth and impede its ability to 

achieve its goals. China has benefitted greatly from its 

inclusion in the existing world order established and 

led by the United States. China will continue to work 

within this order to achieve its goals when it is possible 

to do so.
35

However, China has demonstrated that when the 

international order hinders or precludes the achievement of its goals, it will ignore, amend, or uproot portions of it to protect its core interests. China simply will 

not be contained, and it considers its core interests to 

be non-negotiable. The United States must recognize 

this and be aware of the high potential for conflict and 

misunderstanding that exists where U.S. and Chinese 

interests overlap. Additionally, the United States must 

continue to emphasize that it welcomes China’s peaceful and responsible rise, but not its rise at the expense 

of others and the existing international order.9

Has the United States read China’s intentions 

correctly within the context of the rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific? In some ways, it has. For example, U.S. 

leaders and policymakers have been adamant about 

communicating that the rebalance is not about containing China’s rise.10 The problem, however, is that China 

does not perceive this to be true and clearly believes 

the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific is an attempt at containment. Recent Chinese military-to-military engagements between the United States and China confirm 

this.11 The United States has interests other than China 

in the Asia-Pacific, but China is both a partner and a 

competitor in the region, and both nations see each 

other as such.

China is clearly the dominant regional power 

and is becoming more influential. The United States 

acknowledges this and should declare that its policies 

in the Asia-Pacific do largely concern China and its 

interests―some of which overlap with American interests. This can be done in a manner that allows for both 

cooperation and more frank discussions about points 

of friction, which will exist between an established and 

an emerging world power.12 The new administration 
36

under President Donald Trump seems to be taking this 

approach, and should continue to do so.

At the same time, the United States is right to 

increase its military posture in the Asia-Pacific region, 

specifically in the maritime domain.13 The United 

States and its allies must approach China’s military 

growth and modernization, and its militarization of 

disputed territorial claims, with caution. China’s military outposts in the SCS, its improved anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) and maritime capabilities, and 

its willingness to utilize the China Coast Guard and 

People’s Liberation Army Navy in a coercive manner 

are concerning. These developments present potential challenges to interests of the United States and its 

allies in the region, including freedom of navigation, 

sovereignty, and a stable international order. China 

has repeatedly stated that it desires to pursue its core 

interests peacefully. However, if China feels that its 

interests are directly threatened and its use of measures short of conflict prove unsuccessful at protecting 

those interests, it has the ability and the potential will 

to use military force. The United States must maintain 

a hedge against this capability in order to protect U.S. 

interests, address threats to allies, and assist new partners in the region.

It is due to this growing capability that the United 

States must engage more with China now, while the 

balance of power is still in America’s favor and China 

is willing to communicate. Can the United States still 

influence its relationship with China and persuade 

China to change? Recent engagements, though not 

without disagreements and some misunderstanding, 

suggest that the answer is yes. What remains to be 

seen is how the relationship between the two nations 

will develop and mature under Trump’s administration. Although Trump has issued some tough rhetoric 
37

regarding China’s behavior, his recent assurance that 

the United States will honor the “One China” policy 

demonstrates a potential for continued dialogue and 

engagement.14 The relationship is dynamic and will 

continue to evolve, and will be tested if either nation 

openly challenges one of the others’ core interests.

A recent positive development is the increased 

trade, military-to-military interaction, and memoranda of agreement between the United States and 

China. The two nations have demonstrated that there 

is still an opportunity for communication, cooperation, 

and resolution of disagreements. Military-to-military 

engagement is key to fostering this type of relationship. 

Regular interactions, even small ones, have proven to 

be fruitful and will be important going forward.15 The 

United States should pursue more of these, as well as 

larger scale engagements such as the Rim of the Pacific 

exercise and fora involving senior defense officials.

U.S.-CHINA “ELBOW-RUBBING”

The relationship between the United States and 

China seems to have evolved into a series of back-andforth actions and reactions. China takes actions to protect its interests, the United States objects and/or reacts, 

and China feels additional pressure to do even more to 

protect itself. Chinese officials have difficulty understanding why the United States and others cannot or 

will not respect China’s claims or the actions taken to 

grow and to protect itself.16 At times, it resembles the 

classic power transition struggle between an emerging and entrenched world power as described by Lai.17

This dynamic was demonstrated by China’s responses 

to recent U.S. rhetoric condemning China’s militarization of territories in the SCS, the potential assignment 
38

of a U.S. Marine security detachment in Taiwan, and 

increased U.S. naval operations in the SCS―these U.S. 

actions elicited quick reaction from China.18

This is dangerous, but the onus is on China to 

slow down or stop this cycle. There is concern about 

provoking China, yet it is China that is expanding, 

coercing other nations, and disregarding international 

norms. Nobody wants a miscalculation or unnecessary 

escalation, and all nations should strive to avoid both. 

However, if China desires that the international community respect its interests―and wishes to honor its 

own words regarding peaceful development, respect 

for other nations rights, and rejecting expansion or 

hegemony―then it must demonstrate these intentions 

with credible actions.

Recently, China announced that its annual defense 

budget for 2017 will increase by only 7 percent―the 

lowest in 10 years―though Chinese officials still consider its defense spending “enough to protect its ‘rights 

and interests’ and prevent ‘outside forces’ from interfering in its territorial disputes.”19 While this reduced 

level of defense spending may not be a deliberate effort 

to slow down the action-reaction cycle, it does not 

accelerate it, and is at least a step in the right direction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

China is a rising power that wants to take its rightful place as a world power with a thriving economy, 

a strong military, and a prominent voice on the world 

stage by 2049. China will take the path of least resistance to achieve this position and protect its core 

interests while refusing to be contained or encircled. 

China will continue to be a contributing member of the 

rules-based international order, but will amend, add 
39

to, or ignore it as necessary to achieve its goals. This 

has a direct impact on the United States and the international community, neither of which can ignore the 

rapid growth or actions of the world’s most populous 

nation.

The United States must be open about its intentions in the Asia-Pacific region regarding China and 

directly address areas where the two nations’ interests 

intersect, and especially where those interests conflict. 

At the same time, the United States is right to increase 

its military presence in the region as China grows and 

modernizes its armed forces and expands its militarization of the region. This is necessary to ensure that the 

United States postures itself to support both allies and 

partners and maintain its interests in the Asia-Pacific. 

Additionally, both nations must continue, and ideally increase, military-to-military engagements with 

each other. These engagements offer opportunities for 

cooperation and lessen the probability of miscalculation from both sides.

Finally, it remains to be seen if China’s strict adherence to one-party rule will be an inhibitor to its future 

growth and role as a world power, or if internal pressure from the Chinese population will ultimately prove 

too much to allow the CPC to rule as it chooses.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, China’s Peaceful Development, Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council, September 6, 2011, available from 

http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.

htm, accessed January 13, 2017.

2. Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk, US Policy toward China: 

Recommendations for a New Administration Task Force Report, New 
40

York: Asia Society Center on US-China Relations, February 2017, 

p. 17.

3. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s 

Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016, p. 12.

4. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

5. David Lai, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, October 

26, 2016. See also David Lai, “The United States and China in 

Power Transition: Stage II,” The Diplomat, June 30, 2016, available 

from http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-us-china-power-transitionstage-ii/, accessed February 26, 2017; and David Lai, “China’s 

Strategic Moves and Countermoves,” Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 4, 

Winter 2014-15, pp. 12-25.

6. David Lai, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, October 26, 

2016.

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1976, p. 77.

8. Pillsbury, p. 162.

9. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: 

The White House, February 2015, p. 24.

10. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, available from http://foreignpolicy.

com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century, accessed October 17, 2016; 

Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President 

Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference,” 

public speech, Malacañang Palace, Manila, Philippines, April 28, 

2014, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benignoaquino-iii-philippines-joi, accessed February 11, 2017.

11. “Between War and Peace: Reflections on U.S.-China Security Relations,” 3rd Annual Mil-Mil Education and Research 

Exchange, forum, December 4-7, 2016, Carlisle Barracks, PA. This 

forum was a military-to-military engagement hosted by the U.S. 
41

Army War College at both Bliss Hall and the Army Heritage and 

Education Center. Several senior officers from the People’s Liberation Army attended the forum along with several senior officers 

and staff from the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, and the 

U.S. Department of State.

12. Lai, “The United States and China in Power Transition: 

Stage II.”

13. U.S. Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime 

Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 19-22.

14. Te-Ping Chen, “Beijing’s Patience Pays Off with Trump’s 

Reaffirmation of ‘One-China’ Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, 

February 10, 2017, available from https://www.wsj.com/articles/

beijings-patience-pays-off-with-trumps-reaffirmation-of-one-chinapolicy-1486737397, accessed February 10, 2017.

15. “Between War and Peace: Reflections on U.S.-China Security Relations,” 3rd Annual Mil-Mil Education and Research 

Exchange, forum, December 4-7, 2016, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

16. Ibid.

17. David Lai, “The United States and China in Power Transition: Stage II.” Lai describes the dynamic of a dissatisfied emerging power (China) pushing against an established power (United 

States) and the world order it represents. As the emerging power 

grows, it becomes more assertive, and the danger of conflict 

increases.

18. Ministry of Defense, People’s Republic of China, “Defense 

Ministry’s Regular Press Conference,” February 23, 2017, available from http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2017-02/24/content_4773551.

htm, accessed March 3, 2017. Colonel Ren Guoqiang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, answered reporters’ 

questions during this conference. He specifically responded to 

questions about U.S. statements on China’s potential militarization of islands in the South China Sea (SCS), and stated that China 

has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and has the right 

to deploy necessary defensive facilities on them. On the topic of 

U.S. Marines in Taiwan, Colonel Ren stated that China consistently opposes any form of official exchange and military contact 
42

between the United States and Taiwan. On recent U.S. Navy 

operations in the SCS, Colonel Ren stated that China hopes the 

United States can respect the sovereignty and security concerns 

of regional countries, and that China respects the freedom of navigation and overflight that all countries enjoy in the SCS in accordance with international law.

19. Jeremy Page and Chun Han Wong, “China Eases Foot Off 

Gas on Military Spending,” The Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2017, 

available from https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-raising-militarybudget-by-about-7-1488601110, accessed March 4, 2017.
43

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPING A U.S.-LED MULTILATERAL 

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 

FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Eric W. Young 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Asia-Pacific region is viewed as the most consequential for America’s security and prosperity. While 

five bilateral defense treaties demonstrate U.S. resolve 

for regional stability, the expanding Asia-Pacific security architecture, and increasing critical issues, demand 

greater U.S. engagement and leadership.

While the U.S. defense treaties provide large-scale 

conflict deterrence, shared responsibility for regional 

security threats below large-scale conflict is necessary 

and requires more than the dialogue-only solutions 

that existing regional forums provide. To remain the 

region’s security leader, the United States must adapt 

to the evolving environment while capitalizing on 

existing organizations and infrastructures.

Strategically, such adaptation must recognize, but 

not succumb to, China’s influence and perspectives as 

a rising regional power. As such, leading the development of a multilateral security architecture (MLSA) 

that includes but expands beyond the current “huband-spoke” defense treaty alliance system will increase 

regional capability and resolve to meet both long-term 

and emerging security challenges.
44

For strategic perspective, China has also indicated 

interest in developing a “win-win” regional security 

architecture of its own, providing itself opportunity to 

supplant the United States as the leader for regional 

security, especially if the United States decides to not 

act beyond its existing defense alliance obligations.

This chapter provides four specific recommendations for establishing a framework that enables shared 

responsibility for dealing with security threats below 

the level of large-scale conflict: 

• The United States should lead the development 

of a MLSA that empowers existing regional 

forums and organizations, strengthens existing defense treaties and alliances, and encourages the development of new linkages between 

nations to advance regional stability and conflict prevention.

• Consider China as a potential partner in a 

MLSA in order to advance trust among regional 

participants while countering perceptions that 

a MLSA purposely contains China’s rise; may 

also lessen observations of a U.S.-China power 

rivalry.

• Provide enforcement mechanisms not currently 

available in existing regional security structures.

• Utilize all instruments of national power for 

MLSA establishment and success―it is not a 

military-alone solution or requirement.

INTRODUCTION

While the nations in the Asia-Pacific strive for economic development, they are nevertheless troubled by 

unsettled territorial disputes and a wide range of other 
45

security issues. What should be the security mechanism to deal with these problems?

Since the end of World War II, the United States 

has taken upon itself as a provider and custodian for 

security in this region. The United States does this 

through a hub-and-spoke alliance system. For a variety of reasons, this system is increasingly inadequate 

for the growing security problems in the Asia-Pacific. 

Meanwhile, China is also pushing for a region-wide 

multilateral security architecture to replace the U.S.-

led system.

Should the United States continue to rely on the 

existing alliance system to maintain order and resist 

China’s moves? Should the United States cave in to 

China’s pressure and let China create a new security 

system in the Asia-Pacific? Between these two opposing positions, is there a middle-ground approach for 

the United States to create a new security architecture 

to address regional challenges? The answer is straightforward: the United States has no choice but to take up 

the challenge to do so.

EXISTING U.S.-LED SECURITY ALLIANCE 

SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Centered around five bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, the Republic of the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, the U.S. 

security alliance system has contributed to regional 

security and stability since the early 1950s. These 

mutual defense treaties are commonly referred to as 

a hub-and-spoke system: the United States is at the 

center, and each bilateral treaty partner is a separate 

“spoke.”1 Each evolved from U.S. efforts to counter the 

spread of communism in Asia following World War 
46

II, when the United States was unable to develop a 

“Pacific Ocean Pact” analogous to the North Atlantic 

Treaty in Europe.2

In his book, Powerplay: The Origins of the American 

Alliance System in Asia, Professor Victor Cha, former 

Director for Asian Affairs in President George W. 

Bush’s National Security Council, notes that these 

exclusive and tightly-controlled bilateral hub-andspoke alliances created a “‘powerplay’ in U.S. grand 

strategy,” allowing it “to exert considerable political, 

military, and economic control over key countries in 

East Asia.”3 However, those alliances essentially guaranteed regional security, and arguably prosperity, by 

contributing to large-scale conflict deterrence during 

the Cold War era. Today they remain central to preventing large-scale regional conflict while also demonstrating continuing U.S. security commitment with 

each treaty partner.

OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY 

CONFIGURATIONS

Twenty-seven years after the Cold War ended, 

Asia-Pacific regional challenges remain and are potentially becoming more volatile. The evolving security 

environment fosters insecurities that drive many countries to seek enhanced defense cooperation.4

 Existing 

defense alliances, partnership engagements, and security cooperation activities reassure allies and partners 

while simultaneously aligning U.S. regional strategy, 

resources, and capabilities. Further, regional security 

organizations and mechanisms also influence the existing security architecture.

The largest regional organization, the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), promotes the 
47

active collaboration and mutual support of 10 member 

states on issues including prosperity, economic development, regional peace and stability, agriculture, education, and industry.5

 For their specific relations with 

one another, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed in 1976, requires 

signatories to settle differences or disputes peacefully, 

and renounce the threat, or use, of force.6 Signatories 

must also mutually respect the independence of other 

states, their territorial integrity, and their national 

identity, while recognizing each state’s right to exist 

free from external interference.7

In 1987, ASEAN amended the TAC, inviting 

non-Southeast Asia countries “to accede to the Treaty 

in order to build confidence, promote peace and 

security, and facilitate economic cooperation in the 

region.”8 Participating non-Southeast Asian countries and organizations (including China, India, South 

Korea, Russia, Australia, France, North Korea, and the 

European Union) reflect global interest in the region’s 

security and prosperity. The United States signed the 

TAC in July 2009.9 However, the TAC does not include 

enforcement provisions, which perhaps were not considered necessary in 1976 due to the significant U.S. 

military presence as well as the region’s decentralized 

nature.

In 1993, ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional 

Forum (ARF) as the “first region-wide Asia-Pacific 

multilateral forum for official consultations on peace 

and security issues.”10 The ARF’s objectives, identified 

in the First ARF Chairman’s Statement in 1994, are:

1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on 

political and security issues of common interest and 
48

concern; and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts 

towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy 

in the Asia-Pacific region.11

Today, ARF membership includes the United States 

and 26 other regional and non-regional countries.12

However, the ARF remains solely a security dialogue 

venue. For the United States, it is a “regional foreign 

minister-level forum for promoting security” through 

which the United States helps shape a regional rulesbased order.13

In 2006, ASEAN convened the inaugural ASEAN 

Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). Held annually, 

the ADMM:

is the highest defence consultative and cooperative 

mechanism in ASEAN . . . [aimed at promoting] mutual 

trust and confidence through greater understanding of 

defence and security challenges as well as enhancement 

of transparency and openness.14

As another, albeit high-level, dialogue forum, the 

ADMM’s objectives include: 

[promoting] regional peace and stability through dialogue 

and cooperation in defence and security; [giving] guidance 

to existing senior defence and military officials; dialogue 

and cooperation in the field of defence and security within 

ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners; 

[promoting] mutual trust and confidence through greater 

understanding of defence and security challenges as 

well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and 

[contributing] to the establishment of an ASEAN Security 

Community (ASC).15

As an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the United States 

participates in the annual ADMM-Plus, which, since 

2010, is a “platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners to strengthen security and defence 
49

cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the 

region.”16 The ADMM-Plus objectives include building 

partner capacity among member countries to address 

shared security challenges, promote mutual trust and 

confidence, and enhance regional peace and stability 

through cooperation in defense and security.17 Practical cooperation discussion areas, facilitated through 

Experts’ Working Groups, include maritime security, 

counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, 

and cyber.18 As a practical matter, the ADMM-Plus 

provides the United States a conduit to engage with 

China, itself an ASEAN Dialogue Member, regarding 

security issues and concerns. Overall, ASEAN and its 

attendant sub-organizations are part of an inter-connected “web” of Asia-Pacific organizations (economic, 

diplomatic, and military) that bind regional and 

non-regional countries.

Notably, ASEAN’s aims and purposes include promoting “regional peace and stability through abiding 

respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to 

the principles of the United Nations Charter.”19 As 

an active ASEAN Dialogue Partner (which includes 

an ambassadorship to ASEAN), the United States has 

a central role in “the evolving rules-based regional 

architecture that promotes regional peace, stability 

and prosperity.”20 The U.S.-ASEAN security dialogues 

focus on the U.S. role in “maintaining peace, security, 

and stability in the region through its participation in 

different ASEAN-led regional mechanisms such as the 

[ARF], the . . . ADMM-Plus, and the East Asia Summit 

(EAS).”21

For the United States, the EAS provides significant 

opportunity for strategic influence. At the conclusion 
50

of the first EAS meeting in 2005, the participating states 

agreed that the EAS “would continue to be a leaders’-led Summit for strategic discussions on key issues 

affecting the region and the evolving regional architecture.”22 Held annually, EAS strategic dialogues gained 

more prominence in recent years due to former U.S. 

President Barack Obama personally attending. While 

it originated with “a vision of community building,” 

U.S. participation in the EAS, along with increasing 

strategic tensions, raised it to a “confidence building 

and conflict prevention mechanism” for addressing 

all regional security challenges, including threats arising from North Korea.23 While it remains a dialogue 

opportunity, participating in the EAS advances U.S. 

leadership for regional security, influence, and conflict 

prevention.

An additional security and conflict prevention 

mechanism involves country-to-country dialogues on 

specific topics, such as the Six-Party Talks on ending 

North Korea’s nuclear proliferation.24 Although stagnant since 2009, the Six-Party Talks demonstrate multinational efforts to address and prevent regional 

conflict. Bilateral mechanisms also exist―most recently 

demonstrated in the 2017 Japan-Russia “two plus 

two” discussions between their respective foreign and 

defense ministers that were specially focused toward 

resolving long-standing disputes and urging North 

Korean restraint.25

Conflict prevention is defined as a:

peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, 

civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor 

and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action 

to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of 

hostilities.26
51

U.S. conflict prevention activities include reassuring 

allies and partners, conducting military and non-military engagements, supporting humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief efforts, supporting ASEAN initiatives, undertaking confidence building measures, and 

reiterating international norms and law. Such activities involve various diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power that 

best enable regional stability and security.

Discussing conflict prevention’s increasing role in 

the Asia-Pacific region, Dr. Frank Hoffman posits that: 

Declines in the preponderance of U.S. power in the Asia–

Pacific theater have reduced conventional deterrence, and 

China’s military expansion could accelerate instability. 

The United States is challenged to demonstrate that it 

retains the ability to conduct military operations in the 

Asia–Pacific region and fulfill its treaty obligations to 

its allies. This requires a military capacity—one that is 

growing increasingly suspect—to achieve two critical 

U.S. objectives: maintaining freedom of the commons 

(air, sea, space, and cyberspace) and limiting the potential 

for large-scale regional conflict through deterrence.27

Conflict prevention activities advance a key U.S. 

interest: supporting the rise of a peaceful China that 

adheres to international norms and law. For example, 

confidence building measures essentially lower the 

likelihood that conflict may occur between potential rivals by building interoperability and trust. U.S. 

military engagements with China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) allow limited military-to-military confidence building discussions and exercises 

that contribute to decreasing mistrust while enabling 

regional stability and strategic interoperability.28 Such 

an exercise is the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Rim of the Pacific 

(RIMPAC), held every 2 years, that includes China’s 
52

Peoples’ Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) participation.29 Confidence building efforts facilitate conflict 

prevention by enabling allies and partners to align 

their security efforts to deter, or counter, future threats.

For all of their benefits, ASEAN (including its 

ADMM+ and ARF), the EAS, the Six-Party Talks, 

other regional security engagements, and bilateral and 

multilateral military-to-military security exchanges 

are limited in their ability to resolve regional security issues among participating nations. As the complex and uncertain security environment continually 

evolves, Asia-Pacific regional security requires more 

than dialogue, highly structured confidence building 

security engagements, or over-dependence on U.S. 

military presence. Further, the new U.S. administration, as discussed during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s first trip to the region in March 2017, is distancing 

itself from previous dialogue efforts, most notably the 

Six-Party Talks.30 In addition, whether the new U.S. 

President will personally participate in the ARF as his 

predecessor did also remains to be seen.

Based on existing security structures and the evolving U.S. foreign policy approach to the region, a gap 

exists for the United States between meeting bilateral mutual defense treaty provisions and enforcing 

decisions resulting from various multilateral regional 

forum discussions. Therein lies the weakness of the 

current system. As the 21st century unfolds, Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States, must be confident that threats to regional stability will be met with 

a clear, unified, region-wide resolve and response. It is 

within this gap between dialogue entities and mutual 

defense alliances that a U.S.-led MLSA takes shape.
53

CHINA’S PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC 

SECURITY

While the:

prevailing [U.S.]-led power structure has contributed 

to subdued levels of interstate conflict and war . . . that 

system and its attendant security are being challenged 

by major powers, abetted by a reduced [United States’] 

presence in key regions.31

In the Asia-Pacific, China’s significant economic growth 

and rapid military modernization directly alter the balance of power, highlighting China’s leadership against 

long-standing U.S. influence.32 In this regard, the existing U.S. alliance system presents a significant concern 

for China: how to overcome this ostensibly Cold War 

relic while leading in the Asia-Pacific region. From the 

Chinese perspective, the U.S. “alliance system in the 

region surrounding China is a reality that will last for 

some time . . . [and an] important issue in China’s rise 

is how Beijing will coexist effectively with U.S. alliances.”33 Recognizing that the: 

American centered alliance system in the Asia-Pacific 

region. . . . has critically influenced that region’s security 

order [since World War II and] the recent implementation 

of the United States’ ‘rebalancing strategy’ toward Asia 

and the strengthening American dominance over regional 

affairs has been interpreted by Beijing as a U.S. effort to 

enhance its alliance system in this part of the world and to 

strengthen its security partnerships with some countries 

in the region.34

While the United States consistently states that it welcomes a rising China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in international affairs,35

assessing the Chinese view of the current U.S. security 

architecture and Pacific focus is essential.
54

Professor Zhou Fangyin, of the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies in China, articulates two 

schools of thought regarding China’s views toward the 

U.S. alliance system. On one hand, the U.S. commitment to maintaining this system supports a “Chinese 

posture of ‘peaceful development,’ . . . which embodies 

a ‘low profile’ and generally nonconfrontational posture towards the United States and its alliance system 

in Asia.”36 Professor Zhou notes that: 

America’s underwriting of this network meets some 

important security and political requirements of various 

U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. 

Mitigating allied anxiety by the United States extending 

deterrence guarantees has traditionally contributed to 

regional stability by, for example, ‘capping the bottle’ of 

Japanese militarism or maintaining a conflict threshold 

on the Korean Peninsula. This has been especially true 

in the absence of an effective or efficient macrosecurity 

architecture to solve the security problems faced by East 

Asian countries. In this context, those in China who have 

acknowledged this situation have concluded that the U.S. 

alliance system in Asia has played a fundamental role 

in regional security, even though its indefinite survival 

might not be welcomed as the preferred outcome by most 

Chinese policymakers.37

Challenging the “peaceful development” school 

of thought is the view that the U.S. alliance system is 

a “security impediment” rather than facilitator.38 In 

December 2016, the United States Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) commander reiterated the U.S. position 

that “[in] Asia, there’s not that compelling, single, 

focused enemy.”39 Those in China believing that the 

U.S. alliance system is a security impediment do not 

hold the same view. Rather, they view the formerly 

named Rebalance, and resulting emphasis on the 
55

existing alliance system, as a direct response to China’s 

rapid rise. It is:

the obvious catalyst behind Washington’s decision to 

reinforce its strategic influence and presence in the AsiaPacific region . . . [and the] U.S. pivot strategy, according 

to this faction, is nothing less than a U.S. effort to contain 

[China].40

While the United States openly supports China 

becoming an increasingly capable and active partner 

in addressing regional and global challenges, the Chinese view the U.S. legacy alliance system as increasingly resembling an “offensive realist strategy directed 

against China that impedes the realization of a great 

rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”41 An interesting 

opinion-perspective is that China has never conceived 

of a foreign nation “as more than a tributary to it,” 

and China’s current rise arguably appears to retain 

this hubris.42 Reinforcing this perspective is Chinese 

President Xi Jinping’s proclamation that “it is for the 

people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”―with 

an ascending China as the leader.43 As Professor Zhou 

notes, coexisting with the U.S. alliance system while 

China’s “own strength and influence are rising” is a 

significant challenge.44

In June 2016, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister 

Kong Xuanyou noted, “when compared with economic cooperation, the security architecture construction in East Asia lags behind.”45 As such, he further 

identified that constructing “a security architecture 

that complies with the regional reality and meets the 

needs of all sides is a major strategic task for regional 

states.”46 Such comments reinforce Xi’s proposal for a 

Chinese-led counter to the U.S. alliance system. At the 
56

2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi stated:

One cannot live in the 21st century with the outdated 

thinking from the age of Cold War and zero-sum game. 

We believe that it is necessary to advocate common, 

comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in 

Asia. We need to innovate our security concept, establish 

a new regional security cooperation architecture, and 

jointly build a road for security of Asia that is shared by 

and win-win to all.47

Xi’s vision is already taking shape, at least in public 

Chinese government rhetoric. At the 2016 Xiangshan 

Forum in Beijing, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu 

Zhenmin identified five existing security mechanisms 

in the Asia-Pacific: 

• The United States-led alliance system and relevant bilateral and multilateral arrangements; 

• The ASEAN-centered security dialogue and 

cooperation frameworks such as the ARF and 

ADMM+; 

• Special mechanisms on hotspot issues such 

as the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsular 

Nuclear Issue and the Quartet on Afghanistan; 

• Regional security cooperation mechanisms 

including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 

(CICA); and, 

• Track 1.5 or Track 2 security dialogues such as 

the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Xiangshan Forum, 

and the Asia-Pacific Roundtable.48

Rather than identifying how any, or all, of these existing structures might best enhance 21st century security, Vice Minister Liu instead noted that they “reflect 
57

underlying disconnects in our region: problems left by 

the cold war, lack of coordination among sub-regions, 

and differences on security concepts.”49 Therefore, in 

order to best deal with existing, and emerging, regional 

security challenges, China’s view is that a new, Chinese-led security architecture is necessary.

China’s proposed architecture is based on its concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and 

sustainable security, advocating “consultation and dialogue, openness, inclusiveness, and win-win cooperation.”50 Essentially, China desires replacing the U.S.-led 

alliance system with a China-led and promoted “partnership” community, perhaps mirroring the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization.51 Within this community, 

Xi advocates employing the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (mutual respect for sovereignty and 

territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and 

mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) as the baseline for interaction among Asia-Pacific nations.52 Further, Xi notes that “China stays committed to seeking 

[the] peaceful settlement of disputes with other countries over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights 

and interests.”53

Although advocating a “win-win” security environment, China’s actions in the disputed East Sea and 

South China Sea areas demonstrate otherwise. While 

China’s rise and corresponding increase in national 

strength arguably shifted the world’s economic center 

of gravity to the Asia-Pacific, “[it] is not surprising, 

then, that as China’s economic might has grown, so 

has its ability and inclination to use national power 

and influence to advance its geopolitical ends.”54 For 

example, as a party to the United Nations Convention 
58

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China specifically 

reserved and declared that it:

will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the 

boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States 

with coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on 

the basis of international law and in accordance with the 

principle of equitability.55

While China’s domestic laws claim certain named (and 

“other”) islands as belonging to China, other coastal 

nations (including the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam) also claim several of the same islands, creating 

multiple disputes that should be resolved equitably on 

the basis of international law, which the Philippines 

attempted to do through its 2016 UNCLOS arbitration 

case.56 However, China’s aggressive island building 

in the South China Sea in the midst of these unsettled 

maritime claims arguably indicates, and certainly so 

perceived by the other regional states, that the principle of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 

integrity” is not a reciprocal requirement where China’s interests are concerned.57

U.S. LEADERSHIP FOR 21ST CENTURY ASIAPACIFIC SECURITY

Charting the initial course for his administration, 

President Donald Trump recently stated that U.S. “foreign policy calls for a direct, robust and meaningful 

engagement with the world,” which involves “American leadership based on vital security interests that we 

share with our allies all across the globe.”58 Further,

America is willing to find new friends, and to forge new 

partnerships, where shared interests align. We want 

harmony and stability, not war and conflict. We want 
59

peace, wherever peace can be found. America is friends 

today with former enemies. Some of our closest allies, 

decades ago, fought on the opposite side of these terrible, 

terrible wars. This history should give us all faith in the 

possibilities for a better world.59

This U.S. foreign policy vision preserves the open, 

stable, and rules-based international order that has 

underpinned Asia-Pacific peace, prosperity, and stability since World War II. Formalized ties throughout 

and external to the region create a web of engagements 

(diplomatic, economic, and military) that demonstrate 

regional interests are more common, and combined, 

than believed possible when the United States first 

entered into its bilateral defense treaties.

As Asia-Pacific nations look to the United States for 

security reassurance and rules-based stability, it is in 

the U.S. national interest to share that responsibility 

beyond the existing bilateral security alliance structure. Incorporating existing bilateral security alliances 

(without terminating them) into an interconnected, 

regional security architecture will reinforce Asia-Pacific security resilience, strengthen regional diplomatic 

and economic endeavors, and enable shared conflict 

prevention. Professor Cha identifies such a scenario 

as a “‘complex patchwork’ of bilaterals [sic], trilaterals [sic], and other plurilateral configurations,” which 

inevitably includes already-existing security mechanisms. Such an interconnected and dependent geometry between states results in “a useful tool for muting 

regional security dilemmas” through shared responsibility and mutual security interests.60 For the United 

States, developing and leading such a “complex patchwork” MLSA that builds on existing relationships 

while strengthening bilateral security alliances, is a 

feasible, acceptable, and suitable means for sustaining 
60

regional security. Reinforcing this approach is the 

observation that “US-centered bilateralism and Asia’s 

emerging regional institutions (both ASEAN-centered 

and China-based . . .) [do not] operate at odds with one 

another.”61 To retain this important dynamic, a U.S.-

led MLSA should recognize, and build on, the region’s 

complex nature, economic inter-dependence, and 

already-existing security mechanisms.62

While a U.S.-led MLSA could take many forms, 

the chosen form cannot trump substance; as a precondition, it must work in concert with existing U.S. 

defense treaties. The MLSA must define regional security requirements, establish responsibilities and relationships among participating states, and implement 

national contribution procedures (such as funding, 

personnel, equipment, and logistics). Basic, guiding 

principles such as resolving disputes peacefully, uniting to counter emerging threats to regional security, 

allowing countries to make their own security decisions free from intimidation, preserving the rules of 

international law pertaining to air and sea navigation, 

and acting in recognition of each country’s own constitutional processes, must be addressed and resolved. 

Further, a MLSA must include implementation mechanisms (e.g., consultation among member nations, special discussion processes, support to existing regional 

security mechanisms) and enforcement procedures 

(when and how to act―including using force―beyond 

dialogue exchanges) in order to be effective and viable 

for conflict prevention.

While existing regional security dialogue venues 

provide many of the baseline principles outlined 

above, establishing when and how participating 

nations actively align against emerging threats must 

be developed. Fortunately, other non-Asia-Pacific 
61

organizations are instructive in this matter. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) is one such organization. While not a perfect 

template, the OSCE demonstrates an architecture that 

has evolved from the challenges of the Cold War to 

addressing “the present era of regional conflict, arms 

proliferation, terrorism and other emerging threats 

by combining a uniquely comprehensive definition of 

security with flexibility and innovation of response.”63

Membership is key to gaining regional support, and 

a U.S.-led MLSA must welcome and incorporate new 

partners and opportunities. While the existing defense 

treaties provide the greatest deterrence against largescale regional conflict, all regional nations should be 

invited and encouraged to participate in the MLSA to 

their fullest individual potential. The MLSA will enable 

those nations to go beyond dialogue to resolve actively 

lesser threats and challenges on the conflict spectrum 

(e.g., through partnered maritime domain awareness), 

essentially altering existing regional security dynamics. Further, as a MLSA builds on existing relationships 

(creating linkages within linkages), a new security 

forum similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) North Atlantic Council, while not precluded, may not be needed if the EAS or ARF grows 

into this role.

Finally, U.S. leadership must accomplish three 

goals. First, reassure allies and partners that entanglement or entrapment for U.S. regional gain (including countering China) is not the MLSA’s purpose. 

Second, advocate that mutually supporting and 

regionally responsible security protects against current and future threats. Third, retain the existing bilateral defense treaties while not precluding new U.S. 

security relationships.64 Working toward these goals 
62

will help the United States avoid alienation while also 

shaping regional expectations for responding to security threats.

Implications and Options for the New 

U.S. Administration.

For the United States, an important decision 

includes whether to advance the prior administration’s 

principled security network efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The danger for the decision maker is that 

policy becomes so geared to satisfying the vigorously 

communicated needs of those close at hand that insufficient account is taken of the needs of those more distant and less salient. The hierarchy of concerns on the 

foreign policy agenda will reflect hierarchies within 

national political systems and salient alliances and 

international organizations.65

For the new U.S. administration developing its 

Asia-Pacific policies, the following MLSA strengths, 

weaknesses, opportunities, and risks should be considered. Leading a MLSA provides the means to 

achieve lasting influence and shared security responsibility that ultimately supports diplomatic, economic, 

and informational efforts within, and external to, the 

Asia-Pacific region. Further, a MLSA enables pan-regional military-to-military engagement and modernization while reassuring allies, partners, and neighbors 

through conflict prevention activities. A MLSA also 

provides a strategic opportunity for the U.S. military (principally the USPACOM) to plan and conduct 

engagements within a web of interconnected security 

partners who each have diverse regional economic and 

diplomatic interests.66
63

The region’s previously discussed security dynamics risk escalation and conflict, most notably on the 

Korean Peninsula and in the South China and East Seas. 

However, diversifying security relationships, modernizing existing alliances, enhancing interactions among 

new partners, strengthening regional institutions to 

reinforce rules and norms, and developing collective responses to shared challenges all define ways in 

which the United States can achieve its regional objectives.67 Further, MLSA “burden sharing” potentially 

lowers overall U.S. costs in both money and personnel as a web of interconnected nations is empowered 

(with U.S. support rather than dependence) to prevent 

conflict and respond collectively when required. Most 

significantly, a MLSA provides a different, evolving 

approach to regional security that adapts to the changing security environment and pits, interdependently 

with allies and partners, “our enduring strengths 

against the vulnerabilities of our adversaries.”68

Further, MLSA legitimacy under international 

law adds credibility. Article 52 of the United Nations’ 

Charter provides that:

regional arrangements for dealing with such matters 

relating to the maintenance of international peace and 

security as are appropriate for regional action [are not 

precluded] . . . provided that such arrangements are 

consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 

Nations.69

For example, NATO is such a regional security 

arrangement.70 Establishing a MLSA, whether formal 

or informal, that complies with international law and 

reinforces “rules-based order” for the Asia-Pacific 

region provides legitimacy; doing otherwise risks both 

international acceptance and respected U.S. leadership.
64

The biggest potential weakness is a lack of regional 

resolve to participate actively in a MLSA that advocates and advances conflict prevention activity. While 

a MLSA would buttress existing arrangements through 

an interconnected enforcement web of shared-interest 

nations, participating nations would be expected to 

contribute more than dialogue for conflict prevention.

Further, China likely will view a U.S.-led MLSA as 

a direct threat to its regional leadership: “China has all 

along taken the advancement of regional prosperity 

and stability as its own responsibility.”71 According to 

its January 2017 “White Paper” on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, China is:

[c]ommitted to pushing forward the building of regional 

security mechanisms . . . [while shouldering] greater 

responsibilities for regional and global security, and 

[providing] more public security services to the AsiaPacific region and the world at large.72

The U.S.-China competition for regional security leadership, arguably the most difficult issue to address, 

risks regional states having to choose between their 

closely-located economic trading partner (China) 

and more distantly-located security provider (United 

States), potentially weakening a U.S.-led MLSA.73

Mitigating these weaknesses requires an approach 

that the United States should openly consider: invite 

China’s participation as a welcome and necessary partner in order to utilize both U.S. and Chinese regional 

security leadership. Doing so establishes the single-largest confidence building mechanism for both 

countries, as transparency will be necessary for both 

nations to work together for common security goals. 

Finally, including both nations (perhaps someday 

as co-equal participants) in a single MLSA requires 
65

strategic patience; simply bringing both nations into 

the same U.S.-led security architecture will not happen 

quickly. Underlying, long-standing security issues and 

differences remain unresolved and must be addressed 

before a U.S.-China MLSA could be considered or even 

implemented.

A U.S.-led MLSA presents two notable opportunities. First, achieving long-term regional security presents an opportunity for the United States and China to 

work together for a common security purpose, even if 

they are not MLSA partners. Strategically, and with a 

nod toward China’s economic growth and rapid military modernization, the United States generally considers China an emerging, or already existing, “near-peer 

competitor.”74 Henry Kissinger recently noted that the 

United States should try to make Chinese President 

Xi’s objective to “turn adversaries into partners . . . the 

dominant theme of U.S.-China relations.” Changing 

the analysis from “near-peer competitor” to “nearpeer partner” clearly alters regional security dynamics. 

Doing so should not make the United States beholden 

to China, or require the United States to compromise 

its values and interests. Rather, removing a potential 

near-peer competitor by finding common ground for 

security engagement will change the region’s conflict 

prevention security dynamic. However, such a change 

requires significant action by both nations, which for 

the United States includes re-looking the NDAA 2000 

limits on military-to-military engagement.

Second, developing a U.S.-led MLSA that overlaps existing regional economic and security forums 

demonstrates U.S. understanding of, and commitment 

to, the evolving region. It also provides enforcement 

mechanisms, or “teeth,” that existing security dialogues 

do not. Further, and unlike the existing bilateral U.S. 
66

treaty alliances, a MLSA presents opportunities to welcome all states interested in working together to maintain regional security. Granted, creating a MLSA, and 

encouraging states to exercise the strategic patience to 

let it develop, will take time. However, ever-evolving 

Asia-Pacific dynamics present the United States a significant opportunity for regional security leadership.

The most significant risk is inaction. Although 

China has not yet established a regional security architecture that does not mean the United States should not 

do so. Strategically, the United States must determine 

whether silence regarding or inaction toward China 

advocating for its own regional security architecture 

potentially signals that 21st century Asia-Pacific security leadership belongs to China. Abdicating such 

leadership potentially threatens U.S. stature and influence within the region, arguably validating a power 

transition perception that China’s rise is at the expense 

of a declining United States. A further potential risk 

is whether extending “linkages among the spokes” 

beyond the current hub-and-spoke alliance system, 

(e.g., a Philippines-Japan-South Korea “link” where 

the United States is individually connected to each participant) increases the possibility that the United States 

may be pulled into a regional conflict “without any 

additional security benefits [of its own].”75 Addressing 

these risks within the MLSA is essential for mitigating 

their impact on U.S. security leadership and regional 

resolve.

CONCLUSION

The United States should lead the development of 

an Asia-Pacific multilateral security architecture that 

empowers existing regional forums and organizations, 
67

strengthens existing defense treaties and alliances, and 

encourages the development of new linkages between 

nations to advance regional stability and conflict prevention. Carefully considering China as a potential 

partner is essential, as doing so will advance trust 

among regional participants and counter perceptions 

that such an architecture purposely contains China’s 

rise. At the same time, gaining China’s participation 

may lessen observations of, and challenges inherent to, 

a great power rivalry between a rising China and an 

established United States. Ultimately, effective Asia-Pacific regional conflict prevention―a significant reason 

for developing a multilateral security architecture 

that evolves beyond mutual defense treaties―requires 

a joint U.S.-China partnership from the beginning. 

Doing so necessitates changed behaviors and expectations by both nations, as well as strategic patience 

to adjust to a near-peer partner environment. Simultaneously, an effective MLSA will provide enforcement mechanisms not currently available in existing 

regional security structures. Finally, developing a 

MLSA requires all instruments of national power―it is 

not a military-alone solution or requirement. Patience 

and trust will be necessary, especially since a U.S.-led 

MLSA is not intended, at least currently, to counter or 

oppose a specific threat, but instead to meet the complex security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region 

in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Victor D. Cha, Power Play: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2016, p. 3. See also Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. 

Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy, No. 

11, January 2011, p. 29, available from www.nbr.org/publications/
68

asia_policy/Preview/AP11_US_Alliance_preview.pdf, accessed February 20, 2017.

2. Cha, Power Play, p. 184. Essentially, the United States determined that “multilateralism was out . . . bilateralism, in.” For a 

background discussion on the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. council preparations and post-World War II U.S. efforts at multilateral Asia-Pacific regional security, see Christopher Van Hollen, 

“Background Paper: References in the Negotiation of the ANZUS 

Treaty To Broader Security Arrangements Affecting the Pacific 

Area,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Division of 

Historical Research, July 24, 1952, available from https://www.

trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/view.

php?documentVersion=both&documentid=70-6_26&documentYear=1

952&pagenumber=1, accessed December 23, 2016. By the beginning 

of 1951, however, the United States had decided that it was desirable to take a more active role in building a security system in the 

Pacific area. With this in mind, John Foster Dulles, Consultant to 

the Secretary of State, was sent to the Far East early in 1951 on a 

special mission, with the rank of Ambassador, with instructions 

to discuss a security arrangement to which the parties would be 

the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 

and perhaps Indonesia―in other words, all the nations exercising sovereignty over the so-called island chain stretching from 

the Aleutians to New Zealand, excluding Formosa (although in 

Manila, Dulles mentioned the possibility of including Formosa in 

the security arrangement under discussion).

3. Cha, Power Play, p. 3.

4. Recommended Talking Points―China (U), November 29, 

2016.

5. For a detailed listing of ASEAN’s aims and purposes, see 

Overview, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, available from 

http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview/, accessed March 19, 

2017.

6. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, February 24, 1976, available from http://asean.org/treaty-amitycooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/, accessed 

January 15, 2017. Article 2 provides: In their relations with one 

another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:
69

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 

 territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; 

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free 

 from external interference, subversion or coersion [sic]; 

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; 

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

7. Ibid.

8. U.S. Department of State, “United States Accedes to the 

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, July 22, 2009, available 

from https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126294.htm,

accessed January 15, 2017.

9. U.S. Department of State, “Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN),” available from https://www.state.gov/p/eap/

regional/asean/, accessed February 13, 2017. See also U.S. Department of State, “United States Accedes to the Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation in Southeast Asia.” According to then-Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton, “we believe that the United States must 

have strong relationships and a strong and productive presence 

here in Southeast Asia.”

10. Chung-in Moon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 7, 2001, available from https://www.

britannica.com/topic/ASEAN-Regional-Forum, accessed January 

15, 2017. The ARF was established at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference in 1993, and its 

inaugural meeting was held on July 25, 1994. See also ASEAN 

Regional Forum, “About the ASEAN Regional Forum,” available 

from http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html, accessed January 15, 2017. Note: As perspective on regional security, by 1993 

the large U.S. military presence in the Philippines had ended. For 

a general discussion on the U.S. military withdrawal from the 

Philippines, see David Sanger, “Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave 

Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay,” The New York Times, December 28, 1991, available from www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/

philippines-orders-us-to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html, 

accessed January 28, 2017. During treaty negotiations to keep the 

bases open, “the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty . . . after an 
70

impassioned debate in which the American military presence was 

assailed as a vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine 

sovereignty.”

11. ASEAN Regional Forum, “About the ASEAN Regional 

Forum.”

12. Ibid. Current ARF participants include: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, 

Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, 

Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 

Timor-Leste, United States, and Vietnam.

13. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Engagement in the 2015 

ASEAN Regional Forum,” Washington, DC: Bureau of Public 

Affairs, August 6, 2015, available from https://2009-2017.state.

gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/245759.htm, accessed January 15, 2017.

14. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, “About the ASEAN 

Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM),” February 6, 2017, available from https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/aboutadmm.html, accessed February 13, 2017.

15. Ibid.

16. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, “About the ASEAN 

Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus),” February 6, 2017, 

available from https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/aboutadmm-plus.html, accessed February 13, 2017.

17. Ibid. The ADMM-Plus Objectives, as outlined in the 

ADMM-Plus Concept Paper, adopted by the Second ADMM, Singapore, November 13-15, 2007, are:

• To benefit ASEAN member countries in building 

capacity to address shared security challenges, while 

cognisant of the differing capacities of various ASEAN 

countries;

• To promote mutual trust and confidence between 

defence establishments through greater dialogue and 

transparency;
71

• To enhance regional peace and stability through 

cooperation in defence and security, in view of the 

transnational security challenges the region faces;

• To contribute to the realization of an ASEAN Security 

Community which, as stipulated in the Bali Concord II, 

embodies ASEAN’s aspiration to achieve peace, stability, 

democracy and prosperity in the region where ASEAN 

member countries live at peace with one another and 

with the world at large;

• To facilitate the implementation of the Vientiane Action 

Programme, which calls for ASEAN to build a peaceful, 

secure and prosperous ASEAN, and to adopt greater 

outward-looking external relation strategies with our 

friends and Dialogue Partners.

18. Ibid.

19. Overview, Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

20. Chairman’s Statement of the 4th ASEAN-United States 

Summit, “Turning Vision into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN 

Community,” Vientiane, LAO PDR, September 8, 2016, p. 1, available from http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Chairmans-Statement-ofthe-4th-ASEAN-US-Summit1.pdf, accessed January 15, 2017.

21. ASEAN Secretariat’s Information Paper, “Overview of 

ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations,” January 4, 2016, available 

from www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/4Jan/Overview-ofASEAN-US-Dialogue-Relations-(4-Jan-2016).pdf, accessed December 4, 2016.

22. The Honourable Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 

“Chairman’s Statement of the First East Asia Summit Kuala 

Lumpur, December 14, 2005,” Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations, available from http://asean.org/?static_post=chairmans-statement-of-the-first-east-asia-summit-kuala-lumpur-14-

december-2005-2, accessed March 19, 2017. The first EAS was 

attended by “Heads of State/Government of ASEAN, Australia, 

the PRC, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 

New Zealand. Russia was invited as Guest of the Government of 

Malaysia.” Malaysia hosted and chaired this Summit.
72

23. John Pang, NTU, “The East Asia Summit: a platform for 

confidence building,” East Asia Forum, November 12, 2016, available from www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/12/the-east-asia-summit-aplatform-for-confidence-building/, accessed March 8, 2017. 

The EAS is by design a flexible forum for strategic dialogue 

and cooperation on the key issues facing the region. 

The leaders can shape the agenda with their personal 

interventions. The role of the United States is all the more 

prominent because the president attends, while China and 

Russia only send their premiers.

See also Kang Seung-woo, “East Asia Summit urges NK to abandon 

nuclear program,” The Korea Times, September 8, 2016, available 

from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/09/116_213780.

html, accessed March 19, 2017.

24. For a detailed discussion on the Six-Party Talks, see 

Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, “The Six Party Talks on North 

Korea’s Nuclear Program,” CFR Backgrounders, Washington, DC: 

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), September 30, 2013, available 

from www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclearprogram/p13593, accessed March 19, 2017. “Launched in 2003, the 

Six Party Talks are aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations involving China, the United States, 

North and South Korea, Japan, and Russia.” Essentially, the talks 

have met with little success.

25. For a discussion on the Japan-Russia “two-plus-two” 

talks, see Elaine Kurtenbach, Associated Press, “Japan, Russia 

bolster cooperation, urge NKorean restraint,” AP News, March 20, 

2017, available from https://www.apnews.com/f565f6d2dffa4782919c

c98368dd7c6a, accessed November 30, 2017.

26. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010 (as amended 

through February 15, 2016), p. 46, available from www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed February 18, 2017.

27. Frank G. Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of 

War,” 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s 

Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, Washington, DC: The 
73

Heritage Foundation, available from http://index.heritage.org/

military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/, accessed 

February 18, 2017.

28. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 

Public Law 106-65, 106th Congress, Washington, DC, October 5, 

1999, §1201. Section 1201(a) provides that the:

Secretary of Defense may not authorize any military-tomilitary exchange or contact described in subsection (b) to 

be conducted by the armed forces with representatives of 

the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of 

China if that exchange or contact would create a national 

security risk due to an inappropriate exposure specified in 

subsection (b).

Section 1201(c) provides that the limitations in subsection (a) do 

not apply to “any search-and-rescue or humanitarian operation 

or exercise.” See also Matthew Cox, “General Warns of North 

Korean Missile Threat, Talks China Visit,” Military.com, January 

25, 2017, available from www.military.com/daily-news/2017/01/25/

general-warns-north-korean-missile-threat-talks-china-visit.html, 

accessed February 19, 2017. Lieutenant General Robert Brown, 

U.S. Army Pacific commander, participated in a “visit to China 

as Army units took part in a disaster management exchange exercise there.” He said he met with many leaders during that trip. 

“We concentrated on what we had in common . . . [we] talked 

about Ebola and many [humanitarian assistance, disaster relief] 

and peacekeeping operations―other things we had in common.”

29. For an overview on the RIMPAC exercise and participants, 

see generally Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, “RIMPAC improves 

international cooperation,” available from www.cpf.navy.mil/

rimpac/, accessed March 28, 2017. See also Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, RIMPAC 2016, available from www.

public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/RIMPAC-2016.aspx, accessed March 

28, 2017. 

Held every 2 years by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet 

(PACFLT), and executed by Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet 

(C3F), RIMPAC is a multinational maritime exercise that 

takes place in and around the Hawaiian Islands. [RIMPAC 

2016] is the 25th in the series that began in 1971.
74

30. For an overview on Tillerson’s first trip to Asia, see Eli 

Watkins, “Nikki Haley on North Korea talks: US has ‘been there, 

done that’,” CNN, March 16, 2017, available from www.cnn.

com/2017/03/16/politics/nikki-haley-north-korea/index.html, accessed 

March 19, 2017. “We don’t want to get back into the six-party 

talks,” [UN Ambassador Nikki] Haley said, referring to the previous negotiating structure. “We’re not willing to do that. Been 

there, done that.” During this trip, Tillerson “derided the US 

approach to [North Korea] during the past 2 decades and pledged 

a new path.”

31. Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War.”

32. Ibid.

33. Zhou Fangyin, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese Perspective,” Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Version of Record online: January 16, 2016, p. 207, available from 

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12231/pdf, accessed 

December 22, 2016.

34. Ibid., p. 208.

35. Recommended Talking Points―China (U), November 29, 

2016.

36. Fangyin, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese 

Perspective,” p. 208.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Aaron Mehta, “A NATO to Contain China? Key US Commander Doesn’t See it,” DefenseNews, December 7, 2016, available 

from www.defensenews.com/articles/a-nato-to-contain-china-pacomhead-doesnt-see-it, accessed January 15, 2017.

40. Fangyin, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese 

Perspective,” p. 208.

41. Ibid., p. 209.
75

42. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Lessons of Henry Kissinger,” The 

Atlantic, December 2016, available from www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/archive/2016/12/the-lessons-of-henry-kissinger/505868/,

accessed January 10, 2017.

43. President Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept For 

New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Remarks at the Fourth 

Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, China, May 21, 2014, available 

from www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml, 

accessed January 16, 2017.

44. Fangyin, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese 

Perspective,” p. 212.

45. MFA News, “Assistant Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou 

Attends 5th EAS Workshop on Regional Security Architecture,” 

June 29, 2016, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/

t1376789.shtml, accessed February 20, 2017.

46. Ibid.

47. Xi, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in 

Security Cooperation.”

48. Liu Zhenmin, “Work together to improve regional 

security architecture and address common challenges,” public 

speech, 1st Plenary Session of The 7th Xiangshan Forum, Beijing, China, October 12, 2016, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/

mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1405158.shtml, accessed January 16, 2017. For a discussion on the SCO, see Eleanor Albert, 

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Washington, DC: 

Council on Foreign Relations, March 2009, available from 

www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883, 

accessed January 16, 2017. Founded in 2001, the SCO is composed 

of six member states, two ascending members, four observer 

nations, and six dialogue partners. Originally formed as a confidence building forum to demilitarize borders, the organization’s 

goals and agenda have since broadened to include increased military and [counterterrorism] cooperation and intelligence sharing. 

The SCO has also intensified its focus on regional economic initiatives like the recently announced integration of the China-led Silk 

Road Economic Belt and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. 
76

While some experts say the organization has emerged as an antiU.S. bulwark in Central Asia, others believe frictions among its 

members effectively preclude a strong, unified SCO. For a discussion on the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 

Measures in Asia, see About CICA, available from www.cica-china.

org/eng/gyyx_1/, accessed March 19, 2017. China currently holds 

the CICA presidency, and there are 26 member states; the United 

States is an observer.

CICA follows the principle of consensus . . . [and] is a forum 

for dialogues and consultations on regional security issues 

in Asia, with the main objective and purpose of enhancing 

cooperation through multilateral confidence-building 

measures towards promoting peace, security and stability in 

Asia.

49. Zhenmin, “Work together to improve regional security 

architecture and address common challenges.”

50. Ibid.

51. For a counter viewpoint/observation that China is essentially establishing its own hub-and-spoke system with “partner” 

countries through its “One Belt, One Road” and other initiatives, 

see Cha, Power Play, pp. 200-204.

52. For a discussion on the Five Principles, see Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Houston, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” June 28, 2004, available from 

http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140964.htm, accessed January 16, 2017. See also President Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security 

Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Remarks at 

the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, China, May 21, 2014, 

available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.

shtml, accessed January 16, 2017.

53. Xi, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in 

Security Cooperation.”

54. Scott A. Carpenter, “Limits to U.S.-China Mil-to-Mil 

Engagements Under the 2000 National Defense Authorization 

Act,” Small Wars Journal, August 16, 2015, available from http://
77

smallwarsjournal.com/print/27181, accessed February 20, 2017. The 

author further notes that:

While China forecasts that ‘the international situation will 

remain generally peaceful,’ they also predict profound 

changes in the security environment caused by intensifying 

international competition for the redistribution of power, 

rights, and interests and the threat of local wars due to 

regional conflicts.

55. United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of 

the Sea, China Declaration upon Ratification, June 7, 1996, available from www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_

declarations.htm#China after ratification, accessed January 16, 2017.

56. AsianLII, “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 

Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,” The Standing Committee of the People’s Republic of China, No. 55, Article 2, February 25, 1992, available from www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/

lotprocottsatcz739/, accessed March 26, 2017. For an overview of the 

July 2016 UNTLOS decision, see Award Decision, PCA Case No 

2013-19, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, before 

An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, between The 

Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, 

Permanent Court of Arbitration,” July 12, 2016, available from 

https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN20160712-Award.pdf, accessed January 16, 2017.

57. To be fair, China’s actions are not surprising or without 

precedent. As Graham Allison noted prior to the Permanent 

Court of Arbitration (PCA) issuing its 2016 award in the Philippines’ case against China, “none of the five permanent members 

of the [United Nations] Security Council have ever accepted any 

international court’s ruling when (in their view) it infringed their 

sovereignty or national security interests.” Further, China ultimately rejecting the 2016 PCA decision reflects, “what the other 

great powers have repeatedly done for decades.” Graham Allison, 

“Of Course China, Like All Great Powers, Will Ignore an International Legal Verdict,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2016, available from 

https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/of-course-china-like-all-great-powerswill-ignore-an-international-legal-verdict/, accessed March 26, 2017. 

As an additional outside viewpoint, China’s actions also present 
78

a cautionary observation for how China might administer its own 

MLSA: less “win-win” and more “China first” may become the 

mantra.

58. “Trump’s Speech to Congress: Video and Transcript,” The 

New York Times, February 28, 2017, available from https://www.

nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/trump-congress-video-transcript.

html?_r=1, accessed March 9, 2017.

59. Ibid.

60. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of 

Asia’s Regional Architecture,” p. 29. Professor Cha notes that 

from a multilateral security viewpoint, “previous U.S. disinterest 

in regional architecture at the end of the Cold War stemmed from 

an ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ mentality. Initially, there were 

concerns that regional initiatives were meant to undermine U.S. 

leadership.”

61. Cha, Power Play, p. 204.

62. For a general discussion of, and the U.S. Pacific Command 

commander’s observations on, Asia-Pacific security structures, 

see Mehta, “A NATO to Contain China? Key US Commander 

Doesn’t See it.” According to Admiral Harry Harris, “I do not 

believe we’re ever going to see a NATO in Asia.”

63. U.S. Helsinki Commission, “The Security Dimension,” 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, available 

from https://www.csce.gov/about-csce/helsinki-process-and-osce/

security-dimension, accessed March 19, 2017.

64. For a discussion on the U.S. alliance system as an “organic 

part of Asia’s . . . security landscape,” see Cha, Power Play, p. 205.

65. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, Cambridge, UK: Polity 

Press, 2004, p. 50.

66. See Bernard FW Loo, “China, the South China Sea, and 

ASEAN: Are we witnessing the impending end of multilateral 

security?” Military Studies at RSIS, July 14, 2012, available from 

https://rsismilitarystudies.wordpress.com/2012/07/14/896/, accessed 

February 18, 2017. Note: This paper’s author envisions a MLSA 
79

“bubble” for visual reference as an example of an overarching 

MLSA that encompasses and overlays the existing Asia-Pacific 

organizations shown on the graphic in Loo’s article “The Security 

Architecture of the Asia-Pacific,” including several not previously 

mentioned in this paper: Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC), 

US-Lower Mekong Initiative, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the 

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 

and ASEAN +3. His figure identifies the primary roles for each 

organization.

67. See generally Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 

Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015, p. 24, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_

national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed December 23, 2016. The 

author notes that, while the new administration has not yet published its own national security strategy (NSS), the 2015 NSS is 

instructive as it aligns regional security with U.S. leadership and 

resolve to support allies and partners.

68. Bob Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies,” public speech, Willard Hotel, 

Washington, DC, January 28, 2015.

69. United Nations, Charter, 1 UNTS XVI, art. 52, para. 1, 

October 24, 1945.

70. North Atlantic Treaty, 34 UNTS 243 (No. 541), Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_17120.htm, accessed December 4, 2016. Article 1 provides that:

the Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the 

United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which 

they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 

that international peace and security and justice are not 

endangered, and to refrain in their international relations 

from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 

with the purposes of the United Nations.

71. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security 

Cooperation,” January 2017, available from news.xinhuanet.com/
80

english/china/2017-01/11/c_135973695.htm, accessed February 20, 

2017.

72. Ibid.

73. For a discussion on Asia-Pacific countries “hedging” 

between the United States and China, see Van Jackson, “Asian 

Security after US Hegemony: Spheres of Influence and the Third 

Wave of Regional Order,” The Asian Forum, October 14, 2016, available from www.theasanforum.org/asian-security-after-us-hegemonyspheres-of-influence-and-the-third-wave-of-regional-order/#17, 

accessed February 20, 2017. Citing Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, 

and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian 

Security,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 14, No. 3, 

September 2014, pp. 331-356, the author notes that:

. . . military modernization represents only one indicator that 

Asian states—even those openly aligned with the United 

States—are adopting hedging strategies in their foreign 

policies. The hedging trend has been documented thoroughly 

elsewhere, but it is sufficient for purposes here to note that 

other indicators of hedging include: states simultaneously 

relying primarily on China for economic prosperity and the 

United States for security; a conspicuous absence of overt 

balancing or bandwagoning; and attempts to multilateralize 

security cooperation without taking on costly commitments 

or subscribing to rule enforcement mechanisms.

74. Dr. Greg Austin, telephone interview by author, October 

27, 2016. Dr. Austin is a Professor in the Australian Centre for 

Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, 

Australia, and concurrently serves as a Professorial Fellow with 

the EastWest Institute (EWI) in New York. As a counterpoint, Dr. 

Austin noted that being a peer-competitor is how one assesses relative power, and that China does not think that they are as close 

a competitor as some in the United States believe. He offered that 

by 2050, China may be a “2nd tier power, but not at U.S. level.” 

Impacting U.S. strategic analysis is the likelihood that U.S. confidence in its own power is perhaps not as high as other nations’ 

confidence in U.S. power, which, in turn, impacts the near-peer 

competitor analysis.
81

75. Cha, Power Play, p. 184. See also Richard Haass, “Desert 

Storm, the Last Classic War,” Op-Ed, Council on Foreign Relations, July 31, 2015, available from www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/

desert-storm-last-classic-war/p36857, accessed March 10, 2017. The 

author notes that: 

multilateralism constrains the U.S., but it can yield big 

dividends. Broad participation ensures a degree of burdensharing. . . . Multilateralism [in the example of the first Gulf 

War] can also generate political support within the U.S. and 

around the world; it supplies a source of legitimacy often 

judged missing when the U.S. acts alone.

83

CHAPTER 4

THE LARGEST TIGER: 

INDIA IN THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD 

INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC

Todd D. Carroll 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

India is the world’s most populous democracy and 

shares many western values and political institutions 

with the United States. While it has been a rocky relationship for many years since India gained independence in 1947, the trend has been improving for the past 

decade and a half. This chapter explores ways in which 

the United States can best support the development of 

India while coaxing it to play a bigger role in the IndoAsia-Pacific (IAP). India is especially well suited to 

check China’s assertiveness, as no one can claim India 

is an outsider meddling in Asian affairs. With a population poised to become the world’s largest in 2028, 

and an economy that could surpass that of the United 

States by 2050, India will be the most important player 

in the decades to come in maintaining cooperation, stability, and security in the IAP. To guide India’s rise as a 

great power that respects and defends the rules-based 

international order, the United States should engage 

India along four lines of effort: military, diplomatic, 

commercial, and people-to-people.
84

INTRODUCTION

India is the world’s most populous democracy 

and a rising power. Although it shares many western 

values and political institutions with the United States, 

the U.S.-India relationship had been rocky for many 

years since the latter gained independence in 1947. The 

past 15 years, however, have witnessed an impressive 

improvement in the two nations’ relations. With a U.S.-

friendly Prime Minister in Narendra Modi, the time is 

ripe for the United States to do everything possible 

to assist India in harnessing the power of its growing population and guide its path toward becoming a 

responsible great power that respects and defends the 

rules-based international order.

Perhaps the best indication of the rising importance of India is its economic turnaround since the liberalization of its economy in 1991. Since these reforms 

went into effect, the gross domestic product (GDP) of 

India has more than quadrupled, growing at an average rate of 7 percent a year.1

 Economists expect this 

trend to continue, predicting that India’s GDP will 

rise from $7.28 trillion in 2014 in terms of purchasing 

power parity (PPP, or real GDP adjusted for price level 

differences across countries) to $42.21 trillion in 2050, 

and likely displacing the United States as the world’s 

second largest economy.2

With a political and judicial system developed 

during the British colonial period, India shares many 

western values with the United States. One might 

assume this would make the two powers natural allies, 

but for much of India’s post-independence history, 

this has not been the case. During the Cold War, India 

was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, which 

was a group of third-world countries that refrained 
85

from siding with either the United States or the Soviet 

Union. However, as this movement gradually weakened, India drifted closer to the Soviet Union while 

the United States built stronger strategic relations with 

Pakistan and China.3 Much of India’s foreign policy 

calculus is focused on what is happening in Pakistan, 

with which India has gone to war four times. There are 

still extremely high tensions over the disputed Kashmir region. As recently as September 2016, 18 Indian 

soldiers were killed by armed militants in the garrison 

town of Uri. High-ranking Indian officials, including 

the Home Minister, have accused the Pakistani government of being complicit in the attacks.4

 India had 

a brief war with China as well in 1962 over their disputed boundary in the Himalayas, which remains 

problematic to this day. Sino-Indian relations were further strained due to China’s assistance to Pakistan in 

the development of its nuclear weapons program and 

continued aid to Pakistan’s civil nuclear program.5

Indo-American relations declined further as a result 

of India’s underground nuclear test program. In 1998, 

the Clinton administration responded with economic 

sanctions,6 even encouraging Beijing to play a bigger 

role in ensuring peace and security in the South Asian 

region.7

Former President George W. Bush took a different 

approach toward India. His administration was more 

suspicious of a rapidly rising China than the Clinton 

administration. Feeling that China was trying to alter 

Asia’s balance of power in its own favor,8 Bush engineered a lower-key pivot to Asia. Part of this effort was 

to engage India. His former National Security Advisor 

and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote, “India 

is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be 

in America’s, too.”9 President Bush lifted sanctions 
86

against India because they were “not in the national 

security interests of the United States.”10 The strategic 

relationship was furthered with the announcement of 

the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative in 

2005 (approved by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency [IAEA] in 2008).11

Following former President Barack Obama’s inauguration, Indo-U.S. relations began to drift as the new 

administration pursued a closer relationship with 

China. Obama made early important concessions to 

China in the realm of human rights in the hope of 

developing a closer partnership, perhaps even a “G2” 

aimed at stabilizing global issues.12 Indian sensitivities 

were further rattled as the former President did not 

include Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his first 

wave of introductory phone calls to other foreign leaders, including Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.13

In November 2009, in a major policy speech in Asia, 

Obama vowed to “strengthen old alliances and build 

new partnerships” in the IAP but failed to include India 

on the list of countries to which he was referring.14

By mid-2010, once again India became a part of 

the U.S. strategic calculus. William J. Burns, the Under 

Secretary of State for Political Affairs, affirmed this 

when he stated, “India’s strength and progress on the 

world stage is deeply in the strategic interest of the 

United States.” Michele Flournoy, the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy, added “India’s success is very 

much in America’s national interest” and that “increasingly our specific security interests are converging.”15

In November of that year, Obama delivered a very 

well received address to the Indian Parliament, in 

which he endorsed India’s bid for a permanent United 

Nations (UN) Security Council seat. Prior to the speech, 

most Indians felt Obama placed their interests behind 
87

those of regional rivals Pakistan and China. Afterwards, very few held the same opinion.16

In 2011, the Obama administration rolled out the 

“Pivot to Asia” or Strategic Rebalance, a long-term U.S. 

effort to spur domestic revival and renovation as well to 

keep peace in the world’s most dynamic region.17 India 

figured to play a prominent role in the rebalance. With 

these actions, Indo-U.S. relations were back on a positive track. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) considers 

India and the United States to be natural allies, whose 

relations “constitute the key element in the architecture of tomorrow’s democratized world order.”18 With 

the BJP rising to power in 2014 under the leadership of 

Modi, the Obama administration wanted to redouble 

the efforts toward consolidating gains and taking the 

relationship to the next level.

To guide India’s rise as a great power that respects 

and defends the rules-based international order, the 

United States should engage India along four lines 

of effort: military, diplomatic, commercial, and people-to-people. Each of these lines of effort is discussed 

in more detail.

MILITARY LINE OF EFFORT

Former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Ashton 

Carter played a critical role in advancing this line of 

effort. Carter devoted more personal attention to his 

Indian counterpart, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, than any previous SECDEF. During regular 

meetings in both India and the United States, the two 

developed a very strong personal relationship.19 In an 

encouraging sign of how the new SECDEF will treat 

the relationship, James Mattis, in his testimony before 
88

the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that 

“The U.S. policy should continue to pursue a long-term 

strategic relationship with India” and he “will focus on 

what steps can be taken to bolster the overall defense 

relationship.”20

Some of Ash Carter’s most important work has 

included the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the status of India as a “Major Defense 

Partner.” In 2012, as Deputy SECDEF, Carter undertook an initiative to provide increased senior-level 

engagement to get beyond the legal and bureaucratic 

obstacles to defense technology and trade with India.21

This initiative became the DTTI, which incorporated 

the ability to co-produce weapons in India, along with 

the transfer of technology. Carter’s efforts also paved 

the way for naming India a Major Defense Partner in 

June of 2016, further easing technology sharing “at a 

level commensurate with that of its closest allies and 

partners.”22

While the DTTI is an incredible step in the right 

direction of improving the military relationship and 

meshes nicely with Modi’s “Make in India” campaign, 

more can be done. While relaxing the standards for 

technology exchange is beneficial, the current levels 

of sharing impede greater sales and undermine the 

potential of the relationship. Russia, which provides 

70 percent of India’s defense imports, provides strategically sensitive technology in hardware ranging from 

missiles, to ships, to nuclear submarines, to fifth-generation fighter aircraft.23 As of now, co-production 

efforts between the United States and India are limited 

to only low-end weapons such as the Raven unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) and reconnaissance modules for 

the C-130J aircraft.24 The Trump administration should 

work with Congress to remove barriers in order to allow 
89

for greater transfer and sharing of technology without 

intrusive end-use monitoring agreements, something 

India will absolutely not accept.25 Until this happens, 

Russia will remain India’s main defense supplier. This 

is important as co-production and technology sharing 

accelerate Indian development, and as a partner with 

the United States, interoperability is key to the effectiveness of multinational military operations.

As India builds its capabilities through advanced 

systems acquired from either the United States or 

Russia, bilateral defense cooperation could be furthered by allowing Indian service members access to 

U.S. training. Teaching India’s warfighters the knowledge the U.S. military has gained over time in some 

of their recently gained technologies, such as UAV or 

airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) employment, 

and synchronizing tactics, techniques and procedures 

(TTP) would make an enormous difference to India’s 

ability to use these new capabilities effectively.26 By 

providing more advanced warfighting systems and 

training India’s operators in U.S. service schools, the 

United States will exponentially increase India’s ability to be a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean 

and Western Pacific. An economically vibrant and militarily strong India will be more inclined to look after 

its interests regionally, the foremost of which is peace 

and stability. Beyond technology sharing, improving interoperability, and synchronizing procedures, 

there is one other significant area in which the United 

States could do more to enhance the bilateral security 

relationship.

Joint military exercises have become a common 

occurrence between the United States and India. The 

United States has been a long-time participant with 

India in the Malabar Naval Exercise and India has 
90

contributed warships to the U.S. Navy-led Rim of 

the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise since 2014. In fact, the 

United States cooperates with India in more military 

exercises than it does with any other country, and 

across all five military branches.27 This provides outstanding training for both sides as it is not often that 

U.S. military units are able to interact with Russian 

hardware. These exercises not only strengthen Indian 

forces, they also help identify shortcomings in U.S. 

employment procedures. At Cope India in 2004, some 

U.S. Air Force tactics were exposed as ineffectual and 

forced revisions in the way the Air Force fights.28 The 

incorporation of other friendly regional countries such 

as Japan and Australia only magnifies the benefits. 

However, exercises are for the most part still relatively 

simple and often times overly scripted. To maximize 

effectiveness, these exercises must become more complex and involve the best combatant capabilities on 

both sides.29 As defense analyst Ashley Tellis notes, 

“taking the gains from familiarization and common 

TTPs,” as discussed above, “and applying them in 

combined operations represents the acme of defense 

cooperation.”30

DIPLOMATIC LINE OF EFFORT

Diplomacy is another area where inroads could be 

made to aid India’s development and strengthen the 

bilateral relationship. India’s older statesmen, insistent 

upon state intervention in the economy, a “nonaligned” 

stance to world affairs, and a distrust of close relations 

with the United States, are giving way to a younger 

generation that is friendlier toward the West due to the 

two nations’ many cultural ties and a wish for India 

to play a greater role in world affairs.31 A window has 

opened for greater opportunity to expand connections. 
91

There are multiple areas in which the United States can 

support India’s rise, facilitating the dream of India’s 

younger generation that the country play a larger role, 

while providing the additional voice of a great power 

with common, shared values on international affairs.

As was previously mentioned, since 2010, former 

President Obama supported India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This was a very 

successful, trust-building move, and the United States 

should continue to push for it.

Since the early 1990s, India has sought membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

forum as part of its “Look East” policy, in which it 

tries to integrate further with Pacific Rim and East 

Asian economies, but has been repeatedly denied.32

The United States invited India as an observer for the 

2011 APEC meetings hosted by the United States in 

Hawaii and has supported India’s accession to membership.33 The United States needs to continue to press 

for Indian membership here and in other groups such 

as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 

which would allow for greater exchanges of defense 

technology, and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), 

which would enable India to expand its civilian atomic 

energy sector.

In addition, the United States could offer assistance 

to the Indian government with expertise and programs 

for combating corruption, alleviating poverty, homeland security, improving agricultural practices and 

women’s empowerment. Corruption is rampant in 

India; by some estimates, India’s underground economy could be half of the country’s GDP.34 In fact, on 

the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business scale, India 

ranks 130 out of 190 nations.35
92

Technical assistance could also be offered to support 

Indian programs to fight corruption, such as Modi’s 

attempts at a cashless society to combat exploitative 

middlemen from collecting fees on monies intended 

for the poor. To attract the investment and manufacturing required to employ India’s vast population, 

corruption has to be reduced. Poverty is pervasive in 

India, and has only increased with globalization, providing another reason why the country so badly needs 

investment.36 Creating jobs through investment is how 

India harnesses the power of its population dividend 

and would greatly reduce poverty, lessen instability, 

and help eliminate the barriers and special interests 

that paralyze the central government. Breaking down 

the caste system and improving education and health 

care could diminish the crushing effects of poverty. 

Homeland security and terrorism are among the top 

concerns of the Indian citizenry, and these are certainly 

areas where the United States has much expertise to 

offer.

Agriculture in India is notoriously underdeveloped 

and forms a massive protectionist-voting bloc that stifles reform. Over half of India’s total employment is 

involved in agriculture (in 2010, India was 51 percent 

compared to just 2 percent in the United States);37 by 

enhancing agricultural productivity and competitiveness, India could overcome political resistance to free 

trade and build the type of economy it needs to grow. 

Enlarging opportunities for women and bringing them 

into the labor force could raise India’s GDP growth by 

as much as two percentage points a year.38 For India 

to grow into the world-class economy it wishes to be, 

these factors need to be addressed.
93

COMMERCIAL LINE OF EFFORT

To advance and broaden the bilateral economic 

relationship between the two countries, an emphasis 

should be placed on cooperation at the level of individual companies and states while waiting for progress 

on cooperation between the national governments.39

Some Indian state governments provide more business-friendly environments than the national government. Notably, Gujarat, where Modi was the chief 

minister, realized annual GDP gains of 10 percent 

during his tenure from 2001-2012.40 Other business-oriented states, such as Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, 

have been success stories, while less open states have 

languished. Indian states can neutralize national trade 

barriers with incentives, and many have the size to 

qualify by themselves as high-priority customers for 

American companies.41 The U.S. Government could 

help facilitate greater investment in India by lessening the burden of taxation on U.S. companies that 

repatriate profits. This would encourage companies to 

do business in India while keeping more earnings to 

reinvest at home, benefitting both countries. The large 

market and incredible potential has many companies hoping to gain a foothold in a burgeoning India; 

proper incentives could give U.S. companies an advantage over fierce international competitors.

If India can develop and take advantage of its population dividend, it will be the world’s largest free 

market, and a critical one for sustaining the American 

economic engine. Creating barriers to the greater foreign 

investment required for India to become an economic 

powerhouse are its rampant corruption, complex and 

lengthy investment and business approval processes, 

antiquated land acquisition and labor laws, poor contract enforcement, and protectionist policies for its 
94

manufacturing and agriculture sectors.42 The protectionist policies and other trade barriers harken back 

to the time of India’s independence, when Indians felt 

the need to support their fledgling industries.43 What 

would be most beneficial to both the United States and 

India would be a free-trade agreement (FTA) and a 

high-quality bilateral investment treaty (BIT). An FTA 

would significantly enhance the present unimpressive trade numbers between two economies of such 

size, valued at only $66 billion in 2015.44 A high-quality BIT, one that included intellectual property rights 

as investors look for transparency and rule of law,45

would bring massive investment and new companies to India. These investments and the jobs they will 

bring are required for India’s economy to develop and 

sustain fiscal health for the long term. Talks on these 

initiatives will ebb and flow due to poorly-conceived 

existing policy and reticence within parliament, but 

Modi urgently wants these measures. The United 

States should continue to press on these reforms but 

give the Prime Minister the space, time, and technical assistance he requires as he works to convince the 

opposition of the benefits of such agreements.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE LINE OF EFFORT

People-to-people ties, much like military-to-military cooperation, can be of great benefit to advancing cooperation between the United States and India. 

Over time, as Indians and Americans interact and 

gain greater appreciation for each other’s cultures, the 

relations between the two nations should improve, 

fostering understanding and communication.46 While 

we have a strong and vibrant Indian immigrant population of 2.4 million47 in the United States, the second 
95

largest immigrant population behind Mexico, the U.S. 

Government can facilitate greater human contacts 

between our two nations to enhance the partnership 

and aid India’s development.

While programs are in place to improve educational and worker exchanges, improvements could be 

made. The U.S.-India Education Foundation (USIEF) is 

an outstanding program that has provided 19,000 students from the United States and India the opportunity 

to study in the other country since program inception 

in 1950.48 Every effort should be made to continue 

and expand programs such as this to increase people-to-people ties. When it comes to worker exchanges, 

much more can be done, which will be explored further 

below. It is imperative that people be allowed to travel 

between the countries to provide the innovations and 

cultural and economic ties both need to compete and 

thrive in an increasingly connected and competitive 

world.

In recent years, stories highlighting the horrors 

of outsourcing have come out in the press and have 

taken hold of the American consciousness. In turn, 

constituents have pressed their representatives to take 

action that in some cases have hurt the advancement 

of human ties between the United States and India. 

The progression of these crucial relations is most damaged once policy and law impose barriers to H-1B and 

L-1 visas, which Indians use far more than any other 

nationality to live and work in the United States. Both 

visas are nonimmigrant visas that allow companies to 

temporarily employ foreign workers.

H1-Bs require a bachelor’s degree or equivalent and 

are issued for those going to work in a specialty field. 

L-1s require no specific skill, but the worker must work 

for a multinational company and have been employed 
96

by that company for 1 year in their home nation.49 H-1B 

and L-1 visas normally work on a reciprocity schedule, 

meaning if a foreign government charges a U.S. citizen a fee for a visa, the U.S. Government will charge 

the same fee.50 Rhetoric about outsourcing has turned 

into more frequent visa application rejections and 

increased fees, which exceedingly affect information 

technology (IT) firms due to their significant international presence.51 The IT field is a top Indian industry 

generating over $150 billion annually, more than half 

of which results from business being done with North 

America.52 American fees and rejection rates for Indian 

visas have both risen sharply, in contrast to treatment 

of workers of other nationalities.53

Some of the anger is warranted, because some 

U.S. companies, such as Disney, have been accused 

of replacing American workers with immigrants to 

save money and are responsible for the rise of “body 

shops.”54 Body shops are contracting companies that 

sponsor workers on H-1B visas and illegally subcontract the workers out to other companies using doctored resumes.55 The body shop can then report it 

never displaced American workers since the sub-contracting employer does not need to report it hired any 

H-1B workers.56

This policy should extend to those with degrees in 

science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) or 

other defined fields where the United States is lacking 

trained people. About a quarter of all start-up companies in engineering and technology are founded by 

foreign-born entrepreneurs, and of those, 33.2 percent 

were from India. In fact, Indians founded more engineering and technology firms than immigrants born 

in the next nine immigrant-founder countries combined.57 Keeping opportunities open for immigrants 
97

is key to maintaining a vibrant and growing economy 

while advancing relations by building cultural affinity 

between the United States and India. While some good 

legislation, such as the Stopping Trained in America Ph.D.s From Leaving the Economy Act of 2015 

(STAPLE Act), have been proposed, they have not been 

enacted. The U.S. Government needs to pass such legislation while encouraging India to liberalize its labor 

laws to bring in the global talent it desperately needs 

to expand Indian corporations and provide additional 

jobs to employ its burgeoning youth population.

It may seem counterintuitive for India to send its 

most talented innovators to the United States, but in 

the long run, such a move greatly assists Indian development. The talent networks remaining in India will 

gain access to valuable knowledge and technological networks abroad.58 Additionally, many expatriates will eventually return home, empowered by new 

ideas, experience, and connections to play a direct role 

in India’s development.59

Those individuals with people-to-people ties or 

simply a strong interest in furthering the partnership 

between the United States and India can do their part 

by pressing government officials on the need to revise 

policies, which restrict this critical exchange. As Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and 

Central Asian Affairs, noted in 2008:

We’ve had periods of excitement between the United States 

and India before. The bubbles burst, the enthusiasm is 

turned to disappointment. What’s to make this different? 

And, for those of us in government, how do we make it 

different this time? My answer to the first question is: 

YOU. You’re the ones who make it different: the students, 

the trans-oceanic families, the academics, the doctors, the 

business people. You are the foundation and the dynamic 

between the United States and India. And, what can 
98

governments do to help you? Listen to you, please tell us 

how to open doors and remove obstacles. We’ll help you 

find even more exciting opportunities.60

CONCLUSION

A strong and thriving India is in the best long-term 

interest of the United States. As traditional allies and 

partners in the West see their relative power decline, 

the United States will need new partners with strong 

voices that are willing to defend the existing international rules-based order and to reinforce acceptable 

norms. No single country has an advantage or potential that is even close to that of India. By focusing on 

these four lines of effort—military, diplomatic, economic, and people-to-people—the United States can 

best assist Indian development and guide India’s path 

toward becoming a responsible world power. India’s 

rise can be exemplary to other developing nations, 

demonstrating that democracy and open societies will 

work better than authoritarian alternatives. Additionally, India’s extensive connections with China will 

help encourage them to work within the rules-based 

system rather than outside of it. For now, the United 

States should encourage India to do more as a partner in maintaining regional security, for in the longterm, India may be the strongest guarantor of peace 

and prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It will be an 

extensive and challenging process—relationships take 

a long time to build, and the United States cannot be 

dissuaded by short-term disagreements that will inevitably arise. In the end, a strong bilateral relationship 

will pay dividends far greater than any sacrifice either 

country will have to make to achieve it.
99

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. “One more push,” The Economist, July 21, 2011, available 

from http://www.economist.com/node/18988536, accessed November 26, 2016.

2. John Hawksworth and Danny Chan, “The World in 2050,” 

London, UK: Economics and Policy Team, PricewaterhouseCoopers, February 2015, available from https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/

issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf#page3, 

accessed November 26, 2015.

3. Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, New York: Hachette Book Group, 2016, p. 251.

4. Ravi Agrawal, “Could India and Pakistan go to war?” CNN, 

September 29, 2016, available from www.cnn.com/2016/09/21/asia/

india-pakistan-kashmir-conflict/index.html, accessed November 24, 

2016.

5. Rohan Joshi, “China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” The Diplomat, February 16, 2015, available from 

https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-nonproliferation/, accessed November 27, 2016.

6. “U.S. imposes sanctions on India,” CNN, May 13, 1998, 

available from www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/,

accessed December 1, 2016.

7. Mohammad Samir Hussain, “India-United States Strategic 

Relations: China as a Factor,” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, 

Iss. 2, 2012, p. 86.

8. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000, p. 56.

9. Ibid.

10. “US lifts India and Pakistan sanctions,” BBC News, 

September 23, 2001, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

americas/1558860.stm, accessed December 1, 2016.
100

11. “U.S.-India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” U.S. Department 

of State Archive, 2001-2009: Bureau of South and Central Asian 

Affairs, October 2008, available from https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/

sca/c17361.htm, accessed November 27, 2016.

12. Peter Feaver and Inonut Papescu, “Is Obama’s Foreign 

Policy Different From George W. Bush’s?” E-International Relations, August 3, 2012, available from www.e-ir.info/2012/08/03/

is-obamas-foreign-policy-different-to-bushs/, accessed December 1, 

2016.

13. David J. Karl, “U.S.-India Relations: The way Forward,” 

Orbis, Vol. 56, Iss. 2, 2012, p. 313.

14. Speech of President Barack H. Obama at Suntory Hall, 

Tokyo, Japan, November 14, 2009, trans. by Office of the Press 

Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” The White 

House, President Barack Obama, November 14, 2009, available 

from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-barack-obama-suntory-hall, accessed November 30, 2016.

15. Karl, pp. 313-314.

16. Scott Wilson and Emily Wax, “Obama endorses India 

for U.N. Security Council seat,” The Washington Post, November 8, 2010, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/08/AR2010110807129.html, accessed 

November 27, 2016.

17. Campbell, p. 1.

18. Karl, p. 316.

19. Ryan Browne, “Carter looks to boost India ties as 

China rises,” CNN, December 7, 2016, available from www.cnn.

com/2016/12/07/politics/india-military-ties-ash-carter-china-trump/

index.html, accessed December 10, 2016.

20. Press Trust of India, “US’ relationship with India of utmost 

importance: General James Mattis,” The Economic Times, January 

12, 2017, available from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/

defence/us-relationship-with-india-of-utmost-importance-generaljames-mattis/articleshow/56504083.cms, accessed January 14, 2017.
101

21. “U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative 

(DTTI),” Office of the Under SECDEF for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics International Cooperation, n.d., available from 

www.acq.osd.mil/ic/DTTI.html, accessed December 2, 2016.

22. Joe Gould, “US Names India ‘Major Defense Partner’,” 

Defense News, June 7, 2016, available from www.defensenews.

com/story/defense/2016/06/07/us-names-india-major-defensepartner/85571518/, accessed December 5, 2016.

23. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, US Advance Strategic Relations,” Defense News, January 28, 2015, available from www.

defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/01/28/

india-obama-modi-dtti-us-agreement-weapons-coproduce-bilateralrussia/22457599/, accessed December 5, 2016.

24. Ibid.

25. Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai 

Rajagopalan, James J. Carafano, Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis, and 

Derek Scissors, “Beyond the Plateau in U.S.-India Relations,” The 

Heritage Foundation, April 26, 2013, available from www.heritage.

org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, 

accessed December 1, 2016.

26. Ashley J. Tellis, “Back to First Principles: Realizing the 

Promise of U.S.-Indian Defense Ties,” Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, December 10, 2015, available from http://

carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/10/back-to-first-principles-realizingpromise-of-u.s.-indian-defense-ties-pub-62245, accessed December 5, 

2016.

27. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on 

U.S.-India Security Cooperation,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 2011, available from https://www.

defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20111101_NDAA_Report_on_

US_India_Security_Cooperation.pdf, accessed November 30, 2016.

28. Dario Leone, “Cope India: When India’s Russian Jets 

Achieved a Surprising 9:1 Kill Ratio Against U.S. F-15s,” The 

Aviationist, May 2, 2014, available from https://theaviationist.

com/2014/05/02/cope-india-2004-results/, accessed December 4, 

2016.
102

29. Tellis.

30. Ibid.

31. Anja Manuel, This Brave New World: India, China, and The 

United States, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016, pp. 36, 171.

32. Ankit Panda, “Is India’s APEC Membership on the Table 

at this Year’s Summit?,” The Diplomat, September 8, 2015, available 

from https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/is-indias-apec-membership-onthe-table-at-this-years-summit/, accessed December 8, 2016.

33. Ibid.

34. Liz Zuliani, “The Cost of Corruption in India,” Economy Watch, April 18, 2011, available from www.economywatch.

com/economy-business-and-finance-news/the-cost-of-corruption-inindia.19-04.html, accessed December 13, 2016.

35. “Doing Business: Ease of Doing Business in India,” The 

World Bank, n.d., available from www.doingbusiness.org/data/

exploreeconomies/india, accessed December 13, 2016.

36. “Poverty in India: Causes, Effects, Injustice & Exclusion,” 

October 15, 2013, Poverties, available from www.poverties.org/blog/

poverty-in-india, accessed December 11, 2016.

37. International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database, 

“Data: Employment in agriculture (% of total employment),” The 

World Bank, March 2017, available from https://data.worldbank.

org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?view=chart, accessed December 4, 

2017.

38. Manuel, p. 150.

39. Laveesh Bhandari, Jeremy Carl, Bibek Debroy, Michelle 

Kaffenberger, Pravakar Sahoo, and Derrick Scissors, “Unleashing the Market in the India-U.S. Economic Relationship, Part 1,” 

Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, January 7, 2013, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/unleashingthe-market-in-the-india-us-economic-relationship-part-1, accessed 

December 17, 2016.
103

40. “The Gujarat model,” The Economist, January 8, 

2015, available from www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21638147-how-modi-nomics-was-forged-one-indias-mostbusiness-friendly-states, accessed December 14, 2016.

41. Bhandari et al.

42. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, “2013 Investment Climate Statement,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, February 2013, available from https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/

othr/ics/2013/204659.htm, accessed December 14, 2016.

43. Manuel, p. 213.

44. “Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with India,” United 

States Census Bureau, n.d., available from https://www.census.gov/

foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html#2015, accessed December 13, 2016.

45. Sachin Parashar, “India, US agree to restart talks on bilateral 

investment treaty,” The Times of India, January 12, 2015, available 

from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-US-agree-torestart-talks-on-bilateral-investment-treaty/articleshow/45846021.cms, 

accessed December 20, 2016.

46. David W. Kearn, Jr., “Toward Alliance or Ambivalence: 

A Theoretical Assessment of U.S.-India Relations,” India Review, 

Vol. 13, No. 2, 2014, p. 138.

47. “Largest U.S. Immigrant Groups over Time, 1960-Present,” Migration Policy Institute, n.d., available from www.

migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/largest-immigrantgroups-over-time, accessed December 11, 2016.

48. “About the Fulbright Program,” United States-India Educational Foundation, 2011, available from http://www.usief.org.in/

About-USIEF/About-the-Fulbright-Program.aspx, accessed February 

4, 2017.

49. “Working in the United States: Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

n.d., available from https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/

temporary-nonimmigrant-workers, accessed March 7, 2017.
104

50. “U.S. Visa: Reciprocity and Civil Documents by Country,” Travel.State.Gov, n.d., available from https://travel.state.gov/

content/travel/en/us-visas/Visa-Reciprocity-and-Civil-Documents-byCountry.html, accessed March 8, 2017.

51. Margherita Stancati, “India to Escalate U.S. Visa Row,” 

India Real Time, blog of The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2012, 

available from https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/04/27/indiato-escalate-u-s-visa-row/, accessed February 5, 2016.

52. Ananya Bhattacharya, “Will the H-1B be worth it for Indian 

IT firms if the US overhauls its work-visa programs?” Quartz 

India, January 31, 2017, available from https://qz.com/899306/willthe-h-1b-be-worth-it-for-indian-it-firms-if-the-us-overhauls-its-workvisa-programs/, accessed March 8, 2017.

53. Bhandari et al.

54. Julia Preston, “Lawsuits Claim Disney Colluded to 

Replace U.S. Workers With Immigrants,” The New York Times, January 25, 2016, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/

us/lawsuit-claims-disney-colluded-to-replace-us-workers-withimmigrants.html?_r=0, accessed December 22, 2016.

55. Alessandria Masi, “The Companies Scamming America’s 

H-1B Worker Visa System,” Vocativ, February 3, 2014, available 

from www.vocativ.com/money/business/theyll-sponsor-americandream-might-cost-soul/, accessed December 22, 2016.

56. Shari B. Hochberg, “United States-India Relations: Reconciling the H-1B Visa Hike and Framework for Cooperation on 

Trade and Investment,” Pace International Law Review, January 1, 

2012, pp. 244-245.

57. Vivek Wadhwa, Anna Lee Saxenian, and F. Daniel 

Siciliano, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Then 

and Now,” Kansas City, Missouri: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, October 2, 2012, available from www.

kauffman.org/what-we-do/research/immigration-and-the-americaneconomy/americas-new-immigrant-entrepreneurs-then-and-now, 

accessed December 18, 2016.
105

58. Ajay Agrawal, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale, “Brain 

Drain or Brain Bank? The Impact of Skilled Emigration on 

Poor-Country Innovation,” NBER Working Paper No. 14592, 

Cambridge, MA: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 

December 2008, available from www.nber.org/papers/w14592, 

accessed December 18, 2016.

59. Karl, p. 326.

60. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Richard A. Boucher, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of 

the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin, Las 

Vegas, Nevada,” U.S. Department of State 2001-2009 Archive, 

June 27, 2008, available from https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/

rls/2008/106476.htm, accessed December 23, 2016.

107

CHAPTER 5

JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RENAISSANCE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Neil J. Owens 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Japan has responded to what it sees as an increasingly unfavorable strategic situation by implementing a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” policy. As the 

Trump administration develops its new Asia-Pacific 

policy, how should the United States approach the 

U.S.-Japan alliance?

The Japanese perspective is that it needs to assume 

a greater international leadership role, strengthen its 

alliance with the United States, and improve the Joint 

Self Defense Force’s deterrent effect. Japan’s increased 

international role will present some risk to the United 

States, but the biggest risk would be to allow the 

U.S.-Japan alliance to atrophy.

The United States should continue to encourage Japan to assume an increased international role 

and pave the way for Japan’s new policy by facilitating a closer Japan-South Korea relationship. The 

United States and Japan should also renegotiate the 

2006 Realignment Roadmap that would result in the 

reduction of U.S. combat power in Japan. A successful renegotiation would result in a plan that reduces 

the impact of U.S. bases on the Okinawa community, 

thus maintaining the long-term political viability of a 
108

forward-deployed U.S. military posture while maintaining the current level of deterrence. Finally, the 

United States should encourage Japan to continue 

its existing public discussion on the regional security environment and on the appropriate role for the 

United States-Japan alliance to play within it. The ability of the Japanese public to identify the link between 

the U.S. military presence and Japan’s national security will likely serve to strengthen public support for 

the alliance.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2016, Donald Trump shocked American political culture by securing an upset electoral 

victory over Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton.1

Former Secretary of State Clinton held views representative of those within the U.S. foreign policy establishment and was expected to continue former President 

Barack Obama’s strategic “Rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. Of the many questions that have emerged 

from Trump’s unexpected victory, some of the most 

important involve what his presidency will mean for 

U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. What policy approach will the 

new administration take? What part will Japan play 

within it?

Japan is a major power in the Asia-Pacific. An 

advanced industrial nation that has been on the forefront of cutting-edge technological development and 

design for decades, it possesses the world’s third 

largest economy and exports advanced manufactured items worldwide.2

 Japan is a successful liberal 

democracy and shares U.S. views on the importance of 

democracy, human rights, and the existing rules-based 

international system. Although it has traditionally 
109

followed a modest approach to foreign and defense 

policy, there is ample evidence that Japan is willing to 

do more in these areas.

The United States should understand the international environment from Japan’s perspective, identify 

the major elements of Japan’s policy response, and 

highlight the benefits that the U.S.-Japan alliance can 

provide to the United States.

THE VIEW FROM ICHIGAVA

Japanese strategists see an international environment that is becoming increasingly unstable and decidedly less safe.3

 A palpable shift of global power away 

from the West and toward the Asia-Pacific brings with 

it uncertainty and an unwelcome weakening in international leadership and resolve.4

 “Gray zone” situations, in which states employ carefully calibrated 

levels of force to advance their interests incrementally, 

while being careful to remain below the threshold that 

would trigger a military response—are on the rise 

in the Asia-Pacific.5 Japan, a self-described maritime 

nation economically reliant on seaborne trade, is confronting a world in which the principle of freedom of 

navigation is being challenged by a growing number 

of states.6 The international rules and norms that have 

enabled Japan to navigate its way from post-war ruin 

to economic ascendancy are increasingly under threat.

This is a significant concern for a state that identifies itself as a “peace-loving nation” and which has 

rigorously adhered to international rules and norms 

for over 70 years. Conscious of its early 20th-century 

history and restrained by a constitution that limits its 

ability to employ military force abroad, Japan is careful to operate as a responsible international actor. It 
110

maintains a defense-oriented, nonthreatening military posture and its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” 

which forbid possession, use, and third-party storage 

of nuclear weapons, demonstrates its deep-seated 

opposition to nuclear weapons.7

Japan views North Korea as the greatest threat to 

its national security. North Korea’s ballistic missile 

and nuclear weapons development programs appear 

to be accelerating, and it is currently capable of ranging nearly all Japanese territory.8

 North Korean behavior is provocative and destabilizing, and its aggressive 

rhetoric is frequently aimed at Japan. North Korea’s 

bizarre Japanese abduction program, in which it kidnapped Japanese citizens and brought them to North 

Korea in an apparent attempt to improve the quality of 

its intelligence services, remains a high-profile political 

issue in Japan.9

While North Korea constitutes an immediate threat, 

China poses a more long-term strategic challenge to 

Japan’s interests. China’s economic ascendency has 

been swift: since the early 1970s, it has undergone 

“the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy 

in history.” It now boasts the world’s second largest 

economy, is the world’s largest manufacturer, and 

exports more than any other country.10 Over the past 

decade, it has placed an increasing emphasis on building a modern, capable military: its defense budget is 

the world’s second largest and is six times larger than 

that of Japan. Japan estimates that China’s military 

spending has increased by over 300 percent in the 

years between 2006 and 2016.11 Most observers believe 

that China’s defense spending is significantly higher 

than its official documents indicate; the lack of reliable 

information on China’s military budget makes it difficult to determine how it prioritizes its spending or to 
111

identify the capabilities that it is trying to develop.12

Japan maintains that this lack of transparency is troubling because it obscures China’s long-term strategic 

intentions.13 Even more troubling is that, as China’s 

economic and military power have grown, so too has 

the aggressiveness with which it pursues its expansive 

maritime territorial claims. China’s behavior in the 

East China Sea has resulted in significantly increased 

Japan-China tension.

Japan and China are involved in three closely related 

East China Sea disputes. The first dispute involves 

the maritime boundary between Japan’s and China’s 

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); although there was 

a 2008 agreement to negotiate a boundary settlement 

and to develop hydrocarbon resources jointly in the 

disputed region, negotiations broke down in 2010 and 

have yet to restart.14

The second dispute involves sovereignty of the 

resource-rich Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.15 The Senkaku 

Islands—eight uninhabited features claimed by Japan, 

China, and Taiwan— have been in the possession of 

Japan for over a century. Although the United States 

does not take a position on the territorial dispute, it 

recognizes that Japan “administers” the islands and 

that they are covered by U.S.-Japan security guarantees.16 In 2010 and again in 2012, the Senkaku dispute 

became a flash point between China and Japan. These 

crises caused significant diplomatic, political, and economic friction, and drove China to increase its civilian Coast Guard patrols dramatically in the disputed 

waters.17 Japan views China’s Senkaku activity as a 

“gray zone” attempt to challenge Japan’s territorial 

integrity using non-military means.18 Japanese and 
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Chinese Coast Guard vessels now regularly engage 

each other in tense encounters, and, while both sides 

behave professionally, the likelihood of a crisis-inducing miscalculation remains uncomfortably high.19

The third dispute began in November 2013 when 

China established an Air Defense Identification Zone 

(ADIZ) over part of the East China Sea.20 Japanese military aircraft operating within the declared ADIZ are 

often intercepted by Chinese military aircraft; meanwhile, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is 

regularly forced to scramble to intercept Chinese intrusions into its own ADIZ (see Figure 5-1).21 Not only 

does China’s military regularly operate within Japan’s 

ADIZ, but many of its flights also violate Japan’s territorial airspace over the Senkakus.22

*Although an ADIZ flight is designed to challenge a country’s air 

defense capability, an ADIZ violation does not necessarily entail 

a territorial airspace violation.

Figure 5-1. JASDF Scrambles to Intercept Foreign 

Military Intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ.23
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China’s actions during these disputes fuel the concern with which Japan views China’s rise. China has 

consistently displayed a willingness to employ every 

instrument at its disposal to pressure its neighbor and 

advance its interests; many of the methods used seem 

escalatory and disproportionate. The de facto embargo 

of rare earth minerals, the sanction—if not outright 

encouragement—of violent anti-Japanese protests, 

the use of heavily-armed maritime craft to challenge 

disputed maritime boundaries and territorial claims, 

and the willingness to treat international waters and 

airspace as its own territory raise troubling questions 

about China’s judgment and its dedication to adhering 

to the existing rules-based international system.24

Japan also has a contentious relationship with 

Russia.25 The main area of disagreement is the fate of 

Japan’s four Northern Territories, which Russia seized 

at the end of World War II and of which both countries claim ownership.26 Despite some recent optimism 

that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and President 

Vladimir Putin of Russia would be able to negotiate 

a settlement, it appears now that the negotiations fell 

victim to the larger dispute between Russia and the 

West over Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine.27

Although Russia and Japan cooperate on economic 

issues, and in particular on hydrocarbon exploration, 

the Japanese-Russian relationship is tempered by the 

continuation of Russian military activities in Japanese airspace as well as by Russian unabated efforts 

to modernize its military capabilities on the disputed 

islands.28

Even Japan’s relationship with the Republic of 

Korea (ROK), a neighbor which shares many of the 

same security concerns and with which it shares a 

major ally, is troubled. Despite close economic ties 
114

and the recent signing of some modest security agreements, political and diplomatic relations between the 

two countries are marred by a continuing dispute 

over the highly-charged legacy of the Korean “comfort women” issue and by a territorial dispute over 

Takeshima/Dokdo Island.29 Polling indicates that a 

sizeable majority of Koreans oppose the 2016 “final” 

agreement on the comfort woman controversy that 

the Abe government negotiated with ROK President 

Park Geun-hye’s government.30 Moon Jae-in, recently 

elected to replace the impeached President Park, has 

stated that he thinks the agreement should be revised, 

and a recent comfort women flare-up has caused Japan 

to withdraw its ambassador to Korea.31 These disputes effectively reduce the likelihood of meaningful 

bilateral security cooperation, complicate the strategic 

landscape, and serve as an unwelcome reminder to 

Japan that the legacy of its behavior in World War II 

can still be difficult to overcome.

Finally, Japan faces major economic and demographic challenges. After 45 years of rapid expansion, 

Japan’s economic growth slowed considerably in the 

early 1990s and has remained sluggish ever since.32 A 

long period of deflation acted as a further drag on the 

economy, and Japan’s government debt is the highest 

in the world.33 Japan cannot rely on population growth 

to alleviate these economic problems, as its population 

is aging rapidly and is expected to enter a period of 

steep decline.34 The prospects of successfully turning 

these long-term systemic trends around appear dim.

The one bright spot on the horizon for Japanese 

strategic planners is Japan’s alliance with the United 

States, the undisputed “cornerstone of Japan’s security” since the end of World War II.35 At the heart of 

the U.S.-Japan alliance is the U.S.-Japan Treaty of 

Mutual Cooperation and Security, in which the United 
115

States committed itself to Japan’s security.36 By basing 

its military forces in Japan and extending its nuclear 

deterrence, the United States enabled Japan to focus 

on economic development, while de-prioritizing the 

development of its self-defense forces.37 At the same 

time, the U.S.-led security architecture maintained 

regional stability, enabling a remarkable period of 

region-wide economic growth. As regional challenges have increased, the United States-Japan alliance 

has kept pace, and the United States is now heavily 

involved in Japan’s maritime surveillance and ballistic 

missile defense.38

Yet, even the U.S.-Japan relationship is experiencing uncertainty. During his election campaign, Trump 

implied that Japan should acquire its own nuclear 

weapons and complained that Japan’s funding for U.S. 

military basing is inadequate.39 More significantly, he 

withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 

free-trade agreement that the Obama administration 

viewed as central to its Rebalance to the Pacific policy 

and which many observed as an essential element of 

Washington’s attempt to maintain its competitive strategic advantage over China.40 The TPP would have 

improved economic ties between members and would 

have further cemented the U.S. leadership role in the 

Asia-Pacific. Abe’s allies in the Japanese Parliament 

(the Diet) had supported the TPP despite the substantial political risks involved.41 Although Defense Secretary James Mattis’s visit to Tokyo and Abe’s trip to 

Washington in early 2017 provided much needed reassurance, the events of the presidential campaign and 

of the early days of the Trump administration demonstrated Japan’s vulnerability to the whims of American 

politics. 42 It is likely that profound unease remains in 

Tokyo.
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JAPAN’S RESPONSE: PROACTIVE 

CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe, Japan 

has instituted an ambitious and multi-faceted approach 

to confront the challenges. Entitled the “Proactive 

Contribution to Peace” policy, Japan’s new strategic 

approach will enable it to exert its international influence more effectively.43 Abe’s first step was to establish a National Security Council, which immediately 

released a National Security Strategy (NSS) establishing 

the foundation of the new policy.

The 2013 National Security Strategy articulates 

Japan’s three national security objectives: to increase 

deterrence, to improve regional security by strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and improving Japan’s 

regional ties, and to strengthen the rules-based international order while adopting a leading international 

role.44 While it insists that its policy orientation is 

peaceful in nature, it emphasizes “the international 

community expects Japan to play a more proactive role 

for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.”45 The NSS goes 

on to describe how, in order to fulfill its international 

role and safeguard its national interests, Japan must 

embark upon a series of broad strategic approaches.

The first approach is to both “strengthen and 

expand” Japan’s defense and diplomatic capabilities. 

This requires Japan to pursue an increased international leadership role aggressively so that it possesses 

“the power to take the lead in setting the international 

agenda.”46 This also involves increasing the deterrent effect of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by 

improving warfighting capabilities, particularly in 

ways suited to protecting Japan’s territorial integrity 
117

and maritime security. The JSDF must be integrated 

into a whole-of-government security architecture that 

includes law enforcement agencies and local governments, thus enabling Japan to respond seamlessly to 

a full spectrum of security challenges, from gray zone 

activities to natural disasters.47 The National Defense 

Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (NDPG) 

provides amplifying guidance. It calls for the development of an integrated and more agile “Dynamic 

Joint Defense Force” capable of deterring potential 

aggressors; responding to and defeating any attack; 

and otherwise contributing to regional and global stability.48 The NDPG prioritizes the development of air 

and maritime capabilities to enable Japan to monitor 

and defend its dispersed island territories and defend 

against the North Korean nuclear threat; areas targeted 

for improvement include persistent maritime and 

aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 

strategic and operational lift, amphibious forces, and 

ballistic missile defense. While most of the modernization effort is focused on the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the Ground Self-Defense Force is directed 

to reduce its reliance on heavy conventional forces in 

favor of lighter, more agile ones.49 The NDPG also calls 

for greater interoperability with the United States and 

for enhanced joint training.50

In order to implement this approach, the Abe government has increased defense spending and loosened 

the rules prohibiting the export of defense technologies. Japan’s defense budget has increased for each of 

the last 5 years, and its fiscal year (FY) 2017 defense 

budget is the world’s seventh largest.51 In 2014, the 

government modified a long-standing prohibition on 

arms exports, authorizing exports to allies and partners 

under limited circumstances.52 This policy is meant to 

create a more competitive defense industry, increase 
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cooperation with the United States, and reduce perunit costs for the self-defense forces.53 Japan now offers 

major systems for export, increasing the prospect for 

closer defense ties with regional partners. Its Soryu 

submarines and Shin Maywa seaplanes are attractive 

to regional militaries, while the SM-3 Block IIA shiplaunched anti-ballistic missile—developed jointly with 

the United States and an integral part of their combined 

ballistic missile defense plans—is a candidate for third 

party sales.54 Although Japan recently failed in a bid to 

obtain a contract to build submarines for Australia, its 

status as a finalist is evidence of the increasing competitiveness of Japan’s defense industry.55

The second NSS approach is to strengthen the 

U.S.-Japan alliance to ensure that the United States 

remains committed to upholding Japan’s security 

requirements. This involves expanding and deepening defense cooperation, ensuring the continued presence of U.S. bases in Japan, and tightening economic 

ties.56 The periodic U.S.-Japan secretary-level Security 

Consultative Committee conference has subsequently 

gained an increased prominence and formalized alliance defense arrangements. The resulting Guidelines 

for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 2015 clarifies each 

state’s responsibilities in the event of armed attack, 

identifies areas in which to improve military interoperability, and establishes a standing “Alliance Coordination Mechanism” (ACM) to improve operational 

coordination.57 The ACM is particularly important 

because it enables the United States and Japan to 

respond to contingencies without having to establish 

an ad hoc coordinating framework as they did when 

responding to the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake 

and tsunami.58
119

The highly controversial Security Legislation of 

2014 was specifically designed to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance; it removed legal restraints, which would 

potentially have prevented the Japanese from providing military assistance to the United States while it was 

actively involved in the defense of Japan. This legislation authorized the use of “collective self-defense” in 

circumscribed circumstances, modestly increased the 

circumstances in which Japan could provide logistic 

assistance during United Nations (UN)-led operations, 

and broadened rules of engagement for certain peacekeeping operations.59

The final NSS approaches are designed primarily to 

strengthen security and diplomatic cooperation with 

other regional allies, with regional multi-lateral institutions, and with organizations and countries outside 

of the Asia-Pacific. The Abe government has aggressively undertaken this approach, and in particular, it 

has emphasized Japan’s “special relationship” with 

Australia and its budding relationship with India.60 At 

the same time, Japan has increased its profile within 

regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the East 

Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial 

Meeting-Plus.61 Cognizant of the challenge posed by 

China’s aggressive defense of its territorial claims in the 

South China Sea, Japan has provided several ASEAN 

nations—including the Philippines, Vietnam, and 

Indonesia—with funding and equipment to improve 

their maritime patrol capabilities.62 These diplomatic 

initiatives will gradually help build Japan’s profile and 

regional leadership role.
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IT’S NOT ALL GOOD NEWS FOR THE UNITED 

STATES

As the Trump administration develops its Asia-Pacific policy, it should recognize the extraordinary strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United 

States accrues enormous benefits from the U.S.-led 

Asia-Pacific security and economic system, and its alliance with Japan constitutes the “cornerstone” of the 

system.63 For more than 60 years, the robust U.S. military presence in Japan has ensured regional peace and 

stability. Japan possesses significant economic clout; 

the alliance between two of the world’s three largest 

economies is greater than the sum of its parts. Japan 

is the United States’ closest Asian ally and has proven 

to be a reliable partner. U.S. and Japanese interests 

align in all major policy areas; Japan shares U.S. liberal values and is dedicated to increasing its role in 

upholding the U.S.-led international system and the 

rule of law. Japan cooperates closely with the United 

States on virtually every issue of significance in the 

Asia-Pacific, and the importance of this cooperation 

will only increase as Japan’s diplomatic clout grows. 

The impact of this relationship is global in scope, as 

the United States and Japan cooperate on economic, 

diplomatic and security issues such as countering terrorism, providing assistance to developing economies, 

advancing global health initiatives and fighting infectious diseases, implementing G7 sanctions on Russia, 

and working toward UN reform.64 Japan has accommodated the forward basing of U.S. troops for decades, 

and pays approximately 70 percent of the associated 

financial costs.65 Simply put, the U.S.-Japan alliance is 

a fundamental component of U.S. efforts to safeguard 
121

its national interests in the Asia-Pacific and around the 

world.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is as important as ever due 

to the deterioration of the security situation in Northeast Asia and in the Asia-Pacific. As challenges mount, 

it is critical for the United States to ensure it maintains 

a close relationship with like-minded allies. The United 

States has consistently stated that it “welcomes the rise 

of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China,” and while 

it appears likely that China’s relative power will continue to grow, it is unclear if it will develop into a country that respects and adheres to existing international 

rules and norms.66 A U.S.-Japan alliance is essential to 

ensure continued deterrence of North Korea, to serve 

as an effective bulwark against any Chinese attempt to 

dominate the region, and to help guarantee the continued existence of a security and economic framework 

that provides peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific.

Japan’s strategic renaissance poses some risks to 

U.S. national interests: one risk is that Japan, emboldened by U.S. security guarantees, may escalate the East 

China Sea conflicts; a second is that others in the Northeast Asia—particularly South Korea and China—may 

resist Japan’s attempts to pursue a more active role 

in regional affairs.67 Although these risks should not 

be discounted entirely, they can be mitigated and are 

outweighed by the benefits that Japan’s new policy 

provides.

The greatest risk is that Japan, knowing that the 

United States is committed to backstopping Japan’s 

national security, would escalate the Senkakus dispute in an attempt to demonstrate conclusively its 

sovereignty and permanently resolve the dispute in its 

favor. This could result in an armed conflict between 

the United States and China over a few uninhabited 
122

islands. This risk is unlikely to develop, however, 

because it would not be in keeping with Japan’s overwhelmingly non-aggressive approach to foreign policy. 

It is unlikely that Japan would choose an aggressive 

course because it would significantly damage its security interests were it to be unsuccessful. Moreover, as 

the stronger power in the alliance, the United States 

has enough leverage over Japan to ensure that it does 

nothing that the United States would consider overly 

provocative.

The second risk is that other states in Northeast 

Asia would actively resist Japan’s efforts to implement 

its new policy approach. Neither the Korean nor the 

Chinese people have forgotten the atrocities that Imperial Japan inflicted during the 20th century, and those 

memories color their views of modern Japan. The ill 

will that these memories generate is exacerbated by 

the well-publicized behavior of Japanese nationalists 

and some members of the Abe government.68 There is a 

risk that either South Korea or China—or both—could 

use these issues as justification to challenge the legitimacy of Abe’s policy approach and of Japan’s efforts 

to increase its international role. This could reduce the 

scope of Japan-ROK cooperation, complicate efforts to 

resolve East China Sea disputes or respond to North 

Korean provocations, and reduce the willingness of 

either the ROK or China to cooperate with the United 

States on other issues.

To mitigate this risk, Japan will need to work to 

convince its neighbors of its benign intent. As Japan’s 

relationship with the ROK demonstrates, this will be 

neither quick nor easy. Japan can point to its 70-year 

tradition of adhering to international rules and norms, 

and in the case of the ROK, can point to shared interests. The United States can assist in this effort. While 
123

it is unlikely that China will recognize that Japan’s 

policy is purely defensive, it is not clear that Japan’s 

new approach will dramatically change the status quo 

of the difficult Japan-China relationship.

The biggest risks to U.S. national interests are not 

associated with Japan’s new policy; rather, they are 

related either to the United States weakening the alliance itself deliberately or through inaction. Twenty 

years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that, unmoored 

from its only alliance, “A disoriented Japan would be 

like a beached whale, thrashing helplessly but dangerously”; such a scenario “would spell the end of 

the American role in the Asia-Pacific.”69 Ultimately, 

Japan has other options available to it, as unpalatable 

as those options may be to both Japan and the United 

States. Were Japan to doubt the inviolability of U.S. 

security guarantees, or were it to determine that there 

was no place for a U.S.-Japan alliance in an “America 

First” policy, then there is a real possibility that Japan 

would have to develop a security strategy that does 

not involve the United States. Japan would have three 

options: it could develop an East Asian security system 

which did not involve the United States but which 

was able to balance against China; it could develop an 

independent method of maintaining its own security 

and deterring potential adversaries; or it could learn to 

accommodate China’s regional interests. The first two 

options seem unlikely: as a major economic and military power, China would be difficult for East Asian 

states to balance against; moreover, China has proven 

its ability to disrupt any regional consensus that runs 

counter to its interests.70 It is unlikely that Japan could 

develop sufficient conventional military power to 

effectively deter North Korea and, if necessary, China. 

Although Japan possesses the capability to develop a 
124

nuclear deterrent, it is unlikely that it would overcome 

its overwhelming, deep-seated political and cultural 

resistance to doing so. Which leaves accommodation 

of China.

Despite the historical antagonism between Japan 

and China, there is a logic to such an approach: why 

balance against Asia’s ascending major power when 

Japan can gain a measure of security by bandwagoning 

with it instead? After all, China has significant leverage 

over North Korea should it decide to use it, so China 

could significantly reduce the severity of the threat that 

North Korea poses to Japan. Moreover, China would 

also be more likely to negotiate over the Senkakus if to 

do so would enable it to drive a wedge between Japan 

and the United States or to draw Japan into its orbit. 

Should the Japanese come to view the United States as 

unreliable, Japan may reluctantly decide that its safest 

course is to reconcile itself to the inevitability of Chinese regional hegemony and to accommodate China’s 

supplanting of the United States.

Barring the emergence of a domestic political or 

economic crisis that derails China’s continued growth 

or internal stability, such a policy would increase the 

likelihood of China’s ascendance to regional hegemony from a mere possibility to a virtual certainty. The 

United States would find that its influence in Northeast Asia and in the greater East Asian region would 

be greatly diminished. Japan and other Asia-Pacific 

nations would have to subordinate their interests to 

those of China in order to maintain harmonious relations. Slowly but surely, China would reshape established rules and norms of regional behavior to fit its 

interests. Although China has benefitted tremendously 

from the existing international system, it is not wedded 

to it, and if it were in a position to set the rules it would 
125

likely do so in a way that undermined U.S. values and 

weakened U.S. economic and security interests.71

Fortunately, the likelihood of this occurring is 

low; Japan shows little interest in foregoing its liberal values or in subordinating its interests to China’s. 

Japan has amply demonstrated that it is wedded to a 

rules-based international approach grounded in liberal values. It also shares a long, conflict prone history with China, and the associated historical baggage 

decreases the likelihood of cooperation.72 Although the 

possibility is low, it is not non-existent. The Proactive 

Contribution to Peace policy makes clear that “Japan 

cannot secure its own peace and security by itself,” so 

if the United States should demonstrate indifference 

to Japan’s security interests, then it may be forced to 

seek help elsewhere.73 There is recent precedence for 

such an approach. During his short-lived 2009-2010 

administration, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had 

intended to prioritize Japan’s relationship with China 

over its relationship with the United States.74 Although 

Hatoyama’s approach did not represent a full formal 

repudiation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is hard to see 

how the United States would have fit into the integrated East Asian system that Hatoyama envisioned.75

The Hatoyama administration should be seen as a cautionary tale that demonstrates the U.S.-Japan alliance 

is not something that the United States should take for 

granted.

RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. POLICY

So what policy approaches should the new Trump 

administration take toward Japan? First and foremost, 

the Trump administration should continue to encourage Japan as it develops and implements its new 
126

policy. Japan’s strategic renaissance can bring tremendous benefits to the United States. As one former U.S. 

official said of the Abe administration’s policies, “As 

far as we’re concerned it’s all good news.”76 The more 

Japan assumes a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific, the 

more it is able to advance shared Japanese-U.S. interests. As Japan develops closer relationships with other 

U.S. allies such as Australia, its actions will serve to 

reinforce the U.S.-led security and economic order. 

Japan will also be in a better position to use its heightened diplomatic profile to assist the United States in 

improving its relationship with important regional 

states such as Vietnam.77 Although the occasionally 

cautious and incremental nature of Japan’s policy 

changes may lead to some frustration in Washington, a 

stronger Japan will strengthen U.S. ability to safeguard 

its own national interests in the long run.

The United States should also help pave the way for 

Japan’s new policy by facilitating a closer Japan-ROK 

relationship. Both Japan and South Korea play a critical 

role in ensuring stability in Northeast Asia, but their 

difficult relationship complicates regional security. 

The United States should facilitate the improvement 

of the Japan-South Korea relationship by employing 

what Mark Manyin from the Congressional Research 

Service refers to as the “Commissioner” method of 

managing the dispute. In this model, the United States 

would focus on advancing the South Korea-Japan-U.S. 

trilateral relationship, thereby providing a mechanism for Japanese and South Korean officials to work 

together to advance common interests without allowing ongoing disputes to derail cooperation.78 Even if 

this trilateral relationship is focused exclusively on 

security issues, it can serve as a foundation for a more 

comprehensive political and diplomatic relationship. 
127

Japan has recent experience in this regard: Japan’s 

relationship with Australia began as a pragmatic military relationship but has since blossomed into a successful strategic partnership.79 Ultimately, successful 

U.S. efforts to improve the Japan-South Korea relationship would significantly advance the national security 

interests of all three states.

At the same time, the United States should continue to communicate its disapproval when members 

of the Abe cabinet appease or otherwise support Japanese nationalists and ultra-nationalists. The statements and actions of Abe and his cabinet members, 

which include trips to the controversial Yasukuni 

shrine, attempt to obscure Japanese responsibility for 

the Pacific war. Statements that seek to minimize the 

depravity of―or simply deny the existence of―wartime atrocities inflicted by Imperial Japan are not only 

historically inappropriate, they are also damaging to 

Japan’s efforts to improve regional relationships and 

to increase its diplomatic leadership role.80

The United States should reciprocate Japanese 

efforts to strengthen the alliance. One way to do this 

is to deepen U.S.-Japan economic ties. Although the 

Trump administration has chosen to pull out of the TPP, 

the administration has indicated that it is interested in 

pursuing a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 

Japan in its place.81 Such an agreement would deliver 

net benefits to both countries by reducing barriers to 

trade and anti-competitive subsidies. Although Japan 

is the fourth largest U.S. trading partner, it maintains 

steep import tariffs and quotas to protect its agricultural industry; the United States provides the largest 

share of Japan’s agricultural imports, so it has much to 

gain if an FTA reduces Japan’s protectionist policies.82
128

The United States should also work with Japan to 

renegotiate the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Although 

the Roadmap was an appropriate response to the political and security situation of 2006, it is no longer suited 

to fulfill the policy goals of either the United States or 

Japan in the new, more challenging security environment. The Realignment Roadmap, which reduces the 

U.S. military footprint in Okinawa by rebasing some 

U.S. units elsewhere in the Pacific, was designed to 

“maintain deterrence and to mitigate the impact of 

U.S. forces on the local communities.”83 Yet, while it 

successfully reduces the impact of U.S. forces on some 

Okinawan communities, it fails to maintain, and indeed 

weakens, deterrence. In light of increased Asia-Pacific 

security challenges, it is counterproductive for the 

United States to reduce its combat power in Japan and 

disperse it westward and eastward across the Pacific. 

As one senior U.S. military officer commented while 

looking at a map that depicted the planned realignment, “All the arrows are moving in the wrong direction.”84 It reduces military capability and signals a 

weakening of U.S. resolve, thus reducing deterrence 

during an uncertain and increasingly unstable time.85

Advocates for the current plan argue that, while 

the plan is far from ideal, reducing the impact of the 

U.S. military presence on Okinawa is critical in order 

to maintain the “long-term political viability” of the 

U.S.-Japan alliance.86 Yet, it is possible to do this without reducing deterrence. The United States and Japan 

should continue with the elements of the existing Roadmap that reduce the military footprint on Okinawa but 

rebase the displaced units elsewhere in Japan. This 

would fulfill the original intent of the Roadmap: it 

would reduce the impact of U.S. basing on Okinawa, 
129

maintain deterrence, signal U.S. resolve, and reassure 

Japan of U.S. commitment.87

Finally, the United States should encourage Japan to 

continue its existing public discussion on the regional 

security environment and on the appropriate roles for 

Japan and for the U.S.-Japan alliance to play within it.88

Recent polling demonstrates that the Japanese consider 

the United States a reliable partner, and that a majority 

of Japanese support the U.S.-Japan alliance.89 This support is crucial for the continued political viability of a 

robust U.S. military presence in Japan; the ability of the 

Japanese public to identify the link between U.S. basing 

and Japan’s security will strengthen public support for 

the alliance. Japan is facing an increasingly challenging 

security environment, and Japanese citizens are well 

served by an informed public discussion on the challenges that exist and on the options available to Japan. 

In the long run this will not only increase the popular 

consensus that underlies Japanese decision making, 

it will also help to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance by 

increasing the public’s understanding of the important 

role that the United States plays, and that U.S. military 

bases and forces play, in Japan’s defense.
CONCLUSION: GETTING READY FOR THE 

ASIAN CENTURY

Although it is notoriously difficult to determine 

the shape of the future international environment, current economic and demographic trends indicate that 

the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow in importance. The United States will want to ensure that it is 

positioned properly to take advantage of the opportunities that these trends bring, while ensuring that it 

can continue to safeguard its national interests. The 

U.S.-Japan alliance is sure to play a vital role in those 

efforts. Yet, as Japan evaluates its regional environment, it has recognized that the policy approaches that 

have served it so well over the past half-century are 

no longer suited to the challenges that it faces. Japan 

recognizes that the security situation in Northeast Asia 

is gradually deteriorating, so its response has been to 

reinvigorate its foreign and defense policies to enable 

it to increase its contribution to regional and global 

stability. Ultimately, this new policy approach serves 

the interests of both Japan and the United States. As 

the Trump administration designs and implements its 

own Asia-Pacific policy, it should seek to ensure that 

it remains firmly anchored upon the hugely beneficial 

U.S.-Japan alliance.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. The author would like to thank the following for generously agreeing to meet for interviews: Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior 

Fellow, National Graduate Institute For Policy Studies; Taro 

Yamato, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, 

Defense Policy Bureau, Ministry of Defense; Daisuke Aoyama, 

National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tomohiko Satake, Senior Research Fellow, 

Policy Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies; 

130
131

Colonel Makino JGSDF, Commander Okasaki JMSDF, Lieutenant 

Colonel Ogawa, and Lieutenant Colonel Kasai from the Joint Staff 

Office/J5, Ministry of Defense, and Lieutenant Colonel Otsuka 

from the Ground Staff Office G5, Ministry of Defense. I would 

also like to thank the following for helping set up interviews: 

Colonel Kei Sekiguchi, Director, Japan Peacekeeping Training 

and Research Center; Etsuko Kanno from the National Institute of Defense Studies; Kumiko Horimoto from the Japan-U.S. 

Defense Cooperation Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Colonel Shigemi Sugimura, a fellow student at the 

U.S. Army War College: Miho Higashi from the Tohoku Defense 

Bureau; Lieutenant Colonel Paula Marshall, the U.S. Marine 

Attaché; and Major Daniel Benson, Marine Forces Pacific Liaison 

Officer to the Ground Staff Office. I’d also like to thank the following personnel from the Supply, Services and Support Division at the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, for 

their generous hospitality during my visit: Mayu Inoue, Hisanao 

Ohara, Tomoko Otsu, and Yoko Yamamoto. Finally, I would like 

to thank Mr. Nicholas Szechenyi, from the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, for his assistance and advice.

2. The European Union is often listed ahead of Japan, but is 

excluded from these rankings because it represents a group of 

states. See World Bank, “Gross domestic product 2016,” April 

17, 2017, World Development Indicators database, available from 

databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, accessed December 

1, 2017; Central Intelligence Agency, “Japan,” The World Factbook, 

Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, updated November 14, 2017, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

3. Ichigaya is the neighborhood in which the Japan Ministry 

of Defense (MOD) is located. The author has heard it referred to 

by MOD employees as “Ichigaya Prison” due to the surprisingly 

long hours that MOD employees are expected to work while the 

Diet is in session. It is not unusual for MOD civilian employees to 

work until 2 or 3 a.m.

4. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Security 

Strategy, Provisional Translation published on Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, December 

17, 2013, p. 6, available from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/
132

documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/18/NSS.pdf, accessed 

September 15, 2016; also Office of The Cabinet Secretariat, “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation 

to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” Provisional 

Translation published on Official Website of The Cabinet Secretariat, July 1, 2014, p. 1, available from www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/

jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf, accessed September 15, 2016.

5. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Security 

Strategy, p. 11.

6. Ibid., pp. 2, 8-9. For information on Japan’s dependence 

on trade, see Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) at the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab, “Japan,” OEC, 

n.d., available from https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/

jpn/, accessed February 19, 2017; Central Intelligence Agency, 

“Japan.”

7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan: Path of 60 

Years as a Nation Striving for Peace (Fact Sheet),” published on 

Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2005, available 

from www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/60th.html, accessed February 

12, 2017; also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 60 Years: The 

Path of a Nation Striving for Global Peace, published on Website 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2005, p. 3, available from 

www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/pamph60.pdf, accessed February 

12, 2017; Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Security 

Strategy. Although many criticize Japan for failure to address its 

World War II behavior fully, Japan’s foreign policy has clearly 

been shaped by a recognition of its wartime activities. While 

“nonthreatening” is in the eye of the beholder, a persuasive case 

can be made that Japan has adopted a nonaggressive, defense-oriented posture.

8. Between January 6 and October 20, 2016, there were two 

nuclear tests and 15 ballistic missile/satellite launches, while 

between May 1993 and the end of 2015, there were three nuclear 

tests and 14 satellite/missile launches. Most analysts believe that 

North Korea’s Nondong and Taepodong-1 missiles are nuclear-capable; these missiles can range nearly the entirety of Japan. 

Daisuke Aoyama, National Security Policy Division, Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security 

and stability in Asia,” briefing slides and interview by author, 
133

Tokyo, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2017. See 

also David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “As North Korea’s 

Nuclear Program Advances, U.S. Strategy Is Tested,” The New 

York Times, May 6, 2016, available from https://www.nytimes.

com/2016/05/07/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-us-strategy.html, 

accessed February 17, 2017; Scott A. Snyder, Darcie Draudt, and 

Sungtae “Jacky” Park, The Korean Pivot: Seoul’s Strategic Choices 

and Rising Rivalries in Northeast Asia: A Council on Foreign Relations 

Discussion Paper, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations 

Press, February 2017, p. 5, Council on Foreign Relations website, 

available from https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/01/

Discussion_Paper_Snyder_Draudt_Park_Korean_Pivot_OR.pdf, 

accessed February 17, 2017.

9. Shinzo Abe championed the abduction issue early on, 

enabling him to increase his public profile and accelerate his 

political career. See Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Cancels Investigation Into Abductions of Japanese Citizens,” The New York 

Times, February 13, 2016, available from https://www.nytimes.

com/2016/02/14/world/asia/north-korea-japan-abductions.html?_r=1, 

accessed February 13, 2017; also Elizabeth C. Economy, “Podcast: The True Story of North Korea’s Abduction Project,” Asia 

Unbound, blog of the Council on Foreign Relations, November 

15, 2016, available from https://www.cfr.org/blog/podcast-true-storynorth-koreas-abduction-project, accessed February 13, 2017.

10. World Bank, “The World Bank In China: Overview,” 

updated March 28, 2017, World Bank webpage, available

from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview, accessed 

December 1, 2017; Central Intelligence Agency, “China,” The World 

Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, updated 

November 14, 2017, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html, accessed December 1, 

2017; World Bank, “Gross domestic product 2016.”

11. Ian E. Rinehart, The Chinese Military: Overviews and Issues 

for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

U.S. Library of Congress, March 24, 2016, p. 21, available from 

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44196.pdf, accessed September 17, 2016; 

Aoyama, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security and 

stability in Asia,” briefing slides. It is difficult to obtain accurate 

information on Chinese defense expenditures; most observers 
134

believe that actual expenditures exceed those published by official Chinese sources. “Actual” budget data is subject to debate; for 

instance, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated China’s 2012 

defense budget increase at 10.7 percent, while some observers 

estimated that the increase was as high as 18-20 percent. For more 

on China’s defense spending, see David Helvey, “Department 

of Defense Press Briefing on the 2013 DoD Report to Congress 

on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” press release, 

U.S. Department of Defense Information/Federal Information 

and News Dispatch, May 6, 2013; see also Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2016, pp. 49-50, 

U.S. Department of Defense website, available from https://www.

defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_

Report.pdf, accessed February 18, 2017. For information on Japan’s 

2016 military budget, see Fanz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Approves 

Record Defense Budget,” The Diplomat, December 28, 2015, available from https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-approves-recorddefense-budget/, accessed February 18, 2017.

12. China Power Team, “What does China really spend on 

its military?” China Power, December 28, 2015, updated August 

4, 2017, available from chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/, 

accessed December 1, 2017.

13. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (Summary), December 17, 

2013, published on Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan 

and His Cabinet, available from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/

documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/27/NDPG(Summary).

pdf, accessed September 15, 2016; also Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook, published on Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, pp. 2-4, 156, available from http://

www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html. The Bluebook mentions China’s lack of military spending transparency 10 times.

14. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both China and Japan are a party 

to, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nautical miles 

(NM) from a state’s shores and provides exclusive rights to the 
135

fishing and minerals/hydrocarbons located within and beneath 

it. Unfortunately, not all of the East China Sea is wide enough 

to accommodate two 200 NM EEZs. Japan’s position is that the 

EEZ boundary lies along the half-way point between Japan and 

China, while China maintains that, due to the existence of a continental shelf extending from its coast, the EEZ boundary lies at 

the edge of Japan’s territorial waters 12 NM west of Okinawa. In 

2015, Japan accused China of extracting oil and gas near the disputed boundary in violation of the joint agreement, while China 

argued that its drilling activities are well within its EEZ. This dispute is about more than just sovereignty; both Japan and China 

depend on imported energy and view the hydrocarbon resources 

under the East China Sea as a way to mitigate their energy dependence. To further complicate matters, China’s position that it 

has the authority to regulate foreign military activity within its 

EEZ, a position which, when China attempts to enforce it, further 

increases tension for all military forces that operate in the area, 

including the United States. Most states explicitly reject China’s 

position because EEZs are considered international waters for 

purposes not involving resource management. For more on EEZs 

and international law, see National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) Office of General Counsel, “Maritime 

Zones and Boundaries,” NOAA, last updated May 19, 2017, available from www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html, accessed December 

1, 2017. For more on the details of the Japan-China EEZ dispute, 

see Shelia A. Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute,” 

Orbis, Summer 2012, pp. 381-382. For more on Japan’s argument 

that China is extracting resources in the disputed area in violation of the 2008 agreement, see Nicholas Szechenyi, “Platforms 

of Mistrust: Natural Resource Development in the East China 

Sea,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, August 

5, 2015, available from https://amti.csis.org/platforms-of-mistrustnatural-resource-development-in-the-east-china-sea, accessed January 20, 2017. For the importance that both countries place on the 

hydrocarbon and fishing resources, see Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, May 31, 2016, pp. 2-3, 

available from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf, accessed January 20, 2017; Andrew Stocking and Terry Dinan, “China’s Growing Energy Demand: Implications for the United States,” Working 

Paper Series, Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, June 
136

2015, pp. 2-4, Congressional Budget Office website, available from 

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/

workingpaper/50216-China_1.pdf, accessed January 28, 2017. For 

more on China’s claims regarding its authority within its EEZ, see 

O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 

Disputes Involving China,” pp. 10-14.

15. The islands are known by the Japanese as the “Senkaku-shoto,” by the Chinese as the “Diaoyu Dao,” and by the Taiwanese as the “Diaoyutai Lieyu.” The term “Senkaku Islands” 

or “Senkakus” will be used throughout this book. It is unclear 

if the features would be recognized as “islands” under international law. Geologists estimate that there are significant hydrocarbon resources in the immediate area. The United States actually 

administered the islands for an 18-year period after World War 

II. Taiwan and Japan have successfully managed their competing territorial claims in the Senkakus. In 2013, Taiwan and Japan 

came to an agreement over fishing rights in the vicinity of the 

Senkakus, and while the agreement does not address issues of 

sovereignty, it succeeded in effectively reducing the likelihood 

of a dispute. See Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, October 14, 2016, 

pp. 1, 2-4, 9, available from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf, 

accessed December 29, 2016.

16. Ibid., pp. 5-8; Ankit Panda, “Obama: Senkakus Covered 

Under US-Japan Security Treaty,” The Diplomat, April 24, 2014, 

available from https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakuscovered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/, accessed December 29, 

2016; Manyin, The Senkakus, pp. 6-8; Shelia A. Smith, “Behind 

Japan, 100%,” Asia Unbound, blog of the Council on Foreign Relations, February 13, 2017, available from https://www.cfr.org/blog/

behind-japan-100, accessed February 19, 2017.

17. In September 2010, the Japan Coast Guard arrested a Chinese fishing boat captain in the Senkakus, sparking a diplomatic 

crisis that quickly took on an economic hue when China imposed an 

“unofficial” restriction on Japan-bound mineral exports. In China, 

there were anti-Japanese protests and Japanese businessmen were 

arrested; while in Japan, the crisis led to increased political acrimony and accusations of diplomatic mismanagement. Although 
137

the immediate crisis passed when Japan released the Chinese captain without charge, the underlying tensions remained. In 2012, 

a second crisis erupted when, in order to prevent the nationalist 

Mayor of Tokyo from taking ownership of some of the Senkakus, the Japanese government purchased several of the islands 

from its private Japanese owners (the Japanese government had 

already owned the remaining five islands). This crisis was significantly more severe, and, like the first crisis, involved widespread 

and often violent anti-Japanese protests that negatively affected 

Japanese companies. China has subsequently declared that the 

waters around the Senkakus are Chinese territorial waters. Chinese Coast Guard ships now frequently enter Japanese waters 

around the Senkakus: in the 2 years between November 2014 and 

November 2016, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese 

contiguous waters—24 nautical miles (NM) around the Senkakus—every 2 days on average, while entering Japan’s 12 NM 

territorial waters an average of three times a month. Chinese vessels entered Japanese territorial waters five times in the first 45 

days of 2017. See Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute,” 

pp. 374-380; Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 

2, Spring 2013, pp. 27-28, available from https://www.usnwc.edu/

getattachment/bfa92a47-1f5f-4c23-974c-f92e1ed27be4/the-SenkakuDiaoyu-Island-Controversy--A-Crisis-Po.aspx, accessed January 1, 

2017. The Council on Foreign Relations website provides a good 

overview of the disputes in both the South and East China Seas. 

See Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes: 

A CFR InfoGuide Presentation,” available from https://www.cfr.

org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes#!/, accessed December 

29, 2016. For information on Chinese territorial intrusions, see 

Aoyama, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security and stability in Asia,” briefing slides; NHK World, “China vessels enter 

Japanese waters near Senkakus,” NHK World News, February 18, 

2017; Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes”; 

“Beijing submits East China Sea claims to the UN,” Taipei Times, 

December 12, 2012.

18. Many of these Coast Guard vessels are converted Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, and some 

of them are larger than conventional destroyers. China’s use of 

heavily armed “law enforcement” Coast Guard craft, which can 

outgun and out power Japan Coast Guard craft (significant when 
138

encounters occasionally involve deliberate ramming), can be 

viewed as a deliberate attempt to blur the line between the civilian and military sphere. On the one hand, Japan’s Coast Guard 

vessels are underpowered to respond effectively to China’s Coast 

Guard vessels, but on the other, China could accuse Japan of escalating tensions if it were to use Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels against Chinese “civil law enforcement” craft. Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, “East China Sea Tensions: Approaching 

a Slow Boil,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 

April 14, 2016, available from https://amti.csis.org/east-china-seatensions/, accessed January 4, 2017.

19. Ibid.

20. The ADIZ boundaries closely mirror the boundaries of 

China’s claimed EEZ, and include the airspace over the Senkaku 

Islands. This particular ADIZ is unusual in that it places burdensome requirements on commercial aircraft—even those that are 

not bound for China—that are customarily only imposed over territorial airspace. Although Japan and many other countries refuse 

to recognize the ADIZ, some 60 commercial carriers now submit 

flight plans with the Chinese government for flights which transit 

the ADIZ, even if those flights will never enter into Chinese airspace. See Matthew Waxman, “China’s ADIZ At One Year: International Legal Issues,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency 

Initiative, November 25, 2014, available from https://amti.csis.org/

chinas-adiz-at-one-year-international-legal-issues, accessed January 

1, 2017; NOAA; Zhu Feng, “China’s First ADIZ Decision: One 

Year Later,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 

November 25, 2014, available from https://amti.csis.org/chinas-firstadiz-decision-one-year-later/, accessed January 1, 2017.

21. In 2015, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambled 571 times to meet Chinese military aircraft violating Japanese 

territorial airspace. The JASDF also frequently had to scramble to 

meet Russian military aircraft that regularly violated its airspace. 

Aoyama, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security and 

stability in Asia,” briefing slides; see also Feng; Shelia A. Smith, 

Japan’s New Politics and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Council on Foreign 

Relations Special Report, Washington DC: Council on Foreign 

Relations Press, 2014, p. 19, available from https://www.cfr.org/

report/japans-new-politics-and-us-japan-alliance, accessed January 
139

1, 2017; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “East China Sea 

Tensions: Approaching a Slow Boil.”

22. Japan Ministry of Defense, “Organizations Responsible 

for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling 

(Part III, Section 1, Chapter 2),” in Defense of Japan 2016, Defense 

White Paper, pp. 285-287, Ministry of Defense, available from 

www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_3-1-2_web.pdf, 

accessed March 25, 2017.

23. Aoyama, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security 

and stability in Asia,” briefing slides. This figure is a variation on 

one of the slides in the presentation.

24. News reports indicate that these protests were encouraged 

by state-run media and sanctioned by Chinese authorities. For 

information on China’s sanctioning of protests, see “Anti-Japan 

protests across China over islands dispute,” BBC News, August 

19, 2012, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19312226, 

accessed February 18, 2017; “Anti-Japan protests hit China cities 

amid island row,” BBC News, September 15, 2012, available from 

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19609945, accessed February 18, 2017; N.D., Shanghai, “Anti-Japan protests: Outrage, to a 

point,” Analects China blog of The Economist, September 17, 2012, 

online, available from www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/09/

anti-japan-protests, accessed February 18, 2017. For information on 

the mineral embargo, see Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea 

Dispute,” pp. 375-376.

25. Despite a functioning diplomatic and economic relationship, the two countries are not technically at peace because Russia 

never signed the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended 

World War II in the Pacific.

26. The four islands extend from Hokkaido toward the Kuril 

Islands; the United States recognizes Japanese sovereignty over 

the islands. Mira Rapp-Hooper, “A Treaty To End WWII For 

Russia And Japan?” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 3, 2014, available from https://amti.csis.org/a-treatyto-end-wwii-for-russia-and-japan/, accessed February 18, 2017.

27. An attempt to sign a treaty in 1956, which would have 

returned the two southern-most islands to Japan, failed over 
140

the fate of the remaining two islands. See Ibid.; Shelia A. Smith, 

“Putin’s Japan Visit,” Asia Unbound, blog of the Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2016, available from https://www.cfr.

org/blog/putins-japan-visit, accessed February 18, 2017.

28. Ibid.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, pp. 

122-124; Aoyama, “Japan’s greater contribution to peace, security 

and stability in Asia,” briefing slides.

29. Japan and the ROK are each other’s third largest trading 

partner. In 2016, the two countries joined with their common 

ally, the United States, to develop a trilateral intelligence sharing mechanism and to participate in a trilateral missile defense 

exercise. Although these are positive developments, they are 

overshadowed by the continued legacy of the “comfort women,” 

who the Japanese forced into prostitution during its brutal Imperial-era occupation of the Korean peninsula. Emotions regarding 

Takeshima—which Japan claims but which the ROK occupies—

run high, and one observer notes that for the South Korean public, 

“attachment to Dokdo has assumed a quasi-religious tenor.” See 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, pp. 31-32, 35, 37, 

40; also Scott A. Snyder, “Japan-South Korea Relations in 2016: A 

Return to the Old Normal,” Asia Unbound, blog of the Council 

on Foreign Relations, September 23, 2016, available from https://

www.cfr.org/blog/japan-south-korea-relations-2016-return-old-normal, 

accessed February 19, 2017. For information on Takeshima/

Dokdo, see Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean-Japanese 

security relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute,” 

The Pacific Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, July 2015, pp. 349-350, 353-356; 

also Mark E. Manyin, “Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions,” 

Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper, December 2015, p. 

10, available from https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/

Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf, accessed January 10, 

2017.

30. Kenichi Yamada, “South Korean still firmly oppose 

‘comfort women’ deal,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 31, 2016, 

online, available from https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/

International-Relations/South-Koreans-still-firmly-oppose-comfortwomen-deal, accessed March 21, 2017.

31. Kyodo News, “Park’s downfall muddles Japan’s options 

on ‘comfort women’ agreement, North Korea,” The Japan 
141

Times, March 11, 2017, available from www.japantimes.co.jp/

news/2017/03/11/national/politics-diplomacy/parks-downfall-muddlesjapans-options-comfort-women-issue-north-korea/#.WNl3ek3yncs, 

accessed March 21, 2017; Choe Sang-Hun and Motoko Rich, 

“Japan Recalls Ambassador to South Korea to Protest ‘Comfort 

Woman’ Statue,” The New York Times, January 6, 2017, available 

from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/world/asia/japan-southkorea-ambassador-comfort-woman-statue.html, accessed February 

19, 2017; for Moon’s lead in the polls, see Kanga Kong, “Moon 

Leads the Pack as South Korea Prepares for Special Election,” 

Bloomberg, March 9, 2017, available from https://www.bloomberg.

com/politics/articles/2017-03-10/meet-the-top-contenders-to-replacepark-as-south-korea-s-leader, accessed March 21, 2017.

32. Central Intelligence Agency, “Japan.”

33. Government debt stands at 234 percent of GDP, which is 

the highest level in the world (for comparison, Greece’s government debt is 181 percent of GDP. For more information on deflation, see Simon Kennedy, “Deflation: The Trouble With Falling 

Prices,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2016, available from https://www.

bloomberg.com/quicktake/deflation, accessed February 27, 2017; for 

information on the debt, see Central Intelligence Agency, “Japan”; 

also Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Comparison: Public 

Debt,” The World Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, updated November 14, 2017, available from https://www.

cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.

html, accessed December 1, 2017.

34. Japan’s population is projected to fall by nearly 30 percent within the next 5 decades. D.M., “Japan’s demography: 

The incredible shrinking country,” Banyon, blog of The Economist, March 25, 2014, available from www.economist.com/blogs/

banyan/2014/03/japans-demography, accessed February 27, 2017.

35. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Security 

Strategy, p. 20.

36. Beina Xu, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, July 1, 2014, available 

from www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437, accessed 

September 15, 2016.
142

37. Ibid.

38. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of 

the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a More Robust 

Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibility,” October 3, 2013, pp. 

3-4, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from www.mofa.go.jp/

files/000016028.pdf, accessed January 10, 2017; Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative 

Committee: A Stronger Alliance For A Dynamic Security Environment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 27, 2015, p. 4, available from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078186.pdf, accessed January 10, 

2017.

39. Shelia A. Smith, “Abe’s Trump Test,” Asia Unbound, blog 

of the Council on Foreign Relations, November 18, 2016, available 

from https://www.cfr.org/blog/abes-trump-test, accessed November 

20, 2016.

40. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Rebecca M. 

Nelson, Brock R. Williams, and Taishu Yamakawa, Japan-U.S. 

Relations: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, February 16, 2017, p. 

Summary, available from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf, 

accessed February 25, 2017. For an explanation on how the TTP 

increased the United States competitive security advantage over 

China, see Ashley J. Tellis, “The geopolitics of the TTIP and the 

TTP,” in Sanjaya Baru and Suvi Dogra, eds., Power Shifts and New 

Blocs in the Global Trading System, London, UK: Adelphi Books, 

2015, pp. 93-120.

41. The TPP was seen by Prime Minister Abe as a central component of his plans to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance by deepening economic ties between the two countries. Chanlett-Avery 

et al.; Scott A. Snyder, “SecDef Mattis’s Mission in Northeast 

Asia: Provide Reassurance from the Trump Administration,” Asia 

Unbound, blog of the Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 

2017, available from https://www.cfr.org/blog/secdef-mattiss-missionnortheast-asia-provide-reassurance-trump-administration, accessed 

February 19, 2017; Elizabeth C. Economy, “When the United 

States Abdicates the Throne, Who Will Lead?” Asia Unbound, blog 

of the Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2017, available 

from https://www.cfr.org/blog/when-united-states-abdicates-thronewho-will-lead, accessed February 19, 2017. For more on the TTP’s 
143

role in Abe’s plans to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, pp. forward, 91, 257-

258; James McBride and Beina Xu, “Abenomics and the Japanese 

Economy,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, February 10, 2017, available from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/

abenomics-and-japanese-economy, accessed February 21, 2017.

42. Smith, “Behind Japan, 100%”; Michael R. Gordon and 

Choe Sang-Hun, “Jim Mattis Seeks to Soothe Tensions in Japan 

and South Korea,” The New York Times, February 5, 2017, available 

from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/jim-mattissouth-korea-japan.html?_r=0, accessed February 19, 2017.

43. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Security 

Strategy, p. 1.

44. The three national interests are: the protection of Japan’s 

sovereignty, independence, and the lives and property of its citizens; the pursuit of “the prosperity of Japan and its nationals 

through economic development”; and the maintenance of a values-based international order in which the rule of law is respected. 

Ibid., pp. 4-5.

45. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

46. Ibid., pp. 14-20.

47. Ibid., p. 15.

48. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, pp. 3-4, 6-7.

49. Ibid., pp. 7, 13. See footnote on bottom of p. 13 for a discussion on the reduction in Ground Self-Defense Force conventional 

equipment.

50. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 7-8.

51. At $43 billion, the budget is still a modest 0.97 percent of 

GDP, which ranks 102nd in the world. Tim Kelly, “Japan’s government approves record military spending,” Reuters, December 

21, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defensebudget-idUSKBN14B01C, accessed February 20, 2017; also, see 

Central Intelligence Agency, “Japan.”
144

52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Three Principles 

on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs, April 1, 2014, available from www.mofa.go.jp/

files/000034953.pdf, accessed September 16, 2016. The three principles are: Transfers are prohibited when they would violate Japanese treaties, UN resolution or when the purchasing country is 

party to a conflict; transfers are authorized when they contribute 

to peace and security or when the transfer “contributes to Japan’s 

security”; and finally transfers will ensure that Japan has control 

regarding a subsequent transfer to third parties.

53. Mina Pollman, “The Trouble With Japan’s Defense 

Exports,” The Diplomat, October 02, 2015, available from https://

thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-truth-about-japans-defense-exports/, 

accessed September 16, 2016; also Taisuke Hirose, “Japan’s New 

Arms Export Principles: Strengthening United States-Japan 

Relations,” Center for Strategic & International Studies Newsletter, 

October 14, 2014, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/

japan%E2%80%99s-new-arms-export-principles-strengthening-usjapan-relations, accessed February 21, 2017.

54. Hirose; Kyle Mizokami, “Japan’s Emerging Defense Export 

Industry,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 23, 2015, available 

from https://news.usni.org/2015/02/23/japans-emerging-defenseexport-industry, accessed February 21, 2017; Arthur Herman, 

Hudson Institute, “The Awakening Giant: Risks And Opportunities For Japan’s New Defense Export Policy—Analysis,” Eurasia Review, December 21, 2016, available from www.eurasiareview.

com/21122016-the-awakening-giant-risks-and-opportunities-forjapans-new-defense-export-policy-analysis/, accessed February 21, 

2017.

55. Tim Kelly, Cyril Altmeyer, and Colin Packham, “How 

France sank Japan’s $40 billion Australian submarine dream,” 

Reuters, April 29, 2016, available from https://www.reuters.com/

article/us-australia-submarines-japan-defence-in/how-france-sankjapans-40-billion-australian-submarine-dream-idUSKCN0XQ1FC

accessed February 21, 2017.

56. Ibid., pp. 20-22.

57. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, published on Official 
145

Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 

2015, pp. 1-23, available from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf, 

accessed January 6, 2017.

58. Taro Yamato, Director Japan U.S. Defense Cooperation 

Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Ministry of Defense, interview 

by author, Tokyo, Japan, January 12, 2017.

59. According to Hideshi Tokuchi, former Vice-Minister of 

Defense for International Affairs, this legislation was very much 

about alliance management: “‘Collective self-defense’ is more 

important in peacetime than it is during times of conflict” because 

it demonstrates Japan’s commitment to participate in the alliance 

and reduces the asymmetric nature of the security relationship. 

See Office of The Cabinet Secretariat; also Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security,” 

briefing slides, March 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from www.mofa.go.jp/files/000143304.pdf, accessed September 15, 2016; Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate 

Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), interview by author, Tokyo, 

Japan, January 13, 2017.

60. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, pp. 63-64, 

68-69; Michael Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism,” Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 95, No. 2, March/April 2016, p. 132.

61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, p. 167.

62. Ibid., p. 166; also Auslin, p. 132; Renato Cruz de Castro, 

“Philippines and Japan Strengthen a Twenty-First Century Security Partnership,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 17, 2015, available from https://amti.csis.org/

philippines-and-japan-strengthen-a-twenty-first-century-securitypartnership/, accessed February 21, 2017.

63. The term “cornerstone” is ubiquitous in discussions and 

writings about the U.S.-Japan Alliance. For just one example, see 

U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations With Japan,” 

Washington, DC: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State, January 25, 2017, available from https://www.

state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm, accessed February 22, 2017.
146

64. Ibid; The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 

“U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping 

the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond,” Obama White House 

Archives, April 25, 2014, available from https://obamawhitehouse.

archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statementunited-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac, accessed March 21, 

2017.

65. Kazuya Sakamoto, “What Is The Strengthened Japan-U.S. 

Alliance for? Defending and Advancing the Liberal World Order,” 

Strategic Japan Working Papers, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016, p. 4, available from http://

csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/160401_What_Strengthened_

Japan_US_Alliance.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017. The government 

of Japan’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 budget for U.S. basing was approximately ¥581B. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, p. 

165.

66. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, p. 24.

67. There is a third risk, but the likelihood of it coming to 

fruition is so small that it is not worth mentioning in the main 

text: there is the risk that Japan would revert back to its Imperial, 

expansive past. This is nearly unimaginable for several reasons. 

First, Japan’s modern political climate and popular culture has 

been shaped by the devastation of World War II and 70 years of a 

purely defensive, non-aggressive foreign policy, so the Japanese 

people are highly unlikely to support any military aggressiveness that falls outside of a purely self-defense situation. Another 

reason is that Japan no longer possesses the overwhelming power 

advantages over its neighbors that it did in the early part of the 

20th century, so it is unlikely that an aggressive military policy 

would achieve success. Finally, the international environment has 

changed, and imperialism is no longer an acceptable model for a 

modern state to follow.

68. Visits to the Yakusuni shrine—in which several class A 

criminals are enshrined—are considered particularly provocative; 

Defense Minister Tomomi Inada visited the shrine soon after Prime 

Minister Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor. See Nobuhiro Kubo, “Japan 

minister visits controversial shrine honoring was dead after Pearl 

Harbor trip,” Reuters, December 29, 2016, available from www.
147

reuters.com/article/us-japan-shrine-inada-idUSKBN14I025, accessed 

March 22, 2017.

69. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 50-64. Thanks 

go to Colonel Doug Winton, USA, for suggesting the quote.

70. In 2012, ASEAN was unable to issue a joint communique 

after China apparently pressured Cambodia to reject language 

about China’s behavior in the South China Sea; and in 2016, it 

was able to convince Greece, Hungary, and Croatia—all of which 

are recipients of Chinese “One Belt, One Road” investment—to 

neuter language in a European Union communique on a Permanent Court of Arbitration decision, which ruled against China. 

See Ernest Z. Bower, “Commentary: China Reveals Its Hand on 

ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Center For Strategic & International 

Studies, July 20, 2012, available from https://www.csis.org/analysis/

china-reveals-its-hand-asean-phnom-penh, accessed March 21, 2017; 

Theresa Fallon, “The EU, The South China Sea, and China’s Successful Wedge Strategy,” Analysis, Asia Maritime Transparency 

Initiative, October 13, 2016, available from https://amti.csis.org/

eu-south-china-sea-chinas-successful-wedge-strategy, accessed March 

21, 2017.

71. For China’s ambivalence toward the existing international 

economic system, see Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, 

“Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 72, Washington, DC: Council 

on Foreign Relations Press, 2015, p. 16, https://www.cfr.org/sites/

default/files/pdf/2015/04/China_CSR72.pdf, accessed September 1, 

2016.

72. China and Japan have been rivals for centuries; for a quick 

discussion on their conflicts during the late 19th-century conflict, 

see Henry Kissinger, On China, New York, NY: Penguin, 2012, pp. 

77-88.

73. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Strategy, p. 3.

74. Smith, Japan’s New Politics, p. 5; see also Yukio Hatoyama, 

“A New Path for Japan,” The New York Times, August 26, 2009, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27ihtedhatoyama.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1, accessed March 7, 2017; 
148

Carolyn Leddy, “The Widening U.S.-Japan Security Divide,” The 

Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2009, available from https://www.

wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704597704574486272405220200, 

accessed March 7, 2017.

75. Hatoyama.

76. U.S. official during a discussion with U.S. Army War College students, November 2016.

77. Tokuchi, interview by author.

78. Manyin, “Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions,” pp. 

11-12.

79. Tomohiko Satake, Senior Research Fellow, Policy Studies 

Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, interview by 

author, January 13, 2017, Tokyo, Japan.

80. Chanlett-Avery et al., pp. 8-10.

81. David Brunnstrom and Matt Spetalnick, “Trump to seek 

quick progress with Japan’s Abe on replacement trade deal,” 

Reuters, January 27, 2017, available from www.reuters.com/article/

us-usa-trump-japan-idUSKBN15A33Q, accessed February 25, 2017; 

see also Ibid., p. 31.

82. U.S. Census Department, “Top Trading Partners - December 2016: Year-to-Date Total Trade,” U.S. Census Department, 

December 2016, available from https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/statistics/highlights/top/top1612yr.html, accessed February 22, 

2017. See also Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, “Japan: Trade,” Economic Research Service, 

United States Department of Agriculture, October 6, 2017, available from https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-marketstrade/countries-regions/japan/trade/, accessed December 4, 2017. The 

United States exports high quality manufactured goods to Japan 

such as optical/medical equipment, aircraft, machinery, agricultural products, and commercial services. For its part, the Japan 

exports vehicles and machinery to the United States. For more 

information, see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Japan,” 

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Office of the 
149

President, n.d., available from https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/

japan-korea-apec/japan, accessed February 22, 2017.

83. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 27, 2012, p. 1, available from www.

mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf, 

accessed January 10, 2017; also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, p. 162.

84. This comment was made by a senior commander to the 

author in 2016.

85. The current U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Commander described deterrence as the product of “Capability x 

Resolve x Signaling,” but under the current plan, two elements 

of the equation—capability and signaling—decrease significantly. I would argue that dispersing the 3d Marine Division in 

disaggregated elements to bases as distant from each other as 

California, Hawaii, Guam and Australia unquestionably weakens warfighting capability. Forward basing in Okinawa provides significant benefits: specialized training facilities such as 

the Jungle Warfare Training Center; consolidated command and 

control of III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) units; coordination between III MEF units; shorter response times for regional 

contingencies; and offset basing funding from Japan. Under the 

current realignment plan, all of those advantages are lost. The 

operational disadvantages associated with the current Okinawa 

basing scheme—namely the lack of on-island combined-arms 

training areas and the insufficient quantity of inter-theater lift—

exist to varying degrees at many of the proposed future basing 

locations. And while the Japanese government mitigates Okinawa training area shortfalls by coordinating and funding “relocation exercises” in which U.S. units train on Japan Self-Defense 

Forces (JSDF) installations in mainland Japan, the United States 

will be fully responsible for coordinating and funding similar 

exercises to overcome training shortfalls at the proposed basing 

locations. The political costs associated with forward basing are 

likely to continue even after the plan is executed, they are simply 

transferred to Guam or Australia, both of which are home to 

opponents of U.S. basing. For USPACOM Commanders views 

on deterrence, see Admiral Harry Harris, “Address to the Lowy 
150

Institute for International Policy,” public speech, Sydney, Australia, December 14, 2016, available from www.pacom.mil/Media/

Speeches-Testimony/Article/1029173/address-to-the-lowy-institutefor-international-policy/, accessed January 25, 2017. For opposition to U.S. basing in Guam, Australia, and California, see Jon 

Letman, “Proposed US military buildup on Guam angers locals 

who liken it to colonization,” August 1, 2016, The Guardian, available from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/01/guamus-military-marines-deployment, accessed February 27, 2017; Avani 

Dias, “No support for US military base in NT from Chief Minister Adam Giles,” ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] 

News, January 26, 2016, available from www.abc.net.au/news/2016-

01-25/no-support-for-us-military-base-in-nt-from-chief-ministeradam-/7114054, accessed February 27, 2017; Steven Cuevas, “In 

Joshua Tree, Marine Base Expansion Faces Strong Opposition,” 

The California Report, October 14, 2013, KQED California Public 

Radio, available from https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2013/10/14/

in-joshua-tree-marine-base-expansion-faces-strong-opposition/.

86. Tokuchi, interview by author; Yamato, interview by 

author.

87. While rebasing Okinawa-based units elsewhere in Japan 

may appear to substitute a new set of political problems for an 

old one, this is not necessarily the case: increasing the U.S. military footprint elsewhere in Japan can be accomplished with a 

relatively low amount of local controversy, as the recent relocation of KC-130J refuelers from Futenma Air Station in Okinawa 

to Iwakuni Air Station in southern Honshu demonstrates. This 

rebasing effort could involve existing U.S. installations such as 

the Combined Arms Training Center Mt. Fuji, or it could involve 

existing Japanese training bases, such as the Yausubetsu Maneuver Area in eastern Hokkaido. While there would potentially be 

a need to increase the family-support infrastructure (schools, 

housing, facilities) in some locations to accommodate this realignment, this is mitigated by the fact that many of the Marine units 

which would be moved are rotational units which deploy without families, significantly reducing the amount of family support 

required. If the U.S. units adopted a system similar to the one 

used by some U.S. units in South Korea—in which military families live on existing U.S. installations with family support services 

already available, while the service member commutes to and 
151

from a more austere work installation on the weekend—it would 

further reduce the requirement to increase family support service 

infrastructure.

88. Japan’s political culture has historically been opaque 

when it comes to issues of national security policy, and the strategic decision making process is often controlled by bureaucrats 

whose institutional memory is longer than that of oft-changing 

political leadership. The result was that the rationale behind security policy decisions often remained unexplained, making it difficult to have an informed public discussion about national security 

issues. This historical lack of public discourse has had negative 

practical ramifications; when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 

took power from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009, it 

did not understand some aspects of Japan’s security policy or 

the policy making process because its members had never been 

exposed to the dynamics which influenced LDP decisions. For 

more, see Smith, Japan’s New Politics, pp. 4-5, 24-26, 31, 33.

89. For information on the United States as a reliable partner, see Genron NPO, “Poll 2016: The Future of Northeast Asia 

and Public Opinions,” Genron NPO, March 23, 2017, p. 13, available from http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5342.

html. For information on the January 2016 Yomiuri Shimbun poll 

showing Japan public support for the alliance, see Craig Kafura, 

“Public Opinion and the US-Japan Alliance at the Outset of the 

Trump Administration,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 

February 8, 2017, available from https://www.thechicagocouncil.

org/publication/public-opinion-and-us-japan-alliance-outset-trumpadministration#_ftn8, accessed March 29, 2017. The article has a 

link to the poll, but the results are written in kanji. Thanks to Mr. 

Nicholas Szechenyi from the Center for Strategic & International 

Studies for suggesting these polls.

153

CHAPTER 6

CURTAIL, COOPERATE, OR COMPEL IN THE 

SOUTH CHINA SEA?

Robert R. Arnold, Jr. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States and China are currently in direct 

conflict over each other’s actions in the South China 

Sea. Chinese acts include aggressive behavior to further territorial aspirations and excessive maritime 

claims, harassment of U.S. military-led Freedom of 

Navigation Operations (FONOPS), significant reclamation on disputed land features, and construction of 

new infrastructure that serves both military and nonmilitary purposes.

The United States is concerned that China’s activities challenge the existing international order and are 

a violation of international law. Maintaining military 

freedom of navigation is also a vital U.S. interest. The 

U.S. interpretation of freedom of navigation is the most 

contentious issue for China.

Although China declared it respects commercial 

freedom of navigation and has taken no steps to limit it, 

the United States is concerned that China “may change 

its mind” and restrict commercial freedom of navigation in the future despite the negative impacts it might 

have on both China’s and U.S. economic interests. The 

United States takes no position on territorial and maritime claims, but wants to see a peaceful resolution, 
154

thereby sustaining regional stability. U.S. actions consist of maintaining a strong military presence in the 

area, engagement with allies and partners, and freedom of navigation operations near disputed areas to 

support United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS). China’s main assertion is that U.S. military freedom of navigation operations are intrusions 

into its sovereignty and a breach of China’s territorial 

integrity. China views state sovereignty and territorial 

integrity as core interests. China stated it is committed 

to upholding international law, maintaining freedom 

of navigation in and flight over the South China Sea, 

and to preserving peace and stability by cooperating 

with partners throughout the region.

While a proposal to cooperate with China seems 

counterintuitive and is likely to be unpopular with 

many audiences in the United States, it is the most 

productive method to resolve this issue for the following reasons. First, it is the truly pragmatic choice. 

Second, this plan has the best chance for long-term 

success because it involves China as a willing participant. Third, no matter how hard it tries, the United 

States cannot stop the rise of China, short of going to 

war. Fourth, if the United States wants a peaceful and 

responsible China, it must guide the process. Fifth, 

cooperation with China would bring greater international respect and legitimacy for U.S. global leadership 

efforts. Finally, the Trump administration’s willingness to accept nontraditional solutions and modifications to the existing international system will enable 

the success of this policy.
155

INTRODUCTION

The United States and China are currently in direct 

conflict over each other’s actions in the South China 

Sea. Chinese acts include aggressive behavior toward 

its neighbors to further territorial aspirations and 

excessive maritime claims, harassment of FONOPS, 

significant reclamation on disputed land features, and 

construction of new infrastructure that serves both 

military and nonmilitary purposes.1 The primary U.S. 

concern is that China’s activities challenge the existing 

international order and are a violation of international 

law. Since the United States is the leader of the global 

system, it views Chinese opposition to the rules and 

norms associated with this structure as an attempt to 

increase China’s regional and international influence 

at U.S. expense. Maintaining freedom of navigation 

is also a vital U.S. interest for two reasons. First, the 

United States desires assured access for its military 

forces throughout the maritime global commons, to 

include the South China Sea. This aspect of freedom of 

navigation is the most contentious for China. Second, 

although the Chinese have stated they respect commercial freedom of navigation and have taken no steps 

to limit it, the United States has a very real concern that 

China “may change its mind” and restrict commercial 

freedom of navigation in the future, despite the negative impacts it might have on both China’s and U.S. 

economic interests. Finally, the United States takes no 

position on territorial and maritime claims, but wants 

to see a peaceful resolution thereby sustaining regional 

stability.2 U.S. actions consist of maintaining a strong 

military presence, engagement with allies and partners, and FONOPS near disputed areas to support 

UNCLOS.
156

China’s main assertion is that U.S. military 

FONOPS are intrusions into Chinese sovereignty and 

a breach of China’s territorial integrity. China holds 

state sovereignty and territorial integrity so dear that it 

views them as core interests.3 In addition, China stated 

it is committed to upholding international law, maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the 

South China Sea, and to preserving peace and stability 

throughout the region.4 Upon examination of China’s 

affirmed principles, it would seem the United States 

and China share common interests in the South China 

Sea. If so, why are the two counties involved in such a 

contested dispute? To answer this question, this chapter will address the following four points: 1) the background behind this problem and the contemporary 

issues surrounding this issue; 2) U.S. national interests 

and China’s core interests; 3) the official government 

positions of both nations on the South China Sea; and 

4) the current actions of the United States and China 

in the area. Lastly, three options will be provided for 

review, culminating with a final recommendation 

for the current administration to consider as the U.S. 

response to China’s actions in the South China Sea.

BACKGROUND

For centuries, China maintained sporadic contact 

with South China Sea islands and other land features. 

The most frequent use of the area was by Chinese 

fisherman.5 As China’s power waned, European colonial nations increased their influence throughout the 

region. However, they also generally maintained freedom of navigation for all parties transiting the South 

China Sea. The region was administered by Imperial 

Japan during World War II, and although Japan was 

forced to relinquish all “stolen” land features in the 
157

Western Pacific, including the South China Sea, as a 

part of the post-war settlement, it did not surrender the 

“spoils” to any clearly designated recipient country.

In 1946, the Republic of China sent two destroyers 

to the South China Sea to “recover” the islands and 

land features.6 In the following year, the Republic of 

China government proclaimed a vast majority of the 

South China Sea with the infamous 11-dash line. The 

Chinese claim was through an official map depicting 

the area in the South China Sea.7 The Republic of China 

did not have the time and effort to take effective control 

of its claimed properties in the South China Sea, since 

China had become engulfed in a civil war between the 

government and Communist forces.

The Nationalist government lost the war and sought 

shelter in Taiwan in 1949. The Communists founded 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. 

With respect to the South China Sea, the PRC continued to claim it by using the 11-dash line, yet for a variety of reasons did not exercise much actual control. In 

1953, China removed two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin as 

a friendly gesture to North Vietnam,8 creating China’s 

Nine-Dash Line.9

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

The most contentious territorial claims include 

three main areas: Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, 

and Scarborough Shoal. The Paracels are claimed by 

China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but have been occupied 

and administered by China since 1974 after a successful armed struggle with South Vietnam. Brunei, China, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all 

have claims within the Spratlys. All claimants, except 

for Brunei, hold land features there. There has been 

friction among nations in this area for nearly 30 years, 
158

as best illustrated by the military conflict between 

China and Vietnam in 1988. The Scarborough Shoal is 

disputed by China, the Philippines, and Taiwan and 

was the site of a stand-off between China and the Philippines in 2012. Although the Sino-Philippine relationship has become more positive since October 2016, 

when Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte stated his 

desire to move his country closer to China, their discord has yet to be fully resolved.10 A good illustration 

of this rift occurred in February 2017 when the Philippines alleged that China might be building on a reef 

near the Scarborough Shoal to solidify its claim there.11

Finally, less controversial claims include the Pratas 

Islands that is contested by China and Taiwan, but 

occupied by Taiwan and the Macclesfield Bank, which 

is claimed by China, the Philippines, and Taiwan.12

The conflicting maritime disputes are caused by two 

major issues: overlapping Economic Exclusion Zones 

(EEZ) that, in accordance with UNCLOS, can extend 200 

nautical miles (NM) from internationally recognized 

landmasses; and China’s Nine-Dash Line which has 

no clear definition and has been officially and successfully debunked. The Nine-Dash Line was challenged 

by the Philippines in 2013 when it filed an arbitration 

case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration against 

China over 15 counts of maritime disagreements, the 

most significant of which was the Nine-Dash Line.13 A 

year later, China tested one of its maritime assertions 

within the Nine-Dash Line by emplacing an oil-drilling platform near the Paracel Islands within Vietnam’s 

EEZ. This was the first time the Chinese drilled in an 

EEZ that was contested with another nation. It sparked 

stern reaction by both the Vietnamese government and 

its people. Violent protests broke out, causing damage 

to Chinese businesses in Vietnam and resulting in the 

death of two of China’s citizens. During the conflict, 
159

Chinese and Vietnamese vessels were seen colliding at 

sea. China eventually removed the oil rig, 1 month earlier than originally planned.14 The Permanent Court of 

Arbitration released its results on July 12, 2016, and all 

of its rulings were against China. Most significant was 

its decision that “there was no legal basis for China to 

claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas 

falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”15 China rejected the 

whole arbitration act, did not participate in the hearings, and disavowed the ruling. There is a certain bit of 

irony in China’s reaction, given its status as a signatory 

to UNCLOS since 1996.16 See Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1. Maritime Claims in South China Sea.

17
160

In late 2013, China started land reclamation in the 

Spratlys. In less than 2 years, China reclaimed over 

2,900 acres of land at seven of its eight outposts and 

built multiple artificial structures on six of its controlled land features in the Spratly Islands. The speed 

and scale shocked the United States, the disputants, 

and the rest of the world.18 China also stated its territories in the Spratlys would be used for military 

and nonmilitary tasks like search and rescue, disaster 

relief, scientific research, fishing production, conservation, and maritime safety.19 Previously, in 1993, China 

built a military capable airfield and upgraded Woody 

Island in the Paracels with “an artificial harbor with a 

concrete dock 500-m long and capable of accommodating destroyer and frigate class vessels.”20 In February 

2016, China deployed surface-to-air missiles to Woody 

Island.21

INTERESTS

According to the National Security Strategy (NSS), 

vital U.S. national interests are to maintain global leadership to promote security, prosperity, values, and 

international order.22 The specific plan to address interests in the Asia-Pacific, officially called the “Strategic 

Rebalance,” had been nested with broader priorities 

contained in the NSS. In October 2011, then-Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton introduced the idea of shifting U.S. focus to the region that became known as the 

pivot to the Pacific.

We need to be smart and systematic about where we 

invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best 

position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and 

advance our values. One of the most important tasks of 

American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be 

to lock in substantially increased investment-diplomatic, 
161

economic, strategic, and otherwise-in the Asia-Pacific 

region.23

The next month, former President Barack Obama clarified his intent during a speech to the Australian Parliament.

We seek security, which is the foundation of peace and 

prosperity. We stand for an international order in which 

the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people 

are upheld. Where international law and norms are 

enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation 

are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to 

regional security, and where disagreements are resolved 

peacefully.24

During his inaugural remarks in January 2017, 

President Donald Trump prioritized domestic concerns such as employment, internal investment, 

national unity, and the transfer of power back to the 

population. However, he also addressed international 

affairs focused primarily on the NSS priorities of security, prosperity, and values. The President’s comments 

supported the need for security through strength and 

revealed his desire for greater economic prosperity. Although important, U.S. values should not be 

forced.25 The United States would instead “shine as an 

example” for other nations to emulate.26 In a true realist 

approach, which stresses an international order that is 

guided by states focused on attaining interests through 

the accumulation of power, Trump proclaimed all 

countries have the right to seek their own interests.27

This statement reveals that the Trump administration 

may be more accepting of other nations working to 

achieve their own interests, likely so long as they do 

not compete with U.S. national interests. In the future, 

such a perspective may lead to a more multipolar 
162

system instead of the current U.S.-driven unipolar 

international order.28 Even though Trump’s inaugural 

address did not specifically mention his position on 

continued engagement in the Asia-Pacific, his pledge 

to “reinforce old alliances and form new ones”29 seems 

to imply that maintaining current bilateral hub-andspoke30 alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, 

New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines is a priority. Additionally, it is likely that Trump would be open 

to engaging new partners in this region and elsewhere 

in the world.

Based on China’s claims in the area, it is clear that 

their core values are truly held sacred and guide their 

every action.

China is firm in upholding its core interests which 

include the following: state sovereignty, national 

security, territorial integrity and national reunification, 

China’s political system established by the Constitution 

and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for 

ensuring sustainable economic and social development.31

Chinese territorial and maritime assertions in the 

East and South China Seas highlight the importance 

of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the 

desire for national reunification. However, the emphasis on Taiwan is the clearest example of the value of 

national reunification. China supports its core interest 

of national security by the reform and buildup of its 

military, the stated desire for a nuclear-free Korean 

peninsula, and by its territorial and maritime claims, 

land reclamation, military infrastructure construction, 

and by actions within the East and South China Seas. 

Although not often mentioned internationally, the bolstering of Chinese military capabilities also strengthens its internal stability.32 China’s increase in economic 
163

prosperity directly supports its core interest to achieve 

sustainable economic and social development. China 

created and distributed its specific vision for the future 

of the Asia-Pacific in a recent white paper.

China has all along taken the advancement of regional 

prosperity and stability as its own responsibility. China 

is ready to pursue security through dialogue and 

cooperation in the spirit of working together for mutually 

beneficial results, and safeguard peace and stability 

jointly with other countries in the region.33

The Chinese focus on being responsible and 

enhancing peace and stability through dialogue and 

cooperation with regional partners should be especially enticing to the Trump administration since these 

goals are in line with overall U.S. interests and could 

be used to foster a better and closer relationship with 

China.

OFFICIAL POSITIONS

In reference to the South China Sea, the four main 

themes expressed in the NSS include maintaining freedom of navigation, deterring aggression, resolving 

disputes peacefully, and respecting international law 

and order.34 First, perceived threats to freedom of navigation within the South China Sea are a major security 

concern for the United States because open trade routes 

remain absolutely critical to the economic well-being 

of the United States, China, and the greater world community. Prosperity is also touted as a key priority in 

both the NSS and in statements by Trump. In addition 

to accounting for “more than 10 percent of global fisheries production”35 and billions of gallons of oil and gas 

reserves,36 “almost 30 percent of the world’s maritime 

trade transits the South China Sea annually, including 
164

approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound 

for the United States.”37 While economic protection 

remains a genuine concern for the United States, there 

is another, often unexpressed, aspect that is crucial for 

the United States: unimpeded military access to the 

Asia-Pacific region. Since the United States is the preeminent military power with global operational reach, 

it must preserve its ability to project military force anywhere in the world, with unopposed access being preferred. China’s military presence in the South China 

Sea remains a real threat to U.S. power projection 

capabilities. Second, the United States is committed to 

deterring aggression in the area. Major global conflict 

has been averted for over 70 years because of continued U.S. presence, its relationship with allies and partners, and the inherent security that brings. Third, the 

United States would ultimately like to see all disputes 

worked out in a peaceful manner that will help sustain 

regional stability.38 Finally, international law and order 

must be reinforced. This has been facilitated by several 

methods. First, sustaining freedom of navigation is 

inextricably linked to bolstering international law since 

it supports UNCLOS. Although the United States has 

not ratified UNCLOS, it follows its tenets, considering 

them world norms. Second, deterring aggressive acts 

sustains the international order by preserving peace 

and stability. Finally, and significantly, strengthening 

the rules-based international system supports the leadership and influence the United States enjoys globally.

In December 2016, then President-elect Trump 

stated China was building a “massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea.”39 Beyond 

that, he has not professed an official position on the 

South China Sea. However, both Secretary of State Rex 

Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis made 
165

clear and direct statements on the U.S. official position 

there. Unfortunately, their comments were not mutually supporting. This led to ambiguity on the actual 

U.S. position regarding the South China Sea. At his 

confirmation hearing in January 2017, Tillerson stated, 

“We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, 

first, the island-building stops and, second, your access 

to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”40 His 

words seemed to indicate the Trump administration 

was planning to take a strong military approach to 

Chinese actions in the region. However, in early February 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis contradicted 

Tillerson when he declared, “What we have to do is 

exhaust all efforts, diplomatic efforts, to try to resolve 

this properly, maintaining open lines of communication.”41 He went on to add, “and certainly our military 

stance should be one that reinforces our diplomats.”42

Such discord indicates there is no clear U.S. policy on 

the South China Sea. Given this fact, the Trump administration may be open to considering a wide variety of 

recommended options.

China has consistently stated its position on the 

South China Sea emphasizing four main points: being 

a regional leader, maintaining peace and stability, following international law, and its dedication to cooperating with partners.

China is an important force for maintaining peace and 

stability in the South China Sea. It abides by the purposes 

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and is 

committed to upholding and promoting international rule 

of law. It respects and acts in accordance with international 

law. While firmly safeguarding its territorial sovereignty 

and maritime rights and interests, China adheres to the 

position of settling disputes through negotiation and 

consultation and managing differences through rules 
166

and mechanisms. China endeavors to achieve win-win 

outcomes through mutually beneficial cooperation.43

First, it is significant for the United States to recognize and welcome the message in the first sentence 

of China’s posture statement. Simply stated, China is 

telling the world it longs to be an important player in 

regional affairs. This desire is a critical first step for 

influencing China to become a responsible partner of 

the United States. Two of China’s other points were 

also noteworthy: peace and cooperation. Given this 

promise, it can be inferred that those two particular 

themes are important to China. The second point, preserving peace and stability, is imperative to broadening China’s economic progress—that is its main source 

of strength.

Additionally, any military action, especially against 

the United States, would hamper China’s development 

and is not something the Chinese would welcome, at 

least for now. Despite its increasing military capability, 

China is still no military match for the United States.44

Another aspect of maintaining peace and stability is 

China’s stated dedication to the peaceful settlement 

of disputes. This assertion also supports international 

law and order.

The third point is that China is committed to international law. Although most people in the United 

States would likely question this fact, there is a certain 

truth to this argument. In spite of China’s poor behavior in the region demonstrated by its bullying actions 

in response to territorial ambitions and extreme maritime claims, increased reclamation, and continued 

military capable construction, the Chinese have not 

blocked commercial vessel freedom of navigation in 

the South China Sea. China’s rationale for respecting 
167

this aspect of freedom of navigation is simple: ensuring the free flow of commercial goods through this 

vital trade route is critical to sustain China’s economic 

prosperity, so it is within its interest. As previously 

mentioned, the real concern for China regarding freedom of navigation is the U.S. military FONOPS, which 

China views as provocative. For that reason, China continues to harass, shadow, and impede U.S. warships 

conducting this mission. Although not precisely in the 

manner the United States would desire, China has also 

followed the guidelines of UNCLOS in two ways. It 

abides by Article 310, which says signatory states can 

provide a declaration or statement upon acceding to 

UNCLOS. A small percentage of nations have done so, 

with China being one of them. During the ratification 

process, China stated the desire “to obtain advance 

approval from or give prior notification”45 to foreign 

military vessels transiting its EEZ which China considers territorial waters. What China fails to recognize 

is that “declarations or statements do not purport to 

exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions 

of” UNCLOS.46 In other words, all UNCLOS signatories can make official statements, but doing so will not 

alter the rights or precepts guaranteed by the convention.47 China also subscribes to Article 298 of UNCLOS 

that allows signatory nations to opt out of certain provisions concerning the resolution of disputes, without 

prejudice. This is what China did when it rejected the 

ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that held 

that China’s “Nine-Dash Line” was inconsistent with 

UNCLOS.48

The last Chinese pledge pertains to cooperation 

with partners. When coupled with peaceful claim settlement, the Chinese method to achieve both is best 

addressed by what it calls a “dual track approach.” 
168

China proposed this idea to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which emphasized territorial and maritime dispute resolution through 

bilateral negotiations while concurrently working 

together to maintain regional security and stability 

multilaterally.49

China’s dual-track approach means specific disputes are 

to be peacefully solved through bilateral negotiations and 

consultations by countries directly involved on the basis 

of observing historic facts and international law; in the 

meantime, peace and stability in the region should be 

jointly protected by China and ASEAN countries.50

It is abundantly clear that this method leaves out 

the United States, who is not a claimant to South China 

Sea territorial or maritime disputes. Actions such as 

this are meant to increase China’s regional influence 

at the expense of the United States. Given this fact, the 

United States must remain engaged in the South China 

Sea or its regional influence will be steadily diminished.

ACTIONS

U.S. actions in the South China Sea consist of three 

components: a substantial physical military presence, 

military exercises and exchanges with allies and partners, and unilateral FONOPS. Forward deployed U.S. 

military forces are meant to bolster regional stability and security. Military exchanges with allies and 

emerging partners serve two purposes: to improve 

the security capacity of traditional allies; and to 

engage new partners, including China and important regional organizations like ASEAN, in a cooperative manner mitigating future conflict. The Rim of the 

Pacific (RIMPAC) is one such exercise that meets those 

parameters.
169

The exercise’s objectives are to enhance the interoperability 

of the combined RIMPAC forces as well as to integrate 

new participants in the employment of multinational 

command and control at the tactical and operational 

levels. In 2014, China participated for the first time.51

U.S. FONOPS have been conducted near contested 

territories and excessive maritime claims made by 

China, but have been ineffectual in altering China’s 

behavior since the execution of FONOPS have not been 

aligned with the intended purpose. The United States 

proclaims that, within the South China Sea, it “will 

continue to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with 

international law.”52 However, in many cases, when it 

actually performed FONOPS, it constrained itself by 

operating as if it was in China’s territorial waters by 

purposely sailing beyond 12 NM of disputed land features. Doing so actually legitimized China’s assertions 

since its “territorial waters” were being respected. 

Additionally, U.S. vessels would often execute innocent passage within 12 NM of the contested land. 

Again, such actions supported the very same claims 

that the FONOPS were originally meant to challenge, 

because innocent passage is only required to be performed within territorial waters.53

China has continued to engage in a number of procedures that supported its territorial and maritime 

contentions to include hostile actions against other 

claimants, countering U.S. FONOPS, enhancing land 

reclamation efforts, and building infrastructure to support military and nonmilitary functions.54 China prefers to employ a mixture of civilian and military assets 

to enforce its assertions in the South China Sea. These 

include civilian fishermen, Chinese Coast Guard, militia, other maritime law enforcement units, and the 
170

People’s Liberation Army Navy who support their 

actions.55

Maritime militias may escalate their operations and even 

clash with other nations’ ships. They did just that in 

2011, when they harassed PetroVietnam vessels near the 

Vietnamese coast; in 2012, when they became embroiled 

in a standoff with the Philippines over Scarborough 

Shoal; and in 2014, when they protected China’s Haiyang 

Shiyou 981 oil rig from Vietnamese reprisals. Chinese 

militias also impeded U.S. vessels that were conducting 

freedom of navigation patrols in waters claimed by China 

in 2015.56

Using civilians and other nonmilitary assets to conduct asymmetrical tactics keeps the conflict below the 

threshold to be considered an act of war. Neither the 

United States nor any South China Sea claimant will 

likely go to war with China over its militia ramming 

a fishing boat, its quiet land reclaiming actions on 

a small reef in the middle of the ocean, or its building of dual-purpose airports on such features. China 

knows this reality very well and is following the teachings of ancient Chinese theorist Sun Tzu who stated, 

“to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of 

skill.”57 These “gray zone” tactics are China’s attempts 

to “win without fighting.”58 China’s opposition to U.S. 

FONOPS and overflight operations has also been executed using conventional methods. In October 2016, the 

USS Decatur conducted FONOPS outside the 12 NM 

range of the Paracels. China reacted by dispatching 

three ships to follow the U.S. vessel.59 More recently, 

China responded to a U.S. aircraft near Scarborough 

Shoal where:

on Feb. 8 (local), an interaction characterized by U.S. 

Pacific Command as ‘unsafe’ occurred in international 
171

airspace above the South China Sea between a Chinese 

KJ-200 aircraft and a U.S. Navy P-3C aircraft.60

It is not readily apparent if this was an accident or an 

intentional encounter, but it is clear that China will 

continue resisting U.S. efforts to ensure freedom of 

navigation using military assets.

OPTIONS

Three alternatives for changing U.S. policy in the 

South China Sea were constructed within the general 

framework of curtail, cooperate, and compel. The curtail option would involve the United States halting 

FONOPS in the South China Sea, but continuing to 

maintain military presence in the region. Additionally, engagement with China using diplomatic and 

economic methods would increase. There are three 

opportunities present with this choice. First, stopping 

FONOPS would provide the United States with the 

flexibility to use its economic instrument of national 

power to focus on other priorities within the Asia-Pacific, other hotspots around the world, or on domestic issues. During his inauguration, Trump declared 

the United States had prioritized the needs of other 

nations before its own for too long, creating negative 

economic impacts. This might be a chance to invest in 

the homeland and elsewhere.

For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the 

expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of 

other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion 

of our military. We’ve defended other nations’ borders 

while refusing to defend our own. And spent trillions of 

dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen 

into disrepair.61
172

Easing the national debt, which in mid-February 2017 amounted to over $19 trillion, would also 

be an economic benefit of the curtail alternative since 

there would be some cost savings with discontinuing 

FONOPS, although this would admittedly be a drop in 

the bucket.62 Second, just as stated with the economic 

resources, some military assets could be diverted and 

refocused on other areas of tension like the Korean 

peninsula, the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS), and the deterrence of Russia in 

Europe. Finally, removing the friction of FONOPS and 

concentrating more closely with China on diplomatic 

and economic collaboration may lead to a better relationship between the two nations. This could, at some 

point in the future, result in even stronger economic 

interaction and China’s support for other U.S. security interests like future UN Security Council initiatives, defeating ISIS, dissuading Russian aggression, 

rebuking North Korean belligerence, influencing Iranian actions in the Middle East, and prohibiting global 

nuclear proliferation.

There are three risks inherent in this option. First, 

choosing to discontinue FONOPS may signal a weakening of U.S. global leadership and resolve. This could 

send a negative message to U.S. allies and partners 

and to near-peer competitors and adversaries, initiating new challenges to U.S. interests if not properly 

explained. Second, this action could be politically risky 

for the Trump administration for appearing weak on 

China. As in the first risk, the rationale of this policy 

would need to be clarified for Congress and for the 

U.S. public. Finally, diplomatic and economic cooperation may not be compelling enough to influence China 

to discontinue its aggressive actions in the South China 
173

Sea. Building a solid relationship with China may partially mitigate this risk.

The cooperate alternative would focus on collaboration with China on multiple levels and would consist 

of executing procedures by employing all instruments 

of U.S. national power. Start by communicating with 

several audiences, using varied messages. The Chinese government would need to understand why the 

United States was seeking greater cooperation. The 

plan would be to use China’s own message emphasizing the mutual benefits of cooperation or its “win-win 

process.”63 Next, reiterate the respect and affinity the 

American and Chinese people have for one another. 

The Chinese-American diaspora should be used to 

support this theme. The dissemination of U.S. pop 

culture or “soft power” may also be very appealing to 

Chinese youth. Congress and the U.S. populace would 

need to comprehend why cooperating with China was 

necessary. This collaboration must be viewed as a positive undertaking that would result in greater security, stability, and economic prosperity for the United 

States. The objective to exert greater influence on China 

in the long term also must be explained, primarily to 

Congress. The international community must recognize the benefit of this approach and believe that this 

will facilitate peace, stability, and prosperity. As equal 

partners, the United States and China would be able to 

maintain and further develop their military and economic strength. Each nation would be able to cooperate 

with the other from a position of strength. Diplomatically, given China’s current interest in military-to-military engagement and exercises with the United States 

which focus on common interests and challenges such 

as antiterrorism, counterterrorism, antipiracy, humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR), search and 
174

rescue, and maritime navigational safety, would be the 

best place to begin efforts. In this case, the U.S. military 

would be used to further diplomacy.

The current U.S. military maritime strategy emphasized both opportunities and risks in working with 

China’s rising military, but welcomed the chance to do 

so.

China supports counter piracy operations in the Gulf of 

Aden, conducts humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response missions enabled by its hospital ship, and 

participates in large-scale, multinational naval exercises. 

. . . However, China’s naval expansion also presents 

challenges when it employs force or intimidation against 

other sovereign nations to assert territorial claims.64

Similarly, the Chinese military echoed a desire to work 

with U.S. military forces.

China’s armed forces will continue to foster a new model 

of military relationship with the US armed forces that 

conforms to the new model of major-country relations 

between the two countries, strengthen defense dialogues, 

exchanges and cooperation, and improve the CBM 

(confidence-building measures) mechanism for the 

notification of major military activities.65

As the relationship between the United States and 

China developed, the level of cooperation would be 

expanded to include improved diplomatic, economic, 

and military collaboration such as support for critical 

U.S. short-term security interests like resolving friction in the East and South China Seas in accordance 

with UNCLOS. The United States would first need 

to ratify UNCLOS. Later, both countries could work 

together on long-term security issues like defeating 

ISIS, neutralizing terrorists, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and deterring the aggressive 
175

behaviors of North Korea, Russia, and Iran. China’s 

Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Zhenmin, supported cooperation with the United States in January 2017 when 

he proclaimed, “China is committed to working with 

the US to build relations featuring no conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation, 

and achieve positive interaction and inclusive coordination in the Asia-Pacific.”66 Another aspect of engagement would be facilitating the nascent relationship 

between China and ASEAN, initially regarding the 

completion of the code of conduct that will govern the 

interaction of China and its neighbors. This effort is 

ongoing and scheduled to be completed by the middle 

of 2018.67 However, the enduring relationship between 

China and ASEAN could be based on China’s dualtrack approach that stresses bilateral negotiations 

between South China Sea claimants with multilateral 

cooperation on regional security.68

There are three risks associated with this alternative. First is the chance that those receiving the messaging, the Chinese government and people and the 

U.S. Congress and people, would not accept the information being provided. Second, this action will not be 

successful if China refused to participate, thinking this 

was simply an attempt to contain it. Both of these risks 

could be reduced by clearly and frequently communicating the intent of this increased engagement. Finally, 

there is the risk that China may join forces with the 

United States only to build its power and challenge the 

United States in the future when China becomes economically and militarily stronger. Strengthening the 

relationship with China could help minimize this risk.

With the compel option, more coercive actions 

would be taken toward China by utilizing all instruments of U.S. national power. The United States would 
publicly and frequently chastise China for bullying its 

weaker neighbors and for refusing to accept the July 

2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 

Diplomatically, concentrate efforts on isolating China 

politically and on building international coalitions to 

pursue economic and military action against China 

if required. Economically, lead and impose multilateral economic sanctions on China to weaken its financial power base. This would also limit China’s ability 

to further reform and equip its military forces with 

advanced materiel. Militarily, increase U.S., allied, 

and partner military presence in the area and lead a 

multinational coalition to patrol the South China Sea 

to enforce international law according to UNCLOS. To 

maintain legitimacy during this process, the United 

States should ratify UNCLOS. The two major opportunities with this plan would be exhibiting very strong 

U.S. leadership and vigorous support of international 

law and order.

However, this option would also clearly be 

extremely high risk since it could lead to armed conflict 

with China, as it would be seen as an overt challenge to 

Chinese state sovereignty and territorial integrity that 

are viewed as “core interests.”69 Pursuing this more 

aggressive procedure could push the United States into 

what has been termed a “Thucydides Trap.” Former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey explained this as: “Thucydides, the Greek 

historian, described what he called the ‘Thucydides 

Trap,’ and it goes something like this: It was Athenian 

fear of a rising Sparta that made war inevitable.”70 The 

United States would gain little from a military struggle 

with China unless the result was a total defeat of China 

which would be difficult to achieve and would expend 

plenty of U.S. “blood and treasure.” Additionally, 

176
177

such an event would likely cause economic ruin for 

the United States and the rest of the world. Other risks 

include: economic sanctions would negatively impact 

the United States, its allies, and partners; enhanced 

U.S. actions in the South China Sea would be costly 

and require an increase in U.S. military forces, and it 

would be politically risky since it could lead to a war 

that neither the Congress nor the American people 

would likely support. The risks could only be partially 

diminished by explaining expectations to China and 

by gaining full consensus on action by the coalition, 

the U.S. Congress, and the American people.

RECOMMENDATION

While the suggestion to cooperate with China 

in the South China Sea runs counter to the current 

mainstream American view and is likely to be unpopular among U.S. national decision makers, it should 

be adopted for several reasons. First, it is the most 

practical of choices. Based on ongoing economic interaction and the participation of China in U.S. military 

exchanges and exercises, a positive baseline for further 

cooperation has already been set. It simply needs to 

be expanded by working initially on non-contentious 

common interests until the relationship matures. Once 

this occurs, both parties would then be able to work 

together on solving tougher issues. Second, this proposal has the most likely chance for enduring success because it would involve China in the process 

as a willing and equal participant. It is easy to see 

from current Chinese behavior and statements that 

their nation longs for the international recognition of 

its greater status in the world. Cooperating with the 

United States will afford China the opportunity to 
178

achieve this without limiting its development. As the 

Chinese so aptly say, this would truly be a win-win 

situation. Third, no matter how much effort the United 

States puts behind this aim, it will not be able to stop 

the rise of China unless it is willing to go to war to do 

so. Although, this will require a mind shift to accept, 

the reality of the situation is that China has “come of 

age.” It wants to do more in the world, and it is capable of doing more in the world, so why not let it? This 

revelation also comes with the understanding that it 

would be far easier to influence China by example than 

by coercion or through military conflict. It is probable 

that most of the American people would not believe 

an armed struggle with China to maintain control of 

the South China Sea would be worth the effort. Fourth, 

the United States declared it “welcomes the emergence 

of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China that plays 

a responsible role in and contributes to the region’s 

security network.”71 If this statement is true, then the 

United States must assist China in doing so. The best 

way to accomplish this is to provide China with a solid 

example by employing collaborative measures.

Fifth, working together with China would raise 

the international standing of the United States and 

improve respect for its leadership and legitimacy 

globally since this action would show a willingness to 

work with other nations to achieve regional peace and 

stability. Finally, although this proposal may appear 

difficult for the Trump administration to accept, it is 

actually more possible now than under the previous 

administration. Trump has demonstrated the ability to consider unconventional methods and ways of 

thinking. In his inauguration speech, he set the stage 

for nontraditional policy by proclaiming the United 

States was still committed to cooperating with other 
179

countries, but that it would now be more accepting 

of other nations’ interests. The desire to collaborate 

implies the United States does not always have to lead 

and that it can work with others to develop solutions 

to difficult issues. It also indicates a readiness to allow 

a more multipolar world where other countries can 

contribute more robustly. Furthermore, the President 

stated U.S. values would not be forced and the United 

States would lead by example. The option to cooperate 

with China is just that, an opportunity for the United 

States to lead by example.

We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations 

of the world, but we do so with the understanding that 

it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. 

We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but 

rather to let it shine as an example. We will shine for 

everyone to follow.72

The United States has nothing to lose, but much to 

gain, by pursuing the option to cooperate with China. 

Once given the choice to play, the ball will be in China’s 

court, and it will be up to China to accept or decline 

such a gracious offer.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. U.S. Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

2015, pp. 6-8, 14-17; Clarence J. Bouchat, The Paracel Islands and 

U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2014, pp. 

1-5; Christopher L. Daniels, South China Sea: Energy and Security 

Conflicts, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2014, pp. 2-11; Bernard D. Cole, Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy Security in Asia, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008, pp. 102-103.
180

2. National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice, “National Security 

Advisor Susan E. Rice’s As Prepared Remarks on the U.S.-China 

Relationship at George Washington University,” Washington, 

DC: George Washington University, September 21, 2015, p. 6; 

Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy,” 

American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 37, No. 1, April 8, 2015, pp. 

25-26, available from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10

803920.2015.1006519, accessed December 19, 2016.

3. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “III. China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful 

Development,” September 6, 2011, pp. 1-4, available from www.

scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2011/Document/1000031/1000031_3.htm, 

accessed December 15, 2016; McDevitt, p. 24.

4. Ibid.

5. Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the 

South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,” The American 

Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 98, 2013, p. 98.

6. David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2011, pp. 126-132; Bouchat, pp. 1-5, 13-16; U.S. Department of 

Defense, p. 6; Gavin Briggs, “Geography Matters in the South 

China Sea,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Society, July 23, 2015, available from www.policyforum.net/geography-matters-in-the-southchina-sea/, accessed November 6, 2016.

7. Chris P. C. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China’s 

Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974,” Modern China, Vol. 42, 

No. 1, 2016, pp. 38-39.

8. Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar, “Dots and Lines in the 

South China Sea: Insights from the Law of Map Evidence,” Asian 

Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, January 2012, pp. 89-118, 

quoted in Chung, p. 57.

9. Chung, p. 62.

10. Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, pp. 

126-132; Bouchat, pp. 1-5, 13-16; U.S. Department of Defense, p. 

6; Briggs; Katie Hunt, Matt Rivers, and Catherine E. Shoichet, “In 
181

China, Duterte Announces Split with US: ‘America has Lost’,” 

CNN, October 20, 2016, available from www.cnn.com/2016/10/20/

asia/china-philippines-duterte-visit/, accessed February 18, 2017.

11. Nandini Krishnamoorthy, “South China Sea: Philippines 

sees Chinese Attempt to Build on Reef near its Coast,” International 

Business Times, February 8, 2017, available from www.ibtimes.co.uk/

philippines-sees-chinese-attempt-build-reef-near-its-coast-1605358, 

accessed February 12, 2017.

12. Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, pp. 

126-132; Bouchat, pp. 1-5, 13-16; U.S. Department of Defense, p. 

6; Briggs.

13. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 6-8; Bert Chapman, “China’s Nine-Dashed Map: Continuing Maritime Source of Geopolitical Tension,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 

Vol. 8, No. 1, 2016, pp. 146-150; United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), December 10, 1982, pp. 43-53, 129-

132; Max Fisher, “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute,” 

The New York Times, July 14, 2016, available from www.nytimes.

com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitrationexplained.html, accessed October 19, 2016; Hannah Beech, “Just 

Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line 

From?” Time, July 19, 2016, available from http://time.com/4412191/

nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/, accessed November 7, 2016; 

Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The South China Sea Arbitration: The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of 

China,” Press Release, The Hague, July 12, 2016, available from 

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14. Ankit Panda, “1 Year Later: Reflections on China’s Oil Rig 

‘Sovereignty-Making’ in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, May 

12, 2015, available from https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/1-year-laterreflections-on-chinas-oil-rig-sovereignty-making-in-the-south-chinasea/, accessed February 5, 2017; Andrew Chubb, “China-Vietnam 

clash in the Paracels: History still Rhyming in the Internet Era?” 

May 7, 2014, available from https://southseaconversations.wordpress.

com/2014/05/07/china-vietnam-clash-in-the-paracels-history-stillrhyming-in-the-internet-era/, quoted in Shinji Yamaguchi, “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea,” China 

Perspectives 2016, No. 3, 2016, p. 27.
182

15. Permanent Court of Arbitration. p. 2.

16. Fisher; Beech, “Just Where Exactly Did China Get the 

South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From?”; Zheng Wang, “China 

and UNCLOS: An Inconvenient History,” The Diplomat, July 

11, 2016, available from https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/chinaand-unclos-an-inconvenient-history/, accessed February 6, 2017; 

Hannah Beech, “China Will Never Respect the U.S. Over the 

South China Sea. Here’s Why,” Time, July 7, 2016, available from 

http://time.com/4397808/south-china-sea-us-unclos/, accessed March 

24, 2017; United Nations Oceans & Law of the Sea, Division for 

Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “China’s Declarations 

and Statements,” June 7, 1996, available from www.un.org/depts/

los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China after 

ratification, accessed March 25, 2017.

17. Map courtesy of Wikimedia Commons contributor, “File:-

South China Sea claims map.jpg,” Wikimedia Commons, the free 

media repository, last revised July 3, 2017, available from https://

commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:South_China_Sea_

claims_map.jpg&oldid=250120981.

18. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 15-17; David Lai, email 

message to author, March 19, 2017.

19. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 15-17.

20. Central Intelligence Agency, “Paracel Islands,” The World 

Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, updated 

November 14, 2017, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pf.html, accessed December 4, 

2017; Andrei Chang, “Analysis: China’s air-sea buildup,” Space 

War, September 26, 2008, available from www.spacewar.com/

reports/Analysis_Chinas_air-sea_buildup_999.html, accessed February 18, 2017; D. Collins, “China counters U.S. Asia-Pivot Strategy: 

Fortifies island military base,” The China Money Report, August 

13, 2012, available from www.thechinamoneyreport.com/2012/08/13/

china-counters-u-s-asia-pivot-strategy-fortifies-island-military-base/, 

accessed February 18, 2017, quoted in Bouchat, p. 18.

21. Katie Hunt, Jim Sciutto and Tim Hume, “China said to 

deploy missiles on South China Sea island,” CNN, February 17, 
183

2016, available from www.cnn.com/2016/02/16/asia/china-missilessouth-china-sea/, accessed February 18, 2017.

22. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, pp. 1-35.

23. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 

October 11, 2011, p. 1, available from foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/

americas-pacific-century/, accessed October 17, 2016.

24. U.S. President Barack H. Obama, “Remarks By President 

Obama to the Australian Parliament,” public speech, Parliament 

House, Canberra, Australia, released by The White House, Office 

of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2011, p. 4.

25. Aaron Blake, “Donald Trump’s full inauguration speech 

transcript, annotated,” The Washington Post, January 20, 2017, 

p. 5, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/

wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-inauguration-speech-transcriptannotated/?utm_term=.5a37ad7689fe, accessed January 20, 2017.

26. Ibid.

27. Russell Bova, How the World Works: A Brief Survey of International Relations, 2nd ed., Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, pp. 8-19; 

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 

and Peace, 6th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 

1985, pp. 5, 31-32; Robert C. Nation, “Introduction to International 

Relations: Seminar 14, USAWC, AY 2017 Introduction to Political 

Realism,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, September 6, 2016, notes; Blake, p. 5.

28. Blake, pp. 1-9; Obama, National Security Strategy, pp. 1-35; 

Nation, notes.

29. Blake, p. 5.

30. Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as 

Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy, Vol. 11, January 2011, pp. 27-31, available from www.nbr.org/publications/asia_

policy/Preview/AP11_US_Alliance_preview.pdf, accessed January 

22, 2017.
184

31. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “III. China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing 

Peaceful Development,” p. 2; David Lai, “The United States and 

China in Power Transition, Stage II,” manuscript prepared for the 

4th International Conference on Economics, Politics, and Security 

of China and the United States, July 2016, p. 9.

32. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation, January 11, 2017, file received through email, available 

from www.scio.gov.cn, accessed January 18, 2017; Lai, “The United 

States and China in Power Transition, Stage II,” pp. 9-22; Chinese 

Ministry of Defense, China’s Military Strategy, Beijing, China: Chinese Ministry of Defense, May 26, 2015, pp. 1-26.

33. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation, p. 2.

34. Obama, National Security Strategy, p. 13.

35. US Department of Defense, p. 5.

36. Ibid.

37. U.S. Energy Information Administration data quoted in 

U.S. Department of Defense, p. 1.

38. Rice, p. 6; McDevitt, p. 25.

39. Jethro Mullen, “Trump attacks China on trade but 

misses the mark,” CNN, December 5, 2016, available from http://

money.cnn.com/2016/12/05/news/economy/trump-china-yuan-dollarcurrency-taxes/, accessed February 11, 2017.

40. CNBC, “Trump secretary of state nominee: China should 

be denied access to South China Sea islands,” Reuters, January 

11, 2017, available from www.cnbc.com/2017/01/11/trump-secretaryof-state-nominee-china-should-be-denied-access-to-south-china-seaislands.html, accessed February 11, 2017.

41. Phil Stewart, “Mattis says no need for dramatic 

U.S. Military moves in South China Sea,” Reuters, February 3, 2017, available from www.reuters.com/article/
185

us-usa-trump-southchinasea-mattis-idUSKBN15J061, accessed February 11, 2017.

42. Ibid.

43. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “V. China’s Policy on the South China Sea 

Issue,” in The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through 

Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines 

in the South China Sea, July 13, 2016, p. 6, available from http://

www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1483616/1483616_5.htm, 

accessed December 13, 2017.

44. Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, pp. 

75-99; Chinese Ministry of Defense. pp. 6-23.

45. United Nations Oceans & Law of the Sea.

46. UNCLOS, p. 140.

47. United Nations Oceans & Law of the Sea; UNCLOS, p. 

140.

48. UNCLOS, pp. 136-137; Fisher; The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “V. China’s Policy 

on the South China Sea Issue.”

49. “A New Solution To an Old Issue: The dual-track 

approach emphasizes peace for resolving the South China Sea 

disputes,” Beijing Review, May 28, 2015, p. 1, available from https://

search.proquest.com/docview/1683024482?accountid=4444, accessed 

December 20, 2016; Wang Junmin, “Dual track right approach to 

South China Sea,” China Daily, April 22, 2015, p. 9.

50. “A New Solution To an Old Issue.”

51. U.S. Department of Defense, p. 25.

52. Ibid, p. 19.

53. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “The Rebalance 

and Asia-Pacific Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 6, November/December 2016, pp. 74-75; Idress Ali and Matt Spetalnick, 
186

“U.S. warship challenges China’s claims in South China Sea,” 

Reuters, October 21, 2016, available from www.reuters.comarticle/

us-southchinasea-usa-exclusive-idUSKCN12L1O9, accessed October 26, 2016; Lieutenant Michael S. Proctor, U.S. Navy Reserve, 

“Check China,” Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 142/12/1,366, December 2016, pp. 18-20; UNCLOS, pp. 27-33.

54. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 6-8, 14-17; Bouchat, pp. 

1-5; Daniels, pp. 2-11; Cole, pp. 102-103.

55. “Navigating Conflict in the South China Sea,” STRATFOR 

Global Intelligence, pp. 29-31.

56. Ibid, p. 31.

57. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel Griffith, trans., New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 77.

58. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and Winning 

in the ‘Gray Zone’,” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2015, available 

from https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-thegray-zone/, accessed February 12, 2017.

59. Ali and Spetalnick.

60. Mike Yeo, “US, Chinese aircraft in ‘unsafe’ encounter 

in South China Sea,” DefenseNews, February 9, 2017, available 

from www.defensenews.com/articles/us-chinese-aircraft-in-unsafeencounter-in-south-china-sea, accessed February 12, 2017.

61. Blake, p. 3.

62. “U.S. National Debt Clock: Real Time,” U.S. Debt Clock.

org, cont. updating, available from www.usdebtclock.org/, accessed 

February 17, 2017.

63. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “III. China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing 

Peaceful Development,” p. 1.

64. Ray Mabus, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, General 

Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, “A Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, March 2015, pp. 3-4.
187

65. Chinese Ministry of Defense. p. 24.

66. Liu Zhenmin, “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security 

Cooperation,” press conference, January 11, 2017.

67. Li Xiaokun, “Code of conduct framework taking shape,” 

China Daily, January 12, 2017, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/

epaper/2017-01/12/content_27936031.htm, accessed March 26, 2017; 

Manuel Mogato and Michael Martina, “Philippines hopes South 

China Sea ‘conduct code’ ready this year,” Nick Macfie, ed., Reuters, January 11, 2017, available from https://in.reuters.com/article/

myanmar-rohingya-un/myanmar-forces-may-be-guilty-of-genocideagainst-rohingya-u-n-says-idINKBN1DZ143, accessed March 26, 

2017.

68. “A New Solution to an Old Issue,” p. 1; Junmin, p. 9.

69. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “III. China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing 

Peaceful Development,” pp. 1-4; McDevitt, p. 24.

70. General Martin Dempsey, “A Conversation with General 

Martin Dempsey,” interview by Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, May 

1, 2012, pp. 15-16, transcript available from carnegieendowment.org/

files/050112_transcript_dempsey.pdf, accessed February 17, 2017; 

Lai, “The United States and China in Power Transition, Stage II,” 

p. 1; Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, New York: The Free Press, 

1996, p. 49.

71. Carter, pp. 69-70.

72. Blake, p. 5.

189

CHAPTER 7

PHILIPPINE AMBIVALENCE TOWARD THE 

UNITED STATES: LESSONS LEARNED

Romeo S. Brawner, Jr. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced his intention to cut military and economic ties with the United States, the Philippines’ 

long-time ally, during his state visit to China in 2016. 

This caught the international community by surprise 

and seems to be a significant setback to the U.S. rebalance effort in the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP). For the 

Philippines, the rift is based on perceptions of mistreatment by and inequality with its long-standing 

ally. The good news, however, is that there seems to be 

a strong opportunity for the Trump administration to 

mend fences going forward. With a little political and 

cultural astuteness, the United States should be able to 

restore its friendship with the Philippines and count 

on a strong partnership as both countries pursue their 

interests in the IAP.

The Philippines’ discontent with its current relationship with the United States is the product of the 

following three factors. First, the Filipino identity of 

being a fighter for independence makes them staunch 

advocates for Philippine sovereignty. Second, the Philippine centralized political culture places great power 

on the President to formulate the country’s domestic and foreign policies and thus expects respect and 
190

political independence. Third, the Filipino resilience to 

natural and international challenges makes the Philippines a fair and rules-abiding player in the international arena and therefore expects reciprocity from its 

allies and international partners.

In order to mend fences and to engender a more 

amicable and stable relationship, the United States 

should intervene less with the domestic affairs of the 

Philippines based on the international law principle of 

non-interference. The United States should respect the 

leadership of the Philippines by considering closely 

the country’s political culture and respecting its leadership. This is referenced on the principle of mutual 

trust. It is also important for the United States to assure 

the Philippines and its other allies that they will abide 

by their obligations in accordance with their agreements. They should also bolster their credibility in the 

international world order by agreeing to, ratifying, 

and complying with the provisions of international 

conventions and agreements. This lesson is based on 

the international relations principle of reciprocity.

The future holds a lot of promise for the reestablishment of a good U.S.-Philippine relationship under 

the Trump-Duterte administrations. Both leaders 

have displayed a personal liking for each other but 

more importantly, both have stated their desire to 

find common areas of cooperation. After all, it is all of 

humanity that benefits from a peaceful and harmonious world.

INTRODUCTION

Your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation 

from the United States, both in military and economics.

 —Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte
191

The U.S.-Philippine relationship was rocked in 

2016 with the pronouncement of then newly elected 

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that he would 

cut ties with the United States of America, the Philippines’ long-time ally. He further announced that he 

would build stronger ties with China and Russia. He 

made these statements during his state visit to Beijing 

in October 2016.1

What led to this pronouncement? Is this merely 

the rhetoric of an independent-thinking statesman or 

is this a shared sentiment among the Filipino people? 

What lessons can we learn from this?

This chapter examines this unexpected policy 

change by the Philippines toward its long-standing ally, the United States. It aims to answer two 

main questions―first, what factors contributed to the 

ambivalence of the Philippine government toward the 

United States under the administration of Philippine 

President Duterte, and second, what lessons in international relations can we derive from this phenomenon. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy 

and Policy (ACFSP) developed by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in 2008 was 

used in the analysis.2

This chapter argues that the change of heart by the 

Philippines, following a rekindled romance with the 

United States during the previous administration of 

Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, is the product of three factors: 1) the Filipino identity of being a 

fighter for independence makes them staunch advocates for Philippine sovereignty; 2) the Philippine 

centralized political culture places great power on 

the President to formulate the country’s domestic and 

foreign policies and thus expects respect and political 

independence; and 3) the Filipino resilience to natural 
192

and international challenges makes the Philippines a 

fair and rules-abiding player in the international arena 

and therefore expects reciprocity from its allies and 

international partners.

From these factors above, the three lessons in 

international relations that may be derived are: 1) 

nations should intervene less in the domestic affairs of 

another; 2) an understanding of the political culture of 

a country and the respect for its political leadership are 

imperative to good bilateral relations; and, 3) a country 

should be clear and resolute in reassuring its allies and 

partners that it will comply with the obligations under 

their treaties and agreements.

THE ANALYTICAL CULTURAL FRAMEWORK 

FOR STRATEGY AND POLICY

The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy 

and Policy (ACFSP) is a systematic and analytical tool 

that may assist strategists and policymakers “view the 

world through many lenses.”3 It provides a framework 

that analyzes the interests of other players in the international arena through the cultural lens, and then considers these interests in the formulation of strategies 

and international policies. A country becomes more 

effective in dealing with other state or nonstate players 

by using this framework.

The ACFSP identifies three basic cultural dimensions. These are identity, political culture, and resilience. The identity of a people comes from their shared 

values, principles, norms, and practices, which are 

traceable from its history. The most important dimension is identity because this is where the people draw 

their purposes and interests, which in turn, determine 

their policies and strategies.4
193

The political culture of a country is determined 

from its structure of power and decision-making. The 

structure of power and decision-making determines 

where the political power of a country resides, as well 

as the extent to which this power is centralized or distributed. By understanding this dimension, a country 

can formulate strategies that will enable it to deal constructively with the political leadership of friendly or 

hostile nations.5

Finally, resilience is the capacity or ability to resist, 

adapt, or succumb to pressures from the external world. 

It is determined from its response to globalization, 

global environmental issues, and international institutions. This dimension would tell the world how a particular country would react to international pressures 

such as economic sanctions or troop contributions to 

coalitions. It also gives a glimpse as to how a country 

would interact with other countries and how it would 

act within or outside international organizations.6

FACTORS LEADING TO THE AMBIVALENCE

The following sections will present an application 

of the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and 

Policy to determine the factors that led to the ambivalence of the Philippines toward the United States.

Identity: The Filipino Fighting Spirit

Perhaps the best way to determine the identity of 

the Filipino people is to look at their history. One striking aspect of the history of the Philippines is that it is 

comprised of a compendium of a peoples’ struggle for 

independence. This struggle may be categorized into 

three eras: Spanish colonialism, American occupation, and post-independence neo-colonialism. In 1892, 
194

strong patriotic sentiments among the Filipino elite 

began a movement for independence that threatened 

to end more than 3 centuries of Spanish rule. This was 

the first nationalist movement in Southeast Asia.7 This 

movement led to a bloody revolution that nearly won 

the independence for Filipinos. However, the ceding 

of the Philippines to the United States by Spain in 1899 

dashed the Filipino dream for self-rule. The American 

occupation of the islands followed this period. Another 

revolt by the Filipinos greeted the new colonizers, but 

the Americans quickly repelled this through military 

and diplomatic maneuvers.

The colonization of the Philippines by the United 

States was met with dissention from some lawmakers 

in the mainland because it went against the very principles that make up the core of American society―freedom and independence. Nonetheless, the arguments 

for the spread of democratic values and the need for 

economic expansion of American goods prevailed 

over the dissenting views.8

In 1935, the United States gave conditional independence to the Filipinos as the Philippines transitioned to 

full independence. The Japanese cut this short with the 

attack on Manila, a few hours after their attack on Pearl 

Harbor, Hawaii. Finally, on July 12, 1946, the United 

States granted full independence to the Philippines.

Some Filipinos felt this newfound independence 

was not a total independence. Sentiments of skepticism and continued oppression were manifest across 

Philippine society. Some scholars called this the “Era 

of Neo-Colonialism.”9 The continued presence of 

American military bases contributed to this growing 

sentiment. In 1991, it was this same feeling of independence from American neo-colonialism that drove the 

Philippine Senate to vote against the renewal of the 

U.S.-Philippine Bases Agreement.10
195

On the other hand, the presence of American forces 

brought a cover of security to a country strategically 

situated in the Asia-Pacific region. It was only in the 

past decade, however, that Philippine sovereignty was 

actually threatened with intrusions into the Philippine 

exclusive economic zone by China. These aggressive 

actions by China spurred debates within the Philippine 

congress and judiciary on whether or not U.S. forces 

should be allowed to come back to Philippine shores 

on a more permanent status and with larger numbers.

Neo-colonialism may also come through economic 

ways. Critics of U.S. economic influence on the Philippines stated that:

The ensuing years [after World War II] were characterized 

by political manipulations, through the exploitative 

maneuverings of U.S. hegemony, that began to hurt 

the country’s economic foundation and put in place the 

conditions that later pulled the Philippines down the 

path of political decadence and, more seriously, economic 

retardation.11

Many of these critics believe that the Philippines is 

still at the mercy of international lending institutions 

such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some sectors of Philippine society see this 

as anti-development because of the restrictive economic and financial policies imposed by these financial institutions.12

Coming out of this colorful history, it is evident 

that Filipinos have always had a strong desire to be 

fully independent, not just from an occupying power, 

but also from neo-colonialist influences. Thus, national 

pride is engrained in the Filipino identity. This, therefore, results in the Filipinos’ enduring interest for 

self-determination and sovereignty.
196

Political Culture: Centralized Presidential System

The Philippines follows a democratic system of 

government that has three branches: the executive, 

the legislative, and the judiciary. Among these three 

branches, however, it is the executive branch, led by 

the president, which is the most influential. This form 

of government is that of a unitary government with 

power centralized in the Office of the President.13 The 

president determines the national vision, the national 

priorities, and the general policies of the state, including its foreign policies.

The incumbency of former President Ferdinand 

Marcos from 1966 to 1986 demonstrates how a Philippine president can have great political power. In 

1972, President Marcos declared martial law and took 

control of almost all facets of government, including 

control of key industries and businesses. His political 

reign ended after 2 decades, with a bloodless revolution called the “People’s Revolution” when millions of 

people gathered in the nation’s capital calling for his 

resignation. Marcos went into exile with his family to 

Hawaii.14

Because of this experience under a dictatorship, 

the newly formed government under former President 

Corazon Aquino instituted reforms to limit the powers 

of the president. The 1987 Philippine Constitution 

embodies these limitations to presidential power.15

Despite the delimiting constitutional provisions, however, the Philippine president still exercises great political powers and the incumbency of Duterte manifests 

this trend.

When Duterte took over the seat of power in the 

Philippine government, he placed a premium on the 

resolution of domestic issues over international concerns. One of his top priorities was to get rid of the 
197

drug menace and criminality that plagued most of 

Philippine society. This “war on drugs and crime” has 

resulted in the death of thousands of drug pushers and 

users as well as other criminals. However, it also produced critics, both domestic and international.

In August 2016, a rift between Duterte and former 

U.S. President Barack Obama sent ripples in the international media. This came about after Obama made 

statements criticizing the human rights violations and 

extrajudicial killings resulting from Duterte’s war on 

drugs and crime. This statement was not taken well 

by Duterte and it prompted him to announce that he 

was abrogating ties with the United States.16 He further said Russia could be a very important ally of the 

Philippines because “they do not insult people, they 

do not interfere.”17 Obama was not the only recipient of the tirade from Duterte. United Nations (UN) 

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the European Union, 

and the Catholic Church also received similar remarks 

from the Philippine president for contrary opinions 

against the manner of conduct of the “war on drugs 

and criminality.”18

From the instances mentioned above, it is clear that 

because of the centrality of political power inherent on 

the Philippine president, personality and experiences 

play an important role. A study made on former U.S. 

Presidents demonstrates that the personality of the 

national leader played a big role in determining his 

vision and priorities for his country, as well his effectiveness as a leader.19 Another study made at the U.S. 

Army War College in 2010, argues that the personality and leadership style of the American Chief Executive strongly influences the relationship of the United 

States with the Philippines.20
198

What was it in Duterte’s experience and personality that led to his change in policy toward the United 

States? In several fora, the president admitted to being 

“left-leaning,” having been a student of the Communist Party of the Philippines founder, Jose Maria Sison. 

This inclination toward the left has instilled in the 

president anti-American and anti-colonial sentiments 

early on in his life.21 This anti-American sentiment was 

fueled further by several not-so-pleasant experiences 

with the United States. He claimed that the United 

States once denied him a visa, and in another instance, 

airport officials detained him at the Los Angeles airport while he was in transit to South America. Perhaps 

the more serious matter is his claim that the United 

States was behind the bombing of Davao City when he 

was still its mayor. He also claims that alleged agents 

of the Central Intelligence Agency rescued the bombing suspect who was a U.S. citizen.22

Looking at recent events, it is evident that the president has a disdain for criticism of his policies, but a 

liking for anyone or any nation that approves of his 

domestic war on drugs. For instance, Duterte made 

public his appreciation of two countries in the region, 

China and Japan, that declared their support for his 

drug and crime policies. On September 29, 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said 

in a press briefing, “Under the leadership of President 

Duterte, the new Philippine government enacted policies that prioritize combating drug-related crimes. 

China understands and supports that.”23 On the other 

hand, during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 

visit to the Philippines in January 12, 2017, he declared 

his support for Duterte’s war on drugs saying, “on 

countering illegal drugs, we want to work together 

with the Philippines to think of relevant measures of 

support.”24
199

These series of statements and incidents certainly 

reflect the centralization of political power in the seat 

of the Philippine presidency, which, in turn, depends 

to a great deal on the personality and experiences of 

the president. Consequently, this results in an expectation that the international community will recognize 

this Philippine political culture and respect its national 

leadership.

Resilience: The Philippine’s Position in the 

International Order

Perhaps Filipinos are some of the more resilient 

people on this planet considering the number of natural calamities that affect the Philippines annually. 

An average of 20 typhoons hit the country per year 

because of its geographical location along the Pacific 

Rim of Fire. In addition, several earthquakes shake 

the country, claiming thousands of lives and millions 

of dollars’ worth of properties. Despite these natural 

calamities, the Filipino people have risen repeatedly to 

recover from destruction to normalcy within a short 

period of time.25

This realization of the vulnerability of mankind 

against natural disasters led the Philippine government 

to set up an extensive network with local and international organizations in order to mitigate the effects 

of these disasters. There have been several instances 

when this collaborative effort of the Philippine government with international humanitarian institutions has 

been demonstrated and proven effective, contributing 

to the strengthening of the resilience of the Filipino 

people.

Aside from resilience to natural calamities, resilience is also defined as the ability of a nation to resist, 

adapt, or succumb to pressures from the external 
200

world. It is determined from its response to globalization.26 Thus, the resilience of a nation is measured not 

only by how it reacts to international issues, but also 

by how it deals with other nations in the international 

community.

In the international realm, the Philippines is seen as 

one of the pioneering countries that has supported globalization through the establishment of international 

institutions. This is manifested in the fact that the Philippines is one of the first countries to join the UN. Manila 

was also the venue in the establishment of the South 

East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Currently, 

aside from the UN, the Philippines is a member of the 

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others.

The Philippines also has bilateral relations with 

other countries, but its biggest diplomatic relation is 

with its only ally, the United States. This alliance is 

clearly established in the Mutual Defense Treaty that 

was signed in 1951, but is still in effect today. It stipulates that the two parties should go to the aid of the 

other in the event of an attack on its territory or people, 

whether on land or on a ship in the Pacific. More than 

just a defense agreement, however, the Mutual Defense 

Treaty emphasizes the peaceful resolution of international disputes, the development of the capacity, either 

separately or jointly, to resist or counter an attack, and 

the necessity for collaboration in other areas such as 

law enforcement, counterterrorism, and humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief.27

During his visit to the Philippines in April 2014, 

Obama said, “[the U.S.] commitment to defend the 

Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep 

that commitment, because allies never stand alone.”28
201

It was also during this visit where Obama and Aquino 

signed the Enhance Defense Cooperation Agreement 

(EDCA). The EDCA would allow an increased U.S. 

military presence in the Philippines on a rotational 

basis, thus enhancing the defense capabilities of both 

nations as well as improving the maritime security situation in the region.29

Despite this new defense agreement, however, 

there is still the lack of assurance that the United States 

will come to the aid of its ally in the event of an attack 

by China. According to Pacifico A. Agabin, a former 

dean of the College of Law of the University of the 

Philippines:

our reliance to the Mutual Defense Treaty and assurance 

of U.S. is purely illusory. The treaty, which guarantees 

mutual support in the event of an attack on either the 

Philippines or the U.S., has its limits. For one, the U.S. has 

no automatic participation since the U.S. Congress has 

yet to pass an operating law for the treaty.30

Another factor to be considered is the perceived 

lack of credibility of the United States in its desire to 

establish a rules-based order in the region. While the 

United States insists that the countries in the region 

should adhere to the United Nations Convention on 

the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), the U.S. Senate has not 

ratified this international convention. This does not 

speak well of a global power that considers the establishment of a rules-based international order as one of 

its enduring interests. On the contrary, ratification of 

the UNCLOS would strengthen the U.S. position as a 

global power.31

From these analyses, we deduce that Filipinos are 

very resilient as a people, particularly when dealing 

with natural disasters as well as when dealing with 
202

globalization and the international challenges and 

issues that go with it. As a member of the international 

community, Filipinos are fair and just players, who 

honor the rule of international law and thus expect 

reciprocity from their international allies and partners.

LESSONS LEARNED

Considering the factors mentioned above, what 

then could we learn? The following lessons can be 

gleaned from the ambivalence of the Philippines to the 

United States: first, states should respect the culture 

and identity of other countries and interfere less in their 

domestic affairs; second, countries should ascertain 

the power culture of the target country and deal with 

its political leadership in an appropriate manner; and 

third, countries should assure their allies and partners 

that they will abide by their obligations as stipulated 

in the agreements they may have, while establishing 

their credibility as fair and resolute international players. These lessons are discussed, drawing foundational 

references from principles in international relations 

and international law.

Less Intervention

History is replete with examples of a people’s 

victory following a struggle for freedom and independence. The American independence story is one 

excellent example. At the end of the struggle, the 

American people got what they desired―freedom and 

independence from Great Britain. However, in modern 

times, countries may still struggle for independence, 

not from an occupying power but from a dominant 

country trying to impose its will on the other through 

intervention.
203

As such, the international law principle of non-interference was developed. This principle was also 

written into the UN Charter. The Charter states, 

“every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 

interference in any form by another State.”32 Thus, a 

nation-state acting independently from any external 

intervention is able to chart its own course and follow 

this in the best way it sees fit. It does this to pursue 

fully its national interests in consideration of its culture and resources.33

The newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump 

seemed to share this point of view when he said during 

his inaugural speech on January 20, 2017:

We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations 

of the world, but we do so with the understanding that 

it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. 

We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but 

rather to let it shine as an example.34

The principle of non-interference is also explicitly 

written in the charter of the ASEAN. International 

theorists share the view that the principle of absolute 

non-interference in the internal affairs of states is a 

central pillar of Southeast Asian regionalism.35

During the formal launching of the Philippine 

chairmanship of the ASEAN for 2017, Duterte called 

on ASEAN Dialogue Partners to:

renew their dedication to the valued purposes and 

principles stated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation―

including non-interference―in promoting regional peace 

and stability through abiding respect for the rule of law.36

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 

Asia is a peace treaty among Southeast Asian countries, 
204

signed by the founding members of the ASEAN 

(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 

Thailand) on February 24, 1976. Today, there are 30 

signatories to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 

Southeast Asia, including the United States, the European Union, and China.

Article I of the Treaty states its purpose as “to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity, and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to 

their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.” Article 2 enumerates its fundamental principles as follows:

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, 

equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of 

all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence 

free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful 

means; 

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.37

This brings to light the differences in the way the 

West views intervention in contrast to how the East 

views it: “Western global governance norm of interventionism is being challenged by East Asian norm of 

non-interference and territorial integrity.” The West 

views interventionism as a way to implement their 

role as the governor of the world affairs. On the other 

hand, the East translates this seemingly benign act as 

an affront to their sovereignty and an act of absolute 

intervention.38

Hence, from the discussion above, one lesson that 

we could draw is that countries should interfere less 

into the domestic issues of another.
205

Respect for Political Culture and National 

Leadership

In the previous section, one of the factors that contributed to the ambivalence of the Philippines to the 

United States is the centralized political culture that 

places much power in the Office of the President. 

Because of this, the personality and experiences of the 

president play a big role in the shaping of national policies. Therefore, a lesson that we can draw from this is 

that if a country wishes to have an effective bilateral 

relation with another, it has to consider the political 

culture of that country and try to deal with its national 

leadership in an appropriate manner.

This lesson is based on the principle of mutual 

respect. A study made by Reinhard Wolf argues that 

the “peoples’ fundamental interest in self-respect 

makes them insist on receiving from other people a 

proper respect and recognition of their equality.”39

Wolf also claims that when:

U.S. President Barack Obama promised numerous 

nations new relationships based ‘on mutual respect’, 

many foreign leaders had already begun to insist on being 

‘duly respected’ by the United States and other (mostly 

Western) countries.40

This principle was deemed violated by the U.S. 

President, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, and 

the Secretary General of the UN, from the point of view 

of Duterte, when the former high officials criticized the 

latter’s war on drugs and crime. Considering the political culture of the Philippines, as well as the personality 

of Duterte, a more appropriate response to the Philippine’s war on the drugs and crime would have been 

an offer of assistance through legally accepted means 
206

on this campaign to eradicate the drug menace and the 

culture of crime from the country.

Assurance for Allies and Partners

The third factor that was identified as contributing 

to the ambivalence of the Philippines to the United 

States is the resilience or ability to adapt to globalization by the Filipino people. History has proven that Filipinos have embraced globalization even in its infancy 

as a nation by joining international organizations, 

abiding by their norms, and respecting international 

law. It is therefore natural for the Philippines to expect 

the same from its ally, partners, and friends.

Unfortunately, the current sentiment in the Philippines is that the United States will not abide by its obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Therefore, a 

lesson learned from this factor is that countries should 

be resolute in their relationships with their allies and 

partners and should give assurances that they will 

abide by obligations as stipulated in their treaties and 

agreements. This lesson is based on the principle of 

reciprocity.

Generally, reciprocity in international relations is 

the appropriate form of behavior of sovereign states 

that creates cooperation between them. The principle 

of reciprocity as it relates to treaties and agreements 

is known as specific reciprocity. It states that a country that has entered into a treaty or agreement with 

another must abide by its obligations as it expects the 

latter to abide by its obligations as well.41

Another kind of reciprocity is the diffuse reciprocity where a body of norms dictates how nations 

should act within alliances, coalitions, and international organizations. One such norm is the expectation 
207

that nations would comply with its obligations, even 

if carried in the future.42 Therefore, an assurance that a 

nation will respect and will comply with its obligation 

is important. An incentive for such an assurance is the 

maintenance of its reputation as a responsible player 

in the international arena.43

The United States should likewise establish its credibility as a global power by ratifying the UNCLOS. This 

will give credence to the pursuit of its enduring interest 

of promoting a rules-based international order. While 

it could be argued that the United States has been honoring and adhering to the provisions of the UNCLOS 

even without ratification by the U.S. Congress, a formal 

approval of the convention will send the signal to the 

world that the United States means business when it 

comes to protecting the global commons.

CONCLUSION

A lot can be learned from the controversy that was 

created by the surprising statements made by Philippine President Duterte. Although dismissed by some 

as merely the rhetoric of a strong-minded national 

leader, his statements may have wisdom that could 

remind nations of some basic principles or concepts in 

international relations.

It is useful for a country to consider not only its 

own interests but the interests of the other nations as 

well, especially when it is formulating its foreign policies and strategies. This is why it is essential to view 

the world from the other nation’s lens.

Using the ACFSP, this chapter argues that the 

change of policy by the Philippines toward the United 

States is the product of decades long of colonialization and neo-colonialization, a centralized Philippine 
208

political culture, and the resilience of the Filipino 

people to national and international challenges. From 

these factors, the following lessons can be learned: 

First, nations should intervene less with the domestic 

affairs of another nation. This is based on the principle in international law of non-interference. Second, 

states should respect the leadership of other countries 

by considering closely the political culture of the target 

country. This is referenced on the principle of mutual 

trust. Third, it is important for nations to assure their 

allies and partners that they will abide by their obligations in accordance with their agreements. They should 

also establish their credibility in the international 

world order by agreeing to, ratifying, and complying 

with the provisions of international conventions and 

agreements. This lesson is based on the international 

relations principle of reciprocity. In the end, it all boils 

down to how well one nation treats another.

The future holds a lot of promise for the reestablishment of the U.S.-Philippine relationship under the 

Trump-Duterte administrations. Both leaders have displayed a personal liking for each other but more importantly, both have stated their desire to find common 

areas of cooperation. After all, all of humanity benefits 

from a peaceful and harmonious world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Daxim L. Lucas, “Duterte announces military, economic 

split with US,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 20, 2016, available from https://globalnation.inquirer.net/147293/duterte-announcesmilitary-economic-split-with-us, accessed December 21, 2016.

2. Jiyul Kim, Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 

2009.
209

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Nicolas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History, Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 364.

8. Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia, 3rd Ed., New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 289.

9. William J. Pomeroy, American Neo Colonialism: Its Emergence 

in the Philippines and Asia, New York: International Publishers, 

1970, p. 83.

10. Philip Shenon, “Philippine Senate Votes to Reject U.S. 

Base Renewal,” The New York Times, September 16, 1991, available 

from www.nytimes.com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-toreject-us-base-renewal.html, accessed March 20, 2017.

11. “How US Neocolonial Development Failed the Philippines—Part I,” News Junkie Post, October 30, 2013, available from 

newsjunkiepost.com/2013/10/30/how-us-neocolonial-developmentfailed-the-philippines, accessed January 3, 2017. For further on 

News Junkie Post’s view of U.S. hegemony see “US Hegemonic 

Empire and Culture of Death: State Terrorism on a Global Scale,” 

News Junkie Post, June 1, 2013, newsjunkiepost.com/2013/06/01/

us-hegemonic-empire-and-culture-of-death-state-terrorism-on-a-globalscale.

12. Sandra Nicolas, “IMF-WB in the Philippines: Half-Century of Anti-Development,” Bulatlat, Vol. IV, No. 11, April 18-24, 

2004, available from www.bulatlat.com/news/4-11/4-11-imf.html, 

accessed January 21, 2017.

13. D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present, 5th Ed., 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003, p. 209.

14. Mason, p. 292.
210

15. “The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,” 

The Philippine Official Gazette, 1987, available from http://www.

officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/.

16. Euan McKirdy and Kathy Quiano, “Philippines’ Duterte to US: ‘Do not make us your dogs’,” CNN, October 25, 2016, 

available from www.cnn.com/2016/10/25/asia/duterte-us-comments/, 

accessed December 21, 2016.

17. Associated Press, “Philippines’ Duterte to U.S. on aid 

issue: ‘Bye-bye America’,” Politico, December 17, 2016, available 

from www.politico.com/story/2016/12/philippines-duterte-to-us-overaid-issue-bye-bye-america-232776, accessed December 21, 2016.

18. Nandini Krishnamoorthy, “Philippine President Duterte slams UN for criticizing his war on drugs,” International 

Business Times, August 19, 2016, available from www.ibtimes.

co.uk/philippine-president-duterte-slams-un-critcising-his-wardrugs-1576746, accessed February 3, 2017.

19. Robert J. House, William D. Spangler, and James Woycke, 

“Personality and Charisma in the U.S. Presidency: A Psychological Theory of Leader Effectiveness,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 364-396.

20. Colonel Paterno Reynato C. Padua, Republic of the Philippines-United States Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges, A Filipino Perspective, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 17, 2010, p. 15.

21. Ryan Pickrell, “Why Duterte Really Hates the USA,” The 

Daily Caller, October 31, 2016, available from http://dailycaller.

com/2016/10/31/why-duterte-really-hates-the-usa/, accessed March 

20, 2017.

22. Ibid.

23. Patricia Lourdes Viray, “China backs Duterte’s drug 

war,” The Philippine Star, September 30, 2016, available from www.

philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/30/1629007/china-backs-dutertesdrug-war, accessed January 20, 2017.
211

24. Agence France-Presse, “Japan PM offers Philippines drug 

war support,” The Philippine Rappler, January 12, 2017, available from www.rappler.com/nation/158169-japan-pm-abe-philippinesdrug-war-support, accessed January 20, 2017.

25. Justin Goldman, “Resilience in the Philippines in the Face 

of Natural Calamities,” Diplomatic Courier, May 21, 2014, available from www.diplomaticourier.com/resilience-in-the-philippines-inthe-face-of-natural-calamities/, accessed January 14, 2017.

26. Kim, p. 2.

27. Eleanor Albert, “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance,” Backgrounder, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2016, available from www.cfr.org/philippines/

us-philippines-defense-alliance/p38101, accessed February 1, 2017.

28. Carmela Fonbuena, “Obama: U.S. commitment to PH 

‘ironclad’,” The Philippine Rappler, April 29, 2014, available from 

www.rappler.com/nation/56690-obama-ironclad-support-philippines, 

accessed January 14, 2017.

29. CNN Philippines Staff, “What You Need to Know About 

EDCA,” CNN Philippines, April 14, 2016, available from http://

cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/01/13/what-you-need-to-know-aboutedca.html, accessed January 21, 2017.

30. Noemi M. Gonzales, “US assistance not immediate 

under Mutual Defense Treaty,” Business World Online, June 

29, 2011, available from http://www.bworldonline.com/content.

php?section=Nation&title=us-assistance-not-immediate-undermutual-defense-treaty&id=33858, accessed December 5, 2017.

31. Leon Panetta, “UNCLOS Accession Would Strengthen US 

Global Position,” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, 

July 1, 2012, p. 23.

32. Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, “The Principle of 

Non-intervention,” Leiden Journal of International Law, June 2009, 

p. 345.

33. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 
4th Ed., New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 

1996, p. 30.

34. “FULL TEXT: of President Donald Trump’s Inauguration 

Speech,” ABC News, January 20, 2017, available from abcnews.

go.com/Politics/full-text-president-donald-trumps-inaugurationspeech/story?id=44915821, accessed January 21, 2017.

35. Lee Jones, “ASEAN’s unchanged melody? The theory 

and practice of ‘non-interference’ in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific 

Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4, August 11, 2010, p. 479.

36. CNN Philippines Staff, “Duterte leads launch of PH chairmanship of ASEAN 2017,” CNN Philippines, January 15, 2017, 

available from http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/01/15/duterteleads-asean-2017-launch.html, accessed January 16, 2017.

37. “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 

February 24, 1976, available from http://asean.org/treaty-amitycooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/, accessed January 16, 2017.

38. Lauren Dunn, Peter Nyers, and Richard Stubbs, “Western 

interventionism versus East Asian non-interference: competing 

‘global’ norms in the Asian century,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 23, 

Iss. 3, July 5, 2010, p. 295.

39. Reinhard Wolf, “Respecting foreign peoples: the limits of 

moral obligations,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 19, Iss. 1, January 2016, available from search.proquest.

com/docview/1750884197?pq-origsite=summon, accessed February 

17, 2017.

40. Ibid.

41. Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter 1986, 

available from www.jstor.org/stable/2706740, accessed March 20, 

2017.

42. Ibid.
213

43. Jon Hovi, Games, Threats and Treaties: Understanding Commitments in International Relations, London, UK: Pinter, 1998, 

p. 103.

215

CHAPTER 8

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE 

CYBER DOMAIN: STOP THE 

DOWNWARD SPIRAL

Steven M. Pierce 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The cyber domain has the potential to profoundly 

influence other domains such as land, maritime, and 

space and, consequently, the way nations employ 

national power in and across those domains. What 

happens in the cyber domain does not stay in the cyber 

domain. This is especially significant for U.S.-China 

relations. For better or worse, the United States and 

China have a contentious cyber relationship. There is 

ample evidence that actions taken by the two nations 

have affected broader U.S.-China relations negatively 

and intensified distrust between the two nations. It is 

imperative that the United States and China take measures to stop the downward spiral in cyber space and 

find ways to cooperate within the cyber domain to 

ensure stability across the other domains. Specifically, 

the United States and China should:

• Focus early on cooperation in areas that both 

the United States and China view as harmful 

or criminal but that are not politically charged. 

Examples include cybercrime, protection of 

critical infrastructure, supply chain security, 

intellectual property theft, and prevention of 

proliferation of cyber capabilities to violent 
216

extremist organizations and other nonstate 

actors.

• Follow-up on the September 2015 U.S.-China 

Cyber Espionage Agreement with specific and 

actionable measures aimed at curbing cyber-enabled commercial espionage, theft of intellectual property, and cybercrime.

• Increase people-to-people exchanges between 

the two countries. Exchanges of U.S. and Chinese citizens in academia and technology related 

industries could help build shared understanding and trust at the lowest levels.

• Further discussion of “red lines” in the cyber 

domain. The discussion of red lines is essential to avoid miscalculation and misjudgment 

during crises that could lead to unintended 

escalatory actions on both sides.

INTRODUCTION

Why is it important that the United States and 

China get along? While no two nations always agree 

completely on every issue, it is important for the 

world’s two greatest powers to find common ground 

upon which to anchor their relationship because, ultimately, that relationship will have implications for 

the other nations of the world. As Travis Tanner and 

Wang Dong of the National Bureau of Asian Research 

asserts:

Given that the global challenges facing the world today 

cannot be resolved without both the United States and 

China, calculations in the cyber, maritime, nuclear, and 

space domains are increasingly consequential and carry 

implications for other nations.1
217

Even though the relationship between the United 

States and China is currently “stronger than it has ever 

been,” there exists an:

increasing number of sources of tension and 

disagreement. . . . In addition, general strategic mistrust 

plagues the relationship and carries the potential...to 

quickly exacerbate tensions and bring about a harmful 

deterioration of the relationship or even conflict.2

CYBER DOMAIN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

As is the case with many emerging, immature 

technologies, cyber is a domain that can be at once 

an opportunity and a vulnerability. As Sven Sakkov, 

Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 

Centre of Excellence, explains it:

Everything that is good and everything that is bad in 

human nature have their manifestations in cyberspace. The 

ultra-rapid advancement of technology has challenged 

and outpaced the development of the normative 

frameworks that should limit malicious activities―be it 

crime, hacktivism or state-sponsored activities.3

Albert Einstein’s observation that “All our lauded 

technological progress―our very civilization―is like 

the axe in the hand of the pathological criminal” could 

be as true today with respect to the cyber domain as 

it was 100 years ago when he penned it in a letter to a 

colleague.4 This idea of the duality of the domain—that 

it can be both an opportunity and a vulnerability—is 

explored in more detail in the analysis of how the U.S. 

and China view the domain differently.

The description and characteristics section begins 

with a definition of the cyber domain. The 2006 National 

Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations defines it 
218

as “a domain characterized by the use of electronics 

and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify 

and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”5 As Viktor Nagy of 

the National University of Public Service in Budapest, 

Hungary, notes, even though the domain is relatively 

new when compared to the other strategic domains, 

it “has evolved enough to significantly affect geostrategy.”6

 The cyber domain is the first man-made domain 

and while it exists primarily as a virtual world, nationstates and nonstate actors interact in it in much the 

same way as they do in the other physical domains, 

and those interactions often result in “very real effects. 

Similarly to the advent of human activity in the other 

domains, cyberspace is now strongly contested.”7

While much of the domain exists in a virtual space, 

there are critical physical infrastructure and nodes 

that enable operations, and much of that infrastructure resides within the United States. Adam Segal and 

Tang Lan of the National Bureau of Asian Research 

explain the structure this way: “A small number of 

Internet providers carry the bulk of data over the backbone, and a majority of Internet data is drawn in and 

routed through the United States, even if it makes little 

geographic sense.”8 Because of the U.S. commitment 

to maintaining an open internet and the free flow of 

information, the result is that “American cyberspace is 

one of the least secure online realms.”9 A major reason 

for this is simply the sheer number of users connected 

to the internet.

The United States has so many computers and so much 

of the Internet’s underlying infrastructure—with perhaps 

500 million hosts compared to 20 million for China—it is 

not surprising that so many criminal attacks originate or 

pass through here.10
219

The sheer numbers of connected devices in the United 

States is a measure of America’s dependence on the 

cyber domain and increases U.S. vulnerability to 

attacks in the domain.

Another challenge is the anonymity that the domain 

provides. As one expert writes:

it is virtually impossible to differentiate legitimate 

Internet traffic from traffic with a malicious purpose. 

Information that has been stolen from somewhere, or 

that contains commands that will ‘flip a switch’ in such a 

way as to cause severe damage to a critical infrastructure 

system, is extremely difficult to identify.11

Unlike the other physical domains where actions can 

be observed to a great degree with existing systems:

We have no early warning radar system or Coast Guard 

to patrol the borders in cyberspace . . . [and] information 

of an attack will come first from those being attacked. 

Therefore it is highly unlikely that a government 

organization, unless it is actually the target of a cyberattack, will have greater situational awareness.12

Although many countries interact in the cyber 

domain, there are three primary nations that possess 

the majority of cyber capability and cyber power: the 

United States, China, and Russia.13 This concentration 

of power is an interesting characteristic for a domain 

with the potential to connect billions of people around 

the world. In a speech given in Seoul, South Korea, in 

2015, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated, 

“Roughly three out of every five people in the world 

today remain without internet access―and in the poorest countries that figure can top 95 percent.”14

Another characteristic of the cyber domain, not 

unlike the other domains, is the number of stakeholders with an interest in it. A key attribute of the domain 
220

is that “states, organizations, corporations, and even 

individuals can have major, global impact.”15 The reality is that “a variety of nongovernmental actors are 

significant players in each country’s use of and deliberations about the cyber realm.”16 Due to the nascent and 

ever-evolving nature of the domain, “it is hard to set 

boundaries between the responsibilities of civilian and 

military agencies, creating the need for intense coordination between all actors involved.”17 Complicating the multi-stakeholder environment is the fact that 

these stakeholders do not all share a common vision 

of what “security” or “openness” within the domain 

means, even though these concepts affect both developed and developing countries interdependently.18

The cyber domain is also characterized by its dual 

nature of providing immense opportunities, while at 

the same time allowing nefarious actors to take advantage of its vulnerabilities. One researcher explained it 

this way:

In a way, the world has become a victim of its own 

developmental successes. Over the last two decades, we 

have seen an incredible amount of openness in commerce 

and the exchange of ideas. However, with openness 

comes much vulnerability.19

On the same topic, former U.S. Secretary of State Kerry remarked, “obviously, the internet is not without 

risk―but at the end of the day, if we restricted all technology that could possibly be used for bad purposes, 

we’d have to revert to the Stone Age.”20 While actors 

in all the strategic domains continue to evolve their 

actions to gain advantage, nowhere is this evolution 

more pronounced than in the cyber domain where 

new opportunities and vulnerabilities seem to emerge 

daily. James Clapper, the former Director of Nation-
221

al Intelligence, described one such evolution at a U.S. 

Congressional hearing in September 2015:

The next frontier in cyberspace will feature the 

manipulation of data, rather than theft or destruction. 

Such tools could be used to alter decision making, and 

prompt business executives and others to question the 

credibility of information they receive.21

Another key aspect of the cyber domain is that it: 

enables a new sphere for great powers to carry out 

conflicts directly among each other (and any other power 

for that matter). Previously, their behavior was frozen at 

a certain level due to the strategic nuclear stalemate.22

However, the domain is not just occupied by great 

powers. While it may be true that “the overwhelming 

advantage of developed countries can also be reflected 

in distribution and management mechanism of physical facilities of key infrastructures that ensure operation of global cyberspace,” there are also possibilities 

for smaller countries to develop significant cyber capabilities that can offset comparative advantages held 

by larger powers.23 As one national security author 

noted, “Because of its ability to render long-established positions in other domains irrelevant, and the 

chance to operate with only the slightest risk of detection, cyberspace is now . . . at the center of global geostrategic struggle.”24 This duality of the cyber domain 

is analyzed in relation to U.S. and Chinese views of the 

domain.
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DOMAIN’S INFLUENCE ON THE INSTRUMENTS 

OF NATIONAL POWER

Unlike actions in some of the other strategic 

domains, what happens in the cyber domain does not 

remain there. Actions taken in the cyber domain and, 

more importantly, their effects, spill over into and can 

influence all other domains. The result is that cyber 

domain operations influence all of the instruments of 

national power, and can do so almost instantaneously. 

For that reason, cybersecurity is not only the responsibility of the military but also the civilian national security agencies.25 As Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi of 

the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings noted 

in a 2012 study, “Recent years have witnessed the dramatic transformation of economic, military, and social 

activities in a way that makes the digital world increasingly critical to all three.”26

The United States operates in the cyber domain to 

further its interests across all the instruments of power. 

As U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach 

stated recently regarding the U.S. cyber operations:

The place where I think it will be most helpful to senior 

policymakers is what I call ‘the space between’. What is 

the space between? . . . You have diplomacy, economic 

sanctions . . . and then you have military action. In 

between there’s this space . . . [and] there are a lot of 

things that you can do in that space . . . that can help us 

accomplish the national interest.27

Just as the United States operates in the domain to 

further its national interests, so do other nations. As 

Nagy asserts, “cyberspace is now vital for maintaining national power at its entirety and thus for national 

security.”28 He points out that currently the United 

States, China, and Russia account for the majority of 
223

world cyber power and defines cyber power as “the 

ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and 

influence events in other operational environments 

and across the instruments of power.”29 He states that 

the reason for the United States and its adversaries to 

build up their cyber capabilities is simple: “Whereas 

China’s and Russia’s incentive for building national 

cyber power was to counterweigh overall Western 

power and to catch up, the West’s is to defend that very 

power.”30 To do that, China and Russia took advantage 

of U.S. dependencies on information technologies:

in increasing areas of the economy, society, politics, and 

the military . . . and for a time they managed to turn their 

greatest disadvantage―lack of advanced information 

infrastructure―to an effective weapon and tool against 

the West.31

They did not just focus their efforts on military power, 

but across all instruments of national power by “accessing and copying highly sensitive data of direct military, diplomatic, and economic importance.”32

This strategy of near-simultaneously disrupting or 

degrading all instruments of power pursued by our 

adversaries is no secret. As Segal and Tang reveal:

Chinese open-source writings discuss the importance of 

seizing information dominance early in a conflict through 

cyberattacks on command-and-control centers. Follow-up 

attacks would target transportation, communications, 

and logistics networks to slow down an adversary.33

It is important to remember that the cyber domain is 

still relatively young and that:

In the near future, the size of the international cyber stage 

and the number of actors upon it will grow. Governments 

will both want and need to flex their digital muscles in 
224

order to gain a comparative advantage in political and 

military affairs.34

This analysis of the cyber domain’s influence on the 

instruments of national power will now highlight some 

examples across the diplomatic, information, military, 

and economic instruments of power.

Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Diplomatic Power 

The United States uses the cyber domain to enhance 

its statecraft and diplomatic efforts around the world. 

As then-Secretary of State Kerry explained it in a recent 

speech in South Korea:

The internet is, among many other things, an instrument 

of freedom. . . . So of course, some leaders are afraid of it. 

They’re afraid of the internet in the same way that their 

predecessors were afraid of newspapers, books, and the 

radio, but even more so because in this case, because of 

the interactivity that allows for a free-flowing discussion 

and the exchange of views―activities that can, and often 

do, lead to change.35

This discussion of the cyber domain as an avenue 

to lead change is not simply hollow rhetoric coming 

from senior-level U.S. leaders. The United States has 

committed resources to supporting change agents in 

regions it believes can most benefit. Between 2008 and 

2012, the U.S. Department of State spent approximately 

$100 million:

to fund activities such as training digital activists in 

hostile environments and developing circumvention 

tools to bypass state-sponsored Internet filters . . . [and] 

in September 2015, U.S. ambassador to the United 

Nations Samantha Power announced a $10 million 
225

venture-capital-like fund for the development of new 

circumvention technologies.36

Many of these “circumvention technologies” are 

aimed at getting around firewalls that are established 

by authoritarian regimes to limit their citizens’ access 

to the unfiltered internet.

Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Information Power 

The cyber domain’s influence on the information instrument of power is mainly as a conduit for 

influence or information operations. As a matter of 

policy, the United States has a “stated interest in the 

free flow of information.”37 In three speeches between 

2010 and 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described information networks as a “new nervous system for our planet” and stated “users must be 

assured freedom of expression and religion online, as 

well as the right to access the Internet and thereby connect to websites and other people.”38 One expert has 

a starker view of information operations specifically 

related to U.S.-China interactions when he asserts:

INFOOPS [Information Operations] plays a pivotal role 

in the unfolding ‘cold war’ between the United States 

and China for the domination of the Western Pacific. Both 

American and Chinese military doctrine builds heavily 

on INFOOPS.39

He continues with the warning that an information 

operation “is considered a basis for the growing Chinese capabilities to execute non-nuclear first strike 

against American and Allied military assets in the 

Western Pacific theatre of operations.”40 In this sense, 

the domain’s influence on the information instrument 
226

of national power can have a direct influence on the 

military instrument of power.

Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Military 

Power

The cyber domain’s influence on the military 

instrument of national power is arguably the most 

profound of the four instruments. Its emerging importance led one observer to note, “National and military 

presence in cyberspace has become vital to maintain 

presence in all other domains, putting its importance 

in supporting land and sea powers on par with air and 

space power.”41 An important aspect of the domain is 

that, while it is discussed and studied as a stand-alone 

domain, “it also affects the [military’s] other four operational domains: land, air, sea, space.”42 Of particular 

significance is the fact that the U.S. military is reliant 

on not just critical military infrastructure but also critical civilian infrastructure to execute its missions. Forrest Hare of the George Mason University School of 

Public Policy notes:

cyber-attacks that degrade the ability to command and 

control national security assets and attacks that disrupt 

critical infrastructure have direct implications to national 

security. This infrastructure may be civilian, military, or 

both.

He continues by stating that the “Department of 

Defense relies heavily on the nation’s public and private cyber infrastructure backbone for communications purposes.”43

Another example comes from a 2013 study conducted by the U.S. Defense Science Board entitled 

“Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber 
227

Threat.” In its report, the Board warned that the “benefits to an attacker using cyber exploits are potentially 

spectacular. . . . U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs may 

not fire, or may be directed against our own troops.”44

The report continued with:

Resupply, including food, water, ammunition, and 

fuel may not arrive when or where needed. Military 

Commanders may rapidly lose trust in the information 

and ability to control U.S. systems and forces. Once lost, 

that trust is very difficult to regain.45

Not only can the domain influence military power 

through attacks and information manipulation, but 

also by enabling adversaries to gain advantages 

through cyber espionage. As one reporter notes:

China’s cyber-espionage is also of deep concern to 

the Pentagon, which fears Beijing is focused both on 

stealing plans for advanced armaments to build its own 

versions and on using that know-how to develop ways 

of countering high-tech American aircraft, drones, and 

other battlefield armaments.46

This cyber-enabled espionage allows our adversaries 

to counter potentially some of our most cutting-edge, 

sophisticated military technology without having to 

invest large amounts of resources in costly weapons 

systems research and development over many years. 

A Washington Post article stated that groups, including China’s People’s Liberation Army hackers, “stole 

information from over two dozen Defense Department weapons programs, including the Patriot missile 

system and the U.S. Navy’s new littoral combat ship.”47

This theft of sensitive military information happens on 

both military and civilian industrial networks, highlighting the fact that the United States cannot simply 
228

secure its military networks to shield against the threat. 

A recent example is the potential loss of design and 

capabilities information of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

As Hare explains it:

The information was stolen from private, proprietary 

industry networks (meaning no government access or 

frequent auditing), and it apparently contained several 

terabytes of design data on the future air defense 

capability for several nations.48

Because of incidents such as these, the U.S. military 

is investing scarce resources to counter the threat. The 

U.S. Air Force, for instance, is creating a “new, fulltime office dedicated to protecting its weapons systems from cyber-attacks.”49 The organization, known 

as the Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems, 

was inaugurated with the acknowledgement that:

even though a modern jet fighter is essentially a flying 

network of computing systems that’s vulnerable to cyber 

threats, it’s an exquisitely customized one that doesn’t 

quite fit the procedures the government usually employs 

to protect its traditional IT [information technology] 

systems.50

Protecting U.S. military systems from threats in 

the cyber domain will require properly identifying 

threats and adequately allocating resources during 

the acquisition and budgeting processes. As General 

Ellen Pawlikowski, Commander, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, recently noted, “getting weapons systems into a more cyber-secure condition would likely 

take another 5 to 7 years, partially because the military’s budgeting process to date has not yet made it a 

priority.”51
229

Finally, the cyber domain’s influence on military 

power must be a consideration of multinational efforts 

with U.S. allies. Actions taken by adversaries against 

U.S. allies can have consequential outcomes for the 

United States. As the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Wales Summit Declaration stated:

We affirm . . . that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core 

task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would 

be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case 

basis.52

Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Economic 

Power

There is no doubt about the cyber domain’s influence on the economic instrument of national power. 

Profitable businesses and sectors of the economy that 

offer cyber-enabled services have flourished, many 

without producing any physical product. As discussed 

earlier, much of the world’s internet infrastructure 

resides in, or is routed through, the United States. This 

advantage is reflected in the U.S. position in the cyber 

related economy worldwide. One analyst describes the 

statistics this way:

The Internet generates 6% of [U.S.] domestic economy. 

U.S. technology companies dominate the global Internet 

economy, with the United States accounting for 25% of 

global telecom revenue in 2015 and capturing close to 

25% of the G-20’s Internet economy. In India, nine of 

the top-ten websites are U.S.-based sites such as Google, 

Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn; seven of the top-ten sites 

in Brazil are run by U.S. companies. Google is the leader 

in search engines, and its Android operating system is on 
230

over three-quarters of the smartphones being made in the 

world.53

The United States is not alone as a beneficiary of the 

cyber-enabled economy. China and some of its online 

businesses are also major beneficiaries. The Alibaba 

Group, owner of two of China’s most popular online 

retailers, announced, “during the first 11 months 

of 2012, the total transactions of both shopping sites 

reached . . . $162 billion, the equivalent of [2] percent of 

China’s total GDP.”54

As can be expected, where there is this much potential wealth, there will be actors attempting to gain a 

competitive advantage through unscrupulous means.

While there is no accepted measure of the size of cyberenabled theft, it is assumed to significantly affect U.S. 

competitiveness. Former NSA head General Keith 

Alexander estimated the actual cost to U.S. companies at 

$250 billion in stolen information and another $114 billion 

in related expenses.55

As with much of the military-related cyber espionage, 

adversaries conduct industrial espionage through the 

cyber domain aimed at gaining a competitive advantage without having to dedicate significant resources 

to close the economic and technological gaps. Larry 

Wortzel, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, contends that:

Chinese entities engaging in cyber and other forms 

of economic espionage likely conclude that stealing 

intellectual property and proprietary information is 

much more cost-effective than investing in lengthy R&D 

[research and development] programs.56

He further asserts, “these thefts support national science and technology development plans that are 
231

centrally managed and directed by the PRC [People’s 

Republic of China] government.”57 The Chinese hackers in turn give the proprietary information and intellectual property to Chinese state owned enterprises, 

which gives those companies “an unfair advantage 

over their American competitors.”58 To address this 

growing problem, in September 2015, the U.S. and 

China agreed, in principle, to the U.S.-China Cyber 

Espionage Agreement that pledges, among other 

things, to:

refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyberenabled theft of intellectual property, pursue efforts 

to further identify and promote appropriate norms of 

state behavior in cyberspace within the international 

community, and establish a high-level joint dialogue 

mechanism on fighting cybercrime.59

An unfortunate outcome of China’s cyber espionage against the United States for economic gain is 

that it is furthering strategic mistrust on both sides. 

As a recent discussion panel at the Carnegie-Tsinghua 

Center for Global Policy explained the downside, “it is 

the potential for distrust in the cyber domain to erode 

economic relations, which normally help to mitigate 

security tensions.”60

U.S. AND CHINESE VIEWS ON CYBER DOMAIN

As stated earlier, “There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as 

that between the United States and China,” and in that 

relationship:

there is no issue that has risen so quickly and generated 

so much friction as cybersecurity. Distrust of each other’s 

actions in the cyber realm is growing and starting to 
232

generate deeply negative assessments of each country’s 

long-term strategic intentions.61

In short, the United States and China represent the two 

most significant nations in the domain and their views 

of the domain are very different from one another.62

Before addressing each nation’s views of the domain, 

it is important to note an interesting observation from 

Segal and Tang regarding the U.S. and Chinese positions within the domain:

The two countries are at different stages of technological 

development. All China does today is what the United 

States has already accomplished. China tends to learn and 

absorb U.S. best practices and lessons and has followed 

the U.S. model, which one might perhaps call a latestarting advantage. The United States, for its part, keeps 

a close eye on the measures China takes to improve its 

defense capabilities in the cyber domain and views these 

as a challenge. The root cause is absence of strategic trust 

between both sides.63

The sections below analyze how both the United 

States and China view the cyber domain. These views 

are significant to how each nation approaches behavior within the domain.

The United States has been involved in the cyber 

domain from its infancy. As early as February 2003, it 

published the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the 

first national strategy of its kind.64 In 2011, the Obama 

administration released the International Strategy on 

Cyberspace that declared that the United States would:

work internationally to promote an open, interoperable, 

secure, and reliable information and communications 

infrastructure that supports international trade and 

commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters 

free expression and innovation.65
233

In 2015, former U.S. Secretary of State Kerry reiterated 

that strategy when he stated, “To begin with, America believes . . . that the internet should be open and 

accessible to everyone” and that “it matters to all of 

us how the technology is used and how it’s governed. 

That is precisely why the United States considers the 

promotion of an open and secure internet to be a key 

component of our foreign policy.”66 He highlighted the 

differing viewpoints of the domain and tied the U.S. 

view to its national values when he said:

We will have a lot of choices about technology among 

and between nations. Let me tell you something: How 

we choose begins with what we believe. And what we 

believe about the internet hinges to a great extent on how 

we feel . . . about freedom.67

This American notion of freedom pervades U.S. 

national institutions and is one reason for distrust 

of China’s intent. As Lieberthal and Wang explain, 

Americans:

tend to be deeply suspicious of countries that trample 

on the civil rights of their own citizens. For historical 

reasons, the fact that China is governed by a communist 

party in a one-party system inherently creates misgivings 

among many Americans, including high level officials, 

and makes it still harder to establish full mutual trust.68

Another difference is the U.S. viewpoint of conducting operations (either offensive or defensive) 

within the domain. As one expert observed:

U.S. cyber-operations are extremely different from 

their Chinese equivalents. . . . When the U.S. military or 

intelligence community conducts cyber-operations, they 

are quiet, coordinated, exceptionally well targeted, and 

under the strict control of senior officers and government 

executives. Lawyers review every stage.69
234

He completed his explanation by reiterating, “The 

White House keeps a close hold on cyber-operations 

through senior executives, generals, and political 

appointees throughout the bureaucracy.”70 This tight 

control of operations is meant to prevent unintended 

consequences and miscalculations that could lead to 

escalation in the domain. 

China’s views on the cyber domain are quite different from the United States and, as addressed earlier, 

can be traced back to historical mistrust between the 

two nations dating back nearly 70 years. As a pair of 

experts reveal:

Chinese distrust of the United States has persisted ever 

since the founding of the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) in 1949. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the PRC viewed 

the U.S. as the most ferocious imperial power and the 

gravest political and military threat.71

More recently, China saw the 2008-2009 world financial crisis as an indictment on U.S. economic and political systems.72 The Chinese view the open, democratic, 

and laissez-faire approaches and policies of the United 

States as a structural cause of the global crisis.

As previously noted, China was not an early power 

in the cyber domain but has evolved into one. From the 

time that Chinese citizens first began going online, government officials and policymakers viewed the internet as a “double-edged sword—essential to economic 

growth and good governance but also the source of 

threats to domestic stability and regime legitimacy.”73

Even over 10 years ago, James Keith, a U.S. Department of State senior advisor on China and Mongolia, 

recognized that China’s regulation of the internet was 

aimed at ensuring that “ideas that do not have the government’s imprimatur or that challenge its authority 
235

do not take root in China.”74 Some Chinese analysts 

view U.S. efforts in the domain not only as a desire 

to maintain a strategic advantage, but also as a threat 

to the communist regime. These analysts “believe that 

the United States has soaked itself in Cold War and 

hegemonic thinking and wants to compete with China 

in all aspects of cyberspace, even wanting to jeopardize the current regime.”75

Perhaps because of this viewpoint, in early 2014, 

Chinese President Xi Jinping began to elevate cyber 

issues in importance in the national security dialogue. 

He stated, “network and information security is a 

major strategic issue that relates to national security, 

development and the broad masses of working life” 

and that there is “no national security without cybersecurity.”76 A year-and-a-half later in July 2015, China 

passed a national security law which:

viewed cybersecurity as an imminent and severe security 

risk that requires China to ‘build an assurance system to 

protect network and information security, promote the 

defense capability, [and] safeguard sovereignty, security, 

and development benefits for the country in cyberspace’.77

This marked the first time that China codified the 

importance of cybersecurity in law.78 While the United 

States seeks an open and secure internet, China seeks 

a secure regime. A recent National Bureau of Asian 

Research report asserts, “In the eyes of the Chinese government, the stability of the regime is the core security 

concern. Some scholars argue that Internet freedom 

is used as an excuse to intervene in China’s internal 

affairs.”79 To address this security concern, “the Chinese government has built an Internet management 

system that has an external and domestic face. Offending material from outside China is filtered and blocked 
236

by a number of technologies colloquially known as the 

‘great firewall’.”80 This censorship can take the form of 

simply blacklisting certain terms or phrases and, “in 

extreme cases, whole regions can be removed from the 

Internet as happened for 10 months after riots in Xinjiang in 2009.”81

SOVEREIGNTY: A KEY ISSUE IN THE DOMAIN

The differences in viewpoints noted above have 

profound effects on how the United States and China 

approach issues relating to the domain. This section 

addresses a few issues in the cyber domain and ends 

with a focus on a key issue in the domain—sovereignty. While the domain is increasingly important to 

overall U.S.-China relations, both countries:

still have significant differences over the free flow of 

information and the openness of the Internet, cyberattacks 

and norms of behavior in cyberspace, Internet governance, 

and the security of supply chains and information and 

communications equipment.82

The result of these significant differences is that “each 

country is likely to see the other as an important, if not 

the main, competitor to the pursuit of its interests in 

cyberspace.”83

At the heart of the disagreements is the question of who gets to determine the norms of the cyber 

domain.84 In China, analysts believe “this authority belongs solely to the state, while the West incorporates multiple stakeholders, including technology 

companies and civil society.”85 One of the ways the 

United States and its allies are attempting to establish 

norms in the domain is through the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD 
237

COE). This organization “has been addressing the subject of ‘cyber norms’ since its establishment in 2008,” 

and has focused on “the question of how existing international legal norms apply to cyberspace by hosting 

and facilitating the Tallinn Manual process.”86 China 

has criticized the Tallinn Manual as an effort by the 

United States and its allies “to manipulate cyberspace 

through law.”87 In 2011 (revised in 2015), China, along 

with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan—known collectively as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—introduced an alternative 

position to the Tallinn Manual to the United Nations 

General Assembly.88 The common belief among the 

SCO countries is in “the primacy of the nation state, 

which should be carried over into cyberspace.”89 But, 

as Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul note in a 2014 Tallinn Paper, “a ‘code of conduct’, like that proposed by 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seldom qualifies as international law because it is aspirational or 

exhortational in nature, but not compulsory.”90

A topic that has bearing on the issue of sovereignty 

in the cyber domain is that of borders. As Hare sets 

the stage, “Because actors in cyberspace enjoy relative 

anonymity and can threaten interconnected targets 

around the globe, there is considerable debate whether 

the concept of borders is relevant to the challenges of 

cyber security.”91 He concludes by stating, “Regardless the focus of the debate, the concept of borders is 

important because they define the territory in which 

national governments can employ sovereign measures.”92 Hare also relates the broader discussion of 

borders to the cyber domain when he argues that:

whether the problem is addressed from the standpoint of 

criminal behavior like drug trafficking, or cyber-attacks 

in an interdependent, global domain, borders can be a 
238

potentially useful construct to address cyber security 

issues and inform national policy decisions, regardless of 

the physical location of relevant nodes.93

Another topic with bearing on the issue of sovereignty in the cyber domain related to borders is 

whether or not the cyber domain is a global common. 

One expert notes that global commons are:

considered to be out of the jurisdiction of any state, 

international organization, company, or person, and to be 

fundamental in supporting human existence. The oceans, 

the atmosphere, space, and lately cyberspace are typically 

listed as part of the global commons, constituting the 

fabric or connective tissue of the international system.94

He further notes, “Many refer to cyberspace as a new 

‘global common’ at its entirety.”95

The U.S. position on cyber sovereignty is that 

actors within the domain should not take any actions 

to affect the openness or security of the domain. As one 

observer explains the differences between the United 

States and Chinese positions:

the United States believes that online content should 

flow freely across borders. China, in contrast, promotes a 

sovereignty-driven concept of cybersecurity, which gives 

governments the right to develop, regulate, manage, and 

censor Internet networks, as well as news, information, 

and data within their national boundaries.96

Another expert says simply, “The United States is 

committed to an open and global Internet, while China 

pushes a darker vision with strong national borders 

cutting out any objectionable material.”97 As outlined 

in the SCO alternative to principles found in the Tallinn Manual, “Russia and China both would like to see 

more government involvement in Internet governance 
239

and are pushing a . . . model of cyber sovereignty 

where, in effect, each country can maintain its own 

‘intranet’.”98

As Mikk Raud writes in one of the 2016 Tallinn 

Papers:

China is particularly sensitive in exercising its right 

to sovereignty in cyberspace and does not want it to 

be interfered with by any other state or international 

organization. . . . China does not see international law as 

the main regulator of cyberspace, but prefers each state 

setting its own rules.99

A recent Carnegie-Tsinghua panel of experts tied China’s position on cyber sovereignty to “its long-standing policies advocating for noninterference in other 

states’ domestic affairs.”100 In that statement, one can 

clearly identify similar Chinese complaints over U.S. 

“interference” in China’s domestic affairs, specifically 

regarding Taiwan.

Another reason for China’s position on cyber sovereignty is the threat it feels the domain poses to the 

security of the regime. As one Chinese expert notes:

One of the main reasons why Beijing prefers sovereignty 

in cyberspace is stimulation from the actions launched 

by the [United] States in which the Internet served as the 

tools of US diplomacy, especially after 2009 when the 

term Internet Freedom has been produced to encourage 

NGO’s to launch peaceful regime change all around the 

world.101

To support a secure regime, China’s position on sovereignty even extends beyond its own citizens. Mikk 

Raud writes of China’s position:

the users of cyberspace, both domestic and foreign 

citizens within a state’s territory, should be controlled 
240

by the host state, a clear contradiction of the Western 

position which supports a liberal cyberspace respecting 

human rights. In China’s political culture, maintaining 

social order is unquestionably more important than 

individual privacy.102

As outlined in the July 2015 National Security Law of 

China, “Cyber sovereignty occupies the central position of China’s cyber security strategy,” and the protection of sovereignty in cyber space is a critical national security task.103 In 2014, Chinese President Xi detailed the components of cyber sovereignty that were 

the foundation for cyber sovereignty’s importance in 

China’s 2015 National Security Law:

The first key part of cyber sovereignty refers to the 

sovereignty of the state to manage the information flow 

inside the territory; the second is that every single state has 

the power to make cyber related policy independently; 

the third is that every state should have roughly equalized 

rights to participate in the decision making process of 

the rules, norms, or code of conduct that governs global 

cyberspace; and the respect of sovereignty should be one 

of the most important guiding principles to deal with 

cyber related issues internationally.104

President Xi’s version of cyber sovereignty is essential 

to enabling China to achieve its goal in the domain, 

namely, to become a cyber power.105 At end-state, this 

goal will ensure that China:

develops from an important actor to a great power 

in cyberspace which means China should not only 

effectively defend possible threats from/by cyberspace, 

but also become more influential in the building of the 

rules that govern global cyberspace.106

This vision of Chinese prominence in the cyber domain reflects the perspective of many leaders in China 
241

that “the shifting power balance between China and 

the United States is part of an emerging new structure 

in today’s world.” This is due in part to the outlook 

that “the United States is seen in China generally as a 

declining power over the long run.”107

In order for China to achieve its goal of becoming a 

premier cyber power, one expert predicts that its main 

challenge will be:

to provide a more precisely defined cyber sovereignty 

and develop a sophisticated national strategy on cyber 

security so that it would be taken as a workable guiding 

principle when China becomes more and more actively 

participatory in a creating process of code of conduct in 

the global cyberspace.108

From a U.S. perspective, it has concerns that China 

is attempting to undo its decades-long efforts to establish norms in the still immature cyber domain. A pair 

of experts summed it up this way:

Moreover, the United States worries that China will push 

to rewrite the rules . . . by promoting ‘an alternative to the 

borderless Internet embraced by Americans.’ Preventing 

Chinese challenges to the U.S.-led cyber order is now a 

major task for the White House.109

These vastly different and competing positions on 

issues within the cyber domain and, more specifically, 

of the interpretation of sovereignty within the domain 

ultimately lead to a greater strategic mistrust between 

the two countries.

The reasons for that distrust differ. On the Chinese side 

these doubts stem more from Beijing’s application of 

lessons from past history, while on the U.S. side the doubts 

tend more to derive from Washington’s uncertainties 

as to how a more powerful China will use its growing 

capabilities.110
242

Not helping matters is the fact that in this emerging, 

nascent domain with very few, if any, established 

norms of behavior, there is plenty of room for misjudgment and miscalculation by all actors operating within 

the cyber domain and that “neither the U.S. nor China 

clearly understands each other’s red lines in this arena.”111

Based on the information presented thus far, the 

final section of this project will propose some broad 

U.S. policy recommendations.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Although there are many issues facing the United 

States and China in the cyber domain, there are also 

areas where the countries can cooperate in an attempt 

to build some level of trust. As Segal and Tang identify, 

“Despite the wide ideological gulf between the two 

sides, both China and the United States have identified 

cyberspace as an area that requires cooperation.”112

There is also a cautious optimism that the two powers 

realize that they must work together on certain issues. 

As one analyst notes:

Both sides have a pragmatic awareness of the issues on 

which they disagree, and both appreciate the importance 

of not permitting those specific disagreements to prevent 

cooperation on major issues where cooperation can be 

mutually beneficial.113

Common across all of these recommendations is the 

belief that maintaining open lines of communications 

at the highest levels of governmental and nongovernmental organizations is essential to signal the importance of the issues to the United States.114 Additionally, 

the two sides must “ensure that discussions on norms 
243

of behavior in cyberspace continue at the highest level 

and are not suspended during times of tension.”115 It is 

these potential areas of cooperation on which this final 

section will propose recommendations with the hope 

of improving U.S.-China relations in not only the cyber 

domain but also the overall strategic relationship.

Perhaps one of the easiest areas of cooperation is 

where the United States and China already have an 

agreement. The United States should engage with 

Chinese leadership and actively follow-up on the September 2015 U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Agreement 

(described in the section on the domain’s effect on the 

economic instrument of national power) with specific 

and actionable measures aimed at curbing cyber-enabled commercial espionage, theft of intellectual property, and cybercrime.116

The focus of early cooperation should be on shared 

interests and activities that both the United States 

and China view as harmful or criminal but that “do 

not have a significant political component to them.”117

Examples include cybercrime, intellectual property 

theft, supply chain security, and protection of critical 

infrastructure.118

One specific issue in the national interest of both 

the United States and China, and where both nations 

could benefit from cooperation, is the prevention of 

proliferation of cyber capabilities to violent extremist 

organizations and other nonstate actors. The two have 

already begun a cyber dialogue aimed at countering 

such actors. Two experts provide the concept that:

the two sides agreed to work together to combat the 

posting on the Internet of instructions on how to build 

improvised explosive devices. As the discussions 

progress, the two sides could exchange intelligence on 

the capabilities of specific groups and share ideas on how 
244

to disrupt the development and distribution of cyber 

weapons.119

Another recommendation is to increase what are 

known as people-to-people exchanges between the 

two countries. Exchanges of U.S. and Chinese citizens to conduct research at universities and in other 

technology related industries could help build shared 

understanding and trust at the lowest levels.120

A final recommendation is that the United States 

and China must further discussion of “red lines” in the 

cyber domain. A difficulty in these discussions is that, 

as outlined earlier, actions taken in the cyber domain 

can have near simultaneous effects in the other strategic domains. These cyber red lines are not isolated to 

the cyber domain. The discussion of red lines is essential to avoid miscalculation and misjudgment during 

crises that could lead to unintended escalatory actions 

on both sides.121 Discussions could also lead to the 

development of norms and implementing measures 

that would take riskier actions off the table.122 As one 

analyst related:

From the United Nations to the ASEAN Regional Forum 

and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 

Europe, there has been a growing interest in applying the 

concept of confidence building measures from the Cold 

War to the digital age.123

As the United States and China develop their relationship and enter into additional agreements, it will 

be important to have the backing of U.S. allies and 

partners in the region. In the advice of a recent task 

force from the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations, “Expanding the scope of agreements beyond 
245

the bilateral relationship to multilateral organizations can help reinforce the Chinese government’s 

commitments.”124

All of the recommendations above are made with 

the desired end-state of expanding and strengthening the overall U.S.-China strategic relationship. Ultimately, improved relations will not end iniquitous 

actions or eliminate nefarious actors from the cyber 

domain, but will:

put a framework in place that will not only help prevent 

disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other 

parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides 

to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes 

strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace.125

CONCLUSION

The relationship between the United States and 

China in the cyber domain matters. From a cyber 

domain perspective, “Trust is currently a rare commodity in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship, and it 

is especially difficult to sustain in cyberspace.”126 That 

lack of trust in the domain matters because the consequences of a poor relationship affect more than just 

the cyber domain and more than just the two nations. 

From a broader perspective, this strategic mistrust 

holds an ominous potential if not improved. Lieberthal 

and Wang assess the potential this way:

The United States and China are the two most 

consequential countries in the world over the coming 

decades. The nature of their relationship will have a 

profound impact on the citizens of both countries, on the 

Asia-Pacific region, and indeed on the world.127
246

The two nations must find ways to cooperate within 

the cyber domain to ensure strategic stability within all 

of the other domains.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, “Introduction,” in Travis 

Tanner and Wang Dong, eds., NBR Special Report #57: U.S.-China 

Relations in Strategic Domains, Seattle, WA: National Bureau of 

Asian Research, April 2016, p. v.

2. Ibid.

3. Sven Sakkov, “Foreword,” in Anna-Maria Osula and Henry 

Rõigas, eds., International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2016, p. 

7, available from https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/international-cybernorms-legal-policy-industry-perspectives.html, accessed January 18, 

2017.

4. Ibid.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy for 

Cyberspace Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

December 2006, p. ix.

6. Viktor Nagy, “The Geostrategic Struggle in Cyberspace 

Between the United States, China, and Russia,” Academic & 

Applied Research in Military Science, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, p. 14, 

available from http://zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Volume11/Issue1/pdf/02.

pdf, accessed January 15, 2017.

7. Ibid.

8. Adam Segal and Tang Lan, “Reducing and Managing U.S.-

China Conflict in Cyberspace,” in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 48.

9. Jason Healey, “China is a Cyber Victim, Too,” Foreign Policy, 

April 16, 2013, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/

china-is-a-cyber-victim-too/, accessed January 15, 2017.

10. Ibid.
247

11. Forrest Hare, “Borders in Cyberspace: Can Sovereignty 

Adapt to the Challenge of Cybersecurity?” in Christian Czosseck 

and Kenneth Geers, eds., The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber 

Warfare, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press, 2009, p. 92, 

available from https://ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/06_

HARE_Borders%20in%20Cyberspace.pdf, accessed January 15, 2017.

12. Ibid.

13. Nagy, p. 13.

14. John Kerry, “An Open and Secure Internet: We Must 

Have Both,” public speech, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea, 

May 18, 2105, available from https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/

remarks/2015/05/242553.htm, accessed February 20, 2017.

15. Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Cybersecurity 

and U.S.-China Relations, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 

2012, p. iv, available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/

uploads/2016/06/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_

english.pdf, accessed January 15, 2017.

16. Ibid., p. viii.

17. Nagy, p. 17.

18. Hare, p. 88.

19. Ibid., p. 92.

20. Kerry.

21. Elias Groll, “U.S. Spy Chief: Get Ready for Everything 

to be Hacked All the Time,” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2015, 

available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/10/u-s-spy-chief-getready-for-everything-to-be-hacked-all-the-time/, accessed January 15, 

2017.

22. Tim Maurer, “The Future of War: Cyber is Expanding 

the Clausewitzian Spectrum of Conflict,” Foreign Policy, November 13, 2014, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/13/

the-future-of-war-cyber-is-expanding-the-clausewitzian-spectrum-ofconflict, accessed January 15, 2017.
248

23. Yi Shen, “Cyber Sovereignty and the Governance of Global 

Cyberspace,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, March 

2016, p. 85, available from https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0002-

6, accessed January 15, 2017.

24. Nagy, p. 15.

25. Ibid., p. 16.

26. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-

China Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 

2012, p. 3, available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/

uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf, accessed January 8, 2017.

27. Maurer.

28. Nagy, p. 14.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 16.

31. Ibid., p. 15.

32. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 31.

33. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 52.

34. Kenneth Geers, Pandemonium: Nation States, National Security, and the Internet, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2014, p. 12, available from https://ccdcoe.org/publications/

TP_Vol1No1_Geers.pdf, accessed January 18, 2017.

35. Kerry.

36. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 47.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Nagy, p. 22.

40. Ibid.
249

41. Ibid., p. 14.

42. Maurer.

43. Hare, p. 91.

44. Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat,” Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, January 2013, 

p. 5.

45. Ibid.

46. Shane Harris, “U.S. Indicts Chinese Officials for 

Cyber-Spying,” Foreign Policy, May 19, 2014, available from http://

foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/19/u-s-indicts-chinese-officials-for-cyberspying, accessed January 15, 2017.

47. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 48.

48. Hare, p. 91.

49. Jared Serbu, “Air Force Stands Up New Office to Shield 

Weapons from Cyber Attacks,” Federal News Radio, January 10, 

2017, available from federalnewsradio.com/dod-reporters-notebookjared-serbu/2017/01/air-force-stands-new-office-shield-weapons-cyberattacks, accessed January 16, 2017.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Wales Summit Declaration, Newport, Wales: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

September 5, 2014, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

official_texts_112964.htm, accessed February 22, 2017.

53. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 46.

54. Jing de Jong-Chen, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations: Understanding China’s Current Environment,” September 15, 2014, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.

org/online-edition/u-s-china-cybersecurity-relations-understanding-
250

chinas-current-environment?rq=Jing%20De%20Jong-Chen, accessed 

January 8, 2017.

55. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 49.

56. Ibid., p. 51.

57. Ibid.

58. Harris.

59. John W. Rollins, Susan V. Lawrence, Dianne E. Rennack, 

and Catherine A. Theohary, CRS Insight: U.S.-China Cyber Agreement, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional 

Research Service, October 16, 2015, available from https://fas.org/

sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf, accessed February 21, 2017.

60. Zhao Kejin, Charles Clover, Li Hengyang, Li Yan, and 

Wang Dong, “Establishing Cybernorms: Chinese and Western 

Perspectives,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, May 

31, 2016, available from http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/05/31/

establishing-cybernorms-chinese-and-western-perspectives-event-5272, 

accessed January 15, 2017.

61. Lieberthal and Singer, p. vi.

62. Ibid., p. iv.

63. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 57.

64. Piret Pernik, Jesse Wojtkowiak, and Alexander Verschoor-Kirss, National Cyber Security Organisation: United States, 

Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2016, p. 7, available from https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CS_

organisation_USA_122015.pdf, accessed January 18, 2017.

65. Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Washington, 

DC: The White House, May 2011, p. 8.

66. Kerry.

67. Ibid.
251

68. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 25.

69. Healey.

70. Ibid.

71. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 7.

72. Ibid., p. 8.

73. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 49.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., p. 55.

76. Ibid., p. 53.

77. Ibid., p. 54.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 55.

80. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

81. Ibid., p. 50.

82. Ibid., p. 45.

83. Ibid.

84. Zhao et al.

85. Ibid.

86. Sakkov, “Foreword,” in Osula and Rõigas, eds., p. 7.

87. Mikk Raud, China and Cyber: Attitudes, Strategies, Organisation, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2016, p. 

7, available from https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/

CS_organisation_CHINA_092016.pdf, accessed January 18, 2017.

88. Ibid.
252

89. Ibid.

90. Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms, Tallinn Paper No. 5, Tallinn, Estonia: 

NATO CCD COE Publications, 2014, p. 4, available from https://

ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/Tallinn%20Paper%20

No%20%205%20Schmitt%20and%20Vihul.pdf, accessed January 

18, 2017.

91. Hare, p. 88.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Nagy, p. 15.

95. Ibid.

96. Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China Relations, “Task Force 

Report: US Policy toward China: Recommendations for a New 

Administration,” New York: Asia Society, February 2017, p. 32, 

available from http://asiasociety.org/files/US-China_Task_Force_

Report_FINAL.pdf, accessed February 20, 2017.

97. Healey.

98. Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China Relations, p. 33.

99. Raud, p. 7.

100. Zhao et al.

101. Yi, p. 90.

102. Raud, p. 7.

103. Yi, p. 90.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.
253

107. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 9.

108. Yi, p. 91.

109. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 57.

110. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 34.

111. Ibid., p. 47.

112. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 57.

113. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 1.

114. Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China Relations, p. 32.

115. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 44.

116. Ibid.

117. Lieberthal and Singer, p. ix.

118. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., pp. 57-59.

119. Ibid., p. 59.

120. Ibid., p. 44.

121. Tanner and Wang, “Introduction,” in Tanner and Wang, 

eds., p. ix.

122. Lieberthal and Singer, p. x.

123. Maurer.

124. Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China Relations, p. 33.

125. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China-US Relations in Cyberspace: 

A Half-Year Assessment,” The Diplomat, June 16, 2016, available from https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-us-relations-incyberspace-a-half-year-assessment/, accessed January 8, 2017.

126. Segal and Tang, in Tanner and Wang, eds., p. 61.

127. Lieberthal and Wang, p. 49.

255

PART III: 

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT OF POWER

257

CHAPTER 9

U.S. ECONOMIC REBALANCE 

TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: IS IT 

STILL POSSIBLE?

Jeffrey M. Zaiser 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it is necessary to examine what, if any, 

mechanisms remain available for the U.S. Government 

(USG) to expand its economic engagement and integration with the TPP signatory countries and others, 

including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the 

region. A “re-branding” of the TPP appears to be the 

“best second choice” for the United States to continue 

its economic engagement with countries in the region, 

to reassure our allies and partners that the United 

States remains committed to an increased economic 

integration, and to the avoidance of damaging trade 

wars.

If that is not possible, then the United States could 

negotiate and conclude bilateral free trade agreements 

(FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 

TPP signatories and other countries in the region, 

hopefully in a relatively uniform and consistent 

manner. Additionally, the United States would need 

to encourage those countries to conclude similar bilateral agreements with each other, to build a network 
258

of non-conflicting bilateral agreements to replace the 

TPP.

At the same time, the United States should consider 

participation in some of the other Asian initiatives 

promoted by China. These include the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC), including the 

Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the “One 

Belt, One Road” Initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The latter 

would necessitate conclusion of an FTA with ASEAN, 

which probably is not feasible. Doing so could enable 

the USG to influence the policies and practices of those 

organizations in a positive way and to enhance U.S. 

business opportunities.

INTRODUCTION

On November 17, 2011, in Canberra, Australia, 

former U.S. President Barack Obama announced a 

“deliberate and strategic decision” regarding U.S. 

policy toward the Asia-Pacific region: “the United 

States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and 

friends.” The President described the Asia-Pacific as 

“the world’s fastest-growing region” that was “home 

to more than half the global economy” and was “critical to achieving my highest priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.” To 

advance those economic goals for the United States, 

the President said he would pursue development of 

“an open international economic system where rules 

are clear and every nation plays by them.” More specifically, for the Asia-Pacific region, he said the United 
259

States, Australia, and other countries would soon complete the world’s most ambitious trade agreement to 

date, the TPP.1

While Obama did not include the PRC in his TPP 

comments, he noted that the United States would “continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with 

China” because the United States and other countries 

had “a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and 

prosperous China.” That said, however, the President 

clearly sought to create a new trading system “that is 

free and fair” and in an “open international economic 

system, where rules are clear and every nation plays 

by them.” He also added that this system would have 

to include protections for workers’ rights, intellectual 

property, and consumers, with “balanced growth,” 

environmental protection, and good governance, and 

without manipulation of exchange rates, all implicitly 

but not explicitly referring to China.2

On October 5, 2015, the partners signed a final 

agreement on the TPP in Atlanta, GA. In his congratulatory note, Obama hailed the achievement that:

when more than 95 percent of our potential customers 

live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China 

write the rules of the global economy. We should write 

those rules, opening new markets to American products 

while setting high standards for protecting workers and 

preserving our environment.3

On January 23, 2017, however, consideration of the 

merits and deficiencies of the TPP became moot when 

newly-elected President Donald Trump rejected the 

draft agreement, saying, “we’re going to stop the ridiculous trade deals that have taken everybody out of our 

country and taken companies out of our country.”4
260

ECONOMICS: THE WEAKEST PILLAR?

Despite the Obama administration’s glowing 

assessments of the strong and growing economic 

importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United 

States, the USG’s ability to support that pillar of the 

rebalance:

is arguably the most problematic instrument in the 

nation’s repertoire, [and this] problem is especially acute 

among Asian governments . . . that still blame the United 

States for mismanagement of the 1997 Asian Financial 

Crisis and for causing the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.5

Over the past 2 decades, those same Asian nations 

have witnessed the rapid economic growth and 

development of China, with which they have become 

increasingly intertwined and interdependent. From 

their perspectives, they might agree, “Washington’s 

military instruments dwarf its diplomatic, information, and economic instruments” while China “has 

economic resources that eclipse its other elements of 

power.”6

WHAT WOULD THE TPP HAVE 

ACCOMPLISHED?

The USG intended the TPP to cement U.S. status 

as the leader of a global, rules-based economic system, 

which, over time, would have been extended to additional members able and willing to meet its new, higher 

standards for international economic activity within 

a reasonable time frame. The TPP negotiators sought 

to “create a 21st-century agreement” for the “increasingly globalized economy” that would “eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade in goods, services, 

and agriculture, and to establish or expand rules on 
261

a wide range of issues including intellectual property 

rights, foreign direct investment, and other trade-related issues.”7

 As such, it was far broader in scope than 

typical bilateral or even multilateral FTAs or BITs, and 

it extended into areas not normally covered by those 

treaties, such as government procurement, intellectual 

property rights (IPR), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 

labor, environment, and regulatory coherence. Perhaps more importantly, while the treaty clearly was 

intended to “strengthen and deepen trade and investment ties among its participants,” the United States―

and perhaps some other participants―also viewed it 

as a valuable means to advance non-economic “U.S. 

strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.”8

Had it been realized, the TPP immediately would 

have become the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows, 

including $727 billion in U.S. goods exports and $882 

billion in U.S. goods imports (2014 figures). The potential value of the agreement was greatly enhanced when 

Japan, which did not (and still does not) have an FTA 

with the United States, agreed to participate. Japan’s 

potential membership reportedly attracted interest and 

support from a wide range of U.S. industries, including sectors like agriculture, automotive, and services. 

With the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, it would be 

useful for the USG to translate Japan’s comprehensive 

TPP agreement into a bilateral FTA, thus consolidating 

the TPP objectives between its two largest members.

CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL

At the broadest level, U.S. refusal to ratify the 

laboriously negotiated TPP―which actually required 

major concessions by other members and very little 
262

change from the United States―may have undermined 

U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. The USG 

“expended serious political capital” with the other 

participants to negotiate the TPP in order to establish “U.S. rules and standards at the center of Asian 

trade.”9 It is likely that many Asian governments and 

people will link U.S. inaction on the strategic rebalance’s economic pillar to the broader commitment of 

the United States to diplomatic, political, and security interests in the region. In other words, all aspects 

of the Obama administration’s “strategic rebalance” 

to the region could be negatively affected by the collapse of the TPP. Within the United States, the business community broadly supported the TPP because 

it would have forced foreign competitors―including 

SOEs―to follow the same set of rules as U.S. companies. Some of those U.S. businesses now believe they 

have been undercut by Trump’s decision to abandon 

the draft agreement and fear their future operations in 

Asia could be negatively affected. The Trump administration has not specified its concerns about the TPP, 

simply claiming that the agreement disadvantaged the 

United States by shifting production and employment 

to other countries. 

By withdrawing from the TPP, the USG could 

encourage or even force some Asian countries to 

“take sides” and join alternative economic structures 

designed and dominated by China, rather than the 

stronger and more advanced U.S.-led system. During 

the TPP negotiation process, relatively progressive 

officials in some of those countries had been able to 

argue that the benefits of trade liberalization, including enhanced market access not only to the United 

States but also to other TPP members, outweighed the 

near-term costs of sweeping legislative, regulatory, 
263

and bureaucratic changes to their economic regimes. 

Without U.S. TPP participation, those marginal signatories are unlikely to implement all the reform measures to which they agreed, and may even be tempted 

to reverse the course of reform in some areas. In Vietnam, for example, negotiators “had hoped to use the 

deal to pressure sluggish state-owned companies to 

modernize and reform,” which now may be deferred 

or not even take place.10 Even Japan, a democratic ally 

with a modern capitalist economy that had endured 

a difficult internal political struggle to meet some of 

the agricultural market access requirements and other 

reforms required by the TPP, now may not be willing 

to implement those commitments.

Reform-averse officials in some TPP member 

nations, particularly the relatively less advanced 

and more state sector-dominated countries such as 

Burma and Vietnam, probably were relieved to see the 

agreement’s demise, which in their view would have 

imposed burdensome requirements on their governments. They are likely to view the much less ambitious 

Chinese approach to regional economic architecture 

modernization, which generally focuses simply on 

trade in goods, as much “simpler and less controversial.”11 The collapse of the TPP in those countries could 

even cause governments to move backward in multiple 

respects: one Vietnamese labor activist recently said 

she feared her government would “use this [the U.S. 

withdrawal from the TPP] as an excuse to suppress 

the labor movement.” A 10-page bilateral side agreement between the United States and Vietnam “would 

have required Vietnam to criminalize the use of forced 

labor and broaden enforcement to cases of debt bondage,” both of which remain prevalent in that country. Furthermore, the TPP would have stipulated that 
264

workers “would be allowed to form their own grassroots unions that could bargain collectively and lead 

strikes,” a right not currently available in Vietnam.12

WHAT ABOUT CHINA?

The PRC was not one of the 12 TPP signatories, in 

part because it was widely viewed by the USG and 

others as being unable and/or unwilling to implement 

the sweeping changes in its economic structure and 

regulatory regimes to meet TPP standards within a 

reasonable time frame. The USG and other TPP country negotiators were also cognizant of China’s historic 

modes of participation in the United Nations (UN) and 

other international organizations: “When it becomes 

a member of an international organization, China 

applies a high priority to national sovereignty and 

may therefore act as a brake on that organization,” and 

would be “hostile to . . . any new and legally binding 

standard.”13 More fundamentally, at least one analyst 

also noted, “China will not be hasty to join the TPP, as 

the high standards and terms in [the] TPP are incompatible with China’s economic reality.”14

Throughout the TPP negotiation process, USG officials were careful to characterize the agreement as: 

primarily about increasing ties to Asia, not containing 

China, [and they emphasized that] building a 

constructive and productive relationship with China has 

been an important part of the Pivot ever since it was first 

announced.15

They also noted that if and when the PRC eventually 

joined the TPP, the agreement would prove “extremely 

beneficial” to that country, not only by generating 

“income gains of $800 billion over the next 10 years,” 

but more fundamentally by pushing the Chinese 
265

government to implement wide-ranging reforms to its 

economic system.16 At least some of the increasingly 

nationalistic Chinese leaders and citizenry, however, 

probably viewed their exclusion from the TPP process 

as part of yet another U.S. and Japan-organized plan to 

contain the rise of China; some observers even believe 

“China’s attention to [the] TPP was piqued more by 

Japan than by the U.S.”17

CHINA’S ALTERNATIVE PLANS

In recent years, believing the United States and 

some of its allies were rewriting the economic rulebook 

for the Asia-Pacific region without their participation 

or input, the PRC government has been “meticulously 

constructing an alternative architecture to the postwar Western order.” Their developing system already 

includes the New Development Bank (a multilateral 

development bank founded by China and the other 

four BRICS nations [Russia, India, Brazil, and South 

Africa]), the AIIB, and the “New Silk Road Initiative” 

(also known as the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” 

the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” or the “One Belt, One 

Road”). To achieve that end, “Beijing is using the strongest instrument in its soft-power toolbox: money,” and 

has begun to “sign huge trade and investment deals, 

extend generous loans, and dole out hefty aid packages.”18 The U.S. response to these initiatives has been 

one of indifference (New Silk Road Initiative) or opposition (AIIB), a position that the USG should reconsider 

due to the demise of the TPP.

The most prominent of these new institutions is 

the AIIB, which the Chinese government announced 

officially in late 2013 as a “key arm of the New Silk 

Road Initiative.”19 China launched the AIIB over USG 
266

objections that it was redundant and would lack the 

“environmental, labor and procurement standards 

that are essential to the mission of development lenders.” As China’s economic power has grown rapidly 

in recent decades, it has become particularly unhappy 

with the Asian Development Bank (ADB): “although 

China is the biggest economy in Asia, the ADB is dominated by Japan; Japan’s voting share is more than 

twice China’s; and the bank’s president has always 

been Japanese.”20 The PRC “insisted that AIIB will be 

rigorous in adopting the best practices of institutions 

such as the World Bank.” The Chinese also noted that 

“Asia has a massive infrastructure gap” which even 

the ADB had estimated could be as much as $8 trillion, 

something which “existing institutions cannot hope to 

fill.”21 The USG has not disputed that need for investment, nor has it claimed that the ADP and World Bank 

could meet the demand for capital.

In addition to its own denunciations of the new 

AIIB, the USG also urged its allies and leading trading 

partners to resist participation in the new lending institution, for reasons noted above. These “clumsy efforts” 

to impede success of the AIIB, however, “gave the 

impression that Washington was indeed committed 

to constraining China’s rise.”22 An (at least publicly) 

unstated concern for the USG and probably others, 

however, was that “China will use the new bank to 

expand its influence at the expense of America and 

Japan.”23 Despite USG efforts, approximately 50 countries, including the United Kingdom and other western 

European nations, decided to participate in the AIIB, 

something that seemingly “validates China’s strategy of mixing international integration with its own 

shadow organization competing with the post-World 

War II Bretton Woods international institutions.”24
267

While it may be too soon to evaluate the AIIB’s performance, initial reports suggest that it is operating 

in a responsible and high-standard manner. China 

has opened its membership to European countries, 

recruited many U.S. and European professionals with 

World Bank backgrounds to manage its operations, 

and―perhaps most importantly―has not structured 

the AIIB’s rules and procedures “to give it [China] an 

effective veto power over loan decisions.”25 Given the 

positive development of the AIIB since its inception, 

the USG could seek to participate in the institution in 

some way, thereby gaining influence in its decision 

making and reassuring regional allies of the continuing U.S. economic commitment to the region. Any Chinese resistance to U.S. participation would undermine 

China’s professed openness to the widest possible foreign involvement in the AIIB.

China’s New Silk Road Initiative―including 

both land-based and maritime components―was 

announced by PRC President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan 

in September 2013. Since then, the Chinese government and Communist Party leadership has reaffirmed 

their support for the plan on multiple occasions. In 

addition to its foreign economic and security policy 

value, however, the New Silk Road initiative also is 

designed to “drum up development fever in the less 

developed regions in China” and to further “important internal development priorities.” The overland 

route would extend from the relatively wealthy coastal 

cities of eastern and southern China through industrial 

centers in central and western China and continue on 

to central and south Asian destinations. Large Chinese 

state-owned enterprises, such as CITIC Bank and the 

Central Tourism Group, also would benefit significantly from the project and thus have supported it.26
268

Although to date, the USG has not commented publicly on the feasibility or usefulness of this initiative, 

cautious encouragement of U.S. companies to participate in the program could help ensure the infrastructure projects meet global standards and avoid creating 

a perception that the USG simply wants to prevent the 

PRC from advancing its own economic agenda.

THE ROLE OF ASEAN

In addition to these PRC-created organizations, Beijing also has supported ASEAN’s plan for a Regional 

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which 

would include the 10 ASEAN member states as well 

as the 6 nations with which ASEAN already has FTAs 

(Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New 

Zealand). China “initially showed little interest in the 

RCEP . . . until Japan joined TPP, upon which point 

China spared nothing in cooperating with other Asian 

nations on the RCEP.”27 In actuality, however, some 

analysts believe “domestic support for RCEP is weak 

in China” and the plan primarily “was viewed as a 

counterweight to TPP.”28

While negotiation of RCEP reportedly is close to 

completion, if and when it enters into force, it will be 

“far less ambitious [than the TPP], focusing on the 

basic business of cutting tariffs.”29 For that reason, 

it will be far easier for some ASEAN members to 

accept because it, like ASEAN in general, will operate under the prevalent “ASEAN strategy,” which 

is more commonly described as the “principle of the 

lowest common denominator.”30 More specifically, 

RCEP would largely focus on “trade and investment 

promotion”31 and would reduce or eliminate many 

tariffs, but it would provide a far less comprehensive 
269

and less far-reaching trade framework than the TPP, 

and it would not address a number of significant U.S. 

concerns in areas such as labor, food safety, the environment, and government procurement. Nevertheless, 

some governments that have been involved in both the 

RCEP and the TPP―including Australia, Brunei, Japan, 

Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam―

view the two agreements as “complementary” rather 

than mutually exclusive, and believe conclusion of the 

RCEP could be useful.32 The USG has not commented 

publicly on the merits or shortcomings of the RCEP, 

possibly because the United States does not have a 

Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN and is therefore 

not eligible to participate in the RCEP.

From the PRC’s perspective, participation in 

ASEAN and its component structures has “incurred 

virtually no cost―in terms of national autonomy and 

discretion―for Beijing, while still providing her with 

significant benefits.” More specifically, “joining ASEAN-led institutions did not require China to forfeit her 

freedom of movement on any of the issues considered 

important to Chinese interests,” while at the same time 

“it was granted a de facto veto right on decisions and 

developments that Beijing might consider . . . adverse 

to its interests.” Such status within ASEAN also gave 

the PRC “the possibility of playing on each country’s 

eagerness to benefit from China’s economic growth.”33

China also has used its ability to provide “no strings 

attached” loans and investments to ASEAN’s poorer 

members, such as Cambodia, in return for which Beijing has received a “proxy” within ASEAN to prevent 

that consensus-bound organization from even issuing 

“statements that criticize China’s expansive territorial 

claims in the South China Sea.”34
270

The United States has the same observer status as 

China in ASEAN, and during the Obama administration, the USG significantly elevated its participation in 

ASEAN meetings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 

(ARF). At one of those meetings, in Hanoi, North Vietnam, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 

together with most of the ARF membership, openly 

criticized Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, to 

the visible dismay of the PRC Foreign Minister.

CHINA’S DOMINANCE IN ASIA

As its economy has enjoyed high GDP growth rates 

over the past 3 decades, the PRC has become “the top 

trading partner for most other Asian nations,” which 

in turn “has strengthened Beijing’s ability to use its 

market power to reward its friends and punish those 

opposing its policies.”35 The interest of some of the 

smaller Asian countries in the TPP was at least in part 

based on their growing concern that “their significant dependence on China’s economy exposes them 

to attempts at economic coercion by Beijing.” This is a 

policy instrument that China in the past has employed 

“to pressure the Philippines over fruit, Japan over 

rare earths, Norway over fish, and even the U.S. over 

aircraft.”36

The PRC’s leaders are probably also aware that:

unlike other leading countries, whose national strength 

emanates from the confluence of military, economic, social, 

and geopolitical vectors, Chinese power is inexorably tied 

to the expansion of the Chinese economy.37

In other words, China’s “soft power” is a combination 

of “commercial diplomacy and the mutual benefit of 

partnership with China.”38
271

Unfortunately, for China, some analysts believe the 

“halcyon days of China’s unbridled economic growth 

are coming to an end,” and China’s leaders are “wrestling with how to translate the nation’s economic clout 

into increased influence, especially in Asia.”39 While 

some would dispute that China’s slowing GDP growth 

rate―from 8 to 10 percent annually to a still robust 6 

to 7 percent―is cause for alarm in Beijing, most would 

agree that the Chinese government increasingly would 

have to devote attention and resources to serious internal social-political issues in the near future. These 

include rising labor costs that are eroding China’s 

competitive advantages in lower-tech sectors, an aging 

population, enormous environmental destruction, and 

the potential for social discontent tied to any of those 

problems that could undermine the legitimacy of the 

ruling party and government. Were China’s neighbors 

to perceive it and its economic growth model as faltering, then they might become less willing to tie their 

own future economic prospects to it. As long as the 

Chinese economy continues to grow at a respectable 

rate, however, those regional trading partners will 

continue to “wish above all for a stable China.”40 For at 

least the near term, however, China “has become the 

largest trade and investment partner of virtually every 

country in Central Asia and the largest trade partner of 

every country in East and Southeast Asia,”41 and there 

is no imminent danger of that status diminishing.

CHINA: THE WORLD’S ECONOMIC ENGINE?

Most recently, PRC government officials have publicly promised to continue to pursue a more open global 

economic system. At the January 2017 World Economic 

Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, PRC President 
272

Xi Jinping―the first Chinese president to attend this 

annual gathering of the capitalist world’s political and 

business elite―announced that his country “will keep 

its door wide open and not close it” because “no one 

will emerge as a winner in a trade war.”42 That assessment almost certainly is correct: virtually all Western 

economists agree that trade wars are “no-win” situations for all participants, resulting in reduced economic activity and higher prices for consumers in the 

participating countries. Given the enormous volume 

of trade between the United States and China, a trade 

war between the two countries would be devastating 

to both economies and would have major negative 

repercussions on the global economy.

The Chinese government has said publicly that 

they “welcome continued participation by all countries for mutually beneficial outcomes” in their initiatives such as the “One Belt, One Road,” the AIIB, and 

the Silk Road Fund.43 Some Chinese officials also have 

said they plan to support the Free Trade Area of the 

Asia Pacific (FTAAP) negotiations among the 21 APEC 

member countries, including the United States, which 

would create an “even larger regional pact” than the 

TPP.44 In 2010, APEC leaders agreed to push for the 

FTAAP as a “broad vision for the group,”45 but its realization probably would require even more protracted 

negotiations and compromise than the TPP. Former 

U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman previously 

stated, “the TPP could serve as a ‘building block’” 

for the FTAAP,46 but without the TPP, it is not clear 

if the FTAAP has any chance to be concluded in the 

near future. With the Trump administration’s public 

comments against multilateral trade agreements, it is 

not likely that it would support any involvement in 

FTAAP negotiations.
273

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: 

INCREASINGLY INTERDEPENDENT

Despite their negative views regarding the existing international economic institutions and structures 

in the Asia-Pacific region, and their apparent belief 

that, in the longer-term, western (including Japanese) 

economic dominance will decline, China’s leadership 

certainly is cognizant of their country’s increasing economic interdependence with the United States. Some 

Chinese leaders and their economic advisors would 

acknowledge that their country’s rapid economic 

growth and development since the late 1970s has 

been enabled and facilitated to a considerable extent 

by the existing, western-designed economic institutions―first the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade (GATT), then the World Trade Organization 

(WTO)―even though the design of those agreements 

had been “fundamentally antithetical to closed societies and command economies.”47 The PRC had been 

able to transition from “one of the world’s most isolated countries” in the late 1960s and to overcome the 

enormous “damage to the economy” inflicted by Mao 

Zedong during the 1966-1976 “Cultural Revolution” in 

large part through participation in that international 

economic system.48 By 1986, as the benefits of state capitalist economic reform under the leadership of Deng 

Xiaoping were becoming apparent, even PRC President 

Li Xiannian―a product of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Communist Party system―publicly acknowledged 

that China’s leaders “should have focused our forces 

more on economic development and reconstruction” 

rather than ideology.49

Even during the onset of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, high-level Chinese economic and financial 
274

leaders frequently voiced the opinion that “we’re in 

the same boat” with the United States and therefore 

needed to cooperate to resolve the crisis.50 That interdependence has only grown since the crisis, to the point 

where China now is the second largest trading partner 

of the United States, which in turn is China’s largest 

trading partner.51 Despite that ever-increasing interdependence, however, for Beijing “sovereignty remains 

an absolute priority,” and China has “balked at more 

convergence” in areas such as human rights, trade, or 

disarmament. One analyst characterized this behavior 

as a desire to keep “one foot in the international system 

and one foot outside.”52

ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. withdrawal from the TPP obviously 

“removes the main economic plank” of the strategic rebalance to Asia and “leaves a gaping hole in 

the architecture of Asian commerce.”53 With the TPP 

off the table politically for the foreseeable future, the 

question becomes what could the USG offer as a viable 

economic component of the strategic rebalance (if the 

Trump administration decides to continue support 

for the rebalance in some form). This is a critical issue 

because the economic importance of the Asia-Pacific 

has not declined, and in all probability will only continue to increase both absolutely and relatively.

First, it should be emphasized that nothing else 

could fully replace the TPP. Some of the TPP’s objectives could be achieved through bilateral mechanisms 

such as FTAs among Asia-Pacific countries; there 

already are 147 FTAs in force in Asia with another 68 

at some stage of negotiation,54 and the USG has FTAs 

with 6 of the other TPP countries (Australia, Canada, 
275

Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore).55 Such a piecemeal system, however, would be “a jumbled, overlapping mess,”56 also known as the “noodle bowl effect,” 

of non-uniform or even incompatible arrangements 

that would not approach the TPP’s comprehensiveness. Furthermore, such a conglomeration of bilateral 

arrangements would simply expand the current U.S. 

hub-and-spoke system with allies and partners, without addressing the economic arrangements among 

those other nations. Assuming the interested states 

then negotiated their own bilateral or regional agreements with their non-U.S. trading partners―some of 

which already exist or are under negotiation―there is 

no reason to believe that those new systems would be 

consistent with each other.

A better option, which at this time does not appear 

to be politically feasible in the United States, would be 

to re-brand and revise the existing draft TPP to address 

the criticisms levied against it by its U.S. opponents. 

Some key members of the U.S. Congress, including the 

Republican chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee 

and the House Ways and Means Committee, reportedly still “strongly support” the TPP, as do “many other 

members of Congress.”57 Since Trump took office on 

January 20, 2017, several well-reasoned pro-TPP arguments by both Democratic and Republican-affiliated 

authors have been published. In early January 2016, a 

study by a bipartisan group of former high-level USG 

officials detailed the benefits of a “cooperative U.S.-

China relationship” but also the need for a “revitalized 

U.S. economic strategy” that would serve U.S. interests through a “trans-Pacific order supported by transparent institutions and rules.” More explicitly, the 

study recommended that the USG should “complete 

the TPP,” “take action to ensure that the U.S.-China 
276

relationship is mutually beneficial,” and “update and 

uphold the Asia-Pacific economic architecture,” none 

of which it viewed as mutually exclusive. By “revitalized,” the group of former USG officials clearly meant 

that the USG needed to openly reassert―and then back 

up that assertion with concrete measures―its continuing interest in greater economic integration between 

the United States and Asia. The reference to “update 

and uphold the Asia-Pacific architecture” referred to 

the TPP as a replacement for the existing weak and 

haphazard arrangements.58

In early February 2017, another group of prominent former officials and academics published a list 

of political, economic, and security recommendations 

for the new U.S. administration’s Asia and China policies. The authors explicitly stated, “our future prosperity depends on staying actively involved there” 

and that U.S. “economic and security interests in the 

region have long been intertwined.”59 They also noted 

that many Asian countries, including major U.S. trading partners such as India and Indonesia, “continue to 

pursue protectionist policies that limit opportunities for 

U.S. exporters and investors.”60 The authors explicitly 

addressed the “special opportunities and challenges” 

presented by China’s rapid―but now slowing―economic growth and its emergence as a regional power 

willing and able to use its economic influence to further its interests. This nationalistic activism, said the 

authors, “has troubled neighboring countries” which 

were now “wary of overdependence and eager for 

the United States to play an active counterbalancing 

role.”61

During China’s rise over the past 2 decades, however, “Washington has been distracted and inconsistent 

in its approach to Asia while realities on the ground 
277

have not stood still.”62 With regard to economic policy, 

measures such as the TPP “have been left to languish” 

due to internal U.S. political differences. At the same 

time, U.S. responses to Chinese initiatives such as the 

AIIB at best have been ineffective and at worst, self-defeating; in retrospect, the USG clearly underestimated 

global interest in the AIIB and overestimated its ability 

to prevent other nations, including close allies, from 

joining that initiative. U.S. national interests would 

have been better served by U.S. participation in the 

AIIB from the outset.

Of the six priorities detailed in the paper, two were 

directly relevant to the economic component of the 

strategic rebalance. First, with regard to the Asia-Pacific region, the USG should focus on “rising concerns 

among allies and friends about the dependability and 

reliability of U.S. economic and security commitments 

in the Asia-Pacific region.” Another priority was more 

directly linked to China: the United States should be 

“deploying effective tools to address the lack of reciprocity in U.S. trade and investment relations with 

China.” The need for both these two and the other four 

priorities was based on four vital U.S. national interests: 

1) ”a fair and market-based global economic system” 

in which there is “deep U.S. economic integration with 

China”; 2) “a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region” 

supported by our “substantial security presence”; 3) 

“a liberal rules-based international order”; and, 4) “a 

positive and sustainable relationship with China.”63 To 

further these interests and address what they view as 

the priorities for the new administration, the authors 

strongly recommended a “revised Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty that can command bipartisan support in 

the U.S. Congress . . . and catalyze reform in China.” If 
278

China is not included in the new TPP, it “will not have 

a clear international standard for which to aim.”64

Looking further into the future, some advocates of 

greater economic liberalization envision even greater 

changes to the Asia-Pacific economic architecture. They 

regard the TPP, the RCEP, and other modernizations 

as “way stations on the path to the ultimate destination, which is a massive though still distant agreement 

for the entire region, known as the Free Trade Area for 

the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).”65

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the TPP off the table, at least during the current administration, the USG needs to identify and 

implement the next best option, to both avoid damaging trade wars and demonstrate its continuing economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. First, 

the United States could negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements―FTAs and/or BITs―with key countries in the region, while also encouraging those trade 

partners to negotiate similar and consistent bilateral 

agreements with each other. Second, the United States 

could participate in some of the other Asian initiatives 

promoted by China, ASEAN, and APEC, such as the 

AIIB, the One Belt One Road, and the RCEP (although 

the latter would necessitate conclusion of an FTA with 

ASEAN, which probably is not feasible). Taking some 

or all of these steps could help construct an improved 

rules-based economic architecture between the United 

States and its Asian partners, and also could promote 

U.S. exports and encourage Asian investment in the 

United States.
279

CONCLUSION

The TPP was the best option for comprehensive 

improvement to the economic system. It addressed 

not only trade but also environment, labor, the role of 

SOEs, and government procurement; it also pushed 

some Asian countries to commit to domestic reforms. 

As a multilateral agreement, it would have set identical standards for all participants, and it would have 

demonstrated the continuing U.S. engagement in the 

region. With the new administration’s official and 

public affirmation that it would not join the TPP, the 

United States now needs to find other ways to improve 

the Asia-Pacific trading system and environment, support U.S. companies that are active in the region, and 

promote U.S. job creation and foreign investment in 

the United States.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. All quotes in this paragraph are from former President 

Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian 

Parliament,” Washington, DC: The White house, Office of the 

Press Secretary, November 17, 2011.

2. Ibid.

3. President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President 

on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Washington, DC: The White 

House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 5, 2015.

4. Peter Baker, “Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, 

Obama’s Signature Trade Deal,” The New York Times, January 23, 

2017.

5. Douglas T. Stuart, The Pivot to Asia: Can it Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century? Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2016, 

pp. 12-13.
280

6. Ibid, p. 56.

7. Ian E. Ferguson, coordinator, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 

(TPP): Negotiations and Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, March 20, 

2015, p. 1.

8. Ibid, p. 5.

9. Kurt Campbell, The Pivot, New York: Hachette Book Group, 

2016, p. 15.

10. “Trading Down: The collapse of TPP,” The Economist, 

November 19, 2016, available from https://www.economist.com/

news/asia/21710287-big-free-trade-deals-demise-leaves-worrying-voidasia-trading-down.

11. Campbell, p. 194.

12. Neil Gough, “Labor Abroad May Suffer as U.S. Turns 

Inward,” The New York Times, March 1, 2017, p. B1.

13. Francois Godemont, Contemporary China: Between Mao and 

Market, Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2016, p. 149.

14. Min Ye, “China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road,” Asian Security, Vol. 11, 

No. 3, December 8, 2015, pp. 206-224.

15. Campbell, p. 22.

16. Ibid, p. 195.

17. Ye, pp. 206-224.

18. David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4, July/August 2015, pp. 99-107.

19. Ye, pp. 206-224.

20. S. R., “Why China is Creating a New ‘World Bank’ for 

Asia,” The Economist explains, blog of The Economist, November 11, 2014, available from https://www.economist.com/blogs/

economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6.
281

21. Ibid.

22. John Pomfret, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2016, p. 626.

23. S. R.

24. Godemont, p. 226.

25. Jeffrey Bader, “A Framework for U.S. Policy toward 

China,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 10, 

2016.

26. Ye, pp. 206-224.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. “Trading Down.”

30. Timo Kivimaki, “Power, Interest or Culture―Is There a 

Paradigm that Explains ASEAN’s Political Role Best?” The Pacific 

Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 431-450.

31. Ye, pp. 206-224.

32. Ferguson, p. 8.

33. Yves-Heng Lim, “How (Dis) Satisfied is China? A Power 

Transition Theory Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China, 

Vol. 24, Issue 92, 2015, pp. 18-19.

34. “The Giant’s Client: Why Cambodia has cosied up to 

China,” The Economist, January 21, 2017.

35. Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk, chairs, “Task Force 

Report: U.S. Policy Toward China: Recommendations for a New 

Administration,” New York: Asia Society, Center on U.S.-China 

Relations and University of California San Diego School of Global 

Policy and Strategy, 2017, p. 20.

36. Campbell, p. 195.
282

37. Bonnie Glaser and Matthew Funaiole, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown,” in Craig Cohen and Melissa 

Dalton, eds., Global Flashpoints 2016, Lanham, MD: Rowman and 

Littlefield, 2016, p. 58.

38. Godemont, p. 229.

39. Glaser and Funaiole, in Cohen and Dalton, eds., p. 58.

40. Godemont, p. 8.

41. Bader.

42. “The New Davos Man: Xi Jinping portrays China as a rock 

of stability,” The Economist, January 21, 2017.

43. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, January 2017, available from www.scio.gov.cn.

44. “Trading Down.”

45. Ferguson, p. 8.

46. Andy Morimoto, “Should America Fear China’s Alternative to the TPP,” The Diplomat, March 17, 2016.

47. Andrew Preston, “The Great Transition: From Geopolitics 

to Geoeconomics,” in Lorenz M. Luthi, ed., The Regional Cold Wars 

in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2015, p. 116.

48. Preston, in Luthi, ed., pp. 153-156.

49. J. Simon Rofe, “Ends and Ends: The Cold War in International History at the Systemic and Subsystemic Levels,” in Lorenz 

M. Luthi, ed., The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the 

Middle East, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 270.

50. Jeffrey M. Zaiser, experience as U.S. Treasury Deputy 

Financial Attaché at U.S. Embassy Beijing, 2008-2010.

51. Campbell, p. 231.
283

52. Godemont, pp. 211-212.

53. “Trading Down.”

54. Ibid.

55. Ferguson, p. 8.

56. “Trading Down.”

57. Robert J. Samuelson, “The TPP Lives―Maybe,” The Washington Post, February 16, 2017.

58. Charlene Barshefsky, Evan G. Greenberg, and Jon M. 

Huntsman, Jr., cochairs, and the CSIS Asia Economic Strategy 

Commission, “Reinvigorating U.S. Economic Strategy in the Asia 

Pacific: Recommendations for the Incoming Administration,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

and Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 2017.

59. Ibid., p. 1.

60. Ibid., p. 3.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 4.

63. Schell and Shirk, pp. 16-17.

64. Ibid., p. 26.

65. Campbell, p. 193.

285

PART IV: 

MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER

287

CHAPTER 10

A NEW U.S. INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC

SECURITY STRATEGY

Ryan M. Finn and David B. Moore 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

If China is allowed to continue its systematic expansionist strategy, what some might term “coercive gradualism” in the South China Sea, its regional neighbors 

risk becoming increasingly indebted to China. Regional 

nations all have some degree of economic dependency 

on China, and when this dependency is coupled with 

an increasing military capabilities gap their ability 

to object to China’s aggressiveness is further eroded. 

China is exploiting this situation to further leverage 

its economic and security dealings with these nations, 

and make it more difficult for them to balance against 

China by partnering with the United States.

U.S. forces are of the right size and composition to 

meet current challenges. However, while U.S. forces 

must be of the right quantity and postured appropriately, quality will increasingly take on special meaning 

when facing the transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional (TMM) threat of the future. Furthermore, 

the United States must develop a national policy and 

cohesive joint military strategy to respond to regional 

actors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific who do not comply with 

the accepted world order, or be prepared to accept the 

erosion of the existing world order and the U.S. preeminent role in it. While the United States certainly 
288

has the means available, it lacks a comprehensive, joint 

vision on how to engage below the line of conflict, or in 

the “gray zone.” In order to remedy this condition, the 

United States should do the following:

• The United States should continue to pursue 

and maintain an insurmountable technological 

edge over potential competitors that is focused 

on a qualitative, vice quantitative, advantage 

and focused on the TMM threat of the future.

• The United States must invite regional allies and 

partners, including China, into a broadened collective security architecture, and regularly exercise and demonstrate its qualitative advantage 

to allies and competitors.

• The United States must develop and implement 

responses to China’s use of gray zone strategies. Failure to act will only allow the practice 

to propagate and continue to threaten U.S. vital 

interests in the region.

• The United States must unambiguously determine where the “redlines” are and clearly 

demonstrate the will and capacity to enforce 

them.

• The United States should increase unannounced 

Freedom of Navigation Operations in accordance with international laws and rulings.

• The United States needs to consider a cohesive joint strategy as it continues to redistribute 

military forces in the southern Pacific that will 

impose multiple strategic dilemmas against China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) efforts.
289

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 70 years, America has not only helped 

heal the wounds of World War II. We’ve helped create 

the stability that has allowed people, economies, and 

countries throughout the Asia-Pacific to make incredible 

progress. . . . The rebalance―in a nutshell―is about 

sustaining this progress and helping the region continue 

to fulfill its promise. 

 —Secretary Ashton Carter1

As former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter so 

aptly summarized, the world has enjoyed a historically 

high degree of stability in Europe and Asia. The American-led world order, backed up by America’s military 

might, has largely enabled this remarkable stability. 

The nation’s policy goals are represented in military 

procurements, deployments, and strategies. With the 

resulting military advantage, the threat of action has 

often been sufficient to compel acquiescence to international rules or norms. However, what happens when 

compellence fails? If an adversary is not convinced of a 

credible U.S. intent and the readiness to use the force, 

it can be tempted to break the rules and practice military adventurism.

There are signs in the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) 

region that certain countries are pursuing this course 

of action. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 

Joseph Dunford has identified five strategic challenges 

he termed the “4+1.” These are Russia, China, North 

Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. Dunford further assesses that “future conflict with an 

adversary or combination of adversaries is taking on 

an increasingly [TMM] nature.”2 Therefore, while U.S. 

forces are deployed worldwide, U.S.-led order must 

be of the right quantity and postured appropriately, 
290

quality will increasingly take on special meaning 

when facing this TMM threat of the future. Four of the 

4+1 threats—China, North Korea, Russia, and violent 

extremist organizations—are present in the Asia-Pacific region, making the advance of U.S. interests there 

a significant challenge.

China’s unprecedented economic growth over the 

last few decades, combined with its recent military 

growth, modernization, and innovations, have put it in 

a position to threaten U.S. influence, deny U.S. access, 

and weaken U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. 

China’s rise has emboldened it to take assertive actions 

to strengthen its territorial claims in the East and South 

China Seas.

Of particular note is that China has employed 

“gray zone” tactics to pursue its objectives.3 These 

Chinese assertive acts require a serious U.S. response. 

The United States must develop a national policy and 

cohesive joint military strategy to respond to regional 

actors in the IAP who do not comply with the existing 

rules-based international world order, or be prepared 

to accept the erosion of the existing world order and 

the United States’ preeminent role in it.

STRATEGIC FOCUS

To study the role of the military in the IAP, one 

must start with an examination of the previous administration’s strategic “pivot to the Pacific,” or strategic 

“rebalance,” as it became known. The term “rebalance” itself was adopted to indicate more accurately 

that the United States has always been deeply engaged 

in the Pacific region and is merely returning to a 

more historic posture following the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
291

enduring U.S. interests in the region to ensure freedom 

of navigation and freedom from coercion date back to 

the post-World War II and Korean war treaty alliances 

with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.4 In the 

early months of his presidency, George W. Bush began 

efforts at a “rebalancing” of his own, until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) diverted all 

attention to the Middle East.5 Former President Barack 

Obama announced the rebalance as a distinct transition from focusing on the Middle East, to a post-war 

focus on America’s economic interests in the vitally 

important Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

The objectives of the American policy toward the 

region are the maintenance of peace, prosperity, and 

stability, respect for international law, unimpeded 

lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation. The 

United States is committed to supporting its allies in 

the region to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes, in 

accordance with widely accepted rules, standards, and 

international laws. The United States, however, does 

not take a position on competing territorial claims over 

land features in the South China Sea.6

The United States asserts that the Western Pacific 

is a region with vital American interests, thus necessitating the strategic rebalance the Obama administration began.7

 First, more than half of the world’s trade 

is shipped through the region. Second, by 2020, more 

than half the world’s population will reside within the 

region.8 Third, several regional actors, to include the 

Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea and the Peoples’ Republic of China, are acting in ways which contest accepted international norms. In China’s case, this 

behavior jeopardizes not only U.S. interests, but also 

allies’ interests and territorial claims.
292

Many of the atolls in this region hardly classify 

officially as islands, but their strategic significance is 

extraordinary. The United States Information Agency 

estimates that in these contested areas are 11 billion 

barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 

deposits, and fisheries that account for 10 percent of 

the global total, $5.3 trillion in trade moving through 

annually.9 The requirement to focus on the region, 

therefore, becomes evident, and in pursuing American interests, all elements of national power have been 

augmented in the region for a more robust capability. 

These rebalance initiatives prepare the United States 

to better respond to the broad range of anticipated 

requirements in the region, from assisting an ally or 

partner to countering a competitor.

The Problem

U.S. policies in the Asia-Pacific have been lacking 

in actual enforcement mechanisms. Many critics blast 

the Pacific “rebalance” as being overly militaristic, 

potentially causing the escalation of tensions between 

the United States and a rising China.10 However, in 

fact, the military instrument has not been able to dissuade China from pursuing its increasing assertions to 

Nine-Dash Line claims, or even to its far more aspirant 

claims out to the Second Island Chain.

For example, in July of 2016, the Permanent Court 

of Arbitrations at The Hague (PCA) ruled against China’s claims to disputed land features, “rocks,” in the 

South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoals. 

Yet, China has rejected this ruling and continues to 

maintain a Scarborough Shoals presence. The United 

Nations (UN) took no action to enforce the PCA ruling, 

and since China is a permanent member of the UN 
293

Security Council, it never will. Moreover, since this 

period of peaceful prosperity is largely backed by U.S. 

military might, it seems to fall upon the United States 

to enforce this decision or see this world order begin 

to erode.

The threat that exists today in the region is largely 

from the same two actors that existed when the rebalance was designed in 2011, although several new 

developments have occurred. The North Korean threat 

will be examined extensively in subsequent chapters; 

therefore, this chapter will not address further policy 

options with regard to North Korea, but will focus on 

the military options to maintain deterrence and protection for regional allies in the South and East China 

Seas, and support other instruments of national power 

to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

China has embarked upon a significant modernization effort to expand its military capabilities toward 

power projection in not only the East and South China 

Seas, but also worldwide.11 Analysts suggest that China 

will continue its military expansion to allow not only 

the realization of its claims in the region, but also to 

project power world-wide as it seeks to offer an alternative to the current world order.12

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has 

developed to the point of warranting a hard look at 

force posturing and strategy in the southern region. 

When the rebalance was announced in 2011, the Chinese began land reclamation activities on seven reefs 

in the Spratly Islands, creating several man-made 

“islands.” China continues to assert its Nine-Dash 

Line claim that would give it sovereignty over the 

entire chain despite the objections of its neighbors and 

the international community.13 China has promised 

non-military use of the man-made islands, offering 
294

humanitarian response, environmental protection, 

search and rescue, scientific research, and other types 

of international assistance as to their intended uses.14

However, China’s firm control of the islands and other 

forceful behavior in and around the Senkaku Islands 

in the East China Sea, Scarborough Shoals, Fiery Cross 

Reef, and other Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 

signal other intentions. Additionally, recent satellite 

images reveal runways and hangars suitable for military jets and bombers, radars, anti-aircraft artillery, 

anti-missile systems, ports and docks for naval shipping, and indications of potential for a naval base on 

Mischief Reef. Incidentally, Mischief Reef was specifically deemed to belong to the Philippines, according 

to the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 

on July 12, 2016. All of the islands have military facilities for housing troops and cement plants for future 

construction.15

All of this gives further indication of China’s intent 

to become the regional hegemon, despite its stated 

intentions of peaceful prosperity. Besides building up 

islands from undersea features, China has created an 

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covers 

the Japanese Senkaku Islands.16 There are indications 

that China intends to build on Scarborough Shoals as 

it has on seven other Spratly Islands. An ADIZ on that 

shoal would cover a large portion of the Philippines 

mainland, including Manila.17 The type of intimidation 

that China has applied to the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal situation is illustrative of how it sees 

its neighbors. If China is allowed to continue unimpeded in the South China Sea while it modernizes its 

military and grows economically, all while gradually 

gaining a buffer zone and edging out competitors, the 

rest of its neighbors will be indebted to China before 
295

long. Regional nations all have some degree of economic dependency on China; coupled with an increasing military capabilities gap, this further erodes their 

ability to object to China’s assertions. China exploits 

these situations to leverage further economic and 

security dealings with these nations, and hedges them 

against similar partnerships with the United States as 

evidenced by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s 

recent stated intentions to push away from the United 

States.18

China utilizes classic gray zone tactics, conducting 

activities below a level which would prompt a military response from any claimant, and to which the 

United States has few response options. The Chinese 

strategic expansion in the South China Sea has thus 

been described as a very effective, “peacefully coercive . . . salami slice” strategy as it takes small, incremental steps that will not provoke a military response, 

but will “over time gradually change the status-quo 

regarding disputed claims in its favor.”19 This step-bystep expansionist strategy, or “coercive gradualism,” 

whereby a nation expands its influence and control 

over the sovereign territories of others, or international 

waters, falls right in the heart of the gray zone, and 

has left neighbors and the United States perplexed and 

devoid of options.

Further, China seems prepared to escalate the situation, perhaps due to a lack of U.S. response to its 

moves. Regarding China’s recent seizure of a U.S. 

Navy underwater drone, “Chinese political experts 

said China seized [the underwater drone] in the South 

China Sea . . . to send a strong warning to Trump not 

to test Beijing’s resolve over the sensitive issue of 

Taiwan.” Meanwhile, smaller countries in Southeast 
296

Asia are watching the back-and-forth closely for signs 

that U.S. naval dominance might be diminishing.20

The Current Strategy

A key document created to execute the Obama 

administration’s policy for the Asia-Pacific region, 

and nested under the National Security Strategy and 

National Military Strategy, is the Department of Defense 

(DoD) Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. Published 

in 2015, the strategy delineates the perceived threats 

and opportunities for the Asia-Pacific region and 

defines the military strategy to achieve U.S. goals. The 

Maritime Security Strategy represents a cornerstone in 

U.S. engagement in the region and is complemented 

by a series of classified theater strategy documents. 

It describes four regional challenges and calls for 

four lines of effort to overcome those challenges by 

deterring conflict and coercion and promoting international standards and adherence to the rule of law.

The Maritime Security Strategy describes the regional 

challenges: 

“[1] Competing Territorial and Maritime Claims.” 

The region is replete with a high number of territorial disputes that cover the East China Sea, South 

China Sea, and to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean.21

“[2] Military and Maritime Law Enforcement 

(MLE) Modernization.” As the nations in the region 

advance economically and see their territorial claims 

unresolved, they have begun developing navy and 

coast guard-like capabilities to protect their interests. This build-up of capability, while having the 

potential to contribute to good order at sea, also 

increases the potential for escalation to conflict.22
297

“[3] Maritime Challenges” are described:

“Expanded Use of Non-Military Assets to 

Coerce Rivals.”23 Policies like China’s “cabbage 

strategy” (coercive gradualism) are examples 

of activities the Maritime Security Strategy seeks 

to deter. The goal of the strategy is to assert 

China’s sovereignty over these areas through 

a slow accumulation of small incremental 

changes, none of which in itself constitutes a 

casus belli but together substantiate China’s 

claims of sovereignty over the long term.24

“Unsafe Air and Maritime Maneuvers.” 

Attempts to intimidate ships or aircraft by 

maneuvering into their space and force them 

from their intended path.

“Land Reclamation on Disputed Features.” 

China’s reclamation of over 2,900 acres on features not recognized as anything more than 

rocks by international law demonstrates this 

point. Last summer’s Permanent Court of 

Arbitration ruling clearly stated that China’s 

claims of historic rights within the Nine-Dash 

Line were without legal foundation. The panel 

also concluded that China’s activities within 

the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of other 

nations were illegal per international law.25

“[4] Dispute Resolution.” Although multi-lateral 

negotiations for resolution are the preferred solution for other regional actors, China eschews multilateral fora for bilateral talks where it can more 

effectively coerce its opponent in order to achieve 

the outcome that benefits China.26
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The Maritime Security Strategy describes the Lines of 

Effort (LOE):

LOE 1; strengthening military capacity to ensure 

the United States can successfully deter conflict and 

coercion and respond decisively when needed.

LOE 2; working together with allies and partners 

from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their 

maritime capacity.

LOE 3; leveraging military diplomacy to build 

greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation 

or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the 

road.

LOE 4; working to strengthen regional security 

institutions and encourage the development of an 

open and effective regional security architecture.27

LOE Analysis

The U.S. military, after the planned rebalancing is 

complete, will have the capacity to deter conflict and 

coercion, and respond when needed, if faced with the 

current threat. However, as China’s A2/AD capacity 

increases in effectiveness, volume, and reach, the traditionally unfettered access of the United States is challenged and cannot be countered through an already lost 

quantitative matchup.28 Further, due to the immense 

distances concerned, being in the right place if needed 

is key. The new distributed laydowns resulting from 

the rebalance should allow a more timely response and 

add to the deterrence factor.29 The pre-rebalance force 

posture and basing was a post-World War II, post-Korean war laydown with a strong focus on the North 

West Pacific, enabling the United States to respond 

to potential Korean aggression.30 As that situation 

remains relatively stabilized, and as other regional 
299

threats arise, it is prudent to seek a more distributed 

posture, as the rebalance does to some degree. However, the limited distribution of forces in the rebalance 

was one of required convenience more than it was a 

strategic decision.31 The deterrence capacity is present 

in force numbers; what is lacking is the policy that uses 

said capacity to effectively deter unlawful behavior.

With the notable exception of Cambodia, which 

since 2013 has been strongly influenced by China, 

and the recent dramatic reversal of sentiment toward 

the United States in the Philippines, U.S. engagement 

appears to be achieving its goal.32 The United States 

enjoys more access than it has since its bases in the 

Philippines were closed in 1991.33 This access will assist 

the United States in its pursuit of continued regional 

security and stability. However, with China’s growing 

influence in the region through economic enticements 

and forceful coercion, U.S. ready access and influence 

with allies and partners has become more complicated 

by their relationships with China.

The United States is falling short of the goal in the 

third LOE. One example of an attempt to reduce miscalculation is the creation of the Code for Unplanned 

Encounters at Sea (CUES), a standard set of signals used 

to communicate one’s intentions clearly. Although 

there have been instances whereby the CUES was utilized, China is still conducting unsafe, unprofessional, 

and potentially escalatory actions.34 This is evidenced 

by the recent People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) 

shadowing of a U.S. destroyer and subsequent recovery of the undersea drone, by the 2001 collision of a 

Chinese jet with a U.S. EP-3C, and multiple collisions 

or near collisions of Chinese vessels with other nations’ 

vessels in the East and South China Seas.35
300

Significant efforts have gone forth in LOE 4. The 

Maritime Security Initiative, aimed at developing 

a Common Operating Picture (COP) by outfitting 

regional allies with required equipment is a promising start toward a regional security architecture. 

Such a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability has application also to counter illegal fishing, 

transnational crime, and respond to natural disasters, 

and would help level the technological playing field 

between regional countries and China, enabling them 

to detect better gray zone tactics employed by Beijing, 

both individually and collectively. Funded at only 

$425 million over a 5-year period, opponents point 

out that, while it is a nice gesture, such low funding 

will scarcely produce such capability in reality. Other 

efforts have included helping the Philippines build 

a National Coast Watch Center; assisting Vietnam’s 

establishment of a Coast Guard training center; and 

bolstering maritime surveillance and radar capabilities 

in Indonesia and Malaysia.36

The LOEs do an admirable job of attempting to 

combat the perceived threats within the constraints 

levied upon the current operational environment. 

There is a missing element, however, that will prevent 

successful continuance of the peace and stability of the 

past few decades. That element is the ability to contest the actions an opponent takes which fall below the 

current level of conflict. As Dunford stated before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee:

these actors are advancing their interests through 

competition with a military dimension that falls short 

of traditional armed conflict and the threshold for a 

traditional military response. This is exemplified by 

Russian actions in Ukraine, Chinese activities in the South 

China Sea, and malicious cyber activities.37
301

As mentioned, regional actors, most notably China 

and North Korea, use these gray zone activities, furthering their national interests, often at the cost of U.S. 

and allied interests, without an overt response.

THE 60 PERCENT

There has been much focus on the right size of 

the military in the Asia-Pacific. In 2012, Secretary of 

Defense Leon Panetta first stated, “60% of the U.S. 

Navy will be homeported in the Pacific by 2024.”38 The 

new strategy calls for an allocation of 60 percent of 

U.S. Air and Naval forces to the Pacific region by 2020. 

There is a perception that the military instrument is 

disproportionately, and therefore unnecessarily, large 

in proportion to the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power, which can be attributed 

to the fact that the military is the most visible part of 

the rebalance, as Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., PACOM 

commander, has noted.39

One might question the calculus or factors that contributed to the arrival at the 60 percent number. It is 

a number based on quantities, not necessarily qualities, of forces, equipment, aircraft, ships, and vehicles. 

A detailed assessment of the regional threats in the 

Pacific and other regions led to the conclusion that 6 

of the 10 operational aircraft carriers should be in the 

Pacific. This number was based upon multiple inputs, 

including size and scope of the regions covered, maintenance and training cycles, anticipated requirements, 

and level of perceived and expected threat.40 Seven of 

the 10 would have undermined the ability to support 

the other combatant commanders, while a 5-5 split 

would not be commensurate to the requirement.41

Navy force posture planners considered the remainder 
302

of the maritime fleet weighing the same factors. When 

the calculus was complete, planners had determined 

that 60 percent was a sustainable force posture requirement for the Pacific that would satisfy the strategic 

requirement. Under the rebalance, the Navy’s plan 

was to increase the total number of ships in the region 

from about 150 ships to 180, which would equate to 

60 percent. However, if sequestration cuts called for in 

the Budget Control Act of 2011 were to continue, that 

number would stay at 150, or roughly 50 percent, effectively canceling the rebalance.42

As with anything, the 60 percent number is costly 

on an already strained defense budget. According to 

Michael Green, a senior Asia advisor in the George W. 

Bush administration who is now with the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, the sustainability 

of the 60 percent number is a significant question, given 

defense budget issues. According to an anonymous 

Senior State Department official, the rebalance intends 

to “take advantage of revenues that will be somewhat 

freed up” by the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan.43

This is the scenario when a nation coming off a long 

period of war normally enjoys a “peace dividend,” 

where it can refocus on domestic issues that have taken 

the back burner. In this case, that dividend is committed to the rebalance, and potentially at risk if other 

global requirements were to emerge or re-emerge.

There are also those who believe that a military 

ramp up in the form of the rebalance is not necessary, 

and might even damage efforts in other areas. John 

Kerry, during his confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State in 2013, noted, “I’m not convinced that 

increased military ramp-up [in the Asia-Pacific] is critical yet . . . that’s something I’d want to look at very 

carefully.”44 The suggestion is that the United States 
303

would now focus more on diplomatic engagements in 

the region and avoid any provocations that an increase 

in military forces might bring. In addition, as the 

United States has been a Pacific power for more than 

a century and has played a key role in Asia’s security 

and prosperity, Kerry was implying that a physical 

change in posture is not necessary. The new Secretary 

of Defense, James Mattis, tended to agree early in his 

tenure, stating that “there is no need right now at this 

time for military maneuvers or something like that, 

that would solve something that’s best solved by the 

diplomats.”45 According to this position, it might actually damage current accomplishments and jeopardize 

future opportunities in the diplomatic and economic 

areas. A rebalance to the region is really more of a 

refocus on the world’s most economically dynamic 

region.46

Mattis has seemingly reaffirmed the Trump administration’s commitment to the rebalance, as evidenced 

by his first series of visits. He has visited the Republic 

of Korea and Japan, and has met with the Indian, Singaporean, and Australian Defense Ministers. In each 

case, he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to each country and U.S. obligations in the region, promising continued security cooperation in the region.47

The magnitude of the military instrument of power, 

or “M,” is more than just a number of forces, ships, or 

aircraft. The “M” pertains to military activities in the 

region, including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 

Relief Operations, training exercises with or without 

foreign partners, movement of supplies or forces, port 

visits, Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), 

or even just residing in regional homeports. Determining whether the “M” is too large or too small is a 

question of both the forces and associated activities in 
304

relation to the other instruments of power, and how it 

can assist or damage the achievement of U.S. strategic 

objectives in theater. Kerry and other State Department 

officials noted above have concerns that a military 

buildup could cause damage to U.S. interests. A military buildup would be damaging only if it is a temporary show of force that allies cannot depend on long 

term, or it generates feelings of containment by China 

resulting in provocations against regional allies. Therefore, regardless of the size of the “M,” it is important to 

ensure that military diplomacy and diplomatic, or “D” 

efforts by State Department officials, are synchronized 

to reinforce the proper strategic message.

Today, the true significance of the 60 percent rebalance figure is the strategic message therein: the United 

States is focused on the region, and has permanently 

changed force allocations, deployment schedules, and 

strategic plans to reinforce the message. The informational aspect of a U.S. overbalanced focus to the region 

must synchronize with and reinforce the diplomatic 

and economic instruments. In fact, the recommendations posed later can be considered packaged in with 

these instruments of power. Furthermore, will 60 percent really bring the needed change to the region, or is 

something still missing in the rebalance?

THE REBALANCE BY SERVICE

The rebalance seeks to provide a joint force that is 

capable of responding to any threat in a suitable timeframe. In light of the transregional, multi-domain, 

multifunctional fight envisioned for the future, the 

United States faces serious challenges in this theater. 

The IAP is so vast that planners have coined the term 

“tyranny of distance” to describe the challenges one 
305

faces in responding to events. Consequently, one key 

element of the rebalance is force posture. Each service 

is attempting to increase their distribution from the 

focus on Korea to one that expands U.S. force presence 

across a larger share of the region.

Coupled with this distribution effort, the joint 

force seeks to maintain a qualitative advantage, as 

the United States cannot reasonably expect to maintain a long-term quantitative advantage. Thus, the 

services are deploying the newest technologies to the 

IAP region first, as U.S. competitors in this region are 

advancing most quickly to narrow the technology gap 

and bring that fight into the multi-domain, multifunctional fight. A brief synopsis of each service’s post-rebalance posture will help lay the foundations for a 

means-informed discussion on possible strategic goals 

and achievable ends.

The Navy

The Navy’s response to the rebalance is to employ 

60 percent of its “battle force” vessels in the Pacific 

Command Area of Responsibility (AOR).48 This is an 

increase from a pre-rebalance number closer to 50 percent.49 To do this, the Navy has aggressively freed up 

capacity from other locations worldwide. For example, four destroyers now stationed at Rota, vice Norfolk, frees up six other destroyers for other worldwide 

applications.50

Another initiative the Navy has pursued is development and eventual deployment of new capabilities 

that will help deter or fight the particular threats anticipated in the region. Weapons systems including the 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the P-8 Poseidon, and 

new nuclear submarines will field first to the Pacific 
306

theater. The most modern surface ships, with the most 

advanced capabilities have already begun entering 

the theater, allowing a more advantageous capability-to-threat posture if conflict is unavoidable. A focus 

on maintaining capabilities that best counter the perceived threat is exactly the right policy to pursue and 

must continue as regional actors continue to develop 

their own technologies.

Finally, emphasizing the importance of understanding the human element, the Navy has developed a program of regional experts. These sailors will 

be subject matter experts in their particular region, 

enabling a fuller understanding of the cultures, customs, and ways of thinking of the local populace. This 

will contribute significantly to preventing conflict and 

enabling dialogue that is more cooperative.51

The Marine Corps

The Marine Corps’ response to the rebalance is 

more of a realignment of Marine forces within the 

Pacific. Much of the impetus for the realignment is the 

perpetual displeasure of the local Okinawan populace 

to a U.S. military presence dating back to World War 

II. Many Okinawans are vocal in their opposition to the 

Americans stationed there and have pushed the Government of Japan to request a reduction in U.S. troop 

presence on Okinawa.52 The Marine Corps is in the process of reducing the troop strength on Okinawa from 

20,600 to 11,500. In order to keep the desired number of 

Marines west of the International Dateline, the Marine 

Corps redirected 5,000 Marines to Guam, and 2,500 

to Marine Rotational Force-Darwin in Australia, with 

the remaining 8,800 going to Hawaii.53 The Marines 

took advantage of the requirement to constitute one 
307

additional rotational Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 

(MAGTF) for Darwin, and two additional MAGTFs 

based in Guam. Turning this requirement into operational capability, however, requires additional lift. 

The service plans to operate an unspecified number 

of MV-22B Ospreys for the Darwin MAGTF, and the 

Navy’s plans for additional Amphibious Ready Group 

(ARG) shipping by 2020 will make the Guam Marines 

a viable responsive force.54

While pursuing this plan, the Marine Corps has 

also focused on resiliency of forces in light of the substantial A2/AD threat China poses to the first island 

chain currently. This resiliency features both a hardening of installations and an increase in their quantity, 

creating redundancy.

Another feature of the rebalance is the placement 

of emerging technologies in the Pacific theater. For 

instance, the Marine Corps is the first service to field 

the F-35 in the Pacific region, as their arrival in January delivers 5th generation capabilities to counter the 

advancing capabilities of regional actors.55

The last feature of the Marine Corps rebalance plan 

is the attempt to provide more partner access to highend training to increase their capacity. This includes 

expanding the number of training areas for realistic, 

live fire amphibious assault training with partners and 

applicable activities allowed in regional training areas 

within the Northern Marianas Islands. This effort is 

commendable, but is currently subject to multiple 

bureaucratic delays, from environmental study concerns to foreign complaints, which stymie the process.56
308

The Army

The Army’s rebalance measures are primarily a 

return of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to their 

habitual bases in the Pacific region. Complementing 

the troop strength numbers, the Army created the 

concept entitled Pacific Pathways, which stresses the 

importance of rapid, scalable response to this vast 

region covering 14 time zones. The Pathways concept offers regional partners additional opportunity 

for engagement with the U.S. military and offers the 

Army more exposure to the region. This creates familiarity, enhances interoperability, and reassures select 

partners and allies in the region of U.S. commitment.57

Further, in its role as theater anti-missile defense, 

the Army is relocating its Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) capabilities to the Republic of 

Korea. This is in an effort to negate the missile threat 

from North Korea, as the rogue nation threatens the 

region through continual advancement of its nuclear 

ballistic missile capability.58 THAAD brings the additional benefit of offering a potential counter to China’s growing A2/AD capability that will eventually 

threaten the second island chain.

Finally, the Army is expanding into the multi-domain fight. The Army is exploring ways to use groundbased weapons systems to exert control into other 

domains. For example, using missile and artillery batteries to extend control over adjacent sea-lanes is one 

course of action being explored, and ground control 

of air space is another.59 Advances into the multi-domain fight would enhance the joint capabilities for 

the PACOM commander as the assets committed to 

counter these threats today are freed.
309

The Air Force

The Air Force has also committed to placing 60 percent of its strike aircraft to the Pacific theater. The rebalance is akin to that of the Marine Corps in that the Air 

Force seeks to disperse its current forces over a much 

wider geographic area.60 Current Air Force posture 

focuses on Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam, but the rebalance is causing the Air Force to look south, to other 

allies in the region who might offer basing opportunities for both distribution and resiliency.

The Air Force is also focusing on force modernization and ensuring it deploys the most capable assets to 

the Pacific theater. This poses a significant challenge 

to the technology-focused Air Force, however, as that 

technology carries a high price tag and the post-sequestration budgetary environment is greatly influencing the Air Force’s plans.61

Another key contribution the Air Force provides 

is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 

The need for continued advances in this area is especially compelling in light of adversary advances to 

contest U.S. technological advantages and a growing 

A2/AD threat. “In particular, this means an increased 

emphasis upon stealth capabilities, unmanned systems 

and technologies which enable air platforms to succeed 

in highly challenged environments,” said Lieutenant 

General Robert Otto, deputy chief of staff, ISR.62

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the United States has been focused heavily 

on other global commitments for nearly 2 decades, 

mired in political issues and challenged economically, 

China has taken full advantage of the period to turn its 
310

inward focus into a more overt, assertive one, enjoying 

a “period of strategic opportunity.”63

Beijing has made clear that no one will stand in 

its way as it focuses on its core interests and claims of 

sovereignty. While great strides have been made in the 

region thus far in the rebalance, three things are apparent. First, U.S. allies either question our commitment 

to the region for the long term or feel that China is a 

more attractive ally. Second, the United States’ will to 

employ its vastly superior military power as part of 

a compellence or deterrence strategy is in question by 

China and the region. Third, military response options 

to China’s gray zone expansion through coercive gradualism given current U.S. policy and capabilities are 

non-existent. The new administration should update 

its military posture and strategy in the region, to nullify any capability that a regional actor may develop 

with significant overmatch, such that there is an unmistakably negative consequence to any action taken that 

goes against established international rules and norms.

No one will disagree that the United States has a 

clear technological and capability advantage across 

the globe. While there are close matches in any single 

capability by various military powers, there is no one 

superpower on the planet that is even close to matching 

U.S. capabilities and capacity in their entirety. Add to 

that the unmatched degree of experience in projecting 

power and operating as a synergistic joint or combined 

force across all domains in the swift achievement of 

military objectives, and the gap widens from the nearest competitor. Furthermore, U.S. defense industries 

are second-to-none, its private technological innovations are unsurpassed, and the two grow closer daily 

as our military leaders are beginning to understand the 

technological edge Silicon Valley has to offer in military 
311

innovation.64 Topping it all off, there is no other nation 

on the planet that enjoys such an expansive network of 

allies and partners as the United States.65

In this theater, the United States faces a potential 

adversary in China that is making a strong attempt 

to gain ground militarily, but whose real advantage 

lays in its economic power and willingness to use that 

power to entice or coerce U.S. allies.66 The question 

then becomes, how does the United States counter China’s big “E” with a big “M”? The following recommendations focus the military instrument of power against 

that problem in an effort to reestablish a strong United 

States influence in the region in the attainment of policy 

objectives. For a summary of these recommendations, 

see Table 10-1.

Table 10-1. Summary of Recommendations.

Recommendation: Amplifying information:

1 Maintain insurmountable technological edge and lethality. Focus on a qualitative, vice quantitative, advantage, focusing on the TMM threat without excluding the gray zone.

2 Bring allies and partners under this superior U.S.-provided 

collective security architecture.

Broadens deterrence of China’s coercive activities while 

further reassuring allies/partners. Offer more Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) agreements to enhance regional 

interoperability and compete with China’s monetary 

enticements.

3 Compete in the gray zone. Develop nonlethal technologies for use in maritime and 

aviation scenarios. Explore whole-of-government areas of 

leverage using other instruments of national power.

4 Exercise and demonstrate U.S. superior qualitative 

advantage with allies and partners through multinational 

exercises.

Focus on capacity building and interoperability, refinement 

of TTPs in collective defense/support scenarios while 

demonstrating superior capabilities.

5 Determine the “redlines” and clearly demonstrate the will 

and capacity to enforce them.

Determine unambiguous strategic objectives to defend; 

define adversary actions that cross clear redline 

thresholds; and predetermine escalation of force response 

options. This is paired with information campaign that 

demonstrates resolve while communicating soft power 

inclusivity with China.

6 Increase unannounced FONOPS in accordance with 

international laws and international rulings.

Remove bureaucratic obstacles and more frequently conduct FONOPS inside of 12 nautical miles from reclaimed 

land features that do not rate territorial waters according to 

international laws and rulings.

7 Distribute U.S. forces strategically across the region and 

develop strategies to expeditiously employ them as a joint/

combined force.

Consider a cohesive, joint/combined strategy in securing 

rotational force agreements across the region that will 

impose multiple strategic dilemmas and frustrate China’s 

A2/AD efforts.
312

First, the United States must maintain an unmatched 

technological edge and lethality. This does not mean 

entering into a Cold War-style arms race. In the simple 

counting of ships, aircraft, and military personnel in 

the Asia-Pacific region, the United States comes up 

quantitatively well short of what China already has in 

place. The amount of spending to compete quantitatively in that region would not be in the interest of the 

United States. As the economies of the United States 

and China are both global and interdependent upon 

one another, this type of expensive arms race could 

have an adverse effect on the world economy, not to 

mention the damage it would do to each country as 

they attempt to best the other. Furthermore, as the 

United States and its allies and partners widen their 

focus to include the gray zone tactic “du jour” to the 

TMM fight of the future, quantitative estimates of force 

numbers will be less relevant than qualitative ones.

Maintaining an unquestionable qualitative capability gap serves to either dissuade China’s efforts at 

trying to match, or causes them to spend large amounts 

in wasted efforts to match. The United States should 

combine this dissuasion with immediate actions to 

bring to rapid production those technologies that 

are the closest to fielding, and those for which China 

has no immediate counter. An example is unmanned 

underwater vehicles (UUV) or non-lethal undersea 

capabilities.67

Second, allies and partners should be brought into 

this U.S. provided security envelope in the form of a 

collective security architecture. China already has the 

quantitative advantage in the region that will continue 

to widen, even when the assets of the United States and 

allies are combined.68 Therefore, the key to effective 

balance in the region shared by all allies and partners 
313

will be to offer them the umbrella of protection by the 

United States—protection that they know is and will 

be technologically and qualitatively superior for the 

long term. Furthermore, China’s ability to match competitors qualitatively is largely through copycatting 

those advances, whether in technology, doctrine, procedures, practices, or force structure. The United States 

has, and must maintain, this advantage. To implement, 

the United States should consider the collective security needs of the region, and individual security needs 

of partners, and negotiate individualized security and 

economic trade package deals across the region.

As stated earlier, China has had success in enticing long-standing allies, such as the Philippines, from 

alliance with the United States. China has given every 

indication that this will be their model at weakening 

U.S. influence with allies for the near future.69 Again, 

U.S. diplomatic and information efforts must reinforce both a commitment to collective security, a clear 

technological military advantage, and the will to act 

on behalf of our allies and partners in defense of U.S. 

interests in accordance with treaty or security agreements, as well as international rules and norms. Much 

of that same technology can be delivered into the 

hands of U.S. allies and partners through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements. Furthermore, Foreign 

Military Funding (FMF) arrangements could be made 

to offset defense-spending hardships, allowing allies 

and partners a method of financing these capabilities.

This initiative has several advantages. First, it 

directly competes with China’s monetary offerings 

that serve to weaken the U.S. position with allies and 

partners. Second, FMS contracts with partners immediately increase joint and combined force interoperability in the region, an extremely beneficial aspect of 
314

this collective security strategy. Third, entering into 

FMS contracts with partners sends an immediate message of long-term commitment with that partner, as 

there is typically training and sustainment aspects to 

the contracts. Fourth, FMS contracts have the added 

benefit of supporting the U.S. domestic economy, 

encouraging overseas satellite cells of those industries, 

and reducing costs through economies of scale of the 

same equipment for the U.S. military by increasing 

the numbers of buyers. Fifth, the partner buys more 

security for less overall defense spending, as it brings 

them into a collective security arrangement that not 

only includes the distinct advantage of U.S. forces, 

but those of other regional partners. This would allow 

more of their remaining budget to be used for domestic expenditures.

Opponents argue that China’s perception of U.S. 

containment of China further provoke unpredictable 

actions. The authors contend that the benefits listed 

above outweigh the risks and that an effective and 

supportive information strategy will also stress the 

security and stability being offered, not containment. 

The resulting increased commitment to regional allies 

can be used as leverage against China to compel them 

to align with international rules and norms.

Third, the strategy of late whereby large powers 

achieve their will or cause smaller powers to submit 

without triggering U.S. intervention is through mastery of the gray zone. Indeed, as Russia took Crimea 

with zero response through gray zone operations, 

China seems to write its own rules in the South China 

Sea. The United States needs to enter the gray zone.

One option for response to gray zone aggression is with non-lethal technology. These capabilities 

offer great promise in maritime escalation of force 
315

situations. The lack of response in enforcing international laws thus far has caused an erosion of U.S. strategy since the rebalance was announced. As mentioned 

previously, China continues to claim sovereignty over 

Scarborough Shoal, completely ignoring the international ruling in favor of the Philippines. Recognizing 

that U.S. strategy to date has been an ineffectual one 

that tends to appease China, even if the United States 

wanted to back the Philippines, there are few options 

short of escalating to acts of war to support our ally in 

this example. A solution could lie in non-lethal methods of escalation, such as the use of directed electromagnetic emissions or sound waves, to deter Chinese 

patrolling those waters.70 The United States needs to 

continue development of these and similar technologies for use in maritime as well as aviation scenarios 

for use in the gray zone.

Other options for the gray zone include non-military, whole-of-government approaches. Ultimately, 

the United States needs to find areas of leverage that it 

can use to bring about more cost on the part of China 

than is caused to the United States, to include second 

and third order effects of such actions. Ideally, through 

economic and diplomatic outreaches to regional and 

worldwide partners, the United States can leverage the 

large advantage it enjoys over China in networks of 

international and regional partners to form coalitions 

in these approaches. Examples of areas to explore for 

leverage include student visas, trade, technology, and 

environmental sanctions.71

Fourth, the United States needs to exercise and 

demonstrate these capabilities with and among 

regional partners/allies. Annual U.S.-led multinational exercises focused on capacity building and 

training, training to real world combined scenarios, 
316

interoperability, as well as high-end technological, 

state of the art capability demonstrations such as forcible entry, Integrated Air Defense penetration strikes, 

counter-ballistic missile capabilities and counter A2/

AD will accomplish many objectives. The first is the 

training of partners and the exercising of interoperability. This will not only serve to increase the capacity of 

partners, but it will also strengthen the web of collective security amongst allies and reassure them of continued U.S. commitment. Second, it allows all involved 

to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures in the use 

of collective defense scenarios. Third, this serves as a 

demonstration of capabilities inherent within the collective defense architecture. This will increase the confidence level of individual partners, build a sense of 

camaraderie among regional partners, and serve as a 

deterrent to potential adversaries. Finally, through a 

high-end, state of the art “culmination” demonstration, near-peer competitors get a yearly glimpse of 

exactly how far ahead the United States is in its innovative, technological edge. This serves as a clear strategic 

deterrence; as noted in the Center for a New American 

Security November 2016 report, “Counterbalance,” 

Chinese leaders are “most likely to update their perceptions of the United States when Washington pairs 

clearly stated intentions with capabilities.”72

Fifth, the United States and the international community need to unambiguously determine and communicate where the red lines are and clearly demonstrate 

the will and capability to enforce them. Lack of clarity 

on a specific defensive objective has been noted as a 

shortfall in U.S. efforts in the Western Pacific, perhaps 

leading to ambiguity. A suggestion from the “Counterbalance” article is for the United States to prevent 

Chinese control of the First Island Chain, thereby 
317

protecting U.S. allies and interests in the region.73 This 

is in keeping with the historical U.S. strategic approach 

in the region while acknowledging China’s growing 

capabilities. While the United States has no intent to 

fall back from this objective, despite China’s touts of 

a U.S. strategic retreat, a clear signal of this as a strategic objective that supports the aforementioned policy 

objectives is much more unambiguous to regional 

allies and partners. While U.S. policy has been to avoid 

taking sides in conflict resolutions between opposing 

claimants, and to allow claimants to resolve disputes 

peacefully, there should be no question that the United 

States will enforce international laws and rulings, particularly in the defense of current and future allies and 

partners.74

Beyond more clearly defined strategic redlines the 

United States and the international community need 

more clarity in adversary actions that cross redlines. 

U.S. and partner actions need to be predetermined 

in escalation of force scenarios and ensure that those 

forces who would execute are empowered to do so.75

In a collective security architecture, this might require 

combined action among partners and allies, depending 

on the situation. This will require close command and 

control among the combined force for coordination 

and to manage unnecessary escalation.76 As actions 

and procedures are developed, consideration should 

be given to the fact that conflict might escalate from 

within the gray zone into actual armed engagements 

or standoffs.77

A renewed U.S. resolve to act in support of allies and 

partners and undeniably assert itself in the attainment 

of its interests will undoubtedly cause great alarm and 

suspicion on the part of China, as the regional power. 

While that is partly the objective, the other aspect is to 
318

create a path to peaceful coexistence. This will require a 

new information campaign that both demonstrates the 

new resolve and communicates inclusivity with China. 

Therefore, high-level diplomacy will be focused on 

this as well as reassuring U.S. allies and partners that 

the two powers will work together and do everything 

possible to avoid armed conflict. It is also important to 

communicate and demonstrate the two superpowers 

cohabitating in the region and cooperating militarily on 

as many soft power areas of common interest as possible. Several references note that this is a major interest 

of ASEAN nations, who do not want to be forced to 

take sides between the United States and China, and 

desire relations with both powers.78

Sixth, increase unannounced FONOPS, in accordance with international laws and international rulings. While PACOM strategy and numerous speeches 

highlight the fact that the United States will continue 

to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law 

allows,” the truth is that this is a very sensitive area 

with multiple bureaucratic obstacles.79 In addition, it 

has been internationally recognized that not all of the 

reclaimed land features in the South China Sea rate 

an EEZ, and many do not even qualify as territorial 

waters. The United States has essentially condoned 

the illegal land reclamation and construction activities of China by remaining outside of 12 nautical miles 

(NM) from such features in the conduct of FONOPS. 

The bureaucratic obstacles to internationally legal 

FONOPS should be removed in order to facilitate their 

frequent execution, such that it is a regular enough 

occurrence to soften the sensitivities and make it the 

new (or renewed) norm. If these land features have 

been defined by a recognized, independent tribunal as 

nothing more than fixed objects in the open ocean, then 
319

treat them as such. The only way the United States can 

set the example of promoting international law and 

international rulings is to operate air and naval forces 

wherever international law allows, including inside 

12 NM, and support or accompany allies and partners 

who do so.

Seventh, continue to distribute U.S. forces and 

develop realistic, resource-able strategies to utilize 

these forces across the range of military operations 

in rapid, expeditionary, joint and combined scenarios. Work out more rotational force agreements across 

the South Pacific, placing forces in a strategic manner 

and planning lift assets and logistics support in a way 

that supports rapid aggregation and disaggregation in 

accordance with emerging joint concepts. As alluded 

to previously, the re-posturing of forces that resulted 

after the rebalance was announced was largely reactive in nature, and executed as a result of pre-existing 

requirements (i.e., the Okinawa drawdown), and reallocations from the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Said 

another way, the United States militarily rebalanced 

forces from other commitments and opportunities, conveniently meeting a requirement to rebalance through 

happenstance instead of strategic realignment. In what 

could be termed a “next phase” of the rebalance, the 

United States needs to consider a cohesive joint strategy in securing rotational force agreements throughout 

the southern Pacific region that will impose multiple 

strategic dilemmas against China’s A2/AD efforts.

CONCLUSION

While the United States has made great strides 

in its rebalance to the Pacific after 15 years of hard 

fought efforts in the GWOT, there is much room for 
320

improvement in the achievement of policy objectives 

in the region. In effect, if one were to look at the policy 

objectives―maintenance of peace, prosperity, and stability in the region; respect for international law; unimpeded lawful commerce; and freedom of navigation in 

the South and East China Seas―it is not difficult to conclude that, regardless of any progress that might have 

been made, overall, the United States is largely failing. 

True, out of these, commerce has continued unimpeded through this region thus far. How long, though, 

before China has the ability to become selective about 

which nations can conduct trade or military exercises 

with Asian nations as leverage against the international community? Through coercive gradualism, 

China slowly places its pieces throughout the region 

in an effort to gain this type of influence. The United 

States, with unmatched military power and a unique 

ability to project it wherever and whenever needed, 

runs its traditional plays, employing hope that good 

will ultimately prevail while seemingly unaware of 

what is happening right under its nose. Once a threshold is crossed, the United States will by that time have 

already been placed in an operationally unwinnable 

situation, or worse, be forced to become the offensive 

provocateur on the world stage; potentially a strategically unwinnable situation. To get ahead of the game 

that is being played, the United States needs to get in 

the game.

ENDNOTES―CHAPTER 10

1. Ash Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase of the U.S. 

Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific (McCain Institute, Arizona 

State University),” As Delivered by Secretary of Defense 

Ash Carter, Tempe, AZ, April 6, 2015, available from https://

www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606660/
321

remarks-on-the-next-phase-of-the-us-rebalance-to-the-asia-pacificmccain-instit, accessed March 20, 2017.

2. “Posture Statement of General Joseph Dunford, Jr., USMC, 

19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee Budget Hearing March 

17, 2016,” Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee, 

2016, available from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/

media/doc/Dunford_03-17-16%20.pdf.

3. Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, “Revising U.S. 

Grand Strategy Toward China,” Council Special Report No. 

72, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, p. 19, 

available from www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-towardchina/p36371, accessed December 20, 2016.

4. Idress Ali, “United States has ‘enduring’ interests in Asia-Pacific, defense secretary says,” Reuters, 

December 6, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/

us-usa-japan-asiapacific-idUSKBN13W05U.

5. Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot, 1st Ed., New York: Hatchette 

Book Group, Incorporated, 2016, pp. 17-18.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a 

Changing Environment,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense, August 14, 2015, p. 6, available from https://www.defense.

gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_

Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.

7. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 

October 11, 2011, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/

americas-pacific-century/, accessed March 20, 2017; Blackwill and 

Tellis, p. 19.

8. Ibid.

9. Max Fisher, “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute,” 

The New York Times, July 14, 2016, available from www.nytimes.

com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitrationexplained.html.
322

10. Robert S. Ross, “The Problem With the Pivot,” Foreign 

Affairs, November/December 2012, available from https://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2012-11-01/problem-pivot.

11. David Tweed and Mira Rojanasakul, “The Great Asian 

Arms Buildup: China’s Military Expansion, South China Sea 

to Dominate Shangri-La Dialogue,” Bloomberg, May 31, 2016, 

available from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-shangrila/, 

accessed March 21, 2017.

12. Ryan Pickrell, “Beijing Warns US ‘Word Bombs’ Won’t 

Stop Chinese Power Projection,” The Daily Caller, January 22, 

2017, available from dailycaller.com/2017/01/22/beijing-warns-usword-bombs-wont-stop-chinese-power-projection/, accessed March 21, 

2017.

13. Steve Mollman, “The line on a 70-year-old map that threatens to set off a war in East Asia,” Quartz, July 7, 2016, available 

from https://qz.com/705223/where-exactly-did-chinas-nine-dash-linein-the-south-china-sea-come-from/, accessed March 21, 2017.

14. Daniel Russel, “Testimony of Daniel Russel Assistant 

Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. 

Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Wednesday, May 13, 2015 Maritime Issues in East Asia,” 

Washington, DC: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2015, 

available from www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051315_

REVISED_Russel_Testimony.pdf.

15. Amanda Macias, “‘This is militarization’: We finally know 

what China’s mysterious hexagonal structures in the South China 

Sea are for,” Business Insider, December 16, 2016, pp. 857 224, 

available from www.businessinsider.com/csis-satellite-hexagonalsouth-china-sea-2016-12, accessed December 18, 2016.

16. Zachary Keck, “China Imposes Restrictions on Air Space 

Over Senkaku Islands,” The Diplomat, November 23, 2013, available from https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-imposes-restrictionson-air-space-over-senkaku-islands/, accessed March 21, 2017.

17. Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, “Is It Time for the 

U.S. to Take a Position on Scarborough Shoal?” USNI News, 
323

July 19, 2016, available from https://news.usni.org/2016/07/19/

take-position-scarborough-shoal.

18. “Duterte told: Ignoring sea row with China bad for PH, 

int’l law,” ABS-CBN News, December 18, 2016, available from 

http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/18/16/duterte-told-ignoring-sea-rowwith-china-bad-for-ph-intl-law, accessed December 19, 2016.

19. Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea: Assessing 

U.S. Policy and Options for the Future,” CNA Occasional Paper, 

Arlington, VA: CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses, November 

2014, p. 33, available from https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IOP2014-U-009109.pdf.

20. Nomaan Merchant, Associated Press (AP), “Drone seizure 

latest sign of tougher times between U.S., China,” Military Times, 

December 19, 2016, available from www.militarytimes.com/articles/

drone-seizure-latest-sign-of-tougher-times-between-us-china, accessed 

December 20, 2016.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 5-10.

22. Ibid., pp. 10-13.

23. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

24. Michael Spangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance,” Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2014, pp. 11-21, available from http://

ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Summer_2014/5_

Spangler_Article.pdf.

25. Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea 

Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?” Council of Councils, August 18, 2016, available from www.cfr.org/

councilofcouncils/global_memos/p38227, accessed January 29, 2017.

26. Spangler, p. 17.

27. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

28. George M. Gross, “The New Generation of 

Operational Concepts,” Small Wars Journal, January 8, 

2016, p. 2, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

the-new-generation-of-operational-concepts.
324

29. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 5-10.

30. Felix K. Chang, “Sideways: America’s Pivot and 

Its Military Bases in the Asia-Pacific,” E-Notes, Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 16, 

2013, available from https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/

sideways-americas-pivot-and-its-military-bases-in-the-asia-pacific/.

31. An example is the redistribution of Marine forces to 

Darwin, Australia, Guam, and Hawaii. While this is a redistribution as described in this chapter, it was less a thoughtful strategic 

redistribution of forces and more a requirement to reduce force 

numbers in Futenma, Okinawa, that was a timely coincidence 

with the rebalance. The decisions to place them in Darwin and 

Guam were made out of convenience.

32. Veasna Var, “Cambodia: Between China and the United 

States,” The Diplomat, May 20, 2015, available from https://

thediplomat.com/2015/05/cambodia-between-china-and-the-unitedstates/, accessed March 21, 2017; Jane Perlez, “Rodrigo Duterte 

Gets Closer to China, and the Neighbors Notice,” The New York 

Times, October 24, 2016, available from https://www.nytimes.

com/2016/10/25/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china.html.

33. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 5-10.

34. “Littoral Combat Ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) Completes 

South China Sea Patrol,” Navy Recognition, May 14, 2015, available from http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=2715, accessed March 21, 2017.

35. Merchant, AP; AP, “US Navy destroyer conducts operation 

in South China Sea,” Fox News, October 22, 2016, available from 

www.foxnews.com/world/2016/10/22/us-navy-destroyer-conductsoperation-in-south-china-sea.html; Mike Yeo, “US, Chinese aircraft 

in ‘unsafe’ encounter in South China Sea,” Defense News, available from https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/02/10/us-chineseaircraft-in-unsafe-encounter-in-south-china-sea/, accessed February 

13, 2017; Elisabeth Rosenthal with David E. Sanger, “U.S. Plane 

in China after It Collides with Chinese Jet,” The New York Times, 

April 2, 2001, available from www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/

us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-chinese-jet.html.
325

36. Prashanth Parameswaran, “America’s New Maritime 

Security Initiative for Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, April 2, 

2016, available from https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/americas-newmaritime-security-initiative-for-southeast-asia/, accessed March 26, 

2017.

37. “Posture Statement of General Joseph Dunford, Jr., USMC, 

19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee Budget Hearing March 

17, 2016.”

38. Gregory Whitten and Erum Jilani, “Rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific: A New U.S. Defense Strategy for the 21st Century,” 

Kennedy School Review, June 28, 2014, available from http://ksr.

hkspublications.org/2014/06/28/rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific/.

39. Terri Moon Cronk, “Pacom Commander: Rebalance to 

Asia-Pacific ‘Being Realized’,” DoD News, February 25, 2016, 

available from https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/673465/

pacom-commander-rebalance-to-asia-pacific-being-realized/, accessed 

December 20, 2016.

40. Interview with Navy planners, PACFLT, Pearl Harbor, HI.

41. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, pp. 47-48, available from http://archive.defense.gov/

pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.

42. John Grady, “Locklear: U.S. ‘Shouldn’t Talk Ourselves Into’ 

Conflict With China,” USNI News, March 25, 2014, available from 

https://news.usni.org/2014/03/25/locklear-u-s-shouldnt-talk-conflictchina; John Grady, “U.S. Pacific Commander Defends 11 Carrier 

Navy,” USNI News, March 6, 2014, available from https://news.

usni.org/2014/03/06/u-s-pacific-commander-defends-11-carrier-navy.

43. Howard LaFranchi, “US ‘pivot to Asia’: Is John Kerry retooling it?” The Christian Science Monitor, February 20, 2013, available 

from https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0220/USpivot-to-Asia-Is-John-Kerry-retooling-it.

44. Ibid.
45. Phil Stewart, “Mattis says no need for dramatic U.S. 

military moves in South China Sea,” Reuters, February 3, 2017, 

available from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpsouthchinasea-mattis/mattis-says-no-need-for-dramatic-u-s-militarymoves-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN15J061.

46. LaFranchi.

47. For the Asia-Pacific Rebalance, see “DoD Focus on the 

Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2017, available from 

https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Asia-PacificRebalance; for Mattis’ remarks, see his comments Captain Jeff 

Davis, spokesman, “Readout of Secretary Mattis’ Call with Japan 

Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada,” Release No: NR-087-17, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 6, 2017, 

available from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/NewsRelease-View/Article/1104289/readout-of-secretary-mattis-call-withjapan-minister-of-defense-tomomi-inada.

48. Mr. Eugene Aiu, COMPACFLT N81 Force Posture, interview by authors, Pearl Harbor, HI, January 19, 2017.

49. Moon Cronk.

50. Press Operations, “The U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia: As 

Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. 

Carter, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Monday, April 08, 2013,” U.S. Department of Defense 

Archives, April 8, 2013, available from http://archive.defense.gov/

speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1765.

51. Tuan N. Pham, “The Rebalance Requires BRAINS, Not 

Just BRAWN,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 140, No. 4, 

April 2014, pp. 22-25.

52. Maki Kimura, “The anti-US military base struggle in Okinawa, Japan,” openDemocracy, February 13, 2016, 

available from https://www.opendemocracy.net/maki-kimura/

anti-us-military-base-struggle-in-okinawa-japan.

53. Mure Dickie, “US to move thousands of marines off Okinawa,” Financial Times, February 8, 2012, available from https://

www.ft.com/content/f1e5389a-5266-11e1-a155-00144feabdc0.
327

54. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, and Mark Cancian, 

“Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships: An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in 

the Asia-Pacific,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2016, pp. 127, 204, available from 

https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/

publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf.

55. Brad Lendon, “US Marine F-35s to be ‘cornerstone’ in 

Japan, Pacific defense,” CNN, January 13, 2017, available from 

www.cnn.com/2017/01/12/politics/marines-f-35-stealth-jets-deploy-tojapan/index.html, accessed March 11, 2017; “Lightning II Strikes 

Iwakuni, F-35B Arrives,” The Official United States Marine Corps 

Public Website, available from www.marines.mil/News/NewsDisplay/Article/1052138/lightning-ii-strikes-iwakuni-f-35b-arrives/, 

accessed March 11, 2017.

56. Dennis B. Chan, “Public hearing set for clean 

up of Chiget mortar range,” Saipan Tribune, June 29, 

2015, available from www.saipantribune.com/index.php/

public-hearing-set-for-clean-up-of-chiget-mortar-range/.

57. Vincent K. Brooks, “U.S. Army Pacific And the Pacific 

Rebalance,” Army, Vol. 63, No. 10, October 2013, pp. 121-122, 124, 

126.

58. Jen Judson, “U.S. Army missile defense battery arrives in 

South Korea,” Defense News, March 7, 2017, available from www.

defensenews.com/articles/us-army-missile-defense-battery-arrives-insouth-korea, accessed March 11, 2017.

59. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army’s Multi-Domain Battle To Be 

Tested In PACOM, EUCOM Wargames,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2016, available from https://breakingdefense.com/2016/11/

armys-multi-domain-battle-tested-in-pacom-eucom-wargames/.

60. Steven L. Basham and Nelson D. Rouleau, “A Rebalance 

Strategy for Pacific Air Forces: Flight Plan to Runways and Relationships,” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1, January-February 2015, pp. 6-19, available from www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/

ADA622513.
328

61. Deborah L. James and Mark A. Welsh, USAF Posture 

Statement 2016, Posture Statement presented to the 114th Cong., 

2nd sess., Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, February 10, 2016, available from http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/

airpower/FY16_AF_PostureStatement_FINALversion2-2.pdf, 

accessed December 19, 2016.

62. Kris Osborn, “General: Air Force Must Rebalance ISR 

for ‘Contested Environments’,” Defense Tech, September 17, 

2013, available from https://www.defensetech.org/2013/09/17/

general-air-force-must-rebalance-isr-for-contested-environments/.

63. Jacqueline N. Deal, “Prospects for Peace: The View from 

Beijing,” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2016, pp. 9-10.

64. Ash Carter, “Remarks on ‘Building the First Link to the 

Force of the Future’ (George Washington University),” As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, George Washington 

University Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, 

DC, November 18, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News/

Speeches/Speech-View/Article/630415/remarks-on-building-the-firstlink-to-the-force-of-the-future-george-washington, accessed October 

18, 2016.

65. Gross, p. 3.

66. Douglas T. Stuart, The Pivot to Asia: Can It Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century? Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2016, 

p. 56.

67. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Patrick M. Cronin, Harry Krejsa, and 

Hannah Suh, “Counterbalance: Red Teaming the Rebalance in the 

Asia-Pacific,” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, November 14, 2016, p. 55, available from https://www.cnas.

org/publications/reports/counterbalance-red-teaming-the-rebalance-inthe-asia-pacific, accessed December 18, 2016.

68. Robert Farley, “China’s Military Has Nearly 3000 Aircraft. 

Here’s Why That Matters,” The Diplomat, May 17, 2016, available 

from https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chinas-military-has-nearly3000-aircraft-heres-why-that-matters/, accessed January 8, 2017.
329

69. Rapp-Hooper et al., p. 52.

70. Raunek Kantharia, “18 Anti-Piracy Weapons for Ships to 

Fight Pirates,” Marine Insight, January 18, 2013, available from 

www.marineinsight.com/?p=25340. Notable examples are the Active 

Denial System (ADS), which transmits directed E-M energy to 

cause a harmless heat sensation on the skin, or the Long Range 

Acoustic Device (LRAD), which uses a harmless pain inducing 

sound beam to achieve its effect.

71. Paul Mozur and Jane Perlez, “China Bets on Sensitive 

U.S. Start-Ups, Worrying the Pentagon,” The New York Times, 

March 22, 2017, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/

03/22/technology/china-defense-start-ups.html?nytmobile=0, accessed 

March 23, 2017.

72. Rapp-Hooper et al., p. 41.

73. Ibid., p. 55.

74. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 5-7.

75. Rapp-Hooper et al., p. 56.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 55.

78. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

79. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 5-7.

331

CHAPTER 11

A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE

NORTH KOREA PROBLEM

Frazariel I. Castro 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kim Jong Un is unlikely to give up his ballistic 

missile and nuclear weapons program in the current 

environment. The leader of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (DPRK) has declared that the United 

States and South Korea are existential threats to North 

Korea and has sought to build a nuclear capability that 

he views as essential to defending his country.

The United States, under former President Barack 

Obama, pursued a policy of strategic patience in which 

the United States maintained an open hand to North 

Korea. The United States was prepared to welcome 

the country back to the international community as 

a participant in a rules-based international order as 

long as DPRK ceased provocations and committed to 

a change in behavior as a precondition for formal diplomatic discussions. This policy, however, has failed 

to produce the desired results. Given this fact, President Donald Trump should consider pursuing dialogue with Kim Jong Un and remove pre-conditions 

for a North Korean commitment of denuclearization 

in order to allow diplomacy to start. The United States 

and South Korea must attempt to change Kim Jong 

Un’s mindset and strive to have him understand and 

publicly acknowledge that the United States is not 
332

seeking regime change. The United States should seek 

to first normalize relations, and then take nascent steps 

to limit Kim Jong Un’s nuclear aims.

INTRODUCTION

The strength of the U.S. military supports a diplomatic option to address the persistent problems of 

ballistic missile testing, nuclear weapons development, and hostile provocation that the DPRK or North 

Korea has created on the Korean peninsula.1 It is an 

option that removes the conditional requirement for 

Kim Jong Un, revered as North Korea’s Great Successor, Supreme Commander, or Great Leader to commit 

first to denuclearization before any dialogue between 

the United States and North Korea occurs.2 Both the 

Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea and U.S. 

forces stationed in South Korea are highly trained and 

ready to defeat any North Korean aggression. Armed 

with technologically superior equipment and weapons, they provide a formidable military deterrence 

while enjoying an overwhelming overmatch in capability over North Korean forces despite the size of the 

North Korean army. Moreover, the resolve of U.S. 

regional allies, South Korea and Japan, is unfaltering 

in their support for conflict resolution on the Korean 

peninsula. However, this alternate diplomatic option 

has neither been attempted nor advocated since Kim 

Jong Un came into power, and the North Korean threat 

lingers today. Indeed, Kim Jong Un ushered in 2017 

and the new year with a buoyant proclamation to his 

people that North Korea had entered a final stage for 

the test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).3

The message in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address 

continues the belligerent threats toward South Korea, 
333

Japan, and United States. His proclamation for an 

ICBM test later this year is in line with North Korea’s 

aggressive ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing of 2016. Kim Jong Un also reflected that it was a 

year in which North Korea “achieved the status of a 

nuclear power, a military giant, in the East which no 

enemy, however formidable, would dare to provoke.”4

While Kim Jong Un begins the 6th year of his lifetime 

rule of North Korea, there is some political uncertainty 

ahead with regard to the leadership of his perceived 

enemies. The impeachment of South Korean President Park Geun Hye over allegations that she violated 

their laws by conspiring with an old friend to extort 

private companies for personal gain has left the country in transition as the citizens prepare to elect a new 

president.5

It remains to be seen how the impact of President 

Park’s impeachment will change South Korean policy 

toward North Korea. In the United States, Trump 

assumed the office of president with the responsibility for shaping and developing U.S. foreign policy on 

North Korea. The current situation in Northeast Asia 

raises many questions and presents a few opportunities for consideration. How will U.S. policy change 

under Trump? How would Kim Jong Un respond to an 

offer of a different olive branch? What more can China 

do to help resolve the tension between its two southern 

neighbors?

This chapter argues for a U.S. approach beyond 

what was tried previously for resuming dialogue with 

North Korea in order to set conditions that will lead 

to formal diplomatic discussions and eventual talks 

to acknowledge and perhaps find options to meet 

each country’s national interests.6 This would include 

assuring North Korea that the United States does not 
334

pose an existential threat to either the Kim regime 

or the North Korean people.7 The security, stability, 

and their return to the international community as a 

member of a rules-based society are in the best interest 

of all nations. With their security affirmed, this chapter further argues that, if these initial diplomatic talks 

are successful in convincing North Korea of U.S. good 

will, they would no longer have a need or justification 

for their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the 

United States, South Korea, or Japan. 

To better understand Kim Jong Un and North Korea 

today, it is necessary to understand their background 

and the foundation of their past. This chapter will first, 

briefly summarize critical periods of North Korea’s 

recent history, starting with Japan’s annexation of the 

Korean peninsula early in the 20th century. It focuses 

on North Korea’s three prominent leaders, Kim Il 

Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, and how they 

established North Korea’s national identity, framed its 

political culture, and developed its ideological belief 

that greatly contributed to its resilience.8 Second, it 

will attempt to present Kim Jong Un’s worldview and 

perceptions with which he rationalizes the methods he 

is pursuing to ensure his regime’s survival. A review 

of the capabilities of North Korea’s conventional military and the advancement and of its nuclear development will further highlight the current threat it poses 

to South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Third, 

it will assess previous and developing U.S. strategies 

and options used and considered to dissuade North 

Korea from pursuing its nuclear weapons program. 

This includes United Nations (UN) sanctions, with 

specific emphasis on UN Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 2321. It also looks at the previous U.S. policy 

of strategic patience, current efforts at deterrence and 
335

assurance, and Trump’s developing foreign policy.9

Finally, a recommendation is out forward that diplomacy supported by the strength of the U.S. military 

is an option to consider for achieving peace through 

strength.10

BACKGROUND

A brief historical review beginning in the early 20th 

century provides necessary context for understanding 

both South Korea and North Korea. Having won its 

war with China in 1894-1895 and later was victorious 

over Russia in 1904-1905, Japan assumed control over 

the Korean peninsula in 1905, formally annexing the 

entire peninsula in 1910. The Korean people underwent 

a harsh and brutal existence under Japan’s colonial 

rule until the end of World War II.11 The Allied victory 

over Japan and the beginning of the Cold War between 

the United States and the Soviet Union brought forth 

the division between North Korea and South Korea.12

As North Korea and its founding leader Kim Il Sung 

developed under Soviet communist influence, South 

Korea benefitted from western and U.S. assistance.13

The Korean war, fought from 1950-1953, resulted in an 

armistice which brought an end to the fighting, but not 

the war.14

Kim Il Sung established the foundations for the 

Kim regime and North Korea’s ideological and autocratic rule. He introduced the core concepts of juche 

(self-reliance) and songun (military first) politics.15 Kim 

Il Sung remained in power until his death in 1994. His 

son, Kim Jong Il had already assumed control in 1980 

but only formally became North Korea’s Dear Leader 

when his father died.16 Kim Jong Un inherited control 
336

and the current rule of North Korea when Kim Jong Il 

died in 2011.17

Identity

Kim Jong Un’s rule, the family legacy of the Kim 

Regime, and the authoritarian state government are 

the foundation of North Korea’s collective and national 

identity. North Koreans are culturally tied to and share 

a transnational identity with their South Korean neighbors. North Korea is often labeled as a hermit kingdom. Its population is quite homogeneous and reflects 

North Korea’s regional identity.18

The North Korean government fosters a cult of personality in Kim Jong Un, and it is an essential element 

of its propaganda apparatus. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong 

Il are immortalized with tributes and statues throughout the country, a strategy they used to solidify their 

power and position as leaders. They intertwined their 

background with their country’s history and mythology.19 It now appears Kim Jong Un is developing his 

own cult of personality as he, too, will be honored 

along with his father and grandfather in a monument 

that will be built on Mount Paektu, a sacred mythological point of origin site that links them to a bloodline 

that legitimizes their leadership.20

North Korea is an autocratic communist country. 

There is no democracy in the DPRK. Kim Jong Un 

has ruled with absolute power since he became the 

country’s leader on December 17, 2011. Hence, North 

Koreans lack many basic freedoms. For example, the 

North Korean government does not allow its people to 

practice freedom of religion to include its traditional 

religions of Buddhism or Confucianism.21 The North 

Korean government sponsors religious groups in order 
337

to create a façade that the country allows religious freedom. This is an example of North Korea’s oppressive 

political culture.

Kim Jong Un is the leader of North Korea’s major 

political party, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). 

He ran unopposed during the country’s last election 

held in March 2014. While there are two other minor 

political parties, the KWP controls both the Chondoist Chongu Party and the Social Democratic Party. 

Even the attempt to conduct elections highlights the 

hollowness of the North Korean government toward 

a democratic process. Likewise, the members of the 

Supreme People’s Assembly, a unicameral legislative 

body, are really selected by the KWP. The KWP also 

chooses Supreme Court judges, although indirectly, as 

the Supreme People’s Assembly designates the judges 

to their positions.22

The North Korean government maintains a staterun media. It includes the Korean Central Broadcasting 

Station and the Voice of Korea that are instrumental 

in communicating government propaganda to the 

masses.23 The government prohibits independent 

media outlets from operating. The government takes 

steps to ensure radios and televisions are pre-tuned to 

the government stations. In addition, the government 

blocks foreign radio and television broadcasts to prevent outside influence.24

North Korea, notwithstanding its insulated 

national identity and its dictatorial political culture, 

has remained quite resilient. It appears that globalization has not had a great impact on North Korea and 

its people. As stated previously, North Korea’s staterun media and propaganda contributes greatly to this 

desired state. North Korea has been surprisingly successful at keeping itself relatively isolated from the 
338

international community. There are only a few privileged to have access to a fledging intranet, North 

Korea’s equivalent of the Internet. The ruling elite, 

primarily those who live in North Korea’s capital city 

of Pyongyang, are among the 30 percent of the population that have routine access to electricity. They also 

enjoy a better standard of living than the rest of the 

population. In contrast, the majority of North Korea’s 

people have endured deprivation due to famine and 

the shortage of food.25

North Korea’s economic structure does not provide 

them needed relief. The North Korean government centrally manages all aspects of its economy and receives 

most of the revenue. There is no private enterprise. 

China is North Korea’s largest trading partner. North 

Korea exports include coal, iron, iron ore, and weaponry. Its imports include petroleum, cooking coal, 

textiles, and grain.26 North Korea, at the expense and 

labor of its people, also generates a significant amount 

of revenue by maintaining an extensive workforce 

employed abroad. Even with these limited business 

and economic dealings, North Korea’s engagement 

with the rest of the world remains marginal.

However, it must also be noted that North Korea 

does have formal diplomatic relations with select 

nations. North Korea has a Permanent Mission to the 

United Nations as well as in other countries. There is 

no mutual diplomatic representation between North 

Korea and the United States. The Swedish Embassy 

in North Korea represents the United States. It serves 

as its consular protecting power for American interests.27 Even if North Korea wanted to seek diplomacy 

and engage in dialogue with the international community, its continued ballistic missile and nuclear weapon 

testing have impeded future opportunities. This is 
339

apparent with the routine worldwide condemnation 

of North Korean provocations.

NORTH KOREA’S WORLDVIEW AND ITS 

PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Kim Jong Un and the North Korean Government 

have espoused a view of the United States and South 

Korea as existential threats. They see themselves under 

a nuclear threat, and the annual joint U.S. and South 

Korean military training exercises, for example, are 

actually seen as wargames for a prelude to an attack 

on their nation.28 They also see U.S. forces in South 

Korea as an aggressive interventionist and occupying 

force that is a challenge to North Korea’s reunification goals.29 Therefore, North Korea focuses its strategic policy on building up its self-defense capability. 

North Korea believes that having a nuclear force and 

pre-emptive strike capability is essential to defend 

their peace and security.30 Additionally, the North 

Korean constitution, updated in 2012, makes tribute to 

Kim Jong Il’s achievement in administering songun or 

“military first” politics which led to North Korea’s successful achievement of becoming a nuclear state and 

an unchallengeable military power.31

The North Korean military is the source of power 

for Kim Jong Un and the country’s ruling elite. They 

maintain control of the people through the military. 

With an estimated strength of 1.19 million active military personnel, North Korea has the third largest 

armed force in Asia.32 China has the largest armed 

force with 2.33 million and India is second, with 1.34 

million active personnel.33 The Korean People’s Army 

has an estimated 1.02 million service members, the 

navy has an estimated 60,000 personnel, the air force 
340

has 110,000, and the active paramilitary force (security troops including border guards and public safety 

personnel) is at 189,000. North Korea also has approximately 600,000 reservists and a 5.7 million reserve 

paramilitary force (provincial workers and peasant red 

guard).34

The number of personnel in North Korea’s armed 

forces appears quite formidable. However, in order 

to offset its mostly aged and obsolescent equipment, 

North Korea would need a large armed force to counter 

the technologically superior military equipment of 

the United States and South Korean military.35 North 

Korea also maintains a credible deterrent of its own 

with the thousands of artillery pieces it has positioned 

across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This poses a 

great concern to the United States and South Korea as 

they have the range to reach Seoul and its millions of 

inhabitants.36

North Korea has four types of ballistic missiles 

that have been previously tested and deemed operational. The Hwasong-5 has a range of 300 kilometers 

(km) and the capacity to carry a 1,000 kilogram (kg) 

warhead. The Hwasong-6 has a range of 500 km and 

the capacity to carry a 700 kg warhead. The Rodong, 

capable of striking Japan, has a range of 1,300 km and 

the capacity to carry a 700 kg warhead. The Musudan 

has an even further range of 3,000 km and the capacity 

to carry a 650 kg warhead. The Taepodong-1, flighttested but not deemed operational, has a range of 2,500 

km and the capacity to carry a 500 kg warhead. Two 

potential ICBMs still under development and testing 

include the KN-08 and Taepodong-2. The KN-08 may 

have a potential range of 6,000 km and the capacity to 

carry a 750-1,000 kg warhead. The Taepodong-2 may 

have a potential range of 6,700 km and the capacity to 
341

carry a 700-1,000 kg warhead.37 In addition to the platform based launched missiles, North Korea continues 

to develop its capabilities with mobile launchers and 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests to 

date, two under Kim Jong Il and three under Kim Jong 

Un. Kim Jong Il’s first test occurred on October 9, 2006, 

which had a yield of .48 kilotons and a 4.3 magnitude. 

For comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima yielded about 15 kilotons. On May 25, 2009, 

North Korea conducted a second nuclear test resulting in a 7-kiloton yield and a 4.7 magnitude. The three 

tests under Kim Jong Un occurred on February 12, 

2013 (12.2 kilotons/5.1 magnitude), January 6, 2016 

(11.3 kilotons/5.1 magnitude), and September 9, 2016 

(17.8 kilotons/5.3 magnitude). During their respective 

periods of nuclear testing, Kim Jong Il launched 19 ballistic missiles, 7 in 2006 and 12 in 2009. Kim Jong Un, in 

stark contrast, launched 71 ballistic missiles from 2013 

through 2016. Thirty-four of these launches occurred 

in 2016 alone.38

It is obvious that the technological advancement of 

the North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program is a priority for Kim Jong Un. It is believed 

that North Korea may already have a nuclear arsenal 

inventory of 10 to 16 nuclear weapons.39 Moreover, 

North Korea may have enough fissile material capable of producing an additional 35 nuclear warheads 

as early as 2020.40 Fortunately, recent North Korean 

ballistic missile testing appears to indicate that North 

Korea has yet to perfect their technological advances.41

While North Korea does not yet have a capable ICBM 

delivery system that can be armed with a miniaturized nuclear warhead, they continue to learn more and 

become bolder with every new test. Kim Jong Un will 
342

continue the aggressive development and testing of 

rocket engine and propulsion systems, missile re-entry, guidance targeting, and warhead miniaturization 

in order to attain a credible threat.

U.S. POLICY, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, 

AND DETERRENCE

Early in his first administration, former President 

Obama expressed a desire and willingness to engage 

in dialogue with North Korea. Rather than returning 

the sentiment, North Korea responded with provocative missile tests. Since then, the United States followed a policy of strategic patience. The United States 

maintained an open hand to North Korea and would 

welcome the country back to the international community as a participant in a rules-based world society 

as long as they ceased provocations and committed 

to a change in behavior, as a precondition for formal 

diplomatic discussions.42 Obviously, this has not happened. Shortly after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in 

September 2016, then Director of National Intelligence 

James Clapper made the assessment that U.S. policy 

has failed and that North Korea would not willingly 

give up its nuclear program as it ensures their survival.43 This would be a continuing problem for Trump 

and his administration to address.

Kim Jong Un managed to occupy much of Trump’s 

attention during his first few months in office. On 

February 11, 2017, North Korea launched a mediumor intermediate range ballistic missile that flew for 

310 miles before falling into the sea. This was North 

Korea’s first missile launch of 2017 and the first challenge for Trump.44 A few days later, on February 13, 

2017, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, was 
343

killed in Malaysia. North Korea allegedly ordered the 

assassination.45 On March 6, 2017, North Korea simultaneously launched four ballistic missiles. Three fell 

into the Sea of Japan and the fourth fell close to the 

waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).46 On 

March 19, 2017, North Korea celebrated the testing of 

a rocket engine that could be further developed for an 

ICBM to reach the United States.47 Although another 

missile launch on March 22, 2017, failed when the 

rocket exploded upon launch, the test occurring just a 

few days after a rocket engine test highlighted North 

Korea’s increased technological capability in their ballistic missile program.48 Despite all these events, the 

Trump administration reiterated U.S. unyielding support to South Korea and Japan against North Korean 

aggression.

Upon taking office, Trump spoke with the South 

Korean Acting President Hwang Kyo Ahn to assure 

him of the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea 

with all means to include extended military deterrence.49 Immediately after the February North Korea 

missile launch, Trump, in a joint statement with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stated the security 

of Japan against the North Korean ballistic missile and 

nuclear threat remains crucial to the United States.50

All three leaders agreed to sustain bilateral and trilateral cooperation in order to counter North Korea’s confrontational and hostile actions.51

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis also reaffirmed U.S. 

commitment to the security of South Korea and Japan, 

and emphasized the importance of the region by 

making his first overseas visit as Secretary of Defense 

to meet with these important allies in February 2017. In 

South Korea, Mattis cited the threat of North Korea’s 

continued missile and nuclear weapons program 
344

development. He guaranteed the U.S. commitment for 

defending its ally, and pointedly remarked, “any attack 

on the United States or on our allies will be defeated 

and any use of nuclear weapons would be met with 

the response that would be effective and overwhelming.”52 In Japan, Mattis assured Prime Minister Abe 

that the mutual defense treaty between the United 

States and Japan held firm now and would remain so 

well into the future.53 While Trump and Mattis echoed 

the U.S. long-standing commitment for the security 

of South Korea and Japan, it is through Secretary of 

State Rex Tillerson and his visit to the East Asia and 

Pacific region in March 2017 that perhaps a burgeoning U.S. policy toward North Korea may be seen as 

forthcoming.

At this point, it is prudent first to understand the 

basic underpinnings of Trump’s direction for U.S. foreign policy. American interests and American national 

security are at the forefront of the Trump administration’s America First Foreign Policy. Essential to this 

policy is the principle of “peace through strength,” 

which “will make possible a stable, more peaceful 

world with less conflict and more common ground.”54

The policy highlights the defeat of the Islamic States 

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as the highest priority and 

requires the rebuilding of the U.S. armed forces in 

order to attain military dominance. In support of this, 

Trump, in a presidential memorandum, directed: “to 

pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of 

the United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces.”55

Notably, foreign policy places emphasis on diplomacy. 

“The world must know that we do not go abroad in 

search of enemies, that we are always happy when 

old enemies become friends, and when old friends 

become allies.”56 Yet, diplomacy does not appear to be 
345

the primary approach voiced by either Tillerson or the 

U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, in dealing 

with North Korea.

On his first official visit to Japan, South Korea, 

and China, Tillerson met with senior leaders from 

each country and reaffirmed Trump’s commitment to 

strengthen alliances and partnerships, and to increase 

and improve U.S. security interests in the region.57

During a press conference with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, Tillerson advocated for the development of a different approach to address the North 

Korean threat. He also extended indirect assurances to 

North Korea.

North Korea and its people need not fear the United States 

or their neighbors in the region who seek only to live in 

peace with North Korea. With this in mind, the United 

States calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs and refrain from any further 

provocations.58

In addition, Tillerson believes that U.S. efforts 

toward diplomacy over the last 20 years have failed 

to change North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. He stated 

a new approach is required to encourage North Korea 

to take a different path.59 During his engagement with 

South Korean Foreign Minister Yun, Byung Se, Tillerson stated, “let me be very clear: the policy of strategic 

patience has ended.”60 The United States would keep all 

options, to include military, on the table while exploring new diplomatic, security, and economic measures 

to counter the escalating North Korean threat.61 It is still 

too early to determine any specifics of how Trump’s 

North Korean policy will differ from his predecessors, 

but the initial statements from Tillerson have not indicated anything new. On his last stop in China, which 
346

included a meeting with President Xi Jinping, Tillerson 

and Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted the mutual 

need for both countries to prevent any type of conflict 

on the Korean peninsula.62

Furthermore, Haley stated the United States is 

unwilling to revive and enter into Six-Party Talks. On 

engagement with North Korea, she acknowledged 

she does not interact with the North Korean envoy to 

the UN because North Korea has not yet displayed 

any positive action to address U.S. concerns. Rather, 

Haley outlined U.S. plans to engage China and Russia 

to become more involved in pressuring North Korea 

to stop its weapons development program.63 Tillerson, 

on China’s role to encourage North Korea to give up 

its nuclear weapons program, stated that “China is a 

major source of economic trade and activity with North 

Korea,” and the United States expects the Chinese “to 

fulfill its obligations and fully implement the sanctions 

called for in the UN resolutions.”64

With regard to economic sanctions, the United 

States has always led efforts to compel North Korea to 

stop its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program. 

On November 30, 2016, the UN approved UNSCR 

2321. This UN resolution approved additional economic sanctions against North Korea as a response to 

the fifth nuclear test it conducted on September 9, 2016. 

The sanctions were designed to eliminate significant 

sources of North Korean revenue such as its exports of 

coal, iron, and iron ore.65 Time will tell if the UNSCR 

2321 will be successful. Kim Jong Un and North Korea 

have weathered previous UNSCR sanctions imposed 

against their country. This is evidence of both the Kim 

Regime and North Korea’s resiliency.

The United States also recognized China’s influence, 

albeit waning, over North Korea. China supported 
347

UNSCR 2321 and made it known to North Korea that it 

opposed its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. 

Moreover, in January 2017, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a 

white paper on China’s policies on Asia-Pacific security cooperation. It recognized the nuclear issue on 

the Korean Peninsula as a destabilizing situation for 

the region. It also stated as its position that “China is 

committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its 

peace and stability, and settlement of the issue through 

dialogue and consultation.”66 Both the North Korean 

New Year’s announcement of launching an ICBM and 

the U.S. counter of threatening to shoot them down 

prompted the Chinese Foreign Ministry to pronounce 

their concern and urged both sides not to intensify 

already heightened tensions.67

The strongest and most visible U.S. deterrence are 

the 28,500 U.S. armed forces personnel stationed in 

South Korea. The U.S. 8th Army strength is at 19,200 

and the 7th Air Force is at 8,800 personnel.68 South 

Korea has an active armed force of 655,000 personnel. 

Of that, 522,000 are in the army, 68,000 in the navy, 

and 4,500 are paramilitary. South Korea also has 4.5 

million in the reserve and another 3 million as reserve 

paramilitary (Civilian Defense Corps).69 In response 

to North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear weapons 

test, the United States and South Korea conducted a 

show of force with a combined low-level flight with 

two B-1 strategic bombers that flew from Andersen 

Air Force Base, Guam. A South Korean F-15K fighter 

jet and U.S. F-16 fighter accompanied the B-1Bs during 

their flight over Osan Air Base on September 13, 2016.70

This demonstrated U.S. resolve in support of its South 

Korean ally and its ability to respond to North Korean 

provocation.
348

As a deterrent, South Korea is also accelerating 

the deployment of a three-pronged defensive system 

developed to counter a North Korean nuclear attack. 

The three components of this defensive system are 

comprised of a pre-emptive strike system referred to 

as a Kill Chain, the Korean Air and Missile Defense 

(KAMD), and the Korea Massive Punishment and 

Retaliation (KMPR) plan. The Kill Chain, requiring surveillance satellites, cruise missiles, and air-to-ground 

missiles will target North Korean missile and nuclear 

weapons facilities if they pose an imminent threat. The 

KAMD will provide anti-ballistic missile defense. The 

KMPR response, using surface-to-surface ballistic and 

cruise missiles will target North Korea’s military leadership. Originally planned for deployment in the mid2020s, South Korea is taking steps to have all systems 

in place as soon as possible.71 The South Koreans also 

have another deterrent focused on Kim Jong Un and 

his military elite. The South Korean Defense Ministry, 

as a signal to Pyongyang, also announced it would 

hasten plans to establish a brigade with a specific mission to target the North Korean command and control 

if wartime hostilities resumed. Often referred to as a 

“decapitation unit,” if activated, their targets include 

Kim Jong Un and his military leaders.72

In July 2016, the United States and South Korea 

agreed to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) missile battery to South Korea as an 

added protective measure against any North Korea ballistic missile threats.73 Former Secretary of Defense Ash 

Carter stated the North Korean “nuclear weapons and 

ballistic missile defense programs are a serious threat” 

and the United States, in order to defend the Korean 

peninsula, its friends and U.S. interests, would shoot 

down any missiles that threatened the United States 
349

or its allies.74 Both China and Russia have opposed the 

introduction of THAAD onto the Korean Peninsula, 

stating it would destabilize the security in the region, 

increase the potential for conflict, and further an arms 

race.75 China stated the deployment of THAAD would 

undermine efforts to maintain the peace and stability 

on the Korean Peninsula.76 In light of this, what other 

options can the United States consider to address the 

North Korean threat?

RECOMMENDATION FOR AN ALTERNATE 

OPTION

Trump should consider pursuing dialogue with 

Kim Jong Un and remove pre-conditions for a North 

Korean commitment of denuclearization in order to 

allow diplomacy to start. The U.S. policy of strategic 

patience should not be continued. Kim Jong Un will 

not willingly give up his ballistic missile and nuclear 

weapons program. North Korean leaders will continue 

to opine the United States and South Korea are an existential threat. Kim Jong Un believes having a strong 

military and a credible nuclear capability allows him to 

counter this threat. The United States and South Korea 

must attempt to change Kim Jong Un’s narrative and 

mindset and strive to have him understand and publicly acknowledge that the United States is not seeking 

regime change. Rather, the United States welcomes 

North Korea’s return to the international community.

Although the United States has always maintained 

its willingness for diplomacy with North Korea, it has 

been contingent on North Korea’s full commitment for 

denuclearization before dialogue could even begin. 

To date, this pre-conditional requirement has not led 

to effective talks with North Korea. While the United 
350

States and South Korea maintain a formidable military 

deterrent, which likely keeps Kim Jong Un from going 

beyond brinkmanship displays and provocation, they 

have not changed North Korea’s current path. Additionally, the UNSCR’s imposing economic sanctions, 

as well as the unilateral economic sanctions imposed 

by the United States, South Korea, and Japan have 

yet to bring North Korea back to negotiations.77 Of 

note, the belief that the Kim regime would simply collapse has long been hoped for by many, but has yet to 

materialize.

Initiating dialogue with the intent of beginning the 

normalization of relations and diplomacy should be 

pursued in order to reduce tension in this region. This 

does not weaken the U.S. position in any manner. To 

be sure, the United States has the military advantage 

and capability to execute a change in the North Korean 

regime if it so desired. However, diplomacy and direct 

engagement is the better approach. Furthermore, other 

western nations such as the United Kingdom have 

formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. This certainly warrants further investigation, and the United 

States should consider doing the same. In normalizing relations, it would allow all parties to understand 

their respective interests. The U.S. intent is not to overthrow the Kim regime, but rather to have North Korea 

return to the world community and participate in a 

rules-based society. If North Korea publicly acknowledges this U.S. position, North Korea would no longer 

have the argument to attempt to justify its own nuclear 

deterrent against the United States. Normalized relations may lead to an end to the Korean war.
351

CONCLUSION

It will not be an easy task to begin any type of dialogue with North Korea. This recommendation will 

not likely be a popular option for consideration particularly considering the North Korean withdrawal from 

the Six-Party talks in 2009. After all, for many years 

now, the United States has attempted to address the 

North Korean threat using an unsuccessful policy of 

strategic patience, international and unilateral economic sanctions that have not been enforced by all 

countries, and through strong military deterrence. 

Many are likely to argue that any negotiation without 

first attaining a North Korean commitment for denuclearization weakens the U.S. position. This is a fallacy. 

The United States has the military capability to destroy 

North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear facilities as 

well as the ability to essentially end Kim Jong Un’s 

reign. This comes with significant risk. Therefore, the 

United States should seek to first normalize relations 

and then take nascent steps to limit Kim Jong Un’s 

nuclear aims. 

If the United States does not consider this recommendation, it will likely end up where it is presently 

heading. The United States and North Korea will not 

engage in dialogue or diplomacy, belligerent overtures 

and brinkmanship will continue, and Kim Jong Un will 

steadily increase his ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology. It is plausible that, within the next 5 

to 10 years, North Korea will attain the technological capability to launch successfully an ICBM armed 

with a nuclear warhead that can strike the United 

States. Minimizing options for diplomacy will lead 

the United States toward a path of increased tension, 

greater chances of miscalculation, and likely hostile 
352

military engagement that could reignite the conflict on 

the Korean peninsula. It is a future that must not come 

to fruition.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, p. 10.

American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong 

military, remain essential to deterring future acts of interstate aggression and provocation by reaffirming our 

security commitments to allies and partners, investing in 

their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on 

those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental 

international norms, and embedding our actions within 

wider regional strategies.

2. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, 

New York: HarperCollins, 2012, p. 98.

3. Kim Jong Un, “Kim Jong Un’s 2017 New Year’s Address,” 

trans. and pub. by The National Committee on North Korea, 

January 1, 2017, available from http://www.ncnk.org/resources/

news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jonguns-2017-new-years-address, accessed January 5, 2017.

4. Ibid.

5. Ankit Panda, “South Korean Constitutional Court Unanimously Upholds Park Geun-hye Impeachment,” The Diplomat, 

March 10, 2017, available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/

south-korean-constitutional-court-unanimously-upholds-park-geunhye-impeachment/, accessed March 22, 2017.

6. Obama, p. 2, Enduring national interests include: 

1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. 

allies and partners; 

2. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in 

an open international economic system that promotes 

opportunity and prosperity; 
353

3. Respect for universal values at home and around the 

world; and 

4. A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. 

leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity 

through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges; 

Kim Jong Un. In his address, Kim Jong Un espouses North Korean 

interests for pursuing nuclear weapons.

We will continue to build up our self-defence capability, the 

pivot of which is the nuclear forces, and the capability for 

preemptive strike as long as the United States and its vassal 

forces keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as 

they do not stop their war games they stage at our doorstep 

disguising them as annual events. We will defend peace and 

security of our state at all costs and by our own efforts, and 

make a positive contribution to safeguarding global peace 

and stability.

7. Kim Jong Un. In his address, Kim Jong Un perceives hostile 

U.S. intent toward North Korea: 

We must put an end to the moves for aggression and 

intervention by the foreign forces including the United States 

that is occupying south [SIC] Korea and tries to realize the 

strategy for achieving hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 

. . . the United States must no longer cling to the scheme of 

whipping up national estrangement by inciting the antireunification forces in south [sic] Korea to confrontation 

with the fellow countrymen and war.

8. Jiyul Kim, Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 

18, 2009, pp. 9-10, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=919, accessed December 13 2016. This chapter 

uses the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy 

(ACFSP), which “identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to 

be of fundamental importance in determining political and strategic action and behavior and thus are of importance in policy 

and strategy formulation and outcomes.” The dimensions are 

identity, political culture, and resilience. “Identity: the basis for 

defining identity and its linkage to interests. Political Culture: the 
354

structure of power and decision making. Resilience: the capacity 

or ability to resist, adapt, or succumb to external forces.”

9. Cha, p. 296. Obama initiated “strategic patience” policy.

This policy essentially stated that the United States remains 

committed to diplomacy―that is, the United States seeks 

a peaceful diplomatic solution to the denuclearization of 

the Korean peninsula, and that it remains committed to 

the Six-Party Talks and to fulfilling its commitments in the 

denuclearization agreements of 2005 and 2007. However, 

in the face of the string of DPRK provocations in 2009 and 

2010, Washington was willing to wait for a period of time 

in which Pyongyang could demonstrate some positive and 

constructive behavior and willingness to negotiate in earnest.

10. Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press 

Secretary, The White House, January 27, 2017, available from 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/presidentialmemorandum-rebuilding-us-armed-forces, accessed March 19, 2017. 

To pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of the 

United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces.

11. Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia, 3rd Ed., London, UK: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 300.

12. Cha, p. 7.

13. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea,” The World 

Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, updated 

November 14, 2017, available from https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html, accessed December 11, 

2017; Cha, p. 70.

14. Mason, p. 3.

15. Cha, pp. 37, 59.

16. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea.”

17. Ibid.; Cha, p. 13.

18. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea.”
355

19. Cha, pp. 72-73, 75.

20. Hamish Macdonald, “North Korea to erect first major 

monument to Kim Jong Un,” NK News.org, January 12, 2017, 

available from https://www.nknews.org/2017/01/north-korea-to-erectfirst-major-monument-to-kim-jong-un/, accessed January 13, 2017.

21. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea.”

22. Ibid.

23. Cha, p. 85.

24. Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea.”

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.; Cha, pp. 2-3.

28. Kim Jong Un.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. The Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea, trans. text, and archived by The National Committee on 

North Korea, 2012, available from http://www.ncnk.org/resources/

publications/DPRK_Constitution_2012.pdf, accessed January 8, 

2017.

32. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities 

and Defence Economics, 2015, London, UK: Routledge, 2015, p. 261.

33. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, p. 486.

34. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

35. Ibid., p. 261.

36. Cha, pp. 11-12, 212.
356

37. Simon Scarr, Weiyi Cai, and Wen Foo, “Nuclear North 

Korea,” Reuters Graphics, December 30, 2016, available from 

http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/NORTHKOREANUCLEAR/0100316P2NM/index.html, accessed January 17, 2017.

38. Ibid.

39. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2015: The Annual Review of World Affairs, London, UK: 

Routledge, 2015, pp. 367-368.

40. Ibid., p. 368.

41. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, p. 261.

42. Cha, p. 274. Cha wrote, “Obama promised no serious 

diplomacy until the North showed evidence of better behavior, 

ceasing provocations against the South and refraining from more 

missile and nuclear tests.”

43. Geoff Dyer, “US spy chief admits North Korea policy 

has failed,” Financial Times, October 26, 2016, available from 

https://www.ft.com/content/1a2eb642-9b2c-11e6-b8c6-568a43813464, 

accessed January 7, 2017.

44. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Fires Ballistic Missile, Challenging Trump,” The New York Times, February 11, 2017, available 

from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/world/asia/north-koreamissile-test-trump.html?_r=1, accessed March 20, 2017.

45. Joshua Berlinger, “Malaysia blames North Korea for Kim 

Jong Nam’s death,” CNN, March 8, 2017, available from http://

www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/asia/malaysia-north-korea-blame-kim-jongnam/, accessed March 20, 2017.

46. Ayako Mie and Jesse Johnson, “Abe says latest North 

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47. Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “US: North Korean rocket 

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64. “Press Availability With Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio 

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359

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69. Ibid., pp. 263-266, 486.

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76. The State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security 

Cooperation,” China’s position on THAAD deployment to South 

Korea. “Such an act would seriously damage the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of China and other 

countries in the region, and run counter to the efforts for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”

77. Choe Sang-Hun, “China Suspends All Coal Imports from 

North Korea,” The New York Times, February 18, 2017, available 

from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-koreachina-coal-imports-suspended.html?_r=0, accessed March 25, 2017. 

China’s action to suspend all coal imports from North Korea may 

prove more crippling to North Korea. The decision came shortly 

after the assassination of Kim Jong Nam and North Korean ballistic missile tests.
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CHAPTER 12

KOREAN PENINSULA: UPGRADING 

THE DENUCLEARIZATION STATUS QUO

James L. Conner 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite years of concerted effort, the United States 

and the international community have been unable to 

persuade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK or North Korea) to abandon its quest for 

nuclear weapons. To date, there is little to no progress toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, 

and the DPRK remains a key challenge for the global 

nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is time the United 

States and the international community admit that the 

current approach is not working. Rather than continue 

the policy of strategic patience, which is obviously 

inadequate, the United States must change course 

and pursue a three-pronged approach to dealing with 

North Korea that includes pressuring China to do 

more, enabling the South Koreans to have more military control, and applying new economic pressures to 

the North.

INTRODUCTION

For years, the United States has led international 

efforts to pressure the DPRK to abandon its nuclear 

weapon and missile development and stop its export 

of ballistic missile technology. These extensive efforts 

have not deterred the DPRK from further development 
362

and procurement of nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the 

DPRK carried out tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and in January and September 2016.1

 To date, there has been little 

to no progress toward denuclearization of the Korean 

peninsula and the DPRK remains a key challenge to 

the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.2

Each successive North Korean experiment and test 

causes a greater potential for catastrophic results and 

failure. Further, the DPRK is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the capability to 

strike the Continental United States (CONUS). This 

development could further destabilize East Asia and 

enhance the risk of uncontrolled proliferation in and 

beyond the region. This potential reality may force the 

new U.S. president into an even more difficult decision concerning deterring the DPRK. Furthermore, the 

DPRK’s ability to evade sanctions increases year after 

year. Even with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) expanded legal authority, 

sanctions have had little to no effect on stopping the 

DPRK from further nuclear weapons research, development, and testing.3

 In short, the options available to 

the United States are narrowing and those available to 

the DPRK are expanding. Reversing these trends will 

require an urgent shift in U.S. policy.4

It should be clear that the status quo policy is not 

enough to achieve the goal of a denuclearized Korean 

Peninsula. The crucial question, therefore, is what are 

the requirements necessary for updating the current 

approach? Diplomatically, the United States must 

persuade China to take a tougher stance with its policies toward the DPRK. A denuclearized Korean Peninsula is accomplished through a renewed dialogue 

and collaboration with China. China, as the DPRK’s 

number one supporter, must effectively engage the 
363

DPRK through a series of collaborative steps designed 

to pressure the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons 

program. Militarily, the United States must accelerate 

the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) 

to South Korea. Doing so will ensure that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has the military it needs, assisted 

by U.S. enduring and bridging capabilities. Further, 

OPCON transfer will allow for U.S. strategic flexibility 

with its forces in the Korea Theater of operations and 

allows for a ROK-led unified Korea if the conditions 

permit. Finally, economically, the United States and 

the international community must do more in disrupting the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy System. This 

system brings in millions of dollars of luxury goods 

for paying off the DPRK elite. Excessive sanctions and 

penalties for those who support this economic system 

may assist in eliminating DPRK’s access to hard currency and luxury goods.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS: TAKING CHINA TO 

TASK

The United States and the international community have failed to meet their critical denuclearization objectives: to stop or end the DPRK’s expanding 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and 

prevent it from proliferating nuclear weapon and 

missile technology to dangerous states around the 

world. The DPRK continues to refuse any risks to their 

nuclear weapons development by adopting political or 

economic reforms. Kim Jong Un’s byungjin policy sets 

DPRK economic growth with nuclear development as 

equal priorities.5 Despite the tensions paramount in 

this policy, the fear for regime survival discourages 
364

any kind of genuine North Korean rapprochement 

with the ROK.

China’s reluctance to pressure the DPRK has 

allowed the regime to destabilize further a region critical to U.S. national security interests and to threaten 

the safety of U.S. allies. China has accounted for 

approximately half of the DPRK’s overseas trade in 

the past decade. In 2014, bilateral trade between China 

and the DPRK amounted to $6.86 billion, and made up 

about 70 percent of the DPRK’s external trade (exports 

$2.84 billion, imports $4.02 billion).6 Since the early 

1990s, China has accounted for almost 90 percent of 

the DPRK’s energy imports and as much as 45 percent 

of its food imports. Mineral exports to China produce a 

major revenue stream for the DPRK; exports of anthracite, a higher-grade quality coal used for power generation, for example, have brought in more than one 

billion dollars annually since 2011.7

The diplomatic, economic, and military steps 

required to deter and contain the DPRK regime also 

threaten to aggravate U.S. tensions with China. Developments within the past year have altered the DPRK 

problem in many ways. Although China did consent to 

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 

2321 to strengthen significantly the sanctions regime 

that restricts arms transfers and limits trade with the 

DPRK, China remains the DPRK’s number one trading 

partner. Pyongyang’s actions and Beijing’s reluctance 

to support fully the UNSC resolutions in the past have 

provided incentive for closer military cooperation 

between the United States and the ROK. For example, 

the United States and the ROK have agreed to deploy 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

battery to strengthen missile defense on the peninsula.8

 To counter this alliance cohesiveness, the DPRK 
365

is accelerating the development of a capability to strike 

CONUS, as well as U.S. allies, with a nuclear capable 

warhead delivered by an ICBM. These developments 

present the United States with an exigent threat of a 

DPRK that can strike at the United States—but also 

with new opportunities to halt the cycle of provocation and prevent the DPRK from achieving this capability. China’s policy toward the DPRK can critically 

affect change and the fate of the region. If China, the 

United States, and the international community can 

work together to pressure the DPRK to abandon its 

nuclear weapons program and mitigate its threatening 

military posture, a stable and prosperous Northeast 

Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge. If they 

cannot, the DPRK’s recklessness will further strain the 

U.S.-China relationship and destabilize a region vital 

to both countries’ interests.

For this reason, encouraging a transformation of 

China’s policy toward the DPRK should be the administration’s top priority in its relations with China. This 

transformation should be accomplished through a 

sequence of steps to increase gradually the pressure 

on China to support a cooperative approach, which, 

in turn, would pressure the DPRK to eliminate its 

nuclear capability. The United States, in collaboration 

with China, should present the DPRK with a sharper 

choice: seek a negotiated settlement to return to compliance with UN resolutions on nuclear weapons or 

face severe and escalating consequences. These steps 

should be sequenced carefully and deliberately so as 

to ramp up pressure incrementally on the DPRK. This 

will send a direct and credible signal to the DPRK 

that the United States and the international community will continually increase pressure until serious 

talks or negotiations resume. In addition, the United 
366

States should also expand the trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation to enforce sanctions on the DPRK and 

strengthen its joint deterrence profile.

On a parallel course, the United States and the international community should offer restructured negotiations that provide genuine incentives for the DPRK 

to participate in substantive talks in the face of the 

increased pressure discussed earlier through the strict 

enforcement of sanctions to include the new UNSCR 

2321. Such incentives may include a multilateral security assurance arrangement. This arrangement could 

include an initiation of a diplomatic process toward 

normalization of DPRK’s relations with the United 

States and other nations. It may also include removal 

of economic, trade, and investment sanctions. Doing 

so will target the DPRK’s illicit activity, and encourages other nations in the region—including China—to 

join this effort. If the DPRK refuses this proposal, the 

United States should seek new multilateral sanctions 

to restrict the regime’s funding sources and enact additional military measures, e.g., U.S.-ROK alliance show 

of force exercises to strengthen allied deterrence of military attacks. New nuclear tests or military attacks by 

the DPRK would definitely accelerate this timetable.

It is important to ensure that the DPRK does not 

use any talks or negotiations as a way of distracting 

attention from bad behavior, a tactic used in the past. 

Abrogation of the testing ban, new attacks, or stalled 

talks should result in their termination. The United 

States should also create a new approach to China. The 

objective is to enlist China in the effort to bring about 

a stable and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula. The United 

States should propose new dialogues on the future of 

the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate that it is in both 

countries’ security interests to find a comprehensive 
367

resolution to the problem. A unified response to the 

DPRK stands the greatest chance of finding a lasting 

solution on the peninsula and of forging a stable and 

prosperous Northeast Asia, and is by far the preferable 

course of action. If the DPRK retains a nuclear weapons 

capability, the U.S.-China relationship will be strained.

MILITARY EFFORTS: ACCELERATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON)

Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established 

on November 7, 1978. CFC is the ROK and U.S. warfighting headquarters with the role of deterrence or 

defeat, as necessary, of outside aggression against the 

ROK.9 After almost 30 years in existence, the United 

States and ROK agreed in 2007 to disestablish CFC and 

replace it with separate United States and ROK military 

commands by April 2012.10 This would allow the ROK 

to command ROK forces under wartime conditions 

with the United States as the supporting command.11

Plans for this new command arrangement are referred 

to as OPCON (Operational Control) transfer. In 2010, 

the OPCON transfer was postponed to December 

2015 after a series of provocations from the DPRK and 

concerns about the readiness of the ROK military on 

assuming responsibility. As 2015 grew closer, concerns 

again emerged about the timing and readiness of ROK 

forces. Reportedly, ROK officials worried that their 

military was not fully prepared to cope with DPRK 

threats and that Pyongyang might interpret OPCON 

transfer as a weakening of the alliance’s deterrence.12

In October 2014, the United States and the ROK 

announced in a joint statement that the allies would 

take a conditions-based approach to OPCON transfer 

and determine the appropriate timing based on the 
368

acquisition and readiness of ROK military capabilities 

and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. 

In 2014, the ROK Minister of National Defense (MND) 

reportedly announced that the goal was to transfer 

OPCON in 2023. The ROK MND stressed that the completion of the Korean Air and Missile Defense System 

(KAMD) by 2020 was an important step in the transfer process. To that effect, the ROK MND announced 

it would invest $1.36 billion in the KAMD system in 

2017. The KAMD includes the establishment of the 

“Kill Chain,” capable of immediate find, fix, target, and 

engage to prepare effectively for DPRK missile threats.

In testimony to Congress in April 2015, thenUnited States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti explained the three general 

conditions for OPCON transfer. South Korea must 

develop the command and control capacity to lead a 

combined and multinational force in high-intensity 

conflict; South Korea must improve its capabilities to 

respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in 

North Korea; and OPCON transition should take place 

at a time that is conducive to a transition.13 In order 

for a seamless and accelerated OPCON transfer, the 

United States must support the ROK with bridging 

capabilities and supplying “big-ticket” items allowing 

the ROK military to focus on improving command, 

control, communications, and computers, intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). These items 

include command and control platforms, ballistic missile defense, and precision munitions.

As DPRK provocation persists, it remains critically 

important that the United States continue to support 

the ROK military with these capabilities until the 

announced completion of the KAMD by 2020. Further, 

this allows U.S. forces to act as a deterrent against the 
369

DPRK while allowing time for the ROK military to 

strengthen and reinforce its capabilities. Additionally, 

the ROK must share more of the burden of acquiring 

improved equipment and weapon systems that are 

compatible with U.S. systems. More resource spending 

is necessary for state of the art C4ISR. The ROK MND 

must stay committed to the ROK Defense Reform Plan 

of 2005 (DRP). This plan necessitated approximately 

$505 billion over the course of 15 years (9.9 percent 

military budget increase annually) for key C4ISR and 

missile defense spending. The average increase over 

those years remains at 7.2 percent.14 The DRP is now 

dangerously underfunded and behind schedule. This 

becomes increasingly important as these resources 

become technologically advanced and expensive 

as time goes by. Further, the fact that DPRK nuclear 

weapons are involved makes the stakes much higher 

for cohesiveness in operations. The ROK military 

needs the capability to secure the weapons quickly and 

safely with U.S. supervision. Currently, the ROK military has not mastered operational planning or logistics 

for these types of nuclear-recovery operations. Nor has 

it mastered the ability to coordinate sufficiently with 

the civilian sector.15

Finally, OPCON transfer will allow the use of U.S. 

forces stationed in the ROK to be deployed for global 

contingencies and will transition USFK from leading 

to supporting the ROK military. Currently, U.S. forces 

in the ROK cannot deploy for purposes beyond conflicts on the Korean peninsula. OPCON transfer will 

allow for the strategic flexibility with the expansion 

within the pool of U.S. forces to support the Asia-Pacific or other global contingencies.16 This strategic flexibility will not only address the DPRK problem but 

will also support security challenges within the entire 
370

U.S. Pacific Command area of operations (USPACOM AOR).17 The OPCON transition will strengthen 

the U.S.-ROK alliance while ensuring the proper U.S. 

bridging capabilities, compatible ROK C4ISR, and 

increasing strategic flexibility for the United States.

These recommendations will result in a stronger 

and more self-sustaining ROK military. The key points 

as outlined will also prove to the ROK that the United 

States remains committed to South Korea’s security, 

even when the United States no longer holds OPCON. 

The transfer will also require the United States to 

rethink its force structure in the region. This reevaluation will benefit U.S. force posture in preparation for 

support of other contingencies. Despite OPCON transfer, the Commander, United Nations Command (CDR 

UNC) will continue to serve as the commander of an 

international command responsible for maintaining 

the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. His 

primary tasks will remain to provide strategic direction, guidance, and acceptance and integration of UNC 

member nations’ forces during contingencies. This is 

essential in enabling access to the seven UNC bases in 

Japan.18

USFK must provide the Secretary of Defense 

(SECDEF) with recommendations to the ROK military’s acquisition of the KAMD and assessments on 

the ROK’s ability to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both the U.S. SECDEF and ROK MND 

must reevaluate the current conditions for a successful 

OPCON transfer to ensure the DPRK is deterred properly. Finally, the Presidents of the United States and 

ROK must agree upon the appropriate timing based 

on South Korean military capabilities and the security 

environment on the Korean Peninsula.
371

ECONOMIC EFFORTS: DISRUPTING THE 

DPRK’S ROYAL COURT ECONOMY SYSTEM

The Royal Court Economy, or the Kim Family 

Fund, is a slush fund for the Kim family’s personal 

use, as well as to buy the loyalty of elites. To that end, 

the Korea Worker’s Party (KWP) Central Committee 

Bureau 39 (“Office 39”) plays a critical role.19 Under 

KWP, the bureau reported directly to Kim Jong-il, who 

set up the office in 1974. It now reports directly to Kim 

Jong Un. The activities of Office 39 are not subject to 

the cabinet for central planning and control. Office 39 

directs smuggling, counterfeiting, and trafficking in 

order to generate hard currency, while using sovereignty as a shield. The regime heads a state-sanctioned 

criminal organization used to generate revenue from 

abroad. Kim Kwang-jin, a North Korean defector and 

former “revolution fund” manager, estimates that this 

Royal Court Economy produces 200 times the foreign 

cash revenue of the centrally-directed economy.20 The 

proceeds are used to support the opulent lifestyle of 

the Kim family, purchase luxury goods for the elites to 

obtain their support for the regime, and invest in the 

military including its nuclear weapons programs.

Despite UN sanctions on luxury goods imports, 

Kim Jong Un spent $645.8 million importing luxury 

goods in 2012. This far exceeded his father’s, Kim 

Jong-Il, annual spending average of $300 million.21

These luxury imports include $30 million worth of 

high-end alcohol, $37 million in electronic goods, and 

$8.2 million in luxury watches. While the regime spends 

hundreds of millions of dollars on luxury products for 

the Kim family and his elite, North Koreans continue 

to suffer from malnutrition and stunting, despite the 
372

DPRK receiving international assistance for the past 20 

years.

The Royal Court Economy is essential in sustaining 

the regime because it buys elite support. It also enables 

the DPRK’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, 

which the regime considers a crucial card in regime 

survival. Since the Royal Court Economy is crucial 

to regime survival and has no benefits for the people, 

it is a prime target for sanctions. The UNSC and the 

international community should enforce measures 

to prevent the supply of revenues and luxury goods 

from reaching the DPRK. The mandatory inspection of 

cargo with any possible connection to DPRK, enacted 

in UNSC Resolution 2270, is a good example of such a 

measure.22

Targeting the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy 

through excessive sanctions would assist in eliminating access to hard currency and luxury goods. Further, these targeted sanctions would assist in crippling 

upper echelons of the DPRK government and promote 

instability within the regime. Compliance becomes 

reality when targeted sanctions hurt the DPRK elite 

and lead to domestic and political instability.23 A continual strain on Kim Jong Un’s Royal Court Economy 

is a potential strategic lever that the international 

community can pull to negotiate an end to the DPRK 

nuclear weapons program.

CONCLUSION

The United States and the international community must continue to employ a full range of diplomatic, military, and economic responses to counter 

and put an end to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear weapons 

development. Diplomatically, the United States and 
373

the international community must persuade China 

to place greater pressure on DPRK to dismantle their 

nuclear weapons program. Continued DPRK provocations, to include nuclear weapons testing and ICBM 

development that further destabilizes the region, 

should incentivize China to do more. Incentives such 

as the United States, ROK, and Japan working closer 

together (diplomatically and militarily) and increase in 

military capabilities to the region (deployment of the 

THAAD Battery) should also motivate China toward 

DPRK denuclearization. In the end, China can assist 

in getting the DPRK back to the negotiating table. 

Examples of China’s assistance include withdrawing 

material support, enforcing sanctions, and applying 

diplomatic pressure.

Militarily, the U.S. and ROK alliance must review 

all options pertaining to the acceleration of OPCON 

transfer. This will ensure strategic flexibility for the 

USPACOM commander allowing for the employment 

of U.S. forces in place for the defense of the ROK to 

employ off the peninsula in support of other regional 

contingencies. Further OPCON transfer will allow the 

ROK to control its own forces should reunification of 

the Korean Peninsula occur. Finally, OPCON transfer 

will ensure the ROK has a credible and capable military through U.S. bridging and enduring capabilities 

that can deter further DPRK aggression.

Finally, the United States and the international 

community must continue to escalate economic pressure on DPRK’s Royal Court Economy. Efforts such 

as financial measures taken against the Macao-based 

Banco Delta in 2005 are critical examples that have 

worked in the past, but are inconsistent unless the 

entire international community is involved. Severe economic pressure on the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy 
374

is a necessary way to compel compliance with its 

nuclear, military, and human rights obligations to the 

UN and a central instrument of U.S. and international 

coercive power. However, sanctions prohibiting the 

DPRK’s Royal Court Economy alone are not enough. 

The United States must with work with China and the 

international community to apply more assertive and 

consistent pressure to sanction the full range of DPRK 

illicit behavior. Implementation of multilateral sanctions from China and the international community 

should accompany U.S. financial sanctions that further apply escalating pressure to the DPRK’s source of 

funding.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. “North Korea profile - Timeline,” BBC News, August 

17, 2017, available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiapacific-15278612, September 9, 2016, accessed December 14, 2016.

2. United States security interests for the Korean Peninsula 

include denuclearization and prevention of the proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Barack Obama, National Security 

Strategy, Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015, pp. 

11, 24.

3. Security Council, The United Nations, “Security Council 

Strengthens Sanctions on Democratic Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2321 (2016),” The United Nations, 

November 30, 2016, available from https://www.un.org/press/

en/2016/sc12603.doc.htm, accessed December 14, 2016.

4. President Obama’s “Strategic Patience” policy involves the 

insistence of the DPRK to commit, to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the Six-Party Talks. The policy is 

intended to work closely with Japan and the ROK and attempts 

to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea. Finally, 

it works through applying pressure on the DPRK through arms 

interdictions and sanctions. Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. 

Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, Washington, 
375

DC: Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, 

January 15, 2016, p. 6.

5. Greg Scarlatoiu, “Human Security in North Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Fall 2015, p. 126.

6. Mikael Weissman and Linus Hagström, “Sanctions Reconsidered: the Path Forward with North Korea,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 39, Iss. 3, Fall 2016, p. 64.

7. Ibid.

8. DoD News, US to deploy THAAD missile battery to South 

Korea, U.S. Army, July 11, 2016, available from https://www.army.

mil/article/171316, accessed December 14, 2016.

9. “Mission of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command,” 

United States Forces Korea, n.d., available from http://www.usfk.

mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/, accessed February 27, 2017.

10. Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth D 

Nikitin, Brock R. Williams, and Jonathan R. Corrado, U.S.-South 

Korea Relations, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

U.S. Library of Congress, October 20, 2016, p. 26.

11. Under peacetime conditions, the ROK has control of their 

own military. Steven Denney, South Korean Politics Drive OPCON 

Transfer, The Diplomat, October 28, 2014, available from https://

thediplomat.com/2014/10/south-korean-politics-drive-opcon-transfer/, 

accessed February 27, 2017.

12. Manyin et al., p. 26.

13. Ibid, pp. 26-27.

14. Shelley Su, “The OPCON Transfer Debate,” in Jae-jung 

Suh, dir., SAIS US-Korea 2011 Yearbook, Baltimore, MD: U.S.-Korea Institute, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2011, p. 163.

15. Ibid., p. 171.
376

16. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review 2014, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 

4, 2014, p. V.

17. Ibid., p. 34.

18. “Advance Policy Questions for General James D. Thurman, USA Nominee for Commander, United Nations Command, 

Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces 

Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea,” Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, June 

28, 2011, available from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/

download/2011/06/28/james-thurman-testimony-062811, accessed 

February 27, 2017.

19. Tara O, “Understanding the Nature of the North Korean 

Regime: A Foundation to Engagement and Coercion Discussions,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 

Spring/Summer 2015, p. 50.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Security Council, United Nations, “Security Council 

Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2270 (2016),” The 

United Nations, March 2, 2016, available from https://www.un.org/

press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm, accessed December 14, 2016.

23. Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox Economic Statecraft and International Relations, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1999, p. 292.
377

PART V: 

SOFT POWER CONSIDERATIONS

379

CHAPTER 13

PEOPLE-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES: A MEASURE TO 

PRESERVE AMERICAN STRENGTH

Joel M. Buenaflor 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

People-focused activities provide tangible, convincing reassurance to foreign partner nations of security 

and other benefits that come with a relationship with 

the United States. These kinds of activities reinforce 

persistent impressions of the United States as a benevolent leader of a peaceful world order by delivering 

opportunity and assistance in improving human welfare. As China and other global competitors actively 

work to degrade the prevalence of the worldview that 

sees the United States in the lead, continued support 

for people-focused activities sustain the credibility of 

and respect for the United States as an engaged world 

power. Leveraging people-focused activities, however, 

requires employing a more diversified government 

approach in implementation and funding beyond 

reliance on just security and defense initiatives. Deep 

funding cuts planned for the Department of State and 

United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID) seem problematic in terms of how involved 

these entities are in implementing America’s people-focused activities. Given the expected increase of 

Department of Defense (DoD) manning and resourcing by the Trump administration, the U.S. military 
380

should sustain and expand its own portfolio of people-focused activities.

The current administration’s direction of planned 

budget cuts to diplomacy and increased spending in 

defense should be reconsidered to ensure appropriate 

and sufficient foreign policy advantage is available 

whether the situations at hand involve military force. 

The Chinese ability to bypass U.S. military advantages in achieving strategic goals should encourage 

additional investment in people-focused activities. 

Specifically, the United States should invest more into 

English language and education programs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, food security, and 

peacekeeping operations.

INTRODUCTION

With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increasing its defense spending and demonstrating a growing willingness to utilize the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) as an assertive tool of its foreign policy, U.S. 

national and military strategies need to address how 

best to retain influence and initiative in the Asia-Pacific 

region. President Donald Trump has promised to revitalize the U.S. military with increases of funding and 

human resources.1 In formulating a U.S. stance toward 

China, the current strategic context, particularly from 

a military perspective, seems to fall most easily into an 

adversarial Cold War-style calculation of battle lines 

delineated purely through a balance of hard military 

power, with each side accruing as much coercive military capability as possible. While potential to leverage 

traditional military force certainly plays an important role in today’s regional balance of power in the 

Asia-Pacific, more unexpected and nuanced areas of 
381

competition appear to be emerging into which China 

is eagerly placing emphasis and resources. This chapter considers approaches for how some of these people-focused activities can best be utilized in response 

to China’s strengthening posture in Asia.

China found, from recent foreign policy maneuvering, that its overreliance on hard power in the South 

China Sea triggered an arms-buying spree in Asia, 

caused Japan to loosen its self-imposed military useof-force restraints, and generally deepened its competitors’ military cooperation with each other.2

 As a 

correction to halt the momentum toward its isolation, 

China initiated a well-documented “charm offensive” that includes loans for infrastructure development, free trade agreements, sponsoring dialogs, and 

cultivating ties across a broad range of endeavors.3

These reactive policies reveal a China “attempting to 

rebrand itself as a peaceful partner” and strengthening its case for being a desirable regional hegemon to 

supplant the United States.4 For example, the remarks 

made by Chinese President Xi at the World Economic 

Forum at Davos, Switzerland, in January 2017 serve 

as an interesting data point of where and how this 

U.S.-PRC competition for acceptance as a hegemonic 

power is occurring. At this high-profile event attended 

by the world’s economic leaders, Xi advocated for free 

trade and investment liberalization while demonizing 

protectionism—all appeals that traditionally would 

have been expected from an American leader, and 

which also notably contrasted quite starkly with the 

protectionist “America first” rhetoric instrumental to 

Trump’s ascendance to the White House.5

Xi’s comments, which usurped a narrative usually associated with American global economic influence, transcended the economic forum in which they 
382

occurred, and actually reveal a broader Chinese aspiration to compete with the United States as the world’s 

preferred partner nation of choice. To attain this goal, 

however, the Chinese face an uphill struggle. Since 

many of the realities and systems of international 

interaction were shaped under American leadership 

in the post-World War II-era, decades of success and 

confidence on the world stage have made the United 

States a long-standing powerhouse in this courtship of 

international favor. On some level, however, projecting 

national power departs from just fostering diplomatic, 

military, and economic ties between formal, institutional collectives and begins to make connections 

between people. The United States enjoys a considerable lead and asymmetric advantage in the people-focused aspect of its foreign policy that deliberately and 

systematically should be preserved.

Simply put, for a nation to win over other nations 

requires a full spectrum of activities that create a strong 

affinity and attraction for the citizens of those other 

nations toward the nation looking for partnership, and 

the United States has traditionally excelled in doing 

so. Much of the gravitational pull exerted by America 

comes naturally from the domestic vigor of its society, 

economy, and political systems. The U.S. Government 

also rightfully nurtures America’s appeal internationally as a foreign policy tool that wins admirers, friends, 

and influence. A whole-of-government approach—in 

which military contributions are effectively nested—

toward conducting effective people-focused activities 

can sustain the U.S. lead in this area. Cultivating and 

preserving preference for assistance, opportunities, 

and self-determination championed by the United 

States would in turn retain respect for a U.S.-led world 
383

order and provide advantage for America remaining a 

capable, globally engaged superpower.

ENSURING AMERICA WEARS THE WHITE HAT

In the global competition to be the world’s preferred 

partner nation of choice, victory goes to the country 

that most credibly establishes itself as the provider of 

the best available portfolio of benefits for the populations of its partner nations. Put another way, the leadership and citizens of nations around the world should 

be convinced that throwing their lots in with a given 

global hegemon would reliably yield the greatest good.

To substantiate such a claim in the eyes of world 

opinion requires that a global hegemon establish a 

proven track record as a responsible international 

player that can be trusted to serve the greater good; 

and people-focused activities provide a critical metric 

that allows the world to assess any would-be hegemon’s trustworthiness in this regard. To characterize, people-focused activities are those undertaken by 

either China or the United States and its partners that 

aim specifically to deliver benefit to foreign people and 

populations as their immediate objectives (acknowledging that a strong component of self-interest drives 

these decisions, too). Such people-focused activities—specifically, the type, volume, and effectiveness 

of those that the United States and China choose to 

undertake—will shape the world’s and the Asia-Pacific’s views on which of these two nations has earned the 

right to hegemonic leadership.

In the post-World War II-era, the United States can 

clearly claim leadership, particularly while China was 

engulfed in the decades-long turmoil of its Communist revolution and the subsequent turbulence of its 
384

comprehensive social and economic reorganization.6

America’s willingness to enable post-war reconstruction, economic revitalization, and the establishment of 

collaborative multilateral means for promoting peace 

and stability (conspicuously, even with regard to its 

vanquished foes) undeniably cast a long shadow in 

modern world history and helped forge a positive perception of the United States in world affairs. Such a 

viewpoint drew credibility from the dynamic noted by 

Danny Quah, Director of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast 

Asia Center at the London School of Economics. He 

noted America’s burgeoning power growth seemed to 

quicken counterintuitively the more the United States 

shared and spread power and resources, rather than 

reserving them all for itself, by creating an inclusive 

global order that welcomed others who shared democratic ideals.7

 Funding the Marshall Plan for Europe, 

facilitating the recovery of Germany and Japan, and 

choosing to support the United Nations (UN), which 

the United States itself was instrumental in establishing and funding, all represent major American government decisions that clearly reflect an American 

approach that cultivated state-level bilateral and multilateral partnerships. While many of the defining elements of post-war American foreign policy were not 

purely people-focused activities in and of themselves, 

they did serve as vehicles for people-focused activities 

that the United States sponsored to deliver their trademark benefits to foreign people and populations. These 

people-focused activities helped secure America its 

success in establishing a current U.S.-led world order 

whose rules, unsurprisingly, feature strong U.S. influence in their authorship and tacit or explicit acknowledgement of U.S. interests.8
385

From the early years of this Pax Americana, however, there are significant instances where U.S. activities ran aground of Chinese interests, first in the PRC’s 

massive intervention on the side of North Korea in 

the Korean war, and again in the robust PRC support 

for North Vietnam during the Vietnam war. After the 

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 

decided to liberalize its economy in 1978, Chinese 

wealth and international standing enjoyed explosive 

growth, which seems to have accelerated the increasing conflict of U.S.-PRC interests.9

 China borrowed liberally from economic models of the United States and 

its allies to foster its own growth and ultimately take 

international market share. Some of China’s recent foreign policy showcases people-focused activities that 

programmatically mirror the approaches of the United 

States and its allies, appearing again to create a situation where Chinese gains would accrue at U.S. expense. 

Xi’s recent statements at the World Economic Forum, 

for example, displayed clear people-focused elements 

when he said that economic philosophies should aim 

at ensuring “people have equal access to opportunities 

and share in the benefits of development.”10 In another 

more practical recent example, China’s establishment 

of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 

2014 created a PRC-led financial institution paralleling 

the World Bank that aimed to “lend money to build 

roads, mobile phone towers, and other forms of infrastructure in poorer parts of Asia.”11

However, while Xi borrowing sound bites crafted 

in the American style and funding the AIIB to the tune 

of $50 billion make sensational news, the United States 

still currently has more leverage and credibility available than China in the realm of people-focused activities.12 The luster of the Chinese narrative, after all, 
386

tarnishes somewhat when delivered by a one-party 

state with a track record of repression that clearly does 

not match its outward message.13 The PRC’s economic 

windfall and the advantage it enables play perhaps too 

outsized a role in China’s elements of national power 

and cannot win the day on their own. In contrast, the 

United States has decades of credibility in the area of 

people-focused activities. English remains the primary 

language of economic opportunity and multilateral 

interaction. American higher education maintains its 

internationally recognized leadership and continues 

to attract students from around the world, including 

over 300,000 Chinese in the 2014-2015 school year, 

a 10.8 percent increase from the year prior. People 

around the world (again, including a sizable cohort of 

Chinese) still feel an intense attraction for becoming 

American citizens and enjoying a free and prosperous 

way of life.14 The United States must acknowledge and 

exploit this asymmetric advantage over the Chinese 

in these and similar areas. America highlighting these 

attractive and distinct characteristics of its society and 

way of life and amplifying them in people-focused 

activities nested within its foreign policy could in their 

own way echo and remain consistent with the “America first” message preferred by the Trump administration, a significant positive policy element worth noting 

here.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND ENGLISH IN 

THE AMERICAN “BRAND”

Much of the author’s impetus for writing this 

chapter comes from experiencing first-hand during 

a recent assignment in Cambodia that demonstrated 

how durable esteem for America can be, even when 
387

subjected to an overwhelmingly well-funded Chinese campaign. The script for PRC-sponsored military 

assistance to Cambodia follows a course familiar to 

long-time observers of U.S. and Chinese foreign policies. In the wake of an egregious Cambodian human 

rights violation—in this case, returning Uighur refugees to China in 2010—U.S. military support to Cambodia abruptly halted among a political uproar within 

the United States. The Chinese stepped in 2 days later 

to sign deals estimated worth $850 million to fill the 

military aid vacuum left by the United States.15 Among 

the PRC efforts that poured resources into the Royal 

Cambodian Armed Forces, the Army Institute stands 

out as a particularly ambitious initiative, apparently 

the first of its kind for China, to stand up a large-scale 

military education institution in Southeast Asia.16

Cambodia’s Army Institute, into which the Chinese 

poured resources for construction and whose operations they largely fund, prepares officers for entry into 

the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.17 The Cambodian 

Minister of National Defense has described its facilities as “luxurious”—a descriptor rarely applied to any 

kind of Cambodian military installation, and a word 

choice from a key Cambodian official that underlines 

the impact of the PRC investment there.18 The student 

body at the Army Institute consists of approximately 

1,000 young rising military leaders who study at the 

campus 50 miles outside Phnom Penh: 800 participate 

in a 4-year program, while another smaller cohort of 

200 students attends a shorter 6-month program.19

The 4-year program consists of not only courses at the 

Army Institute, but also conspicuously concludes with 

6 months abroad studying in Chinese military institutions—an experience that one analyst characterized as 

containing a “significant political component aimed at 
388

forwarding China’s foreign policy interests and building sympathy for China.”20 According to coverage by 

Reuters of the Army Institute graduation ceremony 

in 2015, the Cambodian Minister of Defense attended 

and thanked China “for understanding [Cambodia’s] 

difficulties,” ostensibly a reference to providing funding when the United States would not.21 The same article noted that graduates of the Army Institute were 

now occupying positions of significant responsibility 

within the Royal Cambodian Army, to include brigade 

commands.22

While the Army Institute example provides proof 

that China is making inroads in Cambodia through 

the medium of funding educational opportunity, Chinese prestige in this field of endeavor actually still lags 

significantly behind that of the United States. Interviewing a Cambodian official about the program at 

the Army Institute revealed that when the Cambodian 

students spend their time abroad in China, the Chinese 

must actually provide their instruction in English, a 

reality imposed by the lack of Chinese language penetration among those able to translate a foreign language, particularly with specialized military content, 

into the Cambodian tongue.23 This revealing footnote 

to the Chinese programs at the Army Institute exposes 

how much ground the Chinese have to make up before 

achieving parity with the United States in language 

acceptance and educational cachet. Further, despite 

the very high levels of foreign military aid investment 

by China in Cambodia and in spite of the PRC’s foreign 

aid structure that appears calibrated to curry the favor 

of the Cambodian elite, these same elites dependably 

exhibit a marked preference for U.S., or at least Western, education that is conducted in English.24
389

No less than the Cambodian Prime Minister himself, 

whose successful consolidation of power has allowed 

him to control the reins of Cambodia for over 30 years, 

elected to send his eldest son to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.25 That son, 

who graduated from West Point in 1999, already holds 

the rank of Lieutenant General, as well as the titles of 

Deputy Commander of the Army and Commander of 

the National Counterterrorism Special Force, roughly 

the Cambodian equivalent of U.S. Special Operations 

Command.26 Given his family pedigree and predictably meteoric rise in the Cambodian power structure, 

some probability exists that this son might be the next 

Cambodian head of state. Mirroring the choices of the 

Cambodian Prime Minister, other Cambodians also 

seek a U.S. or similar Western, English-based educational background for their children. In fact, the prevalence of English proficiency among those holding key 

billets within the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces who 

attended the two annual Bilateral Defense Discussions 

held in 2015 and 2016—the highest level of military 

dialogues conducted between the Cambodian and U.S. 

militaries—was so high that the Cambodians elected 

to forgo using translators, thereby demonstrating their 

comfort level with English.27

The strong English skills among people of means 

in Cambodia reflect the larger reality of English being 

the single most preferred language for cross-cultural 

interaction both in Asia and worldwide.28 The approximately 2 billion speakers of English around the world 

overwhelm the 1.1 billion speakers of Mandarin Chinese, who are also overwhelmingly concentrated in 

China.29 Again revealing the strength of English as the 

dominant international language, China has approximately 330 million English speakers, “an estimated 1 
390

million English teachers, as well as 125 million to 200 

million school students and 6 million to 13 million university students learning English.”30 These numbers 

consequently also tip the scales in favor of Englishbased educational opportunities being the most desirable. This fact manifests itself in English being the 

common language of various international fora and 

organizations across a broad range of endeavors—for 

example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) and the international information technology and commercial aviation industries.31

The U.S. Government, to include the military, 

should deliberately work to preserve the current 

strength of English, relative to Chinese, as a means 

of international communication, which in turn has a 

ripple effect in strengthening the appeal and relevance 

across the board of U.S. international engagement 

activities. These kinds of efforts already exist in various programs sponsored by the U.S. Government. For 

example, the Young Southeast Asian Leadership Initiative (YSEALI) provides U.S.-based developmental 

opportunities for young Southeast Asians.32 In a parallel effort, the Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program delivers U.S. experts to foreign countries to assist in English 

curriculum development, as well as various other education and developmental challenges.33 Finally, American Corners offices serve as overseas outreach hubs 

providing access to English learning materials and 

U.S. scholarship opportunities for foreign audiences.34

The U.S. military plays a surprisingly robust role 

in propagating English and English-based education 

among Asian partner nations. English competence 

serves as a prerequisite for attending many of the seminars and courses that the U.S. military sponsors, particularly those featuring a mix of multilateral attendees 
391

requiring a common language among them, or those in 

which foreign partners are embedded within a group 

consisting of predominantly Americans. Given the 

unparalleled strength, reputation, and recent combat 

experience of the U.S. military, foreign militaries 

assign significant importance to one of their own being 

selected to take advantage of one of these opportunities, particularly one of the longer courses sponsored 

through the International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program, and especially winning an 

appointment to attend one of the 4-year service academies. Former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, a 

graduate of West Point, and former Australian Secretary of Defence Duncan E. Lewis, a graduate of the U.S. 

Army War College, stand out as extreme examples of 

the ties U.S. military educational opportunities might 

foster.35 While foreign heads of state graduating from 

American military institutions might be relatively 

rare precedents, they do illustrate how funding foreign partners to attend professional military education 

or other events sponsored by the U.S. military bring 

together the talent and the training for top-tier results.

The IMET, along with Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF), have initiatives to expand U.S. military outreach 

by supporting English training within partner nation 

militaries. Since eligibility to attend IMET courses 

requires prospective students to earn passing scores 

on a special English test administered at their nations’ 

U.S. embassies, supporting English language training 

within partner nation militaries helps to grow the pool 

of personnel qualified to attend IMET courses.36 Better 

English capabilities in a partner nation in turn increase 

engagement possibilities and potential for long-term 

impact, whereas low levels of English capabilities 

in a nation close the doors to attending many IMET 
392

courses, as well as many exchanges and multilateral 

engagements.

To address this issue, some IMET courses specialize in immersing foreign students in a tailored English 

learning environment at the Defense Language Institute English Language Center in San Antonio, TX, 

that prepares them to attend follow-on IMET courses 

as soon as they meet their required English proficiency benchmarks.37 Taking a different approach to 

the problem, FMF can also be used to purchase both 

English language labs (servers, workstations, and software packages purpose-built to prepare students for 

English in a military training context) for installation 

in a host nation’s educational institution and mobile 

training team (MTT) support to put qualified English 

instructors there to accompany them.38 These foreign 

policy tools afford America the opportunity to shape 

the educational content and learning environment of 

a broadened cross-section of talented military leaders 

from partner nations—immersing them in English, 

familiarizing them with U.S. operational concepts, and 

exposing them to democratic values—that confers a 

tremendous amount of influence to the United States. 

As the members of that select group return to their 

own countries and assume leadership roles within 

their defense establishments after attending U.S.-sponsored programs, they will each bring a new set of life 

experiences upon which America will have left its 

fingerprints.

To the degree that education and travel can be 

transformative, these U.S. military programs have 

the potential to change their foreign participants’ perspectives and outlooks, perhaps for as long and as far 

as their professional lives will take them. While the 

initial payback to U.S. policy by such programs may 
393

seem no more ambitious than just augmenting partner 

nation military expertise and interoperability with the 

United States, the long-term impact to U.S. interests 

might expand to other, far broader ramifications. For 

example, a specially curated catalog of IMET known as 

Expanded IMET focuses on:

proper management of defense resources, improving 

military justice systems in accordance with internationally 

recognized human rights, understanding the principle 

of civilian control of the military, and contributing to 

the cooperation between police and military forces for 

counternarcotics.39

This Expanded IMET aims toward fostering not only 

improved defense institutions, but also advancing 

national governance and stability.

A generation of rising foreign military leaders 

experiencing first-hand various U.S. institutions and 

elements of American life—whether as lofty as democratic governance and freedom of the press, or as 

simple as having a basic command of English and a 

circle of American friends and colleagues—could have 

inestimable value to the potential for the United States 

to enjoy enduring shared vision and international partnership. As elevated as the dividends of such programs 

might seem, it is people-focused activities serving as 

the soil in which they grow. Without the people-focused activities that the U.S. Government funds and 

conducts for individuals to get better at their jobs, to 

become better leaders, and to become more familiar 

with English, the enticing follow-on effects for cultivating continued U.S. influence internationally will 

never develop.
394

DOES “AMERICA FIRST” REALLY PUT AMERICA FIRST?

Unfortunately, whatever the appeal of the current 

whole-of-government approach to propagating U.S. 

leadership through educational opportunities and 

support for widespread English usage just detailed in 

the last few paragraphs, inward-looking domestic federal budget priorities are threatening to weaken it significantly. As of early 2017, the proposed White House 

2018 budget cuts funding for the State Department, 

which pays for much of the U.S. Government people-focused activity, by $10.1 billion or 28 percent from 

2017 budget levels.40 Trump’s introductory letter for 

the budget proposal justifies these cuts by stating that 

they put “America first by keeping more of America’s 

hard-earned tax dollars here at home.”41 To help contextualize the current risk to the programs described 

previously, however, consider that the Trump administration initially looked into eliminating the State 

Department’s entire Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This bureau promotes overseas outreach 

for increasing English proficiency and access to American higher education opportunities, and whose programs encompass both the YSEALI and the Fulbright 

U.S. Scholar Program.42 While the proposal to disband the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 

was tabled, the funding for its portfolio is expected to 

suffer a precipitous decline since an integral part of 

Trump’s budget proposal consists of “deep cuts to foreign aid.”43

Somewhat counterintuitively, the State Department’s belt-tightening could also deeply affect military security cooperation. Funding for sending foreign 

military leadership to U.S.-sponsored professional 
395

military education, which seems solidly in the realm of 

DoD, actually comes from the State Department.44 The 

International Security Assistance portion of the State 

Department budget contains both the funding lines for 

IMET, as well as the FMF that could be used to buy 

either more education and training opportunities from 

the IMET course catalog (to include English language 

training MTTs) or English language labs.45

Aside from wanting to keep U.S. tax dollars at 

home, the deep budget cuts to the State Department 

sought by the Trump administration also seek to underwrite “the rebuilding of our Nation’s military without 

adding to our Federal deficit.”46 After a protracted 

focus on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the need 

to fund defense modernization initiatives to reinvigorate U.S. capabilities to defeat near-peer competitors, 

along with investing to counter burgeoning threats in 

the cyber domain, suffice to make a strong case for an 

increased defense budget.47 However, cutting the State 

Department’s English and education programs to fund 

other priorities is too drastic. The quote from the current Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, during his tenure 

as U.S. Central Command Commander, “If you don’t 

fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy 

more ammunition,” neatly sums up the countervailing 

line of thinking to that of the White House.48 A recent 

letter addressed to congressional leadership and signed 

by 121 retired three and four-star flag officers echoed 

the same sentiment. They cautioned, “that many of 

the crises our nation faces do not have military solutions alone” and acknowledged that the U.S. military 

“needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the 

drivers of extremism–lack of opportunity, insecurity, 

injustice, and hopelessness.” They ultimately recommended, “that resources for the [State Department’s] 
396

International Affairs Budget keep pace with the growing global threats and opportunities we face.”49

Given the current foundational text for Joint doctrine, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States, espouses the concept of Unified 

Action as one that “synchronizes, coordinates, and/

or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational 

operations with the operations of other USG departments [e.g., the State Department] . . . to achieve unity 

of effort.” A nearly 30 percent budget reduction to the 

State Department coupled with promised increases to 

DoD funding might imbalance diplomatic and military 

efforts and inadvertently cut available funding for people-focused activities.50 Though abilities to defeat nearpeer foes might have atrophied during the GWOT, the 

military capability that arguable achieved its peak in 

the same time period was conducting Unified Action 

alongside State Department and USAID counterparts, 

whether through coordination with the massive U.S. 

embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan, or by working in or 

with one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. While 

government budgets are ultimately zero-sum games, it 

seems like a waste to dissipate whatever recent synergy might have developed between the Department 

of State and DoD by pitting them so starkly against 

each other in fiscal combat. The net result seems to pit 

the instruments of national power against each other, 

rather than seeking to maximize their aggregate effects 

through balance and synchronization.

CHINA’S GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES AND WAY 

AHEAD RECOMMENDATIONS

The current U.S. administration’s emphasis on hard 

power, coupled with its confusion between wanting to 

narrow its concerns to “America first” and wanting to 
397

maintain the mantel of global superpower, likely suits 

the PRC just fine. Since America’s decisive Operation 

DESERT STORM victory in 1991, the Chinese have 

worried about what the ramifications are to them of 

the overwhelming U.S. military dominance demonstrated in that conflict.51 The Chinese realized that 

the revolution in military affairs they had witnessed 

would necessitate a far-reaching reconsideration of 

their strategy.52 In the wake of this strategic reassessment, the PRC has embraced a strategy of “gray zone” 

activities that successfully impose Chinese will on 

smaller Asian states, yet remain below U.S. and ally 

and partner nation thresholds for military action.53

Beginning in the 1990s and accelerating sharply in 

the late 2000s, China embarked on its most conspicuous example of gray zone activity by mobilizing all the 

elements of its national power to lay the foundations 

for its claims in the South China Sea.54 China has implemented a range of policies and actions that successfully 

exert practical control over significant contested areas. 

These extend from early domestic legal revisions proclaiming offshore domestic territory to later informational narratives positioning the Chinese as economic 

developers uninterested in territorial conquest. They 

are followed by the employment of militiamen embedded in the fishing fleet and eventually to the construction of militarized outposts with the ability to enforce 

maritime and airspace claims.55 By the estimate of analysts from the Naval War College and the Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, China has “forced 

the region and the United States to live with a new and 

largely irreversible strategic reality” and “it’s hard to 

see how such gains can be reversed short of open warfare.”56 These strategic maneuvers have allowed the 

Chinese largely to circumvent American conventional 
398

military superiority by utilizing methods that carefully 

avoided situations in which the United States or its 

allies would engage in armed conflict.57

The reality of this Chinese strategic success must 

shape future American employment of and investment 

across its own instruments of national power. The 

current administration’s direction of planned budget 

cuts to diplomacy and increased spending in defense 

should be reconsidered to ensure appropriate and sufficient foreign policy advantage is available whether 

the situations at hand involve military force. The 

Chinese ability to bypass U.S. military advantages in 

achieving strategic goals should encourage additional 

investment in people-focused activities. As stated earlier, much of the strength of American appeal internationally stemmed from its credibility as a hegemon 

whose policies ultimately supported the international 

greater good from which partner nations would also 

benefit, and this concept should be embraced more 

deliberately and visibly.58 The precedents of U.S.-sponsored people-focused activities provides a broad menu 

of options that greatly exceeds what this chapter covered, and new policy approaches can be formulated 

and executed. The hard work and difficult decisions lie 

in selecting which old and new approaches to take that 

are best suited to the changing political and operational 

environment and fit within resourcing parameters. In 

addition to the English language and education programs already displayed, Humanitarian Assistance/

Disaster Relief (HA/DR), food security, and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) stand out as three areas of 

exceptional potential.

The HA/DR exemplifies the strength of the people-focused activity approach. Natural disasters provide high-profile events that build unambiguous 
399

consensus regarding the need to act to relieve human 

suffering. HA/DR therefore provides a medium 

through which U.S. involvement in foreign affairs 

can unequivocally deliver on existing perception of 

a benevolent presence in the region. Whether HA/

DR initiatives are civilian-led by the Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance at a U.S. Embassy, or consist of military-led efforts to deliver support in spite of damaged 

or destroyed civil infrastructure, the message is clear: 

America is a powerful, globally-engaged friend you 

want to have. As an example, U.S. HA/DR response 

to a tsunami that struck Indonesia in 2004, killing over 

166,000 people, had a profound impact on U.S.-Indonesia relations.59 Human rights issues that had previously strained relations between the two countries 

were immediately set aside and the imperative to aid 

Indonesian suffering opened the door for USAID and 

U.S. military assets to participate in the relief effort, 

thereby having a “dramatic and immediate impact on 

U.S.-Indonesia relations.”60 Similarly, the robust U.S. 

response to the 2011 Fukushima tsunami bolstered 

relations between the United States and Japan, highlighting the U.S. commitment to assist Japan and the 

benefits delivered by U.S. installations within Japan.61

By being a people-focused activity intervening to benefit foreign populations when they are most in need 

and vulnerable, HA/DR can dramatically illustrate the 

U.S. benefits of U.S. presence and commitment to our 

allies and partners. The State Department funding line 

for International Disaster Assistance should be sustained to enable these operations.

An area that holds potential for countering PRC 

actions in the South China Sea is food security. Through 

USAID, the United States is already highlighting 

wild fisheries as an important element of the marine 
400

environment that provides a critical source of food and 

protein for communities in developing countries.62 Like 

HA/DR, ensuring peoples’ access to a livelihood and 

nutrition seems to serve as a firm foundation for consensus and conviction to act. This issue of food security 

relates strongly to Chinese actions in the South China 

Sea because they have precipitated an environmental 

catastrophe that is threatening a fishery collapse in key 

areas where they have been complicit in unregulated 

Chinese fishing and environmentally destructive land 

reclamation practices.63 The ruling of the international 

tribunal on “Philippines vs. China, the case brought by 

Manila challenging China’s claims and actions in the 

South China Sea” found “that China had ‘violated its 

obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems 

and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered 

species’ and ‘inflicted irreparable harm to the marine 

environment’.”64 Going further, John McManus, professor of marine biology and fisheries and director 

of the National Center for Coral Reef Research at the 

University of Miami, spoke at a conference on the 

South China Sea held at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. He characterized the damage 

done by the Chinese as sufficiently grave to predict “a 

‘major, major fisheries collapse’ if decisive action isn’t 

taken.”65 These findings by the international tribunal 

and academia should be engaged by the United States 

through USAID as a people-focused activity highlighting an impending food security disaster created by 

China and threatening the welfare of civilians in the 

South China Sea. Taking the issue from the abstract 

disagreement regarding lines of maritime sovereignty 

to a people-focused issue should be explored to bring 

visibility and apply more pressure to this nagging foreign policy problem.
401

A final area to explore with respect to people-focused activities is PKO. While PKO may seem more 

aligned with military operations, it still merits consideration as a people-focused activity because its intent 

and impact delivers security and relief of suffering to 

an affected foreign population. In the frame of U.S. 

Government implementation, PKO parallels HA/DR 

in being a complex interagency effort in which military 

and civilian personnel will be enmeshed in intersecting 

approvals, logistics, and security concerns. However, 

while PKO seems to be among the most militarized of 

people-focused activities referenced so far, it might be 

the one that holds the most promise for defusing rising 

tensions between the United States and PRC. Again, 

as with HA/DR, PKO largely occurs when broad consensus exists that sufficiently horrific events are taking 

place that a dangerous and expensive intervention is 

required.

China has recently taken on significant responsibilities in this area by deciding to participate in PKO only 

under the auspices of the UN, but often being in the top 

10 of all troop contributors to UN missions and committing the most troops out of all the permanent UN 

Security Council members.66 This Chinese participation in PKO through the UN, one of the organizations 

with roots in a U.S.-led world order, presents a strategic 

opportunity for the United States, especially as Trump 

has expressed a desire for partners and allies to pay 

their fair share in shared security arrangements.67 PKO 

holds potential as an area in which the United States 

and PRC could cooperate broadly (including militarily, which would be significant) over shared interests. 

The U.S. military should identify and resource some 

specific international PKO efforts for increased participation and deliberate cooperative outreach with the 
402

PRC’s military participants. Such an initiative could 

create some strong, mutually beneficial precedents in 

American and Chinese forces working together in support of a rules-based order, thereby helping counteract 

existing dynamics toward misunderstanding and conflict in these two nations’ relationship.

CONCLUSION

People-focused activities provide tangible, convincing reassurance to foreign partner nations of the 

security and other benefits that come with a relationship with the United States. These activities reinforce 

persistent impressions of the United States as a benevolent leader of a peaceful post-World War II world order 

by delivering opportunity and assistance in improving 

human welfare. As China and other global competitors are actively working to degrade the prevalence of 

the worldview that sees the United States in the lead, 

continued support for people-focused activities has 

potential to sustain the credibility of and respect for 

the United States as an engaged world power. Leveraging the potential of people-focused activities, however, 

requires acknowledgement of needing a more diversified government approach in implementation and 

funding beyond reliance on just security and defense 

initiatives. Upcoming deep funding cuts planned for 

the Department of State and USAID seem problematic in terms of how involved these entities are in the 

implementation of much of America’s people-focused 

activities. With the expected increase of DoD staffing 

and resourcing by the Trump administration, however, the U.S. military will still find itself in a position 

to sustain and perhaps expand its own portfolio of 
403

people-focused activities that support the preservation 

of American strength.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Dan Lamothe, “Trump promises ‘great rebuilding of the 

Armed Forces’ while signing executive order at the Pentagon,” 

The Washington Post, January 27, 2017, available from https://

www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/01/27/draftexecutive-order-shows-how-trump-wants-to-grow-the-u-s-militarysignificantly/?utm_term=.fd4e08269eb8, accessed May 7, 2017.

2. Paul J. Leaf, “China’s Charm Offensive: A Temporary, Tactical Change,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2014, available from 

https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/how-long-will-the-veneer-of-chinascharm-offensive-last/, accessed March 17, 2017.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ishaan Tharoor, “China plays the adult as Trump attacks 

the system,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2017, available from 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/18/

china-plays-the-adult-as-trump-attacks-the-system/?utm_term=.

d47f2e58ff5c, accessed March 20, 2017.

6. Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia, 3rd ed., New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 222-224.

7. London School of Economics and Political Science, “American Decline: Global Power in the 21st Century,” May 13, 2015, 

London School of Economics and Political Science YouTube Channel, video file, available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_

Eh_QXuw3A&t=304s, accessed February 13, 2017.

8. Ibid.

9. Mason, pp. 227-228.

10. Tharoor.
404

11. S. R., “Why China is creating a new ‘World Bank’ for 

Asia,” The Economist explains, blog of The Economist, November 

11, 2014, available from https://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2014/11/economist-explains-6, accessed February 13, 2017.

12. Ibid.

13. Tharoor.

14. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Chinese Students in America: 300,000 and Counting,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2015, 

available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/16/china-us-collegeseducation-chinese-students-university/, accessed February 14, 2017; 

London School of Economics and Political Science.

15. Aubrey Belford and Prak Chan Thul, “Chinese influence in Cambodia grows with army school, aid,” Reuters, April 

2, 2015, available from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-cambodiachina-military/chinese-influence-in-cambodia-grows-with-army-schoolaid-idUKKBN0MT0T220150402, accessed February 14, 2017.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Interview with Cambodian official, Fall 2016.

24. Simon Denyer, “The push and pull of China’s orbit: A rush 

to invest in Cambodia’s infrastructure is part of a larger quest for 

regional influence,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2015, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2015/09/05/thepush-and-pull-of-chinas-orbit/?utm_term=.6509c3d7160a, accessed 

March 20, 2017.
405

25. Saing Soenthrith and Paul Vrieze, “Hun Sen’s Second 

Son in Meteoric Rise Through RCAF Ranks,” The Cambodia 

Daily, January 30, 2012, available from https://www.cambodiadaily.

com/archives/hun-sens-second-son-in-meteoric-rise-through-rcafranks-1560/, accessed March 20, 2017.

26. Ibid.

27. Author helped to coordinate and personally participated 

in the U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Defense Discussions in 2015 and 

2016.

28. Benjamin Herscovitch, “English is the language of the 

Asian century,” ABC [Australian Broadcasting Corporation] 

News, September 12, 2012, available from http://www.abc.net.au/

news/2012-09-13/herscovitch-english-asia/4257442, accessed May 7, 

2017.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.; “Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations,” Jakarta, Indonesia: Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations, November 20, 2007, available from http://asean.org/asean/

asean-charter/, accessed March 20, 2017; Joe Sharkey, “English 

Skills a Concern As Global Aviation Grows,” The New York 

Times, May 21, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/

business/english-skills-a-concern-as-global-aviation-grows.html, 

accessed March 20, 2017.

32. “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative,” U.S. Mission 

to ASEAN, n.d., available from https://asean.usmission.gov/yseali/, 

accessed March 20, 2017.

33. “Core: Fulbright Scholar Program,” U.S. Department of 

State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, n.d., available 

from https://www.cies.org/program/core-fulbright-us-scholar-program, 

accessed March 20, 2017.

34. U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “The 

New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication Concepts that Recognize Resource Constraints,” Washington, DC: 
406

U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, available from 

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22956.pdf, accessed 

March 20, 2017.

35. See Fidel V. Ramos, Class of 1950, listed in “Notable Graduates,” United States Military Academy West Point, n.d., available 

from https://www.usma.edu/about/SitePages/Notable%20Graduates.

aspx, accessed March 20, 2017; Kareem Fahim, “Egypt General 

Has Country Wondering About Aims,” The New York Times, 

August 2, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/world/

middleeast/egypts-general-sisi.html, accessed March 20, 2017.

36. “English Comprehension Level Test: What is the ECL?” 

Defense Language Institute English Language Center, n.d., available from http://www.dlielc.edu/testing/ecl_test.php, accessed March 

20, 2017.

37. “Frequently Asked Questions about Specialized English 

Training,” Defense Language Institute English Language Center, 

n.d., available from http://www.dlielc.edu/faq/set_faq.php, accessed 

March 20, 2017.

38. Ira C. Queen, “The Value of Security Cooperation,” 

DISAM Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2006, p. 6, available from https://

www.discs.dsca.mil/Pubs/Indexes/Vol%2028_3/Queen_2_apr_2013_b.

pdf, accessed March 20, 2017.

39. “ESAMM Glossary: Expanded IMET,” in Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual 

Online, Official Site of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

April 30, 2012, available from http://www.samm.dsca.mil/glossary/

expanded-imet-e-imet, accessed March 20, 2017.

40. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, America First: A 

Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017, p. 33.

41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. Carol Morello, “State Department’s 28 percent cuts hit foreign aid, U.N., and climate change,” 

March 16, 2017, The Washington Post, available from 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
407

state-departments-28-percent-cuts-hit-foreign-aid-un-and-climatechange/2017/03/15/294d7ab8-0996-11e7-a15f-a58d4a988474_story.

html?utm_term=.c9ec39070831, accessed March 20, 2017.

43. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, p. 2.

44. U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, p. 4, available 

from https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/252179.pdf, 

accessed March 20, 2017.

45. Ibid.

46. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, p. 1.

47. Senior U.S. Defense Official, lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Spring 2017.

48. Dan Lamothe, “Retired generals cite past comments from 

Mattis while opposing Trump’s proposed foreign aid cuts,” The 

Washington Post, February 27, 2017, available from https://www.

washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/27/retired-generalscite-past-comments-from-mattis-while-opposing-trumps-proposedforeign-aid-cuts/?utm_term=.465fa32703f6, accessed March 20, 2017.

49. Ibid.

50. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, p. xiii.

51. Harlan W. Jencks, “Chinese Evaluations of ‘Desert Storm’: 

Implications For PRC Security,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 

Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1992, pp. 455-456, available from www.

jstor.org/stable/23253951?seq=10#page_scan_tab_contents, accessed 

March 27, 2017.

52. Ibid., p. 477.

53. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of 

Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” The National Interest, May 2, 2017, 

available from nationalinterest.org/feature/five-shades-chinese-grayzone-strategy-20450, accessed May 7, 2017.
408

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Mason, pp. 222-224; London School of Economics and 

Political Science.

59. Anthony L. Smith, Indonesia and the United States 2004–2005: 

New President, New Needs, Same Old Relations, Special Assessment, 

Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 

2005, pp. 2, 7, available from http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/

ADA627444, accessed December 8, 2017.

60. Ibid.

61. David M. Potter, “U.S.-Japanese Relations in Transition: 

The Case of Fukushima,” Norteamérica, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2013, 

available from http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext

&pid=S1870-35502013000100006, accessed May 7, 2017.

62. Measuring Impact, Fishing for Food Security: The Importance 

of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and Nutrition, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Agency for International Development, April 2016, pp. 3-6, 

available from https://rmportal.net/biodiversityconservation-gateway/

resources/projects/measuring-impact/mi-project-resources/fishingfor-food-security-importance-of-wild-fisheries-for-food-security-andnutrition-pdf/view, accessed May 7, 2017.

63. Shannon Tiezzi, “South China Sea Ruling: China Caused 

‘Irreparable Harm’ to Environment,” The Diplomat, July 15, 2016, 

available from https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/south-china-searuling-china-caused-irreparable-harm-to-environment/, accessed May 

7, 2017.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Courtney J. Fung, “China’s Troop Contributions to 

U.N. Peacekeeping,” Peace Brief, No. 212, Washington, DC: U.S. 
409

Institute for Peace, July 26, 2016, available from https://www.usip.

org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping, 

accessed May 7, 2017.

67. Jacob Pramuk, “Trump aims to reassure allies about US 

support, but asks them to pay up more,” CNBC News, February 

6, 2017, available from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/06/trumptries-to-reassure-allies-about-us-support-but-asks-them-to-pay-upmore.html, accessed May 7, 2017.

411

CHAPTER 14

DIPLOMACY UNDER THE STRATEGIC 

REBALANCE AND A LOOK FORWARD

Sandra Minkel 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter examines the use of diplomacy under 

former President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” 

through the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) construct to assess the effectiveness and 

soundness of diplomatic efforts under the rebalance 

strategy. It discusses successes and failures that form 

the basis of lessons-learned in order to provide recommendations for the Trump administration as it formulates its strategy for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The 

formulation and articulation of strategy is key to any 

administration. The process prioritizes foreign policy 

objectives and guides government officials as they 

strive to promote and protect U.S. national interests 

successfully through bilateral and multilateral negotiations with other sovereign states in a rules-based 

international order.

While the balance between the roles of diplomatic 

and military power under the Obama administration 

seemed right for the situation, the rising tensions in 

the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula may 

demand an adjustment. Based on lessons learned, the 

following are recommendations to continue to support 

U.S. interests in the region. 
412

• Continue face-to-face high-level (Presidential 

and Cabinet-level) exchanges through summits, 

dialogues, and participation in multilateral 

forums.

• Join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 

(AIIB) as a member and support efforts through 

coordinated projects with the World Bank and 

the Asia Development Bank (ADB).

• After pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), quickly negotiate and enter into 

bilateral or multilateral trade deals that support 

U.S. economic prosperity and business opportunities abroad. Trump stated his preference for 

bilateral trade deals. However, consideration 

should be given to multilateral trade deals that 

support his economic agenda.

• Use various mediums to relay a consistent U.S. 

policy with explanations to the public as to its 

importance.

• Nominate personnel with appropriate regional 

experience to fill key positions within State, 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD) 

to assist with policy formulation and ensure 

implementation of the policy in line with the 

new administration’s priorities.

• Refrain from deep budget cuts in foreign assistance that allows the Department of State and 

USAID to deliver diplomatic and development 

exertions required to achieve national security 

objectives.
413

INTRODUCTION

In November 2016, the people of the United States 

elected Trump to be the 45th President of the United 

States. The new leadership will undoubtedly usher 

in different priorities, policies, and strategies, making 

this an ideal time to review Obama’s strategic pivot 

or rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) and to 

look ahead toward the next 4 years. This chapter considers the Obama administration’s use of diplomacy 

to achieve long-term objectives in line with national 

security interests in the IAP region. While traditional 

diplomatic negotiations are often not directly in the 

public eye or as newsworthy as military activities, they 

nevertheless occur on a constant basis across all governmental agencies. As Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under 

Obama, wrote, “The personal dimension of American 

diplomacy is probably the least understood and most 

important facet of American power in Asia.”1

Merriam-Webster defines diplomacy as “the art and 

practice of conducting negotiations between nations” 

and the “skill in handling affairs without arousing 

hostility.”2 Charles Freeman described diplomacy in 

his book, Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, as the 

adjustment of relations between states by mutual agreement. It is the method and process by which foreign 

policy is pursued through peaceful means. He added 

that diplomatic strategy “must be judged by what it 

prevents as much as by what it achieves.”3 This chapter 

discusses successes and failures under the pivot to the 

IAP in the use of diplomacy in a whole-of-government 

pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It reviews aspects 

of the strategy through the DIME construct to determine whether the efforts in the region were sound. It 
414

contends that there was a mix of successes and disappointments. It then draws on these lessons learned to 

recommend actions under the Trump administration.

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: REBALANCE TO 

THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC

In 2011, Obama declared to the Australian Parliament that he had “made a deliberate and strategic 

decision―as a Pacific nation” to seek “security, prosperity, and dignity for all” in the Asia-Pacific region. 

He clearly stated, “So let there be no doubt, in the Asia 

Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”4

 While the United States has always been 

a “Pacific nation” and previous administrations have 

focused on emerging opportunities in Asia, many 

in the region felt that in recent years, U.S. presence 

waned. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 

the 2008 financial crisis, had diverted resources and 

attention. As a result, high-level U.S. officials did not 

always attend regional forums, leading Asian leaders 

to feel abandoned in their quest for regional stability.

Among the few visible gauges of traditional diplomacy, the “D” in DIME, are state-to-state and highlevel engagements and meetings. In this regard, Obama 

backed up his pledge to “be all in.” “Nine-tenths of 

success in diplomacy in Asia is showing up,” said 

Michael J. Green, a key figure on Asian affairs on President George W. Bush’s National Security Council, in a 

riff on a quote made famous by Woody Allen.5 Obama 

definitely showed up―traveling to Asia 63 times, more 

than any president in history. A look at the records of 

four two-term presidents―Dwight Eisenhower spent 

12 days in Asia; Ronald Reagan, 21 days; Bill Clinton, 
415

52; and George W. Bush, 50―illustrates the increasing 

focus on the region over the last 24 years.6

Hillary Clinton also did her part to reinforce the 

U.S. reinvigorated interest in Asia. She broke from tradition when she became the first Secretary of State in 50 

years to visit Asia on her first official trip―just 1 month 

after her confirmation.7 Maintaining the enthusiasm 

for commitment to the rebalance, she went on to make 

more trips to the region than any previous Secretary 

of State―62, compared to Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s 

47.8 In a 2015 speech at the Brookings Institute, Clinton 

called the rebalance policy a “response to the very real 

sense of abandonment that Asian leaders expressed to 

me,”9 due to the U.S. focus on Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The sense was “we were just not paying attention to the 

developments in Asia.”10 Secretary Clinton reinforced 

the U.S. commitment by attending the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 

Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting, where she signed 

ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 

July 2009. The TAC’s language represents the foundational principles of ASEAN, and signing indicated 

a general acceptance of them for dealing with the 10 

ASEAN nations. It also opened the door for expanded 

participation in other ASEAN-related forums. The 

United States became the first non-ASEAN country to 

establish a dedicated diplomatic mission, and in 2010 

to appoint a resident ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.11 The arrangement provided for continuous and consistent contact by a U.S. representative 

dedicated to ASEAN affairs.

Transition to a new Secretary of State, John Kerry 

in 2013, and the departure of Assistant Secretary for 
416

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell―one 

of the architects of the rebalance to Asia―sparked 

Asian doubts about the U.S. ongoing commitment to 

the region.12 Meanwhile, disagreements at home over 

the debt ceiling added to concerns about U.S. stability 

and staying power. “Running the government of the 

world’s mightiest power by sequestration and threats 

of going over a fiscal cliff,” wrote Robert Hathaway, a 

Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center, “mystified 

those who look to the United States for leadership,”13

and exacerbated doubts of U.S. commitment to the 

rebalance. Criticized for diverting attention to issues in 

Europe and the Middle East, Kerry and other administration officials nevertheless continued to engage 

substantively with Asia, making it a point to attend 

the ARF meetings, for example, and standing in for 

Obama at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

and East Asia Summit (EAS) meetings. (APEC, comprised of 22 economies, is a forum for promoting economic cooperation and trade liberalization.)14

The partial U.S. Government shutdown in 2013, 

driven by sharp budget differences between congressional Republicans and the White House,15 prompted 

Obama to cancel his attendance at an APEC meeting 

in Indonesia, an EAS meeting in Brunei, and a visit 

to Malaysia. Although the United States sent Kerry, 

along with U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman 

and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, the Asians 

were disappointed that Obama was not there to offer 

a high-level counter to the Chinese head of state, Xi 

Jinping.16 In particular, key leaders were disappointed 

he was unable to use his personal influence to press 

for progress on the TPP,17 an agreement connecting 12 

countries and intended to expand economic growth 

with lower non-tariff barriers and higher standards to 
417

address intellectual property rights and state-owned 

enterprises.

Meanwhile, on the sidelines of APEC, Xi was pushing countries to commit to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an agreement 

between ASEAN and six other Asian countries―Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South 

Korea―with which it has bilateral free trade pacts.18

The United States and Russia had become full participants in the EAS in 2011. In an article for the East 

Asian Forum, John Pang wrote that the “single biggest 

influence on the direction of the EAS has been the consistent presence of Washington’s ‘Pacific President,’ 

who shifted the EAS agenda towards geostrategic 

concerns.”19

Public Diplomacy

The success of diplomacy requires clearly defined 

and articulated messaging, which gains buy-in and 

impels others toward common goals. In “America’s 

Pacific Century,” a 2011 article for Foreign Policy, Secretary Clinton included such phrases as “the United 

States stands at a pivot point,” “efforts to pivot to new 

global realities,” and, “this kind of pivot is not easy.” 

Journalists latched onto the catch phrase to brand the 

new strategy.20 Whereas the intent had been to articulate an integrated approach to focusing on a strategically important region in the 21st century, the phrase 

had the unintended impact of signaling a turning-away 

from Europe and the Middle East. Uncertainty regarding U.S. capabilities and the long-term U.S. commitment to those other regions grew. Asian allies became 

concerned that the United States could as easily turn 

away from them should a crisis arise in another region. 
418

Though the policy would later be re-branded as a 

“rebalance,” it was too late to repair the initial damage.

Kurt Campbell admitted to a poorly-handled rollout of the rebalance, saying the administration “could 

have been more effective at communicating what the 

goals were,” including its desire to “embed China in 

a regional strategy.”21 The branding itself detracted 

from the broader intent. While attempting to reassure the IAP region that it was a top priority for the 

United States, this phrasing―in widespread use until 

recently―made it seem as though the administration 

was shifting from, rather than extending the efforts of 

previous administrations.

In fact, the rebalance was nothing more than an elevation of a strategy conceived by previous administrations. Thanks to September 11, 2001 (9/11), the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global financial crisis 

of 2008, this earlier strategy had simply fallen off the 

radar. While his administration had focused on Asia 

from the start, Obama turned his attention to the financial crisis, as it was shaking nerves across the global 

community and calling into question the U.S. role as a 

world leader. China seized on this perceived weakening, becoming more assertive in its territorial claims in 

the South and East China Seas, as well as on the economic front.

The Obama administration also could have done 

a better job explaining its integrated strategy to the 

American people. A well-articulated and documented 

strategy in one central place might have assuaged 

confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders at home 

and abroad. The administration had captured toplevel priorities, including a refocus on Asia and a 

whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, in 

the 2015 National Security Strategy, but the public knew 

little to nothing about it.
419

Bilateral Diplomacy

Fortified through various bilateral and multilateral 

diplomatic, economic, and security relationships, the 

IAP is of great importance to U.S. security and economy. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

estimates that, by 2030, the IAP region will contain the 

three largest economies after the United States (China, 

India, and Japan).22 Five of the 10 most populous countries―Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan―are in Asia, and 7 of the 10 largest militaries are 

in the IAP.23 Of these, the United States has bilateral 

defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, 

and the Philippines, strong partnerships with Singapore and New Zealand, and strengthened partnerships 

with Indonesia and Vietnam. The simple guiding goal 

of the pivot, as Campbell has explained, is to intensify 

its bilateral relationships with “nearly every Asian 

state, from India to Vietnam and from Malaysia to 

Mongolia, and to embed itself in Asia’s growing web 

of regional institutions.”24

In her Foreign Policy article, Secretary Clinton wrote 

that strengthening bilateral relations was among the 

six elements of the strategy that complement efforts 

through multilateral forums and institutions and 

regional security architecture.25 Bilateral relationships 

and promotion of U.S. interests and values overseas 

are not new, but the number of high-level visits and 

face-to-face dialogues helped to build relationships. 

Under Obama, administration officials strengthened 

bilateral relationships across the IAP, promoting an 

international, rules-based order, adherence to international law, democratic values, and human rights. 

Nations long neglected by Washington (New Zealand, 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and small Pacific island 
420

states) received high-ranking U.S. official visits, as did 

India, and most notably, Burma and Vietnam.26

After signing the TAC in 2010, Secretary Clinton 

presented the U.S. “principled engagement” strategy 

toward Burma to ASEAN. The strategy represented 

a shift in policy, from sanctions imposed by previous administrations to engagement based on Burma’s 

reform efforts toward democracy. When she visited a 

year later, Clinton became the first Secretary of State 

to do so in 55 years. A year later, the U.S. Government 

re-established full diplomatic relations with Burma―

nominating Derek Mitchell as the first ambassador 

since 1990―and reopened a USAID mission there. In 

testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 

Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted 

efforts with Burma to “modernize and strengthen legal 

and regulatory regimes” in the country, “helping set 

the stage for major American companies to enter that 

market.”27

Similarly, the engagement with Vietnam brought 

positive results. Since a bilateral trade agreement was 

signed in 2001, trade and investment opportunities 

have grown dramatically, and the country continues to take positive steps on human rights, including 

having authorized independent trade unions, a first in 

modern times. The 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive 

Partnership has encouraged respect for the rule of law. 

After Obama visited the country in May 2016, in part to 

mark the 2015 anniversary of 20 years of bilateral relations (that year U.S. exports to the country increased 

by 23 percent), Vietnam signed the TPP. Still, challenges remain, particularly regarding labor standards; 

Vietnam has yet to pass laws that would bring it to the 

level required for participation in the TPP.28
421

Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama 

all visited India, underscoring the growing importance 

of this bilateral relationship for mutual prosperity and 

security. The Bush administration committed to new 

cooperation on four highly sensitive fronts: civilian 

nuclear energy, civilian space programs, dual-use high 

technology, and missile defense.29 The 2005 U.S.-India 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement “opened the 

doors to a new relationship with an emerging power,” 

as Ashley J. Tellis put it.30 In the years since, cooperation 

between the two countries has steadily increased, helping to offset China’s growing expansion in the region. 

Obama highlighted the “strategic convergence” with 

India’s Act East Policy and the U.S. “continued implementation of the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” in 

the 2015 National Security Strategy.

31 Similar to the U.S. 

rebalance, India actively seeks to engage with ASEAN 

and other Asian countries. India is the second largest 

contributor to the AIIB and is negotiating to join the 

regional trade agreement. In 2012, the United States 

and India created the Defense Technology and Trade 

Initiative, and the White House recognized India as a 

major defense partner, a level that the United States 

accords its close partners and allies.32 This enables 

expanding defense trade and technology sharing with 

the country. With the rise of India’s population and 

economy―Bloomberg reports that the USDA expects 

India to move ahead of Japan as the world’s third largest economy by 203033―it will continue to be a significant partner economically as well as militarily.

South Korea and Japan are both treaty allies with 

long histories of cooperation (and some historical tensions between the two) with the United States. These 

countries are integral alliance partners and coordinate 

closely with the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and other economic and 
422

military issues in the region. The United States worked 

to modernize the treaty with Japan by modifying the 

Defense Guidelines with new and expanded forms of 

security cooperation in 2015 and a new 5-year package 

of host nation support for U.S. troops in 2016.

South Korea agreed last year to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile 

defense system as a way of defending against rising 

threats from North Korea. South Korea’s hosting of 

THAAD threatens China, as it is perceived as a surveillance mechanism and soured South Korea’s relations with China and created additional tensions in 

the region. Many Asian experts believe that Obama’s 

approach of “strategic patience” toward North Korea 

has failed, and they are looking to Trump for a change 

in strategy. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently 

said that, after 20 years of failure to denuclearize the 

peninsula, “strategic patience is over,” and that the 

new administration would most likely take a different 

approach.34

In 2014, the United States deepened long-standing 

security cooperation with the Philippines by signing 

the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The 

agreement authorizes the U.S. military access on a rotational basis and allows the two nations’ forces to conduct security cooperation exercises, joint training, and 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.35

The United States is one of the largest foreign investors 

in the Philippines, and there is a strong bilateral trade 

relationship, though recent concerns about human 

rights abuses under the Duterte presidency and harsh 

statements made by Duterte about Obama raise questions about future long-term relations. Additionally, 

Duterte’s balancing act between pleasing the United 
423

States and China is a precarious situation fraught with 

the potential to anger either of the two large powers.36

China remains the most prominent player and the 

most complex of U.S. bilateral relationships in the 

region. Historians, political analysts, and academics 

have theorized about the “rise of China” as a great 

power and whether a transition from the United States 

as the status quo power and the rise of China as a great 

power might escalate to a military conflict (as has happened in 12 out of 16 such transitions over the last 500 

years). Whether, in other words, the two rivals will 

avoid the so-called Thucydides Trap37―a reference to 

the author who chronicled the 5th century BC Peloponnesian War, pitting a rising Athens against the 

status quo power, Sparta, and the shift in the balance 

of power between them. In a 2015 article for The Atlantic, Graham Allison considered the key drivers behind 

the conflict: on one hand, “the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand 

for greater say and sway,” and on the other, “the fear, 

insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo 

this engenders in the established power.”38

China says it strives for peaceful development, 

with win-win benefits for both nations, while the 

United States says it welcomes a peaceful rise of China 

as long as it adheres to multilateral norms and the 

rules of international law. “There is no such thing as 

the so-called Thucydides Trap,” said Xi on a visit to 

Washington in 2015. “But should major countries time 

and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”39

It will take diligence, dialogue, and understanding to 

avoid such miscalculations. After dealing with U.S. 

domestic issues, the Obama administration showed 

signs of improved partnership with China―following 
424

the line from the Bush administration to hold China 

accountable as a responsible stakeholder regarding 

global issues and increasing the number of high-level 

dialogues.

The Obama administration invested substantial 

resources in a growing set of bilateral forums, including the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 

the Strategic Security Dialogue, and over 60 other 

issue-based and regional dialogues with Chinese government officials.40 In 2013, Obama hosted Xi in California for an informal 2-day summit, just months after 

the new president had taken office, to deepen their 

personal relationship and seek a way forward on key 

issues. The leaders discussed North Korea, cyber-theft 

and espionage, maritime territorial disputes in the East 

and South China Seas, and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.41

These informal summits, the Security and Economic 

Dialogues, and other forums increase understanding and cooperation and yield results. Arguably, the 

mutual commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate 

change is a great sign of willingness to address global 

challenges. However, any momentum toward growing 

trust and cooperation established during the Obama 

administration has been lost with the Trump administration’s decision to pull out of the Paris Agreement.

While the agreement on climate change and highlevel dialogues delivered many positive benefits, there 

is still much to do to reduce the level of mistrust on 

both sides. China claims it strives for peaceful development with win-win benefits while protecting its core 

interests. The United States says it welcomes a peaceful 

rise of China as long as China adheres to the norms of 

international law and multilateral norms. The relationship will continue to be problematic as long as the core 

interests of each country are not in closer alignment.
425

Multilateral Arrangements

The United States uses a whole-of-government 

approach to work through bilateral as well as multilateral institutions in order to promote its interests of 

peace, security, and respect for international law. Aside 

from the long-standing and largely U.S.-led Bretton 

Woods institutions, the most significant multilateral 

achievement under the rebalance was the U.S. signing of the ASEAN TAC, which resulted in the United 

States playing an active and influential role in ASEAN 

forums such as the ARF, EAS, and ASEAN Defense 

Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-PLUS). In addition, 

the United States is a member of several other regional 

organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Lower Mekong Initiative, and is 

an observer to the Pacific Islands Forum and the Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia.

Geopolitical changes are forcing many multilateral organizations to reevaluate their memberships 

and voting rules to reflect better the growing influence of countries such as China and India. In 2010, the 

International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) executive board 

approved a plan to increase the voting share of the 

aforementioned members and to double the amount of 

permanent funding available to the Washington-based 

fund.42 While the Obama administration made several 

efforts to obtain legislative approval of the changes, 

the proposal languished in Congress for 5 years.43

Edwin M. Truman, a former assistant secretary of the 

U.S. Treasury, warned that failure to act would compel 

other nations to work around the United States at the 

IMF.44 Congress finally approved the proposal in 2015; 

5 years after the IMF had submitted it.
426

Analysts have posited growing frustration with 

Washington and U.S.-led international organizations 

prompted China to create the AIIB. In an article for 

The Pacific Review, Xiao Ren wrote that slow-moving 

reforms and resistance to accommodation of China’s 

growing status in the IMF, World Bank, and ADB frustrated the Asian powerhouse.

China’s push for a regional institution within which 

it would be dominant or at least have considerable 

impact was a reflection of Beijing’s frustration over the 

Western, especially American, dominance of the existing 

international multilaterals.45

Some call Washington’s reaction to the AIIB a “diplomatic disaster.”46 Not only did the United States 

show no interest in joining the AIIB, it actively lobbied 

its allies to stay away, suggesting that the new bank 

would not have the same high standards of creditworthiness and transparency as the other multilateral 

banking institutions. The United States also feared that 

the AIIB would increase China’s ability to use infrastructure financing to influence countries toward a 

pro-China stance. Some have argued that China might 

have invested in one of the existing banks in order 

to achieve the same purpose, but its frustration had 

reached a peak. Since then, several allies and other 

countries rushed to join the AIIB, a situation that suggests the United States is losing influence.

In a March 2015 issue of The Economist, the editors 

wrote that the United States is not wrong to question 

the existence of the AIIB, but that it would have more 

influence working from within the structure. They 

also pointed out that, while the ADB and the World 

Bank are focused on poverty alleviation and healthcare, the focus of the AIIB is large-scale infrastructure 
427

programs. “The continent’s relentless urbanization 

requires at least $8 trillion of infrastructure spending in 

this decade, according to ADB,”47 adding that the AIIB 

complements existing development bank programs.

Economic Diplomacy

Under the rebalance, the United States intended to 

focus on economic statecraft and strengthening economic leadership48―the “E” in DIME. At the heart of 

this portion of the strategy was the ambitious TPP, 

a comprehensive trading network encompassing 12 

countries on 4 continents. The Obama administration 

negotiated an agreement that sought to lower barriers, raise standards, and address intellectual property rights and state-owned enterprises, and that 

would have covered 40 percent of the world’s trade. It 

would have fortified the U.S. status as the leader of a 

global, rules-based economic system that would have 

expanded to trading partners in the region with North 

America and South America. The ability to invest in 

the development of the Asian economies and to sell 

goods and services to their growing middle classes 

was to power U.S. growth for decades to come.49

While Obama signed the negotiated agreement 

in 2016, Congress still needed to draft a bill to implement the agreement, which would have served as U.S. 

ratification of the trade deal.50 The U.S. business community largely supported the TPP―it would level the 

playing field and open markets for export―but there 

was not sufficient political will for ratification. The 

Obama administration’s efforts to conclude the TPP 

were laudable, but its inability to submit the agreement to Congress before the beginning of a contentious U.S. election cycle put the entire project at risk. In 
428

the end, both candidates for president denounced the 

agreement―though one had worked on it as Secretary 

of State―and the new administration was clear that it 

would take TPP no further.

Military Diplomacy

The military initiated its portion of the pivot by 

shifting 60 percent of the force to the Asia-Pacific to 

protect U.S. interests while strengthening and modernizing bilateral relationships with treaty allies Japan, 

South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. North 

Korea’s continued efforts to acquire and test longrange nuclear missiles that will reach the United States 

destabilizes the region and threatens the security of 

the United States and its allies. China’s aggressiveness 

on territorial claims and its militarization of the South 

China Sea, combined with a staggering build-up and 

modernization of its forces, threaten security and freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas. 

John Pomfret chronicled a confrontation between Secretary Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 

in Hanoi in 2010, just months prior to the announcement of the rebalance. In response to her assertion that 

claims to maritime space should be directly tied to 

legitimate claims to land features, Yang said, “China 

is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s a fact.”51 This statement may be interpreted two different ways. On one hand, China reacted 

to harsh criticism from Secretary Clinton and others, 

because it felt that the United States was unfairly joining with the ASEAN countries to contain the rising 

power from exercising its rightful claims, and that the 

United States was meddling in regional affairs. On the 

other hand, the outburst may be interpreted as China’s 
429

true intent―to use its economic might and growing 

military to coerce the “smaller countries” to gain its 

goals. While the majority of Asian nations welcome the 

shift in U.S. forces, China and North Korea view it as 

a threat to their national interests and security. China 

consistently voices concerns about the United States 

trying to contain it, but this shift was largely intended 

as a signal to reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to 

provide stability in the region.

Over the last 6 years, the United States has participated in the ADMM-Plus and the ARF in order to build 

regional trust, cohesion, and civil-military cooperation 

and integration. In 2015, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear 

said that, “leveraging defense diplomacy to build 

greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of 

the road”52 would assist in reducing gaps and building trust. Participation in ASEAN-related forums augments the bilateral relationships that DoD maintains. 

The DoD will seek to expand trilateral and quadrilateral defense discussions with key partners. ASEAN-centered relationships are of growing utility in a 

region affected by frequent natural disasters, the threat 

of terrorism, rival maritime claims, illegal fishing, 

food security challenges, environmental degradation, 

and other shared interests that require a multilateral 

response. However, it must be inclusive of China, as 

too much emphasis on force posture and alliance building to counter China is another unintended sign that 

the U.S. strategy is strictly a counterbalance to China’s 

growing power as opposed to a supportive peaceful 

development. Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 

characterizes China as self-isolationist. In his view, the 
430

Chinese are raising the barriers to working in unison 

by “erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.”53

Renewed and modernized defense agreements with 

the Philippines, Japan, and Australia allow forward 

deployment of forces on a rotational basis. Moving forward, they will allow the military to respond quickly 

to potential conflicts as well as to provide security in 

the region and an increased number of combined partner exercises, and assure freedom of navigation and air 

space.

The Obama administration has also expanded trilateral cooperation. Bush initiated the most productive 

of these, the U.S.–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. The Obama administration expanded 

the cooperative reach through a U.S.–Japan–India 

trilateral in 2015. Another trilateral dialogue formed 

between Japan–India–Australia in 2015. This signals 

the increased importance of various countries coordinating and cooperating on a range of security issues in 

every configuration. The shift represents an elevated 

number of joint exercises between allies as well as 

bilateral China-U.S. cooperative maneuvers. The latter 

consists mostly of military school visit exchanges, dialogues, and recently the inclusion of China in the multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise.

The increased multiple partner exercises assist in 

mitigating the potential for miscalculations. In relation to the complicated territorial disputes in the South 

China Sea, to which the United States is not a claimant, Secretary James Mattis recently said that, “these 

territories which are contested need to be addressed 

politically through a legal framework consistent with 

international law.”54 This represents the long-standing 

view of the administration to lead with diplomacy and 

statecraft and use military hard power as a last resort. 
431

The presence of the U.S. military is itself a show of military diplomacy, with an aim toward protecting U.S. 

interests, regional stability, and freedom of navigation. 

It is doubtful that any parties want to choose between 

the United States and China, and elevating diplomacy 

across all levels of statecraft, including military, will 

help to achieve stability.

A LOOK AHEAD TO THE TRUMP 

ADMINISTRATION

Although the Trump administration has not yet 

published a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, 

there are signs that the President is placing some importance on Asia. In a press briefing, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Susan 

A. Thornton clearly stated that, while the pivot or 

rebalance is over, the new administration will remain 

engaged and active in IAP as the region is very important to global economic prosperity and growth as well 

as security. She said the U.S. policy approach seeks to 

level the playing field for U.S. interests and promote 

fair and balanced economic opportunities.55

Regarding China, Trump has significantly softened 

the tough rhetoric of his campaign, during which he 

threatened to name China as a “currency manipulator” 

and stated that trade deals between the countries were 

“lopsided” in China’s favor. As president-elect, Trump 

accepted a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese 

President Tsai Ing-wen. In an interview with The Wall 

Street Journal, he said that the long-standing U.S. “OneChina policy” was negotiable.56 The policy remains 

essentially as first articulated in a 1972 Shanghai Communiqué: “The United States acknowledges that all 

Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
432

there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.”57

Trump subsequently talked with Xi in February 2017 

and acknowledged that he will honor the decades-long 

U.S. “One China” policy.58

Meanwhile, Tillerson talked with the leaders of 

Australia, Japan, and South Korea in February and 

“reiterated the Administration’s intent to strengthen 

our military alliances, our economic partnerships, 

and our diplomatic cooperation.”59 In March, he met 

with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20 

Summit in Germany, urging Beijing “to help rein in 

North Korea.”60 Tillerson also traveled to Japan, South 

Korea, and China to continue discussions on dealing 

with North Korea and negotiated an April 2017 meeting between Xi and Trump at Mar-a-Lago.61 This sends 

a message that North Korea’s recent actions are a high 

priority, and the United States will remain engaged in 

the region.

After the heated debates and messages from the 

campaign trail, it is imperative for the United States 

to delineate a clear vision and strategy for the next 4 

years. To assist in formulating strategies and policies 

toward the IAP and globally, the Trump administration should nominate people to fill the multiple vacant 

positions in State, DoD, and USAID. According to the 

nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service, as of April 

11, 2017, the White House formally nominated 24 

people to fill 553 politically appointed positions across 

all government agencies that require Senate approval. 

Of the 24 nominations, 22 have been confirmed.62 The 

administration would benefit from nominating people 

with extensive Asia experience to fill the key positions that deal with this region, in particular to assist 

with formulation of strategy and policy in accordance 

with the new administration’s approach. This will also 
433

assist high-level decision-makers in the formulation 

of a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy 

toward the IAP.

Another concern that will affect diplomatic efforts 

is the President’s budget request. Asked how cuts to 

the State Department budget might affect the U.S. 

military and its activities around the globe, Office of 

Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney 

replied, “Make no mistake about it, this is a hardpower budget, not a soft-power budget. That is what 

the president wanted, and that’s what we gave him.”63

The United States has one of the largest development 

assistance programs in the world (roughly 25 billion in 

absolute dollars), but one of the smallest as a share of 

gross national income (.018 percent), according to the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.64 Cuts to eliminate positions and support programs will drastically shift government efforts from a 

whole-of-government balanced soft power approach 

to an emphasis on use of military force: hard power. 

The foreign assistance budget has historically received 

bipartisan support. Senior Republican Senator Lindsay 

Graham said the Trump budget is “dead on arrival” 

and added that such drastic cuts would be “a disaster.” 

Senator Marco Rubio had similar statements: “Foreign 

Aid is not charity,” and it is “less than 1 percent of our 

budget and critical to our national security.”65 Over 120 

retired generals signed a letter urging Congress not to 

drastically cut foreign assistance as proposed, since 

“elevating and strengthening diplomacy and development alongside defense are critical to keeping America 

safe.”66
434

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Diplomacy plays a key role in implementing foreign policy objectives across all agencies in the government and in the wise use of the military instrument as 

a deterrent. Obama and his administration should be 

lauded for increased travel to and consistent presence 

in the IAP and for peacefully furthering bilateral and 

multilateral relationships in the region. This all could 

have been accomplished without the distraction of a 

“pivot” that created confusion and left various partners around the world wondering if the United States 

had the ability to respond to its security commitments worldwide. His use of a whole-of-government 

approach and use of other soft power tools to prevent 

the need for military confrontation is applauded, as is 

his recognition of the requirement for active behindthe-scenes efforts to build diplomatic relations gradually. Obama’s inability to shepherd the TPP through 

its ratification process, however, and the decision not 

to participate in and to lobby allies against the AIIB 

will continue to have negative effects on the economic 

front.

While the balance between the roles of diplomatic 

and military power under the Obama administration 

seemed right for the situation, the rising tensions in 

the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula may 

demand an adjustment. Based on lessons learned, the 

following are recommendations to continue to support 

U.S. interests in the region.

• Continue face-to-face high-level (Presidential 

and Cabinet-level) exchanges through summits, 

dialogues, and participation in multilateral 

forums.
435

• Join the AIIB as a member and support efforts 

through coordinated projects with the World 

Bank and ADB.

• After pulling out of the TPP, quickly negotiate 

and enter into bilateral or multilateral trade 

deals that support U.S. economic prosperity and 

business opportunities abroad. Trump stated 

his preference for bilateral trade deals. However, consideration should be given to multilateral trade deals that support his economic 

agenda.

• Use various mediums to relay a consistent U.S. 

policy with explanations to the public as to its 

importance.

• Nominate personnel with appropriate regional 

experience to fill key positions within State, 

USAID, and DoD in order to assist with policy 

formulation and ensure implementation of the 

policy in line with the new administration’s 

priorities.

• Refrain from deep budget cuts in the foreign 

assistance that allows State and USAID to 

deliver diplomatic and development exertions required to achieving national security 

objectives. 

Formulation and articulation of strategy is key to 

any administration. While Obama had a sound strategy, the commotion in naming it as a pivot or rebalance detracted from the intended outcomes. The 

administration’s missteps in messaging combined 

with the inability to implement the economic portion 

of the rebalance were damaging. However, the new 

administration received a stronger regional security 

architecture to assist with potential issues with North 
436

Korea and the South China Sea. The Trump administration should draw on mistakes and successes not 

only from the Obama administration, but also from all 

previous administrations. Recent years indicate that a 

whole-of-government approach, led by soft power first 

and hard power as a last resort, will yield dividends―

because no one “wins” because of a war.

ENDNOTES―CHAPTER 14

1. Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft, New York: Hatchette Book Group, Incorporated, 2016, 

p. 326.

2. “Diplomacy,” in Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 

updated November 28, 2017, available from https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/diplomacy, accessed December 8, 2017.

3. Charles W. Freeman, The Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 

1997, p. 72.

4. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011, available from 

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/

remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament, accessed April 27, 

2017.

5. Michael J. Green, quoted in George E. Condon, Jr., “Air 

Force One’s Pivot to Asia,” National Journal, May 26, 2016, available from https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/626967/air-force-onespivot-asia, accessed December 23, 2016.

6. Condon, Jr., “Air Force One’s Pivot to Asia.”

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Catherine Putz and Shannon Tiezzi, “Did Hillary Clinton’s 

Pivot to Asia Work?” FiveThirtyEight, April 14, 2016, available 
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from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/did-hillary-clintons-pivot-toasia-work/, accessed February 19, 2017.

10. Ibid.

11. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact 

Sheet: Unprecedented U.S.-ASEAN Relations,” Washington, DC: 

The White House, February 12, 2016, available from https://asean.

usmission.gov/fact-sheet-unprecedented-u-s-asean-relations/, accessed 

January 25, 2017.

12. Center for a New American Security, “Secretary Kerry 

and the Future of the U.S. Rebalancing to Asia,” Center for a New 

American Security, March 22, 2013, available from https://www.

cnas.org/press/in-the-news/secretary-kerry-and-the-future-of-the-u-srebalancing-to-asia, accessed January 25, 2017.

13. Robert Hathaway, “Kerry in Asia: Fleshing Out the 

Rebalance,” Asia Program Research, Wilson Center, April 12, 

2013, available from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/kerry-asiafleshing-out-the-rebalance, accessed January 15, 2017.

14. Ibid.

15. Murray Hiebert, Noelan Arbis, and Kyle Springer, “The 

2013 APEC Leaders’ Meeting and East Asia Summit,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

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16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

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from www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/12/the-east-asia-summit-aplatform-for-confidence-building/, accessed December 27, 2016.
438

20. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, available from http://foreignpolicy.

com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/, accessed October 17, 2016.

21. Campbell, pp. 6-7.

22. Jeanna Smialek, “These Will Be the World’s 20 Largest 

Economies in 2030,” Bloomberg, April 10, 2015, available from 

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largest-economies-in-2030, accessed January 10, 2017.

23. UN News Centre, “UN projects world population to reach 

8.5 billion by 2030, driven by growth in developing countries,” 

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7, 2017.

24. Campbell, p. 14.

25. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”

26. David Shambaugh, “Assessing the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” 

Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol 7, Iss. 2, Summer 2013, pp. 10-19.

27. Antony J. Blinken, “Testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee on the Obama Administration Policy 

in the Asia Pacific,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State 

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gov/s/d/2016d/256694.htm, accessed November 17, 2016.

28. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. 

Relations with Vietnam,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

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pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm, accessed December 12, 2017.

29. Ashley J. Tellis, Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the 

Transformation in U.S.-Indian Relations, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2013, 

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439

30. Ibid., p. 6.

31. Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, 

DC: The White House, February 2015, p. 25.

32. Ash Carter, “The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security,” 

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2016, p. 68.

33. Smialek.

34. Rex W. Tillerson, “Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

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35. “Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between 

the Philippines and the United States,” Official Gazette, Republic of the Philippines, April 29, 2014, available from http://

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37. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and 

China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, available from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/

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38. Ibid.

39. Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Speech on China-U.S. 

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40. Bates Gill, “The Pivot, Past and Future,” The Diplomat, 

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the-pivot-past-and-future/, accessed January 24, 2017.
440

41. Richard C. Bush, “Obama and Xi at Sunnylands: A Good 

Start,” Up Front, blog of The Brookings Institution, June 10, 2013, 

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42. Andrew Mayeda, “Congress Approves IMF Change 

in Favor of Emerging Markets,” December 18, 2015, available 

from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/congressapproves-imf-changes-giving-emerging-markets-more-sway, accessed 

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43. Gerald F. Seib, “How Congress’s Inaction on IMF Reform, 

Trade Hinders the U.S.,” Washington Wire, blog of The Wall 

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44. Ibid.

45. Xiao Ren, “China as an institution-builder: the case of the 

AIIB,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2016, p. 436.

46. Shannon Tiezzi, “America’s AIIB Disaster: Are There 

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47. “China on the world stage: A bridge not far enough,” 

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com/news/leaders/21646746-america-wrong-obstruct-chinas-asianinfrastructure-bank-bridge-not-far-enough, accessed February 26, 

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48. Hillary Clinton, “Delivering on the Promise of Economic 

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Singapore Management University, Singapore,” U.S. Department 

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49. Aaron L. Connelly, “Congress and Asia-Pacific Policy: 

Dysfunction and Neglect,” Sydney, Australia: The Lowy Institute, 

September 24, 2015, available from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/
441

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

PROJECT EDITORS

DAVID LAI is Research Professor of Asian Security 

Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC). Dr. Lai joined SSI 

in 2008. Before then, he was on the faculty of the U.S. 

Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery Alabama. Dr. Lai’s research and teaching interests cover 

U.S.-China and U.S.-Asian security relations. He has 

also made special contributions to the study of Chinese 

strategic thinking and military operational art, receiving acknowledgements from Dr. Henry Kissinger, 

General (U.S. Air Force Ret.) Steve Lorenz, Dr. Joseph 

Nye, Jr., Dr. Graham Allison, and many in the U.S. diplomatic and defense communities.

JOHN F. TROXELL is currently serving as Research 

Professor of National Security and Military Strategy, 

with the SSI, USAWC. He served as an economics 

instructor with the Department of Social Sciences, at 

the United States Military Academy from 1982 to 1985, 

and prior to assuming his current position he was Professor of National Security Affairs with the Center for 

Strategic Leadership as a member of the Strategic Decision-making Exercise team. Prior to that, he served as 

the Director of National Security Studies, Department 

of National Security and Strategy, USAWC. He is also 

an adjunct faculty member of the Baltic Defense College. In addition to his research activities with SSI, 

for the past 14 years he has taught an elective course 

on the economics of national security and has widely 

lectured on related topics. Colonel (U.S. Army Ret.) 
446

Troxell earned a bachelor’s degree from the United 

States Military Academy in 1974 and a master’s degree 

from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University in 1982. He is also a 1997 graduate of the USAWC.

FREDERICK J. GELLERT is Professor of Resource 

Management at the USAWC. He served at U.S. Army 

Pacific as the Chief of Force Management and then the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations G-3/5/7 from 

2008-2011. He teaches courses and lectures on strategic leadership, defense management, and Asia-Pacific 

regional studies. Colonel (U.S. Army Ret.) Gellert holds 

a bachelor’s in physics from Wayne State University, a 

master’s in astrophysics from Rensselaer Polytechnic 

Institute, and a Master’s of Strategic Studies from the 

USAWC.

PROJECT RESEARCHERS

ROBERT R. ARNOLD, JR., is a U.S. Army Colonel and 

a recent graduate of the USAWC, 2016-2017. He is currently deployed to Afghanistan and serves as Senior 

Advisor to the Deputy Minister, Security, Afghan Ministry of the Interior. He has held various command and 

staff positions throughout his 26 years of military service. Most recently, he served as Commander, 504th 

Military Police Battalion, and Secretary of the General 

Staff, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. Colonel 

Arnold supported humanitarian relief in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, to 

Kosovo in support of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, 

to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of an operational 

assessment for the Army Battle Command System, 

and twice to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI 
447

FREEDOM. Commissioned through Officer Candidate 

School at Fort Benning, GA, in 1995, Colonel Arnold 

holds a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the 

USAWC, Carlisle, PA, a Master of Science in International Relations from Troy State University, Troy, AL, 

and a Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education 

from Trenton State College, Trenton, NJ (1990).

ROMEO S. BRAWNER, JR., is a Colonel in the Philippine Army. He graduated from the Philippine Military 

Academy in 1989 at the top of the list of graduates joining the Army. He joined the Special Forces Regiment 

(Airborne) as a Company Commander, Regimental 

Operations Officer and Battalion Commander. He was 

also the spokesperson of the Philippine Army and 

later of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Colonel 

Brawner has a Master of Science degree in Information Management, a Master of Business Administration degree, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the 

USAWC. In 2013, Colonel Brawner was the recipient of 

the Ten Outstanding Philippine Soldiers award.

JOEL M. BUENAFLOR is a U.S. Army Colonel. He has 

had extensive experience in the Pacific region including service as the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation 

in Cambodia, Strategy Branch Chief with Pacific Command, Southeast Asia Desk Officer with the U.S. Army 

Pacific, and a tour of duty in Korea. He is currently 

serving on his second tour to Afghanistan. Colonel 

Buenaflor holds a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the USAWC, Carlisle, PA, a Master of Arts in 

English from Texas A&M University, and a Bachelor 

of Science in Philosophy from the United States 

Military Academy.
448

TODD D. CARROLL is a Commander in the U.S. 

Navy. He has served as a Naval Flight Officer who 

has made four deployments in support of Operations 

IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and 

NEW DAWN. He has accrued over 2,500 hours in the 

F/A-18F. Prior to his arrival at USAWC, he was the 

Strike Operations Officer on USS Gerald R Ford (CVN78) and is currently a placement officer at Navy Personnel Command. Commander Carroll holds a BS in 

industrial engineering from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and a Master of Strategic Studies from 

the USAWC. 

FRAZARIEL I. CASTRO is a U.S. Army Colonel 

and Logistician. He was commissioned through the 

Reserve Officers Training Corps in the Transportation 

Corps with a branch detail to Air Defense Artillery. 

Colonel Castro’s current assignment is Deputy Director, HQDA G-46, Logistics Information Management 

Directorate at the Pentagon, Washington, DC. Previous 

assignments include Commander, 68th Transportation 

Company (Line Haul), 28th Transportation Battalion 

at Mannheim, Germany; and Commander, Army Field 

Support Battalion-Korea, 403rd Army Field Support 

Brigade at Camp Casey, Republic of Korea. Colonel 

Castro most recently served as the Transportation 

Organizational Integrator, HQDA G-3/5/7 (Force 

Management), at the Pentagon. Colonel Castro holds a 

Bachelor of Arts in politics from the University of San 

Francisco, a Master of Arts in management and leadership from Webster University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the USAWC.
449

JAMES L. CONNER is a U.S. Army Colonel. He was 

commissioned into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps 

through ROTC in 1995. He has spent more than 8 

years in various assignments in the Republic of Korea, 

including service as the Battalion Commander for 

USFK Special Troops Battalion, in Yongsan. In addition to a deployment to Afghanistan, he has also had 

several assignments in the Pentagon, with the Joint 

Staff, J34 Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection CBRNE 

Branch, and with the Army Staff, G-3/5/7 Operations 

Division for Readiness as the Joint Operations Branch 

Chief. He is currently assigned as the Eighth Army-Director, G-34 Operational Protection Directorate, in 

Seoul, Korea. Colonel Conner holds a B.S. in criminal 

justice from Fayetteville State University, a master’s 

degree in public policy administrative management 

from Georgetown University in Washington, DC, and 

a Master of Strategic Studies from the USAWC.

WILLIAM P. DONNELLY is a Lieutenant Colonel in 

the U.S. Marine Corps. He has served as a U.S. Marine 

for more than 20 years in multiple operational and 

instructional training assignments. In addition to his 

operational experience, he has served the Marine Corps 

as a staff officer in several capacities. He is currently 

serving with the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, 

Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Donnelly holds a Bachelor of Science degree in history from the U.S. Naval 

Academy, a Master of Business Administration degree 

from the Naval Post Graduate School, and a Master of 

Strategic Studies from the USAWC.

RYAN M. FINN is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. 

Marine Corps. He has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as several tours of duty with Marine 
450

Forces Pacific. Lieutenant Colonel Finn holds a Bachelor of Arts in biology from Ithaca College, a Master 

of Military Art and Science from the Marine Corps 

Command and Staff College, and a Master of Strategic 

Studies from the USAWC.

SANDRA K. MINKEL is a career Foreign Service Officer with the United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID). Her current position is as 

the USAID Senior Development Advisor to the U.S. 

Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii. She joined 

USAID in 2000 and has more than 16 years of progressive experience in financial management and international development, with extensive experience in 

Zimbabwe (2011-2016), Iraq (2010-2011), Nepal (2008-

2010), Republic of Georgia (2006-2008), and Hungary 

(2001-2006). In addition, she has experience through 

advisory and technical assistance within USAID, host 

governments, and the private voluntary and non-governmental organization communities in the Balkans, 

Caucasus, Nepal, and Zimbabwe. She has served in a 

variety of civic and charitable organizations providing domestic community service and as a team leader 

for the National Civilian Community Corps in South 

Carolina. She was also a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in 

Kitale, Kenya (1991-1993). Ms. Minkel holds a Bachelor of Science in business administration from Central 

Michigan University, and a Master of Strategic Studies 

from the USAWC.

DAVID B. MOORE is a Lieutenant Colonel in the 

U.S. Marine Corps. He is a Marine Cobra pilot who 

has served in the U.S. Marine Corps for more than 20 

years. His current assignment is with the United States 

European Command. He has deployed three times 
451

to the Asia-Pacific region as part of the Unit Deployment Program and the 31st Marine Expeditionary 

Unit (MEU) out of Okinawa, Japan, and has served in 

combat tours to Iraq in 2003 and 2007 and Afghanistan 

in 2013. He served in staff billets with Second Marine 

Aircraft Wing, Forward (2dMAW Fwd) in Afghanistan 

and with Headquarters Marine Corps, Department of 

Aviation in Washington, DC. He served as the Marine 

Aircraft Group 29 (MAG-29) Headquarters Squadron Commanding Officer from July 2014 until January 2015 and as the Commanding Officer of Marine 

Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467 (HMLA-467) 

from January 2015 until June 2016. Lieutenant Colonel 

Moore holds a master’s degree in military studies from 

the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff Course in 

Quantico, and a master’s degree in strategic studies 

from the USAWC.

NEIL J. OWENS is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. 

Marine Corps with extensive experience in the 

Asia-Pacific region. In addition to multiple operational, instructor, staff, and headquarters billets, he 

has had several opportunities to serve with international militaries, to include Operations Advisor to the 

Afghan National Army, an exchange officer with the 

United Kingdom Royal Marines, and as a student at 

the Australian Command and Staff College. He has 

conducted multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and has deployed to Okinawa, Japan, three times. 

His last assignment was as Commanding Officer of 3d 

Battalion, 12th Marines, and an artillery battalion in 

Okinawa Upon graduation from USAWC, he will be 

assigned to the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa. Lieutenant Colonel Owens holds a Bachelor of 

Arts in history from George Washington University, a 
452

Master of Strategic Studies degree from the University 

of New South Wales, Australia, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the USAWC.

STEVEN M. PIERCE is a U.S. Army Colonel and has 

served more than 22 years in the Army. His assignments include in airborne and armored units through 

the division level, on a Combined Joint Task Force staff 

and at the Headquarters, Department of the Army. He 

has deployed twice in support of Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM and once in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. His next assignment is as a Liaison Officer for the Combined Joint Task Force Horn 

of Africa at U.S. African Command. Colonel Pierce’s 

military education includes the Combined Arms and 

Services Staff School, Joint Firepower Course, Joint Air 

Operations Command and Control Course, and Command and General Staff College. He holds a Bachelor 

of Science degree from the University of North Carolina-Greensboro, and a Master of Strategic Studies 

degree from the USAWC.

DERIC K. WONG is a career civil servant currently 

assigned to the Joint Force Development directorate of 

the Joint Staff (JS J-7) and serves as the Chief, Policy 

Integration Branch for joint force training. In this role, 

Mr. Wong ensures Department of Defense policy guidance and pronouncements are integrated into military 

policy and guidance issued on behalf of the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also provides program 

evaluation expertise to the Department’s joint exercise program. Mr. Wong entered the civil service as 

the Manager, Theater Security Cooperation program 

for Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) in 

2000 eventually becoming Chief, International Affairs 
453

branch supervising seven political/regional affairs 

specialists and overseeing PACAF’s foreign military 

sales program. Prior to his assignment to the Joint 

Staff, Mr. Wong served on the Air Staff of the U.S. Air 

Force and was an operational planner on the staff of 

the Air Force District of Washington (HQ AFDW). Mr. 

Wong holds a Bachelor of Science degree in physics 

from Oregon State University, a Master of Business 

Administration degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic 

Institute, a Master of Arts degree in economics from 

the University of Oklahoma, and a Master of Strategic 

Studies degree from the USAWC.

ERIC W. YOUNG is a U.S. Army Colonel, commissioned in 1993 from Purdue University in West Lafayette, IN. Previous assignments include: Executive 

Officer, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, 

VA; Chief, Active Component Career Management 

Branch/Lieutenant Colonels Assignments, Personnel, 

Plans and Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Washington, DC; Deputy Staff Judge 

Advocate, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, 

HI; Professor, International Law, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI; Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF101/101st ABN DIV (AASLT), Bagram, Afghanistan; 

Command Judge Advocate, Combined/Joint Special 

Operations Task Force-Afghanistan; and Group Judge 

Advocate, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort 

Bragg, NC. Colonel Young holds a Master of Arts 

(MA) with Highest Distinction in national security 

and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, 

Newport, RI; a Master of Laws (LL.M) from The Judge 

Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, VA; a Juris Doctor (J.D.) from Marquette 
454

University Law School, Milwaukee, WI; and a Master 

of Strategic Studies degree from the USAWC.

JEFFREY M. ZAISER is a career Foreign Service Officer. He has served primarily in East and Southeast 

Asia, including U.S. Embassies and Consulates in 

South Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, 

Thailand, and Hong Kong, as well as at the American 

Institute in Taiwan. More recently, he spent 4 years 

in the Middle East region (Iraq and Jerusalem). Mr. 

Zaiser holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of 

Virginia, studied economics at the graduate level at the 

University of Stockholm, and holds a master’s degree 

from the USAWC.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General John S. Kem

Commandant

∗∗∗∗∗

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

AND

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Project Editors

Dr. David Lai 

Colonel John F. Troxell, USA Ret.

Colonel Frederick J. Gellert, USA Ret.

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

∗∗∗∗∗

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT

armywarcollege.edu

This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website