NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

AARON WRIGHT, AKA Aaron Michael 

Wright, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-10403 

D.C. Nos. 

2:09-cr-00241-SMB-1 

2:09-cr-00241-SMB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 10, 2021

San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

After pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, Aaron Wright was 

sentenced to 66 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release. Wright 

moved to terminate his supervised release sentence, and Wright’s probation officer 

sought modification of his supervised release conditions. The district court denied 

Wright’s termination motion and granted several requested modifications. Wright 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 21 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

appeals both orders. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Cate, 

971 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Nixon, 839 F.3d 

885, 887 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), we affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright’s 

motion to terminate supervised release. “The court may, after considering the 

factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), 

(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)[,] terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the 

defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised 

release . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Denying Wright’s termination motion, the 

district court provided “an explanation [that was] sufficiently detailed to permit 

meaningful appellate review, and [to] state the court's reasons for rejecting 

nonfrivolous arguments.” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 

2014) (cleaned up). 

The district court adequately tied its denial of Wright’s termination motion 

to the § 3553(a) factors. By basing its decision on the nature of Wright’s crime as 

detailed in the original presentencing report, the district court considered “the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court also expressed concern 

about Wright’s need for future correctional treatment, especially given that he only 

recently completed treatment and there was no polygraph condition or other tool in 
3 

place to neutrally assess his progress. Thus, the court considered the need “to 

provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, 

or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

The district court also stated its reasons for rejecting Wright’s “nonfrivolous 

arguments in favor of termination.” See Emmett, 749 F.3d at 821 (cleaned up). 

The district court acknowledged Wright’s impressive rehabilitative efforts and 

progress to date, but found that Wright had completed treatment too recently to 

warrant terminating his sentence. Similarly, the court found that “the people 

[Wright] work[s] with, [his] family members, all have glowing things to say about

[him], but that is not unusual in these types of cases.” Thus, the district court

addressed Wright’s key arguments in favor of termination, provided its reasons for 

denying the termination motion, and left open the possibility of termination at a 

later date.

2. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by modifying the terms 

of Wright’s supervised release. A district court “may modify, reduce, or enlarge 

the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or 

termination of the term of supervised release,” after considering the same 

§ 3553(a) statutory factors that the court considers for termination decisions. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). Wright challenges three of his supervised release conditions: 

his drug testing condition, treatment condition, and polygraph condition. 
4 

Wright contends that his drug testing condition constitutes an improper 

delegation of sentencing authority to the probation officer, and is improper given 

Wright’s lack of a history of drug use. We disagree. Reading the recent 2020 drug 

testing modification condition together with the drug testing condition originally 

imposed in 2010, it is clear that the district court ordered the maximum number of 

drug tests not to exceed two per year. Thus, the district court did not improperly 

delegate sentencing authority to the probation officer, and instead satisfied the

requirement to “set the maximum number of non-treatment program drug tests to 

which [Wright] may be subjected.” See United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 

882 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, even where there is no demonstrated history of 

drug use, a sentencing court may nonetheless require drug testing. Cf. United 

States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding condition 

requiring eight drug tests per month for defendant without demonstrated history of 

drug use).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sex offender 

treatment condition on Wright. To justify this modification, the district court 

referenced Wright’s potential for relapse, his potential need for future treatment,

and the fact that Wright will likely struggle with fantasies for years. This condition

is thus connected to the need to “protect the public from further crimes,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(C); the need to provide “other correctional treatment in the most 
5 

effective manner,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(D); and the “the nature and circumstances of 

[Wright’s] offense,” id. § 3553(a)(1). Therefore, this “condition of supervised 

release meant to address [Wright’s] history of sexual misconduct” is not unduly 

burdensome and is “reasonably necessary to accomplish one of the legitimate goals 

of supervised release.” See United States v. Hohag, 893 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2018).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 

polygraph condition on Wright. The polygraph condition is a neutral means of 

determining Wright’s compliance with treatment as well as Wright’s truthfulness 

with his probation officer. Thus, the condition is adequately connected to the need 

“to provide [Wright] with needed . . . correctional treatment in the most effective 

manner.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).

1

AFFIRMED.

1 Because this disposition does not rely on the documents that Wright would 

have us strike in his motion to strike, Dkt. No. 30, we deny his motion as moot.