U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31–404 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

THE STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY 

(115–36) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-transportation?path=/ 

browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

RANDY K. WEBER, SR., Texas 

DOUG LAMALFA, California 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

LLOYD SMUCKER, Pennsylvania 

PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan 

JOHN J. FASO, New York 

A. DREW FERGUSON IV, Georgia 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

JASON LEWIS, Minnesota 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut, Vice 

Ranking Member 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

DOUG LAMALFA, California 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JASON LEWIS, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

WITNESSES 

Ali Bahrami, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation 

Administration: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri ................................................................... 49 

Hon. Mark DeSaulnier of California ........................................................ 54 

Hon. Daniel Lipinski of Illinois ................................................................ 61 

Akbar Sultan, Deputy Director, Airspace Operations and Safety Program, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

John DeLisi, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation 

Safety Board: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri ................................................................... 81 

Hon. Mark DeSaulnier of California ........................................................ 82 

Matthew E. Hampton, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits, Office 

of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

Responses to questions for the record from Hon. Mark DeSaulnier of 

California ....................................................................................................... 97 

Captain Tim Canoll, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 99 

Responses to questions for the record from Hon. Daniel Lipinski of Illinois ................................................................................................................. 123 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, 

submission of the following: 

Accident Report of the National Transportation Safety Board, ‘‘Uncontained Engine Failure and Subsequent Fire: American Airlines Flight 

383, Boeing 767–323, N345AN, Chicago, Illinois, October 28, 2016,’’ 

NTSB/AAR–18/01, PB2018–100344 1

Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. D/B/A FlyersRights.org, and Paul 

Hudson, Petitioners v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al., Respondents (D.C. Cir. July 28, 2017) (No. 16–1101) .............................................. 124 

Letter of February 26, 2018, from Air Care Alliance et al. to Hon. Mitch 

McConnell, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate et al., submitted by Hon. Rick 

Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington ............. 147 

1This 91-page accident report can be found online at the National Transportation Safety 

Board’s website at https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/aar1801.pdf. 

Page

VI 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Written statement from Stephen A. Alterman, President, Cargo Airline Association .................................................................................................................... 155

vii 


Insert offset folio 1 here 31404.001

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ID,u~lnngton DiC 20515 

february 23,2018 

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Aviation 

FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Aviation 

~Oitf ill. l8t1a;to Aaniirlg~ 

~W.De!Jrid: 

~Staif~ 

RE~=------~H~e=ar~in~g~o=n_"~T~h~e~S~ta~t~e~o~f~A~v~ia~t~io~n~S~a=n~et~y_" __________________________ __ 

PURPOSE 

On Tuesday, February 27, 2018, at I 0:00a.m., in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, 

Members of the Subcommittee on Aviation will participate in a hearing to receive an update on 

the safety of the National Aviation System, including progress made and challenges still to be 

addressed. The Subcommittee will hear from representatives of the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 

Transportation (DOT !G), and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). 

BACKGROUND 

The National Airspace System currently enjoys a very high level of safety due to the 

sustained efforts of the aviation community, including the FAA, Congress, labor, and industry. 

Commercial Aviation 

At the beginning of the 21" century, U.S. airline industry and passenger traffic levels 

were severely impacted by the September II th terrorist attacks and subsequent economic 

recessions. However, since 2009, commercial aircraft operations have stabilized, demand for air 

travel has increased annually, and airlines have returned to profitability. Despite the increased 

use of the National Airspace System, commercial aviation safety has improved as a result of 

collaborative efforts between government, labor, and industry. 

The NTSB, the federal agency responsible for investigating transportation accidents and 

issuing safety recommendations without regard to cost, issued 54 recommendations and 

deployed teams to investigate more than 200 domestic and international accidents in 2016. 1 That 

same year, there were 31 accidents involving scheduled U.S. air carriers, none of which resulted 

1

National Transportation Safety Board ''National Transportation Safety Board 2016 Annual Report to Congress:· 

https:i /www.ntsb.gov/aboutlreports/Documents/NTSB-2016-Annual-Report. pdf 
viii 


Insert offset folio 2 here 31404.002

in fatalities or were categorized by the NTSB as a •·major accident."2 While the total number of 

U.S. commercial air carrier accidents increased in 2016, the increase was primarily made up of 

accidents classified by the NTSB as "damage" (meaning accidents in which there were no 

fatalities or serious injuries, but there was substantial damage to an aircraft) 3 In 2016, accidents 

classified by NTSB as "damage" doubled compared to 2015, while the number of accidents 

classified as "injury" (meaning a nonfatal accident with at least one serious injury and without 

substantial damage to a Part 121 aircraft) dropped substantially. The NTSB's "damage" 

category includes abnormal runway contact, ground handling and aircraft servicing events, 

landing gear collapses. and ground collisions. 

The last major fatal U.S. commercial passenger airline accident occurred in 2009 when 

Colgan Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, NY, killing all onboard and resulting in one fatality on 

the ground4 In the wake of this accident, Congress mandated a number of safety reforms, 

including flight crew safety requirements. The !light crew safety requirements include new 

night hour training requirements, new technical skills requirements. and new !light and duty time 

requirements for commercial pilots. The FAA has implemented most of these reforms, however 

progress has been slow on the remaining mandates, including the pilot records database intended 

to centralize information relating to pilot training performance. 

General Aviation 

The United States is home to a large and diverse general aviation community that 

includes over 220,000 aircraft and approximately 500,000 general aviation pilots5 Traditionally, 

this sector of aviation has had the highest number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities. While 

general aviation safety has improved in recent years, in fiscal year 2016 there were still 213 fatal 

accidents with 3 79 fatalities. As a result, the FAA, aviation industry, and Congress have made 

efforts to improve general aviation safety over the past decade. These efforts include 

streamlining certification processes. revising the third class medical process, and a number of 

collaborative initiatives undertaken by industry and the FAA. For example, the FAA recently 

implemented a new policy, Non-Required Safety Enhancing Equipment (NORSEE). which 

streamlines the process for general aviation operators to install non-required safety equipment on 

their aircrall.6 

2 NTSB classifies accidents in categories of''major", "serious", ''injury'', or "damage." A ''major" accident is one 

that meets any of the following three conditions: the accident resulted in the destruction of a scheduled air carrier 

aircraft (part 121 aircraft), multiple fatalities, or single fatality along with a "substantially damaged" part 121 

aircraft A "serious'" accident is one that results in a single one fatality without substantial damage to a part 121 

aircraft or that results in a single serious injury with substantial damage to a part 121 aircraft. One accident in 2016 

was classified as '·serious.·' "2016 preliminary aviation statistics" Table 2. 

https://www.ntsb.gov/investi!!ationsJdata/Pagcsiaviation stats.aspx 

J ''2016 preliminary aviation statistics" Table 2 . .b.l!Q.s:l/www.ntsb.crov/investigations/datwPages/aviation stats.aspx 1 In July 2013, Asiana Flight 214 crashed while landing at San Francisco International Airport. killing three 

passengers and injuring 187 others. In August 2013. t:PS Flight 1354 crash~!anded short of the runway at 

Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport, killing the two pilots on board. These accidents are not classified 

as U.S. commercial passenger airline accidents as they involved a foreign air carrier or a cargo flight respectively. 5 federal Aviation Administration. ·'Fact Sheet- General Aviation Safety" 
ix 


Insert offset folio 3 here 31404.003

While the numhcr of general aviation fatalities has decreased over the past decade, there 

are still safety challenges and concerns within the general aviation community. Periodically. the 

NTSB issues its "Most Wanted List" of transportation safety improvements they believe to be 

priorities. Safety improvements related to general aviation have been included on the list for the 

last seven years. According to the NTSB, more than half of general aviation accidents are the 

result ofloss of control, resulting in I, 194 fatalities between 2008 to 20147 The FAA and the 

NTSB have held multiple safety forums. conducted safety education campaigns, and the FAA 

has established working groups with industry to discuss what steps can be taken to address this 

safety concern. 

The NTSB has also investigated several high profile hot air balloon accidents, including 

one in Lockhart. Texas that killed all 15 passengers and the pilot. The NTSB found that the pilot 

of this hot air balloon had a "pattern of poor decision-making" and that his medical conditions 

and medications impaired his decision-making skills8 As a result of this accident. the NTSB 

raised concerns with the FAA· s oversight of commercial balloon operators and recommended the 

FAA eliminate the second class medical exemption for such operators.9 

FAA's Safety Oversight 

The FAA is responsible for overseeing the safety of our Nation's civil aviation system. 

To carry out this responsibility, the FAA issues rules and regulations to promote the safety of the 

flying public, and regulates airlines, pilots (commercial and general aviation), flight attendants. 

mechanics. charter operators. repair stations, manufacturers, and others. Many of these 

regulations arc in response to Congressional direction. In addition to issuing regulations. the 

FAA conducts regular and continuous oversight of all aspects of the aviation industry. Through 

inspections and enforcement actions, the FAA ensures that its safety standards are being met. 

In 1998, the FAA launched an initiative known as "Safer Skies," which was intended to 

reduce fatal accidents by 2007. 10 To achieve this goal, the FAA established the Commercial 

Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GA JSC)-" 

CAST is comprised of representatives from the FAA, NASA, and industry stakeholders, and 

works to reduce commercial aviation fatality risks through data collection and analysis. As part 

of this effort, the FAA and NASA have the goal oftransitioning to a "prognostic safety 

analysis''." As the aviation system safety rates have greatly improved over the decades, CAST 

is looking to shift its safety analysis from the traditional "diagnostic approach of examining 

t(l .. Fact Sheet- Safer Skies,'' March 26, 2001. 

https:/ /w\vw. taa.gov/news/fact ~sheets/news story .cfm?print- go&contentKey= 3 263 11 lbid. 

J::: "Fact Sheet- Commercia! Aviation Safety Team" 
x 


Insert offset folio 4 here 31404.004

accidents after-the-fact, to a more proactive safety trend analysis. 13 Between 1998 and 2008, the 

fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States fell by 83 percent. 14 

The GA JSC "works to improve general aviation safety through data-driven risk 

reduction efforts focused on education. training. and enabling new equipment in general aviation 

aircraft." 15 The GA .JSC, which is also comprised of representatives from government and 

industry. utilizes a consensus-based approach and safety data analysis to develop strategies for 

the reduction of fatal general aviation accidcnts. 16 The present goal of the GA JSC is to reduce 

the general aviation fatal accident rate by I 0 percent from 2008 to 2018. 17 

Department of Transportation Inspector General Reports 

In recent safety audits, the DOT IG has raised concerns with FAA's oversight in several 

safety areas, including the lollowing: 

"Ibid. 

The FAA is responsible for ensuring that all aircraft are appropriately maintained, 

which includes oversight of suspected unapproved parts (SUPs) in the aviation 

system. The DOT IG conducted an audit and found that the FAA's oversight of SUPs 

was lacking due to weaknesses in record keeping and "lack of management control," 

casting doubt on whether the number of SUPs was being accurately reported. 18 The 

DOT IG issued II recommendations to the FAA to improve its oversight of SUPs. 

In 20 I 5, the DOT IG reviewed FAA's efforts in establishing the pilot records' 

database. As a result of that review, the DOT IG raised concerns over the delays in 

establishing the database and FAA's failure to make key decisions on how to 

incorporate records and database access. 19 

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act()( 2012 (P.L. 112-95) directed the FAA to 

issue a rule on a variety of operational safety requirements for helicopter emergency 

medical service (HEMS) operations. In 2015, the DOT IG assessed the FAA's 

implementation of this final rule. 20 The DOT IG found that the FAA needed to 

update "key oversight policies" and gather ·'meaningful" safety data in order to 

identify trends.21 

More recently, the DOT IG reviewed the FAA's air traffic controller hiring process in 

response to concerns with the changes the F AI\ had implemented. In its audit. the 

14 Commercial Aviation Safety Team. ''Homepage." http://www.cast-safety.org 15 General Aviation Joint Steering Committee. "About Us." http://www.gajsc.org/about~us/ 

i

6 Jbid. 

"Ibid. 

18 Inspector General of Department of Transportation. ''Enhancements Arc ~ceded to FAA ·s Oversight of the 

Suspected Unapproved Parts Program·· May 30, 2017. h!lll~.;l/www.oig.dot.l!ovllibrarv-item/357l5 19 Inspector General of Department of Transportation "FAA Delays in Establishing a Pilot Records Database Limit 

Air Carriers' Access to Background InfOrmation:· August 20.2015. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/32653 20 Inspector General of Department of Transportation. "Delays in Meeting Statutory Requirements and Oversight 

Challenges Reduce FAA's Opportunities To Enhance HEMS Safety" April 8. 2015. 

4 
xi 


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DOT JG found that the FAA had not effectively implemented the new hiring process, 

which resulted in hiring delays 22 

Congressional Oversight and the FAA Safetv, Security and Extension Act of2016 

The most recent extension of the FAA's authorization. the FAA Safety, Security and 

E•tension Act of2016 (2016 Extension Act, P.L. 114-190,), included a number of time sensitive 

and safety-critical mandates and reforms. For example, the 2016 Extension Act addressed issues 

relating to commercial airline and air ambulance safety, pilot training, controller staffing, repair 

station oversight, and aviation cyberseeurity. 

In the past several years. there have been a number of high profile air ambulance crashes 

where post-crash fires resulted in severe injuries and fatalities. In response to this, the 2016 

Joxtension Act directed the FAA to evaluate and update as necessary the standards for crashresistant fuel systems on rotorcraft. The 2016 Extension Act also set a deadline for 

implementation of the pilot record database originally required under the Airline Safety and 

Federal Aviation Administration Ertension Acr ol2010 (P.L. 111-216). The FAA has since 

missed this deadline. Additionally, the 2016 Extension Act revised the fAA's hiring process for 

air traffic controllers, an area where the FAA had failed to meet its goals for several years, 

resulting in nationwide staffing level concerns. Finally. the law includes reforms to the FAA's 

risk-based oversight of domestic and foreign repair stations and requires the FAA to complete a 

comprehensive and strategic framework for aviation cybersccurity. The Committee continues to 

monitor the FAA's progress in implementing these and other mandates. 

Recent Safety Concerns 

Rumrav Safety 

In the last year, there have been a number of high profile near misses at U.S. 

airports as a result of aircraft attempting to land on an incorrect runway or on a taxiway. 

For example, at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), there were three near misses 

within the span of six months. On July 7, 2017, Air Canada Flight 759 nearly landed on 

a taxiway instead of the runway at SFO. During its nighttime visual approach, Flight 759 

erroneously lined up to land on a taxiway on which four passenger planes were operating 

instead of the adjacent runway. Before landing, the flight crew aborted the landing 

attempt and self-initiated a ''go around," missing the planes on the taxiway; the direction 

from air traffic control to initiate a "go around" came a few seconds later. The NTSB 

launched an investigation into the in~ident and found that at its lowest point. Flight 759 

had only 26 feet of separation from one of the passenger aircraft on the taxiway23 

A few months later, on October 21, 2017. another Air Canada flight that was on 

the approach at SFO was instructed by air traffic control to ''go-around'' as it was unclear 

Inspector Genera! of Department of Transportation "While FAA Took Steps Intended To lmprove Its Controller 

Hiring Process, the Agency Did ~ot Effectively Implement Its New Policies" February 15, 2017 

h!.!Rs://www .~t.gov/library~item/35516 

2

' https;//www.ntsb.gov/invcstigations!Pa£?:esiDCA17lA148.aspx 
xii 


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whether a recently arrived aircraft had fully cleared the runway. Ilowever, the Air 

Canada night did not respond and landed on the runway, which radar ultimately showed 

was clear of the previously arrived aircraft. According to pilots of the Air Canada flight. 

they had encountered radio issues and had not heard the "go around" direction from air 

traffic control?4 Lastly, on January 9, 2018, an Acromexico flight at SFO lined up on an 

incorrect runway that already had an aircraft on it. Air traffic controllers noticed the 

issue and directed the Aeromexico flight to "go around." The flight landed safely on its 

second landing attempt. 25 

Crash Resistant Fuel Svstems on llelicopters 

Although the overall rate of fatal helicopter accidents has decreased in recent 

years, a number of high profile air ambulance fatal crashes have raised attention to air 

ambulance safety. In particular, two accidents26 for which the NTSB completed safety 

reports found that occupants experienced survivable impact forces, but post-crash fires 

caused additional injuries and fatalities.27 The NTSB has issued several 

recommendations related to the installation of crash-resistant fuel systems on rotorcraft in 

response to these and other accidents. As a result of this, and the aforementioned 

legislative requirement in the 2016 Ewension Act. the FAA established the Rotorcraft 

Occupant Safety Working Group and tasked it with addressing issues relating to postcrash fires and rotor occupant safety in general. 

UAS Collisions 

Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations arc growing at an exponential rate 

within the National Airspace System. particularly as a result of decreased costs and the 

establishment of the part 107 regulatory regime. While UASs offer exciting and 

innovative opportunities, recent research and incidents have raised concerns about the 

safety risks associated with their operation. A number of incidents in the United States 

and Canada have been reported in which a UAS struck or nearly struck manned aircraft. 

On February 14, 2018, it was reported that a Robinson R22 helicopter crashed near 

Charleston, South Carolina while taking evasive action to avoid hitting a UAS. While 

still under investigation, it is possible that this represents the first manned aircraft 

accident directly attributable to a UAS. 28 

Sul>comrrtitt<:e is aware that there are several helicopter crashes where there are reports of a post-crash fires. 

however the NTSB has not released final reports on the crashes. 

"National Transportation Safety Board 2016 Annual Report to Congress." p. 14 

https:/ /www .ntsQ.,ggv/aboutireports/Documents/~TSB-20 16-Annual-Report.pdf 

:s Alan Levin, "Drone suspected in helicopter crash landing in South Carolina," Insurance Journal, February 16, 

2018. https:l;www.insurancejournal.com/newsisoutheast'20 18/02/I 6i480807 .htrn 

6 
xiii 


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WITNESS LIST 

Mr. Ali Bahrami 

Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Mr. Akbar Sultan 

Deputy Director of Airspace Operations and Safety Programs 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Mr. John DeLisi 

Director of the Office of Aviation Safety 

National Transportation Safety Board 

Mr. Matthew Hampton 

Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits 

Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation 

Captain Tim Canoll 

President 

Airline Pilots Association. International 
(1) 

THE STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to 

order. And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 

recess at any time. And I ask unanimous consent that members not 

on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 

today’s hearing and ask questions. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Thanks again for all of you being here today. Today’s hearing 

will focus on the subcommittee’s number one priority: ensuring the 

safety of the aviation system and the traveling public. 

Our system is extremely safe; last year, nearly 850 million passengers boarded passenger aircraft within or flying to the United 

States and, due to the hard work of all of you and others in the 

aviation sector, there were no fatalities on those aircraft. 

This milestone, however, does not mark the end of our work. 

While the high level of safety we have achieved is a result of close 

collaboration between Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, industry, and labor, we must remain vigilant and recognize 

that we can always do more and be better to ensure the safety in 

our skies. 

I would like to recognize the Colgan Air families who are in attendance today, and thank you for your steadfast support of safety 

issues, and we appreciate your being with us once again on this 

ninth anniversary of the tragic crash near Buffalo, New York. 

Recent events and near misses remind us of the work that remains. Last year we avoided a potentially catastrophic event when 

an Air Canada jet carrying 140 people accidentally lined up to land 

on a taxiway where 4 planes were waiting to take off. These planes 

carried more than 900 people, and the margin between a near miss 

and one of the worst aviation disasters in history was less than 25 

feet. That is a pretty scary thought. This near miss and others 

have rightfully focused our attention on runway safety. 

But while we work to maintain and improve the safety of commercial airlines, we must also work to improve safety in other segments of aviation. The general aviation community makes up a 

2 

large and diverse part of our national airspace, including over 

200,000 aircraft and approximately 500,000 pilots. 

Again, due to the collaboration between Congress, FAA, and the 

aviation community, GA fatality rates have declined significantly 

over the past decade. However, in fiscal year 2016, there were still 

over 200 fatal GA accidents and over 350 total lives lost. 

Helicopter safety also continues to be an area of focus for this 

committee. Too often we see helicopter crashes in which occupants 

survive, only to be injured or killed in post-crash fires. Just 2 

weeks ago, a sightseeing helicopter at the Grand Canyon crashed, 

killing three, seriously injuring four. In this accident, there was a 

post-crash fire. Crash resistant fuel systems on rotorcraft continue 

to be a safety priority. And while the circumstances of the recent 

accident are still under investigation, there is a bipartisan consensus in Congress to address this issue. 

Lastly, as drone operations in the national airspace continue to 

increase, the risk of them interfering with the safe operation of 

manned aircraft increases. The risk was illustrated on September 

21st in 2017, when a small drone collided with a U.S. Army Black 

Hawk over New York Harbor, damaging the helicopter’s rotor and 

forcing an emergency landing. While no one was injured, it is not 

hard to imagine that this kind of accident occurring again could 

have very, very serious consequences. 

Aviation safety is not a destination, it is a never-ending process 

of evaluation, analysis, and course correction. Without continuous 

improvements in safety, the aviation industry as we know it would 

have great difficulty existing. 

And as I said before, aviation safety has continued to improve as 

a result of Government, labor, and industry collaboration, but there 

is always a lot more to be done. 

The FAA has primary responsibility for aviation safety, and it 

must ensure oversight activities that are open and transparent, as 

well as streamlined and efficient. Many safety improvements stem 

from the basic research, the introduction of new technologies, and 

the management of new users making their way into the airspace. 

The FAA’s Technical Center, located in my district—in case any 

of you did not realize that up to this point—Rick—plays a very critical role in the partnership between Government and industry. 

They continue to be a leader in conducting research and development, demonstration, and validation of the safe integration of new 

users and technologies into our airspace. 

New technology and new users bring new risk. If not properly integrated, they could have an adverse effect on the civil aviation 

safety. 

Each person on our panel has a unique role in ensuring the safety of the aviation system. We welcome these varied and unique perspectives as we continue to work together to ensure the United 

States continues to have the safest aviation system in the world. 

Before recognizing Ranking Member Rick Larsen, I would like to 

ask unanimous consent that the record of today’s hearing remain 

open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to 

any questions that may be submitted to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 days for addiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:45 Sep 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\115\AV\2-27-2~1\31404.TXT JEAN
3 

tional comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I now would like to recognize Mr. Larsen for any opening remarks. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo, for calling today’s 

hearing on aviation safety. This is a very important hearing. Our 

aviation system is safe, safer than it has ever been before. No one 

has died in an accident involving a U.S. flight airliner since 2009, 

when Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo and claimed 50 

lives. 

Safe is not enough, though. This subcommittee’s job is to provide 

the resources and oversight necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration to make the system even safer. That must be our 

starting point today. Everyone agrees we have the safest system in 

the history of flight. But what can we do to make the system safer 

still? 

Well, for starters, that means not rolling back safety rules. Some 

have argued for a rollback of the strong pilot training rules that 

require 1,500 hours of flight time that Congress mandated after the 

Colgan Air crash. Those standards were the product of focused 

oversight by this subcommittee, and were enacted without any partisan objection. 

If we want to talk about what Congress, the FAA, and others can 

do to make the airline pilot profession even more accessible to the 

next generation of pilots, we should have that conversation. But 

any reduction in the experience requirements for airline pilots is a 

nonstarter. Such a proposal has kept the Senate FAA reauthorization bill off the Senate floor for nearly a year. 

Congress has never rolled back an airline safety rule, simply to 

respond to the market forces of supply and demand. If there is a 

pilot shortage—and that is a big if—we will find ways to address 

it without sacrificing safety. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the FAA 

can do to improve safety. I was pleased to join Ranking Member 

DeFazio and Congressman DeSaulnier last week in requesting a 

GAO [Government Accountability Office] study of safety in runway 

environments. Now is the time to take a closer look at what steps 

are necessary to prevent future near misses and runway incursions 

at airports across the U.S. A better understanding of current safety 

gaps would help ensure the safety of the 2.5 million people who fly 

in and out of U.S. airports every day. 

Just last year, an Air Canada flight almost landed on top of a 

queue of airplanes waiting to take off at San Francisco. A landing 

Delta flight in Atlanta lined up with a taxiway in poor visibility before going around for another approach. 

And a Horizon Air flight actually landed on the taxiway in Pullman, Washington, as did an Alaska Airlines flight in Seattle. Needless to say, we are fortunate that there were not any other planes 

on those taxiways. 

The NTSB is investigating several of these incidents, and I understand the Department of Transportation inspector general is assessing runway safety, as well. I look forward to hearing more from 

4 

all of our witnesses about how we can prevent recurrences of these 

events before they lead to accidents. 

I am also interested in hearing from our witnesses about what 

we should do to reduce the risk that a drone may one day collide 

with a conventional airplane. A provision in the 2012 FAA bill prohibits the FAA from directly regulating the recreational operations 

of drones. But, as recreational drone use flourishes, should the 

FAA be so restricted? What can the FAA do to prevent collisions 

between recreational drones and other aircraft? 

Captain, Mr. Hampton, I know you have views on this subject 

and I look forward to hearing from you much more on that. 

Chairman LoBiondo and I have a record of working together to 

improve safety and efficiency. And as the chairman enters the last 

year of his distinguished career in Congress, I look forward to continuing that work and moving the needle further. Again, Mr. 

Chairman, I thank you and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Rick. 

Chairman Shuster? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Chairman LoBiondo. And I want to associate myself with the remarks made by both Ranking Member 

Larsen and LoBiondo. I share their observations, views, and concerns about safety in the air. 

I also want to echo Chairman LoBiondo’s thanks to the Colgan 

Air families for being here today, and your continued engagement 

in safety in our aviation system. 

As pointed out many times, the United States has the safest 

aviation system in the world. That can never be taken for granted. 

It comes at a cost, it comes from hard work by the air traffic controllers, the flight attendants, the pilots, and the companies that 

all engage and work every day to make the system as absolutely 

safe as possible. So I want to thank them for that. But it will take 

all of us working together, Congress included, and the administration, to make sure that we have the gold standard. And safety is 

our highest priority. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. DeFazio? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the 3 years since we 

last held an oversight hearing on safety in this committee, there 

have been 90 accidents involving commercial carriers. Thankfully, 

none of those were fatal. But still, there are a number of concerns. 

In December, in my State, a SkyWest plane on approach to Medford went way below minimums and almost crashed into terrain 

before they did an evasive climb. Five days later, up in Washington 

State, a Horizon Air plane landed on the taxiway in Pullman. And 

in July an Air Canada A320 nearly landed on top of five jetliners 

with more than 1,000 people on board waiting to take off in San 

Francisco. 

In view of this, Representatives Larsen, DeSaulnier, and I have 

requested the GAO review safety in the runway environment. 

These sort of incidents are not acceptable. And luckily, thus far, 

they haven’t caused fatalities. But they could in the future. 

I have also raised questions about the evacuation standards. We 

are now—as they jam more and more and more and more seats 

5 

into airplanes, we are not actually physically testing the evacuation 

standard any more. They use computer modeling. And I have asked 

for an investigation of whether that is adequate. 

I mean we had one example—and this was a plane that doesn’t 

have the more and more and more jammed-in seats, it was a 767 

at O’Hare—when it took the passengers 2 minutes and 21 seconds 

to exit a burning aircraft, as opposed to 90. Imagine if that had 

been one of these low-budget airlines, where you can barely get 

your knees in between the seats, given the reduction in pitch. 

You know, we are not going to dictate comfort, but we can certainly be concerned about safety. It took me 7 years to get a rule 

to get the overwing exit spacing after that horrible fire, where people were burned up trying to get out of a plane in Manchester, 

England. It took them 6 months. We can’t be complacent about 

these kind of things. 

For more than—just about a quarter of a century—since I had 

a certified mechanic working on my staff, I have been pursuing the 

whole issue of unapproved parts with the FAA. We are going to 

have the IG report soon, and we have not yet tightened up the way 

we need to tighten up, in terms of certifying SUPs [suspected unapproved parts]. 

I had the bizarre and absurd argument when I was pushing this 

issue before that if you take a life-limited part that could be burnished up to look kind of like new, but was only good for scrap, 

that you couldn’t require that it be shredded or otherwise indelibly 

damaged, because it is a property right. 

And I said, ‘‘Well, if the only value is scrap, and they are not 

going to try and sneak it back into the chain by burnishing it up, 

what is the property right that we are protecting here?’’ 

And apparently some airlines are catastrophically destroying the 

parts. My staff witnessed United Airlines doing that in San Francisco. But others aren’t. And you have got to wonder what happens 

to those parts, which could very easily take down a plane. And we 

have got to get that resolved. 

After the ValuJet crash, my amendment, which I had offered a 

number of times over the years, to strip the FAA of its promotional 

duties and say they should focus on safety issues, was rejected in 

the FAA bill that year and was not in the Senate bill. But after 

the ValuJet crash they called me up and said, ‘‘Where would we 

put this in the bill?’’ 

I said, ‘‘Well, it is not conferenceable. Wasn’t it out of the bill? 

You rejected it.’’ Well, most of it ended up in the bill in the end, 

but we still have progress to make there, in terms of FAA oversight. 

As was noted by Ranking Member Larsen, we have the strongest 

pilot training rules in history. Unfortunately, it took a horrific accident to get to that point, and now there is tremendous pushback 

on that. But when you look at the first officer in that case living 

in her parents’ basement, commuting across the country because 

she was earning $15,800 a year, but, you know, had probably spent 

a couple of hundred thousand dollars to get her license, they say, 

‘‘Oh, that is—we have got a horrible shortage here.’’ Well, market 

forces are starting to work. Some of these airlines are having to 

raise their salaries. 

6 

Yes, you are going to have a shortage if you try and pay them 

less than a Greyhound busdriver when they paid a quarter million 

bucks to get the certificate to fly the plane. I have yet to meet a 

person in the air that says, ‘‘Geez, if I could have got $10 off, I 

would be happy to have someone who has 250 hours in the front 

seat.’’ Huh-uh, I don’t think so. There is some pushback here that 

has got to be dealt with. 

And then drones. Congress, rather stupidly, adopted an amendment in the FAA bill restricting the FAA regulation of drones flown 

by recreational users because the model airplane people objected. 

Well, now there are hundreds of thousands of these things out 

there with people who have been interfering with firefighting, they 

have flown one into a helicopter. We have had many near misses 

with jetliners. 

Finally, FAA, 21⁄2 years ago, I said, ‘‘Could you figure out what 

happens when a drone hits a plane?’’ And their first studies are it 

can cause catastrophic damage because these are brittle and hard. 

And they haven’t even done the engine test yet, sucking one in and 

see whether we have an uncontained explosion of the engine. 

So, we have got to change that, and we have got to get a handle 

on these recreational drones before they take down a commercial 

airliner and kill people. A lot of work to do. 

Thank you for holding the hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Peter, and I want to thank our witnesses today. 

We have Mr. Ali Bahrami, Associate Administrator for Aviation 

Safety for the FAA; Mr. Akbar Sultan, Deputy Director of the Airspace Operations and Safety Program at NASA; Mr. John DeLisi, 

Director of the Office of Aviation Safety of NTSB; Mr. Matthew 

Hampton, assistant inspector general for aviation audits in the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation; 

and Captain Tim Canoll, president of the Air Line Pilots Association. 

I would like to remind and ask each of our witnesses to do your 

best to limit your opening remarks to no more than 5 minutes. 

Mr. Bahrami, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF ALI BAHRAMI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AKBAR SULTAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AIRSPACE OPERATIONS AND SAFETY PROGRAM, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; JOHN DELISI, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 

SAFETY BOARD; MATTHEW E. HAMPTON, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AVIATION AUDITS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; 

AND CAPTAIN TIM CANOLL, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS 

ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LoBiondo, 

Ranking Member Larsen, members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for inviting me to appear today to discuss the current state of aviation safety. 

7 

We are proud to say we are in the safest period in history. We 

have achieved this record of safety by working with industry to 

identify and address risks to our system. With the support of this 

committee we have worked to take a more proactive approach that 

instills a culture of safety, both within the industry and inside the 

FAA. 

The result is the safest, largest, most complex, and most efficient 

air transportation system in the world. 

There has not been a fatal U.S. commercial passenger accident 

since 2009. Last year we had the safest year ever for general aviation. All of us at the FAA are proud of the hard work that has gone 

into providing a basis for achieving this level of safety. 

A number of initiatives led to this safety record, and I will discuss a few of them this morning. We are actively facilitating policies and management processes that transform safety culture, both 

within the FAA and outside organizations. 

For example, we are restructuring the Flight Standards Service. 

This organization plays a vital role in the safety of the U.S. aviation system. We want to make sure we continue to provide a high 

level of service. By moving away from our organizational structure 

based on geographical locations to one built around functions, these 

changes enable flight standards to operate with greater accountability, better use of resources, and flexibility to adapt to change. 

The FAA expects the restructuring to yield benefits to both the 

agency and aviation community by improving our ability to keep 

pace with changes in the aviation industry. In the area of aircraft 

certification, the FAA has gone beyond the reforms that Congress 

directed in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. We are 

transforming our aircraft certification service to meet the demands 

of today’s dynamic aviation environment. Refreshing the certification strategy means FAA will take a systems approach, allowing 

us to focus on areas of higher risk. 

The impressive gains in safety are due, in part, to voluntary actions by industry and Government. The work of CAST, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, has been extremely successful. It 

has moved beyond the historic approach of examining accident data 

to a more proactive approach that focuses on detecting and mitigating risks. Today, using a disciplined, data-driven approach, we 

strive to identify hazards before accidents or serious incidents 

occur. Together, Government and industry have adopted nearly 100 

voluntary safety enhancements. 

We also are expanding this type of cooperation in the general 

aviation community. Together we have been working toward a goal 

of 10 percent reduction in the fatal GA accidents by the close of fiscal year 2018. I am pleased to say we already surpassed that goal. 

Before I conclude my remarks, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support of Chairman Shuster and subcommittee 

chairman Mr. LoBiondo. 

You have been instrumental in providing the FAA with the direction and necessary resources to maintain our position as the global 

leader in aviation. Your guidance and insight have made a difference in aviation, both here and abroad. 

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any of 

your questions at this time. 

8 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Bahrami, for your statement. 

Mr. Sultan, you are recognized for your statement. 

Mr. SULTAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LoBiondo and 

Ranking Member Larsen, Chairman Shuster of the committee, 

Ranking Member—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Excuse me, can you pull your mic a little bit closer? 

Mr. SULTAN. I apologize. Chairman LoBiondo and Ranking Member Larsen, Chairman Shuster and Ranking Member DeFazio of 

the committee, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

this opportunity to appear before you today to testify on NASA’s 

aviation safety research. 

NASA has made decades of contributions to aviation. Every U.S. 

aircraft and U.S. air traffic control facility has NASA-developed 

technology on board. NASA has worked with FAA and industry on 

the long-term research to produce information and technologies to 

fundamentally solve aviation risks. 

For example, in the 1980s, NASA initiated research efforts associated with synthetic and enhanced vision systems to allow aircraft 

to land in low-visibility conditions. Today a large number of aircraft offer these capabilities and multiple manufacturers have developed systems for tablets that can be used on board general aviation aircraft. 

Another good example from the late 1970s was NASA research 

that led to the identification of cultural norms within the aviation 

community that resulted in increased vulnerability to crew communication errors. NASA developed training methods and technologies, techniques to support improved Crew Resource Management, or CRM. Since then, CRM has become a global standard with 

training requirements mandated by the FAA, ICAO, and EASA, 

the European Aviation Safety Agency. 

Now, as we look forward, aviation is on the verge of a significant 

transformation with a rapid evolution of new technologies, vehicles, 

and operations on the horizon, while retaining the high standards 

for safety to which we are accustomed. Maintaining a safe system 

will require recognition and timely mitigation of safety issues as 

they emerge before they become hazards or lead to accidents. A 

shift toward proactive risk mitigation will become critical to meet 

these needs. 

In collaboration with the aviation community, NASA has developed a vision for safety assurance that is achieved by leveraging 

growing sources of aviation data, commercial data, analytics methods, architecture, and innovative things to enable monitoring, prediction, and prognostics capabilities. 

In addition, NASA is addressing difficulties associated with assuring the safety of increasingly complex and autonomous aviation 

systems. NASA is developing improved methods, tools, and guidance to support cost-effective verification and validation and certification of software-intensive and complex systems. 

NASA contributes to the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, or 

CAST, Aviation Safety Reporting System, otherwise known as 

ASRS, and Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, also 

known as ASIAS. 

9 

NASA has delivered technologies to prevent loss of airplane state 

awareness, and is currently completing the research and development of cockpit systems with predictive algorithms to alert pilots, 

models for aircraft stall performance to improve fidelity of training 

environments, and specific flight crew training methods. 

Special attention is being directed toward assuring safety of 

emerging operations, such as unmanned aircraft. Ongoing research 

is dedicated to understanding hazards unique to these vehicles and 

identifying data needs associated with monitoring such operations 

for potential risks. 

Specifically, NASA’s UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] in the 

NAS [National Airspace System] project may enable routine access 

to larger UAS and to regular controlled airspace by delivering data 

to RTCA rulemaking committees. 

In addition, NASA’s UTM [UAS Traffic Management] research 

project may enable beyond-visual-line-of-sight access by small UAS 

to the uncontrolled low-altitude airspace below 400 feet through 

technology demonstrations to validate operational concepts. 

NASA is building on a long history of conducting research that 

advances state-of-the-art technologies to reduce the risk of flying in 

hazardous conditions. The phenomena that creates engine icing 

issues is not well understood. NASA has conducted flight tests to 

better characterize the environment, and has emulated these conditions in a ground facility that has already proven to be very beneficial to industry. 

NASA and FAA have established Research Transition Teams, or 

RTTs. The RTTs have been a best-practice mechanism between 

NASA and FAA in ensuring effective coordination in transition of 

research to implementation. Through the RTTs, NASA works jointly with FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center on joint simulation and testing of assurance tools to help FAA assess aviation systems. 

NASA has a long and successful history of aviation safety research that has made a real difference in the remarkable safety 

record that our system enjoys. And we are constantly looking for 

ways to continue to contribute, with a major emphasis on more 

prognostic approaches that will allow the aviation community to 

get out in front of issues before they become safety risks. 

Let me conclude by thanking you again for this opportunity to 

appear before you to discuss NASA’s research and to answer any 

of your questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. DeLisi? 

Mr. DELISI. Good morning, Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board to testify before 

you today. 

The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United 

States, and issuing safety recommendations aimed at preventing 

future accidents. We investigate about 1,300 accidents per year. 

The U.S. aviation system is experiencing a record level of safety. 

Since the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 in 2009, there have been 

10 

no passenger fatalities on board U.S. part 121 air carriers providing scheduled service. 

However, there were 412 aviation deaths in 2016; 386 of those 

fatalities occurred in general aviation accidents, and 26 occurred in 

part 135 commercial operations. Although we would all like to see 

no fatalities, the good news is that the general aviation accident 

rate fell below one fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours for the 

first time in the NTSB’s 50-year history. 

The number one cause of general aviation accidents continues to 

be loss of control in flight, leading the Board to place this issue on 

our current most wanted list of transportation safety improvements. We are working with stakeholders to increase awareness, 

education, and training to address the risk of these events. In April 

we will hold a roundtable with industry and Government experts 

to discuss technologies and training to combat loss of control. 

I want to highlight several accidents we have investigated in the 

last 2 years that have raised safety issues. 

In 2016 the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in almost a decade 

occurred in Lockhart, Texas, when a commercial hot air balloon 

pilot and his 15 passengers died when the balloon struck power 

lines. The investigation found that the pilot had been previously diagnosed with medical conditions known to cause cognitive deficits, 

and had taken a number of impairing medications. However, commercial balloon pilots are exempt from the requirement to hold a 

medical certificate. The NTSB recommended that the FAA remove 

that exemption. 

In July 2015 a helicopter crashed after takeoff in Frisco, Colorado. The pilot was fatally injured, and the other two occupants 

were seriously injured. We found that the impact forces of the accident were survivable. However, the post-crash fire contributed to 

the severity of the injuries. The NTSB made recommendations that 

continue to push for the installation of crash-resistant fuel systems 

in helicopters. 

In November 2015, a part 135 air taxi crashed on approach to 

Akron, Ohio, and all nine people on board died. We found that the 

flight crew failed to follow a number of company standard operating procedures, and operated the airplane in an unsafe manner. 

However, the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording 

device that would have allowed for the company to monitor daily 

operations and identify deficiencies such as noncompliance with 

procedures. As a result, the NTSB recommended that all part 135 

operators install flight data recording devices capable of supporting 

a flight data monitoring program. 

In October 2016, an American Airlines flight experienced an engine failure and caught fire during takeoff at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. Although everyone evacuated the airplane with 

only one serious injury, our investigation found that the evacuation 

was hindered by a lack of communication between the flight deck 

and the cabin crew, as well as by numerous passengers retrieving 

their carry-on baggage. 

In July an Air Canada flight was cleared to land on runway 28 

right in San Francisco International Airport, but instead lined up 

on a taxiway where four air carrier airplanes were awaiting their 

takeoff clearance. The flight descended below 100 feet before exeVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:45 Sep 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\115\AV\2-27-2~1\31404.TXT JEAN
11 

cuting a go-around as it overflew the other aircraft on the taxiway. 

We are continuing to investigate this incident. 

Advances in aviation technology, such as unmanned aircraft systems, are posing new safety challenges. The NTSB just completed 

the first investigation of an incident resulting from a mid-air collision between an aircraft and a drone, which occurred near Staten 

Island, New York, in September. The drone pilot intentionally flew 

his drone far beyond visual line of sight and was unaware that it 

had impacted the helicopter. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today to discuss 

the work that the NTSB is doing to investigate accidents and make 

aviation safer. I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. DeLisi. 

Mr. Hampton, welcome. 

Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you. Chairmen Shuster, LoBiondo, Ranking Members DeFazio, Larsen, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify today on aviation safety. 

As the committee is well aware, FAA and the industry have 

achieved a remarkable and impressive safety record. My statement 

today will address the key aviation safety challenges that were 

highlighted in our recent report on the top management challenges 

facing the Department. 

First, regional airlines now serve about 20 percent of all airline 

passengers, rely on a unique business model, and operate in a 

highly competitive environment. Our work shows that FAA can 

provide better guidance and tools to its inspectors so they can 

proactively identify risks due to changes at airlines and adjust 

oversight accordingly. 

For example, FAA’s main risk-assessment tool does not yet account for severity of risks such as key staff turnover or rapid service expansion. 

Second, addressing concerns about suspected unapproved parts, 

or SUPs. As we recently reported, FAA lacks the mechanisms needed to have a full and complete picture of risks with unapproved 

parts throughout the industry. For example, we found multiple inaccuracies in the database FAA uses to capture such cases, and the 

agency does not ensure all reports of suspected unapproved parts 

from its local inspection offices make it to the central hotline office 

at headquarters. 

Furthermore, once unapproved parts are identified, FAA does not 

take action to confirm that airlines and repair stations actually 

take them out of the supply chain. We recently learned that FAA 

closed one case, but we are looking into how the parts actually 

made it back into the supply chain. 

Third, we are concerned about the number of close calls in the 

air and the ground at the Nation’s airports. This includes the Air 

Canada flight 759 incident at San Francisco Airport last summer, 

which the safety board is currently investigating. Our work focuses 

on runway incursions, which have seen an overall increase. 

FAA has taken several efforts over the last decade to address 

runway safety issues. Our results thus far show that FAA has 

made progress on educating pilots on visual aids at high-risk airports and communicating more with the aviation community. However, FAA faces challenges with other initiatives, including some 

12 

new technologies that were very promising. The key to addressing 

the upward trend in recent incidents is for the industry to continue 

setting priorities and measuring the effectiveness of initiatives. 

History has shown that FAA can, with sustained attention, successfully address runway safety issues. But a sense of urgency is 

needed at FAA. 

Finally, UAS presents one of the most vexing and rapidly evolving safety challenges FAA has faced in decades. As UAS operations 

have increased, so too have sightings and concerns by pilots and 

others, with over 2,100 events reported in 2017. We are currently 

assessing FAA’s efforts to grant waivers, a process the agency established to accommodate some high-value operations not covered 

in the small UAS rule published in 2006. FAA has received more 

than 15,000 applications for waivers to date. Thus far, the agency 

has granted about 1,500 of them, most of them for nighttime operations. 

There are over 6,500 applications still pending review, and the 

backlog continues to grow. FAA is working on rulemaking for expanded UAS operations, but these are complicated endeavors, and 

it is unclear when they will be completed. 

Our work shows that FAA can take steps now to advance elements of a risk-based system for UAS. This includes, among other 

things, completing a comprehensive system to track and analyze 

UAS sightings, and giving inspectors more guidance and information. Also, FAA is reaching an inflection point, where education 

must give way and be bolstered with more effective oversight and 

enforcement. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to answer any questions you or any members of the subcommittee 

may have. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Hampton. 

Captain Canoll, you are welcome. 

Mr. CANOLL. Thank you and good morning, Chairman LoBiondo 

and Ranking Member Larsen and the subcommittee for the opportunity to be here today. 

Chairman LoBiondo and Chairman Shuster, this may be my last 

time testifying before both of you. On behalf of ALPA’s more than 

60,000 members, please let me express our sincere appreciation for 

your leadership in advancing aviation safety. 

I have been an airline pilot for 28 years. I keep current and I 

fly the MD–88 as often as I can. I am also proud to have served 

in the United States Navy Reserve as an F–18 strike fighter squadron commanding officer. And I can tell you, after flying for more 

than three decades, that experience counts when operating complex 

equipment in a changing environment. So does constantly maintaining and sharpening your skills and judgment through training. 

Flying experience enables pilots to learn how to gather information through their senses about their environment and their aircraft. It cannot be simulated in training. It is learned only from 

time spent at the controls. The examples of the value of real-world 

experience are almost infinite. An airline pilot might encounter 

multiple aircraft talking on the radio at the same time, unexpected 

turbulence, or an engine malfunction, or all three at once. Today’s 

13 

simulators simply can’t replicate the complexity of commercial 

flight. Real-world experience is essential. 

ALPA pilots know this, know that this subcommittee recognizes 

the value of flight experience, qualifications, and training for airline pilots. You led Congress in passing the Airline Safety and FAA 

Extension Act of 2010, the set of regulations that resulted in improved pilot training and updated certificate and type rating requirements. The results speak for themselves. 

In the 20 years prior to the congressional action, more than 1,100 

passengers lost their lives in U.S. part 121 airline accidents. Since 

Congress acted, that number has been reduced to zero. 

ALPA is aware that some believe we can reduce training hours, 

substitute simulator or unstructured class time for experience, and 

still keep our skies safe. To put it plainly, we disagree. The current 

system allows for credit hours for different levels of training and 

experience. This system is working. It is keeping our passengers, 

crews, and cargo safe. 

Let me be clear. No one is more committed than ALPA to ensuring that we have enough pilots to keep the U.S. airline industry 

strong and competitive. Today we have more fully qualified pilots 

than there are commercial positions available in this country. But 

how do we make sure we have the pilots we will need in the future? 

One important element is protecting our industry safety record. 

Our union is helping lead the way. For example, we are pushing 

to do more to safeguard the transportation of lithium batteries by 

air. For similar reasons we are also working to eliminate the risk 

of undeclared dangerous goods. 

In addition, ALPA is driving hard to reduce the safety threat 

from unmanned aircraft systems. We commend recent action by 

Congress to enable the FAA to require UAS operators to be registered. This allows us to locate responsible individuals, if needed. 

But we also must fix the loophole that prevents the FAA from regulating UAS used by hobbyists. Congress must repeal section 336 

of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2012. 

Attracting new pilots to our industry in the future also means 

that U.S. airlines must offer aviators good salaries, a healthy worklife balance, and a predictable career progression. And there is 

more we can do. 

For example, we can reform the Federal student loan programs 

to encourage young people to pursue our profession. Our industry 

can also step up efforts to reach new audiences and inspire them 

to work in aviation. At ALPA, we are building on decades of outreach to students of all ages. Hundreds of ALPA volunteers visit 

schools every year, and we have helped launch Aviation Works 4U, 

a one-stop shop website for exploring a career in our industry. 

We are also focused on doing more to provide reliable air service 

to communities all across America, including in rural areas. With 

safety always the priority, there is more work to be done there, too. 

I hope you share my optimism today as we consider the U.S. airline industry’s incredible safety record. Take it from us, your pilots, 

experience saves lives. We look forward to working with this subcommittee to make aviation even safer. And I would be glad to take 

any questions that the subcommittee has. 

14 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Captain. 

Chairman Shuster? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. LoBiondo. My question 

is directed at the NTSB, the FAA, and NASA, and it is concerning 

space and travel—space travel. 

I watched a couple weeks ago the Falcon Heavy take off, and 

Elon Musk said it was a 50/50 chance it was not going to succeed, 

and it did. It was quite impressive. But as we saw last year, there 

were 18 launches into space. This year they are projecting 20. And 

I have seen estimates that in the next several years it could be 

100, over 100 launches every year, and that is critical, with the 

FAA, NASA—coming to work together to make sure that the airspace is safe. 

And so, just wanted to first ask, starting probably with NASA, 

how has your relationship been with the FAA? And then, from 

there, move to FAA, but also then to—and the NTSB and talk 

about how do we—how do you investigate and how has it worked 

with these two other agencies when you go there? 

So, Mr. Sultan, if you would be—— 

Mr. SULTAN. Thank you for the question. In regards to a relationship between NASA and FAA, I would describe it as it has been 

the closest it has ever been. We work very well, and this is the best 

in the history that we have ever worked together. 

Currently between the two agencies, we have established these— 

we call them the RTTs, the Research Transition Teams. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Can you move your mic a little closer to you? 

Mr. SULTAN. Yes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. That whole box will shift. There you go. 

Mr. SULTAN. Thank you. Between the two agencies we have established these RTTs. We call them the Research Transition 

Teams. And right now we have six of them active on very specific, 

unique, and tangible products that the two agencies cooperate, and 

what we are doing is making sure that the work that we do as a 

research is, first, well coordinated with the implementing agency so 

that it is put on their implementation timeline well before we do 

the handoff, and then FAA knows actually what to do with it, and 

also do the implementation. 

Furthermore, at the executive level, we hold, you know, extensive 

quarterly meetings. This is at Associate Administrator levels between the FAA’s AVS [Aviation Safety] group, Air Traffic Organization, the NextGen Office, as well as international environment and 

energy, where the Associate Administrators do coordinated work to 

make sure that our efforts are fully aligned with each other’s 

needs. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So the bottom line is it has—from your point of 

view, it has been working extremely well. 

Mr. SULTAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. And Mr. Bahrami? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Mr. Chairman, let me highlight what you already 

mentioned, which is the increased number of launches. And one of 

the issues that we are taking very seriously is collaboration with 

other Government agencies that have tremendous experience, including NASA. 

15 

And on the other part of the work that we are doing is a thorough risk assessment prior to each launch, and using the expertise 

that we have in-house, and using the safety management principles 

to make sure, in the event we have an issue that we are protecting 

other aircraft and vehicles in the airspace. 

So, as was mentioned by Mr. Sultan, we have a good working relationship, we continue to work together and improve things as we 

move forward. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. And Mr. DeLisi, if you could, also just 

comment on what you have seen in the interaction and then investigations and how you would operate in that environment. 

Mr. DELISI. Sure, thank you. Commercial space is certainly a 

game changer. It is something that didn’t exist when our agency 

was founded, but we stand at the ready now to investigate the commercial use of space. 

A few years ago we completed the investigation of the Virgin Galactic scaled composite SpaceShipTwo fatal accident. It was our 

first fatality involving a commercial space vehicle. But we have a 

relationship with the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, and our party process allowed us to form an investigation 

using our normal procedures, making some recommendations to 

both the FAA and the Commercial Spaceflight Federation regarding the design of the cockpit switchology in commercial space vehicles. 

One big difference, however, would be the definition of an accident. For a commercial space vehicle that carries a command destruct system, we would not consider it to be an accident if a 

launch were going off target and a command destruct were initiated. As long as the debris fell in the cleared area, that would be— 

the substantial damage to the vehicle would not trigger an NTSB 

investigation. We would only get involved if there were fatalities or 

debris that ended up outside the expected pattern. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, thank you. My time has expired, but I think 

we got to watch this very closely, because we are going to see more 

and more of this, and making sure, from a policy standpoint, that 

the right agencies are in the right place making these decisions, 

and not trying to set up new and different agencies that don’t have 

the experience that you three do. So thank you very much. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Peter? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, and talking about agencies that don’t have 

experience, we have the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, so-called, as the principal regulator of lithium batteries on commercial aircraft. Now, isn’t that interesting? And that 

is, you know, at the behest of this administration. 

And then, of course, Congress has prohibited the regulation of 

lithium batteries beyond any weak rules that ICAO might adopt, 

which doesn’t seem really wise to me—Captain Canoll, you obviously raised this concern, and you certainly know that UPS flight 

1307 in 2006, UPS flight 6 in 2010, and Asiana Airlines cargo 

flight 991 in 2011 all were destroyed because of lithium batteries. 

Now, is there anybody on this panel who thinks that Congress 

should prohibit the FAA from investigating the dangers of lithium 

batteries, and proposing more stringent regulations than those 

adopted by the international consensus authority, ICAO? Anybody 

16 

want to raise your hand, say that that is a prudent thing we are 

doing here? 

OK, thanks. 

How about the other prohibition that Congress has adopted because of the clout of the model aircraft lobby? Now, I know model 

aircraft operators, people—I used to build little planes when I was 

a kid. My brother did, too. You know, they are generally responsible, knowledgeable people. 

But there’s a few hundred thousand of them, and there are now 

millions of people with these little, crappy recreational drones flying around, and we have already talked about those problems. Anybody on the panel want to raise their hand and say that we, Congress, should continue to restrict the FAA from regulating beyond 

‘‘we are going to educate you’’ about where you should fly your 

drone? 

Anybody want to raise their hand on that one? 

OK, well, maybe—— 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Mr. DeFazio, may I make a comment on that? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Absolutely. We agree that something needs to happen to give us better control of the situation. 

And we also want to acknowledge that the work that modelers 

are doing from the perspective of STEM and promoting aviation 

within the younger generation is really important. And as we move 

forward, it is very important that we work with you and your staff 

to find out what is the best way to go forward. 

I absolutely agree with you; we need to do something. And I do 

not know what that is at this point. But we are certainly willing 

to work with you to make that happen. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. Well, we had that core challenge, and now 

we can’t even require registration and/or licensure for these things. 

I mean in my hometown someone was using a UAS as a peeping 

Tom device and someone managed to bring it down. But, of course, 

we have no idea who it belonged to, because we can’t trace them 

back. It seems to me that is pretty minimal, that we would require, 

you know, that they be registered and/or potentially licensed. 

I want to go back to the suspected unapproved parts. Mr. Hampton, I mean I have been working on this for so many years. And 

you mentioned at the end something that—it was something about 

the—I don’t think it was in your testimony, exactly, about some— 

a SUP that got back into the supply chain that is being investigated. 

Mr. HAMPTON. Yes. Thank you for the question, Mr. DeFazio. 

During the course of our review there was a case. A gentleman put 

a number of parts, 65,000 Boeing parts, on the internet. And FAA 

investigated it and found out that he was not going to sell 65,000 

parts. And we thought it was taken care of, and the issue was put 

to bed. 

We subsequently opened another case, and we are looking into 

it. It appears they have now been reintroduced into the supply 

chain, and we are going to find out what happened to those parts. 

So, it is a perfect example. It is not just the instance of what 

happens to a suspected unapproved part, but it has to be taken out 

of the supply chain. The problem is, as you well know, in many of 

17 

the cases, a suspected unapproved part doesn’t affect civil aircraft, 

it can affect a military aircraft. Some aircraft, like in the Boeing 

series, can go back and forth to military and civilian fleets. 

So the trick there is—and it is very important—to make sure 

they don’t make their way back into the supply chain. Because you 

know the term ‘‘pedigree of the part,’’ once it is back in, it is very 

hard to trace. 

So we will keep the committee apprised. We are trying to figure 

out what happened. We don’t know exactly whether these things 

will be used in an aviation mode; we just don’t know. But we are 

concerned about that. And that illustrates the importance. And we 

have an open recommendation: FAA is finalizing how they will get 

their inspectors to make sure that the parts are actually taken out 

of the supply chain. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. How about we all follow the United Airlines model 

and they are shredded? I mean I have never understood this property right argument that, gee, well, I don’t know, maybe somebody 

wants to take this part that could be burnished up to look like 

brandnew, and turn it into a lampholder. And so, therefore, it is 

more valuable than scrap metal. So gee, you know? But I mean 

what is the deal? Seriously. 

Mr. HAMPTON. We understand that FAA can’t destroy it, but 

they have to have the person who is in possession of it take care 

of it and destroy the part. But your point is well taken. And that 

is the importance of getting rid of the part actually out of the supply chain. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Captain Canoll, ALPA has endorsed 

the 21st Century AIRR [Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization] Act, and has said that the bill improves the safety of 

our transportation in the United States. Can you tell us how you 

believe that will happen, and why it does improve safety? 

Mr. CANOLL. So the act, in general, has many provisions that 

would enhance safety, one being the enhancement to our voluntary 

reporting systems, which—a lot of our improvements recently have 

been based upon the concept that voluntarily disclosing a problem 

in the system and, in return receiving a level of immunity, has 

given us a volume of information far beyond what we had before 

to anticipate problems before they actually occur in the system. 

We can see a particular airport, for example, has higher examples or higher incidents of unstable approaches. Then we can modify our training syllabus to address that particular approach so 

that the fleet of aircraft and pilots out there operating to that airport know that that is a known hazard and have been trained to 

deal with it. That is one example. The—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Can you—excuse me. Can you address how ALPA 

believes that the air traffic control reform and modernization contributes to the improvement of air safety? 

Mr. CANOLL. So, in all proposals with regard to reform of the 

ATC system, we approach it incrementally. And the first step is an 

analysis of: is the proposal deemed to provide an equivalent level 

of safety that we have today, which, of course, as we all know, is 

extremely high. Our analysis of this proposal that is currently in 

18 

the House does just that, it does provide an equivalent level of 

safety that we are experiencing today, a very high one. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Sultan, can you describe how NASA uses Research Transition Teams to hand off NASA aeronautical research at the FAA 

Technical Center? 

Mr. SULTAN. So the hand-off occurs to multiple organizations 

within the FAA. What we do is we work jointly with the FAA Tech 

Center in New Jersey on the simulations and the evaluation of and 

validation of the concepts in an integrated fashion with the realworld systems. So the tech center offers us that unique capability. 

Likewise, on the systemwide safety assurance RTT, we work 

jointly with the FAA Tech Center researchers on the V&V of complex and software-intensive systems in developing algorithms and 

testing those algorithms in order to help certify and speed up the 

certification process of software-intensive systems. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK, thank you very much. 

Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Captain Canoll, would you support the FAA reauthorization bill 

that we have been discussing if the ATC privatization was not in 

it? Would ALPA support it without the ATC privatization? 

Mr. CANOLL. I hadn’t contemplated it, but, you know—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, contemplate it. Would you support it without—— 

Mr. CANOLL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CANOLL. We would, because it has many other factors that 

advance safety. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bahrami, the FAA bill—I am sorry, the FAA budget proposes 

$197 million in cuts, including $27 million to the FAA’s operation 

account, $69 million to the F&E, and $101 million to the FAA’s research, engineering, development accounts. That is the proposal for 

2019. 

What specifically would you do to ensure that these cuts, if enacted, would not adversely affect safety? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. As you know, this is not the first time we are 

faced with these types of cuts. We typically reprioritize. We look at 

the sense of urgency, we look at the type of research that can only 

be done by Government agencies, including the FAA, and we also 

try to rely on those types of researches happening in industry, and 

try to promote and advance those types of activities. 

And bottom line, we are going to have to reevaluate our work. 

We have to figure out where the priorities are, and fund those activities that are critical to our safety mission. 

Mr. LARSEN. And you would choose a safety mission first, then? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Safety mission and enabling activities. And in 

terms of enabling activities, fortunately, in a lot of areas industry 

takes the lead, and we will make sure that we can work with them 

closely in those areas. 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Hampton, based on that, what would you say— 

it is kind of tough to pick and choose, there is plenty of issues that 

19 

we are dealing with on aviation safety, but what would be the biggest threat, in the IG’s view, to aviation safety? 

Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you for the question, Mr. Larsen. We wonder back at the IG—we talked to Mr. Scovel on what keeps the inspector general up at night—and I think right now the safety of 

unmanned aerial systems is the big concern. It is not when but if 

there is a collision with a commercial aircraft. And we just hope 

there are no passenger injuries or fatalities. 

That is our top safety concern, followed closely by the close calls 

at airport runways and taxiways right now. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. And in your recommendations with regards to 

UAS, could you reiterate those recommendations? 

Mr. HAMPTON. Sure. Most of our recommendations focus on helping FAA become more risk-based and getting their information systems lined up: a single depository for tracking all their sightings; 

another one for getting their systems in place. Another one is having better guidance to their inspector workforce—information to 

better position the agency to respond to the impact of technology 

on FAA and the industry. 

The UAS is probably one of the most difficult and cross-cutting 

things that is going to affect the agency. So those are two of the 

recommendations we think that they can move out forthwith and 

make some progress on. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thanks. 

Mr. Bahrami, do you think the FAA has that authority to move 

forward on those particular steps, or do you think that you need 

a direction from Congress? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. We are working on a number of initiatives. When 

we talk about UAS and the risk of UAS in aerospace, basically the 

issue is being able to validate and verify the sightings. This is a 

huge problem. We know that we started an ARC [Aviation Rulemaking Committee] that looked at the ID, remote ID. So until such 

time we are able to go forward with that, we are going to continue 

to have challenges identifying and enforcing the rules. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is fair. 

And Mr. Sultan, the role that NASA plays in developing a traffic 

management system with UAS, can you tell us where NASA is on 

timelines to get us to a point where we can start, you know, if you 

will, seeing that in the sky? 

Mr. SULTAN. Thank you for the question. So we have two different projects. One is focused on the larger class, higher altitude 

controlled airspace access—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. SULTAN [continuing]. And one is on the low altitude, below 

400 feet, small UAS. In regards to the UTM, which is the lower altitude one, we have a set of high-fidelity field trials conducted almost on an annual basis, which will look at integration of these vehicles in higher density operations. 

So we started off with just operating in rural areas. The next 

level was with some additional, you know, people and objects nearby. And the third one is operating beyond visual line of sight with 

additional vehicle integrations, manned operations. And of course, 

the fourth one, which will be conducted in 2020, is mainly focused 

on dense, urban operations, or a simulated environment of that. 

20 

The key is that this industry is still very much in infancy, in 

terms of the data needed in order to certify these vehicles and generate the regulation. So what NASA is doing in both of their high 

altitude, as well as the low-altitude UAS projects, is generating 

that data and delivering it to the FAA, as well as the standards 

organizations, such as RTCA, so that they can make informed decisions on what the regulations and certifications ought to be. 

In a nutshell, we don’t know what we don’t know. That is what 

it boils down to in regards to, you know, the UAS operations. And 

that is the gap that NASA is trying to fill. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. DAVIS [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMALFA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for appearing with us here today and for your expertise. 

Just a couple of things. 

Mr. Hampton, I wanted to direct to you here, I come from an extremely rural district in northern California, and wanted to see if 

you can update on the issue of contract towers versus the regular 

ATC towers. A 2012 study at your office had shown they were just 

as safe and effective as a regular ATC tower—that being the contract towers. 

So, you know, it is a good cost-saving measure, it helps our rural 

airports, rural areas, to hang on much longer than if they had 

higher costs. 

And so, again, having so many rural airports in my district or 

a lot of districts like it in the West, I just wondered. Does that remain a priority or a good tool? Do you have any findings on contract towers? 

Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you for the question. Historically, we have 

looked at the contract tower program, and it has been a very costeffective and safe program. We recently received a request from 

this committee to update our work, and we intend to start that assignment in the not-too-distant future and complete it. Probably 

some time next year. 

Mr. LAMALFA. Are those that are questioning them or wanting 

to do away with them, is there any movement that way you are 

aware of? 

Mr. HAMPTON. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. LAMALFA. OK, good, good, just making sure you keep funding. 

Mr. Bahrami, do you have any input on it, as well? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Sir, I just want to point out that we are supportive 

of contract towers, and we are currently revising our cost-benefit 

analysis for contract towers. And my role, my organization’s role, 

is to oversee ATO. And we are making sure that those particular 

towers are safe and operating. And at this point I have to tell you 

that everything is working fine, and it is safe. 

Mr. LAMALFA. OK, thank you. Let me follow up on the drone 

question, as well. You know, coming back to the very rural needs 

we have, and remoteness, it is a great tool, used properly, for inspection of hard-to-get-at power lines and, you know, some roadways, or maybe under bridges. A lot of infrastructure, where it is 

a very handy tool. 

21 

So, what are your thoughts that we can—instead of—in certain 

areas I see what the issue is. But others, we need expanded use 

of this. We need better permission to use them, maybe even an outof-sight basis, as is appropriate, because we have a lot of issues 

with timber, timber that could be—you know, we have 129 million 

dead trees and counting in California, with the interface of that— 

with power lines or just other issues. 

So it is certainly a lot better way to keep abreast of what is going 

on with dead trees and other infrastructure issues. 

So what do you think we can do to expand the use of that, where 

appropriate, in those types of very rural situations? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. I fully agree with you, that we have to use a riskbased approach to deciding on operational applications, and using 

it in areas that are not heavily populated makes a lot of sense. And 

we are doing that. When you look at the process that we have in 

place through the waiver process under part 107, we have issued 

many waivers for those types of operations. 

Also, on the integration pilot program, we are soliciting input 

from those interested applicants who want to introduce new and innovative applications. The idea behind it is, of course, to continue 

to promote the UAS and also make sure that we learn from those 

experiences and apply it appropriately. 

Also, as I mentioned earlier, we are in the process of proposing 

a rule that facilitates operation over people and at night, and that 

will significantly reduce the number of waivers that we have currently in house, and working on that. Going forward with ID, remote ID, we could actually address the concerns that we have from 

our security partners, and we can move forward. All of that—— 

Mr. LAMALFA. Quickly, quickly—— 

Mr. BAHRAMI [continuing]. Is going to help. 

Mr. LAMALFA. Quickly, quick question on—just a quick one on do 

we want to have States and locals have their own sets of rules, or 

do we want to keep this kind of a more broad approach with one 

Federal jurisdiction, instead of multijurisdictions having their own 

rules? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. One of the important benefits of the IPP [integration pilot program] is to actually evaluate what needs to be done 

with the State and local authorities with respect to their jurisdiction, and what we can do under Federal rules and regulations. 

What we learn from that actually is going to help us, moving forward, with the very same issue that you highlighted. 

Mr. LAMALFA. OK, thank you. I appreciate—— 

Mr. DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really do 

appreciate the perspectives of the—at NASA on the importance of 

aviation safety research, and the partnerships that are required between the Federal Government and industry. 

As ranking member of the Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, I believe that research is absolutely essential to developing unbiased practices and techniques that we can deploy to 

mitigate risk. 

Can you, Mr. Sultan, speak more to the value of these partnerships between the Federal Government and industry, and identify 

22 

areas where the Federal Government could benefit from additional 

resources to address the emerging challenges in the aviation space? 

Mr. SULTAN. Thank you for the question. So in regards to the 

partnerships between Government and industry, it is absolutely 

critical. Because for us in the NASA research, first of all, we use 

it as a guiding principle in trying to determine what are actually 

the community needs, what are the tall poles that the eventual 

users of our systems will need and will apply? So, getting that feedback is critical. 

In addition, as we develop these systems, it is critical to be able 

to constantly evaluate the benefits of our research products in the 

operational environments as exercised by the users. 

A good example I can give is, for instance, on our development 

of prognostic tools for data mining, using the data mining of the 

data that is within the ASRS data—we work extensively, for instance, with Southwest Airlines out in Dallas, where they exercise 

our algorithms and provide feedback in terms of how useful they 

are and what additional safety issues those tools and algorithms 

unearthed that were otherwise unknown. So these are kind of examples that I can provide. 

Likewise, when it comes to UAS, these small operators, they 

have tremendous capability in terms of being able to provide capabilities, in terms of detect and avoid and communication capabilities that already exist in other realms, not just aviation, that can 

be brought to bear. So we work quite extensively with—I mean you 

can look at it in terms of the IT sector on how far advanced certain 

capabilities are, and can we leverage those to essentially apply it 

towards the aviation community. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bahrami, we have probably the safest system in the world, 

in terms of our safety record and our complex aviation system. 

Your testimony speaks to investing in the right safety enhancements by aviation industry. It is my belief that probably Congress 

should not dictate whether to invest in a particular technology. 

Rather, it should encourage the FAA to establish technology-neutral standards for industry to pursue. 

Given that the United States has already deployed a comprehensive network of ground-based ADS–B receivers, and there is a mature ATC modernization outlined in the NextGen roadmap, what is 

the benefit of space-based ADS–B for the United States? And how 

does that benefit, compared to the projected cost of space-based 

ADS–B on the annual basis? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Thank you for the question. As you know, this was 

one of the mandates, that we have to study the benefits of the 

space-based ADS–B. And that work has been going on for some 

time. And I think, once we have the information, and through the 

NextGen Advisory Committee, and recommendations that will 

come to the FAA, we will decide what we can do. 

At this point I can see how you may feel that there would be duplications. We already have a system in place. But until we have 

the experts taking a look at that to see if there are other places 

that we are—we do not have coverage and we could get that 

through the—space-based ADS–B, at this point I can’t make any 

more comment beyond that. 

23 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Michigan, Mr. Mitchell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Captain, let me ask you a couple of questions, if I can, please. 

My colleague gave you an interesting question, a closed choice between an FAA reauthorization without ATC modernization of the 

current system, which, of course, isn’t necessarily the choice, so I 

am going to ask you a different question. 

If you had the choice between the 21st Century AIRR Act with 

ATC privatization, simply FAA reauthorization without ATC—leaving it the way it is, or the progression it is on now, and the current 

system, which one do you want to have? 

Mr. CANOLL. From a safety perspective, it is neutral for us. We 

believe that with or without the reform, we are going to maintain 

the safest system we have. If the question is not based on safety, 

we are looking at a profound need for a long-term, stable source of 

funding for our air traffic control system. We believe the one that 

is being offered now will provide that in the current House action. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Which is the 21st Century AIRR Act, correct? 

Mr. CANOLL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MITCHELL. OK. Mr. Bahrami, I am confused, but I believe 

your agency actually supported the 21st Century AIRR Act, did it 

not? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Administration, yes. 

Mr. MITCHELL. That would be the pertinent question. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you. 

A question for you, if I can, Mr. Hampton, before I have to leave 

for another—quite some time ago, after 9/11, the FAA was directed 

by law to update and upgrade the identification process for A&P 

and pilots, so they had more information in terms of photos, biometrics to better secure access to airports. 

To date, to the best of my knowledge, that really hasn’t been— 

let’s put it this way—significantly undertaken, let’s put it that way. 

And I guess—I know there is another committee on which I serve 

is going to get into detail. Can you give us an outline as to—I think 

that is a safety risk that we need to look at. 

Mr. HAMPTON. I would have to get back to you on the biometrics. 

Most of our work is focused on the updates on the pilot records 

database, which is currently underway. And we will get back to you 

on the biometrics. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I appreciate—well, I appreciate that, in terms— 

and additionally, in terms of identification, their identification information and for A&P and mechanics, which appears to me to be 

a significant safety risk, where you have the ability for—— 

Mr. HAMPTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. MITCHELL [continuing]. People to access—— 

Mr. HAMPTON. Yes, sir. We will get back to you. We focus mostly 

on the pilot records database. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I appreciate that. 

Mr. HAMPTON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it is a significant safety concern we need 

to be concerned about, is the safety of our—— 

24 

Mr. HAMPTON. Interesting. We just had a discussion with another committee about that. I will get back to you, sir. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back, thank you. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. 

As a followup, Captain, to Mr. Mitchell’s question, you mentioned 

a stable funding source that you believe the 21st Century AIRR Act 

would provide. That stable funding source, would you agree, would 

allow more safety upgrades and technological upgrades, to make it 

safer for everybody in the industry? 

Mr. CANOLL. I don’t necessarily agree that more funding is going 

to make us more safe. I think we are safe now. The funding would 

be more along the lines of expanding and making it more efficient. 

The safety is going to be maintained. That is an absolute, and it 

is an absolute requirement. We are not looking for new ways to be 

safe. But if we are going to continue to have the safety we experience today with increased volume, which is the objective of a new 

system, then, yes, we will need more funding. 

Mr. DAVIS. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Brownley for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Captain, I would like to also ask you a question with regards to pilot shortages, or not having pilot shortages. But we do 

continue to hear from our regional carriers about a pilot shortage, 

although the FAA data seems to paint a different picture, in that 

there has been a 200-percent increase in pilot licenses that have 

been issued since 2009. 

Yet we continue to hear about it, and from both large and small 

carriers leaving their market. So I was wondering if you could explain a little bit more in further detail about how you think business economics are driving airline service issues in smaller communities. 

Mr. CANOLL. So, ma’am, you are absolutely correct. There is no 

present-day pilot shortage. The FAA data is very clear. There are 

almost two pilots for every job available out there. The challenge 

is that the industry went through a rather dramatic downturn in 

the previous 10 to 15 years, many bankruptcies. And it, quite 

frankly, wasn’t a very desirable profession for almost an entire generation coming through. 

The good news is we have seen a turnaround in the industry, 

from a profitability standpoint. And when our employers are profitable, our members make more money. So that is now attracting a 

new generation of fliers. And we have seen enrollment at the flight 

schools up dramatically over the last 2 years. We have seen the 

production of airline transport pilot and restricted airline transport 

pilots increase, so the trend is very positive on the long-term picture. 

For those who are having troubles attracting pilots today, they 

just need to look at those airlines that are not having troubles attracting pilots. And it is the free market at work, which we fully 

support. We fully support the activity of the free market. And while 

some are having no problems, we can see clearly why they pay a 

good wage and they have a good work-life balance and they have 

good career progression options for the incoming pilot. And those 

25 

who are having trouble do not, in almost all areas. It is almost that 

simple: supply and demand market economics. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. And is there a certain profile of the new pilot 

coming on board? 

Mr. CANOLL. So the pilots that we see today coming into the part 

121 carriers are products of the new rule, since it has been in place 

for almost 5 years now, and that new rule calls for very structured 

academic training, and then a certain baseline, depending on which 

form of structured academic training you had. Let’s say it was a 

2-year aviation degree. You would need 1,250 hours of experience. 

A 4-year aviation degree, you would need 1,000 hours of experience. But if you came from the military, you could obtain a restricted ATP {Airline Transport Pilot] with 750 hours. So we are 

finding that those structured programs and that experience is producing a very high-quality candidate. 

We went through a transition period right after the rule came in, 

where we had some people coming back into the industry who already had ATPs, but hadn’t flown for many, many years, who 

struggled a little bit in the air carrier training course. But we have 

seen that wane away, and now we are seeing a very high-quality 

candidate. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you for that. And there has been a lot of 

discussion today on unmanned aircraft in our national airspace. 

And I am just wondering, from your perspective—I haven’t heard 

your perspective yet, although I heard you make comments in your 

testimony. But how do you see the Federal Government’s role in 

developing, you know, flight standard, certification, air traffic requirements for the use of drones in our airspace? 

Mr. CANOLL. So the Air Line Pilots Association is fully supportive of the development and deployment of these technologies, 

just as quickly as possible, as long as safety is not compromised. 

From a systematic approach to it, we look at it very simply. If 

the vehicle under consideration is intended to fly into the national 

airspace—which I define as airspace shared by our general aviation 

community and our airlines in the military—or the vehicle has the 

capability to do it in a lost link concept, then the development of 

procedures, certification, and operation of that vehicle must be very 

much aligned with what we do today in manned aviation. It 

shouldn’t be a new set of standards. The standards exist for operating in the national airspace. We need to have those same standards. 

One example would be collision avoidance technologies that are 

mandated on all the airliners my members fly. That type of equipment must be installed on any unmanned vehicle that is intended 

to fly in the national airspace, as well. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, sir. My time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. DAVIS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, 

Mr. Lewis, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to everyone 

who is appearing in front of the committee today. We do appreciate 

it. 

Administrator Bahrami, I have got a question on the 21st Century AIRR Act and how it applies, or some of the criticism that has 

been expressed on the other side of the aisle from moving air traffic 

26 

control from the FAA to a nonprofit private entity. And I would reiterate the point that this particular piece of legislation has nothing to do with privatizing profits. They don’t go to the stakeholders, 

they are reinvested back into the system. But it is just a more nimble way to make certain that air traffic control is up to date, and 

just merely the model of so many other nations. 

But nevertheless, some of my—our colleagues on the committee 

have expressed concern about managing airspace and aviation operations, and doing that the right way. 

Now, I want to ask you a question about how the FAA currently 

contracts with private general aviation pilots. I understand there 

is a couple of contractors that we already use that are outside the 

realm of Government. Is that true? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Sir, I am not familiar with the specific contracts 

you are referring to. 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. If you want to either elaborate or give me the 

questions, I will make sure that I provide you the response. 

Mr. LEWIS. Right now the FAA contracts with folks like Leidos, 

which has a presence in my district, in Minnesota, to run the flight 

services center which aids all general aviation pilots in planning 

and executing flights in the national airspace. 

And I guess my question is, if that is good enough for that, what 

would be the fear in the 21st Century AIRR Act for moving to a 

similar model? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Earlier there was a question with respect to the 

contract towers, and we mentioned that this is something that we 

support. We are supportive of the contract towers. And my focus 

is on safety. 

And I want to point out that, from the safety perspective, the 

ATC reform that is included in the proposed act, there would not 

be any adverse impact to safety. That is my belief. And I base that 

on the fact that there are 60 or so countries that have already done 

that, and the level of safety, based on various studies decided that 

it stayed the same or has improved. 

Mr. LEWIS. So there are these successful examples. I believe, additionally, the FAA recently established the LAANC [Low Altitude 

Authorization and Notification Capability] program, is that right, 

that approves private-sector, third-party companies to manage unmanned aviation in specific other areas to make certain that our 

national airspace is safe? 

So there are examples of non-Federal entities operating portions 

of the national airspace in a very proficient and safe manner, correct? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. LAANC, you mentioned, is a good example of that. 

It has been working very well. And we are looking forward to expanding it to 50 other airports. 

Mr. LEWIS. And the FAA still retains safety oversight of these 

programs, as it would the ATC, if it were operated independently. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. That is correct. The responsibility of oversight is 

always with us, sir. 

Mr. LEWIS. Very good, thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

27 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from 

Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you so much. 

Captain, in your testimony you talk about how we need to ensure 

that safety regulations should not be driven by economic decisions. 

Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. CANOLL. I think the easiest example is if you listen to some 

of the chatter in town, and certainly in this subcommittee as well, 

about those who believe there is a need to reduce the number of 

hours required or the structured training that is currently required 

for an ATP or restricted ATP. Those are attempts to address a 

market forces issue with regard to pilot supply with a safety provision, which I do not believe is what the flying public wants us to 

do. 

If you look more on the economic side, it is a problem for the industry that we are going to have to work through together to provide service to small communities at an affordable rate. 

We are not blind to the fact that if the airplanes cost more, the 

fuel costs more, the pilots cost more, eventually the cost of that operation to a small community will make it unaffordable for those 

who want to access that. Hence the Essential Air Service and other 

programs that are meant to offset some of that cost. 

So I think, you know, a lot of attention could be focused on that, 

to see if we can find ways to make it more affordable to fly into 

those things. But reducing safety—and, by the way, we are firm believers that just reducing the number of hours or reducing structured flight training will not address the problem of attracting pilots to the job. That is not going to solve the problem, no matter 

what anyone says. I know what attracts pilots to the job, and it is 

a good work-life balance, career progression, and a fair wage. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Captain, I want you to know that I agree with 

you. And so many things that—so often, when Government looks 

at associations or unions or labor groups, they are labeled as the 

other side, where you are the ones—you are flying that plane, you 

are in that seat. You have the ability to speak at a level of expertise that we need to hear. And I just want you to know I do appreciate you, and because all of us fly a lot, we are so appreciative of 

your service, sir. 

I want to ask this question to the panel. I don’t think it is an 

exaggeration to say that the hurricane response—we will look back 

on it as a landmark evolution of drone usage in this country. The 

University of Michigan’s College of Engineers is building an outdoor fly lab for testing autonomous aerial vehicles called the M-Air. 

I wanted to ask this panel what are some of the challenges faced 

by educational institutions today, as they look at R&D in the UAS 

airspace? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. I will start. In terms of challenges, I think there 

are tremendous innovative ideas out there. And often what we are 

learning is the best way to go forward is through prototyping, and 

actually put those ideas in place and document what lessons we 

learned, and identify those things that maybe we did not know 

prior to conducting that particular research. 

And to some degree, collaboration with the Government agencies, 

industry, will help identify the research requirements, going forVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:45 Sep 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\115\AV\2-27-2~1\31404.TXT JEAN
28 

ward. And I think that is how we can take what is happening in 

academia, and actually transfer it into regulatory and safety requirements. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. And in that vein, to ensure that we do not stifle 

this industry, what are some of the recommendations that you have 

when it comes to regulations, the timeframe? We often hear that 

our regulations stifle the growth. And this industry is moving very 

rapidly. Do you have any recommendations for us? 

You all are not into the drone industry? 

Mr. CANOLL. Ma’am, I sit on the Drone Advisory Committee. I 

am a member of the Drone Advisory Committee. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you. 

Mr. CANOLL. And we struggle with that question every day. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. OK. 

Mr. CANOLL. The industry wants a lot of things. They want flight 

beyond visual sight, they want flight at night, they want flight over 

populations. These are all very desirous of the industry to make 

more money. But we also have to take a focus on all the challenges 

to doing that safely. 

The most recent example of success is the UAS ID and Tracking 

ARC results on—in that ARC—we were a member of that Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee, as well. It went wonderful, and now the 

FAA has those recommendations, and we should be seeing rulemaking in very short order, which will enable a lot of the things 

the industry wants to do. That is the first and most present example of if we are actually making progress. As long as the industry 

and the FAA keep coordinating at the very high level they are 

doing right now, I think we are going to get there. You know, we 

are going to have to be measured, but we are going to get there. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you so much. My time is up and I yield 

back. 

Mr. DAVIS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The Chair begrudgingly recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence, begrudging indulgence. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. I am going to stick with the 

line of questioning from the gentlelady from the great State of 

Michigan. And let me just say before I start that I was encouraged 

that the committee adopted an amendment I had last year, the reauthorization bill which provided the Administrator the authority 

to part 107 waivers for UAS carrying property beyond the line of 

sight. 

And I will also tell you, as a rotary-wing guy who operates in the 

low-altitude airspace, I am particularly concerned about getting 

this right here on a regular basis, especially from my friends in the 

EMS community about close encounters, because they seem to 

just—you know, they are headed to an accident, and so is everybody else, right? And they want to have their own view of it, and 

so on and so forth. 

At the same time, I think that potentially we are getting behind, 

we are behind, we are missing opportunities in this space. And I 

just want to encourage us to continue safely in this regard, but diligently. 

29 

I was pleased to know that the DOT and the FAA place strong 

emphasis on the application and the roll-out of the new UAS integration pilot program, so I just want to—UAS IPP is the acronym, 

just to be clear here. 

Mr. Bahrami, acknowledging package delivery is, for the time 

being, prohibited under part 107. How does the FAA envision enabling delivery operations in the pilot program? Do you know if that 

is part of that, and how that is being worked out? Or where does 

that stand? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. At this point I am not familiar with all the proposals. We are going through the process, as you know. We are following a very strict process. But I can tell you that, even outside 

the IPP, there are companies that have already approached the 

FAA. And we are going to be working with them to identify the 

operational rules that need to be in place for those types of operations. 

And there are two ways we could deal with this situation. One 

would be for us to start looking at the regulations and come up 

with a proposal that goes out for public comments and all that. But 

the other way would be to engage with industry and let them propose ideas that are workable, given their nature of designs, and put 

the safety requirements, performance-based rules, that then actually can go forward and design their vehicles to those type of requirements. 

We have chosen the latter. We want to work with them because 

we believe that would be the quickest way for us to learn some of 

the challenges that we are going to be facing. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. And I agree with you. I hope they are not mutually exclusive. I think that we should engage with industry as 

the experts on this. But at the same time, I think the public comment is important. As a person who is fairly familiar, I consider 

myself, having flown for 30 years, familiar with the aviation process and so on and so forth, but I am also concerned about privacy, 

about the airspace incursions, whether for safety or for privacy, 

what have you. And I think those are important conversations to 

have. I would encourage you to continue. 

I understand that DOT is required to enter into UAS IPP agreements with at least five jurisdictions by early May. That is my understanding. So if I am wrong, just please correct me. Do you anticipate a program being announced by then, or not? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. I can tell you that we are on schedule. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. And I can also tell you that Secretary Chao recently announced that the number would be 10. We are doubling 

the numbers. 

Mr. PERRY. Excellent, OK. So on schedule, doubling the numbers. 

I think this is good news for those of us that are interested in this. 

And whether—just like you said, Captain Canoll, we are concerned 

for safety and the airspace and interoperability and a traffic management system. Nobody wants a 50-pound metal object coming 

through the windscreen at whatever hundred miles an hour you 

are headed. It is going to be catastrophic, right? So we can’t afford 

those kind of incidents. But at the same time, we need to move forVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:45 Sep 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\115\AV\2-27-2~1\31404.TXT JEAN
30 

ward with technology and the things that are in our world today, 

and just do the best we can. 

So I appreciate your answers today, sir, and I thank you for your 

diligence, gentlemen. Thank you. 

Mr. Chair, I yield. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you to my good friend, Mr. Perry. The Chair 

now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. This has been the greatest period of 

safety in civil aviation, I think, in our history. And yet we have got 

the largest, most complex system. So thank you for that. But we 

still have to remain vigilant to maintain those high safety standards which we have established in the United States. 

Mr. DeLisi, if I can ask you on—if you recall, October 28, 2016, 

American Airlines flight 383 experienced an uncontained engine 

failure and subsequent fire. There were 161 passengers, 7 flight 

crew on the plane, 168 people. Several injuries were sustained, and 

NTSB subsequently issued an extensive investigation. 

First, Chairman, can I have entered into the record the investigative report on that record, without objection? 

[Pause.] 

Mr. COHEN. Without objection? Thank you. 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. 

[The 91-page accident report referenced by Congressman Cohen entitled 

‘‘Uncontained Engine Failure and Subsequent Fire: American Airlines 

Flight 383, Boeing 767–323, N345AN, Chicago, Illinois, October 28, 2016’’ 

is available on the website of the National Transportation Safety Board at 

https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/aar1801.pdf.] 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DeLisi, you are familiar with the NTSB’s investigative report 

regarding the flight? There were 168 people on board. Was that the 

capacity of that plane? 

Mr. DELISI. I would have to check into that. I don’t recall if that 

was a full flight. 

Mr. COHEN. So you don’t know how many passengers could have 

flown that plane or a similar flight. Not necessarily. 

Mr. DELISI. I could find that. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bahrami, let me ask you this. In the investigative report following the accident, the NTSB recommended—some passengers 

evacuated and they took their carry-on bags, and that is a problem. 

They shouldn’t have done that. Does the FAA consider the efficient, 

timely evacuation of planes an important factor in passenger safety, and how to accomplish that? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Absolutely. We have specific rules that—emergency evac must be completed within 90 seconds. And when we 

conduct that test, we have the maximum passenger loading on— 

and adverse situations, such as some of the exits are closed and 

those kinds of situations, to make sure that we get as realistic as 

possible to potential scenarios that may happen in service. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. Ninety seconds is what current Federal law requires all passengers to be able to evacuate. 

31 

In the case of flight 383 it took 2 minutes and 21 seconds to evacuate the passengers. Three exits were operable. The flight was 

below passenger capacity, yet it took 51 seconds longer, or 63 percent more time than is permissible under Federal regulations. 

Subsequent to that, post to that, a U.S. circuit court decision was 

issued in July of 2017. And Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the U.S. court of appeals decision of 

July of 2017. 

Mr. DAVIS. You didn’t get me this time. Without objection. 

[Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. D/B/A FlyersRights.org, and Paul 

Hudson, Petitioners v. Federal Aviation Administration, et al., Respondents 

(D.C. Cir. July 28, 2017) (No. 16–1101) is on pages 124–146.] 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

You are familiar with that decision, I presume, FlyersRights 

versus U.S.A.? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes, I am. 

Mr. COHEN. In that decision the panel remarked that the FAA’s 

justifications to reject the public petition to review airline seat safety as a matter of safety risk was vaporous. Even after the dangerous accident involving American Airlines flight 383, even after 

the NTSB’s clear recommendation to review passenger deplaning 

times, the FAA took no significant action. 

Now the U.S. court of appeals has ordered the FAA to take action to review the safety impact that changes in seat size and pitch 

may have. I am concerned the FAA has not taken seriously the 

concerns of the National Transportation Safety Board, or even the 

U.S. court of appeals decision, or this committee, which included a 

study. 

Can we expect some study soon on pitch size and width of seats 

that are getting smaller and smaller and smaller? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. As you mentioned, we have the court order to respond, and we are working on that response. It is a coordination. 

And I think, once that is made public, we know what type of work 

we need to be doing in order to satisfy the directives that we have. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, I hope you will do it quickly, because lives 

could be in the balance. I am deeply concerned about the flight 

safety for the flying public. We shouldn’t wait until somebody dies 

to respond and to take action to make our planes evacuatable within the 90 seconds that is required by law. 

Seat size and pitch continue to shrink, while the average American gets larger and larger and taller and taller. And while I care 

about comfort, my bill, the SEAT [Seat Egress in Air Travel] Act, 

is focused squarely on the risk of the flying public and safety. This 

was part of the FAA reauthorization package. 

Even if airlines did not oppose the amendment, which they 

didn’t—everyone is for safety—I think it should be a grave concern 

of the American public that the FAA has repeatedly failed to act 

in accordance to the guidance and recommendations of not only the 

National Transportation Safety Board, but even the U.S. court of 

appeals. It is clear to me the American public is on our side in urging your agency to issue standards to keep Americans safe in our 

skies. And pitch and width is part of that, Mr. Bahrami, and I hope 

this administration will do that. 

32 

If I can have just an extra second, Captain, I want to thank you 

for your service—— 

Mr. DAVIS. No. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. And ask you this. Do you carry a gun 

in the cockpit? 

Mr. CANOLL. No, sir, I am not an FFDO [Federal flight deck officer]. 

Mr. COHEN. OK—— 

Mr. DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired, thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DAVIS. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada for 

5 minutes, Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up 

on the question earlier about package delivery. I know that you say 

that there are some plans that are going to be announced in May. 

You don’t want to tell me if Nevada is going to get one of those 

proposals, do you, so I can go back with some good news? 

But I just worry that all of this is kind of conditional, and it is 

all in the future, and you are all studying and planning. As the 

FAA reauthorization continues to be controversial and held up over 

that one provision about privatization—all the rest seems to have 

pretty much bipartisan and industry agreement—is there anything 

that we can be doing to help speed along this drone package delivery? 

We just see it happening every day right now, it is a reality in 

Europe, and we seem to be falling further and further behind. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Let me start by highlighting that we are leading 

when it comes to integration of drones into airspace. Many countries have chosen to segregate. But what we are trying to do is integrate, which is the—which is—puts us ahead of other countries. 

Having said that, as it was mentioned several times, there is tremendous amount of energy, passion, and enthusiasm amongst the 

companies to move forward with these types of initiatives. Frankly, 

FAA does not have a choice than to continue to work with those 

parties and move things forward. 

So, we are at the point right now that the demands are upon us 

to respond, and we are doing so. We are doing it in terms of partnerships for safety plans with specific companies that are in that 

particular business. We are trying to learn from their work and see 

what we could do as we move forward. 

And at this point I could tell you that that is a high priority for 

us. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, I am glad to hear that. And Nevada has one of 

the test centers in the State, and there is a lot of potential use for 

drones there. I know some of our utility companies would like to 

see them used in remote areas, because that would be very helpful—out of line of sight. 

Some of the casinos would like to use drones to deliver drinks 

poolside. I mean that is—let’s be creative. I noticed even in one of 

the big fashion houses during fashion week they had drones going 

down the runway, carrying ladies’ purses. So, I mean, it is endless. 

But I appreciate that you all have made that a priority. 

One thing, too, that concerned me was this rule of the administration, this two-for-one Executive order on the development of regVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:45 Sep 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\115\AV\2-27-2~1\31404.TXT JEAN
33 

ulations, and how that affects the drone industry. I wrote Mr. 

Mulvaney about that, to ask him, and he wrote me back and he 

said that he thinks maybe that the—he says that the OMB believes 

that maybe the rulemaking that expands the use of drones would 

be considered deregulatory, so it wouldn’t come under that arbitrary two-for-one elimination. 

I wonder if you all have accepted that. Have you received that 

directive? And does the DOT agree with it, and the FAA? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes, we are following the directives outlined in Executive order. And when you view the requirements in there, or the 

draft, you are looking at two things: first, safety; and the other one 

is enablers, rules that are enablers. In those cases, we are moving 

forward with those. 

And in the area of what—the rules that are considered deregulatory, which—there are a number of them identified by both industry and other sources. In those cases we have to answer two questions: what is the impact on safety if we go forward with that action, and what is the impact on FAA’s roles and responsibilities? 

Can we still do that job? Those things go into the consideration. 

And at this point we are following that guidance. 

Ms. TITUS. So you don’t feel like that two-for-one Executive order 

is hindering you in the development of drones or regulations that 

are needed? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Not so far. I think what it does is that it forces 

us to do a lot more planning, because we need to know what rules 

we have got going and what are some of the deregulatory items, 

and be able to match them together so that the net effect is a positive, in terms of benefits, or neutral. And that is the work that we 

have to do in advance before our regulatory agenda is published. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DAVIS. The gentlelady’s time is expired. Glad I get a chance 

to ask my questions. You know, many that I had actually have 

been asked already. So it has been pretty interesting to listen to 

some of my colleagues. My good friend, Mr. Larsen, and I, we kind 

of stopped when we heard about technology delivering drinks to the 

pool. So we would like to get some opinions on—can you push that 

technology to the head of the line with your risk-based approach, 

sir? A simple yes or no is good. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. We will do our best. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DAVIS. Thanks. Speaking of—a lot of this hearing I don’t 

think many originally thought would center on drone and UAS 

technology, but I just want to let you know I appreciate the FAA’s 

risk-based approach on UAS, and I look forward to continuing to 

work with you. 

As you may know, and many on the panel may know, I introduced an amendment to the 21st Century AIRR Act that would create a microdrone category. And I would hope that that language is 

being utilized as part of your risk-based approach, as part of any 

advisory committee that you may be a part of, Captain, because my 

feeling is that manufacturers will begin to manufacture that technology in a much more safer way for our air system if they know 

what the minimum standards are. And that, to me, would ensure 

that we would keep that technology moving forward. 

34 

Mr. Bahrami, I also wanted to ask you for an update on a piece 

of legislation that was signed into law back in 2016. It is section 

2309 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. I had 

a provision based on my legislation, the Families Flying Together 

Act, which required DOT to review and, if appropriate, establish a 

policy requiring air carriers to enable children to sit with a parent 

or an accompanied family member. 

The deadline for implementation was July 15, 2017. Do you have 

an update on this? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Sir, consumer protection issues are handled by the 

Department of Transportation, and I will be glad to take the question and provide you with an update. 

Mr. DAVIS. All right. And in—thank you for doing that, I appreciate your relaying that to the DOT Aviation Consumer Protection 

Division. If you could, would you ask them to reach out to my office? And I would love to schedule a meeting to get a personal update from that team. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Absolutely. 

Mr. DAVIS. All right, thank you. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Thank you. 

Mr. DAVIS. Captain, you mentioned something. I don’t remember—the hearing has gone on long—if it was your opening testimony or if it was in response to one of the initial questions, but 

you mentioned student loans and the debt that pilots may incur. 

Do you know what the average student loan debt is for a pilot 

going into aviation, coming out of training? 

Mr. CANOLL. No, sir, we don’t. I don’t. We don’t keep those statistics. We do know it is expensive. And the problem with the traditional student loans is the current system of caps and forbearance. 

So in the higher education bill, we are urging a broader look at 

how student loans could help an individual interested in, let’s say, 

being a pilot, factor in the higher cost that flight training is going 

to have to be included. And that would mean higher caps for that 

particular profession, like it has provided in other professions, and 

then maybe a different mechanism for forbearance on the repayment of those loans. Still a loan construct, still not the best way 

to do it, because loans are expensive. But nevertheless, the only 

way for a lot of people. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I appreciate your comments on the forbearance 

issues and the Higher Ed Act, but I want to bring your attention 

to a bill that I have introduced called the Employer Participation 

in Student Loan Assistance Act. And what it does, it sets up a voluntary, private-sector approach that would allow for a company to 

receive a tax benefit to offer up to a little over $5,000 per year to 

an employee. And the benefit would be the employee wouldn’t be 

taxed on it, either. 

So it is something that could get us to pay down student debt 

even more, and allow it to be negotiated as part of a benefits package. So I would love for ALPA and any other organization, the Allied Pilots Association, and Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, 

and all of the different pilots organizations to take a look at that, 

because it is an idea that I think could help get much of that debt 

off the plate of some of your youngest pilots, and give them a 

chance to go into your profession easier. 

35 

And if you look at polling, millennials right now, the biggest concern they have is student loan debt. 

Mr. CANOLL. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIS. And they are not going to go into an expensive profession to get that education like aviation if we don’t give them this 

assistance. So take a look at that. I appreciate the opportunity to 

bring that up. Thanks for your comments. 

Mr. CANOLL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DAVIS. And I will yield back the balance of my time to Mr. 

Larsen, very quickly. 

Mr. LARSEN. So Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to 

enter a letter into the record with 443 signatories of folks who oppose any attempts to privatize the air traffic control system, including the Washington Pilots Association from the great State of 

Washington, just to show the wisdom of this move. So I would like 

to enter this into the record. 

Mr. DAVIS. No. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DAVIS. Without objection. 

[The letter referenced by Congressman Larsen is on pages 147–154.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DAVIS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. DeSaulnier, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank the chairman of this subcommittee, the ranking member, 

and the ranking member of the full committee on their opening 

comments in mentioning an issue that is very important to me and 

the residents of the San Francisco Bay area, and acknowledging 

those incidents there. 

And I want to also thank, first, the captain and your association 

for being so great for myself and my staff to work with. I have had 

a lot of input from your members individually and when you have 

come to see us on the issue of runway incursions and near misses. 

I have learned a lot. 

Then I want to acknowledge both the NTSB and the FAA. My 

initial contacts, to be honest, were not as productive as I thought. 

But subsequent to that, I really appreciate the meetings. 

So I say this in a tone, first of all, acknowledgment that there 

is a problem. And although I get now in regular—still followed very 

closely by the bay area media, it was on two stations this past 

weekend—and trying to put it in context, that we should acknowledge the safety record. But on the other hand, we should be doing 

everything to make sure that what is happening is not a regression 

of the means, that we are so comfortable with our safety record 

that we are not looking at these near misses and learning from 

them. 

So, Mr. DeLisi—and thank you for your career. I have great admiration for what you have done and the value you have given to 

the traveling public. So I want to talk a little bit about your most 

wanted list issue area. First, you mentioned that expanding use of 

recorders, both audio visual and voice and other recorders, are on 

your wish list. So could you expand on that? 

36 

And what is the cost for us to be able to get that, either the private sector or the Federal Government, to help you with that? And 

how would that help with these near misses and the runway incursions? 

Mr. DELISI. Well, thank you. Certainly in the part 121 airline operation realm, aircraft are equipped with flight data recorders and 

cockpit voice recorders, the cockpit voice recorders only capture 2 

hours’ worth of information. They are designed with an impacts, 

which—they are really a tool for accident investigation. If the airplane is involved in an accident, it will stop recording and preserve 

the data. 

However, in an incident in which the airplane is undamaged, 

likely power will remain on as passengers disembark, and the next 

load of passengers will get on board and, very quickly, that data 

is going to be overwritten. So we know that ICAO is looking at a 

new standard for 2021 to go to a 25-hour recording standard for 

CVRs [cockpit voice recorders]. We think that would be very helpful. 

In the part 135 realm, we see accidents in which airplanes fall 

below the threshold of being required to have a flight data recorder. And in airplanes like that, when there is not an optional 

flight data monitoring recorder, there is no way for a company to 

understand how that flight is being operated. There is no way to 

monitor procedural compliance and stabilized approach criteria 

being met. There is no insight. And the accidents that we have investigated recently, like the one in Akron, Ohio, and a more recent 

one in Teterboro, New Jersey, show that those airplanes are not 

being flown in accordance with company procedures. 

So the push on the part 135 operators is to require a low-cost, 

lightweight flight data monitoring recorder to allow that sort of 

monitoring. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So just the jurisdictional issues of looking at 

these near misses and what the triggers are—we have talked to 

you and looked at, is it specifics of the airport, why this—at SFO 

we are pushing, we are very busy, we are happy about that—the 

design of the airports? 

But it does seem that, given all the proper restrictions for privacy and for the good relationships between the operators, the pilots, it—from a lay person’s standpoint, if you made sure all of 

those were consistent, as they are for the voice recorders, you can 

go to Best Buy right now and get a device that would record the 

last half hour, so you at least know that conversation and what the 

human factors were happening in that cockpit when it happened. 

Could you comment on that? 

Mr. DELISI. Yes. We are seeing companies—operators that are 

voluntarily equipping their fleets with a device like an Appareo Vision 1000 recorder that does video, audio, and some parameters, 

and it is a great tool for monitoring flights, and it certainly comes 

in handy, should those aircraft be involved in an accident or an incident. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So it would be helpful? 

Mr. DELISI. Yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. OK. Anything from the FAA in this regard, either the incursions or getting more information from the cockpit? 

37 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Well, as was mentioned by Mr. DeLisi, we definitely would like to see as much information as possible, in order 

to transpire what occurred prior to accident. And recorders—in this 

case, voice recorder—is one of those tools. And there are other ways 

to be able to decipher what transpired. And at this point I think 

we know, historically, any kind of a visual recording has been quite 

controversial. And if we decide to go that route we have to go 

through the process and deliberation and discussions before we 

make any policy decisions. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Well, thank you. I want to thank the chairman, 

too. I recognize again—and I know I have run out of time—the 

amazing safety record. However, if that 59 feet had finalized in a 

tragedy, and if it happens in the future, we are all going to be held 

to account, which I think would be appropriate. So we want to 

avoid that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PERRY [presiding]. The Chair thanks the gentleman from 

California. The Chair now recognizes Mr. DeFazio from Oregon. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bahrami, I keep hearing about our outmoded radar-based 

system, and how good it could be, and about the space-based ADS– 

B. Have we deployed an operable, currently operating ADS–B system that covers the entire continental United States and Alaska 

and part of the Gulf of Mexico? 

It is a simple question. Have we? Is there such a system today 

that operates? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes, yes, of course. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. So we have that. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Why aren’t all the commercial airlines using it? 

Oh, because they haven’t purchased the equipment to use it, is that 

correct? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Well, it is also the rule is not in effect. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, we didn’t mandate it until 2020. 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Yes, it is—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That is correct. But it isn’t like—that we can’t develop the system, it doesn’t exist, you know, and we are so far behind. We have it, and we are not using it, because the airlines 

haven’t invested in the equipment because we didn’t make them invest until 2020. OK? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. That is right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thanks. So that is one of the myths here that is 

a bit disturbing. 

Now, Captain Canoll, I understand the frustration and I understand the frustration of others, because of idiots in Congress who 

adopt things like sequestration and shutdowns and apply it to programs that are fully funded. That is easily solved. All we have to 

do is take the current system of funding off budget. 

But you are supporting a bill that actually reduces the revenues 

by $8 billion over 10 years to support the air traffic control system. 

The pilots will have a place at the table, the airlines will have a 

place at the table to determine what new fees will be paid by passengers or airlines. 

38 

How are you going to raise $8 billion? The ticket tax goes away, 80 percent of it. That is how we fund the system now. That is $9.9 

billion over 10 years. Eighty percent goes away. We have just lost 

$8 billion. And the airlines are going to raise their tickets by 7.5 

percent, just like they did when then-Congressman Mica let it go 

when we temporarily suspended the tax because of some dispute he 

was having. For 3 weeks, every airline in America, except Alaska, 

raised their tickets 7.5 percent, got a windfall of $400 million. That 

didn’t go into the trust fund. This time they are going to get a 

windfall of $8 billion when they raise their ticket taxes. 

How do you, as, you know, your organization, as one of the orga- nizations supporting this bill, intend to raise the $8 billion from 

passengers or airlines after privatization takes effect? 

Mr. CANOLL. So our concept, or our policy, requires that the test 

be applied to ensure that any fee structure that is put in place in 

a successor organization is fair. And we—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Would a head tax on passengers be fair? The airlines have just claimed the $8 billion of new windfall, and now they 

are going to say, ‘‘Well, gee, I think we are going to have to say 

everybody that gets on a plane pays $25 to use the national airspace.’’ Would that be fair? 

Mr. CANOLL. That and many other ways might be fair. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Great. So we pay for higher tickets, and you pay 

to use the airspace every time you fly. And somehow this is an improvement over the current system? 

The only problem with the current system is the idiots I work 

with. That is the only problem. We are raising more than enough 

money, we have deployed the new system. The airlines haven’t 

bought the equipment. They are not using it. And here we are, saying, oh, we need to privatize. 

I mean, seriously. I know that there are some who are saying, 

‘‘Oh, gee, we might be considering pilot training if—oh, OK, well, 

all right, we won’t consider it.’’ 

You know, I don’t like the way this place is working right now. 

And I think there is some groups supporting this privatization who 

really, in their hearts, don’t support it. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Oregon. Before 

we adjourn, Mr. Bahrami, can you just—in keeping with the recent 

testimony and questioning, what is the current general aviation 

ADS–B equipage rate? Do you have any idea where they stand? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. We are—I don’t have the exact number, but I can 

tell you that it is not where we would like it to be. 

Mr. PERRY. Can you get back to us with the exact number—— 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Absolutely. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. At this time? 

Mr. BAHRAMI. Of course, of course, we will do that. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. I appreciate that. 

If there are no further questions, I would like to thank the witnesses for being here this morning. We appreciate it. Gentlemen, 

this has been informative and helpful, and we appreciate your time 

and willingness to come and sit in the hot seat. 

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

39 


Insert offset folio 8 here 31404.008

STATEMENT OF ALI BAHRAMI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION 

SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA), BEFORE THE HOUSE 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON AVIATION: STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY, FEBRUARY 27,2018. 

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the current state of aviation safety. 

Aviation safety is the FAA's top priority. We are in the safest period in commercial aviation, 

and we just experienced the safest year in general aviation. We are actively leveraging our 

experience from commercial aviation to advance safety in other domains. We remain committed 

to working with industry and other stakeholders to identify and address risks. With the support 

of this Committee, we have worked tirelessly to take a more proactive approach that instills a 

culture of safety- both in the industry and inside the FAA. Additionally, industry's commitment 

to engage early on innovative ideas, embrace systems safety, place value on compliance, and 

work collaboratively with us to develop tools and measures, has been critical to our eflorts. 

The result is the safest, largest, most complex, and most efficient air transportation 

system in the world. Indeed, there has not been a fatal U.S. commercial passenger accident since 

2009. I am proud of the hard work that has gone into providing a basis for achieving this level of 

safety. Our success in addressing risk and improving safety in aviation during these past two 

decades is the result of strong and mature safety partnerships between government and industry 

to pursue safety improvement collaboratively and in a proactive manner. 

We have made significant progress, which I would like to share with you today. 
40 


Insert offset folio 9 here 31404.009

Fostering a Culture ofSaf'ety 

As the aviation system and its components have become increasingly more complex, we 

know that our oversight approach needs to evolve to accommodate the future state. In the last 

few years, the FAA has been shifting to a risk management based approach for its safety 

oversight responsibilities. A key part of this has been safety management systems, or SMS. 

With SMS, the FAA is taking a smarter, risk-based, comprehensive approach to managing 

aviation safety. It requires an organization-wide safety policy. It has formal methods for 

identifying hazards, mitigating and controlling risk, and continually assessing performance. 

Under SMS, the FAA is a more data-driven agency. We are leveraging this approach in 

many areas, particularly runway approaches and landing procedures, and air carrier oversight. 

Following runway events at San Francisco International Airport last year, in addition to the 

NTSB investigation, the FAA quickly took action and established a Safety Risk Management 

Team. The team is composed of members from across FAA and external stakeholders, and was 

tasked with identifying the causes of the incident. and taking steps to mitigate and prevent 

similar occurrences. 

In 2016, the FAA replaced its air carrier oversight system for aviation safety inspectors. 

Previously, inspectors used a calendar-based, non-scaling tool to conduct oversight. The FAA is 

now transitioning to a risk-based, scalable tool that relies on data collection to drive decisions for 

adjusting oversight plans. We are also working to incorporate the tools needed for inspectors to 

identify and adjust surveillance during times of rapid growth, or downsizing into guidance and 

training materials. These steps demonstrate FAA's transition from its legacy oversight model to 

a data-driven approach- a key part of SMS. 

2 
41 


Insert offset folio 10 here 31404.010

SMS allows operators to structure a system that matches the size, complexity, and 

business model of its organization. The requirement for part 121 commercial carriers to have an 

SMS comes into effect on March 9, 2018. SMS gives airlines a set of business processes and 

management tools to examine data gathered from everyday operations, isolate trends that may be 

precursors to incidents and accidents, take steps to mitigate the risk, and verify the e!Tectiveness 

of the program. SMS stresses more than compliance with technical standards. It puts an 

increased emphasis on the overall safety performance. Most importantly, SMS creates a safety 

culture that assures hazards are identified, that actions are taken, and that results are measured. 

Then the process repeats itself. In the business of aviation, safety cannot be an "add-on'' it 

must be built in. Our stakeholders understand that and we thank the Committee for its support. 

Another part of our evolving oversight model is our embrace of a new compliance 

philosophy, which emphasizes accountability of all stakeholders. It clearly distinguishes 

between compliance, which is the goal; and enforcement, which is one of our many tools. To 

emphasize, compliance is expected and required of everyone who operates in the airspace. We 

recognize our role in assuring the public of a safe system, and we will not hesitate to use strict 

enforcement where necessary. 

I am very encouraged by the results thus far. Communications are now more open and 

working relationships with certificate holders has improved. Certificate holders are now more 

likely to call when they have questions; whereas in the past, they were might have been more 

reluctant to contact the FAA for fear of enforcement action. We are also seeing industry take a 

proactive approach to address deficiencies, even before being contacted by an FAA inspector. 

We know that it takes collaboration, communication, and common safety objectives to allow the 

FAA and the aviation community to come together, to identify system hazards, and to implement 

3 
42 


Insert offset folio 11 here 31404.011

safety solutions. Safety culture is not just a set of programs that can be ''established'' or 

"implemented." It is a way of living and working, and it requires the open and transparent 

exchange of information. That. in turn, requires mutual cooperation and trust. 

Transforming the FAA 

We are actively working to facilitate policies and management processes that promote a 

broad safety culture transformation both within and outside of our organization. Two of our 

biggest service offices, flight standards and aircraft certification, have undergone major 

realignments to better meet the needs of a changing industry. 

Flight Standards Service (FS) plays a vital role in making the U.S. aviation system the 

world's safest. We want to make sure we maintain that high level of safety. We arc in the 

process of restructuring the FS organization. By moving away from an organizational structure 

based on geographic locations to an organization built around functions, FS will operate with 

greater accountability and greater flexibility to adapt to change. The FAA expects the 

restructuring to yield benefits to both the agency and the aviation community by strengthening 

our ability to keep pace with changes in the aviation industry. We will also be able to increase 

our ability to maximize fixed resources, and better ensure that our employees develop and 

interpret regulations and policies consistently. 

Additionally, in July 2017, the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) was realigned from a 

product-based structure to a functional alignment. The new organizational structure is designed 

to enable transformation. The newly created Organizational Performance Division will oversee 

AIR's roadmap to transformation, and establish and track effectiveness metrics for both the FAA 

and industry. 

4 
43 


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With respect to aircraft certification process improvements. the FAA is moving beyond 

the initiatives that were driven by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. The 

Aircraft Certification Service is transforming to meet the demands oftoday"s dynamic aviation 

environment by moving to a systems approach. Emphasis will be placed on up front planning 

for new technologies, risk based level of involvement in certification programs and a robust 

oversight program. For example, in December of2016, the FAA issued a complete overhaul of 

14 CFR part 23, the rules for small aircraft certification. Instead of prescriptive standards that 

limit innovation, the new rules define performance-based objectives and give industry the 

tlexibility to determine the best and safest way to meet them. On the international front, we 

signed agreements with the European Aviation Safety Agency and Transport Canada to accept 

each other's approvals of Technical Standards Orders and to validate basic approval with no 

technical review. 

In previous hearings, there was discussion about the effectiveness ofthe Organization 

Designation Authorization, or ODA, and our use ofmetrics. Working closely with industry. we 

developed the ODA Scorecard. The scorecard is used to define mutually agreed measures, 

identify areas that need greater focus, and identify issues and concerns with respect to FAA and 

ODA holders' performance. We piloted the program in 2015, and set up a joint FAA/Industry 

Continuous Improvement team in 2016. In 2016, 40 companies participated. The goal is for our 

measures of success to show a year-to-year improvement. I am pleased to report that in just over 

a year, we have realized performance improvements in both FAA certification offices and ODA 

holders. The results are published on our website. By measuring appropriate indicators and 

developing action plans to continuously improve joint industry and FAA performance, we are 

positioned to optimize our involvement with no adverse impact on safety. 

5 
44 


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Working with stakeholders 

With the advent of new entrants such as unmanned aircraft systems, commonly referred 

to as UAS or drones, and commercial space operations, a balanced approach that involves 

collaboration between government and industry is needed. We strive to engage stakeholders 

throughout the lifecycle of policymaking. For example, the FAA's commitment to the safe, 

secure, and efficient integration of drones and the expansion of routine drone operations requires 

resolving several key challenges to enable this emerging technology to safely achieve its full 

potential. Because drone technology is evolving at such a rapid pace, we involve stakeholders in 

framing challenges, prioritizing activities, and developing consensus solutions. By leveraging 

this expertise, we ensure that the FAA maintains its position as the leader in aviation safety. 

The Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), formed in 2016, is a prime example of 

stakeholder engagement. Its members include representatives from industry, government, labor, 

and academia. The DAC allows us to look at drone usc from every angle, while considering the 

different viewpoints and needs of the diverse unmanned aircraft systems community. Our 

collaborative working relationships with groups such as the DAC will help inform and prioritize 

integration activities, ensure we remain engaged with industry trends, and maintain clear 

channels of communication to convey expectations and solicit feedback. 

The impressive gains in safety are due in part to the aviation industry and government 

voluntarily investing in the right safety enhancements. The work of the Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team (CAST), along with new aircraft, regulations, and other activities, reduced the 

fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83% from 1998 to 2008. The CAST 

model uses data to develop an understanding of the best actions or interventions to prevent 

6 
45 


Insert offset folio 14 here 31404.014

accidents. The goal was to collaborate on identifying the top safety areas through the analysis of 

past accident and incident data, charter joint teams of experts to develop methods to understand 

the chain of events leading to accidents, identify effective interventions to address these safety 

areas, and remain focused on implementing these critical interventions. 

CAST has been extremely successful. It has moved beyond the historic approach of 

examining past accident data to a more proactive approach that focuses on detecting risk and 

implementing mitigation strategies before accidents or serious incidents occur with a disciplined, 

data driven focus. Using data from non-accident sources and voluntary reporting programs, 

CAST has adopted nearly 100 safety enhancements. CAST aims to further reduce the U.S. 

commercial fatality risk by 50% from 20 I 0 to 2025. 

In a related effort, the FAA is working to reduce safety challenges in general aviation 

(GA) as well. Much like CAST, the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), 

which was formed in the mid-1990s. established a data-driven, aviation-safety strategy to reduce 

fatal accidents in GA. The FAA, industry, and the general aviation community are working 

together to mitigate the risks that lead to fatal GA accidents. One result of this collaboration is 

the FAA's policy on non-required safety enhancing equipment referred to as NORSEE. 

NOR SEE encourages GA aircraft owners to voluntarily install equipment to provide pilots with 

better overall situational awareness. 

Working with the GA community alongside industry, the efforts have been successful. 

We have targeted, and have been working toward, a yearly I% reduction in fatal GA accidents to 

bring a cumulative l 0% reduction by the close of fiscal year 2018. I am proud to say that we 

7 
46 


Insert offset folio 15 here 31404.015

have already exceeded our original goal, making last year one of the safest years we have had in 

general aviation. 

The collaboration between government and industry, at all levels, has been instrumental 

to the success we have achieved in the improvement in aviation safety. Our continued success in 

advancing aviation safety depends on these strong safety partnerships built on trust and the 

ability to share and protect voluntarily provided safety information. As the work of CAST and 

the GAJSC has evolved, so has the agency's ability to collect and analyze safety information. 

In 2007, the FAA launched the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing. or 

ASIAS, program to help transform safety analysis from a forensic approach, looking at accidents 

and incidents after they occurred, to a risk management approach, allowing for proactive 

discoveries of safety concerns before they lead to significant events. It took years to establish 

voluntary safety programs and build trust within the community. Congress has been an 

important advocate in helping us protect vital safety information. These safety information 

protections are imperative so that we can continue to provide the environment in which safety 

personnel are voluntarily providing safety information. This, in turn, provides carriers and 

government with valuable insight into potential systemic safety issues. 

AS lAS partners with CAST and the GAJSC to monitor known risk, evaluate the 

cflectiveness of deployed mitigations. and detect emerging hazards. There are currently 46 part 

121 member air carriers. 63 corporate/business operators, five manufacturers and two 

maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations participating in ASIAS. The program continues 

to evolve, and has matured to the point that the FAA and industry can leverage voluntarily 

provided safety data from operators that represent 99 percent of U.S. air carrier commercial 

8 
47 


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operations. AS lAS has established metrics that enable CAST and the GAJSC to evaluate the 

effectiveness of mitigations. It is also expanding to support other areas in aviation, such as 

rotorcraft. 

We also regularly engage with our Federal and international partners to improve safety. 

Along with our law enforcement partners, the FAA maintains a multi-layered oversight of the 

aviation system, including its aircraft and airmen registry. This includes a team of special agents 

from the FAA who work with domestic and international law enforcement partners to investigate 

cases involving fraudulent aircraft registrations. The agency is constantly working to enhance 

the integrity of registry information, and is developing a plan to significantly upgrade and 

modernize the aircraft registration process to make the system more effective. 

The online pilot record database is an example of the FAA's and Congress' commitment 

to establishing an electronic database for pilot records. In December of 2017, the FAA released 

a beta version of the database. We arc deploying the database in phases to ensure minimal 

disruption to air carrier and operator access to existing pilot records. Initial feedback of the 

database has been positive. When complete, the database will enable air carriers to easily check 

the qualifications and background of pilots as part ofthe hiring process. 

As safety management systems mature. our reliance on sound safety analysis to identify 

risks to the aviation system, mitigate hazards and track safety enhancements, will be key to 

sustaining a safe and efficient airspace. This type of capability is achieved only through 

sustained safety partnerships and the reporting of critical safety information among stakeholders. 

We must collaborate on safety analysis and best practices, and monitor safety performance and 

implementation of mitigation strategies. SMS, risk-based decision-making, and collaborative 

9 
48 


Insert offset folio 17 here 31404.017

transparent information sharing will be the cornerstone for future FAA oversight and industry's 

management of the safety risks that affect their operations. 

Before l conclude my remarks. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support of 

Chairman Shuster and Subcommittee Chairman LoBiondo. You have been instrumental in 

providing the FAA with the direction and necessary resources to maintain our position as a 

global leader in aviation. l thank you both for your leadership and wish you well as you retire 

from Congress. 

Conclusion 

We have been diligent in our etl'orts to address what is at the heart of your direction: that 

the system be safe, responsive, and flexible. We have made significant progress in restructuring 

our organization to adapt to the new business models, while keeping safety at the forefront of 

any decision. It is because of the collective hard work of the men and women of the FAA, the 

work of Congress. and stakeholders that aviation is the safest it has ever been. Aviation safety is, 

and must always be, our number one priority. There can be no compromise on safety. Yet, we 

do not want to stifle innovation. Working together with all interests, we are confident we can 

balance safety and innovation. The Administration is committed to working with Congress to 

foster American innovation and solidify America's role as the global leader in aviation. 

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any of your questions at this time. 

10 
49 


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Ali Bahrami, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, 

Federal Aviation Administration, Responses to Questions for the Record, 

"The State of Aviation Safety," February 27, 2018 

PILOT TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 

The FAA requires all pilots in part 121 air carrier operations to hold an 

Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate, which requires 1,500 hours of time as a 

pilot. This is a result of Congressional action through The Airline Safety and FAA 

Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216), which contained a self-enacting 

provision for all pilots in part 121 operations to hold an A TP certificate by 

August 2013. The Act permitted credit towards the 1,500 hours of total time for 

specific academic training courses. The Act also directed the FAA to conduct a 

rulemaking to improve the qualifications and training for pilots serving in air carrier 

operations. The FAA established the new requirements in the Pilot Certification 

and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations Final Rule, published 

in July 2013 (78 FR 42323). 

Questions issued by Congressman Sam Graves of Missouri 

QUESTION: During the hearing, a member stated that there has been a 200 

percent increase in issued pilot licenses since 2009. Can the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) please validate this figure using data from the U.S. Civil 

Airmen Statistics database? What has been the rate of change associated with the 

three main categories of airmen certificates since 2009: private, commercial, and 

Airline Transport Pilot (ATP)? 

RESPONSE: For ATP certificates, the total number of new airmen certificates 

issued went from a low point of3,1 13 in 2009 to a high point of9,520 in 2016, 

which does represent approximately 200 percent increase. The change in total 

active certificates from 2009-2017 was -23% for private pilots, -22% for 

commercial pilots and + 11% for A TPs. The corresponding average annual 

change is -3.3%, -3.0% and 1.3% respectively. See chart below. 
50 


Insert offset folio 19 here 31404.019

ATP New Certificates 

QUESTION: What trends does FAA's data show for ATP certificates? Do these 

trends persist through 20 17? Will the Agency share any relevant context or factors 

that may be influencing these changes? 

RESPONSE: Since 2010, there has been an increasing trend for ATP certificates 

held. In 2010, there were 142,198 ATP certificates held. In 2017, there were 

159,825 ATP certificates held. See chart below. 

Regarding the context for any trends, the Pilot Certification and Qualification 

Requirements for Air Carrier Operations Final Rule implemented the requirement 

that all pilots in part 121 operations hold an ATP certificate by August 2013, which 

may have contributed to the increasing trend. In addition, airline hiring has 

increased in recent 

170,000 

160,000 

150,000 

140,000 

130,000 +··········· 

120,000 

110,000 

100,000 

90,000 

80,000 

Airline Transport Pilots 
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QUESTION: Can the FAA provide context for the ATP certificate spike in 2016, 

given 2017 numbers are less than half those of2016? 

RESPONSE: The increase in ATP certificates issued in 2016 may be attributed 

to new requirements established by the Pilot Certification and Qualification 

Requirements for Air Carrier Operations Final Rule, published July 2013. They 

also may have increased due to an increase in airline hiring. 

Prior to August 1, 2014, there were no training requirements for the certificate, 

and ATP knowledge test results with a passing grade were valid for 24 calendar 

months. The rule now requires pilots seeking a multiengine ATP certificate to 

complete an FAA-approved training course referred to as the Airline Transport 

Pilot Certification Training Program (A TP CTP), which is a prerequisite for the 

new multiengine ATP knowledge test. 

Prior to the effective date of the training requirement on August 1, 2014, there 

was a surge in A TP knowledge tests taken. From January 2014 to July 2014, more 

than 25,000 knowledge tests were taken. The 24 calendar month validity period 

may have contributed to the increase in A TP practical tests completed in 2016. 

QUESTION: A provision in S.l405, currently under consideration in the Senate, 

contains a provision that seeks to clarifY that the FAA has the authority to create 

additional pilot training pathways under 14 CFR 61.160. Does the FAA interpret 

this amendment to require it to reduce the flight hour requirements under 14 CFR 

61.159? 

RESPONSE: The FAA is committed to further enhancing safety by 

strengthening air carrier pilot training. in Section 217(d) of the Airline Safety and 

Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010, Congress provided the FAA with 

flexibility to allow specific academic training courses to be credited toward the 

1,500 hours requirement, should the Administrator determine that it enhances 

safety more than simply meeting the 1,500 hours requirement alone. After 

determining that structured academic training integrated with flight training 

programs enhanced safety, we exercised this flexibility in our 2013 rule, which 

created additional pathways to meeting the 1 ,500 hours requirement, including 

military training and degrees from accredited aviation programs. 

As Congress has recognized, there is an important balance between flight 

training, academic training, and operational experience to ensure that Airline 

Transport Pilots are equipped with a strong foundation of aeronautical knowledge 

and experience. We believe that the 2013 rule accomplishes this directive. 
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The provision in S.I405 currently under consideration in the Senate seeks to add 

"other structured and disciplined training courses" to the flexibility granted to the 

Administrator in Section 217( d). Further study is needed in order to determine 

whether these additional pathways would enhance safety more than requiring the 

pilot to fully comply with the flight hours requirement. 

QUESTION: Does the FAA have concerns about the limitations of flight 

simulators or view them as a cost-effective training tool that should be utilized to 

the maximum extent practicable? Additionally, today's pilots build the vast 

majority of their hours to qualify for an ATP or Restricted-Airline Transport Pilot 

(R-ATP) certificate as certified flight instructors. Is it FAA's experience that 

Certified Flight Instructors (CFis) are regularly building flight hours in variable 

conditions that would adequately prepare them to be an ATP? 

RESPONSE: Use of training devices to supplement on-aircraft training and 

maintain proficiency is widely accepted within the aviation community. There is 

a vast range of approved and qualified devices available to training providers for 

use in flight training. Use of the devices is cost effective by reducing time needed 

in an aircraft to become proficient in a given task. It also enhances safety by 

allowing exposure for pilots to emergency situations and difficult operational 

conditions that cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft. Current regulations 

limit the amount of credit a pilot can take for time in training devices that can be 

used toward pilot certification. 

Regarding flight instructor experience, building flight time while providing flight 

training to pilot candidates is an acceptable method for gaining flight experience 

to qualify for an A TP certificate. 

QUESTION: Has the FAA received any data that suggests a correlation between 

implementation of the 2013 First Office Qualification (FOQ) rule and an 

increased failure rate in airline initial training, or other measures of a potential 

negative impact on pilot performance? 

RESPONSE: The FAA does not have official data that suggests a correlation 

between the implementation of new requirements and a negative impact on pilot 

qualification or performance. However, the FAA is aware that some airlines have 

found that additional training events were required for many new-hire pilots to 

meet the qualification standards. As a result, some airlines have elected to revise 

their FAA-approved pilot training programs, increasing the training footprint for 
53 


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new-hire pilots. The standards for demonstrating proficiency prior to flying in 

airline operations, however, were not changed. 

QUESTION: Have other countries followed the United States' aviation 

certification requirements and required 1,500 of flight experience in order to 

serve as a first officer at a Part 121 air carrier? 

RESPONSE: The FAA is not aware of any other civil aviation regulatory 

authority implementing a requirement for all pilots in air carrier operations to 

hold an ATP certificate, which requires 1,500 hours of flight time. 
54 


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Questions for the Record 

Representative Mark DeSaulnier 

1. In 2011, the NTSB recommended that the FAA "[p]erform a technical review of Airport 

Surface Detection Equipment- Model X to determine if the capability exists system wide 

to detect improper operations such as landings on taxiways." The FAA responded that not 

only did it believe that using the AS DE-X system for this expanded purpose would result 

in performance compromises of other components of safety alert systems, but that it 

would not even conduct the recommended review. 

a. Please explain the FAA's unwillingness to conduct the recommended review. If a review 

had provided evidence ofF AA's claim that expanding the use of AS DE-X would 

compromise performance of other safety alert systems, would that not have been 

important data for the safety of our air system? 

Answer: 

The FAA was not unwilling to conduct the review; a technological limitation at the time 

precluded such a review. In 2011, the AS DE-X algorithms weren't capable of accurately 

identifying taxiway alignments. Recent modifications have made it possible to detect taxiway 

alignments with a false alert rate low enough to allow for implementation. 

In January 2018, the taxiway lander alert was optimized and tested at Seattle, with promising 

results. The FAA is currently evaluating the implementation of this taxiway lander alert 

functionality at all 35 ASDE-X equipped airports. 

b. In response to the July 7 Air Canada incident at SFO, the AS DE-X system in the SFO air 

traffic control tower was adjusted so that it would detect planes incorrectly lined up on 

approach to landing. What lessons has the FAA learned from this change and what is 

preventing the FAA from exploring the feasibility of making this adjustment at other 

airports? 

Answer: 

Using lessons learned from this incident, the FAA implemented several safety enhancements at 

SFO. These safety enhancements have been effective in identifying wrong surface alignment 

earlier, allowing corrections to be made before aircraft are in conflict with one another: 

• The Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) Arrival Corridor Box is now required to 

be displayed within the controller's ASSC settings. This box provides air traffic controllers 

with a reliable visual reference to aid in identifying wrong surface alignments. 

• ASSC Parameters at SFO were extended from Y, mile to% mile. This provides an alert of a 

potential collision with an arriving aircraft and a vehicle or aircraft on the runway 

approximately 8 seconds earlier. 

• Precision approaches are required at night when a runway is closed. 

• Air traffic controller shift coverage considers factors such as construction start times and traffic 

load. 
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uutreacn to the pilot and aviatiOn commumty at SFO continues through activities such as 

Runway Safety Action Team meetings. 
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2. Five separate incidents involving commercial airplanes landing on taxiways or nearly landing 

on taxiways or incorrect runways occurred between July 2017 and January 2018. While the 

specific cause of each individual incident may vary, what. in your view, is the cause behind this 

high frequency of close-call incidents? 

Answer: 

The FAA categorizes events where an aircraft lands on or aligns to the wrong runway or 

taxiway, departs on the wrong runway or taxiway, or lands at the wrong airport as wrong surface 

operations. SFO has had four wrong surface events involving two or more air carrier aircraft 

since February 2017. The common contributing factors to the incidents at SFO are: 

• Runway Changes 

• Ineffective communication of runway change between pilot and controller 

• Non-standard airport geometry and traffic increase leading to waiting for gates 

• Pilot mis-identifying the correct landing surface 

• Airport construction/lighting 

3. In addition to the five close-call incidents over the last half-year, runway incursions increased 

by 83 percent from 2011 to 2017. What explanation do you have for the reasons for this 

increase? 

Answer: 

In 2012, the FAA implemented new reporting requirements and a robust system to collect 

runway safety reports and data. As a result, since 2012, there has been an increase in reports of 

all types, including runway safety events, compared to the period before the new reporting 

requirements were in place. 

A key performance metric since the Runway Safety Call to Action is the A/B runway incursion 

rate. This metric was established to track the safety performance associated with the most severe 

surface incidents-Category A and B runway incursions. These incidents may require time 

critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision. The FAA and DOT set a safety 

performance target for FY 2009-2018 to maintain the rate of category A and B runway incursion 

at or below 0.395 per I million airport operations. The number of incidents has been below the 

performance target each year and in 2017 we had the fewest Category A and B runway 

incursions since the metric was implemented. 

4. In a 2009 after-accident report about an American Airlines incident involving an in-flight 

engine fire, the then-Board Member and now-Chairman of the National Transportation 

Safety Board Sum walt wrote about the "casual attitude of a flight crew" that he observed 

in his review of the cockpit voice recorder data. He also wrote, 

What is the best way to prepare yourse?fto deal with events that are 

unfamiliar to you- events where there are no established procedures? 

Based on myflying experience and aviation safety background, I firm~v 
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believe the answer is rigorous adherence to standard operating 

procedures (SOPs) and cockpit discipline on each and every flight. When 

you do this, you are preparing yourselffor the unexpected. 

• What policies or programs are needed to ensure that airlines and pilots maintain strict, 

rigorous adherence to safety protocols and to prevent any sliding away from such 

adherence? Would regular review of actual in flight performance through the use of 

something like a CVR better enable you to assess adherence to these protocols? 

Answer: 

Airlines must continuously train and evaluate crewmember performance. This evaluation of 

crewmember performance is accomplished regularly in simulators and with en route inspections 

in the operational environment. FAA has oversight of the air carrier's training program and its 

line operation with en route inspections that include checks of protocol adherence. Airlines are 

additionally required, through their Safety Management Systems (SMS), to collect and analyze 

operational data in order to identify and mitigate risk, which would include lapses in pilot 

performance. The FAA regularly reviews the collection and analysis of this data, and the 

effectiveness of the airline's mitigation strategies. 

CVR data is intended only for use by the NTSB for the investigation of accidents and serious 

incidents. It is not intended to be used for routine oversight to evaluate compliance with FAA 

regulations. In most cases, air carriers are precluded by their pilot labor contracts from using 

CVR data for anything other than NTSB investigations. Oversight of flight crewmembers' 

adherence to safety practices and protocols is achieved through other means, including training 

program reviews, en route cockpit inspections, and promulgation of professional expectations. 

Additionally, the FAA encourages and oversees industry programs to proactively address 

aviation safety in this context. For example, a Line Operations Safety Assessments (LOSA) 

program measures adherence of flight crews to Standard Operating Practices (SOPs) by trained 

observers and has produced valuable results for many air carriers. 

• What processes does the FAA use for systematically reviewing and analyzing selfreported data for the specific purpose of understanding risks from human factors such as 

fatigue, distraction, or lax adherence to safety protocols? How docs the FAA translate 

these findings on human factors into implementation of safety measures? 

Answer: 

Voluntarily submitted safety data is typically analyzed in two ways: internally via the air 

carrier's required Safety Management System (SMS) and within the Aviation Safety Information 

and Analysis Sharing (AS lAS) program. Both analyze and identify risks. If a risk is identified in 

the carrier's SMS, the carrier is then responsible for mitigating that risk with FAA oversight. If 

AS lAS identifies risk on a system-wide level (meaning not limited to one carrier) the risk is 

mitigated jointly with the FAA and industry through Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) 

safety enhancements. The FAA supplements the analysis of operational data with research on 

human factors and pilot performance. 
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Implementation of identified safety measures can occur in a number of ways. The traditional 

approach is to initiate rulemaking if the project can demonstrate sufficient safety benefit. 

Alternatively, the FAA and Industry can jointly develop safety enhancements through one of our 

many partnerships, such as the CAST. Airman Certification Standards Working Group, the Air 

Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ACT ARC) or the Performance-Based 

Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC). 

5. The FAA officials who met with me last month in my Washington, D.C. office cited the 

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program as a successful 

program and one that has produced a substantial amount of useful data. However. a 2013 

report from the Office of the Inspector General says that several years' worth of work is 

needed before AS lAS can be used as a tool to help predict and prevent aviation accidents. 

• A few years have passed since the 2013 report. In your view, is the AS lAS closer to 

becoming a useful tool for the prediction and prevention of aviation accidents? 

Answer: 

The AS lAS program started in 2007, and participation in the program has continued to grow 

over the years. Starting with just a few carriers, the program has grown to 4 7 air carriers 

contributing data to ASIAS. AS lAS data has supported several safety studies leading to the 

voluntary adoption of22 safety enhancements by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team 

(CAST). These safety enhancements have addressed emerging risk areas as well as enhanced 

deployed mitigations. The FAA believes that AS lAS has been integral to achieve the safest 

period in aviation history. 

6. The 2013 OIG report also says that "the FAA does not allow its inspectors and analysts to 

use AS lAS's confidential data for their air carrier oversight." The report further states 

that "74 percent of field inspectors and analysts who responded [to the IG's survey] and 

were familiar with AS lAS stated that access to national level ... trends would improve air 

carrier safety oversight." 

• Please explain the FAA's rationale for preventing FAA inspectors and analysts from 

using ASIAS data. Is ASIAS without FAA oversight adequately fulfilling FAA's mission 

for public oversight of the aviation industry') 

Answer: 

AS lAS leverages proprietary data that is voluntarily provided by air carriers to advance safety. 

The FAA does not have direct access to the proprietary data. The MITRE Corporation ensures 

that the data is processed in accordance with the governance protocols and supports the safety 

teams in conducting safety analyses. AS lAS is not intended to be leveraged for oversight 

activities. It is intended to integrate data provided by the aviation industry to identify trends that 

would require further action. The FAA has oversight systems that support ongoing surveillance 

of the aviation industry. 

All safety studies conducted by AS!AS and the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), 

along with the safety enhancements, are shared with the FAA inspector workforce. Effective 

March 2018. each part 12! air carrier is required to have established a Safety Management 

System (SMS). The I' AA expects all air carriers to conduct a risk assessment on all risks 
59 


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identified by AS lAS/CAST and to take appropriate action under their SMS. Providing this 

information to the inspector workforce will enable operators and inspectors to discuss safety 

issues and ensure they are addressed under the air carrier's SMS. As AS lAS matures, it 

continues to explore better ways for communicating actionable information to the inspector 

workforce. 

7. It is my understanding that airlines vary in the ways or the extents to which they require 

pilots to use instrument approach procedures as a back-up when they are cleared for a 

visual approach landing. Does the FAA keep track of the status of different airline 

practices in this regard? It is my understanding that on July 7, the Air Canada plane that 

came within 59 feet of landing on a taxiway had been conducting a visual approach and 

that the pilots may not have been using their instruments as a back-up. What procedures 

does the FAA have in place to ensure that pilots use instrument approach procedures as a 

back-up to visual approaches? 

Answer: 

There are no regulatory requirements for a carrier to have an instrument back up on a visual 

approach. However, the FAA promotes as a best practice incorporating a back-up instrument 

approach to a visual approach procedure. Air carriers are required to have a Safety Management 

System (SMS), which must review programs to determine risks and develop an appropriate 

response to mitigate them. A requirement to use an instrument approach as a backup to a visual 

approach is one mitigation that an air carrier's SMS could identify. 

Procedures of this type are not managed centrally, but are documented locally at the certificate 

management office. FAA oversight of these procedures is conducted via regular review of the air 

carrier's training program. 

8. On October 12,2017, an Air Canada plane landed on a runway in spite of repeated 

instructions from air traffic control to execute a go-around. The NTSB is not conducting 

an investigation on this incident What work has the FAA done or is currently doing to 

investigate this incident and what has it learned from this investigation? What are the 

safety recommendations that have emerged from the investigation, and what actions is 

the FAA taking to implement them? 

Answer: 

The FAA initiated, and has now completed, an investigation into this incident. Investigators and 

controllers from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and inspectors from the FAA's 

Flight Standards Service collected and reviewed recorded air traffic voice communications and 

data, interviewed the flight crew, prepared written reports, and held discussions with Transport 

Canada in accordance with lCAO Annex 13 international protocols for accident and incident 

investigation. 

The investigation revealed that the crew inadvertently switched from SFO tower frequency to the 

standby frequency, SFO Ground. The premature frequency change was discovered after landing 

rollout when a switch back to SFO tower frequency occurred. Neither pilot had any history of 
60 


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any safety events, violations, or pilot deficiencies. The event was deemed an isolated occurrence 

and not reflective of any systematic deficiencies at Air Canada. 

The FAA Executive Director of the Flight Standards service discussed this event with the 

Director General of Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), and the discussions resulted in 

several actions. For example, Air Canada is reviewing radio SOPs in order to determine what 

improvements need to be implemented. In addition, TCCA has infonned the FAA that it will 

continue to provide enhanced surveillance of Air Canada, conduct monitoring of additional 

training events, and implement additional in-flight surveillance checks into SFO. 

In addition, United Airlines, as a code-share partner with Air Canada, is working with Air 

Canada to ensure that Air Canada's Safety Management System is capable of effectively 

managing safety risks. 

This event, as well as all wrong surface events, are analyzed as a part of the Air Traffic 

Organization's Top 5 program. The resulting information is used to identify mitigations that will 

reduce the risk associated with wrong surface events. Mitigations span the aviation community 

and include technology solutions, training, procedures modifications, and community outreach. 
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Ali Bahrami, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, FAA, responses to questions for the record 

issued by Rep, Daniel Lipinski of Illinois 

Repair station Drug & Alcohol, and Background check rulemaking (To FAA) 

Two mandates included in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of2016 are overdue, Both 

standards increase the safety requirements at foreign repair stations, First, the Act required the FAA to 

promulgate rule mandating alcohol and controlled substances testing for all foreign repair station 

employees responsible for safety sensitive maintenance functions on Part 121 air carrier aircraft In March 

2014, the FAA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulcmaking (ANPRM) on this subject, but has 

yet to take any actions since closing the comment period in July of that year, 

The second instructs the FAA to institute a pre-employment background investigation of employees at 

foreign repair stations, Both standards are standard practice here in the United States. The FAA is long 

overdue in enacting these safety regulations. Why has the FAA not moved to enact these commonsense 

safely regulations? 

FAA Response 

We have developed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) requiring FAA-certificated foreign repair 

station employees who arc responsible for safety-sensitive maintenance functions on U.S. air carrier 

aircraft to be subject to an alcohol and controlled substances testing program, as determined acceptable by 

the Administrator and consistent with the applicable laws of the country in which the repair station is 

located. The NPRM is currently in the clearance process, and we expect it to continue to move forward. 

Regarding pre-employment background investigations. the FAA and the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)jointly met with the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation in 

October 2017 to discuss the status of implementation of these provisions in Sec. 2112(c) of the FAA 

Extension. Safety. and Security Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-190). It was determined that the TSA 

regulatory requirements for pre-employment safety background checks satisfies the Congressional 

mandates. 

Cabin Safetv (To FAA) 

A number of recent aviation incidents have called into question the ability of passengers to evacuate an 

airliner within the required 90 second window. The NTSB has concluded that passengers attempting to 

retrieve carry-on bags during emergency evacuations demonstrates that FAA actions to mitigate this 

behavior have been ineffective. 

The NTSB has found that passengers exiting an aircraft with carry-on luggage was "the most frequently 

cited obstruction to evacuation," and just this year recommended that the FAA determine appropriate 

countermeasures to mitigate this hazard. Will the FAA act on this recommendation, and what action will 

the agency take? 

FAA Response 

We agree that this is an important issue. Our current certification standards for aircraft evacuation testing 

include the most adverse conditions. including aircraft aisles that are obstructed, to accurately simulate a 

real evacuation. 
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We maintain a high level of cooperation with the NTSB as we work to implement safety improvements, 

discuss controversial issues, resolve differences, and obtain agreement on the proper approach to address 

safety issues. The FAA also continues to respond to individual safety recommendations that result from 

NTSB investigations. We recently received the NTSB recommendations for the accident that resulted in 

this specific recommendation for the FAA to address passenger evacuations. We are in the process of 

developing a response, and will continue to work with the NTSB on how to best mitigate this potential 

safety hazard. 

Unmanned Traffic Management (To FAA) 

An unmanned traffic management system, or U.T.M., is critical to the continued growth, and ultimate 

success, of the commercial drone industry. Other nations and regions, such as the European Union, are 

aggressively moving ahead with UTM implementation plans to attract investment in this rapidly evolving 

technology. As required by the 2016 F.A.A. extension, F.A.A. recently inaugurated a U.T.M. pilot 

program. 

How does the Unmanned Pilot Program align with other FAA UAS initiatives, including the remote 

identification and tracking rulemaking, the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability, or 

LAANC program, and the D.O.T. U.A.S. Integration Pilot Program? How does the agency see these 

efforts complimenting one another to move toward safer integration of U.A.S.? 

FAA Response 

The Unmanned Pilot Program (UPP), a congressional directive for FAA and NASA to collaborate with 

industry, advances UAS industry by demonstrating the technologies and capabilities required to support 

UTM operations at an enterprise level. 

The Integration Pilot Program (IPP), a Presidential directive for the Secretary of Transportation and the 

FAA to create a framework for state/local and tribal governments to partner with private sector entities to 

develop and test innovative UAS concepts, inform future guidelines and regulations, and to evaluate 

involvement of state/local and tribal governments in informing policy and regulations that permit more 

complex, demand-driven UAS operations. We will work with applicants to see how the activities in these 

programs can complement existing capabilities, such as that provided by LAANC. 

Ultimately, the FAA, in coordination with NASA, will apply relevant information collected during the 

IPP and preliminary findings to inform the development of the UAS Traffic Management System under 

Sec. 2208 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of2016 (Public Law 114-190). 
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Statement of 

Akbar Sultan 

Deputy Director 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

UNTIL PRESENTED 

BY WITNESS 

February 27, 2018 

Airspace Operations and Safety Program 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Chairman LoBiondo and Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to testify on NASA's aviation 

safety research. 

NASA Role in Aviation Safety Research 

NASA has made decades of contributions to aviation; every U.S. aircraft and lJ .S. air 

traffic control facility has NASA-developed technology on board. The continuous efforts 

to reduce risk in commercial aviation have made it the safest mode of transportation. 

Addressing known hazards and responding to issues illuminated by post-hoc analysis of 

incidents and accidents, commercial aviation has achieved exemplary safety records and 

inspired the confidence of the flying public. 

Historical Examples 

For decades, NASA research has contributed to this outstanding safety record. For 

example, in the 1980s NASA initiated research and development efforts associated with 

synthetic and enhanced vision systems (SVS/EVS). These cockpit systems present 

information to pilots about the external environment derived from static databases and 

onboard imaging sensors. The information, displayed on the pilot's heads up display, 

provides enhanced awareness of terrain and other obstacles. In the early 2000's, NASA 

supported initial testing of EVS on a Gulfstream aircraft which supported development of 

certification standards for SVS/EVS systems through participation on the RTCA 

committee that publishes standards. 

The safety benefit of these systems has been recognized by the FAA. Aircraft equipped 

with SVS/EVS are permitted to land in low visibility conditions, conditions that would 

require a missed approach for non-equipped aircraft. In addition. the Commercial 

Aviation Safety Team identified additional potential safety benefits of SVS/EVS in their 

analysis of"loss of control'' accidents. A large percentage of the accidents analyzed 
64 


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occurred in low visibility conditions, and SVS/EVS systems can provide information 

necessary for maintaining proper situational awareness in the absence of out-the-window 

information, Today a large number of Gulfstrcam, Bombardier and Boeing business jets 

offer SVS/EVS capabilities and multiple manufacturers have developed systems for 

tablets that can be used on board general aviation aircraft. 

Another good example, from the late 1970's was NASA research that led to the 

identification of cultural norms within the aviation community that resulted in increased 

vulnerability to crew communication errors. The typical command hierarchy discouraged 

co-pilots from questioning captains when they observed them making mistakes. While 

the concept is in many ways intuitive, several of the deadliest accidents of the era were 

found, through analysis of cockpit voice recordings, to have ineffective communication 

as a contributing factor. NASA developed training methods and techniques to support 

improved Crew Resource Management (CRM). CRM training teaches crews the effective 

use of all available resources for flight crew personnel to reduce errors, avoid stress, and 

increase efficiency through better understanding of human performance capabilities and 

methods for effective communication in the cockpit. United Airlines was the first airline 

to provide CRM training for its cockpit crews in the early 1980s. Since then CRM has 

become a global standard with training requirements mandated by the FAA, ICAO and 

EASA. 

Current Aviation Safety Research Challenges 

Now, as we look forward, aviation is on the verge of a significant transformation with the 

rapid evolution of new technologies, vehicles, and operations on the horizon, while 

retaining the high standards for safety to which we are accustomed. Maintaining a safe 

system will require recognition and timely mitigation of safety issues as they emerge, 

before they become hazards or lead to accidents. A shift toward proactive risk mitigation 

will become critical to meet these needs. In collaboration with the aviation community, 

NASA has developed a vision for safety assurance that is achieved by leveraging 

growing sources of aviation data, commercial data analytics methods, architectures, and 

the "internet of things" to enable monitoring. prediction. and prognostics capabilities. We 

are building on previous research to develop the underlying methods, tools and 

techniques necessary to effectively monitor ongoing operations, assess operations in realtime for emerging risks, and provide in-time strategies to mitigate those risks. 

Pm1nerships with operators and the FAA provide opportunities to validate our 

technologies, to tailor them to meet various needs, and a path for transition to the end 

users. 

NASA has continued to develop methods to identify and predict potential safety incidents 

through analysis of operational data, which would otherwise go undetected. Through 

direct partnerships with airlines and the FAA, NASA researchers have been able to 

identify and detect additional safety relevant incidents using tools tuned to analyze large 

sets of flight data or radar track data. The knowledge gained from these tools has led 

airline partners to make adjustments to procedures to address these potential safety issues 

before they are realized. 
65 


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Current NASA work in this area is focused on advancements that will allow users and 

airlines to identify anomalous behavior and precursors to known hazards in real-time. 

Progress in this area will allow users and airlines to verify information arriving through 

streaming operational data, assessment of data in real-time, and greater emphasis on 

advanced warning, including the ability to provide information about the likelihood of an 

emerging risk. 

Human operator fatigue is a well-known risk to aviation safety but has proven difficult to 

monitor in operational settings. NASA's Fatigue Countermeasures research group has 

made progress in developing tools to monitor pilot or controller performance and is 

currently conducting studies to understand how duty times and schedules affect pilot 

performance. The goal is to deliver, in the near-term, tools and methods that human 

operators and their managers can use to predict degrading levels of fatigue and make 

necessary adjustments to schedules or procedures to lessen the risk or likelihood of a 

safety incident. 

In addition to developing technologies to enable in-time monitoring and mitigation of 

safety hazards, NASA ARMD is addressing difficulties associated with assuring the 

safety of increasingly complex and autonomous aviation systems. We arc supporting our 

traditional avionics partners and the FAA by developing and making available to the 

broad community improved methods, tools and guidance to support cost-effective paths 

for achieving the level of safety assurance required for the introduction of highly reliable 

advanced avionics and future Air Traffic Management (A TM) systems. Industry 

estimates of costs associated with Verification and Validation (V&V) activities reveal 

that these costs are becoming unsustainable and have begun to stifle innovation. Current 

NASA work builds on recent experiments with industry partners and includes 

development of additional tools and techniques that can reduce the costs and improve 

effectiveness of V & V, and therefore reduce overall development costs. NASA continues 

to provide tools and techniques to enable assurance early in the development process, 

when most errors are introduced, bringing down cost and improving safety coverage. 

Industry is working with us to evaluate the impact of these new tools and techniques with 

specific use cases. In addition, we are continuing to provide tools and the guidance to the 

FAA that can assist in modifying standards and existing certification processes. 

NASA has served as a member of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) since 

its formation in 1998. Co-chaired by industry and the FAA, the team is chartered with 

identifying safety risks and recommending voluntary safety enhancements. NASA 

researchers have contributed to the analysis and research associated with many of the 

safety concerns tackled by CAST. Most recently NASA has contributed to the CAST 

activities regarding causes of loss of airplane state awareness. We are currently 

completing research and development of cockpit systems with predictive algorithms to 

alert pilots. models for aircraft stall performance to improve fidelity of training 

environments, and specific flight crew training methods. All of these tools enable 

enhanced safety and will transition directly to the commercial aviation community 

through the CAST. 
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Under contract for the FAA, NASA has established the Aviation Safety Reporting 

System (ASRS) data. The ASRS is an important facet of the continuing effort by 

government, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety. The 

ASRS collects voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports from pilots, 

controllers, and others. Users can then act on the information these reports contain. 

Using the data, users can identify system deficiencies, and issue alert messages to persons 

in a position to correct them. Its database is a public repository which serves the FAA and 

NASA's needs and those of other organizations world-wide which are engaged in 

research and the promotion of safe flight. 

NASA also is a member of Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 

Executive Board. AS lAS leverages internal FAA datasets, airline proprietary safety data, 

publicly available data, manufacturers' data and other data. AS lAS fuses various aviation 

data sources in order to proactively identify safety trends and to assess the impact of 

changes in the aviation operating environment. NASA has and continues to develop data 

analytic algorithms for mining of the AS lAS data to proactively identify issues, and 

continuously transfers these technologies to the FAA and industry partners. 

Emergent Users 

Special attention is being directed toward assuring safety of emerging operations, such as 

small unmanned aircraft operating at low altitude in the near-term and autonomous 

passenger aircraft in the longer-term. Ongoing research is dedicated to understanding 

hazards unique to these domains and identifying data needs associated with monitoring 

such operations for potential risks. NASA is developing and testing models of new 

operational concepts to enable prediction of increased risk. 

The cost of certification is the primary concern of our traditional and emergent industry 

partners, and the aviation industry faces significant technical challenges associated with 

certifying increasingly complex systems. Future aviation systems and high-density 

operations will rely on increasing autonomous capabilities. The methods to assure the 

safety of autonomous systems are in their infancy, and thus approaches will need to be 

investigated and evaluated for effectiveness. Given our past success in applying new 

safety assurance methods to autonomous systems for space missions, NASA is uniquely 

positioned to address this challenge. We have already performed initial demonstration of 

some valuable tools and other governmental agencies, like FAA and AFRL, are looking 

to NASA for leadership in this area. Specifically, NASA initiated the Unmanned Aircraft 

System in the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project to enable routine 

access to larger class UAS into the regular controlled airspace. The UAS in the NAS 

project is focused on development of communications standards, detect and avoid 

technologies, human systems integration capabilities, and approaches to determining 

airworthiness requirements. In addition, NASA's UAS Traffic Management (UTM) 

research project may enable Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight (BVLOS) access by small 

UAS to the uncontrolled low altitude airspace below 400 feet. In collaboration with the 

FAA, the UTM project has established a cloud based federated architecture to enable safe 

operations of unmanned vehicles at low altitudes. The project has focused on 
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standardization of altitude reference schemes, understanding effects of wind on vehicles, 

multi-vehicle airspace operations, and position detection technologies. 

Vehicle Research 

NASA is building on a strong history of conducting research that advances state of the art 

in vehicle technologies in order to reduce the risk of flying in hazardous conditions. For 

example, NASA has addressed the issue of atmospheric icing hazards for decades, and 

has developed some of the key design tools to better understand how to reduce the impact 

of airframe icing. Now engine icing research builds on this long heritage of airframe 

icing. The phenomena that creates engine icing issues is not well-understood so NASA 

has conducted flight tests to better characterize the environment and has emulated these 

conditions in a ground test facility that is already proving to be very beneficial to 

industry. NASA successfully tested a highly instrumented engine in a broad range of 

engine ice crystal conditions and altitudes, enabling future NASA and external users to 

have greater confidence in the engine data collected under these simulated conditions as 

compared to natural atmospheric conditions in flight. This new capability will provide 

NASA with reliable datasets to develop engine ice accretion tools that assist in assessing 

new and existing engines. NASA will confirm its capability that can simulate the high ice 

water content cloud conditions experienced in nature to the degree required to simulate 

aviation safety issue of engine icing. In addition. NASA supported the development of 

new radar capability to detect high altitude ice crystal icing conditions to avoid engine 

icing conditions, which will help aircraft avoid these conditions in the future. NASA's 

data collection and analysis will also provide the FAA with the basis to establish and 

update standards as needed. 

NASA and FAA Research Transition Teams 

To enhance implementation and the capabilities ofNextGen, NASA and the FAA have 

established Research Transition Teams or RTTs to develop joint research plans, fund our 

respective portions, and facilitate the handoff from NASA to FAA of the research results. 

The RTTs have been a best practice mechanism between NASA and FAA in ensuring 

effective coordination and transition of research to implementation. To ensure that 

research and development for aviation safety is jointly identified, conducted, and 

effectively transitioned to the implementing agency, NASA, along with FAA's NextGen 

Office (ANG), Air Traffic Organization (ATO), and Aviation Safety (A VS), have jointly 

established RTTs for System Wide Safety Assurance, UTM, and UAS in the NAS. 

Under each RTT, senior researchers and program managers of both agencies define 

needed research products and the transition path for implementation for both current and 

emergent users of the national air transportation system. Furthermore, through the RTTs, 

NASA works jointly with FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center on joint 

simulations of the research products and on testing of a suite of assurance tools to help 

FAA assess aviation systems. 

Concluding Remarks 

NASA has a long and successful history of aviation safety research that has made a real 

difference in the remarkable safety record that our system enjoys. And we are constantly 
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looking for ways to continue to contribute- with a major emphasis on more prognostic 

approaches that will allow the aviation community to get out in front of issues before 

they become safety risks. Let me conclude by thanking you again for this opportunity to 

appear before you to discuss NASA's Aviation Safety research and to answer your 

questions. 
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Testimony of 

Mr. John DeLisi 

Director, Office of Aviation Safety 

National Transportation Safety Board 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

United States House of Representatives 

-On 

State of Aviation Safety 

Washington, DC • February 27,2018 

I National 

Transponation 

Safety Board 

An Independent Federal Agency 
70 


Insert offset folio 39 here 31404.039

Good morning, Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and the Members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify 

before you today. 

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every 

civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of 

transportation-highway, rail, marine. and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of the 

accidents we investigate and we issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future 

accidents. In addition, we conduct special transportation safety studies and coordinate the 

resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family 

members who have been impacted by major transportation disasters. 

Our Office of Aviation Safety investigates all civil domestic air carrier, commuter, and air 

taxi accidents; in-flight collisions; general aviation accidents; and certain public-use aircraft 

accidents, amounting to approximately I ,500 investigations annually since 2007. We also 

participate in the investigation of major airline accidents in foreign countries that involve 

US carriers, US-manufactured or -designed equipment, or US-registered aircraft to fulfill 

US obligations under International Civil Aviation Organization (JCAO) agreements. 

This testimony will address the state of aviation safety from the NTSB's perspective and 

is based on our investigations. It will include a description of safety issues we have identified and 

recommendations we have made, and will conclude with a description of the work we are doing 

with emerging transportation technologies in aviation. 

Preliminary Aviation Accident Statistics, 2016 

The US aviation system is experiencing a record level of safety, and preliminary aviation 

accident statistics for 2016 show an overall decline in the number of US-registered civil aviation 

accidents. 1 For the third straight year, there were no passenger fatalities as a result of accidents 

involving US air carriers operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code olFederal Regulations 

(CFR) Part 121.2 Notably, since the crash of Colgan flight 3407 in 2009, there have been no 

passenger fatalities as a result of accidents involving US air carriers operating under Part 121 

providing scheduled service. 3 

Overall, aviation deaths in the United States decreased slightly from 416 in 2015 to 412 in 

2016. Nearly 94 percent of aviation fatalities (386 instances) occurred in general aviation 

accidents, with the remainder primarily in 14 CFR Part 135 operations, which includes charters, 

air taxis, air tours, and medical services (when a patient is on board). While the number offatalities 

from general aviation accidents increased slightly from 378 in 2015, the fatal accident rate fell 

below I fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours for the first time in the NTSB's 50-year history. 

1 National Transportation Safety Board, 2016 preliminary aviation statistics. 2 ln 2013, there were two fatal accidents involving nonscheduled cargo flights operating under Part 12!-Nationa! 

Air Cargo crash after takeoff at Ragram Air Base, Afghanistan, and United Parcel Ser_yjce flight 1354 crash during 

approach in Birmingham. Alabama. 3 National Transportation Safety Board, Loss of Control on Aoproach Colgan Air Inc .. Onerating as Continental 

CormectionF!ight3407 Bombardier DHC 8 400 X200WQ, Rpt. "io. AAR-10-01 (Washington, DC: NTSB. 2012). 

2 
71 


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Over the last several decades, significant advances in technology, important legislative and 

regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew training have contributed to the current level 

of aviation safety. However, we continue to see accidents and incidents that remind us of the need 

to be ever vigilant in improving safety. 

Most Wanted List Issue Area-Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation 

On November 14. 2016, we announced our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety 

Improvements for 2017-2018. 4 This list identifies I 0 focus areas for transportation safety 

improvements based on safety issues identified by our investigations. Many of the issues on the 

Most Wanted List address multimodal challenges for improving safety, including many that are 

identified in our aviation accident investigations, such as alcohol and drug impairment. distraction, 

occupant protection. fatigue, medical fitness, safe shipment of hazardous materials, and use of 

recorders. One issue area is specific to aviation: addressing loss of control (LOC) in flight in 

general aviation. 

Since 2008, nearly 46 percent of fatal fixed-wing general aviation accidents in the 

United States resulted from pilots losing control of their aircraft in flight. As defined by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), an LOC accident involves an aircraft's unintended departure from 

controlled flight, which can be due to a variety of reasons, such as pilot distraction, loss of 

situational awareness, or weather. The most common type of LOC is an aerodynamic stall, 

including the possibility of poststall spin, which can occur when the pilot allows the aircraft to 

enter a flight regime outside its normal flight envelope. Unfortunately, the circumstances for these 

accidents are often repeated over time. and too many preventable crashes occur. We have focused 

on working with stakeholders, including the FAA, pilots, flight instructors, and other members of 

the general aviation community, to increase awareness. education, and training to address the risk 

of these events. 

In 2013, we began holding a series of safety seminars focused on general aviation safety 

issues, including LOC, weather, impairment, experimental aircraft, and, most recently, ensuring 

adequate flight experience in different types of aircraft. 5 On April 24, 2018, we will hold a 

roundtable of industry and government experts to discuss inflight LOC and to highlight available 

technologies and training. We have also held events in locations such as Alaska and New York to 

share lessons learned about LOC from our accident investigations with the general aviation 

communities in those areas. We regularly issue Safety Alerts and videos for general aviation pilots 

and aviation maintenance technicians to increase awareness, education, and training on issues that 

we have seen in our accident investigations. 6 Our focus has been on continued collaboration with 

the FAA and the aviation community to develop and participate in initiatives to help reduce the 

number of fatal accidents. These efforts have played a major role in the progress made toward 

improving aviation safety. 

4 National Transportation Safety Board, 2017--2018 .Host Wanted List (Washington. DC: NTSB, 20 16). 5 National Transportation Safety Board. Gen_eral Aviation__Saf;;_!y_S~plinars. 6 National Transportation Safety Board, NTSl3 Safety Alerts. 
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Most Wanted List Issue Area-Expand Recorder Usc to Enhance Safety 

Expanding use of recorders is another Most Wanted List issue area that is important in all 

modes. In aviation, data, audio/voice, and video recorders capture and store critical information 

that can help investigators determine the cause of plane and helicopter accidents and companies 

and operators take proactive steps to prevent accidents. Yet. some aircraft, especially general 

aviation aircraft and rotorcraft, arc still not equipped with these critical technologies, even though 

recorders are readily available. easily installed, and largely affordable. 

Although we have used recorder data to determine the cause of accidents and to develop 

recommendations to help prevent future accidents, some questions can only be answered through 

the data provided by an image recorder. These devices help investigators and operators fill in the 

gaps when data and voice/audio recordings cannot capture all of the information. For example, 

although we obtained recorded cockpit audio and extensive parametric data during our 

investigation of the SpaceShipTwo accident, our investigators were only able to determine the true 

cause of the accident from video that showed the copilot prematurely moving the feather lock 

handle. 7 

We have recommended usc of image recorders for more than 18 years. Although there may 

be technical solutions other than image recorders that can capture instrument readings displayed 

to the flight crew, those solutions do not also capture critical information about the cockpit 

environment conditions (for example, crew actions and visibility), instrument indications available 

to crewmembers, and aircraft system degradation. In 2013, we recommended that the FAA require 

installation of a crash-resistant flight recorder system, which should record cockpit audio and 

images and parametric data in certain newly manufactured aircraft as well as in certain existing 

aircraft. 8 Both recommendations are currently classified "Open-Acceptable Response." 

Recorders not only help with determining the cause of a crash or accident, but, perhaps 

more importantly, they also help companies and operators establish effective safety management 

strategies. Data from recorders can be used to adjust procedures and enhance crew training to 

prevent accidents from happening in the first place. Although some operators have implementedor are in the process of implementing-recorder programs and systems, many are slow to do so 

without regulatory requirements. 

Recent Aviation Accident Investigations 

I want to highlight several aviation accidents that we have investigated during the last 

2 years that have raised additional safety issues. 

7 National Transportation Safety Board, In-Flight Breakup During Tp{ Flight Scaled Composites SpaceShipDY!J... 

N339SS Near Koehn Drv Lake California October 3/ 2014, Rpt. No. AAR-15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2015). 

' Aircraft covered by the recommendations are turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft 

that are not equipped with a flight data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of 

Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135. fulfety RecQmmendation A-13-11. applies to newly manufactured aircraft, 

and fu!fety RccOmllJ"Ddation A-13-13 applies to existing aircraft. 

4 
73 


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Lockhart. Texas 

On July 30,2016, the deadliest US aviation accident since Colgan flight 3407 occurred in 

Lockhart, Texas. 9 A commercial hot air balloon pilot and his 15 passengers tragically died when 

their balloon struck power lines; crashed in a field near Lockhart, Texas; and caught fire. We 

determined that the pilot of the balloon made several poor decisions, both before and during the 

flight; for instance, he elected to fly in cloudy and foggy conditions that decreased his ability to 

see and avoid obstacles. However, in this accident, we also identified other decisions made by the 

government that raise safety concerns, such as a lack of medical oversight for commercial balloon 

pilots and a lack of targeted FAA oversight of potentially risky commercial balloon operations. 

Currently, commercial balloon pilots are not required to hold a medical certificate of any 

kind. The Lockhart accident pilot had been diagnosed with medical conditions known to cause 

cognitive deficits that may affect decision-making and, ultimately, flight safety. In addition, 

medications were found in the pilot's system that are known to cause impairment and are listed on 

the FAA's ''Do Not Issue'' and "Do Not Fly'' lists. Altogether, these issues would likely have led 

an aviation medical examiner to either defer or deny a medical certificate. As a result of this 

accident, we recommended that the FAA remove the medical certification exemption in 

14 CFR 61.23(b) for pilots who are exercising their privileges as commercial balloon pilots and 

receiving compensation for transporting passengers. 10 

The FAA conducts almost all of its oversight of balloon operators at large balloon 

gatherings. Thus, those operators who do not attend the gatherings, such as the accident pilot, 

likely do not to receive any FAA oversight. This focus on balloon gatherings does not support the 

FAA • s risk-based, data-informed approach to oversight. It also does not provide the FAA with 

opportunities to educate all commercial balloon operators and mitigate risk before an accident 

occurs. As a result of this accident, we recommended that the FAA analyze its current policies, 

procedures, and tools for overseeing commercial balloon operations and develop and implement 

more effective ways to target oversight of the operators and operations that pose the most 

significant safety risks to the public. 11 

The status of each of these recommendations is "Open-Await Response." 

Frisco, Colorado 

On July 3, 2015, an Airbus Helicopters AS350 83e, registered to and operated by Air 

Methods Corporation, lifted off from the Summit Medical Center Heliport in Frisco, Colorado, 

and then crashed into a nearby parking lot and caught fire. 12 The pilot was fatally injured. and the 

two flight nurses were seriously injured. We determined that the probable cause of this accident 

was the helicopter's preflight hydraulic check procedure and lack of an alert to the pilot that 

9 National Transportation Safety Board, Impact with Po)ver Lines, Heart o[Texas Hot Air Balloon Ride~qf_<2fn: 

Kubic'ek BB85Z N2469L, Rpt. No. AAR-17/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 20 17). 10 National Transportation Safety Board, Satetv Recommendation A-17:1:1, October 31. 2017. 11 National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation A-17-45, October 31, 2017. 12 National Transportation Safety Board, Loss of Control at Takeoff Air ,ifethod' (~ration Airbus Helicopters 

AS350 BJe S391!LG, Rpt. No. AAR-17/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2017). 

5 
74 


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hydraulic pressure was not restored, which resulted in an LOC after takeoff. We found that the 

impact forces of this accident were survivable for the helicopter occupants; however, the 

helicopter's fuel system, which was not crash resistant and facilitated a fuel-fed postcrash fire, 

contributed to the severity of the injuries. 

The helicopter in this accident did not have-and was not required to be equipped witha crash-resistant fuel system. The AS350-series helicopters received initial FAA type certificate 

design approval in 1977, and were not subject to the airworthiness standards revised by the FAA 

in October 1994 for "comprehensive crash resistant fuel system design and test criteria." 13 These 

design features were intended to reduce the risk of a postcrash fire and, for more severe crashes, 

minimize fuel spillage near ignition sources to improve the evacuation time needed for crew and 

passengers to escape a postcrash fire. The improved standards were not applicable to newly 

manufactured helicopters whose certification basis and approval predated the effective date of the 

revised airworthiness standards, which was November 2. 1994. According to Airbus Helicopters 

and Air Methods, no options existed for retrofitting an AS350 B3e helicopter with a crash-resistant 

fuel system until March 2016. 

Shortly after the accident in Frisco, we issued a safety recommendation to the FAA as a 

result of a Bell Helicopter accident in Wichita Falls, Texas, in which the helicopter crashed and 

was destroyed by a postcrash tire. 14 The recommendation asked the FAA to require. for all newly 

manufactured rotorcraft regardless of the design's original certification date, that the fuel systems 

meet the crashworthiness requirements. 15 

In September 2017, the FAA responded to our recommendation by noting that its aviation 

rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) created a subcommittee to examine the issue. The 

subcommittee analyzed the costs and benefits of such a regulation and determined that, although 

crash-resistant fuel systems were highly effective, the cost of such a mandate outweighed the 

benefits. The FAA asked the subcommittee to analyze whether partial compliance with the 

standards might show benefits with reduced compliance costs. In June 2017, at a public meeting 

of the ARAC, the subcommittee reported that it examined six models of in-service helicopters 

from three different manufacturers that met parts of the improved standards adopted in 1994. The 

analysis showed that none of the helicopter models had a postcrash fire in a survivable accident, 

while II percent of helicopters that met none of fire-resistant fuel systems standards had postcrash 

fires. The subcommittee is examining which parts of the fuel tank standards were in the six models 

of helicopters and will propose partial compliance standards that should have substantially reduced 

compliance costs while resulting in comparable safety benefits. The status of this recommendation 

is "Open-Acceptable Response." 

Akron. Ohio 

On November 10. 2015, Exccufiight flight 1526, a Hawker 700A, departed controlled 

flight while on approach to Akron Fulton International Airport and impacted a four-unit apartment 

building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died. Fortunately, no one 

u 59 Federal Register 50380 

"Accident CENl5fA003 15 National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation A-15-12. July 23.2015. 

6 
75 


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on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. 16 We 

determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's mismanagement of the 

approach and multiple deviations from company standard operating procedures (SOPs), which 

placed the airplane in an unsafe situation. Contributing to the accident was Execuflight's casual 

attitude toward compliance with standards; its inadequate hiring, training, and operational 

oversight of the flight crew; and its lack of a formal safety program, and the FAA's insufficient 

oversight of the company's training program and flight operations. Among the safety issues 

identified was the lack of a requirement for flight data monitoring (FDM) programs for Part 135 

operators. 

In this accident, Execuflight had established SOPs, but the flight crew consistently failed 

to follow them. Execuflight had no means of monitoring its airplanes' daily operations, identifying 

operational deficiencies (such as noncompliance with SOPs), and correcting those deficiencies 

before an accident occurred. Absent continual surveillance of an operation through en-route 

inspections by company check airmen, the only means an operator can use to consistently and 

proactively monitor its line operations is through comprehensive data collection over the entirety 

of its operation, which can be accomplished through an FDM program. We believe that, as 

demonstrated by this and many other accidents, all Part 135 operators need FDM programs. Had 

an FDM program been in place at Execuflight, failure of either pilot to follow SOPs on earlier 

flights might have provided Execuflight the opportunity to take corrective action that could have 

avoided the accident. 

As a result of this investigation, we recommended that the FAA require all 

Part 135 operators to install flight data recording devices capable of supporting an FDM program, 

and to require Part 135 operators to establish a structured FDM program that reviews all available 

data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures and other potential 

safety issues. 17 We understand that the FAA plans to review whether a cost-benefit analysis will 

justify such mandates. The status of these recommendations are "Open-Acceptable Response" 

and "'Open-Acceptable Alternate Response," respectively. 

Chicago, Jll inois; Las Vegas. Nevada; Pensacola. Florida 

On October 28, 2016, American Airlines flight 383, bound for Miami, Florida, experienced 

a right engine uncontained failure and subsequent tire during takeoff at Chicago O'Hare 

International Airport. 18 The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the aircraft on the runway, 

and an emergency evacuation was conducted. Of the 161 passengers and 9 crewmembers onboard, 

one passenger received serious injuries during the evacuation. The airplane was substantially 

damaged by the fire, which was caused by a fuel leak that resulted in a pool fire under the right 

wing. A turbine disk in the right engine fractured into at least four pieces, with one piece going 

16 National Transportation Safety Board, Crash During ,\:onprecision Instrument Approach to f,anding Execuf/ight 

Flightl526 British Aerospace HS 125-7DOA,_['{237WR, Rpt. l\io. AAR 16102 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2016). 17 ;'\;ational Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendations A-16-034 and A-16-035. 18 National Transportation Safety Board, Jlpcontained l:ngine Failure andSz!]zvequent fire American Airlines 

J:.]jg}l{383 Boeing 767-323 !V345AA', Rpt. No. AAR -18/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2018). 

7 
76 


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through the inboard section of the right wing, over the fuselage, and into a warehouse facility a 

third of a mile away, 

We are currently investigating other accidents involving uncontained engine failures. On 

September 8, 2015, British Airways flight 2276 experienced an uncontained failure during takeoff 

at McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada. 19 The plane sustained fire damage and the 

157 passengers and 13 crewmembers evacuated via emergency slides on the runway. Five people 

sustained minor injuries and one person suffered a serious injury as a result of the evacuation. The 

airplane was substantially damaged. In addition, on August 27, 2016, Southwest Airlines flight 

34 72, en route from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Orlando, Florida, experienced an uncontained 

engine failure and cabin depressurization while climbingi0 None of the 99 passengers and 

5 crewmembers onboard were injured, but the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight 

crew declared an emergency and diverted to Pensacola International Airport. 

We held a Board meeting on January 30, 2018, to determine the probable cause of the 

Chicago accident and to issue relevant safety recommendations. The Board determined that the 

failure was caused by an internal defect in a turbine disk, which was likely undetectable when the 

disk was manufactured in 1997 and during subsequent inspections. The investigation also found 

numerous problems with the evacuation, including a lack of communication between the flight 

deck and cabin crew, deviation by a !light attendant from emergency evacuation procedures, and 

the crew's lack of coordination following the evacuation. The Board adopted nine new 

recommendations-seven to the FAA and one each to Boeing and to American Airlines-and 

reiterated two recommendations to the FAA. 

One of the recommendations to the FAA addresses passengers evacuating airplanes with 

carry-on baggage, which has been a recurring concern. Flight attendants are trained to instruct 

passengers not to evacuate with carry-on baggage because doing so could potentially slow 

passenger egress and block an exit during an emergency. In June 2000, we released a safety study 

on emergency evacuations of commercial airplanes, which found that passengers exiting with 

carry-on baggage was "the most frequently cited obstruction to evacuation." 21 

Video taken during the Chicago evacuation and postaccident interviews with flight 

attendants indicated that some passengers evacuated from all three usable exits with carry-on 

baggage. In one case, a flight attendant tried to take a bag away from a passenger who did not 

follow the instruction to evacuate without baggage, but the flight attendant realized that the 

struggle over the bag was prolonging the evacuation and allowed the passenger to take the bag. In 

another case, a passenger came to the left overwing exit with a bag and evacuated with it despite 

being instructed to leave the bag behind. In addition, video from the British Airways event in 

Las Vegas and an October 29, 2015, Dynamic International Airways event in Fort Lauderdale 

21 1\iational Transportation Safety Board, Emergencv Evacuation o(Cr~mmerf:iai.Jirplanes, Rpt. No. SS-00/01, 

(Washington, DC: NTSB 2000). 

8 
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Insert offset folio 46 here 31404.046

show passengers who evacuated with carry-on baggage despite the standard instruction to leave 

their baggage and similar items behind in the event of an emergency. 

Evidence of passengers retrieving carry-on baggage during recent emergency evacuations 

demonstrates that previous actions to mitigate this potential safety hazard have not been effective. 

As a result of the Chicago investigation, we recommended that the FAA measure the potential 

delays associated with passengers retrieving and carrying baggage during an emergency 

evacuation, and determineappropriate countermeasures to mitigate any related potential safety 

risks. 

Current Aviation Accident Investigations 

I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight and provide an update on several 

aviation accidents that we are currently investigating. 

San Francisco, California 

Around midnight on July 7, 2017, Air Canada flight 759 was cleared to land on runway 

28R at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), but instead lined up on a parallel taxiway where 

four air carrier airplanes were awaiting takeoff clearance. 22 Flight 759 descended below I 00 feet 

above the ground, and the flight crew initiated a go-around about the time it overflew the first 

airplane on the taxiway. 

We were notified of the incident on July 9, 2017, and initiated an investigation. Parties to 

the investigation include the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. In 

accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada has appointed an 

accredited representative as the state of registration/operator. The Canadian accredited 

representative has appointed Air Canada, Transport Canada, and the Air Canada Pilots Association 

as technical advisors. 

The investigation team has reviewed Airport Surface Detection Equipment 

Model XI Airport Surface Surveillance Capability data associated with the incident, and has also 

interviewed controllers and management personnel at the SFO air traffic control tower and the 

Northern California Terminal Radar Approach Control, as well as personnel among the incident 

flight crew and other flight crews that were landing or on the taxiway at time of the incident. The 

incident airplane's cockpit voice recorder had been overwritten, so NTSB investigators did not 

have that data. 

The preliminary information from our investigation indicates that runway 28L, next to 

runway 28R, was closed to accommodate construction and was appropriately lit, and notices to 

airmen had been issued to alert operators of the runway's operational status. The appropriate 

runway and approach lighting for runway 28R and for taxiway C were also operational. The 

captain had over 20,000 total flight hours, and the first officer had about I 0,000 total flight hours. 

There were no known air traffic control equipment discrepancies. Normal air traffic staffing for 

"National Transportation Safety Board. Landing Approach to TaxiwaY..at San Francisco International Airport 

illQ}, San Francisco, CA. 

9 
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Insert offset folio 47 here 31404.047

the midnight shift included two controllers. On the evening of the incident, one controller was in 

the tower cab. 

In addition to the Air Canada incident, there are two actual runway incursions at SFO 

involving runway 28L that we are currently investigating. 23 Runway incursions-or the incorrect 

presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway-have increased since 20 II. 24 On 

September 19 and 20, 2017, we held a 2-day forum to bring together safety experts from the 

aviation industry to raise awareness of the increase in runway incursions in the United States and 

the need to effectively reverse the trend. 25 The forum provided the opportunity for pilots, air traffic 

controllers, and others involved to discuss their perspectives on the runway incursion issue and 

what is needed to address it. We will be releasing some of the lessons learned from that forum in 

the ncar future. 

Pullman, Washine,rton 

On December 29, 2017, a Horizon Air plane landed on a taxiway at Pullman-Moscow 

Regional Airport in Washington. Taxiway landings are reportable incidents under 49 CFR 830.5, 

and Horizon Air notified us of this incident after it occurred. At that time, investigators requested 

that the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder be preserved, and that pilot statements be 

obtained. Horizon Air is a Part 121 carrier and was transporting the public. We have investigated 

previous Part 121 taxiway landings because of the potential for a catastrophic outcome, and 

decided on January 26, 2018, to launch a formal investigation. 

Brampton, Ontario 

On June 3, 20!6, a FedEx delivery truck was making its final delivery of four large, 

custom-designed, lithium-ion batteries to a Brampton, Ontario, address and was destroyed by a 

fire. The driver discovered that one of the large battery shipments contained a smoking package 

and, shortly after the discovery, the package burst into flames. The tire spread to the remaining 

packages in the cargo area and eventually destroyed the truck. The driver was not injured. The four 

batteries were designed and packaged by Braille Battery Inc., and transported from their Florida 

facility on two Fed Ex cargo flights. They were then loaded onto the Fed Ex truck for final delivery 

when the incident occurred, I 0 hours after they were offloaded from the second aircraft. 

Although this fire occurred in Canada, we are investigating this incident because the 

shipment involved a US air carrier and included lithium batteries that were presumably shipped in 

a configuration that would ensure safe shipment and containment of any battery failure. We believe 

our investigation findings may have significant implications on current regulations addressing the 

safe transportation of lithium batteries. 

03 Incidents PPS171A008A and OPSJ7!A014A. 

Federal Aviation Administration, )<.unway SJ),fety Trends and Runway Incursion Ana!y;;j;;, September 19-20, 

2017. 

25 National Transportation Safety Board Fomm, RunwavJncursion Safety Issues, Prevention, and Mi!iJlilliQ!1, 

September 19-20, 2017. 

10 
79 


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International Aviation Accident Investigations 

We fulfill the US obligations to foreign accident investigations established by treaty under 

the auspices of the ICAO. Although accidents involving US air carriers have been declining, we 

are participating in some significant international accident investigations. The key objectives of 

our international aviation accident investigations are to: 

• Identify safety deficiencies affecting US aviation interests; 

• Capture safety lessons learned to prevent accidents in the US; and 

• Enable credible and comprehensive accident investigations where US interests are 

concerned. 

Given the international nature of air transportation and the leading role the United States 

plays in developing aviation technologies, our participation in foreign investigations is essential to 

enhancing aviation safety worldwide. 

Emerging Transportation Technologies 

Advances in technology are transforming transportation and hold promise for improving 

transportation safety, but they also pose new challenges. Among those advancing technologies are 

commercial space transportation and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). 

Commercial Space 

We have been involved in commercial space accident investigations for almost 25 years, 

since leading the investigation of a procedural anomaly associated with the launch of an Orbital 

Sciences Corporation Pegasus expendable launch vehicle in 199326 Most recently, we led the 

investigation of the fatal in-flight breakup of SpaceShip Two in October 2014. 27 Foremost among 

the safety issues identified was the need to consider and protect against human error for safe 

manned spaceflight, which is the responsibility of designers, operators, and overseers. We made 

recommendations to the FAA and the Commercial Spaceflight Federation to establish human 

factors guidance for commercial space operators and to strengthen the FAA's evaluation process 

for experimental permit applications by promoting stronger collaboration between FAA technical 

staff and commercial space vehicle operators. 

Our work in commercial space transportation supports our broader mission of improving 

transportation safety through investigating accidents and serious incidents, collaborating outreach 

and education efforts related to commercial space vehicles, and developing and disseminating 

safety investigation techniques in commercial space with the international community. To develop 

and maintain the necessary investigative expertise and tools in this emerging segment of 

transportation, we are focused on training for NTSB staff and outreach with commercial space 

stakeholders. 

26 National Transportation Safety Board, Commercial Space Launch Incident Lapnch Procedure Anomaly, Qrbiial 

Sciences Corporation Pegaus/SCD-1, Rpt. No. SIR 93/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 1993). 27 National Transportation Safety Board. In-Flight Breq/syp During Test !'1ight Scaled Composites SpaceShipTw!2_ 

N339SS Sear Ko_ehn Dry Lake Californg.{Jctoher3 I 201 .f, Rpt. No. AAR 15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 20 15). 

11 
80 


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Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

The growing number of UASs and reports of near-collisions with manned aircraft have 

raised safety concerns regarding UAS integration into the airspace. In August 2010, we revised 

our Part 830 regulations to clarify that accident and incident notification requirements also apply 

to unmanned aircraft. 28 An advisory to operators was released in July 2016 clarifying the reporting 

requirements (i.e., if there is death or serious injury, the aircraft weighs more than 300 pounds and 

sustains substantial damage, or other specific serious incidents occur). 29 

On September 21,2017, the pilot of a US Army UH-60 helicopter reported a collision with 

a small drone just east of Midland Beach, Staten Island. New York, representing the first confirmed 

accident involving a UAS and another aircraft. The helicopter sustained damage to its main rotor 

blade, window frame, and transmission deck. We determined that the probable cause of the 

incident was the failure of the UAS pilot to sec and avoid the helicopter due to his intentional flight 

beyond visual line of sight. Contributing to the incident was the IJAS pilot's incomplete knowledge 

of regulations and safe operating practices. 30 As the number and complexity of IJAS operations 

continues to grow, it is inevitable that the number ofNTSB IJAS investigations will also increase. 

We are also performing proof-of-concept testing using UASs as an accident investigation 

tool in all modes. UASs are rapidly becoming a standard tool in the domestic and international 

accident investigation community. Small IJASs can be very rapidly deployed, which allows 

wreckage fields to be documented quickly and thoroughly when the accident area must be cleared 

expeditiously for safety or operational purposes. In addition, smalliJASs can access unique points 

of view useful to the investigator as well as areas otherwise inaccessible by conventional aircraft. 

Data collected is shared immediately, allowing investigators, managers, and support staff in distant 

locations instant access to accident site information not otherwise available. 

Our ability to continue to provide outstanding investigative services and analyses requires 

the resources to acquire additional staff, develop staff expertise, and employ the appropriate 

equipment and analytical tools to investigate those transportation accidents where the latest 

technologies may have contributed to accident. 

Conclusion 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the work that the NTSB is 

doing to make transportation safer. I will be happy to answer any questions. 

28 49 CFR 830.2 29 National Transportation Safety Board, Advisory to Operators of Civil Unmanned Aircrati Systems in the United 

States, July 29, 2016. 30 National Transportation Safety Board, tnflight cQ)_!]sion ofUAS and heli£Ql2kr. Staten Island, NY. 

12 
81 


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The State of Aviation Safety 

Tuesday, February 27,2018, 10:00 a.m. 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 

Questions for the Record (QFR) 

Submitted on behalfofCongressman Sam Graves (M0-05) 

1. Has the National Transportation Safety Board made any aviation safety or training 

recommendations based on a flight hours requirement? 

The NTSB has not made recommendations for flight hour minimums for air carrier 

pilots. Our recommendations have instead focused on specific procedures and 

training, needed regulations, and needed guidance to crews and operators. 

2. From previous aviation accident investigations, has probable cause been found between 

the number of flight hours of the pilots and the cause of the accident? 

We have cited pilots' lack of total experience or experience in an aircraft type as 

causal or contributing to accidents, particularly in general aviation accidents. 

However, we have not produced analyses that would identify a minimum experience 

threshold when risk decreases to some 'acceptable' level. It intuitively makes sense 

that more experience is better, but it is very difficult to quantify. In fact, some of the 

analyses of experience we have done have shown examples of safety issues that do not 

decrease with increased experience. For example, the analysis of accident pilot 

experience for our recent fuel mismanagement safety alert found that student pilots 

rarely ran out of fuel, but 48 percent of the fuel mismanagement accidents involved 

pilots with a commercial or air transport pilot certificate and 50 percent of the 

accidents involved a private or sport pilot. 
82 


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The State of Aviation Safety Tuesday, 

February 27,2018, 10:00 a.m. 2167 

Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 

John DeLisi, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board 

Responses to Questions for the Record (QFRs) 

Congressman Mark DeSaulnier 

I. Because our aviation system is so safe, accidents involving commercial aircraft are few 

and far between. With a limited number of accidents to investigate, what benefits come 

from investigating non-accident incidents for generating insights and recommendations 

for enhancing aviation safety? 

While the safety of commercial aviation is at an unprecedented level, safety risks 

identified through the conduct of comprehensive incident investigation can be 

mitigated before they lead to an accident. In 2017, the NTSB initiated 

investigations into 22 incidents involving issues such as drone safety, engine fires 

or failures, taxiway landing, enhanced ground proximity warning system alerts, 

and runway incursions. While these incident investigations may lead to NTSB 

safety recommendations, often it is the sharing of investigative findings with the 

air carrier industry that allow prompt mitigation of these hazards and prevent 

accidents. 

2. Current regulations, 49 CFR 830.5, spell out the various kinds of incidents for which 

aircraft operators are required to provide immediate notification to the NTSB. Absent 

from this extensive list is the event of an aircraft nearly landing on the wrong runway, 

taxiway, or other part of the airport environment other than the assigned runway. By the 

existing regulations, the July 7, 2017 Air Canada incident at SFO in which a plane came 

within 59 feet of one of the worst aviation disasters in history did not meet the 

requirements for immediate notification to the NTSB. If regulations were to change to 

require these kinds of incidents to be reported, would this change allow NTSB to begin 

reviewing facts about the incident more quickly and develop a better understanding of 

incident trends? 

Even though there was no requirement for Air Canada to immediately notify the 

NTSB about the July 7 SFO incident, the NTSB learned about it from the FAA 

and launched a full investigation. Data from the incident was obtained from the 

airplane's flight data recorder and from SFO's ATC radar system. In addition, 

timely interviews were conducted with the Air Canada flight crew and the air 
83 


Insert offset folio 52 here 31404.052

tramc controllers mvotved. The NTSH has an mtormal agreement in place to 

receive information from the FAA on operational incidents, pilot deviations, and 

surface events which works well without the need for a regulatory change. 

3. In 20 I I, the NTSB recommended that the FAA "[p ]erform a technical review of Airport 

Surface Detection Equipment-Model X to determine if the capability exists systemwide 

to detect improper operations such as landings on taxiways."What is your current sense 

of the progress that the FAA has made in exploring the feasibility of deploying this 

technology as a tool for preventing incorrect landings? 

The FAA initially replied in 2011 that it did not plan to take the recommended 

actions because it believed that the ability to accurately predict that an aircraft is 

arriving on a taxiway is not possible without significant degradation in 

performance, timeliness, and accuracy of safety logic alerts for what the FAA 

believed to be the more likely event of an aircraft arriving on a closed or occupied 

runway. As a result, on September 14, 2011, the NTSB classified the 

recommendation "Closed-Unacceptable Action." However, after the event in 

2017 at SFO, an FAA spokesman indicated to the media that the FAA was working 

on modifications to ASDE-X so they could use the system to spot airplanes that 

are lined up to land on a taxiway, however, they did not submit an updated 

response to the NTSB recommendation. The NTSB was invited to observe a test 

of new features in the ASDE-X system, including the prediction of taxiway 

landings; the FAA can likely provide further information on their current plans 

to implement these recommended features. 

4. In a 2009 after-accident report about an American Airlines incident involving an inflight engine fire, the then-Board Member and now-Chairman Sumwalt wrote about 

the "casual attitude of a flight crew" that he observed in his review of the cockpit 

voice recorder data. His statement goes on to provide a nuanced analysis of what he 

heard on the CVR, including the way the pilots articulated their words when going 

through its flight deck checklists as well as the presence of non-pertinent remarks 

during key phases of the flight. Board :vtember Sumwalt then concludes that this 

casual approach to routine operations was a manifestation of a larger problem of a 

less-than-rigorous adherence to protocols that would likely exacerbate, if not cause, 

grave danger in a serious emergency situation. Board Member Sumwalt wrote, 

What is the best WtryJ to prepare yourself to deal with events that are 

unfamiliar to you -events where there are no established procedures? 

Based on myflying experience and aviation safety background, I firmly 

believe the answer is rigorous adherence to standard operating 
84 


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procedures (SOPs) and cockpit discipline on each and every flight. 

When you do this, you are preparing yourselfjc>r the unexpected. 

• What policies or programs are needed to ensure that airlines and pilots maintain 

strict, rigorous adherence to safety protocols and to prevent any sliding away 

from such adherence? 

As a result of the Colgan accident in 2009, we issued recommendations 

and held a forum focusing on professionalism in airline flight crews. In 

2016, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the 

Federal Register for the Pilot Professional Development rule that 

would also address some of these issues. In addition, the 

implementation of safety management systems that are now required 

for Part 121 carriers, and effective use of flight operations quality 

assurance programs can potentially help air carriers to address issues 

related to adherence to SOPs. The NTSB has also recommended that 

operators incorporate line operations safety audits (LOSA) into their 

oversight programs which have the potential to detect issues related to 

adherence to SOPs. 

• Are the sorts of insights Board Member Sumwalt generated obtainable through 

existing programs for airline personnel to self-report safety incidents or 

irregularities? 

Yes, an operator's SMS, which includes voluntary reporting and 

monitoring programs such as Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), 

Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), LOSA, and internal 

audits, are designed to do just that: identify gaps in existing SOPs and 

compliance. For example, issues identified through an operator's ASAP 

program will result in corrective action for the involved crew members 

that could include ground school, simulator training, and/or line 

operational training and evaluation. Additionally, information gleaned 

from an operator's ASAP and FOQA programs is used by the safety 

and training departments to develop guidance on lessons learned for 

dissemination through company safety bulletins, briefings, and other 

literature. 
85 


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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Perspectives on Maintaining Safety and 

Enhancing Oversight of a Diverse and 

Complex Aviation Industry 

Statement of Matthew E. Hampton 

Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits, U.S. Department of Transportation 
86 


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Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on aviation safety. As you know, safety 

is the Department of Transportation's top priority. Since 1958, the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) has overseen the safe operation of the busiest and 

most complex aviation system in the world, which carries over 2.5 million people 

on approximately 45,000 flights every day. However, recent events, such as the 

near-miss of Air Canada flight 759 in San Francisco1 1ast summer, have drawn 

renewed attention to the importance of enhancing aviation safety. As FAA 

continues to seek ways to ensure its safety efforts keep pace with a rapidly 

evolving aviation industry, new and longstanding oversight needs present several 

challenges. 

My testimony today is based on our recent and ongoing work on aviation safety 

and will focus on two areas: (1) addressing evolving and longstanding safety 

oversight challenges related to regional carriers, aircraft parts, and runway 

incursions and (2) integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National 

Airspace System (NAS). 

Summary 

FAA is taking a number of important steps to improve its safety oversight of the 

NAS. However, our work continues to identify several challenges for FAA that 

have garnered significant public interest and congressional attention. In recent 

years, the regional air carrier industry, which serves more than 20 percent of al! 

airline passengers, has experienced significant operational and financial changes 

that can impact safety in an industry that must keep costs low. These carriers 

must also meet the same safety standards as mainline carriers, and several 

oversight adjustments are required for FAA to proactively mitigate risks. 

Additionally, to ensure safe aviation operations overall, FAA needs to strengthen 

its monitoring and investigation processes to prevent faulty or counterfeit parts 

from being installed on aircraft and assess its efforts to reduce runway 

incursions-incidents on runways involving unauthorized aircraft, vehicles, or 

people. FAA has launched various safety initiatives over the years to mitigate 

these incidents, but the number of reported incursions continues to rise. Finally, 

the use of UAS represents a significant safety concern for FAA, which must 

accommodate the expansion of commercial UAS operations as it strengthens its 

oversight and risk-mitigation efforts. As the aviation industry continues to evolve 

1 "National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] Issues Investigative Update on San Francisco Airport Near Miss," NTSB 

news release, August 2, 2017. 
87 


Insert offset folio 56 here 31404.056

in these and other areas, FAA must be able to quickly adapt to any challenges to 

maintain the safety of the aviation system. 

Addressing Evolving and Longstanding Safety 

Oversight Challenges 

FAA continues to demonstrate a strong commitment to improving safety 

oversight of our aviation system. For example, FAA recently transitioned its 

oversight of passenger air carriers to its risk-based Safety Assurance System (SAS) 

to more effectively identify and mitigate safety risks. Yet FAA faces both new and 

longstanding safety oversight challenges involving various aspects of the aviation 

industry, and enhanced management and stakeholder communication will be key 

to addressing safety vulnerabilities. The Agency oversees a regional airline 

industry that serves more than 20 percent of all airline passengers and is rapidly 

evolving. To help ensure safe aviation operations overall, FAA must strengthen 

efforts to promptly identify and remove suspected unapproved aircraft parts from 

the aviation supply chain and address ongoing challenges to runway safety at 

airports. 

Keeping Pace With a Dynamic and 

Evolving Regional Airline Industry 

Regional air carriers have been a growing segment of the aviation industry over 

the last several years and now operate over 10,000 flights a day and serve 

approximately 20 percent of all airline passengers. 2 These carriers operate in a 

unique and competitive environment and present a multifaceted oversight 

challenge for FAA. While they must meet the same safety standards as mainline 

carriers, they operate under a business model that requires them to keep costs 

low. Yet they do not benefit from upward trends in ticket prices, additional 

revenue from baggage fees, or passenger enplanements. Therefore, their 

operations are strongly impacted by changes such as service expansion, airline 

consolidations,' or new pilot requirements-all of which have taken place in 

recent years. 

2 According to the Regional Alr!ine Association, the average plane size flown by regional carriers grew from 24 seats in 

1990 to 61 In 2015, and the average trip increased from 194 miles in 1990 to 478 miles in 2015. 3 Regional airlines have purchased other airlines to expand operations. for example, SkyWest Inc. purchased 

ExpressJet in 2011. Airlines also merge their operating certificates to streamline operations. For example, in 2014, 

Republic Airways Holdings merged its Chautauqua Airlines certificate with Shuttle America's certificate. 
88 


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At the request of the Ranking Members of this Committee and Subcommittee, we 

recently reported4 on how FAA identifies periods of transition and growth for 

regional air carriers and adjusts oversight in response to operational changes. We 

found that FAA has not provided inspectors with sufficient tools and guidance to 

proactively identify and mitigate operational risks at regional carriers. FAA's main 

risk-assessment tool is subjective and does not include risk scoring-i.e., 

quantitative metrics to assess the severity of risks related to major operational 

changes brought about by transition or growth. These include turnover in key 

personnel, financial distress, or rapid service expansion. In addition, tools to help 

inspectors assess risks related to financial condition and rapid growth or 

downsizing are poorly designed and confusing, which limits their effectiveness. 

As a result of these weaknesses, FAA may miss opportunities to accurately assess 

risks and take corrective actions. In one case, FAA inspectors did not recognize 

multiple indicators of financial distress, as defined in FAA guidance, before a 

carrier filed for bankruptcy. These indicators included a drastic decline in stock 

prices, a decrease in scheduled flights due to a pilot shortage, a lawsuit from one 

of its mainline partners for failing to complete contractually scheduled flights, 

and an increase in the pilot attrition rate. Although inspectors were aware of 

these indicators, they did not believe they posed an increased risk at the carrier 

and attributed many of the risk indicators to a pending merger between the 

company's subsidiaries. 

Even when inspectors are able to identify risk areas, FAA guidance is vague 

regarding how inspectors should adjust surveillance. Inspectors often make 

adjustments based on their own discretion without the benefit of specific FAA 

guidance or data analysis to bolster their experiences. As a result, FAA may not 

be well positioned to respond to changes common to the regional carrier 

industry that carry safety implications, such as changes in airline partnerships and 

bankruptcies. FAA agreed with alllO of our recommendations and is revising its 

risk assessment tools, improving data sharing between offices, and clarifying the 

guidance it provides to inspectors. The Agency committed to implementing our 

recommendations by the end of this calendar year. 

A related issue for the Agency is the increase in required hours of flight 

experience to 1,500 hours for new pilot hires5 and the effect on the pilot 

population, particularly at regional carriers. FAA issued this rule in 2013 in 

response to congressionally mandated changes regarding pilot training and 

experience requirements. 6 Regional carrier officials state that these requirements 

have reduced the pool of qualified pilots available to hire and affected the 

4 FAA Oversight Is Not Keeping Pace With the Changes Occurring in the Regional Airline Industry (OIG Report No. 

AV2018012}, December 19,2017. OIG reports are available on our website: https://www.oig.dotgov/. 5 This rule requires each commercial airline pilot to obtain an Airline Transport Pilot license, which requires 1,500 

hours of flight experience (unless applicants have qualifying educational or military experience). 

"Pub. L. No. 111-216 (2013). 
89 


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experience levels of new hires. However, FAA has not analyzed the impact of the 

1,500-hour rule on the pilot population or reviewed industry's concerns regarding 

a pilot shortage. Furthermore, the Agency currently has no plans for such a study, 

even though pilot training, experience, and staffing levels can all play a role in 

maintaining safety. This raises questions about whether FAA is prepared to detect 

changes in the pilot pool that may introduce risk into regional air carriers' 

operations. This will be an important watch area for the Agency in the near and 

long term. 

Strengthening the Investigative Process 

and Proactively Removing Suspected 

Unapproved Parts From the Aviation 

Supply Chain 

The traveling public depends on FAA and the aviation industry to ensure that 

U.S. aircraft are properly maintained and airworthy. Part of this responsibility is to 

detect and monitor for Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUP)-aircraft parts that 

may have been manufactured without FAA approval, including counterfeit parts. 

Our office has been tracking SUPs for years, and we recently reported that FAA's 

process for monitoring and investigating SUPs is not as effective as it could be7 

This is largely due to weaknesses in recordkeeping and management controls to 

capture and accurately report the number of SUP cases. For example, our recent 

analysis of all 26S SUP entries in FAA's database revealed 16 duplicate, 

86 incomplete, and 28 invalid entries. While FAA guidance provides broad 

direction to its analysts on data gathering for Hotline submissions, it does not 

have specific guidance on data entry for SUPs reports. As a result, the quality of 

data available to FAA to analyze trends is compromised, and FAA does not have a 

full picture of the problems and risks involving unapproved parts within the 

aviation industry. 

FAA also does not ensure all SUPs are reported to its Hotline office, which should 

be the central point of contact, where analysts can receive and track SUPs reports 

in order to identify trends. However, SUPs can be reported through a variety of 

channels, including reports made by the public to the Hotline or local inspection 

offices. FAA guidance states that field inspectors who receive SUPs reports from 

complainants should provide them to the Hotline for tracking and resolution. 

However, FAA inspectors do not follow the guidance, and some reports to local 

inspection offices never make it to the Hotline. As a result, the Agency cannot be 

7 Enhancements Are Needed to FAA's Oversight of the Suspected Unapproved Parts Program (OIG Report No. 

AV2017049), May 30,2017. 

4 
90 


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assured that all SUPs reports to local inspection offices have been captured in the 

Hotline's database. 

Furthermore, once unapproved parts are identified, FAA's oversight of industry 

actions to remove them from the supply chain is ineffective. This is because FAA 

does not confirm that operators (e.g., manufacturers, repair stations, and parts 

distributors} take appropriate action to remove unapproved parts from their 

inventories. For example, an FAA inspector determined that tens of thousands of 

privately owned commercial aircraft parts, which were for sale online via eBay, 

were unapproved. However, the inspector did not physically account for the 

location and quantities of the parts but instead accepted a letter from the owner 

stating that he had removed the ad from his eBay site and had not sold any parts. 

As of February 13, 2018-more than 4 years later-the ad for these parts and the 

owner's contact information could still be viewed online. 

FAA agreed with allll of our recommendations and is committed to taking 

action to strengthen its management controls and ensure consistent SUPs 

investigations. While we are encouraged by FAA's response to our 

recommendations, ensuring that the hundreds of thousands of aircraft parts 

installed on airplanes are manufactured or repaired according to standards will 

continue to be a significant challenge for FAA and the aviation industry. 

Addressing Reports of Increased Runway 

Safety Incidents 

Several recent incidents involving close calls in the air and on the ground at our 

Nation's major airports are a cause for concern. For example, in February 2017 at 

the San Francisco International Airport, a controller mistakenly cleared one 

aircraft to land on a runway while another was waiting to depart. A surface 

surveillance system alerted the controller about the potential collision, and the 

controller instructed the arriving aircraft to abort its landing.8 In addition, in 

November 2017, a commercial aircraft lined up to land on an active taxiway at 

Atlanta Hartfield International Airport before aborting the landing. 

Much of our work in this area has focused on FAA's efforts to reduce runway 

incursions-incidents involving unauthorized aircraft, vehicles, or people on a 

runway-which has been a longstanding challenge for FAA We have repeatedly 

reported on FAA's efforts to address this issue and made recommendations to 

improve the Agency's ability to implement, prioritize, and measure the 

8 As noted previously, there was another near-miss incident at the San Francisco International Airport in July 2017. 

Instead of landing on a runway, a commercial airplane pilot attempted to land on a taxiway where four other aircraft 

were awaiting takeoff This incident has not been officially classified and is currently under investigation by the 

National Transportation Safety Board. 
91 


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effectiveness of its runway safety initiatives' The Agency has undertaken a 

number of safety initiatives since 2007 in response to our recommendations. 

These initiatives include instituting voluntary reporting mechanisms for 

controllers; installing new technologies, such as Airport Surface Detection 

Equipment, Model X (or ASDE-X), that warn controllers and pilots about runway 

hazards; and conducting outreach efforts at individual airports and Governmentindustry forums. 

However, reports of incursions have increased over the last several years, with a 

nearly 83-percent rise in total incursions between fiscal years 2011 and 2017 

(see figure 1). 

Figure 1. Total Number of Runway Incursions, Fiscal Years 

2011-2017 

FY2011 FY2012 fY 2013 fY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 

Source: DIG analysis 

While the number of serious incidents is relatively low, they fluctuated over the 

same timeframe, ranging from a low of 7 in fiscal year 2011 to a high of 19 in 

fiscal year 2016. To help mitigate runway incursions, FAA initiated a Call to Action 

forum in 2015 that focused on developing short-, medium-, and long-term 

initiatives. We are currently evaluating the Agency's progress in this effort. Our 

preliminary results indicate that FAA has had success in educating pilots about 

visual aids at high-risk airports and in conducting outreach to the aviation 

community. However, the Agency faces challenges in implementing other 

initiatives, including those associated with new technologies, such as Data 

9 FAA's Cafl to Action Plan for Runway Safety (OIG Report No. AV-2010-071), July 21, 2010; FAA Operational and 

Programmatic Deficiencies Impede Integration of Runway Safety Technologies (OIG Report No. AV-2014-060), June 26, 

2014; Management !.imitations May Hinder FAA's Ability To Fully Implement and Assess the Effectiveness of Its Runway 

Safety Initiatives (OIG Report No. AV~2014~130), September 25,2014 
92 


Insert offset folio 61 here 31404.061

Communications (DataComm), 10 and measuring their effectiveness at mitigating 

runway incursions. We anticipate issuing our report later this year. 

Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems Into the 

National Airspace System 

The growing use of UAS for commercial purposes-ranging from filmmaking to 

package delivery-represents a substantial economic opportunity for the United 

States. However, it also presents one of the most significant safety challenges 

FAA has faced in decades. In addition to managing the regulatory challenges of 

this evolving industry, FAA must also develop strategies for overseeing an 

increasing number of operations and mitigating safety risks. 

Meeting the Regulatory Challenges of an 

Evolving and Diverse Commercial UAS 

Industry 

FAA recently forecast that the number of UAS in the United States is likely to be 

about 4 million by 2021, increasing from 1.1 million in 2016. The growing 

demand for commercial UAS presents new regulatory challenges for FAA, which 

must develop rules to govern UAS usage while maintaining safety. To advance 

the safe integration of UAS in domestic airspace, FAA published a new rule in 

June 2016n for small UAS (i.e., systems weighing less than 55 pounds). However, 

the rule does not permit several potential uses for UAS that are highly valued by 

industry, such as operating beyond line of sight or at night To accommodate 

these operations, the rule allows operators to apply for waivers from its 

provisions. As shown in figure 2, as of January 2018, the Agency has received 

more than 15,000 waiver applications and reviewed more than 7,500, issuing 

approvals for nearly 1,530 waivers. However, just over 6,500 applications are still 

pending, and the Agency's backlog continues to grow. 

10 DataComm is expected to provide 2~way digital communications between controllers and flight crews by reducing 

radio voice communications, improving accuracy, safety, and reducing time, While DataComm is being used at over 

50 airport towers, the Agency does not expect controllers to use the technology to issue taxi instructions until 2026 at 

the earliest 11 14 CFR Part 107 (June 2016). 

7 
93 


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Figure 2. Number of Waiver Applications Processed by FAA 

Since August 2016 

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data 

While most of these approved waivers (more than 90 percent) have been for 

night flying, others have been granted for more complex activities, such as for 

flying over people or beyond line of sight The commercial activities that typically 

receive waivers for UAS operations are filmmaking, photography, real estate, and 

construction. 

Developing Strategies for Overseeing 

Operations and Mitigating Risks as 

UAS Integration Continues 

The increasing number of UAS operators presents significant oversight and riskmitigation challenges for FAA The Agency is in the early stages of developing a 

risk-based oversight process for commercia! UAS operators. For example, FAA 

recently published national program guidelines that instruct Flight Standards field 

offices to plan at least one operator inspection per year. However, this guidance 

does not include risk or operational factors field offices should consider when 

they decide which UAS operators to visit, and it did not take effect until the 

beginning of fiscal year 2018. 

Developing an effective oversight strategy is particularly important given the 

safety issues that arise as UAS increasingly operate in the same airspace as 

manned aircraft. UAS sightings by pilots and other sources have increased 
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dramatically. Over 2,100 events were reported in 2017 and more than 1,800 in 

2016, compared to about 1,100 in 2015 and just 238 in 2014, according to FAA's 

UAS event data. However, FAA still lacks a cohesive system for tracking and 

analyzing UAS sightings and incidents, which is an essential element of a riskbased oversight system. This limits the Agency's ability to identify, analyze, and 

mitigate safety risks. 

A recently released report from FAA's Center of Excellence for UAS Research on 

the potential impact of UAS collisions further highlights the importance of 

mitigating these risks. 12 Specifically, the research shows that small UAS can cause 

greater structural damage to manned aircraft, including wings and engine fan 

blades, than bird strikes. The Center plans to conduct additional research on 

engine ingestion of UAS in collaboration with engine manufacturers, as well as 

additional studies on airborne collisions with helicopters and general aviation 

aircraft. These research projects began last year and will run through fiscal year 

2021. 

Another UAS oversight challenge for FAA is to identify and locate UAS operators, 

if the Agency needs to contact them or take enforcement action after an incident 

or violation. FAA established an aviation rulemaking committee, which recently 

gave the Agency recommendations and options for remotely identifying and 

tracking UAS owners and operators, as directed by Congress in the FAA 

Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 201613 Based on the act's requirements, 

FAA is also in the process of developing a pilot program to manage UAS in lowaltitude airspace (i.e., at or below 400 feet). These efforts could help FAA respond 

to the challenge of identifying and managing small UAS operations in the NAS. 

Finally, prosecuting UAS owners who violate FAA regulations or engage in illegal 

flight activities has been challenging. Since 2016, our Office of Investigations has 

opened 23 cases involving illegal operation of UAS. However, 10 of these cases 

were closed in the preliminary complaint phase, and 9 were declined for 

prosecution for various reasons, such as the inability to prove criminal intent and 

a lack of prior prosecutions. Ultimately, further attention is needed to ensure FAA 

has strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms in place so it can effectively 

identify violations and mitigate the safety risks associated with increased UAS 

operations. 

n The sUAS Air-to-Air Collision Severity Evaluation Final Report, Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research 

Excellence (ASSURE), November 2017. 13 Pub. L No. 114-190 (2016). 

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Conclusion 

FAA has taken important steps to meet its primary mission of ensuring aviation 

safety and is committed to carrying out a number of our recent 

recommendations to enhance its safety oversight. However, as the aviation 

industry continues to evolve, FAA must ensure it can quickly adapt to new 

oversight challenges, while also addressing longstanding safety concerns. 

Increased management attention and a strong commitment to risk-based 

oversight will be vital to ensure FAA continues to maintain one of the safest 

aviation systems in the world. We remain committed to supporting FAA's efforts 

through our audits and investigations to ensure the safety of the NAS, and we 

will continue to update you on our work on these and related matters. 

This concludes my prepared statement I would be happy to address any 

questions from you or Members of the Subcommittee at this time. 

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Our Mission 

OIG conducts audits and investigations on 

behalf of the American public to improve the 

performance and integrity of DOT's programs 

to ensure a safe, efficient, and effective 

national transportation system. 
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Matthew E. Hampton, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits, Office of 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation 

Responses to Questions for the Record 

The State of Aviation Safety 

February 27, 2018 

Questions issued bv Congressman Mark DeSaulnier of California 

QUESTION: 

The FAA officials who met with me recently cited the ASIAS program as a successful program 

and one that has produced a substantial amount of useful data. However, a 2013 report from 

the OIG says that several years' worth of work is needed before ASIAS can be used as a tool to 

help predict and prevent aviation accidents. In your view, is the ASIAS closer to becoming a 

useful tool for the prediction and prevention of aviation accidents? 

ANSWER: 

Yes. ASIAS is a useful tool to help identify risks that can lead to aviation accidents and serious 

incidents, but complex development work remains before it can help FAA and the aviation 

industry predict accidents. FAA's efforts to improve ASIAS continue, and-as the Agency has 

planned-they will take years to implement For example, FAA is still working to improve the 

program's capabilities to combine data voluntarily reported by pilots and air traffic controllers 

with other information, such as mandatory incident reports from the Agency's air traffic facilities. 

In addition, FAA plans to enhance the identification of safety risks by discovering and examining 

aviation system vulnerabilities. FAA's most recent plan for ASIAS outlines improvements and 

milestones through 2023, and indicates that the transition to prognostic safety analyses will be 

implemented over the next decade. 
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DeSaulnier QFR #2: ASIAS 

QUESTION: 

The OIG report also says that "the FAA does not allow its inspectors and analysts to use ASIAS's 

confidential data for their air carrier oversight" The report further states that, "74 percent of 

field inspectors and analysts who responded to the OIG's survey and were familiar with ASIAS 

stated that access to national level. .. trends would improve air carrier oversight" Do you believe 

that our aviation safety system is relying on self-reporting and self-monitoring at the expense of 

oversight of the airlines? What in your view, is an appropriate way to strike a balance between 

voluntary action and government oversight? 

ANSWER: 

We have not found that our aviation system overly relies on self-reporting and self-monitoring 

at the expense of airline oversight As we and others have reported, ASIAS can provide insights 

into actual flight operations along with possible safety risks and accident precursors that would 

otherwise not be available to FAA. Using these data, FAA and airlines can improve safety by 

enhancing the effectiveness of airline training programs, flight procedures, maintenance 

processes, and air traffic control operations. However, it is important for FAA to strike a balance 

between voluntary action and oversight-there is no substitute for effective Government 

oversight of airline operations. 

In our view, there are two ways to achieve this balance. First FAA needs to share ASIAS data and 

resulting safety enhancements with field staff to incorporate into day-to-day oversight activities. 

For example, FAA inspectors could identify a higher risk for air carriers that do not implement 

recommended safety enhancements. In response to our recommendations, FAA is implementing 

a process to provide ASIAS safety enhancement data and new oversight tools to aviation safety 

inspectors in the field. 

Second, as we have recommended, reports to voluntary programs should not include 

information related to accidents. We believe these data are not appropriate for the program 

because voluntary reports would not include the possibility of disciplinary actions against 

employees that may have caused the accidents. 
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WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL (ALPA) 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

"STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY" 

Air Line Pilots Association, International 

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 797-4033 

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The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), represents more than 60,000 

professional airline pilots flying for 34 airlines in the United States and Canada. ALPA 

is the world's largest pilot union and the world's largest non-governmental aviation 

safety organization. We are the recognized voice of the airline piloting profession in 

North America, with a history of safety and security advocacy spanning more than 85 

years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation of Airline Pilots 

Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to provide active airline pilot 

expertise to aviation safety issues worldwide, and to incorporate an international 

dimension to safety advocacy. 

Overview 

While 2017 was the safest on record globally, U.S. airlines operated under Part 121 

have not experienced a single passenger fatality resulting from an accident since 

2009; over 9 years. This is due to the efforts of aviation industry and our government 

partners BUT also due to the efforts of Congress. Prior to the passage of the Aviation 

Safety and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2010 the passenger airline industry lost 

approximately 1100 passengers in aircraft accidents. Since the passage of that bill 

there has not been a single passenger fatality. 

When compared to the rest of the world, the United States passenger airline record is 

truly remarkable. In the same 9-year timeframe that there have been no fatal United 

States passenger airline accidents, there have been 81 fatal passenger accidents 

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around the world, which includes more than 4,100 fatalities. The most important 

work this committee can accomplish is to ensure the United States maintains the 

highest safety levels in the world and continue to lead by example. This allows 

passengers to board a passenger airline, or send their mail, cargo, and gifts via an allcargo airline, and know, without a doubt in their mind, that all will get there safely. 

From day one in 1931, ALPA has maintained our motto of"schedule with safety". It 

hasn't changed; safety is still our top priority. 

Thus, the hearing today is very important to ALPA. I thank you for putting the 

spotlight on safety because we need to keep the focus on safety constantly, and the 

committee is to be recognized for its efforts to do so. 

We were pleased the committee chose to hold this hearing in February. As you know, 

the most recent passenger airline accident occurred on a cold snowy February 

evening in 2009, in Clearance Center, New York when Colgan Airlines Flight 3407 

crashed on approach to landing. Fifty people lost their lives. Earlier this month the 

pilots of ALPA, and many others directly impacted by that tragic accident 

remembered those we lost, and recalled the horror that for some, will always be 

etched in our hearts and in our minds. 

While we still mourn the loss of family, friends and fellow co-workers we also are able 

to appreciate the tremendous advancements in safety that has resulted from the focus 

members of Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and industry 

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collectively put into ensuring an accident like Colgan flight 3407 would be less likely 

happen in the future. And, given the laws and rule changes that have taken place, it 

appears that Congress, the FAA and industry got it right! 

However, in order for the United States aviation industry to continue to be the safest 

and most efficient airspace system in the world, this committee has very important 

work to do that needs to be accomplished, without delay. Unless we keep airline 

safety the top priority we risk digression and an increase in accidents that impact our 

ability to make progress on other important aspects of aviation such as airspace 

capacity and operational efficiencies. 

First Officer Qualifications Have Improved Aviation Safety 

The best and most important safety feature of any airline operation is a well-trained, 

fully qualified, highly experienced, and adequately rested professional flight crew. 

With a solid foundation of training and experience, pilots are essential in maintaining 

the safety of our system and ensuring that aviation safety continues to advance. 

Several regional airline accidents from 2004 to 2009 identified numerous training 

and qualification deficiencies that ultimately led to congressional action and 

regulatory changes that significantly improved airline safety. The last of these 

accidents occurred February 12, 2009, near Buffalo, N.Y. Fifty lives were lost-49 in 

the aircraft and one on the ground. This accident is now viewed as a "watershed 

event" for the airline industry and aviation safety by resulting in improvements in 

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pilot training, qualification, and flight experience requirements as well as 

implementation of science based flight, duty, and rest requirements. 

The following year, Congress acted decisively and forcefully on the identified safety 

deficiencies by sending legislation to the president that addressed the documented 

shortcomings. P.L. 111-216, the "Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration 

Extension Act of 2010," was signed into law on August 1, 2010. 

Following the establishment ofthe law, and based on industry recommendations, the 

FAA, citing 31 accidents over a nine-year period, issued regulations effective August 

1, 2013 to establish minimum first officer training and qualification requirements. 

These regulations require that all airline pilots flying under 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 121 must hold the air transport pilot (ATP) certificate. They 

also created the restricted ATP (R-ATP) certificate pathway, which could be obtained 

with fewer flight hours than the ATP, if the pilot applicant receives academic and 

flight training from the military or an accredited aviation college or university. 

The new rules emphasize significantly greater focus on academics and instruction, 

areas of knowledge, and flight experience in various weather and operational 

situations. The rules also require a type rating in the aircraft to be flown for the airline 

if operated in FAR Part 121 service, among other numerous safety improvements 

such as increased experience in multi-engine aircraft. The FAA made a specific 

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mention of the importance of academic training when it published the final rule, and 

how the accredited academics along with ground and flight training was necessary to 

qualify for a reduction in hours. 

As mentioned, the law also resulted in science-based flight, duty, and rest 

requirements for airlines. Unfortunately, these new flight and duty requirements 

were only applied to passenger airline operations. Cargo airline operations were 

carved out. 

Based on the safety improvements with minimum pilot training and qualification 

requirements achieved since P.L. 111-216 became law, we strongly urge the 

committee to preserve these critically important safety regulations. We urge the 

committee to reject any proposal to modifY or change that weakens the current 

minimum first officer qualifications. These rules are working very well in all aspects, 

and lives have been saved. 

Safety regulations should not be driven by the economic decisions of airlines. 

There are some people and organizations who want to fix business-related industry 

problems by weakening the First Officer Qualification (FOQ} rules. These 

organizations believe safety is something that can be negotiated. They believe that 

rolling back provisions in P.L. 111-216 is the best way to fix their business challenges 

by widening the employment pool. By that same logic, would these same groups be 

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lobbying to shorten the duration of medical school in an attempt to attract more 

doctors to work in rural areas? 

It is somewhat ironic that some who called for the changes in P.L. 111-216 have since 

become critical of the new rules, arguing that the new First Officer Qualifications have 

created a pilot shortage. Small communities which have experienced changes to the 

levels of airline services are also citing a pilot shortage. However, in both cases, there 

is no reliable data to support these positions. 

There are several business-related reasons that proponents cite for relaxing the 

safety rules. They say that the rules have negatively affected the industry in a number 

of ways. 

For example, while some have pointed out that the rules have created a pilot 

shortage, the data says differently. There is an adequate supply of qualified pilots 

and a robust pipeline of pilots to meet the needs of commercial aviation. In 2016, 

the FAA issued more than 9,500 ATP certificates, which includes more than 2,100 RATP certificates. In 2016, our research revealed that the airlines hired somewhere 

between 3500-4000 pilots, which is considerably fewer than the number of pilots 

who were qualified to fly for the airlines that year. 

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Flight Training Costs Not Impacted by FOQ 

The FOQ rules have not driven increases in flight training costs. The flight training a 

pilot is required to receive to obtain a commercial pilot certificate is the same today 

as it has been for decades. Once pilots achieve their commercial pilots certificate, they 

stop paying for their flight time. Instead, pilots obtain commercial flight experience 

through paid employment as flight instructors, corporate, cargo, or charter pilots. 

The hours and experience garnered in these entry-level commercial flight 

environments are critical to the successful creation of a well-trained, experienced, 

and fully qualified airline pilot. 

Pilot Experience before Airline Flying is Critical 

The length of time from when a pilot obtains their commercial pilots license to when 

they have accumulated the hours and flight experience necessary to qualify for the 

ATP or R-ATP certificate is measured in months, not years or decades. Pilots who 

graduate from an accredited, structured university that are qualified for the R-ATP 

pathway can currently expect to spend 12 months flying in entry level commercial 

operations before transitioning to an airline. 

Because each airline conducts training differently, and because they use different 

terminology and require pilots to adapt to procedural philosophies that are most 

likely unique, there will be some adjustments needed by pilots. While regional 

airlines would like pilots to come pre-programmed from a flight training environment 

that minimizes the adjustments needed by pilots entering an airline's flight training 

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environment, the pilots are also bringing with them real-world experience that 

includes a variety of weather, terrain, and air traffic control environments. 

It is important to note that airlines do NOT provide ANY training or provide pilots 

with aircraft to obtain experience in factors such as weather (e.g., thunderstorms, 

snow, tropical storms), terrain (e.g., high altitude, mountain flying), and high-density 

air traffic (e.g., New York City and Los Angeles metroplex). Today's flight simulation 

environment cannot adequately replicate these factors. Therefore, it is critical for 

pilots to obtain flight time and experience in commercial operations after they have 

obtained the commercial pilots license, but before being inserted into the Part 121 

airline operating environment. The FAA wisely recognized that the combination of 

an accredited university, structured FAA approved flight training, and some 

commercial piloting experience in pre-airline commercial operations was the best 

and safest training pathway to fully address the shortcomings identified from fatal 

passenger airline accidents. 

Pilot Supply Isn't Driving Airline Service Changes 

The changes in airline services to any airport large or small, are driven by several 

variables including passenger demand, an airline's access to an appropriately sized 

aircraft, economic incentives, access to ground services and equipment. Like any 

other business, however, airlines must decide where they are able to profitably 

provide affordable air transportation services. Airlines change service levels to all 

airports on a regular basis. As just one example, last November, Southwest airlines 

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announced that it would end service to Flint, Michigan. But the company was clear 

about the true reason for the change in service: the airport was not a good business 

fit. The same issue that Southwest airlines admitted to in Flint, Michigan (see: 

http://www.mlivc.com/news/flint/ind()~~sf/2017/11/south_west airlines pulls pi 

ug.html) is an issue in other small communities as well. 

Other considerations include proximity to larger airports with air travel that is less 

expensive due to the use of larger aircraft. Sometimes, airlines enhance the service 

to small communities by changing from a propeller aircraft to jet aircraft, which 

adds seats in almost all cases. By adding seats, the airline reduces the frequency of 

the flights but may actually provide more capacity than with propeller aircraft. 

ALPA is a strong proponent for ensuring that all Americans have access to passenger 

airline services, and when possible the services should be made available to the 

small communities across the nation. Lowering safety standards will not increase 

service to small communities it will simply make flying to those communities more 

dangerous. There are other rules and policies that can be changed to more fully 

support air travel from small communities. 

Flight Training Enrollments Are Increasing, Not Decreasing 

Several accredited universities with flight training programs have stated that 

enrollments of professional pilot students are significantly higher this year as 

compared to last year, and demand for future years remains strong. This is a strong 

indicator that the R-ATP pathway that is available to students who enroll at 

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accredited aviation colleges and universities is working. Pilots can and do complete 

a two- or four-year university degree program and accumulate 12-18 months of 

flying experience in entry-level commercial aviation employment before 

progressing to airline flying. 

By calling for changes to safety rules as their number one solution to their business 

problem, these other interested parties are telling the traveling public and elected 

officials that they need to accept reduced levels of safety in pilot training and 

qualifications so that business problems can be fixed. They are saying that no other 

law, regulation, or policy change in all of the United States code, and associated 

regulations can solve their problem. Intentionally or otherwise, they are also telling 

the traveling public that they need to accept reduced levels of safety when flying to 

small communities. They are telling the public that we need to go back to the way it 

was in February 2009. 

Pilot free market supply and demand will dictate if we continue to have enough pilots 

in the future, ALPA and the flying public will not accept a reduction in safety in an 

attempt to influence the pilot supply free market. 

Those few regional cargo and passenger airlines that report a shortage of pilots 

typically offer lower salaries and benefits, poor work-life balance, and fewer 

opportunities for career progression than airlines that are not reporting such a 

shortage. Qualified pilots have many employment opportunities and some regional 

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airlines have realized that to attract qualified candidates, they have to be competitive 

in salary and benefits to attract pilots. 

We urge the committee to seek to understand the issues that appear to be forcing the 

airlines and small community airport advocates to call for changes in safety rules, in 

order to fix a problem that is purely about economics. Travelers in the United States 

should not be required to sacrifice levels of safety to access airline travel from their 

home airports. But weakening first officer qualification rules attempt to do just that. 

Safe Shipments of Hazardous Materials 

ALPA has long advocated for improved transport requirements for hazardous 

materials. As witnessed in 2015 with hoverboards, and again last winter with the 

Samsung Galaxy Note 7, lithium batteries and other hazardous materials can create 

real safety threats in the absence of proper regulations. Mitigating the risk to aviation 

safety from hazardous materials requires a focus on two specific areas: improving 

hazardous materials regulations and eliminating shipments of undeclared hazardous 

materials. 

The significant consumer demand for these high-density power sources has resulted 

in rapid expansion in lithium battery production, supply, and proliferation. 

Consequently, this hazard is increasing exponentially. While lithium batteries 

represent a significant technological improvement over older battery technology, 

their high energy density and flammability make these batteries more prone to 

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failure, resulting in fire and explosion. The lack of comprehensive hazardous 

materials regulations for the carriage of lithium batteries as cargo onboard 

commercial aircraft, both passenger and cargo, continues to pose risks to air 

transportation. 

New standards implemented by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

on April 1, 2016, made significant improvements to provisions under which lithium 

batteries are shipped as cargo by air around the globe. And while the Department of 

Transportation has begun the process of harmonizing these into the U.S. regulations, 

no proposed or final rule has been issued after 22 months. We were very pleased to 

see language included in H.R. 2997 to require DOT to harmonize its regulations with 

the new ICAO standards. 

While the ICAO limitations are a good first step, they do not go far enough in 

addressing the safety risk created by lithium batteries. Work must continue to 

develop and mandate performance-based packaging standards that will prevent 

and/or contain a lithium battery fire. These standards must also address the threat 

from external fires. 

In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), Section 828, 

Congress directed the DOT not to regulate lithium batteries carried as cargo on 

aircraft stricter than the ICAO standards unless a fire onboard an aircraft could be 

proven to have substantially contributed to a fire involving lithium batteries in the 

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cargo hold. There have now been three such accidents (UPS 1307, UPS 6, and Asiana 

991), two of which were fatal to the pilots on board and all three of which destroyed 

the aircraft. The accident reports attribute lithium batteries as a large factor in all of 

these events. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), following the most recent accident 

involving Asiana Airlines Flight 991, issued a safety recommendation stating that it 

"believes that the circumstances and findings in the Asiana Flight 991 accident 

constitutes such credible evidence that demonstrates a deficiency in cargosegregation requirements that would permit the HMR [hazardous materials 

regulations] to be changed to be more stringent than the current ICAO requirements." 

ALPA agrees with the NTSB that the threshold set by legislation has been met and it 

is time to move forward on comprehensive regulations governing cargo shipments of 

lithium batteries. 

Hazardous materials, comprised of liquids, flammables, and other materials, shipped 

as cargo without being identified by the shipper are considered undeclared 

hazardous materials. There are no official estimates of what percentage of parcel 

shipments contain undeclared hazardous materials; however, the FAA tracks 

incidents where hazardous materials shipments create safety hazards for various 

reasons, such as a leaking package or other type of external evidence that the package 

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is a safety concern. In 2015, the FAA received 1,129 reports of such events, and 564 

of the incidents involved undeclared hazardous materials. 

ALP A's research indicates that the biggest weakness in the shipment of hazardous 

materials by air is the reliance on an "honor system" approach by the airlines and 

regulators. Increased attention to and accurate data is needed to eliminate 

undeclared hazardous materials shipments by air. 

FAA Leads the Way on Portable Device Safety in Checked Baggage 

ALPA concerns about lithium battery fires in checked luggage spiked early in 2017 

when security issues drove many passengers to store their large personal electronic 

devices in their checked baggage. 

We were pleased to see that the FAA has taken the significant step at I CAO to propose 

a prohibition of installed lithium batteries in certain electronic equipment from 

checked baggage on passenger aircraft. ALPA fully supports this proposal, which was 

based on testing conducted by the FAA at the William J. Hughes Technical Center (the 

Technical Center), outside of Atlantic City, New jersey. The FAA expertise and rigor 

applied to the testing, and proposal development is to be commended. 

Safe Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

With the rapidly growing use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for any number of 

applications and uses, the safety risks to airline operations needs to be monitored 

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very closely. We applaud this committee's commitment to ensure UAS safety, by 

holding a hearing at the end of last year on the topic, and by probing the need for a 

robust risk mitigation plan. Clearly, at some point in the future, UAS will be integrated 

into the national airspace system (NAS), interacting with other aircraft in a manner 

similar to "pilot on board" aircraft today. 

However, it seems at times that the FAA is struggling to keep pace with the expansion 

of the UAS industry. We must not allow pressure to rapidly integrate UAS into the NAS 

without appropriate safeguards in place. This process must be focused on safety as 

the highest priority. Risk mitigation plans, which have yet to be fully developed, 

combined with consensus-based technology standards that will ensure 

interoperability with manned aircraft, must be in place before a UAS can occupy the 

same airspace as manned aircraft or operate in areas where it might inadvertently 

stray into airspace occupied by airliners. When UAS operate in the same airspace as 

airline aircraft, the pilots will need to be able to see them on cockpit displays, and air 

traffic controllers will also need to see them on their displays to safely separate air 

traffic. Further, the UAS must be equipped with active collision-avoidance technology. 

We will oppose any integration that does not include collision avoidance systems that 

are interoperable with airline collision avoidance systems. 

If a UAS operator does not intend to fly in the same airspace as airliners, then 

limitations that ensure that the UAS stays out of the airspace must be programed into 

the UAS in a way that cannot be overridden. 

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FAA Authority to Fully Regulate all UAS 

The FAA has established 14 CFR Part 107, which are rules for small UAS (sUAS). The 

regulatory framework created is limited to commercial operations only. This is 

because Congress prohibited the FAA from promulgating any new rules on 

"hobbyists" operators in Section 336 of P.L. 112-95 of the FAA Modernization and 

Reform Act of 2012. This law was cited in an appeals court decision in early 2017 

that struck down the FAA regulatory requirement that requires all operators of sUAS 

that weigh more than .55 pounds to register with the FAA. Fortunately, this 

committee's bill - HR-2997-- includes a provision that would legislate the FAA's 

authority to require registration of all sUAS above the minimum weight threshold of 

0.55 pounds. Additionally, Congress saw fit to include this same registration 

requirement in the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed into law in 

December 2017 and ALPA was fully supportive of this effort. 

The prohibition against the FAA's authority to regulate hobbyist sUAS also creates an 

interesting situation where commercial sUAS pilots who are certified by the FAA have 

more operational restrictions on them than the hobbyist operators. While 

commercial sUAS operators must obtain explicit approval from air traffic control to 

operate in the vicinity of an airport with an operating control tower, model/hobby 

sUAS operators merely need to advise ATC. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive 

from a safety perspective. The operators who are not trained, and who have not been 

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issued a certificate from the FAA, should have more safety restrictions than 

commercial operators. 

As has been widely reported, a drone recently collided with a U.S. Army helicopter 

one mile east of Midland Beach in Staten Island, New York. From the investigation, 

we know that a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was in effect for the area of the 

flight, the UAS was not equipped with any type of identification or tracking 

technology. The National Transportation Safety Board used pieces of the sUAS that 

were found lodged in the aircraft, and using the information from these pieces, the 

hobbyist pilot of the sUAS was identified and located. The individual operating the 

sUAS routinely operated his hobby aircraft in the vicinity of the collision site, which 

was beyond his visual line of sight. After losing control of the aircraft, and because it 

failed to return to his position, he indicated that he simply believed his aircraft had 

"gone down" and he was unaware that it had been involved in a mid-air collision. 

In another recently reported event, a drone appears to have captured video of an 

ALPA-crewed airline aircraft flying underneath the drone while on approach to 

landing. In light these situations, we have reached out to all members of Congress 

with the support of other organizations, calling for it to give the FAA the ability to fully 

regulate all UAS operations. 

And we say it again today, ALPA strongly urges the committee to remove the current 

restrictions that Congress has placed on the FAA's ability to fully regulate all UAS, 

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including hobby sUAS. We are not calling on Congress to apply overly restrictive and 

burdensome regulations on the recreational segment of the sUAS industry. However, 

we are calling on Congress to allow the FAA to use its regulatory authority to address 

the known and constantly increasing risk to airline safety. 

sUAS Identification and Tracking Technologies are Needed 

ALPA also encourages Congress to work closely with the FAA to implement 

mandatory identification and tracking capabilities as quickly as possible. An aviation 

rule making committee (ARC) recently concluded its work in this very important area, 

and provided the FAA with recommendations that should result in a regulatory 

framework that increases safety and addresses security concerns as well. ALPA 

participated on the ARC, and I can tell you that a very diverse group of participants 

worked very well together to achieve excellent results. 

If an identification and tracking system had been in place prior to the October 

collision with the Army helicopter, much more information would have been 

immediately available to accident investigators and law enforcement. Such a system 

would likely have prevented the collision in the first place, because law enforcement 

may have observed the sUAS operating on a previous flight, and proactively contacted 

the hobbyist about the illegal use of the aircraft. Until there is a way for law 

enforcement to identifY and track down the sUAS pilots, there is very little incentive 

for non-conformist hobby operator to do so safely. 

19 
118 


Insert offset folio 87 here 31404.087

Strengthening the Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs 

Voluntary safety reporting programs such as the Aviation Safety Action Program 

(ASAP) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) are important, collaborative 

tools that enhance aviation safety through the analysis of voluntarily reported safety 

events and discrepancies that lead to the prevention of accidents and incidents. The 

purpose of ASAP and FOQA is to encourage and use voluntarily reported safety 

information provided by frontline employees and airlines, respectively, to identify 

safety risks. Without these valuable safety reports, unidentified risks go unmitigated 

and remain within the system. 

For example, more than a decade ago the implementation of stabilized approach 

technology and procedures became a top safety priority upon discovering the 

frequency of non-stabilized approaches being reported by pilots. More recently, data 

sources have been combined to identify potential risks that are initially identified 

through the voluntary safety programs. Ground radar data, historical weather 

information, and other data sources were used to identify instances when aircraft 

traffic and terrain warning systems were repeatedly alerting to false alarms. These 

voluntary safety programs triggered these studies, which ultimately led to the 

discovery that improvements to airspace and procedures design would reduce the 

false alarms. These examples prove that the underlying voluntary safety program 

reporting by the operators is the best source to identify potential risk areas and to 

investigate and ultimately mitigate these risks. 

20 
119 


Insert offset folio 88 here 31404.088

Automatic Acceptance 

We can improve and increase the safety benefit of ASAP and voluntarily submitted 

aviation safety information by automatic acceptance of ASAP reports. Several 

programs already have automatic acceptance protocols built in (e.g., American and 

Delta Air Lines). However, where ASAP reports are not automatically accepted, the 

safety benefit is delayed, sometimes by weeks or longer, waiting for an Event Review 

Committee (ERC) to meet, review, and accept these reports. Under an automaticacceptance scenario, the safety benefit of the information would be realized 

immediately. However, a report could be excluded when the ERC convenes and it is 

determined to meet established exclusionary criteria. The automatic acceptance 

model works and should be universal to ASAP. ALPA is pleased that HR 2997 includes 

this very important provision. 

Addressing Cargo Safety 

Many of the safety and security layers working to protect our passenger airline 

industry are absent from all-cargo operations. Cargo airlines fly the same aircraft, 

takeoff and land from the same airports, utilize the same airspace, and fly over the 

same cities as passenger aircraft. From a safety and security standpoint, there is every 

reason to hold all-cargo operations to the same standards as passenger operations. 

All-cargo airline operations currently experience an accident rate that is seven times 

higher than passenger airline operations worldwide. 

21 
120 


Insert offset folio 89 here 31404.089

While many of the same regulations are used for both commercial passenger and allcargo airlines, there are lesser requirements placed on all-cargo operations in several 

very important areas, which results in unnecessary safety risk. 

One example of this safety double standard between cargo and passenger operations 

is flight crew flight, duty, and rest regulations. While new flight- and duty-time 

regulations for passenger operations were issued in 2011 and implemented in 2014, 

those rules apply only to flight crew members at passenger airlines and do not include 

all-cargo pilots. The FAA's original rule included all pilots, passenger, and cargo 

operations, but the cargo sector was removed by the Office of Management and 

Budget due to a flawed cost-benefit methodology. We believe that science-based 

flight, duty, and rest regulations must be developed for flight crew members of allcargo operations. 

Another example of a safety gap is that all-cargo operations are exempted from 

Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) requirements contained in 14 CFR Part 139. 

This means that ARFF is not required to be staffed or even present at airports during 

operations of cargo aircraft. 

Further, cargo aircraft carry some very hazardous cargo such as blood-borne 

pathogen, chemical, and even radioactive material. Not only should ARFF be staffed 

during cargo operations, but ARFF personnel must be trained for dealing with fires 

on cargo airliners. Measures need to be developed and implemented that will 

22 
121 


Insert offset folio 90 here 31404.090

properly prepare firefighters for dealing with a cargo aircraft fire. There is a lack of 

proper ARFF equipment needed to fight all-cargo aircraft fires at some airports, 

including nozzle tips designed for penetrating cargo airliner hulls, and a lack of 

funding, because the exemption of cargo from 14 CFR Part 139 requirements 

interferes with fire departments' ability to get the money they need for staffing, 

equipment, training, and developing strategy for cargo-specific events. 

ALPA has maintained a strong stance that all-cargo operations must have the same 

level of safety as passenger airlines. The facts however, speak for themselves. The 

United States fatal accident rate of all-cargo operations is significantly higher than 

that of passengers. In the same period that there have been no fatal passenger 

accidents on U.S. airlines, there have been several fatal cargo accidents. These facts 

are the reason why ALPA has invested our resources in the efforts of the Commercial 

Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and their technical groups, to identify the differences 

between passenger and all-cargo that need to be addressed. We appreciate the 

Committee's support of the work being done by CAST and the Aviation Safety 

Information Analysis and Sharing (AS lAS) activity. We know that with the support of 

Congress, we will achieve the safety goals that all are striving to achieve. 

ALPA and Aviation Safety 

We appreciate the committee's invitation to offer our insights and perspectives on 

these important safety issues. More importantly, we appreciate the leadership that is 

being exerted by the committee to advance these high-priority safety issues. The 

23 
122 


Insert offset folio 91 here 31404.091

airline industry is best positioned to fully meet the needs of all passengers and 

shippers when safety levels remain at their current levels. It is in our collective best 

interest as legislative leaders, labor organizations, companies, and regulators, to 

ensure the foundation of safety is solid, and continues to lead the rest of the world. I 

look forward to working these issues with you in the coming months as we strive to 

make meaningful safety improvements to aviation in the work we are doing together. 

24 
123 


Insert offset folio 92 here 31404.092

Captain Tim Canoll, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International, responses to questions for the record 

issued by Rep. Daniel Lipinski of Illinois 

Required Experience for R-ATP Certification (To ALPA) 

The FAA gives credit toward the minimum requirements to former military pilots and graduates of 

certain flight training institutions. Often, these pilots have had advanced training in simulators 

capable of testing scenarios that wouldn't otherwise be safe to demonstrate in the real world. In 

your opinion, should more credit be given for simulator time? Are simulators more useful for 

developing skills than, say, accruing time as a flight instructor, when the pilot gains hours ,iust 

watching another pilot fly? 

ANSWER: Simulators are good for training standard operating procedures and practicing flight maneuvers that are 

performed during normal operations as well as some selected system and aircraft malfunctions. Simulators don't 

accurately reflect the real world of line operations that are subject to dynamically changing weather and 

operating scenarios. The use of simulators is conducted with the assumption that the pilot already has a base level 

of understanding that he or she gained during his or her hours of flight experience. That baseline is used as a 

foundation for them to learn in a simulator the procedures of a particular aircraft model. 

Every hour of flight is valuable and provides a base of understanding of the dynamics offlight that's transferable 

across all aircraft. Pilots develop judgment and decision-making skills based on experience in real-world 

conditions. Regardless of the aircraft they fly, they still have to work with ATC, the weather, and aircraft issues, so 

that's transferrable experience. Most pilots who are building toward an ATP or an R-ATP get those flight hours in 

corporate, business aviation, and/or other forms of commercial experience before moving to the airlines. They 

perform Part 135 flight operations such as air taxi services and in-flight instruction, which are done in real-world 

"dynamic" conditions such as shifting weather, changing communications, and developing aircraft maintenance 

issues. 

ALP A's position is that any reduction in the 750, 1,000, 1,250, or 1,500 flight hours required is a step away from a 

safe system toward a less-safe system. 
124 


Insert offset folio 93 here 31404.093

~niteb- ~tates Qiourt of J\ppeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

Argued March 1 0, 2017 Decided July 28, 2017 

No. 16-1101 

FLYERS RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, INC., DIBI A 

FLYERSRIGHTS.ORG, AND PAUL HUDSON, 

PETITIONERS 

v. 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., 

RESPONDENTS 

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

Joseph E. Sandler argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner. 

Karen Schoen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney at 

the time the brief was filed, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney. 

Before: ROGERS, MILLETT, and PILLARD, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT. 
125 


Insert offset folio 94 here 31404.094

2 

Opinion concurring in part and concurnng m the 

judgment filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: This is the Case of the 

Incredible Shrinking Airline Seat. As many have no doubt 

noticed, aircraft seats and the spacing between them have 

been getting smaller and smaller, while American passengers 

have been growing in size. Paul Hudson and the Flyers 

Rights group became concerned that this sharp contraction in 

passenger seating space was endangering the safety, health, 

and comfort of airline passengers. So they petitioned the 

Federal Aviation Administration to promulgate rules 

governing size limitations for aircraft seats to ensure, among 

other things, that passengers can safely and quickly evacuate a 

plane in an emergency. The Administration denied the 

petition, asserting that seat spacing did not affect the safety or 

speed of passenger evacuations. To support that conclusion, 

the Administration pointed to (at best) off-point studies and 

undisclosed tests using unknown parameters. That type of 

vaporous record will not do-the Administrative Procedure 

Act requires reasoned decisionmaking grounded in actual 

evidence. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in 

part and remand to the Administration. 

I 

A 

Congress has charged the Federal Aviation 

Administration with ensuring the safety and security of 

commercial airline passengers. See 49 U .S.C. 

§§ 44701, 40101(d); see also Wallaesa v. Federal Aviation 

Admin., 824 F.3d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In fulfilling 

that role, the Administration has ''"plenar.v authority to 

[ m Jake and enforce safety regulations governing the design 
126 


Insert offset folio 95 here 31404.095

3 

and operation of civil aircraft' in order to ensure the 

'maximum possible safety."' Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 

638, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (alteration in original) (quoting 

H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1958)). 

As relevant here, the Federal Aviation Act charges the 

Administration with "promot[ing] safe flight of civil aircraft 

in air commerce by prescribing* * *minimum standards 

required in the interest of safety for * * * the design, material, 

construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft," as 

well as "regulations and minimum safety standards for other 

practices, methods, and procedure[ s] * * * necessary for 

safety in air commerce[.]" 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(l), (5). 

When issuing such minimum safety standards and regulations, 

the Administration must consider "the duty of an air carrier to 

provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in 

the public interest[.]" /d. § 4470l(d)(1)(A). In addition, the 

Administration "shall consider the following matters, among 

others, as being in the public interest: (1) assigning, 

maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 

priorities in air commerce[, and] (2) regulating air commerce 

in a way that best promotes safety and fulfills national defense 

requirements." /d. § 40IOI(d)(l), (2). The Administration 

thus has broad authority to promulgate regulations 

"reasonably related to safety in flight." Wallaesa, 824 F.3d at 

1 079 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Members of the public may petition the Administration to 

promulgate, amend, or repeal regulations. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ l06(t)(3)(A); 14 C.F.R. § 1l.61(a). Such a petition must 

include, among other things, the purpose of the proposed 

action, an "explanation ofwhy [the] proposed action would be 

in the public interest," and "[a ]ny specific facts or 

circumstances that support" the proposed action. 14 

C.F.R. § 11.71 (a). Once it receives a petition, the 
127 


Insert offset folio 96 here 31404.096

4 

Administration has six months to respond either "by 

dismissing such petition[], by informing the petitioner of an 

intention to dismiss, or by issuing a notice of proposed 

rulemaking or advanced notice of proposed rulemaking." 49 

U.S.C. § 106(f)(3)(A); see 14 C.F.R. § 11.73(a), (e). 

B 

On August 26, 2015, Paul Hudson and the non-profit 

organization Flyers Rights Education Fund of which he is 

president (collectively, "Flyers Rights") petitioned the 

Administration to promulgate rules governing the minimum 

requirements for seat sizes and spacing on commercial 

passenger airlines. In its petition, Flyers Rights provided 

evidence that commercial airline seat and spacing dimensions 

have steadily decreased in size over the last several decades. 

The petition noted that economy-class "seat pitch"-the 

distance between a point on one seat and the same point on 

the seat directly in front of it-has decreased from an average 

of 35 inches to 31 inches, and in some airplanes has fallen as 

low as 28 inches. Evidence in the petition further indicated 

that average seat width has narrowed from approximately 

18.5 inches in the early-2000s to 17 inches in the early- to 

mid-20 lOs. The petition also noted that, since the 1960s, the 

average American flyer had grown steadily larger in both 

height and girth. Flyers Rights expressed concern that the 

decrease in seat size, coupled with the increase in passenger 

size, imperiled passengers' health and safety by slowing 

emergency egress and by causing deep vein thrombosis (a 

potentially fatal condition involving blood clots in the legs), 
128 


Insert offset folio 97 here 31404.097

5 

as well as "soreness, stiffness, [and] other joint and muscle 

problems." Pet. for Rulemaking 6. 1 

Accordingly, Flyers Rights asked the Administration to: 

promulgate regulations that would (i) "set[] maintenance 

standards and limit[] the extent of seat size changes [on 

commercial airlines] in order to ensure consumer safety, 

health, and comfort"; (ii) "plac[ e] a moratorium on any 

further reductions in seat size, width, pitch, padding, and aisle 

width until a final rule is issued"; and (iii) "[a]ppoint an 

advisory committee or task force to assist and advise the 

[Administration] in proposing seat and passenger space rules 

and standards[.]" Pet. for Rulemaking 3. 

On February 1, 2016, the Administration denied Flyers 

Rights' petition for rulemaking. The Administration 

explained that, in addressing petitions for rulemaking, it 

weighs: "(1) [t]he immediacy of the safety or security 

concerns * * * raise[ d], (2) [t]he priority of other issues the 

[Administration] must deal with, and (3) [t]he resources we 

have available to address these issues." Denial of Pet. for 

Rulemaking 1; see also 14 C.F.R. § 11.73(a). The 

Administration then concluded that Flyers Rights' concerns 

1 Flyers Rights is not alone in its concerns. See Press Release, 

Office of the Hon. Steve Cohen, Tenn. 9th Dist., Reps. Cohen and 

Kinzinger, Senators Blumenthal, Schumer, Markey, Menendez and 

Feinstein Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral SEAT Act (March 9, 

20 17), https://cohen.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/repscohen-and-kinzinger-senators-blumenthal-schumer-markeymenendez-and [https://perma.cc/KL7J-GE62] (last accessed July 

21, 20 17) ("The average distance between rows of seats has 

dropped from 35 inches before airline deregulation in the 1970s to 

about 31 inches today. The average width of an airline seat has also 

shrunk from 18 inches to about 16Y2."). 
129 


Insert offset folio 98 here 31404.098

6 

did not warrant action because the issues raised "relate[ d) to 

passenger health and comfort, and d[id] not raise an 

immediate safety or security concern." Denial of Pet. for 

Rulemaking 2. The Administration reasoned that it already 

"require[ s] full-scale evacuation demonstrations and analysis 

that set the limit for the maximum number of passengers for 

any given airplane model," including for aircraft with 

"interior configurations that are more critical (less seat pitch 

and higher number of passengers) than most configurations 

operated by the airlines," and that emergency egress tests 

"have been successfully conducted at 28- and 29-inch 

pitch[.]" I d. The Administration added that "[ s ]eat pitch 

alone does not determine the amount of space available 

between seats * * * [because] modem, thinner seats at lower 

seat pitch provide more space than older seats did at higher 

pitch." ld. The Administration further noted that the medical 

concerns identified in the petition exist "irrespective of the 

seat pitch[.]" Id. With respect to Flyers Rights' concerns 

about deep vein thrombosis, the Administration concluded 

that the condition was ''rare"; it can occur with "any longduration seated activity"; and its risks are "the same for 

economy-class and business-class." ld. 

The Administration's denial of the petitiOn for 

rulemaking did not cite any studies or tests to corroborate its 

representations. Nor did it challenge Flyers Rights' 

characterization of seat dimension decreases or passenger size 

mcreases. 

Flyers Rights sent a follow-up letter to the 

Administration's Director of the Aircraft Certification Service 

asking the Administration to "formally cite the study(ies) [it] 

* * * rel[ied] on" in denying the petition. J.A. 173. In 

response, the Administration identified a series of its own 

reports on airplane emergency egress and links to medical 
130 


Insert offset folio 99 here 31404.099

7 

websites that discussed deep vein thrombosis. The studies 

cited in the letter did not address the impact of smaller seat 

dimensions or increased passenger size on the ability of 

passengers to expeditiously leave their seats and reach the 

emergency exits. 

Dissatisfied with the Administration's unsubstantiated 

representations about matters of passenger health and safety, 

Flyers Rights timely petitioned this court for review. 

II 

We review the Administration's actions to determine 

whether they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Safe 

Extensions. Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 509 F.3d 593, 

604 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Under 

that standard, we will reverse "only if the agency's decision is 

not supported by substantial evidence, or the agency has made 

a clear error in judgment.'' !d. (citation omitted). Upon 

review, we may "affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part 

of the order and may order the * * * Administrat[ion] to 

conduct further proceedings." 49 U .S.C. § 4611 0( c). 

Because Flyers Rights challenges the Administration's 

decision not to engage in rulemaking-the Administration's 

inaction-our review is "extremely limited." WildEarth 

Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(citation omitted); see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 

527 (2007) ("narrow" review of agency decision not to act). 

That is because an agency has "broad discretion to choose 

how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to 

carry out its delegated responsibilities." Massachusetts, 549 

U.S. at 527; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 

F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[A]n agency's refusal to 
131 


Insert offset folio 100 here 31404.100

8 

institute rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the 

range of levels of deference we give to agency action under 

our 'arbitrary and capricious' review.") (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

In reviewing such decisions, we ask "whether the agency 

employed reasoned decisionmaking in rejecting the petition," 

Defenders of Wildl~fe, 532 F.3d at 919, and we will overturn 

the agency's decision "only for compelling cause, such as 

plain error of law or a fundamental change in the factual 

premises previously considered by the agency," WildEarth 

Guardians, 751 F.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Our review turns, more specifically, on 

whether the agency ''adequately explained the facts and policy 

concerns it relied on and [whether] * * * those facts have 

some basis in the record.'' !d. (alterations in original; citation 

omitted). 

III 

Flyers Rights challenges two aspects of the 

Administration's denial of its petition for rulemaking: (1) its 

conclusion that current seat pitch and width, as well as 

passenger size, do not negatively impact emergency egress, 

and (2) its denial of authority to consider matters related to 

passenger health and comfort. We agree with Flyers Rights 

that the Administration failed to provide a plausible 

evidentiary basis for concluding that decreased seat sizes 

combined with increased passenger sizes have no effect on 

emergency egress. But we disagree with Flyers Rights' 

challenge to the Administration's declination to regulate 

matters of physical comfort and routine health. 
132 


Insert offset folio 101 here 31404.101

9 

Emergency egress 

Flyers Rights' petition for rulemaking reasonably 

identified a safety concern arising from the commercial 

airlines' documented pattern of placing ever larger passengers 

in ever smaller seats with still less space between them. The 

petition explained why such seating constrictions could make 

it more difficult for passengers to quickly leave their seats and 

escape an aircraft in the event of an emergency. Specifically, 

the petition asserted that, in an emergency, decreased seat 

spacing would increase panic, delay access to the center aisle, 

and impede the escape of injured passengers. The petition 

also included multiple comments from airline passengers 

expressing safety concerns. One commenter stated that 

current seat spacing made it "necessary to climb onto [her] 

seat to get out." J.A. 167. Another commenter asserted that, 

given current seat spacing, "[i]n an emergency, there is no 

way we would have been able to get to an exit row in less 

than three or four minutes[.]" J.A. 169. 

The Administration has a broad mandate to protect and 

promote passenger safety. Ensuring that all passengers can 

rapidly evacuate an airplane is of central importance to that 

safety mission. See 14 C.F.R. § 25.803(c) (requiring that 

aircraft with a capacity of more than forty-four passengers be 

capable of evacuation within ninety seconds, and that actual 

egress demonstrations be undertaken to ensure compliance 

with Administration regulations). The Administration does 

not dispute that. Accordingly, when the Administration 

responds to a petition for rulemaking that exposes a plausible 

life-and-death safety concern, the Administration must 

reasonably address that risk in its response. 

The Administration failed that task here. In asserting that 

decreasing seat size and pitch had no effect on emergency 
133 


Insert offset folio 102 here 31404.102

10 

egress, the Administration pointed to certain studies and 

demonstration tests. But the cited studies say nothing about 

and do not appear to control for seat pitch, width, or any other 

seat dimension. Nor do they address or control for how 

increased passenger size interacts with the current seat 

dimensions to affect emergency egress. Studies cannot 

corroborate or demonstrate something that they never mention 

or even indirectly address. 

The Administration argues that the omission of 

information about seat dimensions from the tests means that 

seat dimensions are categorically unimportant to emergency 

egress. That makes no sense. Tests generally require a 

limited number of variables to be workable and verifiable. 

The omission of other variables says nothing about such 

variables' relevance to what is being tested; it says only that 

they were not recorded, measured, or altered for that 

particular test. Take, for example, a study on tooth decay that 

only recorded participants' sugar consumption. The study's 

silence on the question of brushing and flossing would surely 

not imply that brushing and flossing have no effect on the risk 

of getting a cavity. 

The Administration's rationale also blinks reality. As a 

matter of basic physics, at some point seat and passenger 

dimensions would become so squeezed as to impede the 

ability of passengers to extricate themselves from their seats 

and get over to an aisle. The question is not whether seat 

dimensions matter, but when. 

Indeed, an Administration study that addressed passenger 

size in a slightly different context actually corroborates Flyers 

Rights' point. The study considered, among other things, the 

ability of wider passengers to pass through the emergency exit 

row and door. Importantly, this test found that increased 
134 


Insert offset folio 103 here 31404.103

11 

passenger width had the greatest effect on exit speed of all the 

variables tested. See J.A. 89 (chart indicating "[ w ]aist [ s ]ize" 

had the largest "[r]elative [m]agnitude of [e]ffect[]" of the ten 

variables tested). Yet nowhere did the Administration explain 

why passenger size would impede progress through the 

relatively wide emergency exit rows, yet have no impact on 

passenger movement through the far more cramped (seatpitch-decreased) seating rows. 2 

The Administration also overlooks that its studies are 

outdated. They were conducted in the 2000s when, according 

to the petition, seat dimensions were larger. Agency 

reasoning, however, must adapt as the critical facts change. 

See American Horse Prot. Ass 'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987) ("[A] refusal to initiate a rulemaking naturally sets 

off a special alert when a petition has sought modification of a 

rule on the basis of a radical change in its factual premises."). 

The Administration points out that evacuation tests must 

be run with the maximum allowable passenger occupancy for 

any given aircraft model. See 14 C.F.R. § 25.807(g) 

(regulating the number of passengers allowed in each 

specified aircraft model. to promote emergency egress); id. 

§ 25.803(c) (tests must be run with maximum allowable 

occupancy). The problem for the Administration is that 

maximum occupancy is not an adequate proxy for cabin-seat 

or passenger dimensions. Because planes commonly include 

different seating classes like first class, business class, and 

2 A second study in part examined the impact of passenger 

size on injuries sustained when traveling through the emergency 

exit door. Notably, that study observed that "physical 

characteristics (gender, age, waist size, height) [were] previously 

shown to significantly affect emergency egress[.]" J.A. 39. 
135 


Insert offset folio 104 here 31404.104

12 

economy plus, limiting the number of seats in an aircraft does 

not limit seat pitch and width in all of the seats, and especially 

in the ordinary economy-class seats. That means that 

economy-seating pitch could decrease to levels that could 

impede emergency egress, while the pitch and width in the 

first class and business class seats would not. 

Finally, the Administration stated in its decision that 

emergency evacuation tests have been successfully run with 

seat dimensions as small as those being used by commercial 

airlines. The problem is that not one of those tests is in the 

record. So they provide no evident support for the 

Administration's conclusion. 

The Administration says they were omitted because the 

tests are "proprietary." Administration's Br. 13. Of course, 

an agency may decline to include confidential business 

information in the public administrative record in certain 

narrow situations, as long as it discloses as much information 

publicly as it can. See MD Pharm., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement 

Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding an 

agency's decision not to include confidential business 

information in the public record of a licensing hearing); cf 

Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep 't of the Air 

Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Under the 

Freedom of Information Act, "[i]t has long been a rule in this 

Circuit that non-exempt portions of a document must be 

disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt 

portions."). 

The problem here is that the Administration has given no 

reasoned explanation for withholding the tests in their 

entirety, and it has declined to file them under seal or in 

redacted fonn. Yet the Administration explicitly relied on 

those missing studies in reaching its decision to deny the 
136 


Insert offset folio 105 here 31404.105

13 

petition for rulemaking. See Denial of Pet. for Rulemaking 2 

("Full scale evacuation tests on widely used airplanes have 

been successfully conducted at 28- and 29-inch pitch[.]"); 

J.A. 178. And the Administration asks the court to trust those 

studies in reviewing the Administration's decision. See Oral 

Arg. Tr. 29-33; Administration's Br. 11-13. 

But that is not how judicial review works. We cannot 

affirm the sufficiency of what we cannot see. "[A]n agency 

decision based on 'reliable data reposing in the [agency's] 

files"' but hidden from judicial view "simply cannot 

withstand scrutiny." United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal 

Maritime Comm 'n, 584 F.2d 519, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 

Indeed, we have long held that, when "the data relied on 

by [an agency] in reaching its decision is not included in the 

administrative record and is not disclosed to the court[,]" we 

cannot "determine whether the final agency decision reflects 

the rational outcome of the agency's consideration of all 

relevant factors[.]" United States Lines, 584 F.2d at 533 

(footnote omitted). Whatever deference we generally accord 

to administrative agencies, "we will not defer to a declaration 

of fact that is 'capable of exact proof but is unsupported by 

any evidence." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States 

Dep't of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1190 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (citation omitted). 3 

3 See also Safe Extensions, 509 F.3d at 605 ("[A]n agency's 

'declaration of fact that is capable of exact proof but is unsupported 

by any evidence' is insufficient to make the agency's decision nonarbitrary.") (citation omitted); cf Chamber of Commerce of US. v. 

SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (for an informal 

rulemaking, "[a]mong the information that must be revealed for 
137 


Insert offset folio 106 here 31404.106

14 

The problems with the Administration's position do not 

stop there. Even with respect to its unseen tests, the agency 

cannot say whether those tests accounted for increased 

passenger size, which is a critical component of the egress 

problem raised by Flyers Rights' petition. When questioned 

at oral argument, counsel for the Administration was unaware 

whether such tests take into account larger passengers. See 

Oral Arg. Tr. 29, 33-34. 

To be sure, the record needed to support an agency's 

decision not to engage in rulemaking can be sparser than that 

needed to support rulemaking. Normally, it "need only 

include the petition for rulemaking, comments pro and con 

where deemed appropriate, and the agency's explanation of 

its decision to reject the petition." WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 

F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ). 

But this case is different because the Administration 

admits it relied materially on information it has not disclosed, 

and the Administration has pointed this court to that 

information as a basis for affirmance. Having invited the 

court into its record, the Administration cannot hide the 

evidentiary ball. L./. CTS Corp. v. EPA, 759 F.3d 52, 64 

(D.C. Cir. 2014) ("It is black-letter administrative law that in 

an [Administrative Procedure Act] case, a reviewing court 

should have before it neither more nor less information than 

did the agency when it made its decision.") (alteration in 

public evaluation are the technical studies and data upon which the 

agency relies") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
138 


Insert offset folio 107 here 31404.107

15 

original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To 

do otherwise would reduce judicial review to a rubber stamp. 4 

In short, when an agency denies a petition for 

rulemaking, the record can be slim, but it cannot be vacuous. 

Especially so when, as here, the petition identifies an 

important issue that falls smack-dab within the agency's 

regulatory ambit. While we do not require much of the 

agency at this juncture, we do require something. And 

information critically relied upon by the agency that no one 

can see does not count. We accordingly remand to the 

Administration to adequately address the petition and the 

emergency egress concerns it raises. If the petition for 

rulemaking is again denied, the Administration must provide 

appropriate record support for its decision. 5 

4 See WildEarth Guardians, 751 F.3d at 653 (a reviewing 

court must determine "whether the agency adequately explained the 

facts and policy concerns it relied on and [whether] * * * those 

facts have some basis in the record'') (alterations in original; 

emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 238 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Allowing such omissions in data and 

methodology may ma[ke] it impossible to reproduce an agency's 

results or assess its reliance upon them.") (alteration in original; 

internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Air Prods. & 

Chems., Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 687, 699 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting 

that "official notice of unspecified information in the files of an 

agency precludes effective judicial review"). 

5 See generally Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 

U.S. 729, 744 (1985) ("If the record before the agency does not 

support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all 

relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate 

the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the 
139 


Insert offset folio 108 here 31404.108

16 

Flyers Rights asks the court to go further and order the 

Administration to institute rulemaking. That we will not do. 

"Our cases make clear * * * that such a remedy is appropriate 

only 'in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances."' 

American Horse Prot., 812 F .2d at 7 (quoting WWHT, 656 

F .2d at 818). Rather, remand is the presumptive remedy 

when the agency record is insufficient "to permit [the court] 

to engage in meaningful review.'' See id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Because the Administration 

claims to have access to the information that would fully 

justify its denial of the petition for rulemaking, an order to 

engage in rulemaking is unwarranted at this point. 

Health and comfort concerns 

Flyers Rights also objects to the Administration's failure 

to address its concerns regarding passenger health and 

comfort. More specifically, Flyers Rights' petition worried 

that cramped seat conditions cause deep vein thrombosis, 

"soreness, stiffness, [and] other joint and muscle problems[.]" 

Pet. for Rulemaking at 6. The Administration rejected such 

concerns partly on the ground that they "relate to passenger 

health and comfort, and do not raise an immediate safety or 

security concern." Denial of Pet. for Rulemaking 2. 

Flyers Rights argues that the Administration's failure to 

_consider matters of passenger health and comfort is a 

misinterpretation of its statutory authority, pointing to 

assorted statutory provisiOns that purportedly require 

consideration of "the availability of a variety of adequate, 

proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the 

agency for additional investigation or explanation."). 
140 


Insert offset folio 109 here 31404.109

17 

economic, efficient[,] and low-priced services" and the 

"develop[ ment] and maint[ enance of] a sound regulatory 

system that is responsive to the needs of the public." Flyers 

Rights' Opening Br. 26 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 49 

U.S.C. § 40101(a)(4), (7)). The problem for Flyers Rights is 

that the cited statutory provisions apply only to the Secretary 

of Transportation, not to the Administration. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 4010l(a). 

Flyers Rights also points out that "health" is a component 

of "safety"-a criterion the Administration without a doubt 

must consider under applicable statutory provisions. Flyers 

Rights' Reply Br. 7-9; see Flyers Rights' Opening Br. 26-27. 

See also 49 U.S.C. §§ 44701, 4010l(d). We agree. We have 

held that the Administration's statutory authority "embod[ies] 

a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of the safety 

aspect[ s] of aviation[.]" Bargmann, 715 F .2d at 642 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). That includes 

protecting passengers' physical health in flight, even from 

harms that are not occasioned by the flight. Indeed, in 

Bargmann, we rejected the Administration's position that its 

authority was confined to addressing only those health issues 

that were "caused or induced by flight." ld. at 640 (emphasis 

and internal quotation marks omitted). We held instead that 

the Administration has the authority to regulate first aid kits 

for treating conditions that occur during the flight, whether or 

not those conditions are caused by flight conditions or 

operations. ld. at 642; see also Wallaesa, 824 F.3d at 1080 

(reaffirming the Administration's power to regulate "care for 

ill passengers"). 

So there is no question that the Administration has the 

statutory authority to address at least some passenger health 

issues. See Wallaesa, 824 F .3d at I 079-1080 (Administration 

may regulate medical equipment to ensure '"the personal 
141 


Insert offset folio 110 here 31404.110

18 

safety of the stricken passengers' and crew'') (citation 

omitted); Bargmann, 715 F.2d at 642-643 ("Not only are 

inflight medical emergencies of immediate concern to the 

personal safety of the stricken passengers, but they may also 

be of concern to the safety of others.") (citation omitted); 14 

C.F .R. § 121, App. A (Administration regulation requiring 

"automated external [heart] defibrillator[ s ]" on passenger 

aircraft). 6 

The problem for Flyers Rights is that, in this case, the 

Administration acknowledged its authority to protect the 

health of passengers, stating that it would "continue to 

monitor seat designs and effects on safety and health." J.A. 

175 (emphasis added). The Administration thus did not 

6 The concurring opmwn would hold that Flyers Rights 

waived reliance on the Bargmann line of cases. Concurring Op. 1-

3. We respectfully disagree. Flyers Rights pressed the argument 

that passenger health can be regulated in conjunction with safety in 

its opening brief. See Flyers Rights' Opening Br. 26-27; Flyers 

Rights' Reply Br. 7-9; Pet. for Rulemaking 3. To be sure, the 

manner in which Flyers Rights substantiated that argument evolved 

from its opening to reply brief. But that is not an uncommon 

occurrence. What matters is that the core of Flyers Rights' 

argument-that passenger health can be regulated in conjunction 

with safety-remained the same. And once an argument is before 

us, it is our job to get the relevant case law right. Cf Elder v. 

Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (when deciding a "question of 

law," a court "should* * * use its full knowledge of its own [and 

other relevant] precedents") (second alteration in original; internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Rapone, 131 

F .3d 188, 196-197 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Indeed, a party cannot forfeit 

or waive recourse to a relevant case just by failing to cite it. See 

Elder, 510 U.S. at 514-516; Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. 

Bank, 619 F.3d 748,773 n.20 (7th Cir. 2010). 
142 


Insert offset folio 111 here 31404.111

19 

decline to regulate the types of circulatory harms identified by 

Flyers Rights because it thought it could not address such 

matters. Rather, the Administration decided that it should not 

address those issues at this time, making the very type of 

regulatory-effort and resource-allocation judgments that fall 

squarely within the agency's province. 

Specifically, with respect to the risk of deep vein 

thrombosis, the Administration cited evidence showing that it 

rarely occurs and, regardless, is not caused by seat size or 

spacing. See Denial of Pet. for Rulemaking 2; J.A. 176 

(citing a study noting that guidelines issued by the American 

College of Physicians indicate that deep vein thrombosis is 

"extremely rare" and that risk of deep vein thrombosis is not 

any higher in economy class than business class) (citation 

omitted). Thus, the Administration reasonably declined to 

initiate rulemaking to assess Flyers Rights' concerns about 

deep vein thrombosis. 

Flyers Rights also noted passenger problems with 

''soreness, stiffness, [and] other joint and muscle problems" in 

its petition for rulemaking. Pet. for Rulemaking 6. Given that 

those conditions are commonplace, temporary, and non-lifethreatening discomforts, Flyers Rights' petition failed to 

demonstrate that the Administration erred in declining to 

undertake immediate rulemaking. 7 

7 Flyers Rights appears to have abandoned its argument that 

the Administration must consider passenger comfort when issuing 

regulations. In any event, the Administration reasonably concluded 

that matters pertaining exclusively to passenger "comfort" are not 

within its regulatory wheelhouse. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44701 (a), 

40 I 01 (d). 
143 


Insert offset folio 112 here 31404.112

20 

* * * * * 

We grant Flyers Rights' petition for review in part, and 

remand to the Administration for a properly reasoned 

disposition of the petition's safety concerns about the adverse 

impact of decreased seat dimensions and increased passenger 

size on aircraft emergency egress. We otherwise deny the 

petition for review. 

So ordered. 
144 


Insert offset folio 113 here 31404.113

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment: I join the court in remanding this matter to the 

Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to address adequately 

the petition for rulemaking filed by Paul Hudson and the Flyers 

Rights Education Fund ("petitioners") with respect to concerns 

about emergency egress from airplanes in light of decreases in 

seat size and pitch. See Op. 9-16. I also join the court in 

rejecting petitioners' argument that 49 U.S.C. § 4010l(a) 

required the FAA to consider matters of passenger health and 

comfort. See Op. 16-17. Unlike the court, however, I would 

decline to reach petitioners' additional argument, first raised in 

their reply brief, that the concept of "safety" in 49 U.S.C. 

§ 4470l(a), a term that is not statutorily defined, "inherently 

includes and is intertwined with the health of passengers." 

Reply Br. 8. But see Op. 17-19. 

The court does not usually address arguments first raised in 

a reply brief, treating them as "waived," in order to "prevent 

sandbagging of appellees and respondents." CTS Corp. v. EPA, 

759 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Novak v. Capital 

l'vfgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305, 316 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009)); 

see United States v. Van Smith, 530 F.3d 967,973-74 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28(c)). This, of course, 

is not to say that the court should disregard refinements made in 

a reply brief to an argument properly raised in an opening brief. 

Here, however, petitioners have offered two distinct theories, 

based on different statutory provisions, for how the FAA 

misconstrued the scope of its statutory authority in dismissing 

passenger health and comfort concerns in responding to the 

petition for rulemaking - one in their opening brief and the 

other in their reply brief. 

Petitioners contend in their opening brief that the FAA 

misconstrued its authority by refusing to consider passenger 

comfort and safety "because it interpreted its own statutory 

mandate to be limited to safety concerns." Pet'r Br. 26. 

Although they acknowledge the FAA's safety responsibilities 
145 


Insert offset folio 114 here 31404.114

2 

under Section 44 701 (a), petitioners do not rely on this provision 

for their argument and instead maintain that the FAA has 

statutory duties distinct from its safety responsibilities that 

require it to consider passenger health and comfort, citing 

Sections 40 l 0 I (a)(4) & (7). See id. at 26-27. Specifically, 

petitioners state in their opening brief: "To be sure, the FAA 

has a statutory responsibility to 'promote safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce.' 49 U.S.C. § 4470l(a). But it also has 

a responsibility, in regulating the industry, to consider a number 

of other factors . . . ." Pet'r Br. 26 (emphasis added). 

Petitioners then cite various obligations under Section 4010 l (a) 

that require consideration of the needs and interests of the 

public, and contend that these provisions create a "clear 

statutory command" to consider passenger health and comfort 

concerns. !d. at26-27 (quotingMassachusettsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 

497, 533 (2007)). In petitioners' view, "the FAA believed, 

incorrectly, that it was not legally obligated even to consider the 

'needs of the public' with respect to passenger health and 

safety," id. at 27, quoting Section 40 I 01 (a)(7). 

Thus, it is evident that in their opening brief petitioners 

conceived of health and safety as distinct factors, with the 

FAA's corresponding health obligations arising under different 

statutory provisions than its safety responsibilities under Section 

44 70 I (a). Only after the FAA pointed out in its responsive brief 

that Section 40 I 0 l (a), on which petitioners relied in their 

opening brief, applies to the Secretary of Transportation rather 

than the FAA, see Resp't Br. 19, did petitioners raise in their 

reply brief the additional argument that "health" is a component 

of"safety" under Section 4470l(a), Reply Br. 8. As presented 

by petitioners in their briefs to this court, one statutory theory is 

not "baked into" the other. The FAA responded in its brief to 

the only theory presented in petitioners' opening brief and had 

no opportunity to respond in its brief to petitioners' second 

theory presented for the first time in their reply brief. Stepping 
146 


Insert offset folio 115 here 31404.115

3 

in, the court offers its own view on how the FAA construes its 

own authority under Section 4470l(a), without the benefit of 

briefing from the FAA on this question. See Op. 18-19. 

Petitioners offer no explanation for their failure to raise both 

arguments in their opening brief, none is apparent from the 

record, and no extraordinary circumstances excuse their failure 

to do so. The court seeks to avoid our precedent by suggesting 

that petitioners' statutory argument simply "evolved" in their 

reply brief, Op. 18 n.6, but references to arguments presented in 

the rulemaking petition to the FAA, see id., that petitioners did 

not, in fact, raise in their opening brief does not eliminate the 

"sandbagging" of the FAA that has occurred on appeal. After 

all, litigants may have several reasons to think an agency has 

erred, but they make choices about which arguments to present 

on appeal; opposing parties in filing a responsive brief 

legitimately confine their response to the arguments presented 

in the opening brief. It is hardly common practice to ignore 

whether the opposing party has notice of the other party's 

position, but see id., and this court has tended to take a strict 

view of the obligation on appealing parties to set forth their 

arguments in their opening briefs, see, e.g., Am. Wildlands v. 

Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Van Smith, 

530 F.3d at 973-74 (citing cases). Consequently, in accordance 

with the court's precedent, I would not reach the new statutory 

theory presented only in petitioners' reply brief. 
147 


Insert offset folio 116 here 31404.116

February 26,2018 

The Honorable Mitch McConnell 

Majority Leader 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Charles Schumer 

Minority Leader 

U.S. Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Paul Ryan 

Speaker 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi 

Minority Leader 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Majority Leader McConnell, Speaker Ryan and Minority Leaders Schumer and Pelosi: 

As representatives of a broad array of organizations including general aviation pilots, consumer 

groups, manufacturers, businesses, airports, state and local aviation officials, management 

associations and unions representing hardworking Americans, we look forward to working with 

Congress on developing a bipartisan infrastructure package. At the same time, we strongly urge you 

to oppose any attempts to include a divisive and costly proposal to remove our nation's air traffic 

control (A TC) system from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in any comprehensive 

infrastructure bill or in any other legislation. 

As you all know, bipat1isan support for legislation investing in our nation's infrastructure will be 

critical to getting a bill to the President's desk. While Congress will face many challenges as it 

considers a comprehensive infrastructure bill, the divisive A TC privatization proposal which is full 

of risk and unintended consequences should not be one of them. 

The lack of consensus in handing over our ATC system to a board dominated by the airlines and their 

interests has for almost two years now prevented the House from moving a long term FAA 

Reauthorization bill. The airlines constantly point the finger at A TC for delays, but the Department 

of Transportation's own data reveals that airline-caused problems far surpass weather and air traffic 

control issues. The airlines have repeatedly demonstrated an inability to manage their own operations 

let alone our already safe A TC system all while taking in over $50 billion in "ancillary fees"' from 

their passengers. 

In fact, a recent CNBC poll shows that a majority of Americans oppose privatizing the nation's ATC 

system. Congress should focus on finding solutions that will garner strong industry support to help 

rebuild our nation's infrastructure. For the aviation industry, that means modernization not 

privatization. 

Access to our national airspace and ecosystem of airports creates jobs and generates local economic 

activity which helps make our aviation system work for all Americans. In fact, general aviation 

alone generates $219 billion in total economic output in the United States and creates 1.1 million 

jobs. 
148 


Insert offset folio 117 here 31404.117

Our national network of thousands of airports connect many rural communities to the rest of the 

world and forges a link for small businesses to their suppliers and customers so they can compete in a 

global economy. To remain competitive, we must ensure that airports of all sizes from small rural 

general aviation airports to larger commercial hub airports have the resources to expand their 

infrastructure needs, repair old facilities, or improve aviation safety. Therefore, support for our 

nation's airports both large and small should be considered in any national infrastructure package. 

Another national asset is our A TC system which is the largest, safest, most complex system in the 

world. While many in the aviation community oppose A TC privatization, everyone agrees on the 

need to modernize the system. The FAA's NextGen program continues to make progress as several 

key platforms are either fully deployed or progressing towards full deployment. These achievements 

are due in large part to the skilled work of FAA employees who operate, manage, maintain, certifY 

and build the NAS. Privatization would disrupt NextGen deployment and distract the focus of those 

responsible for the safest and most efticient system on earth. 

Accelerating investment in NextGen as part of any infrastructure package will expedite the benefits 

for all users of the system including general aviation, commercial airlines and consumers. 

Again, as Congress works to bring our nation's infrastructure into the 21st century, we again urge 

you to not support the inclusion of the divisive proposal that would hand over our ATC system to a 

private monopoly. We look forward to working with Congress to tind common sense, bipartisan 

solutions, that create good paying jobs and provide benefits to all aviation users. 

Sincerely, 

Air Care Alliance 

Airborne Law Enforcement Association 

Aircraft Electronics Association 

Aircraft Kit Industry Association 

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 

Airports Association of North Dakota 

Alabama Business Aviation Association 

Alaska Airmen Association 

American Bonanza Society 

American Helicopter Society International 

Antique Airplane Association 

Arizona Business Aviation Association 

Arizona Flight Training Workgroup 

Arizona Pilots Association, AZ 

Arkansas Airport Operators Association 

Association of Air Medical Services 

Association of California Airports 

Association of Critical Care Transport 

Aviation Council of Alabama 

Aviation Council of Pennsylvania 
149 


Insert offset folio 118 here 31404.118

Aviation Museum of Kentucky 

Balloon Federation of America 

Beech Aero Club of Frederick. MD 

Bessemer Airport Authority, AL 

California Agricultural A ire raft Association 

California Pilots Association 

Cardinal Flyers Online 

Carolina Aviation Professionals Association 

Centennial Airport Business Pilot's Alliance, CO 

Central Kentucky Regional Airport 

Cessna 120/140 Association 

Cessna Flyer Association 

Cessna Pilots Association 

Cessna Pilots Society 

Chicago Area Business Aviation Association 

Citation Jet Pilot Association 

Clark County Aviation Association, NV 

Clarksville Regional Airport, TN 

Classic Jet Aircraft Association 

Colorado Aeronautical Board 

Colorado Aviation Business Association 

Colorado Pilots Association 

Commemorative Air Force 

Connecticut Business Aviation Group 

Corporate Aircraft Association 

Deer Valley Pilots Association, AZ 

Duncan Aviation 

East Central Ohio Pilots Association 

East Tennessee Pilots Club 

Eastern Region Helicopter Council 

Emergency Volunteer Air Corps 

Experimental Aircraft Association 

False River Regional Airport, LA 

Flight School Association of North America 

Florida Aero Club, FL 

Florida Aviation Business Association 

Flying Dentists Association 

Flying Physicians Association 

FNL Pilots Association 

Friends of Meacham International Airport Association, TX 

General Aviation Alliance of Alabama 

General Aviation Council of Hawaii 
150 


Insert offset folio 119 here 31404.119

General Aviation Manufacturers Association 

Georgia Airports Association 

Georgia Business Aviation Association 

Glasair Aircraft Owners Association 

Granite State Airport Management Association, NH 

Greater Houston Business Aviation Alliance, TX 

Greater StLouis Business Aviation Association, MO 

Greater Waco Aviation Alliance, TX 

Greater Washington Business Aviation Association, DC IV A/MD 

Helicopter Association International 

Houma-Terrebonne Airport, LA 

Houston Regional Aviation Professionals, TX 

Idaho Airport Management Association 

Idaho Aviation Association 

Idaho Business Aviation Association 

Idaho Contract Tower Coalition 

Illinois Pilots Association, IL 

Indiana Business Aviation Association 

Indianapolis Aero Club, IN 

International 180/185 Club 

International Acrobatic Club 

International Cessna 170 Association 

International Council of Air Shows 

Iowa Public Airports Association 

Jim Pietz Aerosports, SD 

Joe Foss Squadron of the Commemorative Air Force, SD 

Kansas Association of Airports 

Kansas Chamber of Commerce 

Kansas City Business Aviation Association 

Kansas Pilots Association 

Kentucky Aviation Association 

Kentucky Business Aviation Association 

Lancair Owners and Builders Organization 

Lawyer Pilots Bar Association 

Light Aircraft Manufacturers Association 

Long Beach Airport Association, CA 

Long Island Business Aviation Association, NY 

Los Angeles Area Helicopter Operators Association, CA 

Louisiana Airport Managers Association, LA 

Love Field Pilots Association. TX 

Maine Aeronautics Association 

Malibu/Mirage Owners & Pilots Association 
151 


Insert offset folio 120 here 31404.120

Maryland Airport Managers Association 

Massachusetts Airport Management Association 

Massachusetts Business Aviation Association 

Mckellar Sipes Regional Airport- Jackson, TN 

Michigan Business Aviation Association 

Mid-Atlantic Aviation Coalition, NJ 

Middle Tennessee Aero Club 

Minnesota Aviation Trades Association 

Minnesota Business Aviation Association 

Minnesota Council of Airports 

Minnesota Pilots Association 

Minnesota Seaplane Association 

Mississippi Airports Association 

Missouri Pilots Association 

Mockingbird Flying Club, SO 

Montana Aviation Trades Association 

Montana Pilots Association 

Monticello Flying Club, VA 

Mooney Summit 

Morristown Aviation Association, NJ 

MU2 Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association 

Naples Municipal Airport, FL 

National Air Transportation Association 

National Association of State Aviation Officials 

National Business Aviation Association 

Nebraska Association of Airport Officials 

Nebraska Aviation Council 

Nebraska Business Aviation Association 

Nevada Business Aviation Association 

New Bedford Regional Pilots Association, MA 

New England Helicopter Council 

New Jersey Aviation Association 

New Mexico Airport Managers Association 

New Mexico Pilots Association 

North American Trainer Association 

North Carolina Agricultural Aviation Association 

North Dakota Agricultural Aviation Association 

North Dakota Association of Aviation Museums 

North Dakota Aviation Council 

North Dakota Business Aviation Association 

North Dakota Experimental Aviation Association 

North Dakota Pilots Association 
152 


Insert offset folio 121 here 31404.121

North Dakota Professional Aviation Mechanics 

North Texas Business Aviation Association 

Northern California Business Aviation Association 

Octopus Flying Club, MD 

Ohio Regional Business Aviation Association 

Oklahoma Airport Operators Association 

Oklahoma Business Aviation Association 

Oklahoma Pilots Association 

Oregon Airport Management Association 

Oregon Aviation Industries 

Oregon Pilots Association 

Ozark Regional Business Aviation Group, MO 

Pacific Northwest Business A vi at ion Association 

Partnership for Corporate Aviation Training, TX 

Patient Airlift Services 

Piper Flyer Association 

Prescott Airport Users Association, AZ 

Quincy-Gadsden Airport Authority, FL 

Recreational Aviation Foundation 

Rhode Island Pilots Association 

Russellville Regional Airport, AR 

San Antonio Area Business Aviation Alliance, TX 

San Carlos Airports Association, CA 

Sanderson Farms, MS 

Seaplane Pilots Association 

Smyrna/Rutherford County Airport, TN 

Soaring Society of America 

Sonix Builders & Pilots Foundation 

South Carolina Aviation Association 

South Dakota Pilots Association 

South Florida Business Aviation Association 

Southern California Aviation Association 

Southern Colorado Business Aviation Group 

Southern Museum of Flight, AL 

Spokane Airport Tenants Association, WA 

Stuttgart Municipal Airport, AR 

Tampa Bay Aviation Association, FL 

Taylorcraft Owners Club 

Tennessee Aviation Association 

Tennessee Aviation Hall of Fame 

Tennessee Business Aviation Association 

Teterboro Users Group, NJ 
153 


Insert offset folio 122 here 31404.122

Texans for General Aviation, TX 

Texas Corporate Aviation Schedulers and Dispatchers Group 

Tiger Flying Club, MD 

Twin Cessna Flyer 

United States Hang Gliding & Paragliding Association 

United States Parachute Association 

United States Paragliding Association 

Utah Airport Operators Association 

Utah Business Aviation Association 

Utah General Aviation Association 

Van Nuys Airport Association, CA 

Velocity Owners and Builders Association 

Veterans Airlift Command 

Vintage Aircraft Association 

Virginia Aviation Business Association 

Virginia Highlands Airport 

Waco Chamber of Commerce, TX 

Warbirds of America 

Washington Airport Management Association 

Washin~:,>ton Pilots Association 

Washington Seaplane Pilots Association 

Washington State Aviation Alliance 

Washington State Community Airports Association 

West Virginia Airport Managers Association 

Westchester Aircraft Maintenance Association, NY 

Westchester Aviation Association, NY 

Wichita Aero Club, KS 

WingsReality EDU, ME 

Wisconsin Aviation Trades Association 

Wisconsin Business Aviation Association 

Women in Aviation International 

Wyoming Airport Operators Association 

Yankton Regional Aviation Association, SD 

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 

American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO 

Department for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO 

FAA Managers Association 

Federal Managers Association 

Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association 

Metal Trades Department, AFL-ClO 

National Black Coalition of Federal Aviation Employees 

National Council of Social Security Management Associations 
154 


Insert offset folio 123 here 31404.123

National Federation of Federal Employees 

National Hispanic Coalition of Federal Aviation Employees 

National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) 

National Weather Service Employees Organization 

Patent Office Professional Association 

Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, Inc. (PATCO) 

Professional Association of Aeronautical Center Employees (PAACE) 

Professional Aviation Safety Specialists 

Professional Managers Association 

Senior Executives Association 

United Steelworkers (USW) 

Consumer Action 

Flyers Rights 

Over 100 Mayors from across the U.S. voice opposition to A TC Privatization 

https://www.nbaa.org/advocacy/lettcrs/20 170306-mayors-house-letter.pdf 

https://www.nbaa.org/advocacy/letters/20 170306-mayors-senate-lettcr.pdf 

I 00 Business CEO's from across the U.S. voice opposition to ATC Privatization 

https://www.nbaa.org/advocacv/issues/modernization/20 170619-CEO-ATC-Letter-Housc.pdf 

https://www.nbaa.org/advocacy/issues/modernization/20 170619-CEO-A TC-Letter-Senate.pdf 
155 


Insert offset folio 124 here 31404.124

TESTIMONY FOR THE RECORD 

STEPHEN A. ALTERMAN 

CARGO AIRLINE ASSOCIATION 

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 27, 2018 

"STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY" 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

My name is Steve Alterman and I am the President of the Cargo Airline Association, the 

nationwide organization representing the interests of the all-cargo segment of the aviation 

community. 1 Thank you for holding this very important hearing on the topic of aviation safety. 

The all-cargo carrier industry puts safety as a top priority and we appreciate the opportunity to 

discuss some of the issues we are currently focused on. 

The all-cargo carriers, and the customers and airports they serve, are a unique segment 

of the aviation marketplace. Our member carriers have annual revenues over $100 billion and 

employ upwards of one million workers worldwide. 2 Customers depend on our services to 

transport high value, time sensitive, products such as medical devices and perishables, 

computers and other electronics, and automobile parts. In calendar year 2016, all-cargo 

carriers operated 89.0% of domestic revenue ton miles (RTMs) and 70.8% of international 

1 Association members include direct air carriers: ABX Air, Atlas Air, Federal Express Corporation, Kalitta Air and 

United Parcel Service Co., as well as Associate Members: Amazon, Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International 

Airport, DHL Express, Memphis International Airport, louisville International Airport, Ft. Wayne International 

Airport, John Glenn Columbus International Airport, Spokane International Airport and the Alaska International 

Airport System. 2 Survey of Association members. 
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RTMs3 While passenger and cargo airlines fly similar aircraft, takeoff and land from the same 

airports, and fly over the same cities, they operate entirely different business models with 

different operational characteristics. Therefore, by recognizing that the all-cargo segment of 

the air transportation industry is unique, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 

correctly determined that in many cases a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme is not 

appropriate. This thought was echoed by former Administrator Randy Babbitt at an ALPA 

Safety Conference when he stated, "In rulemaking, not only does one size not fit all, but it's 

unsafe to think that it can." When it comes to safety, it is important to consider the differences 

between cargo and the rest of the aviation industry. 

Flight and Duty Time Regulations 

One area where somewhat different regulations apply to the all-cargo carriers are the 

flight and duty time rest regulations. Initially, it should be noted that the safety record of allcargo pilots in the fatigue area under Part 121 is impeccable and the FAA has determined that 

these regulations need not be changed for the all-cargo operators. There are several safetyrelated reasons for this conclusion. For example, all-cargo operations are different in that we 

provide more and longer flight crew member rest opportunities than passenger counterparts; 

we have invested the necessary resources to make sure we have the best possible sleep 

facilities both at cargo hubs and aboard long-range aircraft; we operate without passengers or 

flight attendants thereby allowing more restful sleep aboard long-range aircraft; and perhaps 

most significantly, we schedule pilots for an average of 34 hours per month (in the express 

segment) and 45.5 hours per month (in the heavy freight segment) while passenger carrier 

pilots fly over 60 hours each month4 • 

Looking objectively at safety, operating under the existing Part 121 regulations, the allcargo industry has operated millions of flights with no fatigue-related accidents attributable to 

3 FAA Aerospace Forecast, 2016-2036, March 2016. 4 FAA Initial Supplemental Regulatory Analysis, December 7, 2012. 
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crew scheduling. Further, in the two accidents where fatigue was listed by the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as the cause or contributing factor, neither of these 

accidents would have been prevented by the Part 117 rules. 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has on three separate occasions carefully 

analyzed changing the rest rules and in each case found virtually no benefit in applying the 

passenger fatigue rules to all-cargo carriers. Additionally, on March 24, 2016, the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the Independent Pilots Association's Petition to 

force the FAA to change the rules, finding that the FAA acted reasonably in its decision to 

exempt all-cargo pilots from Part 117 passenger pilot rest rules. In denying the IPA's petition, 

the D.C. Circuit concluded, "Because the FAA adequately and reasonably considered all relevant 

factors, we also conclude that the FAA's cost-benefit analysis was not arbitrary or capricious". 

Pilot Training 

With respect to required pilot training issues, the Cargo Airline Association supports the 

FAA's authority to create additional structured training pathways for credit toward the airline 

transport pilot certificate (ATP) flight hour requirements. Current language in the Senate 

version of the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017, allows for such 

pathways and stipulates these additional structured training pathways may only be considered 

and approved by FAA if they improve safety. Rather than simply requiring 1,500 hours of flying, 

which may be accomplished by pilots logging flight time in various scenarios that may have little 

to do with experiences encountered in the commercial world, training flexibility can subject 

future pilots to fight situations that would not otherwise be encountered by simply flying a 

required number of hours. Safety would thereby be enhanced by having pilots entering 

commercial operations better equipped to deal with potential challenging flight operations. 

Anecdotal evidence already reveals that those meeting the 1,500-hour threshold, but with no 

other training, are failing initial tests at a rate much higher than before the 1,500-hour 

requirement was imposed. 
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To be clear, we are not advocating for a change in the hours required, it simply allows 

additional pathways to meet the 1,500-hour requirement. The looming pilot shortage cannot 

simply be ignored and Congress should therefore consider ways to address this problem. In 

the express cargo environment, where carriers rely heavily on regional feeder operations, we 

are already encountering situations where there are not enough pilots to fly the feeder aircraft. 

Large cargo carriers, which depend on hiring pilots from the regional carriers, are looking at 

their own significant shortages in the next few years. We hope Congress will consider new 

approaches to addressing the pilot shortage while preserving safety. 

The Safe Transport of Lithium Batteries 

The all-cargo carrier industry recognizes it is essential to be able to transport lithium 

batteries and other hazardous materials in the safest manner possible. As a practical matter, 

all-cargo aircraft operate as part of a global freight network serving hundreds of countries 

worldwide. In order to transport lithium batteries in the most safe and secure manner, our 

members rely on harmonized international regulations that allow for their seamless transport 

across the globe. 

Congress recognized the importance of international harmonization when it included 

Section 828 in the bipartisan FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. The bill ensured U.S. 

harmonization for the regulation of lithium ion and metal batteries with those regulations set 

by the ICAO Technical instructions for the Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air. 

Harmonized rules are essential because if different rules were adopted, it would lead to a 

patchwork of regulatory environments, creating confusion and unnecessary complication in the 

international marketplace and thereby jeopardize safety. Additionally, shippers who are 

overburdened with the resulting complexity may attempt to avoid U.S. specific rules by not 

properly declaring battery shipments or may choose to "go underground" to avoid the rules 
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entirely. The all-cargo carriers believe that absent Section 828, there could be an effort to issue 

U.S. specific rules which do not necessarily confront the safety challenges that exist. 

The education of shippers, oversight and enforcement of existing regulations, and focus 

on counterfeit and undeclared hazardous materials shipments are where we see the most 

needed attention. Increasing the emphasis on resources given to the DOT for the enforcement 

of existing regulations against entities who willfully or recklessly flaunt the rules would be 

something the whole industry may agree on. In certain areas of the world, labeling and 

packaging of lithium battery shipments are ignored leaving a real threat to aviation safety. The 

concern exists that counterfeit and non-compliant batteries are entering the supply chain and 

rarely are these batteries properly declared, while many times they come from unlicensed and 

unaffiliated manufacturers. Therefore, the U.S. needs a continued focus to emphasize the 

importance of enforcement for these manufacturers and shippers. 

In the U.S., PHMSA is the agency with responsibility for promulgating hazardous 

materials regulations for all modes and does so with significant and formalized input from the 

modal agencies such as the FAA, and the general public. PHMSA is uniquely positioned to 

provide expertise on hazardous materials regulation. Additionally, PHMSA serves as the U.S. 

representative for the development of the UN Model Regulations on the Transport of 

Dangerous Goods, which serve as core text that leads to the development of modal regulations 

like the ICAO Technical instructions. They are ultimately responsible for incorporating the ICAO 

standards into national law. PHMSA approaches its participation in ICAO in a similar manner as 

it does domestically, working closely with the FAA and affected industries to ensure the 

regulations adopted by ICAO achieve an appropriate safety objective. Given PHMSA's track 

record at the UN and expertise in both promulgating domestic regulations and incorporating 

international standards, their participation in ICAO as the lead U.S. representative is 

appropriate. 

Conclusion 
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The members of the all-cargo air carrier industry continue to make safety their top 

priority in many cases going above and beyond the basic standards set by the FAA. Thank you 

for the opportunity to comment and I am happy to answer any further questions. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Stephen A. Alterman 

President 

March 13, 2018