J. A04014/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

L.D.W., :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1264 WDA 2015

:

B.E.W. :

Appeal from the Order, July 16, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Civil Division at No. 1946 of 2013-D

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND SHOGAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 17, 2016

L.D.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered July 16, 2015, in the 

Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas, which awarded the parties 

shared legal custody, B.E.W. (“Father”) primary physical custody, and 

Mother partial physical custody of H.B.W., born in December of 1997, and 

A.R.W., born in August of 2006 (collectively, the “Children”). The order 

additionally awarded Father the ability to decide which school A.R.W. is to 

attend. After review, we affirm.

A portion of the pertinent factual and procedural history was 

summarized by this court previously in memorandum dated March 16, 2015, 

as follows:

A.R.W. was born during the marriage of Father 

and Mother. N.T., 7/29/14, at 6. Mother legally 

adopted Father’s son, H.B.W., born in December of 
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1997, who resides at the Milton Hershey School. Id.

at 5-6. In July of 2013, Father and Mother 

separated. Id. at 6. Mother resides in the marital 

home with A.R.W., and Father resides in the home of 

his paramour, K.M., and her daughter, S., who is one 

year older than A.R.W. Id. at 70, 73.

On September 18, 2013, Mother filed pro se a 

custody complaint and a separate petition for 

emergency relief, where she requested primary 

physical custody of A.R.W. and H.B.W., who were 

then ages seven and fifteen, respectively. The trial 

court denied Mother’s petition for emergency relief. 

The court entered a temporary custody order on 

November 4, 2013, which indicated it would become 

a final order unless one of the parties filed a praecipe 

for a pre-trial conference within 30 days. Father 

filed a praecipe on November 18, 2013. On 

November 20, 2013, the trial court issued an order 

scheduling the pre-trial conference for February 11, 

2014. Thereafter, the court rescheduled the pre-trial 

conference for February 18, 2014, due to a conflict in 

the court’s schedule, and again for April 29, 2014, 

due to bad weather.

Prior to the pre-trial conference, on 

February 21, 2014, Mother filed a notice of 

proposed relocation, and proposed relocating with 

A.R.W. to Cheswick, in Allegheny County, 

Pennsylvania, which Mother alleged was less than 

20 miles from the marital residence where she was 

currently living. On March 3, 2014, Father filed a 

counter-affidavit objecting to the proposed relocation 

and to modification of the custody order.

Following the pre-trial conference on April 29, 

2014, by order dated April 30, 2014, the court issued 

an interim custody order and scheduled the trial on 

custody and relocation for July 29, 2014. The 

interim order granted Mother primary physical 

custody of A.R.W., and Father partial physical 

custody on alternating weekends, from Friday after 

school until Sunday at 5:00 p.m., and every Tuesday 

and Thursday after school until 7:30 p.m., 
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inter alia. During the summer, the order granted 

Father partial custody on alternating weekends from 

Thursday at 5:00 p.m. until Sunday at 5:00 p.m., 

and during the intervening week, from Wednesday at 

2:00 p.m. until Thursday at 9:00 a.m., inter alia. 

The interim order was silent with respect to the 

custody of H.B.W.

At the custody trial on July 29, 2014, the 

following witnesses testified: Mother; Father; K.M., 

Father’s paramour; and A.R.W., in camera. By 

memorandum and order dated August 18, 2014, the 

trial court granted the parties shared legal custody of 

A.R.W., Mother primary physical custody of A.R.W., 

and Father partial physical custody of A.R.W. on 

alternating weekends and every Tuesday and 

Thursday after school or at 4:00 p.m. if there is no 

school. The order also set forth a holiday schedule 

and granted the parties one week of vacation with 

A.R.W. during the summer. The order was silent 

with respect to the custody of H.B.W. Further, the 

order denied Mother’s request to relocate with 

A.R.W. On September 18, 2014, Father filed a 

notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. 

L.D.W. v. B.E.W., 120 A.3d 1056 (Pa.Super. 2015) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-4) (footnotes omitted).

Pursuant to the memorandum dated March 16, 2015, this court 

vacated the order of August 18, 2014 and remanded the matter to the trial 

court to: consider all of the Section 5328(a) custody factors, with respect to 

both A.R.W. and H.B.W., on the record or in a written opinion; set forth 

findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and weight of the 

evidence; and enter a custody order that includes both A.R.W. and H.B.W. 

By order dated April 1, 2015, the trial court scheduled a remand trial for 
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April 21, 2015. At the time of the remand trial, the court conducted a trial 

de novo “in order that all facts and circumstances, even those that had 

arisen after remand, could be fairly and comprehensively considered.” 

(Memorandum and order, 7/16/15 at 1.)1 The following witnesses testified: 

Father; Mother; H.B.W.; T.W., Father’s oldest daughter, whom Mother did 

not adopt; J.W., Mother’s boyfriend; and A.R.W., in camera. Of note, both 

Mother and Father were represented by counsel.2

Following the remand trial, on April 22, 2015, the trial court ordered 

the parties to submit a proposed order within ten days. Thereafter, on 

July 16, 2015, by memorandum and order, the trial court granted the parties 

shared legal custody of the Children, primary physical custody of H.B.W. to 

Father, with partial physical custody to Mother as agreed to by H.B.W., and 

primary physical custody of A.R.W. to Father, with partial physical custody to 

Mother. Specifically, Mother was granted partial physical custody of A.R.W. 

as follows: during the school year, every other weekend from Friday at 

5:30 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., and every Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. 

until 8:00 p.m.; and, during the summer vacation, every other week from 

Friday at 5:00 p.m. until the following Friday at 5:00 p.m. In addition, 

 

1 The trial court incorrectly indicates that the remand relates to its order 

dated September 22, 2015, entered September 25, 2015. (Memorandum 

and order, 7/21/15 at 1.) However, as stated in this court’s prior 

memorandum dated March 16, 2015, this order was a “nullity.” L.D.W. v. 

B.E.W., 120 A.3d 1056 (Pa.Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 10).

2 Mother is represented by new counsel on this appeal.
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Father was further granted the ability to decide which school A.R.W. is to 

attend, with Mother to have access to all of the school records and be 

informed of all school activities by Father. The trial court’s memorandum 

analyzed each of the 16 custody factors pursuant to Section 5328(a) and 

included findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and weight 

of the evidence. On August 14, 2015, Mother, through counsel, then filed a 

notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:3

I. Whether the trial court committed an error of 

law by not considering Mother’s request for 

relocation and by failing to consider the 

relocation factors pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. 

§ 5337(h)?[4]

II. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion and an error of law by conducting a 

trial de novo as a result of which a custody 

modification was effectuated when the case 

was remanded from the Superior Court in 

order to have the trial court delineate the 

custody factors, along with the basis for the 

court’s order of August 18, 2014, and when 

the Plaintiff/Mother was deprived of due 

process because she lacked adequate notice of 

the trial court’s intent to modify the August 18, 

2014 order?

III. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion and an error of law by violating 

 

3 We have re-ordered Mother’s issues for ease of disposition.

4 While Mother does not raise this issue in the statement of questions 

involved section of her brief, she includes this issue in the summary of 

argument and argument sections of her brief. For purposes of 

thoroughness, we discuss this issue within.
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Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(d), which required the trial 

court to file its decision within fifteen days of 

the conclusion of trial when the significant 

delay resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff/Mother?

IV. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion and an error of law by misapplying 

and/or failing to analyze the custody factors 

set forth in 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5328(a) and by 

failing to render a custody decision that is in 

the best interests of the minor children when it 

awarded primary custody of the parties’ minor 

children to Defendant/Father, as its decision 

was against the weight of the evidence 

presented at trial?

V. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion and an error of law by addressing 

and assigning school choice, particularly in 

light of the fact that the remand was limited to 

the trial court delineating and supporting its 

August 18, 2014 decision pursuant to the 

custody factors, and whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in making its own 

determination as to which school is better 

suited for the minor child?

Mother’s brief at 4, 15-16.

As we stated in E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

with regard to our review of a custody order:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the 

broadest type and our standard is abuse of 

discretion. We must accept findings of the trial court 

that are supported by competent evidence of record, 

as our role does not include making independent 

factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed 

and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we 

are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the 
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test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. 

We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only 

if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court. 

V.B. v. J.E.B., 2012 PA Super 200, 55 A.3d 1193, 

1197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).

“When a trial court orders a form of custody, the 

best interest of the child is paramount.” S.W.D. v. 

S.A.R., 2014 PA Super 146, 96 A.3d 396 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted). The factors to be 

considered by a court when awarding custody are set 

forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

E.R., 129 A.3d at 527.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) provides as follows:

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the 

court shall determine the best interest of the 

child by considering all relevant factors, giving 

weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the 

following:

(1) Which party is more likely to 

encourage and permit frequent and 

continuing contact between the 

child and another party.

(2) The present and past abuse 

committed by a party or member 

of the party’s household, whether 

there is a continued risk of harm to 

the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide 

adequate physical safeguards and 

supervision of the child.

(3) The parental duties performed by 

each party on behalf of the child. 
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(4) The need for stability and 

continuity in the child’s education, 

family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of 

the child, based on the child’s 

maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn 

the child against the other parent, 

except in cases of domestic 

violence where reasonable safety 

measures are necessary to protect 

the child from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to 

maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing 

relationship with the child adequate 

for the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to 

attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, 

educational and special needs of 

the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of 

the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for 

the child or ability to make 

appropriate child-care 

arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the 

parties and the willingness and 

ability of the parties to cooperate 

with one another. A party’s effort 

to protect a child from abuse by 
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another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol 

abuse of a party or member of a 

party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition 

of a party or member of a party’s 

household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

Turning to Mother’s first issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred 

by not considering her request for relocation and by failing to consider the 

relocation factors pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h). Mother indicates 

that, if the trial court was essentially revisiting or reconsidering all issues, it 

should have addressed her request to relocate and the relocation factors set 

forth by Section 5337(h). (Mother’s brief at 15.) Mother further argues 

that, in determining that she did not establish a right to relocate in its order 

of August 18, 2014, the trial court “failed to consider the factors, 

weight [sic] the evidence or even consider the burdens of proof[,]” as well 

as the best interests of the child. (Id. at 15-16.)

Importantly, neither Mother nor Father raised the issue of relocation 

on appeal after denial in August 2014. Further, Mother did not include this 

issue in the statement of questions involved section of her brief in the 

instant appeal. Therefore, Mother waived this issue. See 
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4) (issues not raised in a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal are waived); Krebs v. United Refining Company 

of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (finding waiver 

where an issue is not included in both a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved section of the 

brief). Notwithstanding, Mother further failed to appropriately preserve this 

issue as she disputes the trial court’s denial of her relocation in her concise 

statement, whereas she raises the trial court’s failure to address her 

relocation in her brief. Krebs, 893 A.2d at 797. In any event, by awarding 

primary physical custody to Father, Mother’s relocation issue would appear 

no longer relevant.

In her second issue, Mother challenges the trial court conducting a trial 

de novo after remand. Mother argues that, as the trial court conducted a 

trial de novo upon remand, rather than issuing an order upon the existing 

record, she received inadequate notice that all prior claims would be 

considered and inadequate time to prepare. As a result, Mother avers that 

she was deprived of due process. (Mother’s brief at 10-11.)

We disagree with Mother. Initially, we observe that, by order dated 

April 1, 2015, the trial court gave notice of the remand trial scheduled for 

April 21, 2015. Mother failed to file any motion and made no inquiry, 

request, or written objection upon receipt of the notice scheduling the 

remand trial. Moreover, Mother voiced no objection, request for 
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continuance, request to present additional testimony and/or evidence, or 

request for any other relief on the record at the remand trial. Mother 

therefore waived any issue related to the trial de novo as she failed to first 

raise it with the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of 

issues not first raised in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515-

516 (Pa.Super. 1995) (stating, “[I]n order to preserve an issue for appellate 

review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate 

stage of the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a 

basic and fundamental error, such as an erroneous jury instruction, will 

result in waiver of that issue. On appeal, the Superior Court will not 

consider a claim which was not called to the trial court’s attention at a time 

when any error committed could have been corrected.” (citations omitted)).

Nonetheless, as indicated previously, the trial court conducted a trial 

de novo “in order that all facts and circumstances, even those that had 

arisen after remand, could be fairly and comprehensively considered.” 

(Memorandum and order, 7/16/15 at 1.) Given the lapse of time between 

its decision and this court’s remand, the trial court found it beneficial and 

wise to take additional testimony.

THE COURT: Well, we met briefly in chambers with 

counsel, and I think the best approach this morning 

would be for Mr. [W.] to proceed first on the 

remand, rather than just, you know, reissue an 

opinion discussing, you know, the elements in a 

statute. 
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It appears to be best to get an update from 

everybody, see where, you know, what, if anything, 

has happened in life since we were last in court. I’ll 

try to do a holistic view of the entire case here and 

discuss the elements in the statute and renewed 

matter that is, you know, relevant.

Notes of testimony, 4/21/15 at 4 lines 2-16. Both parties, who were 

represented by counsel, were given 20 days’ notice and the opportunity to 

fully participate and question witnesses and present evidence, which they 

did. As such, Mother was not deprived of due process. See Everett v. 

Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa.Super. 2005).

With her third issue, Mother next raises trial court error for failure to 

comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.4(d). As this issue 

involves a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our 

scope of review is plenary. Harrell v. Pecynski, 11 A.3d 1000, 1003 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (citations omitted).

Rule 1915.4(d) provides, in part, with regard to disposition of custody

cases: 

(d) Prompt Decisions. The judge’s decision shall 

be entered and filed within 15 days of the date 

upon which the trial is concluded unless, within 

that time, the court extends the date for such 

decision by order entered of record showing 

good cause for the extension. In no event 

shall an extension delay the entry of the 

court’s decision more than 45 days after the 

conclusion of trial.

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(d). Here, the trial court conducted a remand trial on 

April 21, 2015, and did not issue a decision until July 16, 2015. Mother 
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posits that this delay of 86 days, in violation of Rule 1915.4(d), resulted in 

prejudice to herself and A.R.W., as it necessitated that A.R.W. change 

schools prior to allowing for consideration of the issues on appeal. (Mother’s 

brief at 12-14.) Mother further argues that the mandatory nature of 

Rule 1915.4(d), coupled with the prejudice resulting from the delay, 

warrants dismissal of the trial court order. (Id. at 14-15.) In so arguing, 

Mother largely contests the trial court’s decision with regard to school 

choice. (Id. at 12-14.)

We again disagree with Mother. On April 22, 2015, the day after the 

remand trial, the trial court entered an order requesting the parties submit 

proposed orders within ten days. It is unclear from the certified record if the 

parties complied. Regardless, and despite a previous delay in issuing the 

August 2014 order, Mother made no request for a more timely decision nor 

took any affirmative action with either the trial court or this court. What is 

more, Mother appears to be confusing her disagreement, in particular as it 

relates to school choice, with prejudice. Although A.R.W. changed schools, 

this is a function of the trial court’s decision, not delay. In addition, in 

contravention to Mother’s request for dismissal, we note that, while 

Subsection (b) of Rule 1915.4 provides for dismissal, either sua sponte with 

notice or upon motion, Subsection (d) remains silent in this regard. 

Dismissal of the trial court’s order is therefore not appropriate.
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In her fourth issue, Mother asserts that the trial court committed an 

abuse of discretion and an error of law by misapplying and/or failing to 

analyze the custody factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) and by failing 

to render a custody decision that is in the best interests of the Children 

when it awarded primary custody to Father, as its decision was against the 

weight of the evidence presented at trial. Mother argues that the trial 

court’s failure to appropriately analyze the custody factors and interpret and 

weigh the evidence resulted in a decision, as it relates to A.R.W., which 

placed A.R.W. in the “primary custody of a parent who was not as involved 

or emotionally supportive.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Mother contends that 

“[b]y relying on faulty or misinterpreted evidence, overlooking other 

evidence favorable to Mother or negative for father, and ignoring the weight 

of the evidence supporting Mother as primary custodian, the Trial Court has 

failed to craft a custody schedule that is in the best interests of the Minor 

Child[.]” (Id. at 17). Specifically, Mother takes issue with the trial court’s 

interpretation of evidence regarding school, daycare, the condition of the 

marital residence, and abuse. (Id. at 17-23.) Mother further avers that the 

trial court’s decision not only neglects her role as primary caregiver, but 

does not consider the impact on A.R.W.’s stability. (Id. at 23-24.)

As we construe this issue, Mother questions the trial court’s findings of 

fact and determinations regarding credibility and weight of the evidence. 

Under the aforementioned standard of review applicable in custody matters, 
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these are not disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See E.R., 129 A.3d 

at 527. Upon review, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, as directed by this court on remand, and as 

required by law, the trial court carefully analyzed and addressed each factor 

under Section 5328(a) in considering the Children’s best interests. 

(Memorandum and order, 7/16/15 at 4-11.) In concluding and summarizing 

its analysis, the trial court stated:

As stated above, based on [H.B.W.]’s age and his 

reasoning, his preference will be given significant 

weight, and will be the determining factor in his 

custody schedule. An order granting the Father 

primary physical custody of [H.B.W.] and leaving the 

Mother’s partial physical custody up to [H.B.W.]’s 

discretion will be entered.

Although it appears that [A.R.W.] is extremely 

bonded to the Mother, there is a strong bond 

between her and the Father. In considering the 

factors, specifically with the testimony that was 

offered at the April 2015 trial, it appears to be in the 

best interest of [A.R.W.] to grant the Father primary 

physical custody, with the Mother receiving 

substantial partial custody. The evidence presented 

indicates that the Father is more able to promote 

relationships between [A.R.W.] and her siblings, as 

well as extended family, which the Mother does not 

appear to be able to do.

Furthermore, the testimony regarding the Mother’s 

residence, and photos offered in support, indicate an 

unstable and unsuitable environment for [A.R.W.] to 

live in primarily. Additionally, the Mother failed to 

offer sufficient evidence to lead the Court to believe 

that remaining in Harvest Baptist Academy is in 

[A.R.W.’s] best interest. The Father, on the other 

hand, provided information to the Court regarding 
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the Kiski School District regarding academic standing 

and score rating.

For these reasons, an order granting the Father 

primary physical custody of [A.R.W.], with the 

Mother having substantial partial custody will be 

entered.

Id. at 11-12. Thus, after review of the record, we determine that the trial 

court’s findings regarding the custody factors set forth in Section 5328(a) 

and determinations regarding best interests are supported by competent 

evidence in the record, and we will not disturb them. See E.R., 129 A.3d at 

527.

Lastly, we consider Mother’s allegation of error and abuse of discretion 

as a result of the trial court addressing and assigning school choice and 

making its own determination as to which school was better suited for 

A.R.W. Mother argues that, not only was it improper for the trial court to 

consider school choice on remand, but that the trial court should have 

considered the factors pursuant to Section 5328(a) in rendering its decision. 

(Mother’s brief at 11-12.) Mother contends that “moving the child from a 

school she has attended for two years, and for which there is no significant 

evidence of problems or deficiencies, is not in the best interests of the 

child[. . . .]” (Id. at 12.)

We first observe that Mother made no objection, other than 

evidentiary, to the testimony and evidence regarding school choice at the 

remand trial. Mother therefore waived any issue related to the trial court 
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addressing this issue for failure to raise it below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); 

Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d at 515-516.

Further, looking to Mother’s allegation with regard to consideration of 

the Section 5328(a) factors, we have clarified that the factors under 

Section 5328(a) are required to be addressed where an order impacts an 

award of custody and does not merely deal with a discrete and distinct issue. 

S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396 (Pa.Super. 2014).

It is also true that resolution of an otherwise 

ancillary matter may affect a form of custody and 

require consideration of the § 5328(a) factors. For 

instance, the choice of a child’s school may factor 

into a trial court’s decision to award a form of 

custody when the trial court is addressing a request 

to establish or change legal or physical custody in 

connection with the choice of school. One parent in 

a custody dispute may argue that he or she is 

entitled to primary physical custody because his or 

her residence has much better schools. On the other 

hand, many times--like here--these items may 

appear as independent, discrete issues advanced by 

motion or petition that does not require a change in 

the form of custody. Although any decision requires 

consideration of the child’s best interest, only the 

former situation requires consideration and 

application of the § 5328(a) factors.

Id. at 403. In the instant matter, the trial court clearly considered school 

choice in the context of its determination of best interests and examination 

of the Section 5328(a) factors. In fact, the court expressed, “On the 

surface, the resolution of the question of school choice would appear as a 

singular, discrete matter, but in the case herein, the choice of school weighs 

heavily on the custody arrangement that will best serve [A.R.W.]” 
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(Memorandum and order, 7/16/15 at 1 (footnote omitted).) It follows that 

the trial court discussed school choice throughout its analysis, in particular 

as it relates to A.R.W., with regard to Factor 1, which party is more likely to 

encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party, Factor 4, the need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life, Factor 7, the well-reasoned 

preference of the child, based on the child’s maturity and judgment, and 

Factor 13, the level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and 

ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. (Id. at 6-10.) 

Specifically, with regard to Factor 4, in finding that the factor favors Father, 

the trial court stated, in part:

The testimony offered by the Father at the 

April 2015 trial is that [A.R.W.]’s grades have been 

declining at the Harvest Baptist Academy. . . . The 

Father testifies that he does not believe that 

[A.R.W.] is getting a quality education or advancing 

her social skills at the Harvest Baptist Academy. He 

states that the school has no rating and that it is not 

a licensed school. He believes that only having 

8-12 children in a class does not allow [A.R.W.] to 

improve her social skills the way a child her age 

needs. The Mother also testifies that [A.R.W.] is not 

currently in any activities.

Id. at 6-7. Likewise, as to Factor 13, the trial court indicated:

There is high conflict between the parties in 

this case. Although it does appear that the Mother, 

although possibly not intentionally, through her 

enrollment of [A.R.W.] in Harvest Baptist Academy 

and the use of multiple daycare agencies, interferes 

with the relationship between the Father and 

[A.R.W.] The conflict and animosity between the 
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parties is from both sides, though the Mother seems 

more purposeful.

Id. at 10. Moreover, as referenced above, in concluding, the trial court 

noted Mother’s lack of evidence regarding Harvest Baptist Academy as 

compared to Father’s evidence in support of Kiski Area School District. 

Again, the trial court stated, “Additionally, the Mother failed to offer 

sufficient evidence to lead the Court to believe that remaining in Harvest 

Baptist Academy is in [A.R.W.’s] best interest. The Father, on the other 

hand, provided information to the Court regarding the Kiski School District 

regarding academic standing and score rating.” (Id. at 11-12.) As such, 

after review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial 

court awarding the parties shared legal custody, Father primary physical 

custody and Mother partial physical custody of the Children, and Father the 

ability to decide which school A.R.W. is to attend.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/2016