United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Navy Needs to 

Develop and 

Implement a Plan to 

Ensure That Voyage 

Repairs Are Available 

to Ships Operating 

near Guam when 

Needed 

May 2008 

 

GAO-08-427 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2008

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to 

Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships

Highlights of GAO-08-427, a report to the Operating near Guam when Needed 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Unscheduled ship maintenance, 

known as voyage repairs, is a high

priority for the U.S. Navy. Such

repairs are sometimes beyond the 

capability of the ship’s crew to 

perform; cannot be deferred; and 

must be made at a remote location. 

After the 1995 Base Realignment 

and Closure Commission 

recommended closing the former

Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, 

the Navy leased the property at that 

facility to the Guam Economic

Development and Commerce

Authority, which sub-leased the 

property to a private shipyard. 

DOD has since begun planning for 

a military buildup on Guam. In 

January 2007 the Navy

recommended allowing the private 

shipyard’s lease on Navy land to 

expire in 2012. Consequently, the 

House Armed Services Committee 

asked GAO to determine the extent 

to which the Navy has (1) identified 

future ship repair requirements at

Guam, and (2) identified and 

assessed options to address those 

requirements. GAO reviewed

documents related to ship 

maintenance and interviewed

officials affiliated with private

contractors, the Guam government, 

the Marine Corps, Military Sealift 

Command, and the Navy in 

conducting this review.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

estimate future voyage repair 

requirements for vessels at Guam; 

assess the options for providing

repairs; and select the best option 

or combination of options. DOD 

concurred with comments to these

recommendations. 

The Navy has not identified voyage surface ship repair requirements for 2012 

and beyond for vessels operating near Guam, although some information is 

available on which to base estimated requirements for planning. Navy officials 

stated that they cannot estimate such requirements because the Navy expects 

to change its force structure, the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for 

any additional vessels associated with the buildup, and Military Sealift 

Command expects changes to its force structure at Guam. Although the Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force 

structure decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, 

information is available to support an estimation of ship repair requirements 

as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. Specifically, the Navy 

(1) knows the history of voyage repairs conducted on Guam; (2) can identify 

vessels likely to operate near Guam based on planned force structure 

realignments in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review; and (3) can identify 

ship repair capabilities available at other strategic locations in the Pacific 

area, including Yokosuka, Japan. Developing requirements is a prerequisite for 

planning, and without developing estimated repair requirements the Navy 

cannot adequately evaluate options for meeting them. 

Navy officials identified potential options for providing repairs in Guam, but 

have not fully assessed their viability or identified time-critical planning tasks.

According to Navy officials, once the Navy identifies voyage ship repair 

requirements for the Guam area, they will choose from four options or a 

combination of options for providing voyage repairs. First, the Navy could try 

to expand existing organic repair capabilities to conduct voyage repairs. 

However, the existing ship maintenance capabilities and facilities have little 

excess capacity without augmentation, limiting their ability to perform 

additional work. Second, the Navy could rely on repair teams flown in from 

naval shipyards in the United States. Third, the Navy could build a new Navy 

ship repair facility, though that could require years of planning and new 

funding. Fourth, the Navy could contract out work to either or both of the 

private ship repair providers now operating in Guam, or to any other private 

ship repair facility that might choose to locate in Guam. Three of these 

options might require building new facilities or expanding existing facilities. 

Officials said they would not begin planning until preparations begin for 

submissions to the President’s budget for fiscal year 2012. However, lead time

is required to perform planning tasks necessary to provide repair capabilities 

from the Navy’s suggested options. Without assessing the viability of each 

option for voyage repairs in a timely manner, the Navy increases the risk that

voyage repair capabilities for ships operating in the Pacific may not be 

available when needed, potentially undermining ships’ ability to accomplish 

their missions. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-427. 

For more information, contact Brian J Lepore 

at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 6

Navy Has Not Identified Future Voyage Ship Repair Requirements 

at Guam although Some information is Available for Use in 

Planning 7

The Navy Has Not Evaluated Options for Meeting Voyage Repair 

Requirements in Guam beyond 2012, and Risks Not Having a 

Repair Capability in Place when Needed 11 

Conclusions 16

Recommendations for Executive Action 17 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 21 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 24 

Table 

Table 1: Voyage Repair Man-Days and Costs for 2002-2007 10 

Figure 

Figure 1: Physical Locations of Private Ship Repair Facilities 15 

Page i GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

MSC Military Sealift Command 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 12, 2008

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Guam is a territory of the United States with strategic value to the 

Department of Defense (DOD). It is the westernmost U.S. territory with 

Navy repair facilities, and DOD projects it will become increasingly 

important in supporting emerging U.S. strategic and political interests in 

the Pacific. U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships operate 

at or near Guam.1

 Between fiscal years 1987 and 1995 the Navy downsized 

its fleet from 594 to 392 ships and the Secretary of Defense proposed to 

close the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam,2

 as part of the 1995 Base 

Closure and Realignment process, based on the excess capacity in Navy

depot maintenance capabilities. The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission generally agreed with the Secretary and recommended that

the facility be closed. At that time, the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, 

performed intermediate- and depot-level repairs3

 that included (1) major 

maintenance and overhaul, and (2) emergent and voyage repairs 

(hereinafter referred to as voyage repairs) on Navy and MSC ships.4

 The 

commission also found that the Navy repair facility should be replaced by 

a private-sector repair capability if MSC ships were to remain at Guam. 

Because MSC ships did remain, the Navy leased the property on which the 

Guam is a territory of the United States with strategic value to the 

Department of Defense (DOD). It is the westernmost U.S. territory with 

Navy repair facilities, and DOD projects it will become increasingly 

important in supporting emerging U.S. strategic and political interests in 

the Pacific. U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships operate 

at or near Guam.1

 Between fiscal years 1987 and 1995 the Navy downsized 

its fleet from 594 to 392 ships and the Secretary of Defense proposed to 

close the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam,2

 as part of the 1995 Base 

Closure and Realignment process, based on the excess capacity in Navy

depot maintenance capabilities. The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission generally agreed with the Secretary and recommended that

the facility be closed. At that time, the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, 

performed intermediate- and depot-level repairs3

 that included (1) major 

maintenance and overhaul, and (2) emergent and voyage repairs 

(hereinafter referred to as voyage repairs) on Navy and MSC ships.4

 The 

commission also found that the Navy repair facility should be replaced by 

a private-sector repair capability if MSC ships were to remain at Guam. 

Because MSC ships did remain, the Navy leased the property on which the 

 1

 MSC operates logistics support vessels and stations them at strategic points such as 

Guam, and typically has several vessels at or near Guam. 

2

 Ship repair facilities differ from shipyards in that shipyards are generally found near fleet 

homeport concentrations while ship repair facilities are generally found near more remote

deployment or operating areas.

3

 Navy maintenance is performed at three different levels of increasing complexity: 

shipboard, intermediate, and depot. Depot-level maintenance is generally performed by

civilian depot artisans or contractors.

4

 Emergent and voyage repairs generally consist of maintenance to repair any problems

that emerge during deployment, or emergency work needed to enable a ship to continue its 

mission and which can usually be accomplished without a significant change to a ship’s

operating schedule. 

Page 1 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
former Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam resided to the government of 

Guam, which in turn leased it to a contractor doing business as Guam 

Shipyard. The Navy pointed to the strategic value of having a private ship 

repair capability in Guam as the rationale for noncompetitively awarding 

contracts to Guam Shipyard from 1998 to 2007 to overhaul MSC ships and 

conduct other Navy ship repair work, including voyage repairs. Guam 

Shipyard continues to operate on the leased property. Guam Shipyard’s 

lease was to expire by October 1, 2007, although Guam Shipyard exercised 

an option to extend its sub-lease with the Guam Economic Development 

and Commerce Authority by 5 years, and they in turn exercised the option 

to extend the lease by 5 years with the Navy. The lease terms gave the 

Navy the power to terminate the lease at any time for cause, if cause 

existed. 

DOD’s planning effort for a military buildup on Guam, which could have 

an impact on ship repair requirements in Guam, has begun.5

 DOD plans to

(1) relocate about 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to 

Guam, (2) construct a new Navy pier to support visiting aircraft carriers, 

(3) improve piers to support visiting amphibious vessels, (4) increase the 

submarine presence on Guam and in the Pacific region generally, and (5) 

locate an Army ballistic missile defense capability on Guam. Historically, 

U.S. naval ships whose home port was Guam were permitted by U.S. law 

to undergo overhaul, repair, or maintenance in shipyards outside the 

United States or Guam. The John Warner National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (the Act) amended section 7310 of Title 10 of the 

U.S. Code to prohibit U.S. naval vessels home-ported in Guam from 

undergoing such work in shipyards outside the United States or Guam, 

other than in the case of voyage repairs. The Act also required the Navy to

evaluate options for Guam Shipyard’s lease and any anticipated future ship

repair workloads in Guam, and to report its findings to Congress. In 

January 2007, the Navy issued its report and concluded that it would 

prefer that future ship repair contracts on Guam be awarded 

competitively, and that it would be premature to extend the lease with 

Guam Shipyard as a result of the planned military build-up on Guam. 

Specifically, the Navy recommended that the lease with the government of 

 5

 In 2004 the United States and Japan began a series of sustained security consultations 

aimed at, among other things, repositioning U.S. forces from Japan to other areas,

including Guam. GAO’s September 2007 report on DOD’s Overseas Master Plan 

(GAO-07-1015) stated that DOD’s planning effort for the buildup of military forces and 

infrastructure on Guam was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet 

to be addressed. 

Page 2 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Guam and with Guam Shipyard be allowed to expire on October 1, 2007,

and that negotiations be opened to terminate Guam Shipyard’s option to 

extend the lease by 5 years or to allow the lease to run to the 2012

expiration on a smaller acreage, if negotiations to terminate the extension 

option failed.

6

 The Navy has not initiated negotiations since issuing its 

recommendations, and has taken no action to terminate its lease with the 

government of Guam for cause. Guam Shipyard exercised its option to 

extend its lease with the government of Guam until 2012 without reducing 

its acreage, and the government of Guam completed its lease extension 

with the Navy for that time period. 

The Act also required GAO to evaluate the Navy report. On June 22, 2007, 

we briefed your staff on our evaluation and concluded that the Navy’s 

recommendation to allow Guam Shipyard’s lease to expire was logically

supported, and we could not disagree with the Navy’s conclusion based on

the information available at that time.7

 At that briefing, your staff asked 

that we also determine the extent to which the Navy has (1) identified 

future ship repair requirements for the Guam area, and (2) identified and

assessed options to address those requirements. This report responds to 

that request.

To determine the extent to which the Navy has identified future repair 

requirements for ships operating in the Guam area and identified and 

assessed options to address those requirements, we reviewed documents 

related to past ship repair requirements in Guam, contracts associated 

with ship repairs, and Navy records related to ship repair facilities and 

activities. In addition, we interviewed officials at Guam Shipyard and 

another private ship repair provider, Gulf Copper, Inc.; Guam government 

officials; Navy officials in Washington, D.C., Hawaii, and Guam; and MSC 

officials in Washington, D.C., Norfolk, Virginia, San Diego, California, and 

Guam. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to March 2008 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

 6

 Guam Shipyards operates on 100 acres at the former Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, 

but Guam Shipyard and Navy officials indicate that it may be possible for them to continue

operations from a smaller acreage of about 23 acres. 

7

 The Navy had concluded that, although there would be increased ship presence in the 

Pacific, there would be no additional home-porting on Guam and that additional voyage

repairs resulting from the increased presence were expected to be within the capability and 

capacity of the home-ported submarine tender repair department. 

Page 3 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more 

detailed scope and methodology. 

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for surface 

vessels operating near Guam for 2012 and beyond, although some 

information is available for developing estimated requirements for use in 

planning. Navy officials stated that they do not have enough information 

on which to base such an assessment. Nonetheless, while the Navy has 

plans for an increased ship presence in the Pacific and can generally 

predict the number and types of vessels likely to operate near Guam for 

the next 2 years, the Navy has not determined precisely how changes to its 

force structure for 2012 and beyond will impact ship repair requirements 

in Guam. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for 

additional vessels at Guam, or for the potential frequency and duration of

visits to Guam anticipated for amphibious vessels which are currently 

home-ported in Japan, but that may be moved to Guam by 2014 to support 

Marine Corps units being moved there. In addition, MSC expects changes 

to its force structure operating at or near Guam. Officials stated that the

timeline is uncertain for these changes, and thus the timing of future 

voyage repair requirements remains uncertain. While the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure 

decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, 

information is available to support estimations of ship repair requirements 

as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. Moreover, DOD 

guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly linked to strategic 

and contingency planning. Previous ship repair records and certain other 

information exists that could support development of at least estimated 

requirements. Specifically, the Navy (1) has historical data regarding 

voyage repairs conducted at Guam, (2) can identify vessels likely to 

operate near Guam based on planned force structure realignments in the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and developing operational plans, and 

(3) can identify ship repair capabilities available at other strategic 

locations in the Pacific area. Estimation of requirements is a prerequisite 

for performing an assessment of the viability of each option available for 

addressing those requirements in a cost-effective and timely fashion. 

Without developing estimated repair requirements, the Navy cannot

determine the best alternative among various potential sources of repair or 

support planning to provide needed maintenance capabilities. 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Navy officials have identified potential options to meet voyage repair 

requirements on Guam for 2012 and beyond, but have not assessed their 

viability or identified the critical planning tasks. By not performing timely 

planning the Navy risks not having a repair capability in place when 

needed and, as time passes, limits the options that are available to it. Navy

officials told us that once the Navy identifies voyage repair requirements 

for surface ships operating at or near Guam, they will select one or more 

of four options for providing those repairs. The options are to (1) expand

existing Navy repair capabilities on Guam, (2) utilize repair teams flown in

to Guam from U.S. Naval shipyards, (3) establish a new Navy repair 

capability on Guam, or (4) contract with one or more private ship repair

providers. However, existing Navy-owned repair sources will face 

limitations in their ability to provide additional voyage repair capabilities 

for surface ships because they do not have excess capacity to accept 

additional workload, and the Navy has not determined the extent to which

it will rely on U.S. Naval shipyards for voyage repair capabilities on Guam. 

Additionally, building a new Navy repair facility would require years of 

planning and additional resources, and such planning has not begun. 

Finally, the Navy has not determined the extent to which it would rely on 

private-sector ship repair providers beyond 2012, the year that the lease 

with Guam Shipyard will expire based on its exercise of the extension 

option. Military construction may be required depending on the option 

selected. Navy officials stated they will not begin planning to address 

voyage repair requirements on Guam until preparations begin for 

submissions to be included in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2012. 

Without performing an assessment of the viability of each of the options 

for voyage repairs in a timely manner to support planning and budgeting of 

critical tasks, the Navy risks not having adequate voyage repair

capabilities in place when needed to support operations in the Pacific 

Ocean. Further, as time passes, the Navy limits the options that are 

available to it because of the lead time that would be required to support 

some of the options. 

To ensure that adequate repair capabilities are available when needed, we 

are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 

the Navy to (1) estimate requirements for repairs for surface vessels 

operating on or near Guam based on data determined to be most 

appropriate by the Secretary of the Navy; (2) assess the benefits and 

limitations that exist in each of the options selected for providing repairs 

to ships operating near Guam in the future, and perform an assessment of 

anticipated costs and risks associated with each option; and (3) select the 

best option or combination of options for providing repair capabilities to

support surface ships operating near Guam, and develop a plan and 

Page 5 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
schedule for implementing a course of action to ensure that the required 

ship repair capability will be available by October 2012. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred, with comment, 

with each of our three recommendations. The department also provided 

technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s 

comments and our evaluation are provided in the “Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation” section of this report. 

Ships’ crews are often able to complete voyage repairs while the ship or 

battle group is underway. According to Navy officials, because ships often 

include redundant systems, repairs can usually be undertaken without 

interrupting the ship’s mission or be postponed until the ship reaches a 

repair facility or its home port. However, voyage repairs are occasionally 

beyond the capability of ships’ crews to complete, and must be performed 

by an intermediate or depot-level ship repair activity. Historically, Navy 

ships home-ported in Guam were permitted by U.S. law to be overhauled, 

repaired, or maintained in shipyards outside the United States or Guam. 

However, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007 amended section 7310 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code to prohibit 

U.S. naval ships home-ported in Guam from being repaired in shipyards 

outside the United States or Guam, other than in the case of voyage

repairs. 

Background 

Since the closure of the Navy Ship Repair Facility, Guam, the Navy and

MSC have relied on four different sources to provide voyage repairs in 

Guam. First, the Navy submarine tender USS Frank Cable, which is a ship

home-ported in Guam, has provided voyage repair capabilities for 

submarines when needed. Second, the Navy has relied on its Emergent 

Repair Facility to repair submarines by using a repair crew left behind 

from the USS Frank Cable when that ship is deployed. Third, fly-away 

teams from U.S. Naval shipyards have been sent to Guam to conduct 

voyage repairs when needed.8

 Finally, the Navy has used its contract with 

Guam Shipyard for voyage repairs of both submarines and surface ships. 

 8

 Fly-away teams consist of personnel with needed skill sets from U.S. Naval shipyards to 

provide voyage repairs on an as-needed basis at significant distances from U.S. Naval 

shipyards. 

Page 6 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Guam Shipyard has repaired most MSC ships operating around Guam and 

has assisted the Navy in completing voyage repairs on other ships and 

submarines. For example, Guam Shipyard assisted U.S. Naval shipyards 

with extensive voyage repairs on the USS San Francisco, a submarine that 

struck an undersea mountain, by providing dry-dock services and selected 

support services. Voyage repairs have averaged about 17 percent of the 

total annual workload performed at Guam Shipyard. While Guam Shipyard 

officials told us that the voyage repair work would not be sufficient to 

support its current infrastructure and personnel, in 2007 it won a 

competition for the overhaul of the USNS Bridge, an MSC Pacific fleet 

support vessel. Competitions for overhaul of other MSC ships operating 

near Guam are scheduled beyond 2008. 

While Guam Shipyard has been the only commercial shipyard capable of

supporting Navy ship repair and overhaul requirements on Guam since 

1998, a private ship repair provider new to Guam, Gulf Copper, has 

initiated ship repair operations there. Although the Navy had indicated in

its 2007 report to Congress that additional voyage repairs could be 

addressed by the submarine tender USS Frank Cable’s repair department, 

MSC has awarded contracts to both Guam Shipyard and Gulf Copper for 

voyage repairs that may be needed during fiscal year 2008. MSC awarded 

single-year contracts without renewal options, but MSC officials said that 

they plan similar contracts for 2009 that will include option years. Voyage 

repairs are unscheduled, and the capabilities required to address them 

cannot be precisely predicted. 

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for 2012 and 

beyond for surface vessels operating at or near Guam, although some 

information is available on which to base estimated requirements to 

support planning efforts. Navy officials stated that requirements have not 

been developed for the following three reasons. First, the Navy has not 

fully identified its future Pacific force structure or finalized operational 

plans. Second, the Marine Corps’ plans for additional vessels, if any, and 

operations at Guam are still evolving. Third, MSC projects making changes 

to its force structure for ships operating near Guam. However, some 

information is available that could enable the Navy to develop estimates of 

ship repair requirements. Estimation of requirements is a prerequisite for 

assessing each option’s ability to address those requirements in a costeffective and timely fashion. Without developing estimated repair 

requirements, the Navy cannot determine the best alternative among 

various potential sources of repair or support planning to provide needed 

maintenance capabilities. 

Navy Has Not 

Identified Future 

Voyage Ship Repair 

Requirements at 

Guam although Some 

information is 

Available for Use in 

Planning 

Page 7 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Navy officials stated that voyage ship repair requirements at Guam cannot 

be identified until its future force structure plans are finalized. The 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review indicated that the Navy plans to operate six 

aircraft carrier strike groups and 60 percent of its submarine force in the 

Pacific. Moreover, the service has plans for a 313-ship Navy, but it has not 

yet identified the specific ships that will comprise the force structure in 

the Pacific beyond 2012. Officials stated that operational plans will dictate 

the number and type of vessels that will visit Guam, but those plans are 

periodically adjusted due to changes in the global security environment. 

As a result, Navy officials stated that they cannot yet develop requirements 

for voyage ship repairs at Guam for 2012 and beyond. 

Officials State That 

Requirements Cannot be 

Estimated until Force 

Structure Plans Are Final 

Similarly, the Marine Corps’ plans for additional vessels in Guam have not 

been finalized, but conceptual plans for relocating Marines from Okinawa

to Guam may include the home-porting of four new High-Speed Vessels9

and two new Littoral Combat Ships10 at Guam. In addition to the possibility 

of adding vessels, the Marine Corps’ force relocation from Okinawa to 

Guam is expected to result in visits by amphibious vessels home-ported in 

Japan. These vessels are to deploy to Guam to support training exercises 

for the Marines stationed on Guam, and they may generate demands for 

voyage repairs during these operations. 

MSC also expects changes to its force structure operating near Guam, but 

the timeline for these changes is uncertain. Current MSC vessels, such as 

ammunition ships11 and combat stores ships,12 are expected to be replaced

by new dry cargo/ammunition ships13 on a one-for-one basis. MSC officials 

 9

 High-Speed Vessels can operate in shallow waters and reach speeds of 35-45 knots to 

allow for rapid deployment of Marine Corps company-sized units with their vehicles, or be

reconfigured to become a troop transport for an infantry battalion. 

10Littoral Combat Ships are being built to operate in shallow waters close to shore. The ship 

uses interchangeable mission packages so that it can be rapidly reconfigured for different 

missions.

11 T-AE ammunition ships provide logistic support to U.S. Navy ships at sea for all types of 

ammunition and assist with the transfer of ammunition between weapons storage and 

maintenance facilities worldwide. 

12 T-AFS Combat Stores Ships provide supplies to U.S. Navy ships at sea using tensioned

cargo rigs and CH-46 Sea Knight (or commercial equivalent) helicopters. 

13 T-AKE Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships are new vessels for transferring cargo at sea to 

station ships and other naval warfare forces. The T-AKE may also operate in concert with 

T-AO oilers as a substitute on-station ship, providing direct logistic support to ships within 

a single carrier strike group.

Page 8 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
believe that these new vessels will require less maintenance than the 

vessels they replace, thus potentially reducing repair requirements. For 

example, these vessels use new technology, including propulsion and 

electrical systems that are thought to require less frequent maintenance 

and different repair capabilities. Guam’s first new dry cargo/ammunition 

ship is to arrive on station sometime in 2008, but acquisition schedules for

additional such ships indicate deployment delays. Delaying the arrival of 

the new ships will delay decommissioning of the older ships, thus raising 

questions about the need to continue existing levels of repair capabilities 

in the near term, as MSC believes the older ships may require more 

intensive maintenance. 

Some Information Is 

Available to Develop 

Estimated Requirements 

for Repair Capabilities 

While the precise force structure requirements associated with the military 

buildup around Guam remain uncertain, the Navy has some information 

that can be used to identify estimated ship repair requirements. 

Specifically, the Navy knows the history of voyage repairs conducted on 

Guam; it can identify vessels likely to operate near Guam, based on 

planned force structure realignments in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review; and it can identify ship repair capabilities available at other 

strategic locations in the area, including Pearl Harbor, and Yokosuka, 

Japan. 

Historical data are available showing voyage repairs that have been 

performed on surface vessels and submarines in Guam for at least the past

6 years, and could be used to estimate likely future repair requirements 

based on past experience. MSC recently used these data to formulate 

contracts awarded for providing voyage repairs on vessels operating at or

near Guam for fiscal year 2008. Table 1 shows the average number of mandays and the cost to complete voyage repairs from private sources on 

Guam for fiscal years 2002-2007. 

Page 9 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Table 1: Voyage Repair Man-Days and Costs for 2002-2007 

Fiscal year Man-days utilized Dollar value

2002 5,919 $4,198,962

2003 6,564 4,120,036

2004 4,315 3,252,163

2005 12,137 8,507,291

2006 9,274 5,506,583

2007 3,582 5,390,946

Average 6,965 $5,162,663

Source: Military Sealift Command. 

The Navy has identified some vessel assignments associated with the force 

structure changes identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Specifically, the Navy plans to replace the USS Kitty Hawk at its home 

port in Japan with the USS George Washington—a new, nuclear-powered 

aircraft carrier. Navy officials stated that operational plans for that 

carrier’s strike group will include visits to Guam for periods of 2 to 3 

weeks. Although the Navy has not identified the specific vessels that will 

make up the strike group, Navy officials know the types of vessels that are 

normally part of a strike group. Moreover, Navy vessels have operated in 

the Pacific for decades, and voyage repair experiences are readily 

available to the Navy through repair records, shipyard billing, or similar 

documents. Nonetheless, the Navy has not used these records to forecast 

estimated surface ship repair requirements for Guam beyond 2012. 

Further, extensive ship repair capabilities exist in other locations in the 

Pacific, such as Pearl Harbor. Given that future ship repair capabilities on 

Guam may need to support a larger number and different mix of ships, the 

Navy could use ship repair data from Pearl Harbor and other strategic 

forward-deployed locations—such as the Navy Ship Repair Facility, 

Yokosuka, Japan, and the facility that repairs the Navy amphibious ships 

that support the Marine Corps at Sasebo, Japan—to help it develop 

estimated voyage repair forecasts for Guam. 

DOD guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly linked to 

strategic and contingency planning, and that a determination be made as 

to whether a specific industrial capability is required to meet DOD needs. 

This guidance calls for the Navy to follow industrial-based planning to 

ensure that required ship repair capabilities will be available when needed. 

Specifically, DOD Directive 5000.60, “Defense Industrial Capabilities 

Page 10 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Assessments,” requires that planning occur when a known or projected 

problem exists, or when there is a substantial risk that an essential 

capability may be lost. Such problems can consist of inadequate industrial 

capacity operated by a DOD entity or similar inadequate capabilities in the 

private sector. Estimation of requirements is a prerequisite for performing 

an assessment of the viability of each option available for addressing those 

requirements in a cost-effective and timely fashion. Although some 

information is available for developing estimated requirements, the Navy 

has not identified voyage surface ship repair requirements for 2012 and 

beyond for vessels operating near Guam. Without developing estimated 

repair requirements the Navy cannot determine the best alternative among 

various potential sources of repair or support planning to provide needed 

maintenance capabilities. 

While the Navy has not planned for meeting voyage repair requirements on 

Guam for 2012 and beyond, it has identified options for providing repairs,

although some require long lead times to implement. However, by not

performing timely planning the Navy risks not having a repair capability in

place when needed, and as time passes, limits the options that may be 

available to it. Navy officials have stated that they do not intend to develop

plans for a voyage ship repair capability on Guam until preparations for 

the 2012 budget cycle begin. However, in response to our inquiries, the 

Navy identified four potential options for meeting future voyage ship 

repair requirements on Guam and acknowledged that it cannot avoid 

doing some voyage repairs there. First, the Navy could use existing Navyowned voyage repair capabilities in Guam, though these face certain 

limitations in their ability to take on additional voyage repairs. Second, flyaway teams could be brought in from Navy-owned shipyards in the United

States, and these teams would rely on facilities and infrastructure in place 

on Guam. Third, the Navy could develop a new repair facility, which would 

entail significant planning, repair of existing infrastructure, and possibly 

new military construction. Fourth, the Navy could contract out the work 

to either or both of the existing private ship repair providers or to any 

other contractor that might choose to locate at Guam. DOD guidance 

requires that a determination be made as to whether a specific industrial 

capability is required to meet DOD needs and that a selection be made for 

meeting those needs. Moreover, Navy officials acknowledge that if the 

option to expand existing Navy repair capabilities on Guam or establish 

new Navy repair capabilities were chosen, early identification of mission 

requirements would be needed to facilitate planning and budgeting of new 

or expanded Navy construction to ensure that a fully functioning Navyowned ship repair facility would be operational in 2012. 

The Navy Has Not 

Evaluated Options for 

Meeting Voyage 

Repair Requirements 

in Guam beyond 2012, 

and Risks Not Having 

a Repair Capability in 

Place when Needed 

Page 11 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Existing Navy-owned capabilities in Guam are inadequate to address 

current voyage repair requirements for surface vessels and are unable to 

address additional voyage repair requirements without increased 

capabilities and capacity. First, the primary mission for the USS Frank 

Cable is to provide maintenance and support for the three fast attack 

submarines home-ported on Guam, and to address the needs of visiting 

submarines. At the time of our review, the submarine tender’s repair crew 

was operating at full capacity in meeting its primary mission. As a result, 

the Navy contracted with Guam Shipyard to complete $1.2 million in 

voyage repairs on submarines between fiscal years 2002 and 2007, mostly 

to provide additional manpower to augment the submarine tender’s repair 

crew. Although the Navy has not developed voyage repair plans for 

surface ships, it has developed some plans for the provision of voyage and 

other repairs for submarines. For example, current plans will require the 

USS Frank Cable to provide support for the new guided missile submarine 

that will visit Guam for rotational crewing. Additionally, the Navy plans to 

use part of the repair crew from the USS Frank Cable to perform repair 

services for the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land, which will be 

stationed at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territories.14 The 

repair crew on the USS Frank Cable will be increased by about 170 

personnel to enable about 160 to rotate for workload assignments on the 

USS Emory S. Land, leaving no more than 10 repair personnel to take on

additional work. As a result, according to Navy officials, it is unlikely that

the USS Frank Cable could provide voyage repairs for surface vessels in 

Guam in the future without adding capability and capacity beyond the 170 

additional personnel already planned. 

A Navy-Operated Ship 

Repair Capability Presents 

One Option, but Existing 

Navy-Owned Capabilities 

on Guam Are Inadequate 

to Accept Additional 

Voyage Repairs 

Second, the Emergent Repair Facility on Guam that supports submarines 

when the USS Frank Cable is away from port15 lacks the capability to meet 

surface voyage repair requirements. This facility is used by a stay-behind

repair crew from the USS Frank Cable when that ship is away from its 

home port. According to Navy officials, the Emergent Repair Facility is not 

adequate even for its current role. Officials estimated that the Navy would

need about $21 million to expand and equip the facility just to meet its 

current submarine mission requirements, without taking on additional 

 14 Diego Garcia is an island military reservation located off the tip of India with multiple 

resident commands including Afloat Pre-Positioning Ships Squadron 4, Maritime PrePositioning Ships Squadron 2, and a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Detachment. 

15 Navy officials estimate that the submarine tender is deployed elsewhere for 8 to 20 weeks 

per year. 

Page 12 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
voyage repairs for surface ships. For example, the facility has no 

communications capabilities; repair personnel must use personal cellular 

telephones for any necessary communications. Navy officials acknowledge 

that it would have to be expanded to meet any future surface voyage 

repair requirements. Moreover, larger vessels may be unable to approach 

the Emergent Repair Facility without conducting dredging operations and 

completing pier improvements. As a result the Emergent Repair Facility 

cannot be used to provide voyage repairs for surface vessels without 

considerable planning and capital investment. 

The effective use of fly-away teams from Navy-owned shipyards in the 

continental United States to perform voyage repairs at Guam depends on 

the ability of U.S. Naval shipyards to provide personnel to perform repairs 

without negatively impacting their own ongoing work, as well as on the 

adequacy of infrastructure and facilities available for their use in Guam. 

Further, U.S. Naval shipyards have not been provided with voyage repair 

estimates to conduct workload planning and determine their capacity to 

provide fly-away teams to Guam. The use of fly-away teams may not be 

practicable or cost-effective for performing large amounts of voyage repair

work, because Navy-owned shipyards in the United States that provide flyaway teams are currently operating beyond their target capacities, 

although they anticipate having excess capacity in the coming years. 

However, deploying fly-away teams to Guam to meet large amounts of 

voyage repair requirements without advance planning could undermine 

scheduled maintenance at the U.S. Naval shipyards. Fly-away teams also 

need sufficient infrastructure and equipment at the location at which they

will conduct voyage repairs. Because the USS Frank Cable and the 

Emergent Repair Facility both face limitations, fly-away teams that deploy 

to Guam cannot be assured that these facilities would be available to 

provide needed infrastructure or equipment. Without more clearly defined 

repair requirements and further examination of equipment and personnel 

necessary to meet those requirements, the viability of using fly-away teams 

to provide future voyage repairs is uncertain. 

Building a new Navy depot-level repair capability would require years of

planning and additional infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and funding. 

If the lease on the property at the former Naval Ship Repair Facility, 

Guam, is allowed to expire, establishing a new Navy-owned ship repair 

capability at that location would require the Navy to address 

infrastructure, equipment, and personnel requirements to create the 

capability needed to meet surface voyage repair requirements on Guam. 

Effective Use of Fly-Away 

Teams from U.S. Naval 

Shipyards Is a Second 

Option, but Depends upon 

Ability of Naval Shipyards 

to Deploy Personnel to 

Guam and the 

Infrastructure and 

Facilities Available There 

Establishment of a New 

Navy Depot Capability on 

Guam Is a Third Option, 

but Would Require 

Infrastructure, Equipment, 

Personnel, and Funding 

Page 13 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
The Navy would have to determine what capability is needed and then 

take action to acquire the equipment to provide that capability. 

Furthermore, infrastructure repairs may be needed to support work on 

Navy vessels. For example, according to Navy officials the typhoon 

moorings at Guam Shipyard may require repair. A new Navy depot-level 

ship repair capability in Guam would also require staffing by military and 

civilian personnel. Without a determination of equipment, infrastructure, 

personnel, and funding requirements for providing new surface ship repair

capabilities, the Navy cannot know whether establishing a new ship repair 

capability in Guam is a viable option. Additionally, implementing this 

option would also require significant lead time. 

Private-Sector Ship Repair 

Providers Offer a Fourth 

Option, but the Navy Has 

Not Determined the Extent 

to Which It Will Rely on 

Them beyond 2012 

The Navy has not determined the extent to which it will rely on privatesector ship repair providers beyond 2012, when the lease on Navy property 

occupied by Guam Shipyard expires. While it is unclear what kind of 

private sector capability will be available beyond 2012, both private ship 

repair providers operating in Guam have been awarded 1-year contracts by 

MSC to provide selected voyage repairs to surface vessels operating at or 

near Guam for fiscal year 2008. According to MSC officials, new contracts 

are to be executed by the end of fiscal year 2008, and this contracting 

arrangement will include option years that address voyage repair 

requirements for MSC ships through 2012. Guam Shipyard operates on 

Navy property located within Naval Base, Guam. Gulf Copper operates 

from approximately 700 feet of pier space at the commercial port opposite 

Navy property on Apra Harbor. It is possible that additional private ship 

repair providers may express interest in performing voyage repairs at 

Guam in the future, and that Guam Shipyard may continue operations at 

another location in Guam beyond 2012 when its lease on U.S. Navy 

property expires. Figure 1 depicts the physical locations of Guam Shipyard 

and Gulf Copper. 

Page 14 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Figure 1: Physical Locations of Private Ship Repair Facilities 

Navy land

Non-Navy

0 Feet 4000

0 Meters 1200

Glass Breakwater

LIMA

BRAVO

ROM ALPHA EO

SIERRA

TANGO

UNIFORM

VICTOR

X-RAY

I n n e r

A p r a

H a r b o r

P h i l i p p i n e

S e a 

Hotel

Wharf

S a s a

B a y

S u m a y

B a y

O u t e r

A p r a

H a r b o r

OROTE

PENINSULA

Orote Point

Harbor Entrance Channel Orote

Island

Gab Gab

Beach

Dadi

Beach

Commercial Port

Lockwood

Terrace

Sumay

Housing

Family

Housing

Quarry

Fire

Station

Guam

Shipyard

Marine Drive

Front Gate

Orote

Airfield

CDF

Field 5

CDF

North

Tipalao

To

Andersen

AFB

To

Ordnance

Annex

POLARIS

POINT

Cabras Island

DELTA/

ECHO

Marine Drive

Orote Point Road

Approximate location

of Gulf Copper

Apra Harbor

Naval

Complex

Andersen

AFB

GUAM

Not to scale

Sources: GAO, U.S. Navy.

The Joint Depot Maintenance Program provides guidance on selecting 

sources of maintenance and repair, and a DOD Handbook entitled 

Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities provides a framework for 

Page 15 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
coordinating analysis and determining the most cost- and time-effective

options for meeting DOD needs. If the option selected by the Navy for 

providing ship repairs in Guam requires military construction, as may be 

the case if the Navy chooses to expand existing Navy-owned capabilities 

or to establish new Navy-owned capabilities, the military construction 

requirements would have to be included in the budgeting process for fiscal 

year 2010 in order for new facilities to be ready by October 2012. However, 

Navy officials have stated that they do not intend to develop plans for a 

voyage ship repair capability on Guam until preparations for the 2012 

budget cycle begin. Without performing an assessment of the viability of

each of the options for voyage repairs in a timely manner to support 

planning and budgeting of critical tasks, the Navy risks not having 

adequate voyage repair capabilities in place when needed to support 

operations in the Pacific Ocean, and as time passes, limits the options that

could be available to it by 2012. 

The Navy has not effectively identified voyage repair requirements that are 

a prerequisite for selecting among the options to provide such capabilities 

on Guam. While the Navy does not fully know its voyage surface ship 

repair requirements near Guam for 2012 and beyond, it does possess data 

that could be used to estimate requirements. Namely, it could use existing

ship repair experiences, projected requirements identified in the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review, and information about repair capabilities 

maintained at other strategic locations to identify its ship repair 

requirements for Guam in the near term and to aid in developing a baseline 

forecast of repair capabilities it will need for 2012 and beyond. Moreover, 

the requirements determination process is a precursor to planning for the 

provision of ship repair capabilities and selecting an option to provide 

those capabilities, since a certain amount of lead time would be required 

to implement some of the options. Additionally, a decision about future 

industrial repair requirements should be an integral part of ongoing Guam 

infrastructure planning to support the transfer of Marines to Guam from 

Japan. However, the Navy has not developed such plans, nor has it 

assessed the challenges associated with the options identified, or selected

an option to provide ship repair capabilities on Guam. Without identifying 

requirements, performing a risk-based assessment of the viability and 

costs of each of the options, selecting the best option or combination of 

options available, and then developing and implementing an action plan to 

address any challenges associated with the option or options selected, the

Navy lacks reasonable assurance that it will have sufficient time to 

prepare the best option or combination of options for meeting future 

surface ship repair requirements on Guam beyond 2012. 

Conclusions 

Page 16 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
To ensure that adequate voyage repair capabilities are available for ships 

operating near Guam, and recognizing the lead time required to implement 

options, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Navy to

• estimate requirements for repairs for surface vessels operating at or 

near Guam based on data determined to be most appropriate by the 

Secretary of the Navy; 

• assess the benefits and limitations of each of the options for providing 

repairs to ships operating near Guam, and perform an assessment of 

anticipated costs and risks associated with each option; and 

• select the best option or combination of options for providing repair 

capabilities to support surface ships operating near Guam, and develop

a plan and schedule for implementing a course of action to ensure that 

the required ship repair capability will be available by October 2012. 

In a written response to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of 

our recommendations with comments. The department’s comments are 

reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The department also provided 

several technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

With regard to our first recommendation for an assessment of 

requirements for repairs for surface vessels operating at or near Guam, the 

Navy responded that it has a methodology to determine annual emergent 

repair requirements by ship class and fleet—which includes voyage repair

execution history as a subset—and that this requirement will be included 

in the future years defense plan, and that no further direction is necessary.

While we acknowledge that the Navy looks at overall maintenance 

requirements as a part of the annual budget process, this process does not 

provide a detailed listing of specific capabilities required for voyage 

repairs at strategic locations, such as Guam beyond 2012. Given its unique 

location and the changing circumstances that will impact voyage repair 

requirements in and around that location, we continue to believe that a 

specific assessment of requirements for providing surface vessel voyage 

repairs in Guam represents a necessary baseline for planning for the 

provision of ship repair capabilities beyond 2012 and for the selection of

an option or combination of options to provide those capabilities. 

In concurring with our second recommendation regarding the need for an 

assessment of the benefits and limitations of each of the options for 

providing repairs to ships operating near Guam, the department’s response 

was that the Navy has already identified a plan for providing repair 

Page 17 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
capabilities for ships operating near Guam and that the Navy has 

determined that establishing a new repair facility on Guam is not viable 

since the expenditure of funds to do this is not necessary. The 

department’s response also noted that the Navy is already developing a 

military construction project to expand the existing repair capabilities on 

Guam in fiscal year 2010, that the Navy intends to continue the practice of 

utilizing repair teams from U.S. Naval shipyards and private shipyards as 

needed, and that the Navy intends to continue the practice of contracting 

voyage repair work to one or more private ship repair providers. The 

Navy may have determined that a new repair capability on Guam is not 

necessary, but much of the existing repair equipment currently used to 

support voyage repair on surface vessels—including floating dry dock, 

floating crane, and industrial equipment—are owned by Guam Shipyard 

and could potentially be removed at the conclusion of the existing lease, if

a new lease were not negotiated. We continue to believe that it is essential 

that the department determine whether it will have continued need for 

expensive capital equipment such as the floating dry dock and crane, and 

whether the capability provided by such equipment will be available from 

the private sector. Finally, it is commendable that the Navy has a plan for 

providing ship repair capabilities on Guam and is moving forward to 

implement it. However, at the time of our exit briefing with the Navy in 

January, the Navy did not inform us of this plan. Moreover, Navy officials 

have told us that this plan was developed in February, subsequent to our 

exit briefing and in response to our recommendations. 

In concurring with our third recommendation regarding selection of the

best option or combination of options for providing repair capabilities to

support surface ships operating near Guam, the department stated again 

that the Navy’s plan for providing repair capabilities to support surface 

ships operating near Guam has already been determined, and that 

direction from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy is not 

needed. The response also stated that committing the Navy to a lease 

agreement in 2008 for a capability in 2012 is premature. While we agree 

that committing the Navy to a lease in 2008 for a capability required in 

2012 is premature, it is not premature to decide whether or not there will 

be an industrial activity—either owned and operated by the government or 

leased by a private contractor—within the Navy installation. The 

department stated in its response that the Navy intends to use privatesector capability, but it did not state whether that would be on the Navy 

installation on Guam. Given the detailed planning that is required to 

support the planned buildup of military personnel expected over the next 

few years in Guam, we believe it is essential that the Navy determine 

whether or not it expects to continue to have an industrial activity 

Page 18 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
operating as a part of the Guam Master Plan, and that it determine what 

acreage this activity would occupy. 

 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

provided in appendix III. 

Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 19 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Navy has identified future ship 

repair requirements for ships operating in the Guam area and assessed 

options to address those requirements, we reviewed documents related to 

ship maintenance. In addition, we interviewed officials responsible for 

force structure planning, contracting for repairs on vessels belonging to

the U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command, and performing repairs on 

vessels belonging to the Navy and Military Sealift Command on Guam as 

well as related organizations in Hawaii, and on the west coast of the 

United States. Specifically, we interviewed officials and analyzed 

documents related to ship repair requirements and the options proposed 

to meet them at the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations; the 

Commander, Pacific Fleet; the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific; the 

Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command; the Commander, Naval Forces 

Marianas; the Chief of Naval Installations; the Commander, Military Sealift 

Command; the Commander, Naval Facilities Pacific; and the Guam 

Economic Development and Commerce Authority. We also performed 

work at the offices of several private ship repair providers to determine 

the extent to which private-sector repair capabilities may be available on 

Guam in the future. We also examined Department of Defense (DOD) 

policy and Joint Guidance for providing maintenance and repair of DOD 

assets afloat. We performed our review from July 2007 to January 2008 in

accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient 

and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 20 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 21 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 22 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 23 GAO-08-427 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 24 GAO-08-427

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Julia Denman, Assistant Director; 

Jeffrey Kans; Julia C. Matta; John E.Trubey; and Cheryl Weissman made 

major contributions to this report. 

Defense Logistics

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(351068) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, DC 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER