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S. HRG. 110–397 

AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 8, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware .................................... 1 

Boucher, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central 

Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................... 5 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 7 

Dobbins, Hon. James, Director, International Security & Defense Policy Center, Rand Corporation, Arlington, VA ................................................................ 48 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 50 

Feingold, Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin, prepared statement .......... 38 

Jones, Gen James L. Jr., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mclean, VA .......................... 43 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 46 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 3 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator From Connecticut, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 66 

(III)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY? 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Nelson, Obama, Menendez, 

Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Sununu, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

The Chairperson is never supposed to admit this, but I was—I 

called this for 9:15. They usually start at 9:30. And I’m sitting in 

my office at 9:15, and my chief of staff says, ‘‘What are you doing 

here?’’ [Laughter.] 

I apologize, Mr. Secretary, getting you here at 9:15, and then 

starting 5 minutes late. And the train was actually on time, Mr. 

Chairman. I was actually here. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being here. 

Today, we face an issue ‘‘at the very heart of our war on terror, 

the deteriorating—my characterization—deteriorating security situation and conditions in Afghanistan. If the current trend continues, 

we may soon find that our hard-won successes on the battlefield 

have melted away.’’ 

The last part of that statement—and I’ll repeat it again—that ‘‘at 

the very heart of our war on terror, the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan—if current trends continue, we may soon 

find that our hard-won successes on the battlefield has melted 

away.’’ I didn’t write those words in preparation for this morning’s 

hearings. I spoke them nearly 5 years ago on the floor of the U.S. 

Senate when two of my colleagues here, if I’m not mistaken—I 

don’t want to get them in trouble—we all joined together to put 

more money and more troops and more effort into Afghanistan. 

I’m not bringing up old quotes to say ‘‘I told you so,’’ because 

there’s a lot of things I’ve said that turned out not to be correct, 

but to make a simple point. The situation in Afghanistan is not— 

is not an unforeseen circumstance. Plenty of military and civilian 

officials have been predicting exactly this outcome for years. 

So, what’s the state of play? Osama bin Laden remains at large, 

right across the border, in Pakistan, in all probability. There are 

reports that he has reconstituted his terrorist training camps, in 

2 

Pakistan. Given the chance to kill him in Tora Bora, the administration instead pulled most of our special forces out, our CIA 

teams, and our Predators, and sent them to Iraq. The Taliban is 

back, keeping much of Afghanistan ungovernable. Suicide bombings, IEDs, and other techniques imported from Iraq made their 

way, last year, into Afghanistan. I remember, a year ago, we were 

saying, ‘‘Well, at least this isn’t occurring in Afghanistan.’’ I think 

everyone on this panel said, ‘‘Oh, it’s coming. If it’s in Iraq, it’s 

coming.’’ And this has been—the last year has been the bloodiest 

since the ouster of the Taliban. 

The Government in Pakistan turns a blind eye to the Taliban 

cross-border attacks, and to the high command based in Quetta. 

Just last year, the government signed a ‘‘separate peace’’ with proTaliban militants in Waziristan. That is—by ‘‘the government,’’ I 

mean not our Government. 

Afghanistan reconstruction is stuck in first gear. President Bush 

promised a Marshall Plan, but he’s delivered less development aid 

in the past 5 years than we spent in the war in Iraq in the last 

3 weeks. Total amount of aid spent in Afghanistan in the last 5 

years is less than we’ve spent in Iraq in the last 3 weeks. 

Last year, Afghanistan produced 92 percent of the world’s opium. 

The proceeds prop up the Taliban, warlords, and corrupt officials. 

There’s no serious counternarcotics program. If the administration 

pursues a poorly conceived aerial poppy eradication plan, the results could be even worse. We have a lot of experience in this, in 

Latin American. 

Don’t get me wrong, we’ve accomplished some great things. Because of our efforts, millions of Afghanistan children are in school 

today. We’ve built roads and clinics. We got American troops in 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, showing that the U.S. military 

can be a wonderful friend as well as a fearsome enemy. 

President Bush, last month, made two encouraging statements. 

First, he announced the deployment of additional combat brigades 

to Afghanistan. This is obviously very important, because our 

NATO commanders desperately need not only several thousand 

battle-ready troops, but the helicopters, transport aircraft, and 

other military hardware that go with them. Second, the President 

pledged $11.8 billion in new funding over the next 2 years. If these 

figures represent new funding, in addition to current budget numbers—and I’m not sure of that—and if we focus on projects which 

bring real improvement to the lives of ordinary Afghans, this may 

be a start of a more successful strategy. I certainly hope so. Because, in Afghanistan, success is still possible. Or, put another 

way, failure is not thinkable. The question is, How can we turn 

things around? 

Very briefly, in my view we need to do three things. First, establish security. We should be surging—if we surge American forces 

anywhere, it should be in Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops are 

necessary, but not sufficient. We also need to train the Afghan police and army, which means, for starters, paying them decent salaries. I remember when I was in Afghanistan right after the Taliban 

fell, and I was—spent a lot of time with Karzai over a 5-day period, 

as he was just literally moving into an office. And I remember the 

3 

discussion then about pay for police officers, pay for civilian personnel. 

Second, we have to get moving on reconstruction. We need more 

funds, and we need to use them better. The Afghans are patient, 

but they’re not seeing reconstruction worthy of a superpower. As 

General Eikenberry said, ‘‘Where the road ends, the Taliban begins.’’ 

Third, do counternarcotics right. We should target a—multimillion-dollar drug kingpins, not the dollar-a-day opium farmers. 

Someday, aerial eradication may have its place, but not until we’ve 

got an alternative for the livelihoods for the people who we—who 

we’re eradicating the poppy, and a judicial system capable of taking 

down the drug barons. Until then, we should focus on the top of 

the food chain, not at the bottom. And, unfortunately, as years as 

chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I have an awful lot of experience watching us go through this same—how can I say it?—reverse—this same infatuation with thinking that, if we just eradicate, for the compasias down in Latin America, somehow this is all 

going to go away. You’ve got to do it at the top. 

We have three witnesses today who can explain these issues in 

detail—with authority, with expertise. The first is Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia. 

We all know and respect him, and he’s a straight shooter. We’re 

happy he’s here. 

The two—and then we have to exceptional witnesses, General 

James Jones, recently retired from the U.S. Marine Corps, who— 

I probably caused him to retire, because I think he’s the single 

most qualified person in the U.S. military—was the commander— 

and I’ve said that before he retired; I hope I didn’t hurt you, General—who was the Commander of NATO until earlier this year. He 

supervised the Alliance expansion to include responsibility for all 

of Afghanistan. 

And then, Ambassador James Dobbins, currently at the RAND 

Corporation. He has served as Special Envoy for Afghanistan. In 

the immediate aftermath of 9/11, he served as liaison to the Afghan 

forces fighting alongside our troops, bringing down the Taliban. An 

extremely talented man. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and I will now, before we turn to our first 

witness, turn it over to my colleague Senator Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

your welcome of Secretary Boucher and General Jones and Jim 

Dobbins, who have been very good friends of this committee for 

many years. And I appreciate the extraordinary expertise that our 

witnesses bring to our deliberations on Afghanistan. 

Almost 6 months ago, the Foreign Relations Committee held a 

hearing on Afghanistan that featured General Jones. At that time, 

we observed the Taliban insurgents were challenging NATO forces 

in greater numbers, showing dissent among Afghans, cooperating 

with the narcotics trade, and complicating security efforts in ways 

that inhibit the rule of law and reconstruction. 

4 

Many analysts believe that fighting in Afghanistan soon will intensify as the Taliban attempt a spring offensive to demonstrate 

their strength. Although the Taliban do not possess the capability 

to defeat NATO and the coalition and Afghan forces arrayed 

against them on the battlefield, the insecurity the Afghan people 

feel because of the Taliban attacks has caused some to lose confidence in their government. Others are leaning more heavily on 

tribal leaders and warlords who offer security. This undercuts the 

authority of the Afghan Government, increases the risk of civil conflict between tribal factions. 

The United States and our alliance partners must be prepared 

to respond to any increase in insurgent violence. There should no 

doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. The September 

11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan; al-Qaeda still operates 

there. And the fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic. 

As in Iraq, the success of our strategy depends not just on battlefield victories, but also depends on providing the populace with reasons to support the central government and coalition forces. Battlefield successes will not bring security if economic dislocation and 

political resentment within Afghanistan provide the Taliban with 

a steady supply of recruits to replace their losses. 

We need to underscore that the United States, NATO, and the 

international community are committed to stability and to reconstruction in Afghanistan. We must focus efforts now on economic 

development that makes a difference in the lives of Afghans and 

gives young people more employment options. 

We have established an infrastructure to support development in 

Afghanistan, including Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But if this 

infrastructure lacks resources to make discernible progress on electricity, water, healthcare, agriculture, and other measures, it will 

be irrelevant to the security situation. 

It isn’t clear what portion of Taliban insurgents are true believers and what portion are so-called ‘‘day fighters’’—local mercenaries who are being paid to fight by the Taliban, often with funds 

generated from the narcotics trade, but, to the extent that alternatives to a mercenary livelihood can be expanded, the Taliban will 

find it more difficult to regenerate their ranks. 

President Bush has made a significant request, as the chairman 

mentioned, for new funds for Afghanistan in the 2007 supplemental, including $2 billion for economic reconstruction. It’s vital 

that this funding be used to maximum effect, and that our allies, 

similarly, meet their commitments. 

The Afghanistan Compact adopted by the international community last year called for a significant increase in reconstruction and 

development efforts. Likewise, when NATO assumed command of 

the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, it 

called for a renewed emphasis on reconstruction and development. 

Our partners in NATO and beyond must support these calls with 

an increase in resources. 

I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. I would mention, 

as a point of personal privilege, that the chairman and Senator 

Hagel, the three of us, visited with President Karzai in 2003, when 

we were at the conference on the Dead Sea in Jordan, before we 

5 

visited Iraq, and saw his plans then, and were impressed with his 

economic ministers and the things that they wanted to do. And we 

still have confidence in them. And it’s significant that three of us 

are here this morning to hear you and our distinguished witnesses, 

and to try again. 

I thank the Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary welcome. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Hagel, Senator Nelson, 

it’s a pleasure to be here today. 

I have a longer statement that I’d like to have entered into the 

record, and then I’ll—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your whole statement will be 

placed in the record. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir. 

Senator, I’m going to sketch out, briefly, if I can, somewhat of a 

different picture than the one that you—than you opened up with, 

but—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I expected you might. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I want to say, from the start, I think you’ve got 

all the right pieces, all the right factors are there. If the situation— 

if the current trends continued last year’s trends, we would be in 

a horrible situation. But I really do think that we have set it up— 

we’re in better position this year. We have—I’ll explain—we have 

more resources, more capability, and we’re looking for additional 

resources. 

The areas that you outlined—security, reconstruction, narcotics— 

I would add governance—extending the Government of Afghanistan, extending good government in Afghanistan. Those four 

things, as you noted, need to be done more—more generally 

throughout the country, and better—in better coordination. And 

that’s the program that we’ve laid out for this year. 

This year, we recognize, we have to step up efforts and carry out 

a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy to make 

the country safe for all, especially for the people of Afghanistan. 

In the 5 years since Bonn, we have made impressive progress— 

kids in school, thousands of kilometers of roads, extending government—institutions of government—but we recognize we have many 

challenges still to overcome. We have to check the Taliban insurgency, ensure that the population sees the benefits of good government, and do a better job of getting the message out in Afghanistan 

and abroad. 

The administration has requested an additional $11.8 billion in 

assistance for the remainder of 2007 and for fiscal year 2008 in Afghanistan. This is a significant increase in resources compared to 

previous years. The funding request reflects a strategy of extending 

government and the benefits of government to people throughout 

the country, especially in the south and east. It’ll go into training 

and equipping police and military, constructing district roads, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
6 

creasing electricity generation and distribution, extending government, training government employees, providing services to citizens, fighting narcotics, and bringing about rural development. 

We’re all increasingly alarmed by the rapid growth of opium 

poppy cultivation in the country. Poppy production in Afghanistan 

fuels corruption and finances criminal and insurgent groups. 

Less than 2 years ago, we launched a multifaceted campaign that 

we’re intensifying this year. With the support of Afghan authorities, we’ve created and expanded a strategy of public information, 

rural development, law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication. 

Last year, we saw six poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan. We 

have an opportunity this year to double the number of poppy-free 

provinces to 12, maybe 14, perhaps more. 

Once again, this year we anticipate intensified attempts by the 

Taliban to disrupt government authority and sway the population 

in their favor. They failed, last year, to take and hold cities, towns, 

and territory. This year, they’re more likely to—they are likely to 

turn increasingly to suicide bombings, assassination, and intimidation tactics, often targeting innocent civilians. 

The United States, the Government of Afghanistan, and our allies are approaching the expected spring violence with some confidence. NATO, United States, and Afghan forces are more capable 

this year, better positioned, and poised to follow up effectively after 

military operations. We are succeeding in extending the writ of 

government to more districts, reporting more Afghan police, Afghan 

soldiers on the ground, more military, more NATO, more capable 

district officials, more reconstruction, more roads, more effective 

Afghan government than ever before in Afghanistan. 

As you noted, Pakistan continues to be a key partner, and, I 

would say, a vital partner, in the fight against Taliban and alQaeda. It is clear to us that the Taliban are under pressure from 

all sides, including from Pakistan. Recently, Pakistan has launched 

attacks on training facilities and armed infiltrators, and has arrested Taliban leadership figures, including, as you see in press reports, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, a former Taliban Minister of 

Defense. 

Pakistani leaders are committed to combating extremism and 

continuing to move the country toward a moderate course. Pakistan’s success is absolutely key to the success of U.S. strategic 

goals in the region. We have supported Pakistani authorities, and 

will continue to support them. 

At the NATO Summit in Riga, in November, as well as the Foreign and Defense Ministerials in January and February, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan 

mission. We have continued to press our allies to fill the force 

shortfalls for the NATO requirements. And, since last fall, allies 

have pledged approximately 7,000 new troops to the mission; 3,200 

of those are American, but the majority are contributions from 

other allies. While some caveats restricting operations remain a 

concern, allies have also expressed a willingness to come to each 

other’s aid, should the need arise. We’re also grateful that non-U.S. 

donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over the last 6 months in 

new multiyear assistance. 

7 

We and our allies recognize that success in Afghanistan can be 

achieved, and must be achieved. The people of Afghanistan badly 

want our assistance, and understand all too well the consequences 

of failure. 

At the Department of State, we appreciate the committee members’ interest and support, and particularly the kind of travel that 

you’ve made there in the past. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear and discuss these issues with you today, and I 

look forward to responding to any questions you and the members 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address you and the committee 

today regarding progress in carrying out U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. 

I would like to share a few thoughts with you to help frame our discussion today. 

The United States, joined by many international partners, toppled the Taliban government after 9/11 because of its tolerance of al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. After 

years of destruction brought about by war, we committed ourselves to rebuilding 

Afghanistan as a democratic nation to ensure that it would never again serve as 

a platform for international terrorism. That job is not finished. Indeed, we face a 

turning point. In the Afghanistan Compact, adopted by the Afghan Government and 

its international partners last January in London, we made the necessary political 

and economic commitments, but the security challenge has since increased. This 

year we must step up our efforts and carry out a comprehensive security, political, 

and economic strategy to make Afghanistan safe ground for us all, and especially 

for the people of that long-suffering country. 

In the 5 years since Afghanistan’s major factions gathered in Bonn to map out 

a way forward from three decades of war and violence, Afghanistan has made impressive progress. During this period, the United States has provided over $14.2 billion dollars in security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. The political, 

economic, and reconstruction milestones Afghanistan has achieved are extraordinary. It has a new Constitution, Presidential and National Assembly elections 

have been held, and the current Parliament is over 20 percent women. About 4.7 

million refugees from Pakistan and Iran have returned. Afghanistan’s leaders have 

adopted sound economic policies, and annual GDP growth has averaged nearly 14 

percent since 2002. Over 5 million boys and girls have returned to school, hundreds 

of schools and health clinics have been built or rehabilitated, and thousands of 

kilometers of roads have been constructed. Multidonor power sector projects are underway to build or upgrade Afghanistan’s electricity generation, transmission, and 

distribution infrastructure so that Afghans themselves can begin to rebuild their 

struggling economy. 

We are far from having overcome every challenge. We must check the Taliban insurgency and continue to assist the Government of Afghanistan in extending its authority into ungoverned spaces. We must ensure that the population sees the practical benefits of good government and do a better job of getting the message out 

within Afghanistan and abroad. We have the strategic opportunity to help build a 

moderate, Muslim society that can support democratic development throughout the 

region. The transformation of Afghanistan from an essentially ungoverned territory 

into a land bridge linking South and Central Asia will bring unimagined opportunities to the people of the region and contribute to reducing tensions and internal political strife in neighboring countries. 

The integrated strategy we are pursuing meshes security, governance, and reconstruction. We have made excellent progress on roadbuilding and intend to continue 

that as well as extend the availability of electricity. We are supporting honest and 

competent governors, as well as the training and equipping of new police and military forces. We are rebuilding the rural infrastructure, enabling agriculture production to take place in vast areas of the country until recently out of bounds because 

of lack of irrigation or the presence of land mines. And we are intensifying our efforts to end opium-poppy growing. 

8 

REINSTRUCTION

The administration has recently requested an additional $11.8 billion in assistance for the remainder of 2007 and for fiscal year 2008 for Afghanistan, a significant increase in resources for Afghanistan compared to prior years. Accelerating reconstruction efforts is a critical component of our strategy to stabilize the country 

against the Taliban and other insurgents. The funding request reflects a strategy 

of extending government and the benefits of government to people throughout the 

country, especially in the south and east. Specifically, this funding, if approved, will 

go into training and equipping the police and the military; constructing a district 

road system, principally in the volatile south and east; increasing the reliability of, 

and capacity for, electricity generation throughout the country; extending government through the south and east by building government facilities, training government employees, and providing services to citizens; and fighting narcotics and increasing rural development. There is both an Afghan and international consensus 

on this approach. We will continue to work with our partners not only within 

Afghanistan but also in foreign capitals to ensure that this effort is strengthened, 

broadened, and coordinated. 

U.S. assistance programs have already achieved measurable results and brought 

widespread improvements to the lives of average Afghans. Construction is complete 

on over 5,825 km of highways and provincial roads throughout the country, which 

has considerably reduced travel times and thus transport costs. The impact is lower 

prices for consumers. The value of legitimate agriculture production has increased 

some $1.75 billion between 2002 and 2006. This increase has largely gone to farmers. In 2006, the government brought in $440 million in total domestic revenue, 

largely through improved customs collection. This funding has helped to pay the salaries of newly hired teachers and health workers. A new currency has been established and remains stable; further, the United States helped establish a central 

bank that now holds more than $2.5 billion in reserves. A direct result of these macroeconomic measures is stability associated with a remarkably low 3.4 percent inflation rate over the last year, and the trend is further downward. In the social sector, 

according to the Ministry of Public Health, 82 percent of people today have access 

to basic health services, up from just 9 percent in early 2002. According to Ministry 

of Education data, 5.8 million students, one-third of them girls, are enrolled in 

school, versus 900,000 under the Taliban. 

We have helped the Government of Afghanistan establish new procedures during 

the past year to promote the effectiveness of assistance delivery. The Government 

of Afghanistan has developed a common vision, the Afghan National Development 

Strategy (ANDS), to ensure that all donors, nongovernmental organizations, NATO/ 

ISAF, and the government itself are coordinating and measuring the impacts of 

their development programs. The ANDS structure is overseen by, and receives policy guidance from, the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board (JCMB), cochaired 

by the Government of Afghanistan and the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, and comprised of members of the Afghan Cabinet, Ambassadors of the leading donor nations, and the ISAF Commander. I attended the 

last JCMB meeting in Berlin at the end of January, and I believe that this mechanism ensures effective coordination in the form of policy formation, prioritization of 

efforts, and implementation and performance measurement. 

To help ensure the effective administration of the additional assistance resources, 

USAID’s FY 2007 supplemental request contains funding necessary for the assignment of 10 additional personnel, ranging from procurement officials to roads engineers, to oversee field work. 

If Afghanistan is to succeed, it is crucial that its people see that they are served 

fairly and effectively by their democratic government that respects human rights as 

it carries out policies in the interests of all Afghans. The international community 

is working to strengthen Afghanistan’s institutions of governance through capacitybuilding and support for civil service reform, the Parliament, Governors, civil society, and provincial bodies, including the elected councils. The international community is helping to equip and strengthen government at the district level so that 

there is a capable government presence at the subnational level throughout the 

country. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are proving effective in supporting locallevel Afghan Government officials and tribal elders in areas recently cleared of insurgents as well as in more stable parts of the country. In addition, these civilian/ 

military teams are implementing projects such as roads, wells, and clinics that demonstrate the visible advantages and benefits of supporting the central government. 

Through these activities we are helping to improve local governance and robbing 

the insurgency of a prime recruiting tool. Provincial Reconstruction Teams staffed 

by several NATO Allies and partners are proving effective in serving as a ‘‘transVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
9 

mission belt’’ for policy and services linking provincial capitals with Kabul, helping 

Afghans get services from their own government even as the Afghan capacity to deliver those services is enhanced. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS

The Afghan Government and the international community are increasingly 

alarmed about the rapid growth of opium-poppy cultivation in the country. Afghanistan’s poppy production fuels corruption, narcotics addiction, and is a prime source 

of financing for criminal and insurgent groups. In order to survive and prosper, 

Afghanistan—as other states before it have—must rid itself of the opium poppy. 

President Karzai and his top leaders recognize this. 

However, just as the insurgency cannot be defeated by force of arms alone, the 

scourge of narcotics cannot be defeated purely by eradication. The message that 

poppy cultivation is immoral, illegal, and un-Islamic must be reinforced. Small farmers must be provided with other means to feed and clothe their families—access to 

alternative crops and other means of livelihood, to roads that will allow them to 

move their crops to market, to advice concerning markets for their new crops and 

to legitimate sources of credit so they can operate free of Taliban protection rackets 

and intimidation. In fact, they need to rebuild a rural economy that can render the 

poppy unnecessary in Afghan life. However, as in every country dealing with criminal activity, eradication and law enforcement must be credible in order to make the 

risks of growing poppy unacceptable; compared with the benefits of licit alternatives. 

It is precisely such a multifaceted approach that we launched less than 2 years 

ago and that we are intensifying now. We must be patient even as we strengthen 

our approach for the long term. Insecurity in some provinces—notably Helmand, the 

largest poppy producer—prevents the program I have described to you from being 

fully implemented today. But we have seen encouraging results from our efforts in 

other provinces, some of which are poppy-free and some of which have greatly reduced cultivation, and we are persuaded that this strategy is sound. With the support of the Afghan authorities, we have expanded our strategy of public information, 

alternative livelihoods, law enforcement interdiction, and eradication into additional 

provinces. Failure to address illegal poppy cultivation and trafficking head on and 

in a comprehensive manner is a challenge to the Afghan Government’s control over 

its own territory and a victory for the insurgents. 

The United Nations and our own estimates indicate that, despite the expansion 

of poppy-planting, our manual eradication efforts have shown good results so far 

this year. As of March 5, we have confirmed 6,754 hectares cleared nationwide, including 2,229 hectares in Helmand province and 4,525 hectares in the rest of the 

country. Eradication is proceeding ahead of last year’s pace, and all evidence points 

to significant reductions in planting in the north. Last year we saw six poppy-free 

provinces, but we have an opportunity this year to double the number of poppy-free 

provinces to 12 and perhaps add as many as 8 new poppy-free provinces, to total 

14. 

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, on March 5, in its ‘‘Afghanistan 

Opium Winter Assessment,’’ points to increases in the south, but indicates that continued strong eradication efforts throughout that region—coupled with large cultivation reductions in the north—have the potential to hold net national cultivation at 

last year’s level. This would be a remarkable achievement, considering the obstacles 

presented by the security situation. 

Whatever happens this year in terms of eradication and net cultivation, there is 

no doubt that we, the Afghans, and our international allies need to do more. In just 

the first 2 months of this year, the Border Police in Afghanistan’s Herat province, 

which shares borders with both Iran and Turkmenistan, seized more than 3,000 

kilograms of narcotics and arrested 65 drug traffickers. It is good to see that law 

enforcement is improving its capacity to interdict at least some of the illicit production, but we know that too much escapes through other checkpoints, and narcotics 

proceeds undercut all of our efforts in Afghanistan. As Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Anne Patterson noted the 

other day, we are increasingly concerned that the Taliban reap the benefit of narcotics production and trafficking, another important reason why we must redouble 

our efforts to eliminate this scourge. 

SECURITY

We face a ruthless and determined enemy in Afghanistan and, as snows melt, the 

spring fighting is starting up once again. Last summer witnessed heavy fighting in 

the south and east, where U.S. and NATO forces performed admirably. We expect 

the Taliban to challenge the Afghan Government and ISAF once again this year. 

10 

We can anticipate intensified attempts by the Taliban to disrupt government authority and sway the population to their side. Failing last year to take and hold cities, towns, and territory, this year they are likely to turn increasingly to suicide 

bombings, assassinations, and intimidation tactics, often targeting innocent civilians. 

The United States, the Government of Afghanistan, and our allies are approaching the expected spring violence with confidence. NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces are 

more capable this year, better positioned, and poised to follow up quickly and effectively after military operations. We have more troops than last year, and we have 

an agreed, comprehensive approach. We have thoroughly reviewed our longer term 

strategy, a review that resulted in our request to you for additional funding. We are 

succeeding in extending the writ of the government to more districts. We are putting more Afghan police and Afghan soldiers on the ground, more military, more 

NATO, more district officials, more reconstruction, more roads, more effective Afghan Government than ever before in Afghanistan. Our aim is to ensure that following the removal of Taliban forces from an area, we move rapidly to provide services and infrastructure in collaboration with local elders to help them realize their 

highest priorities. This is not top-down planning from the capital, but listening and 

meeting the needs of the people right where they are. 

Although Afghan security forces have made tremendous strides, Afghanistan is 

still almost totally dependent on foreign forces for security, and faces a threat from 

a determined enemy, well supplied from abroad, that knows how to exploit the 

weakness of the security forces inside the country as well as safe havens inside and 

outside Afghan territory. We are making progress in recruiting and training a competent and reliable Afghan National Army (ANA). We have decided to provide qualitative improvements to training and equipping of the ANA, since the threat on the 

battlefield is greater than in past years and the leadership exists within the ANA 

now so they can operate and maintain better equipment. Our review has concluded 

that we must now work toward increasing the size of the army, due to the changing 

dynamics of the security situation, though we must not compromise the quality of 

the ANA in our efforts to boost the quantity. We are also committed to providing 

combat enablers that will increase the ANA’s mobility and develop their ability 

eventually to defend their nation independent of coalition forces. 

LAW AND ORDER

While police are an important component of the Afghan National Security Forces, 

the police force is underdeveloped and still in transition from a system of militias 

loyal to local commanders and warlords, to a professionally led, ethnically balanced, 

national force. In Afghanistan, police play not simply the ‘‘cop on the beat’’ role familiar to all of us; they are also a key component to defeating the insurgency. Once 

military operations have rid an area of the Taliban, it is the police, trained, 

equipped, and loyal to the national government, who must take over and give local 

people the security they need to build their lives. We have a sound program in place 

for developing the Afghan police, and we know that the capacity of the police must 

be expanded, but this will take time. 

Through better training and leadership, improved pay and electronic distribution 

of salaries, and provision of better equipment, we are working to ensure that the 

police are ready and motivated to do their jobs. We strongly support efforts by President Karzai and his government to rein in corruption and prosecute dishonest officials. The international community is supporting reform of the justice system, training for judges, and humane conditions for detainees and prisoners. 

Police salaries are paid for through the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). 

Over the last 2 years, the international community has provided $120 million, including $40 million from the United States. An ongoing reform of the police is 

gradually tripling the salaries of most patrolmen, and that increase should extend 

to all police officers and patrolmen within the next year. In addition to low salaries, 

however, there is also the problem that corrupt officials have been skimming pay 

before it gets to the individual patrolmen. We are working with the Ministry of Interior on a new pay distribution system that uses electronic transfers instead of cash 

and a police I.D. system to reduce opportunities for fraud. 

PAKISTAN

Pakistan continues to be a vital partner and ally in our fight against the Taliban 

and al-Qaeda. It is clear that the Taliban are under pressure from all sides, including Pakistan. Recently, Pakistan has launched attacks on training facilities and 

armed infiltrators, and has arrested Taliban leadership figures, in particular, according to press reports, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the former Taliban Minister 

11 

of Defense. Pakistani leaders are committed to combating extremism and continuing 

to move the country toward a moderate course. Pakistan is absolutely key to the 

success of U.S. strategic goals in the region. We have supported the Pakistani authorities and will continue to support them. 

During his February visit to Islamabad, Vice President Cheney held positive and 

serious talks with President Musharraf about how, together, we can take strong 

measures to eliminate the threats from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. While we continue to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take action against violent extremists, we recognize that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed. We, 

therefore, strongly support President Musharraf’s efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and eliminating violent extremism in 

the border regions, which include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 

and parts of Baluchistan. We are committed to supporting this initiative, to bring 

economic and social development and governance reform that will render these 

areas inhospitable to violent extremists. 

Additionally, we are working to harness the power of markets. To ensure that 

people have opportunities for employment and a chance to develop sustained alternative livelihoods, President Bush announced his support for the establishment of 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Afghanistan and the border regions of 

Pakistan. By allowing certain goods manufactured in ROZs to enter the United 

States duty free as part of a comprehensive strategy of support for the Afghan private sector, this initiative can serve as a catalyst for increased trade and economic 

stability. The administration will be working this year with Congress, American industry, and the Afghan Government to implement this initiative and to give these 

people, who need jobs and hope for the future, an opportunity to join the world economy and build sustainable livelihoods. 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

At the NATO summit in Riga in November, as well as Foreign and Defense 

ministerials in January and February, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their 

commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press allies to fill 

force shortfalls in ISAF, and since last fall allies have pledged approximately 7,000 

new troops to the mission; 3,200 of these are American, but the majority are contributions from other allies. While some caveats restricting operations remain a concern, allies have expressed a willingness to come to each others aid, should the need 

arise. We are also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion 

over the last 6 months in new multiyear assistance. Of course, Afghanistan deserves 

our full effort and we believe the international community can and should do still 

more. 

We and our allies must recognize that success in Afghanistan is our only option. 

We must vanquish the voices of intolerance and extremism that turned Afghanistan 

into a land of lawlessness and intimidation, where Afghan citizens’ rights were severely violated, and that provided a home to al-Qaeda. The people of Afghanistan 

badly want our assistance and understand all too well the consequences of failure; 

sadly, some are questioning our commitment to ultimate success. We must, together, restore their faith by continuing our work until a secure, stable, and more 

prosperous Afghanistan, based on the rule of law and human rights, is firmly established so that the country will never again fall prey to extremists and terrorists. 

The Afghan and American people are working collectively toward a future that is 

secure, prosperous, and free. 

We, at the Department of State, appreciate the committee members’ interest and 

support of this most important endeavor. Thank you again for this opportunity to 

appear before this committee. I look forward to responding to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

We’ll stick to 7-minute rounds, if that’s OK, if we agree. 

Let me get right to it, Do you agree that the Taliban, al-Qaeda, 

and other extremists are now operating in more areas of Afghanistan than they were a year ago? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think so. I think, first of all, they have 

been very dominant in the south, and largely in the south. There 

have been—they have the capability of carrying out bombings, of 

sending suicide bombers to other parts of the country, and we’ve 

seen some of that, but I would say, by and large, it’s the same or 

less, because parts of the south where they had operated pretty 

12 

freely have been taken away from them. So, like some of the areas 

around Kandahar, the Panjshir Valley—— 

The CHAIRMAN. So, you think it’s actually less territory. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it’s probably less. I would say, more or 

less, we’re facing a similar situation. We’ll see suicide bombers 

more throughout the country, though. 

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of Afghan—the Afghanistan 

Army? And to what extent can they operate independently? 

Mr. BOUCHER. They are—I think they have about 35,000 troops 

now. They are operating closely with our forces, with NATO forces. 

I don’t—I think you’d have to get a military person to describe 

their capabilities to operate independently, but they operate very 

effectively, and very effectively with us. Their problem right now 

is that they’re pretty strung out. They’ve been in the fight, and 

fighting well, but they’re constantly working. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about the police? 

Mr. BOUCHER. The police have lagged behind a little bit. I don’t 

have a number right off the top of my head for the police, but I 

guess I’d just have to say there’s more and more every day, and 

they’re starting to get more capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of Afghanistan does the central 

government control, would you say? 

Mr. BOUCHER. It controls the north, the east, the west, the center. It has control of all the provincial capitals, many of the district 

areas in the south. At the same time, control means they have effective government, they have government officials, they have police, they have military. 

The CHAIRMAN. But are they government officials—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. That doesn’t mean it stops everything that might 

go on there. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I’m not—I—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Understand that. Are you telling 

me, in the west, in Herat and other places, that Kabul is in control, 

or are the warlords in those areas in control? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think there is basic national authority throughout the country. And obviously in some places, local authorities 

have a strong role. But previously dominant warlords in some of 

these areas have been moved out, and there is more effective national government authority. 

The CHAIRMAN. When—you know, there’s a routine by which— 

I recall, when—over the first couple of years after the Taliban fell, 

I met fairly regularly, and for 6- or 8-, 10-month period, I don’t— 

can’t remember how long—but I met weekly with the then-National 

Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice. And I remember going into her 

office at one point and making the comment that I thought that we 

were undercutting Karzai in Kabul on public-works projects, because we were going directly to the warlords and giving them the 

money for sewer projects, water projects, highway projects. And the 

comment she made at the time was, ‘‘Well, that’s always been the 

way it is. The warlords are there. That’s just reality.’’ Has there 

been a change in that philosophy? Do we actually—are we actually—when—for example, we’re about to, hopefully, appropriate a 

considerable portion of money for Afghanistan. Much of that—some 

13 

of that will go to public works projects. The PRTs will do some of 

it, but there will also be, I assume, direct appropriations. Need the 

mayor of a city somewhere in Afghanistan go through the central 

government to get the allocation, or does the allocation come directly from either AID or the Department of State or the United 

States Government? In other words, are we funneling all the aid 

for local projects through the national government, Karzai’s government? 

Mr. BOUCHER. A lot of it does go directly through—to the central 

government, for the central government to spend, but—particularly 

with the huge amounts that we’re spending. A lot of it does go directly through—to the central government, for the central government to spend; but, particularly with the huge amounts that we’re 

spending, a lot of it we spend directly, we contract directly. But we 

do it in conjunction with the national authorities, with the authorities. 

I was up in the Panjshir Valley, a very calm area, the PRT there 

works with the governor, they work on the roads that he identifies, 

and the local authorities identified. You know, he’s the one that 

brings a project, cuts the ribbon. It’s done—PRTs act in support of 

the local—of the national government. They act to extend the authority and the benefits of the national government. 

The CHAIRMAN. My observation—my time is almost up—my observation is that there is a direct correlation between who you have 

to go to, to get the money and the degree to which the person you 

have to go is viewed as having authority in the region. And I’ve 

been perplexed as to why—in order to try to build up the central 

government and Karzai’s authority, why we have not increased his 

ability to have leverage on the political scene by allowing it to be 

known that that highway that’s being built is not because of the 

local mayor—it’s a little bit like today. If you go into the—into our 

States in highway funding, you don’t have to go through the State, 

you can go directly to the local mayor or councilman, I promise you, 

the Governor’s authority is going to be a whole lot less in a State. 

And it seems to me—that seems to me to be a missing piece. 

Maybe I’m—maybe I’ve misunderstood how you’ve changed allocations. 

But, to be precise, if the PRT gets a request to extend a road 2 

miles into a village, or to reconstruct a water project that’s been 

damaged, or build one from the start, or dig wells for—does that 

come directly from the local tribal leader or warlord? And I know 

we don’t like using that phrase anymore, but they’re still warlords. 

Or does the—do those requests get rationalized through the allocation of resources by the central government, say, ‘‘No, no, it’s better 

for us to put more emphasis here than there’’? What—how do the 

PRTs interface with Karzai’s ministers and Karzai’s government? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. When I was in Panjshir Valley, sir, I saw 

this working. When people come to the PRT, a local village, and 

says, ‘‘We need a school, we need a clinic, a road,’’ the PRT’s answer is, you know, ‘‘Great, we’ll try to help you. Talk to the governor.’’ He’s the one who’s got to sort out the priorities, because everybody wants a school, everybody wants a road. He’s got to decide 

where it’s going to go. And, as the representative of Karzai, of the 

14 

national government, the Governor is the one that sorts it out and 

decides where these things—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I have 33—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Which ones to do. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Seconds. For the record, explain the 

relationship between the Governor and that Governor’s allegiance 

to the central government. 

Mr. BOUCHER. The Governor is an appointee of the central government, can be hired, fired, sent off. He works for Karzai. He 

works for the central government. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, my time is up. I have a few more questions, 

later, about—if they’re not asked—about the pledges we’ve received 

from other countries, how they’ve been forthcoming, if they’ve been 

forthcoming, and the like. But I—and I—but I thank you very 

much. My time is now up. 

I yield to my colleague. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just following up your last comment, I would mention that the 

Afghan Compact was signed in Afghanistan by 64 partner countries and 11 international organizations in January 2006, last year. 

Now, that Compact pledged $8.5 billion in new funding over 5 

years of time. You’ve mentioned that some of that money has been 

forthcoming. And it is, of course, a 5-year pledge. But probably 

even more significant is the new funding that is being sought in 

the supplemental now and new efforts by our Government. 

Now, I attended a meeting that the President called, last week 

at the White House, that the Vice President and the Secretary of 

State attended with Members of Congress, and the entire agenda 

item was Afghanistan. The enthusiasm for doing things in Afghanistan in that meeting was a bipartisan enthusiasm. The same is exemplified here this morning. But, as I listened to the conversation, 

and participated in that, I wondered: Is there what would be called, 

in commercial life, a business plan for Afghanistan? By that, I 

mean, clearly, $8.5 billion can do a lot. So could the $2 billion in 

supplemental that we’re about to consider. But the question is, as 

a percentage of what complete plan, or—taking a closer look at it, 

a complete country, a so-called nation-building exercise, how many 

roads do we need to build? How much agriculture will need to be 

revamped? Or how much will it need, to turn on the lights? And 

I really ask this not simply to be difficult and hypothetical, but I 

believe that the endgame really depends upon having a comprehensive idea. Now, the figure may be a very large one, as we discussed 

last year, sadly enough, the destruction of Lebanon during all the 

controversies there, billions of dollars’ worth of property were lost 

to individuals, as well as to the state, and it was not clear how that 

is ever going to be recovered in any period of time, just to get back 

to a level playing field. What I’m wondering is, When the $2 billion is asked for, is this 

asked for on the basis of our ability to administer that kind of 

funding, or the Afghans or some other group could administer it? 

In other words, we’re limited by personnel, by logistics. Give some 

context, if you can, as to how this spending fits into a successful 

state, something in which all the objectives we’ve been talking 

about today, in terms of quality of life, are likely to arise to a point 

15 

where there is confidence in that government, and stability after 

the money is spent over there and Afghans are on their own. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Senator, I think that’s a—it’s a really important 

question, and the answer is, really, the needs are infinite. If you 

want to just say, What more is needed? What we’ve tried to do with 

this funding request is—in a responsible manner, but address all 

the critical needs, the things that really needed to be done to 

change the momentum, to take the government and the benefits of 

government to the people throughout the country, but especially in 

the south and east, where the Taliban influence has been strong. 

You have to remember, in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, Afghanistan was one of the poorest nations in the entire—— 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. World. And then it went downhill for 

25 years. As our Ambassador points out, that we talk about reconstruction—a lot of this is construction. We’ve built the ring road, 

we’re now trying to build provincial roads connecting the provincial 

capitals, and we’re trying to build the district road system. But 

we’ve—what we’ve identified in that supplemental request is really 

the road system for the south and the east. If you wanted to add 

the north and the west, you’d have another billion—$2 billion—billion, billion and a half dollars. So, what we’re trying to do is all 

the critical things now to establish government, to build district 

centers and government provincial justice, and things like that. 

And that’s what we think the $2 billion does. It—in terms of the 

reconstruction. The 8.5 on the military and police side tries to give 

Afghanistan a security force that is geared not on what we can afford or what they could pay for, in terms of salary, but, What do 

they need to dominate the situation, for the Afghan Government to 

establish security for its citizens in years to come? And that is one 

that’s, I think, been well worked out by the military to accomplish 

the necessary tasks. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, now, Secretary Boucher, you’re correct, certainly, that the needs would be infinite. They would be, in our 

country, the—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Expectations we have. But I—let me 

refine the question by saying—What level of spending, what level 

of achievement is likely to bring about confidence in the government, or the thought that there has been at least some observance 

of material change, so that there is a desire to proceed with regular 

civil government. This is as opposed to saying, ‘‘Our security depends upon the Taliban,’’ or whoever comes along, ‘‘We’re really 

back where we were, in the pits’’? In other words, there probably 

is some incremental threshold of resources, less than infinity, that 

leads to some point of confidence, or, otherwise, we just simply are 

attempting to do a number of good things, hopeful that people will 

recognize that, that their mood will be better, vis-a-vis the United 

States or the allies or so forth, and, therefore, ipso facto for the 

Karzai government. But I—I want to get some parameters of where 

we’re headed, in a multiyear way. 

Mr. BOUCHER. What we did is, we looked, over the course of last 

summer and fall, what works in Afghanistan. Where has various 

strategies worked and bringing in—you know, clearing out the 

16 

Taliban with military force, bringing in police and government, 

building roads, clearing out irrigation, providing electricity, providing a new economy, new economic base—has worked—has 

worked in the east, has worked in, even, parts of the south. So, 

what we said is, What do we need, to do that more generally, 

throughout the problem areas in the east and south, and to help 

the government generally extend itself? And that’s how we came up 

with these budgets. The road systems, the government provincial 

centers, the other pieces, the electricity grids, north and south, that 

we think we need—electricity plan, take 6 percent of the population now on the grid, up to, maybe, 40 percent of the population 

on the grid. It’s not overwhelming, but it’s a critical mass, and it’s 

critical areas. Above all, providing roads, electricity, security, gives 

a chance for the private sector to go. And they’ve had very good 

economic growth in Afghanistan. That’s going to take them, in the 

long term. 

We’ve spent $21⁄2 to $3 billion a year over the last 5 years. We 

think this big push is needed to extend the effort more generally. 

But there will be a sustained level of commitment that we’ll need 

to keep going, steady progress, I think, beyond this. Big push and 

steady progress, that’s what will convince and sustain people for 

the longer term. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Your testimony and for being here. 

And I appreciate the attention, in your statement, to the poppy 

issue in the—within Afghanistan, and how we are attempting, 

through some of our efforts, to provide alternatives for those who 

make their livelihood off the poppy seed, and your statement that 

eradication itself will not end the problem. I hope you would comment a little bit more in specifics as to how we are coordinating 

our efforts to deal with the narcotic issue within Afghanistan, and 

the impact that is having on achieving our objectives in that region. 

Mr. BOUCHER. The first element of coordination is between all 

the pieces of the strategy so that there is an effective public-relations campaign, there is targeted interdiction of traffickers. I think 

they’re moving to increasingly high levels of the networks to try to 

take them down. Eradication is always accompanied with rural-development schemes, alternate livelihoods. And we’ve actually done 

most of the eradication in areas that have a lot of the assistance, 

even in the south Helmand province, where there’s been the big explosion of poppy. The eradication forces are down there. They’ve 

eradicated something like 6,700 hectares of poppy so far this year; 

whereas, last year at this time it was down in the hundreds. So, 

there is much more eradication, but there’s also much more roadbuilding, irrigation systems, jobs programs, variety of things, that 

give people other ways of sustaining themselves. We coordinate, 

also, internationally, especially in Kabul, with other key countries, 

17 

like the British and other countries that are involved in the effort. 

And, of course, the effort is led by the Afghan Government. 

Senator CARDIN. Are you receiving the cooperation that you need 

in order to deal with this issue? And let me just add to that. What 

other areas do we need to be concerned about in regards to the narcotics issues, as far as getting greater cooperation in order to 

achieve our objectives? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, first of all, I’d keep your eye on international cooperation—How do other countries step up to the plate 

and work? Second of all, I think what we think is a very important 

issue this year is taking down the trafficking networks and some 

of the big traffickers. And we’ve worked to try to make sure that 

the Afghan capability and the international capability are matched 

up there very closely. 

Senator CARDIN. Are there particular countries that we should be 

concerned? 

Mr. BOUCHER. You know, I think how we work—we work very, 

very closely with the British on this issue, because they have been 

the lead nation. We’re also working very closely with the European 

Union, generally, as they come up with a new plan to expand police 

training and to put more of their police trainers in, at the same 

time as we have vastly expanded what we’re doing with police 

training. So, I think it’s primarily the Europeans, and, of course, 

the Afghan Government, how they go after their own—you know, 

how they go after corrupt officials who might be involved in the 

drug trade is very important. We’ve very much supported that, and 

pressed them to do that, for example. 

Senator CARDIN. I would hope that you would keep us—this committee informed as to other countries that we might have to put 

more interest on this issue, that may not be doing everything that 

we need them to be doing, or might, in fact, be hurting our efforts 

to deal with the trafficking of narcotics out of Afghanistan, so that, 

in our contact with these other countries, we underscore the importance of this particular issue. 

I want to get to troop levels for one moment. If you could just 

share with us as to how you see troop levels over the next 12 

months, 24 months, in Afghanistan—of United States troops, international troops that there—what can we expect in regards to the 

near future? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I think, first, it’s important to remember 

that, since NATO started to deploy, about 2 years ago, we have not 

cut U.S. troops; in fact, we added to U.S. troops. So, what you have 

is NATO expanding into areas where United States forces might 

have been thin, or Afghan forces might have been thin before. So, 

now there are many more troops in the country than there had 

been before. There are many more troops in the Afghan Army than 

they had been before. We have just added 3,200 troops. Other allies 

have announced increases—the British, the Australians, a few others. And we have really, I think, seen a lot of people step up to the 

plates, many of those who were already in the south. What we need 

to do is push to fill out the NATO requirements. There are still 

parts of the NATO requirements that are not full—troop levels, 

helicopters, a few other areas like that, that are critical to full 

18 

achievement of NATO’s goals, and we continue to press countries 

on that. 

And, second, we need to make sure there’s the flexibility to use 

the forces in—wherever they’re needed, whenever they’re needed. 

And, you know, countries in the north and the center have important missions up there, but they also—you know, if they’re needed 

in the south, we want ’em to be able to go there. And so, the flexibility with which countries allow their forces to be used is very—— 

Senator CARDIN. Do you expect that there will be a need for additional United States troops in Afghanistan over the next 12 

months? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, you know, we’ve identified the need, and 

we’ve identified the ways to fill out these additional 3,200. As far 

as what I’ve heard from the generals, that’s pretty much what’s 

needed. And the important thing about them is, they’re capable, 

they’re flexible, they’re mobile. And so, they’re able to go and take 

the fight to the enemy, wherever it’s needed. 

Senator CARDIN. So, I take it the answer is, you don’t anticipate—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t foresee other requests, but I—that’s— 

again, that’s a military question, and I—— 

Senator CARDIN. Right, and—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Those guys—— 

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. The NATO commitment—how 

short is the NATO commitment? How much—how many more are 

needed to be deployed? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d have to check. We’re at about 85 percent of the 

need, so it’s several thousand short—several thousand troops short. 

But the requirements have just been revised, a new set of requirements coming out to NATO countries, and I don’t know exact—the 

accounting on that. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr Chairman, thank you. 

Secretary Boucher, welcome. Pursue, if you will, with me for a 

couple of minutes, the line of questioning that the Senator from 

Maryland was taking you along, on NATO commitments—not just 

troop, but dollars. You have noted in your testimony, ‘‘We are 

grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly $1.3 billion over 

the last 6 months.’’ Senator Lugar asked about this, as well, as did 

the chairman. And you also note in your testimony that, while 

some caveats restricting operations remain a concern—among the 

NATO nations, I assume is what you mean by that—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Would you enlighten this committee 

on what those caveats are? General Jones noted, in his testimony 

before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, that there 

are some conflicts, contradictions, cracks in the NATO commitment—not all countries, but a number—to their willingness to contribute to our efforts in Afghanistan. And one of the specific things 

General Jones noted was that the Italian-led judicial reform efforts 

are, in his words, ‘‘on life support.’’ His testimony before the Armed 

19 

Services Committee was not quite as rosy as yours. And if you 

could combine these pieces, and give us what you can about—starting with caveats that NATO nations have, and how that affects the 

pledges in troops, where we are with those pledges. And you mentioned the $1.3 billion over the last 6 months in new multiyear assistance. How much of that has come in? Where do we stand with 

the overall 5-year commitment? 

Thank you. 

Mr. BOUCHER. On the overall 5-year commitment, the pledges 

from London, our view is that most of that has been spent pretty 

well, that people are actually carrying out their commitments. 

Some of it’s, you know, 2 years down a 5-year stream. But they, 

indeed—most of the countries that we’ve monitored have come 

through pretty well, and those who don’t, we go tap them on the 

shoulder, remind them, and give them very specific suggestions. 

The Afghan Government came to a meeting in Berlin not long ago 

with a list of very specific suggestions about who can do what. So, 

we’re trying to make sure the money is spent effectively. But, by 

and large, I’d say the pledges are being committed, spent, and 

made effective. And that’s—— 

Senator HAGEL. Does that mean that they’ve actually produced 

the money? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah, they’ve produced the money and turned—— 

Senator HAGEL. So, you think they’re on track—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And turned it into projects. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. With the commitments they’ve 

made. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. Most—— 

Senator HAGEL. You don’t see any of the—any difficulty with 

those commitments—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. No major difficulties. The European Union—it’s a 

major donor—spends it very well. The Indian Government’s a 

major donor, they spend it well. And so, we’ve—and we do work 

with governments to make sure they not only pledge the money, 

but put it—put up the money and spend it. 

On caveats, it’s—by and large, what you hear is from countries 

who say, ‘‘Well, we got authority from Parliament to go on a humanitarian mission to Afghanistan. We don’t have authority to put 

our troops into active combat.’’ And we’re saying, ‘‘This is an alliance. Everybody needs to, you know, participate in whatever needs 

to be done.’’ And because, you know, we had a Taliban resurgence, 

we have a mission to accomplish as an alliance. And we’ve seen a 

few of those caveats get lifted. We’ve seen contributions by countries that don’t have caveats, some of these new troop contributions. So, I’d say the situation’s a little better now. The French 

have dropped their caveats and said that they are ready to use 

their forces around the country whenever they’re needed—they 

used the phrase ‘‘in extremis’’—to come to the assistance of other 

forces. We’ll have to see, as circumstances and fighting develop, 

how often they, in fact, do that. But I was in Paris last week, and 

they told me the same thing again, with the—and said they were 

ready to act on it. So—— 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you a question on—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

20 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Specifically on this? Of the roughly 

30 NATO countries, how many would you put in the ‘‘caveat’’ column, one caveat or another? You’ve just noted one—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Example. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d like to do it, sort of, carefully and figure it out. 

I’d—probably about a dozen. 

Senator HAGEL. That have concerns, as you noted—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Some restrictions—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Caveats—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. On how they would—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Restrictions as—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Use their forces. 

Senator HAGEL. So, a dozen of the NATO countries. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL. The rest are—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Well within the—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. General comprehensive commitment—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. That’s right. And these—they all have important 

jobs to do. I mean, Germans up in the north, in Badakhsan province, you know, fighting poppies, supporting government. I mean, 

they’re all doing good work and important jobs. We shouldn’t denigrate the commitment. 

Senator HAGEL. So, would your analysis—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. We want—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Be that—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. We want more flexibility. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Our NATO partners are cooperating 

as well as we would like, there are no significant difficulties with 

their commitments, fulfilling those commitments? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I would say NATO’s doing well, and can do better. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

If I could go on to Pakistan—as you know, President Musharraf 

signed an agreement with the tribal leaders along the Pakistan-Afghan border, intended to contain and weaken Taliban. I’d like your 

assessment of that, as well as answering this question. As you 

know, the House of Representatives passed, as part of its 9/11 bill, 

the new requirement that military assistance to Pakistan be conditioned on Pakistan’s efforts against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and 

progress on democratic reforms. What’s the State Department’s position on that? Two questions. Thank you. 

Mr. BOUCHER. On the border region, certainly asserting government authority there, getting government control there, is vital. I 

think the government is committed to doing that. There has been 

pressure on the Taliban from the government. There have been attacks on training camps and madrassas. There have been arrests 

of key figures. All of this, on both sides of the border, are trying 

to become more effective and do more in pressuring the Taliban. 

But there is pressure from both sides, including from the Pakistani 

side, and that’s an important factor as they try to figure out how 

they’re going to operate, this year. 

21 

In terms of conditioning our assistance to Pakistan, we’ve—— 

Senator HAGEL. Well, let me ask—we’ll come—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Back to that—is your assessment, 

then, on this agreement, that it’s working? 

Mr. BOUCHER. No. 

Senator HAGEL. We’re satisfied—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. No. 

Senator HAGEL. You’re saying it’s not working. 

Mr. BOUCHER. On the Waziristan agreement itself, it hasn’t done 

what it was supposed to do. It was designed to be an agreement 

with the tribal elders, where they would basically kick out the foreign fighters, they would stop the Taliban activity, and would stop 

the Talibanization. They haven’t done that, for a variety of reasons, 

whether it’s inability or unwillingness, but they have not effectively 

controlled those areas. And so, the government, in recent months, 

has really moved again with them to try to establish more effective 

control and reassert itself again. We want them to be effective. 

There is more to do, and they recognize that. 

Senator HAGEL. If you could answer the second question, on the 

State Department’s—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. We’re opposed—— 

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Position—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To the provision. We think that there 

is already effort from the Pakistani side, and that conditioning aid, 

the implication is that they have to be forced into it. We think 

they’re doing it for their own sake, as well as ours, and that we 

should look at them as partners. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Continuing along the line of caveats, but really 

looking at our own troops there, what—is your observation that our 

own military troops are fully engaged in combating the Taliban? 

Are there caveats on what we’re doing? I continue to get e-mails 

from parents and from—directly forwarded from troops on the 

ground there, on our side, that feel like they actually are held back 

from doing some of the things they need to do, to combat the 

Taliban. They’re able to watch them actually gear up and set up 

mortars and be able to do the things they need to do, to counter 

our troops, and we have to wait until we’re fired upon to actually 

do anything. Any observations in that regard? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think that’s the rules of engagement. We’d 

have to check with the military. But my observation is that our 

military are out there doing the job, and that they’re doing the job 

militarily, they’re taking the fight to the enemy, they’re using their 

intelligence and information, and following up, and going after opportunities and targets. And they’re also doing the job on the civilian side. One of the things we’ve done best is sort of blend the military’s ability to put some money into reconstruction with AID’s 

ability to come in quickly with projects and to—and the government’s ability to provide authority, so that the security, political, 

and economic aspects of this are very well blended, and that our 

different agencies cooperate in doing that. So—— 

22 

Senator CORKER. No—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m not aware of any restrictions on U.S. troops, 

sir, not—— 

Senator CORKER. As far as the reconstruction that we’re doing 

there, we obviously—following Senator Lugar’s comments—a lot of 

money’s being spent there, and—are we using outside contractors 

to do a great deal of that work, or are we actually trying to use 

Afghans to create economic growth in that regard? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We funnel as much money as we can through the 

Afghan Government, and have a big program to increase their capacity and ability to manage money. Then we use large contractors 

for some of the really big projects, the building of the road systems. 

Those are United States contractors, generally, but then they subcontract with Afghans. And there are programs to try to develop 

local business, local capabilities, so that, increasingly, the money 

from us and other donors can go to Afghan contractors. But we do 

use large contracts for some of these, you know, electricity grids, 

road system, kind of really big projects that need to be planned out 

carefully in all their pieces. 

Senator CORKER. You know, as we’re seeing in Iraq, obviously 

people being unemployed is a big part of what’s creating many of 

the issues there. Back to the poppyseed issue, it’s easy, I know, to 

say that we’re training people to do other things. I know, in my 

own State of Tennessee, when the tobacco issue came up, that’s 

sometimes easier said than done. Tell me, specifically—that’s a 

pretty big statement, to say that these people are moving into other 

economic—other kinds of jobs. Tell me how we’re actually doing 

that. It seems more difficult than just a statement. 

Mr. BOUCHER. It is more difficult than just a statement, because 

you can’t find a crop that’s as valuable as poppy. You can’t say, you 

know, ‘‘Grow pomegranates, you’ll make more money,’’ because you 

won’t. It’s more difficult. Poppy is an easy crop. You get the finance. It’s easy to transport when you don’t have a road. What you 

have to do—and we’ve seen this in the experience of countries like 

Turkey or Pakistan, that, at one time, were the major opium producers—you have to keep at it over time, you have to show government determination, you have to build a different rural economy. 

So, it’s not: You give them a different crop. It’s: You give them a 

road and electricity and irrigation, and they start growing fruit 

trees, but they also can process—you know, somebody sets up a 

packaging plant, and it’s cold storage, so you can sell all winter 

long. Your brother-in-law starts driving a truck. Your sister sets up 

a handicraft business, because she can now market in the cities or 

in—somewhere nearby. And a different rural economy develops. So, 

you’ve got to do all these pieces. That’s where the development 

strategy comes in. 

A lot of the immediate projects have to do with jobs. So, we’re 

doing, like, helping villagers build cobblestone roads, where they 

built it, they maintain it, and it gives them an outlet from the village to a market town or a market road. And that creates jobs, but 

it also opens up that new economic opportunity. Repair of irrigation 

ditches in irrigation systems, so that once—they get the job to do 

the work, but once the job is finished, they have new kinds of agriculture that they can introduce. So, a lot of it’s job-oriented, but 

23 

also trying to develop that different kind of rural economy is really 

the long-term solution, and that’s the precise goal. 

Senator CORKER. What’s the attitude of the Afghans toward their 

own military? I know that’s obviously, again, in Iraq, been a huge 

issue. How are they perceiving their own military, from the standpoint of evenhandedness and their reliance upon them to actually 

create security? 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s very good. The polls that I’ve seen, you know, 

support for the national government and the military, is very high. 

The anecdotal evidence from governors and district chiefs and tribal elders is, they want these guys there, you know, their—one of 

their major demands for the insecure areas is, ‘‘Assign policemen 

to our district. Send the military to our district.’’ And there are 

many more demands than the military’s capable of fulfilling right 

now. That’s why the guys are so busy and constantly fighting. But 

they are wanted. I think building of the Afghan military, as a national institution, has been quite successful in Afghanistan. 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, let me focus on Pakistan, because I don’t think we 

can talk about Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. And I 

think we all would like to know exactly how involved Pakistan is 

in either supporting the Taliban or tacitly allowing it to exist. And 

I think it’s pretty clear that the Taliban existence in Pakistan 

plays a big part in helping to fuel the conflict in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan is one of the world’s leading recipients of United States aid and has received more than $3.5 billion in direct United States 

assistance from fiscal years 2002 to 2006, including $11⁄2 billion in 

security-related aid. So, would you say to the committee that, from 

your perspective, Pakistan is being 100 percent cooperative in its 

effort to combat terrorism and to quell al-Qaeda and Taliban 

forces? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think Pakistan is enormously cooperative, is 

enormously engaged in this fight. No country has captured more alQaeda, or lost more men doing it, than Pakistan. They have also 

increased the effectiveness of their efforts in the border areas. We 

all have a long way to go, and there’s a lot more that we—we’re 

doing, and that they’re doing that we’re going to try to do with 

them. But I think, overall, if you look at Taliban and al-Qaeda, 

particularly on the al-Qaeda side, there’s been an enormous effort 

from Pakistan, and they’ve lost a lot of people in that fight. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, if that’s the case, I would gather from 

your answer that you believe they’re being as supportive as they 

can be. Then why is it that the reports of the Vice President in a 

recent visit suggest that a Democratic Congress might cut off assistance if Pakistan didn’t do more? Why would that statement be 

made, if, in fact, Pakistan is doing everything it can? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I don’t quite want to say they’re doing everything they can, because I don’t think any of us are. I mean, we just 

came up to the Hill and asked—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Or doing as much as they—— 

24 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. For billions more. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Should reasonably—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Expect. 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. They have been doing more and 

more, and there is more we all have to do, including Pakistan. 

They don’t have effective control of the border areas. They have arrested some leaders. There are more to be tracked down and arrested. They have stopped some of the training camps. There are 

more to be tracked down and eliminated. But they’re in this fight, 

and they’re in this fight because Taliban is a threat to Pakistan, 

as well as to us and the neighbors. And we want to help them. We 

want to work with them. We want to encourage them. And that’s, 

I think, what, really, the Vice President did. He expressed our support for their effort, our willingness to support their effort, but also 

our encouragement, and talked to them about how we can all be 

more effective. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, as I read those reports, it’s a rather 

blunt encouragement. 

Mr. BOUCHER. We’re very—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. It seems to me that the suggestion that a 

Democratic Congress might cut off funds to Pakistan, which no one 

has suggested, is a way to move them to greater action—for example, a New York Times article published in late January reported 

that the Pakistani city of Quetta, along the Pakistan/Afghanistan 

border, serves as a rear base for the Taliban and that Pakistani authorities—this is a quote from the article—‘‘are encouraging, and 

perhaps sponsoring, the cross-border insurgency.’’ And although 

President Musharraf denies such claims, the article goes on to say 

that, ‘‘Residents of the border area, opposition figures, and Western 

diplomats point to specific cases of Pakistani involvement.’’ 

So, how does that make sense? And how do we justify our support if that’s the reality? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Again, the Taliban do operate from Pakistan. 

They find sanctuary there, they find sources of supply there. A lot 

of their command and control is on that side of the border. They’re 

a people that go back and forth. They’re not under effective government control there, and we need to work with the Pakistanis to 

make it more effective. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do we believe that the Pakistani intelligence 

service actually continues to collaborate with the Taliban? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We have seen, I think, a lot of effort from the 

Pakistani’s intelligence service against the Taliban, but there are 

those reports that say that some of their members might be keeping ties with their friends. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, recently, Defense Secretary Gates met 

with President Musharraf, who, again, denied charges that the 

Taliban are staging attacks from inside Pakistan. However, a recent report says that at least 700 Taliban fighters crossed from 

Pakistan into Afghanistan to reinforce guerrillas attacking a key 

dam in southern Afghanistan. And the Iraq Study Group noted 

that Afghanistan’s borders are incredibly porous. If you don’t acknowledge that, in fact, Taliban fighters are working from within 

25 

your country, going across borders, how is it that you can ever deal 

with it? 

Mr. BOUCHER. They do acknowledge it, sir. I know that the question gets asked different ways, and people answer it in different 

ways. But, I mean, they just announced—or just made public the 

fact that they’ve just picked up a major Taliban leader inside Pakistan. President Musharraf has said, frankly and point blank, that 

these people do operate from inside Pakistan, and that he’s determined to go after them. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you’re satisfied with what the Pakistanis 

are doing. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we’re satisfied the Pakistanis are in the 

fight, and we’re working them—with them to become more effective, as we are working with ourselves and the Afghans to become 

more effective on the other side of the border. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, do we expect simply a military solution 

in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BOUCHER. No. No. Not on either side of the border. We’re 

also looking at how we can support the economic development of 

the Pakistani side so that people are brought into the national 

economy and have alternate opportunities. On the Afghan side, it’s 

a very well-—I think, increasingly well-coordinated strategy of military action followed by the extension of government—and Karzai, 

as you know, just named a number of new officials for the south, 

for example, new police chiefs, district chiefs—with a smooth flow 

of reconstruction and development assistance. And what we’ve 

found is, where we do this well, it works, it stabilizes parts of the 

country. What we’ve come up with a request to do is so we can do 

it more broadly throughout the country, and continue to try to do 

it better. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, you know, I don’t think we have a 

blank check here. I don’t think all that much progress has been 

made. And I think we have real challenges. Unfortunately, we diverted our attention from finishing the job in Afghanistan, and 

went into Iraq. But we look forward to continuing having a dialog 

with you on this. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Boucher, what’s the point of our eradication policy? 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s to destroy the poppy. It’s part of a complete 

package. 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I think that’s a true statement, that 

eradication is destruction. But what’s the point? What’s the goal? 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s to keep it out of the markets, keep it off the 

streets, and to establish that there is a significant element of risk 

in growing this crop, so that the farmer can’t count on a sure return—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, that’s a—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. So that when he plants—— 

Senator SUNUNU. I understand—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. He has to—— 

26 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. The message you want to—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Decide—— 

Senator SUNUNU. But if the point is to keep it off the street, then 

that places it, effectively, on par as a U.S. domestic drug enforcement effort, because we feel very strongly about preventing drugs 

from coming into this country. Is that a—is that a—are you telling 

me that’s what the objective, the thrust of eradication—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. That’s—— 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Is about? 

Mr. BOUCHER. That’s certainly part of the whole effort. I mean, 

a lot of this drugs actually flow into Russia and Europe, but we 

want to keep it out of—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, it—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. The markets. 

Senator SUNUNU. And so—but if we’re—if that’s a true statement, if you really believe that, that’s the thrust. So, what we’re 

basically doing is placing this objective, as we have to make tradeoffs in the policy, against the other goals of improving security or 

economic issues and other areas where the eradication, as a policy, 

might work against our interest. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think that’s the case. I know I’ve heard a 

lot of people talk about this. But no country that’s been a major 

drug producer has prospered as a healthy society, a stable government, and an economically diverse nation. We’re—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Which—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Trying to get Afghanistan to the 

point where it can develop an economy, it can develop a country, 

without the corrosive and corrupting influence of the drug trade. 

Senator SUNUNU. That’s an important point. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator SUNUNU. Now, that’s an economic point. And I would 

tend to agree with you, that, in terms of long-term economic prosperity, we probably want to encourage other areas of economic development. But, again, as an economic proposition, those longterm—that long-term potential needs to be traded off against the 

short-term effects that it would have on other important objectives. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think—— 

Senator SUNUNU. For example, security. And let me be more specific, because—look, if you’re—a policy of eradication, first and/or 

only—and that is primarily what we’re engaged in here. There are, 

of course, other economic development issues going on in the country which would take place whether we were engaged in a poppy 

policy of eradication or not. But that policy of eradication disenfranchises the rural population from those engaged in the policy, 

the Afghani Government and United States forces, coalition forces. 

It certainly creates a huge incentive for a much stronger relationship between that rural population and the Taliban, which runs 

against our security interests. And I think it makes it more difficult for, then, the Afghani Government to establish both order 

and a strong, ongoing relationship with the populations in those 

areas. And I think that we’ve got to recognize and be honest about 

that, because those are the negative consequences that have to be 

traded off against either the drug enforcement priority—and I— 

that’s certainly a domestic policy and priority for the United States, 

27 

and, I’m sure, for these other countries that would be affected by 

the movement of the drugs—or the long-term economic concerns. 

But I think the short-term economic concerns are at least as important as some of the longer term ones. And obviously the—an eradication policy is not good, economically, for the farmer whose crops 

are being destroyed. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, first of all, it’s a distortion of the policy 

to call it a policy of eradication. There are multiple pieces to this— 

education, interdiction, law enforcement, eradication, alternate 

rural economy. The—when we eradicate, we provide jobs, we provide economic opportunity, we provide a different rural economy for 

people. What—much of what we’re eradicating are large holdings, 

drug barons, who are growing large fields, who have become rivals, 

and local authorities—and fight against local authorities, and try 

to prevent the application of national authority. A lot of that money 

does flow into the Taliban, so you need to—you need to stop that 

connection, you need to stop that flow, because you’re feeding the 

insurgency if you allow the drugs to prosper. 

Senator SUNUNU. Don’t you believe—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. And you need to—— 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Or do you believe that the Taliban 

will have access to financial resources, whether it comes through 

the drug trade or not? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes. 

Senator SUNUNU. What’s the cost of the eradication program? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We spend about $600 million, I think, last year, 

on the antinarcotics program, part of which is eradication, and a 

big chunk of which is roads and irrigation and jobs. 

Senator SUNUNU. You think $600 million is the total cost of our 

antinarcotics program—United States, allies, Afghan Government? 

Mr. BOUCHER. No. Because so much else of what we do—— 

Senator SUNUNU. What is the total? 

Mr. BOUCHER. The—I don’t know if I could do it, because the 

whole effort to establish security, extend government, and give economic opportunity is the essence of the fight against narcotics, as 

well as the essence of development of the country. And that’s—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Why not simply purchase the crop at the field 

and destroy it? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Because you get yourself into a bidding war with 

traffickers who have more money, frankly. The—— 

Senator SUNUNU. I don’t know that that follows. I think someone—a farmer at the field, especially in these regions, which are 

certainly impoverished, in many cases, are looking for—money to 

feed their family. And when an offer is made to purchase a crop 

and destroy it, they would rather be—I think many of them would 

rather be working with the government and obeying the law than 

not. So, if there’s a program to participate in a purchase, I think 

they would be very willing to participate, and not necessarily looking to get more money from someone who’s engaged in illegal or 

antigovernment activity. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, he’s going to follow the laws of economics, too. 

If there’s more demand, he’s going to supply more, he’s going to 

grow more. You’re merely encouraging the production, and you’re 

getting yourself into a bidding war, where the margin for the trafVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
28 

fickers from what they pay the farmers to what they get in the network is so big that they can just keep ratcheting up what they pay. 

You’re just going to increase production. 

Senator SUNUNU. How much do you think it would cost to purchase the entire crop? 

Mr. BOUCHER. The—I’m trying to see if I have a number for the value of the crop. The legal economy has been expanding, so—$2– 

3 billion, probably, based on the numbers I’ve got. 

Senator SUNUNU. So, $2 billion, when we’re probably spending between $1 and $2 billion now on eradication, which, at least under 

the eradication policy, we’ve seen growth expand to record levels 

last year, and you provide an optimistic forecast that will hold our 

ground on the total acreage planted this year; whereas, at least in 

theory, $2 billion—heck, in theory, $2 billion could take all of that 

off the street. If the bidding war you describe ensues, then perhaps 

you’ll only take half of it off the street, with 50 percent margin of 

error. But my—the obvious direction this is headed is, has anyone 

even worked through how such a policy might work, and whether 

it might work? And what is our allies’ thinking on this approach? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Our allies, the ones who were most involved in 

this, with the British and others, are as against it as we are. We’ve 

looked at this carefully. We’ve thought about this carefully, because 

people do propose it. We think it violates fundamental laws of economics, and that if you buy the crop this year, you’re just going to 

get a bigger explosion of production next year, because everybody’s 

going to want to grow it and sell it to you. And they’ll sell it to you 

and everybody else they can produce for. 

Senator SUNUNU. You don’t—so, a target—a program that is either a—broad or targeted, you don’t think you have any ability to 

implement such a program, you know, without having negative 

consequences on those parts of the country where the economy is 

more stable, where people have substituted crops or built the refrigeration or done all the things you talk about—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. That, suddenly, if you have a purchase program designed to target those areas where this is still a 

problem, everything else that you’ve put into place will fall apart? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—I don’t know if it’ll all fall apart, but I 

think everybody that could produce poppy and sell it to you would 

start producing poppy, and you’d destroy any moral basis for saying poppy is bad. 

Senator SUNUNU. And, to be clear, you’re suggesting that you— 

that the United Kingdom, in particular, which has provided a lot 

of assistance in this area, the policymakers responsible for this 

issue haven’t expressed any concern, dissent, about the current policy and program? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We—there are always discussions about how to do 

it more effectively, but they agree with the thrust of the program, 

and that’s to stop the production of drugs and to provide people 

with alternative opportunities. 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I appreciate your answers to the questions. 

Mr. Chairman, you know, I just have concerns, when you look at 

the growth, and when you look at all of the negative consequences 

29 

of an eradication program, driving farmers toward the Taliban for 

financial reasons, causing friction between the government and the 

local population, diverting our military efforts—I think we need to, 

at least, take a very hard look at what we’re doing and whether 

it’s working, and whether it is serving our near-term security 

needs, because those have to be of the highest priority. The longterm economic needs are extremely important. We all want to get 

there. And, obviously, poppy cultivation can’t be part of the longterm economic future of Afghanistan. But I think we have to talk 

at least as much about the short-term security needs of Afghanistan when we have this debate. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, having spent 20 years working in 

this, I’m not sure your assertions, Mr. Secretary, are correct, because the market works the same way. You’re arguing there’s going 

to be alternative crops. You’re just—not going to just eradicate. So, 

the question is, Why would they go to an alternative crop if they 

can stay in the crop they’re in? What you’re doing is—they’re assuming you’re going to buy them by providing an alternative crop. 

I would like to have a copy of whatever report you all have written and concluded what the judgment—the collective judgment of 

State Department is about the poppy program, so we have before 

the committee the actual document that sets out what the strategy 

is and why it’s there. Because economics works the other way. The 

reason why they’d likely be eradicated or not, move to another crop 

substitute, is because of the premise my friend from New Hampshire pointed out, that there are those who would conclude that the 

risk of staying in the business is too high, coupled with their—they 

would rather make a decent living by doing something other than 

growing poppy. But I’d like very much to see something in writing 

as to what the discussions have been and what conclusions have 

been reached as to why the policy you’ve decided on is the correct— 

why you believe it’s the correct policy. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d be glad to get you something. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m not sure I have everything off the shelf, but 

we’ll get you something. 

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:] 

We believe our overall five-pillar counternarcotics policy is sound. We are, however, developing strategic options to improve its implementation. We would be 

happy to share the results of our reassessment with you as soon as it has been approved by the administration and to provide a classified briefing as required. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I assume these discussions just don’t take 

place in the abstract. I assume there’s been actual—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. No, there’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Memorandum of understanding extended between us and the Brits and others as to how to proceed 

with this issue. I hope there has been, anyway. I hope it’s not just 

casual conversation. 

Mr. BOUCHER. No; it’s constant structured discussions. I’m just 

not sure where we have—whether we’ve put it all down in—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Writing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—it would be very helpful—— 

30 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’ll get you—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you could. I—— 

Senator. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Following up on this discussion, which is, I think, a very important one, I think I understand the eradication program. And I 

think the question as to its validity needs to be deeper than the 

questions so far. They provide 92 percent of the world’s illicit 

opium. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOUCHER. That’s right. 

Senator ISAKSON. OK. That is a huge amount. Assuming we’ve 

eradicated it, and assuming we have—the Afghanis have operational control over the areas where it’s grown, the question is, 

Can we supply them with the ability, the technology, and the potential alternative crops to replace the economic value of opium? 

Can we do that? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think the answer is yes. What we’ve seen in Afghanistan is, the regular economy has been growing a lot faster 

than the economy of opium production. So, opium production used 

to come down to about 62 percent of the value of the GDP, now it’s 

about 35. So, over the past 5 years, as a percentage of the total 

economy, it’s gone down. So, we have seen growth in the rest of the 

economy. But it’s—as we’ve talked about before, it’s not just a matter of finding another crop that somebody can grow, it’s giving a 

different economic opportunity. It’s—so that you have processing 

plants and cold storage and transport mechanisms and handicrafts 

and production and, you know, cousins who get jobs in town and 

send money back. You need a different rural economy. And that’s 

been the experience in places that used to be the major producers— 

you know, Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey. It takes time. It takes 

government determination. And it takes a different rural economy. 

And we’re—that’s what we’re trying to work in tandem. 

Senator ISAKSON. On that subject, we’re currently in the midst 

of Operation Achilles. Am I correct that the—that theater of operation is the poppy-growing area? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Part of it’s the poppy-growing area. There’s also 

a lot of production farther south, in Helmand, as well. 

Senator ISAKSON. But it is the Taliban stronghold. And the 

Taliban strength, economically, is through the profits from opium 

trade, is that not correct? 

Mr. BOUCHER. They get other sources of funding, but, yeah, they 

get a lot of money from the drug trade. 

Senator ISAKSON. I was at the World Security Conference in Munich about a month ago, and I met with the Secretary General of 

NATO. We have a bit of a mystery that doesn’t get written about 

too much there are as many foreign allied troops in Afghanistan as 

there are Americans. There’s a total 46,000. We have 23. A number 

of other countries have an additional 23. And the majority of them 

are carrying out Operation Achilles. And there’s a great deal of 

support from the European community. I think Germany’s putting 

in 6 more Tornados and the support to back them up. We got 

Mullah Mahmoud last night, trying to slip out of Afghanistan in a 

burqa. So, obviously, things are getting pretty uncomfortable. If 

that success materializes in that area of Afghanistan and OperVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
31 

ation Achilles gets operational control under Afghan security, the 

key to not wasting that effort is going to be quickly following up 

on these alternatives so that economic diversity can grow in a relatively short period of time. Am I not correct? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely. And we’ve put enormous effort into 

this—what we call a comprehensive approach, and we’ve been trying to work that through with allies and NATO countries. That’s 

the message the Secretary of State took to her NATO meeting in 

January. Secretary Gates took it to the Defense Ministers. And 

we’re working very actively with NATO countries so that assistance, Afghan Government, and reconstruction, and military security are all worked together so that they work simultaneously. Had 

very successful operations earlier this year around Kandahar, Operation Medusa, that did very effectively. And that’s what Achilles 

is going to do, as well. 

Senator ISAKSON. If I remember correctly, when Secretary Rice 

was here and we reviewed the Department’s budget, there was almost as much money for Afghanistan in this area as there was 

Iraq. Am I remembering that correctly? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m afraid I don’t know the numbers on Iraq off 

the top of my head, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Anyway, I think it demonstrated, contrary to 

popular belief, that we have a continuing significant commitment 

in Afghanistan to sustain an actually more secure democracy, get 

rid of the illicit trade of the opium, and also defund and demoralize 

the Taliban. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely. And the supplemental funding request 

we’re making is a really big push, and we hope to not only make 

the big push, get in there more broadly where we need to, but also 

sustain it over the years. It’s going to have to be a long-term effort. 

Senator ISAKSON. And just to confirm what you were saying in 

answer to the questions on eradication, when I was in Munich 

meeting with the security people—where Putin came and made his 

infamous speech, a month ago—there is unanimity on this eradication program within NATO and within the European community 

that it’s the right approach, just as long as we’re able to follow it 

with relative security and the alternatives to allow the economy to 

grow. 

Mr. BOUCHER. There is unanimity on the comprehensive approach, the five-pillared approach to narcotics. And there is always 

debate about how much eradication, and when and where, what 

kind of eradication, versus, Are we bringing enough alternate-livelihood money? And we’ve, I think, worked that out, on an ongoing 

basis. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I appreciate your and the Secretary’s continuing work. Thank you. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Let me go back, if I can, to this. I’m going to take another round, 

if I may. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that the purpose was to— 

of eradication—was to prevent this poppy from coming into the 

United States and other countries. Isn’t one of the overwhelming 

32 

reasons for it to stop being able to fund the warlords and fund— 

where is this money going? Where is this illegal money going? 

Mr. BOUCHER. The money goes into drug barons. The Taliban siphon off some of it. A little bit—a little bit of it goes to farmers. 

But, largely, it goes into the traffickers and trafficking networks 

and the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And who are—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. People that they pay off. 

Senator ISAKSON. Who are the traffickers? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Some of them are what you might call warlords, 

people connected to former centers of power. Some of them, I think, 

are just people who—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have them identified? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We are—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not going to ask you, publicly, who they are, 

but do we have—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I guess I’d say—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Them identified? 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We’re increasingly closing in on identifying them. Some have been picked up and arrested in Afghanistan, by the Afghans—a lot of mid-level people, a few top-level people. But I think we—our drug people tell me—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was told—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We’re getting closer and—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Is some of the—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And closer. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Better-known warlords, the people 

who we know—we know their names, they’ve been around for a 

considerable amount of time—are significant beneficiaries of this, 

that they are cooperating, making their own deals with the 

Taliban, they’re buying off one another, that they are part of the 

problem that relates to the physical security of our troops and 

NATO troops there. I would like—again, in classified form, if need 

be—I would like to have the committee briefed on—not generically, 

specifically who—because if you need help, I can give you the 

names of some of them. I’m not being facetious. It bugs me that 

we have these generic assertions that, ‘‘Well, you know, it goes to 

some people and goes to drug lords.’’ My understanding is, from 

both our military and intelligence people, it goes specifically to 

warlords we know, who have been giving Karzai a hard time, who 

are maintaining control of regions of the country, who have cut 

their deals not only with traffickers, but cut their deals with being 

able to fund their private armies and their militias. And so, if I’m 

wrong about that, I’d love to hear about it, but I’d like a—if you 

would arrange for a classified briefing for us on who the money’s 

going to. It’s billions of dollars. 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s billions of dollars. 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s a lot of money. 

The CHAIRMAN. It far exceeds anything we’re putting in. I mean, 

in terms of thus far, if you added it all up, as I understand it. But 

if I’m wrong about that, I’d like to be corrected—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think that’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. On it. 

33 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Quite true, because the overall Af- ghan economy last year was about $9 billion, and the value of the 

drug trade was 35 percent. So, that put it about $3 billion. It’s a 

lot of money. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s a lot of money. 

The CHAIRMAN. And—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, the—some of the warlords have been 

marginalized. Many of them have accepted the new governing arrangements. I wouldn’t say that all of them—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I’d like to have, with your permission—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Are involved, but we—there are people involved in the drug trade that have—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. In a classified setting, I’d like the 

names of the warlords, each of them—we know them—and what 

our estimate is of their participation. It would be really sad if we 

didn’t know that, or have an estimate, so I hope I don’t get back 

‘‘that’s unknowable,’’ because it is knowable. And, if it is unknowable, then we’re in real trouble. We are absolutely incompetent if 

that’s the case. But—so, I’d very much like to have that, for the 

record. 

Mr. BOUCHER. We know a lot about a lot of people—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I know, and—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And we’ll get you classified—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We’d like to know what you know, 

to determine whether what you know is enough to need—that 

needs to be known, because we don’t have a lot of—I don’t have a 

lot of confidence, so far, in the way we’ve handled Afghanistan. 

Let me also point out that you indicated that you think things 

are better, yet in 2006, 4,000 people killed. And, according to the 

U.S. military, Taliban attacks surged by 200 percent in December. 

Since September, when Musharraf signed his peace deal with the 

extremists, the number of attacks of cross-border have increased by 

300 percent. Suicide bombings have gone from zero in 2002 to one 

every 3 days in 2006, with apparently—at least I don’t see much 

relief in sight. I could be wrong about that. But let me ask you 

about reconstruction details, if I may. 

The—according to the Congressional Research Service analysis, 

the funds for civilian reconstruction the President requests come to 

less than the amounts in some prior years. And fiscal 2005, seems 

to have been the high mark in past years. The administration proposal that—this 11-point-whatever it is, would provide $1.8 billion 

for fiscal 2007, regular and supplemental combined. And that—and 

$1.4 billion for fiscal 2008. But, by comparison, in 2005, it was $2 

billion. So, as I look at this, the reconstruction number is actually 

going down, not going up, from 2005. Two thousand five highwater 

mark, $2 billion, yet combined 2007 and supplemental is $1.8, and 

the request for 2008—I mean, excuse me—combined for 2007, regular and supplemental, is $1.8; total for 2008 in the President’s request is $1.4. Yet, in 2005, it was $2 billion. Is this an accurate 

analysis, or is the Congressional Research Service incorrect? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d have to look at the numbers. It just sounds 

wrong. I mean, we spent $14.2 over 5 years. That works out to 

34 

$21⁄2 billion a year. And now we’re asking for $11.8 to spend 

over—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But I’m talking about—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Two years, that’s $5 billion a year. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Reconstruction, specifically. Reconstruction money, specifically. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Even on the reconstruction side, we’re looking 

at—you know, you can take out the training of army and police, 

even—we’re looking at $2.2 to spend over the next 2 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. Over the next 2 years. So, that’s, you know—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. 2007 and 2008. So, that’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. $1.1 a year. 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. $1.1 billion. We’ve had, in—what I 

know is about $1 billion a year, a little less. So, this is more. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d have to look at the numbers, sir, but I think 

what we’ve tried—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To do is, do a whole program that addresses all the needs. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, again, what you—what—the impression 

being left here is that we have to win the hearts and minds. The 

way in which the Karzai government and a democratic Afghanistan, from—in Kabul, a central government, is going to be able to 

do that, is by changing the status of the life on the ground for people, in terms of reconstruction, not just security, but in terms of the 

change in their daily lives. There’s discussion here among various 

Senators—I think the Senator from New Jersey raised it—about 

everything from electricity to schooling to whatever, and that’s all 

in the reconstruction piece of the equation. Yet, as I look at the reconstruction piece, at best you’re about even with what you’ve done 

in the last 5 years, which is woefully inadequate, in my view, and, 

at best, it’s less than what it was in 2005. So, if you could give us 

an analysis of whether or not my assessment is incorrect—and I 

hope it is—I’d be delighted. OK? Because—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. We’ll get that to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Because it makes it sound like we’re really doing 

something different, and the truth of the matter is, I don’t think 

we’re doing something radically different, in terms of funding for 

reconstruction. Now, we are doing more, finally, in terms of training the police. We are doing more in terms of training of the military. And we are doing more in sending more of a physical presence, more troops. But, again, remember the premise. It was the 

same premise the President put forward years ago with regard to 

Iraq when he said he needed $18.4 billion. The rationale for that 

wasn’t we needed that to provide for security, it was we needed 

that to get the lights on, we needed that to get the sewers functioning, we needed that to get, you know, the public works, the 

roads, the highways, the potholes filled, et cetera. And that was the 

only way we were going to fundamentally alter the attitude of the 

people in Iraq about our not being an occupier. Well, we’re saying 

the same thing, the same basic premise, as I understand, that 

we’re starting off with here is that we have to deal with security, 

but that’s not enough. We can’t do this militarily, we can’t do this 

35 

merely by training Afghan forces, we have to do this by changing 

the lives on the ground as it return—as it relates to their ability 

to have potable water, et cetera. 

And so, if that is true, and if my analysis is correct, it looks to 

me like we’re not doing much that we haven’t done the last 5 years, 

which hasn’t been enough. 

Mr. BOUCHER. What I’d say, sir, is that the premise is that people want the whole package. People expect their government to 

give them safety and justice and government services, and a road 

and electricity and economic opportunity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let’s assume they get safety and justice—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, we’re trying to—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And the rest. This doesn’t—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. Well—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Get them any more roads. This 

doesn’t get them any more potable water. This doesn’t get them 

any more than they’ve gotten the last 5 years, which they’re clearly 

unsatisfied with. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, it gives them more, because they’ve got the 

road that was built last year, and they’re going to get the road 

that’s built next year. I mean, it’s—there is the incremental increase. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I think 

that’s a—we are so far behind the curve. But we can argue about 

that. I’d just like an analysis. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah, we’ll give you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Are we, in fact, doing more on reconstruction 

than we’ve done in 2005? And, if we are, how much more? Just flat 

reconstruction. That’s my second round. 

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:] 

Foreign operations assistance to Afghanistan—in absolute terms, but also as a 

percentage of overall U.S. Government assistance to Afghanistan—has decreased 

from its height in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2005, foreign operations assistance 

accounted for about $2.9 billion, or approximately 60% of overall U.S. assistance to 

Afghanistan. 

In fiscal year 2007, which includes the recently passed supplemental, foreign operations assistance accounted for about $1.8 billion, or approximately 18% of overall 

U.S. Government assistance to Afghanistan. The other 82% is mostly funding for the 

Department of Defense. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll yield now. I see the Senator from Wisconsin 

is here. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for allowing me to make a brief opening statement, but I’d 

rather just ask that it be put in the record, the full statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I want to thank everyone for coming 

here to testify before the committee today. 

And I want to thank you, Senator Biden, for arranging the hearing. 

The situation in Afghanistan is critical to our national security. 

Unfortunately, obviously, recent reports about worsening security, 

a resurgence of the Taliban, increased al-Qaeda operations, and increased poppy production in Afghanistan, are really painting a 

pretty troublesome picture. 

36 

Let me ask you some questions, though, sir. DIA director, General Maples, testified in November that al-Qaeda appears to be attempting to reinvigorate its operations in Afghanistan and that its 

relationship with insurgent networks is, ‘‘increasingly cooperative.’’ 

That strikes me as a pretty profound failure of our policies. Do you 

agree? 

Mr. BOUCHER. What we’ve seen in the past year has been a resurgence of the Taliban and a reconnection of al-Qaeda and their 

ability to operate. We’re there, we’re trying to meet them. And I 

think we’re better set up this year to deal with than we were in 

previous years. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What does it say about our policies, though, 

that have caused—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. It says we haven’t finished the job. We threw 

them off for a while. We pushed them out. But they’ve been able 

to regather and regroup and start to come back at us. They came 

back last year. We stopped them from achieving their goals last 

year. But we haven’t established dominance or got them on the run 

yet. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What conditions on the ground have permitted this to happen, to allow al-Qaeda to reinvigorate operations 

in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it was the fact that there are large parts 

of this country that weren’t effectively governed, including parts of 

Pakistan that were not effectively subject to government authority. 

Senator FEINGOLD. During the Karzai period, you’re talking 

about. 

Mr. BOUCHER. During the last couple of years, yeah. 

Senator FEINGOLD. General Craddock was quoted, in January, 

saying that the war in Afghanistan is an, ‘‘economy-of-force,’’ operation, which means fewer resources. What are the opportunity 

costs posed by Iraq, in terms of troops and resources in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t think there’s been, really, much of a tradeoff at all. I know when the—when the surge was announced in 

Iraq, the first question we got from the Afghans are, you know, 

‘‘Are you going to take them out of here?’’ And the answer is, no; 

we’ve—actually adding to Afghanistan. And so—whereas, a couple 

of years back, you had 20- to 25,000 total forces, maybe 30, now 

you’ve got 46,000, because the United States has, in fact, increased, 

even as NATO has put these major increases in. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Are you saying that the Iraqi war has not 

taken any resources—personnel, money, intelligence, others—attention away from Afghanistan? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Certainly in terms of our overall national-needs, 

we’re putting a lot of money into both, but I’m not aware of any 

circumstance where we’ve cut back in Afghanistan to send something to Iraq. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’ve heard differently both in Afghanistan and 

through many sources here, that it—there’s been some real-tradeoffs that have weakened our situation in Afghanistan. 

What do you think General Craddock called—why do you think 

he called an ‘‘economy-of-force operation’’? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m not sure when he did that. Was that recent? 

37 

Senator FEINGOLD. Relatively recent, yes. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I believe I—I’ve certainly read an article 

about it in the last month, that—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I don’t, frankly, know. I’m not sure what the 

phrase means to military men. There is a very large efforts being 

made. We’ve just increased that effort. We’ve increased the forces. 

And we’re increasing the Afghan Army’s ability and capabilities. 

So, what I see is an ever increasing military and security capability. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In November, CIA Director Hayden testified 

to the Armed Services Committee that, ‘‘little progress has been 

made in constructing an effective Afghan national police force.’’ 

What new initiatives or resources will be needed to finally build up 

the police? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. The police, I’d say, have generally lagged 

behind the military. What we’re doing now is trying to build the 

institutions that sustain the military, the—I’m sorry, the police, 

the—you know, the pay system, personnel systems, things like 

that, so they can become a good national institution. The rates of 

training have been stepped up quite a bit. Europeans are about to 

launch another major effort on their part to put more into police 

training, more mentors in the field. We’ve also, since last fall, 

started to train what are called auxiliary police, which are local 

people who get basic training as policemen and are put on the administrative interior payroll, so they come in the national system, 

but they’re more effective on the spot right away than the other recruits who have to go through longer training in different systems. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In a recent hearing on his nomination to be 

Ambassador to Afghanistan, William Wood said that he thought 

the recent increased efforts by the United States to react and respond effectively to changes in Afghanistan appeared to be ‘‘balanced.’’ Do you agree with this assessment, or are there specific 

changes that the U.S. Government should make in order to react 

and respond effectively to these new conditions on the ground that 

we’ve been discussing? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, absolutely, there is balance. There’s balance in what we’re doing, there’s balance in what we’re requesting 

from the Congress. The point is that security, extension of government, and economic opportunity have to go in a very tight, coordinated fashion, and that’s how the entire strategy has been played 

out, where it’s—in parts of Afghanistan where it’s worked really 

well, we’ve done it in a very well-coordinated fashion. Now we want 

to do it more broadly, throughout the country, and try to do it better—try to do it better, including coordination with our allies, 

NATO, and reconstruction assistance that comes with NATO. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, Secretary Gates said, during a February 6, 2007, hearing that, ‘‘part of the problem with the money 

aspect of it’’—the opium drug trafficking—‘‘is certainly not that the 

farmers get it, but that it fuels the Taliban and it fuels corruption.’’ 

The Department of State’s Narcotics Control Strategy Report also 

noted that there is a direct evidence linking the insurgency in Afghanistan and narcotics. How direct is the link in the increased 

poppy production with the resurgence of the Taliban? 

38 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s—there’s certainly a lot of money that comes 

out of the drug trade that ends up in the Taliban. It—a lot of it 

looks like it’s payoffs and taxes, not Taliban actually directly growing the drugs themselves, and selling it. So, they’re parasites, I’d 

guess I’d say, major beneficiaries of this trade, in that they pull 

money out of this major financial flow. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask it this way. If the Taliban structure were significantly weakened, would see we a decrease in illicit 

opium production? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Probably, because we would see more areas under 

government control, where the alternatives are there, where we 

can bring in the other economic opportunities. Effective government control and economic opportunity are—you know, we can do 

that in areas where the Taliban are no longer a threat. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] 

Thank you for coming to testify before the committee today and thank you, Senator Biden, for arranging this hearing. the situation in Afghanistan is critical to our 

national security. Unfortunately, recent reports about worsening security, a resurgence of the Taliban, increased al-Qaeda operations, and increased poppy production 

in Afghanistan pain a very troubling picture. 

Furthermore, the war in Iraq continues to draw attention and resources away 

from the fight against terrorism in places like Afghanistan, the country from which 

the attacks of 9/11 were planned. 

I am pleased the NATO is increasing its efforts in Afghanistan—robust military 

operations in Afghanistan are absolutely critical at this time. It is not our national 

security interest not only to support NATO forces but to deploy additional U.S. 

forces if they are needed to compensate for NATO’s shortcomings. I have been concerned that our military commitment to Afghanistan has been insufficient and while 

I welcome this month’s offensive, our presence there must be sustained. 

Increased NATO support should ;not be used as an excuse to shortchange our 

military role or our reconstruction and counternarcotics efforts. We need to match 

our military and counterterrorist operations with sufficient resources to help the Afghan Government extend its reach—and legitimacy—throughout the entire country. 

Afghanistan has the potential for being a flagship success in the international 

fight against terrorist networks; it could also easily become another unending and 

botched engagement in which the U.S. Government has no discernable strategy for 

success. 

The administration needs a clear strategy in Afghanistan that links together 

tightly those policies and programs needed to develop a viable state—including economic, political, judicial, and security sector development—with our efforts to defeat 

terrorist networks in the region. Without such a strategy, we run the grave risk of 

leaving behind a weak government susceptible to extremism and the influence of 

powerful warlords, and a region vulnerable to the resurgence of terrorist networks. 

Unlike in Iraq, we have the capabity, through a sustained, comprehensive commitment, to bring stability in Afghanistan. We can do so in a way that is sustainable, 

in terms of military and other resources. And the American people not only support 

our efforts in Afghanistan, they expect that we will direct the resources and attention needed to achieve victory. 

If we take the right approach—one that encompasses a fully integrated military, 

diplomatic, and political strategy—we can stop Afghanistan from becoming a failed 

narco-state, a haven for terrorists and a direct threat to our Nation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for being on time, Senator, I mean, 

in your questions. 

We have—I just would point out to my friend from—I’m going to 

hold him to 7 minutes. Like everybody else, we went over a few. 

General Jones has—is our—on the next panel, and he has to leave 

at 11:45, so I very much want to hear what he has to say. So, Senator, if you could—and I will yield to both of you to ask your quesVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
39 

tions of General Jones first. But if we could keep this portion to 

7 minutes, it would be good. OK? 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And thank 

you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. Boucher, thank you very much for being here and for your 

important work that you’ve done over many years for this Government. 

I wanted to ask you about security in Afghanistan. And I know 

in your statement you indicated that you felt that NATO and 

United States and Afghan forces were more capable and better positioned, and, thus, enter this year, and enter what could be a very 

difficult springtime, with more confidence. Can you elaborate on 

that and just give us a sense of what the indices of that are, the 

markers that you think make this a period where they can have 

that kind of confidence? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think if you look back a year ago, the numbers 

were smaller, the capabilities were less, the numbers of Afghan 

troops were less. We have now increased the size of the Afghan 

Army, and they’re much more active in the field. NATO forces are 

there. U.S. forces have increased, as well, with more flexibility to 

operate, so there’s more of a presence throughout the nation. 

Helmand province, last year, had a couple of hundred troops from 

NATO and an Afghan Army; now they’ve got thousands. 

In addition, the Afghan Government has extended its reach. 

President Karzai made a number of decisions on sending out better 

police chiefs, district officers, into the south as—well, throughout 

the country, but including the south. And we’ve been able to do 

more assistance—get more assistance money down there. So, I 

think we’re better positioned, we’re more capable on all aspects, on 

security, governance, and economics. But, again, that the enemy 

has been spending the winter, you know, building bombs and designing tactics, and it’s going to be nasty, and it’s going to be difficult, but I think we’re better able to cope. 

Senator CASEY. And you may have addressed this earlier. I had 

some conflicts and wasn’t here until later in the hearing, obviously. 

But it always bears repeating, in terms of an important point that 

we should make. With regard to our troop levels, where are we 

now? And do we have a level that’s adequate to confront which we 

expect, which is a pretty strong spring offensive—at least that’s the 

expectation—spring offensive by the Taliban and by al-Qaeda or 

any other organized group? 

Mr. BOUCHER. We’re at about 23,000 troops now. I think we’ll 

have the additional forces, another 3,200, that will go in there. 

When I talked to the military last fall, and said, you know, ‘‘What 

do we need for the springtime?’’ this is what they said they needed. 

The decision made to assign these forces is based on the request 

of General Eikenberry and the commanders in the field. 

We’re still not at the full staffing of the NATO levels. The NATO 

force requirements that have recently been revived—revised. We’ve 

seen more pledges from other countries, NATO members—Australia, people like that—but there’s still more that we want to see 

from the NATO allies, in terms of what they provide to the mission, but, also, we want to get rid of any restrictions they have on 

the use of their forces. 

40 

Senator CASEY. If you say there’s a need there, why do you think 

they’re not forthcoming on that? What’s the holdup? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Countries have other obligations. They say they 

don’t have the forces, they think somebody else should go first, they 

think they’re already doing enough. There are a variety of things 

people say, or—but I think, in the end, you know, we’ve seen 7,000 

new troops pledged for Afghanistan since the Riga Summit last 

fall; 3,200 of those are Americans, but the majority is still foreign 

troops. So, we’re getting there. We’re just going to keep pushing. 

Senator CASEY. And just, finally, I know we’ve got to wrap up, 

but I wanted to ask you about the growing Taliban insurgency and 

why do you think that is? Where do you think that emanates from, 

in terms of that resurgence? Are there multiple reasons, or is there 

a more singular reason for—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. There are a lot of different reasons. I think it goes 

back to the fundamental problem of 9/11, and that’s ungoverned 

spaces. 9/11, we had a country that was hospitable to terrorists, 

that was not governed and controlled. The ungoverned spaces, 

parts of Afghanistan have been—had not had strong government 

authority, or good government authority. Parts of Pakistan, the 

government has not held strong sway. And it’s a matter of exerting 

government authority, bringing these people into the nation on 

both sides. 

Senator CASEY. And, finally—this will be the last, because I 

know we’re out of time in a minute or so—how would you assess 

the relationship now between the Karzai government—in particular, President Karzai—and the Pakistani political leadership, 

especially the personal or one-to-one relationship between Mr. 

Karzai and General Musharraf? 

Mr. BOUCHER. You know, the relationship is rocky. I suppose 

that’s historically the way it’s been between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But, in practical terms, we see more and more cooperation. 

And we’ve got good military cooperation, with our assistance. 

They’ve got national security meetings and foreign affairs meetings. I think they’re having a joint economic committee meeting 

very soon. We’ve seen them start to work together on the refugee 

problems, refugee returns. We are trying to facilitate and encourage every bit of cooperation between the two of them. They need 

to work together on the border areas, on the border crossings, a lot 

of those things. And we spend a lot of effort bringing them together 

and say, ‘‘Hey, guys, we’ve got to sit down and do this together,’’ 

because it’s the only way any of us are going to beat the problem. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

I’m going to yield to my friend Senator Lugar. He has an additional request, or—— 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to amend your 

original suggestion for a classified briefing on the drug problem to 

include this question of buy-out, as opposed to eradication. And I 

raise it from the standpoint, as you pointed out, Secretary Boucher, 

that maybe a third of the economy—some have estimated more of 

that—is involved in the drug situation. But it’s an international 

problem, which you’ve also pointed out, with a large percentage— 

I think you said 90 percent or something of that sort—of the opium 

41 

in the world, coming out of this—so that there are real questions, 

it seems to me, given the cost of both methods, as well as the future, to consider this very carefully. And I’d just like, during this 

classified briefing, to have the backup reasoning that has led to the 

administration’s views on this, so that we can, in our oversight 

way, have an opportunity to look at it. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Certainly, sir. Frankly, let me say, if we can, I’d 

like to give you that in an unclassified form. We’ll look at it 

and—— 

Senator LUGAR. Very well. 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We’ll give you all the information, 

whatever—— 

Senator LUGAR. Unclassified would be—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Is the best way—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Better still—— 

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To get it to you. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. In one form or another. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. 

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:] 

The Governments of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are 

all opposed to the legalization of opium in Afghanistan, as are the relevant technical 

agencies of the United Nations. While this idea does have surface appeal to some, 

legalization would be a severe mistake. 

In the first place, the licit opium market is not lucrative enough to entice Afghan 

farmers. The price difference between licit and illicit opium is so substantial that 

Afghan farmers would not quit the black market. To make up for the price difference, exorbitant subsidies would have to be offered, which would prove prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the Government of Afghanistan would be obligated to 

purchase opium stocks, resulting in the crops’ exponential expansion as more farmers would grow in order to take advantage of a guaranteed source of income. Buying 

up existing poppy crops at licit market rates has been tried by the British in Afghanistan and faciled because it did not decrease cultivation. The Government of 

Afghanistan opposes buyouts because of the numerous complaints they received 

from legitimate farmers about the ‘‘subsidy’’ for law-breaking poppy farmers. 

Secondly, there is no legitimate world demand for legally produced opium from 

Afghanistan. According to the United Nations International Narcotics Control 

Board, world demand for opium-based medicines is fully met. World stockpiles are 

also sufficient to meet any conceivable future or increased demand. 

Nor would this scheme be feasible. Countries that produce licit opium have strict 

controls, sophisticated law enforcement, and licensing systmes—and still admit to 

significant illegal diversion. The lack of security in Afghanistan has led to the explosion of the current illicit poppy crop, so a licit industry that relies on legal controls 

could not work. Without safeguards, licit and illicit opium would be indistinguishable. 

Furthermore, history argues against this approach in Afghanistan. Lessons from 

India, Pakistan, Bolivia, and other countries show the often disastrous effects of legalizing drug production without the requisite market demand, or law enforcement 

and control mechanisms. Each of these countries attempted to regulate a legal trade 

in narcotics and, as a result, saw an increase in cultivation or significant diversion 

into the black market. 

Legalization also is ultimately counterproductive and dangerous—it would expand 

and entrench the drug trade, undermining efforts to bring security and sustainable 

economic development. This would benefit insurgent groups such as the Taliban, 

who profit from the trade, as well as criminals and corrupt government officials. Afghanistan would suffer from more violence, lawlessness, and corruption as a result 

of legalization, not less. Expanding opium cultivation would also come at the expense of important efforts to diversify Afghanistan’s economy, making the country’s 

welfare dangerously reliant on one commodity. 

Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to fighting opium production in Afghanistan. In our full report, attached for your review, we examine the main arguments 

raised in favor of legalization as advocated by The Senlis Council, which has been 

quoted by mainstream media as an authority on this subject. 

42 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

As General Jones and Ambassador Dobbins come forward, I’d 

like to—and I’d—oh, did you have a comment you wanted to make, 

closing? You’re welcome—— 

Mr. BOUCHER. I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Please. No, no, no. No, no, no. Please, I’m sorry. 

I didn’t mean to cut you off. I thought you were anxious to leave. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m anxious to leave, sir. I thank you. And I appreciate the discussion. And I’ve written down a lot of things that 

we’re going to follow up on. So, I’m sure we’ll continue the conversation at some later date. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I didn’t mean to cut you off, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. BOUCHER. No, I’m—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m sorry. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m happy to let the seats at the table go to others. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Well, I’d like to call General Jones and Ambassador Dobbins. 

And, as I do, I want to make a brief comment here before we begin 

this panel. 

I want to thank General Jones for his 40 years of exceptional 

service to this Nation, and at a time when we’re hearing about 

mindboggling failures in leadership at Walter Reed, and with our 

VA system, it’s an honor to have one of the Nation’s best warriors 

and leaders with us today. 

But, you know, I find it mindboggling what’s happening out at 

Walter Reed. I spent 7 months, on and off, out there as a patient. 

I spent almost—over—close to 2 months in the ICU unit there, and 

I found the care out there to be incredible, exceptional, not just for 

me, but for everybody that was around. So, I was stunned to learn 

what we did, what happened out there. And I—I’m going to speak 

a little more to this in a little bit, but I think the combination of 

contracting out, about the BRAC closing, the constant attempt to 

underestimate the cost of this war, has led to this deplorable condition. 

And there’s a number of good ideas out there, but I’m going to 

warn my colleagues, I’m going to be introducing legislation that 

will deal with the privatization of military care, as well as moving 

in the direction to change some other bottom-line requirements. 

You know, at Walter Reed, the maintenance and repairs were 

farmed out to a private firm under a $120 million contract, and the 

contractor replaced 300 workers with 50. Now, maybe some of 

those 300 workers weren’t needed, but I—can’t tell me there’s not 

a correlation between having 300 people dealing with these needs 

and 50 people dealing with the needs. 

And I also am going to move to prohibit the defense—the Department of Defense from being able to mandate medical care budget 

cuts, and also to require that managers have contact with their patients at least once a week to improve their training, and also to 

make that trauma brain injuries, so-called TBI, is a presumptive 

condition for those coming back, seeking service, if they’re in an 

43 

area where there was serious exposure, as well as they have symptoms. As many as 10 percent of those serving in those countries 

have brain injuries. That’s 150,000 servicemembers. 

We also require wounded soldiers and marines to receive new 

uniforms. The idea—when I found out from folks back home that 

one of the patients could not—had to get their own uniforms, because they came back with a tattered uniform and didn’t get a new 

uniform, I found that just absolutely mindboggling. 

There’s a lot more to talk about, and I wish we had time to talk 

to General Jones, not about the specific condition at Walter Reed, 

but about, as a lifelong leader in the military, what some of the 

line officers think about what’s going on. But that’s a different subject. 

And I welcome you both. 

General Jones, why don’t we begin with your testimony; Ambassador, then yours. And then what we’ll do is move to questions. 

And I’d ask my two colleagues, maybe we could direct most of our 

questions initially to General Jones, if you have any for him, so 

he’s able to make the—his appointment. And we thank you for 

being here. Thank you both. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, MCLEAN, VA 

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you very 

much. Distinguished Senators, members of the committee, it’s a 

pleasure to be back talking about an issue that I am passionate 

about, and that’s our efforts in Afghanistan. 

I appear before you this morning in my capacity as a retired Marine four star, as of 1 February, and a former NATO Commander. 

My expertise, to the extent that I have any on this subject, has to 

do with my experiences more in NATO than as a U.S. commander. 

But I have been privileged to be involved with Afghanistan since 

NATO first started talking about it, in 2003, and was privileged to 

lead the formulation of NATO’s plan, which has now been fully implemented and has resulted, in the fall of last year, of NATO moving into all five sectors of Afghanistan. As we divided them, the 

capital, the north, the west, the south, and then the east in a counterclockwise gradual expansion which reached its fruition and full 

completion last fall. 

One of the reasons that violence has gone up in Afghanistan, in 

my opinion, is that prior to NATO’s full expansion, particularly to 

the southern region, there was virtually no presence in that region. 

When we were there, it was largely American coalition troops who 

were there for specific finite reasons; very kinetic, very short-term 

combat operations. And, as such, reconstruction and stability had 

not arrived to that southern part of the country, which is enormous, and it was, in fact, a safe haven for the disparate groups 

which perpetrate violence in Afghanistan, including the tribes, including the remnants of the warlords, including the Taliban, including the narcotraffickers and the like. 

With the arrival of NATO troops in the southern region in the 

summer of last year, in Operation Medusa, which was a—I think, 

a very defining moment, which answered the question, once and for 

44 

all, whether NATO would fight in Afghanistan. We did, in fact, 

make a very positive statement which—and the opposition, suffered a tactical defeat of significant proportions. And I think that’s 

why you see some of the numbers going up, because we just didn’t 

have any reporting before. 

Having said that, I remain convinced that my previous testimony 

before this committee last year remains essentially valid, that the 

possibility of success in Afghanistan is still at our fingertips. But 

I would like to succinctly wrap up and make four or five points as 

to what I think needs to be done, what I would recommend needs 

to be done, and done a little bit better, in order to make sure that 

Afghanistan turns into the right direction. 

The first thing that I would mention, Mr. Chairman, is that we 

have over 60 countries that are involved, in some way, manner, 

shape, or form, in Afghanistan. Thirty-seven countries are troop 

contributing nations, including 26 countries of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization. So, there’s a huge amount of international effort going on in Afghanistan. 

We know what the good things are. We know we’ve had tremendous national elections in 2004. We know that Afghanistan is generally stable in the north and west. We know that the 25 Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams are the promise of the future for the people 

of Afghanistan and they’re doing wonderful things. We know that 

the Afghan National Army represents a success story, as far as it’s 

come, but we know that the army is not big enough, it needs to get 

bigger, and it needs to expand. Under the United States tutelage, 

the emergence of the Afghan National Army as an army that is 

representative of the people, and embraced by the people, and is 

doing good things, is to be celebrated. 

We know that Japan has led the demobilization, reintegration, 

and disarmament pillar of reconstruction, in quite a satisfactory 

way. We know that schools and roads and healthcare is more available to Afghans. We know that there’s a tripartite council where 

NATO, Afghan authorities, Pakistani authorities meet, military 

forces meet, and military leaders meet on a regular basis. We know 

that President Karzai has formed a Policy Action Group, which 

helps to prioritize the reconstruction effort. 

Having said that, there are three or four things that I would suggest that are, as I’ve said before, on life support and need immediate attention by the international community. And may I say, 

Mr. Chairman, that one of the things I’m proudest of to be associated with is that this is an international problem. This isn’t only 

the problem of the United States. When NATO moved into Afghanistan and took responsibility for stability and security, that is a 

very powerful statement by the international community. And so, 

the optimum word here is ‘‘we,’’ not ‘‘we, the United States.’’ We, 

the family of nations, have all the legitimacy, international legitimacy, that’s required to do this mission, five separate United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the authority to justify what 

it is we do. 

So, what are these few things that are absolutely at the core? In 

my view, and it’s been well articulated this morning, but narcotics 

is the Achilles heel of Afghanistan. It affects every aspect of that 

45 

society. It fuels crime, it fuels corruption, and it’s the economic engine for fueling the violence in Afghanistan. 

In my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I will not link violence in Afghanistan only to the Taliban. And I think one of the things that 

we have to be careful of is that we don’t make the Taliban any taller than the Taliban is. The Taliban is a regional problem. It’s not 

a national problem. 

But the failure of the international community to coalesce around 

the U.K. led campaign against narcotics is a matter of record. In 

my 3 years of regular visits to Afghanistan, I’ve seen very little 

progress; as a matter of fact, I’ve seen much more backsliding than 

anything else. 

To develop a cohesive campaign plan that is internationally supported by not just the United Kingdom, which is, I think, the problem. The United Kingdom raised its hand and said, ‘‘We will lead 

this effort.’’ What has happened is that nations have defaulted to 

the United Kingdom and suggested that they have to solve the 

whole thing. That’s not the intent of the G–8 agreements. 

So, narcotics, to me, is the No. 1 problem. 

No. 2, and a problem that has to be tackled at the same time, 

is judicial reform. This is an Italian-led commitment under the G– 

8 agreements. And it is also on life support. The average prosecutor 

in Afghanistan makes $65 a month. The average interpreter for the 

United Nations makes about $750 a month. There are a thousand 

prosecutors in Afghanistan, and the court system is not up to the 

task of prosecuting people, trying them, and then putting them 

away. Instead, what we see is a little bit of a revolving door. To 

be sure, there has been some progress made, but the really big fish, 

Mr. Chairman, as you’ve pointed out, are still out there and are 

still operating. 

So, I think if I were able to do anything, I would focus on narcotics, I would focus on judicial reform. And the third pillar I would 

focus on, which is a German-led pillar, is the adequacy of police 

forces. Trained, sufficient quantity, sufficient quality throughout 

the region so that if we do incentivize the farmers not to grow poppies, for example, there isn’t a roving band of narcotraffickers that 

slits their throat at night for not doing that, or kidnaps their children, or makes them feel unsafe. 

So, those three pillars of the Accords need urgent attention if 

we’re, in fact, going to deliver on the promise of Afghanistan. 

The good news, Mr. Chairman, is that all these things are 

there—60 countries on the ground, the United Nations is there, 

there is a U.N. high representative, who is the representative of 

the Secretary General. But what is lacking is, in my view, in Afghanistan, is that central authoritative figure that can, in fact, 

focus the international relief effort in a way that tackles the three 

or four things that absolutely have to be done. We, if you look back 

at Bosnia, remember Lord ‘‘Paddy’’ Ashdown, who was such a figure. When Paddy Ashdown spoke, the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the 

Croats listened. There is no Paddy Ashdown, that I’ve seen, at 

work in Kabul in Afghanistan. And I think that either a person or 

a group of people, whatever the solution is, that can bring discipline to the effort that we’re bringing to Afghanistan, is necessary. 

46 

And, finally, to pick up on Senator Casey’s comments with regard 

to Pakistan and Afghanistan, that that relationship between those 

two heads of state absolutely has to be brought into a more coherence, so that Pakistan understands that what goes on in Afghanistan is vitally important to their own national interest, as well, because if we’re not successful in Afghanistan, I personally believe 

that that problem will continue to grow, and that it will be a problem for Afghanistan in the future. So, the logic of these two countries working together to solve a common problem, to me, is inescapable. 

I left my job in NATO in December 2006, and the last real big 

meeting I had was with a senior military official from Pakistan. I 

showed him graphic evidence of what was happening across the 

border. And I listened to them respectfully about what they said 

their goals were. I believe them, that they mean to do what they 

say they’re going to do, but at the rate that it was going when I 

left, it was clear that the problem wasn’t going in the right direction. 

I think we’ll know a lot more this spring about whether the Pakistani Government, on its side of the border, was able to do something. But I think this is one of the four or five things that have 

to be done. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve summarized as quickly as I can, but I thank 

you very much for having me, and I apologize for not being able 

to stay as long as you might like today. And I’d be happy to be 

come back any other time you’d like. 

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, 

MCLEAN, VA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, I’d like to thank 

you for the opportunity to testify, and for having this hearing. It is a great privilege 

to be before the committee today—6 months since last testifying as SACEUR, and 

just over a month since my retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps. Congress remains focused on NATO’s ambitious undertaking in Afghanistan. This interest and 

the continued support of the United States for this mission are absolutely essential 

to its success. 

Today I will offer the committee some insights into both the ISAF mission, and 

the importance of sustaining NATO as it continues to perform valiantly in the execution of its mission, so vital to the future of Afghanistan. Since we last met, we 

have witnessed successes in the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) 

mission to establish security and stability. What remains unchanged is that ISAF 

is still NATO’s most important and challenging mission. 

NATO’s ‘‘out of area’’ operations are now at greater distances and more ambitious 

than ever before. There are over 50,000 soldiers deployed under NATO Command 

today on three different continents performing a wide variety of missions—from Baltic air policing to a 15,000-man unit keeping a safe and secure environment in 

Kosovo. The NATO Response Force is arguably its most transformational operational capability, providing strategic Reserve Forces and operational Reserve 

Forces on standby. This brings me full circle to ISAF in Afghanistan. 

There are currently over 34,000 forces in ISAF—with 15,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United States under its command. The Alliance now has 

responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan and works alongside an 

additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

(OEF). The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading 

edge of NATO’s efforts for security and reconstruction, supported by military forces 

capable of providing necessary security and stability. ISAF’s assumption of the entire security and stability mission in Afghanistan is testament to its growing capacity to engage in defense against common security challenges, including terrorism. 

47 

What makes these reconstruction teams so effective is that they’re empowered. PRT 

commanders, usually at the rank of lieutenant colonel, have the independent authority and funding to bring about immediate effects in the region by building a 

bridge, opening a school, digging a well, turning on electricity, paving a road, and 

giving a sense of comfort and reassurance in the hinterlands where the government 

will some day be able to get out there and replace the PRTs. As SACEUR I witnessed what PRTs can do and I continue to believe that one PRT of up to 100 people 

are worth a battalion of 5,000 troops. Proactive engagement is always cheaper than 

reactive engagement. I would have rather had 100 people dedicated to a certain 

thing every single day for 365 days, than 10,000 troops for 60 days. 

While SACEUR, I observed NATO’s civilian leadership spend a considerable 

amount of time working to sustain a unity of purpose for the men and women of 

the Alliance, along with 17 other troop contributing nations. This is a tough job, but 

essential to sustaining the role of NATO in Afghanistan, and in other areas of operation. The military forces deployed under NATO are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO’s collective resolve to project security in unstable regions and 

to deter, disrupt, and defend against terrorism. ISAF continues to be a model of 

teamwork—a cooperation of comrades in arms working together to solve very difficult problems. I am confident that it will continue that way. In the months since 

the full transfer of authority to NATO last fall, opposing militant forces have tried 

to test NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and fight. Operation MEDUSA not only defeated the insurgents near Kandahar, but helped establish the conditions for reconstruction and development activities that are moving the 

province forward. 

While ISAF is focused on establishing security and stability throughout the country, the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan are based on five main pillars: Training the Afghan Army, training the police forces, disarmament of illegally 

armed groups, judicial reform, and counternarcotics. While SACEUR, I shared with 

many of you my belief that the ultimate success in Afghanistan depends not simply 

on military victories—it depends on the efforts of the international community and 

the Karzai government. They need to ensure military efforts are immediately followed up with the needed reconstruction and development activities in the short 

run, and success in the pillars of reform in the long run. Development and reconstruction activities will help meet expectations of the Afghan people who have demonstrated in two national elections, one for President, and one for Parliament, that 

they overwhelmingly understand this effort. Progress in education, agriculture, economic development, public services and health has to go hand in hand with providing a stable and secure environment. The Afghan authorities and ISAF are now 

focusing on the key tasks of ensuring that reconstruction and development can take 

place in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities themselves. 

The Afghan national army is about 30,000 strong and plays a pivotal role in the 

security of Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to train an army of approximately 

70,000 soldiers continues. NATO nations have been fielding NATO operational, 

mentor, and liaison teams. Currently, NATO has 15 such teams offered by troop 

contributing nations, with 7 of them completely fielded and 17 more remaining to 

be fielded. The more rapidly NATO can build a capable and sufficiently robust 

Afghan national army, the faster it will establish conditions for success. 

When I last testified in September, it was my judgment that much more needed 

to be done to train the police force, as well as provide adequate numbers, equipment, training, and pay, coupled with the need to fight against corruption. ISAF’s 

contribution to the Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities. 

Judicial reform is not a NATO task in Afghanistan, but it is so important to 

everything that’s going on there. Judicial reform remains one of the key areas where 

a progress must be made, as the courts and prosecutorial capabilities of the state 

remain distrusted, overly corrupt, and resource starved. A major problem with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which makes them susceptible to corruption. I remember a meeting last year with the attorney general of Afghanistan, who 

told me that prosecutors’ average pay was $65 a month. By comparison, an interpreter working for the United Nations makes 500 Euros a month. A top Afghan 

judge earns less than $100 a month—less than the cost to rent an apartment in 

Kabul; less than what the Taliban pay locals to support their military operations. 

This situation cannot be allowed to stand. 

Finally, the problem that continues to worry me the most is narcotics. Afghanistan does not need to be a narco-state, but it is unfortunately well on its way. The 

parts of Afghanistan which are currently producing the largest poppy crops are not 

those that are traditionally known for the growth of such product. The need to find 

the right means to ensure that farmers can economically grow and sell legal 

48 

produce, in addition to developing an overarching and understandable way ahead 

in the overall fight against narcotics, is vital. Ninety percent of Afghan narcotics are 

sold in the European markets. The money returns to Afghanistan and fuels the 

IEDs and terrorism that kills and wounds our soldiers. 

There remains a need for closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and 

the Government of Afghanistan, as well as those nations, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, involved in security sector reform. President Karzai 

has recognized this and has sought to create a policy action group to made decisions 

and coordinate across the spectrum of reform. This body is Afghan-led and chaired 

by the President. The policy action group is designed to reach down to the provincial 

district and community level in order to provide integrated programs that implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. I believe that this policy 

action group has a good chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced 

cohesion and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of international relief. 

The evidence is clear—over the past 5 years there has been solid progress 

throughout Afghanistan. However, the efforts of the international community and 

those of NATO need to be increased in order to consolidate and expand the gains 

made there to ensure long-term success. NATO’s leadership role, and that of the 

United States, remains as important as ever. With the continued support of the 

United States and of this Congress, I believe NATO will ultimately succeed in solidifying the conditions necessary for sustained peace and prosperity for the people of 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I’d be happy to answer any questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. We’ll take you up on that, General. We’ll still try 

to get some questions in. 

Jim, the floor is yours. And thank you for being here, man. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND 

CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, 

members of the committee. I’ll try to summarize quickly so we can 

get to some questions for General Jones. 

I think that one can pin responsibility for the current difficulties 

in Afghanistan on two sources. They are, sort of, sins of omission 

and sins of commission. The sins of omission were essentially our 

failure, back in 2002 and 2003, to move quickly when we had a benign environment, with the Taliban on the run and an al-Qaeda 

largely dispersed, to provide security and begin the process of reconstruction. The amounts of money that are now being spent and 

being requested for Afghanistan, for economic assistance, are 20 

times more than the amounts that I had in early 2002 to begin 

that process—20 times more on an annual basis. And the number 

of troops we have there now is four times more—more than four 

times more than we had for that first year. 

This is—I’ve overseen post-conflict reconstruction in five societies, and I’ve studied them, going back to 1960—this is the only 

time on record in which we spent more money and had more troops 

5 years after we started than we did the first year or two. And I 

think this is indicative of this early failure to seize the golden hour 

when we could have done so much more. 

But if that’s the sins of omission, I think the sins of commission 

largely lie, not in Afghanistan or in Washington, but in Pakistan. 

This is not an insurgency led by a discontented population in Afghanistan, with an abusive or an ineffective government. It’s true 

that the population in the affected areas don’t have a lot of reasons 

to take risks for their government, or place much confidence in 

49 

their government. But the real source of this conflict lies in Pakistan. The insurgency is organized in Pakistan, it’s led in Pakistan, 

it’s recruited in Pakistan, it’s trained in Pakistan, it’s funded from 

Pakistan, and it operates into Afghanistan. 

And I think that the question, of course, comes as to what to do 

about that. How can we grapple with that phenomenon? 

I don’t think that punitive actions with respect to Pakistan are 

likely to be productive. We tried that through the 1990s. We made 

them international pariahs, and everything just got worse. They 

proliferated, they sold nuclear secrets to other countries, and they 

supported terrorist movements. So, I think that we need a positive 

agenda with respect to Pakistan. 

I’m not sure that requiring the administration to certify that 

Pakistan is fully cooperating as a condition for United States assistance is particularly productive. Frankly and candidly, it simply 

requires the administration to come up here and lie to you, and you 

to accept those lies, because neither you nor they are actually going 

to move toward punitive steps toward Pakistan. 

And what we need, in fact, is a more candid discussion of what’s 

going on in Pakistan. We need to raise the international visibility 

of what’s going on in Pakistan. And we’re not going to be able to 

do that if it gets linked with punitive steps which everybody is— 

recognizes are likely to be counterproductive. 

So, I hope—I mean, I think that we need—we need United States 

officials to say in public what they’ve—what they’re—freely say in 

private about what—the links between elements of the Pakistani 

Government and Taliban activities, the levels of Taliban activities 

in the country, and the incentives that Pakistan has, to be not fully 

cooperative. And I’d be glad to go into some of that in response to 

questions. 

As I said, I don’t think we should be looking at punitive things. 

I’ve—in my written testimony, I’ve suggested four things that we 

should do with respect to Pakistan. One is to promote settlement 

of the Kashmir issue. The second is to address the economic and 

social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border. 

There’s no sense—there’s not much to be gained from winning the 

hearts and minds of all the Pashtuns in Afghanistan if we haven’t 

done the same with the Pashtuns in Pakistan. There are more 

Pashtuns in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan, a lot more. 

And unless their aspirations and their grievances are addressed, 

we’re going to have a permanent problem. 

Third, I think we need to encourage the Afghan and Pakistani 

Governments to establish an agreed border regime. Afghanistan 

doesn’t recognize that border. It’s insisting that Pakistan assert 

better control over a border that it refuses to recognize. 

And, finally, I think we need to encourage Pakistan to move toward—back toward civilian rule. Now, that’s not a particularly punitive list of things to do. Indeed, most of them are things that the 

Pakistani Government would like us to do. 

Finally, just a word on the drug problem, which has been much 

discussed this morning. I think that U.S. officials, and, indeed, 

Members of Congress, are faced with, sort of, two conflicting imperatives here. One is the Hippocratic imperative to ‘‘Do no harm,’’ 

and the other is the political imperative to ‘‘Don’t just stand there, 

50 

do something.’’ And as we know, the latter of those imperatives 

tends to be the operative one, in many cases. 

The administration’s five-pillar plan, which includes eradication, 

interdiction, alternative development, judicial reform, and public 

information, does strike me as a bureaucratic response to the imperative of just—‘‘Don’t just stand there, do something,’’ rather 

than a well-thought- out articulated strategy which emphasizes 

some things and doesn’t emphasize—and doesn’t emphasize others. 

I think that drug strategy needs to be put in the context of a 

broader national strategy, the objective of which is to build support 

for the Afghan Government and allow it to assume greater control 

over much of the country. 

It is true that probably the insurgency gains a certain amount 

of revenue from drug production, but the fact is that most of the 

drugs are being produced and trafficked in areas of the country 

that the government controls, not the Taliban; and, therefore, people in the government are getting, by far, the largest rakeoff from 

the drug production, not the Taliban. This suggests to me a strategy that would give principal emphasis to interdiction and judicial 

reform, rather than the other elements. 

Now, finally, as regards a public information campaign, this is 

going to be a lot more effective if it comes from the Afghan clergy 

than if it comes from a government known to be riddled with drug 

corruption or a bunch of foreigners whose motives are suspect. The 

problem, of course, in Afghanistan is that, in Afghanistan, as in 

many other countries, including most of our democratic West European countries, the clergy depends on public revenue for support. 

Every village in Afghanistan has a school and a mosque. They 

don’t have any government officials at all. There are no government officials, not even police, at the village level. But they all do 

have a mosque. Unfortunately, supporting the Afghan clergy is an 

area that no Western donor has been prepared to take up. And I 

do believe that we need to find ways of allowing the Afghan Government to better fund this aspect of its responsibilities, because 

I think this is one of the most important sources of potential support for that government in that country 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA 

The resurgence of civil war in Afghanistan can be attributed to two fundamental 

causes. One is the failure of the United States, the Karzai administration, and the 

rest of the international community to take advantage of the lull following the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 to strengthen the new Afghan Government. 

The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United 

States put together to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan has experienced civil war since the late 1970s. Unlike the recent or 

current conflicts in Yugoslavia and Iraq, which arose principally from hostilities 

among their constituent nationalities, Afghanistan’s war has largely been the product of external interventions. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States 

used Afghanistan as a battleground in their global competition. In the 1990s, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Iran supported competing Afghan factions in order to protect and extend their influences in the region. Relations among Afghanistan’s various ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities became much more difficult, but 

these tensions were primarily the result of civil war rather than the cause. 

Many Americans believe that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration formed a multinational coalition that drove the Taliban from power. It 

51 

would be more accurate, however, to say that the United States joined Russia, 

India, Iran, and the Northern Alliance in an existing coalition that had been fighting the Taliban for half a decade. With the addition of American airpower and the 

removal of Pakistani support for their opponent, the coalition prevailed. As a result, 

Northern Alliance troops, which had been equipped, trained, and financed by Russia, India, and Iran, occupied most of the country. 

If credit for America’s military victory in Afghanistan needs to be shared with this 

unlikely coalition, so must credit for America’s diplomatic achievement in rapidly installing a broadly based successor regime. 

When named as the American envoy to the Afghan opposition in October 2001, 

I concluded that the United States would not succeed in halting civil war in Afghanistan without the support of the governments responsible for that war in the first 

place. This belief stemmed from my experience a few years earlier in the Balkans, 

in particular from observing Richard Holbrook’s success in orchestrating the Dayton 

negotiations that ended the civil war in Bosnia. That war had been the product of 

Serbian and Croatian ambitions. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman had been personally guilty of the genocide we were trying to stop. Only by engaging them, bringing them to the conference table, and making them partners in the peace process 

were we able, however, to persuade all the Bosnian factions to lay down their arms. 

I believed that a similar approach was needed to achieve a comparable result in 

Afghanistan. 

By November we were working with the United Nations to bring all factions of 

the Afghan opposition together in Bonn, Germany, where we hoped they would 

agree upon an interim constitution and the membership of a new government. The 

U.N.’s initial inclination had been to sequester the Afghan representatives in order 

to prevent any foreign government from exerting a malign influence over their deliberations. 

I made the opposite case that only by bringing states like Iran, Pakistan, India, 

and Russia into the process would we have some chance of reaching a consensus. 

I argued that Afghans would only agree if they were subjected to convergent pressures by their foreign sponsors. Incidentally, this was exactly how it worked out: 

Each of those governments, and particularly Russia and Iran, played positive and 

essential roles in forging the compromises upon which the Afghans ultimately 

agreed. Pakistan was also present at the Bonn Conference, but its role was uncomfortable due to the presence of its former adversaries. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s acquiescence in the process and support for the result was essential for the consensus’ 

durability. 

In the aftermath of this collective achievement, the United States and the rest 

of the international community had a golden occasion to help Afghans build an effective government capable of providing its population with the most basic public 

services. Al-Qaeda was smashed, and its remaining members were forced into hiding. The Taliban was discredited in Afghanistan and dispersed in Pakistan. Neither 

was capable of posing an immediate threat to the new regime in Kabul. 

We failed to seize that opportunity. During those early years, U.S. and international assistance was minimal. While blame for that negligence must be widely 

shared, the failure principally reflected the American administrations early aversion 

to nation-building. Well into 2003 the administration was quite vocal in touting the 

merits of its ‘‘low profile, small footprint’’ alternative to the more robust nationbuilding efforts that the Clinton administration had led in Bosnia and Kosovo. Many 

felt that generous international assistance had made those Balkan countries dependent upon foreign funding and foreign troops, something we were going to avoid 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

In pursuit of this narrow vision of nation-building, the United States initially 

sought to minimize the size, geographical scope, and functions of the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Washington rejected pleas from Karzai and the 

United Nations to deploy international peacekeepers outside Kabul. It opposed any 

role for NATO in Afghanistan. It also refused to assign peacekeeping functions to 

American forces. Security for the Afghan population was to remain the responsibility of regional warlords until a new national army could be recruited, trained, 

and deployed, a process which would have taken years to complete. 

Economic assistance to Afghanistan was also commensurately low. In the first 

year following the collapse of the Taliban, the United States committed approximately $500 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Compare that figure to 

the $18 billion in economic assistance the administration requested for Iraq, a country of comparable size, greater wealth, and less damage in 2003. For the first 2 

years after the fall of the Taliban, the average Afghan received approximately $50 

per year in foreign aid. By contrast, the average Kosovar received 10 times more 

52 

than that over the same period of time and the average Bosnian received 12 times 

more assistance. 

If there is any lesson to be drawn from the Afghan experiment with frugal nationbuilding, it is ‘‘low input, low output.’’ If one applies low levels of military manpower 

and economic assistance to post conflict reconstruction, one can expect to see low 

levels of public security and economic growth. 

As indicated in the chart below, drawn from a RAND study (The U.N.’s Role in 

Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq, RAND, 2005), Afghanistan has received 

the least amount of resources out of any major American-led, nation-building operation over the last 60 years. 

Experience has shown that in major combat, it is possible to substitute firepower 

and technology for manpower, enabling smaller, more agile forces to rapidly prevail 

over much larger, less advanced adversaries. Experience has also shown, however, 

that in stabilization and reconstruction operations, there is no substitute for manpower, money, and time. By 2004, the administration began to recognize these realities and to adjust its aid and military manning levels accordingly: U.S. assistance 

and troop levels climbed steeply, NATO was invited to take over the ISAF mission, 

and international peacekeepers were finally dispatched to the provinces. 

Two vital years had been lost, however—years during which little progress had 

been made in extending effective governance to the countryside. As a result, by the 

time the threat of civil war reemerged, the population in the affected areas had been 

given little incentive to risk their lives for a government that could neither protect 

them nor advance their material well-being. 

This history explains why antiregime insurgents have found local populations receptive to their efforts to overturn the Karzai regime and expel the international 

presence, but it does not explain why this threat has reemerged. The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from deep-seated opposition among large elements of the Afghan population toward their government. Instead, this insurgency 

has been raised by residents of Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others of whom are native Pakistanis. 

For the tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the current border, 

this distinction is of little importance. This is a Pashtun insurgency. I don’t mean 

to suggest that all Pashtuns are insurgents, simply that all insurgents are 

Pashtuns. The insurgency is organized, funded, trained and directed from Pakistan, 

where most Pashtuns live, and where most Pashtuns have always lived. Pashtuns 

generally do not recognize the current border between the two countries as legitiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB

rand1.eps
53 

mate. They believe themselves to represent a majority of the Afghan population, and 

therefore, they claim a predominant role in its government. 

The degree of official Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some 

controversy. In private, knowledgeable United States, NATO, Afghan, and United 

Nations officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani intelligence 

service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions against Afghanistan. For its part, the Pakistani 

Government, at the highest levels, denies any official sanction for these activities, 

suggesting that, at most, these reports reflect the activity of former members of its 

intelligence service acting independently and against government policy. 

The U.S. administration has complained loudly about Iranian support for sectarian violence in Iraq. At this point, lacking access to the intelligence data, it is 

difficult to fully assess the degree of official Iranian support for civil war in Iraq, 

or official Pakistani support for civil war in Afghanistan. What seems indisputably 

clear, however, is that Pakistani citizens, residents, money, and territory are playing a much greater role in the Afghan civil war than are Iranian citizens, residents, 

money, or territory in the Iraqi civil war. 

The RAND Corporation has conducted several studies on nation-building and 

counterinsurgency drawing on dozens of American and non-American case studies 

over the past century. One conclusion reached, highlights the near impossibility of 

putting together broken societies without the support of neighboring states, and of 

suppressing well-established insurgencies that enjoy external support and neighboring sanctuary. The validity of this lesson is evident today both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

It is clear that Pakistan has both geopolitical and domestic political incentives for 

destabilizing its neighbor. Geopolitically, Pakistan fears an independent Afghan 

state aligned with India. Domestically, Pakistani elites would prefer to see Pashtun 

ambitions externalized, in the pursuit of power in Afghanistan, rather than turned 

inward, in the pursuit of greater autonomy, or even independence for Pashtunistan. 

Even if these incentives do not lead Pakistani officials to foment civil war in 

Afghanistan, they may diminish their commitment to helping suppress it. The 

United States and the rest of the international community need to offset these incentives to destabilize Afghanistan with a greater array of incentives and disincentive designed to lead Pakistan to assert control over its own territory and population 

and prevent either from being used against their neighbor. 

Often one hears that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted American manpower and money for Afghanistan. This may be true. But a more serious charge is 

that the war in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front 

in this war, which is neither in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda, 

after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taliban is operating out of Pakistan, 

as are several other insurgent and terrorist groups seeking to expel international 

forces from Afghanistan. It was Pakistan that assisted the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Potential terrorists in Western societies still travel to Pakistan for inspiration, guidance, support, and direction. 

Yet if Pakistan is the central front in the war on terror, it is not one susceptible 

to a military response. We are not going to bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan. 

An increase in U.S. military manpower and money for Afghanistan may be needed 

to contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government from being 

overthrown. But the U.S. and NATO troops are likely to be required indefinitely as 

long as the Taliban and the other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise 

funds, and organize their operations in Pakistan. 

Afghanistan has never been a self-sufficient state, and it probably never will be. 

It is simply too poor to be able to provide security and effective governance to its 

large and dispersed population. So unless the Pakistani Government can be persuaded to abandon its relationship with extremist elements within its society, halt 

its support for terrorism, provide its youth an educational alternative to fundamentalist madrasas, extend effective governance into its border provinces, and curtail 

their use by insurgent movements, the United States and its allies are going to be 

forced to patrol Afghanistan’s Southeast Frontier indefinitely, just as Great Britain 

was compelled to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign along the other side of that 

same frontier throughout the 19th century. 

As I have noted, Pakistan is not a problem susceptible to a military solution. 

Therefore, other sources of influence will need to be used. First the United States 

should intensify quiet efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their 

differences over Kashmir, that dispute being the root cause of radicalization in Pakistani society and policy. Second, we need to address the economic and social needs 

of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan. 

There is only limited benefit in winning the hearts and minds of Pashtuns resident 

54 

in Afghanistan, if the larger number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan remain hostile 

and ungoverned. Third, we need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimize the current frontier. 

And finally, the United States should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections. Fundamentalist parties have never fared well in such 

elections in Pakistan, and are unlikely to do so in the future. It seems ironic that 

the United States has pushed for democratization in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, 

all places where the result was likely to intensify sectarian conflict, but has largely 

failed to do so in Pakistan, where the opposite result is more likely. 

American efforts alone, no matter how intense and skillful, will not be sufficient 

to achieve any of these objectives. Washington, therefore, needs to raise the profile 

of the Pakistan problem internationally, in order to secure a much wider array of 

pressures upon and of assistance to Pakistan in undertaking these transformations. 

At present NATO is manning the Afghan frontier, but doing nothing to address 

the threat emerging from its other side. This is akin to NATO’s guarding the Fulda 

Gap throughout the cold war, but have no discussions about how to deal with the 

Soviet Union. In fact, consultations on the Soviet Union occupied 90 percent of every 

NATO ministerial and summit for 40 years. Its time consultations on Pakistan occupied in a similarly central place in the transatlantic dialog. 

The recent announcement that the administration intends to increase its troop 

and financial commitment to Afghanistan should be welcomed. These steps come 5 

years late, but perhaps not too late. The Afghan people desperately want peace, and 

they continue to hope that their freely elected government, the United States, and 

NATO can bring it to them. We continue to be welcome in Afghanistan in a way 

we are not in Iraq. But public support for Karzai, his government, and our presence 

is diminishing. It is to be hoped that these additional commitments can reverse, or 

at least slow this negative trend. The more American money and manpower is committed to Afghanistan, however, the more important it becomes to address the principal source of the ongoing civil war, which remains, as it has for most of the past 

20 years, largely external, and in present circumstances, largely in Pakistan. 

The continuing growth of opium production and drug trafficking in Afghanistan 

represents a particularly frustrating challenge. U.S. officials are beset by two conflicting imperatives. One is the Hippocratic requirement to ‘‘do no harm,’’ i.e., don’t 

do anything that actually makes the situation worst. The second is the political requirement, familiar to Members of Congress as it is to administration officials, to 

‘‘don’t just stand there, do something!’’ Unfortunately, the latter is usually the more 

compelling imperative. 

The administrations ‘‘five pillar’’ plan, for dealing with the issue, encompassing 

interdiction, eradication, alternative livelihood development, judicial reform, and 

public information, looks at first glance to be more a bureaucratic response to pressures, including congressional pressures, to be seen doing something rather than a 

carefully thought through strategy. Certainly these efforts seem to have been entirely ineffective in reducing drug production, while they have, reportedly, antagonized significant elements of the population to no good purpose. 

I would suggest the need to put counternarcotics firmly within a broader strategy 

designed to defeat the insurgency and strengthen the Afghan Government’s support 

within the population. That strategy needs to be based upon a careful examination 

of both the economics and politics of the drug trade. The most important measures 

of success should not be increased seizures, or reduced poppy production, neither of 

which is likely to have any measurable impact upon drug consumption in Western 

Europe, where most of this product goes. Rather, the objectives should be to reduce 

the flow of drug money into the hands of corrupt government officials and insurgent 

groups. Of the two, incidentally, it seems almost certain that much more of this 

money is going to corrupt officials than insurgents, since the former control much 

more of the territory and transit routes involved. 

This suggests to me a strategy that would give principal emphasis to interdiction 

and judicial reform, while eschewing eradication and promoting alternate development only once genuinely viable alternatives can be offered. 

As to a public information campaign, this will be more credibly conducted by local 

religious leaders than by a government known to be riddled with drug corruption 

or foreigners whose motives are suspect. In Afghanistan, the clergy is, in principal, 

publicly funded, as is the case in many of our most democratic West European allies. Unfortunately, this is one area of Afghan Government activity that international donors have been least inclined to fund. Finding ways to allow the Afghan 

Government to better fund not just the village schools but the village mosques, 

could well be one of the most effective things we could do to delegitimize drug production, and increase public support for the current regime. 

55 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We have only about 13 minutes left, and what I’m going to suggest, since General Jones has to leave in 13 minutes, and we’re 

going to get a chance to speak to the Ambassador, is, each Senator 

get one question, and one question alone, and limited to no speech, 

just a straightforward question. Otherwise, I’ll take my 7 minutes 

and no one will get any chance to ask anything. OK? So, let’s do 

that. 

And I’ll begin by asking you, General Jones—no mention has 

been—no—the phrase ‘‘al-Qaeda’’ has not been raised by any witness thus far. How big a problem is it? And, if you had the authority from the Pakistani Government, could NATO forces go in and 

do damage in the western province, to al-Qaeda? 

General JONES. Senator, the reason that al-Qaeda, in my view, 

doesn’t get mentioned too much is that the al-Qaeda portion of the 

problem is still, in my view, very much manageable. What is come 

back to the fore is the Taliban. In fact, on the Pakistani side of the 

border, they have been fairly direct at their efforts against the alQaeda. It’s the Taliban that we’re asking them to do the same to. 

So, on both sides of the border, the al-Qaeda has a tough time. It’s 

not the same with regard to the Taliban. 

With regard to NATO and the western provinces of Pakistan, 

NATO’s mandate would have to be adjusted to have NATO to do 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Assume it did. My question is, Does the capacity 

exist, if it was adjusted? 

General JONES. I think some of the countries in NATO certainly 

have the capacity, but it would be, with the United States, it would 

be they could do—they could do some thing. If you had the agreements and if you solved the problem with caveats and all of—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General JONES [continuing]. That. But the ability, the capability 

is there in NATO. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman—General Jones, yesterday I 

heard a discussion with Lord Robertson about his experiences in 

Bosnia. He made the comment, with regard to Afghanistan, that 

there is not a contact group in Afghanistan. You were, sort of, onto 

that general idea, mentioning Paddy Ashdown, a high commissioner of some central control. Is the contact group idea a good one, 

or are there so many nations that the idea, at least that was useful 

in Bosnia, would not work in Afghanistan? 

General JONES. I think it could work, Senator. I think that despite some of the many good things that are being done, what is 

lacking is the ability to focus the energies and the resources in certain areas, where we know you have to do something. And so, anything that would be—any group that—or person that could be created to—with the authority to bring about that kind of emphasis, 

I think, is what’s needed. 

The current structure of the U.N. high representative and the 

overlapping amalgamation of organizations like the European 

Union, NATO, the United Nations, and disparate groups of NGOs, 

having this loose relationship is not bringing about the focused efVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:44 Jun 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\030807.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
56 

fort that I think needs to be done in certain key areas. I don’t want 

to overstate this, because they’re doing a lot of good, but the four 

or five things that I mentioned, I think, are really critical to tackle. 

Senator LUGAR. So, in addition to money, we really need reorganization—— 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. And focus—— 

General JONES. Exactly. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Somebody in charge. 

General JONES. And, to the extent that it’s good news is—the potential is there. I mean, it’s on the ground. It’s a question of shaping it in a way where the international community agrees that, 

‘‘Look, we have to get after this narcotics thing, because it’s going 

to eat Afghanistan from the inside out if we don’t.’’ I think that’s 

clear. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. General, the—thanks for the very useful testimony. I want to focus on where both you ended up and Ambassador Dobbins, as well, and that’s on the issue of Pakistan. Given 

your history there, your relationship with both the Pakistani military on the ground, as well as their government, can you give me 

a sense of what their strategic objectives are and what we can do 

to encourage them to be more aggressive or more cooperative in the 

efforts? I tend to agree with the Ambassador’s point, that if we pretend that we’re going to do things here that we’re not going to do, 

that’s not particularly effective, that sanctions may not be particularly effective. On the other hand, we need to encourage a different 

approach on their part. Any thoughts on that? 

General JONES. Well, I think we have to find a way to scratch 

the itches on both sides of the border in a way that makes sense. 

Our NATO involvement with Pakistan is an emerging one. It didn’t 

take place until NATO took over the east, as well, and the United 

States and coalition forces came under the NATO mandate. And so, 

our military-to-military discussions with them are on the ascendancy. The relationship is evolving. But clearly there’s a lot at stake, 

and clearly the Secretary General of NATO understands that if, in 

fact, we cannot find the right ways to bring about the resolutions 

to the problem that we see on the border, that—and if Pakistan is 

judged not to be doing enough—then the full weight—political 

weight of the 26-nation alliance, plus all the countries that are in 

Afghanistan, is going—will be felt; and they should be felt, because 

this is something that critically has to be tackled. 

The Ambassador is much more of an expert on the Pakistani side 

of the border than I am, because of my recency, in terms of coming 

to that problem. But I must say that, in my meetings, all the right 

words were spoken by the Pakistani military. And so, you know, 

being from Missouri, literally, I think it’s fair to say that, by 

springtime, we will have a sense of whether, over the winter, we’ve 

seen a change or not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. I’ll pass for the time allotted and wait to ask 

the Ambassador. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s very kind. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

57 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Yes; thank you both for your testimony and your 

presence here. 

General, just one quick question. You’ve expressed the view that 

a lot of people have, I guess, not just in the context of Afghanistan, 

but in other places in the world, that any kind of military effort 

is only part of the solution, and that reconstruction and development activities have to move forward. 

Where do you think we are on that score, in terms of—if you 

view that as a recommendation that you would make, to accelerate 

or to ensure that we have both reconstruction and development activities at a level they should be—how do you assess that today, in 

light of the President’s budget or in light of this administration’s 

policies on both reconstruction and development? 

General JONES. Senator, I think the way I would answer that 

question is to say that we do have the weight and commitment of 

over 60 countries—about 60 countries, in Afghanistan, which is impressive. So, there is a lot of money being spent. My observation 

is that what I would think would be a good thing to do is to have 

more focus on how it’s being spent, and to make sure that we tackle the three or four things that really have to be done in order to 

turn that country around. And those were the pillars that I was 

talking about in my introduction. 

So, it’s a little bit like the question of, Do you have enough 

troops? My view in Afghanistan is that the commanders have 

asked for a little bit more, but it’s not astronomical. But it’s what 

you do with those troops that’s important. And if you have enough 

money, then it’s what you do with the money that’s important. And 

some of that money is not being spent in the right directions, and 

it needs to be focused. And that’s my message. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Jones, good to see you again. 

General JONES. Senator. 

Senator WEBB. I’d like to ask you a question that actually is a 

little bit of a follow-on from the Armed Services Committee hearing 

the other day. I had to leave before I was able to ask it to you 

there. But it dovetails in with what you’re saying here. 

I am wondering about your judgment with respect to this recent 

increase in insurgent activity or military activity on the other side. 

Are we actually—or to what extent are we able to measure how 

much of that renewed activity is a result of the squeezing of the 

drug lords, the—this attempt to reduce opium growing, and the resistance from that, as opposed to politically? 

General JONES. Senator, I think the resurgence in activity, or the 

heightened activity, has more to do with the fact that NATO expansion in the south took place in the fall of last year. Prior to that 

expansion taking place, which was about 9,000 NATO troops from 

about a half a dozen countries, there was no reconstruction in the 

south, there was no permanent presence of large-scale troops to 

bring about security and stability. The south was largely a safe 

haven for not only the drug cartels, but the Taliban, the disparate 

groups, the rampant corruption and crime, no governance, and not 

58 

much to show in the way of reconstruction. With the arrival of 

those 8- or 9,000 troops, in Operation Medusa, that was the test 

by the opposition to see if NATO was going to fight. They learned 

a lesson and they suffered a military defeat of some significance. 

But since we’re now in—we have now disturbed the hornet’s 

nest. The resultant increases are largely due to the fact that we 

weren’t there before. So, you have more data. 

But I think the NATO forces have acquitted themselves well. I 

will be interested to see, for all this talk about the spring offensive, 

exactly what happens there. We’ve always had something, but we’ll 

just have to wait and see how it materializes. 

But I do think that we’re close with regard to the troop numbers. 

I think if we work on convincing our allies to eliminate some of the 

operationally restrictive caveats that are on their forces, that’s a 

force multiplier in itself. The penalty for not reducing caveats on 

troops that are committed is that you need more troops. You need 

more uncaveated troops. And there are some real moral issues 

there, in my view, whether—you know, how right is it for troops 

to be caveated that they can’t go to the aid of allies, and yet, a nation that is attacked expects everybody else to come to their aid? 

And this is something the alliance is going to grapple with. But the 

quicker they get through that, like, as they did in Kosovo, where 

there were virtually no caveats—in 2003 we had so many caveats, 

we couldn’t even move platoon from point A to point B. And now 

we have no caveats. And I hope that that will happen in Afghanistan, because the commanders will then really have the operational 

flexibility needed to do their job. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator WEBB. Appreciate you being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have you at a quarter of. I’m going 

to ask you a parting question. You told me, when I spoke with you 

early on, a year and a half ago, maybe longer, that you were having trouble, when it became a NATO command, getting—you requested a squadron of 18 attack helicopters, three C–130s, and how 

difficult it was to—at the outset, to get that. Now, the President’s 

committed additional combat brigade in the effort of Afghanistan. 

Does that include the necessary wherewithal, in terms of—do you 

know? Does that include helicopters, C–130 planes, logistics? Is 

that—— 

General JONES. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Part of the package? 

General JONES. There was, when we talked, just before the 

NATO expansion into the south, and we were having a difficult 

time raising two or three helicopters and some—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

General JONES [continuing]. Transports and everything else. 

NATO did, in fact, provide a significant capability package, including the 8- or 9,000 troops that are now working in the south, and 

that included some mobility packages and things like that. There 

still remains maybe 5 percent of the overall plan that needs to be 

resourced, in terms of manpower and mobility, but, given where we 

were when you and I talked, and where we are today, we’re in a 

much better situation. 

59 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Thank you very much, General. It’s a 

quarter of. Actually, it’s 14 of. We went over. So, thank you very, 

very much—— 

General JONES. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For being here, and I hope we can 

call on you again. 

General JONES. Anytime, sir. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, Mr. Ambassador, you’re not free. We’re 

going to pick your brain, if we can, for a little bit, if you don’t mind. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, you talked about—and we’ll go to 7 minutes— 

or 5 minutes—let’s make it 5 minutes—sins of omission and sins 

of commission. And you indicated that the—there are Pakistani incentives not to cooperate. Could you tell us what you think those 

incentives to not cooperate are? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think there are two sets of incentives 

that lead Pakistan to possibly support insurgency in Afghanistan, 

and, at a minimum, to be tepid about their efforts to suppress it. 

One is the sort of geopolitical desire not to face a—adversaries on 

two flanks. And to the extent that they perceive that the Government in Kabul has a close relationship with New Delhi, allows New 

Delhi to open consulates all along the border, where, allegedly, Indian intelligence agents are stationed, and where, again, allegedly—and these are Pakistani allegations—Indian intelligence 

agencies are, in turn, supporting insurgency in Baluchistan, this 

feeds a certain sense of paranoia. And Pakistan would obviously 

prefer to have a government allied with it and supportive of it, as 

it had with the Taliban, and, in effect, to give it what it—what is 

called—what they call ‘‘strategic depth,’’ faced, as they are, with 

this huge adversary on their other flank. 

The second is the desire to externalize Pashtun aspirations. As 

I said, most Pashtuns live in Pakistan. They’ve always lived in 

Pakistan. About, I think, three-fifths of the Pashtuns in the world 

live in Pakistan; and two-fifths, in Afghanistan. And the Pashtuns 

have always had aspirations for autonomy, or even independence, 

a Pashtunistan. And if the Pashtuns are going to run anything, 

Pakistan would prefer they run Afghanistan rather than try to run 

Pakistan, or try to carve our a autonomous area within Pakistan, 

or otherwise exert their influence in Pakistan. So, a simple desire 

to externalize these aspirations is a second—is a second motive. 

And there are historic limitations on Pakistani control over the 

border areas, which have historically been highly autonomous and 

self-governing. 

And this area is the least-developed area of Pakistan, which isn’t 

highly developed, but which is certainly much more highly developed than Afghanistan. And, therefore, this is a population with 

substantial grievances, as well as aspirations. 

The CHAIRMAN. When I met with Musharraf—I can’t remember 

how long ago it was now—and I raised the issue, not about the failure of Islamabad to deal with the northeast province and with the 

Pashtun, but I did raise the possibility of the economic difficulty 

faced by Pashtun in that province. And I raised the issue about aid, 

and it was—he was talking about aid for education. And I gave him 

indications—figures about the cost of—because we hear about the 

60 

madrassas, and funding of the madrassas, particularly in this area 

and along the border, and so on, so forth. And I said I was prepared to come back to the Senate and make a major case for a significant economic aid package relating to education, and—but for 

elementary and secondary education. He said, ‘‘No, no, we want it 

at the university level. That’s where we need aid.’’ And I got the 

distinct impression that anything—now, I’m putting words in his— 

he did not say what I’m about to say—but I got—came away with 

the impression, with he and his ministers, that I—that the idea of 

enhancing the circumstances of the Pashtun in that area was not 

viewed by Islamabad as being in their interest. Now, you know, we 

think in terms of, you know, to use the phrase that our friend who 

writes for the New York Times, Mr. Friedman, uses, ‘‘If you don’t 

visit the bad neighborhood, it’ll visit you.’’ I get the impression that 

it’s better for to—they think it’s better that it stay bad neighborhood, for the reasons you’ve stated, rather than actually, even with 

our help, go in and try to improve the condition of the Pashtun in 

that—those provinces. What is your assessment? Am I misreading 

that? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No; I think you probably were reading it 

correctly. It has been a sensitive region for them, one that they 

have certain inhibitions about getting too deeply involved in, and 

probably have even greater inhibitions about our getting too—more 

deeply involved. It’s possible, however, that their views and ours 

have evolved a bit. I believe that the administration has requested, 

in the assistance package for Pakistan, money—a significant 

amount of money for—specifically for this region. So, I think that 

they recognize that the problem on the Pakistani side of the border 

needs to be addressed, as well. 

And, as I said, I think that it’s not just a question of getting 

Pakistan and Afghanistan to agree on the border—that is, that the 

border is formally recognized—but to agree on a border regime 

which takes into the fact—takes into account the fact that these 

people have historically traveled back and forth, have family and 

tribal relations on both sides of the border, and promotes development in—on both sides of the border. 

So, I think thinking may have evolved somewhat, and it’s possible even that the Pakistani thinking has evolved somewhat. 

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of both sides of the border, one of the 

most interesting things I did in my stay in Pakistan is, with an 

American two-star, getting in an elevator—an elevator, Freudian 

slip—in a helicopter and fly that entire border in the winter. And 

you could see thousands of smuggling paths through the woods 

that were there. I mean, it was—I mean, literally, I guess it would 

be a thousand. I mean, just—and the point was made—this is 5 

years ago—I mean, and the point was made that, you know, when 

the spring comes and the foliage is on the trees, it’s virtually impossible to deal with that. But I think General Jones is right, we’ll 

see what happens here. 

I—my time is up—I yield to my friend from Indiana. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Dobbins, several of the ideas you have are certainly 

‘‘thinking outside the box,’’ to use that phrase, but fascinating. For 

instance, the support of the Afghan clergy so that there is some 

61 

idea of local government. As you point out, in many villages or 

what have you, there isn’t, aside from this. How can you go about 

supporting the clergy? Is this—are these persons all of one faith, 

or are there divergences there, or—just an administrative situation? How would you do that? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, most of Afghanistan is Sunni. There 

is a Shia minority. In the southern region we’re talking about, I 

think it’s exclusively Sunni. Some of the—some of the mosques are 

privately supported, others have traditionally depended on the government. The government’s capacity to provide that support has 

largely dried up. And I think it’s an area that’s worth, you know, 

further study, and maybe asking for a plan in this regard. 

Clearly, sort of direct Western assistance, non-Muslim assistance 

to these facilities and individuals may not be the most productive 

way. The most productive way is probably budget support to the 

Afghan Government and—with flexibility and encouragement that 

they use that budget support to fully fund the Religious Affairs 

Ministry and allow the Religious Affairs Ministry, in turn, to fulfill 

its obligations and responsibilities with respect to village mosques 

and imams. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, that’s a very important organizational 

point. In other words, once again, aid to the government—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Karzai and what have you, but with 

ideas for them that they might find that possible to do. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right. 

Senator LUGAR. In other words, as a part of our general doctrine 

or idea of local government, but, through them, as opposed to our 

attempting to work with local—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Oh, absolutely. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Mosques and what have you. 

Now, second, you’ve just mentioned the problem of lack of development of this area in Pakistan which is the most in controversy 

today. It is difficult for the Pakistani Government to work with, 

historically, but productive of much of the trouble. Is there any conceivable way in which the international group, the 64 nations or 

what have you, could include, in addition to resurgence and reconstruction of Afghanistan, include that portion of Pakistan in question as well? In other words, to see, as you have analyzed today, 

the problem basically in Afghanistan is largely influenced from 

Pakistan, as you commenced your testimony. Now—this is a special 

part of Pakistan, as a matter of fact, which the Pakistani Government has difficulty with—obviously, due to questions of sovereignty—as well as the problems that you mentioned of rivalry 

with New Delhi, as a friendly government to Afghanistan and so 

forth. But I’m just, once again, thinking outside the box, our objective is Afghanistan, but, in fact, a good part of the problem is at 

least an area of Pakistan that includes Pashtuns in Pakistan, as 

well as in Afghanistan. Is there any conceivable way that we could 

recommend to our Government that you extend the territory? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, first of all, I do agree with General 

Jones that the lack of a coordinated and, sort of, hierarchical structure for deciding on—for prioritizing international assistance to 

Pakistan, and then overseeing its implementation, is an important 

62 

lacunae in our capabilities there. And I think something analogous 

to the kinds of structures we’ve set in up Bosnia or in Kosovo could 

be helpful. The situation’s different, and it would have to be structured to take account of those differences. But the fact is that we 

have achieved pretty much unity of command on the military side 

by using the NATO structure, and we don’t have anything comparable on the civil implementation side. And the result is a very 

highly unstructured and overlapping set of national donor programs. So, I do think creating a contact group type structure, and 

assigning an individual to represent all members of that group, and 

oversee the international community’s activities in that regard, 

would be useful. 

Now, whether that specific group could extend its responsibilities 

into Pakistan, I’m a little skeptical. I think that would probably 

make it more difficult for them to operate within Pakistan. I think 

you’d probably need a parallel effort directed to the Pakistani side 

of the border, but an effort that would be based in Islamabad, rather than in—rather than in Kabul. 

I do think, however, that it’s—that we should be trying to raise 

the profile of the Pakistan issue in various international forums. I 

mean, we’re in this anomalous situation now, where NATO troops 

are facing an adversary that’s coming across a border, and it’s like, 

you know, we’ve—for 40 years, we manned the Folda Gap waiting 

for the Soviets to come across the border. It would be like NATO 

not talking about the Soviet Union for 40 years, just manning the 

gap, but not talking about where the threat was coming from. And 

so—and that’s, in effect, what we’re doing now. We don’t—I don’t 

sense that we’ve put Pakistan on the NATO agenda. I don’t see any 

communiques that talk about Pakistan. The General has indicated 

we are developing a military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, 

and I think that’s good. But I think we need to put this on the 

agenda, and we’ll only do that if the administration is prepared to 

talk somewhat more candidly about the problem than they traditionally have been. I remember urging one of our senior officials to 

put this on the North Atlantic Council’s agenda, and the answer 

was, ‘‘Oh, no, the information is too sensitive.’’ Well, you know, I 

mean, we traded intelligence appraisals of what was going on in 

the Soviet Union for 40 years. And they were in a position to obliterate us. So, it’s hard to believe that the information is so sensitive 

that it can’t be shared with key allies, and that sharing it wouldn’t 

create a greater overall sense of what the dimensions of the problem were, and, ideally, would result in larger resources and political influence flowing toward the kind of ameliorative steps that 

I’ve already suggested would be desirable. 

Senator LUGAR. This is a quick followup. Isn’t it possible, though, 

that, given the enthusiasm of the Congress, the administration, 

and what have you, for Afghanistan reconstruction success, that, at 

the same time that we’re admonishing Mr. Musharraf and others 

to do better, we would say to him, ‘‘We would like, as a matter of 

fact, to extend our roadbuilding or our turning on the lights or 

whatever, over across the border. We’d like to help you out, because 

we think it’s in your best interest and ours.’’ In other words, this 

is a very different type of incentive—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right. 

63 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Than the fact that he’s simply not 

fulfilling whatever obligations we think he has. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Oh, I agree with that. And I—and, to be 

fair, I think the administration has suggested something like that 

in the budget to you. But that’s not to say it couldn’t be highlighted 

and expanded. But I agree with that. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your time and your great 

service to the country. I’m struck by where you’ve been over all the 

years, and no easy places to deal with, hotbeds, all of them. 

I’ve got about two or three. I want to start to pick up where I 

left off with an earlier witness, and, also, we’ve had a good discussion about it already with regard to Pakistan. I, like others on this 

committee, have had contact with the Pakistani Ambassador, Mr. 

Durrani, and he made a passionate case in my office a couple of 

days ago that what we’re reading in the newspaper, what the administration and others have asserted with regard to the way Pakistan has or—either has done or has not done to have a more constructive impact and a positive impact on the fight against alQaeda and the Taliban, that that’s—that we’re not getting all the 

information we need, and the press accounts are inaccurate, and 

their side of the story has to be told. 

I asked him point blank to take the most critical news accounts 

of the way the Pakistanis have dealt with this issue, and rebut 

them, and give us—give me and give others the benefit of a written 

rebuttal on the most substantial charges. 

What’s your assessment of that? Just point blank, in terms of the 

Pakistani Government’s assertion that they’re getting a bad rap, so 

to speak, when it comes to the general battle against terrorists, 

but, in particular, within Afghanistan? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I believe that, as regards al-Qaeda, that’s 

probably right. I mean, I think—I think that Pakistan has been cooperative in trying to locate, roll up, arrest al-Qaeda operatives. 

They see this as a threat to them, as well as to us. Musharraf, indeed, has been—suffered from an assassination attempt. So, I 

think, insofar as we’re talking about al-Qaeda, this is true. 

As regard the Taliban, it is—it was, until recently, not true, and 

I think it’s still probably less true, although there have been some 

signs that they’ve stepped up their activities to interdict and interfere with the Taliban’s activities in Pakistan. I mean, the—they’ve 

made—they, in themselves, make a distinction between foreigners, 

whom they’re prepared to collaborate against, and people who 

aren’t foreigners. Well, the fact is that many of the Taliban 

operatives are not foreigners, they’re Pakistanis. Some of them are 

long-term Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have been there 10 or 

20 years. Others have always been Pakistani. And that obviously 

represents a different political inhibition, when you’re talking 

about your own citizens, rather than illegal aliens, in effect. 

And I’ve cited the reasons why they, at a minimum, may feel— 

may lack adequate incentives to be more aggressive in this regard. 

I think that there have been repeated assertions—and, indeed, I 

think, United States, NATO, Afghan, and United Nations officials 

64 

all have said informally and when they’re off the record—that the 

Pakistani intelligence service has had a relationship with the 

Taliban, and has provided support and assistance to the Taliban. 

And I have no reason to believe that that is not the case. Now, 

Musharraf goes—says, ‘‘Well, maybe retired members of the’’—of 

his intelligence service are doing that, but not active-duty ones. 

On the other hand, I don’t believe that the Ambassador you were 

talking to was necessarily lying to you or being intentionally disingenuous. Pakistan’s a big, complicated country, with a complex 

government. And I think there are many Pakistani officials who 

are entirely sincere in their desire to cooperate with the United 

States, cooperate with the international community, move Pakistan 

into the mainstream of the international community, and see these 

extremist threats as primarily threats to their own society. 

Senator CASEY. I was struck by something you had in your written testimony, I’ll read from portions of it. On page 6, where—you 

make the assertion about Afghanistan, that it’s, ‘‘simply too poor 

to be able to provide security and effective governance to its large 

and dispersed population. So, unless the Pakistani Government can 

be persuaded to’’—and then you list things that they must do. The 

United—then you conclude with, ‘‘The United States and its allies 

are going to be forced to patrol Afghanistan’s southeast frontier indefinitely.’’ So, obviously you’re making the case, as I think everyone agrees, that Pakistan has much to do to prove itself, and to 

make sure that they’re a constructive force in Afghanistan. 

And I was also struck by the list of priorities you see with regard 

to Afghanistan. The first one being an age-old challenge. You say 

that the United States should intensify quiet efforts to encourage 

both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir. 

What do you think the likelihood of that, if—that’s the first priority 

among several—what do you think the likelihood of that is in what 

is now 2 years left in this administration? And how do you think 

that’s best accomplished? Is that diplomacy that’s at the level of 

Secretary of State, or is it diplomacy that operates on several 

tracks? What’s the best way to get there? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that’s actually one of the more 

hopeful areas. I think there has been progress between the Pakistanis and the Indians. The Indians react very strongly. The Pakistanis would love to have us mediate this, but the Indians react 

very strongly and rebuff us in that regard. And, therefore, that’s 

why I said that I think it has to be done quietly and informally. 

And, I mean, we’re building up a lot of credit with India. We’re— 

we’ve intensified our relationship, we’ve offered them a nuclear 

agreement, which is a real breakthrough in our relationship, we’re 

treating them as an emerging world power. And I think we need 

to, at the same time, make clear that we regard settlement of this 

issue as one of their responsibilities, and that we’re not going to 

publicly try to engage ourselves in the process, but that it is an important aspect of our attitude toward them over the longer term. 

So, I—and, to be fair, again, I think that this is an area where 

the administration has been making efforts. And I think probably 

American efforts going back to the efforts that Colin Powell made 

to avoid a nuclear confrontation between the two countries, back in 

2002, have yielded some results. 

65 

Senator CASEY. I know I’m over, but I have more, but I’ll wait. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; go ahead. If you have a followup question, 

go ahead. 

Senator CASEY. Let me do one more. 

Something you’ve written about, the topic being ‘‘nation-building,’’ and you contrast—or compare efforts undertaken by the previous administration, the Clinton administration, on what you 

call—I think you call, ‘‘low-profile, small-footprint approach’’ to nation-building. And, among other things, you talk about successful 

nation-building being measured by the level of effort made in terms 

of troops, time, and money. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right. 

Senator CASEY. What’s your sense of that when it comes to—obviously, the past is prologue, and it gives us a lot of ideas on this, 

but in future efforts, in terms of nation-building, what do you think 

we must do, or what hasn’t been done recently that—do you think 

it’s those three areas, in troops and time and resources, or do you 

think there’s something else that we haven’t done? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think the way we organize ourselves to do this is important. Obviously, just throwing resources 

at a problem doesn’t solve it. So, it’s the competent employment of 

those resources. And—but I think we need to—I think we need to 

recognize that there’s an important relationship between the scale 

of one’s commitment and the scope of one’s ambitions. When nation-building missions fail, they usually fail because that relationship hasn’t been adequately recognized. That is, we went in with 

inadequate forces and very large-scale ambitions. Afghanistan 

should have been a mission that could have been accomplished 

with a relatively modest input, as compared to some other ones, because we had a very favorable international climate, we had support of all of the neighboring states, and we had support of most 

elements of the Afghan population, and we were able to put in 

place a moderate, responsible, and broadly based government very 

quickly. And, on that basis, we should have been able to make 

progress with a comparatively modest commitment. Unfortunately, 

we didn’t go in with a comparatively modest commitment, we went 

in with a scandalously inadequate commitment. I mean, in the 

aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the average Kosovar got 25 times 

more assistance the first couple of years than the average Afghanistan—Afghan, who’d had 20 years of civil war. And the average 

Kosovar got 50 times more security in the form of international 

troops than the average Afghan got. So, it was—Afghanistan was 

the least resourced of any America nation-building operation in the 

last 60 years during that first 2- or 3-year period. 

Now, again, the administration’s largely recognized that, and, beginning in 2004, began to provide much more adequate resourcing. 

But, again, the experience of these missions over the last 60 years 

suggests that beginning big and building down is a much—a wiser 

approach than beginning with minimal forces and then having to 

increase them as you’re challenged. 

That said, there’s—one approach is to set high ambitions and 

then commit large-scale resources. The alternative is to commit 

limited resources, but also to scale back one’s ambitions to what is 

likely to be achieved within those limited resources. And sometimes 

66 

that is a viable option. So, not every operation requires hundreds 

of thousands of troops and billions of billions of dollars. 

We didn’t go into Afghanistan saying we were going to make it 

a model for Central Asia, and that, once we democratized Afghanistan, we were going to change the form of government of every one 

of its neighbors. We went in with a more limited set of objectives, 

which were essentially to make sure it didn’t become a launch 

point for global terrorism. We were, therefore, able to get bases in 

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—Russian, Iranian, Pakistani support. 

And, with that, we could have made more progress than we did. 

In Iraq, where we went in with that much, much higher set of objectives, the resource requirements would have been, and were, 

commensurately much higher. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lugar, do you have any—— 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. Your insight is always 

very helpful to this committee, and to me, in particular, and I appreciate it. And this will—this is just the first of hearings we’re 

going to have on this. We’re going to follow this up through the 

spring, and I hope you’ll be available to us. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. Always a pleasure. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We’re adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CONNECTICUT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on Afghanistan 

which remains without a doubt the principal front in the war on terror. 

Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Government of Afghanistan has made 

considerable progress including in adopting a constitution; holding elections; and expanding women’s rights and educational opportunities. 

But Afghanistan continues to face grave threats that directly impact U.S. national 

security. These include the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as noted last 

week by the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell; weak institutions 

of administration; security and justice; rampant poverty and unemployment; and 

the booming drug trade which General Jones has called the ‘‘Achilles heel’’ of 

Afghanistan. 

That al-Qaeda, in particular, is in a position to reconstitute itself in Pakistan’s 

tribal areas shows just how misguided this administration’s priorities have been in 

fighting this war on terror and how its policies have left our country less safe. 

After 9/11, we had al-Qaeda’s leadership on the run and severely limited in its 

ability to plan attacks. Five years later, after having diverted troops and resources 

to Iraq, al-Qaeda has reestablished itself; we’re in for a bloody Taliban spring offensive; and Afghanistan is producing 90 percent of the world’s heroin. 

To combat these threats, the United States and the international community must 

urgently and rapidly increase political, economic, and military support to Afghanistan to ensure its long-term stability and prosperity, and to deny al-Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan. 

We also need to get the Government of Pakistan to strengthen its commitment 

to fighting the Taliban, in particular, and establish control over its territory. The 

Pakistani leadership has made some tough choices and is an important ally of the 

United States but it needs to do more. 

To convey this very message, I introduced a resolution yesterday which states 

that U.S. military assistance to Pakistan should be guided by progress that the Government of Pakistan makes in apprehending al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and 

preventing them from operating in Pakistan. 

67 

In the course of this hearing, I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses regarding recent developments in Afghanistan and the details 

of the White House’s new strategy toward Afghanistan. 

The stakes in Afghanistan for our country, for the international community, and 

for NATO are significant. I will continue to closely monitor the situation there to 

ensure that we are doing everything we can to win a war that at this point is ours 

to lose. 

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