U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–707PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 11, 2018

Serial No. 115–153

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .... 4

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 

Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................................... 12

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten: Prepared statement .................................... 7

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch: Prepared statement .......................................................... 14

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: 

Washington Post article dated July 6, 2018 ...................................................... 63

Letter to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National 

Institutes of Health dated December 4, 2017 ................................................ 65

Washington Post Letters to the Editor Opinion ................................................ 66

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 67

The Honorable Norma J. Torres, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 68

Written responses from the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs .............. 70

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel ............................................................................. 71

The Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 82

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 87

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin ............................................................................. 89

The Honorable Joaquin Castro, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas ................................................................................................... 90

The Honorable Norma J. Torres ......................................................................... 95

(1)

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will call this hearing to order. Today we 

look at U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Our 

relationships in the Western Hemisphere are forged by deep cultural and economic ties. We export a lot of goods to the Caribbean, 

and that supports many U.S. jobs. Across Latin America, our trade 

ties are just as strong. But today, as the region faces urgent challenges and transitions, the United States must be more engaged 

than ever. 

As always, the safety of Americans serving abroad is a top priority for this committee. The still unexplained attacks on Embassy 

personnel in Havana, and now in China, are very disturbing. 

Twenty-six Americans have been medically evacuated from Havana 

with serious symptoms, including sharp ear pain, headaches, 

vertigo and other conditions consistent with brain injury or concussion. Canadians have been impacted, as well. We need to know 

what happened, who is responsible, and how to respond. 

The administration is actively addressing the Western Hemisphere’s major crisis starting with Venezuela. The United States 

has repeatedly condemned the illegitimate election of President 

Maduro as well as the human rights abuses and economic meltdown unfolding there. 

The administration has rightly deployed targeted sanctions hitting Venezuelan officials responsible for this catastrophe, not the 

suffering Venezuelan people, is the way to go. The Vice-President 

has traveled to the region three times to urge regional leaders to 

do more for the Venezuelan people. 

In Nicaragua, the administration has rightly designated three 

top officials for human rights abuses and for corruption. But we 

should do more to support the Nicaraguan people. The repressive 

Ortega regime has killed more than 200 advocates for free and fair 

elections since this April. One of the civilians murdered on a village 

street was a former neighbor of an Orange County friend of mine. 

Subcommittee Chairman Paul Cook will convene a hearing to further examine this matter tomorrow. 

2

Across the hemisphere, transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a major threat. These violent gangs are fueling the 

drug and migration crisis that the United States struggles with 

today. As we fight the deadly impacts of opioids in our communities, we must continue working closely with our regional neighbors to increase counternarcotics cooperation. The recent increase 

in cocaine production in Colombia is unacceptable, and I am hopeful that the election of President Ivan Duque is a sign that the 

country will redouble efforts to confront gangs and the cartels. 

This committee continues to support U.S. efforts to work with 

the countries of Central America’s Northern Triangle, El Salvador, 

Honduras, and Guatemala, to help shore up institutions, combat 

crime, and combat corruption, and create conditions that will keep 

people from migrating north. I agree with the administration that 

combating corruption in the region must be a key part of the strategy to create opportunity and stability. The committee will continue to support assistance to the region. 

Finally, the recent election in Mexico raises questions about the 

future of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship under the Merida 

Initiative. I hope that President-Elect Andres Manuel Lopez 

Obrador’s campaign promise to root out corruption is a sign that 

our two countries can continue to cooperate on matters of security. 

One of those is the Merida Initiative, and we will hear more from 

you on this. 

The U.S. and Mexico share a 2,000-mile border, and must continue to work together to enhance both security and trade that benefits both our countries. NAFTA should be updated for the 21st 

century, not scrapped. And with that, let me go to our ranking 

member, Mr. Engel of New York, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

calling today’s hearing. This region is particularly important to me 

as a former Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chair. Ambassador 

Merten, Deputy Assistant Administrator Lynch, welcome, and 

thank you both for your service. You are both doing great work. 

But again, I must say the White House’s failure to fill key positions 

in a timely manner means we can’t adhere from those setting the 

course for foreign policy. That is too bad, because in my view, the 

administration has put us on a very dangerous course when it 

comes to the Western Hemisphere. 

The way the President talks about this region says it all. Falsely 

insisting Mexico will pay for a border wall we don’t need, the ugly 

language calling Mexicans drug dealers and rapists, the dehumanizing language about immigrants and characterization of Haiti and 

El Salvador using the word I won’t repeat. 

Democrats and Republicans have worked for two decades together to improve the U.S.-Mexico relationship long characterized 

by mistrust. Bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics was once unimaginable. Amazingly, it became the norm with the Mexican Government extraditing the world’s most dangerous drug kingpin, 

Chapo Guzman, to the United States in the last hours of the 

Obama administration. 

On July 1, Mexicans elected a new President, Andres Manuel 

Lopez Obrador. I worry that if President Trump continues along 

the same lines, President-Elect Lopez Obrador may pull the plug 

3

on security cooperation. Where would that leave us the next time 

we are seeking an extradition, or if terrorists sought to cross the 

U.S.-Mexican border? Too much is at stake in our bilateral relationship, and we simply don’t know if the President will continue 

to do this, take to Twitter, and do damage. 

And looking south, Mexico is just a start. For months, the families have been torn apart, and Central American children essentially have been held ransom to a radical anti-immigrant agenda. 

The President created this policy. He then said only Congress could 

fix it, which wasn’t true, made clear by the fact that he then signed 

an executive order trying to end the policy, but the damage was 

done. Children to this day still remain apart from their parents. 

That has to change. The Organization of American States unanimously adopted a resolution on June 29 criticizing the inhumane 

family separation policy. 

It is hard to remember a time in recent memory when the OAS 

permanent council has so forcefully condemned the United States, 

and that is just the start. The administration is making it harder 

for victims of abuse to come to the United States, saying domestic 

violence shouldn’t be grounds for asylum, that women and children 

who have endured rape and other forms of violence should look 

elsewhere for sanctuary. 

The United States also just opposed a U.N. resolution promoting 

breastfeeding. I mean, it is unbelievable, and I fear the worst is yet 

to come. Temporary protected status will soon end for 262,000 Salvadorans, 86,000 Hondurans, and 58,000 Haitians. As Mark 

Schneider of CSIS pointed out in The Washington Post this week, 

this move may result in 273,000 American-born children being separated from their parents. This is a deeply troubling pattern in 

dealing with the treatment of women, of families of immigrants. 

Is this what we are becoming as a country? I hope not. I won’t 

accept it, and I will fight tooth and nail against these policies that 

betray our values and make it harder to advance our interests 

abroad. After all, we are facing very real and urgent crises in the 

region. 

President Maduro has turned Venezuela into a full-fledged dictatorship, and rejected humanitarian aid. State Department sanctions against human rights violators were a step forward. But instead of working with regional partners, we have, again, bellicose 

rhetoric and threatening to invade Venezuela. The result, Maduro 

is empowered and alienated key allies at the same time. 

In Nicaragua, the Global Magnitsky Act has allowed us to crack 

down on thugs tied to President Ortega who are killing innocent 

people in the streets. Yet, the administration zeroed out democracy 

assistance to Nicaragua in its 2019 budget. And in Guatemala, absurd and unconfounded attacks on the U.N. International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, what we call CICIG, threaten 

the institution’s ability to fight corruption and support the rule of 

law. 

Most recently, I was disturbed by the Guatemalan Government’s 

decision to put CICIG personnel at risk removing a large portion 

of their security detail. President Morales should immediately reverse its decision. And I must say, since I have been critical of the 

4

White House, this time I was pleased that the White House came 

out in strong support of CICIG just this week. 

I congratulate Ivan Duque on his recent election victory in Colombia. Outgoing U.S. assistance is essential for implementing the 

peace process and supporting smart drug policies that go after 

kingpins while not harming small farmers or the environment. And 

in Argentina, I was glad to join Mr. McCaul in founding the Argentina Caucus to focus on a relationship that has improved a great 

deal since President Macri took office. 

Finally, the Caribbean. In 2016, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen 

and I authored the U.S. Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, 

which President Obama signed into law in his last few days in office. Last June, the State Department released a strategy mandated by our law. It is an ambitious and impressive strategy, but 

unfortunately, 1 year later, it still has not been implemented. With 

hurricane season under way, the parts of the strategy related to 

disaster preparedness and resilience are especially urgent. I implore our witnesses to put some meat on the bones of what are on 

paper is an excellent strategy, and I would be remiss not to mention that Haiti is very much on my mind this week. Haiti has suffered far more than any country should, and I stand with the Haitian people at this difficult moment. 

So I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. So this morning, we 

are pleased to be joined by Ken Merten, Acting Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and 

Sarah-Ann Lynch, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator of 

USAID for Latin American and the Caribbean. We welcome them 

to the committee. Ambassador Merten has been serving as the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs since August 2015. He is a two-time Ambassador, 

having served as the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, and also, as the 

U.S. Ambassador to Haiti. 

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch currently serves as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean at USAID, 

and prior to that, she was the mission director in Iraq. So we appreciate them both being with us here today, and without objection, 

the witnesses’ full prepared statements are going to be made part 

of the record and members are going to have 5 calendar days to 

submit any statements or questions or extraneous material for the 

record. 

So if you could, Ambassador, I would ask you to just summarize 

your statement in 5 minutes, each of you, and then we will go to 

questions. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENNETH H. MERTEN, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU 

OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks very much, Chairman Royce, 

Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee. Thanks for the 

opportunity to allow us to come here and talk a little bit about the 

5

administration’s approach to our Hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere. 

We know that a democratic, prosperous, and secure Western 

Hemisphere enhances our national security and benefits our economy. Our policies are built upon that premise. The United States 

shares common values and has strong economic bonds with all the 

countries in this region. These long historical connections bind us 

to the nations of the Western Hemisphere more closely than in any 

other region. 

Our economic engagement with the Americas cannot be overstated. The United States is the top trading partner for more than 

half the countries in the region. We trade more than twice as much 

with the hemisphere as we do, for example, with China. We also 

share fundamental values. In the last decades, Latin America has 

largely transformed itself into a region of vibrant, peaceful democracies. 

The United States recently reaffirmed its commitment to these 

shared values and to our partnership with the region at the eighth 

Summit of the Americas in Lima, Peru in May. At that summit, 

leaders acknowledge the need to continue working together to address corruption, to strengthen institutions, and to improve transparency. 

We rely on strong hemispheric partnerships to fight 

transnational criminal organizations, and we work hand in hand 

with our partners to disrupt illicit networks and trafficking roots. 

Because our mutual security and prosperity are so connected, we 

work together to counter the illicit activity and the poverty that 

drive illegal immigration to the United States. As such, the U.S., 

together with our partners, is renewing its commitment to address 

the root causes of Central American migration. 

While most of the region enjoys democratic rule, Venezuela, 

Cuba, and Nicaragua continue to undermine the region’s shared vision for effective democratic governance enshrined in the InterAmerican Democratic Charter. 

The United States remains committed to standing with the people of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in their struggle to achieve 

the liberty that they deserve. 

In Cuba, the regime continues its repressive hold on power despite the recent transition to President Diaz-Canel. President 

Trump’s June 2017 Cuba policy emphasizes advancing human 

rights and democracy, and aims to ensure that the benefits of U.S. 

engagement flow to the Cuban people. 

In Nicaragua, we condemn the violence and excessive force used 

against demonstrators resulting in 215 deaths and hundreds more 

wounded since protests began now in mid April. We urge 

Nicaragua’s government to strengthen democratic processes and institutions, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms 

and support the proposal for free and fair elections that would 

occur soon. 

In Venezuela, the Maduro regime has completely undermined democracy. We join the nations of the world in standing with the 

Venezuelan people as they seek to return to a stable, prosperous 

democracy they deserve. We are also addressing the humanitarian 

6

component of the Venezuelan crisis by supporting Venezuelans who 

are deprived, suffering, and increasingly forced to flee their homes. 

Overall, the United States is providing nearly $31 million in humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans in the region. We will continue to work with our partners to help restore democracy to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and we will continue to build a democratic, prosperous, and secure Western Hemisphere that further enhances our own national security and benefits our economy. 

So I look forward to your questions today. Thanks very much for 

the opportunity to speak with you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Merten follows:]

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ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

TESTIMONY OF 

KENNETH H. MERTEN 

ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE 

THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

July 11,2018 

Chainnan Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opporttmity to testify on the Administration's approach to 

the Western Hemisphere. 

We know that a democratic, prosperous, and secure Western Hemisphere 

enhances our national security and benefits our economy. We build our policies 

towards the region upon that premise. The United States shares common values, 

strong economic bonds, and geographic proximity with the countries in this region. 

These connections bind us to the nations ofthe Western Hemisphere more closely 

than to any other region. 

Our economic engagement with the Americas ca.tmot be overstated. The 

United States is the top trading partner for more than half of the countries in the 

region. We trade more than twice as much with the hemisphere as we do with 

China. The United States has free trade conunitments with 20 countries worldwide 

- 12 of those countries are in the Western Hemisphere. We traded $1.8 trillion in 

goods and services within the hemisphere last year, supporting millions of U.S. 

jobs a.t1d leading to a $12 billion goods a.t1d services trade surplus with the region in 

2017. We believe in strong and fair trade that will create more opportunities for 

U.S. businesses. 

Our econmnic engagement is underpi1med by shared values. Latin America 

has largely transforn1ed itself into a region of vibrant and peaceful 

democracies. Costa Rica, Paraguay, Colombia and, most recently, Mexico elected 

new presidents in 2018, and Brazilians will head to the polls later this year. We 

look forward to working with these newly-elected administrations. 
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30707a-2.eps

The United States reatlinned its connnitment to our partnership with the 

Americas at the Eighth Summit ofthe Americas in Lima in May. The central 

theme ofthe Summit was "Democratic Govemance against Corruption." 

Corruption corrodes institutions and trust in democracy in the region and globally. 

Citizens across the Americas have demonstrated increasing intolerance for 

cormption. 

At the Summit of the Americas, leaders adopted the Lima Commitment. It 

marks a watershed in the willingness ofleaders to acknowledge their responsibility 

to address corruption. The Conmritment provides a roadmap outlining steps to 

curb corruption and promote transparency, including furthering a culture of citizen 

participation in anti-corruption efforts. 

The region's institutions are also responding. A money laundering 

investigation entitled "Operation Car Wash" in Brazil revealed a regional 

corruption case that implicated at least 10 Latin American countries. This case 

was not bmshed aside or ignored; instead, Brazil's ability to share evidence related 

to the Odebrecht bribery case accelerated a wave of activity on the case across the 

Hemisphere. 

In Central America, the Intemational Commission against Impunity in 

Guatemala (CICIG) (SEE-sig) and the Organization of American States (OAS) 

Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), (MAH-see) 

play important roles in supporting the attorneys general in Guatemala and 

Honduras to strengthen the rule oflaw, tight impunity, and combat corruption. 

Unfortunately, corruption is not the only challenge we must confront 

together in the hemisphere. Another pressing issue we face is transnational crime. 

We rely on strong henrispheric partnerships to fight transnational crinrinal 

organizations, and we work with our partners to disrupt illicit networks and 

trafficking routes. 

The U.S. Strategy for Central America; our partnership with Mexico; and the 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative are essential tools in addressing this threat. 

Continued bilateral cooperation with Colombia, Pem, and others is also important. 

At the U.S.-Colombia High-Level Dialogue in March, the United States and 

Colombia agreed to expand countemarcotics cooperation to reduce the alanning 

growth of Colombia's cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50 percent of 

current levels by 2023. 
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Because our mutual security and prosperity are connected, we continue to 

work together to counter the illicit activity and poverty that drive illegal 

immigration to the United States. As Vice President Pence said during his visit to 

Brazil and Guatemala last month, it is of parammmt importance that the citizens of 

our hemisphere have a chance to build a better life tor themselves in the land of 

their birth. As such, the United States is renewing its conunitment to address the 

root causes of Central American migration. 

In the Caribbean, our Caribbean 2020 strategy guides our engagement, 

which focuses on security, prosperity, energy, diplomacy, education, and health. 

Sustaining economic growth and ensuring security in the region requires 

strong democratic institutions that safeguard fundamental freedoms. 

While most of the region enjoys democratic rule, Venezuela, Cuba, and 

Nicaragua continue to undern1ine the region's shared vision for effective 

democratic governance as enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

The United States remains committed to standing with the people of Cuba, 

Nicarah'lJa, and Venezuela in their struggle to achieve the liberty they deserve. 

In Cuba, the regime continues its repressive hold on power and authoritarian 

nile despite the recent transition to President Diaz-Canel. President Tnunp's Jtme 

2017 Cuba policy emphasizes advancing human rights and democracy, and aims to 

ensure the benefits of U.S. engagement flow to the Cuban people rather than 

Cuba's military, security, or intelligence services. This policy amplifies efforts to 

support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free 

enterprise, free association, free press, and lawful travel. 

ln Nicaragua, we condemn the violence and the excessive force used against 

demonstrators, restuting in at least 215 deaths and hundreds more wounded since 

protests began in mid-April. 

We call on the Government of Nicaragua to end the government-sanctioned 

attacks and intimidation campaign against peaceftu protesters, fully implement the 

reconm1endations of the independent Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights, and act upon its findings to ensure accountability and justice for human 

rights abuses and violations. We urge Nicarah'lla's government to strengthen 
10


30707a-4.eps

democratic processes and institutions and to respect human rights and fundamental 

freedoms and support the proposal for early free and fair elections. 

We support a broad-based dialogue to resolve the conflict, and urge the 

Nicaraguan govemment to negotiate in good faith to achieve a democratic future 

tor all Nicaraguans. On Jtme 7, the Department of State adopted visa restrictions 

on those responsible for human rights abuses or undennining democracy in 

Nicaragua, barring their entry into the United States. On July 5, the Treasury 

Department sanctioned three individuals pursuant to Executive Order 13818 as 

responsible for serious human rights abuses against the Nicaraguan people or 

significant corruption at their expense. 

In Venezuela, the Maduro regime has completely undermined democracy. 

We join the nations of the world in standing with the Venezuelan people as they 

seek to return to the stable and prosperous democracy they deserve. 

We were pleased to join with our partners to issue a Declaration on 

Venezuela at the Summit ofthe Americas. Despite calls at the Summit of 

Americas for a free and fair election, the May 20 elections in Venezuela were a 

sham. We joined the EU, the Lima Group, the Vatican and over 40 countries in 

condenming them. 

At the June 4-5 OAS General Assembly, the United States and 18 other 

countries delivered a strong statement on Venezuela by passing a resolution that 

condemned the May 20 elections and denotmced the rupture of democratic order 

they represent. The resolution set the procedural steps for Venezuela's expulsion 

from the OAS under the Inter-American Democratic Charter, as Vice President 

Pence had called for in May remarks to the OAS. 

The OAS resolution also called on member states and OAS permanent 

observer states to implement econmnic and political measures to apply pressure on 

the Maduro regime until it restores Venezuela to genuine democracy and provides 

access for the international humanitarian aid that the Venezuelan people so 

desperately need. 

President Trump has made it clear: the United States of America will not 

stand idly by as Venezuela crumbles. We are using the full range of diplomatic 

and economic tools to support the Venezuelan people's efforts to restore their 

democracy and return to prosperity. 
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We have sanctions in place designed to pressure those in the Madura regime 

responsible for abuses, while limiting their ability to use our financial system to 

conceal their stolen wealth. We have imposed strict financial sanctions on more 

than 50 current or fanner Venezuelan govenunent ofiicials. We sanctioned the 

"Petro" cryptocurrency and announced additional sanctions to ensure that 

Venezuelan state assets are not fhrther liquidated by the corrupt Madura regime at 

the expense of the Venezuelan people. 

We are also addressing the humanitarian component ofthe Venezuelan crisis 

by supporting the Venezuelans who are deprived, suffering, and increasingly 

forced to flee their homes, 

Every day, some 5,000 Venezuelans flee the land of their birth, in the largest 

cross-border mass exodus in our hemisphere's history. The Tntemational 

Organization on Migration (I OM) estimates approximately 2.3 million 

Venezuelans fled to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over the 

past three years. An outflow of another 1.8 million is expected by the end ofthis 

year. 

Vice President Pence announced nearly $16 million dollars of direct aid for 

the regional response to the Venezuela crisis at the Summit of the Americas. In 

May, Deputy Secretary Sullivan mmounced m1 additional $18.5 million in bilateral 

assistance for the Govemment of Colombia's efforts to address the influx of 

Venezuelans seeking safety. On June 26, during an ofiicial visit to Brazil, Vice 

President Pence mmounced $9.6 million in additional U.S. govemment 

humanitarian assistance for emergency response efforts related to the Venezuela 

regional crisis. Overall, the United States is providing nearly $31 million in 

humm1itarian m1d development assistm1ce to Venezuelans in the region. Despite 

this clear signal that the United States, in conjunction with the international 

community, is here to help, the Madura regime continues to callously refuse to 

accept desperately needed humanitarian aid for its people. 

We will continue to work with our regional partners to help restore 

democracy to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and to build a democratic, 

prosperous, and secure Western Hemisphere that enhances our national security 

m1d benefits our economy. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 
12

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. Lynch. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SARAH-ANN LYNCH, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA 

AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation 

to testify today. I had the distinct pleasure of traveling with some 

of you recently while Administrator Green and I were in Peru at 

the Summit of the Americas in April, and thank you so much for 

your continued interest in our work in the region. 

USAID’s engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipients’ 

self-reliance and resilience. This is a region with considerable opportunities, but also critical challenges. USAID works to increase 

the security and prosperity of the hemisphere by addressing issues 

of poverty, insecurity and governance. For example, our work in 

Mexico and Central America responds to challenges that inhibit 

business development, empower criminals, and lead to out-migration. Recent high levels of illegal migration from Central America 

come largely as a result of poverty, instability, and weak governance, including high levels of corruption and impunity. 

Therefore, USAID’s programs focus on engaging young people before they turn to crime and violence, improving democratic governance, and addressing the economic conditions that drive people to 

make the perilous journey north. 

In Mexico, we partnered with the government to strengthen national institutions, spread the rule of law, and promote the protection of human rights. And together with Mexico, we are working 

closely with the Northern Triangle governments to address those 

challenges to security and prosperity that we collectively face. 

Two of our primary areas of focus in South America are Colombia and Peru. These countries are making enormous economic and 

social strides, but remain plagued by coca cultivation, which enriches transnational criminal organizations that threaten regional 

security. In Colombia, USAID is working in some of the most dangerous and hard to reach areas, which were cut off from state presence for decades during the conflict. Our efforts to reduce the 

power and influence of illegal-armed groups build a culture of legality, expand state presence in former conflict areas, and enable 

licit rural economic growth are seeing promising results. 

Similarly in Peru, USAID assistance helps to reduce the flow of 

illicit drugs by providing farmers with alternatives to coca cultivation, and the results—the achievements are impressive. 

As the third border to the United States, the Caribbean remains 

vital to American security and prosperity. I would like to thank 

Ranking Member Engel and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for their continued 

interest and engagement on Caribbean topics, and especially for 

authoring H.R. 4939, which helps lead the U.S. strategy for engagement in the Caribbean. 

Under the Caribbean Basin and Security Initiative, CBSI, we are 

working to improve citizen security and provide employment and 

13

education opportunities to youth at risk of joining gangs and other 

transnational criminal organizations. 

We are also working with countries across the Caribbean to increase resilience so that they are better able to withstand shocks, 

such as tropical storms and hurricanes. Maybe we need to focus for 

our work in the Caribbean where we are addressing poverty, promoting good governance, improving health, and advancing transparent and accountable government institutions. However, as this 

weekend’s violence has demonstrated, Haiti’s progress and stability 

continues to be fragile. 

And unfortunately, Haiti is not the only place in the region 

where we have seen violence and instability recently. We are very 

concerned for the people of Nicaragua who are suffering a brutal 

crackdown at the hands of the Ortega government. USAID has 

given rapid assistance to the brave civil society groups, human 

rights organizations, independent media, and others involved in 

peaceful protest. And we remain flexible to respond to needs as 

they emerge. USAID also helps to maintain an operating space for 

those in Cuba who seek to preserve their basic freedoms of speech, 

religion, assembly and democratic voice. But one of our most pressing priorities in the region right now is the outflow of Venezuelans 

who are fleeing their country in record numbers in search of food, 

medicine and healthcare. 

To help these families who have fled to neighboring countries, 

USAID has partnered with these countries to provide humanitarian and development assistance to meet the most urgent needs. 

And while humanitarian assistance will help with immediate 

needs, it will not and cannot address the root causes of Venezuela’s 

instability. Only lasting political and economic reforms will provide 

sustainable solutions. 

To help the Venezuelan people maintain their voice, USAID supports human rights, civil society, independent media, electoral 

oversight, and the elected national assembly. 

In this discussion, I cannot overlook the rise in competing foreign 

engagement in the region. We recognize that some countries have 

different development models than ours, but we believe we offer 

the clear choice. For example, where other countries assistance 

models may further dependence, our development assistant promotes a country’s own journey consistent with U.S. supported universal values and interests bolstering our partners’ self-reliance 

and prosperity. 

To accomplish our goals, we coordinate and leverage the work of 

the U.S. interagency, other donors, the private sector, faith-based 

communities, and nongovernmental organizations. In all of our 

work, we are committed to oversight and ensure that our programs 

are smart and impactful. We use a range of tools, such as monitoring surveys, evaluations, and assessments to understand the effects of our programs and help us capture changes at the community or other subnational levels. We know very well our responsibility to the American taxpayer, and we take our obligation very 

seriously. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, I want to thank you and 

the committee for the opportunity to give an overview of our work, 

and I welcome your questions. Thank you very much. 

14

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lynch follows:]


30707b-1.eps

"Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere" 

Prepared Testimony of Sarah-Ann Lynch 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Wednesday, July 11,2018 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and members of the Committee, tbank you for the 

invitation to testify today. I am grateful for the Committee's support for the United States 

Agency for International Development's work in Latin America and tbe Caribbean, and am 

pleased to have this opportunity to discuss this critical topic with you. USAID's work advances 

U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and 

promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience 

USA !D's engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is a reflection of the region's 

proximity to and close ties to with the United States. Events in the region affect us here at home, 

whether those events include increased migration flows from Central America to our southwest 

border; the crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua; new governments taking power in Colombia and 

Mexico; a rise in competing foreign assistance in the region; or corruption and transnational 

criminal organizations that pose a threat to long-term security and prosperity. Our programs 

present the most at-risk citizens with legal alternatives to crime and violence, helping to disrupt 

the influence of criminal organizations and shut down illicit pathways to our borders. US AID 

works in coordination and cooperation with relevant USG agencies to ensure that our programs 

are not duplicative and leverages USG foreign policy and strategy in the region. 

Responding to Crises and Promoting Democratic Values: Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba 

The outflow of Venezuelans is our most pressing priority in South America. To assist those who 

have fled to neighboring countries, and in partnership with host country governments, USAID 

has provided humanitarian and development assistance to meet the most urgent needs and help 

neighboring countries to respond. 

However, while humanitarian assistance will help to alleviate the immediate needs of many 

Venezuelans, it will not-and cannot-address the root causes of Venezuela's instability; lasting 

political and economic refonns are the only sustainable solutions to the crisis. To help the 

Venezuelan people maintain their voice, US AID works to support human rights, civil society, 

independent media, electoral oversight, and the National Assembly in Venezuela. The people of 

Venezuela deserve a return to democracy and the rule of law, and a peaceful, hopeful future. 

Our other urgent concern in the region is for the well-being of the people of Nicaragua, who are 

suffering a brutal crackdown at the hands of the Ortega government The United States is the 

only remaining donor working on democracy, governance, and human rights in Nicaragua, and 

we are a crucial lifeline for civil society organizations, emerging leaders, and independent media. 

Since April 2018, thousands of students, members of civil society, and independent journalists 

have been illegally arrested and attacked, and more than 300 have been killed for exercising their 

right to peacefully protest government actions, corruption, lack of democracy, and violence. 

USAID commends the bravery of students, journalists, human rights defenders, members of civil 
15


30707b-2.eps

society, religious leaders, and indigenous groups who have united their voices in a call for 

justice, rule oflaw, and a return to democratic order. From the beginning of the crisis, we have 

given rapid assistance to civil society groups, human rights organizations, independent media, 

and others involved in peaceful protest. Our assistance has included digital security for civil 

society and journalists to combat cyber attacks, grants that enable human rights and civil society 

organizations to provide legal support to victims, and funds that help journalists to keep the lines 

of communication open so that they can disseminate accurate information. We remain flexible to 

respond to needs as they emerge. The United States calls on the Ortega government to cease the 

repression of protesters immediately and heed the demands of the people of Nicaragua. As the 

State Department has said, the United States notes the widespread call among Nicaraguans for 

early elections and believes early elections represent a constructive way forward. 

USAID also helps to maintain an operating space for those in Cuba who seek to preserve their 

basic freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and democratic voice. Cubans are detained 

arbitrarily, harassed, beaten, and arrested for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights. 

USATD's programs in Cuba support human rights, the free flow of information, civil society 

strengthening, and humanitarian assistance in the form of food and medicine to political 

prisoners and their families, and other marginalized individuals and organizations. The programs 

offer a lifeline to improve activists' well-being and reduce their dependence on the state. 

Addressing the Root Causes of Migration: The U.S. Strategy for Central America 

Central America, particularly the Northern Triangle countries ofEl Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras, is also a priority for the U.S. government in the hemisphere. Recent high levels of 

illegal migration are largely a result of poverty and a lack of opportunity, instability marked by 

crime and violence, and weak governance, including high levels of corruption and impunity. 

US AID is working with other USG departments and agencies, as well as the governments of the 

region, the private sector, and civil society to address the drivers of illegal migration. Our 

programs focus on engaging young people with workforce training and education before they 

tum to crime and violence, furthering democratic governance, and addressing the economic 

conditions that drive people to make the perilous journey north. 

To reduce crime and violence, for instance, we focus on at-risk youth and support an integrated 

approach that combines our prevention efforts with law enforcement efforts by the Department 

of State in the areas with the highest rates of violence and migration. To increase prosperity, we 

are improving the business and investment climate, expanding access to markets and financial 

services, building a skilled workforce, and promoting education alternatives for at-risk youth. In 

support of good governance, we further accountability, enhance anti-corruption efforts, 

strengthen revenue generation, and improve the juvenile justice system. 

Our work has seen results. Through agriculture programming in Honduras, US AID has increased 

incomes by more than 97 percent, lifting 29,000 households out of poverty. USAID has 

leveraged $51.6 million from the Government of Honduras to co-invest and expand this model of 

poverty reduction. And thanks to a concerted effort by USAID and the Department of State and 

leadership from the Government of Honduras, there was a 62 percent decrease in homicides 

between 2013 and 2015 in the Rivera Hernandez neighborhood of San Pedro Sula, Honduras. 

We are heartened by the overall reduction in homicides in the region; homicides per 100,000 

2 
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30707b-3.eps

people in El Salvador dropped from more than 100 in 2015 to 81 in 2016 to 60 in 2017, and 

homicides in Honduras dropped from 59 in 2016 to 46 in 2017. This is important progress. 

A Practical Imperative: Haiti 

Recent violence in Haiti reminds us that its progress and stability continue to be fragile. 

USA !D's programs address poverty, promote good governance, improve food security and 

nutrition, fight infectious disease, strengthen primary health care services, and advance 

transparent and accountable government institutions. A more prosperous, stable, and democratic 

Haiti is mutually beneficial, as it reduces illegal migration to the United States, lowers the 

humanitarian costs of recurring disasters and crises, reduces transnational crime, and improves a 

business climate that provides economic opportunities to American businesses. One example of 

steady progress being made in Haiti is in the agriculture sector, where we have introduced 

improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation, and other technologies to more than 118,000 farmers. In 

the North, the continued development of the Caracol industrial park in which the U.S. 

Government has partnered with the !DB and the Government of Haiti, now employs more than 

13,000 people, most of whom were unemployed prior to the park's opening. 

Ensuring Continued Progress: Mexico, Colombia, and Peru 

In Mexico, we partner with the government to strengthen national institutions, build rule of law 

capacity, and promote the protection of human tights. Our efforts include working with at-risk 

youth to prevent crime, improving access to justice and victims' services, strengthening civil 

society, and working with communities to make them more effective in combating crime and 

violence. These programs build upon progress made in the past several years, such as increased 

use of alternative dispute resolution from 15 to 30 percent in the 12 states where USAID works; 

the resolution of 1,387 cases resolved in 100 days, compared to a baseline of 319 days; and 

significantly reduced rates of recidivism among youth in conflict with the law. We look forward 

to continuing these efforts in collaboration with President-elect Lopez Obrador. 

Tn Colombia, we are working to reduce the flow of illicit drugs and support Colombia's efforts to 

implement a sustainable and inclusive peace. USAlD assistance helps to reduce the power and 

influence of illegal armed groups, build a culture of legality, expand state presence in former 

conflict areas, and improve the conditions necessary for licit rural economic growth, which is an 

important counterpart to U.S. eradication and interdiction programs. Our programs expand 

access to justice and human rights, strengthen the ability oflocal governments to provide basic 

public services, foster reconciliation among those affected by the conflict, build civil society 

capacity, and increase rural economic development. We have had an impact. For example, over 

the past 5 years (2012-2017), USAID's work in the four of the top coca producing regions of the 

country, has supported over 35,000 families and over 520 organizations, while leveraging over 

$265 million in public and private resources. We look forward to working with President-elect 

Duque on these efforts. 

Tn Peru, US AID assistance helps to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States by 

supporting the Peruvian government's efforts to combat the illicit drug trade through alternative 

development programs that support licit, economically viable alternatives to growing coca, 

complement security assistance, and help to sustain reductions in coca cultivation in targeted 

areas. We also work with communities affected by illegal gold mining- which is more lucrative 

3 
17


30707b-4.eps

than coca production and attracts child labor, human trafficking, violence, and land grabs -by 

helping them to address social conflicts and rehabilitate affected land. Our work in Peru has seen 

results. For example, in FY 2017 alone, USAID helped more than 25,000 families transition to 

licit livelihoods on more than 49,000 hectares of crops, including cacao and coffee. 

Cross-Cutting Challenges: Corruption and Transnational Criminal Organizations 

Throughout the region, US AID is working to address the long-term challenges of corruption and 

the influence of transnational criminal organizations. Corruption undermines trust in 

government, makes it difficult for businesses to operate, threatens the rule of law, and drives 

people to the United States in search of a better life. Criminal organizations pose a threat to 

security as they use violence and intimidation to further their illegal activities. 

USAID carries out anti-corruption projects in almost all of the countries in which we work in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Our projects include work with local and national 

governments, civil society organizations, independent media, and faith-based organizations to 

further accountability, enhance transparency, strengthen revenue generation, and improve 

juvenile justice systems. We seek to help governments become more open, accountable, and 

responsive to their people's needs, build citizens' trust in local and national government 

institutions, and teach citizens their rights and responsibilities in democratic societies. 

We also work to disrupt the influence and activities of transnational criminal organizations. In 

drug-producing areas of Colombia and Peru, we work with the governments to provide farmers 

with lucrative alternatives to growing coca and connecting them with national and international 

markets. Throughout the region, and particularly under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 

and Central America Regional Security Initiative, we work with youth at risk, especially those at 

risk of joining gangs and other transnational criminal organizations. Combined with our good 

governance work that establishes trust in government, these efforts help to bring people into the 

licit economy and give them a future free of crime, violence, and other illegal activity. 

Supporting Greater Access and Inclusion: Energy and Commerce 

Throughout the region, USAID has helped to ensure that more people have access to energy, 

which is crucial to the development of prosperous, secure societies. Our work in Central America 

has promoted stronger integration of the regional electric power grid, modernization of 

electricity supply, and improved energy quality to address an underreported drag on productivity 

and job creation. Projects with governments in Central America and the Caribbean have 

supported the enabling environment for development of a range of modem energy systems. 

These efforts are intended to broaden access, improve the quality, and lower the price of 

electricity to improve the business climate in the region. This supports more job creation, making 

it less appealing for local citizens to migrate out of the region to earn a livelihood. 

The United States' commercial ties with Latin America and the Caribbean support jobs and 

benefit businesses both at home and in the region. However, inefficiencies such as high cost and 

time to trade goods across borders undermine regional competitiveness, increase costs for U.S. 

and local businesses, and hinder countries' ability to compete in the global market and create 

jobs. U.S. assistance supports customs and trade facilitation through improved infrastructure, 

training for trade-related government agencies and private sector stakeholders, and enhancing 

4 
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30707b-5.eps

information technology connectivity of border control agencies. U.S. assistance improved cargo 

management, contributing to a reduction in the average time to export goods from Guatemala by 

40 percent and reduced transport and logistics costs by 30 percent from early 2016 to 2017. 

Remaining the Partner of Choice: Addressing Competing Foreign Assistance in the Region 

While USAID does not preclude collaboration with like-minded partners where it is in 

America's national interest, our main goal remains to improve security, prosperity, and good 

governance in the hemisphere that we share. Where other countries' assistance models may 

further dependence or unsustainable debt, the United States' model is one of partnership with the 

countries in which we work. Our development assistance promotes a country's own journey, 

consistent with U.S.-supported universal values and interests, bolstering our partners' selfreliance and prosperity. 

Partnerships 

To maximize taxpayer investments, guard against duplication, and ensure greater sustainability, 

USATD ensures that host-countries are invested in their own development. We coordinate and 

leverage the work of other donors, the private sector, faith-based organizations, universities, 

including many U.S. land grant institutions, and non-governmental organizations. We are forging 

agreements with Mexico, Chile, Brazil, and Colombia to tackle shared challenges in the region. 

We are also focused on private sector engagement, including with companies based in the United 

States, to catalyze economic growth, development, and trade in the region. In FY 2016, 57 U.S.-

based private sector organizations were engaged in active partnerships in the region, including 

companies like Chevron, Starbucks, Johnson & Johnson, and CISCO. 

Oversight and Data-Driven Decision Making 

US AID uses a range of tools, such as monitoring, surveys, evaluations, and assessments, to 

ensure that our programs are a smart and impactful use of taxpayer funds. We monitor the effects 

of our programs to help us capture changes at the community or other sub-national levels. We 

compare these indicators to national or regional averages to help us understand the larger context 

in which we are working. On average, US AID conducts approximately 20 performance and 

impact evaluations in Latin America and the Caribbean each year. 

Conclusion 

USA !D's work in Latin America and the Caribbean prioritizes the challenges that most directly 

affect the United States. We are addressing situations in Venezuela and Nicaragua while 

confronting the long-term challenges of corruption and the influence of transnational criminal 

organizations. We will continue to work on the prosperity, security, and good governance 

programs that encourage people to build better societies for their families and home 

communities. We thank this Committee for its interest in and support for our work, and look 

forward to collaborating with you to address the challenges and opportunities in the region. 

5 
19

Chairman ROYCE. If I could begin with this question, we have got 

26 U.S. diplomats and their family members who have suffered 

symptoms similar to brain injury or concussion following sonic attacks in Cuba. We have another three officials now in China who 

have suffered similar symptoms. In response to the attacks, the 

State Department ordered the departure of nonessential personnel 

and their families in Havana. Sixty percent of the U.S. mission diplomats in Cuba have been withdrawn. Other than the Canadian 

mission in Havana where the Canadians report 10 of their diplomats were targeted, have any other Embassies been affected, to 

your knowledge? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman. This 

is something which is very worrisome to us, but we are not aware 

of any other Embassies at this point. 

Chairman ROYCE. What is the health condition of the U.S. diplomats and the family members affected by these unexplained attacks at this point? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I think you covered it very well in 

your opening remarks. The health effects differ from person to person. Some are more serious on some individuals. On some individuals, they are less serious. But the bottom line is the impact of 

these attacks on folks is serious, which is why they were withdrawn, and we have gone down to a skeleton crew at the Embassy 

there. 

Chairman ROYCE. And the last question I would ask you on this 

is how close is the administration to understanding and identifying 

the source and cause of these attacks? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, we have taken this, as I mentioned, 

very seriously, both in the Cuba context and in the China context, 

which is, frankly, still very much evolving. Bottom line answer is, 

we don’t know who is responsible, and we don’t know what is responsible for this. We have various investigations ongoing. The FBI 

is involved. The CDC is involved in looking at this. We have employees who are being looked at by outside medical care. But we 

are still unsure exactly what it is these people have been afflicted 

with. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let me go to a question about the crisis in 

Venezuela, which is worsening. While President Maduro further cemented his power with sham elections this past May, we have seen 

the situation on the streets there and especially the widespread 

food and medicine shortages that continue to displace Venezuelans 

that create a regional crisis, refugee crisis, as well as a humanitarian crisis, obviously. And meanwhile, despite sitting on the 

world’s largest oil reserves. Venezuelan oil production has fallen by 

half in the last few years. Venezuela, in the meantime, has been 

sending several hundred thousand barrels of oil every day to China 

as repayment on the tens of billions of dollars it has borrowed, and 

more recently, China’s development bank announced a new quarter 

billion dollar investment to shore up Venezuela’s struggling oil production. 

Is the administration concerned about China’s economic stranglehold on Venezuela? And is China using Venezuela’s as a foothold 

to gain influence in the rest of the region? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

20

It is not clear that China is necessarily using Venezuela as a 

foothold. Our information indicates that the Venezuelan economy 

still continues to crater, if you will excuse my using that term. Oil 

production continues to go down. The national oil company, 

PDVSA, has been plagued by mismanagement, by political hacks 

replacing people who knew what they were doing, and the company 

continues to deteriorate, and thus, robbing the Venezuelan people 

and the Venezuelan Government of what should be a very valuable 

source of income for them. 

We are, obviously, watching very carefully what China does 

throughout the hemisphere. You know, and we monitor that very 

carefully. We are concerned about the role they play. We believe we 

are a much better partner for all our friends in the hemisphere. We 

share values. We share goals. And it is not clear to us that the Chinese government or entities operating overseas share the same 

goals as our friends in the hemisphere. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, let me ask a question of Ms. Lynch in 

terms of the greatest health concerns that are caused by the crisis 

in Venezuela and by the refugee crisis, and what is being done, for 

example, to ensure vaccinations and other medicines are made 

available, because there is widespread shortage throughout Venezuela right now on the vaccinations. 

Ms. LYNCH. Right. Thank you for the question. Yes, we are also 

deeply disturbed by all the images and the news reports coming out 

of Venezuela. As such, we have been able to identify, as the Ambassador said, several millions of dollars of assistance that is going 

to the almost 2 million Venezuelans that have fled that country in 

search of very basic needs like food, medicine, and healthcare. And 

Colombia, obviously, is taking the brunt of the movement of people. 

I myself was up on the border not too long ago in Cucuta and witnessed firsthand the Venezuelans crossing the Simon Bolivar 

Bridge, and it is very disturbing. The bulk of our assistance to the 

Colombians is in those areas, food, medicine, and healthcare, but 

also to help them manage the crossing of the great number of people. 

We are also assisting Brazil in the region. And in addition, we 

were able to get an assessment team, USAID assessment team, 

into Venezuela in order to get the contacts on the ground and do 

a full assessment, and this was a team that spent nearly 2 weeks 

there, did not just stay in Caracas, but they went throughout the 

country and they visited schools, they visited clinics, they talked to 

NGOs, they talked to the private sector, church they talked to as 

well as organizations, civil society organizations that could provide 

humanitarian assistance at scale. 

One issue that we found is that they lack capacity. So what 

USAID is doing to respond right now is training these organizations to be able to provide humanitarian assistance at scale. So to 

deal with the logistics involved in that kind of effort and to identify 

the truly at-risk people. So with that, we will be able to address 

the concerns that you mentioned. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nothing can quite make 

people understand the horrors that are occurring in our own counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:49 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\071118\30707 SHIRL
21

try as a consequence of the President’s family separation policy 

than hearing the individual stories of Central American children. 

So I would like to briefly talk about Jose, Olivia, and their sons, 

Mateo and Andre, who came to the U.S. from El Salvador seeking 

refuge from gang violence and extortion. A close friend was killed 

by the same gang threatening Jose and Olivia when he was unable 

to pay them. So fearing for their lives and the lives of their children, Jose and Olivia joined a caravan of asylum seekers and traveled for a month through Mexico to reach the border. 

Upon arrival, they presented their papers and the children’s 

birth certificates, proving their familial relationship to avoid 

agents’ suspicion that Jose was a smuggler paired with children 

that were not his. Regardless, U.S. authorities separated the family 

and sent Mateo, only 1 year old at the time, to a facility 1,500 

miles away. 

Olivia and Andre awaited news of Mateo’s status from a migrant 

shelter in Mexico. When Olivia called the facility where Mateo was 

being held, she was told he is doing fine with no further information on his well-being, and certainly, they wouldn’t allow her to 

speak with her son. She was reunited with Mateo finally after 85 

days. According to her testimony, she said that after reuniting with 

her toddler, ‘‘He continued to cry when we got home and he would 

hold to know my leg and would not let me go. When I took off his 

clothes he was full of dirt and lice. It seemed like they had not 

bathed him in the 85 days he was away from us.’’ And that is a 

quote. Obviously, this is child abuse. It is unconscionable and 

should not have happened. 

So I recently introduced the Central America Family Protection 

and Reunification Act with Representatives Torres and Espaillat, 

who are both members of this committee. And this would require 

the State Department, through our Embassies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, to play a much more active role in supporting Central American governments and parents on family reunification. 

Ambassador Merten, let me ask you: Can you please tell us what 

our Embassies in these countries are doing to support family reunification, if anything? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question, Representative 

Engel. What we are doing in Central America, we have a Central 

America strategy which seeks to get at the root causes of migration, to hopefully give people less of a reason to want to leave their 

country in the first place. And our efforts have been really focused 

on implementing that strategy, particularly in the Northern Triangle. 

We are looking at using tools to eliminate corruption that allow 

a climate of impunity for those who seek to abuse people. We are 

supporting law enforcement activities through our partners in the 

region. We are working to help them improve their judicial systems 

so that criminals can be put away in a clear and transparent way 

according to local laws. 

We are working to help these countries grow their economies, 

and we believe that addressing these issues will really obviate the 

need for these kind of—that drive people to want to leave their 

countries and force them into situations like you just described. 

22

Mr. ENGEL. But are Embassies specifically—are Embassies helping to reunite families? Are Embassies playing any role in that in 

the reunification? 

Ambassador MERTEN. At the risk of misleading you, I would 

rather take that question back and get back with an answer to you. 

I don’t want to give you an answer which is incorrect. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, because that is what our bill, our legislation does. It involves the Embassies, which makes sense to me, because anything we can do to help expedite this would be good. 

Ms. Lynch, our legislation also requires the State Department 

strategy to address pervasive gender-based violence in the Northern Triangle. Can you please describe the impact of gender-based 

violence, and specifically, domestic violence on women in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras? 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you for the question. Yes, all of our activities 

in the Northern Triangle are based at focusing on the root causes 

of illegal migration. And certainly, we work on the security front, 

as well as governance and prosperity. So this would fall into that 

security front and governance as well, whereby we just find the 

gender-based violence. The rates that you see in the Northern Triangle are just horrific. So what we do is we incorporate women as 

well as other marginalized communities that suffer as well at higher rates than others—violence. We incorporate them into all of our 

programming, and that means on the governance front, making 

sure there is legislation that addresses these issues; on the citizens 

front, making sure that there is citizen awareness and that there 

is the capacity of certain civil society organizations to address those 

issues. And in addition, prosperity, economic opportunity, is really 

what gives these women power and control over their lives, so specifically with all of our programming that involves increased jobs 

and economic growth, we involve women and marginalized communities to the fullest extent. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Let me just say that given the pervasiveness of domestic violence in the Northern Triangle and the 

low rates of prosecution for these horrific crimes, it is really horrifying that Attorney General Sessions says he will no longer allow 

these crimes to be grounds for asylum. I think that is just a very 

bad thing. 

And finally, let me piggyback on—the chairman has talked a lot 

about Cuba and our Embassy officials being targeted. One of the 

things that I have called for is to have the CDC—to involve the 

CDC, and why has the administration, referring to the health—

well, let me just say this, why has the CDC not yet been deployed 

to Cuba? It certainly seems to me that we should, if we are really 

going to get to the bottom of it, and I just don’t understand why 

that hasn’t happened. Does anyone have any insight into that for 

me? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks very much, yes. One of the things 

that we have done in the past month or so is Secretary Pompeo has 

asked that Deputy Secretary Sullivan chair a task force to look at 

these incidents, both in China and the attacks in Cuba, and this 

task force is chaired by the Deputy Secretary; he participates in it; 

I participate in it representing the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs. 

23

We also have, once a week, a meeting of the task force with the 

interagency community, and in that community, CDC is present, 

and they are an active member of that community, of the interagency community that participates in this task force. I don’t know 

if they have plans to travel yet, but I think their involvement in 

this is relatively recent, but I think there is a possibility that they 

could become more involved. I am not—it wouldn’t be appropriate 

for me to really explain what their plans are to do, but they are 

participating now in this interagency task force. 

So as I said, we remain very concerned about this, and I think 

we are looking for any tools we can find to really get to the bottom 

of what is causing this. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, and Mr. Engel and I are going to be meeting with Deputy Secretary Sullivan this afternoon at 4 o’clock, so 

we will raise that issue, Ambassador, with him as well at that 

time. 

We will go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce. Thank 

you, Ranking Member Engel, for, once again, holding a hearing on 

a very timely and important topic. Since widespread protests began 

on April 18 in Nicaragua, we have seen over 300 people killed 

under the direction of Daniel Ortega and his henchmen, and Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro continues to rule with impunity ignoring 

the pleas of the Venezuelan people for new leadership. In my native homeland of Cuba, Raul Castro continues to call the shots as 

head of the Communist Party, all the while hiding behind the veil 

of the so-called transition of power. Under Diaz-Canel, nada has 

changed for the people of Cuba. Activists are still being held for 

days at a time. Las Damas de Blanco are still being beaten and arrested, and the regime continues to rule with an iron fist. 

More worrisome, Mr. Chairman, is that cooperation between 

these rogue regimes has actually increased. Just last week, there 

were reports indicating that Maduro has sent a shipment of weapons to Ortega to help him further suppress and silence the Nicaraguan people. Instead of using the country’s resources to alleviate 

the Venezuelan people suffering, suffering he caused for his failed 

policies, he sends weapons to his cronies making him complicit in 

the deaths of so many in Nicaragua. 

But this U.S. administration has shown a willingness to lead and 

hold those abusers accountable in stark contrast to the previous administration, and I thank our witnesses here for explaining all that 

has happened. We have seen a reversal of the disastrous Cuba policy. We have seen a more active use of sanctions, particularly the 

global Magnitsky sanctions in Nicaragua and targeted sanctions 

against the Maduro regime in Venezuela. 

On two occasions, I have read letters urging sanctions on several 

Nicaraguan regime officials for their roles in the human rights 

abuses being perpetrated against the people of Nicaragua. The administration has included most of these individuals on the global 

Magnitsky list, but I intend on sending another letter shortly with 

more names. And the administration has begun to provide assistance to Venezuelans who have fled to neighboring countries and 

has signaled that it will make freedom and democracy in the region 

24

a priority, but more must be done. And you had explained, Ms. 

Lynch, about what the administration, and specifically, USAID, 

has been doing to support the Venezuelan refugees who are in Colombia and Brazil. 

I wanted to ask you about Ecuador, what help is being given to 

the Venezuelans there that Vice-President Pence was just there. So 

what more can be done? And secondly, I worry about China’s growing presence and influence in the entire region using its resources 

to bully nations to further isolate our strong ally, Taiwan, and 

what is the administration’s strategy then to counter Chinese aggression to help Taiwan strengthen its relationship with its partners in the region. Thanks again, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you, ma’am. Yes, some small scale assistance 

was requested from Ecuador from the U.S. interagency, and that 

is being provided. And we stand ready to assist other nations if 

they are interested in additional assistance. We know this is a horrific regional problem that may impact other nations in the region, 

other strong partners of ours. 

Regarding our perspective on the development side on China, for 

example, what from AID’s vantage point, we believe that our work 

in building strong institutions in the region, as well as promoting 

strong economic investments, particularly from the U.S., are good 

antidotes to the influence of nations that have a different development model than we do. 

You know, some of these other donors, as I mentioned in my 

opening are more—their development model is one more of dependence rather than one of partnership. Ours is of partnership where 

we look to work with partners who are self-reliant eventually. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. LYNCH. And we look forward to working with you in that 

area. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Lynch. Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Just to talk briefly about the influence of 

China in the hemisphere again, yes, it is something, as I mentioned 

earlier, that we are concerned about and watching very carefully. 

We regularly talk to our partners in the region, I have done so myself, to explain what it really means to sign up with—to some of 

the blandishments of the PRC in terms of loans and other things. 

These are things that we have seen in the recent past that don’t 

necessarily help these countries out in the long term. They may be 

quick political fixes, but I think we are trying to explain, in very 

clear terms, that it makes more sense for long-term development 

of all our partners in the region to focus on rules-based and normal 

economic development. 

Our assistance programs in the region seek to support rule of 

law and governance, and to make these countries better places to 

live, better places to do business, and thus, ultimately reduce migration. But it is an issue that we continue to work very diligently 

on and are paying close attention to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ileana. We go to Brad Sherman of 

California. 

25

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have a knowledgeable witness 

here, but he is the, as I understand it, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. We used to have under secretaries and assistant 

secretaries come here. They may not have been more knowledgeable, but they were higher ranking in the State Department. The 

administration took over a year to appoint an Assistant Secretary 

for the Western Hemisphere, and a Republican Senate still hasn’t 

acted to confirm. The administration is hollowing out the State Department, and I think we as a practice should be compelling the 

testimony of those at the National Security Adviser’s Office and 

Council if you are going to hollow out the State Department that 

if we are going to oversee foreign policy, we have to have those witnesses. 

I had a chance to visit the kids who are separated by the United 

States at the border. I want to commend the State Department for 

its 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report, which identified and condemned foreign governments for separating children from their 

families, and relate the story of one particular family. Jose and his 

son, Brian, arrived in California from Honduras, my State, in May. 

Brian’s mother had been raped and brutally murdered. She was 7 

months pregnant at the time. Jose and Brian thought that they 

might face a similar outcome. 

Jose was jailed for 20 days and asked to sign papers he couldn’t 

understand because they were in English and deported back to 

Honduras. This after Brian, the son, had been separated from his 

father. There are news reports that say that this whole process at 

least began—it seems now they are walking it back—as an effort 

to deter immigration from Central America. Has there been any effort at the State Department to try to tell people in Central America, ‘‘Don’t come to the United States, we will treat you harshly, 

separate families, deport you,’’ et cetera? Ambassador? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. What we do tell 

people is to not make a journey that is dangerous or illegal. We always encouraged legal orderly migration of people, legal and orderly travel of people, so that is what we have been focusing on. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I want to move on to one other issue, Ecuador. Julian Assange is in their Embassy in London. He is wanted 

by law enforcement authorities in both Britain and Sweden. One 

thing we know about Julian Assange is that he did collude with 

Russia to use cyber files stolen from the Democratic National Committee to affect the U.S. election. And in 1972, when files were stolen from the Democratic National Committee, Members of Congress 

from both parties condemned that action. We haven’t put any pressure on Ecuador to turn out Mr. Assange, and I understood that 

to be because we had such respect for Ecuador’s sovereignty. And 

then I find out in The New York Times that we threatened Ecuador with punishing trade measures and a withdrawal of critical 

military aid if they wouldn’t withdraw their support for a World 

Health Organization resolution encouraging breastfeeding. 

Ambassador, can you, on the record, indicate that you know that 

these reports in The New York Times were false, and that we did 

not threaten Ecuador on this issue? 

Ambassador MERTEN. My understanding from our Ambassador 

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ern Hemisphere Affairs that work on this issue, on a regular basis, 

is that we did not threaten anybody, that the U.S. supports 

breastfeeding. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But we don’t support efforts at breastfeeding beyond what the companies that make billions of dollars on the formula industry by discouraging breastfeeding want us to do. We 

support only mild resolutions, and we force the World Health Organization to back down and adopt a milder resolution. But you are 

certain now that Ecuador can introduce the stronger resolution, 

and there will be no diminution of trade or aid. Can Ecuador count 

on you for that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I can tell you what has happened thus far 

in my understanding——

Mr. SHERMAN. What is our policy? Is it our policy to threaten Ecuador on this issue or to allow them to go forward? 

Ambassador MERTEN. My understanding is that there has been 

no threatening, and I do not believe that we——

Mr. SHERMAN. So they are free to go forward, you can guarantee 

it? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am not here to guarantee that going forward. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So maybe they will be threatened, maybe they 

won’t, they either have to——

Ambassador MERTEN. They are not going to be threatened, sir, 

but I will say that this is——

Mr. SHERMAN. They are not going to be threatened? 

Ambassador MERTEN. This is a policy that we don’t actually 

own——

Mr. SHERMAN. So The New York Times reports are false? 

Ambassador MERTEN. As I understand from our Ambassador and 

from the folks that work on this in our bureau, that nobody was 

threatened. We have not threatened to pull trade sanctions or anything else on Ecuador. That is my understanding, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, a lot of infants are going to get worse nutrition as a result of the successful efforts by the United States at the 

World Health Organization to water down this resolution, and I 

yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, and thank you for your testimony to our 

two witnesses. On April 27, I chaired a hearing on serious and 

credible allegations of collusion between CICIG and the Russian 

Government in the persecution, mistreatment, and incarceration of 

a Russian family, the Bitkovs, who fled Russia after Putin’s cronies 

threatened their lives, took away their business, and, of course, the 

young daughter was raped, Anastasia, who obviously is still dealing with the aftermath of that. 

Our prime witness was Bill Browder, the main man, whose tenacity, courage, and credibility led to at least an accountability of 

what happened to Sergei Magnitsky. It is because of Bill Browder 

that we have the Magnitsky Act. It is because of Bill Browder that 

we have the Global Magnitsky Act, so when he speaks, everybody 

should listen and should listen very carefully, and I share his concerns about the Bitkovs. 

27

Let me just say to my colleagues: In 2013, the Bitkovs fled and 

finally got to Guatemala under an assumed name. They used documents that were not true, but again, for having documents that 

weren’t true—and they are true refugees. The Palermo Protocol 

says you don’t prosecute when somebody is fleeing tyranny and has 

a well-founded fear of persecution. Igor got 19 years in prison. Irina 

got 14 years. And Anastasia, 14. Igor spent 3 years in pretrial detention, jail, in a very, very unseemly pattern that CICIG is a part 

of. 

Now my question to our distinguished colleagues today is, one, 

have you investigated, and has there ever been, is there now any 

collusion whatsoever between VTB, Gazprombank, Sberbank, or 

any other person associated with the Russian Government and 

CICIG, including Ivan Velasquez on any matter relating to the 

prosecution and incarceration of the Bitkovs? 

Second, can you tell us what kind of information do you have? 

Is there any accountability? I have asked the Secretary General of 

the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, why aren’t you looking into 

this? He says they have no authority to do so. He told me that just 

a few weeks ago when I met with him. 

I am asking today, and I will do it by way of letter, that the Inspector General investigate the potential of collusion. My hope is 

that in an answer to my question, you will say that you have thoroughly investigated this, and you either found it or you didn’t, or 

to some degree, there is some collusion. Those are my opening 

questions, and I do have some further ones, but if you can answer 

that. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. This is an issue 

that we follow closely. Our Embassy and the Department have 

looked into these allegations of collusion. Thus far, have found no 

evidence that that has occurred. 

Mr. SMITH. Could you give us details of what that investigation 

included? I mean, was it done just asking Mr. Velasquez and a few 

others, ‘‘Hey, is there collusion?’’ Or did you really dig into documents and look into this? I call your attention to this, and we will 

give you a copy, an excellent piece that was put together by Mr. 

Bill Browder—this just reeks of collusion, so I would like to know 

exactly what that investigation entailed. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. I look forward to receiving that document, and I think if you allow us to get back to you with exactly 

what has been done, I think that would be a more effective way 

of answering your question. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there any mechanism for holding CICIG to account? I mean, there is a hold on their $6 million now that has finally gotten their attention. Two days before I had my hearing, the 

constitutional court found in their favor. Again, we are talking 

about 19 years, 14 years, 14 years. People don’t get that many 

years for murder in Guatemala, and CICIG then appealed that ruling and now there is going to be another prosecution of, at least 

Igor, which is absurd. 

I mean, if I was doing that with my family, and I would say the 

same to you: Wouldn’t you use every means possible to get out of 

a country that is going after you, hurting your daughter, putting 

you into prison and maybe even killing you? We have learned that 

28

from Sergei Magnitsky, I thought, and many others. We called our 

hearing the Long Arm of the Russians. Let me ask you again, is 

there any kind of connection between CICIG and the Russians? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Again, thus far in our investigations we 

have found no collusion between them. 

Mr. SMITH. And no contact, no cooperation? 

Ambassador MERTEN. The information I have been given we 

have not received that—we have not seen that. So that is——

Mr. SMITH. Maybe the IG will be able to ferret out that information. Let me ask you about the Guatemalans who are held in pretrial. There is a dual national from Jersey City, Anthony Segura, 

3 years in pretrial detention. I know, and I have been in Congress 

38 years, Mr. Chairman, and I have been to places like Bolivia 

where they use prosecution as way of getting political retribution, 

and certainly, Evo Morales does it better than anybody else on 

earth. What is your view about these pretrial detentions that go on 

for years with CICIG’s full complicity in that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, pretrial detention is a problem in a 

number of countries throughout the hemisphere. It is something 

that we work at in our rule of law programs to get countries to establish mechanisms to reduce or eliminate pretrial detention. I 

think our work in that area is certainly ongoing. So obviously, it 

is not a situation we like. We are working in a number of countries 

to help address that. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, finally, because my time is running out, Mary Anastasia O’Grady from The Wall Street Journal 

in her piece, and I invite members to read it, ‘‘Guatemala, Russia 

and the Bitkovs, The family remains in jeopardy thanks to a U.S.-

funded rogue U.N. agency.’’ She points out immediately after the 

high court decision, CICIG apologists launched a full scale press on 

Capitol Hill to cover up the U.N. agencies’ many transgressions. 

How do you respond to that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am not aware of any such cover-up. If 

you would like to ask, we can get you more details on what we 

know on that. I am not aware of that, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. So there is no cover-up? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am not aware of a cover-up, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We share the concerns of Mr. 

Smith. This committee will continue to work with the Senate, the 

State Department, the U.S., U.N. on reforms that will preserve the 

essential functions of CICIG while responding to legitimate criticisms of overreach. All right. We go now to Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this 

full committee hearing on the Western Hemisphere, and I want to 

thank our panel that is here today. Thank you very much. 

I have this issue over the last few years that I have been on the 

Western Hemisphere Subcommittee that we just don’t focus enough 

on the Western Hemisphere and the Caribbean. I think that while 

we sleep, there are people out there plotting, and basically I am 

talking about China, I am talking about Russia, I am talking even 

about Iran, who is now started with a couple schools now they have 

over 100 schools throughout the area. And the signs are there. I 

29

mean, even in Venezuela, you have 30,000 Cubans basically running the show there, and Cuba, they started with the national assembly, which basically destroy all sorts of democracy or anything 

that was there. And then you have, in Venezuela, you have the 

constituent assembly, which is basically the same thing destroying 

any signs of democracy. And then you go to Nicaragua, you have 

the Russians selling them $80 million worth of tanks, and they are 

asking the people of Nicaragua to contribute more to the Social Security. I mean, the signs are there. And I don’t know what we do 

is basically insult some of these people in Central America, which 

makes your job a lot harder when you want to talk about democracy and talk about investment. I mean, where do we go from here? 

We got a new President in Mexico. I don’t know how we deal with 

the new President of Mexico after all the insults that we have laid 

on the Mexican people. And before we know it, all these people are 

going to be in our backyard, all these countries that are plotting 

as we sleep. 

So, I am not all that bullish on this area. I see more and more 

democracies going down in the future. You have Venezuela, and 

you have Nicaragua. You have to a certain degree Ecuador, some 

of these other areas. 

So where do you see democracy in the area? Can you tell me 

about that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

I think we see the hemisphere largely united behind, as I said 

in my opening remarks, the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

We have been working the OAS. I think we have seen a pretty significant amount of support in the OAS to voice their opposition to 

undemocratic steps that are taken in countries like you have mentioned. 

I think that we continue to do work to promote civil society, to 

engage with civil society, and to enable opposition parties to have 

a voice. We have supported those people in Nicaragua who are calling for early elections. We have acknowledged that. So I think we 

are still working very diligently on this. 

But these are countries that, as several members have already 

noted, are not necessarily going to be—they are not squeamish 

about using repression as a way to stay in power. 

Mr. SIRES. I look at Nicaragua. We have a bill, Ileana RosLehtinen and I, the NICA bill. Basically, it doesn’t allow them to 

take loans from international finance institutions. 

Why should we allow them to have loans from financial institu- tions when they go and spend $80 billion on Russian tanks to oppress their people? And yet some people here don’t like to support 

something like that. 

I think we have to bring some sort of pressure on these governments to realize you just can’t run over people and just expect us, 

the United States, to not do anything, especially when it is our 

Western Hemisphere and our Caribbean. We really have to focus 

more on those areas. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, as you know, we have applied individual sanctions on members of the regime in Venezuela. We have 

applied the Global Magnitsky Act to three people in Nicaragua. We 

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30

cials or officials who were responsible for these types of things. I 

think, you know, there is a possibility we could look at more of 

those kinds of tools as well. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just note from the some of the comments we have had 

so far that this condemnation of our President for the policies that 

we now have in terms of people who are coming to our country illegally and separation of families, let us just note that that policy 

was in place and put in place during the Obama administration. 

And I consider that singling out our President today is very political, because I didn’t hear any of the complaints coming from that 

side of the aisle during the Obama administration when the policies were exactly the same. 

With that said, I have somewhat of a disagreement over the idea 

of using the word ‘‘migration.’’ Maybe you could tell me, what is the 

population of Latin America? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t know off the top of my head, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you know what the population of Latin 

America is? 

Ms. LYNCH. We can get that for the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, I think these are fundamentals 

that people need to know when they are talking about migration. 

We are not talking about 10 million people. We are not talking 

about 50 million people. We are talking about hundreds of millions 

of people, are we not? 

And when you have societies like we see in Latin America—and 

elsewhere in the world, I might add, but now we are focused on 

Latin America—where you have millions and millions of people living in countries that are somewhat chaotic and very clearly repressive—and let me identify myself with the remarks of Ileana RosLehtinen and her concerns about Nicaragua and Venezuela, but 

those same types of repression can be found in other countries, 

Latin America as well. 

We do not have a policy—or do you believe that we should have 

a policy in labeling those people migrants, thus giving them some 

other definition rather than illegal entries or illegal immigrants 

into our country? You think that that should be open to hundreds 

of millions of people when they end up suffering under their own 

government? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, sir, our policy with Central America 

is to address the root causes that drive people out of——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand that. That is not my question. 

Because I understand—that is a good point. I voted for NAFTA for 

that reason, because I felt making sure Mexico had a very good 

economy would take the pressure off of people coming here illegally. 

Okay, let me ask you this: How many people are permitted to legally immigrate from those countries into the United States every 

year? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, I don’t have those figures. That is a 

DHS, Department of Homeland Security, function. 

31

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So already we have, however—you can 

correct me if I am wrong. I am assuming we are talking about millions of people over a 10-year period coming from that area legally 

into our country. Over a 10-year period, we permit more legal immigration into our country than all the rest of the countries of the 

world combined. 

But what I am worried about, after hearing your testimony today 

and the use of the word ‘‘migration,’’ is that that in some way gives 

credence that the United States has to accept millions of more people into our country over and above the million that we allow in 

already legally, which, as I say, is more than the rest of the world 

combined. 

Now, is there a limit that you think that we should have on people who are—you call it migration. Is there a limit on migration 

into our country? 

Ambassador MERTEN. My understanding—again, this is not an 

area of expertise for me; this is really a Department of Homeland 

Security issue—is that there are rules established for this that the 

administration has established. There are rules for people, for example, who can apply for asylum——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me just say I disagree with 

you totally. I think members of our State Department should be 

concerned about massive flows of people coming into our country illegally. 

And I think the use of the word ‘‘migrant’’ in some way adds 

some kind of problem with us for not accepting migrants, as compared to people who have come here illegally, when we have a very 

robust legal immigration system. Our legal immigration, as I say, 

it is the best in the whole world. No one comes close to us on letting—and now we are supposed to feel guilty about not permitting 

a more massive flow? Which basically would change the nature of 

our society, as it has. 

And let me just note, Daniel Ortega and these folks and the 

Nicaragua—when they were removed from power, there was a relatively free system established in those countries. And when they 

left, came back into power, Mr. Ortega, all of a sudden people 

began being murdered. And that is something—I am very proud 

that the Reagan administration did take the moves to make sure 

that Mr. Ortega and his communist dictatorship was removed and 

replaced by a democracy. 

With that said, thank you very much for your service. 

And I do not believe that the President—again, the criticism that 

the President is hollowing out the State Department is ridiculous. 

The fact is that if he was hollowing it out we would be complaining 

that he is putting his own people in. Well, when you have people 

with the expertise, like yourselves, who are still in position that 

the President hasn’t replaced yet, that is not something people with 

an open mind should complain about. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We will go to Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Once again, thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member, for holding this hearing. 

32

I wanted to talk about the situation in Central America and specifically would like to focus on El Salvador. 

I was listening to your responses, Mr. Ambassador, about what 

we are doing to address the root causes, and it seemed as though 

your focus was a little bit on law enforcement. And we have spent 

a lot of time trying to address violence and crime-related issues 

with a strictly law enforcement strategy in the United States, and 

it hasn’t fared very well, so I wanted to know what you have done 

beyond law enforcement. 

And I focus on El Salvador because there is a lot of discussion 

about MS-13, Mara Salvatrucha, which is a gang that started in 

my city, Los Angeles, and we exported this problem to El Salvador. 

And so I want to know what responsibility we are taking for our 

contribution to the problem in El Salvador. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. And I think an 

element of this here should be fielded by my colleague from 

USAID. 

Our Central America strategy, yes, it has a component of law enforcement to it, but it is also designed to address the root causes 

of why people are leaving these countries and—or why they seek 

to leave. 

And this involves working with governments to improve the business climate, the investment climate, to create economic opportunity. My colleagues at USAID and at our economic sections in 

our Embassies are working to help these countries attract investment, attract and grow their economies so that people have less 

reason to have to leave. 

Ms. BASS. Right, which is a catch-22, because it is hard to do 

that with the gang violence. 

So I want to know, since we exported the problem to El Salvador, 

I was wondering if we also exported some of our best practices. We 

actually do have best practices, in the United States, of how to address gang violence. There are a lot of examples of gang violence 

being reduced in a number of communities. Unfortunately, we have 

not really taken a sustained investment in communities, which is 

why we still have the problem. 

So my question is: Are we exporting also some of our best practices in how to reduce gang violence? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, one of my colleagues from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement would be better equipped to answer that. We can take that back and get you 

an answer as to what specifically we are doing regarding gang violence in El Salvador, but——

Ms. BASS. Okay. That is great. I would appreciate that. 

Let me move on to another subject, because, like all of my colleagues—and I am sure all of us in Congress are deeply concerned 

about these children. And I am concerned that many of these children will never be reunited with their parents again. And so there 

is a number of examples of parents who are deported and then not 

being able to find their children since we did this in such a haphazard way. 

And my colleague over there, Mr. Rohrabacher, when the Obama 

administration had the problem of unaccompanied minors, which is 

33

different than taking children away at the border, there was a big 

outcry about that and what was happening with those children. 

But my question is, I have heard of numerous examples of, when 

the parents are deported, number one, if they are fortunate enough 

to find their children, then what we are saying is now you have to 

pay $1,500 to transport your child and a guardian to get your children back. 

And so I want to know if, in the budget of USAID, the State Department, somewhere—it seems as though if we take the children 

away, then our government should be responsible for reuniting 

those families. So I am introducing legislation that makes our government responsible. 

I am also very concerned that the children that are put in is 

time-limited. And so, if you languish in foster care for more than 

18 months, parental rights can be terminated, which is why I am 

worried that some of these children may never find their parents 

again. 

And so I want to know if, within the budget of USAID, you are 

considering setting money aside to help facilitate the reuniting of 

these children that we took away. 

Ms. LYNCH. Great. Thank you. 

All of our funding is dedicated to working in the countries of the 

Northern Triangle on this issue——

Ms. BASS. Right. So the question is, are we setting aside money 

so that we don’t charge the parents? We took the children away, 

and now we are charging them to get their own children back. 

You also mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, an information campaign 

to let people know not to come over here because we take their 

children. And I am wondering if that is a massive PR campaign on 

radio, on TV, social media, or are we just doing it one by one? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I think what I said or certainly what I 

meant to say was that our public diplomacy in all countries is to 

encourage people to travel to the United States, whether that is as 

a tourist, as a student, or as a legal migrant, to come and travel, 

to use legal methods to do so. We——

Ms. BASS. Are we telling them that we are going to take their 

children? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t believe we are telling them that. 

Ms. BASS. Yeah. 

Ambassador MERTEN. We are telling them that they need to 

avail themselves of legal routes of travel and legal routes—should 

they qualify as immigrants, that they should pursue legal ways to 

do that. 

Ms. BASS. This is going to go down in our history as a real moment of shame. 

Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, as I begin, I want to thank the statements of Congressman 

Albio Sires. His thoughtful observations are a fulfilment of the bipartisan promotion of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, 

which really reflects the bipartisanship—usually, not always, as we 

just saw—of this committee. So thank you very much for your service. 

34

Sadly, American diplomats, in 2016, were subject to unexplained 

sonic attacks in Cuba. The Cuban dictatorship continues to deny 

knowledge or involvement in the attacks, but it is in a totalitarian 

regime with heavy static surveillance. 

What is the status of the investigation? Have we been able to determine the cause and source of the attacks? When can Congress 

expect a thorough report on the cause of these attacks? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. As I mentioned 

earlier, this is something we find very troublesome at the State Department. 

The Deputy Secretary chairs a task force which is made up of 

various elements of the State Department but also has an interagency component as well. We have ongoing FBI investigations. 

FBI has traveled on a number of occasions to Cuba to investigate 

the sites where this has happened. Our Diplomatic Security agents 

in the State Department are investigating. We have other elements 

who are participating now in this task force, like CDC and others, 

who are really examining all the data that we have thus far been 

able to bring together. 

But, as of today, we still do not know what the cause of this is 

nor who is responsible. 

Mr. WILSON. And I would tell you, with the technology we have 

today, Ambassador, this should be determined. And so I hope you 

will make every effort to proceed. 

The next question: I am grateful to have been co-chair of the 

Partners of the Americas program with the nation of Colombia 

from South Carolina. And we have hosted students from Colombia 

to live with us. Two of my sons were in an exchange program to 

a high school in Colombia. What an extraordinary country it is. 

I know that we are assisting Colombia in achieving lasting peace 

while also combating criminality and narcotics trafficking. The 

election of Ivan Duque gives the U.S. a reliable partner in combating cocaine production and a modified approach to the peace 

process. 

What do you see USAID or the State Department doing to promote peace and security for the people of Colombia? 

Ms. LYNCH. Yeah. USAID’s program is focused very much on 

peace. And, in fact, we work predominantly in helping the Colombians and supporting their efforts to extend State presence in some 

of the areas that have not seen a government in sometimes decades. So we are actually working in over 50 of the hardest-hit communities in Colombia to help the Colombians provide the local institutions that can provide basic services to people as well as improve the environment to improve the rural economy. 

Specifically, when we work jointly with State Department INL, 

they on eradication and us on alternative development, it works extremely well, where the coca crop is eradicated, and then we come 

in with opportunities and an enabling environment, again, to have 

solid economic opportunities, jobs for people in the licit economy. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, thank you. And what an extraordinary 

nation of 40 million people in Colombia. 

And then, sadly, another country that was dynamic, was democratic is Venezuela. And we now see the consequence of what Margaret Thatcher said, and that is that socialism will work until you 

35

run out of spending other people’s money. And so now they have 

converted one of the wealthiest countries, one of the most dynamic 

in South America into a destitute, poverty-stricken, authoritarian 

regime. 

And so I am really grateful for the sanctions by the President. 

What more can be done to try to help the people of Venezuela? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, as we talked earlier, we are, with 

colleagues at USAID and the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, providing humanitarian assistance 

to those people who have been driven out of Venezuela. We have 

regular outreach at the Embassy with the opposition parties, encouraging them to get unified and form a unified opposition to the 

Maduro government. You know, we have applied targeted sanctions 

to government officials and to Venezuela. 

And we are working with our partners in the region. We have 

pretty much, I would say, unprecedented support of other countries 

in the region who really share our concern at what they see is a 

rich and democratic country descending into abject poverty and to 

effective dictatorship. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you again. And working on behalf of 

the people of Venezuela, mutual benefit to the hemisphere. Thank 

you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Bill Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The President has made it very clear and the administration has 

made it clear, the threat of MS-13 and the gang violence that is 

present in countries like El Salvador. This has been echoed in 

Homeland Security, of which I am also a member, where the administration officials have clearly said how dangerous and violent 

it is there and what danger it represents. 

So I am going to just address—a couple of the administration’s 

responses to this simply don’t make sense. 

For instance, when it comes to the parents and their children 

fleeing this terrific violence in El Salvador, the President’s response 

was to separate the children from their parents, traumatizing 

them, deporting them back to the crisis that they fled from. 

One of these people, Jessica, had two sons taken from her when 

she crossed in Texas in March. They were separated for 3 whole 

months. Jessica fled the brutal violence of El Salvador. She and her 

sons received death threats from MS-13, and she herself was beaten in front of her children by gang members. Yet that is one response, is to separate the children. 

The other one that just does not have any semblance of consistency is to move forward on ending the TPS program for those countries like El Salvador that have—those countries have hundreds of 

thousands of people here legally. And they are being sent back because it is safer now? 

There is a definite contradiction with sending these people—

many of them have been here for years legally to escape that violence—sending them back because now it is safer, yet at the same 

time the administration is saying what an enormous threat it now 

is becoming. 

36

How can you reconcile such contradictions? These things simply 

don’t make sense. They contradict each other, by their own definition. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

As I mentioned earlier, what our goal at the State Department 

is, in our view, is that we need to help these countries address the 

root causes of these problems. In that analysis, the root causes are 

corruption, impunity, lack of economic opportunity for people, lack 

of effective judicial systems, lack of effective law enforcement. 

Our Central America strategy, for which Congress was generous 

enough to give us $2.6 billion from 2015 to 2018, is working in all 

these areas in those countries——

Mr. KEATING. Okay. I apologize for interrupting, but where you 

are going is to the root causes. That is great. But there are present 

dangers. Well, we could deal with the root causes of MS-13, but the 

President and the administration, they are not talking about the 

root causes of MS-13; they are talking about the present danger. 

The same kind of timeline should be used when you are looking at 

the present danger of these people. 

So I know what you are saying in terms of root causes, but you 

are avoiding the contradiction that is quite clear, that one, these 

two instances of the response to this kind of violence contradict the 

fact that the violence is there that they are escaping from. You 

can’t have it both ways. So I want you to address not just the root 

cause but the present danger in that contradiction. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Again, we work with the tools that we 

have, both in USAID and the State Department, and these are the 

tools that we have to address these issues. If you are talking about 

other issues such as TPS, that is a decision that is taken by the 

Department of Homeland Security. They have made that determination. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I just think there should be better coordination. And I sort of echo, actually, the gentleman from California 

who said those are issues for Homeland Security, sure; they are 

also issues for Foreign Affairs, and they are also issues for State. 

Just quickly, I would like to echo the concerns in terms of the 

violence in Nicaragua as well. People like Father Jose Alberto 

Idiaquez has had his life threatened. He has been targeted because 

of his work through the Jesuits and through education. And I want 

to make sure people that have been targeted, that that be known 

to everyone. 

With that, I would like to yield 40 seconds to my colleague from 

California, Mrs. Torres. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. KEATING. No, no——

Mrs. TORRES. He yielded me 40 seconds that he had. 

Chairman ROYCE. Oh, yeah, that is right. Somebody was going 

to give you extra time. Norma Torres of California. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to be on the floor 

at 12 noon to present on a rule. 

I want to thank the Department of State and specifically the 

White House in continuing to support CICIG in Guatemala specifically. 

37

While I agree that we should demand fair treatment for all refugees in Guatemala and here in the U.S., too, I hope that we don’t 

lose sight of the significant progress that CICIG has made, not just 

carrying out investigations but also helping to bring about important reforms and strengthening Guatemala’s institutions. That 

progress is real, and turning back that progress, in my view, is a 

big mistake. 

Ambassador Merten, I had nine questions—they were ‘‘yes’’ or 

‘‘no’’ questions—for you regarding how the State Department—

which I have accused in the past of head in the sand with the certification process in Honduras and now in Guatemala. Because of 

the lack of time that I have, I will submit them for the record, as 

well as a longer statement on CICIG. 

I do hope that you will respond to me. The certification of Guatemala after the ongoing problems with the Congress trying to impugn themselves for their criminal behavior in stealing the purse 

of the people, to me, is something that we should be more careful 

about in how we go about. At the end of the day, us here in Congress have to be accountable, and we have to have a transparent 

process on how taxpayers’ dollars are being spent. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Mrs. TORRES. Yes. 

Chairman ROYCE. Because I would like to add a quick observation here as well. Because, as our witness stated today—and I 

think Ambassador Nikki Haley reinforced this during her trip to 

Guatemala in February—CICIG is providing critical assistance to 

advance justice, accountability, and stability in the region. That is 

not an easy task. It is bound to be controversial. But CICIG is successfully chipping away at the culture of corruption. 

That said, there was an issue that was raised here by Mr. Smith. 

And, as we know, the consequence of that has been adjudicated 

through the courts there in Guatemala, and that family is freed. 

This committee will continue to work, as I said, with the Senate, 

with the State Department, with the USUN on reforms that will 

preserve the essential functions of CICIG while responding to legitimate criticisms of overreach. 

And, with that, I think, without objection, the gentlelady’s questions are going to be submitted to our witnesses, and we will go 

to Ted Poe of Texas. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

As the chairman mentioned, I am from Texas. We have a very 

strong and longtime history with Mexico, back even to the days of 

the 1500s when Mexico and Texas were part of Spain, or at least 

Spain claimed the territory. I am a great believer in trading with 

Mexico. Ten thousand 18-wheelers a day cross back and forth on 

our southern border. Thousands of people from both countries cross 

the border. 

And I think that the United States, as a Nation, needs to refocus 

our attention to our next-door neighbors. I mean, we are all over 

the world. There are 190-something countries, and we are in most 

of them. I am not saying that is a bad idea. I am saying that we 

38

need to focus on our next-door neighbors—Mexico, Canada—and 

then, of course, all of Latin America. 

I see, as many Members of Congress have pointed out, that 

things are not good in the hemisphere from Mexico south: Corruption, incompetence, violence, and humanitarian problems with the 

nations. And, as Mr. Sires pointed out, I think things are getting 

worse. I don’t think they are getting better. I think they are getting 

worse. 

So, I mean, that is my position. As some other Members pointed 

out, I am a believer in NAFTA. But let’s talk about some of the 

issues specifically with Mexico. There are a lot of foreign workers 

in the United States from Mexico. 

Going back to 2003, when Vicente Fox was President, he made 

this comment that was recorded in the San Diego Tribune: ‘‘Twenty 

million Mexicans in the United States generate a gross product 

that is slightly higher than the $600 billion generated by Mexicans 

in Mexico. Remittances are our biggest source of foreign income—

bigger than oil, tourism, or foreign investment.’’ That was in 2003. 

Most recently, the Pew Research organization has listed how 

much remittances from the United States go to other countries—

in other words, foreign nationals working in the U.S. sending 

money back home. No surprise, Mexico is the number-one country 

that receives remittances from their workers in the United States 

back to their country, $28.1 billion, according to the Pew Research 

organization. 

Surprising to me—another issue—China is number two as far as 

remittances go. 

So we are talking about $28.1 billion for Mexico. Total amount, 

$138 billion a year of remittances go back to foreign countries by 

their workers working in the United States. And my understanding 

is, today, remittances are the number-one source of revenue to 

Mexico except maybe for the sale of autos. So tourism and sale of 

oil is still behind remittances. 

So we are sending a lot of money, economic development money, 

from the United States to Mexico and a lot of other countries. It 

is no surprise that the Mexican Government has long supported 

more people coming to the United States by any means so that remittances can go back to their nation. 

So my question is—and this has been brought out by the administration as well. If we just think this through, if we can use the 

phrase ‘‘subsidize’’ these countries all over the world, shouldn’t the 

United States charge a fee, 1 percent, for these transactions to 

occur—specifically, foreign workers in the U.S. sending money back 

to Mexico and any other country where those remittances go each 

year. So that part of that income generated in the United States 

stays in the United States, that the taxpayers don’t have to pick 

up the difference of that $138 billion, with a small fee—1 percent, 

2? It makes, to me, no difference. 

My question is, what is your opinion of that, Ambassador? 

And then I will ask Ms. Lynch what your opinion is. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I think that is an interesting 

thought. I don’t think it is—I think that could be potentially a subject for legislation should you decide to go that route. 

39

I will say, there are other countries in the hemisphere that do 

tax remittances as they come in. Haiti is an example of that in the 

case that I know of. Beyond that, I don’t think I would choose to 

comment. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Ms. Lynch, have you got an opinion? I am about out of time—

I am out of time. 

Ms. LYNCH. I also think it is very interesting. I think we would 

have to do further analysis. I know sometimes remittances are 

something that we look at as a way that we reduce foreign assistance. But we would be happy to look into this and analyze it. 

Mr. POE. All right. I think Congress ought to consider that 

strongly so we can keep some of that money in the United States. 

One hundred thirty eight billion dollars, that is a lot of money even 

for us, you know. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Greg Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There was this—I found out about a Mr. Nazario Jacinto-Carrillo 

and his daughter, Filemona. His daughter was 5 years old. They 

fled to California from their village in the western highlands of 

Guatemala. Nazario was fleeing a local gang that had threatened 

to kill him. 

Nazario and his daughter encountered a Border Patrol agent and 

were promptly arrested at a Border Patrol station in Campo, California, and Nazario was told that he would be sent to jail. 

Filemona, his 5-year-old daughter, was taken by Border Patrol 

agents. Nazario said, ‘‘My daughter was screaming and crying, and 

so was I.’’ Filemona was put in custody of the Office of Refugee Settlement, and she was transferred to my State, New York. 

Nazario subsequently abandoned his asylum claim and was 

flown back to Guatemala. And in the 5 weeks he spent in U.S. custody, he was never once able to speak to his daughter. 

Now, I visited a facility in New York, and one of the things that 

was noted to me, that each and every one of the children that they 

had there also had their birth certificate, which tells me that they 

were not just trying to sneak in, they were truly trying to seek an 

asylum so they could have a hearing because they were running 

from danger. They wanted to stop to see a Border Patrol so that 

they could go through a hearing. They had some evidence of who 

their kids were. But they were treated like criminals. 

In fact, one of the children that was examined by the doctor, we 

were told, thought they had a toothache, but, upon further examination, what was in the child’s mouth was pellets from a bullet. 

That is what they were fleeing from. 

So sometimes I do feel inappropriate asking you questions, because I really do acknowledge you and the service you have given 

our Nation in the State Department and the diplomacy. And watching you—and I know you have to answer some of these difficult 

questions. 

The problem is I think that the President of the United States 

doesn’t understand diplomacy and the value of the State Department. In fact, I was looking at him today when he was—and interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:49 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\071118\30707 SHIRL
40

national organizations—when he was over talking to NATO, making all kinds of horrendous statements and separating us from our 

allies there. I couldn’t help but see the pain on Ambassador Kay 

Bailey Hutchison when she had to admit this was right up Putin’s 

alley, what was going on, and looking at General Kelly as he was 

looking away and drinking water and drinking water and drinking 

water as the President was making his statement. 

I say all that because my question to you is going to be about 

the United States and our affiliation with the OAS and the terms 

of the international American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 

of Man, which obligates the states of the Americas to protect the 

right to life, liberty, and security for every human being and to give 

protection to families and to grant all children the right to special 

protection, and, we know, where a member of the OAS has filed a 

complaint to the OAS’s Inter-American Commission of Human 

Rights concerning this administration’s zero-tolerance immigration 

policy. 

So my question to you—and I know sometimes the President 

doesn’t believe in multilateral and international organizations—

does the Trump administration plan to respond to the OAS member’s complaint to the OAS? Do you know? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, I am unfamiliar with that specific 

issue. I am happy to take that back to my colleagues and get back 

to you with an answer on that. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. Thank you. And that is probably something 

that might be—again, as I said, it is difficult for me to question you 

because I know of your work. And some of it may be more appropriate for some other members of the administration. 

I think we touched on this—and, again, to Ms. Lynch, who is the 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, I agree with you and the 

work that Administrator Green is doing and what the USAID does 

all over the region, and you are addressing the root cause of the 

problem. 

But these deportation—whether it is DACA or TPS, sending a lot 

of these folks, DACA kids who have never been there before, sending them back, does that help our relationship and the work that 

you are doing in trying to deal with the root causes of the immigration problem that we have at the border now? 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you for the question. 

We work very much within those countries, so within the Northern Triangle, in partnership with the interagency and also the host 

countries. So our role is really to support the host country and 

their efforts in receiving some of these folks. 

And so we have worked in the reception centers and through the 

International Organization of Migration, IOM, and working with 

them to refurbish those centers and also make sure basic services 

are available to folks, with the ultimate goal that they would return to their host and home communities and there would be institutions there that would be stood up to also provide basic services 

and economic opportunities. 

Mr. MEEKS. I thank you for your service. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate both of you being here. 

41

This is a timely hearing on the Western Hemisphere. I think we 

have pivoted away from not just the last administration but the 

last 15, 20 years, and it is time that we really put an emphasis on 

there, whether it is energy security for our Caribbean nations like 

Puerto Rico, our territory, or the U.S. Virgin Islands or other Caribbean nations. Instead of them getting their energy from Venezuela, we are implementing energy from North America and allowing us to break the ties from Venezuela. And I think this is 

something that is imperative that we do. 

But I hear over and over again—and, Ambassador Merten, you 

were talking about better governance. We have to do more. Ms. 

Lynch, you were talking about we have to do more and help these 

economies in that. 

The numbers I have pulled up, Central America, from Mexico 

down to Panama, there is roughly 171 million people. Over the 

course of the last 10 years, we have given $5.746 billion in foreign 

aid to El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and 

Panama—$5.746 billion. 

People are leaving the Northern Triangle because of poor governance. We are putting money into our aid programs—USAID, MCC, 

OPIC, other organizations—to get good governance, to get economic 

development in those countries, yet we are not getting the return 

on that. 

I would like to hear from both of you, what would you do—we 

have to do something different. We can’t do the same thing over 

and over again. And if I throw in the war on drugs, we have spent 

over $2 trillion since the 1970s on the war on drugs. And I think 

we are all convinced we are not winning the war on drugs, especially when you have Mexico with 72,000-plus acres of poppy fields, 

which goes right into heroin, which comes right into my country. 

And then you look at Colombia has more coca planted today than 

we did with the drug cartels. 

And so I want to know from you, what do we need to do as a 

Nation, more specifically this committee, to direct foreign policy so 

we get good governance, we get a better economy, and we get allies 

that are on board with us that seriously want to fix this problem? 

Ambassador Merten? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

And we certainly share your concern about all of the above, I 

think particularly the concern about the drug issue, which I will 

briefly talk to. 

We have developed a good level of cooperation with Mexico, and 

one of the things that Secretary Tillerson started was discussions 

with Mexico on how we can work together to stop these 

transnational criminal organizations——

Mr. YOHO. Let me ask you that, because we were down there 

with the chairman a couple years ago, and we want them to get 

better on their drug cartel and the drug production, but I didn’t see 

the want and the desire there as much as we did. How do we get 

the desire with them? Do we pull money back? Do we threaten 

that? Do we threaten to block trade? 

Because we are not getting the results. And I hear what you are 

saying. Yeah, we want them to do this. 

42

Ambassador MERTEN. Yep. We have a new government coming 

in Mexico in 5 months, a new President who has just been elected 

who will take over. Secretary Pompeo will be traveling there in the 

coming days, along with Secretary Mnuchin and Secretary Nielsen. 

We are going to start up those discussions again with this new government——

Mr. YOHO. What is going to be different about those discussions? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I think we have a new government 

to work with. We have to see where we can have leverage with 

them and what their interests are. 

Mr. YOHO. I feel like we have the cookie that they want. You 

know, they want to trade, they want the access to our markets. I 

think we need to play hardball different than we have. 

Ms. Lynch, what are your recommendations? 

Ms. LYNCH. Right. I do think we have considerable successes in 

the region, specifically I will talk about in Central America, where 

we see on the governance side, for example, we see the governments of these countries putting their own resources against some 

of the objectives and goals that we mentioned at the outset——

Mr. YOHO. Define ‘‘success.’’

Ms. LYNCH. Success is when a government—I would say it is 

three things: When a government puts its own resources to these 

issues, when the private sector invests, and when civil society acts 

as a watchdog and can hold their government accountable. 

Mr. YOHO. Which countries are you talking about? 

Ms. LYNCH. I think we are seeing some of these successes in all 

of the Northern Triangle countries, whereby with our U.S. Central 

America strategy, they proposed a similar strategy, the Alliance for 

Prosperity, which aligns very well with ours. 

Mr. YOHO. Are we seeing a decrease in crime, a decrease in migration to our country? 

Ms. LYNCH. Honduras is a good example, again, where we work 

very closely with the interagency and with the Government of Honduras. In one area, the Riviera area of San Pedro Sula is a good 

example where INL works on the law enforcement side, we work 

on citizen security side, and, together, yes, we have seen in past 

years the homicides reduced by over 60 percent there. So that 

is——

Mr. YOHO. I am out of time. I wish we had more time to talk to 

you. I appreciate both you being here. I hate to be so abrupt, but 

limited time. I would like to talk to you further. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

First, I want to thank both our witnesses for being here, and 

thank you so much for your service. And, please, my comments are 

not really directed at you, and I have a lot of respect for what 

USAID does and the development that the State Department takes 

part in. 

So, first, I want to start with, I guess, sometimes I think I am 

just living totally in a bad episode of ‘‘Saturday Night Live.’’ I happen to represent beautiful Palm Beach, where Mar-a-Lago sits. And 

very interesting: Donald Trump asked permission to hire 78 foreign 

workers at Mar-a-Lago for the season. Doesn’t he think there were 

43

American workers who could take those jobs? Oh, well. I thought 

that was very interesting. 

Anyway, on to another point which I think is actually much more 

important, which is the fact that we are witnessing what I call a 

Trump-induced crisis at our Mexican border. We have heard many 

people comment on this, but I am going to say it again, because 

until these families are united I am not going to shut up about 

this. 

Mothers and fathers who are seeking refuge from extreme danger and persecution, they finally think they come for refuge, and 

what do they do? They get to our border and this government 

steals their children right out of their arms. 

And you know what is happening now? Our government is so incompetent and so uncaring that they can’t even match up most of 

these children. This is going to be a dark stain on this country, 

with what is going on here. 

I went to the border a couple weeks ago with some other Members. And look, I am the granddaughter of an immigrant. Probably 

everybody here is either the granddaughter or the grandson of an 

immigrant, right? And what I saw was heartbreaking. 

And I am just going to talk about meeting with the mothers, listening to their excruciating crying because their children were 

taken from them, they hadn’t seen them, didn’t know where they 

were. And one woman told me that she was told she was going to 

go to court for 48 hours, and then it is a month later and she didn’t 

even know where her child was. 

The other day, I had a little roundtable at the Guatemala center 

where I live. And they do wonderful work there. And I heard from 

a young woman who told me that her cousin came over, fleeing 

from gangs and violence in Guatemala, got to the border with her 

10-year-old son. The 10-year-old son is now in Homestead, in Florida, and guess where the mother is? She was deported back to Guatemala. 

Now, I just got a little—you know, it is a good thing you get 

these little alerts from your phone. This is what is happening now. 

Listen to this one. One mother had waited 4 months to wrap her 

arms around her little boy. Another had waited 3 months to see 

her little girl again. And when it finally happened Tuesday in 

Phoenix, the mothers were met with cries of rejection from their 

children. The children didn’t even recognize the mothers. They 

were screaming for the caseworkers. 

And what I heard yesterday at this roundtable from child professionals, psychologists, was the trauma that these children—toxic 

trauma that these children are experiencing. Well, we can see that 

right now. Could you imagine? They don’t even know who their 

parents are. 

So here is what I want to say. I mean, a lot of the questions I 

was going to ask have been asked and answered. I want to thank 

you for that. But I think there is no question—and I want to say 

this—building a wall is not going to solve the problem. Separating 

children inhumanely from their parents is not going to solve this 

problem. We have got to get into these countries and do the work. 

44

And I just saw that there is a proposal now to cut $180 million 

in funding for Central America. To me, that is just dumb, all right? 

That is really dumb. 

I don’t have to ask you what you think about it. You are good 

people. I am not going to force you to answer that. 

But, Mr. Chair, I just want to conclude by saying that we have 

to step up our efforts to try to get to the root causes. And we need 

immigration reform that the Congress is responsible for, and we 

should do that as soon as we can. 

And thank you for patiently being here with us today. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Frankel. 

We go now to Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is an important hearing. And I am sure there are other 

hearings where my colleagues on the other side of the aisle can discuss their desire to abolish ICE, but this is very important issues 

on the Western Hemisphere. 

With a lot of the issues we are seeing on the border, I think it 

drives home the importance of motivating people to fix their own 

countries and live in a better situation. If you look at our friends 

in Colombia, for instance, they went through decades of very difficult times and, with a little help from the United States and a 

lot of desire from their internal community, have really been able 

to not only just overcome their problems but also be a refuge for 

people in tough areas like Venezuela. 

That is a good example of how we should be handling this issue 

so that the issue on the southern border does not continue to haunt 

us, and, frankly, we don’t have to abolish ICE in the process as 

some of my friends want. 

Since September 11th, our security focus has been primarily 

geared toward the Middle East, where we have spent the past 17 

years combating Islamic extremism. And, during these years, many 

of our neighboring countries have faced political and economic instability and domestic insecurity. As a result of this instability and 

insecurity, thousands of people have migrated north and have arrived at our doorstep. 

And, as I have mentioned before, I have worked with ICE, as a 

member of the Air National Guard, as well as Customs and Border 

Protection officers on our southwest border, and I know firsthand 

how those insecurities not only affect our Nation’s security but also 

how they endanger the lives of those traveling north in search of 

freedom. And that is why it is imperative we regain focus on our 

own hemisphere. 

And I believe if we can establish a more stable and secure Western Hemisphere we can usher in an era of prosperity that has 

never been seen before. And I would like to briefly touch on a few 

of those countries. 

We have talked a lot about Venezuela. It has been the problem 

child of our region for the past two decades. In May, we watched 

as the corrupt Maduro regime swept the country’s Presidential 

election, which had been called fraudulent by the U.S. and our 

global partners. 

Last Congress, I introduced legislation that passed in the NDAA 

and would enhance the State Department’s capabilities through the 

45

Global Engagement Center to identify and respond to propaganda 

and disinformation. 

So, Mr. Merten, given Venezuela’s prosecution of political opponents and restriction of freedom of expression, can the GEC be 

used to amplify peaceful protests while highlighting the mass 

human rights abuses occurring in Venezuela? And what other tools 

do you have to handle that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks so much for the question. 

We have not been at all shy about calling out the Venezuelans 

and drawing attention to their abuse of the regime’s abuse of its 

own people. And we have done that in various fora, not least in the 

Organization of American States. And just at the recent summit 

here in Washington at the OAS, we were able to get an unprecedented resolution in support of members of the OAS condemning 

Venezuela and putting them on a path to, perhaps, eventual suspension from that organization. 

Again, we will not be shy. We have used targeted sanctions to 

focus on those people who are responsible for tormenting the Venezuelan people and——

Mr. KINZINGER. Can you answer, though, specifically about if you 

see a role for the Global Engagement Center in this area? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am not an expert in that particular 

thing, and I will be happy to take that back and get you an answer 

on that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And when you talk about what has been done in 

OAS, can you talk about the benefits of removing Venezuela from 

the OAS that you see? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We have discussed that, as I said, in the 

resolution, that was passed by unprecedented support of countries 

representing over 90 percent of the population of the hemisphere, 

that puts us on a path to consider suspending Venezuela from the 

OAS. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And after Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001, 

we saw anti-American administrations, led by populist regimes, 

drive the country in and out of economic despair. However, in 2015, 

under the new leadership of a pro-West, pro-business President, 

the Argentinian Government settled their debts and opened Latin 

America’s third-largest economy for business. There is still a lot of 

work to do, specifically in helping the country’s poor and combating 

a growing narcotrafficking network, but Argentina is showing a lot 

of promise. 

Supporting governments in Latin America that shun socialist 

and repressive policies and support Western values should be one 

of our top priorities. But what concerns me is that, in the past, Argentina has clawed out of an economic collapse only to spend more 

money than they are able to collect through taxes and trade, resulting in new depressions. 

So does State or USAID have any programs geared toward economic growth or making that government more efficient in how 

they spend their money? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well Argentina has a relatively new President that we have engaged with, and we are very supportive of his 

market-oriented reforms. 

46

I think, in our analysis, that, absent reforms generated from inside the country, that realizing their own shortcomings in previous 

legislation and mistakes that they have made in the past is the 

way that they are going to find the proper way forward. So we are 

very optimistic about their approach to resolving their own problems. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you both for your testimony today. 

Many Americans and many around the world have been shocked 

by the Trump administration’s use of family separation, separating 

young kids from their parents, as a deterrent—what the administration would consider a deterrent to having people attempt to 

come here, including those who are seeking asylum, legally, to the 

United States. 

And a few weeks ago now, I was one of the Members of Congress 

who went down and visited two of the centers who are keeping 

these kids. One of them is what is called a tender-age shelter, and 

it is called Casa Presidente in Brownsville, Texas. And myself and 

Sheila Jackson-Lee and a few others held an 8-month-old named 

Roger who had been separated from his family, and the staff told 

us they believed that he came with his sister because his mother 

had died. There was a 1-year-old girl named Leah who was also in 

the room with us. 

What role does the State Department play in the reunification of 

these young children? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, thanks for the question. 

And as I believe I have said in earlier questions similar to this, 

we work in countries with our host governments, we work in places 

like Central America to try and eliminate the root causes of this. 

In terms of——

Mr. CASTRO. Well, but I mean specifically when parents—some 

of these parents have been deported now. Is the State Department 

involved, if they are back in the Northern Triangle countries, in 

trying to get their kids back? Is the State Department involved at 

all? Because HHS is not in Guatemala or Honduras or El Salvador. 

Ambassador MERTEN. I will be honest with you, I am not sure 

that our consular officials are involved in that process. I can take 

that back and get you a clearer answer on that, but I am unaware 

of that. 

Mr. CASTRO. I hope that you will. And I will submit my question 

for the record, because I would like to know if the State Department that deals with other nations and, of course, our domestic 

agencies here, whether they can represent to the American people 

that none of these children has died or been severely injured while 

in the custody of the United States Government. That is my question. 

I would also like to echo the comments by Ranking Member 

Engel and also my colleague Congresswoman Torres about CICIG 

and the work that it is doing to fight corruption in Guatemala. And 

although I think it is fair to always be critical of any organization 

and take a critical look, I think it is important, when we think 

47

about helping these countries get back on their feet, to make sure 

that we have an organization that is trying to root out corruption 

and really restore the rule of law. 

Let me ask you this, because Congressman Kinzinger spoke a 

minute ago about making sure that countries fix the things that 

are wrong with themselves. And I agree. I think that the best antidote to having many people want to come to the United States who 

are undocumented is to make sure that the economies—to work 

with the nations to the south to make sure that the economies 

there are strong. 

But let me ask you, if you are Mexico and there is the United 

States and an incredible demand for drugs coming from the United 

States, what strategy is going to be successful to completely root 

out the trafficking of drugs to the United States, where you have 

a huge demand for it? 

And because Mexico is not Colombia, which, obviously, is in 

South America, but has basically got a 2,000-mile border with the 

United States, so, in other words, geographically, it is a central 

country for drug trafficking routes, how do they combat that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. This is not exactly an area that I have expertise in the terms of domestic demand. My understanding is that 

the administration is putting together policies to look at fentanyl 

and look at ways that we can reduce people’s use of these drugs. 

In terms of working with other countries, which is where we operate, the State Department, we have excellent cooperation with 

Mexico and with other countries in the region, including Colombia, 

to work with them, to reduce the amount of these things that they 

produce, that they prosecute those who are responsible. As I mentioned earlier, we have this working group with the Mexicans on 

combating and Central Americans combating transnational criminal organizations. This is ongoing work. It is important work, and 

we believe we are hopeful that it will ultimately be successful. 

Mr. CASTRO. And my last comment, and the reason I pose that 

question is because as we try to help them figure this out, I think 

for them, if you are a relatively poor nation where the rule of law 

is not what it should be and there is incredible corruption, and you 

have got people who are not making much money, very poor who 

are basically tempted to go into the drug trade, or be part of the 

drug trade, and there is an incredible demand right up north for 

those drugs, the challenge of rooting that out is gigantic. I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Garrett, Tom Garrett, Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the witnesses. I want to ask a series of very brief questions because I have 

a finite amount of time. I want to start with your understanding 

of the nature of the hearing today. The hearing that I was briefed 

on was entitled, ‘‘Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere.’’ Is that your understanding, as well? 

Ambassador MERTEN. That is my understanding. 

Mr. GARRETT. And you all are from the U.S. Department of 

State, correct? 

Ambassador MERTEN. [No verbal response.] 

48

Mr. GARRETT. And yet it seems about half the room is focused 

primarily almost exclusively on separations at the border. Is that 

correct? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We have got a lot of questions on that. 

Mr. GARRETT. A lot of questions on that. And so, in the Department of State, do you all have oversight of HHS? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We do not. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. Do you have oversight of DHS? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We do not. 

Mr. GARRETT. How about USCIS? 

Ambassador MERTEN. No. 

Mr. GARRETT. How about USCBP? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We do not. 

Mr. GARRETT. How about Customs and Border Patrol—I’m sorry, 

how about ICE? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We do not. 

Mr. GARRETT. So none of those are within your purview and yet, 

you have ‘‘gotten a lot of questions on that subject matter.’’ It is 

amazing to me how well some people talk off of talking points. In 

fact, right now, the number of people under the age of 5 who we 

think are separated from their families is just over 100, and yet 

quite candidly, just off of the preplanned talking points, we have 

covered about 14 percent of their cases in this committee hearing 

today. That is amazing. 

But what we have covered zero percent of, and pardon me while 

I go on a little bit of a discourse here, are the roughly 4,000 Americans killed every year by unlicensed drivers who are here illegally. 

In other words, mathematically speaking, and we can’t quantify 

these numbers because while we know about 13 percent of all highway fatalities nationally are caused by people who are here illegally, we don’t quantify fatalities specifically by immigration status, however, what we do know is in the 10 States where you are 

licensed to drive, regardless of your legal status, Maryland, California, et cetera, the number of highway deaths caused by people 

here illegally is closer to 14.5 percent. 

And so I guess if we looked at the numbers and we compared the 

number of people who are under the age of 5 who we think are currently separated from their families, there would be about 40 

Americans permanently separated from their families every single 

year for every one of them, but nobody has talked about that. And 

you all from the State Department and again, my condolences and 

gratefulness for you being here, but we have just determined, and 

I wish that I had gone earlier in the hearing because maybe we 

could have saved some time, that you are not responsible for HHS, 

DHS, USCIS, USCBP or ICE, which a lot of my friends across the 

aisle seem to want to abolish. 

So I apologize vicariously for the waste of your time, and I want 

to cover another thing real quickly that might be further within 

your purview. My good and distinguished colleagues and friends 

across the aisle to include Mr. Meeks, Mr. Keating, Mr. Engel, Mr. 

Sherman, Ms. Bass, and Ms. Frankel all have talked about horrific 

occurrences of gang violence in Honduras and Guatemala and El 

Salvador and Mexico, and it really gives me pause because I don’t 

think that everyone in these countries are violent gang members, 

49

do you all, based on your experience? The Northern Triangle has 

lots of good people, right? They are not all gang members, right? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Of course. 

Mr. GARRETT. And yet, we have heard horrible stories, in fact, we 

heard about Jose and Brian, whose mom was raped and murdered, 

and they came to this country because they were afraid, and I 

quote, ‘‘the same thing might happen to them.’’ But all people in 

those countries, they are not bad people, right? 

Ambassador MERTEN. [No verbal response.] 

Mr. GARRETT. There are some gang members in those countries, 

right? And some of the people who are there are good people, right? 

Likewise, what we haven’t heard of is that any gang members 

might ever leave those countries and come here. Now I understand 

it is somewhat beyond the scope and purview of the responsibilities 

of the Department of State, but do we have reason to believe that 

some of the people who might come into this country illegally could 

also be gang members? Could that be? I mean, mathematically 

speaking, just give me a wild guess. 

Ambassador MERTEN. I mean, I don’t think—certainly, we at the 

State Department don’t know. 

Mr. GARRETT. Do you think it is possible? I mean, you have risen 

to the level of Ambassador. I am just asking you to posit. 

Ambassador MERTEN. I mean, in the realm of possibility, a lot of 

things are possible. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. Okay. And we have heard that a wall is not 

the solution, but just like a door being closed and locked might prevent someone from coming in a room, but doesn’t always prevent 

someone from coming in a room, it might also be part of a solution 

while it is not panacea. 

So I continue that it is remarkable to see this concern for these 

just over 100 people under the age of 5, but not within the purview 

of the Department of State, nor the scope of identifying and addressing, let me see, U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. 

What is it that you would like to have been asked about today very 

quickly that you haven’t been asked about because nobody in this 

room seems to want to talk about the subject matter and why you 

are here, Mr. Merten, Ambassador. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, I think the questions we have got 

today are relevant to——

Mr. GARRETT. What is it that you would have like to have been 

asked about, what question would you like me to ask you? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I would like you to ask me about the 

situation in Haiti, that I know reasonably well. 

Mr. GARRETT. Outstanding. I have got 20 seconds. Please go over 

the situation in Haiti, and I apologize for having been distracted 

there. People are running for election. They have got goals here, 

things they want to do. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. Very quickly, we are very disturbed 

by the recent unrest in Haiti. We are happy to see that the Haitian 

police and the Haitian Government have been able to reclaim control of the streets. We hope that the Haitian Government continues 

to work to pacify the situation, the political situation in the country. And in Haiti, we really see that the answer to why people are 

out on the streets upset rioting is because there is a lack of ecoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:49 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\071118\30707 SHIRL
50

nomic opportunity. And this is something we drive home with them 

at every possible opportunity, they need to attract investors who 

want to come to Haiti, and there are investors who want to come 

to Haiti, and I will leave it there. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you so much, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We appreciate the State Department. Myself 

and another colleague here was on the phone over the weekend 

with the situation room there dealing with some of our constituents 

who were in harm’s way in Haiti, and we appreciate the State Department’s efforts to get that resolved. And we also, Ambassador, 

appreciate very much your expertise in Haiti and all the time you 

spent there. 

We are going to go to Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I hope you don’t find my 

question a waste of time, but thank you for being here, and I would 

just say there is a lot of things—a lot of ways people get killed that 

we don’t talk about here, like gun violence prevention. I just had 

to say that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important as we hold 

these hearings to remember the young families who are escaping 

violence in Latin America and traveling to the land of opportunity. 

A young 14-year old girl from El Salvador identified by her initials, 

VFB, arrived in the United States in May with her mother fleeing 

violence after her stepfather was murdered in a church. The two 

of them fled to save their lives. 

At the time of their arrival, our government announced the implementation of a zero tolerance policy. As we watched the consequences of this policy unfold, we saw thousands of children, as 

we have talked about, being separated from their parents, and she 

being one of them. Believing that she was being taken to give a 

bath, VFB was instead being lured away from her mom, not aware 

that she would not see her mom again. 

After being transferred to a shelter in Connecticut, the girl’s 

mother remained detained in Encino, Texas. Finally, after 39 days, 

the young lady could hear the comfort of her mother’s voice when 

she was finally allowed a 10-minute phone call. And now in July, 

VFB and her mother are still separated. We must get to the root 

problems that are causing increased migration with families giving 

up everything for the chance of a better life, just like you talked 

about what we need to do in Haiti. The United States must do 

more to push for change on the ground in these countries. That is 

why I was so disappointed by the State Department’s decision last 

year surrounding the Honduran election. 

In November, the State Department chose to certify Honduras’ 

conditional funding, meaning you provided the Honduran Government with direct U.S. funding just days after a disputed election 

with the Organization of American State Secretary General Luis 

Almagro eventually concluded was characterized by irregularities 

and deficiencies with very low technical quality and lacking integrity. President Hernandez said he would move forward with electoral reform, yet he has done very little to date. In the past, he has 

also said he would remove the military police on the streets, yet 

there is still no timeline to do so. 

51

What is the State Department doing to pressure the Honduran 

Government to make electoral reforms and to take the military police off the streets? And also, what leverage do you have given how 

quickly you certified the Honduran Government after its disputed 

election? Thank you. 

Ambassador MERTEN. On the Honduran certification, my understanding is that that is a process that takes some time to do. I 

know we do certifications for Haiti and other countries. The determination was made in our—in the building in the State Department, ultimately by the Secretary of State, that they had met the 

criteria for certification, and that is why we recommended that. 

Ms. KELLY. Can you share some of the criteria that they——

Ambassador MERTEN. I can’t speak to the exact criteria for Honduras. That is not an area I work with on a daily or weekly basis. 

Regarding the idea of military servicing as police, it is unfortunate, 

like you see in many countries in the hemisphere, where military 

perform police functions. In general, our view is that is not a good 

thing, that there is a role for military and there is role for police, 

and we believe that those two should be separated. 

Ms. KELLY. And do you know if there is a timeline to do something about the police on—or the military on the street? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t know that there is a timeline no, 

ma’am, sorry. 

Ms. KELLY. And also, is there a general certification criteria, or 

is this something different for every——

Ambassador MERTEN. My understanding is that for every country there are—and maybe this is something you can speak to—

there are different criteria that are established, usually by the appropriators. 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes, and we can get the specific criteria for you, if 

you would like. 

Ms. KELLY. I would appreciate that. 

Ms. LYNCH. Absolutely. 

Ms. KELLY. Believe it or not, I yield back early. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Paul Cook from California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize for 

being late to the committee. I had a markup in Natural Resources. 

I want to thank you for being here today. 

Ms. Lynch, it is good to see you again. Our committee had nine 

members that went to the Summit of the Americas, and you spent 

a lot of time with us, and I am really, really impressed with what 

you are doing in many of the countries, and also saw some of your 

work in Egypt. So thank you for being here. 

My questions, Mr. Ambassador, I did want to address the Peruvian agrarian bonds, and this is something that has been bouncing 

around for a while. It affects San Bernardino County. This is to resolve the claims of many of my constituents. These are land bonds 

as they are known in the—they have been floating around for long 

years, and directly affected many of the pension plans in San 

Bernardino. 

The role of the government right now is they don’t want to address it. They think that this happened 50 years ago, and that this 

was under a different regime, and they are not—they just don’t 

52

want to address it. And I keep pushing it on them, and I get some 

pushback. So I am hoping you can kind of help me out with that. 

Are you familiar with it at all? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am generally familiar with the case, yes, 

not with the specifics, however. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. The other thing I wanted to talk about, when 

we were down there, we had a weekend trip, as I said it was a 

great codel. It was short-lived. It was only a weekend basically, a 

Friday and came back on a Monday, and we met with 21 countries. 

And I got to be honest with you, I came back just exhausted, but 

never learned so much in my life. 

But one of the things on the tail end of it, we met with nine of 

the Caribbean countries. And you hear the same theme over and 

over and over again, that the United States has kind of forgotten 

or ignored the Western Hemisphere, same thing. And even more so, 

in the Caribbean, and even more so with some of these smaller 

countries. And it is no wonder that some of the very small ones, 

and not just Caribbean countries, they are susceptible to some of 

the economic manipulations that the Venezuelan Government is 

making in returns for rebates on oil, and this is going to be a continuing problem. And you have to do the math in regards to the 

OAS. Each one of these countries has one vote, same as the United 

States. You add them together, and whatever changes you want to 

do in the OAS that is going to affect it, it ain’t gonna happen. At 

least, I am not very good at math. I am not very good in a lot of 

things, but something we have got to talk to these countries in the 

Caribbean. 

One of the big concerns, hurricanes coming. Every year, we are 

going to have a hurricane, we are going to have one, two, three, 

four, five, and here we go again trying to get aid down there, 

whether it is—Puerto Rico isn’t a country, it is a territory, as you 

know. 

But here we go again. Now I am from the military. I know how 

successful prepositioning equipment is, and we had talked about 

this prepositioning many of these supplies, have command post exercises where we go through the drill when it happens, whether it 

is in our own southern states or in the Caribbean, so we don’t start 

from scratch like this because we know it is going to happen. So 

I would hope that we agendasize that, and I think my staff has 

kind of mentioned that to you, that this was a big, big issue with 

our committee, and just don’t—we are going to keep pushing that 

at all. 

The other thing I wanted to just to ask you in terms of—I know 

that Secretary Pompeo is interested in Mexico and everything else, 

but do you get that same feeling that, Hey, we got to—we have to 

start paying more and more attention because there is a lot of 

countries down there. We have got China, we got Iran. Ambassador, I didn’t mean to talk so much, but if you can kind of address 

that absence of attention to the area. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Yes, thanks for your comment and question, sir. I would respectfully disagree that we have been neglectful 

of our neighbors in the hemisphere. We have a whole bureau of 

people that work on a daily basis with this. USAID has large bureau that works with them on a daily basis. We have had the ViceVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:49 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\071118\30707 SHIRL
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President who has traveled to the region several times already. We 

have, regarding the Caribbean, H.R. 4939, which has been the 

guiding light. 

Mr. COOK. I don’t mean to cut you off, but the chairman is going 

cut me off anyway. The only thing I want to say is perception is 

reality. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Understood. 

Mr. COOK. And if you poll those countries down there, their perception is they have been ignored, and that is all I am going to say 

there, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Congressman Cook. We go to Dina 

Titus of Nevada. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have to 

agree with Mr. Cook. I appreciate your optimism, Mr. Merten. You 

have said it in your opening statement, and now that we have 

these great bonds and that nothing is more important than our relationship down there, but actually, history tells a very different 

story. Our relations with Latin America over the years, at best, 

have been benign neglect, and at worst have been shoring up either 

with troops or resources, governments that practice state terrorism. 

Now we are ripping children from the arms of their parents, and 

current policy is so bad and relations so abominable that the OAS 

recently unanimously passed a resolution condemning our behavior. So I don’t really think that is anything to brag about. 

I would go back to something, though, that was discussed hours 

ago, you brought it up, Ms. Lynch, that we have a policy that tends 

toward self-sufficiency, but there are other players in the region 

who have a policy that is more about dependency. This worries me 

because I have seen it all over the world. We have seen it in Southeast Asia, we see it in Africa. We see it in Eastern Europe. The 

U.S. pulls back. We create a power vacuum. In moves Russia. In 

moves China. And now, certainly, there are examples of that in 

Latin America. We heard about the tanks that Russia is selling in 

Latin America. We know that they are increasingly meddling politically and economically through propaganda. I wonder, have you 

asked the President if he is going to bring this up with Mr. Putin 

when he meets with him next week, that this could be causing a 

problem, the tanks and the other activities? They have supplied 

global navigation satellite system in Managua. They have got a 

joint counternarcotics center there. I mean, they are moving in 

when we are not doing much. 

Also, let’s be specific about China. Latin America is now their 

second largest destination for Chinese investment, and they are the 

largest trading partner for Argentina Brazil, Chile, and Peru, so 

this is not something minor. They are putting $2 billion into the 

ports in Peru as part of a $10 billion Chinese investment in energy, 

mining, and shipping, and telecommunications. So even if it is creating dependency when they are offering those kind of things, it is 

kind of hard for us to compete with it or counter it with the policy 

as you described, Mr. Merten, of telling them it is not a good idea 

to do this in the long run. Well, they are interested in the short 

run. 

So I would say, in addition to having talked to the President 

about Russia’s involvement, how can we possibly compete when we 

54

have a diminishing budget at USAID, they want to cut that back 

all the time. It is already very small. We have got kind of a demoralized, understaffed State Department. You have got a President 

who insults our allies. You have got a policy of zero tolerance at 

the border. How can we compete with the competition down there 

to build those strong relations that we need? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I do think we do have strong relations, and we have a history of engagement, we have a history of 

shared values with all the countries in the hemisphere, and particularly, our close neighbors Canada, Mexico, Caribbean countries. 

We have diaspora communities here in this country who contribute 

to our national well-being. 

So I think that we have a lot to offer. We also have aside from 

all the good things that our colleagues at USAID are doing 

throughout the hemisphere and our colleagues from the state INL 

are doing, we also have a very vibrant private sector, and I think 

that while our private sector does well exporting and trading with 

Latin America, we also have a lot of investment there. And I think 

that is a good vector of bringing economic opportunity, and hopefully, hope to these places. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, I agree with that, and I think the USAID does 

a wonderful job. I think they are one of the best agencies. We get 

more from them by giving them less than any agency I can think 

of, but as far as the commercial aspect, we are not even being very 

helpful there because the one party in this Congress doesn’t even 

support the Export-Import Bank, which would help with some of 

the investment there. So I just—on what front are we really being 

successful? And I know you have to answer that in a positive way, 

and I appreciate that, and I would like to be optimistic, too, but 

I think we need to be realistic, as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Mr. Chris Smith of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just 

make clear for the record that after being unjustly jailed for 3 

years, Igor Bitkov and his wife Irina, who spent 3 months unjustly 

jailed, and their daughter Anastasia, another 3 months for being 

unjustly jailed, Igor got out on bail, but they were told they are not 

free. They are under house arrest. I just confirmed it again within 

the last couple of minutes with their attorney that they are under 

house arrest. Significantly, on May 23—and I mentioned earlier before in terms of the chronology—2 days before my hearing, which 

was in this room, the court ruled and allowed them out of jail. That 

was the constitutional court. 

That wasn’t enough for CICIG however. On May 23, CICIG went 

back to the constitutional court—yet another action against the 

Bitkovs. 

Chairman ROYCE. This would be the third time. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. And so there is a pattern, I think, here. On June 

21, the constitutional court, in contrast to its previous decisions, 

exonerated the Bitkovs under the Palermo Protocol. I remind my 

colleagues that under Palermo—I mean, we are talking about migrants, these are asylum seekers, a family that was escaping the 

impunity of Vladimir Putin and his cronies. Article 5 makes clear 

55

that migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution under 

the protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct set 

forth in Article 6 of the protocol. And then it is clearly pointed out 

that producing a fraudulent travel or identity document procuring 

or providing or possessing such a document. So the Palermo Protocol couldn’t be clearer, and anyone who doubts that they were escaping a tyrannical action against them just look at the record, it 

couldn’t be more clear. 

So the constitutional court now has allowed a CICIG action because the Bitkovs got false drivers’ licenses and credit cards. Again, 

they wanted to change their identity. We have witness protection 

in this country when someone wants to change their identity in 

order to escape the mob or the Mafia, in this case the Russian 

Mafia, and now they are bringing another action. And what is it—

I want to ask with respect, what is the driving force behind CICIG 

after first being part of an action that got 19 years for Igor, 14 

years in prison for his wife, and 14 years in prison for their daughter? I mean, that is what the judge found. That is what the court 

found. What is the driving obsession here? When you say there has 

been an investigation and you found no evidence, how deep was 

that investigation? How much was looked into the Russian connection here? 

We know for a fact that thousands of businesswomen and men 

in Russia routinely have their businesses taken away from them. 

I cut my eye teeth on Russian human rights issues in 1982 in my 

first term on a trip to the Soviet Union on behalf of Soviet 

Refusniks—Jews who wanted to emigrate—including people like 

Yuli Koshirovsky, great people, who then had all these false 

charges brought against them and often were sent to psychiatric 

prisons, or places like Perm Camp 35. I actually visited Perm 

Camp 35 in the Ural Mountains just a few years later, and heard 

horror tales of men who had been taken and tortured by the Russians, in that case the Soviets, but now we have a continuation of 

that, and again, the Russians went looking for the Bitkovs, took 

them several years, and then they found them, and had a willing 

partner called CICIG to join in the efforts. It is all laid out in nauseating detail unfortunately, and yet, there are people who suggest 

that this is an overreach on our part trying to raise these issues. 

And I said it before, Bill Browder—he is the subject of unrelenting attacks by the Russian Government, unrelenting. I was in a bilateral at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as head of the United 

States delegation these last 5 days in Germany, and at that meeting that was chaired by Pyotr Tolstoy from the Russian side from 

the Duma was some of the people who had been held to account 

under the Magnitsky Act in terms of their wrongdoing. They were 

sitting right at the table and took great umbrage of the Magnitsky 

Act. They don’t like it. We believe in sanctions. We believe in personalizing them as a way of really trying to inhibit bad behavior 

and hold to account. But now we have a situation where a family, 

who is at grave risk in my opinion—their physical safety is my 

overriding concern. I want to keep them out of prison because I 

think they have done no wrong. They have done what any of us 

would do for our families if a gangster group came after us, and 

certainly changing a passport to a new name, certainly having a 

56

driver’s license with a different name, and now CICIG is going 

after them because of their driver’s license. It begs credulity. It is 

beyond the pale as to why. Can you tell us why? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, I can’t speak to the particularities of 

how CICIG works internally. I will say in terms of beyond what I 

told you about the Bitkovs before, our Embassy has engaged with 

the Guatemalan Government. We have got assurances from them 

that they will not send the Bitkovs back to Russia. 

Chairman ROYCE. If I could interrupt, would the gentleman 

yield? 

Mr. SMITH. There is no extradition. 

Chairman ROYCE. How about the son? Since the Russian banks 

are now asking that the young son, who is maybe under 3 years 

of age, be returned from Guatemala to Russia, do you have assurances of that, too? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I hate to admit this, but you have exhausted my expertise in this subject, and rather than mislead you, 

I would rather get back to you. 

Chairman ROYCE. If the gentleman would yield, Ambassador, I 

would suggest in a situation where you are looking at, in sentences 

of 17 years, 14 years for the wife, 14 years for the daughter, who 

had been, after the bank tried to—after certain individuals in the 

bank tried to take control of the company, had been abducted and 

raped in St. Petersburg for 3 days, for her to get 14 years, for the 

younger son to be in a situation where the Russian Government is 

trying to have him returned to Russia, and given the past pattern 

of behavior, you would have to ask yourself when these sentences 

are longer than sentences for drug trafficking, for murder, for even 

terrorism in country, there is something a little unusual about the 

particulars of this case, and that is why, when I said earlier, we 

are going to work with U.S. U.N. on investigations here in terms 

of this set of circumstances, it is, I think, incumbent upon all of us 

to dig a little deeper and get a little bit more understanding of this 

case. 

And I would ask you to do that and then get back in touch with 

Chairman Smith and myself and other members of this committee 

that are interested because at the end of the day, our goal is to 

have CICIG work effectively. They are in an environment where 

they are taking on corruption. But the one thing you and I know 

is that the Russians try to influence the outcome in any case where 

they go after anyone who tries to flee their government’s control. 

And if you ask yourself how far will they go, apparently poison by 

radiation is not out of bounds. We know of two cases where that 

was done in the U.K. 

So when you have an arm of the state, a state bank bringing a 

case in Guatemala after bringing a case where they had previously—anyway, I have exhausted our time, but I think Chairman 

Smith made the point, and I would just reiterate it. 

At the end of the day, we want CICIG to be effective. For that 

to happen, we need the reforms in place, but again—and I see Mr. 

Cook here. Were you seeking time? 

Mr. COOK. I came back in because we are planning a trip, as part 

of my committee, to Guatemala, and obviously this is a huge, huge 

issue. We are all concerned about it. I know Mrs. Torres, it is someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:49 Sep 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\071118\30707 SHIRL
57

thing that we are concerned and I share the chairman’s feelings 

about Russia and their history, and, so, this is something that is 

not going to go away and obviously this is going to be our top agenda when we go down there. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. If I can just conclude, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

you for——

Chairman ROYCE. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Your comments. To the Bitkovs, they 

live with the Sword of Damocles hanging over their head every single day. I mean, they have got very poor treatment in prison. They 

had a huge, huge SWAT-like team take them to prison in the first 

place, totally beyond all reason. And what that has done—especially to Anastasia, who was abducted, and this is the way the Russian oligarchy, the Russian leadership works. They go after businessmen and women who are successful to fleece them, and if you 

don’t play ball, they set examples for certain people. To think that 

CICIG has anything to do with that absolutely undermines their 

mandate. Who doesn’t want to get rid of corruption? Every single 

one of us. But if personnel is policy, which I think it is, and there 

are any corrupt people within the organization called CICIG, that 

needs to be weeded out and beyond that, not just weeded out—anyone who is complicit in any of this, that is why I have asked very 

specific questions about collusion, they need to be prosecuted. And 

no games. I thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. With that we thank the witnesses for 

being with us today, and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 205I5-6128 

Edward R Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

July11,2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at )!!!ty//\\ww.For~j_o.nAffai rs.house.Qov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, July I I, 20 18 

10 00 a.m. 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 

U S. Department of State 

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MIN<JTES OF FULL COMMiTTEE HEARING 

2172 

Starting Time ·-.!~:OSAM Ending Time 12:401'}! __ 

Recesses L_to __ )L_to_JL_to __ )L_to __ )L_lo_JL_to __ ) 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Chairman Edward R. Royce 

Checl< all of the following that apply: 

Open Session J:Zl Executive (closed) Session 0 Televisetl J:Zl 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (taped) [Z] 

Stenographic Rceonl W 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the West em llemispllere 

COMllUTTEE MEJVIBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

NIA 

HEARING '\\TfNESSES; Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [J NoD 

(If "no", please list below cmd include title. agency, department, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record) 

IFR- Ranking Member Eliot E11grl (3) and Reprettlative Albia Sires 

SFR- Represetttatives Get(P Cmwol(v and Norma Torres 

QFR- Cfwirman Edward R. Royce, Ranking Member Eliot Ettgel, attd Representatives Paul Cook, Brad 

Sherm.an~ Jim Sensenhrenner, Joaquin Castro, an.d l\lorma Torres 

TIME SCIIEDULED TO RECONYEJVE -----::7"' 

or 

TlMEADJOURNIW !2:40PM 
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PRESE?vT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

i'UII COMMIITHF H~_AJI!NG 

]\,[EMBER PRESENT MEMBER 

Edward R. Royce, CA X Eliot L. EngeL NY 

Christopher H. Smith_ NJ X Brad Shemmn_ CA 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Gregory W. Meeks, NY 

Dana Rohmbachcr_ CA X Albio Sires. NJ 

Steve Chabot. OH Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

Joe Wilson, SC X Theodore E. Deutch, FL 

Michael T. McCaul, TX X Karen Bass, CA 

Ted Poe, TX X William Keating, MA 

Darrell Issa, CA X David Cicilline_ RJ 

Tom Marino, PA X Ami Bera. CA 

Mo Brooks_ AL X Lois FrankeL FL 

Paul Cook, CA Tulsi Gabbard, HI 

Scott Perry_ PA X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Robin Kelly, lL 

Mark Meadows, NC X Brendan Boyle. P A 

Ted Yoho, FL X Dina Titus_ NV 

Adan1 Kinzinger,lL X Nonna Torres, CA 

Lee Zeldin, NY X Brad Schneider. IL 

Dan Donovan, NY Tom Suozzi_ NY 

James F. Sensenbreuner. Jr., WI X Adriano Espaillat_ NY 

Ann Wagner_ MO X Ted Lieu, CA 

Brian J. Mast, FL 

Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Francis Rooney. FL 

Thomas A. Garrett. Jr.. VA 

John Curtis_ UT 
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national security interests. The US. Southern Command, which covers Central and South 

America, came to the same conclusion. 

The Department of Homeland Security also ignored these State Department travel advisories in 

January warning US. travelers to "Reconsider Travel" to those countries: 

"'7-7-""'-"""~'-· Violent crime, such as murder, assault, rape, and armed robbery, is common. Gang 

as extortion, violent street crime, and narcotics and arms trafficking, is widespread. 

Local police may lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal incidents. 

====· Violent crime, such as homicide and armed robbery, is common. Violent gang 

as extortion, violent street crime, rape, and narcotics and human trafficking, is 

widespread. Local police and emergency services lack the resources to respond effectively to 

senous cnme. 

• Jlaiti: Reconsider travel to Haiti due to crime and civil unrest. Violent crime, such as armed 

robbery, is common. Local police may lack the resources to respond effectively to serious criminal 

incidents or emergencies. Protests, tire burning, and road blockages are frequent and often 

spontaneous. 

studies that more than 80 percent of TPS beneficiaries work, pay taxes, and 

contribute an estimated $690 million each year into Social Security. It would cost an estimated $3 

billion to deport them and the US economy would lose about $4.5 billion each year in gross 

domestic product. 

Finally, U.S. policy, begun under Obama and a Republican Congress, and continued, according to 

-'-'--'--"-'--'-'"'-'-'"""·"'-"--'"-"""' in the Trump administration, sees the best way to reduce the "push" factors 

on illegal migration is to assist Central America to strengthen their economies, democratic 

institutions and law enforcement. 

Sending back hundreds of thousands of people to those countries, when the governments 

themselves have said they cannot handle it, undermines that policy. And placing at risk 273,000 

US. citizen children- some still being nursed- undermines our values. 

The immediate answer is for the president to reverse the DHS termination decisions. The best 

answer for those U.S. citizen children is for Congress to authorize permanent residency for their 

parents now and a pathway to citizenship -they have been here for as long as two decades and 

have demonstrated they can contribute to our future - as immigrant parents in this country have 

done for almost 250 years. 

Mark L Schneider is a senior adviser at the Cemer for Strategic and International Studies,jormer 

director of the US. Peace Corps, andformer head of httin America and the Carihhean at USAJTJ. 
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REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

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Statement for the Record from Representative Gerry Connolly 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

Julyll,2018 

Latin America and the Caribbean are home to 43 of the world's top 50 most murderous cities, 

including San Salvador, the murder capital of the world. In the rural Northern Triangle, which 

encompasses El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 60 percent of people live in poverty and 95 

percent of crimes go unpunished. A new case of sexual violence is reported every 46 minutes in 

Guatemala, but many more remain unrecorded. Citizens of the Northern Triangle pay an 

estimated $661 million annually in extortion fees to street gangs and other criminals. 

Given these dire conditions, it is no wonder that the number of asylum seekers worldwide 

originating from the Northern Triangle increased by five-fold from 2012 to 2015. More than half 

of Salvadorans entering Mexico have lost a family member within two years before migrating. 

Sixty-two percent of women crossing the U.S. border reported seeing dead bodies in their 

neighborhoods and many mentioned that their children saw dead bodies weekly. 

After summoning the strength to tlee this suffocating violence and surviving a treacherous 

journey to seek asylum in the United States, an internationally recognized human right, many of 

these migrants have faced turther abuses at the hands of the Trump Administration. The 

inhumane and morally repugnant "zero-tolerance policy" seeks to separate families at the border 

in order to deter turther migration. As a result, the Administration has forcibly separated nearly 

3,000 children tram their parents in the past couple months. 

Despite the Administration's relentless Orwellian attempts to blame non-existent laws for 

Trump's own actions, the reality is that this is a humanitarian crisis of Trump's own making. I 

have otfered multiple amendments aimed at forbidding this shametul policy, and have 

cosponsored the Keep Families Together Act (HR 6135). Along with my colleab>ues, I have also 

requested that the appropriations committee prohibit funding for the implementation of this 

family separation policy. 

For a president who launched his campaign by vilifying Mexicans, used reprehensible lafib>uage 

to characterize El Salvador and Haiti, became the first President to neglect the Summit of the 

Americas since it started in 1994, and cannot maintain a positive rapport with Canada, it should 

come as no surprise that U.S. intluence in the hemisphere is in a tree fall. As the Administration 

seeks to address the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, high levels of crime and violence in the 

Northern Triangle, and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and 

Canada, it should bear in mind that this President's repulsive rhetoric and destructive policies 

toward our southern neighbors only serve to undermine U.S. interests and exacerbate tensions in 

the region 
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Statement for the Record from Representative Norma Torres 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

Julyll,2018 

In recent months, some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the International 

Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and its role in the case of a Russian family 

that was convicted in Guatemala for various offenses related to passport fraud and identity theft. 

While I support my colleagues in their efforts to ensure transparency and fairness, and while I 

acknowledge that CICIG, like all institutions, is not immune to mistakes, it is essential that the 

United States continue to strongly support CICIG in a bipartisan manner, in the context of our 

broader efforts to promote security and prosperity in Guatemala and throughout Central 

America. 

Since the end of the country's civil war in 1996, the Guatemalan state has struggled to free itself 

from the grasp of organized criminal networks that have penetrated and corrupted the highest 

levels of government in successive administrations. This systemic corruption drains state 

resources, while distorting the priorities of government institutions and inhibiting the state's 

capacity to tackle the serious challenges facing the country, such as widespread poverty, 

malnutrition, gang violence, and drug tratl!cking. 

In the years following the end of the civil war, the Guatemalan people sought valiantly to 

establish a true democracy that responded to the needs and interests of the people, and to seek 

justice for the victims of war crimes and human rights violations, including the more than 

200,000 people who were disappeared or killed during the civil war. However, powerful criminal 

networks, especially those known as ''illegal security groups and clandestine security 

organizations" (CIACS, in Spanish), undermined Guatemala's nascent democracy and thwarted 

the fight for justice. Criminality became rampant and the CIACS used their influence in 

government to carry out a range of illicit activities, including the trafl'icking of drugs, arms, and 

persons, with impunity. 

To overcome the power of these CIACS and other criminal networks, and to strengthen the rule 

of law in Guatemala, in 2006 the Guatemala state entered into an agreement with the United 

Nations to create CICIG, whose mandate permits it to "carry out independent investigations, to 

act as a complementary prosecutor and to recommend public policies to help fight the criminal 

groups that are the subject of its investigations." 

Since its creation, CICIG's work has increased the capacity of Guatemalan prosecutors and 

police to investigate organized crime. With CICIG's support, prosecutors have learned to build 

complex cases against major criminal networks, and have established a witness protection 

program; police investigators learned to use advance investigative techniques, such as judicially 

supervised wiretapping, to gather evidence. Joint investigations by CICIG and the Guatemalan 

authorities have led to the successful prosecution of corrupt politicians of all political stripes, 

including the two previous presidents, and to convictions of dozens of powerful drug traffickers, 

including members of the Zetas Cartel. CICIG's work has also had a positive impact on public 

safety in Guatemala. In 2009, the homicide rate was 45.1 per 100,000; by 2017, it had fallen to 

26.1. With CICIG's help, Guatemala has become the only country in the Northern Triangle to 
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experience a steady decline in violence. Because of these accomplishments, CICIG has become 

the most popular institution in Guatemala. Much work remains to be done, but CICIG's 

contributions to the rule of law in Guatemala are undeniable. 

In fact, because of CICIG' s success, other countries have sought to replicate its model. In 2016, 

the Government of Honduras entered into an agreement with the Organization of American 

States to create the Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption (MACCIH), which is 

modeled on CICIG and has already produced significant results, with legislative reforms passed 

into law and indictments of widespread corruption networks operating in Honduran government 

institutions. 

I am proud that Congress has worked on bipartisan basis to support CICIG and its role in 

Guatemala's tight against corruption. Under both Democratic and Republican leadership, 

Congress has appropriated funds for CICIG; Democratic and Republican administrations have 

endorsed and supported the Commission's work. Last year, the House passed H.Res 145, my 

resolution in support of CICIG and the tight against corruption in Central America, as well as an 

amendment I otl'ered, which exempts CICIG funds trom the conditions that are normally placed 

on aid to the Central American governments. 

Members of our committee, on both sides of the aisle, have repeatedly met with Ivan Velasquez, 

the CICIG Commissioner, and we have been vocal in our support. The Trump administration has 

also expressed support for CICIG and its Commissioner. For example, when Guatemala's 

president attempted to expel CICIG's Commissioner trom the Country, UN Ambassador Nikki 

Haley stated that, "Mr. Velasquez is a critical voice calling out corruption and upholding the rule 

of law. He has the tull support of the United States and the international community." Just last 

week, a White House spokesperson reafilrmed that CICIG is key to the tight against corruption 

in Guatemala and to the broader etl'ort to improve conditions in the country. 

Fighting systemic corruption and dismantling criminal networks that have penetrated state 

institutions are not easy tasks. It should not come as a surprise to any of us that CICIG has 

powerful enemies, including those who fear criminal prosecution, and those who are already 

imprisoned. CICIG's employees and their Guatemalan counterparts carry out their work in a 

climate of severe pressures and threats, and are regularly the subject of smear campaigns. Some 

in Guatemala have even taken the extraordinary step of hiring lobbyists in Washifib>ton, D.C., 

paying as much as $80,000 per month to int1uence U.S. policy, presumably with the intention of 

weakening U.S support for CICIG and the fight against corruption in Guatemala 

Congress must not give in to these pressures, and must continue to stand with CICIG and with all 

of those who are tighting corruption in Guatemala. We have invested far too much in CICIG, and 

have far too much at stake, to give up now. By staying the course, we can help the Guatemalan 

people achieve their long-sought goal of an effective and impartial justice system. Doing so is 

best chance to create the conditions for a more prosperous and secure Guatemala, where the next 

generation can see a future for themselves in their home country. 
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[Note: The preceding question was directed to both witnesses. Prior to printing, 

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Questions for the Record from Chairman Edward R. Royce 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

Julyll,2018 

The potential for deeper integration of the US energy market with those of other countries in 

Latin America is well known. After a long period of declining oil production in Mexico, in 2013 

the country adopted historic reforms to PEMEX- its state-owned enere,'Y company- to invite more 

foreign direct investment, creating new opportunities for U.S. firms while at the same time 

providing much needed technical and capital investments in the country's energy 

industry. President-elect Obrador has called into question his commitment to these reforms, which 

could significantly impact one of the hemisphere's biggest producers. Similarly in Honduras, a 

hydrocarbons law has been proposed which could impact US. investors. How is the State 

Department engaging with Mexico, Honduras and other countries in the region to support 

America's commercial and energy interests in the continent? 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten's Answer: 

Support for US. investors and businesses operating overseas is a top priority. Several countries, 

including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana have opened opportunities in the energy sector 

for US. private sector investment as well as government-to-government technical assistance. Our 

engagement has helped further open opportunities by accelerating Central American regional 

enerb'Y integration, advancing enerb'Y integration etTorts with Mexico and the Andes, promoting 

solutions that created new markets for US. energy companies throughout the Americas. In the 

Caribbean, we seek to increase the use of low cost, reliable sources of energy to spur economic 

development to create new opportunities for US. energy firms and exports. 

We continue to engage the current Mexican government and plan to engage the incoming 

administration to advance the implementation of its energy reforms and increase opportunities for 

US. businesses. In Honduras, we understand US. companies are concerned over the proposed 

hydrocarbon bill. We have met with government ofticials on this issue and continue to monitor 

developments closely. 
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Questions for the Record from Ranking Member Eliot Engel 

For the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Advancing US. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

July II, 2018 

Central America- Violence Trends: 

Question: 

Please provide the Committee with the following data on violence in the Northern Triangle 

countries ofEI Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala: 

(a) Data disaggregated by age on the overall rates of gender-based violence in the Northern 

Triangle countries, regardless of whether or not these acts of violence are reported to 

government authorities 

(b) Data on incidences of gender-based violence cases reported to the authorities in the 

Northern Triangle countries and the percentage of perpetrators investigated, 

apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted 

(c) Data disaggregated by age on the overall rates of domestic violence in the Northern 

Triangle countries, regardless of whether or not these acts of violence are reported to 

government authorities 

(d) Data on incidences of domestic violence cases reported to the authorities in the Northern 

Triangle countries and the percentage of perpetrators investigated, apprehended, 

prosecuted, and convicted. 

(e) Descriptions of the obstacles (including capacity gaps within the criminal justice system) 

to resolving gender-based violence cases and deterring violence against women and 

children in the Northern Triangle countries. 

(t) Descriptions of gender-based violence trends in each of the Northern Triangle countries. 

(g) Infonnation regarding the incidence of violence, including domestic abuse, against 

indigenous women 

(h) Infonnation on the availability of trauma-informed legal and social services for victims 

of gender-based violence in Northern Triangle countries, including in shelters. 

(i) Data on the number of police otlicers, prosecutors, court personnel, and specialized units 

trained in violence against women and children in Northern Triangle countries. 

G) Data on the time period from first report of crime to otlicial verdict in gender-based 

violence crimes in Northern Triangle countries. 

(k) Data on the availability of restoration services (including shelter, trauma care, and 

economic support) for women and child victims of gender-based violence in Northern 

Triangle countries. 

(1) Data on the capacity of child welfare systems in each Northern Triangle country to 

protect unaccompanied children, including runaways and refugee returnees in Northern 

Triangle countries. 

(m) Descriptions of barriers to comprehensive health care, including reproductive health care, 

for survivors of gender-based violence in Northern Triangle countries. 
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(n) Data disaggregated by age on tbe overall rates of violence against LGBTI individuals in 

the Northern Triangle countries, regardless of whether or not these acts of violence are 

reported to government authorities 

( o) Data on incidences of violence against LGBTI individuals reported to the authorities in 

the Northern Triangle countries and the percentage of perpetrators investigated, 

apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted 

The Department and USAID developed a comprehensive Results Architecture for the US. 

Strategy for Central America to measure US. interagency progress in advancing security, 

prosperity, and governance objectives in Central America. In accordance witb requirements 

accompanying the fiscal year 2018 appropriation, the Department submitted a progress report to 

Congress on this monitoring and evaluation plan in May. 

There is limited disaggregated available data on gender-based violence (GBV) in the Northern 

Triangle. The Department is aware of a number of obstacles and trends in the region related to 

GBV, including unequal access to justice and health care, limited services available in 

indigenous languages, and few shelters for survivors. Women and girls with disabilities and 

indigenous, African-descendant, lesbian, and transgender women and girls often face multiple 

forms of discrimination, making them even more at risk when cont1icts arise. 

Young women and girls often face intimate partner violence and experience sexual assault or 

abuse by gang members, forcing them to drop out of school or relocate. Lack of accountability 

perpetuates existing patterns of violence and abuse. Persistent social exclusion, ingrained sociocultural attitudes, heightened levels of generalized violence, high levels of impunity, inadequate 

legal frameworks, and weak institutions contribute to the insecurity of women and girls in the 

region. The US. Strategy for Central America supports programming to address these 

underlying conditions. 

Question: 

What more can the State Department do to strengthen in role in support of the capacity of states 

and other entities in the Northern Triangle to combat and prevent gender-based violence as a 

push factor for migration? 

As a part of the US. Strategy for Central America, we are addressing the underlying causes of 

gender-based violence (GBV) by working with governments and civil society in the Northern 

Triangle. In Honduras, we are supporting efl'orts to increase public advocacy against GBV, 

fllling gaps in emergency assistance, and promoting a judicial and civil-society approach that 

empowers victims. In Guatemala, the U.S. government supports the 24-hour court system to 

reduce pre-trial detention periods, better protect victims, and increase the etliciency of the 

judicial system. We are also supporting a court that specializes in sexual assault, exploitation, 

and tratlicking of women and children. In El Salvador, the US. government supports municipal 
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prevention centers to provide citizens a "one-stop shop" for crime and violence prevention 

services, including services for women and youth. 

Central America- Family ReunijiClltion: 

Onestion: 

I recently introduced the Central Americ:a Family Protection and Reunific:ation Act with 

Representatives Torres and Espaillat which would in part require the State Department- through 

our embassies in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras - to play a much more active role in 

supporting Central American governments and parents on family reunification. 

Can you please tell us what our embassies in these countries are doing to support family 

reunification? 

For questions related to current etJorts in family reunification, we refer you to the Departments 

of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, the U.S. government leads for this effort. 

The Department supports the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human 

Services by liaising with Mexican and Central American governments to ensure the United 

States tully complies with requirements for consular notification, communicates relevant 

policies, and encourages partnership with foreign governments to achieve speedy and lawful 

reunification. The Department remains deeply committed to working with the people of Central 

America to address the root causes of irregular migration The United States has committed 

approximately $2.6 billion in foreign assistance to Central America for Fiscal Years 2015 to 

2018. Together, we are working to address the drivers of illegal immigration and illicit 

tratlicking and stop transnational criminal organizations, including criminal gangs. 

Caribbean: 

In your statement, you discussed the Administration's Caribbean 2020 Stratet\Y While the 

strategy as written is very impressive, its implementation - a ±ull year after it was sent to 

Congress -leaves much to be desired. 

(a) For each of the areas in the Caribbean 2020 Strategy (security, diplomacy, prosperity, 

energy, education and health), please provide the Committee with a timeline of when the 

Administration will take specific policy actions. 

This initiative cannot be unilateral input and cooperation from our Caribbean partners is 

essential. In this context, we have devised and are implementing the Caribbean 2020 Strategy 

with limited available personnel and funding resources. Diplomatically, we consult regularly 
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with Caribbean otlicials on the Caribbean 2020 Strategy pillars. On security, we are committed 

to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and prioritizing maritime security and capacitybuilding in countemarcotics and law-enforcement We look to highlight private sector 

engagement and sustainable growth in a second Prosperity Roundtable with our Caribbean 

partners in 2018. Through the Department's Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, we are 

seeking options to stimulate investment in the Caribbean energy sector. We are strengthening 

partnerships between US and Caribbean higher education institutions that teach 

entrepreneurship, technical, and vocational skills. We work with Caribbean community leaders 

on health projects, such as disaster management training with the American Red Cross, and 

containing Zika in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean with the Caribbean diaspora and the US. 

Department of Health and Human Services. 

Question: 

The Strategy states, "We will hold a trade and investment conference with Caribbean countries 

focused on increasing bilateral trade and improving the region's investment climate and 

regulatory environment." When and where will this conference take place? 

The Department hosted an inaugural Caribbean Prosperity Roundtable in November 2017 with 

Caribbean policymakers and private sector representatives to spur economic development and 

trade, and plans are underway for a second Roundtable in 2018. We continue work to ensure 

that reconstruction efforts in the Caribbean result in resilient, cost-effective energy systems. 

Question: 

The Strategy states, "Were funding to become available in the future, the Department could 

explore expanding its diplomatic and consular presence in Eastern Caribbean countries that do 

not currently host a permanent US diplomatic mission." In anticipation of funding becoming 

available, please provide the Committee with a detailed plan on how the US. could expand our 

diplomatic and consular presence in the Eastern Caribbean. 

Embassy Barbados constitutes the United States' diplomatic and security presence in the Eastern 

Caribbean, with support from the US. Embassy in Grenada and the US. Consular Agency in 

Antie,'l.la and Barbuda. Otlicial personnel based in Embassy Barbados travel frequently to engage 

with government officials and other host nation interlocutors in all Eastern Caribbean countries 

to advance and defend bilateral and regional US foreign policy goals. We are focused on 

ensuring that we actively promote US. interests from this platform and we intend to continue to 

do so. Any decisions on a future expansion of our diplomatic and consular presence in the 

Eastern Caribbean would be premised on which countries would best support the protection of 

US. citizens and advancement of US. interests not only bilaterally, but also regionally. 
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Ecumlor: 

Question: 

In response to questions at the hearing on a New York limes report that US. delegates to the 

World Health Assembly fought aggressively to weaken a resolution encouraging breast-feeding, 

going so far as to threaten Ecuador, the sponsor of the resolution, with the removal of military 

assistance and trade penalties, Ambassador Merten said during the hearing that it was his 

understanding "from our Ambassador'' and "from the folks that work on this in our bureau" that 

"nobody was threatened'' 

Did anyone from the State Department, the White House, or any other US. government agency 

threaten Ecuador in any way, or suggest that their sponsorship of this resolution would result in 

any response tram the United States? 

No. The United States works constructively with other Member States of the World Health 

Organization to find common ground on issues at the World Health Assembly (WHA) and other 

governing bodies. On the resolution in question, the United States was a leading voice in 

negotiations that led to adoption of the resolution by consensus. The United States hears from a 

wide variety of stakeholders in advance of the annual World Health Assembly. 

Question: 

What exactly was communicated to the government of Ecuador on this resolution, and by 

whom? 

The United States communicated through various bilateral and multilateral channels that 

improving nutrition among mothers, infants, and young children is an important public health 

priority for the United States and highlighted that we share a common objective to protect and 

promote health and nutrition for mothers and their children. We asked the government of 

Ecuador to withdraw its proposed resolution as we had procedural and policy concerns with it, to 

include the fact that a resolution had been adopted on this topic in 2016 after a long and difficult 

negotiation, and that reopening that negotiation would detract tram other important initiatives 

before the World Health Assembly (WHA) Substantively, we raised concerns with references 

to a controversial 2016 guidance document that sought to restrict infonnation available to parents 

about safe, appropriate products for the children of mothers who for medical or personal reasons 

cannot breastfeed or choose not to exclusively breastfeed. In 2016, the Obama Administration 

raised the same concerns about the guidance. We noted that Member States consider a range of 

factors when detennining whether and how best to address issues of inappropriate marketing or 

promotion of foods for infants and young children in their national contexts and that the 

resolution did not adequately reflect the complexity of the global public health context - or the 
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scope of nutrition issues being considered at the WHA. For turther information, we refer you to 

the US. Department of Health and Human Services. 

Allende and Monterrey Incident: 

ProPublica has reported on two specific incidents in Mexico involving State Department-funded 

and DEA-trained Sensitive Investigative Units (Sills). First, in March 2011, t,'lmmen from Los 

Zetas invaded the Mexican town of Allende, forty minutes from the US - Mexico border, 

murdering between 60 and 300 civilians. This attack was sparked by a Mexican Federal Police 

SIU investigation aimed at taking down leaders from Los Zetas. A member of the SIU reportedly 

leaked information on these etl'orts, and the Zetas leaders ordered the attack on Allende as 

revenge on the individuals who had given information to the SIU in the first place. Despite the 

fact that the unit had a poor record of keeping intelligence out of the hands of criminals, DEA 

agents in Mexico City allegedly passed information to the SIU which led to this tragic chain of 

events. Separately, in April 2010, individuals from Los Zetas stormed a Holiday Inn in 

Monterrey and took hostage tive individuals who have not been seen since. At the time, the DEA 

and the SIU were carrying out an operation tram the hotel but switched to a ditJerent hotel the 

night before the attack. Four hotel guests and a hotel manager were reportedly mistaken as SIU 

members and kidnapped. According to l'rol'ub/ica, SIU members "used personal credit cards to 

secure their rental cars and hotel rooms," making it easy for the individuals tram Los Zetas to 

track them down. 

Question: 

What was the role of the State Department and the DEA in the Allende and Monterrey incidents? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Question: 

Was there any reporting by the State Department or DEA to headquarters and/or senior officials 

at the Departments of State and Justice following each of these incidents? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 
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Question: 

What practices, if any, were changed by WHA, INL or the DEA in Mexico or globally as a result 

of the Sill's activities? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Question: 

What was the chain of custody of the information that was passed to the Sill in each of these 

incidents? Who approved passing this information to the Sill? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Question: 

The Allende tragedy was precipitated by the leak of sensitive information provided to the DEA 

by a local source. This information was then shared by DEA with an Sill whose commander was 

rumored to have connections to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. I understand that the 

Mexican government retuses to allow US. vetting of commanders of these Sills. 

Should the US government share information with Sills if we are unable to vet their 

leadership? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Question: 

Did the State Department, DEA or any other US. government agency provide compensation or 

at least an explanation to any of the families of the victims of these incidents? 
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The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Otlice of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Question: 

What steps could the Departments of State and Justice take to ensure greater accountability for 

the DEA when innocent civilians are harmed as a result of its operations? 

The State Department remains committed to working with the Mexican government to combat 

transnational crime. However, for detailed information on the Allende and Monterrey incidents, 

inquiries should be referred to the Otiice of the Inspector General at the Department of State. 

Mexico: 

Question: 

Can you please specifically describe how our security cooperation with Mexico protects the 

American people? 

Transnational criminal organization (TCO) activity in Mexico directly atiects the safety, 

security, and prosperity of the United States. According to the Centers for Disease Control, in 

2016, more than 42,000 U.S. citizens died from drug overdoses involving prescription and illicit 

opioids, including heroin and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. Over 90 percent of heroin 

consumed in the United States comes from Mexican TCOs. In addition to heroin, TCOs tratiic 

fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine across the U.S.-Mexico border and are the greatest 

criminal drug threat to the United States. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation is essential to 

address illicit drug trat1icking and TCOs. 

The Merida Initiative has fostered closer collaboration with the Government of Mexico to 

combat distribution of illicit drugs. In 2017, the United States and Mexico adopted a strategic 

approach to disrupt the entire business model of TCOs, including attacking drug production; 

cross-border movement of drugs, cash, and weapons; markets; and illicit revenue. Merida 

programs assist Mexican specialized units that work closely with U.S. law enforcement 

counterparts, providing Mexico with the tools to more effectively eradicate opium poppy and 

disrupt the TCO networks, and enhancing the capacity of Mexican officials to secure its borders. 
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Cubct Health incidents: 

Question: 

In December, Secretary Tillerson stated that the health incidents that a±Iected our personnel in 

Cuba were "targeted attacks'' Since then, the Trump Administration has continued to use this 

description. Yet, according to press reports, no one- including the FBI- has been able to prove 

what happened and who, if anyone, is culpable. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has 

referred to similar occurrences in China as "health incidents.'' 

What specitlc evidence can you point to that shows that the health incidents in Cuba were 

"targeted attacks?" 

There is still much we do not know about the health attacks in Cuba. No cause or culprit behind 

these attacks has been identified to date. Despite the inability to identify a specitic attacker or 

mechanism of injury, the fact pattern of these reports indicated that the attacks appeared to be 

targeted at the U.S. diplomatic community. The investigation into various aspects of this matter 

is ongoing. 

Question: 

What will it take for the State Department's travel warning on Cuba to be reversed? 

The protection of U.S. citizens overseas is among the Department's most fundamental missions. 

The infonnation used to fonnulate Travel Advisories is collected from a range of sources, such 

as crime statistics and other information that is publicly available, information gathered from 

U.S. government sources, as well as assessments by our embassies and consulates. Travel 

Advisories also take into account decisions made to protect the security of U.S. government 

personnel overseas and ensure that private U.S. citizens receive appropriate security infonnation. 

This analysis is undertaken without regard to bilateral political or economic considerations. The 

Department continues to investigate the cause of the injuries to U.S. personnel in Cuba. 

Question: 

When will the CDC be deployed to Cuba? 

The Department has asked the CDC to assist but we do not direct how the CDC, the premier 

epidemiologic investigatory body in the U.S. government, formulates and conducts its 

investigations. The Department stands ready to assist the CDC in this investigation as necessary 

and appropriate. I direct you to the CDC for any plans they have to deploy teams to Cuba. 
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Cuba- Impact of Downsizing on U.S. Embassy Operations: 

Question: 

As a result of the staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba, the Trump Administration is 

extremely unlikely to meet our commitment under a 1994 immigration agreement with Cuba to 

issue a minimum of 20,000 travel documents. This impacts average Cubans who seek to come to 

the United States. At the same time, in a recent l'rol'ubfica article, prominent Cuban dissident 

Marta Beatriz Roque said that the U.S. withdrawal had already had a "dramatic" impact on 

human rights advocates on the island, all but eliminating their access to American diplomats and 

making it much more difficult for dissidents to travel to the U.S She said, "Basically, I would 

say the interaction with the U.S. Embassy right now for us is at a level of zero. The embassy is 

not getting the information it needs about the human rights situation in Cuba. Our contact before 

was frequent. Now there is no contact." 

What impact has the U.S. diplomatic downsizing had on our human rights work in Cuba and our 

ability to process visas? 

The Department monitors and advances human rights developments in Cuba, consistent with the 

June 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the 

United States Toward Cuba. We remain engaged with and support activists, dissidents, and 

other members of Cuban civil society in Havana, Washington, and beyond. The Department also 

continues to call out the Cuban regime's enduring repression of its citizens and its recent 

undemocratic leadership transition. 

U.S. Embassy Havana currently processes only diplomatic nonimmigrant visa applications and 

nonimmigrant cases for applicants with life-threatening illness. As of June I, we are scheduling 

immigrant visa interviews for Cuban nationals at U.S. Embassy Georgetown, Guyana. 

Question: 

Have you established criteria to detennine when you will re-sta±I the embassy? 

The Department is reviewing the threat situation presented by the health attacks in Havana 

through the High Threat/High Risk Assessment Process, which began June 29. Once this review 

is complete, we can assess the staffing situation at Embassy Havana. All staffing decisions will 

include safety and security considerations of U.S. government personnel and family members, as 

well as the interests of the United States and the Cuban people. The Department has also 

convened an interagency Task Force, chaired by Deputy Secretary Sullivan, to discuss the 

incidents in Havana and Guangzhou. The Task Force has been meeting twice weekly to assess 
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the situation and inform the ongoing review process. Additionally, a government-wide effort to 

find the cause behind the health attacks continues, as does the criminal investigation. 

Question: 

When exactly will you re-staff the U.S. Embassy in Cuba? 

The Department is reviewing the threat situation presented by the health attacks against our 

diplomats in Havana. Once this review is complete, we can assess the statling situation at 

Embassy Havana. A government-wide effort to find the cause behind the health attacks 

continues, as does the criminal investigation. We continue to seek assurances from the Cuban 

government to resolve this threat-assurances which the Cuban government has not provided to 

date. 

Question: 

In the meantime, how are you maintaining critical monitoring of human rights? 

The Department continues to monitor human rights developments in Cuba by engaging regularly 

with independent members of Cuban civil society in Havana and Washint,>ton. We continue to 

advance our human rights priorities consistent with the June 2017 National Security Presidential 

Memorandum on Strent,>thening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba by raising our 

concerns with the Cuban government and in international fora. The Department continues to 

administer the annual Congressional appropriation of economic support funds supporting 

democracy programs in Cuba and call out the Cuban regime's enduring repression of its citizens. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Paul Cook 

For the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Advancing US. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

July II, 2018 

Peru Agrarian Bonds: 

Question: 

I want to raise an issue that I've been personally engaged on over the last several months. I've 

encouraged the Peruvian Government to resolve the claims of many of my constituents who have 

invested in Peruvian Agrarian Reform Bonds, commonly known as "land bonds." This issue 

directly impacts a large pension plan in San Bernardino County and thousands of my 

constituents. It is my understanding that the Peruvian Government has suggested that it does not 

have an obligation to pay the debt now because it was issued over 50 years ago by a communist 

regime even though the Peruvian Supreme Court authorized the sale or transfer of these bonds on 

the secondary market and ruled in 200 I that the government must compensate bondholders in an 

amount equal to the "current value" of the debt. 

What steps is the Administration taking to help resolve this issue, especially related to Peru's 

interest in joining the OECD? 

O±licials at the Department of State and at our Embassy in Lima have met with representatives of 

current holders of the bonds (which were issued by left-wing Peruvian military governments 

between 1969 and 1979) on multiple occasions, and our door will continue to be open to them. 

The Department will continue our dialogue with the Peruvian government on this issue. 

Each country must meet high standards to join the OECD. Peru will be held to these standards 

as part of any consensus decision by OECD members to issue an invitation to Peru to start the 

accession process. 

Combatting Transnational Criminal Threats: 

Question: 

The region faces multiple threats trom transnational criminal organizations that undermine 

democracies and destabilize the region. These groups include drug cartels in Mexico, the MS-13 

and 18'h street gangs in Central America, rebel groups like the ELN and BACRIM in Colombia, 

and Iran-backed Hezbollah in South America. These groups contribute to violence and insecurity 

in the countries where they operate, drive illegal migration from the region, extort local 

communities and use their money to influence government officials and undermine democratic 

institutions including electoral processes. 
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How would you assess current US. e±Iorts to combat drug traft'icking organizations and other 

transnational crime groups operating in the region? 

The Department actively engages regional partners to increase their capacity and willingness to 

disrupt illicit networks, dismantle criminal organizations, and protect all of our citizens. Our 

diplomatic engagement and capacity building directly strengthen US. national security by 

combating illicit traft'icking and smuggling routes, while creating an environment for increased 

U.S. trade and investment. Our efforts help disrupt transnational criminal organizations, 

strent,>then border security, combat corruption and impunity, and reduce the ±1ow of irret,>ular 

migrants, illicit drugs, and illegal goods across our southern border. 

Our programs focus on the areas where these criminal networks operate, most notably Colombia, 

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. We engage partner governments in order to 

improve information sharing and expand law-enforcement cooperation. Key programs include 

enhancements to interdiction forces, investigative capabilities, border controls, and migration 

management. These programs take a comprehensive approach, strengthening the rule of law and 

denying criminal organizations the permissive environment they need. In Mexico, INLsupported Joint Intelligence Task Forces contributed to more than 200 arrests, including 

principal leaders of the Sinaloa cartel, and the extradition of "El Chapa" Guzman. In Colombia, 

our programs build capacity for law enforcement operations against high-value targets, including 

Gulf Clan leaders, and assist the Colombian government in achieving drug interdictions. 

Question: 

How effective have Kingpin and other drug trafficking designations been on reducing drug 

traft'icking operations and the flow of drugs to the US.? 

Kingpin Act designations impede drug traffickers from laundering millions of dollars in drug 

tratl!cking proceeds into legitimate businesses. They are an important US. government tool to 

hinder Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) from using drug money to expand their 

criminal enterprises. The US. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is the leading US. agency 

for implementation of the Kingpin Act sanctions program. According to Treasury, since the 

Act's inception in 1999, more than 2,000 foreign nationals and entities running or supporting 

TCOs have been listed in Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions list. As a 

result, billions of dollars in drug proceeds and assets have been blocked from drug tra±1ickers' 

laundering operations. 

Question: 

How can we increase our e±Iorts to dismantle these groups, which have contributed to the opioid 

epidemic in our own country? 
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Nearly all of the illicit opioids available in the United States originate from abroad. Mexico is 

the primary source country for heroin consumed in the United States, while also being a transit 

country for fentanyl and precursor chemicals from China. Canada is likewise a transit country 

for fentanyl and precursor chemicals from China. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) 

which facilitate the production and trafiicking of these illicit drugs to the United States have 

exacerbated the US. opioid epidemic by flooding the market. The Department, through the 

Merida Initiative, focuses on dismantling these groups by working with Mexico to target drug 

traffickers' entire business model. To protect American lives, we need to partner with Mexico to 

not only disrupt the networks that smuggle drugs, cash, and weapons across our shared border 

with Mexico, but also to achieve meaningful criminal justice outcomes that prosecute and deny 

TCOs the ability to act with impunity and profit from their crimes, and to fight the corruption 

that undermines our efl'orts. 

We appreciate the Peiia Nieto administration's cooperation on combating the opioid crisis, and 

we intend to collaborate closely with President-elect Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador to keep our 

efl'orts moving forward. 

U.S. Anticorruption efforts: 

Question: 

Several high-profile corruption scandals have broken out across the region, including the 

Odebrecht scandal, but corruption is entrenched in every level of government, often involves the 

private sector, and is negatively affecting public confidence in government institutions and 

democracy. 

What is the State Department's strategy for combatting corruption in the region? 

Pervasive corruption and poor governance erode prosperity and undermine security in this region 

and around the world. We support country-level ownership of anti-corruption efl'orts and 

bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and foreign assistance efTorts to prevent and combat 

corruption. We will continue to work with our partners to improve the rule oflaw and strengthen 

independent judiciary sectors; defend freedom of expression and independent journalism to shine 

a light on corrupt practices; and will build upon relevant outcomes from the 2018 Summit of the 

Americas, including reinforcement of democratic governance in the fight against corruption. We 

will also continue to work closely with Congress to ensure that our efl'orts to combat corruption 

in the Western Hemisphere are robust, accountable, and coordinated. 

Question: 

What examples has the State Department seen of the U.S. private sector's role in addressing 

corruption issues and strengthening the rule oflaw in Latin America? 
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I have observed several examples of the private sector's increased commitment to transparency 

in the region. American Chambers of Commerce, whose members are already subject to the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, promote anti-corruption efforts to level the playing field for US. 

companies and seek more transparency in doing business. At the 2018 Summit of the Americas, 

the private sector leaders that comprise the Americas Business Dialogue issued a commitment to 

promote transparency and work with leaders in addressing corruption. Business leaders from 

multiple sectors in the United States and other Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

economies have signed codes of conduct for doing business. In Central America's Northern 

Triangle countries, the American Chambers of Commerce and other local business leaders have 

been active in pursuing formal public-private dialogues aimed at streamlining and improving 

transparency in infrastructure investment, public procurement, and trade and customs 

procedures. Pri vale sector support bolsters reform efiorts and political will to achieve new legal 

frameworks, empower efJective civil society advocates, increase judicial capacity, and improve 

international coordination. 

Question: 

How is the US. engaging the private sector and countries in the region following the Summit of 

the Americas in Lima to implement the 57 points that were agreed to in order to ensure countries 

address corruption issues? 

US. follow up to the 2018 Summit of the Americas focuses on implementing the region's 

commitments to combating corruption, promoting transparency, and ensuring our security, as 

reflected in the leaders' "Lima Commitment" declaration. The Department is supporting Peru's 

efiorts to develop a follow-up mechanism to ensure implementation of governments' Summit 

commitments, which include combating transnational criminal organizations and their corrupt 

activities, enhancing international legal cooperation, and combating bribery of domestic and 

foreign public ot1icials, among others. 

Due in large part to US. government and private sector efforts, the Lima Commitment 

encourages Summit governments to work with stakeholders, including civil society and the 

business community, to combat corruption and its root causes. The Department is working with 

the Americas Business Dialot,'lle to ensure governments and the private sector are equally 

committed to transparency in doing business. The Department will seek input on implementing 

the Summit of the Americas outcomes from the Americas Business Dialot,'lle and civil society 

leaders and continue to advocate for those stakeholders to have substantive roles in the Summit 

of the Americas process. 
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Promoting U.S. Commercictf Interests in the Region: 

Question: 

I am concerned about the importance of protecting US intellectual property rights in the region, 

and I've heard from US. businesses, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, who have invested 

billions of dollars in developing innovative drugs for the market One trend I'm hearing trom 

businesses about is recent action by some countries in Latin America to unlawfully obtain access 

to US. intellectual property using compulsory licenses on patent protected medicines. Other 

companies have had regulatory and bribery challenges and inconsistent application of permits 

and licenses in many countries. 

What is the State Department doing to work with the region to address these challenges? 

The State Department is committed to working with international partners to identify practical 

ways to increase access to safe, etiective, atiordable, and life-saving medicines around the 

world, and to support policies that drive development of new medicines. The State Department 

regularly underlines our concerns regarding infringement of US. firms' intellectual property 

rights in meetings with foreign government otlicials in the Western Hemisphere and we advocate 

for strengthened IP regimes. 

The US. government position on compulsory licensing is clearly stated in the 2018 Special301 

Report: "To maintain the integrity and predictability of IP systems, governments should use 

compulsory licenses only in extremely limited circumstances and after making every etiort to 

obtain authorization trom the patent owner on reasonable commercial terms and conditions. 

Such licenses should not be used as a tool to implement industrial policy, including providing 

advantages to domestic companies, or as undue leverage in pricing negotiations between 

governments and right holders'' 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Brad Sherman 

For the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Advancing US. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

July 11, 2018 

World Health Assembly in Ecuador: 

Question: 

On July 8, the New York Times reported that the American delegation to the World Health 

Assembly sought to block the introduction of a resolution promoting breastfeeding. The 

resolution's intended sponsor, Ecuador, was threatened with "punishing trade measures" and the 

"withdraw[al of] crucial military aid.'' It has also been reported that our Ambassador in Quito 

said the Administration might end military assistance in northern Ecuador if the resolution was 

introduced. 

Was Ecuador threatened over its potential introduction of the resolution by the State Department 

or any other US. government agency? Did Ambassador Chapman, or any other official, 

"suggest" or otherwise imply economic or military cooperation consequences if the resolution 

was introduced? 

No. The United States made no threats against any partner nation in relation to the proposed 

resolution for the May 2018 World Health Assembly. The United States works constructively 

with other Member States of the World Health Organization to find common ground on issues at 

the World Health Assembly and other governing bodies. On the resolution in question, the 

United States was a leading voice in negotiations that led to adoption of the resolution by 

consensus. 

Question: 

After Ecuador opted to not introduce the resolution, did the United States pressure or encourage 

other countries to not introduce, or to revise the lanb'llage of, any resolutions relating to 

breastfeeding? 

The United States did not engage in pressure tactics in relation to this resolution. The United 

States worked collaboratively with colleab'l!es from other nations to come to agreement on the 

wording of the resolution during the recent World Health Assembly. 

Question: 

Was the State Department in contact with representatives of any infant formula company in 

advance of the World Health Assembly? Is the State Department aware of any Assembly-related 
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contacts with such companies by any other US. government agencies or White House otJicials? 

If so, please describe the nature of these contacts. 

The United States hears from a wide variety of stakeholders in advance of the annual World 

Health Assembly. The State Department was not in contact with representatives of any infant 

formula company in relation to the resolution proposed by the government of Ecuador. 

Furthermore, the State Department is not aware of contacts with infant formula companies by 

any other offices of the United States government in relation to the resolution proposed by the 

government of Ecuador. 

Qnestion: 

Will you commit to support etl'orts to promote breastfeeding at the World Health Assembly? 

Specifically, if an identical resolution to the one originally proposed by Ecuador is offered at 

next year's Assembly, will the United States support it? 

The United States strongly supports breastfeeding as the healthiest option for infant nutrition and 

development. Improving maternal, infant, and young child nutrition is a high priority among 

Member States at the World Health Assembly, and the United States will continue to at1irm our 

consistent support for breastfeeding at the World Health Organization. Through USAID, the 

United States helped countries to promote, protect, and support breastfeeding as a way to reduce 

infant malnutrition and child mortality for more than 45 years with outstanding results, including 

the doubling of breastfeeding rates across 20 of our priority nutrition countries between 1990 and 

2014. The importance of breastfeeding is not what was in dispute in an early draft of the 

resolution presented by the government of Ecuador. What was in dispute in the resolution were 

references to a controversial 2016 b'llidance document that sought to restrict information 

available to parents about safe, appropriate products for the children of mothers who for medical 

or personal reasons cannot breastfeed or choose not to exclusively breastfeed. In 2016, the 

Obama Administration raised the same concerns about the guidance. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative F. James Sensenbrenner 

For the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Advancing US. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

July 11, 2018 

Working with Peru: 

Question: 

"There is concern that the government of Peru has thus far been unable to resolve the claims of 

many of our constituents who have invested in Peruvian Agrarian Reform bonds, commonly 

known as "land bonds." These constituents are hard working men and women, often in blue 

collar jobs, who have invested via their pension funds, which are already facing considerable 

financial strain. Though the former President of Peru Pedro Pablo Kuczynski assured me last 

year that he would meet with the US. bondholders, to date the government has refused to do 

so. In her confirmation hearing, the WHA Assistant Secretary nominee committed to working 

with the Peruvian government to achieve a final resolution to this issue." 

What steps can the Department of State take to encourage Peru to fulfill its obligations to US. 

citizens on these notes? 

Otlicials at the Department of State and at our Embassy in Lima have met with representatives of 

current holders of the bonds (which were issued by left-wing Peruvian military governments 

between 1969 and 1979) on multiple occasions, and our door will continue to be open to them. 

The Department will continue our dialogue with the Peruvian government on this issue. 

Question: 

Is the United States willing to block Peru's membership request into the Organization for 

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) until the bond issue is resolved? 

Each country must meet high standards to join the OECD. Peru will be held to these standards 

as part of any consensus decision by OECD members to issue an invitation to Peru to start the 

accession process. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Joaquin Castro 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

Julyll,2018 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten's Answers 

Family Separation 

What role does the State Department play in family reunification for parents who have already 

been deported? 

The State Department is not involved in implementing US. border apprehension and deportation 

policies, though we communicate with foreign governments to help them understand how US. 

policies may affect their citizens. For questions related to current efforts in family reunification, 

we refer you to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS ), the US. government lead in the effort We coordinate closely with DHS, 

HHS, and other federal agencies in immigration-related discussions with the Central American 

and Mexican governments, and with respect to the topic in other regional fora. Further, we are 

working closely with our partners in Central America and Mexico to ensure that individuals 

returning to the region who hold US citizenship are appropriately documented and effectively 

integrated into society. 

Has this issue come up in any meetings with countries abroad or international organizations? If so, 

please detail any such high-level interactions. 

The Department is committed to our partnership with the Central American and Mexican 

governments to expand economic opportunity, improve governance, and enhance citizen security 

in the region. We regularly discuss immigration-related issues with government counterparts in 

bilateral and multilateral meetings, including at international fora 

On June 29, the OAS Permanent Council approved by consensus a resolution proposed by Mexico, 

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras expressing concern regarding implementation of the "zero 

tolerance" policy and the separation of migrant families along the US. southwest border. The 

final text called on the United States to continue implementing the June 20 executive order ending 

family separations. The United States delivered a statement regarding US. immigration practices 

and included a footnote clarifying various legal understandings and concerns. Additionally, we 

communicated our openness to considering a site visit by the Inter-American Commission on 

Human Rights (IACHR) to the southwest border, as requested in the resolution. 
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Venezuela 

Is the State Department tracking the emigration of Venezuelan citizens who have fled Venezuela 

due to the ongoing political and economic turmoil in the country? To which countries have they 

fled? 

The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) tracks the outflows 

of Venezuelans and maintains an estimate of the number of Venezuelans present throughout Latin 

America and the Caribbean. The countries in the region hosting the largest population of 

Venezuelans are Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Brazil. However, there are also some smaller 

countries in the region, especially Trinidad and Tobago, which are hosting large numbers of 

Venezuelans in proportion to their overall population. 

What etiorts is the United States government undertaking to support the ability of these countries 

to accommodate these emigres? 

The United States, through the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration (State/PRM) and USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian 

Assistance, is providing life-saving humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people in countries 

atiected by an influx of fleeing Venezuelans. This assistance, provided in coordination with other 

humanitarian organizations and relevant government authorities, includes shelter for the most 

vulnerable, safe drinking water and hygiene supplies, food, protection from violence and 

exploitation, and access to work, education, and medical care. In FY 2017 and to date in FY 2018, 

the United States has provided more than $3 7 million in humanitarian funding for the regional 

response to the Venezuela refugee and migration crisis. The funding includes nearly $24 million 

in State/PRM funding, including support for the regional, multi -sectoral response efforts of 

UNHCR and IOM in the broader Latin America and Caribbean region; $6 million for USAID/FFPsupported programs in Colombia and Ecuador; and nearly $7.5 million for USAID/OFDAsupported programs in Brazil, Colombia and the region. We are monitoring migration t1ows and 

assessing options for additional humanitarian assistance in the region given the scale of the 

displacement. 

How many such Venezuelan citizens have moved to the United States as a result of the political 

and economic situation in Venezuela" 
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The political and economic cns1s inflicted by the Madura regime has forced millions of 

Venezuelans to flee their homeland. The United States is supporting emergency response efforts 

throughout the hemisphere to help mitigate the plight of the Venezuelan people. We support the 

democratic aspirations of the people of Venezuela and urge an end to the crisis along with a swift 

return to a prosperous democracy. 

For specifics on immigration into the United States, we refer you to the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Question: 

From which countries do the security forces of the Venezuelan government procure weapons, 

equipment, training? 

The Venezuelan government procures the majority of its weapons, equipment, and training from 

Russia and China. It sustains a small amount of legacy US. and European equipment. 

Has the United States provided or sold any weapons, equipment, ortraining to Venezuelan security 

forces since January 2008? n· so, what please detail any such transfers or sales. 

No. Venezuelan security forces have not received any weapons, equipment, training, or any form 

of security assistance from the United States since 2006. 

NAFTA 

When will the United States, Mexico, and Canada wrap up NAFTA negotiations~ 

USTR is renegotiating NAFTA to modernize the agreement in order to reflect the highest standards 

and to rebalance the agreement to better serve US. interests. 

The United States, Canada, and Mexico have held seven rounds of negotiations covering more 

than two dozen different topics. The NAFTA countries have held discussions at all levels of 

government since the last formal negotiating round in March. 
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The Department continues to support ongoing efforts and the U.S. commitment to rebalance and 

upgrade the agreement 

What are the negotiating objectives of the United States in renegotiating the NAFTA agreement? 

Have these objectives of the United States changed during the course of the renegotiations, since 

January 2017~ 

In renegotiating NAFTA, the Administration seeks to create more balanced, reciprocal trade that 

supports more high-paying jobs for Americans and grows the U.S. economy. We seek to 

modernize the agreement to reflect the highest standards, and to rebalance the agreement to better 

serve the interests of American workers, fanners, ranchers, and businesses. These goals have not 

significantly changed since USTR first published negotiating objectives in July 2017 with an 

update in November 2017. 

Has the United States government conducted an analysis of the economic costs of withdrawal tram 

NAFTA? Please provide a copy to me if any such analysis exists. 

The President has made it clear that we need more balanced, reciprocal trade that supports more 

high-paying U.S. jobs and grows the U.S. economy. The United States is working to secure the 

best possible deal for American workers and businesses. 

As you are aware, USTR has the lead in the negotiations for the United States, with support ±rom 

the Department of State and other agencies. The Department will continue to support U.S. 

negotiating objectives. 

Of the various chapters of a renegotiated NAFTA, which chapters have negotiators finalized? 

Which chapters are remaining? 

We have completed seven formal rounds in the renegotiation of the NAFTA To date, we have 

concluded substantive discussions in nine chapters and several sectoral annexes. The nine chapters 

include small and medium-sized enterprises, competition, anti-corruption, good regulatory 

practices, administration and publication, sanitary and phytosanitary, telecom, technical barriers 

to trade, and competitiveness. Significant issues remain to be negotiated. The chapters remaining 

include energy, customs/trade facilitation, financial services, investment, digital trade, rules of 

origin, and government procurement, among others. 
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[Note: The preceding questions were directed to both witnesses. Prior to printing, 

however, no responses were received from Ms. Sarah-Ann.]

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Economic Support antllntegrlltion 

What efforts are the Department of State and USAID currently taking to support economic 

integration, connectivity, and commerce between the United States and Latin America and the 

Caribbean? 

The United States has free trade agreements with 11 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

playing a significant part in the $1.1 trillion in goods and services we traded with the region last 

year. The Department is participating in the renegotiation ofNAFTA to bring it in line with 21'1 

century standards, especially on digital trade. As part of the U.S Stratef,'Y for Central America, 

USAID is working to enhance regional integration and improve trade facilitation, targeting 

assistance on key ports of entry and economic corridors to reduce the time and cost of trading 

across borders. These etl'orts are boosting regional competitiveness and reducing costs for U.S. 

and local businesses. 

The United States is an otlicial observer to the Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia), 

which is enhancing economic integration across the region. The Department has supported the 

Pacific Alliance in the areas of small business development, entrepreneurship, and trade 

facilitation and is developing additional areas of cooperation. The Department also supports 

similar activities through the OAS. The Department's Caribbean 2020 strategy is engaging in 

areas such as expanding internet access and promoting sustainable economic policies across the 

region in key forums such as the U.S.-CARICOM Trade and Investment Council. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Norma J. Torres 

For the Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere 

Julyll,2018 

"On July 7, 2018, the Secretary of State published the following notice in the Federal Register: 

'By virtue of the authority vested in me as the Secretary of State, including pursuant to 

section 7045(a)(4)(B) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act 2017 (Div J, Pub. L 115-31), I hereby certify that the 

central Government of Guatemala is taking effective steps, which are in addition to those 

steps taken since the certification and report submitted during the prior year, to: 

Work cooperatively with an autonomous, publicly accountable entity to provide oversight 

of the Plan; 

Combat all forms of government and international agency corruption and impunity when 

credibly alleged; 

Implement reforms, policies, and programs to improve transparency and strengthen 

public institutions, including increasing the capacity and independence of the judiciary 

and the Office of the Attorney General; 

Implement a policy to ensure that local communities, civil society organizations 

(including indigenous and other marginalized groups), private sector, faith-based 

organizations, and local governments are consulted in the design and participate in the 

implementation and evaluation of activities of the Plan that affect such communities, 

organizations, and governments; 

Counter the activities of criminal gangs, drug tratlickers, and organized crime; 

Investigate and prosecute in the civilian justice system government personnel, including 

military and police personnel, who are credibly alleged to have violated human rights and 

to ensure that such personnel are cooperating in such cases; 

Cooperate with commissions against corruption and impunity and with regional human 

rights entities; 

Support programs to reduce poverty, expand education and vocational training for at-risk 

youth, create jobs, and promote equitable economic growth particularly in areas 

contributing to large numbers of migrants; 

Implement a plan that includes goals, benchmarks, and timelines to create a professional, 

accountable civilian police force and end the role of the military in internal policing, and 

to make such plan available to the Department of State; 

Protect the rights of all citizens, including protection of freedom of the press; 
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Increase government efficiencies, including implementing tax reforms and strenb>thening 

customs agencies to promote a more stable economy and job creation; 

Resolve commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between US. 

entities and such government.' 

On Aub>ust 27, 2017, two days after the Attorney General and the International Commission 

against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) announced they were seeking to lift President Morales's 

immunity from prosecution, Morales declared the head of CICIG, Ivim Vel<isquez, persona non 

grata and ordered him to leave the country. One of Morales's ministers resigned rather than carry 

out the order, and the constitutional court-Guatemala's highest court-blocked the order. 

On September 11, 2017, the Guatemalan Congress voted to defeat a motion to remove President 

Morales' immunity from prosecution. Two-thirds of the !58-member legislature, or 105 

deputies, are needed to remove an otlicial's immunity; only 25 deputies voted to remove his 

immunity. About 20 percent of the legislators are also under investigation. 

On September 13, 2017, the Guatemalan Congress approved the "National Emergency" bill. This 

bill would have reduced penalties for violations of campaign finance laws, and made party 

accountants-rather than party leaders-responsible for such violations. Public outcry was such 

that the Congress repealed the bill, which tbe public labeled the 'Pact of the Corrupt,' two days 

later. Thousands of protesters demanded the resignation of Morales, and of the 107 legislators 

who voted to weaken anticorruption laws. 

On September 21, 20 17, the Guatemalan Congress again voted to continue to protect the 

president from further investigation, although the number voting to rescind his immunity rose to 

70. Attorney General Thelma Aldana and CICIG had sought to lift President Morales's immunity 

from prosecution so they could further investigate alleged violations of campaign finance laws, 

as well as potentially illegal bonuses paid to him by the military. 

On Wednesday, July 4, 2018, the National Civil Police recalled 20 police ofticers who were 

assigned to provide security for CICIG, leaving only 25 officers to provide security for the 

Commission, even though Article 8 of the agreement between the Guatemalan Government and 

the United Nations states that 'the Government of Guatemala shall take such efl'ective and 

adequate measures as may be required to ensure tbe security and protection of the persons 

referred to in this Agreement' 

Beginning on June 26, 2018, the Chief of Security of the Guatemalan Public Ministry ordered a 

series of changes to the security measures provided for the security of former Attorney General 

Thelma Aldana, including the replacement of vehicles provided for her security with older 

models in poor condition, including one vehicle which lacked brakes. 
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Question: 

Does the Department agree that these actions are contrary to the requirement that the 

Government of Guatemala 'Implement reforms, policies, and programs to improve transparency 

and strengthen public institutions, including increasing the capacity and independence of the 

judiciary and the Ofllce of the Attorney General' and the requirement that the Government of 

Guatemala 'Cooperate with commissions against corruption and impunity and with regional 

human rights entities'? 

While serious challenges remain in the implementation of reforms, policies, and programs to 

improve transparency and strengthen public institutions, the Department notes that Guatemala 

has made sufficient progress to meet the Congressional criteria. 

Question: 

If so, how did the Department take these actions into account when making its decision to issue 

the certification described above? 

The Department certified Guatemala following a thorough evaluation of the steps taken by the 

Guatemalan government to meet each of the 12 Congressional criteria, as set forth in the FY 

2017 Consolidated Act 

Specific progress has been made in several areas For example, the public ministry, in 

collaboration with the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), 

thoroughly investigated current and former government otiicials and private sector actors 

credibly alleged to have committed corrupt acts. On May 3, following a transparent nomination 

process, President Morales complied with the guidelines set forth by the postulation commission 

to select a qualified new attorney general, Maria Consuela Porras Argueta, with credentials to 

continue the fight against corruption. At the request of President Morales, Guatemala's congress 

increased the public ministry's 2017 budget by 22.7 percent over 2016levels to include ti.mding 

for anticorruption and internal affairs prosecutors units and the establishment of new 

investigative units to work alongside CICIG in the Western Highlands. These were all positive 

etiects that factored into the decision to certify. 

Question: 

To what extent is the Department concerned that issuing a certification despite the 

preponderance of such actions could send a policy signal that the United States supports or 

countenances such actions? 
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Answer: 

Continued collaboration with the Guatemalan government is vital to our efforts to stem illegal 

immigration, fight corruption, combat impunity, enhance security cooperation, and increase 

economic opportunity in Central America. 

Certifying Guatemala allows U.S. foreign assistance to move forward as intended to advance our 

strategy for Central America, including through support for the International Commission 

Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and capacity building for the Public Ministry, and 

through programs that work to address the economic drivers of illegal immigration. 

Question: 

What actions does the Department intend to take to deter future actions that are contrary to the 

requirement that the Government of Guatemala 'Implement reforms, policies, and programs to 

improve transparency and strengthen public institutions, including increasing the capacity and 

independence of the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General' and the requirement that 

the Government of Guatemala 'Cooperate with commissions against corruption and impunity 

and with regional human rights entities'?" 

The Department is committed to using all of the tools at our disposal, including travel restrictions 

and visa revocations, to ensure individuals who have violated human rights, have engaged in 

corruption, or committed other criminal acts, including impeding the fight against corruption and 

impunity, do not secure safe haven in the United States.