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i

**Strategic Studies Institute**

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**U.S. Army War College Press**

**TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE:**

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

**Richard Weitz**

**September 2014**

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iii

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iv

**FOREWORD**

Since the Cold War era, when the United States 

began heavily investing in Turkey’s military and de-

fense operations, the United States and Turkey have 

enjoyed  a  fruitful  and  mutually  beneficial  relation-

ship. Because of Turkey’s geographic location, politi-

cal stability, and recent economic success, the country 

has served as a strategic ally in U.S. foreign policy. 

The Arab uprisings in particular have challenged the 

Turkish-U.S. partnership. For a country that was al-

ready struggling to balance its position as a regional 

power with the imperative of maintaining good rela-

tions with its Western allies, the increasing instability 

in the region has forced Ankara to rely more on the 

United States than it would prefer. Although the Syr-

ian conflict has underscored to Turkey the value of its 

security ties with the United States, the war has also 

exposed deep differences between the two countries 

on fundamental issues. While presently partially bur-

ied, these differences could easily rise to the surface in 

coming years. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. 

Director

Strategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

v

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

**RICHARD WEITZ** is Senior Fellow and Director of 

the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hud-

son Institute. His current research includes regional 

security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, 

and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense 

policies. Dr. Weitz is also an expert at Wikistrat and 

a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New 

American Security (CNAS). Before joining Hudson in 

2005, Weitz worked for the Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Stud-

ies, Defense Science Board, DFI International, Inc., 

Center for Strategic Studies, Harvard University’s 

Kennedy School of Government, and the U.S. Depart-

ment of Defense. Dr. Weitz has authored or edited 

several books and monographs, including  *Rebuilding*

*American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century*

*Strategy* (2013);  *Global Security Watch-China* (2013); two volumes of  *National  Security  Case  Studies* (2012 and 

2008);  *War  and  Governance:  International  Security  in  a*

*Changing World Order* (2011);  *The Russian Military To-*

*day and Tomorrow* (2010);  *Global Security Watch-Russia*

(2009);  *China-Russia  Security  Relations* (2008);  *Mis-*

*managing Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis*

(2008);  *The  Reserve  Policies  of  Nations:  A  Comparative*

*Analysis*(2007); and  *Revitalising U.S.–Russian Security**Cooperation: Practical Measures* (2005). Dr. Weitz holds 

a B.A. with Highest Honors in government from Har-

vard College, an M.Sc. in international relations from 

the London School of Economics, an M.Phil. in politics 

from the Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in political 

science from Harvard University. 

vii

**SUMMARY**

Until a few years ago, the relationship between 

Washington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perenni-

ally troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks strongly 

opposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have sub-

sequently complained that the Pentagon was allowing 

Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorat-

ing security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagree-

ments over how to respond to Iran’s nuclear program, 

U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey’s outreach efforts 

to Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Pal-

estinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties and 

contributed to further anti-Americanism in Turkey. 

Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local chal-

lenges by moving closer to the West, leading to the 

advent of a “Golden Era” in Turkish-U.S. relations. 

Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship 

a “model partnership” and Turkey “a critical ally.” 

Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties have 

improved during the last few years. The U.S. military 

withdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tension 

and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with 

Washington  to  influence  developments  in  Iraq.  Fur-

thermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries to 

partner in support of the positive agenda of promoting 

democracy and security in the Middle East. Americans 

and Turks both want to see democratic secular govern-

ments in the region rather than religiously sanctioned 

authoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey’s reconciliation 

efforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankara 

to realize that having good relations with the United 

States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle East 

and beyond. Even though Turkey’s role as a provider 

of security and stability in the region is weakened as 

ix

a result of the recent developments in Syria and the 

ensuing negative consequences in its relations to other 

countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and re-

sume its position. Partnering with the United States is 

not always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuaded 

Turkey’s leaders that they need to backstop their new 

economic strength and cultural attractiveness with the 

kind of hard power that is most readily available to 

the United States. For a partnership between Turkey 

and the United States to endure, however, Turkey 

must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspec-

tive, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and 

resolve  a  domestic  democratic  deficit.  At  the  same 

time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting 

Turkey’s security concerns regarding the European 

Union, while the United States should adopt a more 

proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of 

tensions between Ankara and Washington that could 

significantly worsen at any time. 

x

**TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE:**

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

**INTRODUCTION**

During its past decade under the ruling Justice 

and Development Party ( *Adalet  ve  Kalkınma  Partisi*

or AKP), Turkey became a much more prominent 

global actor due to its dynamic diplomacy, strength-

ening economy, and the security vacuum in its tur-

bulent neighborhood, which created a demand for 

the greater foreign policy activism Ankara was now 

able to provide. The “zero problems with neighbors” 

policy, which has been the cornerstone of the Turk-

ish AKP party’s foreign policy under Prime Minister 

Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  and  Foreign  Minister  Ahmet 

Davutoğlu,  aims  at  resolving  all  Turkey’s  problems 

with neighbors, or at least minimizing them as much 

as possible. Guided by the philosophy of Davutoğlu, 

the dominant strategic thinker of the AKP even be-

fore he became foreign minister, Turkey has sought to 

improve its political relations with its key neighbors 

by strengthening mutual economic links and by mov-

ing its position on prominent issues, such as Israel 

and Iran’s nuclear program, closer to the mainstream 

international view even if that differed from the po-

sition favored by the United States and most North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) governments. 

The goal has been to strengthen Turkey’s economy, 

achieve greater regional stability, and thereby raise 

Ankara’s  global  influence.  The  Turkish  leadership 

recognized  that  regional  conflict  and  competition 

would persist, but hoped the parties would keep these 

negative elements constrained to enjoy the positive 

benefits of improved economic relations and a more 

1

secure region, which would provide Turkey with the 

“strategic depth” Ankara needed to become a great 

power. Turkey’s rapid economic growth is facilitat-

ing the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces 

(TSK) and the country’s domestic defense industry. 

Its large, predominately moderate Muslim popula-

tion provides Ankara with one of the largest and most 

readily deployable armies in Europe. Turkey’s loca-

tion astride multiple global hotspots—the Balkans, the 

Caucasus, the Middle East, etc.—widens NATO’s geo-

graphic perspective. Turkish strategic thinkers have 

traditionally seen their country as surrounded by un-

stable, potentially hostile geographic regions. Turkish 

foreign and defense policy has sought to reduce this 

instability—and ideally transform Turkey’s pivotal 

geopolitical position from that of a liability into an 

advantage—by partnering with the United States and 

other NATO countries. Being more flexible, however, 

recent Turkish foreign policy has also become less pre-

dictable, which complicates Ankara’s relations with 

Washington and other traditional partners. Within 

Turkey, newly empowered societal actors such as eth-

nic lobbies, business associations, influential civilian 

politicians, and a resurgent religious establishment 

have pushed for changes in long-established foreign 

and defense policies. Conversely, the Turkish mili-

tary, previously the dominant security actor, has lost 

influence, weakening a traditional force favoring close 

ties with the United States. The AKP has managed to 

exploit Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union 

(EU) to justify stripping the TSK of political powers. 

2

**EUROPEAN SECURITY**

Turkey has presented both a challenge and an op-

portunity to NATO and the EU as they restructure 

their roles, missions, and capabilities to address Eu-

rope’s 21st-century security challenges. Since NATO’s 

foundation in 1949, the Alliance has played a crucial 

role in Turkey’s security strategy and contributed to 

its integration with both Europe and the United States. 

During the Cold War, the Turkish government relied 

on its NATO membership and its bilateral alliance 

with the United States to backstop Turkey’s security. 

The pro-Western elite that dominated the country’s 

foreign and defense policies viewed Turkey’s affilia-

tion with NATO and ties to the United States as defin-

ing and ensuring its status as a core member of the 

Western camp. 

NATO simultaneously defended Turkey against 

the Warsaw Pact and benefited from Ankara’s efforts 

to deter Soviet adventurism. Though confrontations 

occurred between Turkey and fellow Alliance mem-

ber Greece over Cyprus and other issues, these con-

flicts actually highlighted NATO’s additional value in 

moderating differences between Athens and Ankara. 

Turkey has not only benefitted from NATO’s support, 

but has also contributed heavily to the Alliance’s effort 

to promote security in the Euro-Atlantic region and 

beyond. Turkey serves as the organization’s vital east-

ern anchor, controlling the straits between the Black 

Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and sharing a border 

with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Although the Cold War is 

over, NATO’s importance for Turkey remains. With 

much of Europe paralyzed due to the Euro crisis and 

with U.S. attention drifting eastward, Turkey has the 

opportunity to emerge as one of NATO’s new leaders, 

3

providing Ankara adopts more of a collective transat-

lantic perspective and stops trying to import its bilat-

eral disputes with Israel and the EU into the Alliance’s 

multinational deliberations. Having been a member 

of NATO since 1952, an aspirant for EU membership 

for over a decade, and disposing of one of Europe’s 

most powerful military forces, Turkey must perforce 

be a key component of any effective European secu-

rity architecture. Yet, finding an appropriate place for 

Ankara in the evolving EU-NATO balance has proven 

exceptionally difficult given the country’s continued 

exclusion from the EU and dispute with the govern-

ment of Cyprus. 

Turkish officials have waged a protracted battle to 

influence EU security decisions and compel Greek Cy-

priots to reach a political settlement with their Turkish 

minority. In pursuit of these ends, they have proved 

willing to block EU-NATO cooperation on important 

security issues. A recurring problem is that Turkey is 

a member of NATO but not the EU, whereas Cyprus 

belongs to the EU but not NATO. The two countries 

have used the consensus rules of each organization 

to prevent one organization from cooperating with 

the other on important security issues. In particular, 

Turkish objections to the possible leaking of sensitive 

NATO military information to Cyprus have limited 

ties between the EU and NATO since Cyprus joined 

the Union in 2004. With no security arrangement in 

place, EU officers on the training mission for Afghan 

police are forced to improvise on the ground for their 

own protection with local International Security As-

sistance Force (ISAF) commanders. 

These mutual antagonisms have constrained 

NATO-EU cooperation in general, and disrupted the 

joint NATO-EU security missions in Afghanistan, 

4

Kosovo, and in the Gulf of Aden in particular. For 

example, there is no comprehensive EU-NATO agree-

ment on the provision by ISAF of security for the Eu-

ropean Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) 

staff  and  no  possibility  to  exchange  classified  and 

often critical information. Consequently, EUPOL has 

had to conclude individual agreements with Provin-

cial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations and has even 

been obliged to hire a private company to guarantee 

its security and to maintain an extremely tight secu-

rity policy. Moreover, Turkey and the United States 

did not conclude bilateral agreements with EUPOL. 

All this has slowed down EUPOL’s deployment 

and hampered its effectiveness.1 The AKP’s dominant 

form of security discourse, with frequent references to 

multilateralism, soft power, and critical dialogue, re-

sembles more closely that used by EU rather than U.S. 

officials,  who  try  to  “keep  all  options  on  the  table,” 

including the use of military force. But Turkey has al-

ways relied on the United States as well as NATO to 

provide such power when it is needed. For example, 

Turkey insisted on giving NATO control of the 2011 

Libyan intervention.2 Having NATO, rather than an ad 

hoc coalition or one led by the EU or United States, will 

likely remain Ankara’s preference as long as Turkey is 

excluded from the EU.3 

**NATO**

When NATO was formed in April 1949, Turkey 

was not initially invited to join. Washington was re-

luctant to commit to defend distant Turkey, and had 

also rejected Turkish proposals for a bilateral alliance 

or a unilateral U.S. security guarantee. NATO’s West 

European members did not want to risk diluting the 

5

U.S. economic and other assistance they were receiv-

ing. Although some Turkish leaders wanted to pur-

sue a more neutral foreign policy following NATO’s 

snub, Turkish policymakers continued to pursue 

NATO membership, believing the Alliance offered 

Turkey the optimal Western anchor. Turkey’s key 

contribution to the U.S.-United Nations (UN) Korean 

War effort augmented Ankara’s renewed membership 

campaign. In September 1951, NATO invited Turkey, 

along with Greece, to join the Alliance. The United 

States was hesitant to extend its involvement in the 

Middle East due to its commitments in Europe and 

Asia.4 Yet, with the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia, 

the decline of British influence in the Middle East, and 

the threat of Soviet aggression in the Mediterranean, 

the United States began to not only see the importance 

of the Middle East but also the importance of Turkey 

as a potential ally. At the time, several factors impeded 

Turkey’s admission into NATO. Influential European 

leaders considered Turkey as part of the Middle East 

and did not want to extend the Marshall Plan to Tur-

key.5 Nonetheless, London, United Kingdom (UK), 

and Washington pushed for Turkey’s admission into 

NATO, primarily because of its “guardianship” of the 

Dardanelles and Bosporus. Under the Montreux Con-

vention, Turkey could close these straits to the Soviet 

Navy in wartime.6

Turkey has since made major contributions to 

Western security. During the Cold War, Turkey 

helped constrain the Soviet Navy in the Mediterra-

nean, provided one of the largest armies in Europe, 

and hosted key NATO military facilities. NATO 

planners were concerned with strategic weaknesses 

that could be exploited by the Soviet Union if war 

were to erupt between the Alliance and the Union of 

6

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). NATO’s boundaries 

stretched from the North Cape in Norway to Mount 

Agri in eastern Turkey, and while central Europe was 

the primary focus of NATO’s defense, its northern 

and southern flanks were dangerously exposed. Not 

only did NATO have to contend with Soviet ambi-

tions in the Mediterranean, but it also had to deal with 

the  deterioration  of  British  influence  in  the  Middle 

East and the disunity between the Arab states. The 

Middle East and the Mediterranean are also important 

because of vital transportation and communications 

lines and the raw materials located in the region.7 In 

addition, Turkey not only played an important role 

in intelligence gathering, early warning, forward bas-

ing, logistics, and training, but also served as a valu-

able link between the Middle East and the West. This 

was demonstrated during the U.S. landings in Leba-

non in 1958 and the Jordanian civil war in 1970. Un-

til its military intervention in the Cyprus crisis, Tur-

key was “a strong element of stability in the eastern 

Mediterranean.”8

The end of the Cold War, however, changed this 

relationship.9 Turkey cooperated with the United 

States in the 1991 Gulf War and contributed to NATO-

backed missions in the former Yugoslavia and Libya. 

But as the 1990s unfolded, Turkey suffered escalating 

terrorist violence in the southeast region, a major eco-

nomic crisis, increased political polarization, a secu-

rity vacuum in neighboring northern Iraq (which the 

PKK exploited), and perceived diminished Western 

interest and support.10 The September 2001 (9/11) at-

tack on the World Trade Center marked a new era in 

NATO’s history, but it also led to a change of Turkeyś 

role within the Alliance’s structure. The more diverse 

security environment in the post-9/11 world has led 

7

to NATO engagements far beyond the Euro-Atlantic 

area, and provided new importance to Turkey, given 

its geographical and cultural position in contempo-

rary “out of area” missions.11 There are three main de-

velopments that gave Turkey a more significant role 

in the organization. First, NATO’s attention expanded 

to include a wider geographical focus, reaching coun-

tries with a strategic distance away from the Euro-At-

lantic geography. This included a specific focus on the 

Middle East and countries located in Turkey’s neigh-

borhood. Second, the allies reached a consensus to in-

clude terrorism in NATO’s agenda, creating a need for 

new means and strategies, which largely depended on 

local knowledge that Turkey could contribute regard-

ing its region. Third, Turkey has close physical and 

other connections with Afghanistan.12 

Turkey brings other important assets to the NATO 

Alliance. It is the only predominantly Muslim member 

of NATO and boasts one of the world’s most dynamic 

economies. The country’s rapid growth is allowing 

the country to enhance its military forces through both 

foreign purchases and an improving domestic defense 

industry. Thanks to its large population and the geo-

graphically broad perspective of its national security 

community, Turkey has one of the largest and most 

readily deployable armies in Europe. With a force of 

over 600,000 personnel and a military budget of close 

to $19 billion, Turkey has the second largest military 

in NATO.13 Turkey borders three security hotspots of 

concern for the Alliance: the Balkans, the Caucasus, 

and the Middle East. Turkey has contributed heavily 

to the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan, commanding 

ISAF on multiple occasions and stationing more than 

1,700 troops in Kabul. Turkey has made substantial 

contributions to the reconstruction of the country. 

8

One such example is the Vardak Provincial Construc-

tion Team, which was established in November 2006. 

Under its auspices, Turkey had provided $200 mil-

lion worth of aid by 2008.14 At the same time, Turkey 

has deployed soldiers to Afghanistan to train Afghan 

soldiers and police belonging to the Afghan National 

Security Forces. Turkey’s training mission, its eco-

nomic assistance, and its regional diplomatic initia-

tives aimed at reconciling Afghanistan and Pakistan 

are essential to promoting Afghanistan’s security and 

post-conflict  reconstruction.  President  Abdullah  Gül 

has said that, “As stakeholders in the region, we can-

not expect that the United States and other Western 

powers solve the problems by themselves. We should 

shoulder our responsibilities.”15 In addition, by con-

structing  roads,  Turkish  firms  are  building  stronger 

economic relations and diplomatic ties between Af-

ghanistan and other countries.16 With its involvement 

in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Turkey can not 

only take a stand against Taliban extremism, but also 

provide NATO with leverage against Iran.17

Turkey’s influence in the Balkans, another area of 

concern for NATO, remains strong, especially since 

Ankara has improved relations with Serbia. Turkey 

has made contributions to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), 

the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(SFOR), and the follow-on mission led by the Europe-

an Union Force Althea.18 For years, Turkish warships 

have been helping patrol the Black Sea and eastern 

Mediterranean against terrorists and other threats to 

these vital lifelines. Ankara has supported expanding 

NATO’s roster of members and partners since the Al-

liance’s enlargement promotes stability in neighbor-

ing regions. Current Turkish efforts focus on assisting 

Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 

9

Herzegovina in their efforts to join NATO at some 

point. In terms of NATO’s “new missions,” Turkey 

is playing a vital role in promoting NATO’s energy 

security by serving as a vital conduit for oil and gas 

reaching Europe from Eurasia, especially the Caspian 

basin and Russia. Turkey’s energy partnership and 

overall good relations with Russia, despite differences 

over the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 

(CFE) and Syria, have helped buffer Russia-NATO 

tensions on many issues. In the future, Turkish diplo-

mats could help resolve the protracted conflicts in the 

former Soviet Union involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia. 

Ankara has also played a critical role in the Eu-

ropean Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which 

is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian 

short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. 

assets, personnel, and allies in Europe.19 When the 

Obama administration announced the EPAA, it was 

in Turkey’s interest to integrate the U.S. program into 

NATO to present a transatlantic missile defense proj-

ect as a NATO rather than a U.S. plan to its neighbors. 

In September 2011, Turkey agreed to host in Malatya 

a forward deployed AN/TPY-2 early warning radar 

system, operational since January 2012, as part of the 

EPAA ballistic missile defense program. Turkey has 

also played an important role in advancing NATO’s 

security in the Middle East. From August 2004 to June 

2013, Turkey hosted NATO’s Allied Air Command 

Headquarters. This Air Command, located in Izmir, 

was part of Allied Joint Force Command Naples and 

safeguarded almost three million square miles of air-

space across NATO’s southern region. The Air Com-

mand in Turkey played an important role in Operation 

UNIFIED PROTECTOR against Libya.20 Turkey today 

10

hosts NATO’s Land Command headquarters, which 

is also located in Izmir, in addition to one of NATO’s 

six “Rapid Deployable Corps,” which are high readi-

ness headquarters that can be quickly removed to lead 

NATO troops on missions within or beyond NATO 

territory.21 As part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrange-

ment, Turkey is reported to host U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.22 Turkey 

and NATO have been aligning their policies toward 

Syria throughout the crisis there. Turkey is playing 

a crucial role in promoting NATO’s energy security 

by serving as a vital conduit for oil and gas reaching 

Europe from Eurasia, especially the Caspian basin 

and Russia. 

From Washington’s perspective, Turkey has an 

exemplary nuclear nonproliferation record. Neither 

the collapse of the Eastern bloc, nor the wars involv-

ing neighboring Iraq, which under Saddam Hussein 

sought nuclear weapons and used chemical ones, nor 

Iran’s nuclear ambiguous ambitions have prompted 

Turkey to pursue nuclear weapons. Of particular im-

portance to Turkey’s foreign policy are arms control 

and disarmament treaties. Turkey became a party to 

the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 

2000. Turkey also joined the Chemical Weapons Con-

vention in 1997 and the Biological Weapons Conven-

tion in 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the founding 

member of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding 

export controls of conventional weapons and dual-

use equipment and technologies. Turkey joined the 

Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zang-

ger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

in 2000, and the Australia Group that seeks to ensure 

that exports do not contribute to the development of 

11

chemical or biological weapons that same year. Tur-

key supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 

which was launched by President George W. Bush 

during a speech in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003. 

Turkey joined, as initial partner state, the “Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (GICNT), 

launched by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Bush, fol-

lowing a joint statement in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 

July 2006. Turkey hosted the Initiative’s second meet-

ing in Ankara in February 2007. Turkey became a sig-

natory to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 

Missile Proliferation (HCOC) at the conference held 

in The Hague, the Netherlands, in November 2002. 

Furthermore, Turkey joined the “Convention on Pro-

hibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-

ventional Weapons” (CCW) and its three Protocols 

(Protocol I, Amended Protocol II, and Protocol IV) in 

2005. Under the provisions of the Convention, Turkey 

is obligated to destroy its stockpiled anti-personnel 

land mines by 2008 and to clear mined areas by 2014. 

In order to destroy the stockpiled anti-personnel land 

mines, the “Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Dispos-

al Facility” was built and has been operational since 

November 2007. 

Turkey’s  nonproliferation  bona  fides  were  high-

lighted by the March 26-27 Nuclear Security Sum-

mit in Seoul, Korea. Turkey’s delegation reported 

progress in adopting international treaties against 

nuclear terrorism, supporting UN and International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts in these areas, 

holding training courses for its customs and nuclear 

workers on nuclear security issues, participating in 

anti-nuclear smuggling initiatives, shipping danger-

ous highly enriched uranium spent reactor fuel to the 

United States for more secure storage, and upgrading 

12

the safety and security regulations for its emerging ci-

vilian nuclear energy program, especially the Akkuyu 

Nuclear Power Plant project. ****

Nonetheless, several developments could move the 

environment in a more adverse direction. Most obvi-

ously, unambiguous evidence could arise that Iran is 

pursuing nuclear weapons, which would compel Tur-

key to reassess its nuclear weapons policies. Turkey’s 

plans to expand its domestic nuclear energy program 

would, for the first time, provide its government with 

the scientific, technical, and industrial foundations to 

pursue genuine nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s 

own development of the capacity to make nuclear 

weapons has demonstrated to Ankara and others. But 

Turkey’s leaders might still decide that, even if Iran 

developed a small nuclear arsenal, they would be bet-

ter off continuing to rely on NATO and Washington 

as well as Turkey’s powerful conventional military, 

bolstered by national and multinational missile de-

fenses, rather than pursue an independent Turkish 

nuclear force as a means of deterring even a nuclear- 

armed Iran. 

**EUROPEAN UNION**

Turkey has been bidding to join the EU since 1959, 

only 2 years after the organization’s inception. An-

kara achieved this goal on September 12, 1963, with 

the signing of the Agreement creating an association 

between the Republic of Turkey and the European 

Economic Community (EEC). This agreement aimed 

to move Turkey toward entry into a customs union 

with the EEC, both as an achievement in itself and as 

a means to facilitate Turkey’s accession into the EEC 

as a full member.23 This was accomplished with the 

1963 Ankara Accession Agreement and its Additional 

13

Protocol, which envisaged eventual EU membership; 

in 1995, Turkey joined the EU Customs Union. Tur-

key gained the right to export its goods duty free to 

EU countries though the freedom of movement was 

restricted to goods; Turks wishing to enter the EU still 

require an entry visa. 

Negotiations toward Turkey’s accession to the EU 

officially  began  on  October  3,  2005.  This  process  re-

quires that the parties negotiate and close all 33 chap-

ters of the EU  *acquis communautaire* (the corpus of EU 

laws and policies). The opening and closing of indi-

vidual chapters is subject to unanimity among the 27 

EU member states, as is the final decision to conclude 

an Accession Treaty, making the whole process vul-

nerable to national vetoes and blackmail. All 27 EU 

governments must vote to open and close each chap-

ter as well as to admit each new member.24 As of now, 

only 13 chapters have been opened to Turkey; the 

European Council suspended eight chapters in De-

cember 2006. Austria, Cyprus, France, and Germany 

have blocked another nine chapters.25 Turkey started 

accession negotiations with the EU at the same time 

as Croatia, which will soon join the EU. Fifteen other 

countries have joined the EU since 1987, when Turkey 

applied for full membership. Not only has Turkey’s 

membership drive stalled while the EU has grown 

from 12 to 27 countries, but the EU has declined other 

Turkish priorities, such as being extended the visa-

free entry privileges offered by all EU members to one 

another’s citizens under the Schengen Treaty. Egemen 

Bagis, Turkey’s Minister for EU Relations, has called 

these travel restrictions “not fair” since “Turkey is the 

only EU candidate country, whose citizens are still 

subject to visas.”26

14

Since coming to power more than a decade ago, 

the ruling AKP****has used the EU entry requirements 

as  a  justification  and  catalyst  to  promote  economic 

and political reforms at home that have also served 

to strengthen the Turkish economy and to curtail the 

power of the Turkish military. Public opinion polls 

show that Turkey’s EU membership drive continues 

to enjoy strong support among the country’s elite 

despite falling popular support for membership. In 

a January 2013 opinion survey, 87 percent of experts 

still favored joining the EU, while only 33 percent of 

the public were in favor of persisting.27 The other main 

political parties still officially support Turkey’s quest 

for EU accession. 

Yet, the question of Turkish accession has been 

problematic for many years. Many Europeans have 

been concerned about Turkey’s poor human rights 

record, restrictions on media freedoms, potential mis-

carriages of justice, constraints on Kurdish rights, and 

nonrecognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Disputes 

with EU countries over various Turkish domestic 

and foreign policies have led Turkish leaders to lose 

faith that Ankara will soon be invited to join as a full 

member. EU members have become preoccupied with 

organizational reform, economic restructuring, and 

integrating recent members. Efforts to develop a Eu-

ropean Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) distinct 

from NATO have presented challenges for Turkey 

due to its limited influence on EU decisionmaking. In 

addition, many Europeans characterize the accession 

negotiations that formally began in October 2005 as a 

decades-long process that might not lead to full mem-

bership even if Turkey completes them successfully. 

Numerous domestic and external issues have neg-

atively affected the negotiation process. Supporters of 

15

EU membership for Turkey argue that the AKP has 

managed to stabilize the economy and suppress the 

scope for military coups since it came to power in 2002. 

It has built good ties with international donor organi-

zations and can count on the support of the European 

Commission in its dispute with the Constitutional 

Court in regards to its legitimacy.28 Critics argue that 

Turkey is mostly located in Asia. Also, the proxim-

ity to security areas such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria does 

not appeal to some EU leaders. They argue that EU’s 

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not ready to 

shoulder more responsibility in the Middle East, and 

that Turkey’s membership would link the otherwise 

fairly peaceful and quiet EU more strongly to a very 

volatile region in security terms. As for Turkey’s new 

political stability, critics argue that the AKP achieved 

this through suppression of government critics. The 

recent mass protests against the Erdoğan government 

have reinforced these concerns. 

Public opinion in several EU countries, such as 

Austria and France, has opposed Turkey’s member-

ship. This fact became significant when both govern-

ments announced they would hold referendums on 

Turkey’s accession. In addition, the 2004 entry into 

the EU of the Republic of Cyprus, not recognized by 

Turkey, further complicated matters since, once hav-

ing joined, Cyprus could veto Turkey’s entry. The Cy-

priot government has blocked six chapters of Turkish 

accession negotiations, arguing that Ankara needs to 

normalize relations with them before being consid-

ered as a potential EU member.29 When Cyprus held 

the rotating EU presidency during the last 6 months 

of 2012, Turkey–EU relations froze solid with no prog-

ress in their negotiations and minimal official contact 

between Turkey and the EU. Leading EU countries, 

16

such as France and Germany, openly expressed their 

unease regarding Turkey’s joining the EU and instead 

proposed establishing a “privileged partnership” 

for Turkey short of membership, which Ankara has 

rejected. As a result, talks between Ankara and Brus-

sels became rather quiet, stale, and unproductive 

throughout the following years and leading up to the 

present. Turks have become frustrated by these nego-

tiations, which have been stalled for years. The EU’s 

protracted crises have also considerably decreased 

Turkish interest in the organization. 

The official reason given for suspending the acces-

sion negotiations with Turkey was Ankara’s refusal to 

apply the Customs Union between the EU and Tur-

key to the Republic of Cyprus.30 Vessels flying Cypriot 

flags are barred from entering Turkish ports.31 On July 

20, 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied a third of the 

island after a Greek initiated coup attempted to secure 

power and annex the island to Greece.32 The Turkish 

government seized for its citizens the northern section 

of the island, which they then self-declared to be the 

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The rest of the 

island, besides the small segment that is currently be-

ing occupied by UN Peacekeeping forces, is known 

as the Republic of Cyprus. The problem is that the 

Turkish government refuses to recognize the Republic 

of Cyprus because of their dispute over the rightful 

possession and subsequent governance of the island 

as well as the Northern Cyprus blockade currently in 

place. The Republic of Cyprus has been a member of 

the EU since 2004 and, as a result, many EU countries 

have banded together in support of that entity. The 

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized 

by the international community, including the EU, as 

an “occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus.”33 Tur-

17

key does not recognize the ethnically Greek Republic 

of Cyprus. EU nations such as France and Germany 

have unequivocally said to the Turkish government 

that they need to treat Cyprus the same as any other 

EU member state, starting with recognizing them as a 

sovereign nation. However, leadership from Ankara 

is standing its ground firmly in refusing to make such 

acknowledgments, even if it means possibly terminat-

ing their chance at joining the EU.34 

France has played a lead role in impeding Turkey’s 

accession in recent years. The French government led 

the effort in 2006 to suspend the negotiations after 

Turkey refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. 

France vetoed 11 out of the 35 chapters, which caused 

the accession talks to virtually halt (only eight remain 

suspended as of early-2013).35 Relations rapidly dete-

riorated when the French Senate approved a bill that 

would punish those who deny internationally recog-

nized genocides. Turks saw this legislative measure 

as an explicit reference to their denial of the Armenian 

genocide in 1915.36 Many Turkish officials argued that 

the bill was a campaign strategy by then French Presi-

dent Nicholas Sarkozy aimed at recruiting votes from 

the Armenian population in France.37 

In retaliation to the proposed bill, Turkey imposed 

immediate political, military, and economic sanc-

tions. For example, Turkey did not renew permission 

for French military planes to use Turkish airspace.38 

These sanctions were quickly lifted and a French court 

eventually negated the bill, but relations between the 

two countries remained cold throughout the Sarkozy 

presidency.39  However,  since  Sarkozy  left  office  in 

2012, France has had a revamped policy regarding 

Turkish accession. President Hollande has openly 

stated his support for Turkey’s becoming an EU mem-

18

ber at some point.40 Following his election in 2012, his 

administration advocated opening some of the eight 

chapters of the accession talks that were closed.41 In 

February 2013, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told 

his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoğlu of his will-

ingness to open Chapter 22 of the  *acquis* regarding “Re-

gional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instru-

ments.”42 According to the European Commission, this 

chapter consists: 

mostly of framework and implementing regulations, 

which do not require transposition into national legis-

lation. They define the rules for drawing up, approv-

ing and implementing Structural Funds or Cohesion 

Fund  programs  reflecting  each  country’s  territorial 

organization. . . . Member States must have an insti-

tutional framework in place and adequate administra-

tive capacity to ensure programming, implementing, 

monitoring and evaluation in a sound and cost-effec-

tive manner from the point of view of management 

and financial control.43 

This was followed by Angela Merkel’s trip to An-

kara in late-February 2013, where she not only sup-

ported the opening of Chapter 22, but also suggested 

potentially opening other chapters to advance the  

accession talks.44 

Germany’s backing of France in welcoming the re-

sumption of accession talks between Turkey and the 

EU was a major shift for Berlin. Germany has long 

been an opponent of Turkish accession despite having 

one of the largest Turkish populations outside of the 

native country. Chancellor Merkel was the first to pro-

pose a “privileged partnership” between Turkey and 

the EU as an alternative to full membership. Many 

Germans have long held a position of not wanting 

19

Turkey to become a member state, despite its boom-

ing economy and critical geographic location. Other 

EU  officials  have  expressed  concerns  about  the  EU 

needing Turkey more than vice versa due to Turkey’s 

more dynamic economy and increased foreign policy 

options.  German  officials  have  also  adopted  a  more 

positive attitude toward Turkey’s accession drive. In 

2012, German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, 

said that: 

We, the Europeans, should open chapters to negotia-

tions with Turkey in the first half of 2013. Otherwise, 

in the upcoming term, our interest in Turkey may be 

greater than Turkey’s interest in us.45 

Gunther Oettinger, Germany’s EU commissioner, said 

that the EU could eventually “crawl to Ankara on its 

knees to beg the Turks to join the EU.”46 

Meanwhile,  Turkish  officials  are  maneuvering, 

such as by threatening to abandon the EU and seek 

membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-

tion (SCO), to give Ankara more leverage in the acces-

sion negotiations. On October 12, 2011, the EU Com-

mission released a “Positive Agenda” document that 

listed and rated progress being made between Turkey 

and the EU. It offered favorable conclusions regard-

ing Turkey’s political reforms in key areas. The new 

EU approach is seen as a complement rather than a 

substitute for EU membership, since it could impart 

new momentum to the accession process as well as 

prepare Turkey better for it. The positive agenda in-

cludes eight areas of joint interest: political reforms 

in Turkey, visas, the EU  *acquis*, migration, energy, 

trade, foreign policy dialogue, counterterrorism, and 

further participation of Turkey in EU programs. Joint 

20

EU-Turkish Working Groups have been formed to see 

how progress can be made regarding these issues. The 

newly created EU External Action Service has estab-

lished a special Turkey team to support this process. 

Turkey’s excellent economic performance during 

the past decade, contrasted with the overall economic 

weakness within the EU, has made Ankara a more at-

tractive partner for the Union. In fact, former Turk-

ish  Foreign  Minister  Yaşar  Yakış  has  expressed  the 

opinion of many Turks when he argued that Turkey 

should delay negotiating with the EU over accession 

since Turkey’s bargaining position will improve as the 

Turkish economy continues to perform much better 

than the EU average. Turkey’s economy is projected 

to grow for the next decade at an average rate of 6.7 

percent per year.47 It would already rank as the sixth 

largest among EU members. Turkey’s geography also 

makes it a natural conduit for EU trade and investment 

flowing eastward to Eurasia and the Middle East, and 

oil and gas from the Caspian Basin entering the EU.48 

As a partial EU member, Turkey offers a large 

market for European goods and simultaneously acts 

as a gateway to markets in the Middle East and North 

Africa.49 For Berlin, this is especially crucial, given 

that Germany sustains its economy through exports.50 

Conversely, Ankara’s continued interest in joining 

the EU results in part from Turkey’s economy still 

being oriented toward Europe. Although the percent-

age of Turkish trade involving the EU has continued 

to decline over time, some 38 percent of its imports 

originated from the EU in 2011, whereas 46 percent 

of Turkey’s exports go to EU members.51 Those shares 

amounted to $85 billion and $58 billion, respectively.52 

These trade volumes have kept increasing despite 

the current Euro crisis and the more rapid growth of 

21

Turkey’s economic links with Russia and many other 

countries. Turkey’s imports from the EU increased by 

35.1 percent and 19.8 percent in 2010 and 2011, respec-

tively, while exports grew 18.4 percent and 12.7 per-

cent in those same years. Approximately two-thirds 

of Turkey’s foreign direct investment still comes from 

the EU.53

But one might wonder how long Germany will 

hold this more flexible position. Merkel’s encouraging 

approach****toward Turkish accession was partly due to 

the forthcoming German national elections in 2014. 

In the 2009 election, the Christian Democratic Party 

(CDP) eased its anti-Turkish position in order to ap-

peal to the 690,000 Turkish voters54 and 3 million resi-

dents of Turkish origin living in Germany.55 The CDP 

might be preparing for a similar electoral gambit on 

this occasion. In addition, although Germany has now 

come out in favor of opening of a new chapter in ne-

gotiations, the German government has conditioned 

expanding the renewed EU-Turkey talks to cover 

additional chapters to Turkey’s applying its Ankara 

Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus.56 By enunciat-

ing this condition, the Merkel government has indi-

cated its willingness to engage more with Turkey in 

the field of European integration, but stands firm on 

the matter of its accession to the EU. Indeed, the chap-

ter opened is relatively minor and not subject to much 

controversy, unlike the chapters concerning human 

rights or Cyprus. Hence, Merkel’s change of position 

is more symbolic than significant. 

Many other EU leaders naturally want to focus on 

addressing the EU’s internal problems before serious-

ly discussing Turkish accession.57 Germany’s reaction 

to the recent thaw between France and Turkey is fur-

ther complicated by the differing views among parties 

22

within Germany. Merkel’s CDP is much less favorably 

disposed to accession than the Free Democratic Party 

and the Social Democratic Party, which both officially 

favor full Turkish accession into the EU.58 The CDP 

prefers granting Turkey only partial membership in 

order to maintain good relations with one of Germa-

ny’s biggest economic partners.59 Even though Merkel 

reassured Turkey about the accession process, she did 

not promise full accession.60 Finally, despite the po-

litical pivots made by Germany and France, Turkey 

still faces many hurdles in the accession process. For 

example, France is still blocking four Chapters, while 

Cyprus is blocking another six, making full accession 

improbable in the near future. 61

**TROUBLED TRIANGLE: NATO, THE EU,**

**AND TURKEY**

Despite the difficulties with making progress in the 

EU admission process, European leaders are aware 

that Europe’s security cannot be separated from Med-

iterranean security, and there have been various at-

tempts to establish a sustainable relationship between 

EU and Turkey. The task of redefining a security rela-

tionship between EU and Turkey has proved difficult, 

mostly because of EU’s internal problems with defin-

ing the limits of integration and responsibility within 

defense and security policy. As a result, it will most 

likely continue to be in Turkey’s interest to maintain 

NATO as the most powerful institution for defense 

and security in Europe even while Turkey continues 

to participate in military and civilian ESDP missions. 

Indeed, Turkey has been the most active participant 

in ESDP missions among countries outside of the EU, 

and more active than many EU-states as well.62

23

In 1992, Turkey was granted associate status in 

the Western European Union (WEU) as a means to 

allow for an EU-Turkey security partnership to de-

velop even without granting Turkey full membership 

in the EU. Turkey was directly involved in planning 

and preparing WEU operations in which NATO assets 

and capabilities were to be used, thanks to Ankara’s 

status as one of the six “associate members” (Turkey, 

Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and the Czech 

Republic) that had membership in NATO and the 

WEU. Turkey could attend its bi-weekly ambassador-

level meetings, send officers to the WEU defense plan-

ning cell, and have Turkish parliamentarians attend 

the sessions of the WEU Assembly. Turkey also had 

the right to participate fully in WEU decisions when 

they involved collective NATO assets.63 But Ankara 

lost this favorable situation when the EU decided to 

end the WEU’s role in the ESDI and develop the ESDP 

wholly within the EU instead. Turkey subsequently 

found itself marginalized in the European security 

system and feared that the EU could potentially oper-

ate in its areas of interest without Ankara’s having any 

input to the decision.64 

NATO and the EU have sought to cooperate more 

effectively to address European security challenges. 

This collaboration has included sharing high-value 

but scarce assets, developing mutually profitable di-

visions of labor, and conducting joint operations, as 

in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and against Somali pirates. 

A priority is to avoid the creation of gaps, needless 

redundancies, institutional rivalries, or tensions be-

tween countries belonging to one but not the other—

such as Turkey and the United States. After decades 

of informal talks between their officials and member 

governments, NATO and the EU established formal 

24

institutionalized relations in 2001 in response to the 

EU’s expanding range of security and defense activi-

ties, as manifested in its ESDP. (Technically, it is the 

ESDP rather than the EU per se that has institutional 

ties with NATO).65 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty had 

designated the WEU as the EU’s defense component. 

Its main responsibility was to undertake the “Peters-

berg tasks” (humanitarian missions, search and res-

cue operations, crisis management, peacekeeping, 

peace enforcement, and environmental protection). 

Maastricht also established an intergovernmental 

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). NATO 

and the WEU had developed extensive cooperation 

over the preceding decades. Welcoming potential EU 

contributions for the Petersberg tasks despite NATO’s 

also performing the same types of missions, NATO 

governments agreed in 1994 that the WEU could use 

NATO collective assets, following the approval of the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC), for Petersberg-type 

missions under the EU Common Foreign and Security 

Policy. The Alliance likewise approved the concept of 

Combined Joint Task Forces, whose “separable but 

not separate” deployable headquarters could be used 

for EU- as well as NATO-led operations. In June 1996, 

the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin sought 

to promote an ESDI within the Alliance in an effort 

to encourage European members to assume more of 

NATO’s roles and responsibilities by strengthening 

their defense capabilities. Under what became known 

as the “Berlin Plus” agreement, the ministers further 

agreed to make NATO assets available for WEU-led 

crisis management operations. 

Meanwhile, European governments also took 

steps to strengthen the EU’s security and defense role 

independent of NATO. At their December 1998 sum-

25

mit in St. Malo, France, the British and French govern-

ments issued a joint statement that affirmed the goal 

of establishing an ESDP within the EU. The following 

December, however, the European Council meeting in 

Helsinki, Finland, transferred the EU crisis manage-

ment role from the WEU to the EU. At the November 

2002 Prague Summit, the NATO members consented 

in principle to making NATO assets and capabilities 

available for EU-led operations in which the Alliance 

was not militarily engaged. The EU-NATO Declara-

tion on ESDP issued in December 2002 defined the po-

litical principles that would govern their relationship: 

effective mutual consultation; equality; institutional 

decisionmaking autonomy; respect for member states’ 

interests; and the coherent, transparent, and mutu-

ally reinforcing development of their military capa-

bilities.66  The  declaration  affirms  NATO’s  continued 

role in crisis management and conflict prevention (as 

well as collective defense), while stating that the EU’s 

growing activities in the first two areas will contribute 

to their common goals. 

In March 2003, NATO and the EU finalized adop-

tion of the Berlin Plus agreements that allows the 

EU to use NATO’s collective assets and capabilities 

for EU-led crisis management operations, including 

NATO’s command arrangements, logistics assistance, 

and assistance in operational planning, when NATO 

as an institution is not involved in the operation. Only 

EU members that are either also NATO members or 

that have joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

Program, and thereby established a bilateral security 

arrangement with NATO, are eligible to use these 

NATO assets.67 At the end of that month, the EU be-

gan its first Berlin Plus operation when its Operation 

CONCORDIA replaced the NATO-led Operation AL-

LIED HARMONY in the former Yugoslav Republic 

26

of Macedonia. After the transition, some NATO as-

sets supported the EU-led follow-on operation.68 An-

other Berlin Plus operation began in late-2004, when 

the EU’s Operation ALTHEA replaced the NATO-led 

Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.69

As originally formulated, the Berlin Plus agree-

ment Arrangement between NATO and the EU meant 

that the non-EU European NATO allies could contrib-

ute to EU-led operations without participating in the 

decisionmaking process regarding these operations. 

Consequently, Turkey decided to use its decisionmak-

ing powers in NATO to stall implementation of Ber-

lin Plus agreements to force the EU to accept a more 

favorable arrangement from Ankara’s perspective. In 

December 2001, Turkey, the UK, and the United States 

signed the Ankara Document, which guaranteed that 

NATO members not in the EU could participate in 

ESDP decisions when contributing to them. The EU 

heads of state and government adopted the document 

during their Brussels Summit in October 2002 as the 

“ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the 

Involvement of the non-EU European Allies.” This 

Nice Implementation Document served as the basis 

of the December 2002 NATO-EU Joint Declaration 

that was adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 

December 13, 2002, and the decision of the December 

2002 European Council session in Copenhagen, Den-

mark, that the Berlin Plus agreements would apply 

only to EU members that also belonged to NATO or 

had joined its PfP Program. The Copenhagen Summit 

also agreed that Turkey could participate in EU-led 

operations in its geographic vicinity if Ankara wanted 

to do so.70

Turkey has since become the largest contributor to 

ESDP missions of any non-EU country and has even 

27

contributed more than some EU members. According 

to many Turkish officials, however, the EU failed to 

live up to this commitment, resulting in Turkey being 

asked to contribute to ESDP operations that Ankara 

had little input in planning or initiating. In December 

2002, the EU issued a declaration of intent to estab-

lish nine 2,000-troop battle groups by 2007 as rapid 

reaction units for foreign crises. The EU has had two 

battle groups on permanent standby since 2007, but 

the failure of EU member governments to agree re-

garding how, when, and where to employ them has 

prevented them from ever being used.71 In November 

2004, the Turkish government declared its intent to 

contribute forces and capabilities to the battle groups, 

but in June 2007, Ankara withdrew its air and naval 

contributions due to its exclusion from ESDP deci-

sionmaking structures.72 Further use of the Berlin Plus 

agreements has been limited due to their inapplica-

bility to the short time frames intended for many EU 

crisis-response operations as well as their political and 

structural complexity.73 By contrast, in the ground op-

erations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in the 

maritime counterpiracy mission off Somalia, when 

EU and NATO missions have overlapped, the EU and 

NATO have established various ad hoc command 

and communications arrangements for these parallel 

operations.74 

Since 2007, NATO and the EU have had some two 

dozen common member countries. But since both 

institutions decide many important security and de-

fense issues by consensus, countries that have mem-

bership in one organization but not the other can exert 

substantial  negative  influence  on  the  level  of  coop-

eration between the institutions. At present, NATO 

members Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the 

28

United States are not EU members, while the tradi-

tionally neutral or nonaligned EU members Austria, 

Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not 

NATO members, though four of the five (Malta since 

April 2008 but still not Cyprus) have joined NATO’s 

PfP, which allows for institutionalized cooperation 

between members and partners in support of NATO 

goals. All these countries participate in official NATO-

EU meetings. With Malta’s entry into PfP in 2008 and 

France’s re-entry into NATO’s Integrated Military 

Command in 2009, Cyprus has become the main out-

lier within the NATO-EU partnership. Cyprus is not a 

PfP member and, partly due to a Turkish veto, does not 

have a security agreement with NATO for exchanging 

classified documents. As a result, it uniquely cannot 

participate in official NATO-EU meetings, though in-

formal meetings including Cyprus do occur. The row 

has led Greece and Cyprus to object to any Turkish 

participation in the development of the ESDP while 

Turkey has blocked the Greek Cypriots from joining 

EU-NATO meetings and from taking part in ESDP 

missions using NATO intelligence and resources. 

Turkish objections to sharing sensitive NATO 

military information with the government of Cyprus, 

which joined the EU in May 2004 despite its fail-

ure to adopt a UN-backed political settlement with 

the island’s Turkish minority, has limited formal  

NATO-EU intelligence sharing since then.75 The Cy-

prus government, sometimes assisted by Greece and 

other EU members, has retaliated by blocking Tur-

key’s participation in certain EU defense activities, 

such as the work of the European Defense Agency. A 

recurring justification is that Turkey has not complied 

with its obligations under its accession negotiations to 

open its ports and airports to Cypriot-registered ships 

29

and aircraft.76 The dispute has impeded a range of pos-

sible EU-NATO cooperation. The various EU-NATO 

institutional arrangements and meetings in Europe 

have been constrained by an inability to hold formal 

sessions with an agreed agenda or the authority to 

reach substantive decisions.77 These mutual antago-

nisms have also disrupted the joint NATO-EU secu-

rity missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and in the Gulf 

of Aden off Somalia. Thanks to its full membership 

in NATO, Turkey has the ability in principle to deny 

the use of any NATO collective assets for any future 

EU-led mission. 

When the December 2000 EU Summit in Nice, 

France, decided to exclude non-EU-NATO members 

from the EU’s security and defense decisionmaking 

mechanisms, Ankara’s national security community 

worried that it could have little impact on EU policies 

that could affect Turkey’s security. It also anticipated 

that the EU would therefore pay less attention to Turk-

ish concerns than would the WEU and NATO. More 

generally, Turkish policymakers were concerned about 

the EU’s lack of will and ability to defend Turkey. In 

addition to the often grudging support for Ankara 

against the PKK terrorists and periodic denunciations 

of an “Armenian genocide” that many Turks deny 

ever occurred, many West European governments 

proved reluctant to render Turkey military assistance 

during the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. Due to 

its persistent capabilities-expectations gap, moreover, 

the EU did not (and still does not) look like it would 

soon develop more robust military assets comparable 

to those available to NATO, thanks largely to its U.S. 

membership. Conversely, there was the theoretical 

possibility that, in a confrontation between Turkey 

and Greece, the WEU would be obliged to side with 

Athens simply due to its EU membership.78 Finally, 

30

some Turkish policymakers resented that, due to the 

barriers placed on Turkey’s desired accession to the 

EU, the former Soviet bloc countries that would soon 

join the EU would have more influence on the orga-

nization’s European security policies than Turkey, a 

long-standing Western ally within NATO.79

Turkey aspires to a leadership role in the Alliance, 

but Turkey’s contributions risk being overshadowed 

by its petty efforts to limit NATO’s ties with Israel and 

the EU. Turkey’s love-hate relationship with the EU 

is a major complicating factor for Turkey’s NATO re-

lationship. Even setting aside its frustrated EU mem-

bership ambitions, Turkey’s security relationship with 

the EU remains so problematic as to threaten its ties 

with NATO. The most immediate problem is the para-

lyzing effects of the Turkey-Cyprus dispute on insti-

tutional cooperation between NATO and the EU. The 

dispute with the EU, along with those with France and 

the United States in recent years, helps explain why 

opinion polls show that popular support for NATO 

is lower in Turkey than in any other member country. 

Turkish diplomats initially refused to allow EU lead-

ers to attend NATO’s May 2012 heads-of-state summit 

in Chicago on the grounds that the EU was making 

no greater contribution to NATO than the 56-mem-

ber Organization of Islamic Conference, then led by 

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish national, and other 

international organizations. In the end, the EU lead-

ers were allowed to attend some NATO sessions but 

not others. 

Turkey’s relations with NATO have also suffered 

from various other problems, including  *de facto* Turk-

ish-Russian collusion to limit NATO’s presence in 

the Black Sea, diverging threat perceptions regarding 

Iran, and Ankara’s opposition to the appointment of 

31

Rasmussen as NATO’s Secretary General due to his 

stance, when head of the Danish government, on the 

Danish cartoon portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Nonetheless,  Turkish  policymakers  definitely  pre-

ferred having a transatlantic institution of which An-

kara was a core member dominate European security 

than having EU structures potentially displace it. 

**THE MIDDLE EAST**

Turkey’s geostrategic position between Europe 

and the Middle East has made the country an impor-

tant NATO ally and an essential partner for both the 

United States and European countries. With its secular 

values, it has been important for Turkey to preserve 

its Western ties. Although Turkey has never ignored 

its proximity to the Middle East, Ankara tended to col-

laborate the most with Iran, Israel, or other non-Arab 

states. But during the past decade, Turkey broke with 

Israel and reengaged in the Arab world after years of 

estrangement.80 In Washington and Ankara, expecta-

tions  were  high  that  Erdoğan’s  successful  “Turkish 

Model”—a moderate Sunni government with a dy-

namic economy tied to the United States--could be 

exported.81 

The Obama administration assigned Turkey 

an important role in advancing U.S. interests in the 

Middle East while allowing Washington to stay in 

the background in a component of a “lead from be-

hind” foreign-policy strategy.82 For both Turkey and 

Washington,  trying  to  manage  the  difficult  political 

transitions in the Middle East has become the primary 

issue in the Ankara-Washington relationship.83 This 

partnership has seen both progress and setbacks. With 

fresh self-confidence, the government in Ankara tried 

32

to meet these expectations using the soft power of its 

model along with skillful diplomacy. Of course, given 

the situation in the region today, the “zero problems” 

phrase has become something of a joke for Ankara. 

Following some transient improvements, Turkey’s re-

lations with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and other 

Middle Eastern governments have regressed to their 

troubled mean and sometimes even worse. Ankara 

is the only government not to have an ambassador 

in Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv simultaneously. 

At  the  cost  of  some  popularity,  Erdoğan  is  seen  as 

the champion of radical Sunni policies in the Middle 

East rather than a renewed Ottoman leader. Turkey’s 

troubles with its neighbors have helped drive Ankara 

back toward the United States, which has the hard 

power even if it chooses not to use it, but Turkish-U.S. 

differences regarding many Middle Eastern issues  

are acute. 

**Syria.**

Since the Syrian crisis began, Turkey and the 

United States have been effectively coordinating their 

policies. They first sought to induce Bashar al-Assad, 

whom Washington was trying to wean away from 

Iran, to introduce reforms demanded by the moder-

ate protesters. But after Assad only made fig-leaf re-

forms designed to divide the opposition and reduce 

foreign resistance, Washington and Ankara demand-

ed a change of regime in Damascus. They have since 

imposed various sanctions on the Syrian government, 

but these measures have been challenged by China, 

Iran, and Russia. Although Turkey and the United 

States have followed similar paths regarding Syria, 

the journey has proven far costlier to Turkey. Bilateral 

33

trade between Turkey and Syria reached $2.5 billion 

in 2010, making Turkey Syria’s largest trading part-

ner, but has since collapsed, as have various Turk-

ish visions of establishing a free trade agreement, a 

customs union, or other region-wide economic struc-

tures. In addition, Turkey has accepted more than 

600,000 refugees from its neighbor in accordance with 

Ankara’s “open door” policy to those fleeing the civil 

war.84 Additionally, both the Syrian National Council 

and the Free Syrian Army have used Turkey as a base 

for organizing their resistance against Assad’s forces. 

Turkey has also supported the war against Assad by 

quietly allowing the passage through its territory of 

volunteers  from  Muslim  countries  to  fight  in  Syria. 

In addition, some sources claim that the Syrian reb-

els have received weapons and other military support 

transported through Turkey and funded by Qatar and 

Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government has denied 

this claim on several occasions.85 Even so, the confron-

tation with Syria has contributed to negating Turkey’s 

“zero-problems” policy toward its neighbors. In con-

trast, the United States had few economic or diplomat-

ic ties with Assad’s regime, so lost little in calling for 

his removal and imposing sanctions on his country. 

It is easy to forget that the relationship between 

Turkey  and  Syria  significantly  improved  after  the 

AKP came to power in November 2002. When Prime 

Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister****Davutoğlu be-

gan their intense effort to improve the relations with 

the country’s neighbors, Syria became one of the most 

important targets. The Turkish effort to strengthen 

relations with Syria resulted in frequent meetings be-

tween Erdoğan and Assad bolstered by growing dip-

lomatic and commercial ties between the two coun-

tries. On December 22, 2004, Turkey and Syria signed 

34

a free trade agreement (the Association Agreement) in 

Damascus, which entered into force in January 2007.86 

In many ways, Syria became a showcase symbol of 

Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy of zero problems 

with  neighbors.  But  Erdoğan  misjudged  when  he 

believed he could persuade Assad to accept needed 

reforms.87 As the situation in Syria became worse dur-

ing the summer of 2011, Davutoğlu went to Damascus 

to encourage Assad in person to end his repressive 

policies. The mission failed. Following Assad’s con-

tinuing use of violence against his own people, Tur-

key drastically changed its policy toward Syria. Both 

countries withdrew their diplomatic representatives 

and suspended the Association Agreement.88 Erdoğan 

became  one  of  the  first  leaders  to  call  for  Assad  to 

leave power.89 

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and Tur-

key’s willingness to harbor Syrian rebels and refugees, 

Turkey has been subjected to a series of cross-border 

attacks. In an April 2012 incident, Syrian soldiers 

opened fire on Syrian rebels and refugees in the Turk-

ish town of Kilis, killing two Syrian refugees and 

wounding some two dozen people.90 The downing of 

a Turkish fighter plane over Syrian air space in June 

2012 was but the most prominent of several incidents 

of the deteriorating security situation between the 

two countries.91 Following the incident, the Turkish 

government decided, with Washington’s encourage-

ment, to request assistance only under Article 4 of the 

North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for urgent con-

sultations if a NATO member considers its security 

interests threatened. 

Turkey did not seek Article 5 protection, which 

calls for collective defensive actions to counter threats, 

because few NATO members want to employ military 

35

force  against  Syria.  The  Alliance  justified  deploying 

Patriot air defense missiles in southern Turkey as a 

purely defensive “precautionary measure” to counter 

any threat emanating from Syria.92 NATO’s Patriot 

Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Interceptor 

Batteries are some of the most sophisticated air and 

missile defense systems in Western inventories. Com-

bined with the high accuracy of their radar sensors 

and targeting systems, the Patriots can intercept for-

eign warplanes and short-range ballistic missiles as 

far as 100 kilometers (km) away, allowing them to 

command an area well beyond the Turkish-Syrian 

border—all of northern Syria to include the embattled 

towns of Aleppo and Homs.93 

While the earlier 1990 and 2003 Turkish requests 

for Patriots from NATO provoked major intra-Alli-

ance divisions, on this occasion the NATO decision-

making  process  went  more  smoothly.  Davutoğlu 

and other Turkish diplomats engaged in lengthy and 

comprehensive consultations with the other NATO 

governments even though only Germany, the Nether-

lands, and the United States have the PAC-3s.94 NATO 

largely has remained aloof from the Syrian crisis, 

but with the Patriot systems have come hundreds of 

NATO troops to operate, maintain, and protect the Pa-

triot interceptors, their radars, and their other support 

elements. In effect, the NATO personnel have become 

a “trip wire” that makes NATO military intervention 

more likely following future Syrian-Turkish border 

clashes. This tactic has seemingly worked. Since the 

missiles arrived, there have not been any further ma-

jor airstrikes against Turkish territory. The Syrian mil-

itary has likely been more cautious in its operations 

near the Turkish border. Even so, NATO has not tried 

to use its Patriots to establish a no-fly zone over Syr-

36

ian airspace, which the systems have the capacity to 

do. Such a step would make it easier for the guerrillas 

to establish camps and troop concentration across the 

border in Syrian territory. 

Some  Turkish  officials  and  commentators  have 

called for Turkish military intervention to protect Syr-

ia’s civilians or Ankara’s economic and security inter-

est.95 The Turkish government has reinforced its bor-

der and authorized more flexible rules of engagement 

for the TSK to respond to potential threats from Syrian 

forces approaching the Turkish border. Turkey has 

experienced numerous cross-border attacks by Syrian 

government forces, terrorist attacks by groups linked 

to the Assad regime, and a surging number of Syrian 

refugees taking up residence in Turkey—whose num-

bers have exceeded by several orders of magnitude 

the burden Turkish leaders said at the beginning of 

the war they could tolerate. If Turkey does intervene 

militarily, the Obama administration would likely 

again follow its “lead from behind” strategy and, as in 

Libya, provide primarily low-profile intelligence and 

logistics support for the Turkish military. Washing-

ton has been concerned that the failure to uphold its 

perceived “red lines” in Syria will decrease U.S. cred-

ibility and encourage Iran, North Korea, and other 

countries to challenge other declared U.S. red lines. 

But although Ankara and Washington have had their 

opportunities to intervene more directly in the Syr-

ian conflict, they repeatedly have declined to exploit 

possible pretexts for employing their armed forces to 

remove Assad. 

Neither Turkey nor the United States wants to 

intervene militarily in the Syrian war. Ankara has 

declined to exploit several opportunities that would 

have served as pretexts, including cross-border shoot-

37

ings and shelling against refugees fleeing into Turkey. 

On paper, the TSK should be able to defeat the di-

vided and weakened Syrian military, but the Turkish 

military has fought only irregular PKK guerrillas for 

the past few decades and lacks experience in invading 

and occupying a foreign country. An invading Turk-

ish military might be welcomed as liberators by Syrian 

Sunnis, but the country’s Kurds and Alawites would 

more likely respond negatively to a Turkish occupa-

tion force and perhaps even respond with an anti-

occupation insurgency such as those that harassed the 

U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps the main 

Turkish concern is that, once Turkish forces occupy 

Syria, they will become bogged down trying to sup-

press the fighting among the various factions. 

The Syrian regime is not without means to retaliate 

for whatever measures Turkey and the United States 

adopt in support of Assad’s opponents. In partner-

ship with Iran, the Syrian government could resume 

its pre-1998 practice of providing extensive support 

for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Many PKK 

operatives were born or based in Syria. The recent 

upsurge in PKK attacks against Turkish targets may 

be a Syrian-Iranian warning to Ankara to moderate 

its pressure on Assad. Even excluding the PKK factor, 

a Turkish decision to intervene on behalf of Assad’s 

opponents risks labeling Turkey as a regional cham-

pion of Sunni Arabs, despite Turkish efforts to define 

the Syrian crisis as a humanitarian issue rather than a 

sectarian one. Although Turkey and the United States 

have called for Assad’s removal, the incumbent presi-

dent is not the **center of gravity**,  ** in Clausewitzian terms, of the war, as Maummar Qaddafi was in Libya. 

Whereas  Qaddafi’s  death  ended  his  unique  regime, 

in Syria the regime’s power resides with the security, 

38

business, and political elites. This system of collective 

rule, which has a sectarian orientation due to the large 

numbers of minority Alawites among the elite, could 

easily result in a continuation of Assad’s policies even 

if the incumbent president leaves office. 

The Turkish authorities have allowed members of 

the opposition Syrian National Council and the Free 

Syrian Army to organize on Turkish territory, but the 

disunity of the Syrian opposition factions remains a 

problem. Even many Syrians are reluctant to embrace 

these opposition bodies for fear that they will become 

dominated by Sunni extremists. Although Turkish 

and U.S. officials have sought to purge al-Qaeda op-

eratives from their ranks, the Turkish authorities have 

proven less sensitive to the concerns of Syria’s non-

Sunni ethnic and sectarian groups. Turkish and U.S. 

officials have long been considering the option of es-

tablishing a border buffer zone or safe areas deeper 

inside Syrian territory, where refugees could find safe 

shelter without entering Turkish territory. But the ex-

perience in the Balkans in the 1990s made clear that, 

unless backed by air strikes and robust ground forces, 

the adversary will not respect these safe havens. 

Both governments would like to avert further 

civil strife and achieve a rapid transition to a stable 

and prosperous Syria under a new government. They 

also want to prevent extremist groups from exploiting 

the chaotic situation to break Syria apart or transform 

the  country  into  a  terrorist  safe  haven.  U.S.  officials 

share Turkish worries about the adverse regional re-

percussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assad 

is overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, then 

the Iraqi government and state might soon follow, 

creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurds 

in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. Turkish 

39

leaders note that a continuation of the Syrian fighting, 

which has already spread to parts of Lebanon, risks 

provoking a wider sectarian war that will hurt Tur-

key even if its troops refrain from directly intervening 

in Syria. Meanwhile, the Kurds in Syria are gaining 

the kind of autonomy enjoyed until now only by the 

Kurds of northern Iraq. In order to concentrate Syrian 

forces elsewhere, the regime has withdrawn its troops 

from Kurdish-dominated towns in northern Syria and 

allowed a major Syrian Kurdish movement, the Dem-

ocratic Union Party (PYD), to take charge of municipal 

administration to prevent the Syrian Free Army from 

seizing the region.96****Turkish officials suspect the PYD 

of having links with the PKK. Erdoğan warned that, 

“We will not allow the terrorist organization to pose 

a threat to Turkey in Syria; it is impossible for us to 

tolerate the PKK’s cooperation with the PYD.”97 U.S. 

officials are also worried about the adverse regional 

repercussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assad 

is overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, then 

the Iraqi government and state might soon follow, 

creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurds in 

Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. U.S. officials 

join Turks in asserting that: 

we are equally clear that we don’t see for the future 

of Syria an autonomous Kurdish area or territory; we 

want to see a Syria that remains united . . . any move-

ment towards autonomy or separatism . . . would be a 

slippery slope.98 

Given the reluctance to employ direct military 

force against Syria, the Turkish and U.S. governments 

favor less costly options that nonetheless go beyond 

the current sanctions. The United States and several 

European governments have been providing com-

40

munications equipment, training, and other forms 

of nonlethal assistance to the guerrillas. Some Gulf 

countries reportedly are supplying weapons as well 

as fighters and trainers. As a result, the Assad regime 

has remained in power thanks to even greater support 

from Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, whose 

decision last year to send large numbers of armed 

fighters to Syria saved Assad at a critical time in the 

war. The Syrian regime has skillfully polarized the 

conflict to exploit popular fears that an insurgent vic-

tory would result in Sunni extremists dominating the 

new regime, which would suppress Syria’s non-Sunni 

minorities and transform the country into a Taliban-

style regime and an al-Qaeda bridgehead.99 The oppo-

sition has been divided into feuding political leaders 

and indeed depends on al-Qaeda-affiliated groups for 

its best fighters. Since neither Turkey nor the United 

States is prepared to send large numbers of ground 

forces to Syria to attain these goals, they are increasing 

the likelihood of post-Assad civil strife in Syria, with 

adverse consequences for neighboring countries. 

The Syrian conflict has had an ambiguous impact 

on Turkish-U.S. relations. It has directed their poli-

cymakers to focus on strategic issues at a time when 

both sides are eager to diversify the partnership. Since 

the Syrian Civil War, Ankara and Washington have 

been preoccupied with harmonizing their Middle 

East  and  Syria  policies.  The  conflict  presents  both 

countries with the prospect of relying on a weak, di-

vided, and increasingly extremist guerrilla force, or 

using their own forces directly in Syria, which would 

entail a difficult post-conflict stabilization and prob-

able state-building missions. For the past few years, 

Turkey and the United States have undertaken many 

limited measures designed to remove the Assad gov-

41

ernment, but none have succeeded. They have pur-

sued the relatively low-cost policy option of seeking 

to induce Assad to give up voluntarily in some form 

of managed political transition to a broader and more 

representative regime. Yet their efforts to organize a 

credible Syrian government-in-exile have been frus-

trated by divisions and jealousies among Assad’s op-

ponents. With extensive Turkish backing, the military 

opposition has grown stronger, but has proved unable 

to achieve decisive victories. If anything, the military 

balance has shifted in favor of the Syrian government, 

though Assad’s forces lack the strength to win the 

war quickly. 

Neither the Turkish nor the U.S. governments have 

considered Assad’s removal a sufficiently vital nation-

al interest as to warrant the use of their own troops 

in Syria. Turkey would like the Pentagon to do it, but 

U.S. policy has focused on keeping the conflict largely 

contained within Syria, which has succeeded thus far, 

and more recently securing the elimination of all its 

chemical weapons. U.S. policymakers have increas-

ingly recognized the dangers of repeating past policy 

failures in Syria. As in 1979, the United States risks 

replacing an odious dictator who nonetheless has not 

threatened core U.S. national security interests with 

an extremist religious regime whose members would 

be ideologically prone to attack the United States and 

its regional allies in Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. As in 

the 1980s when Washington inadvertently allowed al-

Qaeda to exploit the war against the Soviet occupation 

of Afghanistan to develop a powerful regional base 

and network, in Syria the United States risks the trans-

formation of a popular uprising against an unfriendly 

regime into a Sunni-defined jihad that could easily ex-

tend against American and other Western targets. 

42

At worst, a Taliban-like regime will take power 

in Damascus and encourage the new al-Qaeda linked 

network of Syrian fighters and their foreign support-

ers to extend their guerrilla campaign to neighboring 

countries. Removing Assad is also not a critical vital 

interest for the United States. Washington has lived 

with the Assad dynasty for decades and can prob-

ably continue to do so. Assad’s removal could weaken 

Tehran’s influence in the Middle East, but would nei-

ther prevent Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons nor 

necessarily facilitate an Arab-Israel peace agreement. 

The Assad regime may miscalculate and finally force 

Ankara’s or Washington’s hands, but the most likely 

scenario for the next few years is a continuation of 

the current crisis, with the possibility of a renewed 

Ankara-Washington rift. 

Turkish leaders would have liked to see more vig-

orous actions by the Obama administration against 

the Assad government. In an interview with  *The Wash-*

*ington Post*, President Abdullah Gül stated that he did 

not see the U.S.-Russia framework agreement on elim-

inating Syria’s chemical weapons as leading to a com-

prehensive solution to the crisis. He also implied that 

dealing with Assad to secure their elimination was 

immoral, given Assad’s crimes; only his overthrow 

would bring an enduring solution to the country’s 

security threats.100 That the United States and Russia 

reached the Syrian agreement without Turkey’s par-

ticipation, let alone consent, likely reinforced Turkish 

animosity to the agreement. In a reversal of the Iraq 

situation a decade ago, the beleaguered Turkish gov-

ernment has increasingly pressed the United States to 

adopt a more assertive stance in a neighboring Arab 

country. Turkish officials have called for arming the 

rebels, establishing no-fly zones to negate the devas-

43

tating effects of Syrian air power, and making a great-

er effort to deny foreign arms shipments to the Syrian 

government. 

In contrast, Washington remains uncomfortable 

regarding the skills and ideological inclinations of the 

Syrian insurgents, and tensions have grown between 

Washington and Ankara over how to handle the ex-

tremist element of the Syrian resistance. Although 

opposed to al-Qaeda, whose affiliates have conducted 

terrorist attacks inside Turkey against Western and 

other targets, the Turkish government has allowed 

Sunni militants a free hand in using its territory to train 

and  equip  fighters  for  the  Syrian  campaign.  Ankara 

has also permitted Qatar and Saudi Arabia to provide 

lavish funding for the most extremist factions within 

the resistance. The narrative advanced by these Gulf 

monarchies—that what is occurring in Syria is an op-

pressed Sunni population finally overthrowing an op-

pressive Iranian-back regime—resonates well among 

the Sunnis of Syria, Iraq, and even many Turks. Sunni 

militants****in Syria are some of the most effective as 

well as dogmatic opposition fighters. Iraq’s own Sun-

ni militants are obtaining weapons and combat train-

ing that they will likely later use against the Baghdad 

government. Their hope is that, if Assad falls and a 

Sunni-led regime takes charge in Damascus, then the 

Iraqi Sunnis will receive even more assistance since 

they could benefit from the direct support of the new 

Syrian government as well as the assistance of many 

returning Syrian veterans and renewed enthusiasm 

for Sunni-based insurgencies. 

Turkish  officials  continuously  have  denied  the 

claim that they have supported radical groups like 

Jabhat al-Nusra, but, until  recently, the government in 

Ankara has turned a blind eye to the issue. An affiliate 

44

of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra is a Sunni jihadist faction 

that fights alongside the more moderate Free Syrian 

Army against the Assad regime. Many of its mem-

bers are foreigners who are primarily from Middle 

Eastern countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Ara-

bia, and Pakistan.101 However, international pressure 

combined with fears of domestic blowback has led the 

government to adjust its strategy toward Syria’s ex-

tremist groups. For example, the arrests of suspected 

al-Nusra members in Turkey were followed by deadly 

car-bombings in Reyhanli.102 Gül has since stated that 

these radical groups threatened Turkey’s security.103 

Ankara is especially concerned with the growing 

presence near its borders of Jabhat al-Nusra and other 

fighters  connected  with  the  al-Qaeda  linked  Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).104 A related concern 

is that the radicals will gain the military upper hand 

in Syria and attack the moderate opposition, weaken-

ing its international support and legitimacy.105 Turkey 

has now begun a stricter border control and a more 

sensitive evaluation of which opposition groups to 

support. The authorities have been taking measures 

to prevent Turkish youth from joining radical Islamist 

groups.106 The United States should continue to sup-

port these efforts, presumably with low-profile Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency and other intelligence assets. 

U.S.  officials  have  parried  Turkish  proposals  to 

consider the option of establishing a border buf-

fer zone or safe areas deeper inside Syrian territory, 

where refugees could find safe shelter without enter-

ing Turkish territory. Turkey created a similar zone 

in northern Iraq in 1991, which allowed more than a 

million Iraqi Kurds to escape Saddam Hussein’s ex-

pected retribution for their failed 1991 uprising after 

the Kuwait war. Ankara and Washington could also 

45

apply the model used in Iraq and the former Yugosla-

via in the 1990s and create no-fly zones, safe havens, 

and humanitarian corridors to protect Syrian civilians 

and accelerate the disintegration of the Syrian army 

by enticing more military defectors, who could flee to 

the zone with their families. At one point, Davutoğlu 

reportedly expressed interest in establishing such 

a corridor that would extend from the sea, perhaps 

even to Cyprus, rather than near the Turkish border. 

But the lesson of the 1990s is that, unless backed by 

air strikes and robust ground forces, the adversary 

will not respect these safe havens. Assad’s military is 

considerably  stronger  than  Qaddafi’s,  so  any  no-fly 

zone would need to be robustly enforced. It would 

need to begin with a preemptive strike against the 

Syrian military to destroy its planes and helicopters, 

degrade its ground forces and command and control 

networks, and weaken the morale of the Syrian forces. 

Then  it  would  resemble  the  no-fly  zone  established 

over northern and southern Iraq after 1991 by the 

United States and other NATO governments, which 

required repeated strikes against Iraqi targets (such 

as air defense units) to prevent Saddam’s forces from 

re-grouping. It is doubtful that Chinese and Russian 

governments would provide UN authorization for 

any such enforcement measures, so the Turkish and 

U.S. governments would need to justify the measures 

on  the  basis  of  self-defense.  U.S.  officials  point  to 

significant  differences  between  the  Libyan  and  Syr-

ian situations, notably the lack of an authorizing UN 

resolution as well as greater divisions within the Arab 

League and NATO about the wisdom of intervening. 

In the absence of more universal regional support or 

a more sold backing in international law, U.S. officials 

are more reluctant to employ force in Syria. 

46

**Iraq.**

Turkey has several core interests in Iraq: cultivat-

ing ties with the various Iraqi factions; preventing the 

PKK from using northern Iraq as a base of operations; 

balancing  the  influence  of  Iran;  securing  access  to 

Iraqi oil and other economic opportunities; and gener-

ally seeking to promote stability in a key neighboring 

region. In particular, a mixture of defensive and of-

fensive motives has been driving Turkish policy to-

ward Iraq. The defensive consideration is the convic-

tion among Turkish leaders that Prime Minister Nouri 

al-Maliki’s divisive policies, designed to weaken his 

rivals for power and rally Shiite partisans behind him, 

are leading Iraq back toward sectarian civil war. They 

fear that renewed confrontation could undermine 

Turkey’s economic interests in Iraq, present Ankara 

with yet another humanitarian crisis on its border, 

and undermine Turkey’s carefully crafted policy of 

containing Kurdish nationalism in Iraq within tightly 

constrained limits. Another defensive goal of Turkey 

is to keep Iranian influence in Iraq limited. Although 

Ankara has sought to develop better ties with Iraq’s 

Shiite majority, Turkey generally has sought to bal-

ance Tehran’s use of some Iraqi Shiites as its main lo-

cal proxies by supporting various Sunni and Kurdish 

leaders in Iraq. Ankara does not want to wage a proxy 

battle with Iran on Iraqi soil, but it wants to ensure 

that a coalition government in which Turkish inter-

ests are represented rules Baghdad. Turkish leaders 

also aim to ensure that Iraqi Kurdistan is governed by 

leaders that will take Ankara’s economic and especial-

ly security interests into account. Al-Maliki naturally 

resents what he sees as Turkish efforts to contain his 

power and divide and rule parts of Iraq. The Turkish 

47

government has employed several tools in pursuit of 

these goals in Iraq—diplomatic initiatives, economic 

ties, and, when necessary, military power. 

Turkey suffered security and economic problems 

as a result of the 2003 Iraq War, but the conflict did 

enhance  Ankara’s  regional  influence  by  deepening 

the power vacuum that had emerged after the 1991 

Persian Gulf War. The AKP government has filled this 

vacuum by extending its influence in many neighbor-

ing countries in what some observers describe as a 

“neo-Ottoman” policy, a label rejected by AKP lead-

ers. Turkey’s influence in Iraq has grown considerably 

in recent years as Turkish policymakers have adopted 

more inclusive policies and as economic and cultural 

intercourse between Iraqis and Turks has grown. But 

sources of tension do exist in the relationship. The 

Turkish military regularly violates Iraqi sovereignty 

by attacking PKK targets in northern Iraq, sometimes 

through large cross-border ground invasions. Some 

Iraqis still suspect that Turkey would like to establish 

*de facto* control over northern Iraq, which used to be-

long to the Ottoman Empire. If the situation in Syria 

stabilizes, then that country rather than Turkey could 

provide the main oil pipeline conveying Iraqi crude 

to European markets. Turkey and Iraq have regu-

larly disputed access to water and the management 

of shared waterways, with Iraqis objecting in the past 

to various Turkish dam projects that could reduce the 

flow of water to downstream countries like Iraq and 

Syria. Should Iraq ever come under the control of a 

government hostile to Turkey, Ankara could use the 

KRG as a buffer to shield Turkey from Baghdad as 

well as a means to exert pressure on Iraqi policies. But 

Turkish officials have been careful to refrain from dis-

cussing such an option for fear of exacerbating wor-

48

ries that Ankara’s real objective is to recover northern 

Iraq, the former Ottoman vilayet of Mosul. 

The United States and some Arab governments 

have generally encouraged Turkey to expand its pres-

ence in Iraq. Not only does Turkey help dilute Iranian 

influence, but Turkish business activities also generate 

economic growth and jobs in Iraq, helping the country 

recover from decades of war and civil strife. Further-

more, many U.S. leaders still see Turkey’s Islamic-

influenced, but essentially secular, political system as 

a model of the type of political and social system that 

could work well in Iraq, with its large Sunni minority 

and secular tradition, or at least as offering a superior 

alternative to that of an Iranian-style Shiite autocracy. 

Even religious Turks such as AKP leaders espouse a 

moderate form of Sunni Islam that exudes tolerance 

toward Shiites and other Islamic minorities. This trend 

is likely to continue as U.S. influence in Iraq declines 

further in coming years with the withdrawal of U.S. 

troops and the natural deeper integration of Iraq into 

mainstream Middle East politics. By helping keep Iraq 

out of Tehran’s orbit and linking Baghdad to the West, 

Ankara increases its own regional influence and en-

hances its value as a strategic partner of Washington 

and Persian Gulf governments. 

The  nadir  of  Turkish  influence  in  Iraq  occurred 

after the Anglo-American invasion of March 2003. 

Despite the offer of billions of dollars of U.S. aid, the 

Turkish parliament voted against a reluctant proposal 

by the new AKP government to allow the U.S. mili-

tary to attack Iraq through Turkey’s southeast border 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Instead, 

the Pentagon had to spend considerable time reposi-

tioning its troops to enter Iraq through its southern 

border. The George W. Bush administration partly 

49

blamed the Turkish parliament’s decision for the sub-

sequent emergence of the anti-Western insurgency 

in Iraq. In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-

feld claimed that, “If we had been able to get the 4th 

infantry Division in from the north through Turkey 

. . . the insurgency would have been less.”107 By then, 

Turkish public opinion had turned solidly against 

Washington’s Iraq policies. Turks perceived the U.S. 

promotion of an autonomous Kurdish quasi-state in 

northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government, 

as inspiring Kurdish separatism in Turkey and pro-

viding a  *de facto* sanctuary for PKK terrorist attacks 

on Turkish civilians, which escalated following the 

Anglo-American invasion. Another source of concern 

was how Turkey’s exclusion from the occupying co-

alition combined with the tensions between Ankara 

and Washington had minimized Turkish influence in 

post-Saddam Iraq. 

Since 2007, the Turkish and U.S. Governments have 

cooperated more effectively with the Turkish military 

to counter PKK activities in northern Iraq. Before then, 

Ankara had complained repeatedly that Washington 

was paying insufficient attention to Turkey’s security 

interests in northern Iraq, especially PKK activities in 

the KRG. But the deaths of 13 Turkish soldiers in a 

border clash in October 2007 led the United States to 

provide intelligence and other assistance to the Turk-

ish military, which conducted air and ground attacks 

against PKK targets in northern Iraq. The more precise 

Turkish attacks minimized Kurdish civilian casualties 

and therefore KRG complaints.108 

Since then, in line with the AKP’s “zero prob-

lems” with neighbors policy, Erdoğan, Gül, and other 

Turkish policymakers have sought to balance unilat-

eral military action with the application of soft power 

50

means of influence in Iraq, primarily by deepening cul-

tural, education, and business ties with Iraqis. In July 

2008, Turkey and Iraq signed a joint political declara-

tion that established a high-level strategic cooperation 

council aimed at establishing a “long-term strategic 

partnership.” The agreement also calls for joint efforts 

to prevent terrorists and illegal arms from moving 

across their border. The council has since served as 

a discussion forum for the prime ministers and oth-

er  high-level  government  officials  of  both  countries. 

They have met several times a year to improve coop-

eration regarding energy, security, diplomatic, and 

economic issues. 

The reorientation in Turkey’s policy toward Iraq 

culminated in Gül’s March 23-24, 2009, trip to Iraq, the 

first official presidential-level visit to the country in 33 

years. ****The trip also resulted from a sustained Turk-

ish campaign to improve ties with the KRG. In 2009, 

Turkey opened consulates in Erbil (the KRG capital), 

Basra, and Mosul—major regional centers of Kurdish, 

Shiite, and Sunni influence, respectively—in a tangible 

display  of  support  for  a  unified  Iraq.109 Within Iraq, 

Turkish  leaders  first  developed  extensive  ties  with 

Iraq’s Sunni minority, which until Saddam Hussein’s 

overthrow in 2003 ruled over Iraq’s other minorities 

as well as its Shiite majority. Turkey then improved 

relations with the leaders of Iraq’s Kurdish minority, 

who prudently distanced themselves from the PKK 

and embraced the economic opportunities offered by 

the Kurds. 

In addition to reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni and 

Kurdish minorities, the AKP has also attempted to 

develop ties with Iraqi Shiites, including reaching out 

to populist Shiite cleric, Moktada al-Sadr, by training 

lawmakers belonging to al-Sadr’s party in parliamen-

51

tary protocol. In addition, a Turkish consortium par-

ticipated in an $11 billion renovation project in Sadr 

City, Baghdad’s largest Shiite neighborhood. In Octo-

ber 2009, Turkey opened a consulate in Basra, a Shiite-

dominated southern port city and Iraq’s only large 

seaport in a major oil-producing region. To further 

signal his government’s desire to reach out to Iraqi 

Shiites,  Erdoğan  became  the  first  modern  Turkish 

leader to attend the Shiite commemoration of Ashura 

(in December 2010) and visit Imam Ali’s tomb in Najaf 

(in March 2011), one of the most important Shiite sites 

in Iraq. 

During Iraq’s March 2010 national elections, Turks 

generally supported the more secular Iraqi National 

Movement bloc led by Ayad Allawi rather than the 

Shiite-dominated State of Law Coalition led by al-

Maliki. Turkish officials view al-Maliki less as an Ira-

nian puppet than as an ambitious strongman who has 

exploited the post-war weakness of competing Iraqi 

political and social institutions to accrue and exercise 

near dictatorial powers. Turkish policymakers are also 

concerned that the new Iraqi government and military 

are too weak to govern the fissiparous Iraqi state ef-

fectively. Turkish policymakers want an Iraqi regime 

that can keep “peace at home, peace in the world,” 

and not fall under the control of another foreign gov-

ernment, in this case Iran. 

The governments of Saudi Arabia and the other 

conservative Persian Gulf minorities consider Turkey 

a useful ally for promoting moderate Sunni causes in 

Iraq against either Sunni extremists belonging to al-

Qaeda or Shiite militants backed by Iran. Turkey’s 

relations with many Arab governments have im-

proved in recent years as Turkey has moved toward 

mainstream Arab positions regarding Israel and other 

52

issues. Al-Maliki and his allies naturally disliked An-

kara’s interference in their domestic affairs, though 

Turkey’s  financial  and  other  support  to  al-Maliki’s 

opponents was considerably less than that provided 

by some Persian Gulf monarchies. 

Pressure from Turkey, the United States, and other 

foreign governments during the coalition formation 

talks did succeed in inducing the Iraqi rivals to form 

what looked to be a nominally multiparty government 

in which power is divided between al-Maliki, Allawi, 

and other Iraqi leaders. But al-Maliki exposed the frac-

tures within the Iraqi government and shattered the 

facade of unity by trying to arrest Vice President Tariq 

al-Hashimi,  the  highest-ranking  Sunni  official  in  the 

Iraqi government, on charges of running a terrorist 

death squad. Al-Maliki then threatened Kurdish lead-

ers after they provided al-Hashemi, who enjoys good 

ties with Turkey, with sanctuary in the KRG on the 

grounds that he would not receive a fair trial in Bagh-

dad.110 Alarmed by the prospects of renewed civil war 

and Iraq’s possible break up, Erdoğan called al-Maliki 

by phone on January 10 and urged him to reconcile 

with his colleagues in order to avoid the “irreversible 

chaos” that would result from renewed ethnic and re-

ligious wars among Iraqis, which could engulf other 

Muslim countries. In response, al-Maliki told the U.S.-

sponsored al-Hurra Television network on January 13 

that, “Turkey is playing a big role that might bring 

disaster and civil war to the region, and Turkey will 

suffer because it has different sects and ethnicities.” 

The two governments summoned each other’s 

ambassadors to complain about their respective coun-

try’s behaviors.111****Later several rockets were fired at 

the Turkish embassy in Baghdad.112 No one was hurt, 

and no one claimed responsibility, but the Turks natu-

53

rally suspect the incident was a warning orchestrated 

by al-Maliki’s forces. Relations worsened after Turkey 

gave refuge to Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, 

who  arrived  on  April  9  and  has  taken  up  indefinite 

residence in a luxury apartment in Istanbul, where he 

continues to denounce al-Maliki while undergoing 

medical treatment and enjoying round-the-clock po-

lice protection and elite patronage.113 

Al-Maliki’s harsh rhetoric regarding Turkey was 

partly motivated by his suspicions that Turkey was 

colluding with his enemies in the United States and 

various Arab governments against him. His rhetoric 

about Turkey sharply escalated after Davutoğlu and 

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton ex-

pressed their unease at the situation in Iraq in a Feb-

ruary 13, 2012, joint press conference. Clinton stressed 

that it was important “that the Iraqi Government be 

an inclusive one in which all Iraqis believe that they 

have a stake in the future of a united Iraq.” She went 

on to add that: 

the foreign minister and I had a good discussion about 

Iraq and how we can work together to strengthen their 

democracy, help to settle political differences between 

various factions. 

Clinton pointedly added that: 

We encourage Turkey to continue to play an impor-

tant role in trying to reach out to Baghdad, to many 

different personalities within the political system, and 

we’ve encouraged other nations in the region to do the 

same. We think Turkey’s played a very constructive 

role. But we share the concern about the need to dem-

onstrate unequivocally a commitment to an inclusive 

Iraqi Government that represents all Iraqis. 

54

Davutoğlu replied that: 

Iraq is the backbone of the stability in our region. If 

there is no stability in Iraq, there cannot be stability in 

our region. We have been always saying Iraq is like a 

small Middle East. We have all sectarian, ethnic com-

munities, religious communities in the Middle East we 

have in Iraq. 

But Davutoğlu went on to insist that: 

The welfare of all Iraqis, regardless of their ethnic 

or sectarian background, that is the only demand of 

Turkey. . . . We see all Iraqis as our eternal neighbors, 

brothers and sisters. Their welfare is our welfare. 

If they have any problem, any pain, it is us, we feel  

the pain. 

Davutoğlu  added  that  the  Iraqi  constitution  re-

quires power sharing among its communities, and that 

Turkey considers that principle essential for the “suc-

cess of the Iraqi democracy,” adding that, “If there is a 

successful Iraqi democracy, that will be a good model 

for other countries as well.”114

The PKK issue has also contributed to the general 

deterioration in relations between Ankara and Bagh-

dad. Turkish leaders have complained that security 

along the Iraq-Turkish border has declined and that 

the PKK has been exploiting this opening to intensify 

attacks against Turkey. Dozens of Turkish security 

personnel died in the summer of 2011. On October 29, 

2011, the PKK launched its most successful attack to 

date, killing 24 Turkish soldiers and wounding many 

more, in an ambush in Hakkari province. In response, 

around 10,000 Turkish security personnel, including 

elite special forces units in addition to regular con-

scripts, engaged in a major military operation in the 

55

border region against the PKK. Although most Turk-

ish forces stayed inside Turkish territory, some 2,000 

Turkish troops crossed into northern Iraq to search 

for and destroy PKK units and facilities. Gül told vis-

iting U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on De-

cember 16, 2011, that Turkey feared its border secu-

rity situation would worsen now that all U.S. troops 

were leaving Iraq.115 Ankara has sought to minimize 

its costs and rely on Iraqi forces to deal with the PKK 

fighters inside Iraq. The leaders of both the Iraqi cen-

tral government and the KRG in northern Iraq have 

denounced the PKK attacks and not resisted Turkish 

military operations on their territory, but they lack the 

means to eliminate the PKK forces in Iraq themselves. 

Meanwhile, the Turkish government has encour-

aged the expansion of Turkish-Iraqi economic ties. 

In addition to commercial considerations, Turkish 

officials have sought to make Iraq’s economic health 

depend more on its sustaining good relations with 

Turkey, which increases Ankara’s leverage over Ba-

ghdad’s policies. Most of Iraqi Kurdistan’s trade and 

foreign  investment  involves  Turkish  firms,  but  even 

Iraqis located elsewhere understand that Turkey is the 

most prosperous and industrialized of Iraq’s neigh-

bors, offers routes to and from Western markets, and 

provides an exit to the Mediterranean Sea for Iraqi hy-

drocarbons.116 Furthermore, economic exchanges with 

Iraq  especially  benefit  southeastern  Turkey,  where 

Turkey’s discontented Kurdish population lives. One 

means of reducing their dissatisfaction is to improve 

their standard of living. 

Between 2003 and 2011, overall yearly bilateral 

trade between Iraq and Turkey increased from $940 

million to $11 billion.117 Iraq has become Turkey’s 

second largest trading partner, after Germany. More 

56

than half of Turkey’s trade with Iraq involves the 

KRG.118 Turkey’s main exports to Iraq include ma-

terials, machinery, and construction products, basic 

food and cleaning materials, and electrical and elec-

tronic products. In contrast, about the only items that 

Turkey imports from Iraq are hydrocarbon products 

such as crude and fuel oil. In 2009, Turkey began im-

porting oil directly from the KRG after Iraq’s central 

government could not agree on a new oil law due to 

disputes over revenue sharing and other issues. On 

August 7, 2007, Turkey and Iraq signed a memoran-

dum of understanding that Iraqi natural gas would be 

supplied to Turkey and via Turkey to Europe.119 After 

Baghdad, politicians failed to agree on a new oil law, 

Turkey began importing oil directly from the KRG in 

2009. The oil pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in Iraq 

to Ceyhan in Turkey transports one-fourth of Iraq’s 

crude oil exports. The flow assures the authorities in 

both Kurdistan and beyond considerable revenue, 

while helping secure Turkey’s position as a major 

energy bridge between the Middle East and Europe. 

Meanwhile, Turkey is helping Iraq meet its own en-

ergy demands. Turkish firms have invested in oil and 

gas exploration and production projects throughout 

Iraq. Even excluding the oil sector, Turkey has become 

Iraq’s largest commercial investor. Turkish firms have 

invested in hotels, housing, and the energy sector in 

Iraq. These companies provide manufactured goods 

and other products. By early-2012, 740 Turkish firms 

had negotiated $2.5 billion in construction contracts in 

the KRG alone.120 Altogether, more than 1,000 Turk-

ish companies had invested in Iraq, concentrated in****

the construction, irrigation, solid waste management, 

pharmaceutical, agriculture, and tourism sectors.121 

Turkish firms had undertaken more than $11 billion 

57

worth of construction projects in Iraq since 2003.122 

Hundreds of Turkish contractors in Iraq are working 

on approximately $16 billion worth of projects.123 

Turkey  has  sought  to  exert  influence  in  Iraq  by 

means other than force, economics, and energy. Tur-

key has been utilizing “soft power” and projecting an 

image of pop culture over its border.124 In addition, 

Turkey helped double the number of out-of-country 

training opportunities that NATO could offer Iraqis 

in 2010 for internal security training.125 In Decem-

ber 2005, Turkey encouraged efforts in Iraq to bring 

together the Sunni Arab Party representatives and 

U.S. ambassador in Istanbul, in an effort to head off 

the burgeoning Sunni-led insurgency.126 Turkey also 

hosted programs to train hundreds of Iraqi politi-

cians in democratization for all of Iraq’s various eth-

nic and sectarian political parties.127 In August 2009, 

Davutoğlu unsuccessfully sought to mediate between 

Iraq and Syria after Iraqi officials blamed the Syrian 

government for helping several massive bombings 

in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Nonetheless, the recurring 

Turkish military interventions in northern Iraq under-

score that Turkey still relies on military power as its 

ultimate security guarantee in northern Iraq. 

**Kurdish Connections.**

In  their  conflicts  with  Baghdad,  Turkish  policy-

makers have had what a few years earlier would have 

been a surprising ally: Iraq’s Kurds. Turkey enjoys 

considerable  support  and  influence  in  northern  Iraq 

due to its deep cultural, education, and especially 

business presence there. Previously Ankara refused 

to deal with the KRG, but now Turkish officials strive 

to cooperate with it. One senior Turkish Foreign  

Ministry official argued that: 

58

Turkey has no problems with Iraq and Syria, but has 

problems with al-Maliki and al-Assad’s policies. Our 

relations with the rest of the region and with many 

partners are in their best state for years.128 

Although Turkey’s outreach effort has failed to 

make much progress with respect to Iraq’s Sunnis, 

Ankara has become the dominant actor in northern 

Iraq. The year 2009 saw a major change in Turkey’s 

approach to the KRG. Before then, Turkey had es-

chewed official contact with the KRG based in Ebril 

and sought to constrain its autonomy and regional 

influence. Ankara feared that the KRG’s emergence as 

a quasi-independent state would encourage separat-

ist tendencies among Turkey’s own Kurdish minority, 

estimated to number as much as 20 percent of the pop-

ulation. Instead, the Turkish authorities pursued their 

interests within Iraq primarily by engaging with the 

occupying  powers  and,  as  it  gained  more  influence, 

Iraq’s central government in Baghdad. This latter ap-

proach was similar to how Ankara worked in the past 

with Iraq to contain Kurdish influence. But this strat-

egy, while yielding gains in the 1960s and 1970s, has 

proved less effective since the 1991 establishment of a 

Kurdish autonomous region and especially since 2003 

due to the decentralized nature of political authority 

in post-Saddam Iraq. 

Attempts to use the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC), 

established in 1995 to consolidate several smaller po-

litical parties and therefore strengthen the influence of 

Iraq’s Turkmen minority, as a local proxy also failed 

to yield major benefits. Ankara has backed Turkmen 

objections to the incorporation of the city or region of 

Kirkuk into the KRG since having control of the area’s 

59

oil resources would bolster the KRG’s wealth and au-

tonomy, and perhaps embolden its leaders to declare 

independence.129****Although the local Turkmen are ea-

ger to partner with Ankara, Baghdad, and Iran (many 

are  Shiites)  to  contest  Kurdish  influence  in  Kirkuk 

and other areas, they lack much political strength and 

have been able to elect only a couple of members to the 

Iraqi national parliament in each election. As a result, 

Ankara  found  itself  with  little  influence  in  northern 

Iraq despite that border region’s vital importance to 

Turkey’s security. 

In 2009, the Turkish government reversed course 

and  adopted  a  more  flexible  and  embracing  policy 

toward the KRG as well as its own Kurdish minor-

ity. After having for years avoided direct contact with 

the KRG, whose existence Turkish nationalists feared 

would encourage separatist sentiments among their 

own Kurds, Turkey now engages directly with the 

KRG, which still enjoys considerable autonomy but 

whose leaders have committed to remaining part of a 

unified Iraqi state and to suppressing PKK operations 

in their area of control. KRG pressure reportedly con-

tributed to the PKK’s decision to declare a ceasefire in 

August 2011.130 

For their part, Turkish officials currently prefer a 

strong KRG that has the power to control its border 

and internal security, promote economic develop-

ment that provides opportunities for Turkish traders 

and investors, and provides Kurds with an alternative 

successful model to that of supporting the PKK. Many 

Kurds in Turkey as well as Iraq support the KRG as 

their best means of achieving limited autonomy in a 

situation in which Kurds cannot establish an indepen-

dent country. Turkey’s 2010 opening of a consulate in 

Erbil signified Turkey’s new approach by recognizing 

60

the KRG as a core constituent element within the fed-

eral state of Iraq. ****Turkish officials have also developed 

ties with moderate Kurdish leaders such as Iraqi Pres-

ident Jalal Talabani and KRG President Massoud Bar-

zani, who regularly visit Ankara as honored guests. 

Ankara’s elevated role in the KRG has also enhanced 

Turkey’s influence in Baghdad since Turkey has be-

come the most powerful foreign actor in a region of 

vital importance to the Iraqi government.131 

Although Turkey’s overall economic exchanges 

with Iraq have increased considerably in recent years, 

its economic presence has become particularly promi-

nent in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially its trade, energy, 

and construction sectors. In the KRG, 80 percent of 

goods sold are imported from Turkey.132 The border 

between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan has never been 

more open, as 1,500 trucks daily pass through the 26-

lane main border crossing of Ibrahim Khalil. A few 

years ago, the main Turkish presence in northern Iraq 

was military. Although some Turkish troops now 

quietly remain in northern Iraq, Turkey’s most vis-

ible presence is its pop culture, especially cinema, and 

Turkish goods. Turkish clothes, furniture, toys, build-

ing materials, and other products flood the malls and 

shops throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. 

Turkish investment is also flourishing, with more 

than  half  the  registered  foreign  firms  operating  in 

Iraqi Kurdistan—almost 800 of the 1,500 registered 

foreign companies—being Turkish.133 Many Turkish 

business leaders see Iraqi Kurdistan as both an area 

of economic opportunity in itself as well as a transit 

zone for increasing Turkish trade with more distant 

regions in the Middle East. If the KRG were a separate 

country, then it would rank among Turkey’s top 10 

trading partners. 

61

Turkish political leaders want to strengthen their 

border security by working with Iraqi Kurdish au-

thorities against the PKK. They also hope that the 

increased economic exchanges across the border will 

bring greater prosperity to the traditionally economic 

backward regions where many of Turkey’s Kurds, 

which  constitute  one-fifth  of  Turkey’s  population, 

reside. Iraqi Kurds appreciate that their economic 

development depends heavily on attracting Turkish 

investment, as well as being able to trade with Turkey 

and beyond, by means by transiting Turkish territory. 

The KRG is landlocked, and Turkey offers the optimal 

connecting route to European markets. During a June 

2010 trip to Turkey, Barzani observed that, “Turkey 

is a gateway for us to Europe as we are a gateway for 

Turkey to Iraq and the Gulf countries.”134 Kurds at-

tribute several Turkish advantages, including lower 

prices  and  more  flexible  contract  terms  than  other 

foreign sellers.135 

Ironically, Kurdish nationalism now has also been 

encouraging Kurdish-Turkish reconciliation. Iraqi 

Kurds appreciate that, under current conditions, they 

can best deepen ties with Turkey’s Kurds by having 

good relations with Turkey. At least for the time be-

ing, the possibility of establishing a unified Kurdish 

political entity is excluded, so keeping the borders as 

porous as possible is their best option. However, as 

long as the PKK insurgency persists, it will remain an 

impediment to deeper cross-border economic and po-

litical ties among Kurds and with their neighbors. 

Turkey’s counterinsurgency operation on both 

sides of its border with Iraq highlights the recurring 

problem confronting Turkish governments and mili-

tary in their fight against Kurdish terrorists: the insur-

gents’ area of operations, like the Kurdish population 

62

itself, straddles across Turkey’s borders with other 

countries—namely Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The govern-

ments of all four countries share an interest in sup-

pressing Kurdish separatism and violence, but they 

have also found Kurdish terrorism useful tools to 

pressure the other countries. These transnational ties 

mean that, despite their large scale, Turkish military 

operations cannot suppress the insurgency for long. 

Its vigorous nature might at best deter further foreign 

backing for actions by the PKK against Turkey as well 

as provide the maneuvering room the Turkish govern-

ment needs to make the concessions required in the 

new constitution to address Kurdish grievances—but 

it remains unclear whether the ruling AKP will so use 

this opportunity. 

**Iran.**

The relationship between Turkey and Iran is 

fraught  with  baffling  contradictions.  One  might  ex-

pect the inherent religiosity of both the AKP and Iran, 

despite Sunni-Shite theological differences, to sustain 

good ties, but the contrasts between the Islamic Re-

publican and the “Turkish Model” have resulted in 

an acute rivalry during the Arab uprisings, as both 

have held themselves out as a paradigm of Islamic de-

mocracy. At first, the presence of two overtly Islamist 

parties in charge of Ankara and Tehran encouraged a 

Turkish-Iranian reconciliation, but then their religious 

orientations became a source of their divisions. Tur-

key’s secular political parties and national security es-

tablishment, which dominated Turkey’s foreign pol-

icy until a decade ago, generally perceived Turkey’s 

Islamic neighbors, Iran and Syria, as potential threats, 

and sought to develop security ties with Israel, the 

other important non-Muslim state in the Middle East. 

63

The Islamic orientation of the ruling AKP has 

meant that current Turkish and Iranian leaders now 

share a common devotion to Islam and animus to-

ward Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. However, 

the religious element, which had previously buoyed 

the relations between the two, became a source of di-

vision as Erdoğan began to displace President Mah-

moud Ahmadinejad and other prominent Iranians 

as the most popular Muslim leader among the Arab 

masses due to the AKP’s public attacks on Israel and 

their support for various pro-Palestinian initiatives 

such as the controversial “freedom flotillas” seeking 

to defy Israel’s blockade of Gaza.136 During his trium-

phant tour to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September 

2011 and at other times, Erdoğan recommended that 

the new regimes in the Arab world follow Turkey’s 

secular democratic model, whereas Iranian govern-

ment representatives have told them to establish an Is-

lamic Republic, as in Iran.137 Since then, their religious 

devotion has become an even more direct source of 

tensions as Turkish leaders have backed Sunni oppo-

nents of Shiite governments (as in Iraq and Syria) and 

Sunni governments facing mass Shiite opposition sup-

ported by Iran (as in Bahrain).138 

The AKP deviated from Washington’s policy re-

garding Iran’s nuclear program, though its approach 

has corresponded to the mainstream international 

view. While Turkish officials do not want the Islamic 

Republic to obtain nuclear weapons—members of 

Turkey’s still influential military establishment have 

suggested that Turkey would rapidly follow Iran in 

acquiring nuclear weapons for reasons of security and 

prestige—Turkish officials do not object to Iran’s pur-

suit of limited nuclear energy activities under appro-

priate international monitoring. The current Turkish 

64

government insists that any country should have the 

right to engage in all civilian nuclear activities, includ-

ing uranium enrichment and the other phases of the 

cycle needed to produce nuclear fuel, provided it ap-

plies traditional IAEA safeguards and complies with 

other nonproliferation norms.139 

In contrast, most of Turkey’s NATO allies remain 

adamant that Iran must cease enriching uranium or 

engaging in other sensitive nuclear activities until 

Tehran convinces the international community that 

its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Turk-

ish leaders have sought to mediate the nuclear dispute 

between Tehran and the West. In 2010, they worked 

with Brazil to achieve a confidence-building exchange 

of enriched uranium between the parties. Months of 

diplomatic efforts by Erdoğan and President Lula Ina-

cio da Silva of Brazil to mediate the Iranian nuclear 

dispute appeared to achieve results when they an-

nounced an agreement in Tehran on May 17. In their 

trilateral statement, the three governments declared 

that Iran was prepared to “deposit” 1,200 kilograms 

(kg) of its low-enriched uranium in Turkey in return 

for the delivery within 1 year of 120-kg of uranium 

enriched to the higher level needed for Tehran’s medi-

cal research reactor.140 After the West rejected that pro-

posal, Turkey’s initial reaction was to stand behind the 

Tehran accord. Turkish officials claimed that Obama 

and other U.S. officials had earlier supported their ini-

tiative, though in retrospect they may have failed to 

give it proper attention due to an expectation that it 

had little chance of success.141 

In the months of recriminations that followed, 

Turkish  officials  denounced  what  they  described  as 

the hypocrisy of Western governments in approach-

ing nonproliferation issues. They said that these coun-

65

tries repeatedly have sought to sanction Iran despite 

its government’s signing the Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) and the absence of any concrete proof that Ira-

nians are seeking nuclear weapons.142 In addition, they 

have made special deals with India despite the Indian 

government’s refusal to adhere to the NPT. Erdoğan 

was especially incensed by what he saw as the West’s 

deliberately overlooking Israel’s nuclear weapons 

program. Turkey wants to prevent other countries, 

such as Israel, from employing—or threatening to 

employ—force against Iran to attack its nuclear facili-

ties. Turkish officials consider counterproductive the 

“dual-track” approach adopted by Western countries 

toward Iran—combining offers of cooperation with 

threats of attack and sanctions. Instead, they argue 

that the best way to prevent Iran from seeking nuclear 

weapons is to address the underlying sources of inse-

curity that might induce Tehran to seek them. Rather 

than rely on threats and sanctions, they want to offer 

Iran security pledges in return for reciprocal Iranian 

guarantees that Tehran will not use its nuclear activi-

ties for military purposes. 

Accordingly, Turkish officials have generally op-

posed sanctioning Iran.143 First, Iran is Turkey’s second 

largest supplier of natural gas.144 Turkey is not blessed 

with sufficient energy resources to meet its needs and 

cannot afford to cut trade ties with one of its most 

significant  energy  partners.  Turkish  policymakers 

have felt obliged to accept the mandatory sanctions 

imposed by the UN Security Council, but they have 

tried to resist applying the supplementary sanctions 

adopted by Western governments, which include not 

purchasing Iranian energy or selling Iran precious 

metals.145 Turkey currently imports about 25 million 

cubic meters of natural gas per day from Iran through 

66

a direct pipeline.146 This flow amounts to almost one-

third of Turkey’s total annual gas consumption and 

helps balance Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia, 

which provides Turkey with most of its gas, some oil, 

and is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. 

Second, the people of Turkey and Iran have a broad 

cultural and historical relationship. One-third of Irani-

ans are Azeri Turks, and Tehran is the second-largest 

Turkish-speaking city in the world. Turks are there-

fore reluctant to support sanctions that harm the Irani-

an people.147 In the absence of convincing evidence to 

the contrary, Turkish officials had reservations about 

imposing economic and other sanctions against Iran 

by the UN Security Council or by individual coun-

tries, which severely hurts Iran’s neighbors and key 

economic partners, including Turkey. Rather than rely 

on threats and sanctions, Turks urge the United States 

and its allies to offer Iran security pledges in return 

for reciprocal Iranian guarantees that Tehran will not 

use its nuclear activities for military purposes. These 

Turkish-U.S. differences, currently overshadowed by 

Turkish-Iranian divergences over Iraq and especially 

Syria, could become more serious in the future. Tur-

key might also change its benign nuclear weapons 

policies in coming years. Most obviously, unambigu-

ous evidence could arise that Iran is pursuing nuclear 

weapons, which some Turks have said would require 

Turkey, refusing to accept military inferiority regard-

ing Iran, to do likewise. Turkey’s plans to expand its 

domestic nuclear energy program would, for the first 

time, provide its government with the scientific, tech-

nical, and industrial foundations to pursue genuine 

nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s own development 

of the capacity to make nuclear weapons has demon-

strated to Ankara and others. 

67

In September 2011, Turkey committed to host a 

U.S. AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile defense (BMD) early 

warning radar at Malatya as part of NATO’s defense 

against Iran’s growing missile capabilities. Turkey 

made the controversial decision to reinforce Ankara’s 

security ties with the West despite Iranian objections. 

The decision was both presented and facilitated by the 

restructuring of the U.S. missile defense architecture 

in Europe by the Obama administration, which relo-

cated the initial U.S. deployments out of East Central 

Europe and toward the Balkans, Black Sea, and eastern 

Mediterranean regions. The new structure, with the 

interceptor missiles based in Romania and on nearby 

U.S. warships, offers Turkey greater BMD coverage as 

well as the opportunity, though publicly unsought, to 

play a major role in that architecture. Despite Turk-

ish lobbying not to identify Iran as the main target of 

the NATO BMD network, Iranian leaders and media 

clearly consider the decision to host the radar in the 

face of Iranian and Russian opposition an unfriendly 

act.148 But the decision has proven useful in silencing 

Western critics of the AKP’s Eastern orientation and 

has been overshadowed by the more serious differ-

ences between Ankara and Tehran regarding Syria. 

The same pattern of initial reconciliation followed 

by renewed divisions has occurred with respect to 

other regional security issues. In addition to renounc-

ing security ties with Israel, the AKP pleased Iran by 

seeking to reconcile with its Syrian ally, President 

Bashar al-Assad. In the process, the new leaders in 

Turkey managed to dampen Syrian support for the 

PKK, a policy that Tehran soon followed. Turkey and 

Iran each have large Kurdish minorities (some 14 mil-

lion Kurds live in Turkey and approximately 5 million 

live in Iran) whose members sometimes are so dissat-

68

isfied  with  the  policies  of  their  central  governments 

that they engage in anti-regime terrorism. Turkey and 

Iran each face major Kurdish terrorist groups based in 

Iraq. Besides the anti-Ankara PKK, the Free Life Party 

of Kurdistan (PJAK) has attacked Iranian targets from 

its strongholds in Iraq’s Qandil mountain range. 

A few years ago, Turkish and Iranian authorities 

began exchanging counterterrorist intelligence and 

coordinating military strikes against Kurdish terror-

ists in northern Iraq.149 But more recently, the AKP 

has supported Assad’s opponents, irritating Tehran 

in the process.150 Although a few years ago the AKP 

was able to overcome decades of confrontation and 

develop good ties with the Syrian government, the re-

gime’s brutal killing of thousands of protesters has led 

the AKP officials to support Syrian opposition forces 

seeking to change the current regime.151 Iranian lead-

ers have complained about Turkey’s becoming the 

main regional backer of the armed opposition seek-

ing to overthrow Assad. Iranians consider preserving 

a friendly regime in Damascus a vital national interest 

for Iran.152 

A more recent dispute has been Turkey’s suc-

cessful appeal in November 2012 that NATO deploy 

Patriot air defense systems on Turkish soil to defend 

Turkish territory against Syrian air and missile strikes. 

Iranian analysts fear the Patriots could serve as the ba-

sis of a no-fly zone that would deprive the Assad re-

gime of one of its few advantages over the insurgents. 

Ahmadinejad canceled a planned visit to Turkey that 

December, which the Iranian media said was in pro-

test to the deployments.153 Turkey has also declined to 

send high-level officials to events in Iran, such as the 

2012 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran. 

69

Furthermore, it seems that some Iranian support 

has resumed to the PKK, which also receives help from 

Assad’s regime. PKK military leader Cemil Bayik, who 

has close ties to Iranian hardliners, has been one of the 

most vocal opponents of peace talks with the Turkish 

government. He has pledged to defend Iran and Syria 

from alleged Turkish plots to change their regimes. 

Earlier media reports claimed that Iranian authorities 

had briefly “detained” PKK leader, Murat Karayilan, 

when Iranian officials learned of impending Turkish 

air strikes against his PKK camps. The Iranians sup-

posedly then released Karayilan when the bombing 

ended rather than remand him to Turkish custody. 

Turks speculated that Iranian authorities wanted 

to keep Karayilan and the PKK active as a potential 

source of leverage or a bargaining chip with Turkey.154 

Turkish-Iranian differences regarding Iraq have 

also become a major source of bilateral tension. Most 

Turkish  officials  do  not  want  Iran  to  dominate  Iraq. 

They fear that Iranian leaders seek a weak and divided 

Iraq that is unable to contest Tehran’s drive for region-

al primacy. They also perceive Iran as wanting a sub-

servient Shiite coalition to rule Baghdad that would 

not resist Iranian political and economic control over 

Iraq. In contrast, Turkey favors a strong but demo-

cratic Iraqi state ruled by a coalition of political forces 

that can maintain domestic stability as well as contrib-

ute to regional security.155 These conditions would be 

favorable for reviving Iraq’s hydrocarbon production, 

which would benefit Turkey as a key transit state for 

Iraqi oil and gas, and restoring Iraqi economic growth, 

which would support Turkish investors and traders. 

These different strategic visions have seen Turk-

ish and Iranian groups often back opposing political 

forces in Iraq. Even the nuclear issue has lost its ability 

70

to sustain good Turkey-Iran ties. Ankara gained some 

credit in Tehran in 2010, when it sought to galvanize 

a  confidence-building  agreement  between  Iran  and 

the West over its nuclear mediation. Turks have since 

expressed irritation at Iranian ingratitude for their ef-

forts to mediate between Tehran and the West. Iranian 

carping often includes threats as well as criticisms.156 

Erdoğan  has  since  stopped  accepting  at  face  value 

Iranian pledges never to develop nuclear weapons, 

telling an American journal that Turkey would feel 

compelled to seek nuclear weapons, too, if Iran ever 

acquired them. Iran subsequently proposed Kazakh-

stan and other countries as suitable hosts for holding 

future rounds of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, 

excluding Turkey.157 

The economic ties between the two are deep, even 

though Iran has proven to be an unreliable partner and 

a graveyard of Turkish investment capital. Trade be-

tween the two is large—Turkey-Iran trade rose above 

$10 billion in 2011 and now exceeds $15 billion.158 The 

two parties even have agreed to start using their own 

currencies in their bilateral commerce to help achieve 

their goal of tripling Iran-Turkey trade to $30 billion 

within a few years.159 But trade with Iran is frustrat-

ing for Turkish entrepreneurs. Many deals announced 

with great fanfare never pan out—a pattern one sees 

in Iran’s relations with many other countries. As such, 

Turkey is making progress in having Azerbaijan, Iraq, 

and eventually Turkmenistan replace Iran as major 

suppliers of gas and oil.160 

Iran’s role in the Turkish economy looks set to de-

cline further as Turks deepen their ties with the more 

dynamic economies in Asia and elsewhere. Turkish 

and  Iranian  officials  have  discussed  arrangements 

whereby natural gas from Iran and Turkmenistan 

71

could flow to European markets via Turkey.161 But U.S. 

officials have criticized Turkey’s energy and economic 

ties with Iran, which Washington has been seeking to 

isolate. UN, U.S., and European sanctions forced the 

Turkish Petroleum International Co. to abandon a $7 

billion deal to develop a part of Iran’s enormous South 

Pars field.162 

Although Turkey consistently has voiced oppo-

sition to sanctions against Tehran, the country has 

at  times  benefited  from  those  sanctions,  which  have 

eliminated competition from other foreign firms that 

Turkish businesses would have to contend with in a 

sanctions-free environment. Furthermore, UN sanc-

tions prohibit countries from paying for Iranian goods 

in dollars or euros, which forces Iran to use any earn-

ings to buy local goods such as food and medicine 

rather than purchase nuclear-related equipment with 

hard currency. But the Turkish authorities have toler-

ated a “gas-for-gold” sanctions-circumventing scheme 

whereby Iran has used Turkish lira to purchase gold 

that Iranians can sell elsewhere in exchange for West-

ern currency. The corruption scandal that came to light 

in December 2013 revealed the Turkish government 

allowed the state-owned Halkbank to circumvent the 

sanctions by exploiting the loophole that permitted 

Turkey to pay for Iranian energy imports with gold.163

The renewed Turkish-Iranian tensions of recent 

years mark a regression to the historic pattern for 

their relationship. Clashes between the imperial am-

bitions of the Turkish-centered Ottoman Empire and 

the Safavid Persian dynasties shaped regional politics 

for centuries. Relations between Ankara and Tehran 

were strained even during the 1990s. Turkey’s strong-

ly secular leaders accused Iranians of seeking to pro-

mote religious fundamentalism in Turkey and other 

72

countries; Iranians criticized Turkey’s strict rules 

against religious expression, such as the banning of 

headscarves in public institutions. Turks opposed the 

Iranian practice of rule by clerics while Iranians criti-

cized military rule in Turkey. Both governments sus-

pected the other of promoting terrorist and separatist 

movements against them. Turkey and Iran also have 

diverging interests in Central Asia. Both would like to 

increase their influence in a region where they were 

the dominant players in previous centuries. Ankara is 

particularly drawn to the Turkic nations, whereas Iran 

feels closest to Tajikistan. It has only been in the last 

decade that Turkey, under AKP rule, has improved its 

relations with the Iranian government, and some early 

gains have more recently been reversed. 

Iranian leaders have resisted breaking entirely with 

Turkey. They already have enough potential adversar-

ies and lack any genuine allies, so having a powerful 

neighbor that opposes using force against Iran is still 

a great advantage. Turkey and Iran have not fought a 

war since the 17th century, and the popular mood in 

both counties is against another bilateral armed con-

flict any time soon. In public, influential Iranians have 

been attributing some of their tensions with Turkey to 

U.S. machinations and Western plots. Iranians want 

Turkey to continue to refrain from sending their own 

military forces into Syria. Without them, the Assad re-

gime might survive for years in a stalemated civil war, 

with the opportunity growing over time that a new 

Turkish government might come to power. 

Meanwhile, Turkey and Iran are establishing a 

joint university, a joint economic commission, and 

more transit and border terminals.164 Even beyond 

economic ties, Turkish leaders fear that isolating and 

threatening Tehran could further radicalize Iranian 

73

foreign policy, which, at least in regards to Turkey, 

has been rather pragmatic. An alienated Iranian gov-

ernment might deepen its ties with terrorist organiza-

tions, intervene more deeply in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and take other actions designed to retaliate against 

the United States and its allies, like Turkey. A war be-

tween Iran and the West would prove disastrous since 

Turkey’s regional interests would severely suffer, as 

they did during the confrontation between the West 

and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.165 Turkey suffered heavy 

economic losses during the years in which the UN 

Security Council imposed sanctions on Saddam Hus-

sein’s government and then as a result of the Western 

invasion of the country. The losses from a war today 

involving Iran would be even greater. 

Nonetheless, the Turkey-Iran relationship is 

primed for problems due to their differing geopo-

litical and sectarian interests. They have already re-

sumed their historic pattern of eschewing direct wars 

by competing against one another by proxy in Iraq, 

Syria, and Azerbaijan. After decades in which one 

or the other country was clearly dominant, we now 

have a dangerous equipoise in which both these 

non-Arab regimes consider themselves rising pow-

ers that deserve preeminent say in the region. But 

by  definition,  at  most  only  one  of  them  can  gain 

that primacy. 

**EURASIA**

Although many earlier successes of the AKP’s zero 

problems policy have failed to endure, Turkey’s rela-

tions with Russia, Central Asia, China, and even Af-

ghanistan are still better than a decade ago. Turkey’s 

relations with Russia are generally good despite dif-

74

ferences over Syria, the South Caucasus, Turkey’s de-

pendence on Russian energy, Moscow’s noncompli-

ance with the CFE Treaty, and other issues. Thanks to 

their ties with NATO and the United States, Turkish 

policymakers have been able to accept these differenc-

es with general nonchalance. Moscow has not become 

overly irritated by Turkey’s confrontations with Syria, 

Moscow’s main client in the Middle East, or Turkey’s 

support for NATO’s missile defense architecture 

in Europe. Turkey has likewise accepted Moscow’s 

moves to establish a Eurasian economic bloc with sur-

prising nonchalance. Yet, differences over Syria, and 

now the Crimea, confront Turkey’s Russia policy with 

its most serious challenge in decades. For now, the 

improved relationship with Russia has also enabled 

Turkey to better support U.S. goals in Central Asia. 

Russia no longer fears Ankara’s influence in Central 

Asia and might even welcome a Turkish presence to 

help counterbalance China’s growing presence in the 

region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey has 

strived to carve out a space for itself in the Central 

Asian region, among its Turkic brother-nations. Turk-

ish involvement in the region increased tremendously 

with the War in Afghanistan, which Turkey has sup-

ported and participated in with vigor and enthusiasm. 

Turkey has spearheaded mediation efforts in the re-

gion, particularly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Through the 1990s, Russia countered Ankara’s efforts 

to  exert  influence  in  the  region,  and  only  in  recent 

years has Turkey been able to expand its cooperation 

with former Soviet Central Asian nations beyond a 

strictly cultural context. Turkish firms have begun to 

dominate in the region in many sectors, from banking, 

to telecommunications, food processing, and textiles. 

Erdoğan, having failed to overcome the impasse that 

75

currently hinders EU membership, has courted closer 

relations with the SCO as a means of exercising influ-

ence in Central Asia. Turkey has recently attained the 

status of “dialogue partner,” but there are significant 

obstacles to fuller membership, and major doubts as 

to the degree to which the SCO, with its limited eco-

nomic and security capabilities, could replace the EU 

and NATO. 

**RUSSIA**

The AKP has pursued better Russian-Turkish rela-

tions. The two countries have developed a sustained 

economic and security partnership, centered on grow-

ing  tourism,  energy  flows,  and  overlapping  security 

concerns in their shared neighborhoods of Central 

Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. 

Several factors explain the mild Turkish response, 

limited to declarations of principles and feared conse-

quences. Turkey now receives more than half its natu-

ral gas from Russia, as well as large deliveries of oil 

and support for its planned nuclear energy program. 

Annual trade now amounts to some $40 billion. Mu-

tual  investment  has  also  grown,  with  Turkish  firms 

helping construct the Sochi Olympics complex in  

Russia.166 

During the past decade under the AKP, Turk-

ish and Russian interests converged more than they 

differed. Both countries have sought to reduce ter-

rorism, increase oil and gas transit through Turkey, 

and limit disruptive political upheavals in Central 

Asia and neighboring regions, given the risks of such 

chaos spilling across their borders. Neither govern-

ment wants Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, but both 

Ankara and Moscow do not object to Iran’s pursuit 

76

of limited nuclear activities under appropriate inter-

national monitoring. In addition, Turkey and Russia 

want to prevent other countries from employing force 

against Iran to attack its nuclear facilities. 

Russian  officials  no  longer  evince  concern  about 

Turkey’s growing economic and cultural presence in 

Central Asia and, as evidenced by Moscow’s low key 

response to Turkey’s decision to host a NATO mis-

sile defense radar, no longer consider Turkey a ma-

jor military threat. Turkey and Russia largely have 

set aside their Cold War adversarial mindsets in the 

former Soviet space. The Kremlin, protective against 

U.S. and West European intrusions, no longer evinces 

much concern about Turkey’s growing economic and 

cultural presence in the Turkic nations of the South 

Caucasus and Central Asia. Russians may even wel-

come Turkey’s growing economic presence in Central 

Asia as a means of diluting China’s growing economic 

prowess there. Despite Moscow favoring Armenia 

and Ankara siding with Azerbaijan, Russia and Tur-

key have managed to keep their differences over the 

Nagorno-Karabakh dispute under control. Even in 

the case of Georgia, Turkey has managed to maintain 

good relations with Tbilisi without antagonizing Mos-

cow, though Turkish efforts to lessen Russia-Georgia 

antagonisms have largely failed. 

The independent policies Ankara pursued toward 

regional security issues presumably lessened Mos-

cow’s concerns about Turkey serving as an anti-Rus-

sian stalking-horse for Western interests in the region. 

Policymakers in both countries have shared the belief 

that other NATO countries, particularly the United 

States,  have  paid  insufficient  attention  to  their  con-

cerns in these regions. A few years ago, analysts even 

spoke of an “Axis of the Excluded” between them.167 

77

Although Turkey has since strengthened its ties with 

NATO and the United States, Russian analysts still 

cultivate Turkey as a rising power. It has a dynamic 

economy,  newly  flexible  foreign  policy,  and  shares 

with Russia the experience of being physically part of 

Europe but practically treated as a peripheral country 

not suitable for membership in core European clubs 

such as the EU.168 

The Black Sea region has represented another geo-

graphic region of overlapping mutual concern to both 

Turkey and Russia. In recent years, Russian-Turkish 

security cooperation in this area has been sufficiently 

extensive and exclusionary as to worry the West about 

the two countries establishing a  *de facto* condomin-

ium in the region, which represents the main route 

through which Caspian oil and gas reaches Europe. 

For example, Moscow and Ankara have worked to 

limit the presence of Western navies in the Black Sea. 

In particular, they have resisted Alliance proposals 

to enlarge the scope of NATO’s Operation ACTIVE 

ENDEAVOUR, currently active in the Mediterranean, 

into Black Sea waters. Russian policymakers do not 

want NATO to establish a major military presence in 

another region neighboring the Russian Federation, 

while  Turkish  officials  also  oppose  any  steps  that 

might lead to a review of the 1936 Montreux Conven-

tion, which grants Turkey special privileges as pos-

sessor of the Bosporus Straits, including the power to 

limit the size of warships from nonlittoral states that 

enter the Black Sea. 

Since 2006, Russian warships have been participat-

ing in Black Sea Harmony, a Turkey-led multinational 

initiative launched in 2004 designed to counter ter-

rorism,  narco-trafficking,  and  weapons  of  mass  de-

struction (WMD) proliferation in the south Black Sea 

78

region by tracking suspicious vessels and conducting 

security checks on ports.169 The two navies track ves-

sels and exchange data about possible illegal activi-

ties. Russian and Turkish government representatives 

maintain that Black Sea Harmony and other Russian-

Turkish maritime security cooperation, such as the an-

nual exercises of the Black Sea Naval Force involving 

the riparian states since April 2001, obviate the need 

to bring NATO’s ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR or any other 

NATO naval presence into the Black Sea region. As 

Gül put it during his joint February 2009 news confer-

ence with then Russian President Dmitrey Medvedev 

in Moscow: 

Russia and Turkey are the two most important coun-

tries in the region, which are called upon to make a 

weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, se-

curity and cooperation across the region.170

Frictions do exist between Ankara and Moscow. 

Turkey has criticized Russia’s decision to suspend 

implementation of the CFE, whose provisions limit 

the number of Russian military forces that can be de-

ployed near Turkey and also promote military trans-

parency and restraint throughout the South Caucasus, 

the scene of one recent war (involving Georgia in 2008) 

and potentially another (between Armenia and Azer-

baijan). Turkish policymakers have sought to main-

tain “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet Eurasia 

in general and in the South Caucasus in particular.171 

Preserving “pluralism” involves strengthening the 

political sovereignty of these countries, countering the 

growth of Russian influence in the Caucasus (though 

in a covert rather than overt way), and promoting 

closer ties between these countries and Euro-Atlantic 

organizations such as NATO.172 

79

In line with its strategy of “making friends” with 

previously alienated countries, generating opportuni-

ties for greater east-west commerce through Turkey, 

and attempting to avert further instability in the South 

Caucuses following the Georgia War, the AKP gov-

ernment signed a set of protocols with Armenia in 

October 2009 that would establish mutual diplomatic 

relations and reopen their joint border. Pressure from 

Azerbaijan and its Turkish supporters has generated 

opposition within the Turkish legislature to ratifying 

the protocols before Armenia resolves the Nagorno-

Karabakh dispute, which the Turkish government 

cited in 1993 as the original reason for closing the bor-

der. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev threatened to 

stop subsidizing the sale of natural gas to Turkey and 

seek alternative energy export routes should Turkey 

adopt the protocols while Armenian forces continued 

to occupy Azerbaijani territory.173 The Turkish gov-

ernment rapidly backtracked and resumed insisting 

on a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue before 

the protocols could enter into effect. 

The government of Armenia, which set aside pre-

vious demands for Turkey to recognize the 1915 mas-

sacres as genocide during the signing ceremony, has 

been unwilling to make further concessions simply to 

reestablish relations and reopen its border with Tur-

key. Turkish diplomats have hoped that Russia, an 

historical ally of Armenia as well as member of the 

OSCE Minsk Group, would help promote a reconcilia-

tion between Turkey and Armenia. When he met with 

Putin  in  January  2010,  Erdoğan  called  on  Moscow 

to play a more active role in resolving the Nagorno-

Karabakh issue.174 Yet, Putin declined to commit to 

exerting any pressure on Armenia, whose parliament 

must also ratify the protocols, to make concessions 

80

regarding Nagorno-Karabakh in order to secure Turk-

ish parliamentary ratification. When asked about the 

issue at their joint news conference on January 13, Pu-

tin argued that linking the Turkish-Armenian recon-

ciliation with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would 

simply delay progress on both. He stated:

Both the Karabakh and Turkish-Armenian problems 

are extremely complicated in their own right, and I 

don’t think they should be joined together in a pack-

age. Each problem is hard to resolve even taken on 

its own, and if we lump them together, any hope of 

their resolution automatically recedes into the distant 

future.175 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made 

similar remarks the following day when he visited Ye-

revan.176 Skeptics might suspect that Russian officials 

are not eager to see a reconciliation between Turkey 

and Armenia since, while offering the possibility of 

drawing Azerbaijan and Turkey closer to Russia, the 

protocols’ adoption could reduce Moscow’s influence 

in Armenia and promote the development of new 

east-west energy and commercial routes through Tur-

key that circumvent Russian territory. Armenia sus-

pended the parliamentary ratification process for the 

protocols a few months later. 

Russia’s decision to use overwhelming force to 

defeat Georgia in its August 2008 war shocked Turk-

ish policymakers into realizing that their margin for 

maneuver in Russia’s backyard might be smaller than 

anticipated due to Moscow’s new assertiveness.177 To 

prevent further regional disorders, Ankara sought to 

advance a multilateral regional security framework 

that would both constrain Russia’s assertive impuls-

es as well as revitalize efforts to solve the regional 

81

conflicts that might lead to new flareups and further 

destabilization.178 Although Turkish leaders tradi-

tionally had strongly supported Georgia’s territorial 

integrity and developed strong economic ties with 

Georgia, Turkish officials restrained their criticism of 

Moscow’s intervention and subsequent dismember-

ment of Georgia. Turkish representatives instead fo-

cused  on  averting  future  conflicts  by  promoting  the 

creation of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Plat-

form (CSCP) that would include Armenia, Azerbai-

jan, Georgia, and Russia, as well as Turkey. The CSCP 

would have supplemented the contributions made by 

other regional security institutions, such as the Or-

ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), whose Minsk Group has sought to address 

the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet republics, 

and the SCO, with which Turkey is also seeking to 

develop closer ties. The CSCP also sought to exploit 

the interests Russia shared with Turkey in promot-

ing sufficient regional stability to allow for a mutually 

profitable  energy  corridor  between  Eurasian  energy 

suppliers and European energy consumers.179 

In addition to hoping to enlarge Turkey’s margin 

to maneuver in the South Caucasus, Ankara wanted 

to avoid further conflicts that placed Turkey uneasily 

between Russia and the Western democracies. Tur-

key had found it difficult to manage the intense pres-

sure placed on Ankara during the war. In the early 

days  of  the  conflict,  Turkey  turned  down  American 

requests to send ships through the Turkish Straits into 

the Black Sea.180 After Ankara eventually agreed to al-

low three U.S. ships, as well as some other NATO ves-

sels, the Russian government complained that Turkey 

was violating the 1936 Montreux Convention, which 

regulates passage of ships from non-Black Sea states 

82

through the Turkish Straits.181 More generally, Turk-

ish leaders traditionally have sought to dampen ten-

sions between their neighbors, including those in the 

Middle East, to avoid disputes that could harm the 

Turkish economy or otherwise negatively redound on 

Turkish interests. Russian officials endorsed the pro-

posed platform in principle since, by excluding non-

regional actors, it would give Moscow and Ankara 

a leading role in addressing local security problems. 

But Western and Georgian disinterest led to the initia-

tive’s demise. 

Another source of Turkey-Russian tension has been 

the large and persistent trade imbalance in Russia’s fa-

vor, despite recurring pledges by both governments to 

work to change the balance and composition of their 

trade. The imbalance, which does not characterize 

Turkey’s trade with other major economic partners, 

results from Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russian 

oil and gas, which accounts for almost three-fourths 

of Turkey’s imports from Russia. Turkey has become 

one of the largest Russian gas importers and natural 

gas accounts for the largest proportion of Turkey’s 

annual trade turnover with Russia. Turkey’s depen-

dence on Russian energy is a cause of concern among 

officials in Ankara, leading Ankara to seek to diversify 

its sources of energy to include suppliers in Central 

Asia, the South Caucasus, and at times Iran (though 

international sanctions and U.S. pressure have made 

this difficult). Turkey is also planning to develop ci-

vilian nuclear power, though Turkey has partnered 

with Russia, which offered the best deal, to develop 

its first nuclear power plant, which will use a third-

generation Russian-made reactor. Russia has agreed 

to pay most of the costs of this construction and accept 

repayment out of the revenue from the electricity the 

plant will generate. 

83

In recent years, Syria has become a major sore point 

between Ankara and Moscow. While Ankara has been 

demanding that Assad resign, Moscow continues to 

support his regime. Turkey’s leading role in organiz-

ing the anti-Assad resistance, Syria’s cross-border at-

tacks against Turkish territory and Ankara’s decision 

to force a Syrian plane wrongly suspected of carrying 

weapons to land for inspection in Turkey after it had 

left Russia, have strained ties. However, neither gov-

ernment has been willing to break ties over the issue 

because the two countries still have strong overlap-

ping interests in other areas. Turkey and Russia have 

been able to compartmentalize their differences over 

Syria so that they can continue to pursue other dimen-

sions of their improving relationship.182

More recently, the March 2014 Crimea crisis has 

confronted Turkey with the most serious challenge to 

its Russian policy since the Cold War. Until losing the 

Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, the Ottoman Empire 

held sovereignty over the Crimea, then dominated 

by a population of Muslim, Turkic-speaking Crimean 

Tatars who looked to Istanbul for spiritual and other 

leadership. Joseph Stalin forcefully changed this eth-

nic balance by accusing the Tatars of collaborating 

with the German occupation and sending them into 

exile. It was not until the last days of the Soviet Union 

that the authorities allowed many Tatars to return. 

Today, the peninsula’s 300,000 Crimean Tatars 

represent some 12 percent of the population. ****Turkey 

has provided them with special aid programs, and 

Turkish officials have affirmed that they will protect 

the Tatars during the present crisis.183 The Tartars 

have opposed the Crimean independence referendum 

and fear that, as part of Putin’s Russia, their rights will 

again be infringed. Representatives of the millions of 

84

Turks of Tartar origin have demanded that Ankara 

take a strong stand against the illegal territorial trans-

fer.184 Moscow’s proclaimed right to use military force 

to protect ethnic Russians resembles the pretext Mos-

cow used in more than a dozen wars against the Otto-

man Empire, justified by the need to defend Orthodox 

Christians against Muslim oppressors. 

Despite having closer ties with the Crimea than any 

NATO country, championing the cause of threatened 

Muslims elsewhere, and being key neighbors and en-

ergy partners of both Russia and Ukraine, Turkish of-

ficials adopted a surprising low-key response to Mos-

cow’s moves against the Crimea. Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, 

and other Turkish officials have simply called for up-

holding Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, 

and political unity without taking any concrete mea-

sures to compel observance of these principles other 

than call for a coalition government in Ukraine that 

maintained a foreign policy balanced between Rus-

sia  and  the  West.  Likewise,  though  Davutoğlu  has 

warned that Moscow’s actions could open a “Pando-

ra’s Box” by unfreezing other “frozen conflicts” in the 

Black Sea region—an allusion to the Armenian-Azer-

baijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh—Ankara has 

not launched a new****initiative to avert that outcome, as 

it did after the 2008 Georgia War. 

Although the Turkish government has said that it 

will not recognize the legitimacy of the Crimean refer-

endum, in which the peninsula’s residents reportedly 

overwhelmingly voted to join Russia, Ankara has not 

followed the United States and the EU in imposing 

sanctions  on  Russian  officials  for  backing  this  ma-

neuver. Davutoğlu has even insisted that Turkey will 

not let “another power”—perhaps an allusion to the 

EU  or  Washington—create  a  Russia-Turkey  conflict 

85

over Crimea, which he insisted was a global crisis that 

should concern all countries. Searching for ways to 

de-escalate the crisis, the Foreign Minister has also ar-

gued that the West should avoid trying to isolate Mos-

cow and instead should, along with Ukraine, negoti-

ate a mutually acceptable compromise that respected 

Russian interests.185 

Diverging domestic considerations have also been 

paralyzing Ankara’s response in the current crisis. The 

AKP’s declining popularity should encourage the gov-

ernment to take a firmer stance toward Moscow to gain 

popularity among Turkey’s nationalists, ethnic Tatars, 

and Russian-haters. But if Russia retaliated by disrupt-

ing gas deliveries and other economic intercourse with 

Turkey, voters’ standard of living would decline at a 

time when Turkey faces several crucial ballots. In ad-

dition, Erdoğan and other Turkish leaders may have 

viewed the popular revolution in neighboring Ukraine 

with some unease, given how Turkey has also faced 

months of unprecedented protests. Putin thus far has 

been playing Turkey well, keeping Ankara quiet in 

both the Georgian and Crimean crises, but if he con-

tinues to grab former Soviet territories, he may finally 

drive Turkey to return to its traditional anti-Russian 

stance, especially in the Black Sea region, just as Anka-

ra has reversed many of the AKP’s initially new foreign 

policies in recent years. 

**CENTRAL ASIA**

Turkey has striven to deepen ties with Central Asia 

since these formerly Soviet republics became indepen-

dent countries. Several Central Asian republics have 

majority populations of ethnic Turkic origin, and all 

have long engaged in trade and other relations with 

86

Turkey. Since these countries gained independence 

in 1991, the Turkish government has sought to train 

and educate their people and provide technical, lin-

guistic, and other assistance to their institutions, from 

their militaries and governments to their businesses 

and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

Turkish officials also see one of their missions as rep-

resenting Central Asian interests and views within 

major international institutions such as the G-20.186 

They therefore encourage Central Asians to convey 

messages to these institutions’ members via Turkey. 

To diversify its sources of energy imports further, 

Turkish officials have been seeking to develop options 

to transship, and possibly purchase for domestic use, 

natural gas from Kazakhstan and other Caspian Basin 

countries. Turkey is interested in serving as a “natu-

ral energy bridge” between the supplier countries to 

Turkey’s east and international energy markets to 

Turkey’s north, west, and south. The Central Asian 

states, desiring to decrease their reliance on Russian-

controlled pipelines, have supported this effort. In-

deed, Central Asian governments welcome Turkey’s 

growing ties in the region as these times help pursue 

multivector foreign policies with Western directions, 

even as other NATO countries reduce their presence 

in their region. 

Turkish  analysts  and  government  officials  are  of 

two minds regarding future political developments in 

Central Asia. One group believes that Central Asia is 

ripe for deep political change through its own version 

of the Arab Spring. They see the region as the last bas-

tion of one-party authoritarian rule and consider the 

prospects for its near-term democratization to be high. 

This group would also welcome a phenomenon like 

the Arab Spring in the region since they consider the 

87

absence of functioning democracies in most Central 

Asian countries as a significant problem for Turkish 

entities. For example, they note that, since all major 

policies in a dictatorship are determined by a single 

individual or group, authoritarian governments are 

prone to make radical changes in policy overnight. In 

addition, the constraints on most individuals’ ability 

to access information in authoritarian regimes, as well 

as the legal arbitrariness common in nondemocracies, 

present major obstacles to domestic and foreign entre-

preneurs seeking to run profitable businesses in these 

countries. 

But another group of Turkish experts consider the 

prospects for Central Asia’s near-term democratiza-

tion to be low because they were more optimistic about 

these regimes’ ability to withstand the kind of political 

chaos sweeping through the Arab world. They argued 

that it would take decades for these countries, whose 

leaders still consist of people who have overwhelm-

ingly developed their political views during the Sovi-

et period, to abandon their Soviet mentality and adopt 

Western liberal values. 

In the view of these Turkish analysts and officials, 

another constraint on political change in Central Asia 

was the geographic isolation of these states from other 

democratic countries as well as their history of author-

itarian rule. They argued that Central Asia’s democ-

ratization would entail a lengthy process requiring 

the further political and economic evolution of these 

countries. For example, they believed that these na-

tions’ economic development would expand the size 

of their middle class. In time, these stronger middle 

classes could provide a foundation for these states’ 

evolution into more democratic regimes, since people 

having some property want to exert some influence on 

88

government policies that could affect these interests. 

Conversely,  this  second  group  of  Turkish  officials 

feared that efforts to rush Central Asia’s democratiza-

tion could easily backfire and lead their rulers to adopt 

even more repressive domestic politics. Instead, they 

advocated that, for the time being, Western govern-

ments focus on promoting the rule of law and human 

rights in Central Asia, while hoping that economic 

development and other modernization trends would 

eventually lead to more democratic governments in 

the region. 

At present, this second group of Turkish officials 

seems to have the greater influence on Turkey’s poli-

cies toward Central Asia. But the onset of revolution-

ary upheavals in this region could easily shift the bal-

ance of influence in favor of the first group more eager 

and optimistic about the prospects for Central Asian 

democratization. Despite these differences, both 

groups of Turkish officials maintained that their coun-

try could play some role in Central Asia. Neither has 

thought Turkey sufficiently powerful to compete with 

Russia directly for regional influence. Turkish officials 

recognize Russia’s political, military, and economic 

primacy in the region. They also perceive China as a 

growing economic power in the region. These officials 

see Turkey’s role in Central Asia mainly in cultural 

terms, encouraging these Turkic people to learn Turk-

ish and acknowledge their historical affinity with the 

commonwealth of Turkish nations. They also want 

Turkish businesses to trade and invest in the region. 

In practice, the few Turkish companies having a major 

presence in Central Asia concentrate their activities in 

certain economic sectors such as construction. 

Turkey has also been developing ties with the 

SCO. The SCO has rapidly become one of Eurasia’s 

89

most influential multinational institutions despite its 

short history. It is also one of the largest (in terms of 

geographic size and population) regional organiza-

tions, with a most comprehensive agenda. When they 

established the SCO on June 15, 2001, the six found-

ing states (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) adopted a “Declaration 

on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-

tion” that emphasized their adherence to a “Shanghai 

Spirit” based on “mutual respect for multiciviliza-

tions” and other values. The issue of Turkey’s acquir-

ing some kind of formal affiliation with the SCO, the 

dominant multinational institution in Eurasia, has 

been under discussion for years, but it was not until 

2012 that the SCO governments finally decided to of-

fer  Turkey  some  kind  of  formal  affiliation  after  An-

kara had assured them that Turkey would not be a 

stalking-horse for NATO in Eurasia. 

The June 2012 annual meeting of the SCO heads 

of state in Beijing, China, designated Turkey a formal 

“dialogue partner” of the organization. The SCO uses 

the category for countries that are neither full mem-

bers nor formal observers (like India, Iran, Pakistan, 

Mongolia, and now Afghanistan). The 2009 Yekaterin-

burg summit in Russia granted Belarus and Sri Lanka 

“dialogue partner” status. These partners cannot sign 

SCO documents or participate in SCO decisions; they 

can only offer advice in those areas of cooperation 

specified  in  a  memorandum  negotiated  between  the 

SCO and the partner. Designating Turkey a dialogue 

partner makes imminent sense given Turkey’s long-

standing interest in Central Asia, economic influence 

in that region, and powerful regional military force. 

Turkish academies and trainers have been working 

with the Central Asian armed forces since these coun-

90

tries became independent. Turkey’s location astride 

multiple global hotspots—the Balkans, the Caucasus, 

the Middle East, etc.—gives it significant geopolitical 

weight. In addition, allowing a NATO member to af-

filiate with the SCO helps reduce the concerns of some 

outsiders that the SCO is seeking to construct an alli-

ance of anti-Western autocracies in the heart of Asia. 

By making Turkey a dialogue partner and Af-

ghanistan a formal SCO observer, the SCO now has 

the most comprehensive set of members to address 

Afghanistan’s regional security and economic inte-

gration. Turkey has played a major role in enhanc-

ing Afghanistan’s security and development. Turkey 

could also help the SCO realize its aspirations to have 

greater economic impact. Turkey has considerable as-

sets in such sectors as finance, transportation, energy, 

telecommunications, and construction. Although not 

yet in the same class as China, India, and Russia, Tur-

key’s booming economy has already propelled Turkey 

to the ranks of the G-20. Turkey already has some $11 

billion in combined trade and investment in Central 

Asia, as well as approximately $1 billion in Eximbank 

loans and some $30 billion in contracts to almost 2,000 

Turkish firms. 

In  a  January  2013  TV  interview,  Erdoğan  said 

that he had told Putin that Turkey, after decades of 

thwarted efforts to join the EU would join the SCO 

instead if Putin could arrange it. Explaining his opin-

ion, Erdoğan called the SCO “better and more power-

ful, and we have common values with them,” which 

include Muslim and Turkic ties with these nations.187 

Erdoğan’s remark should not really be seen as a great 

surprise. The Prime Minister has earlier cited sup-

posed Western hostility toward his country and reli-

gion. For example, when in Egypt in November 2013, 

91

Erdoğan warned his listeners that “all the West wants 

is to tear the Islamic world to pieces.”188 

Political calculations might also be at work. Polls 

show that Turks have become increasingly frustrated 

with the EU, and Erdoğan presumably saw no harm 

in bashing this unpopular target.189****Although most 

Turkish commentators also saw the remarks as a gam-

bit to strengthen Ankara’s negotiating leverage with 

Brussels, a few noted that they resonate well with 

Turkey’s’  flexible  foreign  policy  which,  under  the 

AKP, has moved Ankara away from its previously 

strongly Western orientation. The comments also re-

flect Erdoğan’s sense that Turkey belonged to a dif-

ferent “Islamic civilization” rather than an exclusively 

Christian one.190 

Last  October,  Erdoğan’s  chief  adviser,  İbrahim 

Kalın, complained of a growing gap between Islamic 

and Western values and concluded that “the Euro-

pean model of secular democracy, politics, and plu-

ralism seems to have little traction in the Arab and 

larger Muslim world,” in which he included Tur-

key.191 Although many Turks agree that the EU is sim-

ply unwilling to accept such a large Muslim-majority 

country, Erdoğan’s critics, including heads of leading 

opposition parties, complained that Erdoğan was us-

ing the religion issue to avoid uncomfortable questions 

about EU attacks against his government’s authoritar-

ian tendencies at home.192 In addition to reflecting a 

genuine concern about Turkey’s mistreatment by the 

EU and an effort to gain easy popularity by attacking 

an unpopular target, Erdoğan and other Turkish lead-

ers see cooperating more with the SCO as an enticing 

option. Like everyone else, Erdoğan has noticed that, 

“The economic powers of the world are shifting from 

west to east.”193 

92

In addition to Afghanistan, the main security preoc-

cupation of the SCO thus far has been the “three evils” 

of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—all 

priorities of Turkey’s national security establishment. 

A strengthening of Islamist radicalism in Central Asia 

could easily redound negatively in Turkey, while 

Turkish authorities want to delegitimize Kurdish as-

pirations for a separate state. Turkey’s border secu-

rity is constantly challenged by narcotics and human 

trafficking  from  Central  Asia  since  Turkish  territory 

provides the most direct land route to rich European 

markets.  The  SCO’s  preoccupation  with  fighting  Is-

lamist terrorism and ethnic separatism would help the 

AKP justify its repressive domestic policies, which are 

claimed to help counter Kurdish terrorism and sepa-

ratism. Unlike EU governments, SCO members would 

support whatever repressive means the Turkish au-

thorities deemed necessary.194

The SCO provides another means for Turkey to 

deepen its still modest political engagement with 

Central Asia, and in a framework acceptable to Russia 

and other countries that remain wary of neo-Ottoman 

aspirations regarding the Turkic nations of Central 

Asia. The Turkish Council, Parliamentary Assembly 

of Turkic-speaking Countries (TÜRKPA), the Inter-

national Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), 

the Turkish Academy and Turkey’s numerous student 

scholarships have never yielded Ankara much influ-

ence in these states. The impact of the Central Asian 

projects sponsored by the Turkish International Co-

operation and Development Agency (TİKA) has been 

weakened by the decision to expand its aid recipients 

to dozens of countries rather than retain its original 

focus on the newly independent Turkic republics. The 

educational and cultural outreach efforts sponsored 

93

by the Turkish government and various Turkish 

NGOs have had limited impact building on the shared 

ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other bonds between 

Turkey and these nations. Furthermore, Turkey’s new 

status offers Ankara the prospect of participating in 

SCO-led diplomatic initiatives regarding Afghanistan 

or Central Asia and the organization’s socioeconomic 

initiatives, which might extend to the energy realm. If 

the SCO forms an oil and gas club, then Turkey wants 

to be one of its members.195 

Meanwhile, Turkey’s leverage with Europe, the 

United States, and elsewhere might also rise through a 

deeper affiliation with the SCO. Closer ties would also 

help counter criticism that the AKP’s ambitious policy 

of zero problems with neighbors has failed to attain 

enduring results. Although Turkey’s ties with Syria, 

Iraq, and Europe have worsened in recent years, the 

improvements in Ankara’s relations with the SCO 

members have largely persisted. Deepening ties with 

the SCO could prove useful for Ankara in promoting 

its security goals in Afghanistan and Central Asia. And 

Turkey is now eligible to become a formal observer or 

full member of the SCO, with enhanced privileges, in 

the future. Turkish officials have affirmed interest in 

moving up the membership ladder and becoming a 

formal observer state of the SCO, though this might 

not yield any tangible gains in Turkey’s involvement 

in SCO activities given the marginal differences in the 

rights and privileges of the two categories.196 

Turkish and SCO officials have since indicated that 

Turkey could join both the SCO and the EU since they 

were not exclusive organizations. Nonetheless, joining 

the SCO would prove easier since there are far fewer 

parties to convince to grant membership (only the six 

existing full SCO members); no SCO government has 

94

publicly opposed Turkey’s accession as a full member, 

while France, Austria, and Cyprus openly have op-

posed Turkey’s joining the EU; joining the SCO does 

not require extensive negotiations on specific chapters 

like the EU admission process; and public opinion 

within Europe to Turkey’s joining the EU is generally 

unfavorable, while in the SCO, the governments can 

make decisions without taking their public opinion 

into account. 

But  Turkey  also  will  find  it  harder  to  avoid  the 

contradictions that permeate the SCO. Turkish diplo-

macy has already fallen afoul of the confrontation be-

tween SCO observers India and Pakistan, with media 

commentators in both governments accusing Turkish 

leaders of not paying sufficient heed to their security 

interests in Afghanistan. Although currently camou-

flaged by Turkey’s relying on NATO to bolster its se-

curity  regarding  Syria,  some  NATO  officials  remain 

uneasy about the implications of Turkey’s eastward 

drift for Alliance cohesion. Turkey might seek to use 

its SCO ties as leverage in NATO debates. Turkey will 

also find it hard to avoid the differences between Bei-

jing and Moscow regarding the SCO’s proper role and 

development. Whereas China would like the SCO to 

establish a free-trade zone, Russia has sought to sus-

tain barriers that help preserve the privileged status 

many Russian businesses inherited from the Soviet 

era. This is especially true in the energy sector, where 

China is eager to expand its access to Central Asian 

oil and gas resources traditionally under Russia’s con-

trol. The differences between China and Russia have 

contributed to the SCO’s not admitting any new full 

members to its ranks since its founding in 2001. 

95

**Afghanistan.**

One reason Turkey wants to deepen its ties with 

the SCO is to expand its diplomatic toolkit regarding 

Afghanistan, which became a formal SCO observer in 

2012. Turkey has undertaken major military, econom-

ic, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore Turkey’s 

important role in Afghanistan, which may increase as 

more NATO troops withdraw from that country. 

Turkey’s military contributions to Afghanistan 

have been channeled through the International Secu-

rity Assistance Force (ISAF), created by the December 

2001 Bonn (Germany) Agreement as a means to pro-

vide security while the new post-Taliban government 

rebuilt Afghanistan’s military and police forces.197 

NATO took charge of ISAF in subsequent years and 

expanded its area of operations in stages until it of-

ficially  covered  all  of  Afghanistan.  An  independent 

U.S.-only command focusing on counterterrorist op-

erations has also operated in Afghanistan. Turkey has 

twice  led  ISAF:  first  between  June  2002  and  Febru-

ary 2003, and then between February and November 

2005.198 Turkey has also played a major role in vari-

ous ISAF regional commands and has led the Force’s 

Regional Command Capital in the Kabul region.199 

Turkey extended its command of the ISAF’s Kabul 

region for another year on November 1, 2011.200 Tur-

key initially deployed 276 troops into Afghanistan in 

late-2001 during the post-9/11 coalition military op-

erations in that country, but this figure rose to 1,300 in 

June 2002, when Turkey assumed command of ISAF 

and was charged with providing security in Kabul 

and running the city’s international airport. At one 

point, Turkey had almost 2,000 troops in Afghanistan 

assigned to various noncombat missions.201 

96

While the Turkish government has refused to 

deploy its troops on explicit counterinsurgency or 

counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan, its mili-

tary forces within ISAF have helped train members of 

the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National 

Police in these tactics. In this regard, Turkish instruc-

tors can draw on the experience the Turkish military 

has gained in its many years of conducting counterin-

surgency and counterterrorist operations against the 

PKK, al-Qaeda, and other militant groups.202 Turkish 

troops serve primarily in the Kabul region, but also 

in several Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) 

across Afghanistan. In Kabul, Turkish troops trained 

hundreds of Afghan soldiers and assisted in recon-

struction projects. They also patrolled the city to reas-

sure citizens about their security. Turkey also collabo-

rated with other NATO members such as France and 

Italy in a joint Kabul headquarters to promote security 

in the capital area. In November 2006, moreover, Tur-

key established a PRT in Wardak, located 40-km west 

of Kabul. Its mixed contingent of civilian and military 

personnel trained the Afghan Police, improved judi-

cial administration, developed public infrastructure, 

and supported projects aimed at raising the quality of 

life of the local population.203

During Erdoğan’s visit to the White House in Wash-

ington, DC, on December 7, 2009, President Obama 

requested that the Turkish government deploy com-

bat troops to Afghanistan. In declining the proposal, 

Erdoğan  and  other  Turkish  officials  explained  that 

they wanted to focus Turkey’s military contributions 

on training Afghan security forces, undertaking eco-

nomic reconstruction projects, and supporting other 

noncombat missions. Alluding to Turkey’s value as 

a potential mediator between the Afghan govern-

97

ment and its adversaries, Gül argued that, “If Turkey 

sends combat forces to Afghanistan, the power that 

everybody respects—including [the] Taliban—will 

disappear.”204 The Obama administration eventually 

accepted this logic. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates subsequently stressed to the media that the 

Obama administration was “extremely pleased with 

Turkey’s contributions in Afghanistan” because U.S. 

officials “pay high importance to personnel that can 

train [Afghan] individuals in the areas of military and 

security.”205

The Turkish government and Turkish NGOs have 

supported many humanitarian and economic re-

construction projects in Afghanistan. These have in-

cluded education, health, housing, and infrastructure 

improvement projects. The Turkish government, with 

funds from TİKA, has constructed dozens of schools, 

helping fill a major socioeconomic gap in Afghanistan. 

TIKA has also helped dig wells to provide citizens 

with safe drinking water. Turkey’s Greater Anatolian 

Project (GAP) has supported projects to improve ir-

rigation in the Afghan city of Jalalabad.206 Turkey has 

donated much food to Afghanistan through the UN 

Food and Agricultural Organization and other means. 

Turks have constructed or rebuilt seven medical clin-

ics in Afghanistan and have supported other health 

initiatives in that country.207 Economic considerations 

have sustained Turkish interest in ending the Afghan 

conflict.  The  continued  fighting  has  prevented  Af-

ghanistan from joining with Turkey and other coun-

tries in providing a Eurasian east-west land route for 

Central Asian exports to European markets. Turkey 

aims to become a major transit country for trade be-

tween Asia and Europe, but regional insecurity has 

discouraged foreign investment in east-west railroad, 

highway, and pipeline projects. 

98

Turkey has complemented its long-standing mili-

tary and economic contributions to Afghanistan with 

diplomatic initiatives aimed at creating a favorable 

environment for an Afghan-led peace process. This 

focus has dovetailed well with the Obama administra-

tion’s Afghan-Pak war strategy, which tries to pursue 

three  mutually  reinforcing  tracks:  “fight,  talk,  and 

build,” signifying the need for a favorable regional 

diplomatic  framework  for  ending  the  conflict,  along 

with increased military and economic support for 

Afghanistan. The administration’s “New Silk Road” 

policy aims to increase economic ties between Af-

ghanistan and its neighbors in the expectations that 

the economic gains would reduce economic incentives 

to join regional terrorist and insurgent groups, reduce 

Afghanistan’s dependence on foreign assistance, and 

promote greater regional cooperation in other areas. 

Turkey’s three contributions also coincide well with 

the Obama administration’s “3-D” (defense, devel-

opment, and diplomacy) approach toward foreign  

policy.208 

Many of Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives have con-

centrated on improving relations between Afghani-

stan and Pakistan—or at least keeping their lines of 

communication open during their frequent bilateral 

disputes. Like the Obama administration, and other 

NATO governments, Turkish officials argue that any 

enduring solution to the conflict will require better re-

lations between the governments of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. In particular, Pakistani support is needed 

for inducing the Afghan Taliban to end its insurgency 

since the insurgents use Pakistani territory as a base 

of  operations.  Turkish  officials  and  experts  argue 

that their country has distinct advantages in this me-

diation role, including historically good relations with 

99

both countries, a shared Islamic faith, a lack of local 

proxies or other means, and no incentives to interfere 

in their internal affairs.209 Turkey has long-established 

ties with Pakistan dating from their common align-

ment with the Western camp during the Cold War 

and their shared moderate Muslim governments. 

Their military-to-military exchanges, which include 

a diverse range of bilateral and multilateral exercises, 

have continued to this day. In turn, Pakistan may have 

helped Turkey improve its relations with China and 

discouraged its Afghan Taliban allies from attacking 

Turkish troops in ISAF.210 

Since April 2007, Turkey has hosted six Turkey-

Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Forum meetings in-

volving senior Turkish, Afghan, and Pakistani gov-

ernment officials. These sessions began as presidential 

summits but have since expanded to include senior 

foreign, intelligence, interior, and other civilian and 

military  officials.  Similarly,  while  their  initial  focus 

was on promoting regional security and counterter-

rorism collaboration among the three governments, 

they have since broadened to include economic and 

other forms of nonmilitary cooperation.211 For exam-

ple, at the January 25, 2010, trilateral summit, the three 

governments endorsed initiatives to promote the rec-

onciliation and reintegration of Taliban members who 

agreed to cease fighting and engage in solely nonvio-

lent activities.212 They also discussed cooperating on 

health, education, and other socioeconomic projects.213 

Turkey has sought to move beyond mere dec-

larations and have the parties establish concrete 

confidence-building measures among the parties. As 

part of this trilateral process, in early-2011 Turkey 

organized  the  first  joint  military  exercise  (on  urban 

warfare) involving all three armies.214 A trilateral di-

100

rect video-telephone conference line among the three 

presidents has been established. There is also a Tri-

lateral Minds Platform whose members include aca-

demics and members of the media and think tanks. In 

addition, Turkey has started an Istanbul Forum that 

brings together representatives of the chambers of 

commerce in each of the three countries, which helps 

promote cooperation among their national business 

leaders and other private sector actors to complement 

the government-to-government meetings.215 

In November 2011, Istanbul hosted two vital mul-

tinational meetings designed to support international 

peace efforts regarding Afghanistan. The first gather-

ing was a tripartite presidential summit with Hamid 

Karzai of Afghanistan, Asif Zardari of Pakistan, and 

Gül of Turkey. The second, the Security and Coopera-

tion in the Heart of Asia conference, involved officials 

from these three countries, as well as from many other 

neighboring and supporting countries seeking to es-

tablish a benign regional security environment for 

ending the war. Representatives from Afghanistan, 

China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paki-

stan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turk-

menistan, Uzbekistan, and the United Arab Emirates 

attended the event as full participants and wrote the 

collective conference communique. These self-desig-

nated “Heart of Asia” countries were joined by senior 

officials from other supporting countries and interna-

tional institutions. The latter included Australia, Can-

ada, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, 

Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States, as well as the UN, Economic Coopera-

tion Organization, OSCE, NATO, SCO, South Asian 

Association for Regional Cooperation, Organization 

for Islamic Cooperation, the EU, and the Conference 

101

on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in 

Asia. 

In its mediation efforts, Turkey has encountered 

many of the same challenges that have bedeviled 

similar U.S. and other third-party facilitators. These 

obstacles include the region’s porous borders, which 

facilitate  the  flow  of  fighters  and  drugs;  poor  gov-

ernance; transnational organized criminal groups 

that have an interest in sustaining the conflict; weak 

national governments and security forces that have 

faced major Islamist insurgents; and limited and de-

clining commitments by external powers to support 

regionally driven peace programs. In addition, the 

Afghan-Pakistan conflict has elements of a civil war 

in which the Taliban enjoys some support among the 

large Pashtun community that straddles the Afghani-

stan-Pakistan border. For this reason, regionally based 

peace efforts invariably will prove of limited effective-

ness unless accompanied by complementary develop-

ments in Afghanistan and Pakistan such as more effec-

tive governance, better counterinsurgency operations, 

and a greater desire on the part of the insurgents to lay 

down their arms and reenter their civilian societies. 

The Istanbul conference communique, like other in-

ternational gatherings, stressed that any peace efforts 

must be led by the Afghan conflict parties. Regional 

rivalries have also impeded Turkey’s peace efforts. 

While Russia, China, and the West now generally sup-

port the same goals, Turkey has found it just as dif-

ficult as other countries to manage the India-Pakistan 

rivalry. The Indians complained when they were not 

invited to the trilateral summits between Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Turkey, as well as other Turkey-hosted 

gatherings on Afghanistan. Indians interpreted their 

exclusion, as well as Turkish diplomats’ seeming pre-

102

occupation with improving bilateral economic ties 

between Turkey and India, as a sign that Turkey does 

not respect India’s legitimate national security interest 

in Afghanistan.216 Meanwhile, the main Turkish op-

position party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), 

has attacked the Turkish government for seeking to 

cooperate with the Taliban, which they denounce as a 

terrorist group, by considering establishing a Taliban 

representation bureau on Turkish territory.217 

Whatever limitations on its role as a potential medi-

ator in Afghanistan, Turkey has been a natural partner 

with NATO, the EU, and the United States in Afghani-

stan. The EU’s special representative to Afghanistan, 

Vygaudas Usackas, has praised Turkey’s support for 

regional peace efforts and termed EU-Turkish coop-

eration “most exemplary.”218 This bond has helped 

sustain close ties between Turkey and the West even 

when its government pursues policies toward Iran or 

Israel unwelcome in many Western capitals. Even if 

Turkey’s diplomatic efforts regarding Afghanistan 

fail, Ankara could well receive credit for trying. 

In addition to sharing the general Western goals 

in Afghanistan and contributing troops to the NATO-

led ISAF, Turkey has unique cultural and geographic 

assets regarding Afghanistan that are welcome in the 

West as well as the region. Turkey is the only NATO 

country with a Muslim-majority population, a valu-

able attribute for a Western-led military operation in 

a Muslim-majority country (Afghanistan) and region 

(Central Asia). Turkey’s location is also pivotal since 

Afghanistan, unlike the former Yugoslavia, is very 

much “out-of-area” for an Alliance whose military 

operations have focused primarily on Europe, North 

America, and the ocean between them. Incirlik Air 

Base and other facilities in Turkey have served as im-

portant transit centers for helping transport NATO 

103

troops and other items to Afghanistan.219 Turkey, 

which has the second highest number of troops of any 

NATO member after the United States, accrues certain 

advantages within the Alliance from its prominent 

role in Afghanistan. The other allies acknowledge 

Turkey’s unique assets and contributions. From 2003 

to 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Ce-

tin served as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative 

in Afghanistan. 

At the same time, several factors have constrained 

Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan. These include a 

concern about becoming bogged down in an unwin-

nable war, alienation from U.S. policies in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, and fears of antagonizing fellow Muslims by 

appearing to join a Western (Christian) crusade. These 

concerns, manifested in low popular support within 

Turkey for Turkey’s limited involvement in the war, 

have made the Turkish government cautious about 

its level of involvement, especially in the military 

realm. Public opposition to the AKP’s foreign policy 

might grow now that the AKP’s “zero problems with 

neighbor” policy is in tatters with Turkey’s relations 

with Syria, Iran, Armenia, Israel, and other countries 

deteriorating in recent years. 

**CHINA**

The relationship with China is, on the whole, quite 

positive. The Chinese see Turkey as a potentially valu-

able partner, now that its economy has shown itself 

to be both dynamic and resilient, and now that it is 

demonstrating a policy independence that it has not 

shown since ties between the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) and Turkey were established in 1971. 

Beijing has been cultivating Turkey on many levels, 

104

and Sino-Turkish economic and more recently securi-

ty relations have become increasingly important. Chi-

nese scholars have expressed admiration for Turkey’s 

strong economic performance while PRC policymak-

ers are content that Ankara is not going to champion 

Uighur or other Turkic separatism in China or other 

countries. 

The rise of Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s has 

done much to change Ankara’s perspective regarding 

Beijing’s policies toward the Uighur Turks in Xinjiang 

(East Turkestan) province: like Beijing, Ankara now 

champions the principles of territorial integrity and 

national sovereignty, and opposes separatism. Bei-

jing, in return, has adopted a neutral line regarding 

the Cyprus issue. Trade between the two has grown 

by leaps and bounds, though the deficit remains in the 

PRC’s  favor.  Turkish  officials  have  sought  to  entice 

Chinese investment in various infrastructure projects 

as a means of reducing the trade imbalance. Turkey is 

even considering a Chinese air defense system despite 

Washington’s objections. The AKP government’s de-

sire for new partnerships and Turkey’s eagerness to 

join  other  states  in  benefitting  from  the  strength  of 

the Chinese economy has contributed to this flourish-

ing relationship with Beijing. Their growing mutual 

attraction has led them to overlook their diverging 

policies regarding some regional issues, such as Syria 

and the status of ethnic Turks in China, and instead 

concentrate on cultivating mutual economic and stra-

tegic ties. Both Chinese and Turkish analysts describe 

their countries as two rising great powers that, located 

on opposite ends of Eurasia, could through their stra-

tegic partnership have a major impact on the nations 

between. The two countries referred to increasingly 

deepening relations between the two nations as “stra-

105

tegic cooperation” in 2010 and celebrated the 40th an-

niversary of establishing diplomatic ties between the 

two countries. 

Several factors are driving Turkey to improve ties 

with China. First, Turks want to develop economic 

ties, especially to sell goods to China and attract PRC 

investment. Second, Ankara is exploring develop-

ing further military ties with the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA). Third, China is a leading world power. 

For example, its status as a permanent member of the 

UN Security Council gives Beijing considerable say 

over issues of concern to Ankara, including Cyprus, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East peace 

process. Fourth, China’s economic and political influ-

ence is growing in Central Asia, an important region 

for Turkey. Fifth, unlike Europeans and Americans, 

PRC officials do not attack Ankara’s policies toward 

the Kurds, talk about an Armenian genocide, criticize 

Turkey’s repression of media freedoms, or otherwise 

seek to interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs. Finally, 

strengthening ties with China helps Ankara gain le-

verage in its relations with other important countries, 

such as Russia, Europe, and the United States. 

Chinese analysts consider Turkey an increasingly 

important country for China due to its growing econ-

omy, increasingly independent and influential diplo-

macy, and pivotal geopolitical location between Eu-

rope, Eurasia, and the Middle East. With respect to the 

latter, Chinese analysts note that Turkey is a Turkic-

speaking nation closely linked with Central Asia, a 

Middle Eastern country whose regional influence has 

been rising, and a member of both NATO (formally) 

and the EU (in terms of some economic conditions that 

interest the Chinese). Beijing has strived to improve 

relations with the Turkish peoples, including in Xinji-

106

ang, considers the Middle East and especially Central 

Asia as two regions important for China’s develop-

ment and security, and is aiming to improve ties with 

both NATO and the EU. Turkey can serve as a conduit 

for China to exert both direct and indirect influence in 

these other regions. 

In addition, Chinese analysts view Turkey as one 

variant of the rising number of overly Islamic oriented 

governments arising in Eurasia and the Middle East. 

They also perceive Turkey as the best of these vari-

ants, contrasting Turkey’s moderate, stable and secu-

lar political system with the less stable regimes in their 

client state of Pakistan and the aggressively extremist 

form of Islamic government seen in Iran. They pre-

fer that the Arab Spring yield more governments like 

Turkey rather than more regimes like Pakistan and 

Iran. China’s Turkey specialists express grudging ad-

miration for the ruling AKP despite suspicions of its 

overtly religious ties. They note that Turkey’s AKP-

led government has pursued a more independent for-

eign policy than its predecessors that has seen Turkey 

distance itself from the United States and especially 

Israel. More recently, the AKP has deftly developed 

good ties with the governments of Libya and Syria 

and then abandoned them when these regimes have 

fallen into trouble. 

Through much of the 20th century, relations be-

tween Turkey and China were either peripheral, 

conflict-prone,  or  both.  During  the  first  half  of  the 

century, the two nations were preoccupied with their 

internal affairs, trying to modernize their antiquated 

political and economic institutions. In 1950, Turkey 

and the newly created PRC came into direct contact 

in highly unpropitious circumstances. Seeking to gain 

entry into NATO, which occurred in 1952, Turkey vol-

107

untarily  sent  thousands  of  troops  to  fight  alongside 

American and other Western soldiers in the Korean 

War. A few months later, the PRC also sent soldiers 

into the Korean battlefield, leading to bloody battles 

between Chinese and Turkish troops. Ankara contin-

ued to recognize the Chinese government in Taipei, 

while PRC propagandists labeled Turkey a “running-

dog of the U.S. imperialism” and supported Turkey’s 

leftist movements. 

Trade and cultural ties developed during the 1960s 

and after a pause due to China’s chaotic Cultural Rev-

olution, Ankara and Beijing established formal dip-

lomatic relations in 1971, continuing only trade and 

other economic connections with Taiwan. The concur-

rent improvement in ties between Beijing and Wash-

ington facilitated this reconciliation, as did a mutual 

Chinese and Turkish concern about the growth of the 

military power of the Soviet Union, their common 

neighbor. They signed several bilateral accords, in-

cluding a China-Turkey Trade Agreement, a Mutual 

Protection of Investments Agreement, an Agreement 

on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention 

of Tax Evasion, and a Fraud and Marine Shipment 

Agreement. Nonetheless, even after Turkey and the 

PRC established diplomatic relations in 1971, their 

political engagement with one another remained mar-

ginal. It was not until 1982 that Turkish head of state 

President Kenan Evren visited China. PRC President 

Li Xiannian conducted a reciprocal visit to Turkey 2 

years later. Economic and political ties grew slowly 

during the next 2 decades but were not major priori-

ties for either government. Their status as develop-

ing countries with little mutual cooperation meant 

that, in 1985, two-way trade amounted to only some 

$100 million. 

108

A major source of tension in PRC-Turkish relations 

is Beijing’s treatment of its ethnic Uighur minority in 

Xinjiang. The Uighurs are a Turkic-speaking Muslim 

minority who have lived for centuries in western Chi-

na in what they historically have called “East Turkes-

tan.” They share ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, 

historical, and other ties with the other Turkic people 

of Central Asia, as well as Turkey itself. In the view 

of Chinese analysts, the close cultural and historical 

affinity between the PRC’s Uighurs and other Turks 

should enable them to serve as a bridge between  

China and Turkey, as well as Central Asia. 

Although the PRC’s trade with the Turkic na-

tions remains low in relative terms, and dwarfed by 

China’s enormous commerce with other regions like 

East Asia, Western Europe, and North America, trade 

with Turkey and Central Asia is important for Xin-

jiang. Its peripheral location has limited Xinjiang’s 

trade ties with China’s larger markets. Chinese plans 

to import more Caspian Basin oil and natural gas will 

fortify Xinjiang’s westward orientation. In fact, Cen-

tral Asian countries are important to China due to 

their proximity and the growing Chinese investment 

in Central Asia, whose governments are more inviting 

to Chinese businesses than those of the Middle East, 

where Chinese companies most often engage in proj-

ects under contract. In fact, the Chinese worry that the 

new Arab regimes will not respect China’s commer-

cial interests due to their collusion with Western gov-

ernments to constrain Chinese business opportunities 

in these countries. Another concern is that the Middle 

Eastern disorders, which Chinese experts believe will 

last for months, if not years, will help keep world oil 

and other commodity prices unnaturally elevated. 

109

China expresses suspicions about the AKP’s sym-

pathies for their fellow Muslims in Xinjiang and fears 

that religious and other ties could serve as a transmis-

sion belt for importing Middle Eastern chaos into the 

Muslim-majority nations of Central Asia and poten-

tially Xinjiang, with its large Muslim Uighur minor-

ity. Beijing has established tight control over Xinjiang 

to ensure possession of its valuable natural resources 

and pivotal geographic position as the PRC’s gateway 

to Central Asia and beyond. Beijing fears that relaxing 

control over the region would encourage separatist 

sentiments in Tibet and other regions of China. 

PRC policies such as restricting the use of the  

Uighur language in schools, curbing their religious 

freedoms, and encouraging Han Chinese migration 

into Xinjiang have exacerbated ethnic tensions and 

led  many  Uighurs  to  flee  to  Turkey.  Many  Turks 

have sympathized with the Uighurs as victims of 

Chinese communist persecution. When the Turk-

ish nations of Central Asia gained independence in 

the early-1990s, many Turks hoped those in Xinji-

ang would soon follow suit. For decades, successive 

Turkish governments offered asylum to these waves 

of Uighur migrants, some of whom established as-

sociations advocating independence for what they 

called the state of East Turkistan. These included the 

Eastern Turkistan Cultural Association, the Eastern 

Turkistan Women Association, the Eastern Turkistan 

Youth Union, the Eastern Turkistan Refugee Commit-

tee, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, and the 

Eastern Turkistan National Center. Some Uighurs—

the numbers are constantly in dispute—have joined 

militant groups and fought back against Beijing and 

ethnic Hans. 

110

The rise of Kurdish militarism later in the 1990s 

helped win over the Turkish political establishment 

to  the  Chinese  position  that  Beijing’s  difficulties  in 

Xinjiang resembled Ankara’s problems with Kurd-

ish separatists. By the end of the decade, Turkish of-

ficials ended their practice of giving Uighurs leaving 

the PRC automatic Turkish citizenship, stopped us-

ing the name “East Turkistan” rather than Xinjiang, 

and recognized that province as an inalienable part 

of China. This forced many independence-advocating 

East Turkistan groups to close or leave Turkey, often 

to Germany or the United States. 

In December 1998, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz 

banned  Turkish  officials  from  participating  in  anti-

Beijing activities relating to East Turkistan.220 They 

eventually joined the PRC in prioritizing the values 

of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and the 

fight  against  what  PRC  officials  denounce  as  the 

three evil forces. Beijing rewarded Turkey’s new Ui-

ghur policies, as well as its restrained response to the 

June 1989 Tiananmen Square killings, by not criticiz-

ing the Turkish government’s use of military force in 

Kurdish areas. 

The PRC also adopted a neutral stance toward the 

Cyprus issue. The suppression of the 2009 ethnic riot-

ing between Han Chinese and Uighurs—which began 

in Urumqi, the regional capital, and then spread to 

other regions—by the PLA in 2009 only temporarily 

disrupted this process of distancing Turkish govern-

ment policy from Uighur nationalism. At the time, 

Erdoğan  called  the  results  “almost  genocide,”  while 

other Turkish leaders used similar language.221 What-

ever  their  personal  sentiments,  Turkish  officials  felt 

compelled to express concern over the July 2013 riots 

in Xinjiang due to the strong, if short-lived, pressure 

for action by important segments of Turkish society. 

111

Media commentators, political agitators, and others 

condemned the killings.222 The riots embarrassingly 

also came just days after Gül had visited China and 

had prioritized developing bilateral economic ties over 

human rights or other issues. During a stop in Urumqi, 

Gül commented that the region’s Uighur population 

represented a bridge between Turkey and China.223 

PRC analysts accept that Erdoğan’s harsh comments 

following the riots were made for domestic political 

reasons—to resonate with the popular sentiment in 

Turkey against Beijing’s crackdown. They note that 

Erdoğan quietly sent his special envoy, State Minister 

Zafer Çağlayan, the following month to Beijing, where 

he expressed understanding for the PRC policies and 

hope that the incident would not undermine bilat-

eral  ties.  They  further  noted  that  Erdoğan  refrained 

from denouncing China’s Uighur policies when PRC 

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Turkey in October 

2010. The Chinese and Turkish governments agreed 

to establish a strategic partnership, again manifest-

ing Erdoğan’s policy of forgetting about the Uighurs 

in order to develop bilateral state-to-state ties with 

the PRC. 

Since  the  riots,  Turkish  and  PRC  officials  have 

again prioritized the values of territorial integrity, na-

tional sovereignty, and fighting the three evil forces. 

The end of their common Soviet threat and the inde-

pendent national economic reform processes in the 

two counties, which aimed to integrate them more 

into international markets, also led both governments 

to focus more on developing bilateral economic con-

nections even as new political issues emerged that 

led to more joint discussions: the newly independent 

Central Asian countries, the Middle East peace pro-

cess, Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the war on terror. 

However, the deaths of some two dozen people in re-

112

newed Xinjiang clashes in late-February 2012 made it 

harder to ignore the Uighur issue during Xi’s visit. In 

his  *Sabah* newspaper interview, President Xi stressed 

how the PRC had sought to promote Xinjiang’s devel-

opment to raise the living standards of all the ethnic 

groups living there, including the Uighur. He encour-

aged Turkish entrepreneurs to invest in the region and 

attend the second China-Eurasia Expo in Urumqi in 

September. Despite his remarks, Uighur activists pro-

tested outside Xi’s hotel in Ankara against Beijing’s 

repression of its Uighur minority. Carrying a flag of 

East Turkestan, the demonstrators burned a poster of 

Xi  and  PRC  flags  before  police  dispersed  them.  Ac-

cording to China’s  *Xinhua* News Agency, when meet-

ing with Erdoğan at his Istanbul home on February 22, 

Xi said that:

China hopes that Turkey will continue to take effective 

measures to oppose and prevent anti-China separatist 

activities by ‘East Turkistan’ forces on its territory so 

as to ensure the healthy and steady growth of China-

Turkey ties.224 

*Xinhua* also reports that: 

Erdogan reaffirmed that Turkey has consistently ad-

hered to the one-China policy, recognized the People’s 

Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative 

of the whole Chinese people, and never allowed any 

activity on its territory that aims to undermine China’s 

independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.225 

Turkey may become more important for the rest 

of China since the two countries’ national economies 

are expanding much faster than the global average, 

and have sustained exceptionally high gross domestic 

113

product (GDP) growth rates despite the global reces-

sion, elevating their global economic importance. The 

PRC has become Turkey’s third largest trading partner 

(after Germany and Russia) and the leading source of 

Turkey’s imports. According to the PRC Ministry of 

Commerce, two-way trade has grown from approxi-

mately $1 billion in 2001 to almost $18.7 billion in 

2011, an 18-fold increase during that decade.226 Turk-

ish government statistics indicate that bilateral trade 

amounted to $24.1 billion in 2011.227 During the 2001-

11 period, Chinese investment in Turkey reached  

$10 billion, with projects worth $4 billion already  

finalized.228 

PRC firms are very active in Turkey’s infrastruc-

ture, construction, mining, and telecommunications 

sectors.229 Both Ankara and Beijing have an interest in 

helping Turkey realize its ambition to become a mul-

tidirectional energy corridor that would help direct 

some Eurasian oil and gas eastward as well as toward 

Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.230 Turkey and 

China, with two of the world’s largest and most dy-

namic economies, are especially eager to revive their 

traditional Silk Road links though Central Asia and 

other Eurasian countries. The PRC leadership appre-

ciates Turkey’s potential gateway status for sales in 

Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. Huawei Tech-

nologies Ltd. has chosen İstanbul as its headquarters 

for managing its businesses in Central Asia.231 When 

Premier Wen Jiabao visited Turkey in 2010, the two 

countries signed eight deals in areas including trade, 

energy facilities, and railway networks that would 

help connect Istanbul to Beijing through a “modern 

silk road.”232 Wen’s visit to Turkey was the first con-

ducted by a PRC Prime Minister in 8 years.233 He and 

Erdoğan announced they would establish a strategic 

114

cooperation relationship that would include increased 

economic, political, energy, security, cultural, and 

other ties.234 Wen said that China would: 

take active measures to promote trade with Turkey” 

and would encourage investment by Chinese enter-

prises in Turkey and facilitate cooperation in various 

economic fields, such as power projects, bridge con-

struction and the financial sector.235 

The two leaders pledged to increase their bilateral 

trade, which then amounted to less than $20 billion 

each year, to $50 billion annually within the next 5 

years. The agreements signed during Wen’s visit sug-

gest that Turkey and China are eager to expand their 

economic ties. China is already Turkey’s largest trade 

partner in the Far East.236 

There  are  some  economic  difficulties  in  the  Tur-

key-China relationship. The two countries sometimes 

compete for sales as well as access to regional energy 

supplies. Another source of economic tension is their 

bilateral trade imbalance. Approximately 60 percent 

of China’s imports from Turkey consist of mined raw 

materials, with chemicals also ranking high on the 

list.237 Meanwhile, more than three-fourths of Tur-

key’s imports from China are intermediate goods.238 

The Turkish authorities want PRC companies to pro-

cess more of these mining products inside Turkey.239 

Trade  between  Turkey  and  China  has  flourished 

in recent years, but almost all of this has been due to 

Turks’ growing appetite for Chinese goods. Turkey’s 

trade with China is currently dominated by imports 

from China, which totaled $21 billion in 2011, with 

only $3 billion in exports. Like other countries, Turks 

have found penetrating the Chinese market difficult. 

The lower costs of Chinese labor and other PRC ad-

115

vantages have resulted in Sino-Turkish trade being 

very imbalanced.240 The PRC Ambassador to Turkey, 

Gong Xiaosheng, insists that China does not want 

such an enormous trade surplus. He claimed the PRC 

government was encouraging Chinese enterprises to 

import more from Turkey as well as increase their di-

rect investment in Turkey.241 In addition to setting the 

goal of increasing their two-way trade, the two gov-

ernments said they would rely more on national cur-

rencies in their bilateral commerce, which could help 

equalize both countries mutual imports and exports. 

In any case, Turkish policymakers seem less inter-

ested in rectifying the bilateral trade imbalance than in 

enticing more PRC investment in Turkish infrastruc-

ture. Turkish officials are eager to take advantage of 

Chinese capital and technology to help develop their 

energy and transportation sectors. High-speed rail-

roads are a special area of interest given China’s lead-

ing expertise in this area and Turkish desires to build 

a network of fast east-west trains to enhance Tur-

key’s role as a conduit for commerce between Europe 

and Asia. 

The focus on deepening and rectifying mutual eco-

nomic ties was evident in then-Vice President Xi Jin-

ping’s 3-day February 2012 visit, made at the invita-

tion of Gül.242 In Ankara, Xi met with Gül and Turkish 

Parliament Speaker Cicek. He then flew to Istanbul to 

talk with Erdoğan and attended a China-Turkey busi-

ness forum. When Xi met Gül, the two governments 

signed seven bilateral economic agreements.243 These 

included a financial cooperation agreement between 

the Treasury Undersecretariat and the China Develop-

ment Bank, a memorandum of understanding between 

Turkish public broadcaster-TRT and Chinese Central 

Television (CCTV), and a currency swap agreement 

116

between the two national banks. Furthermore, Deputy 

Prime Minister Ali Babacan encouraged Turkish banks 

to open branches in China and PRC financial institu-

tions to enter Turkey.244 Xi and Erdoğan said that the 

two sides should enhance their economic cooperation 

in  finance,  energy,  infrastructure  construction,  and 

high-technology sectors such as aviation, aerospace, 

nuclear energy, and high-speed rail transportation.245 

In his February 22 address to the China-Turkey 

Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Istanbul, 

attended by hundreds of Chinese and Turkish busi-

ness leaders, Xi praised the attendees as “participants 

and  promoters  of  the  win-win  and  mutually-benefi-

cial economic and trade cooperation between the two 

countries.”246 Xi urged the two countries to grasp the 

opportunities for their emerging market economies to 

“upgrade and push forward the win-win and mutu-

ally-beneficial  economic  and  trade  cooperation.”  He 

specifically called for increasing cooperation****on****global and international hotspot issues; broadening cooperation into more sectors such as transportation and 

infrastructure development; jointly resisting trade 

protectionism including by mitigating trade imbal-

ances; and increasing cultural exchange and people-

to-people ties.247 

To this end, Turkey designated 2012 as a Chinese 

Cultural Year and China hosted a Turkish Cultural 

Year in 2013. The number of Chinese tourists visiting 

Turkey has grown significantly in recent years, soar-

ing from only a few thousand in 2008 to more than 

100,000  in  2011.  Even  so,  this  figure  is  considerably 

less than the millions of Russians and Europeans who 

vacation every year in Turkey.248 

For his part, Turkish Economy Minister Zafer 

Çağlayan told the Forum attendees that, besides Chi-

na’s purchasing more Turkish products, additional 

117

Chinese investments in Turkey were needed to help 

remedy the trade imbalance.249 Murat Sungurlu, the 

head of the Turkish-Chinese Industrialists and Busi-

nessmen Association (TÜÇSİAD), told  *Today’s Zaman*

that only 43 of the 29,144 foreign-owned companies 

in Turkey were from China.250  Çağlayan  called  for 

the holding of more of these mutual business forums 

and trade fairs so that Chinese companies would bet-

ter understand business opportunities in Turkey.251 

Babacan said Turkish and Chinese firms could estab-

lish partnerships and undertake joint projects in third 

countries.252 Xi denied China “deliberately” sought a 

trade surplus with any other state. “With respect to the 

trade deficit in the trade between Turkey and China,” 

he explained, “China is willing to maintain commu-

nication and cooperation with Turkey and take com-

prehensive mitigation measures.”253 Xi said the PRC 

would  continue  to  give  incentives  for  Chinese  firms 

to invest in Turkey, though he encouraged Turkish of-

ficials  to  ensure  an  attractive  investment  climate  for 

PRC investors.254 

Sino-Turkish military cooperation began in the 

1990s after Ankara turned to China following failed 

negotiations with the U.S. Government to produce, 

with technology transfer, the M-270 Multiple Launch 

Rocket System (MLRS). In the late-1990s, Turkey man-

ufactured under license the Chinese WS-1 302mm and 

TR-3000 rockets, as well as the B-611 short-range sur-

face-to-surface missile.255 In the late-1990s, the United 

States rejected Turkey’s request to purchase the MLRS 

on the grounds that Turkey had used U.S.-provided 

arms to attack Kurdish anti-government militias. 

Therefore, Turkey turned to China to acquire rockets, 

missiles, and relevant technologies. Still, the value of 

the Chinese arms transfers to Ankara has remained 

118

small compared to what Turkey was acquiring from 

its NATO partners, and Turkish military exchanges 

with China were very infrequent compared with the 

robust exchange program between Turkey and the 

United States, Europe, and Israel. In recent years, mili-

tary cooperation between China and Turkey has taken 

an upward trend. 

In  October  2010,  China’s  fighters  arrived  in  Tur-

key (via air passageways provided by Pakistan and 

Iran) at the invitation of Turkey to join in its air force 

drill  code-named  Anatolian  Eagle,  in  China’s  first 

ever bilateral military exercise with Turkey, which 

also marked the PRC’s first military exercise based on 

the territory of a NATO member. In past years, the 

annual Anatolian Eagle air drills in the central Anato-

lian province of Konya involved warplanes from the 

United States, other NATO countries, and Israel. But 

in 2009 and 2010, the Turkish government decided not 

to invite Israel to participate, which may have contrib-

uted to the U.S. decision to skip the drills as well. 

Seeing an opportunity for mutual benefit, the Turk-

ish and Chinese air forces decided to conduct their 

own maneuvers. Presumably at the government’s di-

rection, the Turkish media gave much less coverage 

to the drills as compared with previous years. Still, 

the Pentagon spokeswoman felt compelled to stress 

that Turkey remained committed to NATO and that 

Turkish representatives had pledged to protect U.S. 

and NATO military secrets.256 The decision of the 

Turkish air force to use its older F-4Es rather than its 

more advanced F-16s during the exercises with the 

Chinese may have resulted from Pentagon pressure 

since the initial media reports had indicated the F-16s 

would participate.257 Notwithstanding this apparent 

concession to U.S. concerns that the exercises would 

119

enhance Chinese understanding of NATO tactics and 

technologies, which presumably make it easier for the 

PLA to develop countermeasures, several American 

commentators cited the exercises as a reason to be 

cautious about transferring further advanced military 

technology to Turkey, including the new F-35 joint 

strike fighter.258 Despite these concerns, Turkish-PRC 

military cooperation looks set to continue. The TSK 

are eagerly trying to develop contacts with non-West-

ern militaries, while the PLA Air Force has been ex-

panding its range of operations during the past year, 

including by simulating long-distance bombing runs 

in Kazakhstan earlier in September 2013 during the 

SCO’s annual exercise. 

The more interesting matter is Beijing’s ambitions 

to expand its hitherto intermittent presence in the 

Turkish defense market. ****While the Turkish military 

has strong ties to the U.S. military industry and con-

tinues to seek advanced military equipment from the 

United States and participate in joint defense indus-

try projects, Erdoğan recently announced the decision 

to enter into negotiations with China to purchase the 

Chinese FD-2000 air defense system. Ankara’s opting 

for the PRC’s system, based on the HQ-9 missile, rep-

resents a tremendous achievement for China’s arms 

sales industry and a major break with tradition for 

the Turkish national security community, which still 

prefers to purchase major weapons systems from the 

West if Turkey’s own developing defense industry 

cannot produce them. Although its reported range 

and effectiveness is less than that of the competing 

systems, and the FD-2000 is not battle tested like the 

Patriots, China’s bid was reportedly $1 billion less 

than the competitors. Most importantly, China has 

offered to co-produce the entire systems in Turkey, 

120

transferring much defense technology in the process 

and meeting Turkey’s long-standing preference to 

improve the capacity of its national defense industry. 

But the state-owned Chinese company, China Preci-

sion Machinery Export-Import Corporation, is under 

sanctions for violating the Iran, North Korea, and 

Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006, enacted by the 

United States, to prevent proliferation of WMD and 

ballistic missile technology to the named countries. It 

is not clear if Turkish policymakers knew or under-

stood this problem, and recent media reports suggest 

Turkish defense firms are lobbying Ankara to reverse 

course and buy another system.259

The China-Turkey relationship looks set to become 

even more important in coming years due to the two 

countries’ status as rising global powers and their cur-

rent governments’ inclination to embrace new part-

nerships and opportunities. They are also rising world 

powers eager to remake at least some features of the 

international system, whose foundations were laid 

after World War II, when Ankara and Beijing were 

too  weak  to  have  much  influence.  Turks  are  eager 

to draw on Chinese capital and technologies as they 

develop their own economy, while the PRC is look-

ing to deepen ties with important regional actors such 

as Turkey. Nonetheless, their bilateral relationship is 

unlikely to become as important as, for example, the 

broad and deep ties each has developed in recent years 

with Russia. 

Turkey and China could easily become commer-

cial rivals in third markets, especially in the textile 

and construction sectors, since they both rely on their 

low labor costs as a main source of their comparative 

advantage in world trade. U.S. pressure will probably 

also constrain Turkey’s potential interest in develop-

121

ing close defense ties with the PRC. Turkey and China 

might also compete again for influence and resourc-

es in Central Asia even if they continue to overlook 

China’s Uighur minority. 

**TURKEY’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY**

Turkey has built one of the most impressive de-

fense industrial bases among the newly industrialized 

states in the Middle East. The country’s total military 

expenditure for 2014 was almost $11 billion.260 The 

TSK are the 14th largest in the world and the largest in 

Europe (if Russia is excluded), with more than 500,000 

active duty personnel across all the services, 2,500 

main  battle  tanks,  350  fighter  and  fighter/ground 

attack jets, 40 attack helicopters, and about 24 sub-

marines and major surface warships.261 According to 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 

Turkey accounted for 3 percent of worldwide imports 

of conventional weapons for the 2009-13 period.262 

Yet, over time, Ankara has reduced the percentage of 

these weapons that it has purchased from U.S. sourc-

es, while raising the share of arms imported from 

non-U.S. companies and the proportion of weapons 

manufactured in Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkish defense 

companies have been expanding their own exports. 

The United States traditionally has been the larg-

est supplier of defense systems to Turkey due to the 

two countries’ strategic ties, joint military exercises, 

common NATO membership, the TSK’s long famil-

iarity with U.S. weaponry, and interoperability con-

siderations. Initially, Turkey lacked a major defense 

industrial sector, and buying weapons from the Unit-

ed States was seen as a natural means of reinforcing 

the bilateral alliance. Since the mid-1990s, Turkey has 

122

strived to modernize its armed forces and develop 

its defense industry. In the 1990s, Turkey launched a 

campaign to modernize its military that will cost an 

estimated $150 billion by 2026. The motives for this 

indigenous defense industrialization were not only 

military, but also economic and political. Turkey con-

sciously pursued a parallel strategy of security and 

development, building its heavy industry and high-

technology sectors while striving for greater self-suf-

ficiency in arms production. Turkey has also pursued 

an advanced arms production capability to enhance 

its international status and influence. 

Furthermore, U.S. policies have shaped Ankara’s 

behavior. Turkey’s 1974 military intervention in Cy-

prus led the U.S. Congress to curtail defense assis-

tance to Turkey and impose an embargo on weapons 

sales, which led Ankara to seek alternative arms sup-

pliers.263 Congress lifted the arms embargo in 1978. In 

1980, Turkey and the United States signed a Defense 

and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) that 

provided for additional weapons transfers and for 

U.S. bases in Turkey. The DECA has been renewed 

several times.264 

Nonetheless, Turkey has continued to seek non-

U.S. arms suppliers. Turkey bought some weapons 

from Russia in the 1990s. While Russia was more re-

laxed about how Turkey could use these weapons, the 

TSK complained about the inferior quality of some 

Russian weapons, the lack of Russian after-sale ser-

vices, and Russia’s inability to provide sufficient spare 

parts. Russia further irked Ankara when it announced 

its intention to sell S-300 air defense missile systems 

to the Greek-governed portion of Cyprus.265 Israel also 

became a major arms supplier to Turkey, beginning 

with a 1996 defense and military pact between the two 

countries.266 

123

In the ensuing years, Israeli firms upgraded ageing 

Turkish weapons systems and sold its newer defense 

systems to Turkey. Israeli Military Industries Ltd., for 

example, upgraded 170 of Turkey’s tanks, while Israel 

Aerospace Industries (IAI) sold Ankara unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) and upgraded several dozen 

Turkish F-4 fighter jets.267 But defense cooperation be-

tween the two countries ceased following the Israeli 

raid  on  a  Turkish-organized  flotilla  that  was  trying 

to break the Israeli blockade on the Hams-controlled 

Gaza Strip. Signs of a thaw emerged only in 2013, 

when the IAI delivered $100 million worth of electron-

ic systems for the airborne early warning and control 

aircraft that Boeing is manufacturing for Turkey’s air 

force.268 However, the IAI had committed to the deal 

in 2002.269 

The frayed Israel-Turkey relationship has affect-

ed Turkey’s nascent defense industry in other ways. 

In 2005, Turkey contracted with IAI to purchase 10 

Heron UAVs, which were to be delivered in 2007. The 

delivery date was continually postponed, with the 

Israeli producers blaming the delays on the need to 

adopt the Heron to accommodate Turkish electronic 

systems. After Israel began delivery of the UAVs in 

2009, Turkey complained about their sub-par perfor-

mance. Turkey tried to acquire U.S.-made Predator 

UAVs, but the U.S. Government resisted, given the 

rift between Tel Aviv and Ankara as well as Turkey’s 

then-relatively warm ties with Syria and Iran.270 

Turkey has cooperated with new defense indus-

trial partners in recent years. For example, Turkey has 

become the second largest buyer of defense equip-

ment from South Korea, after the United States. In 

2001, Seoul and Ankara inked a deal worth $1 billion 

for  modified  versions  of  South  Korea’s  K9  Thunder 

124

self-propelled howitzer, produced by Samsung Tech-

win. In 2007, Turkey agreed to purchase 40 single-

engine turboprop training KT-1 aircraft, with much 

technology transfer. Turkish Aerospace Industries 

will produce 35 of the aircraft under a license.271 From 

Turkey’s perspective, this deal is ideal in that it pro-

vides Turkey with “good enough” defense systems at 

a lower price than the most advanced systems, while 

augmenting the capacity of its own defense industry. 

While considering a wider range of foreign sup-

pliers, the Turkish government has sought to raise the 

share of items and services purchased from the coun-

try’s own defense industries. Nearly 2 decades ago, 

the Turkish Parliament adopted Law No. 3238, which 

mandated the development of a “modern defence in-

dustry . . . to achieve the modernization of the Turkish 

Armed Forces.” Turkey’s defense industry has grown 

since then. In 2008, Turkey had more than 200 defense 

companies and 1,000 subcontractors dealing in $3 to 

$4 billion worth of business. That year, Turkey was 

the world’s 28th largest arms exporter.272 Between 

2004 and 2010, the ratio of domestically sourced ar-

maments rose from 15 percent to 54 percent, though 

the percentages for the more critical and advanced 

defense technologies is likely higher.273 

As Turkey has developed its defense industry, more 

U.S. companies have lost sales to firms from countries 

with less restrictive export rules and more generous 

technology transfer policies.274 Turkey sees producing 

its own tanks, helicopters, UAVs, and fighter jets as 

high-priority national projects. Even so, Turkey will 

likely  need  foreign  technical  expertise  and  financial 

resources, at least for some critical sub-systems.275 U.S. 

defense sales to Turkey reached an all-time high in 

the 1990s. Although the U.S. share has since declined, 

125

for the 2009-13 period, Turkey was the world’s 11th 

largest importer of arms.276 In 2012, Turkey was the 

world’s fourth largest importer of arms, behind India, 

China, and the United States, respectively.277 

Turkish  officials  want  to  increase  their  country’s 

weapons exports. The government sees foreign arms 

sales as another means to give other countries a stake 

in Turkey’s security, as well as an opportunity to cre-

ate more high-tech jobs and lower unit costs for the 

TSK through larger production runs. The same factors 

that have enabled Turkey’s industry to substitute for 

previously imported defense items have made them 

better able to compete for foreign sales: the growing 

sophistication and size of Turkey’s civilian economy, 

the companies’ improving human capital and produc-

tivity, mandatory technology transfers and offsets, 

and extensive Turkish government support for the in-

dustry in the form of domestic military contracts and 

state-supported research and development efforts. 

In 2012, Turkey exported defense products to 60 

countries.278 That year, Turkish arms exports reached 

$1.3 billion, a 43 percent increase over the previous 

year, making Turkey the world’s 24th largest arms ex-

porter.279 The United States was Turkey’s chief defense 

export market, buying $490 million of Turkish mili-

tary products in 2012. These purchases were primar-

ily related to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, for 

which Turkish firms produce components. Following 

the United States, Turkey sold $101 million worth of 

weapons to the United Arab Emirates and $99 million 

to Saudi Arabia.280 

Ankara aspires to raise its arms exports to $2 billion 

by 2016 (while spending $8 billion on acquiring de-

fense systems from other countries).281 Turkey hopes, 

for example, to sell its Altay main battle tank, referred 

126

to as the “national tank,” to Saudi Arabia, which has 

plenty of cash to invest in its defense capabilities and 

has an inventory of ageing tanks. A sale would boost 

political and military ties between the two Sunni 

countries and help to cement security ties useful for 

managing any Iranian-led Shia bloc in the region.282

It is important not to exaggerate the extent of these 

changes. Despite its maturing defense industry, Mu-

rad Bayar, Turkey’s Undersecretary for Defense In-

dustries, has stated that Turkey lacks a cohesive de-

fense armaments export policy.283 The U.S. grip on the 

international arms market is declining, while Turkish 

defense firms are experiencing growth, but the Unit-

ed States still remains the largest international arms 

dealer, with a 30 percent share of total arms exports in 

2012, worth more than $200 billion.284 Furthermore, the 

United States is the world’s largest supplier of combat 

aircraft (62 percent of total exports), which happens 

to be one of Turkey’s major military imports.285 As of 

2010, the United States was involved in roughly 80 

percent of the defense-related activities in Turkey. 

Although unable to match the quality of some U.S. 

defense exports, Turkish companies can often win 

contracts based on their lower costs and greater abil-

ity to transfer military technology to potential buyers. 

Obviously, there are buyers, like the Arab monarchies, 

who can afford to pay the highest prices for the best 

quality weapons, and also hope their purchases gen-

erate influence in Washington. But many other coun-

tries will find Turkish weapons systems of sufficient 

quality for their needs, and also gain from Turkey’s 

less restrictive technology transfer policies. However, 

in these respects, Turkish firms are joined by Russian 

and increasingly Chinese defense companies, which 

can capture defense markets where the buyer is seek-

127

ing good enough weapons at substantially lower costs 

than their U.S. competitors and with more generous 

technology transfer provisions. 

The solution for this greater foreign competition in 

third-party defense markets is to make U.S. defense 

exports more competitive in general rather than just 

against Turkey. In addition to ensuring a level playing 

field by denying foreign competitors access to unfair 

subsidies, proprietary information, or proliferation 

loopholes, U.S. defense corporations must lower their 

costs, increase their reliability, and work with the 

Obama administration and Congress to reform U.S. 

defense export laws and regulations to make it easier 

for  U.S.  firms  to  transfer  widely  available  military 

technologies to foreign buyers while still protecting 

U.S. defense secrets. 

**DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS**

The Turkish government’s 2009 policy reversal 

toward the Kurds applied within Turkey as well as 

in northern Iraq. Today, there are nearly 15 million 

Kurds  in  Turkey,  comprising  one-fifth  of  the  coun-

try’s population.286 They are Turkey’s largest minority 

group, as well as one of the country’s poorest popu-

lations due to the discrimination against them by the 

Turkish state. 287 Many Kurds reside in Turkey’s south-

east, which traditionally has been their home region, 

but there are many others who also live in Turkey’s 

urban areas.288 Besides the several million Kurds liv-

ing in Turkey, there are also Kurdish populations in 

the neighboring states of Iraq, Syria, and Iran, making 

a total of around 30 million Kurds worldwide.289 

Within  Turkey,  the  conflict  between  the  Kurds 

and the Turkish government has produced more  

128

than 40,000 casualties in 30 years and cost Turkey 

billions of dollars.290 In 1978, the Kurd leader, Abdul-

lah Öcalan, founded the PKK, which has sought to win 

Kurdish independence from Turkey through armed 

conflict.291 Turkey, the United States, and the EU have 

since designated the PKK a terrorist organization. Its 

first attack against Turkish forces occurred in 1984 in 

the district of Semdinli,292 located in the largely Kurd-

ish southeast, and many more attacks have occurred 

since then. Originally, the goal of the attacks was 

the establishment of Kurdistan, which would be an 

independent entity made up of the Kurdish regions 

of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.293 During the 1990s, 

however, the PKK gave up this separatist idea and in-

stead called for more autonomy for the Kurds living 

in Turkey.294 

Finally, in 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya 

and imprisoned for treason on the Turkish prison 

island of Imrali, located in the Sea of Marmara.295 De-

spite this, he is still considered to be the  *de facto* leader of the PKK and serves as its spokesperson. In recent 

years, the PKK’s demands have changed; it no longer 

holds the aspiration to establish Kurdistan. Instead, 

the PKK has shifted to demanding more autonomy 

and democratic rights. It also seeks greater constitu-

tional rights for Kurds, more freedom to use the Kurd-

ish language, and the lessening of state pressure on 

Kurdish activists.296 

Following years of pro-reform rhetoric as well as 

open and secret talks with Kurdish nationalists (in-

cluding between the director of national intelligence 

and imprisoned PKK leader Öcalan), the AKP-led 

Turkish government made a major policy reversal 

in  2009  and  adopted  a  more  flexible  and  embracing 

policy toward its Kurdish minority as well as the KRG 

129

in northern Iraq. The Kurdish opening within Turkey 

saw the government give Kurds more cultural rights, 

including the right to use the Kurdish language in 

public (responding to claims of linguistic genocide). 

For example, it launched a 24-hour state-run Kurdish 

language television channel (TRT6, widely available 

through terrestrial transmission) in January 2009. Fur-

thermore, AKP leaders apologized for past Turkish 

repression of Kurdish rights and pledged to address 

earlier wrongs. Some Kurdish leaders hoped that, once 

Turks understood that Kurds simply want to achieve 

equal rights within a common country, more Turks 

would appreciate and support their concern. Kurd-

ish nationalists proposed a peace plan whose com-

ponents include a ceasefire, establishing a Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission with amnesty for ex-PKK 

fighters, deploying a multinational force to assist with 

the demobilization of PKK insurgents and their even-

tual entry into the peaceful political process, releas-

ing PKK prisoners, enhancing Kurds’ constitutional 

and legal rights, and eventually the release of Öcalan 

from prison. 

The newly declared policy of moderation initially 

received substantial popular support due to wide-

spread war weariness among Turks, Kurds, and oth-

ers. Turk-Kurdish violence had persisted for decades, 

so many individuals on both sides were willing to try 

to achieve a political resolution of their differences. 

Moreover, the AKP worked to improve the economic 

situation in the poor Kurdish southeast by supporting 

local businesses, developing agriculture, and promot-

ing the construction of private hospitals. These actions 

have led many Kurds to see the party in a favorable 

light and to vote for it in elections.297 But Turkish na-

tionalist parties soon began to make political gains by 

130

accusing the AKP of making too many concessions 

with little effect. 

The AKP responded by moving more cautiously, 

which led to dampening enthusiasm among Kurds for 

the opening and renewed PKK violence. In effect, the 

hardliners on both sides were empowering each other. 

In addition, impatient Kurdish activists, only some of 

whom defend or even sympathize the PKK and its 

violent methods, complain that they have seen few 

changes on the ground in southeast Turkey despite 

the progressive rhetoric they hear in Ankara. The slow 

and half-hearted pace of the AKP “Democratic Open-

ing” also led some Turkish Kurds to question the gov-

ernment’s sincerity. For example, the government’s 

amnesty proved very limited and conditional, with 

many ex-PKK and even nonviolent Kurdish national-

ists finding themselves re-arrested and imprisoned. 

Restrictions on Kurdish political activities con-

tinue to constrain opportunities for a peaceful resolu-

tion of Turkey’s Kurdish crisis. The requirement that 

any political party must receive at least 10 percent in 

a general parliamentary election to gain seats in the 

national legislature is twice as high a hurdle as that in 

most European countries that have proportional rep-

resentation voting systems. Kurdish nationalists often 

must run as independent candidates, which deprives 

them of access to public television and radio political 

protests or votes from Turkey’s large diaspora, whose 

members must vote for one of the parties on the ballot. 

In September 2011, the International Crisis Group 

(ICG) released a report entitled, “Turkey: Ending 

the PKK Insurgency,” which offered sensible advice 

regarding how to make progress resolving Turkey’s 

Kurdish issue. The thrust of their recommendations 

was to move the struggle for Kurdish rights from the 

131

field of battle to field of parliament. The group called 

for an end to the fighting, major legal reforms, an am-

nesty and Turkish Kurd acceptance to work within 

the legal Turkish system. The ICG authors endorsed 

the Democratic Opening toward the Kurds adopted 

by the ruling AKP, which has sought to deemphasize 

ethnic tensions by making some concessions to Kurds, 

as well as stressing the common Muslim identity of 

Turks and Kurds rather than their ethnic differences. 

But the ICG wants to see the Turkish government 

implement its reforms more consistently and effec-

tively. They also advocate that the authorities release 

imprisoned nonviolent Kurdish politicians and allow 

even those Kurds sympathetic to the PKK, which is 

the leading anti-Ankara terrorist government, to take 

their elected seats in parliament. Meanwhile, they 

call on both sides to avoid tit-for-tat escalatory moves 

and  instead  resume  the  government-PKK  ceasefire 

declared last year—there have been many such cease-

fires,  but  they  soon  collapse  due  to  lack  of  follow-

up and other problems—as well as disarmament  

negotiations. 

Inside Turkey, the declining influence of the Turk-

ish  military  may  have  weakened  U.S.  influence  in 

Turkey. Before the advent of the AKP government 

in 2002, the military effectively dominated Turkish 

politics and enforced a secular and Western-oriented 

country. The Turkish General Staff exercised power 

largely informally but also through successive coups 

in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. 

Under the AKP, the Turkish parliament has estab-

lished powers of surveillance and control over major 

institutions, such as the National Security Council, 

that used to facilitate the military’s control of civil 

society.298 Publicized criminal investigations like the 

132

Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases, looking into the 

military’s role in suspected plots to overthrow the 

government in the early-2000s, have also undermined 

the Turkish military’s power. Some Turkish citizens 

fear that the AKP’s policies have overcorrected for the 

earlier military threat, and that these policies threaten 

to impose an excessively powerful civilian executive 

branch. Turkey has recently experienced some of its 

most serious corruption scandals and mass protests 

in years. Concerns regarding the AKP government 

have been reflected in the demonstrations that started 

in late-May 2013 in Taksim Square, which rapidly 

expanded in scope. The protesters have denounced 

what they saw as the country’s growing authoritari-

anism, mistreatment of minorities, and repression of 

civil rights and media freedoms. 

The Istanbul street protests began when a group 

of environmentalists staged a peaceful demonstration 

at Taksim’s Gezi Park to challenge the government’s 

plans to demolish the park to establish a shopping 

mall and other buildings.299 On May 30, the opposi-

tion CHP announced that they would side with the 

protestors, thereby elevating the political stakes at is-

sue. As the number of protestors grew, Erdoğan, the 

main proponent of the demolition plan, refused to 

back down or offer a compromise, such as agreeing 

to establish a commission to study the issue or to hold 

a referendum. With his approval, the Turkish police 

tried to disperse the protesters with tear gas and by 

burning several of their tents.300 The police violence 

backfired,  encouraging  many  others  to  join  the  pro-

tests, which spread throughout Istanbul and many 

other parts of Turkey.301 

By June 1, Interior Minister Muammer Guler 

claimed that almost 1,000 people had been arrest-

133

ed at nearly 100 demonstrations nationwide, with 

over 1,000 people injured in Istanbul and Ankara.302 

Erdoğan  said  that  he  would  investigate  the  issue  of 

excessive police violence but insisted that he would 

stand by plans to develop Gezi Park.303 Clashes be-

tween anti-government demonstrators and the Turk-

ish police became a regular occurrence. The protest 

movement has adopted a broader agenda and gained 

a wider following, including several strata of Turkish 

society that have not engaged in such direct action be-

fore, such as some professionals and other members 

of the middle class. The demonstrators have a lengthy 

list of grievances against the Turkish government and 

the ruling AKP.304 Their most prominent concerns in-

clude objections to Erdoğan’s leadership style, seen as 

authoritarian and insensitive to the concerns of non-

AKP supporters. The protesters also worry about the 

AKP’s Islam-inspired policies, such as its weakening 

secularization, limiting free speech, and recent efforts 

to limit the sale of alcohol. 

Erdoğan has blamed the Hizmet movement, Jews, 

and foreign countries for the most recent scandals, 

whose reach has extended to the security services. 

The corruption, protests, and crackdown have se-

verely  harmed  Erdoğan’s  international  standing,  es-

pecially in the West. EU membership, always a long 

shot despite the AKP’s initial reform drive, has faded 

even further away. Erdoğan’s January 21, 2014, trip to 

Brussels, Belgium, provided EU leaders with an op-

portunity to criticize him in person. In a joint press 

conference with the Turkish prime minister, Euro-

pean Council President Herman Van Rompuy point-

edly stated that, “It is important not to backtrack on 

achievements and to ensure that the judiciary is able 

to function without discrimination or preference.”305 

134

European Commission President José Manuel Bar-

roso added that, in the view of the EU, “Whatever the 

problems are, we believe that the solution for those 

problems should respect the principles of rule of law 

and separation of powers.”306 

Influential U.S. opinion leaders have also expressed 

concerns regarding Turkey’s secular political democ-

racy and foreign-policy orientation. In a public ad-

dress in Washington, Senator John McCain called the 

public demonstrations “a rebellion against Erdoğan’s 

push of the Turkish people toward Islam” as well as 

popular unease that “Erdoğan . . . is becoming more 

like a dictator than a prime minister or a president.”307 

A bipartisan network of dozens of foreign-policy 

opinion makers, including former senior Democratic 

and  Republican  officials  in  recent  U.S.  administra-

tions, have circulated a letter urging Obama to adopt 

a more critical line with Erdoğan. 

Some analysts worry that the United States is re-

peating its familiar approach in the greater Middle 

East of downplaying human rights and democracy 

concerns in favor of short-term security needs and 

other priorities, despite the risk of alienating the 

partner’s population and accepting policies that risk 

weakening the country’s liberal democratic potential 

over the long term. Furthermore, many commentar-

ies  expressed  concern  that  Erdoğan’s  actions  were 

discrediting the model partnership image found in 

U.S. official discourse on Turkey since Obama’s first 

trip  there  a  few  months  after  he  assumed  office  in 

January 2009. 

Since Turkey is one of the largest electoral de-

mocracies with a Muslim majority, the United States 

is looking to Turkey as a democratic model for Mus-

lims and to present an alternative to Islamic extrem-

135

ism. Turkey’s value of a force against radical Islamist 

movements has been devalued by the Turkish govern-

ment’s lax attitude toward secularism and ties with 

Sunni militants in Syria and elsewhere. Citizens and 

governments in Central Asia who previously saw 

Erdoğan and the AKP as role models of a moderate 

Islamist movement now see Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan 

as having as strong economies as Turkey but also be-

ing more secular and stable, if less democratic. The 

Arab Spring analogy was sometimes referenced in the 

U.S. media, with the cozy ties between Washington 

and Cairo when Hosni Mubarak still held autocratic 

power over Egypt cited as a common example. 

In recent months, a group of experts assembled by 

the Washington-based Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) 

have launched the most comprehensive and sustained 

campaign calling for changing U.S. policies toward 

Erdoğan.  Under  its  auspices,  U.S.  Ambassadors  to 

Turkey Morton Abramowitz and Eric Edelman, along 

with BPC project leader Blaise Misztal, have been 

releasing a number of op-eds and other publications 

calling on the Obama administration to take a much 

harder  public  stand  with  Erdoğan.308 In their view, 

Erdoğan’s  policies  risk  undermining  Turkey’s  value 

as a U.S. partner through actions that weaken its 

democratic political institutions, foreign investor con-

fidence,  and  other  sources  of  Turkey’s  international 

power. While acknowledging the risk that outside 

heckling  can  backfire  given  the  Turkish  public’s  an-

tipathy toward the U.S. government, they argue that 

the prime minister and other Turkish elites do care 

about Obama’s views and have moderated their poli-

cies regarding Israel and other issues to address U.S. 

concerns.309 

136

However, Obama’s cautious policy does have 

some supporters in the U.S. media and think tank 

community. For example, Doug Bandow of the CATO 

Institute,  while  acknowledging  that  Erdoğan  is  not 

an ideal democratic leader, writes that Erdoğan was 

legitimately elected and a better alternative than the 

previous military dictatorship, where hundreds were 

jailed, tortured, and executed. In addition, Bandow 

maintains that Turkey’s current government, while led 

by an Islamist party, is not a dictatorship like the for-

mer governments of Tunisia, Egypt, or Syria; Bandow 

also considers the AKP-run government considerably 

more stable than the others.310 These recent criticisms 

followed earlier criticism in the United States about 

how Turkey was drifting away from its Western orien-

tation toward Iran, Russia, and other Eastern partners. 

Until now, fears of damaging the U.S.-Turkey part-

nership generally has made Obama administration of-

ficials reluctant to attack Erdoğan’s domestic policies. 

Even during the June protests and resulting police 

crackdown, Obama never directly criticized Erdoğan 

publicly.311 When asked about the domestic events in 

Turkey, the standard White House response has been 

to describe them as important but insist that that the 

United States does not interfere in Turkey’s inter-

nal affairs. For example, in late-January 2014, White 

House Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 

Communications Ben Rhodes told the foreign media 

that  the  administration  has  confidence  that  Turkey, 

as a strong democracy and important NATO ally, can 

resolve its problems on its own and that Washington 

would continue to cooperate with the Erdoğan gov-

ernment on foreign policy.312 At the State Department, 

Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf likewise insisted 

that, “The United States is not and will not become 

involved in Turkey’s domestic politics.”313 

137

One reason for the divergence between the EU 

and the U.S. response is that Obama does not want 

to worsen further his personal ties with Erdoğan. In 

place of their constant dialogue a few years ago, now 

months  go  by  without  Erdoğan  and  Obama  talking 

even by phone. Another difference is that the EU has 

more leverage over Turkey due to Brussels’ ability 

to deny Ankara various economic rewards. U.S. eco-

nomic aid to Turkey is much less, while U.S. military 

financial assistance, previously the dominant form of 

financial aid, has dwindled to almost nothing. 

Conversely, the United States needs Turkey more 

than the EU due to Turkey’s status as an almost 

unique platform for projecting U.S. hard and soft 

power in Iraq, Syria, and other Middle Eastern coun-

tries.314 But Erdoğan escalated matters by blaming the 

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Francis J. Ricciardone, 

for plotting his removal. A story that simultaneously 

appeared in four pro-AKP newspapers describes Ric-

ciardone as telling his EU ambassadorial colleagues 

in Ankara over dinner on December 17, 2013, when 

the latest arrests became public, that the scandal 

would precipitate the “collapse of an empire,” an al-

leged reference to Erdoğan’s government. Erdoğan’s 

partisans described Ricciardone as participating in 

a Jewish-Hizmet conspiracy to bring down the AKP 

government and replace it with one more pliable to 

Washington and Tel Aviv. The conspiracy theorists 

point to a coincidence of alleged facts to justify their 

suspicions—Ricciardone had warned Turkey’s Halk-

bank earlier that it would be punished for helping Iran 

evade sanctions, he met with CHP opposition leaders 

on December 17, and one of the people arrested that 

day was the son of Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan, 

who had announced that Turkey would renew its 

138

controversial gold-for-gas trade with Iran now that 

Tehran had reached a sanctions-relief deal with the 

international community.315 

Erdoğan has voiced disapproval of the presence of 

Fetullah Gulen in Pennsylvania, accusing the religious 

leader of organizing a campaign to infiltrate Turkey’s 

security forces, create a state within a state, and seek 

Erdoğan’s overthrow from his safe haven in Pennsyl-

vania.316  U.S.  and  EU  officials  have  denied  that  Ric-

ciardone made the alleged statement against Erdoğan. 

The U.S. embassy in Ankara released a statement  

stating: 

Allegations targeting US Embassy employees pub-

lished in some media organs do not reflect the truth . . . 

to repeat once again: No one should endanger Turkey-

US relations through such intentional slander.317 

Nonetheless,  Erdoğan  publicly  implied  that  he 

would seek Ricciardone’s withdrawal from Turkey 

over his supposed plotting against him.318 Obama re-

sponded with his first public rebuke of Erdoğan, warn-

ing that such statements and actions could endanger 

the U.S.-Turkey relationship.319 Regarding the larger 

protests and scandals, State Department spokeswom-

an Jen Psaki, insisted that, “We’ve expressed our con-

cerns about some of the events that are happening on 

the ground directly, publicly and privately, and we’ll 

continue to do that.”320  During  a  media  briefing  in 

December, she added that, “We would reiterate that 

we expect Turkey to meet the highest standards for 

transparency, timeliness, and fairness in its judicial 

system.”321 

Nonetheless, at a January 14, 2014, meeting be-

tween Davutoğlu and Secretary of State John Kerry, 

139

the two leaders glossed over these issues and instead 

spoke about Turkey-U.S. cooperation regarding Syria, 

the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and the Iranian 

nuclear dispute.322 Moreover, the administration has 

declined to punish Turkey for its circumvention of the 

sanctions through its gas-for-gold scheme.323 

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Every few years, the U.S. National Intelligence 

Council (NIC) publishes studies of how the world 

might evolve over the next 2 decades. The authors 

of  *Global Trends 2025,* which appeared in 2008, high-

light several factors that they believe warrant focus-

ing much attention on Turkey’s evolving role in the 

international system. According to  *Global Trends 2025*, 

a future Turkey most likely will blend Islamic and 

nationalist strains, which could serve as a model for 

other rapidly modernizing countries in the Middle 

East.  Conflict  and  armed  engagements  between  Is-

rael, Iran, and Turkey contribute to instability in the 

region, which remains unstable as most populations 

in the Middle East live in poverty. 

Turkey could play a prominent role in modernizing 

and reforming the region’s militaries. Previous Turk-

ish governments developed a strong, positive rela-

tionship with Israel and any future government could 

reverse the friction now existing between the AKP and 

Israel. Turkey’s future leaders might also pursue far 

less conciliatory policies with religious regimes such 

as Iran, especially if Iran developed nuclear weapons 

or pursued destabilizing policies in Iraq, Central Asia, 

or the South Caucasus. An already important member 

of NATO’s missile defense system, Turkey could play 

an even greater role in this architecture in the future. 

140

A more recent study,  *Global Trends 2030,* predicts 

that by that year, the diffusion of power among coun-

tries will see Asia surpass Europe and North America 

in terms of aggregate GDP, population size, military 

spending, and technological investment. In this vision, 

a regional power such as Turkey will become especial-

ly important to the global economy as Europe, Japan, 

and Russia continue to slowly decline. However, this 

study views Turkey not as a single entity, but rather as 

a collective with countries such as Columbia, Egypt, 

Iran, Mexico, and South Africa. Termed the “Next 

Eleven” by Goldman Sachs, they will surpass Europe, 

Japan, and Russia in terms of global power by 2030. 

Turkey especially has a major opportunity to se-

cure a strong footing in the future global economy. 

Aging is the key structural change underlying the 

negative economic outlook for Europe, Japan, and 

the United States. Turkey’s youthful population will 

only decline slightly by 2030, and an influx of young 

migrants should help maintain a stable workforce. Af-

rica’s demographic youth bulge could reinforce Tur-

key’s economic growth–a reality that other emerging 

regional and global powers, including China, India, 

Brazil, and Turkey have already begun to seize. 

Turkey has invested heavily in several North Af-

rica countries. As of late-2011, Turkish investments 

in Africa had reached more than $5 billion. Assum-

ing continued growth, Turkey and other members of 

the Next Eleven will play a very important role in the 

future of Africa as well. 

However, one area of concern in  *Global Trends 2030*

is Turkey’s youthful, ethnic Kurdish population. In 

general,  the  amount  of  armed  conflict  over  the  past 

40 years has decreased; even when armed conflict has 

occurred, the amount of violence toward citizens has 

141

been limited as well. However, during this same time 

period, there has been an uptick in intrastate violence 

in countries where a population contains a politically 

dissonant, youthful ethnic minority. More than 80 

percent of all armed ethnic and civil conflicts have oc-

curred in such countries. The ethnic Kurds in Turkey 

have a pattern of actively participating in intrastate 

conflict. Kurdish fertility in southeastern Turkey is at 

four children per woman. This high rate of fertility, 

combined with the overall decline in fertility of other 

Turks, will result in Turkey seeing a higher percent-

age of ethnic Kurds than ever before. 

It is only natural that the U.S. intelligence com-

munity ponders the impact of Turkey’s growing sig-

nificance  in  global  affairs.  Turkey  will  exercise  con-

siderable  influence  over  global  and  regional  power 

dynamics during the next 20 years. The legitimacy, 

stability, and alignment of Turkey will have a major 

impact on the balance of power in Southeast Europe, 

the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterra-

nean, and the Middle East. Turkey can either be a valu-

able source of stability in these regions or a dangerous 

contributor to their problems. If Turkey becomes too 

bogged down in its international agenda and ignores 

its own demographic situation involving the youth-

ful Kurdish population, or engages the Iran Nuclear 

problem unilaterally, Turkey’s likely bright future 

could become considerably dimmer. 

The NIC studies many other countries, so Turkey 

was by no means singled out in its reviews. Prudent 

policymakers, in both Turkey and the United States, 

should consider what future contingencies they might 

encounter so as to perhaps anticipate and avert them. 

Some of these studies and seminars may have had an 

impact on U.S. policies toward Turkey, though this is 

142

uncertain. Often policymakers are moved exclusively 

by the spirit of the moment—and we suffer as a result. 

Turkish policymakers must adopt more of a col-

lective, transatlantic perspective of a NATO stake-

holder seeking the greater good of the West rather 

than that of a frustrated nationalist engaged in petty 

squabbles with NATO policymakers. Above all, they 

need to keep its bilateral disputes with Israel and the 

EU out of NATO’s multinational security agenda. For 

example, much of the Western media coverage of Tur-

key’s activities before the May 2012 NATO Summit 

focused, not on Turkey’s admirable contributions to 

NATO’s defense capabilities and in Afghanistan but 

on how the Turkish government sought to deny Israel 

access to any information from the U.S. BMD radar on 

its territory and deny Israelis from having an official 

presence at the Chicago summit. 

Turkish diplomats also initially refused to allow 

EU leaders to attend the summit on the grounds that 

the EU was making no more contribution to NATO 

than the 56-member Organization of Islamic Confer-

ence, then led by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish na-

tional, and other international organizations that were 

not invited to Chicago. Turkish officials need to adopt 

more of the perspective of a collective NATO stake-

holder seeking the greater good of the West. Turkey 

should avoid strategic surprises such as agreeing to 

host military exercises with China without consulting 

NATO allies. Without Turkey’s full support, neither 

the EU nor NATO can achieve its important security 

goals in the Arab world. The solution for many EU-

NATO problems involving Turkey is to address their 

root causes rather than merely their symptoms. 

Expanding Turkey’s role in EU security and de-

fense decisionmaking would ease many of the anxi-

143

eties in Ankara about the Union’s growing security 

roles. If Turkey is not to soon gain EU membership, 

then  it  should  receive  at  least  as  much  influence  in 

ESDP decisionmaking structures as Ankara had pre-

viously enjoyed as a WEU associate member—a sta-

tus that was evidently pledged at NATO’s April 1999 

Washington Summit. Alternately, undertaking a more 

genuine effort to bring Turkey into the EU would 

make Turkish policy makers more tolerant of exclu-

sionary ESDP practices since they would know that 

this discrimination was a temporary phase pending 

Ankara’s membership accession. Fortunately, Cyprus’ 

EU presidency did not cause a further EU-Turkey rift, 

due to the parties’ preoccupation with other issues, 

but the negotiations regarding the proposed Transat-

lantic Trade and Investment Partnership could further 

isolate Turkey from its traditional Western economic 

partners unless Brussels and Washington make a great 

effort to ensure that Turkey’s interests are addressed, 

including keeping open the ultimate prize of possible 

EU membership. The EU’s long-term potential will 

be degraded if its members cannot draw on Turkey’s 

economic, military, and other assets. 

With respect to the Middle East, Turkey and the 

United States need plans for what might happen 

should the government in Syria or other Middle East-

ern countries retaliate against Turkey or abruptly col-

lapse. If the Assad regime falls, fighting among the el-

ements of the winning Syrian coalition over the spoils 

is entirely possible, with other neighboring countries 

having strong incentives to support local proxies. 

Until then, Turkey and the United States need to do 

a better job at unifying the disparate Syrian opposi-

tion factions around a moderate platform. Their lack 

of unity is a major reason why the Assad regime still 

enjoys much support among Syrians who prefer the 

144

devil they know. Turkish authorities need to promote 

better integration among the insurgents as well as 

mechanisms to exclude Islamist extremists. 

Furthermore, Turkey’s strained ties with Israel 

will constrain its partnership with the United States, 

especially in the U.S. Congress. Although economic 

relations between Turkey and Israel remain strong, 

the two countries are maneuvering to punish one 

another diplomatically. Turkey is seeking to exclude 

Israel from international meetings, while Israel is try-

ing to show it has other diplomatic options by pursu-

ing better ties with Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and 

Romania. Despite efforts at reconciliation, supported 

by the United States in general and Obama in particu-

lar, and supported by their still strong economic links 

and mutual concerns regarding Syria, deep sources of 

tension between Turkey and Israel exist. For instance, 

both sides are seeking different goals in their recon-

ciliation efforts. Israel wants to resume close strategic 

ties, whereas Turkey seeks an amicable divorce. In ad-

dition, Israel does not fit into the new AKP worldview, 

which deemphasizes state-to-state relations based on 

realpolitik and instead adheres to a mixture of Turk-

ish and Sunni Islam bolstered by appeals to popular 

democracy and other transnational values. 

Popular animosity in each country toward the 

other remains strong. A contributing factor to the 

poor relationship is Turkey’s support for Hamas. At 

one level, this connection is useful for helping moder-

ate Hamas policies and providing a channel through 

which Hamas and Western interlocutors can commu-

nicate. But in addition to providing much aid to Hamas 

that helps sustain its control over the Gaza Strip, there 

is evidence that Turkey’s lax financial procedures are 

allowing  Hamas  to  receive  illegal  finds  for  terrorist 

145

activities.324 The United States and other governments 

must increase their pressure on Ankara to strengthen 

its  measures  against  terrorist  financing  and  to  crack 

down on the provocative actions of Turkish extremists 

against Israel and other targets. 

The United States and other pro-Western govern-

ments should welcome Turkey’s keeping Iranian in-

fluence within limited bounds in Iraq, but Washing-

ton would also be wise to keep any support to Ankara 

low key. Turkey can best advance Western (and Iraqi) 

interests if it is not seen as a U.S. proxy or a Sunni 

Muslim patron seeking to marginalize Iraq’s long re-

pressed Shiite majority. Although Ankara has sought 

to cultivate ties with Iraqi Shiites, and more recently 

Iraqi Kurds, the strong Turkish support for the Sunni-

secular  *Iraqiyya* bloc in the 2010 elections against the 

Shiite-centered block of incumbent al-Maliki aroused 

fears in Iran and Iraq that Turkey was playing such 

a  role.  Turkish  officials  appreciate  that  an  explicitly 

sectarian approach would be counterproductive since 

most Iraqi Shiite and Iranian animosity is focused on 

Saudi Arabia and other patrons of Sunni extremism. 

At worst, Turkey could find itself leading a block of 

West-leaning Sunni states against Iran and its Shiite-

dominated proxies. Such an Islamic cold war would 

still promote further divisions among Middle Eastern 

Muslims as their governments gravitate toward one 

pole or the other. 

Turkey could change its own, thus far benign nu-

clear weapons policies in coming years, if, for exam-

ple, unambiguous evidence arose that Iran is seeking 

to militarize its nuclear program. Turkey’s plans to 

expand its domestic nuclear energy program would, 

for the first time, provide its government with the sci-

entific, technical, and industrial foundations to pursue 

146

genuine nuclear weapons options, as Iran’s own de-

velopment of the capacity to make nuclear weapons 

has demonstrated to Ankara and others. But Turkey’s 

leaders might still decide that, even if Iran developed 

a small nuclear arsenal, they would be better off con-

tinuing to rely on NATO and Washington as well as 

Turkey’s powerful conventional military, bolstered 

by national and multinational missile defenses, rather 

than pursue an independent Turkish nuclear force as 

a means of deterring even a nuclear-armed Iran. In 

this context, U.S. aspirations to eliminate NATO’s tac-

tical nuclear weapons may become a source of tension 

with Turkey. 

From Ankara’s perspective, the U.S. tactical nu-

clear weapons that have reportedly been stationed in 

Turkey for decades under NATO’s nuclear-sharing 

arrangement help bind the U.S.-NATO security di-

mensions  together.  At  times,  some  Turkish  officials 

implied that having physical access to the U.S.-NATO 

nuclear weapons was a form of compensation for Tur-

key’s not developing its own national nuclear arsenal. 

The weapons are a symbolic manifestation of Turkey’s 

security links to Brussels and Washington that could 

be replaced by something else such as integration 

within EU defense structures or the emerging U.S.-

NATO missile defense architecture. 

If Iran developed a small nuclear arsenal, Turkey’s 

leaders might still decide that they could continue to 

rely on NATO and Washington as well as Turkey’s 

powerful conventional military, bolstered by national 

and multinational missile defenses, rather than pur-

sue an independent Turkish nuclear force as a means 

of deterring even a nuclear-armed Iran. Even so, 

Washington and Brussels need to fully consider Turk-

ish security concerns as they proceed to formulate 

147

and pursue arms reductions policies with Russia. This 

is also true in the domain of non-nuclear weapons, 

given Turkey’s interest in restoring the CFE and other 

mechanisms of preventing destabilizing arms races or 

conventional force imbalances around its periphery. 

Human rights and economic issues complicate re-

lations with the United States and other Western coun-

tries. Foreign critics complain about the Turkish gov-

ernment’s repression of media freedoms, stalemated 

efforts to solve the problem of Turkey’s Kurdish mi-

nority, and the lack of strong oppositional parties in 

Turkey. U.S. leaders will continue to be torn between 

seeking to sustain the advantages they receive from 

maintaining close ties with Turkey as an ally—vital 

security support in a critical geographic location—and 

disapproving  of  the  prickly  Erdoğan’s  authoritarian 

behavior and human rights violations. 

Future developments could tip the balance in favor 

of a more critical approach to Erdoğan. The U.S. and 

NATO military withdrawal from Afghanistan could 

reduce the need for Turkey’s direct and logistical sup-

port for the coalition military campaign there. The 

U.S.-Iran reconciliation, if it continues, will decrease 

Washington’s concern with keeping Turkey in align-

ment with U.S. policies regarding nonproliferation, 

missile defense, sanctions, and balancing Tehran’s in-

fluence in Iraq. A continued decline in the fortune of 

the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world is reduc-

ing Ankara’s value as a partner with Washington in 

Egypt and other countries. The diminishing U.S. role 

in the Middle East is making Turkey’s reduced ability 

to promote pro-U.S. policies in that region. Turkey’s 

economic slowdown, partly due to how the disorders 

in Turkey are scaring off foreign investors, will also 

lower Ankara’s influence in Washington—something 

U.S. diplomats should point out. 

148

One can imagine converse scenarios in which An-

kara’s value in Washington rebounds, but the main 

wild card is how the scandals, protests, and eco-

nomic problems will affect Turkey’s upcoming elec-

tions. A new government in Ankara, either under a 

weakened  Erdoğan  (less  able  to  implement  a  Kurd-

ish reconciliation) or a new political leader (who may 

not prove any more committed to the rule of law and 

political democracy than Erdoğan), will likely gener-

ate more mutual frustrations and further reduce the 

reluctance of U.S. leaders to challenge objectionable 

Turkish policies. 

Another constraint on the Turkish-U.S. relation-

ship is the decreasing U.S. share of Turkey’s trade and 

investment, which now is oriented more toward the 

EU and the Middle East. Both governments need to 

make it easier for Turkish and American businesses to 

trade and invest in each other’s countries. Initiatives 

are needed to reduce the level of popular hostility in 

Turkey toward the United States, which limits the 

depth and breadth of the relationship. Turkish-U.S. 

ties are still focused on government-to-government 

relations. The relationship needs to encompass civil 

society and private sector actors more. 

More generally, the United States should adopt 

a more proactive policy toward potential sources of 

tensions between Ankara and Washington that, unre-

solved, could abort the recent upturn in Turkish-U.S. 

relations. For example, the United States could launch 

sustained initiatives to resolve differences between 

Turkey and other U.S. partners such as Armenia, Isra-

el, Iraq, and the EU. It is understandable that Washing-

ton wants to limit Turkey’s imports of Iranian natural 

149

gas, but then the United States must be more open to 

allowing Turkey to obtain energy from the KRG even 

if Baghdad opposes it. 

The Obama administration should continue its 

welcome efforts to reconcile Turkey and Israel. U.S. 

and Turkish policymakers have proved skilled at com-

partmentalizing their differences over Israel, but an 

Israeli attack on Iran, a popular uprising in Palestine, 

and other not improbable events could easily escalate 

Turkey-Israeli tensions, which invariably would spill 

over to adversely affect the Washington-Ankara axis. 

Less often cited, the Armenia-Turkey relationship has 

the same explosively destructive potential. After the 

failed reconciliation effort of a few years ago, neither 

country has made major exertions to overcome their 

current deadlock. But 2015 will mark the centenary of 

what many call the “Armenian genocide.” Unless An-

kara, quietly backed by Washington, renews its rec-

onciliation  efforts,  the  Armenia  issue  risks  inflicting 

a blow to bilateral relations. Otherwise, Washington 

could find itself constantly torn between key allies. 

Regime changes in other Middle Eastern coun-

tries could also have implications for U.S. military 

bases and deployments in Turkey’s region, requir-

ing further adjustments in the U.S. military presence 

in Turkey and other regional partners. It would be 

best if Ankara and Washington developed plans for 

such scenarios in advance to improve the prospects 

of a harmonious response to such contingencies. In 

addition to the substance of any policies, improving 

communications between Ankara and Washington is 

essential for avoiding further misunderstandings be-

tween these pivotal partners, regardless of who is in 

power in either country. 

150

As the Western world continues to be concerned 

about what is seen as evidence of a Turkey reaching out 

to the East, it is vital for Turkey to reassure its Western 

allies of its support. On the other side, Western schol-

ars and politicians should have more understanding 

of the fact that Turkey is not an island, and that the 

country must take the necessary means to create a 

sustainable environment for itself. A long-term objec-

tive should be renewing cultural ties among Turks 

and Americans. There is still much popular hostility 

in Turkey toward the United States, which limits the 

depth and breadth of the relationship. Bilateral rela-

tions still excessively focus on government-to-govern-

ment ties. The Turkey-U.S. relationship must extend 

to encompass civil society and private sector actors. 

Turks and Americans still hold surprisingly negative 

misperceptions about one another. Encouraging more 

Foreign  Area  Officers  to  learn  Turkish  would  pay 

dividends even beyond Turkey given renewed inter-

est in the Turkish language in Central Asia and the 

Middle East. 

**ENDNOTES**

1. John Greenway, “Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy: An 

Asset for Europe,”  *Alliance Geostrategique*, March 31, 2010, available from  *www.alliancegeostrategique.org/2010/03/31/turkey-john-greenway-aweu/*. 

2. Sinan Ülgen,  *The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relation-*

*ship*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, pp. 97-109. 

3. Gülnur Aybet, “Turkey’s Security Challenges and NATO, 

2012,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2012, pp. 1-5, available from  *carnegieendowment.Org/Files/*

*Aybet_Brief.pdf*. 

151

4. Mustafa Bilgin,  *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics**and Influence In The Early Cold War Era*, London, UK: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008, pp. 138-139. 

5. Ihsan Gurkin,  *Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern*

*Perspective*, New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1980, p. 30; and Bilgin, 166. 

6. Gurkin, pp. 30-31. 

7.  *Ibid*., pp. 5-6. 

8.  *Ibid*., p. 31. 

9.  Güneş  Ünüvar,  “Turkey-NATO  Relations:  Past,  Present 

And Future,”  *Vrije  Universiteit  Brussel,  Vub,* Brussels, Belgium: Institute For European Studies International And European Law, 

Ll.M. Programme, 2011-12, March 7, 2014, available from  *https://*

*www.academia.edu/1472745/turkey_-_nato_relations_past_present_*

*and_future*. 

10. Richard Outzen, “From Crisis To Cooperation Turkey’s 

Relations With Washington and NATO,” Washington, DC: The 

Washington Institute For Near East Policy, June 2012, p. 4, avail-

able from  *www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/*

*PolicyNote12.pdf.*

11. Sofia Hafdell, “Turkey–Nato Relations at the 60th Anni-

versary,” Policy Update No. 2, March 2012, Istanbul, Turkey: Is-

tanbul Kültür University, Global Political Trends Center, March 

7, 2014, available from  *www.Gpotcenter.Org/Dosyalar/Pu2_Nato_*

*Hafdell_Mar2012.pdf*. 

12.  Ahmet  Davutoğlu,  “Transformation  of  NATO  and  Tur-

key’s Position,”  *Perceptions*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 

7-17, available from  *sam.gov.tr/Transformation-Of-Nato-And-*

*Turkeys-Position/*. 

13. Selcan Hacaoglu, “NATO Member Turkey Turns to Sanc-

tioned Chinese Co. for Missiles,”  *Bloomberg*, September 27, 2013, available from  *www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-27/nato-member-turkey-turns-to-sanctioned-chinese-co-for-missiles.html.*

152

14. Muharrem Eski, “Turkey’s Increasing Role in Afghani-

stan,”  *Journal of Global Analysis* Vol. 1, No. 2, 2012, p. 145. 

15. Daren Butler, “Karzai Seeks Closer Trade Ties with Mus-

lim Nations,”  *Reuters*, November 9, 2009. 

16. Eski, pp. 147-149. 

17.  *Ibid*., p. 143. 

18. Aybet, pp. 1-5. 

19. Tom Z. Collina, “The European Phased Adaptive Ap-

proach at a Glance,” Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 

May 2013, available from  *www.armscontrol.org/Factsheets/Phased-*

*adaptiveapproach*. 

20. NATO, “NATO Deactivates Allied Air Command Izmir 

Headquarters, Turkey,” Brussels, Belgium: NATO, May 22, 

2013, available from  *www.aco.nato.int/Nato-Deactivates-Allied-Air-Command-Izmir-Headquarters--Turkey.Aspx*. 

21. NATO, “The Rapid Deployable Corps,” Brussels, Bel-

gium: NATO, November 26, 2012, available from  *www.nato.int/*

*cps/en/natolive/topics_50088.htm*. 

22. “Overview, Turkey,”  ** Washington, DC: The Nuclear 

Threat  Initiative,  Official  Web  Page,  July  2013,  available  from *www.nti.org/country-profiles/turkey/.*

23. “Turkey-EU Relations,” Istanbul, Turkey: Republic of 

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from  *www.mfa.gov.*

*tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa*. 

24. “Turkey: EU Political Benchmarks ‘Were Never Given 

to US’,”  *Eurasia Review*, February 7, 2013, available from  *www.*

*Eurasiareview.com/07022013-Turkey-Eu-Political-Benchmarks-Were-*

*Never-Given-To-Us*. 

25. Kemal Kirisci, “Shanghai Blues, the European Union, and 

John Kerry’s Turkey,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institu-

153

tion, February 27, 2013, available from  *www.brookings.edu/blogs/*

*up-front/posts/2013/02/27-eu-kerry-turkey-kirisci*. 

26. Egemen Bagis, “For A Visa-Free Europe,”  *New Europe*, January 27, 2013, available from  *www.neurope.eu/blog/visa-free-europe*. 

27. “Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 

2013/1,” Istanbul, Turkey: Edam Center for Economics and For-

eign Policy Studies, available from  *edam.org.tr/Eng/Document/*

*Edam%20poll%202013-1.pdf*. 

28. Grace Annan, “Turkey Marks Half Century Of Unsuccess-

ful Bids To Join EU,”  *Global Insight*, August 3, 2009. 

29. “Fule Urges Turkey To Implement Additional Protocol,” 

*Famagusta  Gazette*, available from  *famagusta-gazette.com/Fule-Urges-Turkey-To-Implement-Additional-Protocol-P18332-69.htm*. 

30. “Relance Des Négociations D’adhésion De La Tur-

quie A L’union Européenne?”  *Toute  L’europe*, February 26, 

2013, available from  *www.touteleurope.eu/Fr/Actions/Construc-*

*tion-Europeenne/Elargissement/Actualite/Actualites-Vue-Detaillee/*

*Afficher/Fiche/6267/T/44207/From/2247/Breve/Relance-Des-*

*Negociations-Dadhesion-De-La-Turquie-A-Lunion-Europeenne.*

*html?Chash=806abe3562*. 

31.  *Ibid*. 

32. “1974: Turkey Invades Cyprus,” BBC News, available 

from   *news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_38660*

*00/3866521.stm*. 

33. “Resolution 550,” New York: United Nations Security 

Council, May 11, 1984, available from  *www.un.org/en/ga/search/*

*view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984)*. 

34. “Turkey Says It Won’t Recognize Cyprus as EU Presi-

dent,”  *Thejakartapost.Com*, June 8, 2012, available from  *www.*

*thejakartapost.com/News/2012/06/08/Turkey-Says-Wont-Recognize-*

*Cyprus-Eu-President.html*. 

35. “Turkey-EU Relations.” 

154

36. Scott Sayare and Sebnem Arsu, “Genocide Bill Angers 

Turks as It Passes in France,”  *The New York Times*, January 23, 2012, available from  *www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/europe/*

*french-senate-passes-genocide-bill-angering-turks.html?_r=0*. 

37. Quentin Peel and Daniel Dombey, “Merkel Backs New 

EU Talks For Turkey,”  *The  Financial  Times*, February 24, 2012, available from  *www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f853063e-7e99-11e2-a792-00144feabdc0.html*. 

38. Scott Sayare, “French Council Strikes Down Bill on Arme-

nian Genocide Denial,”  *The New York Times*, February 28, 2012, available from  *www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/world/europe/french-bill-on-armenian-genocide-is-struck-down.html*. 

39. “Turkey Has Lifted All Sanctions Against France,”  *The*

*Journal of Turkish Weekly*, July 6, 2012, available from  *www.Turkishweekly.Net/News/137913/Turkey-Lifts-All-Sanctions-Against-*

*France.html*. 

40. Andreas Rinke and Gulsen Solaker, “Cyprus Remains 

Stumbling Block In Turkey’s EU Ambition: Merkel,”  *Reuters*, February 25, 2013, available from  *www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/*

*us-germany-turkey-eu-idUSBRE91O10L20130225.*

41.  *Ibid*. 

42. “France To Assist Turkey in Opening EU Chapter,” 

*Hurryet  Daily  News*, February 12, 2013, available from  *www.*

*hurriyetdailynews.com/france-to-assist-turkey-in-opening-eu-chapter-.*

*aspx?pageID=238&nID=40984&NewsCatID=351.*

43. “Chapters of the Acquis,”  ** Brussels, Belgium: Europe-

an Commission, available from  *ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/*

*conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm*. 

44. Yavuz Baydar, “Merkel’s Visit Marks a Turn,”  *Today’s*

*Zaman*, February 26, 2012, available from  *www.todayszaman.com/*

*columnists/yavuz-baydar_308224-merkels-visit-marks-a-turn.html*. 

155

45. “EU May Chase Turkey Soon: German FM,”  *Hurryietdai-*

*lynews.Com*, December 22, 2012, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-may-chase-turkey-soon-german-fm.aspx?pageID=238&n**ID=37410&NewsCatID=338*. 

46. Andrew Rettman, “Germany Ready to Re-Start EU-Tur-

key Talks,”  *EU Observer*, February 25, 2013, available from  *euob-server.com/enlargement/119178*. 

47. Natasha Gural, “Investing in Europe’s Fastest-Growing 

Economy,”  *CNBC*, August 15, 2012, available from  *www.cnbc.com/*

*Id/48552347/Investing_In_Europe039s_Fastestgrowing_Economy*. 

48. Directorate General for Trade of the European Commis-

sion, “Turkey-EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,” 

Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, available from  *trade.*

*ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf.*

49. Ksneia Krauer-Pacheco, “Turkey as a Transit Coun-

try and Energy Hub: The Link to Its Foreign Policy Aims,” 

*Forschungsstelle Osteuropa*, December, 2011, available from  *www.*

*forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf*. 

50. David Rising, “German Economy Shrank in Q4 as Exports 

Slump,”  *Time World*, February 14, 2013, available from  *bigstory.*

*ap.org/article/german-economic-growth-drops-4q-2012*. 

51. “Turkey-EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World.” 

52.  *Ibid*. 

53. Roman Muzalevsky, “Turkey Looks Forward, Talks 

SCO,”  *Eurasia  Daily  Monitor*, February 13, 2013, available from *www.1913intel.com/2013/02/14/turkey-looks-forward-talks-sco-the-jamestown-foundation/*. 

54. Judy Dempsey, “Merkel’s Party Eases Anti-Turkish 

Stance,”  *The New York Times*, June 6, 2009, available from  *query.*

*nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E5D9143AF931A35755C0A*

*96F9C8B63*. 

55. Peel and Dombey. 

156

56. Rinke and Solaker. 

57. Kristen Allen, “The World from Berlin: Turkish Acces-

sion Is ‘of Minor Importance’ to EU,”  *Spiegel*, November 1, 2012, available from  *www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-press-criticize-erdogan-eu-accession-ultimatum-a-864734.html*. 

58. Peel and Dombey. 

59. “Turkey Deserves More from Merkel if Their Future in 

the EU Is to Be Taken Seriously,”  *European Green Party*, February 26, 2012, available from  *europeangreens.eu/News/Turkey-Deserves-More-Merkel-If-Their-Future-Eu-Be-Taken-Seriously*. 

60. Hanne Bursch, “Stall in Turkey’s EU Accession Talks 

Calls for Alternative Approach,” Washington, DC: United States 

Institute Of Peace, February 26, 2012, available from  *www.usip.*

*org/olivebranch/stall-in-turkey-s-eu-accession-talks-calls-alternative-approach*. 

61. Peel and Dombey. 

62. Ülgen,  *The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship*. 

63. Suhnaz Yilmaz, “Turkey and the European Union: A  

Security Perspective,” Giovanni Gasparini, ed.,  *Turkey and*

*European  Security,* Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2006, pp. 58-59. 

64. Miguel Medina Abellan, “Competing Visions of Euro-

pean Foreign and Security Policy Making. Turkey, the European 

Union and Nato,” April 24-26, 2008, p. 5, available from  *www.ies.*

*be/node/440*. 

65. Jolyon Howorth, “NATO and ESDP: Institutional Com-

plexities and Political Realities,”  *Politique Étrangère L 4:2009 English Ed*., April 2009, p. 95. 

66. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership,” New York: NATO, 

April 26, 2010, available from  *www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/EN/*

*NATO-EU-strategic-partnership.htm*. 

157

67. “The Presidency Conclusions,” Copenhagen, Denmark: 

Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002, Annex Ii-

I, available from  *www.consilium.europa.eu/Uedocs/Cms_Data/Docs/*

*Pressdata/En/Ec/73842.pdf*. 

68. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership.” 

69. Howorth, p. 96. 

70. “The Presidency Conclusions.” 

71. Paul Ames, “ESDP: Presidency: Closer EU-NATO Ties 

Key To Success Of Missions,”  *Europolitics  Monthly*, September 21, 2009. 

72. “NATO’s Chief to Convince Turkey Not to Block NATO-

EU Ties,”  *Turkish Daily News*, June 11, 2007. 

73. Simon Duke, “The Future Of EU-NATO Relations: A Case 

Of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?”  *European Integra-*

*tion*, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2008, p. 34. 

74. “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership.” 

75. Ames. 

76. Howorth, p. 97. 

77. Duke, p. 33. 

78. Petros Vamvakas, “NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and 

Central Asia: Possibilities and Blind Spots,”  *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 

10, No. 1, March 2009, p. 65. 

79. Yilmaz, pp. 59-61. 

80. Piotr Zalewski, ”How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ 

To Zero Friends,”  *Foreign Affairs*, August 22, 2013, available from *www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/21/how_turkey_foreign_*

*policy_went_from_zero_problems_to_zero_friends*. 

158

81. Peter Kenyon, “The Turkish Model: Can It Be Replaced?” 

*National Public Radio News*, January 6, 2012, available from  *www.*

*Npr.Org/2012/01/06/144751851/The-Turkish-Model-Can-It-Be-*

*Replicated*. 

82. David Ignatius, “U.S. and Turkey Find A Relationship 

That Works,”  *The Washington Post*, December 7, 2011, avail-

able from  *www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-and-turkey-find-a-*

*relationship-that-works/2011/12/06/gIQAh5UcdO_story.html*. 

83. Bulent Aliriza, “The Escalating Syrian Crisis and US-Tur-

key Relations,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-

tional Studies, 2012, available from  *www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/*

*haber/1347972429-2.Bulent_Ali_Riza_Escalating_Syrian_Crisis_and_*

*US_Turkey_Relations.pdf*. 

84. Humeyra Pamuk, “Number of Syrian Refugees in Tur-

key Exceeds 600,000: Turkish Official,”  *Reuters*, October 21, 2013, available from  *www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-syria-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUSBRE99K04O20131021*. 

85. Aliriza. 

86. “Turkey-Syria Association Agreement,” Istanbul, Tur-

key: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, Official Web Page, 

available from  *www.economy.gov.tr/Index.Cfm?Sayfa=Tradeagreeme*

*nts&Bolum=Fta&Country=Sy&Region=0*. 

87. Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey’s Syria Calculus Must Change 

Again,”  *The National Interest*, September 23, 2013, available from *nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkeys-syria-calculus-must-change-again-9104*. 

88.  *Ibid*. 

89. Lally Weymouth, “Turkish President Abdullah Gül: Assad 

Must Go,”  *The Washington Post*, September 23, 2013, available from   *www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/turkish-president-abdullah-gul-assad-must-go/2013/09/23/ffc45d7a-246e-11e3-b75d-*

*5b7f66349852_story.html.*

159

90. Neil Macfarquhar and Sebnem Arsu, “Syrian Troops 

Fire into Turkey in Clash Near Refugee Camp,”  *The New York*

*Times*, April 9, 2012, available from  *www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/*

*world/middleeast/turkey-accuses-syria-of-firing-across-border.*

*html?pagewanted=all*. 

91. Aliriza. 

92. Jerome Rivet, “NATO Expected To Give Go-Ahead To Pa-

triot Deployment In Turkey,”  *Agence France-Presse* (AFP), December 2, 2012. 

93. “US-Led NATO Intervention Begins in Syria War: Patri-

ots in Turkey,”  *Debkafile*, November 27, 2012, available from  *www.*

*debka.com/article/22566/US-led-NATO-intervention-begins-in-Syria-war-Patriots-in-Turkey*. 

94. “NATO Agrees To Augment Turkey’s Air-Defence Ca-

pabilities,” December 4, 2012, available from  *www.nato.int/cps/en/*

*natolive/news_92861.htm.*

95. Kirisci. 

96. Jonathon Burch, “Turkish Minister Plays Down Syria Link 

To Turkey Attacks,”  *Reuters*, August 25, 2012, available from  *mo-bile.reuters.com/article/BMW/idUSBRE87O05M20120825*. 

97. David Pollock, “Syria’s Kurds Unite Against Assad, But 

Not With Opposition,”  *The Washington Institute*, July 31, 2012, available from  *https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/*

*view/syrias-kurds-unite-against-assad-but-not-with-opposition*. 

98. Philip H. Gordon, “International Press Roundtable,” 

Washington, DC: Department of State, July 30, 2012, available 

from  *www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/195910.htm.*

99. Soner Cagaptay, “‘Testing Turkey’—Why War in Syria 

Could Bring Ankara and Washington Closer Together,”  *For-*

*eign Affairs*, May 28, 2013, available from  *www.foreignaffairs.com/*

*Articles/139409/Soner-Cagaptay/Testing-Turkey*. 

100. Weymouth. 

160

101. Ruth Sherlock, “Inside Jabhat Al-Nusra—The Most  

Extreme Wing of Syria’s Struggle,”  *The  Telegraph*, December 2, 2012, available from  *www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middle*

*east/syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-the-most-extreme-wing-of-Syrias-struggle.html*. 

102. Jonathon Burch, “Turkey Arrests 12 in Raids on ‘Terror-

ist’ Organization,”  *Reuters*, May 30, 2013, available from  *www.*

*reuters.com/article/2013/05/30/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSBRE-*

*94T0YO20130530*. 

103. Weymouth. 

104. Sami Kohen, (Milliyet), “Turkey Readjusts North Syria 

Strategy,” Timur Goksel, trans.,  *Al-Monitor*, October 20, 2013, available from  *www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/10/turkey-north-syria-strategy-firing-isis.html*. 

105.  *Ibid*. 

106.  *Ibid*. 

107. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “Rocky U.S.-Turkey Relations 

Persist Since Iraq War,”  *Fox News*, April 7, 2005. 

108. Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Em-

bracing Iraqi Kurdistan,” Washington, DC: United States Institute 

of Peace, May 2010, p. 5, available from  *carnegieendowment.org/*

*files/USIP_SR_Turkey_Iraq.pdf.*

109. Gonul Tol, “Turkey and Iran Find Common Ground in 

Iraq,”  *Frontline*’s Tehran Bureau, January 19, 2012. 

110. Sahar Issa, “Attack on Turkish Embassy in Iraq High-

lights Rift,”  *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 20, 2012. 

111. “Turkish Embassy in Baghdad Attacked Amid Rising 

Tensions,”  *Today’s Zaman,* January 18, 2012, available from  *www.*

*todayszaman.com/news-268888-turkish-embassy-in-baghdad-attacked-amid-rising-tension.html*. 

161

112. “Press Release Regarding the Rocket Attack Launched 

against the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad,” Istanbul, Turkey: Min-

istry of Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2012, available from  *trove.nla.*

*gov.au/work/161237539?versionId=175770144*. 

113. Saban Kardas, “Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs,”  *Eur-*

*asia Daily Monitor*, May 3, 2012, available from  *www.refworld.org/*

*docid/4fa7a28d2.html*. 

114. Davutoğlu and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ex-

pressed their unease at the situation in Iraq in a February 13, 2012, joint press conference. 

115. Serkan Demirtas, “Gul Warns Panettao on Terror in Post-

US Iraq,”  *Hurriyet Daily News*, December 17, 2011. 

116. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.” 

117. “Turkey’s Trade Volume with Iraq up 41 Percent,”  *World*

*Bulletin*, May 2, 2012, available from  *www.worldbulletin.net/?aType*

*=haber&ArticleID=89305*. 

118. Jon Hemming, “Turkey Does Not Want Return To Iraq 

Chaos: Minister,” January 18, 2012, available from  *www.reuters.*

*com/article/2012/01/18/us-iraq-turkey-idUSTRE80H18M20120118*. 

119. Hasan Turunc, “Turkey and Iraq,”  ** London, UK: The 

London School of Economics, available from  *www2.lse.ac.uk/ideas/*

*publications/reports/pdf/sr007/iraq.pdf*. 

120. “Turkey Aims to Double Iraq Trade in 2012: Minister,” 

*AFP*, ****available from  *www.iraqdirectory.com/en/print.aspx?sid=18080.*

121. “Turkish Minister Likens Turkey, Iraq to Adjacent 

Stores,”  *Journal  of  Turkish  Weekly,* May 3, 2012, available from *www.turkishweekly.net/news/135454/turkish-minister-likens-turkey-iraq-to-adjacent-stores.html*. 

122. Turkey’s Trade Volume with Iraq up 41 Percent,”  *World*

*Bulletin*, May 2, 2012, available from  *www.worldbulletin.net/?aType*

*=haber&ArticleID=89305*. 

162

123. “Ankara, Arbil Likeminded on Iraq’s Future,”  *Hürriyet*

*Daily  News,* January 19, 2012, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-arbil-likeminded-on-iraqs-future--.aspx?pageID=238*

*&nID=11799&NewsCatID=344*. 

124. Anthony Shadid, “Resurgent Turkey Flexes Its Muscles 

around Iraq,”  *The New York Times,* January 4, 2011, available from *www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/world/middleeast/05turkey.html?_*

*r=1&pagewanted=all*. 

125. Michael D. Barbero, “Turkey, NATO, and Iraq: 2011 and 

Beyond,” October 12-13, 2010, available from  *www.aco.nato.int/*

*page12822541.aspx*. 

126. Turunc. 

127.  *Ibid*. 

128. **“**What Went Wrong with Iraq and Syria?”  *Hurriyet Daily**News*, January 19, 2012, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.*

*com/what-went-wrong-with-iraq-and-syria.aspx?pageID=238&nID=*

*11811&NewsCatID=409*. 

129. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.” 

130. Mohammed A. Salih, “Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan: From 

Cold War to Warm Peace,”  *World Politics Review*, March 4, 2011, available from  *www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8088/turkey-and-iraqi-kurdistan-from-cold-war-to-warm-peace*. 

131. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq: Embracing 

Iraqi Kurdistan.” 

132. Turunc. 

133. Salih. 

134.  *Ibid*. 

135. Salih. 

163

136. Tony Karon, “Even as He Clashes With Israel, Turkey’s 

Erdoğan is Displacing Iran’s Influence,”  *Time World*, September 14, 2011, available from  *world.time.com/2011/09/14/even-as-he-clashes-with-israel-turkeys-erdogan-is-displacing-irans-influence/*; and Soner Cagaptay, “Gaza Crisis: Turkey’s New Role,”  *Newsweek*, June 3, 2010, available from  *www.newsweek.com/gaza-crisis-turkeys-new-role-73091*. 

137. Mark Levine, “Is Turkey the Best Model for Arab De-

mocracy?”  *Al Jazeera*, September 19, 2011, available from  *www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201191684356995273.html*; Ariel Ben Solomon, “Iran FM says his country is model of democracy 

for region,”  *The Jerusalem Post*, January 6, 2014, available from *www.jpost.com/International/Iran-FM-says-his-country-is-model-of-democracy-for-region-337222*. 

138. Semih İdiz, “Turkey-Iran Ties Strained by Iraq, Syria,” 

*Al-Monitor*, February 19, 2013, available from  *www.al-monitor.com/*

*pulse/originals/2013/02/turkey-iran-tensions-rise-syria.html#*. 

139. “Turkish FM says Ankara supports Iran nuclear rights,” 

*Press TV*, February 27, 2013, available from  *www.presstv.com/*

*detail/2013/02/27/291139/turkey-supports-iran-nuclear-rights/*. 

140. “Iran signs nuclear fuel-swap deal with Turkey,” 

*BBC  News*, May 17, 2010, available from  *news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/*

*8685846.stm*. 

141. Thomas Erdbrink, “Brazil and Turkey Seek Iranian 

Nuclear Deal,”  *Washington  Post,* May 16, 2010, available from *www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/*

*AR2010051503508.html*. 

142. “Turkey: World Is Turning a Blind Eye to Israel’s Nucle-

ar Weapon,”  *Haaretz*, April 11, 2010, available from  *www.haaretz.*

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143. Mary Beth Sheridan, “Turkish Foreign Minister Op-

poses U.N. Sanctions on Iran,”  *The Washington Post*, April 14, 2010,  available from  *www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/*

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164

144. Stephen J. Flanagan, Bulent Aliriza, and Andrew Kuchins, 

“The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

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*Flanagan_TurkeyRussiaIran_web.pdf*. 

145. Tulay Karadeniz and Ibon Villelabeitia, “U.S. Presses 

Turkey to Enforce Sanctions on Iran,”  *Reuters*, October 21, 2010, available from  *www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/21/us-iran-turkey-usa-idUSTRE69K46920101021*. 

146. “Turkey’s Gas Imports from Iran Unaffected by Deals 

with Iraq: Minister,”  *Press TV*, May 23, 2012, available from  *www.*

*presstv.com/detail/2012/05/23/242621/turkish-gas-imports-from-iran-unaffected/*. 

147. Ben Katcher**,** “Turkey Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto-

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148. Thom Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile 

Shield,”  *The New York Times,* September 15, 2011, available from *www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missile-radar-for-nato-defense-against-iran.html*. 

149. Patrick Markey, “Iraqi Kurds Flee Iranian and Turk-

ish Bombardment,”  *Reuters*, August 24, 2011, available from  

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150. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Turkey & Iran: Islamic 

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151. Sinan Ülgen, “Turkey’s Syria Connundrum,”  *The Na-*

*tional Interest*, August 24, 2012, available from  *nationalinterest.org/*

*commentary/turkeys-syria-conundrum-7385*. 

152. Alex Vatanka and Soner Cagaptay, “How Turkey and 

Iran See Each Other,” Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 

165

April 13, 2012, available from  *www.mei.edu/content/how-turkey-*

*and-iran-see-each-other*. 

153. Kadri Gursel, “Iran-Turkey Rivalry Worsens over Patriot 

Deployment,”  *Al Monitor*, January 4, 2013, available from  *www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/turkey-patriot-missiles-iran.html*. 

154 . Henri J. Barkey, “Back to Bloodshed,”  *Foreign  Pol-*

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*articles/2011/10/21/back_to_bloodshed*. 

155. Sean Kane, “The Coming Turkish-Iranian Competition 

in Iraq,” Special Report No 276, Washington, DC: United States 

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*default/files/Turkish_Iranian_Competition.pdf*. 

156. Suat Kiniklioglu, “Turkey’s Iran Issue: The End of Turk-

ish Romanticism,”  *Today’s Zaman*, April 6, 2012, available from *www.todayszaman.com/columnists/suat-kiniklioglu_276605-turkeys-iran-issue-the-end-of-turkish-romanticism.html*. 

157. “Kazakhstan Will Host Iran-P5+1 Talks Due to Neutral-

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158. “Turkey-Iran Economic and Trade Relations,” Istanbul, 

Turkey: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, 

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159. “Turkey, Iran to Trade in Local Currencies to Replace 

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160. Robert M. Cutler, “Turkey Strengthens Iraqi Energy 

Ties,”  *Asia Times*, March 26, 2010, available from  *atimes.com/atimes/*

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161. Simone Tagliapietra,  ****“**Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth or Reality?”  *Natural  Gas  Europe*, January 27, 2014, available from  *www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-regional-naturalgas-hub*. 

166

162. Thomas Erdbrink, “In Iran, Elite Unit Expands Oil Role,” 

*Washington Post*, May 5, 2010, p. 12. 

163. Gary Clark, Rachel Ziemba, and Mark Dubowitz,   “Iran’s 

Golden Loophole,” Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies, May 13, 2013, available from  *defenddemocracy.*

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164 . “Iran, Turkey Set to Establish Joint University,” 

*Press TV*, February 3, 2013, available from  *www.presstv.com/detail/2013/02/03/287038/iran-turkey-to-launch-joint-university/*; “Tehran, Ankara to Set Up Joint Economic Commission,”  *FARS News*

*Agency*, January 30, 2013, available from *english.farsnews.com/*

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165. “Turkey’s Erdogan: Israeli Strike on Iran Would Devas-

tate Mideast,”  *Haaretz*, April 1, 2012, available from  *www.haaretz.*

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166. Lamiya Adilgizi, “Old Rivals or Regional Partners: Rus-

sia, Turkey, and Crimea,”  *Al-Jazeera*, March 16, 2014, available from   *www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/old-rivals-regional-partners-r-2014315144016585481.htm* l. 

167. Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, “Turkey and Russia: 

Axis of the Excluded?”  *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 

81–92,  available from  *www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/*

*articles/2006/3/spring%20turkey%20hill/2006_survival.pdf*. 

168. Fedor Lukyanov, “Russian-Turkish Gambit,”  *Rossiyskaya*

*Gazeta*, October 17, 2012. 

167

169. “Russia Agrees to Join Turkish Security Operation in 

Black Sea,”  *RIA Novosti*,  *Global Security.Org,* June 29, 2006, available from  *www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/06/mil-060629-rianovosti01.htm*. 

170. “Press Statements Following the Russian-Turkish 

Talks,”  *President of Russia Website*, February 13, 2009, available from  *www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/13/2131_type82914*

*type82915_212893.shtml*. 

171. Igor Torbakov, “The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey 

Relations,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, 

p. 9, available from  *www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Georgia*

*CrisisTorbakov.pdf*. 

172.  *Ibid*. 

173. Roman Muzalevsky, “The Armenia-Turkey Protocols: 

Tactical Cooperation in the Shadow of Eurasian Strategic Compe-

tition,”  *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*, November 11, 2009, available from  *old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5214*. 

174. E. Tariverdiyeva, “Russia-Turkey Cooperation Will Con-

tribute to Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution, but in the Long 

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175. “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Min-

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176. “Russian FM Urges Progress on Turkey, Armenia 

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177. Torbakov, p. 5. 

178.  *Ibid*., p. 30. 

168

179. Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, “Thinking about the Cauca-

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180. “US Warship Sails Through Straits, Russia Suspicious,” 

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181. Alexander Murinson, “Russia Accuses Turkey of Violat-

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182. Jacob Resneck, “New Energy Between Cold War Foes 

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186. G-20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 

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of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, 

United Kingdom, United States—the EU, with Spain participat-

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169

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188. Burak Bekdil, “The Shanghai Seven?”  *Hürriyet  Daily*

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190. Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s Quest for a Eurasian Union,” 

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191. Bekdil. 

192. “Idea of Shanghai Membership Inconsistent, Says 

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194. Doga Ulas Eralp, “Turkey—Can the Shanghai Coop-

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170

195. “Is Turkey Serious About Becoming SCO Member State?” 

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196. Ariel Cohen, “Mr. Erdogan Goes to Shanghai,”  *Nation-*

*al Interest*, February 18, 2013, available from  *nationalinterest.org/*

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197. United Nations Security Council Document 1154 Annex 

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198. “Turkey’s Emerging Role in Afghanistan’s Reconstruc-

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199. “Troop Numbers and Contributions,”  *ISAF Afghanistan*, 

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200. “Turkey Extends ISAF’s Command One More Year,” 

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201. Desmond Butler, “Obama Praises Turkey for Help in Af-

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202. Düden Yegenoglu, “The ISAF Mission and Turkey’s Role 

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203. “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Opera-

tion,” Istanbul, Turkey: Turkish General Staff, February 3, 2010, 

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204. “Turkey: Ankara’s Strategic Outlook on Af-

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171

205. “U.S. Requests No More Troops from Turkey to Afghani-

stan—Robert Gates,” Trend News Agency, February 6, 2010, 

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206. John Daly, “Afghanistan: The Turkish Advantage,” 

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207. “Turkey to Restore Afghanistan’s Oldest Hospital,” 

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208. Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Revises Its Strategy for Ending 

the Afghan War,”  *The Washington Post*, October 31, 2011, available from   *www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-revises-its-strategy-for-ending-the-afghan-war/2011/10/31/gIQAwTbXaM_*

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209. Ceren Kumova, “Turkey Looks to Stabilize Afghanistan, 

Boost Confidence in Af-Pak Region,”  *Today’s Zaman,* October 30, 2011,  available from  *www.todayszaman.com/news-261311-turkey-looks-to-stabilize-afghanistan-boost-confidence-in-af-pak-region.html*. 

210. Saurav Jha, “Turkey-Pakistan Ties: India’s Loss Is Chi-

na’s Gain,”  *World Politics Review*, January 14, 2011, available from *www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7569/turkey-pakistan-ties-indias-loss-is-chinas-gain*. 

211. “Global Insider: Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral 

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*worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8623/global-insider-turkey-afghanistan-pakistan-trilateral-forum*. 

212. “Une Main Tendue Aux Talibans Afghans Et Pakista-

nais À L’étude À Istanbul” (“An outstretched hand to the Afghan 

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172

213. “Turkish President Meets Afghan, Pakistani Lead-

ers for Co-Op in Supporting Afghanistan,”  *Xinhua*, January 25, 2010,  available from  *english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/*

*6878306.html*. 

214. Joint Statement on U.S.-Turkey Consultations on Afghan-

istan Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, U.S. 

Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, April 7, 2011, available 

from  *www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160178.htm*. 

215. **“**Global Insider: Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Forum.” 

216. Jha, and Aditya Kaul, “After an Absence, India Back at 

Turkey Meet on Afghan,” October 30, 2011, available from  *www.*

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217. “An Istanbul Address for the Taliban?”  *SETimes* May 1, 

2011, available from  *www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/*

*features/setimes/features/2011/01/05/feature-02.*

218. Mahir Zeynalov, “EU Applauds Turkey’s Generous Sup-

port To Afghanistan,”  *Today’s Zaman*, November 3, 2011, available from  *www.todayszaman.com/news-261835-eu-applauds-turkeys-*

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219. Soner Cagaptay, “Incirlikization,”  *Hurriyet  Daily*

*News,* July 30, 2009,  ** available from  *www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/*

*opinion/11975929.asp.*

220. Yitzhak Shichor, “Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch 

in Sino-Turkish Relations,” Washington, DC: East-West Center, 

2009, p. 48. 

221. Fatih Furtun, “Turkish-Chinese Relations in the Shadow 

of the Uyghur Problem,”  *Today’s Zaman*, March 29, 2010, available from  *www.todayszaman.com/news-205744-159-turkish-chinese-*

*relations-in-the-shadow-of-the-uyghur-problem.html.*

173

222. Mustafa Edib Yilmaz, “Turkish Pressure Mounting 

on China to Stop Killings in Xinjiang,”  *Today’s Zaman*, July 9, 2009,  available from  *www.todayszaman.com//news-180330-turkish-pressure-mounting-on-china-to-stop-killings-in-xinjiang.html.*

223. “Tension Runs High as China Cracks Down on Uighur 

Riot,”  *Today’s  Zamam,* July 7, 2009, available from  *www.todays**zaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=180125.*

224.  Recep  Erdoğan,  interview  with  China’s  Xinhua  News 

Agency, Istanbul, Turkey, February 22, 2012. 

225.  *Ibid*. 

226. Cheng Guangjin, “Xi Looks to the Future at Journey’s 

End,”  *China Daily,* February 23, 2012, p. 1, available from  *www.*

*chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/23/content_14672508.htm*. 

227. “Chinese VP Addresses Business Forum in Istanbul,” 

*Xinhua*, February 22, 2012, available from  *news.xinhuanet.com/*

*english/china/2012-02/22/c_131425406_2.htm.*

228. Ergin Hava and Zhuying Shi, “Turkey, China set Eyes 

on $100 bln in Mutual Trade,”  *Sunday’s Zaman*, February 22, 

2012,  available from  *www.todayszaman.com/news-272194-turkey-*

*china-set-eyes-on-100-bln-in-mutual-trade.html.*

229. “Turkey and China have signed a series of deals,”  *Balkan*

*Business News*, February 23, 2012, available from  *www.balkans.com/*

*open-news.php?uniquenumber=136741.*

230. “Tension Runs High as China Cracks Down on Uighur 

Riot,”  *Today’s  Zaman,* July 7, 2009, available from  *www.todays**zaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=180125.*

231. Hava and Shi. 

232. Zhao Shengnan, “Turkey Looks to Strengthen Ties 

with China’s Vibrant Economy,”  *China  Daily*, February 21, 

2012,  available from  *europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-02/21/*

*content_14654757.htm*. 

174

233. B. Raman, “China Engages Turkey to Neutralize Uighur 

Threat,”  *Rediff News*, October 17, 2010, available from  *news.rediff.*

*com/column/2010/oct/17/b-raman-china-engages-turkey-to-neutralise-uighur-threat.htm*. 

234. “China, Turkey to Establish Strategic Cooperative Rela-

tionship,”  *China Daily*, October 8, 2010, available from  *www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/08/content_11386689.htm*. 

235. Raman, “China Engages Turkey to Neutralize Uighur 

Threat.” 

236.  *Ibid*. 

237. Hava and Shi. 

238. “China’s Xi Tells Turkey’s Gul of Regional Stability 

Hopes,”  *AFP*, February 21, 2012, available from  *sg.news.yahoo.com/*

*chinese-leader-begins-turkey-talks-amid-uighur-protests-180124657.*

*html.*

239. Hava and Shi. 

240. Barcin Yinanc, “Improving Economic Relations with  

China Is No Easy Endeavor,”  *Hurriyet  Daily  News*, October 17, 2010,  available from  *www.hurriyedailynews.com/n.php?n=impro*

*ving-economic-relations-with-china-is-no-easy-endeavor-2010-10-17*. 

241. “Wen’s Visit to Turkey to Boost Bilateral Relations,” 

*China.org*, September 29, 2010, available from  *www.china.org.cn/*

*world/2010-09/29/content_21034081.htm*. 

242. “Chinese VP Calls for Efforts in Boosting Trade with Tur-

key,”  *China Daily*, February 23, 2012, available from  *www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/23/content_14676867.htm*. 

243. Tulay Karadeniz, “Uighur Protests as China’s Xi Visits 

Turkey,”  *Reuters*, February 21, 2012, available from  *www.reuters.*

*com/article/2012/02/21/us-turkey-china-idUSTRE81K1X920120221*. 

244. “Turkish, Chinese Firms to Ink $1.38 Billion Deals: Min-

ister,”  *AFP*, February 22, 2012, available from  *www.rnw.nl/english/*

*bulletin/turkish-chinese-firms-ink-138-billion-deals-minister.*

175

245. “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Talks about Vice President 

Xi Jinping’s Visits to Ireland and Turkey,”  *Consulate  General  of**China in Los Angeles*, February 28, 2012, available from  *losangeles.*

*china-consulate.org/eng/topnews/t908882.htm*. 

246. “Vice President Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses China-

Turkey Economic & Trade Cooperation Forum,” Beijing, China: 

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 23, 2012, available 

from  *www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t908092.htm*. 

247.  *Ibid*. 

248. Zhao Shengnan, “Turkey Looks to Strengthen Ties 

with China’s Vibrant Economy,”  *China  Daily*, February 21, 

2012,  available from  *europe.chinadaily.com.cn/europe/2012-02/21/*

*content_14654757.htm*. 

249. Hava and Shi. 

250.  *Ibid*. 

251.  *Ibid*. 

252. “Babacan Urges More Chinese Banks in Turkey,”  *World*

*Bulletin*, February 22, 2012, available from  *www.worldbulletin.net/?*

*aType=haber&ArticleID=86172*. 

253 . “Vice President Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses Chi-

na-Turkey Economic & Trade Cooperation Forum.” 

254. “Xi Jinping Receives Written Interview of Turkey’s 

Sabah,”  *Embassy  of  China*, February 21, 2012, available from *gr.chineseembassy.org/eng/zgyw/t907757.htm*. 

255.  Yitzhak Shichor, “Turkey Trot: Military Cooperation 

between Beijing and Ankara,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown 

Foundation, April 16, 2009, available from  *www.jamestown.org/*

*single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34868*. 

256. Jim Wolf, “China Mounts Air Exercise with Turkey, U.S. 

Says,”  *Global Post*, October 8, 2010, available from  *www.reuters.com/*

*article/2010/10/08/us-china-turkey-usa-idUSTRE6975HC20101008.*

176

257. Burak Ege Bekdil and Umit Enginsoy, “Turkey, China in 

Exercises,”  *Defense News*, October 17, 2010, available from  *www.*

*defensenews.com/story.php?i=4921329*. 

258. B. Raman, “Chinese Air Force Planes refuel in Pakistan, 

Iran on way to Turkey,”  *The Guardian Sri Lanka*, October 16, 2010, available from *www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/10/chinese-air-force-planes-refuel-in.html*. 

259. “Turkey Distancing from Missile Deal with China,” 

*Defense  Updates*, March 11, 2014, available from  *defense-update.*

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260. “Turkey Increases Defense Spending,” Washington, DC: 

Atlantic Council, available from  *www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/*

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261. “Chapter Four: Europe,”  *The Military Balance*, London, 

UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014, pp. 146–149. 

262. “The Top 20 Arms Importers, 2009–2013,” Stockholm, 

Sweden: Stockholm International Peace ** Research Institute, 2009–

2013, available from  *www.sipri.org/googlemaps/2014_of_at_top_20_*

*imp_map.html*. 

263. Richard Weitz, “Reducing Its Dependence on Foreign 

Arms Suppliers, Turkey Enhances Its Strategic Autonomy,” 

*Turkey Analyst*, Vol. 3, No. 14, August 30, 2010. 

264.  *Ibid*. 

265. Michael R. Gordon, “Greek Cypriots to Get Missiles from 

Russians,”  *The New York Times*, April 29, 1998, sec. World, available from  *www.nytimes.com/1998/04/29/world/greek-cypriots-to-get-missiles-from-russians.html*. 

266. “Israeli Defense Industry, with Relations Improving, 

Eyes Turkey Again,” UPI, accessed March 18, 2014, available from 

*www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/04/08/Israeli-*

*defense-industry-eyes-Turkey-again/UPI-60071365439747/*. 

177

267. “Israel Defense Systems Firms Court Turkish Military,” 

*www.JPost.com*, accessed March 18, 2014, available from  *www.*

*jpost.com/Defense/Israel-defense-firms-court-Turkish-military-308824*. 

268.  *Ibid*. 

269. “Israeli Defense Industry, with Relations Improving, 

Eyes Turkey Again.” 

270. Suzan Fraser, “Turkey: Drones to Be Bought From Unit-

ed States,”  *Huffington  Post*, available from  *www.huffingtonpost.*

*com/2012/05/22/turkey-drones_n_1535912.html*; “U.S. Denies Turkey’s Request for Combat UAVs,”  *World Tribune*, January 6, 2011, available from  *www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/*

*me_turkey1329_01_06.asp*. 

271. Tolga Ozbek, “Turkish Air Force to Receive First KT-1 

Trainer,”  *Flight  Global*, October 27, 2010, available from  *www.*

*flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-turkish-air-force-to-receive-first-kt-1-trainers-348995/*. 

272. Andrew Mcgregor, “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: 

Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century,” Washington, DC: 

The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p. 2. 

273. “Turkish Defense Market Worth $14 Billion,” UPI, Vol. 

1, accessed March 18, 2014, available from  *www.upi.com/Business_*

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*14-billion/UPI-88161344953044/*. 

274. Richard Weitz, “Whither Turkey-US Arms Sales,”  *Turkey*

*Analyst* Vol. 4, No. 11, May 30, 2011, available from  *www.silkroad-studies.org/new/inside/turkey/2011/110530B.html.*

275. Robert K. Ackerman. “Turkey’s Defense Industry Ma-

tures,”  *SIGNAL Magazine*, September 2010, available from  *www.*

*afcea.org/content/?q=node/2387*. 

276. “The Top 20 Arms Importers, 2009–2013,” Stockholm, 

Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 

2009–13, accessed March 17, 2014, available from  *www.sipri.org/*

*googlemaps/2014_of_at_top_20_imp_map.html*. 

178

277. “Turkey Joins World’s Top Five Weapons Importers,” 

*Hürriyet  Daily  News*, April 18, 2013, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-joins-worlds-top-five-weapons-importers.*

*aspx?pageID=238&nid=43160*. 

278. “Turkey Seeks Increased Arms Exports,” UPI, August 

28, 2012, available from  *www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-*

*Industry/2012/08/28/Turkey-seeks-increased-arms-exports/UPI-*

*50721346186145/*. 

279. “Turkey Sets High Arms Export Hopes,”  *Hürriyet Daily*

*News*, April 18, 2013, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/*

*turkey-sets-high-arms-export-hopes.aspx?PageID=238&NID=44445&**NewsCatID=344*. 

280.  *Ibid*. 

281. “Turkey Seeks Increased Arms Exports.” 

282. Burak Bekil, “With Tank Deals, Turkey Focuses on Arms 

Exports,”  *Defense News*, May 25, 2013, available from  *www.defense**news.com/article/20130525/DEFREG01/305250010/With-Tank-Deals-Turkey-Focuses-Arms-Exports*. 

283. Robert K. Ackerman. “Turkey’s Defense Industry Ma-

tures,”  *SIGNAL Magazine*, September 2010, available from  *www.*

*afcea.org/content/?q=node/2387*. 

284. K. K. Sruthijith, “India Remains Top Arms Importer 

While China Becomes Fifth Largest Exporter,”  *The Economic*

*Times*, March 18, 2013, available from  *economictimes.indiatimes.*

*com//articleshow/19029471.cms*. 

285. Weitz, “Whither Turkey-US Arms Sales.” 

286. Sebnem Arsu, “Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw From 

Turkey,”  *The New York Times*, April 25, 2013, available from  *www.*

*nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from-turkey.html?_r=2&*. 

287.  Alon  Ben-Meir,  “The  Kurdish  Conflict:  The  Real  Chal-

lenge to Turkey’s Democracy,”  *The World Post*, December 5, 2011, 179

available from  *www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/the-kurdish-*

*conflict-the_b_1129359.html*. 

288. Ragan Updegraff, “The Kurdish Question,”  *Journal of De-*

*mocracy*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2012, p. 119, available from  *https://*

*muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v023/23.1.updegraff.*

*html.*

289.  *Ibid*. 

290. Constanze Letsch, “Kurds Dare to Hope as PKK Fighters’ 

Ceasefire with Turkey Takes Hold,”  *The Guardian*, May 7, 2013, available from  *www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/07/kurds-pkk-turkey-peace-talks*. 

291. Aliza Marcus, “The Kurds’ Evolving Strategy: The 

Struggle Goes Political in Turkey,”  *World Affairs*, November-December 2012, available from  *www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/*

*kurds%E2%80%99-evolving-strategy-struggle-goes-political-turkey*. 

292. Letsch. 

293. Sebnem Arsu, “Kurdish Rebel Group to Withdraw From 

Turkey,”  *The New York Times*, April 25, 2013, available from  *www.*

*nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/kurdish-rebel-group-to-withdraw-from-turkey.html?_r=2&*. 

294. James Reynolds, “Turkey Kurds: PKK Chief Ocalan Calls 

for Ceasefire,”  *BBC*, March 21, 2013, available from  *www.bbc.com/*

*news/world-europe-21874427*. 

295. Letsch. 

296. Reynolds. 

297. Updegraff, p. 124. 

298. Steven A. Cook, “The Weakening of Turkey’s Military,” 

*Council on Foreign Relations*, March 1, 2010, available from  *www.*

*cfr.org/turkey/weakening-turkeys-military/p21548.*

180

299. Duygu Dogan, “Raid on ‘Occupy Taksim Park’ Dem-

onstrators Triggers Outcry”  *Hurriyet  Daily  News*, May 30, 2013, *available  from  www.hurriyetdailynews.com/raid-on-occupy-taksim-park-demonstrators-triggers-outcry.aspx?PageID=238&NID=47870&**NewsCatID=341*. 

300.  *Ibid*. 

301. Can Sezer and Parisa Hafezi, “Turkish PM Erdogan Calls 

For End To Protests As Clashes Flare,”  *Reuters*, June 1, 2013, available from  *www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/01/us-turkey-protests-idUSBRE94U0J920130601*. 

302.  *Ibid*. 

303.  *Ibid*. 

304. Joe Parkinson and Emre Peker, “Violence Spreads In Tur-

key As Rifts Widen Prime Minister’s Supporters Stage Rally,”  *The**Wall Street Journal*, June 16, 2013, available from  *online.wsj.com/*

*news/articles/SB10001424127887323566804578548931174506930*. 

305. Deniz Arslan, “US Avoids Criticizing Turkey To Protect 

Middle East Interests,”  *Today’s Zaman*, February 2, 2014, available from   *www.todayszaman.com/news-338096-us-avoids-criticizing-turkey-to-protect-middle-east-interests.html*. 

306.  *Ibid*. 

307. “Turkey Protests Mark A Democracy Request, US 

Senator McCain Says,”  *Hurriyet  Daily  News*, June 7, 2013, 

available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/TurkRadio.aspx?pageID*

*=238&nID=48395*. 

308. “The United States Needs to Tell Turkey to Change 

Course,”  *The Washington Post*, January, 23, 2014, available from *www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-needs-to-tell-turkey-to-change-course/2014/01/23/3525bf52-7eda-11e3-93c1-*

*0e888170b723_story.html*. 

309. Morton Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman, Co-Chairs, 

“From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing US Turkey Policy,” Wash-

181

ington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, October 2013, available from 

*bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/US%20Turkey%20Policy.pdf.*

310. Doug Bandow, “Turkey Is Different,”  *American Spectator*

*Online,* June 10, 2013, available from  *www.Cato.Org/Publications/*

*Commentary/Turkey-Different*. 

311. Jim Zanotti, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2014, 

p. 7, available from  *www.Fas.Org/Sgp/Crs/Mideast/R41368.pdf*. 

312. Ben Rhodes, “2014 Foreign Policy Priorities for the 

Obama Administration,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, January 29, 2014, available from  *fpc.state.gov/220909.htm*. 

313. Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf, “Daily Press Brief-

ing,” U.S Department of State, January 23, 2014, available from 

*www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/220560.htm*. 

314. Arslan. 

315. “US Ambassador Ricciardone Warned Turkey’s Halk-

bank,”  *World Bulletin*, December 21, 2013, available from  *www.*

*Worldbulletin.Net/News/125412/Us-Ambassador-Ricciardone-*

*Warned-Turkeys-Halkbank.*

316. “White House: No US Interference in Turkish Affairs,” 

*Today’s Zaman*, January 30, 2014, available from  *www.todayszaman.*

*com/news-338032-white-house-no-us-interference-in-turkish-affairs.*

*html.*

317. Jayson Browder, “Erdogan Risks U.S. Ties with Provoca-

tions,”  *Asia Times*, January 2014, available from  *www.atimes.com/*

*atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-140114.html*. 

318. Semih Idiz, “Turkey Will Pay for Erdoğan’s Ambitions,” 

*Hurriyet Daily News*, December 24, 2013, available from  *www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-will-pay-for-erdogans-ambitions.aspx?Page**ID=238&NID=60032&NewsCatID=416*. 

182

319. Tim Arango, “Growing Mistrust between U.S. and Tur-

key Is Played Out in Public,”  *The New York Times*, December 23, 2013,  available from  *www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/europe/*

*growing-mistrust-between-us-and-turkey-is-played-out-in-public.*

*html?_r=1&*. 

320. Orhan Coskun, “Turkish Graft Scandal Triggers Feud 

over Judicial Independence,”  *Reuters,* January 10, 2014, available from  *www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/10/us-turkey-corruption-idusbrea090jr20140110*. 

321.  Jen  Psaki,  “Daily  Press  Briefing,”  U.S.  Department  of 

State, December 20, 2013, available from  *www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/*

*dpb/2013/12/219043.htm*. 

322. “Remarks with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davu-

toglu after Their Meeting,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of State, January 12, 2014, available from  *www.state.gov/secretary/*

*remarks/2014/01/219569.htm*. 

323. Jonathan Schanzer, Mark Dubowitz, “Iran’s Turkish 

Gold Rush,”  *Foreign  Policy*, December 26, 2013, available from *www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/26/irans_turkish_gold_rush*. 

324. Jonathan Schanzer, “The Turkish-American Alliance: 

Opportunities and Challenges,” Washington, DC: Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies, April 12, 2013, available from  *www.*

*defenddemocracy.org/events/the-turkish-american-alliance-*

*opportunities-and-challenges/*. 

183

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**Major General William E. Rapp**

**Commandant**

*********

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE**

**and**

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS**

**Director**

**Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Director of Research**

**Dr. Steven K. Metz**

**Author**

**Dr. Richard Weitz**

**Editor for Production**

**Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant**

**Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

*********

**Composition**

**Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil**

# Document Outline

- TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
- FOREWORD
- ABOUT THE AUTHOR
- SUMMARY
- TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
- INTRODUCTION
- EUROPEAN SECURITY
- NATO
- EUROPEAN UNION
- TROUBLED TRIANGLE: NATO, THE EU, AND TURKEY
- THE MIDDLE EAST    - Syria. 
  - Iraq. 
  - Kurdish Connections. 
  - Iran. 
- EURASIA
- RUSSIA
- CENTRAL ASIA    - Afghanistan. 
- CHINA
- TURKEY’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
- DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- ENDNOTES

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