AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 21, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-01149-CV 

DALLAS EXCAVATION SYSTEMS, INC., EDUARDO CHAVEZ, 

AND ANTONIO CASTREJON, Appellants 

V. 

VICTOR ALEXANDER ORELLANA, DORA ALICIA ORELLANA, 

DEL REY SPORTS BAR LLC, AND REY’S SPORTS BAR LLC, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-11298 

OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Kennedy 

Opinion by Justice Molberg 

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellants Dallas Excavation 

Systems, Inc. (DES), Eduardo Chavez, and Antonio Castrejon appeal the trial court’s 

order denying their motion to compel arbitration. This consolidated lawsuit involves 

claims between appellants and appellees Victor Alexander Orellana (Victor), Dora 

Alicia Orellana (Dora),1

 Del Rey Sports Bar LLC (Del Rey), and Rey’s Sports Bar 

1

 For clarity and brevity, we refer to appellees Victor and Dora Orellana by their first names. 
 –2– 

LLC (Rey’s). As explained below, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration because, based on the 

record and totality of circumstances before us, appellants waived their right to 

arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court’s order. 

I. BACKGROUND

DES previously employed Victor, who is Dora’s son. Dora was part-owner 

of a restaurant (Restaurant) located in Irving, Texas. 

At some point, Chavez and Castrejon approached Dora and Victor, proposing 

that DES invest in the Restaurant, and according to appellants, a written agreement 

was reached and signed on or about September 14, 2021. Around the same time as 

the initial proposal, Victor approached Castrejon about borrowing funds to purchase 

a car. Castrejon, as DES’s president, authorized DES to loan amounts to Victor, 

which were to be repaid with deductions from Victor’s DES paycheck. 

On August 31, 2022, DES sued Victor on the loan, asserting a claim for money 

had and received and seeking to recover unpaid loan amounts totaling $25,200, along 

with court costs and pre- and post-judgment interest. 

On September 12, 2022, DES, Chavez, and Castrejon filed a separate lawsuit 

against Victor, Dora, Del Rey, and Rey’s, asserting claims for money had and 

received, seeking unpaid amounts totaling $427,122.27, along with court costs and 

pre- and post-judgment interest, as well as an involuntary winding up and 
 –3– 

termination of Del Rey. In their petition, appellants alleged that on or about 

September 14, 2021, Chavez, Castrejon, Victor, and Dora formed Del Rey to 

manage, fund, and operate the Restaurant and that, from September 2021 through 

May 2022, DES contributed more than $427,000 to Rey’s operations. Appellants’ 

petition further alleged that certain agreements were made and were reduced to a 

written agreement signed by Chavez, Castrejon, and Dora. Finally, appellants 

alleged that on or about May 22, 2022, Victor and Dora breached the “Company 

Agreement” by locking out appellants from the Restaurant and refusing to pay back 

the unpaid balance of $427,122.27 loaned by DES. 

In response, Victor and Dora filed counterclaims against appellants for 

negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of the Deceptive Trade 

Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).2

In February 2023, Victor moved to consolidate the two lawsuits, urging 

“[b]oth suits involve common questions of law and fact.” Over DES’s objection, 

the trial court granted the motion and consolidated the second suit into the first on 

April 12, 2023. DES moved for rehearing but appeared to later withdraw the 

request.3

2 See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 17.41–.63. 

3

 The motion for rehearing was set to be heard September 21, 2023, the same day as the motion to 

compel arbitration that is at issue in this appeal. When the trial court asked counsel about the order in which 

they wished for the court to hear the motions, appellants’ counsel responded, in part, by stating, “I’ve looked 

back at the petition and claims that are in the original case . . . are about the same time as the formation of 

the entity, so there’s no real argument that I can make that the claims are not all related to the operation of 

the restaurant.” 
 –4– 

Also in April 2023, prior to the signing of the consolidation order, Victor filed 

a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the claims DES asserted against 

him in the first suit. DES filed special exceptions to the motion, claiming the motion 

did not satisfy the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i). The trial 

court granted the special exceptions and gave Victor a certain amount of time to cure 

the deficiencies and to comply with civil procedure rule 166a(i). Victor made no 

attempt to cure the deficiencies within the given time period according to the docket 

sheet in the record before us. 

After the consolidation order was signed, DES filed an amended petition to 

add a claim for breach of contract and a request for attorney’s fees against Victor in 

addition to the claims asserted in its first and by-then-consolidated lawsuit. 

On June 1, 2023, the parties filed an agreed motion to continue the trial setting 

to October 23, 2023, which the trial court granted. 

On September 5, 2023—forty-eight days before the October 23, 2023 trial 

setting—appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay further 

proceedings in the trial court pending arbitration. In that motion, appellants argued 

that when Victor, Dora, Chavez, and Castrejon formed Del Rey, they entered into a 

Company Agreement that includes a mandatory arbitration provision that states: 

The Parties hereto agree that any and all disputes, claims, or 

controversies arising out of or relating to this Agreement that are not 

resolved by their mutual agreement through voluntary negotiation or 

mediation will be submitted to final and binding arbitration pursuant to 

the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq. 
 –5– 

Appellants also asserted that the scope of that arbitration provision encompasses 

their claims to liquidate Del Rey and for an accounting of money loaned by 

appellants to appellees during the operation of the Restaurant and the appellees’ 

counterclaims alleging that appellants made misrepresentations regarding the 

operation of the Restaurant. Although appellants attached a copy of the Company 

Agreement to their motion to compel, they did not include an affidavit or sworn 

declaration authenticating it. 

Appellees filed a response opposing appellants’ motion, asserting the 

arbitration provision was unconscionable and that appellants had waived its 

enforcement by litigating the case and waiting to move to compel until within sixty 

days of trial.4

 Appellants filed a reply, denying any waiver of their right to enforce 

the arbitration agreement and urging that even if Dora had a valid affirmative 

defense, Victor had not asserted any, and the claims against him and his 

counterclaims should be arbitrated while the remaining claims and counterclaims are 

stayed pending arbitration. Finally, appellants similarly argued that even if some 

4

 More particularly, appellees asserted six bases for the trial court to deny the motion to compel 

arbitration: (1) Dora’s inability to read English, more specifically the arbitration provision, such that 

enforcement against her would be unconscionable; (2) appellants waived any right to arbitration by 

proceeding with litigation, conducting discovery, and moving to compel arbitration within sixty days of the 

trial setting; (3) the arbitration provision is an unenforceable contract of adhesion because appellants have 

superior or unequal bargaining power over Dora; (4) enforcement of the arbitration provision would be 

unconscionable because counsel for appellants initiated and represented Del Rey in a bankruptcy 

proceeding and then withdrew that action before filing suit against Del Rey; (5) appellants failed to raise 

the issue of arbitration in discovery or when appellees moved to consolidate the cases; (6) the counterclaims 

are beyond the scope of the arbitration provision because the complained-of conduct includes fraud in the 

formation of Del Rey and operating the Restaurant by serving food and alcohol without proper license or 

permit. 
 –6– 

claims or counterclaims arose out of the operation of the Restaurant and some did 

not, the former should be arbitrated while the remaining claims and counterclaims 

are stayed pending arbitration. 

After conducting a hearing on appellants’ motion and receiving both 

arguments5

 and evidence during that hearing, the trial court denied the motion to 

compel arbitration in an order signed on October 19, 2023.6

 This interlocutory 

appeal of the order followed. 

II. ISSUES & DISCUSSION

In two issues, appellants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion to 

compel arbitration because appellees (1) failed to establish any affirmative defense 

precluding enforcement of the arbitration agreement and (2) failed to establish 

appellants waived their right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial 

process. We begin our analysis by examining the latter issue first. 

5

 In response to the trial court’s question regarding the timing of the motion to compel, appellants’ 

counsel stated, “[I]n getting ready for this case in the month of August, I realized that the [C]ompany 

[A]greement did have an arbitration provision.” The same counsel had filed both lawsuits for appellants 

more than a year earlier, including the second lawsuit, which was based on the same agreement counsel 

referred to in the hearing. 

6

 Subject to their motion to compel, appellants also filed a motion to strike appellees’ jury demand, 

urging that another provision of the Company Agreement provided that each party waived all rights to trial 

by jury in any action, proceeding, or counterclaim arising out of or relating to the Company Agreement. 

Appellees responded to the motion to strike, urging the claims and counterclaims “are beyond the scope of 

the [Company Agreement]” and asserting their statutory and constitutional right to a jury trial. The trial 

court signed an order granting the motion to strike the jury demand. That order is not at issue in this appeal. 
 –7– 

A. Standard of Review 

We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of 

discretion, deferring to the trial court on factual determinations supported by the 

evidence and reviewing legal determinations de novo. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 

S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018). Whether the claims in dispute fall within the scope 

of a valid arbitration agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. 

We also review de novo whether a party has waived the right to arbitration by 

substantially invoking the judicial process. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 

580, 589 (Tex. 2008) (“Under a proper abuse-of-discretion review, waiver is a 

question of law for the court, and we do not defer to the trial court on questions of 

law.”) (footnotes and related citations omitted). 

Because the trial court did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law to 

explain its denial of the motion to compel arbitration, we must uphold the trial 

court’s decision on any appropriate legal theory urged below. QualiZeal, Inc. v. 

Cigniti Techs., Inc., No. 05-22-00923-CV, 2024 WL 833439, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bonded Builders Home Warranty Ass’n 

of Tex. v. Rockoff, 509 S.W.3d 523, 531–32 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). 

B. Our Assumptions Regarding the Arbitration Agreement 

A trial court “may summarily decide whether to compel arbitration on the 

basis of affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. However, if the material 

facts necessary to determine the issue are controverted, by an opposing affidavit or 
 –8– 

otherwise admissible evidence, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing 

to determine the disputed material facts.” Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 

S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also QualiZeal, Inc., 2024 WL 

833439, at *4. When the trial court conducts such a “Tipps hearing” and thereafter 

makes a ruling, we review the trial court’s findings for legal sufficiency. QualiZeal, 

Inc., 2024 WL 833439, at *4. 

In this case, we assume, but do not decide, a Tipps hearing occurred and that 

appellants established both that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that the 

claims in question are within the scope of the agreement. Based on those 

assumptions, a presumption arises in favor of arbitrating those claims, and appellees 

had the burden to prove a defense to arbitration. See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & 

Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 499–500 (Tex. 2015).7

C. Appellants Waived Their Right to Arbitration by Substantially 

Invoking the Judicial Process 

In their second issue, appellants argue appellees failed to establish appellants 

waived their right to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process, a 

question we review de novo. See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 589; see also 

Sivanandam v. Themesoft, Inc., No. 05-21-00645-CV, 2022 WL 872623, at *2 (Tex. 

7

 We make these assumptions despite our reservations regarding whether appellants satisfied their 

initial burden under Tipps, as appellants’ motion was not accompanied by an affidavit or sworn declaration 

authenticating the agreement that was attached to its motion. Moreover, although a witness in the hearing 

on appellants’ motion authenticated the parties’ signatures on a document that was shown to the witness, 

the document was not offered or admitted into evidence, leaving us with no way to determine whether the 

agreement attached to appellants’ motion was the same document shown to the witness. However, because 

of the nature of our disposition, we need not reach that question. 
 –9– 

App.—Dallas Mar. 24, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).8

 There is a presumption 

against waiver of arbitration, but it is not irrebuttable, Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 

584, and “[w]aiver involves substantial invocation of the judicial process, not just 

judgment on the merits.” Id. at 592. The FAA’s “purpose is to make arbitration 

agreements ‘as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” In re Merrill Lynch 

Tr. Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 192 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Prima 

Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)); see RentA-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“The FAA places arbitration 

agreements on equal footing with other contracts.”). 

“Like any other contract right, arbitration can be waived if the parties agree 

instead to resolve a dispute in court.” Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 593. In Perry 

Homes, the Texas Supreme Court stated, “[A] party waives an arbitration clause by 

[1] substantially invoking the judicial process [2] to the other party’s detriment or 

prejudice.” Id. at 589–90. More recently, however, in a case involving an arbitration 

agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),9

 like this case, the United 

States Supreme Court concluded that an appeals court “was wrong to condition a 

waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice.” Morgan v. Sundance, 

596 U.S. 411, 417 (2022). While the Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed 

8

 “We defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported by evidence but review its 

legal determinations de novo[,]” and “[w]hether a party waived its right to arbitrate is a question of law.” 

See Sivanandam, 2022 WL 872623, at *2 (citing Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115). 

9 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–402. 
 –10– 

the second Perry Homes factor since Morgan was issued, based on Morgan, we 

conclude a showing of prejudice is no longer required in order to establish waiver, 

at least in cases involving the FAA. See id.

10

The substantial-invocation element requires the court to consider the totality 

of the circumstances. Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591. The analysis involves 

numerous, non-exclusive factors, including the following: 

• whether the movant is a plaintiff or a defendant in the lawsuit; 

• when the movant knew of the arbitration clause; 

• how long the movant waited before seeking arbitration and any 

reasons for delay; 

• how much discovery has been conducted, who initiated it, whether 

it related to the merits rather than arbitration or standing, and how 

much of it would be useful in arbitration; 

• whether the movant sought judgment on the merits; 

• whether the movant filed affirmative claims for relief in court; 

• the amount of time and expense the parties have expended on 

litigation; 

• whether the discovery conducted would be unavailable in 

arbitration; 

• whether judicial activity would be duplicated in arbitration; and 

10 In Morgan, the Court considered a single issue—whether courts of appeals “may create arbitrationspecific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s ‘policy 

favoring arbitration.’” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 

(1983)). The Court answered, “They cannot[,]” and stated the court of appeals in that case “was wrong to 

condition a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice.” Id.; see also Zurvita Holdings, Inc. 

v. Jarvis, No. 05-23-00661-CV, 2024 WL 1163209, at *13 n.11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2024, no pet. 

h.) (mem. op.) (“We recognize that recently the United States Supreme Court held that under the FAA a 

party no longer needs to demonstrate that invocation of the judicial process resulted in prejudice to establish 

waiver.”) (citing Morgan, 596 U.S. at 419). 
 –11– 

• when the case was to be tried.

Id.; see also RSL Funding LLC v. Pippins, 499 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. 2016) (per 

curiam); G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. 

2015). Of course, all of these factors are rarely presented in a single case. Perry 

Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591. Federal courts have found waiver based on only a few, 

or even a single one. Id. (citing, in part, Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid 

Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (other citations omitted) (finding 

that litigants waived their right to arbitrate by removing to federal court the statecourt lawsuit filed against them rather than seeking to arbitrate in the state-court 

action)). 

In this case, in addition to actions addressed in the next paragraph, appellees 

argue appellants substantially invoked the litigation process and waived their right 

to arbitration by initially filing and later dismissing a case in which they sought 

judicial relief in the bankruptcy court. For the reasons that follow, we need not and 

do not consider the impact, if any, of such bankruptcy actions with regard to alleged 

waiver because, even without them, we conclude appellants met their burden of 

establishing the first Perry Homes factor. 

Putting aside appellants’ bankruptcy court activity, the record before us shows 

appellants—the movants for arbitration—sued appellees, not just once, but twice, 

seeking judgment on the merits on multiple causes of action they now claim should 

be sent to an arbitral forum. Their actions, however, evidence an election to litigate, 
 –12– 

not arbitrate.11 The record also shows they did not seek to compel arbitration until 

370 days after DES filed its lawsuit against Victor, 358 days after appellants filed 

the second lawsuit against appellees, and 48 days before the scheduled trial date on 

the consolidated lawsuits.12 In the interim, appellants also engaged in the discovery 

process by sending and answering merits discovery requests, requested and appeared 

in court hearings, amended their petition to add additional claims, filed and 

responded to several motions, and filed special exceptions to a dispositive motion, 

which were granted. Appellants’ counsel’s excuse for the extreme delay—that he 

simply had not noticed the arbitration provision in the Company Agreement—rings 

hollow, given that he filed suit based squarely on the agreement a year before. 

Further, there is no indication that appellants have made a demand for arbitration 

before any arbitral forum. Given the totality of the circumstances present here, 

11 We find this analysis persuasive: 

Selection of a forum in which to resolve a legal dispute should be made at the earliest 

possible opportunity in order to economize on the resources, both public and private, 

consumed in dispute resolution. . . . Parties know how important it is to settle on a forum 

at the earliest possible opportunity, and the failure of either of them to move promptly for 

arbitration is powerful evidence that they made their election—against arbitration. Except 

in extraordinary circumstances not here presented, they should be bound by their election. 

Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., 50 F.3d at 391. 

12 Appellants filed the first of their two later-consolidated lawsuits on August 31, 2022. They filed their 

motion to compel arbitration on September 5, 2023, three-hundred seventy days later, and when they filed 

that motion, trial was set for October 23, 2023, just forty-eight days later. Whether the movant has “sought 

arbitration only on the eve of trial” is part of our analysis of waiver. See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 590. 

The rule that one cannot wait until “the eve of trial” to request arbitration is not limited to the evening 

before trial; it is a rule of proportion that is implicated here. See id. at 596; see also Archimedes, Inc. v. 

Russell, No. 01-21-00222-CV, 2022 WL 2024851, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2022, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (motion filed thirty-three days before trial setting was considered to have been filed on the 

“eve of trial”). 
 –13– 

including that appellants filed the claims and were not simply respondents, the time 

expended in the trial court—by counsel, the judge, and court personnel—was 

significant, and the motion was filed on the eve of trial, we conclude appellants 

substantially invoked the judicial process and satisfied the first of the two Perry 

Homes factors. 

The dissent’s analysis, which concludes otherwise, balkanizes the evidence 

by separately considering and dismissing the Perry Homes factors rather than 

considering them together as a whole, an approach inconsistent with what is required 

in the context of analyzing the totality of the circumstances. See Perry Homes, 258 

S.W.3d at 591 (“[W]aiver must be decided on a case-by-case basis” and “courts 

should look to the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 275 (2002) (in Fourth Amendment context, court of appeals’ “evaluation and 

rejection . . . of the listed factors in isolation from each other [did] not take into 

account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” and constituted a “divide-and-conquer 

analysis” precluded by Terry);13 see also City of Dallas v. Siaw-Afriyie, No. 05-19-

00244-CV, 2020 WL 5834335, at *11 n.13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2020, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (in employment discrimination context, declining to balkanize 

evidence and divorce it from context of terms and conditions of employment). 

13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
 –14– 

While we agree with the dissent that a “mere delay in moving to compel 

arbitration is not enough for waiver[,]” Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior 

Recharge Sys., L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam), we conclude 

much more than a “mere delay” occurred here. We also conclude that, given the 

totality of circumstances in this case, appellees established that appellants waived 

their rights to arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process and thus met 

the required showing under the first Perry Homes factor. 

As to the second Perry Homes factor—prejudice to the nonmovant—we 

conclude that factor no longer applies, at least in cases involving arbitration 

agreements governed by the FAA. See Morgan, 596 U.S. at 419; see also Zurvita 

Holdings, Inc., 2024 WL 1163209, at *13 n.11 (“We recognize that recently the 

United States Supreme Court held that under the FAA a party no longer needs to 

demonstrate that invocation of the judicial process resulted in prejudice to establish 

waiver.”) (citing Morgan, 596 U.S. at 419). 

However, even if we assume, without deciding, that the second Perry Homes 

factor applies, based on the record before us, appellants established they suffered 

detriment or prejudice as a result of appellants’ substantial invocation of the judicial 

process, as the record reflects an attempt by appellants to have it both ways, twice 

initiating litigation for their own benefit, and then later switching to arbitration to its 

own advantage, soon before the trial date. See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 589–

90. (“‘Prejudice’ has many meanings, but in the context of waiver under the FAA it 
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relates to inherent unfairness—that is, a party’s attempt to have it both ways by 

switching between litigation and arbitration to its own advantage.”). 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ 

motion to compel arbitration because appellants waived their right to arbitration by 

substantially invoking the judicial process. See id. at 595–96. “Like any other 

contract right, arbitration can be waived if the parties agree instead to resolve a 

dispute in court. Such waiver can be implied from a party’s conduct, although that 

conduct must be unequivocal.” Id. at 593. Appellants’ conduct here was 

unequivocal, at least up until the time their counsel claimed to have recently realized 

the Company Agreement contained an arbitration agreement, even though the same 

counsel filed suit on appellants’ behalf based on the same Company Agreement a 

year earlier. We overrule appellants’ second issue and need not address their first 

issue as a result. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a 

written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised 

and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”). 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellants’ motion to compel 

arbitration. 

Kennedy, J., dissenting 

231149F.P05 

/Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG 

JUSTICE 
 –16– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DALLAS EXCAVATION 

SYSTEMS, INC., EDUARDO 

CHAVEZ AND ANTONIO 

CASTREJON, Appellants 

No. 05-23-01149-CV V. 

VICTOR ALEXANDER 

ORELLANA, DORA ALICIA 

ORELLANA, DEL REY SPORTS 

BAR LLC, AND REY’S SPORTS 

BAR LLC, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-11298. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Justices Nowell and 

Kennedy participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order 

denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee VICTOR ALEXANDER ORELLANA, 

DORA ALICIA ORELLANA, DEL REY SPORTS BAR LLC, AND REY’S 

SPORTS BAR LLC recover their costs of this appeal from appellants DALLAS 

EXCAVATION SYSTEMS, INC., EDUARDO CHAVEZ AND ANTONIO 

CASTREJON. 

Judgment entered this 21st day of August, 2024.