NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES G. KINNEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; THE 

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16689 

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-02277-MMC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 18, 2017**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his antitrust and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action arising out of California State 

Bar disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral 

argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

FILED

DEC 28 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-16689 

review de novo the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss. Coal. to 

Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012). We 

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kinney’s action because his claims 

against the State Bar of California and the California Supreme Court are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 

F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (California state courts are “arms of the state”

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of 

State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (the State Bar of California is an 

arm of the state and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Eleventh 

Amendment immunity applies to states and their agencies or departments 

“regardless of the nature of the relief sought”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney leave to 

amend the complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes 

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting 

forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is 

proper when amendment would be futile); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 

772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district court from 

exercising jurisdiction over a “de facto” appeal from a state court judgment).
3 16-16689 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enter the default 

of the California Supreme Court because Kinney’s claims against the California 

Supreme Court lacked merit. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (setting forth standard of review and holding that district court did not 

abuse its discretion by declining to enter default judgment “[g]iven the lack of 

merit in [plaintiff’s] substantive claims”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney’s motion 

for recusal because Kinney failed to establish any basis for recusal. See United 

States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard 

of review and discussing grounds for recusal).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kinney’s motion to 

vacate because Kinney failed to establish any grounds for such relief. See Sch. 

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.

1993) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for relief under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.