FILED

August 16, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON 

 JULY 1999 SESSION

BRADLEY GREEN, )

)

Appellant, ) No. 02C01-9809-CR-00300

 )

) Shelby County

v. ) 

) Honorable Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) (Post-Conviction) 

Appellee. )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Michael E. Scholl Paul G. Summers

200 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 202 Attorney General of Tennessee

Memphis, TN 38103 and

R. Stephen Jobe

Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 

425 Fifth Avenue North

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

William L. Gibbons

District Attorney General

and

Michael H. Leavitt

Assistant District Attorney General

Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301

201 Poplar Avenue

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

Joseph M. Tipton

Judge
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O P I N I O N

The petitioner, Bradley Green, appeals as of right from the Shelby County

Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 1993 convictions for felony

murder and especially aggravated robbery for which he is presently serving an effective

sentence of life imprisonment. The petitioner contends (1) that his guilty pleas were not

knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of

counsel by his attorney’s misadvice regarding parole eligibility. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner and a co-defendant, Darryl Wallace, were jointly indicted for

and pled guilty to first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and criminal

trespassing. The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that on May 30, 1992, the victim,

Erving Manis, was closing the Bargain Center at the Southgate Shopping Center. He

carried a money bag with the day’s receipts, and an unarmed security guard had gone

to the car. While the victim was locking the door, the petitioner and Wallace, each

armed with a revolver, approached him. Wallace took the money from the victim and

shot the victim several times while he was on the ground. The state’s proof would

circumstantially show that the petitioner tried to fire a shot but that the gun misfired. 

The two ran from the scene and broke into an apartment, where they were arrested. 

The petitioner had prior convictions involving the use of or the threat of violence, an

aggravating circumstance that exposed him to the death penalty. The petitioner’s

sentences of life for the first degree murder, fifteen years for the especially aggravated

robbery, and thirty days for the criminal trespass are to be served concurrently.

The gist of the petitioner’s claims is that the trial court intimidated him and

that one of his attorneys told him that he would only have to serve 19.6 years and

maybe as little as twelve years, both of which were incorrect. At the evidentiary

hearing, the petitioner testified that he had no trouble with his attorneys and was
3

satisfied with their preparation before trial. He said that he rejected the state’s offer of

consecutive sentences. He also said that he knew he was going to lose the case

because of the evidence against him. He stated that on the morning of trial, the state

offered concurrent sentences. He said that Brett Stein, one of his attorneys, said that

he would serve 19.6 years and that with good and honor time, he might serve as little

as twelve years. The petitioner testified that when he got to prison, he found out that he

would not be released for “thirty something years.” He said that he would not knowingly

have pled guilty with that much time in confinement.

The petitioner testified that when he was testifying at the guilty plea

hearing, the trial judge intimidated him by advising him of the crime of perjury and of the

consequences of him committing perjury in his testimony. The petitioner said that he

was not threatened by the trial judge but that the judge was intimidating, and the

petitioner wanted to get off the witness stand in a hurry.

Brett Stein testified that he and Larry Nance were appointed to represent

the petitioner. He said that an office fire destroyed his file regarding the case, and he

had very little independent recollection of the events. However, he stated that he made

no mention of 19.6 years or twelve years to the petitioner. He said he mentioned no

numbers, although he acknowledged on cross-examination that some mention might

have been “possible.” Regarding parole, he said that he usually would tell a defendant

that the defendant would “see daylight again.” He said that the petitioner pled guilty to

avoid exposure to the death penalty. Finally, he said that he did not find the trial judge

to be intimidating and, in any event, thought his remarks regarding perjury were

irrelevant to the plea process.

Larry Nance testified that he had no recollection of a discussion regarding

any specific number of years before parole. He said he never mentioned nineteen
4

years to the petitioner and did not recall Mr. Stein mentioning any figure. He testified

that it was his practice to tell inquiring defendants that he could not say when they

would be paroled and that it was up to the parole board. Mr. Nance testified that he

believed that the petitioner pled guilty because of the possibility of the death penalty. 

He said that the shell casing in the petitioner’s gun had an impression as if the

petitioner had attempted to shoot but that the gun had not fired.

The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that the trial court and Mr. Stein

discussed with and questioned the petitioner at length regarding his understanding of

his constitutional rights, the consequences of waiving those rights, the nature of the

offenses, the sentences involved, the facts in the case, and the petitioner’s desire to

enter guilty pleas. Under oath, the petitioner stated that he understood the

proceedings, had no questions about them, and freely and voluntarily wanted to enter

guilty pleas. The petitioner also testified that he was pleading guilty because if he went

to trial, he would be found guilty and would get the death penalty.

In the present case, the trial court filed an eleven page Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law denying the petitioner post-conviction relief. Relevant to this

appeal, the trial court stated the following:

Turning to Petitioner’s allegations, Petitioner asserts

that the trial court was unduly coercive by asserting possible

criminal charges against the Petitioner if he were later to claim

his counsel ineffective. During the guilty pleas, the trial court

judge explained the importance of being truthful to Petitioner

while under oath and carefully explained to Petitioner that this

was his day in court. Therefore, Petitioner had an opportunity

to tell the truth, make any complaints about his legal

representation or ask any questions in open court.

The trial judge warned the Petitioner that he would be

committing perjury if he were dishonest with the court. There

is no evidence of the trial court being unduly coercive.

Therefore, this issue is without merit.

Petitioner further states that the alleged threat by the

trial court judge inhibited the voluntariness of the Petitioner’s

plea. However, the Petitioner was specifically asked by the
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Court and his legal counsel whether the guilty plea was

voluntary and the response by the Petitioner was in the

affirmative. Further, Petitioner clearly, stated at the beginning

of the guilty plea that his attorney had explained all of his

rights, explained the charges in the indictments, the lesser

included offenses and had specifically interviewed the

witnesses given by the Petitioner.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that

Petitioner’s attorney told Petitioner that he would receive

parole on a life sentence in nineteen (19) years. There was

also no evidence that Petitioner’s attorney attempted to tell

Petitioner about the exact time which would be served at the

Tennessee Department of Corrections. Therefore, these

allegations by Petitioner are without merit and are hereby

dismissed.

The trial court carefully explained to Petitioner his

constitutional rights before accepting his guilty plea. The trial

court advised Petitioner that he had a right to plead not guilty,

a right to a public and speedy trial by jury, a right to confront

and cross-examine any state witness, a right against selfincrimination. In consideration of these facts, the evidence

establishes that the trial court took great care [i]n ensuring that

Petitioner was well advised and aware of his constitutional

rights. The Petitioner freely and voluntarily, understandingly,

knowingly, advisedly and intelligently waived his rights and

entered his guilty plea. Accordingly, this Court finds that

Petitioner’s allegation that he entered his guilty plea

involuntarily is without merit.

It is obvious that the trial court accredited the petitioner’s testimony at the

guilty plea hearing and the testimony of the petitioner’s attorneys at the evidentiary

hearing. The burden was on the petitioner in the trial court to prove his claims by clear

and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). On appeal, the trial court’s

findings are conclusive unless we determine that the evidence preponderates against

them. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). Questions concerning the

credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given their testimony, and the

factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the trial court. Black v.

State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

First, we note that the petitioner’s testimony at the guilty plea hearing

“constitutes a formidable barrier” to his claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty in
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that “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977). The guilty plea

hearing transcript fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s guilty

pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. In fact, the petitioner’s testimony at the

evidentiary hearing does not purport to show otherwise. As for the claim that the

petitioner was advised that parole eligibility would occur in 19.6 years, the trial court

was entitled to accredit the testimony of the petitioner’s attorneys. With such

accreditation, the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the

attorneys did not misadvise the petitioner about parole. In consideration of the

foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

__________________________

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________

James Curwood Witt, Jr., Judge

___________________________

John Everett Williams, Judge